Anti-Codifiability in Normative Ethics

Abstract

This thesis is a critique of consequentialist and deontological attempts to reduce normative ethics to strictly formulaic models of direct action guidance according to purportedly universal laws and principles of morality. This project explores how dominant theories such as John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism and Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative fail to account for critical nuances and contextual determinants that inform right action in moral conundrums. An applied analysis of each model suggests that, as exceptions to supposedly universal principles arise, both theories face a double-bind between appealing to a non-principle entity or necessitating immoral action in strict accordance with a codified verdict. By examining the limitations of codified frameworks, this thesis advocates for a paradigm shift towards incorporating virtue, contextual literacy, and practical discernment into ethical decision-making. Rosalind Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian model of Virtue Ethics and indirect action guidance offers a more flexible and context-sensitive approach to normative ethics that corresponds to the dynamic and multifaceted nature of morality.