Essays in Microeconomic Theory

Abstract

This dissertation consists of two independent essays. In the first essay, Coordination in Complex Environments, I introduce a framework to study coordination in highly uncertain environments. Coordination is an important aspect of innovative contexts, where: the more innovative a course of action, the more uncertain its outcome. To explore the interplay of coordination and informational complexity, I embed a beauty-contest game into a complex environment. I uncover a new conformity phenomenon. The new effect may push towards exploration of unknown alternatives, or constitute a status quo bias, depending on the network structure of the connections among players. In the second essay, The Extensive Margin of Bayesian Persuasion, I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts attention effort. The sender uses the information to incentivize the receiver to pay attention. I show that persuasion mechanisms are equivalent to signals. In a model of media capture, the sender finds it optimal to censor high states.