An Interactive Theory of Power Projection: Naval Power Shift, The Contagion Effect, and Alignment Opportunity

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Abstract

Military balance of power and geographical proximity are two key factors that shape the likelihood of war and peace in the realist paradigm. However, the empirical cases associated with the leading sea power and a naval challenger sometimes are not congruent to systemic anticipations of both the balance of power theory and hegemonic shift theories. Why do the leading sea power and a challenger fight a war despite naval power disparity and geographical distance? Conversely, how do these powers arrive at a strategic settlement even with naval power parity and geographical proximity? More practically, under what conditions are the U.S. and China more likely to avoid or end up in a war as China's naval overtake looms large in the 21st century?

To address these questions, I construct a mid-range theory, *An Interactive Theory of Power Projection*, that incorporates the geographical dimension of power projection in determining the outcome of naval power shifts. Specifically, I conduct comparative historical case studies of the two Anglo-French dyads (1856-1870/1882-1904) and the U.S.-Japan dyad (1921-1941) with a goal of developing a theory to apply to U.S.-China relations. At root, I argue that the outcome of a naval power transition is contingent upon two conditions: (1) the interactive dynamics between a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expectation about its contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense in peripheral regions; and (2) whether alignment opportunity, shaped by third common threats and available allies in the theaters of the power transition, is open or closed.

The contagion effect refers to three kinds of possibilities in the event of a challenger's occupation: (1) an occupation will become a stepping stone on which a challenger further expands into the adjacent first line of maritime defense; (2) an occupation will produce a negative second-order effect on the other, possibly distant, first line of maritime defense; (3) an occupation will undermine or remove local allies on the first line of maritime defense. I argue that while the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities initiates or ends a naval arms race, it is the interactive dynamics of geographical power projection as well as alignment opportunities in the theater of the naval challenge that bring a conflict to the fore and determine its outcome. These findings carry policy implications for U.S.-China relations and U.S. foreign policy.

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"Teach us to number our days aright, that we may gain a heart of wisdom." (Psalm 90:12)

It feels a bit strange to realize that this is the end of my formal schooling. While I'm more certain than ever before that there are too many things that I don't know, I'm also glad to conclude this dissertation project. In the process of writing this dissertation, I often felt like I only vaguely knew where I was in my learning and where I was ultimately headed, without knowing exactly how I could get there. Nevertheless, I was able to come this far thanks to various friendships and other sources of support along the way, and I would like to acknowledge them.

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Chapter 1. Theory

An Interactive Theory of Power Projection: How the Leading Sea Power and a Challenger Avoid or End up in a War

1. Introduction: when naval balance of power and the stopping power of water fail

How does a naval arms race between the leading sea power and a challenger end up in a war or peaceful settlement? The realist paradigm posits that naval balance of power[1] and geographical distance, including "large bodies of water,"[2] are two key factors that shape the likelihood of war and peace. However, the empirical cases associated with the leading sea power and a naval challenger are not always congruent with systemic anticipations of both the balance of power theory and hegemonic shift theories.[3] Why do the leading sea power and its challenger sometimes fight a war despite naval power disparity and geographical distance? Conversely, how do these powers sometimes arrive at a strategic settlement even with naval power parity and geographical proximity? Under what conditions are the U.S. and China more likely to avoid or end up in a war as China's naval overtake looms large in the Asia-Pacific?

On the one hand, a range of hegemonic theories assume war is more likely if there is near power parity in the central international system.[4] On the other hand, Waltz contends that "self-dependence of parties, clarify of dangers," and "certainty about who has to face them" cause "a bipolar world" to be more stable than a multipolar system.[5] Waltz puts, "bipolarity has been proof against war between the great powers," while admitting that there were "enough wars of lesser scale."[6] Mearsheimer concurs that a bipolar system tends to be "the most peaceful" and an unbalanced multipolar system is "the most prone to deadly conflict."[7] Though a challenger's naval overtake doesn't necessarily mean a bipolar world, these two theories display almost opposite systemic anticipations in case of a challenger's naval overtake.

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[1] In the neorealist terms, it refers to "changes in the distribution of capabilities across nations." Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979), p. 102.

[2] Mearsheimer argues that nuclear forces, large bodies of water, and the distribution of power are the three main power considerations that "affect the intensity of fear" among great powers. John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, 2014), pp. 42-45.

[3] With regard to geographic distance or proximity, Organski and Kugler simply make a distinction between "whether the nations involved are members of central or peripheral international systems" when defining great powers. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 42-45, Erik Gartzke, Alex Braithwaite, M. Patrick Hulme, and Lauren Gilbert, "Power, Parity and Proximity: How Distance and Uncertainty Condition the Balance of Power," *A paper presented to ISA 2021*.

[4] The operationalization of power differs in a variety of hegemonic shift theories. As Levy summarizes, hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory focus on "financial and commercial strength and gross national product" respectively. The long cycle theory conceptualizes power in terms of "naval capability and dominance in leading economic sectors." Jack Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When," in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, ed., *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st century*, (Stanford University Press, CA: Stanford, 2004), p. 41.

[5] Kenneth N. Waltz, *op.cit.*, (1979), p. 168, pp. 171-172, pp. 176-177.

[6] Ibid., pp. 182-183, pp. 192-193.

[7] John J. Mearsheimer, *op.cit*, (2001, 2014), pp. 335-336, pp. 338-347.

In this sense, the immediate conditions under which a naval arms race between the leading sea power and a challenger leads to a war or strategic settlement remain undertheorized. The existing research that focuses on geographical distance, or the stopping power of water, is ill-equipped to the aforementioned questions, too. Though Levy and Thompson make a major contribution by introducing the geographical dimension to show the lower frequency of coalition balancing against the leading sea power,[8] their argument that states are less likely to balance against the leading sea power is problematic for two reasons.

First, this is because they exclude the central means of balancing, internal balancing or "arming and imitating the successful military practices of others to counter the capabilities of their rivals," from their definition of balancing, as already critiqued.[9] Historically, a challenger has continued to balance the leading sea power through naval arms buildup and power projection even when there is no ally availability. Second, their argument reinforces the essentialist illusion that naval powers, trading states,[10] or production-oriented states,[11] are peaceful or pacifist as opposed to continental powers. As Kindleberger observes, European great powers' interest in future trade and rights in extra-European areas frequently triggered wars among "trading states," let alone countless imperial and colonial military operations in the non-European regions.[12]

Rather, contrary to the conventional notion that European trading states were less war-prone than the territorial counterparts, European maritime powers had been exceptionally oriented "to combine commerce and war at sea" via "gunboat diplomacy" especially in the non-European regions compared to Asian great powers which had been relatively indifferent to naval coercion or fighting at sea.[13] The stopping power of water is less likely to dominate when both great powers possess comparable power projection

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[8] Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, "Balancing on Land at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?" *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 1., (Summer 2010), pp. 7-43.

[9] David W. Blagden, Jack S. Levy and William Thompson, "Correspondence: Sea Powers, Continental Powers, and Balancing Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Fall 2011), p. 193, Parent and Rosato find that "the default course of action for great power is incessant internal balancing." Joseph Parent and Sebastian Rosato, "Balancing in Neorealism," *International Security*, Vol. 40., No. 2 (Fall 2015), p. 53, p. 59.

[10] Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of The Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, (Basic Books: New York, 1986), pp. 22-29.

[11] Peter Hugill, "Trading States, Territorial States, and Technology: Mackinder's Contribution to the Discourse on States and Politics," in Brian W. Bloulet, ed., *Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defense of the West, London: Frank Cass*, 2005, pp. 107-122, Jonathan N. Markowitz and Christopher J. Fariss, "Power, proximity, and democracy: Geopolitical competition in the international system," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 55, No. 1, (Jan. 2018), pp. 78–93, Jonathan N. Markowitz, Suzie Mulesky, Benjamin A. T. Graham, and Christopher J. Fariss, "Productive Pacifists: The Rise of Production-Oriented States and Decline of Profit-Motivated Conquest," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 3, (Sep. 2020), pp. 558–572.

[12] Charles P. Kindleberger, *World Economic Primacy, 1500 to 1990*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 46-47.

[13] Jason C. Sharman, "Power and Profit at Sea: The Rise of the West in the Making of the International System," *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 4, (Spring 2019), pp. 163-167. Paine also ascribes Japan's strategic failure to its policy's transition from "a negative sum-global order based on the control of territory "a positive-sum order of economic growth." S.C.M. Paine, "Japan's transition from a maritime to a continental security paradigm, 1928-41," in Paul Kennedy and Evan Wilson, ed., *Navies in Multipolar Worlds: From the Age of Sail to the Present*, (Routledge: London and New York, 2021), p. 108. S.C.M. Paine, *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*, (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

capabilities that neutralize "the tyranny of distance."[14] With these in mind, I seek to elaborate the immediate conditions of a peaceful settlement and war during a naval arms race by taking the geographical variation of power projection seriously without reinforcing the essentialism.

It is striking that few theoretical attempts have been made to systematically incorporate a variation in the geographical dimension in explaining the outcome of naval arms races.[15] In a nutshell, I argue that the outcome of a naval arms race is contingent upon three conditions: (1) whether the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities, backed by economic and fiscal capacity as well as expansionist nationalism, is symmetric or asymmetric; (2) the interactive dynamics of a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expectation about its contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense; and (3) whether alignment opportunity, shaped by third common threats and available allies in the theaters of the power transition, is open or closed.

First, the preventive war motivation will increase if the relative balance of resources-extraction capacities becomes more symmetric, while the preventive motivation will deflate, or a naval arms race will cease, when the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup is more asymmetric. Second, I argue that the key variable that activates, or deactivates, different preventive motivations are the direction of a challenger's power projection and the leading sea power's expectations about its contagion effect. The preventive motivation will be deactivated if a challenger's expansion is solely directed towards the peripheral theater of the leading sea power where the leading sea power expects no contagion effect on the first line of naval defense.

Third, a common threat and ally availability in the central and peripheral theaters of two naval great powers are important in that they can open or close alignment opportunity. In particular, alignment opportunity in the theaters of the naval arms race and a challenger's expansion will have immediate impacts on the likelihood of a confrontation or strategic settlement. If there is no common threat and low ally availability in such theaters, the two naval great powers are more likely to confront each other than when there is a third common threat and high ally availability. A conclusion of neutral treaties among third powers also affects alignment opportunity as they will deprive the two powers of a potential ally or a third common threat in a given theater.

2. The scope condition, definition, and case selection

[14] Douglas Lemke, "The Tyranny of Distance: Redefining Relevant Dyads," *International Interactions*, Vol. 21, Issue. 1, (1995), pp. 23-38.

[15] The recent works on power projection center more on empirically investigating the expansion of market access, port access, foreign bases, power projection capabilities and its implications for grand strategy than on advancing a theory that redresses the blind spot of the systemic anticipations of balance of power theory and hegemonic transition theories. Evan Braden Montgomery, "Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection", *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 4, (Spring 2014), pp. 115-149, Jonathan N. Markowitz and Christopher J. Fariss, "Going the Distance: The Price of Projecting Power," *International Interactions*, Vol. 39, No. 2, (2013), pp. 119-143, Jonathan N. Markowitz and Christopher J. Fariss, *op.cit.,* (January 2018), Renanah Miles Joyce and Brian Blankenship, "The Market for Foreign Bases," *Security Studies*, (2023), Issac B. Kardon and Wendy Leutert, "Pier Competitor: China's Power Position in Global Ports," *International Security*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Spring 2022), pp. 9-47.



Figure 1. The scope condition: naval power shift and a challenger's power projection

This research concerns cases in which differential growth of power among great powers[16] drives a challenger with the second-largest naval capabilities to close the naval gap with the leading sea power and geographically project its power in the established system since the 17th century. In line with Gilpin's insight, I presuppose that a challenger will "try to expand its control over the international environment" as its economic power grows. Among a naval challenger's bid to extend "its political, economic and territorial control,"[17] geographical expansion is the one of territorial or maritime nature. The leading sea power is prompted to adapt to a challenger's naval expansion in various ways, which in turn leads to a naval power shift and a revision of spheres of influence.

Form	Coercive				Diplomatic
Geographical Expansion	Territorial conquest or annexation	Fait accompli [18]	Colonization	Assertion of a right of access to a part of territory or sea	International intervention in a maritime/ territorial issue

Figure. 2. The forms of geographical power projection

Gilpin stresses the importance of territoriality as it is "the control and division of territory constitute the basic mechanism governing the distribution of scarce resources among states."[19] Modelski similarly refers to "the essence of global power" as "functional network control."[20] More often than not, a challenger's naval buildup goes hand in hand with geographical expansion as its naval capabilities grow. While a

[16] I follow the definition of great power by Levy and Wight. According to Levy, great powers are defined by their "relative self-sufficiency with respect to military security." In addition, Levy and Wight concur that great powers possess "global" or "general interests" rather than "regional" or "limited interests" and military capabilities to "conduct offensive as well as defensive military operations" or "contemplate war against any other existing single power." Jack. S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 14-19, Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, (Leicester University Press, 1978, 1995), pp. 50-53.

[17] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 94-95.

[18] Altman argues that challengers are likely to seize small pieces of territory to reduce the risk of provoking war after 1945. Dan Altman, "By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 4, (2017), pp. 881-891, Dan Altman, "The Evolution of Territorial Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial Integrity Norm," *International Organization*, Vol. 74, (Summer 2020), pp. 490-522.

[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 30-38.

[20] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *Seapower in Global Politics, 1494-1993*, (Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 228.

challenger's naval armament generates different levels of the preventive motivation, it is a challenger's power projection and the leading sea power's expectation about its contagion effect that will eventually activate, or deactivate, such preventive motivations.[21] The form of geographical power projection may vary as indicated in the Figure 2.

Naval power shift		Naval power gap (global sum:1)			
A challenger's geographical expansion		High disparity [0.4-0.2]	Moderate disparity [0.2-0.1]	Low disparity [0.1-0.01]	Parity/ **Overtake [0.01-0.001]
The leading sea power's theater	Peripheral Theater	The Anglo-American (1880-1904) [0.45-0.25] -the Venezuelan crisis The Anglo-Japanese (1902-1922) [0.34-0.22] ***The U.S.-Japan (1922-1933) [0.25-0.17]** **-the Manchurian invasion** ***The Anglo-French (1880-1904) [0.25-0.29]** **-the Fashoda crisis** *The Anglo-German (1904-1911) [0.28-0.17] -the Morocco crises	***The U.S.-Japan (1934-1941) [0.11-0.09]** **-the Asia-Pacific War**		The Anglo-American (1914-1919) ** The Anglo-American (1940-1945)** [parity/1940] ***The Anglo-French (1856-1870)** **-Annexation of Nice and Savoy** [0.003/1862]
	Central Theater	The Anglo-French (1740-1748) [0.25-0.32] -War of the Austrian Succession	The Anglo-French (1756-1763) [0.18-0.09] The Anglo-French (1792-1802) [0.12-0.21] -the French revolutionary wars The Anglo-French (1803-1815) [0.18-0.22] -the Napoleonic Wars The Anglo-German (1912-1918) [0.15-0.18] -WW1 The Anglo-German (1936-1941) [0.15-0.18] -WW2	The Anglo-French (1775-1783) [0.12-0.07] -the Seven Years War -the American revolutionary war (1775-1783) -the War of 1778 (1778-1783)	The Anglo-Dutch (1649-1674) ** -the Anglo-Dutch wars The Franco-Dutch (1660-1678/ 1688-1701) ** -the Wars of Louis 14th The Anglo-French (1701-1714) ** [0.003/1701] -War of the Spanish Succession

[21] Lee and Thompson call for a need to distinguish global powers from major powers "if only some great powers have the ability to overcome geographical obstacles." Michael J. Lee and William R. Thompson, "Major Wars vs. Global Powers: A New Measure of Global Reach and Power Projection Capacity," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia: Politics*, 2017. Crisis can either lead to war or facilitate the resolution of security competition. Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1981), pp. 309-333.

Table. 1. Cases of naval power shift and a challenger's power projection[22]

Naval power overtakes had been frequent in the 17th century, resulting in three Anglo-Dutch wars and the wars of Louis 14th. Yet, naval power transitions had become increasingly rare since the 18th century aside from the Anglo-French parity in 1862 and the Anglo-American transitions in 1919 and the 1930s,[23] which occurred after Britain's accommodation of the U.S. in 1904.[24] Meanwhile, despite the British naval supremacy, France had incessantly engaged in continental expansion in Europe and adopted a commerce raiding strategy with Spain,[25] leading to the seven Anglo-French wars between 1689 and 1815.[26] Moreover, a challenger's naval armament, power projection, and alliance against the leading sea power repeatedly emerged from the 19th to 20th centuries as demonstrated in the cases of France, Russia, Germany, and Japan.

The general pattern of the related cases from the 17th century to 20th centuries show that whether a naval challenger encroaches upon the central or peripheral theater of the leading sea power is typically critical in the outcome of naval arms races. I define a great power's central theater as its home theater and immediate naval flanks, whereas the peripheral theaters fall outside its home theater. Within the peripheral theater, a great power envisions the adjacent theaters and its first line of maritime defense, which are ultimately connected to naval flanks of the central theater. Though the way a naval great power envisages them may be internally contested, adjacent theaters and the first line of maritime defense can be also of high important for naval great powers within the peripheral theater if the contagion effect is highly expected.

It is possible that a naval great power's adjacent theaters and first line of maritime defense are geographically far from the central theater. For instance, North Sea and the English Channel consist of immediate naval flanks of Britain, while North Atlantic and Mediterranean belong to its adjacent theaters. But these oceans are vastly wide themselves and could be possibly very distant from the British islands. Similarly, Western Pacific and North Atlantic comprise adjacent theaters of the U.S. but they could be far apart from the American homeland geographically. The similar logic applies to Indian Ocean and Western Pacific for China. Thus, what matters is not a mere physical distance but where a challenger's expansion is directed as well as the leading sea power's belief about the first line of maritime defense.

Theaters	Central		Peripheral		
Geographical variation	Central theater (homeland)	Immediate naval flanks	Adjacent theaters	The first line of maritime defense	Peripheral theater

Figure. 3. The spectrum of central and peripheral theaters

[22] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), pp. 116-124.
[23] Ibid., pp. 128-132.
[24] Aaron L. Friedberg, "Britain and the experience of relative decline, 1895-1905," *The Journal of Strategic Studie*s, Vol. 10, No. 3, (1987) pp. 331-362.
[25] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), p. 207.
[26] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, Penguin Books, (1976, 2017), pp. 116-117.

As indicated in Table 1, on balance, naval power parity and a challenger's power projection into the central theater of the leading sea power are conducive to war between them. The Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century were the result of England's naval expansion in both central and peripheral theaters of Holland. Likewise, the Anglo-French wars during the 18th century were associated with France's naval and continental expansion in the central theater of Britain. Under high and moderate naval disparity, France capitalized on its superior land forces and asymmetric naval strategy, *guerre de course*, aligning with the third largest naval power, Spain in the 18th century. The rest of the major wars through the 20th century broke out of the continental and central expansions of challengers under low or moderate naval disparity.

Conversely, high naval disparity and a challenger's peripheral expansion are likely to favor strategic settlement, such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, the Anglo-American alignment since the early 20th century, and the Washington naval system from 1921-1936. This general pattern is mostly consistent with the proposition of the long cycle theory that "shifts in the distribution of sea power" are correlated with "changes in the position of world leadership" and the importance of the central theater.[27] However, some cases where a challenger expanded into the peripheral theater of the leading sea power not only produced different outcomes but also are inconsistent with the estimation based on naval balance of power. These are the three major cases of this research.

For example, moderate naval disparity between the U.S. and Japan and Japan's territorial expansion into the peripheral theater of the U.S. from 1934-1941 could not avert a major war in the Asia-Pacific. Further, the two Anglo-French dyads in the 19th century are puzzling in light of both naval balance of power and a challenger's peripheral expansion. Considering high naval disparity and the more peripheral nature of Fashoda in 1898, the likelihood of war should have been lower in the second Anglo-French dyad from 1882-1904 than that in the first Anglo-French dyad from 1856-1870 where there was near naval parity and France's annexation of Nice and Savoy in the early 1860s. Nonetheless, Britain invoked the preventive war motivation and was about fight a war in 1898 whereas the likelihood of a war was much lower in the 1860s.

3. Expectations and limits of existing theories

With respect to the three major cases, the existing theories exhibit partial explanatory powers as to the outcomes of naval arms races among France, Britain, Japan and the U.S. First, hegemonic shift theories would expect the first Anglo-French dyad from 1856-1870 to be more unstable and war-prone than the second Anglo-French dyad from 1882-1904 due to near naval parity in the central international system, Europe. The U.S.-Japan dyads from 1921-1934 and 1934-1941 largely fit into expectations of hegemonic shift theories as the former period was more stable with naval disparity and the closed naval power gap ended up in a major war in the latter period except that the Asia-Pacific theater was the peripheral international system. The leading sea power's robust resolve in the peripheral theater deserves an additional explanation.

Second, the balance of power theory would expect that naval bipolarity between Britain and France would be conducive to stability in the first Anglo-French dyad from 1856-1870 than uneven naval tri-polarity among Britain, France, and Russia in the

[27] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

second Anglo-French dyad from 1882-1904. Yet, the balance of power theory fails to grapple with the U.S.-Japan cases from 1921-1934 and 1934-1941 as near naval bipolarity in the Asia-Pacific during the latter period produced a major war. Third, the liberal-rationalist theories would expect that the democratic Anglo-French dyad from 1882-1904 should be more peaceful than the autocratic Anglo-French dyad from 1856-1870. Britain and the U.S., democracies, would be able to send costly signals to France and Japan if the opposition party supports a hardline policy, too.

Likewise, systemic expectations of hegemonic theories and the balance of power theory are only congruent with either the two Anglo-French dyads in the 19th century or the U.S.-Japan dyad in the 20th century. From the perspective of the liberal-rationalist framework and hegemonic theories, Britain's stronger resolve for the preventive war against France in the more democratic dyad during the is puzzling. Also, whereas Britain's costly signal was able to push France to back down over the Fashoda crisis, the costly signal sent by the Roosevelt administration and the undivided Congress against the Japanese aggression did not lead Japan to back down in 1941. Thus, the liberal-rationalist framework based on regime type, costly signal and audience costs, shows a limited explanatory power across the three major cases, too.

On the other hand, Copeland's trade expectation theory hypothesizes that "the effect of economic interdependence" on a state's behavior depends on "leaders' expectations of the trade environment." In other words, a dependent state's trade expectations will determine "when high dependence will push states toward either relatively peaceful behavior or hard-line policies and war."[28] While Copeland admits that the effect of economic interdependence was negligible in the first Anglo-French dyad from 1856-1870, he ascribes Britain's hardline policy over Fashoda and Japan's southward advance to "the new threat to Britain's African trade" and U.S. trade sanctions as well as the plan for a war against the Soviet Union.[29] I will show that these are inaccurate, if not problematic, accounts and my interactive theory better explains these cases.

3.1. Hegemonic shift theories: systemic probability

A number of hegemonic shift theories, including hegemonic stability theory,[30] power transition theory,[31] and the long cycle theory,[32] emphasize the key role of power transitions or the differential growth of power in creating a necessary condition of a war

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[28] Dale C. Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War*, (Princeton University Press, 2015), pp. 13-14, p. 27.

[29] Ibid., p. 82, pp. 84-86, pp. 173-181, pp. 377-381, pp. 409-411.

[30] Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (April 1976), Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.*, 1981, Charles P. Kindleberger, *World Economic Primacy: 1500 to 1900*, (Oxford University Press, 1996).

[31] Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, *op.cit.,* (1980), Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, in eds., *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).

[32] George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20, No. 2, (April 1978), pp. 214-235. George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), pp. 13-18, George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, (Macmillan Press, 1987).

between the established power and a rising challenger. In spite of different conceptualizations of power in each theory, such as economic, industrial power, and naval capability, hegemonic shift theories anticipate the increased likelihood of war between the leading power and a challenger over a period of power shifts. Gilpin argues, "the most important factor for the process of international political change is…the dynamics of power relationships over time. It is the differential or uneven growth of power."[33]

Organski and Kugler argue that "the source of war is to be found in the differences in size and rates of growth of the members in the international system."[34] Likewise, assuming "sea power as the necessary condition of global operation," Modelski and Thompson connect changes in world leadership with shifts in naval capabilities.[35] As such, hegemonic shift theories imply the predominance of the leading state's power is a condition that induces the stability of the international system. Kindleberger puts forward that "economic primacy" of the leading power may ensure the provision of "the public good of leadership of the world economy" and "wars are often turning point in the rise of one country to world economic primacy and the decline of another."[36]

I draw on the long cycle theory due to its focus on naval capabilities as the basis for power projection as clarified. Nevertheless, these theories remain probabilistic and reticent about the immediate, or sufficient, conditions under which a naval arms race is sometimes peacefully resolved under naval power parity or ends up in a war under naval power disparity. Theorists acknowledge this point. Organski and Kugler qualify that the power transition and a challenger's overtake are "necessary and not sufficient conditions for major war."[37] Gilpin writes, "the theory of hegemonic war is a limited and incomplete theory" and the theory of hegemonic stability is "not deterministic,"[38] concluding that "the inevitable conflict" can be resolved either "through a resort to force or peaceful adjustment."[39]

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[33] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.*, (1981), p. 93.

[34] Organski and Jacek Kugler, *op.cit.*, (1980), p. 20.

[35] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), pp. 13-18, George Modelski, *op.cit.,* (1987). Thompson advances the long cycle framework as a potential bridge between the balance power model and the power transition model by considering the effects of interactions between global long cycle, regional power shift, and industrial innovation. Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, *The Great Powers and Global Struggle, 1490-1990*, The University Press of Kentucky, (1994), William R. Thompson, *Great Power Rivalries*, (University of South Carolina Press, 1999), William R. Thompson, ed., *Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future*, (Macmillan Press, 2009). Montgomery anticipates different strategies of leading states in cases of regional power shifts depending on a leading state's preference of the local order and the type of local power shift. Evan Braden Montgomery, *In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers*, (Cornell University Press, 2016).

[36] Charles P. Kindleberger, *op.cit.,* (1996), pp. 8-13, p. 46. He attributes the depth of the world depression of 1929 to the absence of world economic leadership until 1936. Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1973, 1986), p. 11. Krasner writes, "a hegemonic distribution of economic power is likely result in an open trading structure." Stephen D. Krasner, *op.cit.,* (April 1976), p. 318.

[37] Organski and Jacek Kugler, *op.cit.*, (1980), p. 206-207.

[38] Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1988), pp. 601-605.

[39] Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, (1987), pp. 91-93.

3.2. Balance of power theory: systemic probability and balancing the leading sea power?

The balance of power theory does not present the immediate conditions of a war or strategic settlement in the context of naval arms race, either. According to the assumption of the balance of power theory, the systemic equilibrium of power is likely to be restored because "states prefer their own security and independence" to hegemony. But, as Levy puts, "balancing hypotheses predict either state strategies of balancing or an outcome of balance, not peace."[40] Since the systemic equilibrium can be achieved through either war or peaceful settlement, this theory indeed speaks little about the immediate conditions of a war and peace. Nonetheless, compared to hegemonic shift theories, the balance of power theory posits that stability is more likely in a more balanced distribution of power than the concentration of power.

Levy calls this "the power parity hypothesis." Though it is "a dyadic-level hypothesis that assumes that alliances play no role," it hypothesizes that "an equality of power between two states is likely to lead to peace, or at least parity is more likely than preponderance to lead to peace."[41] It is no wonder that Waltz maintains bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity due to the reduced uncertainty about threats.[42] Along the line of Waltz, Mearsheimer distinguishes balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity. He insists that unbalanced multipolarity is the most destabilizing distribution of power because a potential hegemon, seeking to achieve regional hegemony, with greater military capability will trigger conflicts and possibly war.[43]

Therefore, hegemonic shift theories and the balance of power theory are both probabilistic and indeterminate at the systemic level. Whereas the long cycle theory's key independent variable is naval capabilities, one might question the continental, and European, bias of the theory of balance of power and doubt whether the theory is applicable to the maritime domain. Levy and Thompson delve into this question and implicitly suggest that hegemonic shift theories are applicable to cases of economic or naval power shifts whereas balance of power theory measures up to balancing against continental land power but not the leading sea power.[44] However, let alone China's rapid

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[40] Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design," in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, ed., *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate*, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 2003), pp. 130-133.

[41] Ibid., p. 132.

[42] Kenneth N. Waltz, *op.cit.*, (1979), pp. 161-169, pp. 192-193.

[43] John J. Mearsheimer, *op.cit.*, (2001, 2014), pp. 334-336.

[44] Jack S. Levy, *op.cit.,* (2003), pp. 139-147. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,* (Summer 2010), pp. 16-20. Thompson's earlier work alludes to a possibility that the differentiation between regional, global, and regional-global transitions can reconcile the balance of power model with the power transition model. William R. Thompson, "Balances of Power, Transitions, and Long Cycles," in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, ed., *op.cit.*, (1996), pp. 163-185. In a similar vein, Walt's balance of threat theory takes into account geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions in addition to aggregate power, Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 21-33.

naval modernization in the past two decades,[45] the three major cases demonstrate that naval balancing has repeatedly occurred against the leading sea power. [46]

3.3. The liberal-rationalist framework and trade expectations theory

The theories of liberal peace, or democratic peace,[47] may turn to the features of regime type to explain a war and peace among great powers, though liberal theories do not directly concern with the scope condition of a naval arms race. Owen argues that "liberalism as a worldview" is translated into "a foreign policy ideology and political institutions" in a fashion that causes liberal peace. Both normative and institutional constraints on the liberal regime are the products of liberal ideas and they "work in tandem" to induce liberal peace.[48] In response to a realist rebuttal,[49] Doyle responds that "Republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence operate together, and only together."[50] But the two Anglo-French dyads of the 19th century defy such expectations.

Schultz's liberal-rationalist framework takes into account the institutional feature of democracy and the effect of audience costs from Fearon's rationalist model.[51] Schultz claims that a credible and costly signal can be sent from a democratic regime if there is "the support of domestic opposition groups," or "strong domestic consensus behind the government's threats."[52] In particular, he ascribes the French backdown at Fashoda, one of my major cases, to the undivided political support from the opposition party and anti-imperialist group, which "entailed high and visible audience costs."[53] By contrast, France couldn't help sending "the weak signals" that involved low audience costs due to "the

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[45] Ronald O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities –Background and Issues for Congress*, RL33153, October 19, 2023, at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/275

[46] Lobell contends that great powers undertake "targeted balancing," or "target-balancing," against "the most threatening element (s) of another state's power." Steven E. Lobell, "Brining Balancing Back In: Britain's Targeted Balancing, 1936-1939," *The Journal of Strategic Studies,* Vol. 35, No. 6, (December 2012), pp. 747-773, Steven E. Lobell, "A Granular Theory of Balancing," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 3, (2018), pp. 593-605.

[47] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, (Princeton University Press, 1993), James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*, (University of South Carolina Press, 1995), Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1997). Kori N. Shake, *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony*, (MA: Cambridge, Harvard University Press), 2017.

[48] John. M Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security*, (Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 3-10, pp. 17-21,

[49] Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1, (Nov., 2003), pp. 585-602.

[50] Michael W. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 463-466.

[51] James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Dispute," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3, (Sept., 1994), pp. 577-592, James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3, (Summer, 1995), pp. 379-414.

[52] Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-7.

[53] *Ibid.,* pp. 186-191.

appearance of domestic opposition."[54] The liberal-rationalist model sets forth a specific mechanism through which a crisis is resolved or escalated.

However, Schultz's argument reduces the underlying and immediate conditions that influence the outcome of naval arms races to a short-term information game. This reductionist tendency is derived from Fearon's core assumption that "disagreements about relative power and uncertainty about a potential opponent's willingness to fight" are attributed to "leaders' private information" in the rationalist model.[55] As Kirshner points out, this is problematic because rational actors can "come to different conclusions about expected outcomes" when looking at the same information even "in the absence of any private information."[56] When confronted with the information about the domestically *united* resolve of Britain and the U.S. by 1898 and 1941,[57] the choices of France and Japan completely diverged.

Fearon dismisses the role of great powers' incessant evaluation of "relative capabilities and interests," let alone prestige or status, in shaping the initiation and outcome of international crises. He suggests that as "rational states will select themselves into crises on the basis of the observable measures of relative capabilities," "the balance of capabilities and balance of interests should be unrelated" to their decisions once a crisis breaks out. Hence, he even argues that "crises would occur only when the disadvantaged side irrationally forgets its inferiority" if the assessment of capabilities and interests mattered.[58] Nonetheless, France in the 1890s and Japan in the 1930s knew their naval inferiority and provoked a crisis for imperial interest and prestige.

As shown in the empirical chapters, these "extreme and implausible assumptions about individual behavior and economic theory" do not pass muster with empirical realities.[59] The evidence shows that great powers continue to take seriously the relative capabilities, interest, and prestige, even after a crisis comes to pass. Both France and Japan had not forgotten their inferiority in military capabilities but other assessments of interest and prestige drove them to initiate a crisis in the first place and to choose different paths in the face of the information about the adversary's domestically undivided political support and a real possibility of war. They haven't "converged around" the liberal-rationalist model of war.[60]

Copeland's trade expectation theory, which embraces the impact of economic interdependence, assumes that a state's pessimistic or positive expectations about future trade environment will determine its aggressive or accommodative policy choices. In this regard, Copeland holds that Britain's pessimistic expectations about future trade in Africa

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[54] *Ibid.,* pp. 191-196.
[55] James D. Fearon, *op.cit.,* Vol. 49, No. 3, (Summer, 1995), p. 395.
[56] Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" *Security Studies*, Vol 10, No. 1, (Autumn 2000), pp. 147-148.
[57] The Roosevelt administration's decision to freeze all Japanese assets and impose an oil embargo in July 1941 elicited the wide bipartisan support across internationalists and isolationists. Wayne S. Cole, "The Role of The United States Congress and Political Parties," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto with the assistance of Dale K. A. Finlayson, ed., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, (Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 303-320.
[58] James D. Fearon, *op.cit.,* (Sept., 1994), pp. 586-587.
[59] Jonathan Kirshner, "The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and The Classical Realist Alternative," *World Politics*, Vol. 67, No. 1, (January 2015), p. 171, Marc Trachtenberg, "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis," *Security Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2012), pp. 3-42.
[60] Ibid., pp. 172-173.

and Japan's negative expectations about international trade, triggered by a series of U.S. trade sanctions from 1938, were the main causes of their hardline policies in the late 1890s and 1930s.[61] But the trade expectation theory can't explain why Britain made a concession in Niger in June 1898 but not in the Upper Nile after a few months. Also, Japan's redirection from the North to the South in 1939 stemmed from the underestimation of U.S. maritime interest than the fall in trade expectations.[62]

3.4. Strategies of a rising power and the leading power

In an effort to redress the limits of both systemic theories, a number of research investigates the concrete conditions under which a rising power's strategy and the leading power's adjustment can result in a peaceful settlement or confrontation over a power transition.[63] Nonetheless, they tend to focus more on the determinants, independent variables, of either a rising power's strategy or the established power's strategic adjustment. There is few research that directly tackles a naval arms race between maritime great powers and proximate conditions of a war and strategic settlement between them during a naval arms race since the works of Modelski and Thompson. Not so many works have yet theorized a variation in geographical power projection as a critical variable in a manner that complements the existing systemic theories.[64]

4. An Interactive Theory of Power Projection

4.1. Domestic and international conditions

Since the 17th century, the leading sea powers, including the Netherlands, Britain, and the U.S., had been on the winning coalition of the major wars.[65] Unlike Mearsheimer's assertion that "the most powerful states possess the most formidable armies," except the U.S., the Netherlands and Britain didn't possess the most powerful

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[61] Dale C. Copeland, *op.cit.*, (2015), pp. 84-86, pp. 174-175, pp. 409-410.

[62] Ibid., p. 86. Unlike Copeland's argument, Japan in fact accommodated the Soviet Union from 1939 to the extent that it concluded the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty in April 1941 and kept the neutrality treaty until 1945. This will be elaborated in the U.S.-Japan chapter.

[63] Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts*, (Cornell University Press, 2018), Stacie E. Goddard, *When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order*, (Cornell University Press, 2018), Steven Ward, *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers*, (Cambridge University Press, 2017), Paul K. Macdonald and Joseph M. Parent, "Review Article: The Status of Status in World Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 73, No. 2, (April 2021), pp. 358-391, Rohan Mukherjee, *Ascending Order: Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions*, (Cambridge University Press, 2022), Elias Götz, "Status Matters in World Politics," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 23, No. 1, (2021), pp. 228-247, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, *Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment*, (Cornell University Press, 2018), Kyle Hanes, "Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 59, Issue. 3, (September 2015), pp. 490-502, David Edelstein, *Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers*, (Cornell University Press, 2017).

[64] For the previous research that incorporates the center-periphery division into a mid-range theory, see Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery*, (Cornell University Press, 2004).

[65] George Modelski, *op.cit.*, (1987), pp. 40-47.

armies.[66] Given that the established international system is more favorable for the leading sea power than a challenger, the leading sea power is expected to be wary of the relative loss of interest and prestige as a challenger with the second-largest naval capabilities seeks to close the naval gap and widen its sphere of influence to boost its interest and prestige.

For a challenger and the leading sea power, domestic as well as international conditions, render the gain and loss of interest and prestige at stake during a naval arms race. Strategic interest indicates military and political-economic advantage that great powers strive to maximize from naval armament and expanding their spheres of influence. Following Weber, prestige is defined as the global status that great powers seek to enhance in relation to other states.[67] A challenger's bid to bolster its naval capabilities and project its power into a wider sphere of influence is to increase its interest and prestige, which will result in relative loss of interest and prestige of the leading sea power.

First, domestic conditions, namely the internal political balance and economic and financial capacity, can reinforce or erode the underlying condition of a naval arms race. Great powers' tendency to expand their power entails costs to the domestic society.[68] Thus, the uneven growth of power, in terms of GDP or economic wealth, does not always proportionately translate into naval power shifts despite the correlation.[69] While an economy in relative decline or contraction constrains the total amount of available resources, as Weber observes, "not all political structures are equally expansive."[70] Gilpin presupposes, the differential growth of power compels a state to change the international system through a range of expansions "until the costs of such expansion are equal or greater than the benefits."[71]

In light of these dynamics, the domestic political balance ultimately determines "the capacity and willingness of a society to pay the costs"[72] of a naval arms race. Modern ideologies, such as mercantilism, imperialism, and nationalism, may propel a great power's maritime expansion to a certain extent but the domestic political balance of the great power can be more expansionist or more non-expansionist at a given moment. In Weber's words, "the attitude of political structures towards the outside may be more

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[66] Moreover, his argument on "the primacy of land power" and "the limits of independent naval power" makes sense at the operational level not much at the strategic level given the cases of the Netherlands and Britain from the 17th to 19th centuries. John J. Mearsheimer, *op.cit.*, (2001, 2014), pp. 83-96/.

[67] According to Weber, great powers' prestige "means in practice the glory of power over other communities". It refers to "the expansion of power, though not always by way of incorporation or subjection." Max Weber, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich ed., *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1978), pp. 911-912.

[68] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1981), pp. 95.

[69] On uncertainty about power relationships, Posen remarks, "states in normal times may distill economic power into military power at only a fraction of the level they could achieve under other conditions." Barry Posen, "Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care?" *Current History*, (November 2009), p. 350.

[70] Max Weber, *op.cit.*, (1978), p. 910, As Shaman reveals, the Ottoman Empire and the Chinese Empire had not been interested in naval expansion, or gunboat diplomacy, as the European maritime powers. Jason C. Sharman, *op.cit.,* (Spring 2019), pp. 170-175.

[71] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1981)*,* pp. 106-107.

[72] *Ibid.,* pp. 95-96.

isolationist or expansive" and "such attitudes change."[73] Expansionist imperialism sometimes trumps the financial constraints caused by economic recession.

For example, Japan's domestic political balance had been "uniquely oriented toward strategic expansion" from 1934-1941. Nazi Germany's rapid rearmament in the 1930s is a similar case in point.[74] Economic and financial strength will typically facilitate or hinder the allocation of resources for the proposed naval armament, yet the domestic political balance may exert the countervailing effect on economy and fiscal capacity in contraction.[75] I draw on Taliaferro's model of the resource-extractive state in which he defines the state power as "the relative ability of the state to extract or mobilize resources as determined by the institutions of the state, nationalism, and ideology."[76]

On the other hand, the economic capacity structures the extent to which the state power can convert resources into naval power.[77] In sum, each great power's ability to extract resources for naval defense consists of its economic strength, the domestic political capacity backed by its institution and expansionist nationalism, or imperialism in this research.[78] The relative balance of the two naval powers' resource-extraction capacities for naval mobilization not only constitutes the underlying condition of a naval arms race and power projection but also generates a variation in the preventive war motivation in conjunction with the geographical distribution of naval forces.

Second, in the event of a challenger's power projection, two international conditions, geography and third power politics, shape the immediate conditions that affect a shift in the gain and loss of interest and prestige for two naval great powers. The central theater plainly carries greater weight of interest and prestige for both great powers than the peripheral theater does. Yet, as noted, in the peripheral theater, the leading sea power cares about whether the direction of a challenger's power projection is concentrated toward adjacent theaters and the first line of maritime defense. Adjacent theaters and the first line of naval defense, are of higher interest and prestige than other geographical realms for the leading sea power in the peripheral theater.

This is not only because the fault line between immediate naval flanks and adjacent theaters is not always crystal-clear in the maritime domain but also because the leading

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[73] Max Weber, *op.cit.*, (1978), p. 910.

[74] Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4, (Spring 1999), p. 91, Robert S. Ross, "On the fungibility of economic Power: China's Economic Rise and the East Asian Security Order", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2019), p. 308.

[75] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 102-103.

[76] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 3, (2006), p. 486. When it comes to ideology, he indicates a political spectrum along the line of statism and anti-statism. Statism and anti-statism may correlate with expansionist nationalism and non-expansionist nationalism respectively.

[77] Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense: A Review of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," *The National Interest*, No. 67, (Spring 2002), p. 120, Barry R. Posen, *op.cit.,* (November 2009), p. 348.

[78] Western great powers' nationalism had been expressed as imperialism in the non-home theater regions. Carr notes, "nationalism, having attained its first objective in the form of national unity and independence, develops almost automatically into imperialism." Niebuhr also comments, "strategies for preserving life" can be easily "transmuted into the imperial purposes and policies." E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1939, 1964), p. 112, Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, (Westminster John Knox Press, 1932, 1960), p. 42.

sea power has a geographical preventive motivation to act to stunt the direction of a challenger's power projection before a challenger comes too close to adjacent theaters or immediate naval flanks. Third, with respect to third power politics, I propose a concept of alignment opportunity, drawing on Snyder's definition of alignment, viz., "essentially expectations in the minds of statesmen about whether they will be *supported, opposed, or ignored* by other states in future interactions" regardless of "whether they have been formalized as alliances or not."[79]

Gain and Loss	International Condition		Domestic Condition	
	Geography	Third Powers	Domestic political balance	Financial Strength
High ↑	Central Theater ↑	No common adversary/ Low ally availability ↕	Expansionist nationalism (mercantilism, imperialism) ↕	Economy in expansion ↕
Low ↓	Peripheral Theater ↓	A third common adversary/ High ally availability	Non-expansionist nationalism	Economy in contraction

Figure. 4. The baseline effect of international and domestic conditions on gain and loss

Two naval great powers may hold "*adversarial, allied or indifferent*"[80] expectations about future interactions with the rise and fall of a third common threat and available allies. When a naval arms race goes hand in hand with a challenger's power projection, alignment opportunity between two naval great powers may be open or closed depending on whether there is a third common threat and ally availability in their central and peripheral theaters. The contingent formation of neutrals in the central and peripheral theaters can affect alignment opportunity by depriving them of a potential ally or a third common threat. In particular, alignment opportunity in the theater of a naval arms race and a challenger's expansion is of utmost importance.

4.2. (1) The relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval arms buildup

All things being equal, if the relative balance of naval mobilization is asymmetric, the two great powers with the will have the lower preventive motivation. The asymmetric balance of resource-extraction capacities undercut the necessary condition of a continued naval arms race. If the degree of asymmetry is considerably high, asymmetric capacity may also end a naval arms race without a crisis or war. However, because the leading sea power's forces are distributed across the globe, the geographical dispersion of naval forces and a third naval ally of a challenger in the theater of the naval power shift may increase the level of the preventive motivation at the regional level in spite of asymmetric capacity.

[79] Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, Cornell University Press, (1997, 2007), p. 21.
[80] Ibid.

When the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities is symmetric, the preventive war motivation heightens. Although the preventive motivation is typically associated with the leading power, a rising challenger may also have incentives for a preventive war if its resource-extraction capacities are expected to last only in the short term. Thus, the preventive war motivation can cut both ways and does not strictly apply to the leading power. In sum, the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval arms buildup produces the initiation or ending condition of a naval arms race, generating various levels of the preventive motivation along with the geographical allocation of naval forces.



Figure. 5. The relative balance of resource extraction capacities and preventive motivations

4.3. (2) A challenger's power projection and the leading sea power's expectation

As defined, the central theater denotes the great power's homeland and its immediate naval flanks. While the adjacent defense perimeter, the first line of naval defense, falls into the peripheral theater, the leading sea power takes the first line of naval defense more seriously than a region of mere continental importance within the peripheral theater. Ceteris paribus, a challenger's gain will be high if it launches an expansion from its central theater and will be low if it projects its power into the peripheral theater. However, there is a rare possibility that a challenger's expected gain in the peripheral theater will be high if there are large military-economic interests or expansionist nationalism prevails at the domestic level in a way that enables a prestige-driven expansion.



Figure 6. Variation in a challenger's expansion and its expected gain

From the perspective of the leading sea power, a challenger's expansion into the leading sea power's central theater will certainly lead to high loss. Conversely, a challenger's expansion in the peripheral theater typically will cause low loss. But the leading sea power's loss will be higher if a challenger's peripheral expansion is expected to yield a contagion effect on the first line of naval defense. While expected loss may include military interest, economic interest, and prestige, I show that the expected loss of military interest in connection with the first line of maritime defense is the central driver of the leading sea power's taking risks of an armed conflict in the peripheral theater.

The contagion effect refers to three possibilities in the event of a challenger's occupation: (1) an occupation will become a stepping stone on which a challenger further expands into the adjacent first line of maritime defense; (2) an occupation will produce a negative second-order effect on the other, possibly close or distant, first line of maritime defense; (3) an occupation will undermine or remove local allies on the first line of maritime defense. I argue that it is the interactive dynamics of a challenger's geographical expansion and the leading sea power's expectations in the theater of the power transition that activate, or deactivate, different levels of preventive motivations and determine the outcome of naval power shifts.



Figure 7. Variation in a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expected loss

My conceptualization of expectations about the contagion effect is akin to the expected loss of "power values" and "intrinsic values" in Snyder's words. Snyder elaborates that "the potential costs of enemy moves" consist of "intrinsic values" and "power values." Three components of power values, viz., strategic, deterrent, and political ones, have to do with the expectation about the probable costs incurred from the increased chance of the aggressor's further expansion or its effect on "the alignment or attitudes of third countries."[81] Intrinsic values are sought as "end values," such as self-respect, honor, and prestige."[82] A variation in a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of naval defense and allies can either activate or deactivate different preventive motivations shaped by the resource-extraction capacities, geography, and ally availability.



Figure. 8. Dyadic illustration of the leading sea power's expected loss

4.4. (3) Alignment opportunity: a common threat and ally availability in the theaters

[81] Ibid., p. 32.
[82] Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 31-32.

Alignment opportunity will be most open when there exists a clear common threat[83] and other available allies[84] in both central and peripheral theaters. Alignment opportunity will be most closed when there is no third common threat and no other allies. The more alignment opportunity is open, the gain and loss from a military confrontation is low. Alignment opportunity in the central theater is more pivotal than that in the peripheral theater and great powers usually find alignment opportunity open in the peripheral theaters even if alignment opportunity in the center is less open. Nonetheless, if a challenger directs its expansion toward the first line of maritime defense of the leading sea power's peripheral theater in a fashion that generates high expectations about the contagion effect, the alignment opportunity in such a theater will matter a great deal, too.

In addition to asymmetric naval strategy, a challenger seeks out a potential ally to supplant its weaker naval capabilities insofar as there is an available ally. From the late 16th century to the 17th century, the Netherlands had allied with England to fight the Iberian empire and Britain sided with France against the Netherlands in the second half of the 17th century until France posed more acute threats to them. Throughout the 18th century, France and Spain had been naval allies against Britain and the Dual Alliance of 1894 targeted the Triple Alliance on land as well as Britain at sea.[85] Japan joined the Tripartite Pact against the U.S. and its allies in September 1940, too. The difficulties of the challenger often had to do with a dearth of available great power allies with naval capabilities, not its aversion to balance the leading sea power.



Figure. 9. Alignment opportunity in the central and peripheral theaters

[83] The presence of a third threat and the utility of a declining power towards the third threat are the key variables in Shifrinson's theory on a rising power's strategy. Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, *op.cit.,* (2018), Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, "Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers", *International Security*, No. 45, Vol. 1, (2020), pp. 90-126.

[84] Hanes, Macdonald, and Parent suggest ally availability is one of the conditions that help facilitate a declining power's retrenchment. Kyle Haynes, *op.cit.*, (2015), Paul K. Macdonald and Joseph M. Parent, *op.cit.*, (2018).

[85] Glenn H. Snyder, *op.cit.,* (1997), pp. 109-110.

Alignment opportunity is a less systemic variable than Jervis's alignment consistency,[86] Wight's simple and multiple balance, or polarity.[87] It is devised to capture the immediate impact of common threats and ally availability in the theaters of the naval power shift and a challenger's spatial expansion. Alignment opportunity implies that the choices of third powers as well as the consequences of negotiations with third powers play a role in shifting the strategic calculus of the two naval great powers. The unexpected development of neutrals may remove a potential ally or bring forth a third adversary in the other theaters.[88] The emergence of a third common threat and high ally availability will alleviate a bilateral conflict, whereas no common threat and low ally availability in the theaters will deprive the two great powers of an alternative to a confrontation.

4.5. An Interactive Theory of Power Projection

To recap, the relative balance of two great powers' resources-extraction capacities for naval mobilization initiates or ends a naval arms race in a way that produces various degrees of the preventive motivations. But the immediate conditions that determine the outcome of such naval power shifts consist of a challenger's power projection, the leading sea power's expectations about its contagion effect and alignment opportunities in the central and peripheral theaters. These three conditions render four possible outcomes of naval power shifts between a challenger and the leading sea power. The interactive dynamics between a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expectations about its contagion effect activates, or deactivates, the motivation for a war.

Conditions are most conducive to a strategic settlement if the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval mobilization is asymmetric, a challenger's expansion is concentrated in the peripheral theater without causing expectations about the contagion effect, and alignment opportunity is open in the theaters. By contrast, major war is likely if the relative balance of the resource-extraction capacities is symmetric, a challenger's expansion is concentrated in the central theater, or in the peripheral theater with high expected contagion effect, and alignment opportunity is closed. Either a

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[86] Robert Jervis, *op.cit.*, (1997), pp. 210-211. According to Jervis, "the pure case" of alignment consistency is "the system divided into two camps in which each actor has friendly relations with every other actor in its camp, each other has hostile relations with every actor in the other camp, and there are no neutrals outside either camp." Rapkin and Thompson also discuss "the additional effects of bipolarization whereby countries increasingly align and commit themselves to opposing camps." "Interlocking alliance ties and rivalry dynamics" can "act in conjunction with power shifts." David P. Rapkin and William R. Thompson, *Transition Scenarios: China and the United States in the twenty-first century*, (The University of Chicago Press, 2013).

[87] Wight puts, "when there are three or more great powers or blocs, not tied by rigid alliances, there may be said to be a multiple balance" and a simple balance arises when "the powers divide into opposite camps." Martin Wight, *op.cit.*, (1978, 1995), pp. 168-170.

[88] On triangular security dynamics, see Timothy W. Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 4, (Spring 2011), pp. 155-189, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics," *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, (2013), pp. 498-531, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics: The Soviet-Japanese-US Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 1, (2018), pp. 102-120, Timothy W. Crawford, *The Power to Divide: Wedge Strategies in Great Power Competition*, (Cornell University Press, 2021), Chengzhi Yin, "Logic of Choice: China's Binding Strategies toward North Korea, 1965-1970," *Security Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, (2022), pp. 483-509.

challenger or the leading sea power is likely to accommodate, or adapt to, the other's assertion if its gain or loss of is asymmetrically lower.

	A challenger's gain of interest and prestige from naval armament and geographical power projection		
The leading sea power's loss of interest and prestige from a challenger's naval armament and geographical power projection		Low	High
	Low	Conditions conducive to strategic settlement	Increased likelihood of a challenger's assertion and the leading sea power's accommodation
	High	Increased likelihood of a challenger's adaptation and the leading sea power's preventive war motivation	War is likely

Table. 2. An interactive theory of power projection

5. Major cases and methods

To test my theory, I examine three major cases, including the two Anglo-French dyads from 1856-1870 and 1882-1904 as well as the U.S.-Japan dyad from 1921-1941. Each case's differential growth of power correlated with the shifts in global economic cycles before and after the Great Recession of 1873-1896 and the Great Depression of 1929. Moreover, these cases are associated with the variations in the three foregoing conditions. Employing process tracing and congruence method, the subsequent chapters delve into the three cases.

Drawing on the primary and secondary sources, I first investigate the threat perception of civilian and naval leaders with regards to the trend of a naval power shift and determine whether the resource-extraction capacities of each great power enable the requested allocation of resources for naval armament or not. Second, I probe the ways in which the challenger's expansion begins in the central or peripheral theater of the leading sea power and shed light on the variance in the leading sea power's expectation about the contagion effect in the event of peripheral expansions. Third, I investigate how the emergence and absence of common threats and available allies in the central and peripheral theaters can alleviate or exacerbate the magnitude of the bilateral conflict.

	A challenger's gain of interest and prestige from naval armament and geographical power projection		
The leading sea power's loss of interest and prestige from naval and geographical power projection		Low	High
	Low	The Anglo-French case 1 (1856-1870) The Anglo-French case 2 (1882-1904) The U.S.-Japan case (1922-1933)	The Anglo-French case 1 (1858-1862) The U.S.-Japan case (1934-1938)
	High	The Anglo-French case 2 (1894-1898)	The U.S.-Japan case (1939-1941)

Table. 3. Major cases

In the case of the first Anglo-French dyad from 1856-1870, the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval arming grew increasingly symmetric from 1856-1862, causing the war scare and high preventive war motivation on the part of Britain.

Even so, France's geographical expansion focused on the peripheral theaters of Britain without low expectations about the contagion effect, deactivating the high preventive motivation. Besides, alignment opportunities in Europe and non-European regions were between Britain and France continued to be open because of the common threats and available continental allies in the central theater, such as Austria, Russia, and Prussia. France's asymmetric resource-extraction capacity after the mid-1860s virtually ended a naval arms race.

The second Anglo-French dyad from 1882-1904 saw the consistently weaker resource-extraction capacities of France, hence the constant low preventive war motivation. Nonetheless, asymmetric naval threats posed by the French navy, the geographical dispersion of British naval forces, and the Franco-Russian alliance in the early 1890s brought about the untypical preventive motivation of Britain at the regional level in the Mediterranean. In addition to the Franco-Russian alliance, the demise of Bismarck and the Mediterranean entente, and the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897 greatly closed the alignment opportunity. Under these conditions, France's expansion into the Upper Nile by 1898 aroused British expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense, Alexandria, activating the preventive war motivation.

France's expected gain of interest and prestige from its expansion into the Upper Nile had little to do with its military interest and was incomparably low relative to Britain's expected high loss in the Mediterranean. After the resolution of the Fashoda crisis as well as the failed Anglo-German alliance negotiations, the emergence of a third great power threat, Germany, opened the alignment opportunity between France and Britain and led them to conclude the Entente Cordiale in 1904. The U.S.-Japan dyad from 1921-1941 can be divided into the two periods from 1921-1933 and from 1934-1941. The earlier period involved the asymmetric resource-extraction capacities embodied in the Washington naval system, Japan's limited expansion in the peripheral theater, and the open alignment opportunity due to Russia and high ally availability of the U.S.

By contrast, the second period from 1934-1941 witnessed the symmetric resource-extraction capacities, which brought about the high preventive motivation alongside the geographical distribution of U.S. naval forces between the Atlantic and Pacific. As Japan redirected its expansion towards the maritime South, U.S. expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense, a series of islands in the Pacific, activated the preventive motivation from 1939-1941. Further, the alignment opportunity profoundly closed with the anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, the fall of France and the Netherlands, and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 1941. Japan's geographical redirection compelled the U.S. to take risks of a preventive war along with the closed alignment opportunity.

Chapter 2. The first Anglo-French Dyad, 1856-1870

4. The Naval Puzzle of the Crimean System, 1856-1870: Naval Parity, Peripheral Expansion, and Open Alignment Opportunity

Introduction: The naval puzzle of the Crimean system

The Crimean system, formulated by the settlement of 1856, was in part an extension of the Vienna System of 1815 in that it restored "the Concert of Europe" on the basis of the Russian defeat.[89] But unlike the Vienna system in 1815-1848, the Crimean system in 1856-1870 was more fraught with a number of crises and regional wars among European powers despite the absence of a major war as the Napoleonic wars or the World Wars. In other words, the reconstituted Concert of Europe *per se* hardly guaranteed a greater stability among great powers in 1856-1870 compared to the Vienna system.[90] Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia all underwent crises and wars at one point or another in 1859-1861, 1863-1864, and 1866-1870. In particular, Napoleon III's maritime expansion played a significant role in eroding the Crimean system.[91]

Nevertheless, two premiere naval powers of the Crimean system, Britain and France, did not fight a war against each other in spite of the rapidly closed naval gap and France's expansion in Italy from 1858-1862. This is the puzzle of the Crimean system this chapter attempts to unpack. I argue that the likelihood of a war was lower because France's expansions were concentrated in the peripheral theaters of Britain and the open alignment opportunity, shaped by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, was sustained from 1856-1870. Though the previous research had extensively shed light on the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and the failed coalition against the rise of Prussia,[92] this naval puzzle of the Crimean system had been not addressed in light of the peaceful resolution of a naval arms race despite near naval parity in the central international system.

In short, the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup reached at the highest symmetry from 1858-1862, which generated war scares, near naval parity, and the high preventive motivation. But this symmetry dissolved as Britain's remarkable naval buildup started to kick in from 1863 to 1870, diminishing the preventive motivation. The asymmetric resource-extraction capacity of France nearly ended a naval

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[89] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *The Concert of Europe*, (Harper & Row: New York, 1968), pp. 174-191.

[90] Albrecht-Carrie comments, "though universal war did not break out in Europe, there were several conflicts among some of the major powers, from which it would appear that the Concert of Europe had suffered a serious breakdown". Ibid., pp. 152-153.

[91] Mosse depicts "the six years following the Crimean War" as "the second 'Napoleonic Age' in European Affairs" in this regard. W.E. Mosse, *The European Powers and the German Questions: With Special Reference to England and Russia*, (Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 81.

[92] James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security", *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2, (1993), pp. 207-233, Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940", *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 1, (1997), pp. 65-97, Stacie E. Goddard, *op.cit.*, (2018), pp. 84-117, Jayme R. Schlesinger and Jack S. Levy, "Politics, Audiences Costs, and Signalling: Britain and the 1863-4 Schleswig-Holstein Crisis", *European Journal of International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (2021), pp. 338-357. The existing works underscore domestic political benefits and costs associated with armament and alliance, perceptions of offense-defense balance, the role of domestic opposition, the resonance of rising powers' legitimation strategy to account for Britain's non-intervention in the Danish conflict and the lack of a coalition balancing against Prussia.

arms race from 1864. Besides, during these years, France's geographical expansion pointed towards the non-European theaters, such as Syria, China, Southeast Asia, and Mexico, apart from Nice and Savoy. The French annexation of Nice and Savoy indeed exacerbated Britain's threat perception but France's subsequent expansion was bridled by Britain and third powers in a way that didn't arouse expected contagion effect.

In part, Britain's expectations about France's contagion effect were revealed when France sought to expand its spheres of influence around the Rhine region, Belgium and Luxembourg. Nevertheless, as France's expansionist scheme continued to be forestalled, Britain's expectations about the contagion effect didn't grow as to be substantial in the peripheral theater of Britain even in Europe. Moreover, the contingent shifts in potential common threats and allies in Europe kept France from further moving onto "the Rhine or Alps," part of "the natural frontier" according to the French rationalization of the annexation, and also rendered alignment opportunities between them open in a way that alleviated the degree of gain and loss from the bilateral confrontation or naval arms race from 1856-1870.

4.1. Expectations of the existing theories regarding the first Anglo-French dyad, 1856-1870

Hegemonic shift theories and balance of power theory

Why didn't near naval parity between France and Britain during the early 1860s in the result in a war? From the perspective of hegemonic shift theories, the likelihood of a war during these years should have been higher than the actual likelihood of an Anglo-French war during the early 1860s. Because of its opposite systemic expectation, the balance of power theory is well-positioned to provide an answer to this puzzle. The balance of power theory would expect that a naval bipolarity between Britain and France from 1856-1870 could contribute to the stability and the decreased likelihood of a war. But unlike the expectation of Levy and Thompson's theory of balancing, France clearly engaged in a naval arms buildup, internal balancing, against Britain, and geographical expansion even without an available naval ally.

The liberal-rationalist framework and trade expectations theory

The liberal-rationalist framework is mostly irrelevant in regards to this case due to their non-democratic regime types and British leaders' united resolve against France.[93] The trade expectations theory can be an alternative explanation for peace but the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of January 1860 did not alleviate Britain's threat perception that followed in the early 1860s. The French naval buildup and annexation of Nice and Savoy in the 1860s greatly exacerbated Britain's threat perception and British leaders were adamant and united in their endeavors to secure Britain's naval supremacy. Likewise, Copeland admits, "it is hard to judge the degree to which it [the Cobden-Chevalier treaty]

[93] As examined in the following section, the Treasury Committee, the Admiralty, the Queen, Derby, and Palmerston all coalesced around the imperative of British naval supremacy vis-ai-vis France despite the partisan difference. The British leaders were less united against Prussia during the Danish crisis.

kept Britain and France from war after 1860."[94] Positive trade expectations didn't play an important role in Britain's threat perception towards France.

An interactive theory of power projection

An interactive theory of power projection expects that Britain's preventive motivation would rise as the naval gap closed from 1856-1862 but whether the high preventive motivation would be activated or deactivated would depend on the direction of France's power projection and Britain's expectations about its contagion effect on naval defense. If France's geographical expansion were steered in the peripheral theaters of Britain with no or low expected contagion effect on Britain's naval defense, the high preventive motivation would be deactivated. If France's expansion were directed in the central theater or peripheral theater with highly expected contagion effect on naval defense, Britain's preventive motivation would be activated. An interactive theory also expects that Austria, Russia, and Prussia as third powers would help open the alignment opportunity between Britain and France.

4.2. the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup:
symmetric [1856-1862] ⟶ asymmetric [1863-1870]

The years from 1843-1873 is widely considered a phase of expansion rather than contraction. In terms of the long-term cycle of global economy, Gilpin remarks, "even skeptics of these alleged long waves agree that the world economy has experienced a series of alternating periods of rising and falling prices for reasons that are not well understood." He adds that the evidence "supports the existence of alternating periods of rising and falling prices and of changing rates of economic growth."[95] Britain and France did not undergo severe contraction in economy or financial crisis until the great recession of 1873 kicked in, though Kennedy notes, "Britain's position began to "alter from the 1860s."[96] According to Wallerstein's cycles of global hegemony, the British cycle in 1850-1873 is presented as "hegemonic maturity."[97]

Year	1850	1860	1870
France (GNP)	11.8	13.3	16.8
Britain (GNP)	12.5	16	19.6
France (GNP/capita)	333	365	437
Britain (GNP/capita)	458	558	628
France (population)	35.8	37.4	36
Britain (population)	27.6	29	31

Table. 4. GNP, Per Capita GNP, and Population of France and Britain, 1850-1870[98]

[94] Dale C. Copeland, *op.cit.*, (2015), pp. 377-378.
[95] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 100-102.
[96] Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945*, (Fontana, 1983, 1984), p. 91.
[97] Charles P. Kindleberger, *op.cit.*, (1996), p. 51.
[98] GNP at market price, in 1960 U.S. dollars and prices; in billions, Per Capita GNP in 1960 U.S. Dollars and Prices; Total Population in millions, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, (Vintage Books: New York, 1987, 1989), p. 171, p. 199.

Given the trend of GNP and per capita GNP of Britain and France in 1850-1870, as shown in Table 2, it is fair to suggest that economies of Britain as well as France simultaneously enjoyed a prosperous trend. However, Britain still led the global economy and in fact slightly increased economic gap with France from 1850 to 1860 and sustained it by 1870. While France's financial capacity could not excel those of Britain, Napoleon III's expansionist imperialism, supported by France's reviving economy,[99] propelled the early modernization and notable growth of the French navy from the mid 1850s,[100] which rendered near naval power parity in 1862. Likewise, the relative ability of mobilization for naval defense does not only hinge upon the shifting economic capacity but also has more to do with whether the domestic political balance in a particular moment favors or disfavors such an allocation of resources.

France's rapid naval buildup and subsequent near naval parity, 1856-1863

As early as in November 1853, the acute need "for an effective protection against shell-fire" arose, "when a Turkish squadron was virtually annihilated by a Russian fleet employing shell-guns" in the battle of Sinope. Napoleon III himself pushed for trials for an effective protection against them when most of officers were dubious about the effectiveness of any armor.[101] Once it was found at Vincennes that "four-inch-thick wrought iron, well supported by timber, could resist a very heavy concentration of shot, and shrug off shell," the Ministry of Marine approved of "the construction of steam ironclad-batteries, vessels fit to take on the Russian fortresses without being destroyed" in June 1854. Moreover, alerted by the damage of "his wooden-ships in the bombardment of Sebastopol on October 17, 1854," Napoleon III "proposed the transformation of wooden-ships of the line into ironclads to reinforce his newly projected floating batteries."[102]



Figure. 10. The relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval arms buildup

[99] Charles I. Hamilton, *Anglo-French Naval Rivalry, 1840-1870*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 62.
[100] Robert S. Ross, "Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the 19th century to the Rise of China", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 71, No. 4, (2018), pp. 13-14.
[101] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,*(1993), p. 74.
[102] James P. Baxter, *The Introduction of The Ironclad Warship*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 92.

The Admiralty son followed suit by "laying down five batteries and authorizing four more the following year" but only "three of the French batteries had an important role in the attack of September 1855 on the fort of Kinburn situated on a small peninsula jutting north-west from the Crimea." At the battle of Kinburn, the armor itself was barely scathed except "slight dents and rust marks" and it was all the more striking since "the batteries' fire had been very effective."[103] Specifically, the three ironclad floating batteries of France, the *Dévastation*, *Lave*, and *Tonnate,* having anchored in the morning between 8:45 and 9:30, "fired 1265 shot and shell, 900, and 1012" respectively "in about four hours of fighting" with minimal casualties and damage on October 17th, 1855. "With six British and three French frigates steaming up the Dnieper after noon," General Kokonovitch, "encircled by an overwhelming fire," was forced to surrender at 1:25 a.m.[104]

During the years of the Crimean war, whereas the French took up a position in advance in producing ironclad batteries and proved its effectiveness at Kinburn in the Black Sea, the British steam-flotillas, which consisted of mortar-floats as well as gun-vessels and gunboats that placed "moving floats into firing position and protected them from any attack," had their own triumph in the Baltic where "the allies did not have as large army" as in the Black Sea. The Baltic Sea was consequently "a war zone of particular naval significance and British interests."[105] For instance, the gunboats and mortal vessels demonstrated the effectiveness by their dominant bombardment of Sweaborg on August of 1855.[106] The steam-flotillas as well as the ironclad-batteries were all certainly part of the wartime innovations that influenced the post-war naval policies,[107] but the French again could take the initiative in transition from screw-liner to ironclad with the experience.

Hamilton attributes "the success of French naval policy in the 1850s and 1860s" to "able and energetic chef d'état-major [chief of staff]" and their ministers of Marine, yet most importantly, to the solid commitment of the Emperor, which "has to be stressed above all others."[108] Baxter seems to concur and comments, "At all events, between 1854 and 1860, Napoleon III had inaugurated a great revolution in naval architecture" during the Second Empire.[109] Even from 1852, France moved ahead of Britain in converting sail of the line ships into fast steamers. Only the *Gomer*, the French paddle-frigate, and the *Napoléon,* the first purpose-built steam battleship*,* were able to overcome the winds and currents "of all the towing operations" through the Dardanelles strait to Constantinople. [110] The end of the Crimean war in March 1856, transformed once allies, who built screw-fleets together against Russia, into the most tangible naval rivals to each other.

At Vincenne again, France continued a series of experiments in 1856, and the *Conseil des Travaux,* the board of construction in the Ministry of Marine*,* devised "a program for studies in the ports projects for ships" sides at least as resistant as those of the first floating batteries, and, if possible, more durable, more easily repaired, less liable to leaks, and more likely to withstand ramming". By March, 1857, the Emperor had

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[103] Ibid., pp. 75-76.
[104] James P. Baxter, *op.cit*, (1933), pp. 82-85.
[105] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit*.,(1993), p. 73.
[106] Ibid., p. 77.
[107] Ibid., p. 78.
[108] Ibid*.,* pp. 267-268.
[109] James P. Baxter, *op.cit*, (1933), p. 115.
[110] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,*(1993), pp. 64-65.

intervened and "ordered tests of several styles of corrugated and grooved plates of his own design."[111] Though the plates of his design were not particularly effective compared to ordinary armor, the Vincennes Commission had already conducted experiments to a sufficient extent that could solve "the problem of the seagoing ironclad."[112] Further, Napoleon III had appointed capable ministers and personnel in the Second Empire and gave them unwavering support, ensuring the continuity of "ironclad schemes."[113]

Year	Britain (1913=100)	France (1913=100)	Britain (£ in millions)	France (Franc in millions)
1852	89	103	6.63	108.02
1853	106	120	8.65	121.11
1854	118	128	14.49	202.45
1855	118	133	19.66	241.33
1856	117	135	13.46	225.72
1857	**120**	**130**	**10.59**	**126.76**
1858	**105**	**118**	**9.22**	**133.43**
1859	**108**	**118**	**11.82**	**293.03**
1860	**113**	**124**	**13.33**	**241.95**
1861	**108**	**122**	**12.60**	**206.87**
1862	**113**	**122**	**11.37**	**218.91**
1863	**114**	**123**	**10.82**	**137.64**
1864	**112**	**122**	**10.90**	**193.06**
1865	110	114	10.26	192.07
1866	113	116	10.68	179.29
1867	111	113	10.84	159.67
1868	108	114	11.14	155.58
1869	101	112	9.43	163.28
1870	104	115	8.97	195.95

Table. 5. Naval expenditures of Britain and France, 1852-1870[114]

The appointment of Dupuy de Lôme, the prescient naval architect "whose rules for iron shipbuilding had been the standard and who had submitted his first plan for a seagoing ironclad as early as 1845,"[115] as *Directeur du Matériel* in January 1857, was also prompted by the Emperor. As a result, the French vote for "construction and provisioning" for the naval building program surged by "over a half between 1857 and 1860" and France's naval expenditure restored and even surpassed the previous wartime level as seen from Table 3. "The ironclad fleet" was obviously "costly."[116] This possibly alarming shift of naval power balance couldn't have gone unnoticed by Britain. In December 1858, a special committee appointed by Treasury produced a report that examined "the Navy estimates in 1852-1858 and the comparative state of the Navies of England" and projected the actual expenditure of France.[117]

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[111] James P. Baxter, *op.cit*, (1933), pp. 94-95.
[112] *Ibid.,* pp. 96-97.
[113] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit*.,(1993), p. 268.
[114] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,* (1988), p. 338-346.
[115] James P. Baxter, *op.cit*, (1933), p. 97.
[116] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,(1993*), p. 269.
[117] George A. Hamilton, "Report of Treasury Committee to inquire into Navy Estimates, 1852-58, and Comparative State of Navies of England and France", *House of Common Papers* [HC], No. 182, 1859.

Type of Ships	**Line of Battle Ships**		**Frigates**	
December, 1858	**England**	**France**	**England**	**France**
Complete, Hull and Machinery	29	29	Screw: 17 Paddle: 9 Total: 26	Screw: 15 Paddle: 19 Total: 34
Receiving Engines	4	2	2	3
Converting	7	4	0	1
Building	10	5	6	8
Total	**50**	**40**	**34**	**46**
Iron-plated Ships	-	**Building: 4**		

Table. 6. Steam line of battleships and frigates of Britain and France in 1858[118]

At the outset, the committee, comprised of the Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Admiralty, Accountant-general of the Navy, and Chief Clerk in the Treasury, explicitly showed the British sense of falling behind in naval power balance vis-à-vis France in 1858 and thereafter. They observed, "the naval force of the country is far inferior to what it ought to be with reference to that of other powers, and *especially of France*; and that increased efforts and increased expenditure are imperatively called for to place it on a proper footing." The committee underscored that the British naval supremacy "must be secured as a matter of paramount necessity" and ascribed the primary cause for "a prospective increased" in naval expenditure to France's "construction and armament of ships of war."[119] The major concern of the report revolved around the prospect of balance of line of battleships, including iron-plated ones.

According to the comparison of two navies in December 1858, even though Britain was expected to have 10 more steam line-of-battle ships than France, France would possess 12 more steam-frigates than Britain in addition to the four more ironclad ships "of which two were more than half-completed."[120] The partial superiority of Britain in steam line-of-battle ships would be virtually nullified by France's larger steam-frigates and stronger iron-cased ships in the coming years. The committee forecasted, assuming "the present rate and mode of expenditure in the dockyards,"[121] the proposed conversion of sailing ships of the line might not be complemented by 1863. Britain would only have 43 steam line-of-battle ships, whereas France would possess a steam fleet of 40 screw line-of-battle ships alongside four iron-sided ships in 1861. They acknowledged additional reinforcement could be made to the French steam navy in 1861-1863.

The British uneasiness stemmed from the estimated inferiority in the combined forces of steam line of battleships and frigates, let alone that the French already moved ahead of England in constructing new ironclad ships. Aside from the four iron-plated ships of France, the total number of Britain's line of battle ships and frigates, 84, was fewer than that of France, 86, as easily inferred from Table 4. The report suspected, "French would have, by 1860, a steam-fleet which, with a proportion of large transports, would enable them to carry an army of 60,000 men, with all its horses, provisions, and materials for one month" and concluded, "this superiority of France might form a serious detriment to this

[118] *Ibid.* pp. 17-18.
[119] *Ibid.* pp. 1-2.
[120] *Ibid.* p.15.
[121] *Ibid.* p.15.

country in the event of hostilities."[122] England maintained more sailing vessels, 296 compared to 144 of France, but the committee urged for the attention to its growing weakness in steam navies due to the strategic and military implications.

Sailing-Vessels (1858)	England			France		
	Afloat	Building	Total	Afloat	Building	Total
Line of Battle Ships	35		248	10	-	86
Frigates	70			28	4	
Corvettes and Sloops	43			11	2	
Brigs and Despatch Vessels	15	-		26	2	
Mortar-Vessels	45			3	-	
Mortar-Floats	40			-	-	
Schooners, Cutters, & etc	48		48	32	-	32
Transports	-	-	-	26	-	26
Total	296		**296**	136	8	**144**

Table. 7. Sailing vessels of Britain and France in 1858[123]

While the Anglo-French balance of sailing vessels in 1852, 299 of Britain and 258 of France respectively, was largely symmetric, the breakdown of balance in sailing vessels in fact resulted from the French conversion of "all their sailing-ships that were fit for it into steam-ships" from 1852.[124] As Hamilton illustrates, "the *Bretagne*, a first-rate sail of the line, began her conversion into a fast battleship of 131 guns in January 1853," which was "to be larger than the Duke of *Wellington.*" Additionally, "five fast second-rates, improved *Napoléons*, were laid down between March and September", and two more followed in 1854. In the same year, the *Eylau*, a sailing battleship, was converted with extended amidships and engines of 900 horsepower.[125] The committee had been also well aware of the fact that "the large increase of the French steam navy, since 1852, has been effected mainly by the conversion of sailing ships."[126]

As such, it may not be an overstatement that 1858 was the year when the Anglo-French maritime competition "entered a new and more intense phase."[127] Alongside Hamilton, Beeler agrees, "the height of the French naval challenge occurred in the late 1850s and early 1860s."[128] The special committee of 1858, represented by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Admiralty, was not the only officials who were anxious about "the progress which France has made, and may hereafter make, in the formation of a steam navy."[129] Once the French new port at Cherbourg was completed, the Queen and Prince Albert were invited to visit the Cherbourg port for "a feast aboard the *Bretagne,"* but they could not be content with "a great arsenal and excellent harbor directly

[122] *Ibid.* p.19.
[123] *Ibid.* pp.18-19.
[124] *Ibid.,* p. 14.
[125] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 62-63.
[126] "Report of Treasury Committee to inquire into Navy Estimates, 1852-58, and Comparative State of Navies of England and France", *House of Common Papers,* No. 182, 1859, p. 21. The report noted, "the process of conversion is speedy as compared with that of building."
[127] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit*., (1993), p. 79.
[128] John F. Beeler, *British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880*, (CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 203.
[129] "Report of Treasury Committee to inquire into Navy Estimates, 1852-58, and Comparative State of Navies of England and France", *House of Common Papers,* No. 182, 1859, p. 24.

facing the Channel and the South Coast of England" in August 1858.[130] The visit rather aroused "increased suspicion of French armaments."[131]

In fact, two days prior to her departure to Cherbourg, on August 2nd 1858, the Queen revealed her serious concerns as to the plausible naval inferiority vis-à-vis France and demanded "immediate action with regard to our ships and dockyards," in a letter to the Earl of Derby, then Prime Minister. The Queen became increasingly wary not only due to "the first time" of "an absolute minority of ships on the sea" but also because of the asymmetric deployment of fleets between the Royal navy and the French navy in that France could "keep her fleet and occupies the center in Europe."[132] She had previously suggested the Derby cabinet have "an exact knowledge" on "the state of preparation of our Navy in case of a war" in March as well as April of 1858.[133] The relative inferiority of naval forces in the Channel and "the manning problem" of "the warships preserved in the Ordinary" unfortunately reinforced the naval scare in Britain.[134]

Thus, the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval armament from 1856 to 1862 was in large measure symmetric. In other words, Napoleon III's pursuit of naval expansion drove France's impressive naval armament, while Britain sharply perceived the unfavorable shift in naval power balance and technological competition and was able to proportionately respond to France's naval challenge. Although Disraeli, Chancellor of Exchequer, accused the Admiralty of "frightening the country" and being "inefficient," making the case for "reduction" of naval expenditure in October 1858,[135] Derby stressed "the necessity of increased expenditure" on the basis of "the conversion of old sailing Vessels into Screw Steamers and the construction of Iron-plated ships" and averred "we *must* have a naval preponderance over France, however inconvenient the outlay may be."[136]

The mounting precariousness felt by the Treasury committee, the Admiralty, the Queen, Derby, and later Palmerston who returned to office in June 1859,[137] was by no means a groundless sense. In spite of the partisan difference between Derby and Palmerston, they converged on the cause of the British naval supremacy over France. The French navy budget increased from 158 million francs to 219 million in 1858-1864,[138] and the naval expenditures reached at its zenith in 1859, 293 million francs, which was greater

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130 Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 83-84.

131 James P. Baxter, *op.cit*, (1933), p. 135.

132 Queen Victoria to the Earl of Derby, 2nd August, 1858, in Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher, eds., *The Letters of Queen Victoria: A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence between the Years 1837 and 1861, Vol. 3, 1854-1861*, (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W, 1908), p. 297.

133 *Ibid.,* pp. 275-278.

134 Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit*., (1993), pp. 82-83.

135 3213, From Benjamin Disraeli to Lord Derby, October 9 1858, DBP Box 146/1 [R2-25], in M.G. Wiebe, ed., *Benjamin Disraeli Letters: 1857-1859*, (University of Toronto Press, 2004), pp. 257-258.

136 Derby hoped the increased naval expenditure "could be counterbalanced by reductions elsewhere". *Ibid.,* pp. 258-259.

137 Palmerston observed in a letter to Russell in November of 1859, "he [the Emperor] has been assiduously labouring to increase his naval means, evidently for offensive as well as defensive purpose" and "in regard to our defensive arrangements, we must not be over-ruled by financial economy", in Evelyn Ashley, M.P., ed., *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, 1846-1865: With Selections from His Speeches and Correspondence, Vol. 2*, (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1876), pp. 187-189.

138 Theodore Ropp, *The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871-1904*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 10.

than twice those of 1857 and 1858. After hovering around 200 francs by 1862, the French naval expenditures began to decline 1863-1864. In comparison with the British spending, the naval budgets of France had been persistently "more than 60% of British spending and as high as 77% in 1862," which "amounted to between £8.1million and £8.8 million."[139] All in all, the most intense naval race took place in 1858-1862.

France ordered three ironclads in March of 1858, including the first seagoing ironclad, *Gloire*, and three more in June and September. By 1860, ten more iron-plated ships were scheduled to be constructed in the following plan approved on November 16th.[140] Along with *Gloire* completed in 1860, *Couronne*, the first capital ship with an iron-hull, commissioned in 1862, signified the French lead in the ironclad innovation of the era. Dupuy de Lôme's new ironclad fleet consisted of "16 homogenous broadside battleships of the *Gloire*, *Couronne*, *Flandre*, and *Solferino* classes."[141] The Orisini incident in January of 1858, an Italian nationalist's attempt to assassinate the Emperor, preceded this inopportune moment, aggravating the naval scare precipitated by the colonels' petition to cross to London. Consequently, a Channel fleet was kept in peacetime and thousands of volunteer riflemen were recruited for coastal defense.[142]

In line with the committee report of 1858, Sir John Pakington, Derby's First Lord of Admiralty, shared a unsatisfactory condition of the Royal navy "in reference to the condition of the navy of France" in his speech of February 1859.[143] Adverting to "the progress made by France in increasing her naval armament during the last few years," Pakington specified that naval power parity might be reached "for the first time" in screw-liners and France could become "superior" to Britain "as regards to the most powerful class of ships of war at the close of next year" without "some extraordinary steps."[144] Derby entirely concurred in "the absolute necessity for the increase of your Majesty's naval force," as he wrote to the Queen in May.[145] Rumors of a Franco-Russian alliance in April[146] inspired another invasion scare of 1859 as well.[147] In response, Britain went to great lengths to retain its naval supremacy as shrewdly as possible from 1859.

As clarified in Table 3, Britain had arrested the downward trend of naval expenditures in 1855-1858 since 1859. The naval estimates also "edged back from £ 12.7 million to £ 9.6 million and £ 8 million prior" to 1859. Nonetheless, the budget never fell below £ 9 million again,[148] let alone the naval expenditures until 1870. The British naval expenditures soared from £ 9.22 million to £ 13.33 million in 1858-1860. As a consequence, the first British seagoing ironclad, HMS *Warrior,* was laid down in May

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[139] John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 204.
[140] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 82-83.
[141] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 10.
[142] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), p. 84, James P. Baxter, *op.cit*, (1933), pp. 138-139.
[143] *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 152, 1859, page cols. 882-944.
[144] *Ibid.* Pakington's assessment was based on the report of the Surveyor of the Royal Navy, Sir Baldwin Walker.
[145] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, 1st May, 1859, in Arthur C. Benson and Vicsount Esher, ed., *op.cit,.*(1908), p. 330.
[146] Concerning a Franco-Russian alignment, Derby indicated that he had "no doubt but France may rely on tacit assistance, if not the active cooperation of Russa" in the same letter. *Ibid.* p. 330.
[147] Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902*, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 100.
[148] John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 57.

1859, and its sister ship, the *Black Prince*, followed after five months.[149] On the other hand, having broken his short political hiatus, Palmerston pushed for the fortification of naval arsenals and other important points on the coast, arguing, "one night is enough for the passage to our coast and twenty thousand men might be landed at any point" in December of 1859.[150] By 1862, Britain constructed 4 firs-class ironclads and France had 5 ones.[151]

Palmerston had been tirelessly keen on the French building program and strongly in favor of "getting funds for screw-liners as well as armor-clads" to counteract France.[152] Regardless of the types of ships, he sided with the opinion of "having as many of them as needed to overmatch those against us."[153] When Gladstone recommended transfers of the wooden ship estimates to shot-proof shipbuilding in the face of the Admiralty's demand of three million "for a fresh naval outlay,"[154] Palmerston defended the Admiralty, invoking that "the great increase in the French navy was ordered only a short time ago," and opposed Gladstone's idea as it might "deprive" Britain "of some things which are still essential," namely wooden-ships.[155] Palmerston as well as the successor of Sir Pakington, Edward Seymour, were staunch "advocates of naval preparedness" and public opinion also backed them in 1859-1862.[156]

The *Royal Oak*, one of "the screw-liners abandoned on the stocks," was approved for armor-cladding in May 1861, launched two years later, and as the French naval program progressed, four more sister ships followed the example of the *Royal Oak*. All of the previous seven screw-liners were brought back to life as ironclads. The relatively symmetric ability of mobilization eventually rendered near naval power equality between Britain and France in 1862, as displayed in Table 6. Palmerston's letter to Gladstone on July 21 in 1861 unveils that he became increasingly "uneasy about the relative positions of England and France with regard to Naval Strength" as the committee members of 1858.[157] He elaborated the comparative status of the British and French ship-building programs and unequivocally foresaw near naval power equality, or even the French superiority, would be very likely in 1862.[158]

Britain's superior capacity and the end of a naval arms race, 1863-1870

Palmerston's conclusion was crystal-clear. Because the French naval superiority "would be dangerous to England either in the amount or in the quality of her naval force," England "should lose no time in adding to our numbers and improving the quality of the

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[149] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,*(1993), p. 89.
[150] Palmerston to Gladstone, December 15th, 1859, in Philip Guedalla eds., *Gladstone and Palmerston: Being the Correspondence of Lord Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865,* (New York: Harper, 1928). pp. 115-118
[151] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), p. 327.
[152] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), p. 90.
[153] Palmerston to Gladstone, November 29th, 1859, in Philip Guedalla, *op.cit*, (1928), p. 114.
[154] Gladstone on Lord Palmerston's Memorandum, February 25th, 1861, Philip Guedalla, *op.cit*, (1928), pp. 157-160.
[155] Palmerston to Gladstone, February 25th, 1861, in Philip Guedalla, *op.cit*, (1928), p. 160.
[156] John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 51.
[157] Palmerston to Gladstone, July 21st, 1861, in Philip Guedalla, *op.cit*, (1928), p. 181.
[158] *Ibid.,* p. 183, p. 185. In his own account, Britain might have 15 or 16 ironclad ships against 17 of France in the summer of 1862 and be able to restore its superiority in 1863 depending on endeavors on the part of Britain.

ships to be added."[159] He particularly insisted 6 more ironclads be constructed by 1863 in following the First Lord's recommendation.[160] Palmerston viewed that the precondition of "peace and good understanding" was "when France has no naval superiority over England."[161] Likewise, "the latest generation of screws" was entirely replaced with ironclads in 1861. Moreover, the marked difference between French ironclads and English counterparts was that the former had wooden-hulls and the latter was equipped with iron-hulls. Iron-hulls were advantageous since "it avoided the basic incompatibility between steam machinery and wooden hulls" and was less susceptible to both fire and water.[162]

Year	Britain	France	Russia	The U.S.
1856	0.505	0.269	0.148	0.080
1857	0.504	0.246	0.168	0.083
1858	0.489	0.266	0.146	0.099
1859	0.467	0.341	0.116	0.077
1860	0.493	0.323	0.117	0.068
1861	0.574	0.304	0.063	0.060
1862	***0.401***	***0.398***	0.047	0.150
1863	0.449	0.315	0.051	0.187
1864	0.490	0.269	0.077	0.165
1865	0.401	0.273	0.118	0.209
1866	0.475	0.278	0.139	0.109
1867	0.493	0.299	0.116	0.092
1868	0.514	0.276	0.132	0.079
1869	0.503	0.287	0.144	0.068
1870	0.477	0.292	0.153	0.075

Table. 8. Proportional distribution of naval capabilities, 1856-1870[163]

Furthermore, Britain's naval expenditures, undergirded by its robust commitment for the maritime preponderance and superior financial resources, didn't substantially vacillate from 1862. In contrast, the French naval expenditures dropped to a great extent in 1863, even though the initial budget in 1863 was larger than the previous budget by approximately 18.7 million francs.[164] In part, the authoritarian simplicity in the 1850s of the Second Empire was partially undermined with the *Senatus-Consultum* of December 1861, which granted the *Corps législatif* "some power to control military and naval expenditure". Subsequently, the Emperor gradually made "greater concessions" as the end of the decade came closer.[165] By 1863, the French shipbuilding program appears to have been "in arrears."[166] In spite of Gladstone's economical oversight, Britain was capable of widening the naval gap with France from 1864, if not 1863, moving forward.

Napoleon III's commitment to strengthening French naval power waned thereafter and the superiority of British financial and industrial resources trampled a slim hope for

[159] *Ibid.,* pp. 181-187.
[160] *Ibid.,* p. 186.
[161] *Ibid.,* p. 187.
[162] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 92-93.
[163] Source: George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), p. 122.
[164] Captain Hore, R.N. to Early Cowley, Paris, April 1862, in "Reports respecting the Strength of the Naval and Military Forces of France", *Parliamentary Papers*, Command Papers [CP], 1862, Vol. 63, No. 283. p. 3.
[165] *Ibid.,* p. 294.
[166] John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 52.

the French lead.[167] Accordingly, British expenditures for ironclads shrunk from £630,203 in 1864-1864 to £130,000 two years later and the large shipbuilding programs of the Conservatives cabinet in 1867-1868 were "conceived to counter an essentially nonexistent French threat."[168] The military defeat of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1871 finally dealt a serious blow to the French shipbuilding that had been already falling behind Britain from 1864. Hence, the relative ability of domestic mobilization for naval defense bounced back towards asymmetry with the French capacity weaker in 1864-1870. While the previous balance of domestic mobilization in 1858-1862 generated almost naval power parity, the fallout of the balanced ability for domestic mobilization watered down the intensity of maritime security competition from the mid-1860s.[169]

4.3. France's geographical expansion, 1856-1870

→ Britain's peripheral theaters without expected contagion effect on naval defense

France's bid for territorial rearrangement of the Crimean system, 1856-1860

Geographically, the Crimean system, established by the Paris treaty of 1856, largely focused on barring Russia from encroaching on the Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean through the Black Sea. As a revised system of the Vienna settlement of 1815, the Crimean settlement was predicated upon "the four points of Vienna,"[170] such as (1) Russia's loss of the protectorate of the Danubian principalities (2) the free navigation of the Danube (3) a modification of the Straits convention of 1841, in accordance with "the interests of the Balance of Power in Europe," and (4) Russia's abandonment of its "claim to a protectorate over the Christian subjects of Turkey."[171] In the course of the Crimean war, Russia had already conceded the fourth point, the original source of the conflict, in August 1853, and the first and second point were implicitly accepted in August 1854 when Russia departed from the principalities.[172]

Thus, the Crimean war primarily centered around the third point associated with the issue of Russian maritime power in the Black Sea. As a result of the defeat of the Crimean war, Russia lost its previous protectorates in the Danube, consequently including access to the Danube, and most significantly, the Black Sea and the Aland islands were neutralized or demilitarized.[173] The neutralization of the Black Sea and the Aland islands in the Baltic imposed a considerable setback on Russia's maritime power projection in the respective

[167] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,*(1993), p. 304.
[168] John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 52, p. 203.
[169] In his appreciation of the Anglo-French squadron meetings at Cherbourg, Brest, and Portsmouth, Palmerston notified the Queen, "the political advantage of these meeting will serve to essentially the security for peace, and it will dispel in France the mistaken belief that the English nation entertain a settled hatred of France and Frenchmen", by September of 1865. Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 4th September, 1865, in George Earle Buckle, eds., *The Letters of Queen Victoria: A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1862 and 1878, Vol. 1, 1862-1869*, (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W, 1926), pp. 275-276.
[170] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 92.
[171] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit*., (1954, 1973), pp. 65-67.
[172] *Ibid.,* p. 66.
[173] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 93.

regions until the abrogation of the Black Sea neutralization in 1871.[174] It is not a wonder that Russia had persistently sought to ultimately revoke the Black Sea neutralization of the Crimean system in 1856-1871. However, it was France with Sardinia that initiated and completed the first major territorial revision of the Crimean system in 1859-1861 as France simultaneously engaged in the ambitious naval armament.

Napoleon III vigorously expanded the French spheres of influence in multiple fronts across the regions. Though both Britain and France were the victors as well as allies in 1853-1856, Britain preferred the status quo after the Crimean settlement whereas France pressed for revising the existing spheres of influence for its favor in Europe and abroad. Nonetheless, the direction and concentration of France's geographic expansion hardly fell upon the shared central theater, Europe, alone. The Second Empire's expansion had been more frequently directed and concentrated in the peripheral theaters for both great powers, including Syria in 1860-1861, China in 1856-1862,[175] Southeast Asia in 1857-1861,[176]and Mexico in 1862-1867.[177] Such peripheral campaigns of France reduced the loss of interest and prestige for Britain from France's power projection even when the French naval bases proliferated across the global oceans.

France's geographical expansion in the extra-European regions did not trigger alarming reactions on the British side and Britain rather worked with France in China, Syria, and Mexico. For example, the Anglo-French joint expedition forces fought the Second Opium War against the Qing Empire in 1856-1860. Despite minor tensions with Britain, the French military as well as naval intervention of 1860 in Syria was largely understood by virtue of the European joint action to ensure the integrity of the Ottoman Empires and protect Maronite Christians.[178] Britain, Spain and France also embarked on a joint expedition to Mexico by occupying Veracruz in October 1861 but the former two countries shortly withdrew as disagreements emerged while France became mired in Mexico until 1867.[179] From 1858 the French warships operated in Indo-China and France seized "large territories around Saigon, and rights of overlordship in Cambodia by 1861."[180]

However, the French intervention of 1858-1861 in Italy, particularly France's annexation of Nice and Savoy, was an unambiguous exception. Napoleon I's territorial expansion, which ended with the Vienna System, previously swept across West Asia, Italy and the Rhine, in Palmerston's phrase, "the Tide of Conquest ran from West to East, then

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[174] "Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Prussia, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the Revision of certain Stipulations of the Treaty of March 30, 1856 (Navigation of the Black Sea and the Danube), Signed at London, March 13, 1871", *British and Foreign State Papers*, (1870-71), Vol. 61, pp. 7-10.

[175] Brian C. Chao, "A brilliant second: France as a naval great power", in Paul Kennedy and Evan Wilson, *op.cit.,* (2021), p. 37.

[176] Emmanuelle Guenot, "Napoleon III and France's colonial expansion: national grandeur, territorial conquests and colonial embellishment, 1852-1870" in Robert Aldrich and Cindy McCreery *ed., Crowns and colonies: European Monarchies and Overseas Empires*, (Manchester University Press, 2016), p. 217.

[177] Jerome Greenfield, "The Mexican Expedition of 1862-1867 and the End of the French Second Empire", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 3, (2020), pp. 660-664.

[178] *Ibid.* "Speech of the Lords Commissioners, on the Closing of the British Parliament, August 28, 1860", *British and Foreign State Papers*, (1870-71), Vol. 61, pp. 4-9.

[179] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 120.

[180] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit*., (1993), p. 80.

returned back from East to West."[181] The conclusion of the Crimean war settled the territorial issues in Southeastern Europe and West Asia, with maritime implications in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and Napoleon III's excursion into the affairs in Italy might establish a solid stepping stone for another disturbing encroachment upon the left bank of the Rhine. The probability of France's power projection into the Rhine is the point at which Britain could not sit back in a nonchalant manner and any territorial compensation, which was France's rationale of annexation, or expansion in Italy could entail such a possibility.

There could be no doubt that England preferred the territorial order of the Crimean system, and despite its sympathy towards the nationalist cause of Italian unification,[182] it had seldom desired an Italian unification that should increase France's spheres of influence or drive Italy into the orbit of France. The Orsini incident of 1858, where an Italian nationalist attempted to assassinate the French Emperor only to fail in January, aggravated the Anglo-French tension as the notable naval power shift took off. Napoleon III capitalized on the incident to intervene more deeply in the Italian affairs and the Derby cabinet came to power in February as Palmerston tried to conciliate the demands of the Emperor in the Parliament. Meanwhile, the Tory cabinet was less sympathetic to the Italian cause as the previous Whig cabinet and endeavored to avert a war among Austria, France and Sardinia.[183]



Figure. 11. France's expected gain and Britain's expected loss from France's power projection

Concerning the Italian affairs, Foreign Minister Malmesbury wrote to Queen, "England could give her moral support, and even her material aid eventually," if these assistances helped establish a more stable "administration of the Roman states" without causing a war.[184] Nonetheless, France and Sardinia were already determined to provoke a war against Austria from the outset. In July 1858, Napoleon III aligned with Cavour and consented to a secret plan to expel the Austrian presence and unify a Kingdom of Upper

[181] Palmerston to Russell, November 18, 1863, G.& D. 22/22, *Pte Russell Papers,* Quoted in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, eds., *Foundations of British Foreign Policy, From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902): Old and New Documents Selected and Edited*, Cambridge University Press, (1938), pp. 256-258.
[182] Denis Mack Smith, "Palmerstone and Cavour: Some English Doubts about the Risorgimento", in C. P. Brand, K. Foster, and U. Limentani, eds., *Italian Studies Presented to E.R. Vincent*, (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1963), p. 244.
[183] Malmesbury wrote on January 12th, 1859, "I care for neither Austria nor France, but Lord Derby and I are determined to use every effort to prevent war……My whole mind is occupied by that object," Earl of Malmesbury, *Memoirs of An Ex-Minister*, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1885, 1924), pp. 458-459.
[184] The Earl of Malmesbury to Queen Victoria, December 10th 1858, in Arthur C. Benson and Vicsount Esher, *op.cit.,* (1908), p. 305.

Italy in return for the cession of Savoy to France at Plombières.[185] Piedmont-Sardinia's task was to lure Austria into a war and France was supposed to militarily intervene, localize the war, and diplomatically cope with other great powers. The Franco-Sardinian alliance was formed in January 1859, when Nice was added to part of the territorial gain. Austria unfortunately fell for the Franco-Italian plot with its ultimatum to Sardinia in April.[186]

Malmesbury made futile efforts to "invite Austria to submit" to "the friendly mediation of an impartial Ally" prior to the outbreak of the Italian unification war.[187] On May 1st 1859, Derby thought that Britain would have to adhere to "the principle of strict neutrality in the affairs of Italy."[188] Once the British mediation, in which they suggested Austria not interfere with Central Italy and Sardinia be neutralized, fell apart, the war broke out in May and Napoleon won victories twice in June at Magenta and Solferino,[189] after which France named its second and fifth first-class ironclads.[190] By June, Derby again made case for "a perfectly neutral policy" in spite of "a great jealousy and suspicion of France in the country."[191] The British position concerning the Italian affairs became more concrete after Palmerston returned to power, even though the policy of neutrality during the war ensued.

Until the French annexation of Nice and Savoy was realized in March 1860, the Palmerston cabinet pursued "an independent kingdom of Italy, free of 'both' Austria and France" and partially sided with the Franco-Sardinian alliance in dispelling Austria from Lombardy and Venice.[192] In this respect, Britain was pro-Italian and anti-Austrian from June of 1859, but it never implied that Britain would warrant any territorial expansion on the French side in Italy. As Schroeder points out, the objective of the British policy was to curb France's ambition and deter "Napoleon from making territorial gains or acquiring a dominant influence in Italy."[193] In July 1859, the British ambassador to France, Earl Cowley, had been disconcerted about the rumor of France's annexation of Savoy and implored Napoleon III to "abandon any idea of territorial aggrandizement" through France's Foreign Minister, Count Walewski.[194]

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[185] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*, Harper & Row, Publishers, (1958), p. 100. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, (Oxford University Press, 1954, 1971), p. 103.

[186] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, eds., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, (The University Press of Kansas, 1976), pp. 206-207.

[187] Malmesbury to Loftus (Vienna), No. 282, 21 April 1859, F.O. 7/563, in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938), pp. 200-201.

[188] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, 1st May, 1859, in Arthur C. Benson and Vicsount Esher, *op.cit,* (1908), p. 330.

[189] Derek Beales, *England and Italy, 1859-60*, (Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1961), p. 62.

[190] Charles I. Hamilton, *op.cit.,*(1993), p. 327.

[191] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, 2nd June, 1859, in Arthur C. Benson and Vicsount Esher, *op.cit,.*1908, p. 337.

[192] Denis Mack Smith, "Palmerstone and Cavour: Some English Doubts about the Risorgimento", in C. P. Brand, K. Foster, and U. Limentani, *op.cit.*, (1963), p. 246.

[193] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

[194] Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell, Paris, July 4, 1859, "Correspondence between Great Britain, France, Sardinia, and Switzerland, respecting the proposed Annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, 1859, 1860," *British and Foreign State Papers* (1859-1860), Vo. 50, p. 457.

However, Walewski's answers could not ease Cowley. While denying the allegation of any "understanding between France and Sardinia upon the subject," which was arguably disingenuous, Waleski admitted that the Emperor "entertained the idea" of territorial compensation if Sardinia turned into a larger "Italian Kingdom."[195] Contrary to his words in the annual address at the legislative in February of 1859, where he declared he would "put all my perseverance to consolidate the alliance with England,"[196] his envision of territorial expansion in Italy confounded the British side. Russell, Foreign Secretary, raised a disturbing possibility that "the left bank of the Rhine will be the next object [of France] if Savoy should be annexed to France," making clear of the British opposition to the annexation.[197] As the most adjacent neighbor, the Swiss government had continued to request the British intervention with its growing anxiety about the annexation.[198]

The French signals had been neither frank nor reassuring. When French Foreign Ministers, Walewski and Thouvenel in 1859-1860, had given some assurances to Earl Cowley, the British ambassador to Paris, that "the idea of annexation had been abandoned" and "the Emperor had not alluded to Savoy with him [Thouvenel],"[199] In response, Russell suggested, "had it been otherwise, great alarm would have been felt on the Rhine and throughout Germany."[200] Minister Thouvenel eventually conceded in February of 1860, "the security of France would require the annexation of Savoy and Nice" because "the territories of Sardinia greatly increased" after the war with Austria, Russell replied that Britain "cannot conceive the security of France can be endangered" in any manner.[201] Russell warned against the French expansion under the rationale of "security" since the French claims of "natural frontiers, the Alps and the Rhine" could imply a Napoleonic war.[202]

Ironically, aside from the French incorporation of Nice and Savoy, France's war against Austria ceased due to another threat from 'the Rhine,' namely Prussia that mobilized its troops in June, with the armistice at Villafranca in July 1859.[203] Nevertheless, the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in March 1860 increased the loss of interest and prestige for Britain in the central theater. Britain's alignment with France turned frailer with France's territorial revisionism that Britain disfavored in Europe. Even when the conservative cabinet of Derby sought neutrality to prevent a Franco-Austrian war, Foreign Secretary Malmesbury actually hoped to thwart "a plot to impose French domination on the [Italian] peninsula" out of "fear of the aggrandizement of France."[204] In the secret dispatch to Berlin, Malmesbury suggested, "France must see a barrier to any ambitious

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[195] *Ibid.*
[196] Napoleon III, "DISCOURS de l'Empereur des Français à l'Ouverture de la Session Législative", Paris, le 7 Ffévrier, 1859, *British and Foreign State Papers* (1858-1859), Vo. 49, pp. 767-769.
[197] Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley, Foreign Office, July 5, 1859, *British and Foreign State Papers* (1859-1860), Vo. 50, pp. 457-458.
[198] Captain Harris to Lord J. Russell, Berne January 31, 1860, *pp.* 475-476.
[199] Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell, Paris, January 27, 1860, *Ibid,* p. 472.
[200] Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley, Foreign Office, January 28, 1860, *Ibid.,* pp. 474-475.
[201] Lord J. Russell to Earl Cowley, Foreign Office, February 13, 1860, *Ibid.,* pp. 492-493.
[202] *Ibid.*
[203] Derek Beales, *op.cit.*, (1961), p.7.
[204] *Ibid.,* pp. 164-169.

views of territorial aggrandizement in a wise and just union" between Britain and Prussia.[205]

Palmerston's position in regard to the Italian unification war represented a complete volte-face from January to March and April in 1860. In January, Palmerston advocated the British participation in the Franco-Sardinian alliance to counterbalance the influence of Austria, the Pope and Naples in Italy, calling it as "a triple league against Austria", and contemplated the British role in case of a war would be "chiefly naval and our squadron in the Adriatic."[206] However, having been provoked by France's annexation in March, Palmerston sternly spoke to Count Flahault, the French ambassador to the Royal court, "England would fearlessly accept" a war with France, "if forced upon England" though he "was most anxious to prevent such as war" three days after the annexation in March 1860.[207] These words stood in contrast to the January memorandum in which he rather defended the Emperor's consistent view about Italy to those who didn't trust France.[208]

France's annexation of Nice and Savoy and Britain's increased anxiety, 1860-1865

Napoleon III's annexation of Nice and Savoy had not only been undertaken in a fraudulent fashion given the two neutral provinces of Savoy, internationally guaranteed in the treaties of 1815, but also enhanced the British apprehension since it fostered a prospect of France's expansion along the Alps and Rhine based on the claim of natural frontier or security. Specifically, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had stated France would not infringe upon the neutrality of Chablais and Faucigny, two districts bordering on the lake of Geneva, and "those should be united to Switzerland" in February of 1860. In the statement sent to Cowley, Thouvenel laid out the logic of the annexation but simultaneously sought to evade the indictment of "conquest or aggrandizement" by assuring that France would abide by the neutrality ensured by the Concert of Europe.[209] Therefore, these districts were expected to be "handed over to the Swiss Confederation" by the French Emperor.[210]

Cowley promptly expressed his regret concerning the idea of annexation and invoked "the apprehension of Europe," refuting the French case that Sardinia should be "as rich as powerful as France to make the case parallel."[211] To make matters worse, the French

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[205] Malmesbury's secret dispatch to Lord Bloomfield (Ambassador in Berlin), 'upon the supposed prospect of rupture between France and Austria', 7 January 1859, Copy of draft in Royal Archives, J 14/19 in Kenneth Bourne, *op. cit.,* 1970. Given Malmesbury's note and Palmerston's continued policy to constrain France's geographic challenge in the later years, the partisan difference did not appear to fundamentally alter the British strategic interests.

[206] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 174-180.

[207] Memorandum of a Conversation with Count Flahault on Tuesday, March 27, 1860, *Ibid.,* pp. 190-192. Flahault retorted that a French invasion of England, particularly afforded by steamships, "would be disastrous to England".

[208] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 178-179, For example, Palmerston wrote, "there is no ground for imputing for Napoleon unsteadiness of purpose in regard to his views about Italy……I always found him strongly entertaining the same views and opinions".

[209] Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell, Paris, February 5, 1860, *British and Foreign State Papers (1859-1860),* Vol. 50, pp. 483-485.

[210] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 183.

[211] Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell, Paris, February 5, 1860, *British and Foreign State Papers (1859-1860),* pp. 485-486.

assurance turned out to be not a genuine one but a bluff. In March, the Emperor still publicly legitimized the annexation that it was his "duty to reclaim to French mountain slopes for the security of our borders" because "the transformation of Northern Italy" created "all the passages of the Alps" for a powerful state. He suggested that a significant revision of territory in Italy entitled France to occupy "a territory of small extent."[212] Noting European expectation that France "would give Switzerland the neutralized parts and dedicate Savoy to Sardinia," Palmerston vitriolically wrote to Persigny [213] that Switzerland unfairly lost a strategic border for the sake of France's strategic border.[214]

France at least had betrayed two previous assurances with regard to the annexation of Savoy. One had to do with Napoleon III's enunciation that he "would consult the Great Powers" when it came to the issue of Savoy and "it is unlikely" that he "should act against the advice of Europe."[215] The other was concerned with its breach of the neutrality of two districts in Savoy, which should have been incorporated into Switzerland had France adhered to the European treaties of 1815. Although the Emperor compared Savoy "for the safety of France" to Perim, an island off the south-west coast of Yemen, which Britain annexed in 1857 "for the safety of Eastern dominions," his legitimation paled in comparison with his deeds that followed.[216] Subsequently, Queen Victoria called upon Russell to "perform a solemn duty" of the treaties of 1815,[217] but Palmerston found "no ground for war" or "no sufficient reasons for war about Nice and Savoy."[218]

Even though Britain's reaction to the French annexation did not entail any use of force at last, France's territorial expansion in Nice and Savoy, which unveiled its ambition for the territorial revision in Europe, was the critical juncture that cemented the British distrust towards France. Britain's misgiving about the French scheme continued to haunt to a certain extent that facilitated the Anglo-French alienation and the fallout of the Crimean system since 1860. After confiding to Cowley that Britain couldn't "prevent their annexation by any means", Palmerston yet suggested that "England could not be thus passive" should "other questions may arise" and insinuated a mobilization of the British fleet in case of another cession of Genoa.[219] By October, discussing a probability of war, Palmerston disclosed his confidence to Persigny in Britain's industrial strength to fight a war with France and anticipated almost equal power balance on land and at sea.[220]

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[212] Napoleon III, "DISCOURS de l'Empereur des Français à l'Ouverture de la Session Législative", Paris, le 1 Mars, 1860, *Ibid.,* pp. 630-633.
[213] The French Ambassador to London in 1855-1860 with a brief interval in 1858-1859
[214] Palmerston to Persigny, April 17th, 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 183-186.
[215] Earl Cowley to Lord John Russell, Paris, 7th March, 1860, in Arthur C. Benson and Vicsount Esher, *op.cit,* (1908), pp. 391-393.
[216] *Ibid.,* p. 391.
[217] Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell, Paris, 25th March, 1860, *Ibid.,* p. 395
[218] Palmerston to Lord Cowley, April 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 182.
[219] *Ibid.,* pp. 182-183.
[220] Palmerston to Persigny, October 18th, 1860, *Ibid.,* pp. 192-196.



Figure. 12. France's expected gain from its geographical expansion

Notwithstanding the disturbances generated by the annexation of Nice and Savoy amidst the shrinking naval power gap in 1860, France's geographical foray had not extended into either the Alps or the Rhine by 1870-1871. Hence, the extent to which Britain had lost its interest and prestige due to France's geographic challenge fell short of being high along with their shared interests in the peripheral theaters, such as Syria and China. The British loss of interest and prestige could have been far greater if France had persisted in striving for more territories across the Alps and especially Rhine. However, it was not that the Emperor had entirely done away with such an idea of gradual expansion but that France couldn't find anyone like Cavour who might grant a territorial compensation in return for the French scheme from Russia, Austria, and Prussia over the course of the Polish uprising, the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, the Austro-Prussian war in 1863-1866.

Napoleon III appeared to have acknowledged the geographical advantage of England, insularity, as the foundation of its economic advantage, and mentioned "a system of boundaries that France would have to arrive" in a conversation with the Belgian Minister, Marquis Moustier, in April 1860. According to the Emperor, France attained the secure flank on the Italian side with Nice and Savoy and the Belgian neutrality could help hinder an attack from the north. But "boundary rectifications" would be imperative "on the line from Mainz to Cologne" to which he referred "the Palatinate and the left bank of the Rhine."[221] The Emperor added that he was "not dreaming of conquest" but wished to "advance peacefully and gradually by friendly discussion and understandings."[222] The Emperor's interest in the left bank ensued for later years but Britain could not sanction it after the Italian disturbance in 1860.

France's undesirable encroachment in Italy had a marked impact on the British policy in the following years that witnessed a series of regional crises and wars. While Palmerston still took France as "essential in the balance of power in Europe," he assessed that "the seizure of Savoy and Nice and the breach of promise towards Switzerland" were issues which could "not got over easily" and "France should be content" with the status

[221] Hermann Oncken, *Napoleon III and the Rhine: The Origin of the War of 1870-1871*, Trans. Edwin H. Zeydel, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1928, 1967), pp. 23-24.
[222] Baron Beyens, *Le second Empire, vu par un diplomate belge*, (Lille-Bruges: Paris, 1924), Vol 1, p. 313, Cited in *Ibid,* p. 24.

quo in November 1860. Palmerston made clear that France should not drift into "the schemes and policy of the first Napoleon."[223] With the naval arms race intensified in 1858-1862, which heightened Palmerston's threat perception toward France,[224] Britain rebuffed the French proposal for a European congress and joint remonstrance against Russia[225] due to the reservations about France's "ulterior plans of aggrandizement" as seen from the Italian case.[226] The British sense was indeed not completely off the mark.

As Russell and Palmerston well recognized, Napoleon III's engagement in the Polish affairs was in part dictated by his domestic political incentives to garner liberal and Catholic support but also by his interest in further territorial rearrangement which France thought could be discussed at a European congress.[227] For instance, in Prince Napoleon's note sent to the Emperor on February 20th, 1863, "the general plan" of European rearrangement presented that Austria cede Venetia and Galicia to Italy and Poland respectively as in return for compensations from Germany and France take over the lands on the left bank of the Rhine then possessed by Bavaria, Hesse, and Prussia.[228] Napoleon III knew this proposal was a wild imagination purely from the French perspective yet endorsed it as "a dream which might be possible of realization one day."[229] Yet, Britain turned down the French request "for a joint remonstrance in Berlin" on 28th, which piqued the Emperor.[230]

Taylor comments that the British cabinet "were still dominated by the suspicion aroused by the annexation of Savoy" and wary of a chance that a joint action "against Prussia in Berlin" might provide France with a pretext "to occupy the Rhineland."[231] When France managed to have Austria and Britain join them for "demanding an armistice in Poland and an autonomous Polish state" in June,[232] Russia called their bluff and showed its resolve to withstand.[233] The Foreign Minister of Russia, Prince Gortchakoff, was believed to have told a Polich Count, Andrzej Zamoyski, that he would turn Poland into "a heap of ashes and corpses [*un monceau de cendres et de cadavres*]." With no intention to be dragged into a war by France, the British cabinet, including Palmerston, unanimously

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[223] Palmerston to Cowley, Broadlands, November 2, 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 196-198.
[224] Palmerston to Gladstone, Piccadilly, April 29, 1862, *Ibid.,* pp. 222-225.
[225] W. E. Mosse, "England and the Polish Insurrection of 1863", *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 71, No. 278, (1956), p. 32.
[226] Earl Granville to Queen Victoria, February 24, 1863, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), pp. 67-68. Earl Granville, Lord President of the Council, reported to Queen that Palmerston agreed with Russell that the French policy was driven by "a desire to conciliate Catholic support and probably by ulterior plans of aggrandizement".
[227] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 112-113.
[228] Prince Jerome Napoleon, "Note for the consideration of the Emperor on Affairs in Poland", Paris, February 20th, 1863, Ernest D'Hauterive, *The Second Empire and Its Downfall: The Correspondence of the Emperor Napoleon III and his Cousin Napoleon*, Trans. Herbert Wilson, New York: George H. Doran Company, (1927), p. 264.
[229] The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, January [this should read February] 22, 1863*, Ibid.,* pp. 186-187.
[230] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1956), pp. 32-34.
[231] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.*, (1954, 1971), pp. 136-137. Mosse similarly observes Palmerston's immediate concern of affording France an excuse for an attack on the Rhine. W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1956), p. 42.
[232] *Ibid.,* p. 138.
[233] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1956), p. 49.

refused to another French proposal to announce a collective determination to settle the Polish question by "pacific means" and other means if necessary.[234]

Palmerston could merely offer the British neutrality in case a Franco-Russian war, holding that "a French army was less dangerous in the Baltic than on the Rhine," when the French sounded out Britain's interest in its plan to land in the Baltic with a plausible assistance of Sweden.[235] The British preference is also found in another dispatch of Palmerston and Russel sent to Cowley in June where they specified that England "would insist on certain conditions in favor of the integrity of Germany against encroachments on the part of France, before she consented to be neutral."[236] Although the Emperor seemed to have informed Sweden of that he "intended to act in the Baltic in the spring of 1864 with or without England,"[237] France's expansion in the periphery, particularly Mexico,[238] in some measure deprived itself of a necessary number of troops to confront Russia single-handedly. By 1862, France spent more in sustaining troops in Mexico than in Italy.[239]

As a last resort, Napoleon III circulated the letters on November 4 in 1863, which proposed a European assembly in Paris, clamoring that the Vienna system of 1815 upon which the Crimean system was founded was "crumbling away" and thus had to be modified.[240] Britain unsurprisingly brushed it aside again. The concrete extent to which France strove for the rectification of territories in Europe, such as the Rhine provinces, is disputed by historians.[241] But the fact that France desired a reorganization of the existing territorial arrangement at each point, irrespective of whether it was triggered by the question of Poland, later the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, or the Austro-Prussian conflict, is indisputable. Aside from France's real intention and capacity to realize another territorial rearrangement, Palmerston denied any necessity of a general assembly of Europe to reorganize territorial boundaries in a manner that could possibly further the French interest.[242]

Palmerston's case was not unreasonable in that the Polish question was incomparable to the European general wars, such as the Napoleonic wars, or even the recent Crimean

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[234] Queen Victoria to Earl Russell, June 26th, 1863, Earl Russell to Queen Victoria, June 27th, 1863, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), pp. 95-96.

[235] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1971), p. 138.

[236] Russell to Cowley, June [this should read July] 3, 1863, Foreign Office, 27-1480, no. 857, confidential, drafts, quoted and cited in W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* 1956, p. 49.

[237] Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Grey and the king of Sweden, August 14, 1863, cited in *Ibid.,* p. 51.

[238] Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1956), p. 48, p. 50.

[239] For example, the supplementary credit appropriated for the maintenance of the troops in Mexico amounted to 7,489,990 Francs compared to 5,294,790 Francs in Italy or 5,953,362 Francs for the interior ministry. Captain Hore, R.N. to Early Cowley, Paris, April 1862, in "Reports respecting the Strength of the Naval and Military Forces of France", *Parliamentary Papers*, Command Papers [CP], 1862, Vol. 63, No. 283. p. 28, p. 36.

[240] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* 1876, p. 236.

[241] Whereas Oncken's traditional view holds that Napoleon III's goal was "the return of Rhine provinces to France", Ritter argues that Napoleon III's policy primarily aimed at a rearrangement of Germany in a fashion that would "suit French diplomacy". Hermann Oncken, *op.cit.*, (1928, 1967), Gerhard Ritter, "Bismarck and die Rhein-Politik Napoleons III", *Rheinische Vierteljahresblätte*, 15-16, (1950/51), pp. 358-67, E. Ann Pottinger, *Napoleon and the German Crisis, 1865-1866,* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), Peter Sahlins, "Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 95, No. 5, (1990), p. 1449.

[242] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 236.

war. Moreover, there were "not even any boundary questions in dispute" except the Polish independence.[243] When enumerating a variety of sources of disagreements among European powers with respect to the territorial issues, Palmerston particularly conceived that "France would plead geography for the frontier of the Rhine."[244] He fairly well estimated the territorial interest of France in the note of Prince Napoleon without actually having consulted it. His concern that the Polish issue might render an excuse for the French expansion into the Rhine already appeared in March 1863. In a letter to the Belgian King, Palmerston construed the French proposal against Prussia as "the trap" and urged Belgium to restrain Prussia to prevent France from entering "the Rhinish provinces."[245]

The uncertainty that a contingent development might press France to seize the opportunity to enter into the Rhine province shaped Palmerston's diplomacy vis-à-vis France. In regard to the issues of Poland and Schleswig-Holstein, Palmerston estimated that Russia wouldn't budge at all in a European congress and a smaller assembly would better suit the Danish question in November of 1863.[246] Despite the British sympathy for the principle of nationalities, Britain was certainly unwilling to take risks of "seeing France in the Rhineland," as Palmerston wrote to Russell on November 8th.[247] He clung to the same position on a European congress a month later, showing his mistrust for "one of the traps laid by Napoleon."[248] Hence, Russell responded to France that Britain would not join the congress since such it might rather increase tension. The French pursuit of territorial revision was thwarted.

The British anxiety didn't ebb away in the subsequent Danish crisis, either. When a joint Austro-Prussian attack forced the Danish to evacuate *Dannewerke* in February 1864, another joint counteraction, in which Britain should send a squadron to Copenhagen and France dispatch its armies to the Rhinish frontier of Prussia if mediation efforts failed, was discussed.[249] Palmerston unwelcomed this idea of the Anglo-French joint military action since Britain could not tactically deploy a squadron to the Baltic for weeks come. Strategically speaking, he remarked to Russell, "it might not be advisable nor for our own interests to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian Rhenish territory" and went further to describe that the occupation of the Prussian Rhine by France "would be an evil for us" and "seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium."[250] However, it was France's turn to snub the British initiative for a European intervention to save Denmark.

France seemed as lukewarm in participating in the British endeavors to coerce Austria and Prussia as Britain had been inactive in the French diplomacy over the Polish question. Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, the successor of Thouvenel as the Foreign Minister, still remembered the Polish debacle and hoped to retain its freedom of action over the Danish crisis. Furthermore, aware of the British suspicion and the unreliability of Britain in France's diplomatic campaign, the Emperor began to tinker with other possible

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[243] *Ibid.,* p. 238.
[244] *Ibid.,* p. 241.
[245] Palmerston to the King of the Belgians, March 13, 1863*, Ibid.,* p. 232. In case of Prussia's intervention against the Polish, Palmerston expected that France might enter the Rhine provinces to "coerce Prussia to be neutral."
[246] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 240-241.
[247] A. J. P. Taylor, *op.cit*., (1954,1971), p. 141.
[248] *Ibid.,* pp. 242-244.
[249] Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 246.
[250] Palmerston to Russell, February 13, 1864, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 247-248.

arrangements with Austria and Prussia.[251] Palmerston likewise speculated that France distanced from any cooperation with England to "keep hands free to act in anyway". He opined that Prussia seemed to underestimate Napoleon's ambition to take "the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, or Bavaria, or be at the head of a Confederacy of the Rhine," or assist Italy in Ventia if "the proper moment arises" over the Schleswig-Holstein crisis.[252]

Britain's low expectation about the contagion effect and France's failed expansion, 1865-1870

Palmerston clearly contemplated that everyone in England "would feel that it was a severe blow to English interests" should the Rhenish provinces be incorporated into France, which would imply a substantial "change in the balance of power" whereas a cession of Venetia to Italy would render only a minor regret for the lack of sufficient compensation for Austria.[253] Once Palmerston failed in averting a war over the Schleswig-Holstein question without the greatly needed assistance from France and Russia,[254] he confided to Russell that the effect of a stronger Germany might be salubrious for "the general interests of Europe," in fact for Britain. Palmerston clarified, "it is desirable that Germany should be strong in order to control two ambitious and aggressive powers, France and Russia." A month before his death in 1865, Palmerston turned out to retain the wariness for when "restless and aggressive" France might "break loose for Belgium" or "for the Rhine."[255]

Meanwhile, though the Emperor himself called the note of Prince Napoleon "a dream,"[256] as historians converge on qualifying his "serious intention to acquire the left bank of the Rhine,"[257] the French interest in the Rhine regions, or a territorial revision that would better serve France in Europe, did exist in terms of its border security and repetitively emerged in the course of France's diplomacy in 1863-1866. Not to mention France's invitation of a European congress with respect to the Polish question, Drouyn de Lhuys spoke "in favor of the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein" and indicated the French interest in a territorial compensation to the Prussian Ambassador, Count Robert von der Goltz, when the Austro-Prussian troops advanced into Jutland in 1864.[258] Goltz reported to William I that Drouyn de Lhuys discussed "a slight rectification of the border" or "an

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[251] Keith A. P. Sandiford, *Great Britain and the Schleswig-Hosltein Question, 1848-64: A study in diplomacy, politics and public opinion*, (University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 61.
[252] Palmerston to Queece Victoria, February 22, 1864, in George Earle Buckle, [*LQV*] *op.cit.*, (1926), pp. 161-162.
[253] *Ibid.,* p. 165.
[254] Palmerston recollected at the Parliament in July 1864, "Well, we tried to make war impossible. But France and Russia would not combine with us, and therefore war became possible, and took place". July 8, 1864, *Hansard,* 3rd series, Vol. 176, page cols, 1280-1281.
[255] Palmerston to Russell, September 13th, 1865. Russell MSS., P.R.O. 30/22/15E in Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 270-271.
[256] The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, January [this should read February] 22, 1863*,* Ernest D'Hauterive, *op.cit.*, (1927), p. 186.
[257] Alongside Ritter, Pottinger, and Sahlin, Taylor makes a qualification. A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit., (*1954,1971), p. 136. But as noted, even Pottinger avers, "Napoleon's policy was a desire to see Germany reorganized in a manner which would suit French diplomacy," E. Ann Pottinger, *op.cit.*, (1966), pp. 208-209.
[258] Hermann Oncken, *op.cit.*, (1928, 1967), p. 34.

neutral Rhine state based on the Belgian model" that would not belong to Prussia in February.[259]

Needless to say, Prussia had no offer to make any geographical compensation in 1864. As the Gastein convention between Austria and Prussia provisionally patched up their dispute over the Danish Duchies in August of 1865, based on an agreement that "Austria would be in charge in Holstein and Prussia in Schleswig,"[260] the lingering tension in the Austro-Prussian relations provided France with another, if not the last, chance to press for a reorganization of boundaries in the Rhine. France struck a satisfactory deal with Austria that concurred in the cession of Venetia to Italy and the French right of consultation in the rearrangement of Germany in return for France's neutrality, which might materialize a buffer state or neutral state on the Rhine, in case of Austria's victory.[261] Duke of Gramont, made a verbal promise to France that Austria would not object to "a territorial reshuffle that would turn the Rhenish provinces into an independent Germany."[262]



Figure. 13. Britain's expected loss from France's geographical expansion

"The idea of a Rhenish buffer state", or "of an autonomous neutral German Rhenish state," was a way for the Emperor to improve France's border security without annexing or assuming a direct territorial control over the Rhine region. It was essentially the establishment of "a second Belgium" that France would benefit if either Austria or Prussia were to be enlarged out of a war.[263] Minister André, the Chief of Cabinet under Drouyn de Lhuys, later conceded that the Foreign Minister "wanted the same contract with Prussia" for the Rhine.[264] Unfortunately, Bismarck was not so as dull as Austria to cut such a deal of the Rhenish border. In the fall of 1865, Napoleon III and Bismarck held a series of

[259] Count Goltz to King William I, February 9, 1864, *Ibid.,* p. 196.
[260] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 129.
[261] *Ibid.,* p. 130.
[262] Duke of Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys, June 12, 1866, Hermann Oncken, *op.cit.*, (1928, 1967), p. 198.
[263] *Ibid.,* pp. 43-46.
[264] Count Solms to Bismarck, May 30, 1869, [Words of Minister Andre], Hermann Oncken, *op.cit.*, (1928, 1967), p.196.

conversations in both Biarritz and Paris. While Bismarck was able to secure the French neutrality prior to coming to a head with Austria, Napoleon tried to extract "an understanding with him" if Prussia altered her territory to which Bismarck turned a deaf ear.[265]

Had Austria won the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Napoleon III could've pursued a creation of a neutral and independent Rhine region to a certain extent but the French hope for a territorial rearrangement in favor of its security in the Rhine was dashed by the triumph of Prussia. Since Bismarck had been keenly cognizant of the fact that the Emperor "cherished reminiscences of the confederation of the Rhine," believing that "the non-Prussian portion of Germany would feel a greater need of French support,"[266] there had been little chance that France would have been able to push forward another diplomatic scheme in the Rhine, as Napoleon III successfully and slyly had done with Cavour in 1858-1860. Additionally, Bismarck undoubtedly envisaged that a Franco-Prussian war had to be waged before "the construction of a United Germany could be realized" and France would "wish to hinder development in the direction of a United Germany."[267]

In sum, though France's annexation of Nice and Savoy in March 1860, which rendered an increase in the loss of Britain's prestige, France could not further exploit a series of European conflicts, including the Polish uprising, the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, and the Austro-Prussian war, in a way that could pull off another territorial settlement near the Rhine region. Britain's strengthened distrust toward France did not allow a French initiative in dealing with the Polish question and did not vanish after Britain's bluff had been called by Austria and Prussia in the Danish question. Austria might have been the only power that played a role of Cavour before the Austro-Prussian showdown in 1866. But Bismarck had been keen in frustrating the French pursuit of territorial gain and finally seized a right moment to take on France until 1870-1871.[268]

France's intensive naval arms buildup and power projection in the peripheral theaters also generated undesirable impacts on the deployment of the French army in the central theater upon which Napoleon III's diplomacy relied. Since 1860, the army size of the French troops at home had remarkably declined in 1861-1866 due to France's "far-flung commitment" in Algeria, Mexico, and Rome,[269] as confirmed in table 7. In the meantime, Britain already acutely took note of the downward trend of the French army's size from 1862. In the special report of 1862, Colonel Claremont estimated the French army would be reduced from "446,548 to 415,000," aside from the reserves, in 1862-1863 and Cowley informed Russell of the fact that the Emperor "ordered the standing army to be reduced by

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[265] Paul Berstein, "Napoleon III and Bismarck: The Biarritz-Paris Talks of 1865", in Nancy N. Baker and Marvin Brown Jr., ed., *Diplomacy in an age of Nationalism, Essays in Honor of Lynn Marshall Case*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 139.

[266] Otto Von Bismarck*, Bismarck, The Memoirs*, Vol. 2, Trans. by A.J. Butler, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 57.

[267] *Ibid.,* pp. 57-58.

[268] France had still toyed with an array of plans for territorial gains near the Rhine region, such as the left bank of the Rhine, the frontier of 1814, Belgium and Luxembourg, over the negotiations with Prussia, Holland, and Austria in 1866-1869. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 133-136.

[269] Paul Berstein, *op.cit.,* (1971), p. 134.

32,000 men for the sake of economy" in April. France announced further reduction of 12,000 in May of 1862.[270]

In addition to the ongoing naval arms race with Britain that imposed more financial burden on France's economy, foreign expeditions in the peripheral theaters deconcentrated the troops at home. For example, Napoleon III's dream of building a model of functioning monarchy in Mexico had over 30,000 troops mired in the Mexican campaign in 1862-1866 and the Algerian uprising that arose in the spring of 1864 absorbed more troops up to 62,000 in Algeria by 1865 when the French troops were still struggling with the remaining Algerian force and Napoleon III visited Algeria for six weeks from late April to early June.[271] In the summer of 1865, the Finance Minister, Fould, "won a reduction in the size of the army as an economy measure" again. As Napoleon III met with Bismarck in Biarritz, a third of the French army was deployed outside France in 1865 and the army size once again shrunk by 15,000 men in November 1865.[272]

Region	**1856**	**1857**	**1858**	**1859**	**1860**	**1861**	**1862**	**1863**	**1864**	**1865**	**1866**
France	310,347	301,614	207,094	322,338	398,550	366,033	350,717	320,103	307,006	281,000	286,690
Africa	64,235	82,694	75,338	73,500	83,782	66,432	70,904	57,361	61,944	83,130	60,888
Crimean War	197,507	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rome	5,357	4,884	5,230	6,050	7,904	19,428	17,824	17,004	15,430	13,650	8,812
Lombardy/ Piedmont					55,281						
China					5,468	7,043	4,420				
Syria						7,173					
Mexico							738	27,123	35,318	32,272	30,175
Southeast Asia								2,180	1,713		
Reserve	11,755	10,864	47,547	13,887	11,017	152,197	159,074	165,827	178,804	196,417	214,625
Total	**580,291**	**577,665**	**586,479**	**551,072**	**626,482**	**619,206**	**612,743**	**505,088**	**600,215**	**607,089**	**610,390**

Table. 9. The deployment of the French troops at home and abroad in 1856-1866[273]

The dispersed power projection in the peripheral theaters and reduction of the army size, which in part was a consequence of the growth of the French navy, undermined the basis of Napoleon III's diplomacy for a territorial rearrangement in Europe even though Napoleon III had consistently striven for a geographical deal that would boost its security and prestige in the north in 1863-1866. In retrospect, Persigny lamented France should have been able to "assemble on the Rhine, as it had intended, at the news of the Austrian defeat" and blamed Fould for his "audacity to ask the Emperor for a reduction in the army to save 12 million from the budget" in November 1865.[274] In light of the continued

[270] Colonel Claremont to Earl Cowley, February 3, 1862, Colonel Claremont to Earl Cowley, April 1, 1862, Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, April 4, 1862, Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, May 4, 1862, Colonel Claremont to Earl Cowley, May 4, 1862, "Reports respecting the Strength of the Naval and Military Forces of France", *Parliamentary Papers*, Command Papers [CP], 1862, Vol. 63, No. 283. p. 13, pp. 15-16, p. 17.

[271] Paul Berstein, *op.cit.,* 1971, p. 125, p. 135, Napoleon III informed Prince Napoleon of his trip to Algeria on April 27th and embarked at Marseilles on 1st of May in 1865. The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, April 27th, 1865, in Ernest D'Hauterive, *op.cit.*, (1927), pp. 206-208.

[272] *Ibid.,* pp. 134-135.

[273] Jean-Chales Chenu, *Recrutement de l'armee et population de la France*, (Paris, 1867), pp. 74-75. The total number of troops include troops on renewable leave as well as six months leaves in 1857-1859 and in 1860 respectively, which I elided for the clarity of the table.

[274] Duc de Persigny, *Memoires Du Duc De Persigny*, (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit & Cie, 1896), pp. 353-355, p. 368.

wariness of Britain over France's expansion into the Rhine, Britain would have attempted to form a joint front, or possibly aid Prussia or Austria but France didn't take risks of stirring up a conflict with its ill-prepared army.

4.4. Alignment opportunity: open [1856-1864] ⟶ open [1864-1870]

Overview: How Austria, Russia, and Prussia kept alignment opportunity open, 1856-1870

The Crimean system was essentially founded as the coalition against Russia's ambition in Turkey and further aggression. For instance, Palmerston clarified that the primary objective of the Crimean war was "to curb the aggressive ambition of Russia" and "we went to war not so much to keep the Sultan in Turkey as to keep the Russians out of Turkey."[275] Palmerston expressed his contentment to the Queen when the treaty of Paris was about to be signed and depicted the Crimean settlement as "satisfactory for the present, and which will probably last for many years to come" in March 1856.[276] But Napoleon III was less enthusiastic about the anti-Russian coalition and Palmerston had already observed the French emperor "busily seeking a rapprochement with" Russia "in the interests of his Italian Policy" during the peace negotiations.[277]

France was not completely on the same page with Britain in "a long line of circumvallation to confine the future extension of Russia" in the Crimean system, as Palmerston had intended.[278] Still, France had shared potential common threats, which ameliorated the extent of the bilateral conflict associated with the fierce naval arms race and France's territorial expansion. Liska once suggests the accessibility of "the lesser state to the potential ally directly or at least indirectly" is a precondition of alignment between great powers and the smaller state.[279] In fact, such an ally availability in the theaters can influence the dynamics of the bilateral security competition between the leading sea power and a challenger especially when the relative shifts in naval power set in motion between them.[280]

Austria in Italy, Russia in Poland, the German states in Denmark, engendered the varying degrees of openness in alignment opportunity for England and France from 1859-1864, dampening the gain and loss from France's naval expansion. Given Britain's swift shift in its strategic concern after France's annexation of Nice and Savoy, Austria appeared to have played a double role of the potential common threat and ally for Britain from 1859-1860. The Polish question of 1863, the Danish crises of 1864-65, and the Russo-Prussian

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[275] Memorandum by Palmerston enclosed in Clarendon to Cowley, private, 26 Sept, 1855, Cowley MSS in the Public Record Office in London. Cited in W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1963), p. 1.

[276] Palmerston to Queen Victoria, Picadilly, March 30th, 1856, in Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher, *op.cit.,* (1908), p. 183.

[277] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1963), p. 2.

[278] W. E. Mosse, *The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System, 1855-71: The Story of a Peace Settlement*, (London: Macmillan & Co LTD, 1963), p. 1.

[279] George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1962), p. 13.

[280] Paul K. Macdonald and Joseph Parent, *Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment,* (Cornell University Press, 2018), p. 38, Macdonald and Parent consider "two worlds in which a declining power has access to a regional great power ally, and one where it does not," assuming that balancing behavior and bandwagon will prevail in the former and latter world respectively.

entente, induced France and Britain to turn back to each other at different junctures to engage in coercive diplomacy toward Russia and the German powers from 1863 to 1864, keeping the openness of alignment opportunity. As the Danish question was settled in 1865, Britain also regarded Prussia as a counterweight to France.

In 1859, the degree to which England and France saw Austria as a potential adversary swelled, as Austria fell into the trap and initiated the war with Sardinia, but sharpy dropped with France's annexation of Nice and Savoy in March of 1860. While Russia neutral and Prussia on its own, Austria sustained a certain level of ally availability for Britain. As to the Polish question in 1863, France took Russia as a third power to be restrained but Britain did no more than moral sanction. Even so, due to the Russo-Prussian concert, formulated by the Alvensleben convention, alignment opportunity did not diminish. With the Russo-Prussian alignment constant, or stronger, over the Danish question in 1864, alignment opportunity was again maintained as England sought for France's assistance.

By 1865, it was evident for Palmerston that France could not be a reliable force that would help Britain maintain the Crimean system of 1856, which already had watched two modifications in Italy and Schleswig-Holstein. Rather, France had consistently been keen on another project in which France's frontier be rectified in a fashion that could further its interst. In this regard, apart from the British grudge for Schleswig-Holstein, Palmerston came to discern the enlargement and growth of Prussia would be actually "better" than Prussia being "of less force" in "the general balance of power in the world." He expounded to Russell in September, "it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and aggressive powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and east."[281]

In a geographical sense, Palmerston intimated Britain need to leash France in the Rhine and Belgium, which he thought France "would be likely to get without too great an exertion," and Russia in "Asia," implicitly including Southeastern Europe adjacent to West Asia across the Black Sea. Thus, in Palmerston's view "to the future," Germany should be stronger and a stronger Prussia was "essential to German strength."[282] Palmerston's words well forebode the direction of Britain's non-intervention policy in the years to come after his death in October despite the cabinet change in June 1866. On the other hand, the French Emperor's policy also centered on exploiting the Austro-Prussian split to materialize a beneficial territorial rearrangement in Venetia, the Rhine, or Belgium, or Luxembourg, while maintaining a neutral position from 1865-1869.

Russia and Austria as potential common threats until the French annexation, 1856-1860

The prelude of the Anglo-French breach was exposed in their diplomatic communications surrounding the Triple Treaty of 1856 in April, an additional treaty agreed only among Britain, France and Austria. It stipulated the reaffirmation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and that any breach of the treaty agreement should be considered a

[281] Palmerston to Russell, September 13th, 1865. Russell MSS., P.R.O. 30/22/15E in Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 270-271.
[282] *Ibid.,* pp. 270-271.

casus belli.[283] Whereas Austria and England were content with a separate treaty as the keystone of a defensive alliance against Russia, the French emperor was anxious about the impression that the allied powers behaved "disloyally" towards Russia, who might be resentful in the face of the proof that the allies "had no faith in the engagement" which they had just signed in Paris.[284] France had preferred that the Triple Treaty should be unknown to Russia and the publication of the Treaty could be postponed.[285]

When Britain proceeded to publicize the Triple Treaty, the Emperor with his eyes fixated on the future Italian affair, attempted to cool down Russia's annoyance by putting the blame for the Triple Treaty on Britain and Austria, claiming that France had been forced to sign the treaty.[286] Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary then, countered the French argument by directing Cowley to tell the Russian counterparts that Britain declared the treaty "arranged and proposed to us by France and Austria in last October." When it came to the concrete execution of the Paris Treaty, especially the Article 20 relative to Serpents Island and Bolgrad,[287] Walewski once recommended a plan in which Russia was to attain "territorial compensation in return for abandoning the town of New Bolgrad" to Russia in October 1856, which Palmerston absolutely did refuse to consider.[288]

Since France had not taken risks of endangering the British alliance or making a concession of the neutralization of Black Sea, the cornerstone of the Crimean system,[289] to placate Russia, Russia was eventually forced to forgo both Serpents Island and New Bolgrad in January of 1857. Serpents Island was ceded to the Ottoman Empire and New Bolgrad joined the principality of Moldavia.[290] Nevertheless, the exchange of several drafts of a Franco-Russian convention between France and Russia in November 1856, where France invoked the principle of compensation for Russia, opened the door of a future Franco-Russian rapprochement.[291] The Tsar and the Russian Foreign Minister, Gorchakov

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[283] "Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, and France, guaranteeing the Independence and Integrity of the Ottoman Empire – Signed at Paris, April 15, 1856", *British and Foreign State Papers (1855-1856)*, Vol. 46, pp. 25-26.

[284] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1963), pp. 40-41.

[285] *Ibid.,* pp. 42-43.

[286] *Ibid.,* pp. 46-47.

[287] Article 20 and 21 of the Paris Treaty of 1856 concerned the rectification of the Russian frontier in Bessarabia, the territory involved to be attached to Moldavia, whose purpose was to deprive Russia from direct access to the Danube, thereby removing Russia from the category of riparian states. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 188.

[288] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1963), pp. 82-84.

[289] Respecting the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, foreign ships of war were prohibited from entering the Straits in peacetime. In the Black Sea, the Russo-Turkish convention stipulated that the High Contracting Parties be allowed to "maintain in that sea 6 steam-vessels of 50 meter in length at the line of floatation, of a tonnage of 800 tons at the maximum, and 4 light steam or sailing vessels of a tonnage which shall not exceed 200 tons each." Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 189-190.

[290] "PROTOCOL of Conference between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, for carrying out the Provisions of Article XX of the Treaty of March 30, 1856, relative to the Bessarabian Frontier. - Signed at Paris, January 6, 1857," *British and Foreign State Papers (1856-1857)*, Vol. 47, pp. 92-94.

[291] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1963), pp. 92-96. In the first draft of Russia's proposal, Russia informed Walewski that Russia might "give up all claim to New Bolgrad and leave the question of compensation entirely to the French Emperor." p. 92.

who later succeeded in terminating the neutrality of the Black Sea, attempted to exploit the division between Britain and France immediately after the Paris Treaty.[292]

Palmerston couldn't help noticing the ambience of a Franco-Russian rapprochement and stood firm whenever France appeared to have taken a step closer to Russia. By December of 1856, Palmerston remarked to Clarendon he interpreted "the altered feelings" of France toward England "with calmness and composure" because it "might have been expected sooner or later." He elaborated that once the common object was accomplished "the separate interests and feelings" should "again come into play" and "intimate Alliances" could not long last "between equal powers" contrary to the alliances between "a stronger and a weaker state," although Britain should make efforts to "be at peace" with France given the interests of both states.[293] According to Granville's speech in 1871, Palmerston indeed suspected the Crimean system would subsist for 7-10 years.[294]

In his writing on Napoleon I's ideas, Napoleon III put forward three possible foreign policies of France. The first policy is blindly throwing down the gauntlet to Europe to take down all the leaders, whilst the second policy is keeping peace even "at the expense of honor and interests of the country." The third policy, which Napoleon III seemingly endorsed as the best one and "the Napoleonic foreign policy," is to "offer the alliance of France to all the governments willing to cooperate with their common interests."[295] Until the Polish uprising in 1863 when the Emperor plainly turned against Russia to sanction the national cause of Poland but Britain was resolved to avoid a war since it was against "its interests," in Palmerston's words,[296] France's foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia had been consistent with "the Napoleonic" one in searching for a closer alignment.

In other words, the extent to which Britain and France shared Russia as a common adversary had steadily withered since 1856, albeit not altogether. In devising the Italian scheme, France's immediate adversary was doomed to be Austria, instead of Russia, because of its presence in Lombardy and Venetia. Further, Napoleon III had apparent interests in ensuring that France's other frontiers would not be menaced by Prussia and Russia in the event of an Italian war. When a war against Austria was contrived at Plombières in July 1858, they meant to induce Austria to be the initiator of war and localize it with the possible neutrality of other powers, mainly Russia.[297] Throwing a bait that Austria might bite was the task of Cavour and Napoleon III managed to extract Russia's neutrality from the secret treaty in March 1859.[298]

The Franco-Russian entente had been earlier underway since the Stuttgart meeting between Alexander II and Napoleon III in September 1857, where they consented that

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[292] *Ibid.,* p. 54.

[293] Palmerston to Clarendon, 14 December, 1856, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 286-287.

[294] Granville introduced several accounts of what Palmerston said as to how long the Crimean system might last. Palmerston seemed to have spoken of "7 years", "10 years", and during his "lifetime". 14th February, 1871, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 204, page cols, 247-249.

[295] Napoleon Louis Bonaparte III, *Napoleonic Ideas*, 1839, Tras., James A. Dorr, (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1859), pp. 113-114.

[296] Russell expressed Britain had "less explicit" resolution to prevent a war in case Napoleon III "took the initiative in such as a war", while Palmerston remarked, "despite the unanimous sympathies for Poland, a war……is against its interest". 21-22, April 1863, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.,* (1938, 1966), pp. 240-241.

[297] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 202-203.

[298] Kenneth Bourne, *op.cit.,* (1970), p. 98.

"neither would join a coalition hostile to the other" and "there should be mutual consultation in all important matters of European interest." France in fact sought more than neutrality from Russia by raising "the possibility of the Russians concentrating 150,000 men on the Galician frontier" in the discussion at Stuttgart about which Russia wasn't enthusiastic.[299] Apart from the invocation of the Stuttgart meeting as the basis of the treaty and the Article 1 of Russia's neutrality during a Franco-Austrian war, the Article 2 manifestly revealed that France and Russia saw eye to eye in "the modifications of the existing treaties in the interests of both empires," namely revisions of the Crimean system.[300]

Given the Article 3, which spelled out a possible enlargement of Savoy in Italy Russia agreed to not oppose, France had been more transparent about its Italian plan to Russia than to Britain.

Napoleon III's fervor to draw out more of the Russian assistance in every plausible way, which almost amounted to the level of *de facto* alliance, did not subside even after the conclusion of the secret treaty of March 1859. For example, the Emperor angled for the military support of Russia should Austria receive assistance from Prussia or England only to be rebuffed by Gorchakov.[301] Ever since Gorchakov had advised Kiselev, the Russian ambassador in Paris, to "inform Napoleon that Russians were secretly moving a corps across the Dnieper" in February, [302] France's interests chiefly lied in the Russian mobilization on the Galician front along with Prussia's neutrality.

Walewski wrote to Kiselev that Russia would "perform an important service to France if she moved a corps to the Galician and Posen frontiers" and announced that its neutrality would depend on the neutrality of Prussia.[303] On April 28th 1859, another French proposal was presented by the Second Duke of Montebello, the French ambassador to Russia, to Bismarck in St. Petersburg, the Prussian ambassador to Russia then, "for a German declaration of neutrality" conditional on "a French guarantee of the territory of the Confederation." Though Russia and Bismarck received the proposal favorably, Berlin found it distasteful.[304] Once Austria advanced into Italy on the 29th, Napoleon III again called upon The Tsar to cause a diversion on the Galician frontier on May 5th, reminding him of Gorchakov's communication in February.[305] But Russia didn't wish to move.[306]

In late May 1859, the Emperor yet dwelt on Russia's promised neutrality with satisfaction and wrote, "the [Russian] Emperor continues to behave very loyally towards me."[307] On the contrary, the unsecured neutrality of Prussia posed a compelling uneasiness

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[299] B. H. Sumner, "The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859", *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 48, No. 189, (1933), p. 67.
[300] *Ibid.,* p. 78.
[301] *Ibid.,* p. 79.
[302] *Ibid.,* p. 81.
[303] *Ibid.,* p. 79.
[304] *Ibid.,* p. 80.
[305] Napoleon III to Alexander II, 5 May, 1859, Three Russian corps in Poland had been placed on a war footing at the end of April. Cited in *Ibid.,* p. 81. Gorchakov had also enunciated a possibility of the Russian diversion in the summer of 1858 when Prince Napoleon visited Warsaw. W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1963), p. 119.
[306] Russia had no strategic reason to cave in to the French demand at the expense of the cordial relations with Prussia "particularly in view of common problems in regard to the Poles", as Sumner well puts. *Ibid.,* p. 79.
[307] The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, May 28th February 22, 1863*,* Ernest D'Hauterive, *op.cit.*, (1927), p. 140.

to France before as well as during the war in a manner that eventually brought the war to a snappy armistice. Not only had Napoleon III tirelessly engaged with Russia and Prussia to attain the Prussian neutrality, albeit fruitlessly, Prince Napoleon but also displayed his unsettling feeling about the eastern frontier and Prussia in his note on the Defense of France prepared for the Emperor on May 1st of 1859. Prince Napoleon conjectured, "a Prussian army of 200,000 men could in 15 days be transferred by rail to our northern frontier, which is open on every side" and France is "at the mercy of Prussia."[308]

As the Franco-Sardinian alliance pushed back Austria into Lombardy and earned two more triumphs in Solferino and Magenta in June,[309] the disconcerting prospect of a Prussian attack on the northern border of France overshadowed. Prussia mobilized six army corps and moved on to plan the additional mobilization of two federal corps in Frankfurt and paved the way for "an armed mediation of the neutrals."[310] Russia had no incentives to sincerely restrain Prussia despite the Tsar's verbal promise. After France learned that Russia would stick to the neutrality even when Prussia declared war,[311] Napoleon III deemed the termination of campaign as the best course of action and went on to sign the armistice of Villafranca on July 8th. France could not concurrently afford two active wars in Italy and on the Rhine.[312]

As a consequence of the Villafranca settlement between France and Austria on July 11th, Austria was compelled to cede Lombardy to Napoleon III, who in turn handed it over to Sardinia-Piedmont.[313] The Villafranca agreement formed the basis of the Treaty of Turin in November that restored peace. By virtue of Treaty of Turin, Nice and Savoy were annexed to France in March of 1860.[314] Meanwhile, the Derby cabinet, which took office in February 1858 and stayed until Palmerston's return in June 1859, was less sympathetic to the Italian cause and more averse to any disturbance which might catalyze a European war than Palmerston. Foreign Secretary Malmesbury stated that Sardinia's project should not provoke "the terrible curse of a European war" in spite of the British sympathy for its constitutional model in January 1859.[315]

Malmesbury's mediation proposal for a European conference to resolve the conflict between Austria and Sardinia demonstrated the conservatives' endeavor to arrest a source of conflagration in Europe.[316] In response to Cowley's denial of the Franco-Russian alliance that had been rumored, Malmesbury conveyed to Cowley that Britain "could keep out of the war" insofar as "Baltic was made safe" by France, Russia, and Austria in late April and early May of 1859. The red line for Britain seemed to be hostile acts of France

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[308] Prince Jerome Napoleon, "Note for the consideration of the Emperor on the Defense of France", Paris, May 1st, 1859, Ernest D'Hauterive, *op.cit.*, (1927), p. 258.
[309] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 101.
[310] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1958), p. 84. Mosse comments that the frontier of the German Confederation "remarkably" matched with the front between "the provinces of Venetia and Lombardy".
[311] Letter of P. A. Shuvalov, the Russian representative at French G. H. Q., to Gorchakov, 4 July: Fleury asked him whether, if Germany declared war, Russia would march; Shuvalov replied that neutrality was more than ever urgent for Russia. Quoted in B. H. Sumner, *op.cit.,* (1933), p. 82.
[312] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 103.
[313] *Ibid.,* pp. 101-102, W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1958), p. 84
[314] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 104.
[315] Malmesbury to Sir James Hudson (Turin), No. 10, 13 January 1859, F.O. 167/105, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.,* (1938, 1966), pp. 198-199.
[316] Malmesbury to Loftus (Vienna), No. 282, 21 April 1859, F.O. 7/563, Ibid., pp. 200-201.

or Russia "in that sea", although Malmesbury preferred an agreement among Russia, France, and Austria on the neutrality of the Adriatic and Baltic.[317] Palmerston on hiatus did not reproach the idea of a conference for mediation but observed, "a great mistake" was "not pressing hard upon Austria to induce her to go into Congress."[318]

Likewise, irrespective of the partisan difference in the degree of empathy and commitment for the Italian unification, the baseline of Britain's policy centered around not allowing a dramatic shift in the previous status quo, as indicated by Palmerston's endorsement of a European congress. In a similar vein, it was Derby in late April, not Palmerston, who grew jittery about the news of the Franco-Russian secret treaty, though Russia assured that "there is nothing hostile to England," and regarded it necessary to "call upon Sir J. Pakington" to examine "what addition could be made to be Channel Fleet within a period of two or three months, without weakening" the Mediterranean fleet.[319] While Russia's statement was unfeigned, the Franco-Russian secret treaty yielded sufficient apprehension concerning the future Franco-Russian cooperation.[320]

Notwithstanding, as previously elucidated, the actual extent to which France garnered the Russian aid in the Italian campaign was of limited scope, no more than its neutrality. Moreover, Russia's interest in preserving good relations with Prussia precluded them from forging an alliance that France temporarily wished and the absence of France's interest in wholly assisting Russia's diplomatic campaign to undo the neutrality of the Black Sea helped maintain the loose and fragile alignment with Britain. To put another way, even when the degree that France and Britain shared Russia as the common adversary abated in 1856-1863, the Franco-Russian engagement occurred within a bounded range that rendered alignment opportunity still high or open. Further, Austria as another third adversary evidently brought them together as Palmerston took office again in 1859.

As such, Russia remained a potential third adversary in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, and West Asia and Austria soon developed into a more pressing common adversary in Italy for Britain and France. It is telling that Cowley blamed Russia for not sincerely aiding "the British endeavors to make peace instead of exciting France against us" and Palmerston imputed the breakdown of the British mediation to "the folly and infatuation of Austria" and "her unjustifiable encroachments in Italy, South of the Po" by early May in 1859.[321] Napoleon III appeared to have wondered why Britain hadn't promptly joined France for standing against the Austrian move given its dislike the presence of Austria in

[317] Malmesbury to Cowley (Paris), Private telegram of 29 April, 1859, D. 1.5 p.m, F.O. 96/26, Malmesbury to Sir John Crampton (St. Petersburg), No. 181, 2 May 1859, F.O. 65/532, *Ibid*., pp. 201-202.

[318] Palmerston to Cowley, May 8, 1859, in Colonel F. A. Wellesley, eds., *The Paris Embassy during the Second Empire: Selections from the Papers of Henry Richard Charles Wellesley 1st Early Cowley, Ambassador at Paris, 1852-1867*, (London: Thorton Butterworth, Ltd, 1928), pp. 181-182.

[319] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, April 27th, 1859, in Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher, *op.cit.*, (1908), p. 328.

[320] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, 1st May, 1859, in Ibid., p. 330, Derby did not take the denials of the Franco-Russian engagement at face value and wrote, "Lord Derby has no doubt but that France is well assured that in any case she may rely upon the tacit assistance, if not the active cooperation, of Russia, and that both Powers" would "excite troubles in the East, as well as in Italy."

[321] Colonel F. A. Wellesley, *op.cit.,* (1928), p. 181.

Italy and asked Cowley who mentioned Britain would keep "her neutrality" in the event of a war.[322] Derby also viewed neutrality as the only choice left for Britain.[323]

In reverse, Cowley called for France's account for "not having adhered to his promise of joining us in calling upon Sardinia to disarm, should Austria agree to disarm" in the course of mediation on April 8th. Napoleon III equivocated that "he had not intended to do more than endeavor to obtain" what he deemed "a desirable object by persuasive means," whereas Cowley brusquely responded to the French question that "he had only to take the course he had hinted at if H.M. wanted to unite Britain as one man" against Austria.[324] Similarly, the former Foreign Secretary of the previous liberal cabinet, Clarendon, monitored, "the Emperor is speculating upon the change of government, and the countenance he shall receive to his anti-Austrian policy from Palmerston and Lord John."[325]

However apathetic France might have been for a peaceful resolution because of the plot the Emperor collaborated with Cavour, Austria's decision to dispatch a *de facto* ultimatum to Sardinia in which it demanded Sardinia to unilaterally disarm was impetuous on its part.[326] In point of fact, the Emperor assessed that "the chance of war diminished" at the moment as England agreed to admit Sardinia to the Congress, albeit not "as one of the Great Powers."[327] This was Cavour's condition upon which Sardinia would "accept the principle of disarmament". Napoleon III even urged Prince Napoleon to write to Cavour to "tell him not to lose heart, and that everything may yet take a favorable turn" on the same day when he seemed to consider peace as an actual possibility.[328] It was virtually up to Austria to choose peace or war by April 20th.

Both the Emperor and Malmesbury, Foreign Secretary, precisely shared this understanding. Malmesbury's last proposal insisted on "*a general and simultaneous disarmament previous to the Congress,*" which Cavour accepted. Britain in turn ensured that "Sardinia and other Italian states shall be admitted into the Congress" on April 19th.[329] Hence, Malmesbury inferred that "all the difficulties preparatory to the Congress" would be surmounted if Austria consented the last proposal of disarmament.[330] At the same time, having heard of the English proposal sent to Austria, Napoleon III didn't differ much from Malmesbury in writing, "if she [Austria] has refused we shall know it tomorrow, and then we shall have either peace or war."[331] On the 21st, the Emperor was told that Vienna went for war, ordering to "place all the army on a war footing."[332]

France and Sardinia didn't have to wait for another "favorable turn" to carry out their plan. The Derby cabinet was determined to strongly "protest against the course" of Austria

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[322] Ibid., p. 179.
[323] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, April 27th, 1859, in Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher, *op.cit.*, (1908), pp. 329.
[324] Colonel F. A. Wellesley, *op.cit,*, (1928), pp. 179-180.
[325] Ibid., p. 179.
[326] Malmesbury differently recorded, "The Austrian summons to Sardinia to disarm was given at Turin on the 23rd." Earl of Malmesbury, *op.cit.,* (1885, 1924), p. 480.
[327] April 18th, 1859, Earl of Malmesbury, *op.cit.,* (1885, 1924), p. 479.
[328] The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, April 19th, 1859, Ernest D'Hauterive, *op.cit.*, (1927), pp. 129-130.
[329] April 18th, 19th, Earl of Malmesbury, *op.cit*., (1885, 1924), p. 479.
[330] April 19th, Earl of Malmesbury, *op.cit.,* (1885, 1924), pp. 479-480.
[331] The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, April 20th, 1859, Ernest D'Hauterive, *op.cit.*, (1927), p. 133.
[332] The Emperor to Prince Napoleon, April 21st, 1859, Ibid., p. 133.

which had lost "all the claim to the support or countenance of England" but not committed to "come to the aid of Sardinia."[333] Derby's following remark concerning the impact of Austria's thrust on the British relations with France is noteworthy. Derby expounded, "*for the moment* these events rather ***diminish*** than increase the probability of ***a rupture with France***, while they will task her means to the uttermost."[334] Thus, though Derby and Palmerston displayed different levels of commitment to the Italian war, even Derby, who clung to neutrality, recognized the critical effect of Austria as the third adversary that more immediately mattered on the Anglo-French competition.

In this regard, the emergence of Austria as the aggressor in Italy largely countervailed the noted impact of the Franco-Russian entente that had been set in, as manifested in the Secret Treaty of 1859 and Russia's neutrality in the Italian affairs. The extent to which Britain and France shared Austria as a common threat was strengthened by the liberal cabinet's return in June until the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1860. As noted, Palmerston not only vociferously accused Austria of having first "embarked on a war in Italy" in May of 1859,[335] but also resolutely advocated "a triple league" of France, Sardinia, and Britain against Austria to prevent any foreign interference in Italy even at the expense of Britain's naval participation in war by January 1860.[336]

Palmerston's conviction for the anti-Austrian coalition was so remarkably solid as to defend Napoleon III from the imputations of his "unsteadiness" and untrustworthiness. Palmerston argued that the Villafranca agreement fell short of what the Emperor intended to achieve in his declaration in the beginning of war, not the proof of his "unsteadiness." Given the conversations he had with the Emperor in the last 4-5 years, Palmerston had always "found him entertaining the same views upon the affairs of Italy" particularly "in regard to forcing Italy from Austrian domination and weakening the temporal sovereignty of the Pope." Most notably, he strove to convince Parliament to approve of his proposal for a Congress where the triple coalition could be formulated since it might "*avert* ***a rupture with France*** and secure the continuance of peace with our neighbor."[337]

Apparently, Derby as well as Palmerston understood Austria's deviation in the Italian affairs would create a ground on which the Anglo-French rupture associated with naval arms race could be either diminished or averted. In reality, this had been the case until the French annexation of March 1860. The Villafranca settlement of July 1859, which satiated Palmerston to some extent since Lombardy was ceded to Sardinia via Napoleon III, was in large part prompted by the Prussian mobilization on the northern border and not by the lack of France's territorial scheme in Italy. Palmerston's rhetorical guard of the French Emperor faded into insignificance when Napoleon III proceeded to annex Nice and Savoy, violating the neutrality of Chablais and Faucigny of Savoy, without any consultation with the Great Powers, as he had previously announced.

Palmerston's countenance for the Franco-Sardinian alliance in Italy relied on his inaccurate assumption that France might not engage in territorial enlargement in the course of its intervention. Once this assumption was debunked, the British Foreign Policy towards

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[333] The Earl of Derby to Queen Victoria, April 21st, 1859, in Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher, ed., *op.cit.*, (1908), pp. 327.
[334] Ibid., p. 328.
[335] Colonel F. A. Wellesley, *op.cit.,* (1928), p. 181.
[336] Palmerston's memorandum, January 5, 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 177.
[337] *Ibid.,* p. 181. Palmerston's proposal was declined by the cabinet and not realized.

France underwent a sea-change from intending to stand by France and Sardinian, as spearheaded by Palmerston in January, to even considering a counter-coalition with Austria or Prussia against France.[338] Palmerston spoke of the preparedness for a war with France "with a confederated alliance or singly and by herself."[339] The British distrust surged vis-à-vis Cavour, too. Palmerston insinuated that "if on the other hand Cavour is determined to grasp Venetia, a British fleet may oppose his attempt,"[340] noting "England might have to fight with Austria" to uphold "the European peace and British interests" in May.

Austria as a counterforce and seperate moves to deter Russia and Prussia, 1860-1865

The French annexation of March 1860 was the juncture that produced Britain's misgiving toward France and a diplomatic precedent of territorial revision in the central theater of France, though Nice and Savoy fell into the peripheral theater, or adjacent theaters of Britain. Britain's expectation about the contagion effect on Belgium and Holland emerged. On the French side, Napoleon III had tenaciously made efforts to enact a territorial arrangement from a diplomatic deal of the Rhine, Luxembourg, and Belgium in 1863-1870 until the Franco-Prussian war shattered his aspiration. Nevertheless, Britain no longer espoused any pretext for France's diplomatic scheme and hesitated more to align with France. The experience of Nice and Savoy altered Britain's view of Austria in a manner that shaped their interactions in a series of crises that occurred later.[341]

At each moment of crisis or war since 1860, the degree to which Britain and France took a common stand against a third threat vacillated. To put differently, neither had they witnessed a plain common threat that could bring them together, as Austria had done before the annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1860, nor had they been deficient in potential allies to engage from 1863-1870. Although the French annexation certainly boosted the British distrust as well as the British loss of prestige in reference to its status quo policy in Europe, Palmerston conceived that Britain "had no ground for war, and no sufficient reasons for war about Nice and Savoy" since it was France, not Britain, that took up arms to eliminate the Austrian rule by sending more than 55,000 troops in Lombardy and still desired to see Austria pass Venetia onto Italy.[342]

As the direction of France's expansion shifted towards the Alps and Rhine from March 1860, once the common threat, Austria, was converted into a probable ally of Britain should France set out for further territorial revision. Palmerston appealed to "a European interest," not "an English interest" or "a question between France and England," when

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[338] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 206-207.

[339] Memorandum of a Conversation with Count Flahault on Tuesday, March 27, 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 191.

[340] Russell to Hudson, May 22nd, 1860, P.R.O. [Public Record Office], 30/22/109, Cited in Denis Mack Smith, "Palmerstone and Cavour: Some English Doubts about the Risorgimento", in C. P. Brand, K. Foster, and U. Limentani, *op.cit.*, (1963), p. 250, p. 266.

[341] In this sense, the learning dynamics associated with the Italian war, the French annexation, and the Polish question had been relatively dismissed in the previous security literature compared to the examination of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis and the Prussian wars. For a recent work on the effect of learning on leaders' decision-making during the Danish crises, see Jayne R. Schlesinger and Jack S. Levy, *op.cit.*, (2021), pp. 338-357.

[342] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 108.

reproaching the French violation of the neutrality of two provinces of Savoy as well as its rationale for territorial expansion in April.[343] After a couple of months, Palmerston warned Persigny of "a European coalition against France" in the event that France became more aggressive considering "the recent acts of France and her present attitude." He added, "there is not a man [in England] who would not do his best to organize a coalition to restrict ambitious and invading France."[344]

The Italian unification of March 1861, except Venetia under the Austrian control until 1866, represented the first major revision of the Crimean system. In the course of the Italian war, France was able to absorb Nice and Savoy by implementing his disingenuous project with Cavour at the expense of almost unwavering distrust of Britain concerning its territorial quest in the forthcoming years.[345] Though the Polish uprising of 1863 necessitated the British assistance in France's attempt to impose a collective pressure on Russia, Britain had patently not been as supportive as France wished because of its apprehension about France's expansion. In early 1861, Palmerston imparted to Russell, "our Policy is to prevent France from realizing her vast Schemes of Extension and aggression in a number of questions" by "diplomatic trammels."[346]

In the meantime, the Russo-Prussian alignment over the Polish uprising was materialized by the Alvensleben Convention of February 1863 in which they agreed to cooperate in pursuing the Polish along the common frontiers.[347] Such a development provided Britain and France with incentives to coordinate more closely to wield a countering force vis-à-vis the Russo-Prussian alignment alongside their countenance of the principle of nationalities. For example, Drouyn de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, tried to convince the Austrian ambassador and the British counterpart to engage in a joint action of Austria, Britain, and France against the Russo-Prussian convention in late February, noting that Britain "might not be willing to furnish troops but might afford naval assistance."[348] Russell also briefly advocated 'a policy of intervention with France.'[349]

In this respect, Russia during the Polish question constituted the common threat for France and Britain to some extent. But Palmerston's misgiving about France's plot of territorial expansion became so entrenched as to facilitate a joint action for the Polish nationalities. Palmerston thought that France would enjoy "a fine opportunity of occupying the Rhenish Provinces" by coercion or conquest, "if Prussia could not back out of their agreement with Russia" in March 1863.[350] The Queen similarly noted, "the Emperor Napoleon is dying for an opportunity to be on the Rhine, and we must take care not to give him a pretense for it".[351] Palmerston even purported that Napoleon III's "real Object is the

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[343] Palmerston to Persigny, April 17th, 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 183-186.
[344] Palmerston to Persigny, October 18th, 1860, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), p. 192-196.
[345] Russell repeatedly averred the British distrust after the Treaty of Turin in the parliamentary debate. For example, he said, "the course he [the Emperor] pursued has already produced a great deal of distrust", "the course he pursued has produced great distrust in this country", and "I believe it will produce great distrust all over Europe". 26 March 1860, *Hansard,* 3rd series, Vol. 157, page cols, 1257-1258.
[346] Palmerston to Russell, 8 February, 1861, P.R.O 30/22, 21, Quoted in W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 101.
[347] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 110.
[348] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1956), p. 30.
[349] W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 112.
[350] Palmerston and Russell on Bismarck and French military strength, 1860-3, 3 March, 1863, in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, ed., *op.cit.*, (1938), p. 250.
[351] Note by the Queen, 23 February, 1863, Cited in W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 112.

humbling of England" and thus Britain's business was to "render it hopeless for him to attempt doing so in any other way."[352]

Therefore, Britain declined a joint denunciation proposed by France in February and again clarified to France that Britain would be averse to going to war with Russia over Poland "whatever sympathy for the Poles might be felt in Britain" in July, which pushed France to contemplate that a military action should be postponed until 1864.[353] Even when Russell drafted a joint proposal of Austria, France, and Britain to recommend Russia an armistice of a year in May, the major reasoning was that such a cooperation with Napoleon III could be the best means to bridle France's revisionist pursuit, as he wrote to the Queen in June.[354] Besides, Prussia's affirmation that it would adhere to neutrality unless its own territory was attacked encouraged Palmerston to find Russell's joint campaign more acceptable.[355] But Russia and Austria scorned the British proposal.[356]

The British dismissal of the French invitation to a European Congress, Napoleon III's last bid with respect to the Polish question, almost finalized the Anglo-French estrangement in late 1863. Ironically, as the Polish question and Russia deepened the French interest in alignment with Britain, the Danish question and Austria and Prussia in 1863-1864 escalated Britain's alignment interest with France, after France was dismayed, if not infuriated, by Britain's disinterestedness for the Polish issue. Before the Danish crisis began to flare up with the November constitution of 1863, where Denmark claimed the succession in Schleswig and Holstein, and the Austro-Prussian military advance in mid-January 1864, Palmerston presumed any aggression of Germany against Denmark "would most likely" cause France's countermove against them in June 1863.[357]

But whether France would be available as an ally in the Danish question depended upon the French determination and not Britain's desire. A month later, while admitting that Germany might wish to possess Kiel as a German seaport, Palmerston delivered a warning against the violation of the integrity of Denmark established by the London Protocol in 1852. He remarked, "all reasonable men in Europe, including those in France and Russia," would concur in maintaining the integrity of Denmark.[358] But France was more reluctant to side with Britain after its diplomatic fiasco over the Polish question.[359] The closer alignment of Russia and Prussia, represented by the Alvensleben convention of 1863, had forestalled Russia's cooperation with Britain in case of a Danish-German dispute.

Hence, while the extent to which France and Britain regarded the German states in Schleswig-Holstein as a common adversary had been tenuous, the strategic need of allies against Prussia near Danish Duchies, compelled Britain to solicit France's countenance over the Danish crisis in 1864. Alongside Russia as a third power in the Polish question, the combined effects of the Germans states rising as a third power to be restrained for

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[352] Palmerston to Russell, 7 April, 1863, P.R.O. 30/22, 14. Cited in W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 101.
[353] Cowley to Russell, 6 July 1863, no. 786, confidential, R.A. H. 51/115, copy, Quoted in W. E. Mosse, *op.cit.,* (1956), p. 51.
[354] Russell to the Queen, 1 June, 1863, and Russell to Grey, 2 June 1863, R.A. H. 51/57 and H. 51/58, Cited in Ibid*.,* p. 48.
[355] Ibid., p. 43.
[356] Ibid., p. 44.
[357] Palmerston to Russell, 27 June 1863, with note by Russell, 10 July, in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938), pp. 250-251.
[358] 23 July 1863, *Hansard,* 3rd series, Vol. 157, page cols, 1251-1252.
[359] Keith A. P. Sandiford, *op.cit.,* (1975), pp. 61-62.

Britain and France having been a potential continental ally in the Danish question scaled back the British loss from alienating France. Britain swayed between pursuing a peaceful settlement through joint diplomacy and military intervention in case of a diplomatic fallout but the latter faced consequential domestic oppositions from the Queen and her allies in the cabinet.[360]



Figure. 14. Open alignment opportunities in the theaters of France's expansion

The Emperor ended up being equivocal or evasive regarding a collective action with Britain. When Cowley commented that he believed the Emperor "was not going to follow up his anger against us [Britain] in the midst of these troubles," Napoleon III answered that he aspired that "some *terrain* might be found on which the past could be forgotten."[361] In view of the territorial arrangement that Napoleon III preferred concerning Schleswig-Holstein, which he had hinted to Cowley in this conversation, France's interests diverged from the British ones. Over the very same conversation, the Emperor confessed that his desired solution was "the separation of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark, their union with Germany and the union of Denmark with Sweden and Norway,"[362] which was absolutely at odds with what Britain had sought.

The past to which the Emperor referred was intertwined with the cold shoulder Britain had given to France over the Polish engagement, which actually originated from the French annexation of Savoy and the heated naval arms race that was about to slacken off in some measure. Cowley already acknowledged the adverse impacts of the Polish question on France's attitude towards Britain and informed Russell, "The question of

[360] For example, as Granville, President of the Council, confronted Palmerston by saying that he strongly objected to "the plunging this country into a war for the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852", Palmerston gave some assurance that "there was no question whatever of England going to war". Sir Charles Phipps to Queen Victoria, 7th January, 1863? [this should be read 1864], in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), p. 142.

[361] Ibid. p. 259.

[362] Ibid., p. 258. In Prince Napoleon's note for the consideration of the Emperor on the Polish affairs, Prince Napoleon submitted that "Sweden shall have Finland, and possibly, Denmark" in February 1863. Moreover, the Emperor appeared to have envision a military act in the Baltic with Charles XV of Sweden by August of 1863 when Britain seemed to be adamant in not intervening in Poland. Likewise, Napoleon III's enunciation with regard to Denmark's union with Sweden is not completely mystifying. According to Cowley, Drouyn de Lhuys said, "Sweden might be willing to take up arms but could be of little assistance" when speculating possible allies of France in defense of Denmark. Quoted in W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 163.

Poland had shown that Great Britain could not be relied upon when war was in the distance……France did not wish a collision single-handed with Germany but would wait the development of events" on January 3.[363] Nevertheless, Russell and Palmerston went the distance to impede Prussia's conquest of Schleswig. Russell warned the Prussian envoy, Bernstoff that Britain "could not allow Denmark to perish without aiding her."[364]

Whereas the Queen was frightened by Russell's anti-German tone, opposing military assistance for Denmark, "England cannot be committed to assist Denmark" in case of Prussia's occupation of Schleswig,[365] Palmerston "heartily" concurred with Russell. Palmerston advocated Russell's opinion on the ground that Prussia's seizure of Schleswig might justify a stronger power's expansion on part of a weaker power's territory whenever the former "has a demand upon" the latter. Prime Minister stated twice that France might be motivated to seize the Prussian Rhenish provinces if such a principle or precedent was established by Prussia.[366] Palmerston underscored the probability of France's movement towards the Rhine to dissuade the German states from taking over Schleswig-Holstein.

As such, Palmerston envisaged the principle established by Prussia could be "fatally retorted by France's seizure of the Prussian Rhenish provinces," which would further menace "the peace," assuming that "the whole French nation would be as clamorous for the Rhine as the Germans are for Schleswig-Holstein."[367] Though Palmerston's anticipation was imprecise in terms of the extent of France's boldness for the Rhine, his apprehension appeared to be one of the primary drivers of Britain's foreign policy as it had been consistently addressed. Still, Palmerston and Russell faced considerable dissents within the cabinet as well as from the Queen, and the Cabinet members decided "to inquire of France, Russia, and Sweden whether they would join England in preventing the invasion of Schleswig" after "a great tussle" in the cabinet on January 12th.[368]

As for Russia, Gorchakov's dominant interests were to "combat the notions of democracy and nationality and to control France" and Napier, the British ambassador to Russia, advised to Russell Russia would "support Denmark as far as possible consistently with those objectives."[369] Likewise, Mosse commented that Russia could "cooperate with England" only if the "overriding object of strengthening Bismarck and German conservatism was not jeopardized."[370] In line with this interest, Gorchakov opined that it behooved "England and Russia to lay the basis of a common policy" to suppress "the revolutionary forces of France" in December 1863.[371] Thus, Russia had little interest in curbing the German expansion solely for the integrity of Denmark. Gorchakov deplored the ultimatum but refused to join any *demarche* that could wound Austria and Prussia.[372]

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[363] Cowley to Russell, 3 January 1864, *Ibid.,* p. 163.
[364] Russell to Bloomfield and Buchanan, 8 January 1864, Quoted in Ibid., p. 162.
[365] Queen Victoria to Palmerston, 8th January, 1864, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), pp. 143-144.
[366] Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 8th January, 1864, in Ibid., pp. 144-148.
[367] Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 8th January, 1864, in Ibid., p. 146, p. 148.
[368] W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 162-163.
[369] Napier to Russell, telegram, January 5, 1864, Napier to Russell, No. 53, January 20, 1864 (Record Office, London), Quoted in Lawrence D. Steefel, *The Schleswig-Holstein Question*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), p. 166.
[370] W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 164-165.
[371] Napier to Russell, no. 823, most confidential, 30 December 1863, RA I 92/175, copy, Quoted in Ibid., p. 165.
[372] Lawrence D. Steefel, *op.cit.*, (1932), p. 166.

Furthermore, Gorchakov encouraged Denmark "not to resist the occupation." In Russia's view, Schleswig would be "better occupied by them than the minor states." The Russian *Chargé d'affaires* conveyed to Count Rechberg, the Foreign Minister of Austria, "the Russian Government has full confidence in the intentions of Austria and Prussia with regard to Schleswig."[373] Britain's diplomatic attempts to bring France and Russia together to dissuade the German states were as pointless as the French quest for a European Congress against the Russian crackdown of the Polish nationals. Cowley rightly reckoned that the "lamentable conduct" of France stemmed from "a rankling disappointment at the failure of the projected Congress" and "anger toward the British Government for their abandonment of France on the Polish question."[374]

By 27th January, it became unmistakable to the British cabinet that France would not join Britain "in the use of force" to ensure the integrity of Denmark. Palmerston continued to explore the ways in which Britain could extract the cooperation of France "in diplomatic [non-military] action for the maintenance of the Treaty."[375] Nonetheless, Prussia crossed into Holstein on February 1st and Austria shortly followed the Prussian forces. Meanwhile, even though Britain strenuously aimed at winning the French diplomatic aid in its mediation, Palmerston made sure to not produce any pretext for France's approach toward the Rhine. Russell once drafted a proposal in February, which indicated that Britain would dispatch a squadron to Copenhagen and France would place a strong corps on the Rhenish frontier if Austria and Prussia refused the mediation.

Palmerston objected to this proposal for France since "it might not be advisable, nor for our interest, to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian Rhenish territory." He elaborated that the French conquest of that territory would be "an evil for us" and "seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium."[376] Although the Emperor had been in actuality more circumspect in devising another territorial scheme, particularly after the Polish fiasco, than Palmerston assumed, Palmerston's reasoning was predicated upon the assumption that the Emperor was "holding back to be enabled to size the Rhenish provinces, or to occupy the Palatine of Bavaria, or to put himself at the head of a Confederacy of the Rhine."[377] He inferred Europe would take the French extension in the Rhine as "a severe blow to English interests" and "a change in the balance of power."[378]

In order to establish the Anglo-French concert for a conference at London, the British cabinet sent Clarendon to Paris in April and Russell advised him to put forward "the partition of Schleswig" as a proposal by the western powers during the conference.[379] But the French aloofness sticked around. After the conversation with the Emperor and Drouyn de Lhuys, Clarendon briefed that the Emperor said "he could not" join Britain "in strong language to the German powers, not being prepared to go to war with them." Napoleon III explained that "the question did not touch the dignity or the interests of France," as

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[373] Bloomfield to Russell, No. 72, January 28, 1864 (Record Office, London), Quoted in Ibid., p. 166.
[374] Cowley to Russell, No. 99, January 15, 1864 (Record Office, London), Quoted in Ibid., p. 167.
[375] "Discussion of Cabinet members on hearing that France will not use force", 26-27, January, 1864, in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938), p. 266.
[376] Proposals to be made to France, February 1864, Memorandum of Palmerston, February 13th, 1864, in Spencer Walpole, *The Life of Lord John Russell, Vol. 2*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1891), pp. 402-403.
[377] Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 22nd February, 1864, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), pp. 161-162.
[378] Palmerston to Queen Victoria, 22nd February, 1864, in Ibid., p. 165.
[379] Spencer Walpole, *op.cit.*, 1891, p. 403, Keith A. P. Sandiford, *op.cit.,* (1975), p. 106.

Palmerston had rationalized the non-intervention in the Polish matter, and France did not desire another "*gros souflet"* from Germany when it had received it from Russia due to its endeavors to champion the Polish cause.[380]

As a matter of fact, the Algerian uprising that erupted in April compelled France to deploy more troops from 1864, which amounted up to 62,000 by 1865, as the foregoing part addressed, Napoleon III's statement of France's unpreparedness for a war with the German states was not a hyperbole. In his reply to the Danish request for France's support on April 8 of 1864, Napoleon III called the general impression in Europe that "France was always prepared for war" as one of many "illusions" and a war with Prussia would require "no little preparation."[381] Alongside the favorable public opinion for peace, represented by the *Corps législatif* whose capacity to control the military and naval expenditure slightly enhanced in late 1861, the Emperor referred the French reluctance to another reason associated with his aversion to a European coalition against France.

Napoleon III did not conceal his motivation that France would "look for some compensation on the Rhine" in the event of intervention, which might provoke "all Europe against him." The Emperor obviously took note of the prevalent suspicion in Europe that he awaited an excuse for extending "the French frontier in this direction." He asserted that "replacing the Holsteiners under the rule of Denmark" would not fit with the policy of nationalities upon which France's upholding the independence of Italy, including Venetia, from Austria as well as Poland had been based. Though France could have been more proactive in reining the German states had it been for Britain's acceptance of a modification in the northeastern frontier, Britain recognized it as a greater "evil" than the sacrifice of on the part of Denmark.[382] Yet, Palmerston and Russell contemplated taking a stand against the Germans powers by dispatching the British fleet to the Baltic if Britain could bring France, Russia, and Sweden on board at the London Conference from the late April.[383]

There existed a short-lived moment in which alignment opportunity was amplified for a week in the late June. As the Russo-Prussian meetings were held in Potsdam and Berlin and another conversation among Francis-Joseph, William I, Rechberg and Bismark followed, Droyun raised a probability of the Anglo-French concert again on June 20 by explaining to Cowley that the Italian affair ended up as "an incomplete business" because France was alone then and Britain seemed to be "paralyzed" for being alone.[384] Cowley and Droyun discussed a probable collective measure in the Adriatic but Cowley confined the level of the British assistance by noting that it "would only be auxiliary." Intelligence that reached Cowley alluded to the impact of the Russo-German interchanges on the French move of which he thought England must make the most.[385]

In the interim, Cowley certainly took into account the cost that the alliance with France might entail and expressed his views to Clarendon, "It is clear that the French

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[380] Lawrence D. Steefel, *op.cit.*, (1932), p. 205.

[381] Karl Döhler, *Napoleon III und die deutsch-dänische Frage, unter besonere Berücksichtigung der Französischen Politik während des Konfliktes von 1863-64*, Leipzig Dissertation, Halle a-S., (1913), p. 53, A Report of Admiral Steen Bille, to the Danish Foreign Office dated April 8, 1864, Cited in Lawrence D. Steefel, *op.cit.*, (1932), p. 206.

[382] *Ibid.,* p. 206.

[383] Palmerston to Russell, April 18, 1864, in Spencer Walpole, *op.cit.*, (1891), p. 405, The London Conference took place from April 25th to June 25th in 1864. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 230.

[384] Cowley to Russell, 20 June 1864, Clarendon MSS. Copy, Quoted in W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 204.

[385] Ibid., pp. 204-205.

alliance is to be bought, but the price will be perhaps more than it is worth."[386] The Queen and Palmerston, peeved by the obstinacy of the Danes, apprehended that "the greatest danger from France joining us was dragging us into a war, in which she [France] would claim the Rhine and possiblyrevolutionize the whole of Italy" on June 21st. All things considered, they agreed that "nothing but naval assistance only for three months" could be available.[387] Russell similarly reasoned that the British assistance would be "inefficient" without France's collaboration and the question was, "what would France require as the price of her alliance" and whether paying the price was "the interest of Britain."[388]

As the London conference was on the brink of collapse, Cowley conversed with Eugène Rouher on the 24th, the Minister of State and Chief Spokesperson of the Emperor before the *Corps Législatif,* where France spelled out clues with respect to the cost of the French alliance. Minister Rouher expounded, so Cowley illustrated, that France would not "take part against" England insofar as British operations solely were "confined to naval demonstrations". Rouher supposed that while he was sure the Emperor would "take the field himself" if England dispatched troops, considering it as the manifestation of Britain's seriousness, the Danish cause "would not occupy the attention of the Emperor" as the more paramount issues as "the liberation of Venetia", his first priority, and "something on the Rhine perhaps his second."[389]

The cost of a common front with France against the German states had become more evident for Britain. Though Rouher denied the allegation of France's obsession with the Rhine by assuring that the Emperor's demand in exchange for the military assistance would be quite "moderate [*peu de chose*]," the suspected loss of the British interest from a territorial modification in the Rhine in case of the French military intervention, which might also escalate into a war Britain disliked, significantly outweighed the strategic gain from delivering the Danish provinces from the German states. Notwithstanding the more cordial suggestion from France, the British disinclination for a European war in addition to the Danish recalcitrance and the expected price Britain would have to pay for the French intervention dissuaded Britain from further military and diplomatic campaigns.

The British cabinet finally resolved to be against war "either single-handed or in conjunction with France" on 24th and consequently the London conference broke down on the 25th.[390] Among Russell, Palmerston, and the Queen and her allies in the cabinet, Russell spearheaded the most aggressive project against the German states and even took account of "the Adriatic provinces of Venetia for Italy, and a bit of the Rhenish frontier" to obtain the French reinforcement "if the German powers refuse the proposal" on the 21st.[391] But Palmerston, once the staunch proponent of Russell's initiative, was not on the same page with Russell and did not take the words of France at face value, let alone the Queen and others. He interpreted France wanted to lure Britain into a war only to present "the real price of France cooperation in the midst of Britain's complications."[392]

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[386] Cowley to Clarendon, private, 20 June, 1864, Quoted in *Ibid.,* p. 205.
[387] Extract from the Queen's Journal, 21st June, 1864, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), pp. 223-224.
[388] Russell to Queen Victoria, 23rd June, 1864, in Ibid., pp. 227-228.
[389] Rouher qualified that Napoleon III had "less eagerness" in the Rhine region than "people were inclined to believe" and did not presume that the Rhenish provinces desired the annexation to France. In Spencer Walpole, *op.cit.*, (1891), p. 408.
[390] W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, 1958, p. 206, Keith A. P. Sandiford, *op.cit.,* (1975), p. 112.
[391] Russell to Palmerston, 21 June, 1864, Palmerston MSS (HMC, London), Citied in Ibid., p. 110, p. p. 176.
[392] Palmerston to Russell, 17 and 21 June 1864, Russell Papers, P.R.O., 30/33/15c in Ibid*.,* p. 110, p. 176.

It was the point at which Palmerston gravitated towards the Queen and other members in the cabinet. The Queen was delighted to find him "very sensible, wonderfully clear-headed, and fully alive to the extreme dangers of the situation" on the 21st almost for the first time during the Schleswig-Holstein conflict.[393] After all, both Palmerston and the Queen bore the strong mistrust towards the French project on the Rhine[394] and had been frustrated by the stiffness of the Danish responses over the course of multiple mediations. In their notes, Palmerston depicted the Danes as "not an intelligent race" and "very borne"[395] and the Queen delineated that "the German Powers would all agree to" mediation but Denmark might "insanely and incredibly refuse every proposal" but the one that could not bring about any agreement with the other parties.[396]

The remaining question on 25th Russell asked was what Britain should choose to do "if the war should assume another character, and the safety of Copenhagen, or Denmark be menaced"[397] or if Austria should enter in the Baltic.[398] Although Palmerston warned the Austrian ambassador, Apponyi, against entering the Baltic and noted, "Germany, and especially Austria, would be the sufferer in such a war" in May,[399] the British opinion within Parliament and the cabinet, including Russell who stated "a pacific policy would suit the country better" on 26th,[400] increasingly favored a neutral and peaceful position by the late June.[401] Palmerston lamented Britain had capitalized on "every possible means" to "bring two parties to an agreement" but the conference failed.[402] Russell also announced that England was "in no way engaged to take part in the present war."[403]

At last, Britain sent a cold reply to France that "only a naval force and no other ally but Sweden" would be not of great use "to recover Schleswig for Denmark" and it would not be imperative to "use force" to protect Denmark.[404] Russell was convinced by the common mistrust of Palmerston and the Queen against France and Britain should not count on the assistance of Napoleon III whose interests largely revolved around Venetia[405] and the Rhine. Denmark couldn't help but standing alone as Britain pulled out in the end. Prussia crossed to the Alsen island on 29th and the ministry in Copenhagen was forced to

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393 Extract from the Queen's Journal, 21st June, 1864, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), p. 223.

394 The Queen held the similar anxiety about the French move towards the Rhine as Palmerston on 22nd June and wrote, "The French are evidently most anxious to get us into the quarrel and to set all Europe in a blaze by rousing Italy, and by getting *the Rhine*!." Queen Victoria to Palmerston, 22nd June, 1864, Ibid., p. 226.

395 Extract from the Queen's Journal, 21st June, 1864, in Ibid., p. 224

396 Queen Victoria to Palmerston, 22nd June, 1864, in Ibid., p. 225.

397 Russell to Queen Victoria, 25th June, 1864, in Ibid., pp. 229-230.

398 W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 206.

399 Palmerston to Russell, 1st May, 1864, Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *op.cit.,* (1876), pp. 249-252.

400 Russell to the Queen, 26th June 1864, R.A. I 98/161, Cited in W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 206-207.

401 *Ibid.,* pp. 206-207.

402 27th June, 1864, *Hansard,* 3rd series, Vol. 176, page cols, 349-350.

403 Spencer Walpole, *op.cit.*, (1891), p. 409. Russell recalled that Britain at least attempted to "induce Denmark to accept propositions three times". Denmark intransigently turned down the last mediation proposal that suggested partitioning the Duchies in accordance with their ethnic composition to which the rest of great powers at the London Conference, including Austria and Prussia, agreed.

404 Russell to Cowley, 29th June, 1864, F.O. 27-1519, no. 563, draft. Cited in W.E. Mosse, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 207.

405 Russell to the Queen, 26th June, R.A. I 98/161, Quoted in Ibid., 207.

resign on July 8th. The armistice, requested by the Danish, came into effect on July 20th.[406] Russell seemed to be relieved in July that Britain hadn't "given in to the temptation of" a Franco-Prussian war since France would "certainly take an ell if they get an inch."[407]

The British annoyance and didactic languages against the German Powers endured through July and August but Britain was by no means committed to effecting a meaningful change in the Danish circumstances at this point. For instance, Russell submitted to Paget, the British minister at Copenhagen, that Denmark "yield and avoid the unnecessary effusion of more Danish blood" on July 21[408] and Palmerston recommended to Russell on August 8th Britain stand "entirely aloof from the Schleswig-Holstein dispute" for its own dignity.[409] The Queen held on to her position that England must not "mix ourselves up in the question" but Prussia should be known their deeds were taken as "the gross and unblushing violation" of the previous assurances in August.[410] In October, Russell lastly snubbed the Danish request for Britain's mediation respecting Jutland.[411]

Without any external assistance from either England or France, Denmark was doomed to be defeated and the Treaty of Vienna of October 30 restored peace in 1864.[412] As confirmed in the Polish and Danish questions, contingent developments of the third power politics, particularly a potential common threat and ally availability, could alter the extent to which alignment opportunity between the leading sea power and a challenger opens or closes. In short, the different alignments among Austria, Russia, and Prussia created the openness of alignment opportunity between Britain and France from 1860-1865. Britain's mistrust after the annexation of Nice and Savoy led Britain to regard Austria as a potential counterforce against France. France and Britain searched for each other's help during the Polish question and the Danish crises to no avail.

Prussia: a counterforce for Britain and a third threat for France, 1865-1870

Britain's diplomatic debacle and the German conquests in the Schleswig-Holstein struck a severe blow to the British prestige in 1864 as the French diplomacy over the Polish question had done to France's prestige in 1863. Regardless, as hinted by Palmerston's words, once the Gastein convention concluded the Danish question in August 1865,[413] Britain began to prefer Prussia's aggrandizement as a potential counterweight against both France and Russia to France's territorial modification in the Rhine. The foregoing examination of the London Conference of 1864 well proved how the British aversion to another French plot in the Rhine precluded England from aligning with France to deter the

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[406] Ibid., p. 207.
[407] Russell to Cowley, 9th July, 1864, Foreign Office, in Spencer Walpole, *op.cit.*, (1891), pp. 409-410.
[408] Russell to Paget, 6 July, 1864, Cited in Keith A. P. Sandiford, *op.cit.,* (1975), p. 117, p. 177.
[409] Palmerston to Russell, 8 August, 1864, Russell Papers, P.R.O. 30/22/15c, Ibid*.,* p. 117, p. 177.
[410] General Grey to Granville, 25 August, Cited in Ibid., p. 117, p. 177.
[411] Russell to Paget, 24 August, 30 September, and 19 October, 1864, nos. 177, 196 and 208, drafts, F.O. 22/312, Cited in Ibid., p. 117, p. 177.
[412] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 230.
[413]Palmerston acknowledged that however "the immoral and indefensible" the German pretension of not having conquested the Duchies might have been, the German occupation was ratified by a treaty with Denmark's cession and thereby Schleswig-Holstein belonged "to Austria and Prussia *par droit de conquête* [by right of conquest], strictly speaking and in accordance with international law", Palmerston to Russell, September 19, 1865, in G. P. Gooch, ed., *op.cit*., (1925), pp. 315-316.

German powers. Schroeder pinpoints, "it was safer to let Prussia aggrandize itself at the expense of Denmark than to risk" French expansion in the Rhine.[414]

When Britain grew increasingly more passive and made use of the Prussian advancement in the continental affairs, Napoleon III continued to scout out a preferred deal in Venetia and along its frontier of the Rhine from manifold arrangements with Prussia, Austria, and Italy in 1865-1867.

Alignment opportunity between France and Britain slightly dwindled because of the absence of a common threat in Europe but did not evaporate as the German states could possibly play a double role of a third threat and potential ally, as Austria in Italy, depending on the subsequent territorial reshuffling. The death of Palmerston and the return of the conservatives did not fundamentally shake the re-oriented foreign policy of Britain ifrom1865-1867 when the asymmetric mobilization restored the previous level of naval power gap.

In these years up to the point when the Franco-Prussian dispute rose to a considerable level, Britain did not dislike the Prussian growth irrespective of the cabinet shift from the liberals to the conservatives in July 1866. Cowley congratulated Russell who succeeded Palmerston on "leaving Foreign Affairs without a question of importance to solve, unless it be that of America," which implied no acute conflict for Britain as the previous Schleswig-Holstein crisis in October 1865.[415] Even when the Austro-Prussian conflict started to be aggravated from early 1866, the British engagement was largely of bounded nature. Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary of Russell's cabinet, made case for a restrained response because England had already acquiesced the Danish settlement such that "the time for action" passed and "neither English honor nor interests" were at stake.[416]

In fact, France had acted more proactively than Britain and opted for neutrality in 1865 prior to the looming conflict between Austria and Prussia, which pre-conditioned the low likelihood of a concert of Britain and France. As examined, Bismarck was able to ensure the French neutrality in return for his promise of Venetia to Italy at the Biarritz conversation of October. Whereas Bismarck was clear-eyed in blocking the French alignment with Austria in case of Prussia's annexation of the Duchies and a consequent Austro-Prussian war, Napoleon III futilely spoke of a Franco-Prussian understanding provided Prussia allowed a territorial compensation in Germany,[417] such as Belgium and the Rhine province.[418] Prussia initiated a crisis by protesting the Austrian decision in Holstein for a united assembly and both soon mobilized their troops in March.

No wonder Cowley reported "the prospects of war in Germany" seemed never "displeasing to the Emperor" and "No co-operation" was expected in late March of 1866.[419] Clarendon assessed "the good offices of England single-handed" would be pointless. More importantly, Foreign Secretary observed no critical interest and prestige of Britain was involved in the German dispute. Russell concurred with Clarendon that Britain

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[414] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 207.

[415] Cowley to Russell, October 26, 1865, in G. P. Gooch, ed., *op.cit*., (1925), p. 339.

[416] The Earl of Clarendon to Queen Victoria, March 31st, 1866, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), p. 315.

[417] Paul Berstein, *op.cit.,* (1971), p. 139.

[418] Colonel F. A. Wellesley, *op.cit.,* (1928), p. 299.

[419] The Earl of Clarendon to Queen Victoria, March 31st, 1866, in George Earle Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1926), p. 314.

"could not use" the words of coercion or "menace" because such bluffs had been humiliatingly called earlier by Prussia in the Danish question.[420] On the other hand, Napoleon III advised Italy to ally with Prussia as part of a Franco-Italian campaign to wrest Venetia from Austria, which Bismarck accepted. As a result, the Prussian-Italian alliance was signed on April 8th in 1866.[421] Bismarck's preparation for a war with Austria was on a roll.

By May, Britain was barely unaware of the French move. Cowley wrote to Clarendon that France's concern was fixated upon "the line on neutrality" as well as "a settlement of the Venetian question" and France seemed to be encouraging a war in an indirect manner.[422] With the French plot in mind, Clarendon turned down a French proposal on May 9th for assembly among England, France and Russia to address the questions of "Venetia, the Duchies, and the Reform of Federal Germany" on account of its unfair exclusion of Prussia and Austria. Cowley reported to Clarendon the Emperor "appeared determined that this crisis should not end without the annexation of Venetia to Italy."[423] The report was accurate because France soon gained the third promise of Venetia from Austria and the right of a reform of the German states in exchange for its neutrality in the Franco-Austrian Secret Treaty of June 1866[424] when Austria and Prussia were on the brink of war.

As Bismarck intended, the Austro-Prussian war, the Seven-weeks war, broke out in middle of June but neither Austria nor Prussia were common threats for both England and France at this moment. When the British conservatives assumed power in July 1866, the logic of their non-interventionist principle bore much resemblance to Palmerston's last advice that the expansion of Germany, or Prussia, would be preferrable for Britain in controlling France and Russia. Stanley, the Foreign Secretary of the Derby cabinet, retorted to Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador who warned that "a strong power in North Germany" might trigger a future war with France and Russia, "the danger of disturbance to the peace of Europe" conversely "lay in the weakness rather than in the strength of Germany" on July 21 of 1866.[425]

Stanley further informed France via Cowley that England would not "join in any declaration of a Protest against" what was passing in Germany in August because there was no responsibility for Prussia's steps "to increase her power at the cost of other states" or objection "to such increase of Power on her part" in August 1866.[426] After Austria's unexpectedly quick defeat at Königgrätz, Sadowa, in early July, France sounded out Bismarck with some pictures of territorial compensation, including the left bank of the Rhine, the frontier of 1814, Luxembourg and Belgium, even offered a French alliance in return to no avail.[427] It augured the beginning of France's fruitless search for alliance and territorial pursuit in 1866-1870. Bismarck already postulated a war with France be

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[420] The Earl of Clarendon to Queen Victoria, March 31st, 1866, Ibid., pp. 314-315.
[421] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit*., (1954, 1973), pp. 160-161.
[422] Colonel F. A. Wellesley, *op.cit.,* (1928), p. 302.
[423] Ibid., p. 303.
[424] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 165-166. France's additional promise to keep Italy neutral was deceitful in that it had previously encouraged Italy to participate in the Prussian alliance.
[425] Stanley to Lord Bloomfield, No. 12, 21 July, 1866, F.O. 7/702, in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938), p. 307.
[426] Stanley to Cowley, No, 118, 8 August, 1866, F.O. 27/1608, in Ibid., p. 308.
[427] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 133.

inevitable but waited "until the effect of military legislation and training could be developed." [428]

As Austria was transformed into the Dual Empire in October 1867, the French project for an Austro-French alliance was aborted by Hungary's demand of the Balkan interest and Italy's request for Rome in compensations for alliance. Albeit not for Britain, the rising Prussia also exerted an active and animating check on France's territorial and alignment project as Britain wished. Bismarck not only refused to make any concession for geographical arrangement or an alliance with France in 1866 but also inhibited France from seizing Luxembourg from Holland by acquiescing to withdraw the Prussian forces in Luxembourg between April and May in 1867.[429] In addition, the Russo-Prussian concert became more robust as Russia agreed to mobilize its troops on the frontier to neutralize Austria in case of a war by March 1868.[430]

Although France had initially set out for an alignment with Russia to keep Prussia in check before the Luxembourg question in 1867, Russia needed Prussia to be stronger to counterbalance Austria and was more interested in attracting France's support in the Eastern questions. The Russo-Prussian convention of 1868 delivered a final blow to the French attempt. Since a series of the French diplomacy to acquire continental allies, such as Prussia, Austria, and Russia, floundered in 1866-1869, France's strategic rationale for alignment with Britain was bolstered to avoid a total isolation before the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1871. [431] But Britain had reverted to its non-committal position in the continental crises, aside from moral and diplomatic engagement, after the Danish blunder in 1864 and its reinstated naval primacy from 1865 onwards.

Bismarck well recapitulated the variation in Britain's Foreign Policy towards France in the Crimean system. He observed, "the requirement of England's policy was either an entente cordiale with France, or the possession of a strong ally against the enmity of France."[432] The Crimean system of 1856 was founded upon the shared common threat in Southeastern Europe and Black Sea, namely Russia. In 1856-1861, Russia in the Black Sea and Austria in Italy were third common parties that kept alignment opportunity open until the French annexation of Nice and Savoy. From 1861 to 1864, Russia in Poland and the German states in Denmark motivated France and England to seek for each other's assistance despite their bungled diplomacies. from 1865-1871, whereas Prussia turned into a potential guard against France's territorial adventurism for Britain,[433] France was again constrained to resort to Britain's backup once it had lost all continental partners.

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[428] Otto Von Bismarck*, op.cit.*, (1966), p. 57.

[429] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 134.

[430] Ibid., p. 135.

[431] France asked Stanley to seize the initiative of mutual reduction of armaments by France and Prussia and Clarendon worked to facilitate the communication with respect to mutual arms control in 1869-1870. But these overtures failed and the Franco-Prussian tension was not lessened. Clarendon to Loftus, Private 9 March 1870, Pte Clarendon Papers, F.X. 361/1, in Harold Temperley and Lillan M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938), pp. 318-323.

[432] Otto Von Bismarck*, op.cit.*, (1966), p. 62.

[433] Bismarck appeared to have understood this and wrote, "England is, indeed, ready to accept the stronger German-Prussia in place of Austria…..but this theoretical sympathy would scarcely have condensed itself into an active support by land and by sea. The occurrences of 1870 have shown my estimation of England have been correct". Ibid., p. 62. In light of this dynamics, Austria in the Italian war and the Franco-Prussian war had been conceived by Britain in an equivocal manner.

4.5. Conclusion:
Naval Parity, France's Peripheral Expansion, and Open Alignment Opportunity

		A challenger's gain of interest and prestige from naval armament and geographical expansion	
The leading sea power's loss of interest and prestige from a challenger's naval buildp and expansion		Low	High
	Low	[1856] [1865-1870] [1863-1864] [1858-1862]	
	High		

Figure. 15. The first Anglo-French dyad, 1856-1870

As the French naval buildup was spearheaded by Napoleon III's ambition, the naval gap was rapidly closed and the underlying preventive motivation of Britain was strengthened from 1856-1862. France's expected naval overtake and geographic proximity between Britain and France gave rise to the British leaders' apprehension. Palmerston pushed for coastal fortifications and Somerset, the First Lord of Admiralty, warned, "the command of the Channel will be in jeopardy, and there will be great and not unreasonable alarm" in February 1861.[434] Despite Gladstone's cautiousness as a chancellor of the Exchequer, Palmerston's will to retain England's naval primacy was "generally supported by the Crown, Parliament, and the public."[435] Yet, France's expansion didn't proceed in a way that could activate the preventive motivation.

Though the French annexation of Nice and Savoy undermined Britain's prestige associated with the status quo policy in Europe, France's expansion into the peripheral theaters of Britain and failed territorial rearrangement in the Rhine area deactivated the British preventive motivation. In addition to the openness of alignment opportunity in Europe, this is the key answer to the naval puzzle of the Crimean system. Britain's expectation about the contagion effect did appear when Palmerston began to express his concern about the possibility of France's further expansion into Belgium and Luxembourg in the event of France's occupation of the Rhine provinces in the 1860s. However, France's territorial scheme was unsuccessful and mostly relied on diplomatic means that was vulnerable to the British and Prussian opposition.

Additionally, open alignment opportunities simultaneously played a role in alleviating the British preventive motivation. Austria and Prussia were at times the third powers to be deterred or countered by Britain and France or potential continental counterforces for Britain toward France. Russia's presence and movement created a necessity to retain the loose alignment between Britain and France especially in the period of the Polish crisis and the Russo-Prussian alignment. Austria, Prussia, and Russia continued to constitute potential common threats and ally availability in Europe from 1859-1866. From the mid 1860s, Prussia was positively viewed as a counterforce to France and

[434] Colin F. Baxter, "Lord Palmerston: Panic Monger or Naval Peacemaker?," *Social Science*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 205-206.
[435] Ibid., p. 210.

the Russo-Prussian alignment matured in a way that compelled France to not give up on Britain.

Hence, though near naval parity and geographic proximity did cause a certain level of the preventive motivation, France's peripheral expansions without expected contagion effect and the open alignment opportunity in Europe deactivated, or countervailed, the preventive motivation from 1856-1865. The British preventive motivation itself decreased from 1863 as the Palmerston cabinet swiftly caught up with France in ironclad arms race with Britain's economic capacity and political will. The relative balance of resource-extraction capacities turned back to asymmetry from 1863, so did naval balance from 1864-1870. In this sense, all three conditions of an interactive theory were even more conducive to a peaceful settlement between Britain and France in the years between 1864-1870.

Chapter 3. The second Anglo-French Dyad, 1882-1904

5. The Untypical Preventive Motivation and the Fashoda Crisis Revisited, 1882-1904: Peripheral Expansion, The Contagion Effect, and The Swing of Alignment Opportunity

Introduction: The puzzle of Britain's untypical preventive motivation

The second phase of the Anglo-French naval competition in the late 19th century presents a different puzzle from the one in the Crimean system. The Third Republic could not close the naval gap with Britain as substantively as the Second Empire had done in the late 1850s to the early 1860s, and France's power projection was also geographically confined within the peripheral theaters for both Britain and France. Nevertheless, France and Britain were on the verge of a war over the Fashoda crisis in 1898 more so than from 1858-1863. Likewise, Britain could have had a lower preventive war motivation in 1898 than from 1858-1863 as France had been consistently unable to overtake Britain in naval capabilities in this period. But Britain had exhibited a more robust resolve to go to a preventive war in 1898 than in the 1860s.

The focal point of this chapter is to untangle this puzzle and account for the subsequent conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, which exemplifies a strategic settlement between the leading sea power and a challenger along with the Washington naval system in the 20th century. Previous accounts mostly ascribe the peaceful resolution of the Fashoda crisis to the asymmetric military balance[436], the democratic peace,[437] audience costs and credible signals from the political opponents in the regime,[438] Britain's public opinion and military mobilization,[439] different executive-legislative relations of democratic regimes[440] and a combination of these factors.[441] However, little attention has been paid to the Fashoda puzzle as to why the leading sea power displayed the untypical preventive motivation in the first place even in the peripheral theater.[442]

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[436] Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace", *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Fall 1994), pp. 32-33.

[437] Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*, (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 290-291, James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*, (University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 176-198, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, (Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 7-9.

[438] Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 175-196. Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Causal Inference", in Henry Brady and David Collier, ed., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp. 211-212.

[439] Marc Trachtenberg, *op.cit.,* (2012), pp. 13-17.

[440] Susan Peterson, "How democracies differ: Public opinion, state structure, and the lessons of the Fashoda crisis," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5 No. 1, (1995), pp. 3-37, Susan Peterson, *Crisis bargaining and the state: the domestic politics of international conflict*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 95-101.

[441] Richard Ned Lebow, *op.cit.,* (1981), pp. 317-333. Lebow's emphasis on "British military superiority, Salisbury's ability to convince French leaders and public opinion" of its preparedness to use force, "mobilization of public opinion", and "military preparations" is in large part consistent with most of the existing arguments except the ones based on the democratic peace and audience costs.

[442] Taliaferro and Kupchan address the puzzle of great power's intervention, or overexpansion, in peripheral regions. But the scope condition of their works does not concern the context of naval power shifts as well as interactions between a challenger and the leading sea power. Charles A. Kupchan, *op.cit.,* (1994), Jeffrey W.

France's weaker resource-extraction capacity for naval defense could have curtailed Britain's preventive motivation in the peripheral theater. But the direction of France's power projection in 1898 heightened Britain's expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of naval defense in the Mediterranean and the shift in alignment opportunities in both central and peripheral theaters also countervailed the systemic effect of naval disparity from 1891-1898 to a large extent that almost activated the untypical preventive motivation of Britain. Since the Fashoda crisis, the redirection of France's peripheral expansion and the re-opening of alignment opportunity gave rise to the strategic settlement of a long naval competition of the 19th century between Britain and France from 1898-1904.

5.1. Expectations of the existing theories regarding the second Anglo-French dyad, 1882-1904

Hegemonic shift theories and balance of power theory

Hegemonic shift theories expect that the level of the preventive war motivation of Britain would be low due to France's persistently weaker naval power from 1882-1904. However, Britain showed a stronger preventive motivation than it had revealed during the years of the first Anglo-French dyad, 1856-1870. Like the first Anglo-French dyad, the second Anglo-French dyad is more consistent with expectations of the balance of power theory in that the asymmetric naval balance induced instability and the increased likelihood of a war. However, France's behaviors from 1882-1904 again challenge Levy and Thompson's theory of balancing because France posed asymmetric naval threat and formed a coalition-balancing with Russia against Britain until the Fashoda crisis was resolved in 1898.

The liberal-rationalist framework and trade expectations theory

Shultz's liberal rationalist theory expects that the domestically united resolve, including the hawkish position of the opposition party in Britain, a democracy, would send a costly signal to France and compel France to back down. The outcome of the Fashoda crisis in part can be explained by the liberal-rationalist framework. But the liberal-rationalist framework does not account for why Britain had the untypically high preventive motivation and spoke of fighting a preventive war in the first place. In addition, given the Anglo-French convention of June 1898 over West Africa, the puzzle remains as to why Britain's preventive motivation was not activated in West Africa. The trade expectations theory also does not solve this puzzle because it expects that expectations about the fall in trades in Africa would trigger Britain's resolve.

Different institutional structures of democracy and domestic preferences

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Taliaferro, *op.cit.,* (2004). In a different sense, Anderson sheds light on "inadvertent expansion" in peripheral regions, as opposed to "strategic expansion." Nicholas Duncan Anderson, "Inadvertent Expansion in World Politics", Yale University Ph.D. Dissertation, 2021.

Peterson argues that "the degree of executive autonomy from the legislature" that channels domestic preferences of elites and the public differently explains the French insistence and the British hawkishness during the Fashoda crisis. She claims that Delcassé's hawkishness was not constrained by the dovish public opinion whereas Salisbury's dovishness was overruled by the hawkish preferences of elites and the public due to different institutional relations between the executive and the legislative in France and Britain.[443] Nonetheless, Peterson's theory can't explain why Britain had the high preventive war motivation at the outset and, more importantly, such preventive motivation was deactivated in West Africa in June 1898 but activated in the Upper Nile later in 1898, as shown in the change in Goschen's position.

As she admits, the British public opinion was already hostile over West Africa in June 1898 but Salisbury was still able to conclude the Anglo-French convention of 1898. Peterson's theory lacks an explanation for the different cabinet decisions of Britain in West Africa and the Upper Nile because Salisbury was not constrained by the cabinet members in the former case.[444] On the other hand, the French decision to stand at Fashoda could not be reduced to Delcassé's autonomy backed by the institutional structure and the colonial group. The French House endorsed the appropriations for the expedition by 477 votes to 18 votes in late 1896 and Hanotaux, not Delcassé, set "a division of Sudan" as the official position of the Foreign Ministry in 1897.[445] The Marchand mission was extremely popular aside from being hawkish or dovish.

An Interactive Theory of Power Projection

An interactive theory of power projection expects that the geographical dispersion of Britain's naval forces across different theaters and the Franco-Russian combination would generate the preventive war motivation at the regional level despite overall naval disparity. Further, it expects that France's expansion towards the British first line of maritime defense in the peripheral theater, the Mediterranean, would cause Britain's high expectations about the contagion effect and activate the preventive motivation. If France's power projection is not steered toward the first line of naval defense in the peripheral theater, the British preventive motivation is expected to be deactivated. Whether alignment opportunity is open or closed in the peripheral theater would be of high importance, too.

5.2. the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval armament, 1882-1904: asymmetric ⟹ asymmetric

Background: Britain, France, and the great depression of 1873-1896

Unlike the years of international economic expansion in 1843-1873 that enveloped the Crimean system, the onset of "the great depression of 1873-1896,"[446] or "the

[443] Susan Peterson, *op.cit.,* (1995), p. 5, pp. 16-18.
[444] Ibid., pp. 27-30.
[445] Pierre Guillen, *L'Expansion, 1881-1898*, (Imprimerie Nationale à Paris, 1985), pp. 409-410.
[446] Aaron L. Friedberg, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 332-333.

recession of post-1873,"[447] conditioned the differential growth of power among European states[448] in 1882-1904. In the period of the great recession of 1873-1896, as the international production of industrial and agricultural goods exploded, prices and profits had been kept low, which retarded the overall growth rate and resulted in high unemployment across Europe.[449] It was the economic slump of a peculiar kind in that production and national wealth actually continued to increase but consumption decreased, creating a surplus of goods and incentives for protective tariffs.[450]

Most of European states, except Britain, raised tariffs on imported goods to protect home markets, which unambiguously hurt the British exports. Even so, the British cabinets in the 1880s and 1890s were convinced that England could benefit from its "adherence to the principle of free trade" until "the Tariff Reform controversy of 1903," which Friedberg depicts as "an effort to determine where England stood in terms of comparative economic power and where she was likely to stand in the future."[451] Kennedy attributes Britain's industrial descent to "a flood of imported foreign manufactures into the unprotected home market," too.[452] In a relative sense, Britain entered into the cycle of "declining hegemony" from 1873-1897.[453]

To illustrate, British exports expanded at 5% per annum in volume from 1840-1870 but the annual rate of growth fell to 2% in 1870-1890, reaching 1% in the following decade.[454] The annual growth of rate of Britain's industrial production also dropped from 3% from 1840-1870 to 1.5% from 1875-1894.[455] Britain maintained "31.8% of world's manufacturing capacity in 1870, as compared with 13.2% of Germany and 23.3% of the U.S." but steadily lost ground as its share dwindled to 22.9% in 1880 and 14.7% by 1906-1910.[456] Consequently, the British share of world trade had consistently decreased from 24.9% in 1870 to 14.1% by 1911-1913, as presented in Table 7.

Percentages of World Trade					
States / Year	1870	1880	1889	1898	(1911-) 1913
Britain	**24.9**	**23.2**	**18.1**	**17.1**	**14.1**
Germany	9.7	9.7	10.4	11.8	12
France	**10.4**	**11.2**	**9.3**	**8.4**	**7**
The U.S.	7.5	10.1	9.0	10.3	15

[447] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 102-103.
[448] Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 in Central Europe," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1/2, (1943), pp. 59-61, Albert E. Musson, "The Great Depression in Britain, 1873-1896: A Reappraisal," *The Journal of Economic History,* Vol. 19, No. 2, (1959), pp. 199-202, Norman Stone, *Europe Transformed, 1878-1919*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 117, 133, 151, 155, 173, 193.
[449] Albert E. Musson, *op.cit.,* (1959), p. 199, Aaron L. Friedberg, *op.cit*., (1987), p. 332.
[450] Hans Rosenberg*, op.cit.,* (1943), p. 59, Aaron L. Friedberg, *op. cit.,* (1987), pp. 332-333.
[451] Aaron L. Friedberg, *op. cit.,* (1987), pp. 333-334. Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980*, (Fontana Press, 1981, 1985), p. 25.
[452] Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1981, 1985), p. 22. In this vein, Sumida notes, "Britain's industrial growth slowed sharply as foreign competition reduced the demand for her domestic exports" from the 1880s to 1910. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 6-7.
[453] Charles P. Kindleberger, *op.cit.,* (1996), pp. 51-52.
[454] Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1976, 2017), p. 190.
[455] Ibid., p. 189.
[456] Ibid., pp. 189-190, Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1987, 1989), p. 228.

Table. 10. Distribution of World Trade in Percentage, 1870-1913[457]

In the meantime, France's economic performance had been no less sluggish than the British under the influence of the great depression of 1873-1896. The French share of World Trade diminished from 10.4% in 1870 to 7% in 1913 despite its economic structure that was less reliant upon foreign trades.[458] In addition, France's growth of total GNP in 1880-1910 didn't place France on a position to outcompete Britain whose apparent decline was more noticeable relative to Germany and the U.S. Viewed from a purely bilateral perspective, economic gap in total GNP between them rather almost doubled from 6.17 billion dollars to 12.77-13.76 billion dollars over the two or three decades from 1880 to 1900-1910, as presented in Table 8.

Year	1880	1890	1900	1910
France (GNP)	17.38	19.75	23.5	26.86
Britain (GNP)	23.55	29.44	36.27	40.62
France (GNP/capita)	464	515	604	680
Britain (GNP/capita)	680	785	881	904
France (population)	39.2	40.0	40.7	41.5
Britain (population)	31.1	34.4	38.2	42.1

Table. 11. GNP, Per Capita GNP, and Population of France and Britain, 1880-1910[459]

Whereas France and Britain "shared a rapid rate of expansion in the 1850s and 1860s," both states simultaneously underwent relative stagnation, or the great depression, in 1873-1896, or at least in 1882-1896.[460] Yet, Kindleberger reminds that "Britain had been growing faster than France from 1760 to 1850, possibly earlier" and Britain's lead was "extensive."[461] In terms of percentage of total great power GNP by state, the French share kept sinking by far among the others in 1880-1910 from 18.02% to 14.86%, while the British counterpart hovered around 22.47-24.68% in the same years.[462] Therefore, it is hardly an overstatement that Britain's superior economic and industrial capacity had persisted vis-à-vis France from 1882-1904.

Overview: The asymmetric balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup

[457] Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1976, 2017), p. 190, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *Britain and France: Adaptations to a Changing Context of Power*, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970), p. 158.
[458] Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, ed., *Conway's All the World Fighting Ships, 1860-1905*, (Conway Maritime Press, 1979), p. 282.
[459] GNP at market price, in 1960 U.S. dollars and prices; in billions, Per Capita GNP in 1960 U.S. Dollars and Prices; Total Population in millions, Paul Bairoch, "Europe's Gross National Product: 1800-1975," *Journal of European Economic History*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1976), p. 281, p. 286, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.,* 1970, p. 155. The numbers of population slightly differ from those of Kennedy. Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.*, (1987, 1989), p. 199.
[460] Charles P. Kindleberger*, Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 5-14.
[461] Ibid., pp. 9-10. Kindlegerber comments, "the two economies could thus grow at the same rate, with the difference in level widening absolutely." In 1873-1913, the growth rate of Germany and the U.S. was notably higher than that of Britain. Albert E. Musson, *op.cit.,* (1959), p. 208.
[462] Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, *op.cit.,* (2018), pp. 188-189.

Meanwhile, the great depression of 1873-1896 forged the international condition under which nationalism was strengthened in Europe. As Gilpin puts, "the falling prices from 1873 to 1897 that brought hard times to many farmers, workers, and industries" reinforced "economic nationalism and imperialistic conflict."[463] It was not a coincidence that "the depression at the turn of the century threw up political groups, or simply tighter political organization of existing groups" across Europe, including Britain, France, Germany and Russia.[464] As the economic recession arose in the mid-1870s, "radical politics of right and left" gained traction all over Europe.[465]

Such a political-economic dislocation in France paved the way for the emergence of "radical nationalism" in 1886-1889, or "Boulangism," led by Boulanger, the Minister of War in 1886-1887, who provided a nationalistic and anti-establishment platform upon which the conservatives and radicals could ride.[466] Boulangism was based on public discontents with "sectarian and unstable republican government" and also able to mobilize seemingly discordant elements of the Left and the Right, such as "nationalism, socialism, popular militancy, authority and order."[467] Though Boulanger as a political figure fell by the wayside in 1889-1890, the sources of political instability, namely nationalism, socialism, and antisemitism, ensued.[468]

Year	Britain (1913=100)	France (1913=100)	Britain (£ in millions)	British Total Government Expenditure (£ in millions)	France (Franc in millions)	French Total Government Expenditure (Franc in millions)
1882	95	98	10.26	87	**222.05**	3,687
1883	95	95	10.73	85	**259.11**	3,715
1884	90	87	11.43	89	**298.44**	3,539
1885	83	85	**12.66**	**92**	**309.44**	**3,467**
1886	78	82	**13.27**	**90**	**272.21**	**3,294**
1887	76	79	**12.33**	**87**	**199.84**	**3,261**
1888	79	83	**13.00**	**87**	**180.99**	**3,221**
1889	79	86	**15.27**	**91**	**199.03**	**3,247**
1890	82	86	**15.55**	**93**	**201.39**	**3,285**
1891	81	85	15.58	96	229.99	3,258

Table. 12. Naval expenditures of Britain and France, 1882-1891[469]

However, whether the nature of France's radical nationalism was so expansionistic as to enable France to extract more resources for naval armament is obscure, if not ambivalent. One of components of Boulangism was the "resolute attitude to Germany," which pushed Bismarck to publicly note that "Boulanger was a threat to Germany."[470] While the cabinets of Ferry and Gambetta promoted colonial expansion in Tunis, Tonkin, and China in the early 1880s, assuming a direct confrontation against Germany was

[463] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 102-103.
[464] Norman Stone, *op.cit.*, (1984), p. 156.
[465] Robert Tombs, *France, 1814-1914*, (London: Routledge, 1996, 2014), p. 445.
[466] Ibid., pp. 447-449.
[467] Ibid., p. 453.
[468] Ibid., pp. 453-461.
[469] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,* (1988), pp. 340-344, Brian R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970*, (Macmillan Press, 1975), pp. 699-702.
[470] Ibid., p. 449.

"impossible,"[471] the radical nationalists who insisted "the French military effort should be concentrated in Europe" opposed their proposals and ousted Ferry from power in 1885.[472] Yet, Boulanger served as the War Minister alongside Aube as the Minister of Marine, whose asymmetric strategy didn't necessitate larger resource extraction.

Germany had been unequivocally the most important theme in military questions in Parliament[473] but the ordinary army budget reduced from approximately 607 million in 1882 to 550-567 million francs in 1888-1891, though it began to climb up again after 1890 due to the increases in the strength of the army.[474] Concerning the naval expenditure, as Table 9 indicates, there was a short uptick in 1882-1885 as well as a decline in 1885-1891 compared to a steady increase in the British one. According to Ropp, whose data varies from that of Modelski and Thompson, the French navy budget even in 1883-1885 "fell from 217.2 million francs to 171.6 million francs" and its entire armored ship-building program virtually came to a halt.[475]

Granted that the defense share of France's total government expenditure kept creeping up from 26.3% in 1880 to 29.8%, 37.7% and 38.4% in 1890, 1900, and 1903 respectively,[476] the naval expenditure of France fluctuated with a marked cutback in the late 1880s. It can be said that France did keep pace with Germany in the amount of the army expenditure and the manpower in 1871-1900, though it "lagged a little" in the 1890s after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance. For example, "France had 14 under arms as compared to 11 for Germany" by 1895.[477] But it wasn't the case for the French navy against the Royal navy though the alliance with Russia compensated France's unsteady capacity for naval mobilization.

Hence, the anti-establishment populism and radical nationalism that plagued in the 1880s under France's economic contraction was not conducive to a naval parity with Britain to the extent that Napoleon III had pursued in two decades earlier. As stated, the radical nationalism did not distinctively favor foreign expansion, either. Even though the loss of the French influence over Egypt in 1882 had become much unpopular to a degree that brought down the Freycinet cabinet,[478] the Right and the Left that collectively pushed forward Boulangism wished France to focus on the German threat in Europe. In other words, the effect of the French nationalism on its resource-extraction for naval defense was mixed, or moderate, from 1882-1891.

On the contrary, the British naval expenditure as well as total government spending durably spiralled upwards throughout the 1880s, rising from 10. 26 and 87 to 15.58 and 96 million pounds from 1882-1891, as seen from Table 9. Additionally, the British army

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[471] Ibid., p. 446.
[472] Arne Røksund, *The Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 143-144.
[473] David B. Ralston*, The Army of the Republic: The Place of the Military in the Political Evolution of France, 1871-1913*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), p. 133, *Journal Officiel de la Chambre des Députés: Débats* (hereafter cited as *J.O.C. Déb*), 1890, November 6th, p. 1912.
[474] David B. Ralston*, op.cit.*, (1967), p. 134*, J.O.C. Déb*, 1890, November 6th, pp. 1912-1913.
[475] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 140.
[476] So did the proportion of the national budget spent on education and science rise from 3.8% in 1880 to 8.5% in 1903. Peter Flora, *State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975: Vol. 1: The Growth of Mass Democracies and Welfare States*, (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 382.
[477] David B. Ralston*, op.cit.*, (1967), pp. 133-134.
[478] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 144.

budget was augmented from 15 to 17.6 million pounds from 1880 to 1890-1891.[479] The French government spending not only ceased to grow in 1883 but also began to go downward from 3,715 in 1883 to 3,258 million francs in 1891.[480] With France's domestic political support for naval buildup mediocre, the reduction in French naval spending in the 1880s, especially from 1885-1891, seems to have roughly corresponded to the truncated size of its total government spending.

Accordingly, the Third republic was chronically incapable of mobilizing sufficient resources to close the naval gap with Britain through the 1880s. As Table 10 demonstrates, the French spending ratio of the British naval outlays mostly stayed around 60-70% except 1883 and Britain upheld its naval dominance in light of the first, second, and coastal defense ironclads. In addition to the curtailed government expenditure of France, while its national debt swelled from 20,391 in 1880 to 25,129 million francs in 1891,[481] the enlarged political control of the liberal republicans, or the Left, over the budget and strategy of the *Marine nationale* also constrained the extraction of resources to construct more capital ships during the 1880s.



Figure. 16. The relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup, 1882-1904

Year	Britain	France	France	France (% of British Outlays)	Britain
1880	24 / 16 / 13	20 / 11 / 8	**7,220,031**	**67.4**	10,702,935
1881	26 / 17 / 13	19 / 11 / 8	**7,681,980**	**72.6**	10,576,453
1882	24 / 17 / 14	17 / 13 / 10	**8,102,285**	**77.8**	10,408,904
1883	26 / 17 / 14	17 / 12 / 10	**8,864,186**	**82.6**	10,728,781
1884	26 / 16 / 14	16 / 12 / 11	7,796,929	68.2	11,427,064
1885	20 / 16 / 13	16 / 14 / 11	7,873,812	62.1	12,660,509
1886	19 / 13 / 14	15 / 11 / 11	**9,323,884**	**70.2**	13,265,401

[479] Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,*(1981, 1985), p. 35.
[480] Richard Bonney, "The Apogee and Fall of the French Rentier Regime, 1801-1914", in José Luis Cardoso and Pedro Lains, ed., *Paying for the Liberal State: The Rise of Public Finance in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 93.
[481] Ibid., p. 94.

1887	21 / 14 / 14	17 / 9 / 12	**8,454,685**	**68.5**	12,325,357
1888	23 / 17 / 15	19 / 9 / 12	7,775,582	**59.8**	12,999,895
1889	24 / 22 / 15	20 / 7 / 12	7,963,900	**52.1**	15,270,812
1890	26 / 22 / 15	20 / 9 / 11	8,062,100	**59.2**	15,553,929

Table. 13. Battleships[482] and naval spendings (in £) of Britain and France,[483] 1880-1890

A prelude of France's asymmetric naval strategy in the early 1880s

Given the Program of 1872, drawn up by Admiral Pothuau, the Minister of Marine in 1871-1873, aimed at constructing a fleet of 215 ships, consisting of 26 first class ironclad battleships, 34 ironclad armored cruisers, and 20 ironclad coastal defense ships,[484] the actual number of three classes of ironclads in 1880-1890 paled in comparison with what Pothuau had originally envisioned. Unlike the 1870s when the successive cabinets of France had been conservative and pro-monarchical, the 1880s saw the republicans demanding "general reform of the navy" as they "wrested control of the government away" from the conservatives, which was initially led by the reporter of the Budget Committee, Etienne Lamy, a deputy in 1871-1881.[485]

Lamy accused the program of 1872 of the lack of "a clear definition of its objective" and lamented, "after so many years and so much money spent, the fleet is still to be created." Reminiscing the "complete uselessness" of Napoleon III's splendid ironclad fleet in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, Lamy wrote, "the construction of battleships is so costly, their effectiveness so uncertain and of such short duration" and instead called for producing "ships with powerful engines and strong artillery, able to remain at sea for an extended time, and destined for commercial war" in his new proposal.[486] Lamy's strategy was chiefly based on "the ability to match any two continental navies" and cheaper "coastal battleships and cruisers."[487]

The report of Lamy marked the first parliamentary document that reviewed the existing program and proposed "a complete program of naval organization, strategy, and ship-construction", foreboding an upcoming strife between "navally conservative higher officers and the more progressive younger men" [488] within *La Royale* in the 1880s and 1890s. Noticeably, Lamy's new proposal was partly in line with the school of "the younger men," or the *Jeune École*, because of his emphasis on less costly cruisers, coastal defense, and preparedness for commercial warfare. However, his "two power continental defensive naval standard"[489] created a confusion about the primary naval threat of France, if it was not Britain.

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[482] (1) First-class ironclads (battleships): Left (2) Second class ironclads (armored cruisers): Center (3) Coastal defense ironclads: Right, John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 198.
[483] Ibid., pp. 192-193.
[484] Hugues Canuel, "From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole: French Naval Policy under the Second Empire and the Early Third Republic (1852-1914)", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 71, No. 1, (Winter 2018), p. 103.
[485] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 118-119.
[486] Ibid., p. 120.
[487] Ibid., pp. 120-121.
[488] Ibid., pp. 121-122.
[489] Ibid., p. 120.

These two components of Lamy's theory were incompatible to a certain extent. On the one hand, the *Jeune École*'s asymmetric strategy made sense for France when Britain was presumed to be its principal naval adversary. But Britain should be naturally ruled out in the continental two-power standard since Britain was not a continental threat as the Triple Alliance, which emerged in 1882 and did not exist in 1878 when Lamy drafted his proposal. As proponents of colonial expansion in the eastern Mediterranean, "Lamy and the public didn't seem to know which two navies were threatening France's eastern interest."[490] Regardless, Lamy sowed the seeds of the materialization of the asymmetric strategy and the tension between the naval traditionalists and the *Jeune École*.

As Ropp points out, Lamy's "uneasiness about the situation of the Mediterranean" was warranted but his preferred ships were unsuitable for his strategic objective. The gradual advancement of the naval reformists, represented by Lamy and later the *Jeune École* in the following decades, is noteworthy because it played a role in curbing France's naval spending in a fashion that didn't necessarily dampen the threat perception of Britain. As such, the expansionist nationalism, or imperialism, of the republican left which elevated the *Jeune École,* did not peculiarly yield the greater resource-extraction of France due to their focus on more affordable cruisers and torpedo boats and less on capital ships.[491]

Succeeding Lamy's attempt, a Parliamentary Mixed Commission was appointed in 1879 for the investigation of the naval reform soon fell apart prior to reporting its conclusions with the elections of 1881. Nevertheless, a new Minister of Marine chosen by Gambetta's cabinet in the same year, Auguste Gougeard, predicated his scheme on "the Lamy report of the navy's administrative organization as well as the work of the Mixed Commission."[492] Gougeard especially demanded "a rational accounting system and the assignment of coast defense to the navy rather than the army" as recommended by the Commission's program.[493] His tactical policy sough to combine "an offensive in the Mediterranean with the threat of a cross-Channel invasion."[494]

Gougeard was critical of a strategy merely based on commerce-destroying with "meager means,"[495] not believing in "the cult of commercial warfare." Yet, having watched improvements of the Whitehead torpedo in the Russo-Turkish war of 1878-1879 and the early 1880s, he concurred with the *Jeune École* that the development of the torpedo rendered the battleship more obsolete than before. Like most of the *Jeune École,* he strongly advocated colonial expansion and perceived the Mediterranean as the central field for the French navy, he was a variant within the *Jeune École*.[496] In fact, after the success of France's two Thornycroft boats in 1876, the French navy had already ordered 23 more boats, launching a sizable torpedo boat program.

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[490] Ibid., p. 121. Ropp observes that Lamy's scheme grew out of the public anxiety "over the naval efforts of Italy, Germany, Austria, and Russia which coincided with a series of crises and wars" in the Balkans and West Asia.

[491] An underlying assumption of the *Jeune École'*s theory was that Britain was "a superior but economically vulnerable enemy*".* Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. xi.

[492] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 123.

[493] Ibid., p. 124.

[494] Ibid., p. 128.

[495] Augueste Gougeard, *La Marine de Guerre, Son Passé et Son Avenir: Cuirassés et Torpilleurs*, [The Navy, its Past and Future: Battleships and Torpedo Boats] (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1884), p. 21.

[496] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 127-128.

Specifically, the automobile torpedo was fitted to a number of the existing spar torpedo boats as the new construction advanced. While 12, 11, 7, and 7 new boats were ordered in 1878-1881, the size of the boats expanded, too. Once the first seagoing boat, the No. 60 of 46 tons, was ordered in 1880, 14 seagoing boats were additionally built in 1881-1883. As a consequence of the consecutive construction, France had gained about "50 good-sized boats of various types" by 1884, which was "second only to Russia most of whose 115 boats had been bought in 1877." By contrast, England only possessed 19 boats, which was smaller than those of Holland, and Italy had 18 boats.[497] Table 10 doesn't capture such an asymmetric reinforcement.

The legacy of Lamy's recommendation on the better utilization of asymmetric naval assets, not his continental two power standard, outlasted Lamy as Gougeard carried through parts of the Budget Committee's reforms and invested in "torpedo cruisers of the 1,200-ton *Candor* class and smaller torpedo avisos of the 320-ton *Bombe* class" to replace the previous outmoded scouts and *avisos* in 1881-1882.[498] In particular, it was Gougeard's response to the *Conseil des Travaux's* [the Board of Construction] request for "an entirely new torpedo vessel of large dimensions, very fast, without masts, artillery, or ram" in 1879, which chose not to adopt ships of the English torpedo-ram, *Polyphemus*, type for the French navy in 1880.[499]

These seakeeping torpedo ships were designed to serve the squadron as a special auxiliary and akin to what Gougeard envisaged as "the new torpedo cruiser" and "the ideal ship of war." Since the Mediterranean was the central battlefield in his mind, where the faster Italian ironclad, newly launched in 1880, *Italia*, had to be 'sunk', he preferred the torpedo to the gun or the ram.[500] In regard to Britain, even though he admitted Britain was "big and tough enough to be in isolation" and the disruption of enemy's trade would be no more than an auxiliary means that shouldn't be used alone, Gougeard judged, "it would be necessary to threaten its more expensive and vital communications with India" to impose pressure on Britain in the Mediterranean.[501]

On the other hand, Gougeard hoped to follow through with the already initiated construction of battleships but at the same time conjectured that the torpedo ship would replace the armor-clad.[502] Although the French navy in effect avoided Lamy's two continental power standard and a shift towards a fleet of coast-defense ships and cruisers by initiating a replacement program in1879-1880,[503] from the Lamy's report of 1878 and the Mixed Commission of 1879 to Gougeard in 1881-1882, the naval reformists that arrived at the *Marine nationale* shored up the asymmetric strengthening to a varying degree. It was an indirect consequence of the continuous expansion of the liberal

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[497] Ibid., p. 132.
[498] Ibid., p. 130.
[499] Ibid., p. 129.
[500] Ibid., pp. 129-130.
[501] Augueste Gougeard, *op.cit.,* (1884), pp. 20-22. Ropp views that Gougeard was "misled" to believe in the importance of "the route to India" for Britain", which might not be "the most vital". Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 128. The Mediterranean theater might pale in comparison with Britain's home theater. But, as the following parts will disclose, the importance of the Mediterranean theater steadily mounted as the contingent alignment and shift in naval power balance created a second-order effect on the defense of home theater, coupled with the Suez Canal as the sea route to India.
[502] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 131.
[503] Ibid., p. 122.

republicans in the National Assembly, which attempted an array of reforms in the French society over the most of the 1880s.[504]

But the organizational reforms of the navy were not completely carried out. After the Gambetta cabinet fell, Jean Bernard Jauréguiberry, Admiral and the former Minister of Marine in 1879, returned to the Ministry of Marine in January of 1882 and the navy's organization remained virtually "unchanged."[505] Also, the French navy straddled a two-pronged construction of battleships and asymmetric assets. The fierce debate on the balance between battleships and torpedo boats was ignited in the Chamber of Deputies in 1884,[506] setting off "the endless debates" in the next two decades.[507] As Gougeard, Alexandre-Louis-François Peyron, the Minister of Marine in 1883-1885, wanted to complete "the battleships under construction" but evaded taking the responsibility to lay down more of capital ships, suspending "construction of two ships."[508]

The balance between the Jeune École and the naval traditionalists from the mid 1880s

While Gougeard and Peyron had not decidedly pressed for a shipbuilding that suited the asymmetric naval strategy, Admiral Theophile Aube, a *Jeune École* theorist, was conspicuously more committed to the strategy of the *Jeune École*. In January of 1886, Aube assumed office as Minister of Marine in a coalition cabinet of Freycinet who was soon replaced by Goblet by December in the same year, and stayed in power until the Goblet cabinet left in May 1887. Aube tried to ensure that necessary changes in tactics and the composition of the fleet based on his theory follow in his navy. Although his program was occasionally hampered by "the budget committee and his successors", he had put a brake on the construction of the four battleships of the *Hoche* and *Magneta* class, ordered in 1881 and 1883, to concentrate on his alternative fleet.[509]

Unsurprisingly, his focus lied in asymmetric vessels and he devised another construction program that scheduled to manufacture 6 large and 10 small cruisers, 20 large torpedo boats for use against other torpedo boats, 50 gunboats, 100 regular torpedo boats, and 3 armored coastal defense ships for use as torpedo mother ships.[510] Before the *Jeune École*'s idea about commerce warfare and coastal defense was further promoted by Aube in 1886-1887, France laid down or attained 20 ironclad ships in 1874-1883, whereas Britain kept up with France by securing 19 ironclad ships in the same period. Alongside the revision of the previous program of 1881 made by Aube, there was no ironclad ship ordered, converted, or purchased for France in 1886-1887 while Britain added 4 more ironclad ships to the Royal navy in two years.[511]

The influence of the *Jeune École* appears to have reached its zenith in these years of Aube's tenure as well as the vigorous activities of publicists, such as Gabriel Charmes, the journalist and foreign affairs expert who had gone to great lengths to circulate the

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[504] Hugues Canuel, *op.cit.,* (2018), p. 106.
[505] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 125.
[506] *J.O.C. Déb*, 12, December 13th, pp. 2761-2764.
[507] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 138.
[508] Ibid., p. 139.
[509] Hugues Canuel, *op.cit.,* (2018), p. 106.
[510] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 53.
[511] John F. Beeler, *op.cit.*, (1997), p. 207. See Table 10.

ideas of the *Jeune École* to a wider public since the first half of the 1880s.[512] Charmes's case for "raids against Britain's seaborn trade" in the mid 1880s reflected no more than "a logical development of Auber's earlier writings".[513] The idea of *guerre de course,* as opposed to *guerre d'escadre*, is traceable to Captain Richild Grivel in the late 1860s,[514] if not Louis and Jérôme de Pontchartrain who managed the corrosion of Colbert's fleet in the 17th century,[515] but the *Jeune Ecole*'s theory aimed to create "an economic panic" that would in turn lead to "a social and political collapse."[516]

Likewise, the creeping extension of the asymmetric vessels in France's shipbuilding from the Lamy report of 1878 to the official ascent of the *Jeune École* in 1886-1887, backed by the emerging political clout of the Left, or the naval reformists, is also associated with the reduction of France's naval spending in the late 1880s in addition to the diminishing total government expenditure. There was no extraordinary change in the percentage of central expenditure out of France's total GDP in 1880-1890, which only insignificantly dropped from 13.1% to 12.5%.[517]

Public advocates of the *Jeune École,* epitomized by Charmes, denounced "the naval hierarchy and the reluctance" to introduce "new technologies" with "a revolutionary doctrine,"[518] siding with radical deputies and propagating their views at the meetings of the Budget Committee.[519]

Aube's ascendance and service as the Minister of Marine in 1886-1887 not only helped constrain the mobilization of resources for a battleship arms race vis-à-vis Britain but also had a critical impact on the French navy's force structure and debate over the prime naval adversary of France in the next two decades. As a matter of fact, the latter two issues were intertwined with each other in that the strategic priority regarding the principal threat would ineluctably require different compositions of the fleet. Given the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1882 and Lamy's two continental naval standard, Aube's assumption that Britain was the primary enemy of France[520] was hardly self-evident. For instance, the Council of Admiralty insisted on the preparedness for "traditional fleet warfare" in case of a conflict with either Germany or Italy.[521]

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[512] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. xii

[513] Ibid., p. 1, p. 8.

[514] David H. Olivier, "Two Sides of the Same Coin: German and French Maritime Strategies in the Late Nineteenth Century, in *Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755-2009*, in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds., *Newport Paper 40,* (Newport: R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2013), pp. 92-93, Martin. N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara, "Fighting the Naval Hegemon: Evolution in French, Soviet, and Chinese Naval Thought", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 68, No. 3, (2015), p. 15, Arne Roksund, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 1-7.

[515] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 121.

[516] Arne Roksund, *op.cit*., (2007), p. 12. Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 163, The strategic goal was not to "starve out England" but to "produce an economic panic" by raising insurance rates in Britain to "25% of the total value of ships and cargo." Arthur J. Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), p. 91.

[517] Peter Flora, *op.cit.*, (1983), p. 377.

[518] The self-propelled torpedos proved to be more successful in trials of the 1880s and the torpedo boat constituted crucial components in the defensive and offensive doctrine of the *Jeune École.* Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 18.

[519] Hugues Canuel, *op.cit.,* (2018), pp. 105-106.

[520] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 61.

[521] Ibid., p. 58.

The Council of Admiralty did not reject Aube's key tenet, or the asymmetric strategy, against Britain flatout. Aube discussed the issues of strategic importance three times with the Council of Admiralty during his tenure, while the previous Ministers of Marine consulted the Council of Admiralty no more than once in 1880-1885, and the Council of Admiralty in large part agreed that "harassing the weak points" of Britain should be a type of warfare that France should conduct against Britain[522] and there would be "no possibility of equaling British naval forces".[523] Nevertheless, they differed in the effectiveness and utility of torpedo boats in offensive operations, and the Council of Admiralty was even more dubious as to whether the asymmetric warfare would be the best way to combat Germany or Italy.[524]

While Boulanger served as the Minister of War side by side with Aube as the Minister of Marine from January of 1886 to May 1887, Aube's threat assessment that singled out Britain as the primary naval rival was not so mutually exclusive with Boulangism as the French naval establishment's threat perception. Aube's critics held that France might have to fight an inferior navy such as the Italian navy, placing weight on the need for more battleships in such a case. They blamed Aube's obsession with Britain and downplayed his claim that fleet warfare was obsolete and thereby command of the sea was a delusional notion with the development of the self-propelled torpedo and small torpedo boats.[525] However, the radical nationalism, whose part was Boulangism, was anti-German on land and anti-British at sea or on the imperial issue.[526]

The Council of Admiralty was apparently more determined to factor in a possible fleet battle against the Triple Alliance than Aube. From the admirals' view, both battleships and cruisers were of vital importance in the event of fleet warfare in the Mediterranean and *guerre de course* from the Atlantic.[527] Cruisers in particular should meet two potential war scenarios, one against Britain and the other against the Triple Alliance. Light and fast cruisers would suffice in case of a war against a superior navy as Britain, but some cruisers must be genuine warships to destroy robust cruisers and battleships of inferior navies of Germany and Italy.[528] All in all, the Council of Admiralty held on to a twofold strategy that required a balanced fleet to respond to manifold threats from Britain and the Triple Alliance with a focus on the latter.[529]

Admittedly, Aube supposed that the French navy could face off with a superior navy, a navy of the relatively equal size, or an inferior navy. The Italian navy was perceived to be "the most likely and formidable of the inferior navies" that France could be compelled to fight in his article.[530] Nonetheless, unlike the Council of Admiralty and Grivel who proposed the French navy maintain twofold strategies depending on the type of enemy as a predecessor of the *Jeune École* in the 1870s*,* the main enemy in Aube's

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[522] SHM, BB8-914: Conseil d'Amirauté: Procès-verbal de la séance du 21 Mai 1886. Quoted in Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 56.
[523] SHM, BB8-915: Conseil d'Amirauté: Procès-verbal de la séance du 7 Janvier 1887. Quoted in Ibid., p. 56.
[524] Ibid., pp. 57-58.
[525] Ibid., p. 61.
[526] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 308.
[527] Ibid., p. 57.
[528] Ibid., p. 81.
[529] Ibid., pp. 81-82.
[530] Cited in Ibid., p. 7, Théophile Aube, "Italie et Levant" in *A Terre et à bord, Notes d'un marin,* Paris, (1884), p. 58.

mind was Britain, categorically. Aube's preoccupation with Britain as France's central adversary might be incomprehensible without the consideration of his unique anticipation of the future naval warfare as well as colonial expansionism as the solution of socio-economic problems of capitalism in Europe.

Aube interpreted that whereas numerical superiority did not necessarily lead to triumph in a naval battle in the age of sail because the variation in speed of ships, the quality of the commander and crews, and the spread of sails engendered a lot of possibilities, a numerically superior fleet would most likely to win in a maritime engagement given "the virtual equality of the elements constituting two enemy armored squadrons" in his time. He surmised that the difference in the performance of two enemy fleets essentially stemmed from "the individual power of each battleship and the number of these battleships."[531] The logical consequence of such premises for Aube was that "command of sea will pass to the stronger side without battle" because both parties would be aware of which would be the winner of in that fleet warfare.[532]

Year	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890
Germany	8/2/0	9/2/0	10/2/0	11/3/0	11/3/0	11/3/0	11/3/0	11/3/0	11/3/0	11/3/0	11/3/0
Italy	5/6/1	4/6/1	5/6/1	5/6/1	5/6/1	6/6/1	6/6/1	7/6/1	8/6/1	9/6/1	9/6/1

Table. 14. Battleships of Germany and Italy, 1880-1890[533]

More importantly, as an avid colonialist and the Minister of Colony, Aube held a belief that future conflicts would most likely arise from colonial competition as Charmes claimed that almost all European nations would find themselves in conflict at sea and colonial areas.[534] As noted, the politicization of the naval strategy was in some measure the legacy of Lamy's report and later intensified by the vigorous involvement of Charmes and deputies of the Left at the Budget Committee to the extent that torpedo boats were portrayed as "an instrument better suited to promote republican ideas"[535] and battleships were "unsuitable to a democratic republic."[536] Meanwhile, Aube's judgment Britain was the eventual prime threat was inseparable from his understanding of colonialism as European states' international exit from domestic problems.

According to Aube, the heightened political and class conflicts between labor and capital under the economic recession, which Europe had been undergoing in the 1880s,

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[531] Théophile Aube, "La Guerre Maritime et Les Ports Militaires De La France", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. 50, No. 2, (March 1882), p. 323.

[532] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 5-6.

[533] (1) First-class ironclads (battleships): Left (2) Second class ironclads (armored cruisers): Center (3) Coastal defense ironclads: Right, John F. Beeler, *op.cit.,* (1997), p. 198. Compared to Table 10, each navy of Germany and Italy had been individually far weaker than the French navy throughout the 1880s. The Council of Admiralty suspected two states could bring together their naval forces against France. While "France would be able to face both" should were they combined, the Council of Admiralty contended the French navy "should be structured for such a contingency", retrospectively following Lamy's two continental power standard. Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* 2007, p. 58.

[534] Ibid., p. 7, Gabriel Charmes, "La Réforme Maritime: II. La Guerre Maritime et L'Organisation Des Forces Navales", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. 68, No. 1, (March 1885), pp. 138-139.

[535] Hugues Canuel, *op.cit.,* (2018), p. 106.

[536] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 121-122.

were structural problems of modern capitalism. Whereas France sought to cope with this problem by achieving "the contingent and relative justice" in its society, which fell short of the necessary absolute justice, other states, such as Britain, had found the solution in "creating and inventing" foreign markets in a manner that domestically precluded "the menace of poverty."[537] Therefore, if France were to count on colonial expansion to resolve domestic political-economic discontents, Britain, not Germany or Italy, would be 'the dominant threat' France would ultimately face, since Britain had a grip on the widest sphere of colonies and foreign markets.[538]

In short, the *Jeune École'*s perception that Britain was the key adversary of France rested upon their skeptical expectation about the future battleship warfare, sanguine assessment of the utility of fast light cruisers and torpedo-boats, and presumably inevitable colonial competition as a response to systemic flaws of capitalism under duress. Along this line of thought, Charmes asserted that *guerre de course* would "replace war in future conflicts between maritime nations" and other continental powers would also "turn to" the maritime and economic competition once they were assured of continental territories.[539] For the *Jeune École*, commerce raiding was imperative because striking private property was to "destroy modern, capitalist economy" and public wealth was ultimately the sum of individual wealth.[540]

More concretely, whereas Gougeard previously underscored cutting off the British trade route with India, Aube and Charmes put forward that commerce raiding in other trade routes, such as Atlantic, was no less paramount than that in the Mediterranean, because "the cotton" and "grain in America" were as much valuable as "the products of India" for Britain's economy.[541] Though the geographical distribution of naval power in the Mediterranean impelled Aube to take account of a war against Italy,[542] Italy was less likely to dare to challenge the French navy because of France's numerical superiority in battleships in his theory. Thus, he redistributed the French naval forces in Europe in accordance with his principle, viz., "offensive in the Mediterranean, defensive in the Channel, and commercial warfare in the Atlantic."[543]

Nonetheless, the *Jeune École'*s distinct threat perception that supposed Britain as France's ultimate enemy was not wholly shared with the naval establishment, represented by the Council of Admiralty, Boulanger, and domestic supporters of Boulangism, who were more hostile to Germany and unsympathetic to colonial expansionism. Granted, the

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[537] Théophile Aube, "La pénétration dans l'Afrique centrale" in *A terre et à bord. Notes d'un marin*, Paris: 1884, pp. 66-67, Translated in Theodore Ropp, *op.cit*., (1987), p. 163.
[538] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 7-9.
[539] Gabriel Charmes, *op.cit.,* (March 1885), p. 138.
[540] *Ibid.,* pp. 139-140, Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 8, p. 50, The *Jeune École* theory asserted unlimited economic warfare in defiance of the international maritime law. Privateering was internationally outlawed and both belligerents' goods in neutral ships and neutral goods in belligerent ships were immune from capture unless they were contraband by the Declaration of Paris of 1856, Bryan Ranft, "Restraints on War at Sea before 1945", in Michael Howard, eds., *Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict*, (Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 43-45, Arne Roksund, *op.cit*., (2007), p. 24.
[541] Théophile Aube, *op.cit.,* (Paris: 1884), pp. 66-67, Translated in Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 164.
[542] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 164-165.
[543] *Ibid.,* p. 171. On the surface, such a distribution matched up with the majority opinion of the Council of Admiralty. But the Council of Admiralty still intended to concentrate battleships in the Mediterranean to "engage in fleet warfare against the Royal Navy" while Aube "dismissed fleet warfare" as a feasible option of the French navy. Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 82.

rapprochement between the Council of Admiralty concurred with Aube regarding "*guerre de course à outrance*" against Britain[544] and the use of fast cruisers and *avisos de course*, "smaller than cruisers but larger than torpedo boats," on the Atlantic coast and in the Channel,[545] but the naval traditionalists clung to the case for fleet warfare against the Triple alliance in the Mediterranean, should a two-front war break out with Germany and Italy,[546] ending up with "a balanced fleet."[547]

Britain's superior capacity and perception of the French threat in the Mediterranean

The elaborated divergence between the heirs of the *Jeune École* and the naval establishment lingered in the 1890s as domestic coalitions of the French cabinet were not dominated by either conservatives or republicans and the right or the left.[548] In the meantime, the asymmetric naval threat of France against trade routes and sea lines of communication couldn't have been gone unnoticed by Britain. Before the palpable advent of the *Jeune École* from the mid 1880s, the Carnarvon Committee of 1879 had been set up to examine "the state of the Royal navy" and its capacity to "defend Britain and the Empire" and reported that "the navy was too small to fulfill many duties."[549] The Royal navy deemed a new construction program desirable, which would require a spike in taxation, but it wasn't sanctioned by Cabinet.[550]

In 1880, Captain Bedford Pim, who once pushed for "the protection of trade as part of a unified scheme for imperial defense" in the Estimates Debates in 1877,[551] repeated his case in the Parliament that the British warships must be "sufficient in number to perform the duty" of combating a combination of enemy fleets, "blockading an enemy's coast, clearing the ocean of enemies' cruisers, convoying our merchant ships, and defending our Colonies and coaling stations." Pim lamented that the British ships were "quite unable" to fulfill these duties "so far as number is concerned."[552] Though it was occasionally recognized cruisers were necessary to "keep the seas and protect our commerce,"[553] the cabinet approved of £10 million, which was less than £ 15million required for cruisers of all these purposes at the moment.[554]

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[544] Arne Roksund, *op.cit*., (2007), p. 77.
[545] Ibid., pp. 78-79, p. 80, p. 83, Aube tacitly admitted torpedo boats were not autonomous as he expected for "long cruises on the high seas chasing merchant ships" in practice.
[546] Ibid., pp. 81-82.
[547] Ibid., p. 81, pp. 83-84.
[548] With the fall of the Goblet cabinet, Aube left office in May 1887. Martin. N. Murphy and Toshi Yoshihara, *op.cit.,* (2015), p. 17. Aube's intellectual predecessor, Grivel, passed away in Senegal in 1882, and Charmes died three months after Aube's appointment in January of 1886. Some of the naval officers influenced by the *Jeune École* revived theoretical debates in the early 1890s but they hadn't taken official positions until Edouard Lockroy's appointment as Minister of Marine in 1895 and 1898-1899. Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 85.
[549] Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, *op.cit.,* (1979), p. 1.
[550] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 11.
[551] Bryan Ranft, "Parliamentary Debate, Economic Vulnerability, and British Naval Expansion, 1860-1905", in Lawrence Freedman, Paul Hayes, and Robert O'Neill, eds., *War, Strategy, and International Politics, Essays in Honor of Sir Michael Howard*, (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 80-81.
[552] 8th, March, 1880, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 251, page cols, 562-578.
[553] Ibid., page col, 601-604.
[554] Ibid., page col, 588-655.

But it solely indicated that the sufficient amount of naval budget for more cruisers was not assigned and the Gladstone cabinet of 1880 actually raised naval expenditure, enabling the "moderate level of construction in the early 1880s."[555] In 1881, the Parliamentary Secretary, Sir George Trevelyan, again reckoned with the fact that Britain had "only 11 swift cruisers" with 14 knots, which was not the appropriate number either "in relation to that of its great neighbor," France, or to "the enormous commerce" to be protected.[556] Trevelyan demanded increasing existing types as well as developing a new type of armored cruiser with "a speed of 16 knots, a large number of guns and tonnage of 7300" to "keep and sweep the sea." The subsequent debate centered around the values of large and small cruisers.[557]

A more systematic policy planning for trade protection beyond the construction of additional cruisers was precipitated by the three more reports of the Carnarvon Commission in 1881-1882. The Carnarvon Commission of 1881-1882, established to "inquire into the Defense of British Possession and Commerce Abroad," conducted "detailed analyses of the tonnage, value, and routes of the ships and cargoes to be defended." At root, the Commission chiefly highlighted the need to devise "a global naval strategy, based on battle fleet supremacy, the strongest possible cruiser force for direct protection of trade, and a world-wide system of defended coaling stations."[558] The third report of the Carnarvon Commission of 1882 also suggested that "due protection be afforded to British commerce" along the English shores.[559]

Similarly, the theme of the vulnerability to a French raiding, possibly carried out by a larger number of cruisers and torpedo boats, on the British sea-borne trade, repetitively appeared in the "papers and discussions of the Royal United Service Institution after 1882" when the *Jeune École* began to steadily surface in the French Parliament and the navy.[560] The Earl of Carnarvon illustrated "a considerable increase" in "the value of British shipping" from 1878 to 1883 and underlined that the defense of coaling stations and trade became indisputable at the Parliament in May of 1883.[561] The British reaction seemed not unreasonable as the year of 1878 witnessed France embark on "a shipbuilding program that equaled in Britain's in cost"[562] from which France obtained 50 seagoing and torpedo boats, while Britain had 19, by 1884, as stated.

Britain's naval superiority in battleships hadn't entirely slipped away[563] but the major concern of the British cabinet with respect to its maritime vulnerability was also associated with a disruption of its trade and shipping routes in addition to emerging

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[555] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 81. Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, *op.cit.,* (1979), p. 1.
[556] 18th March, 1881, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 259, page cols, 1389-1390.
[557] Ibid., page cols, 1390-1391, Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 81
[558] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 82.
[559] "The Carnarvon Commission, 1882, Third Report of the Royal Commission to enquire into the defence of British Possessions and commerce abroad – conclusions, 1882", in John. H. Hattendord, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H. Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till, eds., *British Naval Documents, 1204-1960*, (Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, 1993), pp. 601-604.
[560] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.,* (1992), pp. 50-51.
[561] 4th May, 1883, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 278, page cols, 1832-1836.
[562] Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905,* (Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 146.
[563] Northbrook, the First Lord of the Admiralty, testified in July of 1884, "we had laid down 8 ships to the French 4 in 1880-1883, and in 1884, up to the present time, we had added one and the French none. He referred only to fighting ships". 10th July, 1884, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 290, page cols, 660-661.

multiple naval threats. In the Parliamentary debate on the 1884/1885 Estimates, the Opposition urged the Gladstone cabinet to demonstrate that the Royal navy would be able to safeguard the British trade against "a combination of European powers" in March of 1884.[564] The political pressure for a more vigilant naval buildup further flared up as several articles, titled as "The Truth about the Navy," were published in *Pall Mall Gazette* from September in 1884. The articles deplored the British naval expenditure hadn't "increased at all" from 1868-69 to 1883.[565]

In comparison, the articles specifically presented the greater extent to which naval expenditure of France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, incremented from 1868-69 to 1883. The mounting naval expenditure of France in 1880-1883 is displayed in Table 10 and W.H. Stead, the author of the articles, had taken note of such a hike in the French naval spending. Stead lamented Britain was "not superior to a coalition of two or more naval powers even in first-class ironclads" despite "a slight preponderance against France and Italy or France and Russia." Furthermore, the British navy was perceived to be "far from superior to France alone" in second and third-class ironclads.[566] In light of these, Admiral Astley Cooper Key remarked that Britain "should be powerful beyond question of comparison" and "keep pace with other powers" in October.[567]

Correspondingly, domestic political balance of Britain had shifted towards a stronger naval armament, particularly after the summer recess and the publication of "The Truth about the Navy" in September of 1884. The cabinet of Gladstone who had been "a determined opponent of 'bloated armaments' in Disraeli's expression" since his return in 1880,[568] couldn't help but concede to the insurmountable political pressure in the Parliament.[569] The Gladstone cabinet authorized "a special expenditure of £3,100,000"[570] to be spent over 5 years for a new program proposed by Northbrook to build 2 first-class ironclads, 5 armored cruisers, 6 torpedo cruisers, and 14 torpedo boats along with additional £2,400,000 for naval ordnance and coaling stations and the ordinary estimates on December 2nd.[571]

The immediate objectives of the Northbrook program of 1884 were not only to secure the British superiority over France in capital ships but also to shield coaling stations and commerce abroad in the event of commerce raiding. Though the proposed number of cruisers in the Northbrook program, roughly from 11 to 15,[572] did not amount to that called upon by the First Naval Lord in October, 20, his counsel also aimed at investing in "valuable cruisers for the protection of commerce" and "our maritime

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[564] 20th March, 1884, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 286, page cols, 336-380, especially page cols, 346-349.
[565] "The Truth about the Navy, 1884", Articles in the *Pall Mall Gazettes*, 18 September, 1884, in John. H. Hattendord, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H. Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till, eds., *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 604-605. The article wrote the British Navy Estimates in 1868 and 1883 were £11,157,290 and £11,077,163 respectively.
[566] Ibid., pp. 606-607.
[567] "Remarks on the Navy Estimates for 1885-6", 23th October, 1884, Admiral Astley Cooper Key, First Sea Lord, Ibid., pp. 607-608.
[568] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 120.
[569] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), pp. 82-83.
[570] Lord George Hamilton, *Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1886-1906*, (London: John Murray, 1922), pp. 45-46, p. 118. Hamilton succeeded Northbrook as the First Lord of the Admiralty, the civilian head of "the whole of the naval services and establishments", in 1885.
[571] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 122.
[572] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 83, Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, *op.cit.,* (1979), p. 1.

supremacy."[573] Northbrook agreed with Carnarvon in the significance of trade protection[574] but added "these defenses" would be "against cruisers and such forms of attack" rather than "against an armed squadron of large force."[575] The Admiralty was not nonchalant about the feasibility of the asymmetric naval warfare.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty wasn't convinced the days of the battleship warfare were over, as Aube supposed.[576] The new construction was carried on by the Salisbury cabinet, averaging £3,600,000 in 1885-1887.[577] But the technological advancement of torpedo and torpedo boats had become too compelling to be simply dismissed in the British shipbuilding,[578] as the ship composition of the Northbrook program hinted. Northbrook depicted the Admiralty's obligation to meet both maritime challenges as "the great difficulty," which was "to decide how to spend the money" if "£3,000,000 or £4,000,000" were approved. He cautiously expressed, "it would be an extravagance to spend £2,000,000 in the construction of large iron-clad ships" and "we were now obliged to leave portions of our ships undefended and to protect only certain vital parts."[579]

In 1887-1888, the British allocation of budgets for shipbuilding was momentarily weakened due to "a reaction to previous increases" in 1884-1887, which the First Lord regarded as reasonable "with an increase of naval efficiency and strength.[580] Besides, as Northbrook's previous comment in 1884 implied, "the realization that their expensive new battleships might be vulnerable to torpedo"[581] regularly aroused the Parliamentary debates on expenditure for the shipbuilding and fortification of coaling stations.[582] Relatedly, the case for suspending the construction of two ironclads, *Nile* and *Trafalgar*, in 1886 was made as "France had left off building the two large iron-clads which had been begun" and "other naval powers of Europe, with one exception" had stopped building armored battleships "during the last two years."[583]

After a two-year hiatus in the expansion of naval spending, a French war scare in 1888, initially spurred by the London *standard* report of the French naval mobilization at

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[573] Admiral Astley Cooper Key, 23th October, 1884, in John. H. Hattendord, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H. Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till, *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 607-609.

[574] 13th November, 1884, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 293, page cols, 1533-1548

[575] Ibid., page cols, 1548-1552.

[576] The view of the Admiralty on this matter had become crystal-clear by 1888 when naval maneuvers were undertaken. The three admirals concluded in the report, "there is nothing in our opinion to justify the belief that the days of ironclad battle-ships are over, we recommend a resumption and a steady continuance of ironclad building". "Extracts from Report of Committee on Naval Menoeuvres, 1888, together with the narrative of the operations and the rules laid down for conducting the same", February 1889, *Command Papers* [in Parliamentary Papers], L. 735, C. 5632, p. 30.

[577] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 123.

[578] Ibid., pp. 124-125.

[579] 10th July, 1884, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 290, page cols, 661-662.

[580] The budgets for the new construction declined to £2,800,000 and £,2,500,000 in 1887-1888. Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 123.

[581] Aaron L. Friedberg, *op. cit.,* (1988), pp. 146-147.

[582] 2nd December, 1884, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 294, page cols, 447-460, 16th March, 1885, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 295, page cols, 1292-1322, 28th January, 1887, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 310, page cols, 150-153,

[583] 10th June, 1886, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 306, page cols, 1386-1388. This comment was made by George Shaw Lefevre, a member of the Liberal Party. The Parliamentary Secretary emphasized the significant sunk costs already incurred and the construction proceeded. Two ships were completed in 1889-1890 and deployed in the Mediterranean until 1897-1898. Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, *op.cit.,* (1979), p. 31.

Toulon in January,[584] reignited the political agitation for enlarging naval expenditure to bolster the Royal navy. Salisbury was secretly notified twice that "the French fleet was being concentrated in the Mediterranean" on February 3 and soon informed by the ambassador in Paris on February 22nd that "the new Minister of Marine" had sent "two more ironclads to the squadron" to redress "the backward condition" of only "four ironclads and an aviso" that Aube had left in the Mediterranean after 1887.[585] Though Salisbury and Hamilton didn't fall for Germany's scheme,[586] "most of the French ironclad fleet" gathered "in that sea" by April.[587]

Since the fall of Aube in 1887, the French naval establishment, including the General Staff of the Ministry of Marine and the commanders in chief in Toulon and Brest, had been preoccupied with the Triple Alliance.[588] While Italy, which solicited Britain's naval assistance via the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, was indeed the chief concern behind the French concentration in 1888,[589] the "insufficient" state of the British squadron in the Mediterranean "in case of a sudden attack or outbreak of war" raised by the Duke of Edinburgh, the Mediterranean commander in chief, prompted the Queen and Salisbury to enquire the Admiralty about the matter.[590] Salisbury exacted the Admiralty's promise of strengthening the Mediterranean fleet "after the maneuvers in July" with "the delay in the supply of guns" for ships in May.[591]

Britain			France
Home and Reserve Squadrons	Mediterranean Squadron	Necessary Reinforcement	Mediterranean Squadron
Battleships: 22 Cruisers and gunboats: 23	Ironclads: 8 Cruisers: 4 Sloops: 3 Gunboats: 4 Dispatch vessel: 1	Armor-clads: 9 Cruisers: 13	Armor-clad vessels: 15 Armored gunbotas: 2 Cruisers: 16 Torpedo cruisers and avisos: 4 Sea-going torpedo boats: 7

Table. 15. The Mediterranean squadrons of Britain and France in 1888[592]

[584] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 126.
[585] Ibid., pp. 126-127.
[586] According to Hamilton, Germany "suggested to us for nipping this movement in the bud to order the British Fleet up to Toulon and threaten it with bombardment". Both Salisbury and himself were not convinced by the German suggestions. Lord George Hamilton, *op.cit.*, (1922), pp. 138-140.
[587] Ibid., p. 128.
[588] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 86.
[589] Marder comments the increasingly strained relations with Italy was one of three factors that caused "a greater concentration of French naval power in the Mediterranean" next to "the security of the French lines of communication" and "the colonial rivalry with England centering in the Egyptian question". Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 145-146.
[590] The Duke of Edinburgh to Sir Henry Ponsonby, 21st April, 1888, in George Earl Buckle, eds., *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal Between the Years 1886 and 1901*, *Vol.1, 1886-1890,* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1930), pp. 399-400, There were 14 armored battleships and cruisers of France whereas Britain had 6 first-class battleships and an armored torpedo ram in the Mediterranean. To carry blockade into effect, Britain at least required 21 armored ships for a 3:2 superiority. Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 129.
[591] The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir Henry Ponsonby, 4th May, 1888 and The Marquis of Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 8th May, 1888, Ibid., pp. 409-410.
[592] Admiral Sir William Dowell, Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, and Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, 21 November 1888, "The Report of the Three Admirals, 1888", Report of the Committee on the

The naval scare of 1888 was followed by the public resolutions of the London Chamber of Commerce in May, "urging large naval increases,"[593] which was amplified by the conservative press and service sources.[594] In a letter to Salisbury, the Queen also found the state of "Army and Navy" to be "certainly very unsatisfactory" and accused the First Lord and the War Secretary of War, Hamilton and Mr. Stanhope, saying "all is right" when "it is *not.*"[595] Because the British navy was no more than marginally superior against the French navy alone in the Mediterranean, the Select Committee on Navy Estimates and the report of the three admirals of 1888 concluded that a maritime combination of France and Russia, which seemed to be already in the offing to some extent, must be taken into account in laying out Britain's future naval expenditure.[596]

In detail, the three admirals of the Committee on the Late Naval Maneuvers of 1888 elaborated on the available and necessary assets to deal with two operational fronts, the Channel and Mediterranean, in case of a war with France. They estimated the Mediterranean Squadron would have to be complemented with 9 armored-clads and 13 cruisers from Channel and Reserve squadrons for "even an equality of force", which would necessarily render the defense of the home theater more susceptible.[597] With regards to "the relative strength of the torpedo flotilla at the home ports and in the Mediterranean" in August, France enjoyed 92 torpedo boats of first and second class as well as 17 torpedo gunboats of diverse types, whereas Britain had no more than 68 first class torpedo bats and 4 torpedo gunboats in total.[598]

Hence, the warning that "the balance of maritime strength" could be "decidedly against" Britain should "the fleets of another power, say (Russia) have been joined against Britain"[599] couldn't have been deemed a hyperbole in late 1888. Alongside the maritime balance against France and Russia[600] and the meaning of "supremacy of the Navy,"[601] the Select Committee interpellated whether the organization of naval mobilization had improved since 1885[602] when the British warships became only available 6 weeks after the Panjdeh crisis broke out with Russia in March, intensifying the parliamentary pressure for rectifying the seemingly shaky state of the Royal navy.[603]

Late Naval Manoeuvres, 21 November, 1888, in J. H. Hattendord, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H. Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and G. Till, *op.cit.,* (1993), pp. 614-617, Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 133, Given Marder's account, the naval maneuver had been undertaken in July and reported in November.

[593] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 131.

[594] Paul Smith, "Ruling the Waves: Government, the Service and the Cost of Naval Supremacy, 1885-99," in Paul Smith, eds., *Government and the Armed Forces in Britain*, 1856-1990, (London: The Hambledon Press, 1996), p. 35.

[595] Queen Victoria to the Marquis of Salisbury, 8th June, 1888 [very confidential], in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1930), pp. 413-414.

[596] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 131-132.

[597] Ibid., pp. 614-615.

[598] Ibid., pp. 616-617.

[599] Ibid., p. 616.

[600] "The First Report from the Select Committee on Navy Estimates", 2nd May, 1888, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 12, pp. 66-67.

[601] "The Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Navy Estimates", 6th August, 1888, *Accounts and Papers,* Vol. 13, pp. 32-33.

[602] 2nd May, 1888, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-58.

[603] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 132-133.

As the Parliamentary debates raged on, Hamilton, Salisbury, and Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, consented in a future standard of Britain's naval policy.[604]

Britain's efforts to counter the Franco-Russian combination in the Mediterranean

This was the birth of "the Two-Power Standard", a British standard of naval strength equal to the combined power of the next two largest navies, upon which a new naval program was drafted by Hamilton and embodied in the Naval Defense Act of 1889.[605] The two-power standard largely accorded well with the desirable state of the Royal navy expressed by the Second Sea Lord before the select committee in April of 1888.[606] Hamilton, the First Lord of the Admiralty, enunciated that such a naval standard was premised on a probable alliance of France and Russia but it was felt "impolitic to mention either France or Russia by name."[607] The Admiralty initially commended building up 10 battleships, 37 cruisers, and 18 torpedo-gunboats over 5 years and the Salisbury cabinet added 5 more cruisers, authorizing £21,500,000 in March 1889.[608]

In conjunction with the Northbrook Program of 1884 completed by 1889, the Naval Defense Act of 1889 was the manifestation of Britain's potent political capacity to reallocate its resources to counteract to the French naval threats in the form of a possible merger with Russia as well as commerce raiding driven by torpedo boats and cruisers. By the late 1880s, the British naval opinion didn't much diverge in that even the protection of maritime trade could be effective with a battle fleet capable of "destroying or blockading enemy counterpart" without which "the strongest cruiser force" could be vulnerable.[609] Hamilton tried to take back his words of 1887 that "the *Nile* and *Trafalgar* would be the last battleships", because of then France's suspension of ironclad constructions, but "our neighbors" were building them again.[610]

In the 1880s, as elucidated, Britain had been keen on the alteration in the type of naval menaces[611] from France and reasonably shrewd in reacting to them. In the midst of the relative decline, Britain's economy still outperformed the French counterpart. Furthermore, the political backing for "its battle fleet supremacy" and "the safety of its vital merchant marine"[612] turned out to be quite solid regardless of the partisan difference, as shown in the Northbrook Program of the liberal cabinet in 1884 and the

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[604] Lord George Hamilton, *op.cit.*, (1922), pp. 104-106.

[605] Ibid., pp. 107-108, Hamilton publicly announced the two-power standard, "that our establishment should be on such a scale that it should at least be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries", at the House of Commons on March 7th in 1889. 7th March, 1889, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 333, page cols, 1171.

[606] 2nd May, 1888, *op.cit.*, pp. 66-67, 6th August, 1888, *op.cit.,* pp. 32-33, The Second Sea Lord, Admiral Hoskins, advocated "for going on building in such a way as to establish a sufficient superiority to any two nations combined" on April 18th and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Hood, referred to the naval supremacy as "a state of supremacy as compared with that of the next most powerful navy in the world" on June 13th in 1888.

[607] Lord George Hamilton, *op.cit.*, (1922), pp. 105-106.

[608] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 13.

[609] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 85.

[610] 7th March, 1889, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 333, page cols, 1169-1170.

[611] Like George Shaw Lefevre in 1886, Hamilton had noticed "a large reduction in the French shipbuilding program" by 1888, which could be the consequence of Aube's decision in 1886-1887. 2nd May, 1888, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-58.

[612] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 86.

Naval Defense Act of the conservative cabinet in 1888-1889. In the case of the Naval Defense Act of 1889, "even Gladstone and other liberal leaders" were willing to endorse the expenditure of £21,500,000[613] and public opinion well buttressed the fleet expansion, which Hamilton found to be fortunate for himself.[614]

Financially, Britain also became reasonably solvent in the end of the 1880s owing to a number of reasons. In 1880-1884, the British government had struggled to pay off the loans incurred from colonial wars in the late 1870s, which were liquidated by 1885.[615] On the other hand, there were "large budget surpluses in the late 1880s in spite of a slight fall in the level of revenue" and Goschen devised "a conversion scheme" that significantly brought down "the cost of servicing the National Debt" effective from April 1889.[616] Though Goschen was shortly against "increased spending on the navy" on the basis of the necessity of more "new warships" in November 1888, his opposition was overruled by other members of the Salisbury cabinet and his own conversion scheme paradoxically would "release fund" for a fresh naval program.[617]

Funds unspent by the end of the year were to be transferred not to the Treasury, but to "a special account for use in the remaining years of the program". Moreover, the Naval Defense Bill permitted "advances on the next year's allocation" by either the Treasury from "the Consolidated Fund" or borrowing. The bill boosted the British naval expenditure on shipbuilding by "an average annual increase of £2,600,000". While 70% of the elevated amount was to be covered by outside of the estimates, leaving 30%, £600,000, for the navy estimates, this enlarged portion was diminished to "annual payments into the special account of £1,430,000" via the measure of amortizing 5 years of budget over seven. With £1,380,000 annually unleashed from Goschen's debt conversion scheme, the bill didn't wrest much borrowing or more taxation.[618]

In a nutshell, Britain's economic growth, albeit slacked, and financial and political capacity, underpinned by its institution and popular support, enabled the appropriation of the requisite amount of resources to keep its fleet first-rate in number and quality to face off against the French navy in 1882-1890. The political ascendancy of the *Jeune École* from the early 1880s, which brought out the up-tempo production of asymmetric naval vessels and culminated during Aube's tenure in 1886-1887, had been countered by the Northbrook Program of 1884 and the Naval Defense Act of 1889. In the face of different maritime threats from aggregated battleship forces of France and Russia as well as commerce raiding in the Mediterranean, Britain had been resolute as well as able to stay on top of both naval challengers.

France's naval strategy against both the Triple Alliance and Britain in the 1890s

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[613] Ibid., p. 85.

[614] Lord George Hamilton, *op.cit.*, (1922), p. 109.

[615] According to Daunton, Britain had had "the convention" that transfers any surplus to "the sinking fund to reduce the national debt" since 1829 and "a combination of debt-repayment and economic growth" brought down "the British national debt by 90% relative to GNP" in 1822-1914. Martin Daunton, "Administering Taxation in Britain, 1815-1914", in José Luis Cardoso and Pedro Lains, *op.cit*., (2010), p. 37. In contrast, the French public debt rose from 20,391 million francs in 1880 to 25,153 million francs in 1890. Richard Bonney, "The Apogee and Fall of the French Rentier Regime, 1801-1914", in Ibid., (2010), p. 94.

[616] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 12.

[617] Ibid., p. 13.

[618] Ibid., p. 14.

By and large, the asymmetric balance of state power to mobilize resources for naval defense between Britain and France in the 1880s had not remarkably veered from the 1890s up to the point of the Fashoda crisis in 1898. The French navy again placed weight on the Triple Alliance. The successors of Aube in 1887-1889, Admiral Barbey and Krantz, reactivated "some of the ships" in reserve and conducted "tests of the system of mobilization" with a realization that France could not resolve the financial problem only "by decreasing the size of the active squadron of battleships."[619] These reorganizations subsequently expanded the number of ships in commission and inadvertently caused a naval scare on the part of Italy, as France walked away from negotiations for a tariff treaty and initiated "a tariff war" in February 1888.[620]

Italy was also disconcerted by the French planning for "a major naval facility at Bizerte" in Tunisia by 1888, which Aube and Boulanger had previously seen as "the site of a major base"[621] but could definitely pose a proximate menace to Italy. In response, Italy moved ahead to fortify the coastal defense of Maddalena, precipitate the completion of "the unfinished battleships," and deploy "their battleships as a fleet" rather than as "a garrison force." Italian moves ignited a vociferous press campaign in France and the Ministry was criticized by members of both the *Jeune École* and traditionalists in the Chamber over a 4-days debate. Accordingly, the Budget Committee brought back a French continental two-power standard "for the first time since 1878" [622] and a large naval program was approved in November of 1890.[623]

The French naval program of 1890, "the first large naval program since 1872" that rested on the principle that "the French fleet must be equal in number of those of the combined fleets of the Triple Alliance," led the way for the gradual augmentation of naval expenditure in the 1890s.[624] However, while the aggravated tension with Italy led the French navy to be prepared against the Italian navy from the spring of 1889, the Italian naval capabilities had shrunk to a large extent that did not impinge on the French control of Mediterranean since 1889. For example, Italy's naval budget plummeted from 158 million lire in 1888 to 113 million in 1890 and to 99 million in 1893. The naval construction virtually ceased and "the councils and much staff work" were repressed from 1893 to 1896 when it was also defeated at Adua in Ethiopia.[625]

The traditionalists' preoccupation with the Triple Alliance was consistent with France's search for a counterpoise the Triple Alliance on land as Germany's industrial growth and material resources unsettled France.[626] But "the apparent adhesion of Britain

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[619] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit*., (1987), pp. 190-191.

[620] Ibid., p. 191. The French was much more alerted by the German dispatch of four battleships to Maddalena "for a join visit with the Italian navy" in November 1888. The combined fleet of the Italian and German navy consisted of 10 battleships, 5 cruisers, 7 torpedo-gunboats, and 24 high-seas torpedo boats while the French fleet at Toulon was composed of 5 battleships, 3 older ships, and three cruisers. The French Mediterranean Fleet was no better than the Italian fleet in terms of modern ships. Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 87.

[621] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 171.

[622] Ibid., p. 195.

[623] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 87-88.

[624] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 197.

[625] Ibid., pp. 198-199.

[626] Christopher Andrew, *Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy, 1898-1905*, (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 15.

to the Triple Alliance," exhibited by the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, was the more "immediate precipitant" of the Franco-Russian alliance.[627] "A political entente" was signed in 1891, followed by "a military convention" in 1893 as well as the Dual Alliance in 1894.[628] Simultaneously, the French began to be more cognizant of a German maritime growth. In late 1891, Gervais reported that "the German fleet was superior in cruisers, auxiliary cruisers, and in torpedo boats" though it couldn't "concentrate its force in the North Sea" if Denmark remained neutral.[629]

Year	Naval Ships (1) /(2)/(3)/(4) [630]	Naval Expenditure[631] (in million mark)
1880	9 / 11 / 7 / 7	39.37
1885	12 / 9 / 12 / 28	52.06
1890	12 / 6 / 20 / 77	71.73
1895	21 / 2 / 25 / 99	85.89
1900	24 / 6 / 26 / 92	167.14
1905	29 / 9 / 34 / 124	248.18

Table. 16. Germany's naval ships and naval expenditures, 1880-1905

It was not until the early 1890s that France heeded attention to the German navy. In a similar vein, Vice Admiral Alquier, the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, called upon the Minister of Marine to abandon the outdated notion that "the German navy was weak" and to turn the French navy's focus from Italy to Germany in early 1895. Alquier's successor, Vice Admiral Parrayon, again followed his predecessor's case that "the Northern Fleet would be in the front line in case of war against the Triple Alliance" in November 1896. [632] Notwithstanding, the French priority in naval operational planning was still anchored on Italy and the slight switch in attention from Italy to Germany did not signify a critical transition. As Røksund puts, "the Tirpitz Plan and Germany Navy Laws were yet to come" till the late 1890s.[633]

Hence, justifiable as it may, the French navy's single-minded fixation on the Triple Alliance, and especially Italy, was striking to some extent from the early 1890s to the Fashoda crisis of 1898 notably given the Naval Defense Act of 1889 that publicized "the two-power standard" vis-à-vis France and Russia. Since the 1890s, the Italian navy had fallen by the wayside and Germany hadn't ramped up its efforts for shipbuilding as

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[627] Glenn H. Snyder*, op.cit.,* (1997), pp. 136-138, pp. 110-112. A conglomeration of Britain and the Triple Alliance, which seemed to have surfaced in the late 1880s, would have meant "a dominant coalition" against France and the French isolation both on land and at sea. Meanwhile, the fall of Bismarck and "the German refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in June 1890" prompted Russia to engage with France. Aaron L. Friedberg, *op. cit.,* (1988), pp. 154-155, Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 161.

[628] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 95-96.

[629] Ibid., p. 89.

[630] R. Chesneau and E. Kolesnik, eds., *op.cit*, (1979), p. 241. (1) Battleships [including coast defence battleships and ironclads of all kinds] (2) Heavy cruisers [including all the larger cruising ships] (3) Light cruisers (4) Torpedo craft

[631] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), pp. 340-341.

[632] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 90.

[633] Ibid., pp. 92-93. For example, a war against Germany was presumed to be "more defensive in character" and the crucial part of the naval plans, such as "bombardment of enemy infrastructure", targeted Italy and was scarcely "an integral part of the plans against Germany".

fervently as Tirpitz spearheaded until the late 1890s despite "a certain build-up and modernization of the German navy."[634] Yet, the General Staff and the commanders in Toulon and Brest maintained the operational planning against the Triple Alliance.[635] Vice Admiral Barréra, a new commander of the Northern fleet, couldn't "find any plans" in case of a war against Britain by October 1897.

Nevertheless, Admiral Barréra merely modified the existing plans on "how to fight Germany as late as July 1898."[636] A coherent naval strategy that integrated a way to combat the Royal navy and the Triple Alliance was not appropriately thought out through the 1890s except intermittent undertakings of the *Jeune École* followers until the debacle at Fashoda in 1898.

More astoundingly, the Franco-Russian alliance that came to the fore in 1891-1894 had little impact on the French navy's assessment of "the naval balance of power" in Europe, which could have otherwise accounted for the French navy's complacency about the British. Even concerning Russia's assistance against the Triple Alliance, the General Staff reported that France "should not count on any substantial assistance from Russia" aside from a diversion in the Baltic.[637]

The General Staff had set out to investigate "whether its ally could improve France's position at sea" against Britain, as the Franco-Russian alliance might have provided them with a solution to redress the naval imbalance between France and Britain "in theory." By November 1898, they arrived at another unfortunate conclusion that the Russian navy could not be of substantial assistance in a war against the Royal navy in consideration of "a lower speed" of ships, the difference in artillery and protection of capital ships, "a diversity of battleships and cruisers", and their location in the Baltic and the Black Sea.[638] While Besnard, the Minister of Marine in 1896-1898, drafted an operational plan against Britain in April 1898 once the Niger talk collapsed,[639] his plan didn't elicit a "thorough examination" on how deal with Britain.[640]

On the other hand, the legacy of the *Jeune École,* which contributed to the incoherence of the French naval policy*,* variably played a role in the portfolio of France's shipbuilding in the 1890s, too. As it accepted Aube's strategy against Britain in the 1880s, the General Staff insisted that it "assign its cruisers to commerce raiding," when it came to Britain in the early 1890.[641] The absence of an integrative strategy necessarily brought forth a "compromise program" of 1894 as the French navy catered to the Budget Committee of 1893.[642] Even though Britain revitalized its naval buildup with a Franco-

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[634] Ibid., pp. 91-92.
[635] Ibid., p. 86, p. 91.
[636] Ibid., p. 91, p. 145.
[637] Ibid., p. 96. The report on a possible joint naval war effort against the Triple Alliance was produced in June 1892.
[638] Ibid., p. 147-149.
[639] A war scare over the Niger crisis occurred in February and March 1898. Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 307.
[640] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 146-147. Admiral Fournier, the commander in chief of the Mediterranean Fleet during the Fashoda crisis, devised another plan in the Mediterranean, which was "more defensive and probably more realistic" than that of Besnard.
[641] Ibid., p. 109.
[642] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit., (*1987), pp. 282-283.

Russian naval scare in the Mediterranean in 1893,[643] the program of 1894 substituted the program of 1890 by adding "a few scouts cruisers and battleships for the admirals" and lots of "torpedo craft and some commerce-raiding cruisers" for the *Jeune École.*[644]

Edouard Lockroy's appointment as the Minister of Marine in November 1895, whose ideas on France's naval strategy accorded with Fournier, "the most prominent *Jeune École* thinker in the post-Aube era," implied "a comeback" for the *Jeune École.* As a member of the Parliament,[645] he strove to turn the navy's priority from the Triple Alliance and Battleships to Britain and armored cruisers and the French navy endeavored to build armored cruisers at the cost of battleship constructions in 1896-1897. Lockroy and his advocates in the Parliament revised the budget of 1896 to replace "the second ship of the *D'Entrecasteaux* class with a new model cruiser, *Jeanne d'Arc,"* as well.[646] Lockroy underscored the preparedness for commercial warfare and, logically, the significance of armored cruisers, not Aube's torpedo boats.

In 1897, the debate between the incumbent conservative Minister of Marine, Besnard, and Parliament wound up with the construction of three 9,500 tons "Fournier-inspired" armored cruisers of the *Montcalm* class, which begun to arouse the British concerns.[647] Lockroy and Fournier pressed for the improvement of *Montcalm* and the *Glorie* class. Lockroy's return as the Minister of Marine in June 1898, after the Niger crisis and before the Fashoda crisis, facilitated the construction of "11 relatively homogenous armored cruisers" between 1897 and 1899.[648] The priority given to cruisers by Lockroy and his allies enabled a single modification to the 1896 program for the following 1898 program, which boosted the number of cruisers for European waters from 12 to 18. The total number of armored cruisers amounted to 25.[649]

The Fashoda crisis as the turning point of the French naval strategy from 1898

To sum up, the naval establishment's inclination to assume the Triple Alliance as France's foremost naval adversary and the primacy of fleet warfare[650] had been widespread and entrenched but also balanced by the re-emergences of the *Jeune École* within the Parliament and the navy through the 1890s. The *Jeune École* from the mid-1890s differed from its predecessors in garnering a broader support via the discussions within the Superior Council and moderating "extreme claims under Aube and Charmes." The French cabinets had been generally under moderate republicans in the 1890s[651] and the contour of naval programs hinged on the dynamics between the establishment and the

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643 Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 174-187.
644 Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 283.
645 Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 85, pp. 110-111. He founded "the French naval staff college" in December 1895 and nominated Admiral Fournier as "the first commander of the college". As stated, Fournier was later in charge of the Mediterranean Fleet in the midst of the Fashoda crisis in 1898.
646 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
647 Ibid., p. 136.
648 Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), pp. 288-290.
649 Ibid., p. 366.
650 Røksund speculates, "the most likely reason for this is probably that the Italian navy was a perfect enemy for the supporters of battleships". Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 160.
651 Moderate republicans had been united by *rallies* (Catholics) and monarchists against radicalism, socialism and anarchism in the 1890s. Robert Tombs, *op.cit.*, (1996, 2014), p. 460.

Jeune École, which sustained "the confusion and disarray"[652] in the navy until the Fashoda crisis in 1898.

The blunder at Fashoda in 1898 awakened the French navy to finally face its "lack of naval, expeditionary capabilities" and a well-articulated strategy, which all pointed to its unreadiness for a potential war with a superior navy.[653] As demonstrated, the Fashoda crisis prompted the French navy to outline a war plan against Britain and seriously take stock of the state of its strategic priority and the Russian naval capacity. De Lannesan, who succeeded Lockroy as the Minister of Marine and member of Parliament in 1899-1902, had put the icing on the cake for "a thorough reform" of "the navy's strategy, doctrines, organization, and the composition of the fleet," and managed to persuade the naval establishment and Parliament that "the Royal navy should be the standard against which it should measure itself."[654]

Lanessan asserted the construction of cruisers of 2nd and 3rd class would be more efficient than that of "a great number of second-rate warships" and France's naval plan and organization ought to be tailored to combat Britain.[655] The Lanessan program integrated fleet warfare and commerce warfare for the offensive system and requested the Parliament bolster the fleet by adding "6 battleships, 5 armored cruisers, 28 destroyers, 112 torpedo boats, and 26 submarines over the next 8 years." The Parliament passed the fleet law of 1900 and even approved additional 50 million francs, curtailing the required number of years to 7.[656] Ropp portrays that it was "the first indication of a new unity in French naval policy"[657] in that Lannesan's program merged battleships and cruisers in a fashion "could be used against both England and Germany."[658]

Lannesan's naval program brough closure to the French navy's incongruity in the past 20 years by bridging the sharp division between traditionalists and the *Jeune École.* The general consensus reached was "industrial warfare should be complementary to fleet warfare" and France could not resort to "either industrial warfare or fleet warfare" alone. Commerce raiding "along the French and North African coasts" could press the Royal navy to disperse its ships that would be otherwise concentrated in the major fleet warfare.[659] Unlike Lockroy's initiative that assigned more armored cruisers in 1895-1898, the Lannesan program of 1900 that included more battleships accompanied a certain hike in France's naval expenditures in 1898-1902. The Fashoda crisis of 1898 had shaken up France's navy and the Parliament backed its reform.[660]

Meanwhile, opportunist republicans aided by moderate conservatives had let the Dreyfus Affair fester in 1894-1899 and "the polarization of public opinion" kicked in as "a reopening of the case" appeared plausible.[661] The Dreyfus Affair reshuffled the political debate along the lines of "Left against Right and "the Republic against its

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[652] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 160, Ibid., p. 149.
[653] Ibid., p. 145.
[654] Ibid., p. 143.
[655] Ibid., p. 165.
[656] Ibid., p. 171.
[657] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit., (*1987), p. 329.
[658] Ibid., 328.
[659] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 171-172. With this compromised scheme of Lannesan and the Russian naval program of 1898, the Russian navy's secondary role was viewed more positively than 1898.
[660] Ibid., pp. 174-175.
[661] David B. Ralston*, op.cit.*, (1967), pp. 231-232.

enemies."[662] The Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet whose political base relied on moderate republicanism was replaced by the cabinet of Emile Combes that represented more radical republicanism and anticlericalism in the 1902 election.[663] Consequently, Camille Pelletan, who stood against clericalism and aristocracy in the navy, assumed office as the Minster of Marine. Pelletan's tenure was ostensibly "the *Jeune École* back to power for the last time.*"*[664]

Granted, Pelletan assisted "the 50 million francs extension of credit to the program of 1900" that was appropriated to construct "more torpedo boats and submarines" before his appointment. He also retarded the battleships construction and restored the production of "the old *Jeune École* favorite, small torpedo boats with a little less than 100 tone."[665] However, the *Jeune École* reckoned that small torpedo boats were simply suitable for defensive in the coastal water and cruisers and submarines were the offensive means in the *Jeune École'*s strategy by the mid-1890s.[666] Pelletan's decisions were not well aligned with either the theories of the *Jeune École* in a strict sense or any consistent idea of his own. Instead, he seemed to have capitalized on the *Jeune École* "as a useful platform" to label this political enemies as "anti-republican."[667]

Although the technological development of submarines fostered a renewal of the *Jeune École'*s theory, Pelletan cancelled Lannesan's previous order of 13 submarines of the *Aigrett* class in September 1902, permitting only the two under construction. Rather, he proposed to manufacture 14 "miniscule" submarines of three different classes in the program of 1904.[668] No wonder that Fournier called Pelletan's cancellation as "a disastrous mistake." Pelletan "postponed the construction of the torpedo boats" he had once claimed as important, "withdrew a third of all the complements from the Mediterranean Squadron" for the winter of 1902,[669] and thwarted "the annual fleet maneuvers in the summer of 1903" in the pretext of "financial constraints." His policy mirrored "a will to reduce costs" and not much of the *Jeune École.*[670]

From the late 1890s to 1904, France exited from "the stagnant period" from 1896 and its economic growth was reinvigorated.[671] The Fashoda crisis of 1898 concurrently catalyzed the naval reform led by Lannesan in a manner that reconciled the internal cleavage that featured the French navy since the 1880s. But as Boulangism and Aube's policy reined a greater resource extraction in the late 1880s, Pelletan's haphazard application of the *Jeune École*'s idea in 1902-1905 also bridled a larger and efficient allocation of resources. Though the French economic growth had been more "rapid" than Britain from 1896,[672] France's extraction capacity was marred by the political and

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[662] Robert Tombs, *op.cit.*, (1996, 2014), pp. 468-469.
[663] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 213-214.
[664] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 325.
[665] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 214-216.
[666] Ibid., 216.
[667] Ibid., p. 215, p. 217, p. 220.
[668] Ibid., pp. 216-217.
[669] Ibid., p. 219, The French Parliament "unanimously resolved" to bring back the Mediterranean Squadron and the Fleet "on a war footing" and restored the status quo ante in December.
[670] Ibid., pp. 218-219. Aube introduced major maneuvers for the French navy for the first time.
[671] Robert Tombs, *op.cit.*, (1996, 2014), pp. 469-471, Charles P. Kindleberger*, op.cit*, (1964), pp. 8-10, pp. 12-14.
[672] Charles P. Kindleberger*, op.cit*, (1964), p. 13.

bureaucratic inconsistency. The relevance of the *Jeune École* petered out with the Entente Cordiale of 1904 and the expansion of the German navy.[673]

Britain's robust naval arms buildup against the Franco-Russian alliance in the Mediterranean

Apart from the frequent modifications that corresponded to the fluctuant impact of the *Jeune École,* it was telling that the five naval programs of France in 1890-1900 had almost always failed to yield the proposed number of ships, particularly battleships.[674] Contrary to France, Britain's state capacity to extract resources for its naval defense continued to be thoroughgoing and vigilant from the 1890s to 1904. When France's asymmetric strategy became salient in its naval policy and shipbuilding programs by fits and starts, the British political and naval leaders have gone to great ends to keep its predominance in battleships and come to grips with the peril of the asymmetric warfare. As the Naval Defense Act of 1889 neared its end, a renewal of the British shipbuilding was exhorted by the Admiralty.[675]

Spencer, the successor of Hamilton as the First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to Roseberry, Foreign Secretary, that Britain's "actual present strength" was "not enough" and France and Russia would "have more ships" from one or two years later to 1896 in May 1893. [676] Spencer foresaw the upcoming expiration of the Naval Defense Act of 1889 "by the end of the financial year 1893-1894," whose progress had been either "realized" or "exceeded," and requested the Royal navy "lay down new ships" in February 1893.[677] As a Franco-Russian alliance loomed, the naval balance in the Mediterranean disturbed Britain. In July, Rosebery heard of the Russian navy's scheduled visit to Toulon and asked Spencer to "increase Mediterranean strength" even at the expense of "Pacific and Channel squadrons."[678]

Rosebery's information was confirmed on August 6th that the Russian squadron planned to visit Toulon in October and some of the ships would stay indefinitely in the Mediterranean.[679] Rosebery further pressed Spencer and the Joint Committee about "naval and military preparation" in case of a war against France and Russia in September.[680] Spencer also notified Rosebery of the lack of appropriate protection at

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[673] Arne Røksund, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 221-222. Even if the *Jeune École* had been so dominant as to achive the bureaucratic consistency within the French navy in the 1880s-1904, the asymmetric nature of the *Jeune École'*s strategy couldn't have necessitated a stronger extraction of resources in France.

[674] Theodore Ropp, *op.cit.,* pp. 364-367. (1987), pp, Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 162, Such a poor record of the French shipbuilding was even acknowledged by a British army officer and journalist in 1897. Charles A. Court, "French Naval Policy in Peace and War", *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 41, No. 239, (1897), p. 149.

[675] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 86.

[676] Spencer to Roseberry, 26th May, 1893, in Peter Gordon, eds., *The Red Earl: The Papers of the Fifth Earl Spencer, 1835-1910, Vol. 2, 1885-1910*, (Northhamton: The Northhamptonshire Record Society, 1986), pp. 223-224.

[677] "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1893-94", 21st February, 1893, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 53, C. 6909 [Command Papers], pp. 3-6, p.11.

[678] Rosebery to Spencer, 29th July, 1893, in Peter Gordon, *op.cit.,* (1986), pp. 226.

[679] Ibid., p. 226, Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 175.

[680] H. Cambell-Bannerman [Secretary of State for War] to Spencer, 5th September, 1893, Spencer to H. Campbell-Bannerman, 17th September, 1893, in Peter Gordon, *op.cit.,* (1986), pp. 227. Spencer was relieved

home ports against "sudden torpedo attack" despite their superiority in battleships and cruisers.[681] Similarly, Richards, the First Naval Lord, accentuated the construction of both first-class battleships and torpedo-boat destroyers, stating Britain adopt "the means" to meet "torpedo boats established by Aube policy" on the coast of the English Channel."[682] The number of cruisers was deemed insufficient by the Sea Lords, too.[683]

As a consequence, Spencer drafted a new 5-year construction program, which would extend the Naval Defense Act of 1889 and require an expenditure increase of £3,126,000.[684] At the end of 1893, the majority of the cabinet members, including the Chancellor of Exchequer, Harcourt who attempted to trim down the estimate,[685] backed the Spencer program except Gladstone and Shaw-Lefevre.[686] Once Gladstone under the massive political pressure resigned on March 3rd, the Rosebery cabinet approved of the Spencer program of 1893 on March 8th in 1894,[687] which had set out to produce 7 battleships, 20 cruisers, 40 torpedo-boat-destroyers, 30 first-class torpedo-boats in five years.[688] A number of proposed destroyers in fact would have defused Gladstone's anxiety about "anti-torpedo vessels" to some extent.[689]

Though Gladstone, almost alone, was assured that "the present superiority in the principal classes of vessels" was "manifest and very large" in 1893,[690] the British uneasiness that engendered the Spencer program of 1893 was not groundless. France and Russia "laid down 12 battleships," and "by the end of 1893 had announced plans to lay down an additional five such vessels at the beginning of 1894."[691] The Spencer program of 1893 was the revelation of Britain's determination to retain its two-power standard in capital ships, beef up the means to counter torpedo attacks, and add more cruisers for the

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to know that a war plan against a Franco-Russian combination existed "on paper" from the intelligence department.

[681] Spencer to Roseberry, 3rd October, 1893, in Peter Gordon, *op.cit.,* (1986), pp. 227-228.

[682] Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, First Naval Lord, August, 1893 "After the Naval Defence Act, 1893", Minute for the Board of Admiralty in John. H. Hattendord, R. J. B. Knight, A. W. H. Pearsall, N. A. M. Rodger, and Geoffrey Till, *op.cit*., (1993), pp. 620-621. Minute by Rear-Admiral C.A.G. Bridge, "Countering French torpedo attacks, 1893" Director of Naval Intelligence, 23 October, 1893, Ibid., pp. 621-622.

[683] Sea Lords to Spencer, 20th December, 1893, in Peter Gordon, *op.cit.,* (1986), pp. 231-232.

[684] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, 1992, pp. 86-87. "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1894-95", 10th March, 1894, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 54, C. 7295 [Command Papers], pp. 3-11.

[685] Paul Smith, "Ruling the Waves: Government, the Service and the Cost of Naval Supremacy, 1885-99", in Paul Smith, *op.cit.,* (1996), pp. 43-48.

[686] Peter Gordon, *op.cit.,* (1986), pp. 207-208. Gladstone opposed because of what he deemed as "a constitutional impropriety" that "the Admirals have dictated terms to the Executive Government" without civilian and financial control. Paul Smith, in Paul Smith, *op.cit*., (1996), pp. 47-48. He remarked, "it entirely subverts our established administrative and financial system". Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 12th December, 1893, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1931), pp. 329-330.

[687] Memorandum of Spencer, 8th March, 1894, in Peter Gordon, *op.cit.,* (1986), p. 243.

[688] Roger Chesneau and Eugene Kolesnik, *op.cit.,* 1979, p. 2, Rosebery to Queen Victoria, 8th March, 1894, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1931), pp. 377-378, The Army Estimate also increased by £ 2,500,000.

[689] While not in favor of a large increase in naval armament, Gladstone admitted that Britain was "behindhand" as to "torpedo and anti-torpedo vessels". Likewise, the asymmetric challenge of France's *Jeune École* had an uninterrupted impact on the British threat perception in the 1890s. Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 12th December, 1893, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1931), pp. 330-331.

[690] Gladstone to Queen Victoria, 12th December, 1893, Ibid., pp. 330-331.

[691] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 16

sake of the protection of commerce.[692] The increase in expenditure on shipbuilding was partly met by "the introduction of a system of graduated rates for the death duties," which resulted in "increased revenue" in 1895-1896.[693]

Year	1st class battleships		2nd class battleships			Cruisers	
1893	Built	Building	Built	Building	3rd class battleships	1894-95	1896-97
England	16	6	14	-	-	78	83
France	10	5	9	4	16	29	44
Russia	4	5	4	2	6	5	7

	Relative strength in 1st class battleships (if ships laid down were completed)				Relative strength in total battleships (if ships laid down were completed)		
Year	1894-95	1895-96	1896-97	1897-98	1894-95	1895-96	1896-97
England	19	19	22	22	56	56	59
France	10	13	15	18	39	42	44
Russia	4	6	9	11	15	17	23

Table. 17 & 18. The Admiralty's estimation of the trend in naval power balance in 1893[694]

Further, the Parliament passed Naval Works Act in July 1895 to "fund the building or improvement of naval shore facilities" aside from the navy estimates, which generated £1,000,000 for the naval works in 1895-1896 and allowed the Treasury to "borrow all or part in the form of terminable annuities."[695] The British economy resumed its growth after 1896 and the British government had arguably "the most effective" financial and institutional means to tap into the nation's wealth to follow through on the consecutive naval programs.[696] The Salisbury administration succeeded the Rosebery cabinet in June 1895 and ordered five more battleships.[697] The Salisbury cabinet led the way towards the almost undisturbed "ten years" during which naval spending soared from £17,500,000 to £36,800,000 in 1895-1905.[698]

Regardless of the regime change, Britain had upheld its political and financial capacity to exact resources to shore up its naval armament. In 1896, Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, submitted the navy estimates for 1896-1897 with an increase of £3,122,000 to "hasten on the completion of ships beyond degree originally contemplated"

[692] Spencer saved £4,000,000 or £8,000,000 by proposing 20 cruisers and not 30 or 40 cruisers recommended by the Sea Lords. The number of torpedo-boat destroyers in the Spencer program, 40, was less than that initially suggested by the Sea Lords, 50, too. Paul Smith, in Paul Smith, *op.cit*., (1996), pp. 42-46. The National Intelligence Department came up with "a simple formula for the required naval strength: B = F + R + X". B, F+R, and X referred to "British strength, the combined strength of France and Russia, and the number of additional ships needed to protect our much greater maritime interests" respectively. X can be interpreted as the number of fighting ships, cruisers and smaller vessels, to protect the trade of commerce and food supply. Bryan Ranft, "The Protection of British Seaborne Trade and Development of Systematic Planning for War, 1860-1906", in Bryan Ranft, eds., *Technical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860-1939*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 9.

[693] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), pp. 16-17.

[694] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, 1940, pp. 191-192.

[695] Ibid., p. 17, Paul Smith, in Paul Smith, *op.cit.,* (1996), p. 49.

[696] Paul Smith, in Paul Smith, *op.cit.,* (1996), p. 50.

[697] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 17.

[698] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 87.

and also extend the previous naval works via another Naval Works Bill of 1896.[699] Revenues from death duties surpassed the expected amount and there was a timely rise in taxation due to an "upturn" in economy. Moreover, the Salisbury administration reallocated most of national "surpluses," which had conventionally gone to pay off the sovereign debt, to finance the Naval Works of Act of 1895 and 1896.[700]

After the naval expenditures grew by 65% between the fiscal years of 1889-90 and 1896-97 from £15,888,502 to £23,790,835,[701] Britain's navy estimates in the fiscal years of 1897-1905 continued to be heightened from £21,838,000 to £36,889,000[702] notwithstanding the Boer war of 1899-1902 that temporarily effected an extraordinary surge in the army budget of 1900-01.[703] Save for the years of 1897-98, 1898-99, and 1902-03, the annual increase in the navy estimates revolved around no less than £2,083,600 and no more than £3,202,000. The shipbuilding or a purchase of battleships[704] comprised most of the increased budget. An occasionally miniscule increase derived from the transfer of the fund to the earlier fiscal year, which hadn't retarded or hindered the multiple construction programs.[705]

The Spencer program of 1893 and the additional naval buildups carried over by the Salisbury cabinet reaffirmed the British commitment for the two-power standard in battleships and the strategic imperative of countering the asymmetric threats. To the latter's end, along with torpedo-boat destroyers, Britain immensely invested in armored cruisers over "the eight fiscal years from 1897-8 to 1904-05."[706] The British had been conscious of the vital importance of cruisers since the 1880s when the naval maneuvers of 1887-1889 demonstrated that "a superiority of 5:3 in battleships and 2:1 in cruisers" was required for the "effective blockade."[707] Even if Spencer slightly curbed the number

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[699] "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1896-97", 26th February, 1896, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 53, C. 7896 [Command Papers], p. 3, p. 7, pp. 10-12.

[700] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), pp. 17-18.

[701] Ibid., p. 18.

[702] "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1897-98", 22nd February, 1897, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 55, C. 8353 [Command Papers], p. 3, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1904-05", 1st February, 1904, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 52, Cd. 1959, p. 3

[703] Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1981, 1985), p. 35. For example, the British Army Budget in 1900-01 rose up to £91.7 million in comparison with £17.6 million in 1890-01 and £27.4 million in 1910-11.

[704] These ships from Chile were bought to prevent Russia from obtaining for a potential use against Japan. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 24.

[705] "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1897-98", 22nd February, 1897, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 55, C. 8353, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1898-99", 3rd March, 1898, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 55, C. 8738, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1899-1900", 7th March, 1899, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 54, C. 9184, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1900-1901", 17th February, 1900, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 50, Cd. 252, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1901-1902", 1st March, 1901, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 50, Cd. 252, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1902-3", 10th February, 1898, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 59, Cd. 950, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1903-4", 14th February, 1903, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 39, Cd. 1478, "Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1904-5", 1st February, 1904, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 52, Cd. 1959.

[706] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), p. 20.

[707] Bryan Ranft, "The Protection of British Seaborne Trade and Development of Systematic Planning for War, 1860-1906," in Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.,* (1977), p. 8.

of cruisers in 1893-1894, the Admiralty's "assessment of cruiser requirements" was generally embraced in the program in 1894-1899.[708]

Year	Britain (1913=100)	France (1913=100)	Britain (£ in millions)	British Total Government Expenditure (£ in millions)	France (Franc in millions)	French Total Government Expenditure (Franc in millions)
1892	77	82	**15.73**	96	251.98	3,380
1893	77	81	**15.48**	98	253.30	3,451
1894	70	75	**17.55**	101	274.19	3,480
1895	68	73	**19.72**	105	268.10	3,434
1896	69	71	**22.17**	110	265.93	3,445
1897	70	72	**20.85**	112	260.78	3,524
1898	74	74	**24.07**	118	**289.66**	3,528
1899	79	80	**26.00**	144	**322.45**	3,589
1900	86	85	**29.52**	193	**372.95**	3,747
1901	81	82	**31.04**	205	**344.36**	3,756
1902	81	81	**31.18**	194	298.58	3,699
1903	81	83	**35.48**	155	304.69	3,597
1904	78	81	**36.83**	150	292.96	3,639

Table. 19. Naval expenditures of Britain and France, 1892-1904[709]

In 1896, alluding to this First Sea Lord's assessment, Goschen testified that his proposal to "add 4 first-class cruisers, 3 second-class cruisers, 6 third-class cruisers" was "based upon the question what we have to defend, in what direction the food supply will have to be protected, and what resources we have."[710] The British "ordered its first six side-armored cruisers" in the estimates of 1897-98 and owing to "greater numbers and increased cost-per-unit" of cruisers from 1897-98 to 1904-05, spending on "all cruiser classes" became virtually as twice larger as that "between 1889-90 and 1896-97."[711] As noted earlier, France also struggled to formulate a homogenous fleet of armored cruisers at the expense of battleships with the reappearance of Lockroy as the Minister of Marine in 1895 and 1898-99, attaining 25 cruisers in Europe.[712]

While there were parliamentary debates on whether "large squadrons of cruisers" would be the panacea for the commerce protection on trade routes,[713] Britain's attention to trade protection and securing food supplies from abroad in particular had not subsided but waxed in 1898-1904. The injured trade of Spain and the U.S. during the Spanish-American war and France's construction of fast cruisers were evoked to remind the possibility of the asymmetric warfare conducted by cruisers of a maritime enemy in

[708] The Admiralty assessed in November and December of 1893 that "direct protection of trade must come from cruiser concentrations at well-known points, especially in the approaches to home ports". For instance, the number of cruiser requirements for the Mediterranean Fleet, Home Fleet, and United Kingdom was 36, 28, and 20 respectively. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[709] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,* (1988), pp. 340-344, Brian R. Mitchell, *op.cit.*, (1975), pp. 699-702.

[710] 2nd March, 1896, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 37, page cols, 1518-1520.

[711] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), pp. 19-21.

[712] Ibid., p. 20, France and Russia ordered 8 more cruisers in addition to the 9 vessels under construction in the fiscal years of 1898-99, 1899-1900, and 1900-01.

[713] 27th July, 1897, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 51, page cols, 1276-1282, 16th February, 1899, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 66, page cols, 1135-1137, 1154-1158.

February 1899[714] when France had been under the influence of Lockroy, the cruiser advocate. By 1900, Goschen clarified the Royal navy's plans were "carefully worked out" in accordance with "the geography of the seas" to ensure "the protection of our coasts and commerce" alongside the intelligence department.[715]

At this point, Goschen looked into the navy estimates of France and Russia and reassured the parliamentary members that although Britain's estimate "might be the same as in France and Russia combined, we should build an additional battleship and an additional cruiser" because the shipbuilding in France and Russia would cost "as 20% dearer than here." While Goschen then evaluated "the new programs of France and Germany,"[716] Britain still first referenced to the Franco-Russian combination to justify its own naval armament even after the Fashoda crisis of 1898. From 1900-1904, "the safety of food supplies in war"[717] became the pivotal theme over naval debates in the Parliament. The navy was referred to as "the first line of defense" as Britain "should be starved into submission,"[718] though it was not the aim of the *Jeune École'*s theory.

The fact that France adhered to producing more cruisers and torpedo boats was enough to create the British concern in 1898-1904 aside from the actual theory of the *Jeune École* and the pathological inertia of the French naval establishment. At one point, the objective of the *Jeune École'*s strategy, which was raise "insurance rate" by launching *guerre de course* to generate social panic, was acknowledged as a possibility in reference to safeguarding Britain's food supplies. The British worry was a legitimate one given its considerable dependence on food supplies from other states.[719] Selborne, who succeeded Goschen in 1900 and remained until 1905, reiterated "the British navy had to protect the sea-borne traffic" and other parliamentary members chimed in that cruisers should be taken into account in the two-power standard.[720]

Selborne insisted a policy of "equality plus margin" to sustain superiorities over "the combined strength of France and Russia" in battleships and armored cruisers to also defend their "mercantile marine" in 1901-1902, which the cabinet eventually approved.[721] The Admiralty conceived the Mediterranean as "the decisive naval theater in a war with France" and "the difficulty of defending commerce there." Fisher, the commander-in-chief, anticipated no reserve forces would be available "for the defense of trade" once the naval force met "the French main forces" and one plan thus suggested "all homeward-bound trade" halt in the Suez Canal.[722] The ever arising "public apprehension" with respect to "the dangers to Britain in a maritime war" brought about "the establishment of the Royal Commission" on this matter in March 1903.[723]

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[714] 16th February, 1899, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 66, page cols, 1142-1144.
[715] 26th February, 1900, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 79, page cols, 1131-1133.
[716] 26th February, 1900, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 79, page cols, 1125-1127.
[717] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 87.
[718] 22nd March, 1901, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 91, page cols, 930-932.
[719] 28th January, 1902, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 101, page cols, 1120-1123.
[720] 14th May, 1903, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 122, page cols, 707-709, 713-716. 29th February, 1904, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 130, page cols, 1276-1278.
[721] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *op.cit.,* (1989), pp. 22-24.
[722] Bryan Ranft, "The Protection of British Seaborne Trade and Development of Systematic Planning for War, 1860-1906", in Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.,* (1977), p. 11.
[723] The Royal Commission concluded that the British "look mainly for security to the strength of our Navy" and "rely in a less degree upon the widespread resources of our mercantile fleet", recommending a scheme

The Entente Cordiale in 1904 "relieved" Britain's nervousness about the wartime food supplies and trade to a certain degree but it did not necessarily trigger a significant curtailment in naval expenditures afterwards.[724] This was in part due to Germany's groundbreaking naval arming that caught Britain's attention. The parliamentary members started to increasingly discuss the revised implication of the two-power standard for the Royal navy with the German maritime armament in the early 1900s compared to the early 1890s.[725] With the parliamentary request, the admiralty submitted a report of naval expenditure of Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan, and America from 1880 to 1904. Whereas the naval spending of France in large part stagnated, Britain's naval expenditure leaped from £32,131,062 to £39,060,887 in 1900-1904.[726]

Year	Britain	France	Russia	The U.S.	Germany
1882	**0.498**	**0.311**	0.094	0.051	0.038
1883	**0.489**	**0.324**	0.082	0.049	0.038
1884	**0.481**	**0.335**	0.075	0.051	0.040
1885	**0.477**	**0.348**	0.076	0.047	0.040
1886	0.479	0.302	0.115	0.041	0.039
1887	0.483	0.282	0.116	0.044	0.029
1888	0.499	0.263	0.112	0.054	0.043
1889	0.533	0.238	0.107	0.064	0.037
1890	0.521	0.244	0.105	0.064	0.046
1891	0.481	0.239	0.093	0.069	0.088
1892	0.476	0.238	0.093	0.076	0.101
1893	**0.454**	**0.227**	**0.102**	0.110	0.092
1894	**0.436**	**0.239**	**0.105**	0.113	0.091
1895	**0.458**	**0.222**	**0.107**	**0.101**	0.094
1896	**0.467**	**0.218**	**0.100**	**0.094**	0.089
1897	**0.428**	**0.219**	**0.099**	**0.098**	0.087
1898	**0.425**	**0.203**	**0.090**	**0.131**	0.079
1899	0.393	0.181	0.094	**0.141**	**0.108**
1900	0.392	0.178	0.104	**0.152**	**0.096**
1901	0.392	0.166	0.100	**0.153**	**0.118**
1902	0.405	0.146	0.103	**0.149**	**0.131**
1903	0.405	**0.136**	**0.108**	**0.155**	**0.137**
1904	0.419	**0.124**	**0.108**	**0.168**	**0.137**

Table. 20. Proportional distribution of naval capabilities, 1882-1904[727]

To summarize, the relative state capacity to extract resources for naval armament between Britain and France was unsymmetrical in 1882-1904 because of Britain's exceeding economic and financial capacity, and the bipartisan political commitment for naval primacy. Nevertheless, it seldom means France had 'not' balanced Britain despite

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of national indemnity to "keep down the cost of transport" and therefore prevent "high prices" in wartime. "Report of the Royal Commission on Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War, Vol. 1 The report", 1905, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 39, Cd. 2643, p. 62.

[724] Bryan Ranft, *op.cit.*, (1992), p. 90.

[725] 14th May, 1903, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 122, page cols, 703-748.

[726] "Naval Expenditure: Return of naval expenditure of this country in the years 1880, 1890, 1900, 1901, 1902, and 1903, and the naval expenditure of France, Russia, Germany, and America in the same years", 18th April, 1904, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 53, House of Commons Papers, p. 129, "Naval Expenditure: Return of the naval expenditure of this country in the years 1880, 1890, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, and 1904, and the naval expenditure of France, Russia, Germany, Japan and America in the same years", 9th May, 1905, *Accounts and Papers*, Vol. 48, House of Commons Papers, p. 155. In the same period, the naval expenditure of Germany was also greatly raised and from £7,472,656 to £ 10.567,342 according to this report.

[727] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit*, (1988), p. 123.

distractions that derived from Boulangism and the naval traditionalists' parochial preoccupation with Italy and battleship warfare. France had kept ahead in building self-propelled torpedo boats and seagoing boats in the early 1880s. Advocates of the *Jeune École* took office as the Minister of Marine in 1886-1886, 1895-1896, and 1898-1902, also albeit arguably in 1902-1905, shaped the course of the French shipbuilding in a fashion that delivered more armored cruisers and later submarines.

It is outstanding Britain's reactions vis-à-vis France had little to do with the variation in the political influence of the *Jeune École* within the French navy and hinged upon its assessment of the geographical distribution of fighting ships, the shifting trend of France's naval construction, and a Franco-Russian alignment, as exemplified in the Northbrook program of 1884, the Naval Defense Act of 1889, and the Spencer Program of 1893. Ironically, since the *Jeune* École ministers, unequivocally committed to maritime balancing against Britain, had not pursued naval overtake, their tenures did not fully elevate domestic political capacity to extract resources for naval defense in 1886-1904. Hence, as naval spendings translated into naval capabilities in Table 15, France's domestic resource-extraction for naval defense had dwindled since the mid-1880s.

Britain had been no less nimble to cope with French naval challenges from both capital ships and asymmetric vessels, namely self-propelled torpedo as well as torpedo boats in the early 1880s, the redistribution of French battleships in the Mediterranean in the late 1880s, armored cruisers and submarines from the 1890s to 1904, and the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894. Because of the persistent asymmetric challenges in the Mediterranean and the Dual alliance that complemented France's inferior naval power, Britain's potential loss of interest and prestige from naval security competition with France had been hardly negligible in spite of the sustained naval power gap since the mid 1880s. In other words, the preventive war motivation of Britain against France didn't completely subside as the naval power balance between them might suggest in 1882-1904.

5.3. France's geographical expansion: the peripheral theaters of Britain with no expected contagion effect, 1882-1898 ➡ the peripheral theater of Britain with high expected contagion effect [the Upper Nile], 1898

The Mediterranean and the Egyptian Question

In a geographical sense, the Mediterranean had steadily become the epicenter of Britain's maritime interest next to its defense of home theater in 1882-1904. As articulated, this was in some measure because France's asymmetric naval armament, though not ideally implemented, and its deployment of battleships in the Mediterranean along with the Dual Alliance of 1894 led to a series of alarms with regard to the British preparedness in a wartime situation and the protection of trade and food supply. Not unrelatedly, the Egyptian question, once the issue of the Anglo-French joint control in 1876-1882,[728] synchronously turned into a flashpoint between Britain and France up to the year of 1898. Yet, since the French expansions invariably fell into peripheral theaters of Britain in 1882-1904, it is imperative to unpack how the Egyptian question differed from other disputes.

Noticeably, the Third republic didn't seek to reshuffle the territorial status quo in Europe in 1882-1904 as Napoleon III incessantly had tried in the years of the Crimean

[728] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 21.

system. The central theater for Britain and France seemed undisturbed also because Bismarck's Germany "strove to maintain the status quo" in Europe.[729] Taylor was not incorrect to comment, "the British could turn their backs on Europe as never before or since" the years between 1864-1904.[730] The French imperial expansion, driven by the leaders, such as Gambetta, Ferry, Ribot, Hanotaux,[731] and Delcassé, was not limited to Africa but ranged from China to the Southeast Asia in the name of "*Pénétration Pacifique*."[732] In the late 1870s, the Egyptian question had not been a distinct colonial issue and even the source of the bilateral cooperation until 1882.

The Berlin Treaty signed in July 1878, which settled the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, again "contained" the Russian influence in the Straits to a certain extent as Britain opposed Russia's "unilateral gain" and pushed for the reorganization of the Balkan region, including independent Romania and "the new Bulgaria,"[733] notwithstanding the Russian victory.[734] Salisbury[735] carried through what he laid out in March the British objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was to preserve "the balance of power in the Egean" and "the free passage of the Straits," and to "drive back the Slave State to the Balkans" and obtain "two naval stations for England, say, Lemnos and Cyprus."[736] By concluding the Convention of Defensive Alliance with the Porte in June 1878, the Cyprus convention, Britain acquired Cyprus as its naval base.[737]

In the meantime, Salisbury acknowledged the French control of Algeria as "the success of the experiment conducted by France" and expressed that Britain had "no special interest" in the neighboring Tunis.[738] In October of 1878, Salisbury again "disclaimed any intention of establishing an exclusive footing in Egypt" and affirmed that England was "wholly disinterested" in Tunis and bore "no intention to contest" the French "geographical position of Algeria."[739] The British position on Egypt as well as Tunis was maintained by the succeeding Gladstone cabinet from 1880, though Gladstone previously denounced "the purchase of the Suez Canal shares"[740] and the occupation of Cyprus.[741] By 1881, Gladstone found England's case against France's expansion in Tunis untenable given its "acquisition of Cyprus" and "Salisbury's declaration."[742]

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729 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 247.
730 A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 284.
731 Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), pp. 13-14.
732 T. G. Otte, "From "War-in-Sight" to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 17, No. 4, (2006), p. 700.
733 Salisbury to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State (Received July 15th, 1878), in Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 275.
734 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 268-274.
735 Salisbury served as foreign secretary of the Disraeli cabinet in 1878-1880.
736 Salisbury to Disraeli, March 21, 1878, in Gwendolen Cecil*, ed., Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, Vol. 2, 1868-1880*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921), pp. 213-214.
737 Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 280-281.
738 Salisbury to Lyons, August 7, 1878, Cab/37/5/11, in C. J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878-1902*, (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 281-282.
739 Salisbury to Layard, October 29, 1878, in Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1921), p. 332.
740 Disraeli purchased 44% shares off the Suez Canal company in 1875.
741 Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 390.
742 Gladstone to Granville, April 22, 1881, in *Ibid.,* pp. 414-415. In principle, Britain's acquisition of Cyprus in 1878 violated the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire guaranteed by the Paris Treaty of 1856 and so did France's occupation of Tunis. For that matter, Gladstone once considered "handing over Cyprus to

Gladstone didn't renounce the advantages that accrued to Britain from Cyprus and the Suez Canal and kept "a ground of action which might be common to both political parties."[743] Likewise, the Anglo-French joint management of Egypt had remained in place until Britain wound up with consolidating its *de facto* exclusive control over Egypt in 1882. The financial insolvency of Egypt in April 1876 brough about the Anglo-French dual control, which lasted for another three years. In February 1879, Disraeli averred to the Queen, "England and France will act together on Egyptian affairs."[744] The Gladstone cabinet continued to adhere to its "steady concert with France on Egyptian matters" in 1881.[745] Taylor observes, "France was determined to protect bondholders; Britain wished to keep an eye on the French for the sake of the canal."[746]

Salisbury's account of the British policy over Egypt in 1881 is illustrative. He stated that "we resolved to share" rather than "renounce or monopolize" because the latter two choices could have either placed France "across our road to India" or have generated "the risk of war."[747] Whereas Gladstone and Gambetta held onto the bilateral cooperation from November 1881 to January 1882, Arabi Pasha's nationalist movement and the subsequent political crisis in April and May of 1882 compelled Britain and France to part ways. Although both Britain and France agreed on a joint naval demonstration in May and dispatched squadrons to Alexandria, when the British initiated bombardments, the French disengaged "in protest." Freycinet's proposal of "an Anglo-French occupation of the canal zone" was voted down by the French chamber in July.[748]

The initiation of France's expansion into the peripheral theaters of Britain, 1881-1889

The French withdrawal in the last minute inevitably resulted in the British occupation of Egypt in September 1882.[749] In fact, Gladstone had already complained that "the hesitation and vacillation of the French policy" had "retarded and disconcerted proceedings in the East" [750] on July 3rd and Granville disclosed his aversion to "a dual armed and political intervention of the English and French" on July 12th in his justification of the bombardment of Alexandria.[751] The Gladstone cabinet soon determined to "dispatch an expedition to restore order in Egypt"[752] and the British Army led by Wolseley subdued the nationalist forces in September.[753] Malet, the Consul-General in Egypt, reported, "the French have intrigued against us ever since I have been

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Greece" in 1880 and Granville, foreign secretary, was prompted to think of issuing a diplomatic protest toward France. Gladstone to Granville, December 17, 1880, Granville to Gladstone, April 21, 1881, in Ibid., pp. 406-407.

[743] Memorandum of conversation with Granville, September 23, 1880, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 279.

[744] Disraeli to the Queen, February 21, 1879, Cab 41/12/7, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 283.

[745] Gladstone to Granville, September 13, 1881, P.R.O. 30/29/124, in Ibid., p. 285.

[746] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 287.

[747] Salisbury to Northcote, September 16, 1881, in Gwendolen Cecil, *op.cit.*, (1921), pp. 331-332.

[748] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 288-289.

[749] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 303.

[750] Gladstone to the Queen, July 3, 1882, Cab/41/16/33, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 287.

[751] Granville to Ampthill, Private, July 12, 1882, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 420-421.

[752] Gladstone to the Queen, July 27, 1882, Cab/41/16/40, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 287.

[753] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 289.

in Egypt," insisting on taking advantage of a chance to enforce "our own preponderance."[754]

Accordingly, Britain proceeded to unilaterally terminate the dual control in Egypt. Ostensibly, Gladstone mentioned in August that the British occupation in "an indefinite period" would be at odds with "all the principles of Britain".[755] In a similar vein, Granville announced their intention to "withdraw as soon as the state of the country will admit of it."[756] However, Gladstone confided to Granville that the dual control had "entirely failed" since France provided Arabi with "the pretext" for his movement that costed "our lives and our millions." Moreover, France "did not act jointly in meeting the consequences." Gladstone concluded, "we are in a condition not to go before France with a request."[757] Duclerc, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, grumbled about the abolition[758] but couldn't help but see Britain go it alone.

Britain came to establish itself as "practically masters of Egypt" in late 1882,[759] which inexorably wrecked "the liberal alliance for more than 20 years" between Britain and France to a certain degree.[760] When asked about "the exact date of the withdrawal of the troops" by Salisbury, Granville replied that while they shouldn't stay "any longer than is necessary," it was not desirable for them to evacuate "until there is a reasonable expectation of a stable, a permanent, and a beneficial Government being established in Egypt."[761] Though such an ambiguity resulted from the fact that "the Sultan's title" as well as "the equal rights of other Powers" concerning the Egyptian question were upheld internationally,[762] the extent to which international control could be effected in the Egyptian affair virtually depended on Britain.

As Gladstone invoked, the French had reasonably felt that the British encouraged them to expand into Tunis in 1881 as a territorial compensation for Cyprus that Britain had taken previously in 1878.[763] In contrast, the one-sided way that Britain replaced the dual control with "a single European financial adviser," which Duclerc rightly presumed to be English, *without compensation* left the French colonialists mortified. Lyons, the British ambassador to France, conveyed to Granville in November 1882 that Duclerc griped, "France had been nearly deprived of its share of control *without receiving compensation.*"[764] In January 1883, Duclerc again notified Granville that France would

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[754] Malet to Granville, September 5, 1882, Cab/37/9/84, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 288.
[755] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, 1968, pp. 303-304. A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit., (*1954, 1973), p. 289.
[756] Granville, Draft Circular, December 14, 1882, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 288.
[757] Gladstone to Granville, October 3, 1882, P.R.O. 30/29/126, in *Ibid.,* pp. 288-289.
[758] Duclrec to Tissot, October 28, 1882, *Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1871-1914*, [Hereafter D.D.F] 1e série, 1871-1900. T. 4, No. 551, pp. 526-527.
[759] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville K.G., 1815-1891, Vol. 2*, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1905), p. 307.
[760] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 289-290.
[761] 15th, February, 1883, *Hansard*, 3rd Series, Vol. 276, page cols, 41-42.
[762] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), p. 306-307, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 303-304, Six great powers had agreed that "no definitive settlement of the Egyptian question is to take place except with the cooperation of all the Powers" in June at Constantinople and confirmed it in August of 1882.
[763] Paul Deschanel, *Gambetta,* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1920), p. 291.
[764] Lyons to Granville, November 3, 1882, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T. 4, No. 551, pp. 526-527.

have been given "sufficient *compensation,*" or "equivalents that would be attributed for France," in such a case of the abrogation of the dual control.[765]

The French insistence of compensation, or the French rightful share, for the Egyptian settlement in 1882 indicates that the French leaders' overriding concern in the peripheral theaters appears to have been less associated with substantive or strategic interest than prestige of the French empire. Indeed, Gambetta congratulated Ferry, once France had occupied Tunis as the French protectorate in 1881, "France is becoming a Great Power again." No wonder Gambetta though the loss of Egypt was equal to the weakened influence in the Mediterranean.[766] Although Ferry mostly rationalized France's imperial expansion "in economic terms," he had been as preoccupied with "France's prestige as a great power" as Delcassé who regarded the spatial extension of the French empire as "a means of restoring France to its former rank in Europe."[767]

In the pursuit of prestige, Gambetta and Ferry sought for "a French India" near the sub-Saharan Africa.[768] The Ferry cabinet approved of the expedition of Pierre Savorgan de Brazza into the Congo River basin in 1883. Another punitive expedition was authorized in Madagascar in 1883 and the French also pressed for expansion into Annam and Tonkin, which triggered the Sino-French war in 1884-1885.[769] However, as Freycinet was overthrown by his proposal of a joint canal zone and blocked from militarily intervening in 1882, the Ferry government was again "swept from office" by the strong domestic opposition against his expansionist policy in Asia in 1885. [770] Though the loss of Egypt became domestically unpopular, the French public opinion didn't robustly undergird the foreign expansion as the republican leaders had coveted.[771]



Figure. 17. France's expected gain and Britain's expected loss in the 1880s[772]

The French foreign expansion in Africa and Asia during the years of 1881-1885 barley incurred a consequential loss of interest and prestige for Britain. As addressed, Salisbury and Bismarck not only abetted France's extension in Tunis in 1878,[773] by 1881,

[765] M. Duclerc to M. Tissot (Communicated to Earl Granville), January 4, 1883*, British and Foreign State Papers* (1882-1883), Vo. 74, pp. 1313-1315.
[766] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 22.
[767] *Ibid.,* pp. 27-28.
[768] Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), p. 143.
[769] Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Reberioux, *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914*, (Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 97.
[770] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 26.
[771] *Ibid.,* p. 22, Arne Roksund, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 143-144.
[772] France didn't challenge the territorial sovereignty by projecting its military power in Burma in spite of the Franco-Burmese treaty of 1885. After all, it was Britain that annexed Burma in 1886.
[773] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 272-273.

Gladstone felt his hands tied by Britain's encroachment upon Cyprus and Salisbury's denial of "any jealousy of the influence which France is likely to exercise over Tunis."[774] Regarding Granville's concern about Malta being neutralized by Bizerte, Gladstone bluntly responded, "I do not see that it neutralizes Malta more than it is neutralized by Malta."[775] In regards to the Congo issue, Granville viewed that the British interests there were no more than "commercial" and had less to do with territorial claims or rights.[776] The conservation of "an open door" to the Congo basin would suffice.[777]

Under such considerations, in February 1884, Britain moved on the recognize the Portuguese sovereignty "on both banks of the river" to avoid the French tariffs, "control the mouth of the Congo" and hold both Belgium and France in check.[778] The Queen urged "a protest against the French ultimatum to Madagascar" but the Gladstone cabinet stood aloof. Gladstone judged, "intention to interfere was matter for regret" in March 1883.[779] Granville deemed, "it might be impossible" to take a stronger line against the French proceedings in Madagascar." Gladstone and Granville regretted that Derby unnecessarily made public of their "giving away Madagascar" to France.[780] Notified of the French blockade in Madagascar, Granville merely ordered to communicate that the French should have given more time to evacuate in 1884.[781]

Britain had been more indifferent to the issue of Tonkin and Annam than that of Madagascar. After the second Ferry cabinet determined to occupy Tonkin and the Annamese Empire admitted "France's protectorate over Tonkin" in August 1883,[782] Granville enunciated to Gladstone that he would inform Waddington of Britain's readiness for diplomatic "intervention and good offices" if Waddington "opens subject". But Granville was "inclined to remain silent" if Waddington said "nothing about China" in September 1883.[783] Gladstone thought, "it would seem unnatural not to say a friendly word" to Waddington, and was keen on not being as seen as "the advocate of China."[784] Though Ferry was replaced in 1885 as the war in Tonkin became protracted, the French chamber voted for the occupation of Tonkin.[785]

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[774] Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 413-415.
[775] Granville to Lyons, Private, April 22, 1881, Gladstone to Granville, April 22, 1881, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 414-415.
[776] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.,* (1905), p. 344.
[777] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 294.
[778] Gladstone was in favor of this proposal in response to the French expedition. Gladstone to Granville, December 8, 1883. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.,* (1905), pp. 344-345, A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 294-295.
[779] Gladstone to Granville, March 10, 1883, in Agatha Ramm, eds., *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886, Vol. 2, 1883-1886*, (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 37.
[780] Gladstone to Granville, September 1, 1883, in Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.,* (1905), pp. 315-316.
[781] Graves to Granville, May 31, (received July 9), 1884, *British and Foreign State Papers* (1884-1885), Vo. 76, pp. 453-454. Granville to Walsham, September 3, 1884, *Ibid.,* p. 455.
[782] Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Reberioux, *op.cit.,* (1984), p. 96-97.
[783] Granville to Gladstone, September 6, 1883, P.R.O. 30/29/127, in eds., Agatha Ramm, *op.cit.*, (1962), p. 83.
[784] Gladstone to Granville, September 8, 1883, P.R.O. 30/29/127, in Ibid*.,* p. 85. Granville did play a role in facilitating the negotiation between China and France. But Ferry turned down "this overture". Granville to Gladstone, December 22, 1884, in Ibid., p. 298.
[785] Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Reberioux, *op.cit.,* (1984), p. 97.

In peripheral theaters, Britain either contemplated or resorted to the use of force insofar as the territorial security, or border defense, of India was perceived to be menaced by other great powers' penetration into the buffer states abutting India in the 1880s. Afghanistan and Burma were the cases in point. In late March of 1885, the Russo-Afghanistan border dispute broke out and the Russians defeated the Afghans.[786] Britain mobilized forces in India and Gladstone was able to pass "a vote of 11millions," among which "six million and a half" were apportioned to "meet the preparations rendered necessary by the incident at Penjdeh" in April.[787] Although the general principles of "a Russo-Afghan line" was finalized in September, Gladstone and Salisbury couldn't help repeatedly suppose that a war would be likely if negotiations failed.[788]

Since Burma had been another buffer state of India on the eastern frontier,[789] Britain had viewed France's political-economic overture to Burma in 1885 as provocative after the Anglo-French negotiations since 1883 ended to no avail.[790] Dufferin received a report on a Franco-Burmese treaty[791] in February 1885 and wrote, "I should not hesitate to annex the country" should "the French proceedings eventuate in any attempt to forestall us in upper Burma."[792] In July, August, and September, Salisbury repeated that Burma "should not be permitted" to "conclude any such convention" given "the relations in which Upper Burma has stood towards" Britain's "Indian Empire."[793] The ratification of the treaty in November[794] and the Burmese confiscation of the British property prompted Britain's annexation of Burma in January 1886.[795]

The steady increase in Britain's interest and prestige over Egypt and the Upper Nile, 1882-1887

Although the Egyptian question didn't involve the implication for the territorial security of India, as Afghanistan and Burma, the Suez Canal, the strategic route to India,

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[786] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 298.

[787] *Ibid.,* p. 299, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), p. 440.

[788] Gladstone wrote in March, "Granville should communicate with the Russian ambassador and point out to him the necessary consequence of any design upon Herat, in bringing about a case of ***war*** between the two countries**,** according to the policy of the British Empire……", Gladstone to the Queen March 25, 1885, Salisbury sought Bismarck's arbitration in August and noted, "the position is critical, if a settlement is not arrive at within the next few months, is very likely to lead to ***war***……", Paper shown to Herbert Bismarck, August 3, by Currie [Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs], enclosed in Currie to Salisbury, August 4, 1885, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 311, pp. 314-315.

[789] Dufferin, the Governor-General of India in 1884-1888, was skeptical of keeping Afghanistan as a buffer state but his judgment reflected the prevailing perception of Afghanistan as a buffer state in the period. Dufferin to Churchill, July 30, 1885, Cab/37/16/46, Ibid., pp. 312-314.

[790] T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 700.

[791] With this treaty, it was anticipated that "France would acquire an advantageous position in the upper valley of the Irrawadi, which might supplant British influence", Sir Alfred Lyall, *The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*, Vol. 2, (London: John Murray, 1905), p. 119.

[792] Ibid., p. 118.

[793] Randolph Churchill served as the India Secretary from August 1885 to January 1886. Salisbury to Churchill, July 25, 1885, Winston Spencer Churchill, *Lord Randolph Churchill, Vol. 1*, (New York: The Macmillan, 1906), p. 522, Salisbury to Walsham, August 7, 1885, Salisbury to Walsham, September 9, 1885, *British and Foreign State Papers* (1885-1886), Vo. 77, pp. 154-156.

[794] Lyons to Salisbury, November 26, 1885, *British and Foreign State Papers* (1885-1886), Vo. 77, p. 159

[795] T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* 2006, pp. 700-701. Winston Spencer Churchill, *op.cit.*, (1906), pp. 523-525.

rendered the maritime significance of Egypt more crucial than other regions without any association with naval implication or India. Even when Gladstone felt undecided about the control of the Suez Control and Egypt in June 1882, he suggested that "the Suez Canal question cannot be wholly excluded for discussion as a part of the Egyptian territory," invoking "security for the peace of the territory," including "the Suez Canal," as "certain matters" that "must be included" at the Constantinople conference.[796] Britain's interest principally lied in "the free navigation of the Canal" and the cabinet committee recommended "an international agreement" to this end.[797]

In October 1888, the British policy of "an international agreement", as opposed to "a British protectorate over Egypt or the Canal," for the guarantee of the free navigation, was first agreed in 1887 and achieved by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 signed at Constantinople.[798] Until the mid 1880s, while Britain's "determination to create stable government"[799] was cemented, the British preferred "indirect to direct" control or responsibility over Egypt in principle.[800] As the Mahdi Sudanese routed the Egyptian troops in late 1883, Granville clarified that Britain had "no intention of employing British or Indian troops in that province."[801] In early 1884, Britain called on the Egyptian forces to evacuate after its defeat at Khartoum and decided General Gordon' expedition to merely "direct the withdrawal."[802]

The British cabinet was divided over the issue of the troops in Egypt. Whereas Ponsonby and Dufferin favored "the reduction of force in Egypt" in early 1883,[803] Northbrook made the case for remaining in Egypt "for a term of 3 or 5 years" in August 1884. Harcourt demanded, "Retire from Egypt, *quam celerrime.*"[804] Nonetheless, as stated, the Sudanese local resistance and ensuing instability had made Britain's evacuation from Egypt and "a reduction of the army occupation" more implausible in 1883-1884.[805] Moreover, the financial difficulties in Egypt deteriorated because of "the destruction of property at Alexandria," Egypt's "endeavor to hold the Sudan," and "considerable expenditure on works of irrigation."[806] Baring, Consul-General of Egypt, argued, "we must be content with slow and moderate progress" in July.[807]

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[796] Gladstone to Granville, June 21, 1882, in Agatha Ramm, eds., *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886, Vol. 1, 1878-1882*, (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 80.
[797] Report of Cabinet Committee, November 4, 1882, Cab/37/9/103, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), pp. 290-291.
[798] *Ibid.,* p. 290, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 304-308.
[799] C. J. Lowe, *Salisbury and the Mediterranean, 1886-1896*, (London: Routledge, 1965), p. 2.
[800] In Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 421.
[801] Gladstone to Baring, December 13, 1883, F.O. 78/3551, Ibid., p. 422.
[802] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), pp. 319-320, Granville to Baring, January 4, 1884, Granville to Egerton, July 25, 1884, Gordon was besieged in Khartoum and disastrously died as a relief expedition had been postponed until August. in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 423.
[803] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), p. 319. Ponsonby had proposed, which was supported by Dufferin. But. Granville to the Queen, January 7, 1883, in Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), pp. 318.
[804] Northbrook Memorandum, August 9, 1884, Cab/37/13/38, Harcourt Memorandum for the Cabinet, November 16, 1884, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), pp. 294-295.
[805] Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), pp. 319.
[806] Granville Draft Circular, April 9, 1884, Cab/37/13/24, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 292, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *op.cit.*, (1905), p. 310.
[807] Baring Memorandum, July 4, 1884, Cab/37/12/34, Ibid., pp. 293-294.

By 1885, when negotiations for a separate arrangement with France boded ill, Gladstone supposed that "an indisputable proposition" was to guard "the peace of Egypt while we remain there" regardless of the subject of financial control as well as its official declaratory policy of occupation or withdrawal.[808] Granville also retained such a strategic ambiguity and told the Porte that "we could not fix a date for evacuation for Egypt."[809] Having listened to the Turkish remonstration about the continued occupation of Britain, Salisbury similarly answered, "no step of immediate retreat was possible" as Britain was "responsible for the condition of Egypt."[810] Baring observed, "whilst wishing to withdraw from Egypt, as a matter of fact, we have been acting in a manner which has taken us far along the road to annexation."[811]

On the other hand, France had been increasingly more vexed about the persistence and uncertainty of Britain's hold over Egypt since 1882 and the Anglo-French relations on the Egyptian question soured. Lyons informed Granville from Paris, "irritation against England has been on the increase," referring to "the Suez Canal Company" as "the hazardous point" and the issue to which "French feeling is most of all sensitive" in 1883.[812] Having found France more uncooperative, or "paltering with" Britain, Gladstone suspected that "close co-operation with Germany" would be "of immense importance" in December 1884.[813] Against this backdrop, Currie, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, sounded out Bismarck's view on Egypt and Bismarck correctly pointed out Britain's "principal difficulty" would be with France in 1885.[814]

Assuming the recalcitrant resistance from France, along with Russia, against Britain's exclusive privilege over Egypt, Salisbury had set out to resolve the Egyptian question by directly striking a deal with the Ottoman Empire from 1885. Salisbury expected the major objection would come from France and instructed Drummond-Wolff, the British envoy, to "impress upon the Sultan" that "the introduction of the Turkish troops" in the parts of Egypt might not elicit the French objection and "the direct dominion of the Khedive should not be carried further in the valley of the Nile."[815] In regard to Sudan, Drummond-Wolff stood firm against the Ottoman dominance, "what we wish to see in the Sudan is not conquest, but pacification," which forged the ground of Britain's position until its decision of reconquest in March 1896.[816]

Britain's elevated interest and prestige in Egypt, which was necessarily intertwined with the Sudanese issue and the control of Nile, was comparably made clear in the Wolff convention signed in May 1887. The British evacuation was proposed to take place in 3

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[808] Gladstone to Granville, January 6, 1885, P.R.O. 30/29/29A, in Agatha Ramm, *op.cit.,* (1962), pp. 313-314.
[809] Granville to White, April 1885, F.O. 195/1504, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 427.
[810] Salisbury to White, June 1885, F.O. 78/3746, in Ibid., pp. 427-428.
[811] Baring Memorandum, July 4, 1884, Cab/37/12/34, Ibid., p. 293.
[812] Lyons to Granville, June 5, 1883, Cab/37/10/42, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), pp. 291-292.
[813] Gladstone to Granville, December 31, 1884, P.R.O. 30/29/128, in Agatha Ramm, *op.cit.,* (1962), pp. 309-310.
[814] Currie, "Notes of a conversation with Prince Bismarck", September 28, 1885, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 318.
[815] Salisbury, Draft to Drummond-Wolff, August 7, 1885, Cab/37/16/48, in Ibid*.,* pp. 319-321.
[816] Drummond-Wolff to Salisbury, January 16, 1886, Cab/37/17/4, in Ibid*.,* p. 321, Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 420.

years but not without the condition that "the withdrawal could be postponed or that the troops could return if order and security in the interior were disturbed."[817] When Salisbury advised Drummond-Wolff that "the end to which" he would work was "evacuation, but with certain privileges reserved for England," the political weight was placed more on England's privileges over Egypt than evacuation in itself.[818] Britain struggled to avoid costly "permanent occupation" but also to keep Egypt from falling into "internal anarchy" or "foreign invasion" other than the British control.[819]

It is telling that Salisbury greatly strove to make sure that Britain's "independent right of reentry" should not be "contingent on" any action on the part of Constantinople and the British evacuation would not occur "until other Powers have assented to the stipulations which bind them not to enter, and enable us to do so under specified conditions" in April.[820] He stressed to Drummond-Wolff again that the clause that "the failure of any of the Powers to assent to the Convention will contribute an external danger" must be "recorded by you" and "accepted by the Turks" on May 3 prior to the final conclusion of the Wolff convention.[821] Salisbury's words well encapsulated the increased interest and prestige of Britain by the year of 1887 relative to those in 1878-1882. Simply put, Britain developed its interest in being the exclusive arbiter of Egypt.

As Salisbury had anticipated in February,[822] France didn't consent to the British privileges to prolong the occupation of Egypt at its own disposal and re-enter at any time.[823] Assisted by Russia, France wrenched the arm of the weaker party, the Ottoman Empire, into rejecting "the draft convention" by threatening that otherwise France and Russia would "occupy Syria and Armenia" respectively. Drummond-Wolff was pressed to leave Constantinople in July.[824] The Anglo-Turkish endeavors to settle the Egyptian question came to naught. The Franco-Russian coercion stood in stark contrast to the admission of the British interest in Egypt from the first Mediterranean agreements of 1887 by Italy, openly mediated by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Spain from February to May.[825]

Britain's heightened interest in Egypt as the epicenter of European alignment, 1887-1894

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[817] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 314.

[818] Salisbury to Drummon-Wolff, August 13, 1885. The British case for "a privileges position" was reiterated to Bismarck in September by Currie. Gwendolen Cecil, ed., *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, Vol. 3, 1880-1886*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1931), p. 235, p. 260.

[819] Salisbury to Queen Victoria, February 10, 1887, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1930), pp. 272-273.

[820] Salisbury to Wolff, Tel. No. 35, Secret, April 27, 1887, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 453.

[821] Salisbury to Wolff, Tel. No. 38, Secret, May 3, 1887, F.O. 78/4060, in *Ibid.,* p. 453.

[822] Salisbury to Drummond-Wolff, February 23, 1887, Gwendolen Cecil, ed., *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, Vol. 4, 1887-1892*, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), pp. 41-42.

[823] As Taylor and Lowe annotated, it can be reasonably inferred that the Boulangist crisis, or the Boulangist movement, which reached at its height in May 1887, emboldened the French opposition of the Wolff convention. In this regard, Otte points out that Boulanger advocated both "*revanchisme* against Germany" and "a bullish colonial policy against Britain." A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 314, C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), pp. 18-19, T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 701.

[824] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 314.

[825] Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 445-448.

As such, the Egyptian question in late 1880s had risen to prominence, unlike other areas of imperial interests in peripheral theaters, not only because the control of the Suez Canal and Nile were valuable but also because it had grown into the pivotal point of the great powers' alignment in the Mediterranean. In April 1887, Salisbury felt, "our relations with Austria and Italy are singularly cordial" and "as regards Egypt, Germany appears to be entirely with us." For Salisbury, it was not "worthwhile estranging any of these for the sake of conciliating France."[826] The foundation of the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, or the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty of 1890, seems to have been already laid down in 1887, since Salisbury opined that it wasn't worth "quarrelling with Bismarck for the sake of Heligoland at Zanzibar", implicitly favoring a deal.[827]

By contrast, Salisbury regretted, "the French refuse to let us exercise the necessary powers of defense" concerning the Egyptian question. In July 1887, contrary to the British relations with the Triple alliance, Salisbury assessed that "our relations with France" were "not pleasant" and placed the fact that France had "destroyed the Convention at Constantinople" as the first among the six places where they were "at odds."[828] By October, the agreement on the Suez Canal Convention ameliorated the strained relations between them to a certain degree "for the moment" but Salisbury perceived that France's "only weapons against us" would be "the threat of making us uneasy in Egypt" and Britain could be "free of France in proportion as we can blunt it."[829] The finalization of the Suez Canal Convention in 1888 couldn't straighten out the Egyptian question.

To make matters worse, the unfavorable shift in naval power balance in the Mediterranean, especially related to number of cruisers and torpedo boats in 1888, additionally gave rise to the naval scare over the summer, strengthening Britain's threat perception toward a conceivable "Franco-Russian bloc" in this theater.[830] Beyond the potential that a Franco-Russian combination might imperil Egypt and the route to India, Britain came to speculate the strategic ramification that a Franco-Russian alignment, which could necessitate "the dispersion of force" in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, would generate for the security of the British isles, its home theater. Hamilton warned in June 1890, "the naval supremacy of England in the Channel might be endangered by a large operation" in the Mediterranean.[831]

Consequently, the Egyptian question became entangled with a broader re-alignment in the Mediterranean that could cause a probable second-order effect on the home theater of Britain from the late 1880s to the mid 1890s. On the other hand, the protection of Nile had not been comprehended as independent from the general question of Egypt by Britain. Britain's heightened interest and prestige in Egypt rendered the evacuation more unimaginable at this juncture. Baring advised Salisbury in 1889, "the more I look at it, the more does the evacuation policy appear to me impossible under any conditions."[832] He again expressed in 1890, "I should prefer to see the Dervishes in

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[826] Salisbury to Wolff, Tel. No. 26, Secret, April 14, 1887, F.O. 78/4060, in Ibid., pp. 453-454.
[827] Salisbury to Scott, May 4, 1887, in Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1932), p. 43.
[828] Salisbury to Lyons, July 20, 1887, Ibid., pp. 48-49.
[829] Salisbury to White, November 2, 1887, Ibid., pp. 70-71.
[830] C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), p. 19.
[831] Memorandum of Hamilton, June 10, 1890, Quoted in T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 702.
[832] Baring to Salisbury, June 15, 1889, Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1932), p. 139.

possession of Kassala and Khartoum than that those places held by the Italians," since it would enable them to "choose its own time for a forward movement."[833]

Salisbury concurred and asserted that Britain "should insist upon the command of *all the affluents of the Nile* so far as Egypt formerly possessed them is agreed". He explained that "the value of the Italian alliance" didn't outweigh that of "the friendship of Germany," which would "keep Russia and France in order" in August. [834] Salisbury's reasoning backed the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty of 1890, which "kept Germany out of the Upper Nile Valley" and recognized Zanzibar as Britain's protectorate in return for Heligoland, the Caprivi strip, and East German Africa.[835] Salisbury expounded that delaying "a settlement in Africa" could harm the relations with Germany and "force us to change our systems of alliance in Europe." More significantly, "the alliance of France" was to be shunned as it "must involve the early evacuation of Egypt."[836]



Figure. 18. France's expected gain and Britain's expected loss in the 1890s

Though Britain had leaned closer to Germany, and the Triple alliance, than France since the Mediterranean agreements of 1887, there was no reason for Britain to commit itself to an officially binding alliance with the Triple alliance or unnecessarily antagonize France. As Salisbury recommended in late 1887, Britain attempted to "keep friends with France without paying too dear for it." France's geographical expansion in West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Madagascar, hadn't incurred dear costs for Britain through the 1880s. Likewise, Salisbury patched up a few more territorial conflicts with France in West Africa, such as Niger, Chad, and Western Sudan, sanctioning France's protectorate in Madagascar in exchange for the recognition of Zanzibar as Britain's protectorate with the Anglo-French agreement of 1890 in August.[837]

Nevertheless, whereas Germany admitted the British influence over the Upper Nile in the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, the Anglo-French agreement of 1890 by no means addressed the Egyptian question. As the Franco-Russian alignment loomed from 1891 and evolved into the Dual alliance in 1894, the maritime implication of the Egyptian question for European alignment in the Mediterranean as well as the security of Britain's home theater simultaneously mounted. Given the existing alignment based on

[833] Baring to Salisbury, March 15, 1890, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), pp. 338-339.
[834] Salisbury to Baring, August 31, 1890, Gwendolen Cecil, *op.cit.*, (1932), pp. 330-331. Salisbury had already declared that no European power should establish itself on the Upper Nile or be able to divert its water, because that would ruin Egypt in April 1890. Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 399.
[835] T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 704.
[836] Salisbury to Queen, June 10, 1890, in Eds., George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1930), pp. 613-614.
[837] Waddington to Ribot, August 1, 1890, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T. 8, No. 131, pp. 190-192.

the Mediterranean agreements of 1887, Britain had to take risks of a likely realignment in the Mediterranean, or Italy's departure, in case of a rapprochement with France. Between Italy and France, Salisbury assured Austria that Britain preferred "the status quo in the Mediterranean" to any alteration "in favor of France" in 1891.[838]

Furthermore, the deteriorating naval position of Britain in relation to the Franco-Russian combination by 1891,[839] despite the Naval Defense Act of 1889 and its superiority vis-à-vis France, forced Britain to reconsider "the protection of Constantinople from Russian conquest," Britain's traditional policy "at least for forty years" since the Crimean system. Two months before he was succeeded by the liberals, Salisbury inferred from the joint report of the Director of Military Intelligence and Director of Naval Intelligence[840] that it had become "not only not possible for us to protect Constantinople, but that any effort to do so" was "not permissible." The French fleet at Toulon would pose "a grave peril" if the French escaped "into the Atlantic and the English Channel."[841] Britain's interest in Constantinople began to diminish relative to Egypt.

Therefore, Salisbury suggested that "our foreign policy" be "speedily and avowedly revised" to "not pretend to defend Constantinople" because "the protection of it" seemed "not worthy of the sacrifices or the risks which such an effort would involve."[842] The Egyptian question gradually, and inexorably, transformed into a more salient issue of strategic interest respecting Britain's alignment between the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance as well as its maritime security in the Mediterranean and home theater in 1888-1895. Gladstone's liberal cabinet replaced the Salisbury government in August and Rosebery, Foreign Secretary, promised to preserve "the general continuity of foreign Policy." Waddington's remark to Rosebery that "he wouldn't even mention the subject of Egypt" indicated that Egypt lingered as a festering sore.[843]

The British policy in 1892-1894 didn't largely deviate from Salisbury's last counsel to Rosebery, where he had shown his "concurrence in the Italian policy of maintaining the status quo in the Mediterranean" without the provision of "any assurance of material assistance" to Italy.[844] Rosebery iterated to Austria that "the attitude of the English cabinet towards Italy following the change of government would undergo no

[838] Deym to Kálnoky, June 17, 1891, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, (1969), p. 355.

[839] Balfour to Hamilton, December 29, 1891, B.P., Add. MSS. 49778, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), p. 87.

Capital Ships	First Class		Second Class		Third Class	
England	10	20	10	10	10	11
France and Russia	10	23	12	15	6	6
	Built	Built and Building	Built	Built and Building	Built	Built and Building

[840] The report analyzed, "until the neutrality of France is assured, or her fleet is paralyzed, we cannot risk the movement of troops through the Mediterranean". The Joint Report of the D.M.I and D.N.I, March 18, 1892, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* 1965, pp. 358-361.

[841] Salisbury's memorandum for the Cabinet, June 4, 1892, in Kenneth Bourne, *op.cit.,* 1970, pp. 429-431.

[842] Salisbury's memorandum for the Cabinet, June 4, 1892, in Ibid., pp. 431-432.

[843] Rosebery to Queen, August 23, 1892, in George Earl Buckle, eds., *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal Between the Years 1886 and 1901*, *Vol.2, 1891-1895,* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1931), pp. 152-153.

[844] Salisbury's 'Message to Lord Rosebery on leaving the F.O.', August 18, 1892, in Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, 1932, pp. 404-405, also in Kenneth Bourne, *op.cit.,* 1970, pp. 432-433.

alteration."[845] While admitting that the Gladstone cabinet "inclined to the policy of non-intervention", Rosebery remarked that France "was acting in every way as if its aim were to drive England into the arms of the Triple Alliance" in 1893.[846] Britain's maritime position in the Mediterranean and France's "chauvinistic" spirit in territorial issues had been alike the sources of Rosebery's apprehensions in late 1893.[847]

With the Spencer program of 1893 launched in March, Rosebery denied that "the English fleet was no match for the combined Franco-Russian fleet" but brought Deym's attention to "the critical situation in which the English fleet would be placed between the French fleet in the Mediterranean and the Russian fleet in the Black Sea." Though Austria-Hungary desired "binding assurances" concerning Constantinople, fearing a Russian move, Rosebery inescapably came back at whether the French navy could be deterred in the Mediterranean from the British perspective. He insinuated a chance of Britain's withdrawal from the Mediterranean "if France weren't kept in check"[848] but also stressed the need to "count on the Triple Alliance" to deter France if Britain resolved to "defend the Straits alone" in 1894.[849]

France's continued prestige-driven expansion in Africa and Asia in the 1890s

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the Anglo-French agreement of 1890, the French imperial expansion had been again propelled so as to clash with the British in West Africa, East Africa, and Siam by colonial groups, such as *parti colonial*, *groupe colonial*, *Comité de l'Afrique Française*, and *Union Coloniale Française*,[850] through the 1890s. Noticeably, the expansionist pressure of the French colonial groups were transmitted through acknowledged leaders, including Eugène Étienne who served as deputy for Oran and under-secretary for colonies in 1887-8 and 1889-92 and Théophile Delcassé who was a founding member of the *groupe colonial*, under-secretary for colonies in 1893, and

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[845] Deym to Kálnoky, November 3, 1892, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.*, 1969, p. 362.

[846] Deym to Kálnoky, June 14, 1893, Deym to Kálnoky, June 27, 1893, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 473-477.

[847] Deym to Kálnoky, December 28, 1893, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 477-480.

[848] Deym to Kálnoky, February 7, 1894, in *Ibid.,* pp. 480-485. This remark appeared to imply that the protection of Britain's home theater couldn't be sacrificed at the expense of Mediterranean and Black Sea when the English fleet "had not achieved a success" in the Mediterranean and not that the Mediterranean theater became insubstantial.

[849] Deym to Kálnoky, February 26, 1894, Kimberly succeeded Rosebery as Foreign Secretary, when Rosebery rose to Prime Minister after Gladstone's resignation in March, carried forward this position, too. Deym to Kálnoky, March 17, 1894, in Ibid., p. 487. In January 1894, Rosebery urged that "we should require the assistance of the Triple Alliance to hold France in check". Langer interprets that Rosebery in fact "believed the English fleet would be sufficient to defend the Straits" but wished the Triple Alliance to pressure France to "remain neutral." William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 53.

[850] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 28-32. Whereas the *parti colonial* wasn't a political party but referred to "a grouping of those concerned" or "colonially-minded individuals and groups", the *groupe colonial, Comité de l'Afrique Française*, and *Union Coloniale Française* wielded sizable influence in both the Chambers and Senate since its support had been drawn from almost all political parties except the socialists on the left and the Bonapartists on the right. Henri Brunschwig, *French Colonialism, 1871-1914*, (New York: Frederik A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 105-107.

minister of colonies in 1894-1895.[851] Ribot, Foreign Minister in 1890-1893, had been frequently confronted with the pressure from them.

In the aftermath of the Anglo-French convention of 1890, the Ministry of Colonies outcried over the terms of the agreement, which left the richest and most-populated regions of Eastern Sudan, especially the Kingdom of Sokoto, to England. Emboldened by the colonial press, Étienne devised a number of missions to grab the regions of Middle Sudan and Chad to get ahead of the English. For instance, Monteil was sent to the regions between Say and Barroua. Further, Menard and Bidua, Crampel, and Mizon were assigned to reach the hinterland of the Ivory Coast, Chad via divergent routes, and Congo[852] to place the hinterland of Cameroon and Nigeria. These expeditions to Lake Chad evoked local disputes with the Royal Niger Company but had little association with the Egyptian question.[853]

In fact, because the Foreign Ministry was reluctant to incite more tensions with Britain, the French missions in West Africa were privately organized the *Comité de l'Afrique Française,* founded in November 1890*,* and endorsed by the Ministry of Colonies. These expeditions pursued the objective of the *Comité de l'Afrique Française*, which was "linking the coastal colonies of Dahomey and the Ivory Coast to the river Niger and joining the French Congo to the rest of French West Africa at Lake Chad."[854] In doing so, Étienne attempted to counter the activities of the Royal Niger Company as much as Delcassé wished to deprive Britain "of their hinterlands and reduce them to coastal enclaves."[855] The French Chamber backed the moves by appropriating credits for a conquest of Dahomey, which was carried out by Colonel Dodds.[856]

However, the Foreign Ministry not only followed a more modest policy to a degree that constrained the colonial expeditions in West Africa in 1890-1893, the colonial groups but also considered that the Egyptian question was "the essential problem of Franco-British relations" compared to other colonial issues.[857] When the French scheme to occupy Touat generated international oppositions from Britain, Italy, and Spain, supporting the sovereign claim of the Sultan of Morocco in 1890-1892, Ribot had the Touat expedition cancelled and also rejected the aggressive proposal of the French representative in Tangier.[858] Moreover, faced with the British protest by Dufferin against the second mission of Mizon for the lower Niger and Benoue, the French government recalled the second Mizon mission in June 1893.[859]

After the French parliament voted for Dodds' operation to Dahomey, even Delcassé informed Dodd that "our strict duty is not to impose upon the country any sacrifice which is not absolutely necessary" and "1500 soldiers," as opposed to 3000 men

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[851] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 28-29, Henri Brunschwig, *op.cit.*, (1964), p. 106.
[852] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), pp. 320-321.
[853] Ibid*.,* p. 322, p. 393.
[854] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 35.
[855] Ibid., p. 35, Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 320.
[856] Henri Brunschwig, *op.cit.*, (1964), p. 103.
[857] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), pp. 397-398.
[858] Ibid., pp. 323-324. For Britain, Morocco itself was not of "intrinsic strategic value" but Tangier's neutrality was preferred as it "guarded the Western entrance to the Mediterranean". But as stated, France ceased to make headway into that direction by 1892. In 1894, an Anglo-French arrangement was undertaken to no effect. T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 705.
[859] *Ibid.,* p. 322.

Dodds requested, "would suffice" on February 22 in 1893.[860] Delcassé plainly saw a series of expeditions in West Africa and Siam "as a race against England" but "his most ambitious project" was to conclusively challenge the British position in Egypt. To take control of the head waters of the Nile was assumed to be "the logical way" to accomplish it.[861] The idea that seizing the Upper Nile could be a means to revisit the Egyptian question floated among colonial groups in 1892,[862] while Gladstone cabinet had virtually closed all doors of negotiation on Egypt since May 1893.[863]

The colonial groups additionally clamored for the right over the Upper Mekong from 1891 and Waddington approached Salisbury to demand an agreement delimiting the spheres of influence of both states in the region in February 1892, to which Salisbury turned a deaf ear. During the first half of 1893, "the Siamese incursions into territory east of the Mekong" triggered the French backlash.[864] As the Foreign Ministry repeated its protests to Britain from January to March in 1893, Delcassé, now Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced France's resolve to "retake the left bank of the Mekong" in February 1893.[865] As to Siam, Develle who succeeded Ribot as the Foreign Minister, also gave the assurance of "a very firm policy" from March.[866]

France ordered the dispatch of gunboats and military detachments to the middle Mekong to dislodge the Siamese from the posts they had established on the left bank of Mekong in April and May, deciding on a naval demonstration in front of Bangkok in June. However, not to mention that Burma had been already annexed as the Western buffer state of India in 1886, the Siamese question in 1893 entailed nebulous strategic implication in respect to Britain's naval position in the Mediterranean theater and alignment in Europe. The parties directly involved in the armed dispute were France and Siam, not Britain. In early June, Rosebery rather instructed Captain Jones to "urge the Siamese Government" to "avoid a breach of friendly relations" and wrote that Siam "have no grounds for refusing" the French demands.[867]

The French aggressiveness in Siam perturbed Britain to some degree but Britain's loss of interest and prestige from the Siamese question were scarcely considerable. Rosebery surmised, "should the French seize Bangkok, their press would demand that they should stay there, *mainly to annoy us.*"[868] Thus, Rosebery's response to France's naval demonstration was no more than sending in "two British men-of-war [fighting ships] at Bangkok," which he presumed to suffice for "the protection of the lives and

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[860] Charles W. Porter, *The Career of Théophile Delcassé*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), p. 81.
[861] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 41.
[862] Roger Glenn Brown, *Fashoda Reconsidered: The Impact of Domestic Politics on French Policy in Africa, 1893-1898*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp. 22-23.
[863] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 397, p. 418.
[864] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 32.
[865] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 397, p. 325.
[866] Ibid., p. 326. The political pressure on Siam encompassed the Ministry of Colonies as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Develle's assurance was a response to the petition signed by more than 200 deputies.
[867] Rosebery to Captain Jones, June 4, 1893, Siam responded that killing of the French inspector, Grosgurin, and the capture of the French officer were "justified by the circumstances" because they "committed an act of war, being in command of a hostile and aggressive expedition upon Siamese territory". Captain Jones to Rosebery, June 5, 1893, *British and Foreign State Papers (1894-1895),* Vo. 87, p. 230.
[868] Rosebery to Queen, June 5, 1893, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1931), pp. 258-259.

property of British subjects" on June 24.[869] Also, unlike the colonial groups that insisted on imposing a protectorate on Siam, the French government ruled out the plan of a protectorate as it wasn't worth "a break with Britain."[870] On June 28, Develle conveyed the idea of "the Upper Mekong as the dividing line" between Britain and France.[871]

By July 25, in spite of "great anxiety" the French blockade in Bangkok caused due to their pursuit of "a coterminous frontier with India," Rosebery claimed, "we cannot, however, interfere everywhere," and proposed to "secure a sufficient *buffer* state between our frontiers and those of France."[872] When Dufferin, now the British Ambassador to Paris, made the case for "a buffer between the two countries" and its advantage, Develle "cordially assented" on July 26.[873] Whereas Delcassé coveted "bringing Siam firmly within the French sphere of influence," the "stiff opposition in the cabinet" thwarted his ambition and Develle had been resolutely in favor of "an understanding with England."[874] Though the tension momentarily escalated,[875] Rosebery and Develle finally signed a protocol for "a neutral zone" between them on July 31 in 1893.[876]

On balance, the Siamese question of 1893 couldn't have been tantamount to the Egyptian question in terms of the significance for the British maritime position in the Mediterranean and European powers' alignment particularly when the geographical focus of the naval scare of 1893 was Mediterranean.[877] Indeed, the public opinion on both sides of the Channel had been vehement over the Siamese crisis[878] and a British intrusion in the Upper Mekong Valley, "Muong-Sing" [Muang-Sing], revived the friction in May 1895.[879] Nevertheless, their central interests lied in no less than a delimitation in Siam, and Courcel and Kimberly reaffirmed their agreement in respecting each influence in British Burma and French Indochina in March 1895.[880] The Anglo-French convention of January 1896 neutralized "Siam as a source of tension."[881]

France gearing toward the Upper Nile and the failed Anglo-French negotiation, 1893-1896

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[869] Rosebery to Captain Jones, June 24, 1893, *British and Foreign State Papers (1894-1895),* Vo. 87, p. 235.
[870] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 326.
[871] Rosebery to Phipps, June 28, 1893. This message was communicated to Rosebery via their ambassadors. *British and Foreign State Papers (1894-1895),* Vo. 87, p. 240.
[872] Rosebery to Queen, July 25, 1893, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit.*, (1931), p. 284.
[873] Dufferin to Rosebery, July 26, 1893, *British and Foreign State Papers (1894-1895),* Vo. 87, pp. 274-275.
[874] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 33.
[875] Rosebery to Ponsonby, July 30, 1893, France called on British gun-boats to withdraw on July 30. in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1931), p. 290. In Langer's view, Rosebery supposed the Gladstone cabinet "would never consent to a war in behalf of the Siamese". William L. Langer, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 331.
[876] Rosebery to Ponsonby, July 31, 1893, Rosebery to Queen, July 31, 1893, in *Ibid.,* p. 292. Dufferin to Rosebery, July 31, 1893, *British and Foreign State Papers (1894-1895),* Vo. 87, p. 289. A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 343.
[877] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.,* (1970), pp. 259-262.
[878] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 327.
[879] Hanotaux to Courcel, May 20, 1895, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.12, No. 15, p. 24
[880] Courcel to Hanotaux, March 30, 1893, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.11, No. 421, p. 642.
[881] Britain conceded the French rights in the Mekong Valley and both sides made a pledge of "strict non-interference" in Siam. T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 706.

On the other hand, in 1893-1896, France reactivated its endeavors to settle the Egyptian question, which had been dormant for a time in the early 1890s. There was a shift in the attention of the *Comité de l'Afrique Française* from Lake Chad to the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Upper Nile Basin from 1892 to 1893 based on a number of reasonings. The Upper Nile territory was located in the center of "a French-African Empire from Dakar in the west to French Somaliland in the east" and presumed to be a pivotal area to "prevent Britain from dominating the African continent from Cairo to the Cape." Above all, it was expected by the *Comité* that "the occupation of the headwaters of the Nile" could enable France to "challenge British control in Cairo" and resolve the Egyptian question in a fashion that better served the French empire.[882]

The *Comité's* project on Egypt was well carried on by the appointment of Delcassé as under-secretary for Colonies in January 1893. Considering that the British occupation of Egypt had corroded the French position in the Mediterranean,[883] Delcassé intended not to merely "make a bid for Egyptian territory" but to hopefully coerce England into honoring "the pledge which it had given to bring its occupation to an end."[884] Along with Britain's evacuation from Egypt, the French policy had developed in a fashion that presupposed "the neutralization of the Suez Canal."[885] When Gladstone asked if France could accept the terms of the Wolff convention, Waddington answered that "unlimited right to return to Egypt," which he regarded as "a kind of special protectorate of England over Egypt," would be still unacceptable in May 1893.[886]

Gladstone's reaction to Waddington's overture in 1893 is memorable in that his position could be taken as the more, if not most, conciliatory one within his cabinet at the moment. Gladstone had never been inclined to do away with Britain's *de facto* political privilege in Egypt, stipulated in the stillborn Wolff convention, and the best he could broach to France was "the idea of a European conference." Even Waddington contemplated that "a conference could be fatal" for them and France "would be almost isolated" because of Russia's indifference in Egypt. Put differently, whereas Waddington certainly preferred "an improved Wolff convention" to a conference,[887] Gladstone, one of the few who stood against the Spencer program of 1893, had no interest in giving away anything substantive on Egypt.

Predictably, Rosebery, a liberal-imperialist, was "irritated"[888] by the fact that Waddington sounded out Gladstone's thought on Egypt "behind the Foreign Secretary's back." Rosebery strongly demanded that "all questions of foreign policy be treated through his department,"[889] refusing to initiate the slightest discussion on Egypt, which Gladstone didn't oppose according to Rosebery. Ribot was also prompted to conclude

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[882] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), pp. 23-24.
[883] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), pp. 397-398.
[884] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 41.
[885] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 398. Waddington recalled that the idea of "the neutralization of Egypt" was accepted during the negotiation between Granville and formulated in the draft of the Drummond-Wolff convention. Waddington to Ribot, November 2, 1892, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.10, No. 21, p. 61.
[886] Waddington to Develle, May 5, 1893, Ibid., No. 224, p. 327.
[887] Waddington to Develle, May 5, 1893, Ibid., No. 224, pp. 327-328.
[888] Horace G. Hutchinson, eds., *Private Diaries of the Rt. Ho. Sir Algernon West, GCB*, (London: John Murray, 1922), p. 75.
[889] T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), pp. 706-707, In part due to his direct approach to Gladstone, Waddington had been recalled from London.

that it was best not to raise the Egyptian question on the diplomatic front so as not to disturb England.[890] In addition to the use of the veto right of the Conversion fund in Egypt,[891] the Monteil mission, the Liotard Mission, and the Marchand Mission were designed to address the Egyptian question and call for the British evacuation in 1893-1896.[892]

Bypassing the Foreign Ministry, Delcassé obtained the assent of President Carnot for the mission and they convinced "the *officier soudananis* Monteil to head a mission toward the Upper Nile" on May 3 in 1893.[893] Carnot was a friend of Victor Prompt who presented an idea that "a dam could be built across the Upper Nile and used in such a manner as to put Egypt in danger" in January and found the idea quite invaluable. Consequently, "an advance party of the Monteil expedition" left France for Africa on June 10.[894] Monteil was dispatched to Upper Ubangi and "reach the Nile to establish the French flag around Fashoda" through the Bahr-el-Ghazal.[895] However, as Monteil invoked later, he ought to gain access to the roads held by Congo to reach Bahr-el-Ghazal and logistical setbacks and prolonged negotiations frustrated his mission.[896]

As the French-Belgian negotiations dragged on from July 1893 to early 1894, Leopold secretly signed "a convention with England which leased to the Congo the Bahr-el Ghazal region on the west bank of the Nile" to block "France's route to Fashoda" in April.[897] The Anglo-Congolese agreement of 1894, publicized in June, provoked "a general outcry" in the French Chamber and seriously undermined Hanotaux's previous opposition of "a forward policy on the Nile."[898] By August, after Leopold again concluded the Franco-Congolese agreement to resolve the border dispute and renounce the lease of the Bahr-el-Ghazal previously provided by Britain,[899] Delcassé subsequently redirected Monteil to the Ivory Coast instead of the Upper Ubangi, undertaking another Upper Nile mission led by Liotard.[900]

The Anglo-French negotiations that proceeded in 1894 appeared to bear fruit for the moment when Phipps and Hanotaux converged on "a provisional reciprocal withdrawal agreement by which France and England would undertake not to enter the Upper Nile" in October.[901] However, the British Foreign Office "was not impressed" with this provisional settlement. Rosebery, who succeeded Gladstone in March, rejected the proposal and depicted it as "an attempt to debar us from entering on our sphere." Kimberly, the Foreign Secretary, and Anderson, Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Office's

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[890] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 317.
[891] *Ibid.,* p. 418.
[892] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), p. 24, Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), pp. 418-419.
[893] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), p. 26.
[894] William L. Langer, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 127, Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), p. 26.
[895] Monteil to Lebon, March 7, 1894, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.11, No. 65, pp. 96-98.
[896] Monteil to Lebon, March 7, 1894, *Ibid.,* p. 99-100, Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 317.
[897] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 42-43.
[898] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), pp. 27-28. This was because Hanotaux had resisted French occupation of Fashoda on the grounds that it would be at odds with "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire" which France traditionally recognized. However, in principle and French view, Britain ought not to have a right to lease the left bank of the Nile by the same token of "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire" and "the traditional rights of the Sultan of Egypt", as agreed in the Anglo-Congolese agreement of 1894.
[899] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 43.
[900] *Ibid.,* p. 29.
[901] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 404.

Africa Department, chimed in.[902] Unlike the 1880s, Britain had mounted expeditions to reach Egyptian Sudan from the South in 1892-1893 with arising discussions on the reconquest of Sudan.[903]

Rosebery and Anderson were content with placing the protectorate over Uganda in June 1894 and deemed the Upper Nile as "our sphere recognized by three out of the four Great African Powers", viz., Germany, Italy and the Congo Free States,[904] on account of the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1891,[905] and the Anglo-Congolese agreement of 1894. Even though Britain didn't intend to go far as to form "an Anglo-Italian joint front against France" as Italy had pushed forward,[906] the German and Italian recognitions of the British sphere in the Upper Nile and East Africa also sustained Britain's frail leaning toward the Triple Alliance and the Mediterranean entente.[907] In this respect, the Upper Nile issue, as indivisible part of the Egyptian question, diverged from territorial issues in West Africa by 1894.

Dissatisfied with Phipps' negotiation, Kimberly replaced Phipps with Dufferin in mid-October.[908] The French Colonial Ministry regarded the Phipps-Hanotaux proposal as "the self-denying" one, pressing Hanotaux in a more expansionist direction, while Delcassé informed him that "the French expeditions could race the British to the Nile."[909] Though Hanotaux made efforts to resuscitate the negotiation, the English asked France "not to extend beyond the Congo basin and to recognize the Upper Nile as a sphere of British influence," which was inadmissible even for Hanotaux.[910] As Phipps and Hanotaux had earlier drawn out agreement "on various points in West Africa without difficulty" in September,[911] Dufferin was pliable in "the frontier settlement at Sierra Leon" but stalemate was reached again on the Nile in November.[912]

The Anglo-French negotiations of 1894 collapsed. As Taylor illustrates, "diplomacy had ceased; the race to the Nile had begun."[913] Since November 1894,

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[902] A.J.P. Taylor, "Prelude to Fashoda: The Question of the Upper Nile, 1894-1895," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 65, No. 254, (1950), pp. 72-73.
[903] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 399.
[904] Kimberly to Phipps, telegram, No. 60, October 10, 1894, F.O. 27/3188, draft by Rosebery, Cited in A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1950), pp. 73-74.
[905] The Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1891 delimited "the frontier from the Indian Ocean to the Blue Nile" and settled "the northern delimitation, from the Blue Nile to Ras Kasar on the Red Sea" with a secret protocol that should Italy withdraw from "any part of the territory between the present frontier with Ethiopia and the line of demarcation indicated in the said Protocol", Italy would not object "such abandoned territory being permanently occupied by the Egyptian Government." G. N. Sanderson, "England, Italy, the Nile Valley and the European Balance, 1890-91," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (1964), pp. 107-108, p. 119.
[906] C. J. Lowe, "Anglo-Italian Differences over East Africa, 1892-1894, and Their Effects upon the Mediterranean Entente," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 81, No. 319, (1966), pp. 318-321.
[907] On the other hand, Rosebery warned Germany that it would "become impossible" for England to "maintain her *entente* with the Triple Alliance in European questions" if Germany "follows in Africa in a policy hostile to England and makes common cause with France" in 1894. Deym to Kálnoky, June 13 and 14, 1894, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 491.
[908] Minutes by Anderson, October 9, and by Kimberly, October 10, 1894, F.O. 27/3209, Cited in A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1950), p. 73.
[909] Ibid., p. 74.
[910] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 404.
[911] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1950), p. 70.
[912] Ibid*,* p. 75.
[913] Ibid., p. 76.

Hanotaux had no longer opposed France's expansion toward the Upper Nile due to his eroded "authority in African affairs", inflated pressure from the colonial groups, and, domestically, his initial challenge against pressing the Dreyfus case in fear of "increased tension in Franco-German relations."[914] Although Delcassé managed to send out the Liotard Mission, approved by the French cabinet on November 17 in 1894,[915] Liotard's progress had been sluggish. Facing the difficulties of the conquest of Madagascar and the costly campaign in West Africa, the French cabinet couldn't attain credits by the mid 1895. The Liotard mission fizzled out without further reinforcements.[916]

Agitated again by the *Comité de l'Afrique Française,* which set up another *Comité* for Egypt to induce the French government to reopen the Egyptian question in June*,* Berthelot*,* the Bourgeois cabinet's Foreign Minister, "gave his adhesion" to the Marchand Mission in November 1895.[917] Despite restrictions on "an act of occupation" and "making political treaties with native groups" [918] given by Berthelot and other cases for limiting the mission to Upper Ubangi, the final orders of the Marchand Mission were signed in February 1896.[919] As expansionists, such as Archinard and Binger, overruled more cautious members in the Ministry of Colonies, the Marchand Mission defied the early restrictions of Berthelot and became "a full-blown expansionist project,"[920] reaching Fashoda through Congo and the Nile by July 1898.[921]

It is important to be reminded that the Marchand Mission in 1896-1898 couldn't be simply attributed to bureaucratic chaos or domestic pathologies. First, the Meline cabinet that took office after the Bourgeois cabinet stayed from April 1896 to June 1898 for almost two full years of the Marchand Mission and the Foreign Minister of the Brisson cabinet from June 1898 to October 1898 was Delcassé, ensuring the continuous policy of the French colonial expansion. Second, the Marchand Mission developed into a remarkably popular project not only within the colonial groups but also in the French Parliament by late 1896. The French House approved the appropriations for the expedition by 477 votes to 18 votes and even the socialists voted for it in December 1896.[922] Hanotaux hadn't intervened to alter the objective of the mission, either.[923]

On June 23 of 1896, Lebon, the Minister of Colonies, signed new "final instructions" in which Marchand was ordered to "progress by attaching the local chief and forming native militias to manage the posts and to debouch on the Nile." Hanotaux told Marchand, "Go to Fashoda, France is firing its gun." In his mind, it was a non-

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[914] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), pp. 30-32.
[915] Ibid*.,* p. 31.
[916] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), pp. 405-406.
[917] Ibid., pp. 407-408.
[918] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), p. 51.
[919] Ibid., pp. 45-49, Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 408. Within the Ministry of Colonies, as opposed to Archinard who supported the Marchand Mission, Roume preferred to revive the Liotard Mission and limit the scope of the Marchand Mission.
[920] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), p. 52.
[921] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 44.
[922] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 409. Likewise, the majority of the Meline cabinet authorized a joint Ethiopian-French mission toward Fashoda to reinforce Marchand in 1897. Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), pp. 53-53.
[923] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), pp. 50-52. Brown points out, "if the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been willing to assert his full authority as a responsible minister, he could have substantially altered the nature of Marchand mission by enforcing the restrictions which his predecessor had."

diplomatic means to bring Britain to negotiate a settlement of the Egyptian question or an international conference. He didn't envisage the chance of an armed conflict and was convinced that Britain wouldn't go to a war with both France and Russia.[924] Hanotaux underappreciated the enhanced interest and prestige of the Egyptian question for Britain, compared to the issues in West Africa, as well as the indivisibility of the Upper Nile from the Egyptian question in 1896-1898.[925]

The liberal cabinet's proposal of 1895, drafted by Anderson in May when Rosebery and Kimberly wished to revive negotiations with France for the last time, suggested, "Britain, acting in the name of Egypt, would have had exclusive control of the Nile as far south as Fashoda; beyond that would have been a no man's land, which both France and Britain would be pledged not to enter, while all other neighbors would have recognized it as a British sphere of influence."[926] Courcel, the French Ambassador to London, declined the connection that Britain "sought to establish between" its occupation of Egypt and its claim of the sphere of influence on the Upper Nile.[927] With the Marchand mission, France strove for "a division of Sudan," or a delimitation of the Upper Nile, and the re-opening of the Egyptian question in 1897-1898.[928]

The shift in Britain's first line of naval defense in the Mediterranean, 1895-1898

In 1895-1898, there was an additional upsurge in Britain's interest and prestige in the Egyptian question since the Eastern question, namely the protection of Constantinople, lost more significance in the Mediterranean. When Salisbury returned in June 1895 and envisioned a plan to send the British fleet to the Straits should Russia aggress on Constantinople, the naval leaders opposed the idea since "a cast-iron guarantee of French neutrality" should be the precondition. They only agreed to "an occupation of the Dardanelles,"[929] in which case "the absolute and permanent occupation of Egypt" would be "the next best move."[930] Operationally, Goschen yet conveyed the Admiralty's skeptical view on forcing through the straits given "the geography and the torpedos of the Dardanelles" in December 1895.[931]

Further, the Director of Naval Intelligence assessed that England would "require 3 fleets and 3 bases", Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria, to "stand against France of the Atlantic, France of the West Mediterranean, and Russia of the East Mediterranean" because of "the division of the English forces" that would result from fighting a two-fronts war by October 1896. This memorandum was predicated upon the Admiralty's

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924 Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 409.
925 A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1950), pp. 78-80.
926 Memorandum by Anderson, May 6, 1895, F.O. 27-3257, cited in A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1950), p. 79.
927 Kimberly to Dufferin, No. 151, May 10, 1895, F.O. 27/3229, cited in Ibid., p. 79.
928 Such a policy is indicated in a note for the Minister, "Project for the Settlement of pending questions in North East Africa" drawn up by de Beaucaire at the request of Hanotaux on February 10 in 1897. It became the official position of the French Foreign Ministry until the Fashoda crisis even after Hanotaux was succeeded by Delcassé. This note was repeated verbatim in a subsequent note titled as "Limits of the territories that France could seek to constitute in the region of the Upper Nile" on July 18, 1898. Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 410.
929 A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 361.
930 Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 248.
931 Goschen to Salisbury, December 7, 1895, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 373-374.

assumption that "any lasting check" on Russia at the Dardanelles would not be easily imposed and "the last stand" should be "made in Egypt" as the second defensive line. Along with the strategic and operational challenges of defending the Straits against the Dual Alliance, the Ottoman Empire's assistance "against Russia" had become increasingly unreliable as the Sultan moved closer to Russia than Britain.[932]

Salisbury showed his understanding of the foregoing problems and moved away from Britain's traditional policy of the defense of Constantinople through 1896 and 1898. In January 1897, Salisbury observed that "the sanction and support of the Sultan" was not "confidently held now" and "the forcing of the Dardanelles had become a much more arduous task than it was." Since the Armenian massacre of the Ottoman Empire ensued from 1894,[933] the British public opinion was "more favorable to Russia" than the Turks by early 1896, too.[934] Besides, the issue of Sudan and the Upper Nile became more tightly entwined with the Egyptian question after Italy was defeated by Ethiopia at Adowa in Abyssinia and Britain resolved to reconquer the Sudan to obstruct to way "open for a French advance to the Nile" in March 1896.[935]

By October 1897, Salisbury imparted that he had "regarded the Eastern question as having little serious interest for England since some two years back the Cabinet refused me leave to take the fleet up the Dardanelles, because it was impracticable." Having noted that "our interest in Egypt is growing stronger," Salisbury thus appraised that "the only policy left to us by the Cabinet's decision" was "to strengthen our position on the Nile (to its source) and to withdraw as much as possible from all responsibilities at Constantinople," which should be implemented "gradually" due to Britain's "past engagements."[936] With regard to "the protection of the Straits," where England's interest would be less "vital than that of Austria and France," Salisbury claimed that "it was quite impossible for England" to act as much as the Austrian ambassador wished.[937]

Therefore, Egypt and Alexandria had gained greater importance for Britain's maritime defense in the Mediterranean, relative to the Porte and Constantinople, more so in consideration of a second-order effect on its home theater by late 1897. As Lowe recapped, the British policy appeared as "sticking in Egypt and treating the Straits as negotiable"[938] in 1897-1898 though Britain would have still preferred the status quo to Russia's control of Constantinople or the Straits.[939] In addition, the British assertion of its exclusive control over the entire valley of the Nile, as part of the Egyptian question, had

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[932] Extract from the Director of Naval Intelligence's confidential 'Memorandum on Naval Policy viewed under the existing conditions', October 28, 1896, P.R.O.., Adm. 116/866B, in Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 578-580.

[933] Salisbury's 'very confidential' dispatch No. 6 to Sir Horace Rumbold (Ambassador in Vienna), January 20, 1897, P.R.O. F.O. 120/730, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, ed., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, Vol. 1, London, (1927), pp. 775-776.

[934] Salisbury to the Queen, February 19, 1896, Cited in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), pp. 112-113.

[935] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 367.

[936] Salisbury to Currie, October 19, 1897, Copy in Salisbury MSS., A/138 no. 43, in Kenneth Bourne, *op.cit.,* (1970), p. 452, also in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 377-378.

[937] Salisbury's 'very confidential' dispatch No. 6 to Sir Horace Rumbold (Ambassador in Vienna), January 20, 1897, P.R.O. F.O. 120/730, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, ed., *op.cit.,* 1926-38, Vol. 4, Part 1, pp. 775-776.

[938] C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), p. 118.

[939] J. A. S. Grenville, "Golushowski, Salisbury, and the Mediterranean Agreements, 1895-1897," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 36, No. 87, (1958), p. 368.

been solidified in 1896-1898 as Kitchener's troops took control of "most of the Sudan by September 1898."[940] Salisbury firmly held that "the Valley of the Nile had belonged and still belonged to Egypt" on October 12 in 1898.[941]

Indeed, Britain's insistence on the Upper Nile had already been put forward, as demonstrated over the Rosebery cabinet's last negotiations with France in 1894-1895. For example, Grey, then Under Secretary of Foreign Ministry, famously announced in the Parliament, "the British and Egyptian spheres of influence covered the whole Nile waterway" in March 1895.[942] Kimberly, Foreign Secretary, reiterated that they could "admit no question as to our rights in the territory" on April 1.[943] By December 1897, Monson, the British ambassador to France, warned Hanotaux that France should not misunderstand that "any other European power than Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of the Nile" on the basis of the declarations of Grey and Kimberly.[944]

Finally, when informing Baring of the instructions for Kitchener who was commissioned to "command the White Nile flotilla as far as Fashoda" in August 1898, Salisbury drew upon Monson's message of December 1897. Specifically, he directed that "nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley."[945] By September, he requested Monson to tell Delcassé that "all the territories" of the Khalifa were subject to "the British and Egyptian Governments by right of conquest" and "this right" was not "open to discussion."[946] Having found out that France wouldn't "instruct Marchand to leave Fashoda" without "large concessions of territory" on October 1, Salisbury clarified, "this Government will not do."[947]

By and large, Salisbury's stance on the Fashoda issue had been aligned with the British denial of any substantive territorial concession around the Upper Nile as well as the Egyptian question throughout the Fashoda crisis from early September to late October in 1898. Salisbury stated "no offer of territorial concession on our part would be endured by public opinion here"[948] and communicated to Delcassé that there would be no "slightest modification of the views previously expressed" and Marchand's expedition had "no political effect" on October 3.[949] After the cabinet meeting on October 27th, Britain notified that "any territorial discussion" was impossible as long as "the French

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[940] T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), p. 707.
[941] Salisbury to Monson, October 12, 1898, Cab/37/48/75, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 387.
[942] 28th March, 1895, *Hansard*, 4th Series, Vol. 32, page cols, 405-406.
[943] Kimberly to Dufferin, No. 112 A, April 1, 1895, F.O. 27/3229, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, ed., *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 504-505.
[944] Monson to Hanotaux, December 10, 1897, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 387.
[945] Salisbury to Baring (the Earl of Cromer), No. 109, Secret, August 2, 1898, F.O. 78/5050, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, ed., *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 507-509.
[946] Salisbury to Monson, September 8, 1898, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, *op.cit.*, (1927), No. 189, p. 164.
[947] Salisury to Rodd, October 1, 1898, *Ibid.,* No. 201, pp. 172-173.
[948] Salisbury to Queen, October 3, 1898, in George Earl Buckle, ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd Series, A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence and Journal Between the Years 1886 and 1901*, *Vol.3, 1896-1901,* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1932), p. 290.
[949] Salisbury to Monson, October 3, 1898, No. 21, "Egypt. No. 2 (1898) Correspondence with French Government respecting Valley of Upper Nile," *Accounts and Papers*, 1899, Vol. 112, C. 9054, C. 9055 [Command Papers], p. 12.

Flag flew at Fashoda," and even if "the flag had been removed," it could not agree to "the territorial arrangement" to which France "could consent."[950]

Admittedly, Salisbury was more pliant with regard to whether any negotiation could proceed without Marchand's withdrawal than the rest of the cabinet from early to mid-October. But his willingness to negotiate and press on France to draft a concrete scheme of the delimitation doesn't necessarily imply his will to give away a concession concerning the Upper Nile and the Egyptian question. Britain, including Salisbury, had far more reasons to toughen its position even if the negotiations had advanced without the precondition in 1898 than it had had during the Anglo-French negotiations on Egypt in 1894-1895. Even in this period, Salisbury "gave no countenance to a considerable stretch of the left bank of the Nile"[951] and fell back on the necessity to discuss the matter with "the cabinet,"[952] or "colleagues,"[953] at best.

Needless to say, the majority of the British cabinet demanded Marchand's unconditional withdrawal without a territorial concession and that "the question of delimitation could be discussed" only afterwards on October 27th.[954] Having acknowledged that the French navy was "absolutely incapable of carrying on a naval war" against Britain "even with Russian help" by the mid-October, which was very "unlikely" at any rate, Delcassé had no other alternative than to order "the evacuation of Fashoda" on November 2.[955] In fact, he had thought of Marchand's unconditional withdrawal by October 24, and wrote, "So my course of action is decided. If England does not accept my proposition, I shall publish Marchand's journal and recall the heroic little band."[956] Delcassé went to great lengths to preserve national "honor" but failed.[957]

France's paradox of peripheral expansion: West Africa and the Upper Nile, 1896-1898

Last but not least, in order to make sense of France's debacle at Fashoda, it is essential to shed light on the ways in which France had conflated, or misunderstood, the implication of the Upper Nile and Egypt for Britain with that of West Africa, Niger in particular, for Britain in 1898. In large part, France had applied the indistinguishable tactics in its colonial expansion in West Africa and the Upper Nile in spite of the critical difference in strategic significance for Britain between them by 1898. Unlike West Africa, the Egyptian question, including the Upper Nile, was of higher significance for Britain in 1898 given the decreased interest in the defense of Constantinople as well as the possible second order effect of the naval distribution in the Mediterranean on the home theater. But France's expectation was alike in both regions.

Once the Marchand mission left for Fashoda, France resumed its colonial expansion in West Africa by sending the Bretonnet mission "to establish itself below the

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[950] Salisbury to Queen, October 27, 1898, in George Earl Buckle, ed., *op.cit.*, (1932), p. 299.
[951] Salisbury to Monson, October 6, 1898, *op.cit.,* 1899, Vol. 112, C. 9054, C. 9055 [Command Papers], pp. 1-2.
[952] Salisbury to Monson, October 12, 1898, Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[953] Salisbury to Queen, October 12, 1898, in George Earl Buckle, ed., *op.cit.*, (1932), p. 291.
[954] Salisbury to Queen, October 27, 1898, in Ibid., p. 299.
[955] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 102-103. A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 381.
[956] Delcassé to his wife, October 24, 1898, Delcassé MSS, Cited in Ibid., p. 102.
[957] *Ibid.,* p. 99.

Busa rapids" in 1897.[958] Britain's military counter-offensive developed on the ground throughout 1897 and "negotiations over Western African boundary" resumed in October. Hanotaux treated the Western African question as "the necessary prelude to the settlement of the question of the Upper Nile" and expressed his hope to Monson that "talks about West Africa would lead to a general settlement of all the questions at issue" in November.[959] Another expedition, driven by the *Comité,* entered Sokoto, recognized as a British protectorate, triggered a crisis in which Salisbury warned of "the most serious consequences" in February 1898.[960]

Nevertheless, the British interest and prestige in West Africa were not as momentous as those in the Egyptian question and the Upper Nile by 1898, let alone the fact that the Anglo-French agreements of August 1890 and January 1896[961] constituted the basis upon which the joint commissions were appointed to engage with each other to resolve the frontier issue on the Lower Niger from February 1896.[962] On January 28 in 1898, Salisbury advised the Minister of Foreign Affairs that "our object is, not territory, but facility for trade" and "the course which we should take in present negotiations" would hinge on "the fiscal policy which the French government intended to adopt,"[963] before the Niger crisis escalated in February. As such, Britain's dominant interest in West Africa had not been as territorial as commercial and fiscal.

Diplomatic deadlock derived from the French claiming all the territories of Niger north of the 9th parallel while Britain refused any territorial concession without France's acceptance of a trade regime ensuring freedom of trade and equality between French and English products by a common customs tariff in West Africa.[964] When the French forces raided the left bank of the Niger in February, Salisbury perceived that "the proceedings of the French forces have not been authorized by the French government."[965] Monson judged Hanotaux had appeared to take the British proposal as "fairly acceptable" but "anticipate more difficulty on the fiscal than on the territorial points" in the French cabinet.[966] The British cabinet was even "prepared to recognize French claims East of the Lake Chad" if France could admit its claims over the Upper Nile.[967]

Unsurprisingly, after Hanotaux obtained "the opening of several French possessions in West Africa to British trade for 30 years" and "the renunciation of all territorial claims to the East of Niger" from the French cabinet, Britain and France signed an agreement delimiting the French and English spheres to the West and East of Niger on June 14th in 1898. Specifically, France renounced access to the lower Niger and received

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[958] G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, *op.cit.* (1927), p. 132, Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 395.
[959] Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, "General Hanotaux, the Colonial Party, and the Fashoda Strategy", in E. F. Penrose, ed., *European Imperialism and the Partition of Africa*, (Frank Cass, 1975), p. 88.
[960] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 396.
[961] *Ibid.,* p. 395.
[962] J. D. Hargreaves, "Entente Manque: Anglo-French Relations, 1895-1896," *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (1953), p. 81.
[963] Salisbury to Monson, January 28, 1898, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, ed., *op.cit*, (1927), No. 163, p. 139.
[964] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 396.
[965] Salisbury to Monson, February, 29, 1898, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, edit., *op.cit*, (1927), No. 167, p. 143.
[966] Monson to Salisbury, February, 19, February 20, 1898, Ibid., No. 166, No. 168, pp. 143-144.
[967] Balfour to Monson, March 28, 1898, Ibid., No. 175, pp. 148-149.

part of the Sultanate of Borgou in return.[968] Hanotaux had not only underappreciated the difference between Britain's interest over West Africa and that in the Egyptian question but also overestimated the implication of the Niger convention of 1898 in a way that eventually engendered the Fashoda crisis. Instead, Hanotaux imbued Cogordan, the Consulate General in Egypt, with "a greater confidence."[969]

Although the French colonialists shifted their attention from Britain's evacuation to territorial, or colonial, compensation from May and the summer of 1898 as the hope for Germany's sanction in the Egyptian question seemingly petered out,[970] Hanotaux remained "confident" after the Niger crisis by June.[971] He inferred that Britain's conflicts with Russia in China and Germany in South Africa would encourage Germany and Russia to support France and "the capture of Khartoum" could give rise to negotiations where the European powers assert their interests in Egypt. Hanotaux viewed that the Egyptian question "must not find its own solution" as crises were resolved in Siam and Niger.[972] France grievously failed to update its understanding of the heightened interest of Britain in the Egyptian question from 1896 to 1898.

The French regrettably kept up its venture to treat the Egyptian question, including the Upper Nile, as one of the delimitation issues in Africa during the two months of the Fashoda crisis in 1898, even after Delcassé succeeded Hanotaux with the fall of the Meline cabinet in June.[973] Delcassé was more cognizant of the unfavorable circumstances than Hanotaux and advised the Minister of Colonies, Trouillot, to take into account the British capture of Khartoum as well as the improved relations between Germany and Britain in September 1898.[974] In point of fact, he discerned that the European sanctions for France in Egypt were unlikely and Britain would not cease their conquest toward the Upper Nile.[975] Nevertheless, Delcassé endeavored to raise the delimitation of the Upper Nile, which necessarily touched on the Egyptian question.[976]

As the negotiation progressed, Courcel held, "France regards it [the Upper Nile] as the natural continuation and the necessary outlet of its possession in the Congo," attempting to bind the matters of West Africa and the Egyptian question.[977] While having abandoned the expectation about Britain's evacuation, France still aimed at extracting a deal that could delimit the Upper Nile, which inexorably belonged to the Egyptian question especially for Britain. Courcel presumed that "we would accept the line of the Bahr el Ghazal as our northern limit on the Nile,"[978] as France had struck a deal for the Upper Mekong and the Niger in 1896-1898. France sought for a compensation by fixing

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[968] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 397.
[969] Hanotaux to Cogordan, June 21, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 236, p. 350.
[970] Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 48-50.
[971] Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, in E. F. Penrose, ed., *op.cit.*, (1975), pp. 90-92.
[972] Hanotaux to Cogordan, June 21, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 236, pp. 350-351.
[973] Pierre Guillen, *op.cit.*, (1985), p. 425.
[974] Delcassé to Trouillot, September 7, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 329, pp. 515-516.
[975] Delcassé to Trouillot, September 7, 1898, Ibid., pp. 517-520.
[976] Delcassé to Courcel, October 8, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 419, p. 640.
[977] Courcel to Salisbury, October 12, 1898, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, *op.cit*, (1927), No. 210, p. 180.
[978] Courcel to Delcassé, October 6, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 414, pp. 632-634.

"the limit in the north"[979] and "an outlet for us on the Nile" would have sufficed according to Delcassé in late October of 1898.[980]

Unfortunately, Britain couldn't reduce the Egyptian question to a matter of the peripheral delimitation of the Upper Nile in late 1898. As a matter of fact, even the political ground upon which France brought up the issue of the Upper Nile inevitably centered around the Egyptian question. For instance, Courcel suggested a delimitation talk to by asking, "where were the limits of England either for herself or for Egypt?."[981] Likewise, Delcassé wrote back to Courcel, "if we are spoken to today on behalf of Egypt, we are entitled to ask by virtue of what mandate and in what way the title invoked by England would be better than ours."[982] In spite of the French effort to square the circle, it turned out to be almost impossible even for themselves to distinguish the Upper Nile from the Egyptian question for which Britain was willing to go to a war by October.

Britain's expectations about the contagion effect and the untypical preventive motivation, 1898

Britain's interest and prestige associated with the Egyptian question couldn't be any higher than late 1898 since 1882. As articulated, it was Salisbury who pushed for Britain's *de facto* exclusive privilege over in Egypt already by 1887, which disturbed France to the extent that it finally torpedoed the Drummond-Wolff convention. The maritime implication of Egypt in the Mediterranean began to soar with the Franco-Russian alignment, culminating in the Franco-Russian alliance by 1894. The dispersed naval distribution of power in the Mediterranean was assumed to generate a second-order effect on Britain's home theater. Further, Egypt won far greater importance as the operational challenge at the Straits and the deterioration of the Mediterranean entente curtailed its interest in the defense of Constantinople from 1894 to 1897.

As the foregoing part shows, Salisbury's willingness to continue to negotiate with the French by no means indicated Britain's intention to concede to France's ultimate demand to reopen the Egyptian question. Salisbury's attempt to engage with the French should not be conflated with his genuine will to make a concession, as some of the previous works assumed. For instance, Peterson implies Salisbury might have made a concession, as he had done with Niger in West Africa in the same year, since Salisbury "considered Egypt a disastrous inheritance and the Nile Valley a malarious African desert that was not worth war" but Salisbury was overridden.[983] However, Salisbury was aware of Britain's increased interest of Egypt. It also doesn't explain why other elites allowed Salisbury to sign a deal in Niger in the first place.

To illustrate, it was Salisbury who supported the Heigoland-Zanzibar treaty of 1890 with Germany to remove Germany "out of the Upper Nile Valley" and induced Germany, Italy, and the Congo Free States to accept the British spheres of influence over the Upper Nile, which was deemed inseparable from Egypt. Moreover, Salisbury entirely

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[979] Courcel to Salisbury, October 12, 1898, in G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, *op.cit*, (1927), No. 210, p. 180.
[980] Delcassé to his wife, October 23, 1898, cited in Christopher Andrew, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 100.
[981] Courcel to Delcassé, October 6, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 414, p. 633.
[982] Delcassé to Courcel, October 8, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 419, p. 640.
[983] Susan Peterson, *op.cit.,* (1995), pp. 27-28. Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 247-248.

understood and endorsed the critical shift in the British policy in the Mediterranean, forgoing "supporting Turkey and defending the Straits" by 1897. On January 27 1897, Salisbury conveyed to the Ambassador in Vienna that "obviously now England had to fall back on the second line of defense suggested by the Director of Naval Intelligence in November 1895, "the absolute and permanent occupation of Egypt." [984]

The British interest in the first line of maritime defense moved away from Constantinople to Alexandria by 1897 and Salisbury had been right in the center of such a significant change in the British naval policy. The decreased value of Italy as a means to garner "the German power's assistance at Constantinople," the emerging understanding among Germany, Austria, and Russia,[985] the operational challenges of forcing the Straits because of with the Sultan's fortification of the Dardanelles, and perhaps most importantly, the Franco-Russian naval combination in the Mediterranean in light of the Two power standard prompted Britain's traditional naval policy to be altered and center around Alexandria and Egypt relative to the Constantinople and the Straits.[986]

As demonstrated, Salisbury, arguably the most dovish member of the Cabinet, plainly made the case for strengthening the British position on the Nile at the expense of Constantinople in October 1897, referring it to as "the only policy…left to us."[987] Besides, Salisbury was barely inclined to distinguish "the Valley of the Nile" from Egypt, or Britain's exclusive spheres of influence by October 1898.[988] Considering the notable shift in Britain's first line of naval defense in the Mediterranean, in part led by Salisbury himself, Salisbury's relative openness to negotiate with France stood out simply because the majority of the Cabinet members didn't even regard such negotiations worthwhile. The existing work highlighting Salisbury's dovishness or the opposition party's backing dismisses the more fundamental factor that altered Britain's policy.

The Cabinet members exhibited expectations about the contagion effect in case of France's occupation of the Upper Nile as well as the preventive motivation. The Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, was primarily averse to "the French claim to established themselves in the immense province of the Bahr-el-Ghazal and so to join up their Congo possessions with the Nile and with Abyssinia," not "Fashoda itself." In other words, Chamberlain expected that France's expansion would not stop at Fashoda but further disrupt the British control of the Upper Nile. Curzon similarly wrote to Chamberlain in October 1898, "their object in seizing Fashoda, which is in itself worthless, was to get a débouché on the Nile. If we grant it to them, they will have gained their object and in touch with Abyssinia they will give us infinite trouble in the future."[989]

The British leaders saw no reason to allow future complications to arise from France's seizure of Fashoda around the Upper Nile. Chamberlain agreed with Curzon who added, "wherever we draw the frontier I do hope – no French flag, territory or men anywhere near the Nile," and expressed his expectations about the contagion effect on the Nile, "my mind is uneasy about the Bahr-el-Ghazal" to which the Upper Nile was

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[984] Salisbury to Rumbold, January 20, 1897, cited in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), p. 115.
[985] C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), pp. 115-116.
[986] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), pp. 271-273.
[987] Salisbury to Currie, October 19, 1897, Copy in Salisbury MSS., A/138 no. 43, in Kenneth Bourne, *op.cit.,* (1970), p. 452, also in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 377-378.
[988] Salisbury to Monson, October 12, 1898, Cab/37/48/75, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 387.
[989] Curzon to Chamberlain, October 26, 1898, quoted in J. L. Garvin, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. 3, 1895-1900: Empire and World Policy*, (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1934), pp. 228-229.

extended.[990] Besides, Chamberlain showed his preventive motivation to settle the Anglo-French naval competition, assuming that Russia "would not and could not interfere." He opined, "as soon as we are ready, we shall present our bill to France not only in *Egypt* but all over the globe, and should she refuse to pay, then war" on November 4 1898.[991]

Alongside Chamberlain, the other members of the Cabinet "seemed to take the view that the row would have to come, and it might as well come now as later" by October 28 1898.[992] Chamberlain, Goschen, and Devonshire especially appeared to "regard the opportunity for permanently crippling so dangerous a rival by a preventive war as too favorable to be missed."[993] Albeit as the member of the opposition party, the former Prime Minister Rosebery, likewise supposed that "a war with France now would simplify difficulties in the future."[994] In particular, Goschen's belligerent position over the Fashoda is notable. Whereas Chamberlain remained hostile against France during the negotiations over West Africa, Goschen was as cautious as Salisbury with regards to West Africa but was ready for a war during the Fashoda crisis.[995]

The differences in Goschen's positions concerning West Africa and the Upper Nile, stemmed from the fact that Goschen and the Admiralty's central interests lied in the naval balance of power in the Mediterranean, and not the West or East Coast of Africa in 1898. Goschen opposed a reduction of the fleet in the Mediterranean to "make a larger display near Zanzibar, and on the East Coast of Africa" in 1896 and encouraged Salisbury's diplomatic settlement over West Africa in 1898. Yet, being keen on "the future relative strength" and being "equal in numbers and superior in power to the fleets of any two countries," the Admiralty was "calm" and "ready for whatever might occur" during the Fashoada crisis.[996]

On November 1st 1898, Goschen penned a letter to Salisbury, "the newspapers are exaggerating our naval preparations very much… However, we have now our "Home Squadron" [not what the papers call an "emergency squadron"] perfectly ready."[997] Without a doubt, France and Russia were "the two powers against whose united naval forces Goschen and the Admiralty had to prepare" at the moment of the Fashoda crisis in 1898.[998] The expected contagion effect of France's control of the Upper Nile was particularly salient on the Nile, the Suez Canal, and Alexandria where Britain had become immensely determined to reinforce as the first line of naval defense in the Mediterranean. In spite of France's asymmetric capacity for naval buildup, the Franco-Russian alliance in the Mediterranean theater revived the preventive war motivation.

Hence, the British cabinet had reasons to favor "an ultimatum to France coupled with a military show of force, as a minimum" and some pushed for a "preventive war." The Admiralty proceeded to put the Reserve Squadron "in readiness on October 24" and

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[990] Chamberlain to Lansdowne, October 27, 1898, quoted in Ibid., pp. 229-230.
[991] Quoted in Ibid., pp. 231-233.
[992] Maurice V. Brett, eds., *Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, Vol. 1, 1870-1903*, (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1934), pp. 221-222.
[993] Arthur J. Marder, *op.cit.*, (1940), p. 332.
[994] Maurice V. Brett, *op.cit.,* (1934), p. 222.
[995] Arthur D. Elliot, *The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831-1907, Vol 2*, (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1911), pp. 209-214.
[996] Ibid., pp. 210-211, pp. 212-214.
[997] Goschen to Salisbury, November 1, 1898, Quoted in Ibid., p. 214.
[998] Ibid., pp. 218-219.

drafted "war orders for the Home, Mediterranean, and Channel Fleets" on October 26. France's last proposal of "a commercial outlet on the Nile" in exchange for "a spontaneous recall of Marchand" was declined and Britain endorsed the Royal navy being on a war footing. The war orders were given to the Mediterranean Fleet on October 28 and the Channel Fleet was deployed to Gibralta on October 29.[999] France's backdown catalyzed the Anglo-French agreement of 1899,[1000] which soon led to the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 over Morocco and Egypt, the Entente Cordiale.[1001]

5.4. Alignment opportunity: open [1882-1887] ➡ closed [1887-1898] ➡ open [1898-1904]

Alignment opportunities between Britain and France wound up being much narrower and more closed in 1898 than that in 1882-1890, which in turn almost eradicated a potential off-ramp in case of France's power projection into the British realm of Egypt. The extent to which Britain and France shared a third common adversary in Europe and non-European theaters reached a nadir and available allies either parted ways with Britain or were of no avail for France in Egypt and Mediterranean by 1898. The re-alignment of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy from 1882 to 1898 rendered Britain's loss of interest and prestige from France's encroachment on Egypt in the Mediterranean theater greater in 1898 than it had been in 1882-1897. The want of a third power's expansion in Europe also redounded to the closed alignment opportunity.

Whereas the years of the Crimean system saw a chain of crises or a third power's geographical expansion in Europe, such as the Polish uprising, the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, and the Austro-Prussian war, the European theater of the late 19th century was relatively calmer in terms of a third power's power projection. Crises and wars were instead concentrated in non-European theaters, namely Africa and Asia. In light of this, the Mediterranean theater held its unique geographical importance in that it embraced both Europe and non-European regions and encompassed continental and maritime alignment. Hence, it is seldom mystifying the European alignment chiefly centered around the Mediterranean and the settlement of the Egyptian question restored alignment opportunities between France and Britain after the Fashoda crisis in 1898.



[999] Roger Glenn Brown, *op.cit.,* (1969), pp. 110-113.
[1000] T. G. Otte, *op.cit.,* (2006), pp. 707-708. They exchanged concessions in the Dafur region and the Upper Nile.
[1001] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 213.

Figure. 19. Alignment Opportunities in Europe and non-European theaters, 1882-1904

Bismarck's alliances, the Bulgarian crisis, and Russia: open alignment opportunity, 1882-1887

As the Crimean system was built upon the shared interest in keeping Russia out of Constantinople through the neutrality of the Black Sea in 1856-1871, Russia had been the third power that Britain and France aimed at restraining in the Balkan, the Eastern question, and, more importantly for Britain, in the Straits since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 until the Franco-Russian alignment loomed after 1887. Disraeli's concern primarily consisted of the maintenance of the status quo in the Straits and "the Mediterranean route to India" and Russia had to split the spoils of its victory at the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 by the intervention of the European concert.[1002] The application of territorial compensation in Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cyprus prompted Bismarck and Salisbury to propose Tunis as a French share.[1003]

Russia in the Eastern question and the Dual control of Egypt were the two foundations of "the unwritten liberal alliance between France and Britain in 1876-1882."[1004] While Britain's unilateral occupation of Egypt in September 1882 set off the continuous erosion of "the liberal alliance,"[1005] Bismarck's sophisticated alliance system and Russia fostered the wider openness of alignment opportunity between France and Britain in 1882-1887 that that in 1887-1898. The Triple Alliance of May 1882, in which Germany and Austria-Hungary promised military assistance for Italy should France aggress on them,[1006] was complemented by the *Dreikaiserbund* of June 1881 that secured "the neutrality of the other two powers" should the third power fight a war with a fourth power.[1007]

Even though Bismarck was so judicious as to not unnecessarily strain the relations with Britain and France, Britain and France fell outside the orbit of Germany's formal alliances, including the ancillary ones with Romania in October 1883 and Serbia.[1008] In fact, the article 3 of the *Dreikaiserbund* recognized Russia's interest in the Straits, which was at variance with "the British contention that Turkey could make no exception to the principle of closure of the Straits."[1009] After the *Dreikaiserbund* was renewed in March 1884 for another three years, Bismarck sounded out France's interest in "a League of Neutrals against England."[1010] In September 1884, Bismarck broached "the idea of a

[1002] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 173-176.
[1003] Ibid., p. 177.
[1004] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, ed., *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 210.
[1005] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 288-291.
[1006] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 182-186.
[1007] Ibid., p. 180.
[1008] Ibid., p. 183, Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 210.
[1009] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 180
[1010] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 295.

maritime league against England"[1011] to "establish a kind of balance at sea" against Britain in which "France has a big role to play."[1012]

Had France been serious about the German proposal, alignment opportunity between England and France could have fallen off from the mid 1880s. However, France simply "exploited" the German approach to crack the British schemes of financial reform in Egypt.[1013] Bismarck called upon a classic coalition balancing of "the navies as a counterweight to England" at sea to urge Britain "to reckon with the interests of others" and that "a Franco-German alliance is not an impossible thing."[1014] But Courcel speculated that the German bid appeared to purpose to "detach" France from the liberal alliance, or divide the liberal alliance, by holding "an equally benevolent language for France and England."[1015] Bismarck's view on the Egyptian question was also "vague" to a degree that didn't eliminate the existing alignment opportunity.[1016]

Unquestionably, the degree to which France and Britain perceived Russia as the third adversary with respect to the Eastern question abated given that from 1856 to 1882 because France had been too isolated on the continent by Bismarck's Triple Alliance and the *Dreikaiserbund* to fully antagonize Russia. On the other hand, France didn't wish to be estranged from Britain at sea by entirely siding with Russia in the Eastern question, rekindled by the Bulgarian crisis of 1885 with the fear of "a coalition of England and the central powers."[1017] Repudiating the Berlin Treaty of 1878 that separated Eastern Roumelia from Bulgaria,[1018] Prince Alexander, a protégé of Russia,[1019] declared "the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria in September 1885. Russia gladly advocated the *status quo ante* of the Treaty of Berlin.[1020]

While determined to forestall Russia from impinging on the Constantinople, Salisbury sought for the French support in the Bulgarian question. Salisbury observed that Austria's policy was "obscure" and France favored "the idea of personal union in the prince" and "very anxious to act with us in this matter" on September 28, though France didn't express any "inclination to get rid of prince of Bulgaria." He sensed "a strong vein of Russian influence at Vienna", which might have been derived from their secret understanding of the *Dreikaiserbund*.[1021] Bismarck also "spoke favorably of the idea of a personal union" but clarified that Germany "could only offer neutrality" in case of

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[1011] Ibid., p. 296.
[1012] Courcel to Ferry, September 23, 1884, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.5, No. 407, p. 424.
[1013] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 297.
[1014] Courcel to Ferry, September 23, 1884, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.5, No. 407, p. 424.
[1015] Courcel to Ferry, April 25, 1884, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.5, No. 247, p. 266.
[1016] Note from Ferry, Conversation with Count Bismarck, October 6, 1884, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.5, No. 421, pp. 441-442, Bismarck denied the allegation that Germany had the motivation to arouse a quarrel between France and England.
[1017] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 310.
[1018] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 173-174.
[1019] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 293-294.
[1020] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 301, p. 305.
[1021] Salisbury to White, Tel. No. 101, September 28, 1885, F.O. 78/3757, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, ed., *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 431-432.

Russia's attack along the line of the *Dreikaiserbund*.[1022] Bismarck surmised, "Russia's obtaining possession of Constantinople would hurt no one but herself."[1023]

The invisible operation of the *Dreikaiserbund* deprived Britain of available allies except France at the Constantinople conference over the Bulgarian crisis in 1885, even though the crisis itself didn't escalate to a degree that a war among European powers would be likely. Salisbury instructed the British representatives to not offer any sanction "in favor of the *status quo ante*".[1024] Britain devised a formula in which the Porte appoint "a special Commissioner ad hoc for the maintenance of order in Eastern Roumelia" and "sub-commission," later attempting to revise the Treaty of Berlin as "an act of veneration."[1025] Though Salisbury felt that "the three Empires declined to take any account of the wishes of the populations"[1026] and Bismarck waited others to "pull the chestnuts out,"[1027] a personal union was adopted as a solution in April 1886.[1028]

The Bulgarian crisis of 1885-1886 not only wrecked Germany's bid for an entente with France, previously demonstrated by the Berlin Conference over Congo from November 1884 to February 1885,[1029] but also uncovered where European powers stood vis-à-vis Russia when it came to the Eastern question. As noted, Bismarck offered Britain that he could "prevent any attack from France upon England" but only offer "neutrality" in regards to Russia.[1030] When Serbia demanded a territorial compensation for the larger Bulgaria, declaring a war against Bulgaria in November 1885, Austria-Hungary's diplomatic intervention to settle the Balkan conflict after the Bulgarian defeat of Serbia left the friction between Austria-Hungary and Russia.[1031] Austria-Hungary started to drift away from the *Dreikaiserbund* afterwards.

As Austria-Hungary turned up as an available ally for Britain against Russia in the Eastern question over the Bulgarian crisis in 1885-1886, Salisbury communicated to Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1886 that Britain "may not be primarily so much interested in the independence of Bulgaria" as "the growing power of Russia in those countries" and "*England no doubt would fight* for a clearly defined object such as the defense of Constantinople."[1032] France was another potential ally for Britain but the Egyptian question impeded a closer alignment. Indeed, Waddington disclosed his hope

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[1022] Currie, Memorandum of his conversation with Prince Bismarck, September 28-30, 1885, Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1931), p. 258.
[1023] Currie, Memorandum of his conversation with Prince Bismarck, September 28-30, 1885, Ibid., pp. 259-260.
[1024] Cited in Edit., Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 430.
[1025] Salisbury to White, Tel. No. 204, November 19, 1885, F.O. 78/3757, Salisbury to Pauncefote, December 4, 1885, F.O. 64/1075, Ibid*.,* pp. 432-433.
[1026] Salisbury to Morier, December 2, 1885, Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1931), pp. 249-250.
[1027] Salisbury to White, December 2, 1885, Ibid., p. 253.
[1028] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 197.
[1029] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 310-315, A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 297-298, pp. 301-302.
[1030] Currie, Memorandum of his conversation with Prince Bismarck, September 28-30, 1885, Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1931), pp. 257-258.
[1031] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 293-294.
[1032] Confidential Memorandum communicated to Austria-Hungary by the British Ambassador at Vienna, it is dated September 1886, but is endorsed as communicated on October 2, 1886 F.O. 7/1092, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 442-444.

for an aligned policy in Constantinople in his to Salisbury[1033] and strove to induce Salisbury to come to terms with France over Egypt by insinuating a possible action on the part of France in the Eastern question in November 1886.[1034]

From the mid 1880s onwards, the Egyptian question already became entwined with the European alignment in relation to Russia and the Eastern question. In dealing with Britain, Germany and Russia, the French policy was "highly cautious."[1035] Outwardly, Boulangism in 1885-1886 stirred up the radical nationalism of France and the Franco-German tension mounted. Bismarck spearheaded the introduction of "a new military law in the Reichstag" from November 1886 and the Reichstag passed the new army bill in March 1887.[1036] However, Herbette, the French ambassador in Berlin, reported that the German move resulted from Bismarck's realization that the *Dreikaiserbund* was no longer sustainable and "the urgency of war preparations didn't find much credit in the parliamentary sphere" in December 1886.[1037]

Herbette's understanding that Bismarck wanted "peace" at the moment and the German arrest of a French officer in Baden couldn't be "serious" was not off the mark.[1038] Bismarck released the French officer without a haggle and rather "confessed in private that Germany needed France for the sake of a future maritime balance against England" in February 1887.[1039] As for Russia, France was conspicuously averse to "the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the Russians at Constantinople,"[1040] as shown during the Bulgarian crisis, but suspected that the best policy in case of a Russo-Austrian war in the Balkan would be neutrality.[1041] Though the degree to which Russia was deemed as the third adversary declined in 1887, the *Dreikaiserbund* and Russia in the Eastern question kept up the openness of alignment opportunity.

The Mediterranean Entente and Russia: The closing of alignment opportunity, 1887-1898

The open and malleable alignment opportunity between Britain and France in 1882-1887 underwent the three stages of downturn in 1887-1890, 1891-1894, and 1895-1897. In the first phase, Britain leaned on the side of the Triple Alliance in the Mediterranean, Italy and Austria-Hungary as their available allies in particular, through the two Mediterranean agreements in 1887, assisted by Bismarck's mediation. The termination of the *Dreikaiserbund* in 1887 released Austria-Hungary into the alignment with Britain, and Italy had strong interests in holding France in check in the Mediterranean despite the absence of Britain's pledge for material assistance. On the other hand, the Reinsurance treaty of July 1887 barred Russia from departing from Germany's alliance system until the resignation of Bismarck in March 1890.

When Italy approached England with a couple of proposals in February 1887, Salisbury judged "common efforts for maintaining the status quo in the Aegean, the

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[1033] Waddington to Freycinet, November 3, 1886, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.6, No. 342, p. 347.
[1034] Waddington to Freycinet, November 23, 1886, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.6, No. 358, pp. 372-373.
[1035] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 196-197.
[1036] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 297-298, pp. 307-308.
[1037] Herbette to Flourens, December 19-20, 1886, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.6, No. 378, pp. 389-390.
[1038] Herbette to Flourens, December 19-20, 1886, Ibid., pp. 390-391.
[1039] Bismarck to Schweinitz, February 25, 1887, Cited in A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit*., (1954, 1973), p. 309.
[1040] Ibid., p. 308.
[1041] Herbette to Flourens, February 7, 1887, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.6, No. 428, pp. 442-443.

Adriatic, and the Black Sea and on the Africa Coast acceptable" but couldn't agree to "an alliance in case of war against France." In efforts to not shut down the window of alignment with France, Salisbury elaborated on the British countenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean that "England never promised material assistance in view of an uncertain war and any promise even of diplomatic co-operation could not be directed against any single Power such as France." He added that the English assistance would be likely "if France were to attack to Italy" but "very unlikely if Italy made an aggressive war on France."[1042]

Therefore, the limits of the Anglo-Italian agreement of February 1887, which ushered in the first and second Mediterranean agreements of 1887, were crystal-clear at the outset and didn't obviate the chance of an alignment between Britain and France. Salisbury intended to leave "the discretion" of the cabinet "as to whether" Britain would provide Italy with "material cooperation" and characterized "the entente" with Italy as "the *relations plus intimes*"[1043] to "maintain absolute *status quo*" and "the independence of the territories adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea".[1044] Through the Mediterranean agreements of 1887, the British cabinet aspired to "avoid serious danger" of being "left out in isolation in the present grouping of nations" engineered by Bismarck.[1045]

The first Mediterranean entente of 1887, based on the exchanged notes among Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Britain during February and March in 1887, "protected British interests in Egypt, Italian interests in Tripoli, and the interest of all three at Constantinople."[1046] The Reinsurance treaty of June 1887, where Germany and Russia agreed to neutrality "unless Germany attacked France or Russia attacked Austria-Hungary" along with Germany's sanction for "Russia in Bulgaria and at the Straits,"[1047] upheld the last moment of Bismarck's alliance system. After the consultations with Germany, Austria, and Italy in late 1887, Salisbury reluctantly insisted that "we must join" the second Mediterranean entente due to the feeling that Britain might be pulling out Germany's chestnuts out of fire toward Russia.[1048]

The British interest in denying Russia in the Constantinople drove the extension of the *Accord à Trois*. Salisbury conveyed the British adherence on nine points of the second Mediterranean agreement for the sake of "the preservation of the Straits from the domination of any other Power but Turkey" in December. Specifically, "the freedom of the Straits" and the inadmissibility of Turkey's act "to cede or delegate her rights over Bulgaria to any other power" were precisely incompatible with Russia's interests in the Reinsurance treaty.[1049] This was the reason why he wrote, "a thorough understanding with Austria and Italy is so important to us." However, as in the case of the first

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[1042] Salisbury to Queen, February 2, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1930), pp. 268-270.
[1043] Salisbury's Cabinet report to the Queen, February 10, 1887, *in* Ibid., pp. 272-273.
[1044] Salisbury to Corti, February 12, 1887, F.O. in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 450-451.
[1045] Salisbury's Cabinet report to Queen, February 10, 1887, in George Earl Buckle, *op.cit*, (1930), pp. 272-273.
[1046] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit*., (1954, 1973), p. 313.
[1047] Ibid., p. 317.
[1048] Salisbury to White, November 2, 1887, in Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1932), pp. 70-71.
[1049] Salisbury to the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Ambassadors, December 12, 1887, F.O. in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, ed., *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 460-462.

Mediterranean entente, Salisbury qualified that Britain "shall keep friends with France as far as we can do it without paying too dear for it."[1050]

As such, even though Britain plainly leaned more closer toward the Triple Alliance with Russia being the common adversary in the Eastern question for them by 1887 than it had been in 1882-1887, the British cabinet had confined the scope of its commitment for the Mediterranean entente and been amenable to a cooperation, or alignment, with France. But as previously uncovered, the Egyptian question inhibited such a development. In comparison, the Anglo-German cooperation came to a climax in 1887-1890. Though Germany was not a party of the Mediterranean agreements of 1887, the *rapprochement* of the late 1887 elicited the Samoa agreement of 1889 and the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty of 1890. Salisbury disfavored "the alliance of France instead of the alliance of Germany" due to "the evacuation of Egypt."[1051]

One of the motivations Britain had in joining the Mediterranean entente in 1887 was to avert a plausible isolation from Bismarck's multiple alignments. As a consequence, Britain obtained potential allies, or partners at least, Austria-Hungary and Italy, vis-à-vis Russia and France in the Mediterranean. But Britain's alignment with the Triple Alliance, the Anglo-German rapprochement in 1887-1890, and the Franco-Italian rivalry that proceeded together in the Mediterranean cultivated the fertile ground for a Franco-Russian alignment in the later years. The Russo-German relations was already seriously strained from 1889 and Germany's refusal to renew the Reinsurance treaty after the resignation of Bismarck in March 1890 finally unfettered Russia.[1052] France was also alarmed by Italy's bid for an alliance with Britain in 1890-1891.[1053]

When Waddington fretted about Britain's "commitments to Italy" that "weighed on the cordiality of relations between France and England", Salisbury reassured France by reiterating that Britain was "essentially concerned with the status quo in the Mediterranean," particularly "the Black Sea and the Adriatic" and not "the Red Sea," and he acted to restrain "the reckless whims" of Italy and anti-French Crispi and "keep the Italians within bounds."[1054] France wasn't quite assured. Waddington concluded, "if France should attack Italy, the English government would immediately consider and submit to the Parliament the question of whether the English fleet would join the Italian fleet, in other words the question of war on France," and anticipated "the neutrality of England" in case of Italy's attack against France in June 1891.[1055]

As a matter of fact, the Franco-Russian financial relations swiftly advanced from the late 1880s and the bilateral cooperation between the military establishments of Britain and France undoubtedly was "in operation" by the early 1890s. The French diplomats were more sluggish than those on the financial and military front in this trend because of their apprehension that it would "carry the risk of a new war with Germany". But the Russian estrangement from Germany became so evident.[1056] The French squadron visited Kronstadt in July 1891 and the Russian navy in turn arrived at Toulon in October 1893.

[1050] Salisbury to White, November 2, 1887, in Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1932), pp. 70-71.
[1051] Salisbury to Queen, June 10, 1890, in George Earl Buckle, ed., *op.cit*, (1930), pp. 613-614.
[1052] George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890*, (Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 398-401, p. 407.
[1053] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit*., (1954, 1973), pp. 328-333.
[1054] Waddington to Ribot, June 25, 1891, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.8, No. 390, pp. 520-521.
[1055] Waddington to Ribot, June 25, 1891, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.8, No. 390, p. 522.
[1056] George F. Kennan, *op.cit.*, (1979), pp. 401-406.

At last, the Franco-Russian alliance was materialized in January 1894.[1057] Although Salisbury admitted, "our interests lie on the side of the Triple Alliance," he still invited the French fleet to Portsmouth to show "no antipathy to France."[1058]

The Franco-Russian alliance consisted of "a military convention and a *casus foederis,*" which would be automatically in effect in the event of "an attack or mobilization by Germany or Austria" on the continent. Concurrently, although Russia "made clear that it would not support France in a war of revenge for Alsace-Lorraine" and France similarly was unsupportive of Russia "against Britain" in West Asia and East Asia, it was more anti-British at sea as well as on the imperial issues in Africa and Asia than anti-German.[1059] Russia turned into an official ally, not a latent third adversary, for France in 1891-1894, while Britain had Austria-Hungary and Italy as probable allies through the Mediterranean entente. The degree to which France and Britain might perceive Russia as a common adversary virtually evaporated in the second phase.

Until the British alignment with the Mediterranean entente nearly crumbled by 1897, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy were valuable for Britain to counterpoise France and Russia. Salisbury intimated to Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, "as long as France afraid of Germany, she could do mothing to injure us."[1060] Caprivi's new military law designed to "the larger army" the Schlieffen plan "demanded was introduced in November 1892 and passed in July 1893,[1061] which stiffened France's motivation for an alignment with Russia. In light of this, the extent to which Britain treated Germany as the third adversary had been low in the 1890s at least until the collapse of the Anglo-German alliance negotiation of 1901.

Austria-Hungary's strategic significance in the Balkan improved after the demise of Bismarck. Salisbury once called on Austria-Hungary to "take over the role of leader which you might have left to Bismarck had he still been at the helm" in April 1890.[1062] Concerning Italy, despite his diplomatic assurance to France, Salisbury told Deym, the Austrian ambassador to London, that "no Ministry in England could permit the status quo in the Mediterranean to be altered in favor of France," and Deym monitored, "Italy can count upon British support" in case of "a French attack upon the Italian coast" in June 1891.[1063] Salisbury remarked to his successor, Rosebery, "the key is our position towards Italy, and through Italy to the Triple Alliance."[1064] Rosebery stood by Salisbury's advice without offering a binding commitment in 1893-1894.[1065]

[1057] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 208-214.
[1058] Salisbury to Queen, August 22, 1891, in George Earl Buckle, ed., *op.cit*, (1931), pp. 64-65.
[1059] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Edit., Klaus Knorr, *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 211.
[1060] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), pp. 332-333.
[1061] Ibid., pp. 340-345.
[1062] Deym to Kálnoky, Private and Confidential, April 9, 1890, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 464-466.
[1063] Deym to Kálnoky, June 17, 1891, in C. J. Lowe, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 355.
[1064] Extract from Salisbury's message to Lord Rosebery on leaving the F.O., August 18, 1892, in Gwendolen Cecil*, op.cit.*, (1932), pp. 404-405.
[1065] Deym to Kálnoky, Secret, June 14, 1893, Deym to Kálnoky, Secret, June 28, 1893, Deym to Kálnoky, Secret, December 29, 1893, Deym to Kálnoky, Secret, February 7, 1894, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, ed., *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 473-487.

In the second half of the 1890s, another shift in Britain's ally availability originated from the Italian defeat at Adowa in 1896 and Austria's withdrawal from the Mediterranean entente in 1897. With the defeat at Adowa by the Ethiopian forces in March 1896, Italy had lost its "value as a counter" to France's expansion in East Africa and the Upper Nile in spite of its naval presence in the Mediterranean.[1066] More importantly, Austria-Hungary was disappointed by the lukewarm attitude of Britain in its commitment for the Mediterranean entente, especially "the protection of the Straits" from Russia.[1067] Goluchowski, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, refused to renew the Mediterranean agreements[1068] and went further to conclude "the Balkan agreement of May 1897" with Russia.[1069]

In fact, it was Russia that "made all the running" in the early Austro-Russian engagement from the autumn of 1895 to the spring of 1896. Lobanov, Russia's Foreign Minister, provided Golushowski with repetitive assurances that "Russia desired only peace and the preservation of the *status quo.*" They reaffirmed their common interests in "the *status quo* in the Balkans" and in the Eastern question in August 1896.[1070] But Goluchowski hadn't abandoned his hope for a renewal of the Mediterranean entente until January 1897 when Salisbury notified, "it was quite impossible for England to make any such engagement as that which he desired."[1071] The Austro-Russian agreements of 1897 and 1903 eventually developed into the Austro-Russian treaty of neutrality in 1904.[1072]

Even though Britain's participation in the Mediterranean entente counterbalanced France and Russia in the first phase, the Reinsurance treaty of 1887 discouraged Russia from forging a Franco-Russian front by loosely tying it to the Triple Alliance and offering diplomatic support for the Russian sphere of influence in Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia, and the Black Sea until it expired in 1890. As Kennan recounts, "Bismarck's retirement and the ensuing lapse of the Reinsurance treaty" removed "the last serious formal impediment" to the Franco-Russian alliance that formed from 1891 to 1894 in the second phase.[1073] In the third phase, Austria-Hungary retreated from the Mediterranean entente[1074] and the Austro-Russian Balkan agreement of 1897 eliminated Britain's previous alignment partner in 1896-1897.

Other alterations in the peripheral theaters, such as Africa and Asia, hadn't engendered a countervailing impact on the closing alignment opportunity between Britain and France in the late 1890s. As mentioned, Italy's defeat at Adowa in 1896 implied that France would be the only European power that resisted the recognition of Britain's

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[1066] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *op.cit.*, (1958), pp. 222-223. The Italian defeat at Adowa expedited Britain's reconquest of Sudan from March 1896.
[1067] Salisbury to Rumbold, No. 6, very confidential, January 1897, F.O. 78/4884, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 496-499.
[1068] J. A. S. Grenville, *op.cit.,* (1958), p. 366-367.
[1069] Alfred Franzis Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, Vol. 1.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), pp. 184-195.
[1070] Ibid., p. 362.
[1071] Salisbury to Rumbold, No. 6, very confidential, January 1897, F.O. 78/4884, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), p. 497.
[1072] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 212.
[1073] George F. Kennan, *op.cit.*, (1979), p. 410.
[1074] J. A. S. Grenville, *op.cit.,* (1958), p. 367.

exclusive sphere of influence in the Upper Nile. Further, after Austria-Hungary derailed from the Mediterranean entente in 1897, Italy's value as the conduit through which Britain kept the German powers against Russia went stale.[1075] The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 and Japan's victory merely produced the continental alignment among France, Germany, and Russia in East Asia, which coerced Japan into returning some spoils of the war via the Triple intervention of 1895.[1076]

France in 1894-1898 didn't undergo critical changes in terms of alignment as Britain did in the same period. Hanotaux put forward the four objectives of the French foreign policy in 1896, which were maintaining "the general peace," "the *franco-russe,*" "the integrity of the Ottoman Empire", and "French influence in the Near East and the equilibrium in the Mediterranean".[1077] There existed no outstanding common adversary shared with Britain and the Dual Alliance guaranteed at least one official ally for France. Meanwhile, after Russia almost disregarded Britain's proposition for an understanding in the Eastern question and East Asia in January 1898,[1078] alignment opportunities between France and Britain touched bottom. Regrettably, Russia turned out to be an unavailable alliance at the moment of the Fashoda crisis in 1898.

Germany and the Entente Cordiale: The re-opening of alignment opportunity, 1898-1904

By the time the Marchand mission evoked the Fashoda crisis in the autumn of 1898, Britain's former likely partners, albeit hardly alliance members, Austria-Hungary and Italy, either departed from the Mediterranean entente in 1897 or was expelled from the theater of East Africa in 1896. France's sole alliance, Russia, was not obliged to come to the aid for France by the *casus foederis,* which would go into effect should Germany or Austria attack or mobilize. More fundamentally, as Taylor pinpoints, Russia's interest in the Anglo-French conflict over Egypt was as trivial as the Anglo-German conflict over Transvaal. When visiting Paris in October 1898, Muraviev gave "vague assurances" and a hollow remark that "Russia might find a chance to reopen the question of Egypt in the future."[1079]

Germany was the absolute third adversary in France's home theater but Britain's alignment policy vis-à-vis Germany was undecided, if not equivocal, by late 1898 as the Anglo-German alliance negotiation of 1901 displayed.[1080] In effect, as Salisbury exhorted Courcel, Germany, Italy, and Belgium had already conceded the British right over the Upper Nile and Egypt in the Anglo-German agreement of July, the Anglo-Italian protocol of 1891, and the Anglo-Congolese Convention of 1894 respectively.[1081]

[1075] C. J. Lowe, *op.cit.,* (1965), pp. 116-118.
[1076] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit.,* (1954, 1973), p. 357.
[1077] Jerome Greenfield, "Gabriel Hanotaux and French Grand Strategy, 1894-1898," *The International History Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3, (2016), p. 462.
[1078] Salisbury's venture to reach an understanding with Russia with respect to the Ottoman Empire and the Chinese Empire in January 1898 was unsuccessful due to Russia's previous alignment with Germany in East Asia from the late 1897. Salisbury to O'Coner, Tel. No. 22, Secret, January 25, 1898, F.O. 65/1557, in Harold Temperley and Lilliam M. Penson, *op.cit.*, (1938, 1966), pp. 499-501.
[1079] A.J.P. Taylor, *op.cit., (*1954, 1973), p. 381.
[1080] Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*, (London: Ashfield Press, 1987), pp. 223-250.
[1081] Courcel to Delcassé, October 6, 1898, *D.D.F.*, 1e série, 1871-1900. T.14, No. 414, p. 633.

Therefore, alignment opportunity between Britain and France was exceptionally more closed not only in the theater of France's geographical expansion, namely East Africa and Egypt, but also in their central theater, Europe, by late 1898 than that in the past years since 1882.

Nonetheless, the Anglo-French agreement of 1899 in the aftermath of France's withdrawal from Fashoda in 1898 smoothed the path to an Anglo-French alignment. Germany's "inauguration of a full-scale Weltpolitik" as well as "beginnings of the battlefleet,"[1082] and more crucially, the breakdown of the Anglo-German alliance negotiation in 1901, markedly augmented the degree to which Britain reckoned with Germany as the pressing third adversary in 1902-1904. From 1898, the British Naval Intelligence Department "formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities" and motivated the Admiralty to reconsider Germany's rising naval threat.[1083] Besides, Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, discovered "the German price" for an alliance, Britain's participation in the Triple Alliance, was "too high" in 1901.[1084]

In May 1901, Salisbury already regarded that "the liability of having to defend the German and Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of having to defend the British Isles against France" in weighing the costs and benefits of aligning with the Triple Alliance. Though the Boxer uprising of 1899 created incentives to cooperate in one of the peripheral theaters and led to the Anglo-German agreement of 1900, or the Yangtze Agreement,[1085] Lansdowne ultimately objected to "joining the Triple Alliance" given "the impossibility" of defining the proper definition of the *casus foederies* that would be neither "rigid" nor "vague" and "the certainty of alienating France and Russia" in November 1901.[1086] With the key impediment of an alignment with France eliminated in 1898-1899, Britain was able to weigh the better alternative.

As the German naval threat became clearer, the Admiralty spurred the cabinet to "release vessels" from the Asian theater for the defense of home and the Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in January 1902.[1087] By October 1902, Selborne, the First Lord, was convinced that "the composition of the new German fleet" was "designed for a possible conflict with the British fleet" and could not be "designed for a future war between Germany and France and Russia," urging the cabinet to not dismiss the German menace.[1088] Delcassé similarly feared the German advance along the Adriatic sea, which might endanger the status quo in the Mediterranean, and succeeded in inducing Russia to modify the *casus foederis* in a manner that would apply to the European balance beyond Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1899.[1089]

[1082] Paul M. Kennedy, *op.cit.*, (1987), pp. 223-224, pp. 236-250.
[1083] Matthew S. Seligmann, "Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898-1906", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 6, (2012), pp. 861-886.
[1084] Samuel R. Williamson, *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914*, (London: Ashfield Press, 1990), pp. 1-3.
[1085] G. P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, ed., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, *Vol. 2, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Franco-British Entente*, (London, 1927), pp. 1-3.
[1086] Memorandum by Lansdowne, November 11, 1901, in Ibid., pp. 76-79.
[1087] Samuel R. Williamson, *op.cit.,* (1990), pp. 3-4.
[1088] Extract from Selborne's Cabinet Memorandum on 'Naval Estimates, 1903-1904', October 10, 1902, Cabinet Print in P.R.O., Cab. 37/63 No. 142, in in Kenneth Bourne, *op.cit.,* (1970), pp. 478-479.
[1089] Samuel R. Williamson, *op.cit*., (1990), p. 5.

Alignment opportunity between Britain and France in 1898-1904 dramatically rebounded as Germany's continental and naval menace became salient. In 1902-1904, the Anglo-French relations turned "increasingly friendly" as they engaged in the negotiations over Morocco where Britain consented to exclude Germany from Morocco in exchange for France's admission of the British sphere of influence in Egypt. Finally, the Entente Cordiale of April 1904 resolved a range of the colonial issues and resulted in the Anglo-French alignment that the Egyptian question thwarted in 1882-1898.[1090] While Russia and Germany failed to be aligned with Britain in 1898-1901, the common adversaries in the central theater and peripheral theater gave rise to Britain's re-alignment with France and Japan in 1902-1904.

5.5. Conclusion: How France's peripheral expansion activated the preventive motivation

Since France had been unable to close the naval power gap with Britain throughout the years between 1882 and 1904, the level of Britain's preventive war motivation could have been lower during these years than that of Britain's preventive war motivation in the early 1860s. However, the probability of a war between Britain and France was much greater by 1898 than that in the early 1860s. This chapter shows that the direction of France's expansion towards the Upper Nile, Britain's expectations about its contagion effect on the Upper Nile and Egypt and closed alignment opportunities in Europe and the Mediterranean brought about and almost activated Britain's untypical preventive motivation. The geographical dispersion of naval forces and a challenger's third naval ally can sometimes generate the untypical preventive motivation.

Britain's stronger resource-extraction capacity was manifested in the Northbrook program of 1884, the Naval Defense Act of 1889, and the Spencer Program of 1893. Meanwhile, though the political rise of *The Jeune École* was intermittent and inconsistent, the French navy devised an asymmetric naval strategy and allied with Russia to cope with Britain's superior navy in the event of a crisis or war especially in the Mediterranean. In this regard, France had balanced against the leading sea power despite its weaker resource-extraction capacity and Britain's naval buildup was scheduled and implemented to meet the maritime combination of France and Russia after 1893. The Mediterranean theater became the most important theater within Britain's peripheral theaters and the British untypical preventive motivation should be explained against this backdrop.

	A challenger's gain of interest and prestige from naval armament and geographical expansion		
The leading sea power's loss of interest and prestige from naval and geographical expansion		Low	High
	Low	[1882-1887] [1899-1904] [1887-1890] [1890-1894]	
	High	[1894-1898]	

Figure. 20. The second Anglo-French dyad, 1882-1904

[1090] *Ibid.,* pp. 7-10.

By taking the direction of a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expectations about the contagion effect seriously, An Interactive Theory of Power Projection also accounts for why Britain's untypical preventive motivation was deactivated by France's expansion into West Africa but activated by France's intrusion to the Upper Nile in the same year, 1898. This was because Britain's first line of naval defense shifted away from Constantinople to Alexandria, Egypt, from 1895-1898, and expectations about the contagion effect on the Upper Nile, and hence Egypt, was high whereas the French expansion into West Africa was conceived to be of little importance in terms of the contagion effect on naval defense. Fashoda itself was distant from Alexandria but it was the direction of the French expansion toward Egypt that activated the preventive motivation.

Lastly, the closing and re-opening of alignment opportunities were also decisive from 1891-1898 and 1898-1904 respectively. In brief, Britain's alignment with the Mediterranean entente and Britain's traditional policy against Russia rendered alignment opportunity open between Britain and France from 1882-1887. But Bismarck's fall, the demise of the Mediterranean entente, the Franco-Russian alliance, and the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897, closed alignment opportunity between them from 1890-1898, while the Egyptian question became increasingly intertwined with such re-alignments. Eventually, the settlement of the Fashoda crisis, the naval rise of Germany, and the fallout of the Anglo-German alliance negotiation swiftly re-opened alignment opportunity between Britain and France from 1898-1904, bringing their naval security competition to an end.

Chapter 4. The U.S.-Japan dyad, 1921-1941

6. The Origins of the Asia-Pacific War Revisited, 1921-1941: The Paradox of Peripheral Expansion, The Contagion Effect, and The Closing of Alignment Opportunity

Introduction: The paradox of peripheral expansion

A naval challenger is at times emboldened by the underestimation that the leading sea power would not go far as to consider the use of force in its peripheral theater, expecting a weak resolve in the periphery.[1091] Yet, the leading sea power at times betrays the challenger's belief under certain conditions by resolutely taking risks of fighting a war in the peripheral theater. It may be coined as the paradox of peripheral expansion since the crisis escalation does in part originate from a challenger's underestimation of the leading sea power's resolve in the peripheral theater. The settlement of the Washington system and its descent into the Asia-Pacific War is another prime case in which Japan's expansion into the leading sea power's peripheral theater finally met with the latter's firm and robust determination by late 1941.

From the standpoint of power transitions theories, the U.S.-Japan dyad in the interwar period may be less mystifying than the previous cases of the Crimean system and the Fashoda crisis of the 19th century. Admittedly, a strategic settlement was attained under the conditions of high naval disparity and Japan's limited expansion in the peripheral theater of the leading sea power through the Washington system from 1921-1934. The foundations of the Washington system were eroded by the closing naval power gap and Japan's expansion on multiple fronts from 1934-1941. Nevertheless, the ratio of naval capabilities between the U.S. and Japan was 0.326 to 0.234 by 1941 and there was no near naval parity.[1092] Besides, the Asia-Pacific remained the secondary theater for the U.S. compared to the Europe-Atlantic in 1941.[1093]

On the other hand, the U.S.-Japan dyad from 1921-1941 is puzzling from the systemic anticipation of the balance of power theory because a naval bipolarity in the Asia-Pacific ended up with the major war by 1941. Under what conditions does the leading sea power's expectation about the adverse effect of peripheral expansion grow so salient as to be willing to use coercion and force? Why does a challenger fail to reorient the direction of its territorial expansion despite the foreseeably high geopolitical risks? This chapter seeks to address these questions by clarifying the underlying and immediate

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[1091] In the French case during the Fashoda crisis, the presence of the Franco-Russian alliance gave rise to France's false hope that Britain would not seek a war against both France and Russia in the peripheral theater. On the other hand, some of the Japanese middle-echelon Army officers misperceived that Britain and the U.S. could be dealt with separately in the event of their southward advance in Asia. Both France and Japan failed to come to grips with the fact that not all regions in the peripheral theaters were considered trivial.

[1092] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,* (1988), p. 124.

[1093] The American War Plan prior to the Asia-Pacific War, Plan D or Plan Dog, envisioned "a strong offensive in the Atlantic in conjunction with the British and a defensive campaign in the Pacific." Building on the Plan D, the Joint Board approved a paper on "the National Defense Policy of the United States" in late December 1940 and President Roosevelt approved "the instructions" of the U.S. war strategy on January 26th 1941. Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1941-1945: The Test of Battle*, (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 6-9.

conditions of the Asia-Pacific War by investigating the variation in Japan's power projection as well as the reactions of the U.S. in the midst of a naval power shift in the Pacific theater. This chapter proceeds with three following sections.

First, I examine how the balance of resource-extraction capacities shifted from asymmetry to symmetry from the years between 1922 and 1934 to those between 1934 and 1941, giving rise to the high preventive motivation. The naval power gap was narrowed by Japan's second building program of 1934 and the third replenish program of 1937. These were countered by the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934, the Naval Act of 1938, and the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940. The asymmetric balance of the 1920s turned into the symmetric balance since the high political-economic capacity of both great powers enabled their naval buildups in the aftermath of the Great Depression of 1929. The underlying condition for the high preventive motivation was solidified.

Second, I argue that the American expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense in the Asia-Pacific theater were reinforced when Japan's series of expansions turned out to be clearly oriented towards the Southeast Asia and the South Sea within the peripheral theater. In spite of Japan's highly centralized resource-extraction, the U.S. inhibited Japan from surpassing the U.S. in naval capabilities by passing the aforementioned acts from 1934-1941. Nevertheless, the geographical dispersion of U.S. naval forces across the Atlantic and Pacific theaters resulted in a naval parity at the regional level. Hence, the Southeast Asia and South Sea were of higher strategic and deterrent values in connection with the first line of defense in the Pacific theater and the Allied forces from 1939 to 1941.

Third, I demonstrate that the closing of alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan acutely occurred from 1936 to 1941. Once the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty was replaced by the multilateral treaties of the Washington system in 1921-1922, the potential third adversaries of Japan had been China and the Soviet Union, which could be the probable allies or partners of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific in addition to Britain and France in Europe. As Japan launched a chain of invasions against China and Soviet Russia from 1931 to 1939, the U.S. and Japan hadn't shared a clear common third adversary with the U.S. With Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland and the Tripartite Pact of 1940, the alignment opportunity closed further. The fall of France and Netherlands in 1940, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 1941, and Nazi's attack against the Soviet Union also deprived the U.S. of available allies in Asia except Britain.

6.1. Expectations of the existing theories regarding the U.S.-Japan dyad, 1921-1941

Hegemonic shift theories and balance of power theory

Whereas systemic anticipations of the balance of power theory mostly dovetail with the two Anglo-French dyads during the 19th century, hegemonic shift theories are better positioned to come to grips with the U.S.-Japan dyad of the 20th century. The balance of power theory expects that a naval bipolarity in the Asia-Pacific theater would be conducive to stability by 1941, while power transition theories posits that the closing of naval gap Would increase the likelihood of a conflict by strengthening a rising power's dissatisfaction and the leading power's preventive motivation. But both theories do not concern the most proximate conditions of a war and strategic settlement. The balancing

theory of Levy and Thompson does not fare well, too. Japan's naval buildup primarily targeted the U.S. and Japan formed a coalition-balancing.

The liberal-rationalist framework and trade expectations theory

Fearon's original rationalist explanations for war help explain the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific war given the two states' inability to credibly commit themselves to a mutually preferred bargain in the context of a power shift. The core logic and implication of commitment problem is consistent with hegemonic shift theories in this regard. However, the rationalist framework is incapable of making sense of how the commitment problem could be resolved by the Washington naval system from 1921-1934, while hegemonic shift theories could explain the Washington naval system as an extension of the central international system in the periphery after the First World War. On the other hand, Schultz's liberal-rationalist framework expects that the domestically united resolve of the U.S. would send a costly signal to Japan.

When it comes to Japan, the U.S. Congress, including isolationists, was not internally much divided especially from 1939-1941. Though the undivided domestic support for coercive measures to deter Japan in these years should have generated a credible and costly signal to Japan, Japan didn't back down but reacted with a more hostile decision. The liberal-rationalist framework is ill-positioned to account for a resolutely revisionist state's behavior that could not be altered by a costly signal. Copeland's trade expectations theory expects that U.S. economic sanctions, such as the passage of U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, the moral embargo of 1938, and the abrogation of U.S.-Japan commercial treaty of 1939, would bring about Japan's negative trade expectations that in turn would lead to its belligerent actions.[1094]

Among others, Copeland argues that "the deepest fall in Japanese trade expectations began only after 1939 with Washington's ending of the US-Japanese trade treaty and its increasingly severe restrictions on raw material exports." Further, he claims that such actions led Japan to think that "Japan might have to initiate war south and not just north against the Soviet Union."[1095] However, not to mention the Manchurian invasion of 1931 was unilaterally engineered by the Kwantung Army, not as a response to the U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariff, a series of economic sanctions hadn't seriously dealt a severe blow to Japan's wartime efforts until the total oil embargo and asset freeze by mid 1941.[1096] Japan's redirection of expansion had more to do with its underestimation of U.S. maritime interest in the South than its falling trade expectations.

Moreover, his emphasis on the Russian factor is off the mark or misleading. He comments, "war with the U.S., just like the war with China in 1937, was always an undesired sideshow to the main event, the reduction of Russian power in the Far East along with the protection of Japan's economic and strategic flank." Such an assessment is

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[1094] Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and the Grand Strategies of Germany and Japan, 1925-1941", in Jeffrey W. Taliferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, Steven E. Lobell, ed., *The Challenge of Grand Strategy: The Great Powers and the Broken Balance between the World Wars*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 120-123, pp. 135-146, Dale C. Copeland, *op.cit.,* (2015), pp. 159-161, pp. 175-177, pp.

[1095] Dale C. Copeland, *op.cit.,* (2015), pp. 182-183.

[1096] This point will be elaborated in the following analysis. Edward S. Miller, *Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan before Pearl Harbor*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007).

inconsistent with the actual rationale behind Japan's strategic redirection of geographical expansion from the North to the South from 1939-1941. For Japan, the Sino-Japanese war from 1937 and its advance towards the South were by no means "an undesired side show." Rather, because they were "the main event" Japan had repetitively engaged with the Soviet Union from 1939 and signed the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 1941, which Japan kept until the Soviet's attack in August 1945.

Theories of domestic pathologies

A number of the existing literature ascribes Japan's geographical expansion in the 1930s to domestic, bureaucratic, organizational, local, or psychological pathologies,[1097] Japan's territorial expansion may not be all reducible to pathologies in consideration of the wide domestic political support and not inadvertently redirected southward advance from 1934-1941. For instance, though Japan's expansion was initiated independently executed by the Kwantung Army in 1931,[1098] Japan's strategy converged on the penetration into the South from 1939-1941. As a consequence, Japan ceased moving toward the North against the Soviet Union with the Kwantung Army's defeat in 1939 as well as the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of April 1941.[1099] These critical decisions could not be seen as domestic pathologies if they were widely popular and supported among elites and the public at the domestic level.

An interactive theory of power projection

An interactive theory of power projection expects that the level of the preventive motivation would be lower due to the naval ratio embodied in the Washington naval system as well as the asymmetric balance of resource-extraction capacities from 1921-1934. Also, it anticipates that the low preventive motivation is less likely to be activated because Japan's geographical expansion was concentrated in the peripheral theaters without the expected contagion effect from 1921-1934. By contrast, an interactive theory assumes that the level of the preventive motivation would heighten as the balance of resource-extraction capacities becomes more symmetric from 1934-1941 and U.S. naval forces are dispersed in both the Asia-Pacific and the Atlantic theaters. The closing of alignment opportunity in Asia and Europe would additionally increase the likelihood of a confrontation.

My theory posits that Japan's strategic redirection of geographical expansion from the continental North to the maritime South would generate expectations about the contagion effect in the Asia-Pacific theater and activate the high preventive motivation of

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[1097] Charles A. Kupchan, *op.cit*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1994), p. 316, p. 299, Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 112-113, Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 49, S.C.M. Paine, *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*, (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 106, Nicholas D. Anderson, "Push and Pull on the Periphery: Inadvertent Expansion in World Politics," *International Security,* Vol. 47, No. 3, (Winter 2022/2023), pp. 136-173. Jeffrey Taliaferro, *op.cit.*, (2005), p. 3, pp. 51-54, pp. 97-99.

[1098] Nicholas D. Anderson, *op.cit.,* (Winter 2022/2023), pp. 161-166.

[1099] Brian Bridges, "Yoshizawa Kenkichi and the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact Proposal," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (1980), pp. 124-125.

the U.S. from 1939-1941. Few foregoing research address the variation in a challenger's power projection as the central driver of a conflict. The theories of Taliaferro and Kupchan may come close to my theory in that they incorporate the center-periphery division to explain great powers' overexpansion in the peripheries.[1100] But alongside variation in a challenger's expansion, I bring in the leading sea power's expectations about the contagion effect even in the peripheral theaters. A focus on these interactive dynamics may help resolve the debate on Roosevelt's intention associated with the drastic shift in the U.S. response in July 1941.[1101]

6.2. the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval defense: asymmetric [1921-1934] ⟶ symmetric [1934-1941]

The size of the U.S. economy, industrial capacity, and military potential far outweighed the Japanese counterpart throughout the decades in the interwar period. However, as Kennedy comments, "military potential is not the same as military power."[1102] Military potential needs to be translated into military power, such as naval capabilities, through the resource-extraction process that hinges upon the state institution and political support for nationalism or imperialism. Especially, while Gilpin's statement that "the state could not exist, in fact, without the supporting ideology of nationalism" is reasonable,[1103] the forms of nationalism, or internationalism, may be either expansionist or non-expansionist.[1104] From 1921-1931, the political balance of the U.S. and Japan was relatively disposed toward non-expansionism.[1105]

American isolationism is an instance of non-expansionism. Although the U.S. primarily wielded its economic and financial power, or "banks rather than tanks," to

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[1100] Jeffrey Taliaferro, *op.cit.,* (2005), pp. 29-54, pp. 94-99. Japan's expansion from 1940-1941 is one of the cases of great powers' involvement in the periphery from the theoretical lens of Taliaferro.

[1101] Trachtenberg and Schuessler doubt the veracity of Roosevelt's remarks that he wanted to avoid a war in the Pacific given the oil embargo in July 1941 and the American demand of Japan's withdrawal from China at the end of the negotiation. In contrast, Reiter argues that Roosevelt attempted to evade a war in Asia "if possible" by deterring Japan. Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 84-87, Marc Trachtenberg, "Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Security Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (January-March 2007), pp. 22-29, John M. Schuessler, "The Deception Dividend: FDR's Undeclared War," *International Security*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 133-165, Dan Reiter and John M. Schuessler, "Correspondence: FDR, U.S. Entry into World War II, and Selection Effects Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 176-185, Dan Reiter, "Democracy, Deception, and Entry into War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4, (2012), pp. 615-621, John M. Schessler, *Deceit on the Road to War: Presidents, Politics, and American Democracy*, (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2015), pp. 46-58. H-Dipo/ISSF Roundtable 5-4, "Democracy, Deception, and Entry into War," H-Net, May 17, 2013, https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Roundtable-5-4.pdf. Darnton takes an issue with their sampling of the primary sources and discounts the arguments of Trachtenberg and Schuessler. Christopher Darnton, "Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II," *International Security*, Vol. 42, No. 3, (Winter 2017/2018), pp. 84-126.

[1102] Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1987, 1989), p. 198.

[1103] Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 83.

[1104] On the other hand, internationalism can also be of expansionism or non-expansionism depending on whether the primary means utilized for internationalism are associated with military power or not.

[1105] Albeit not precisely identical, what I describe as the domestic political balance is comparable to "social purpose" or "domestic distribution of power" in the expressions of Ruggie and Gilpin. Robert Gilpin, *op.cit.,* (1987), p. 72, John G. Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 1982), pp. 382-385.

promote its interest abroad under the influence of isolationism in the early phase of the interwar era, it would be an overstatement that "American isolationism is a myth"[1106] since the allocation of resources for military capabilities and power projection is the demarcation line between expansionist nationalism and non-expansionist nationalism. The five-power treaty famously restricted the relative ratio of capital ships strength among the U.S., Britain, France, and Italy to 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 in tonnage, initiating a ten year 'holiday' of the construction of capital ships and resolving the latent commitment problem[1107] between the U.S. and Japan in the 1920s.[1108]

Japan's non-expansionist imperialism and asymmetric naval strategy, 1921-1933

The Japanese leaders accepted "a smaller ratio for every category except submarines" at the first London conference of 1930 despite the extended backlash of the fleet faction[1109] that represented the lingering domestic force of expansionist imperialism within the Japanese navy.[1110] While naval parity was agreed between the U.S. and Britain for "every type of warship," Japan was conferred upon a 60% ratio in heavy cruisers as well as an overall ratio of 69.75% vis-à-vis the U.S. and 67.9% vis-à-vis Britain in auxiliary vessels.[1111] Since the foundation of the Washington naval system in 1921, the clamors of naval expansion in the U.S. navy as well as the Japanese navy had been sidelined by the proponents of non-expansionist nationalism or imperialism of the executive and legislative until the early 1930s.

To illustrate, naval construction programs of the 1920s proposed by the Navy General Staff "were subjected to successive diminution" and "outright rejection by the Navy Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Cabinet, and the Diet."[1112] In addition to

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[1106] Bear F. Braumoeller, "The Myth of American isolationism," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 349-371. Some historians, Warren Cohen and Melvyn Leffler, have a similar understanding that the U.S. exerted a sizable influence through its financial power instead of military might. Charles A. Kupchan, *Isolationism: A History of America's Efforts to Shield Itself from the World*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 30.

[1107] Commitment problem mostly prevents the established power and a rising power from reaching a mutually preferred bargain because "they cannot trust each other to uphold the deal for structural reason", such as "offensive advantages, preventive motivation over power shifts, and strategic territory." James D. Fearon, *op.cit.,* (1995), pp 401-409.

[1108] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 166. Paul Kennedy, *op.cit.,* (1987, 1989), p. 277, Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan,* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 520-521.

[1109] Sadao Asada qualifies that depicting "factions" and "cliques" of the Japanese navy during the 1930s as "formal," "fixed," "or institutional subgroups" would be "misleading." Nevertheless, his analysis presents that whereas the "administrative group" in the Navy Ministry, the treaty faction, and the Anglo-American faction were relatively moderate elites who admitted the imperative of naval arms limitation, the "command group" in the Navy General Staff, the fleet faction, and the German faction were hardliners who staunchly opposed the Washington naval system. Sadao Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 225-232.

[1110] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), pp. 213-214.

[1111] Kobayashi Tatsuo, "The London Naval Treaty, 1930," in James William Morley, eds., *Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 20-27.

[1112] Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Naval Construction, 1919-1941," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit*, (2001), p. 95.

Japan's status motivation to be distinguished from the rest of Asia after its acerbic recognition of the racial hierarchy at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,[1113] this was the domestic political background against which the Japanese naval and civilian leaders compromised with the U.S. over the 1907 Imperial National Defense Policy of "a 70% naval ratio as a strategic imperative" vis-à-vis the U.S. as the Japanese navy's hypothetical enemy as well as "a building plan for an 'eight battleships and eight battle cruisers' fleet" at the Washington naval conference of 1921-1922.[1114]

Prime Minister Hara Kei intentionally appointed Kato Tomosaburo, Navy minister and "the architect of eight-eight fleet plan," as chief of the Japanese delegation to the Washington naval conference, for the sake of "civilian control by proxy." Although the special committee on arms limitation of the navy submitted a resolution that reaffirmed the absolute necessity of "a naval ratio of 70% or above vis-à-vis the American navy," Kato's prestige and incomparable political clout enabled him to "simply ignored this position paper."[1115] Kato considered a prevention of additional bases of the U.S. in the Pacific, particularly Philippines and Guam, more crucial to the Pacific Strategy than bargains concerning fleet ratios and induced the U.S. agree to the non-fortification of bases in the Pacific except Hawaii, Singapore, and Japan.[1116]

The Japanese cabinet appreciated Kato's leadership at the Washington naval conference and appointed him as Prime Minister in June 1922. He simultaneously served as Navy minister until his health lasted by August 1923. Japan followed through on its commitment by suspending the 8-8 fleet plan and cancelling two 48,000-ton battleships and four 46,000-ton battle cruisers. Instead of an 8-8 fleet, Japan ended up with having "a 6-4 fleet (6 battleships, four battle cruisers) to be supported by three carriers." The Japanese naval budget dramatically shrunk and "the percentage of naval expenditures in the national budget" fell from 31% in 1921 to 21% in 1923.[1117] Despite the fleet faction's resistance, Kato Tomosaburo firmly held, "avoidance of war with American through diplomatic means is the essence of the national defense."[1118]

The Japanese fleet faction was represented by Vice Admiral Kato Kanji, then chief naval expert in the Japanese delegation at the Washington naval conference, and constantly chafed at non-expansionist leaders' concessions at the subsequent Geneva and London conferences from 1927-1930. He was promoted to vice chief of the Naval General Staff in May 1922 but still overruled by the elder Kato who used to aver, "as long as I am alive and kicking, I will never allow the Naval General Staff to have its own

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[1113] Dr. Morinosuke Kajima, *The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922*, (Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1980), pp. 411-413, Hughes memo for information of E.T. Williams and Stanley K. Hornbeck, January 26, 1922, 793.94/1265, SDA, Delegates to Uchida, December 5, 1921; Shidehara to Uchida, January 26, 1922, Cited in Sadao Asada, "Between the Old Diplomacy and the New, 1918-1922: The Washington System and the Origins of Japanese-American Rapprochement," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2006A), pp. 227-228.

[1114] Sadao Asada, "From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921-1930," in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer, *The Washington Conference, 1921-22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability, and the Road to the Pearl Harbor*, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 148.

[1115] Sadao Asada, "The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 86.

[1116] Dr. Morinosuke Kajima, *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 487-495. Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 520-521.

[1117] Sadao Asada, *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006B), pp. 99-100.

[1118] Sadao Asada, *op.cit*., (1994), pp. 152-153.

way."[1119] For Kato Kanji, Japan should be entitled to parity by the doctrine of "equality of armament" and "points of national honor" as a sovereign nation.[1120] The 70% ratio, not to speak of the 60% ratio of the Washington naval system, per se was a massive compromise on the part of Japan for Kanto Kanji.

The Japanese navy appeared to have obtained the information about the War Plan Orange of the U.S. Navy by 1917 and secured "a copy of a confidential war plan" of the U.S. that outlined "the operation for a transpacific offensive." The Naval General Staff's strategic rationale of the 70% ratio was predicated on these intelligence reports that assumed that the U.S. "required at least a three-to-two superiority over Japan to advance its main fleet to the Western Pacific and cut off Japan's vital seaborne traffic for an economic blockade."[1121] Under the international and domestic constraints on naval mobilization, the Japanese navy espoused the asymmetric strategy and naval buildup to go the extra mile to countervail its numerical inferiority in capital ships, as the *Jeune École* of France did in the late 19th century.

The Navy Minister that succeeded the elder Kato, Tararabe Takeshi, lacked the predecessor's charismatic political clout and remained in office from 1923 to 1927. In the meantime, Kato Kanji and Suetsugu, Chief of the Operations Division, kept building up his fleet faction in the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry. Abo Kiyokazu and Osumi Mineo served as Vice Minister of the Navy Minister from 1924-1925 and 1925-1928 and were allies of Kato Kanji in the Navy Ministry.[1122] Kato Kanji and Suetsugu managed to single out the U.S. as "hypothetical enemy" number one for both the navy and the army in the 1923 National Defense Policy alongside the representatives of the Army General Staff, excluding the elder Kato's principle of avoidance of war with the U.S.[1123]

As a consequence of "the Washington ratio of 60 percent," the General Plan for Strategy of 1923 centered around "the attrition strategy" as a precondition for "interceptive operations and a decisive fleet encounter." The attrition strategy was to be implemented "through repeated torpedo attacks by submarines" to wear down the American main fleet on its transpacific passage. The strategic plan was conceived to proceed in three stages, "scouting, attrition strategy, and a decisive fleet encounter."[1124] This asymmetric strategy was worked out by Rear Admiral Suetsugu, Commander of the First and Second Submarine Divisions from 1923-1925. Accordingly, Japan constructed a number of ocean-going fleet submarines equipped with reliable torpedoes for the attrition strategy after 1924.[1125]

[1119] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), pp. 100-101.
[1120] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.,* (1993), p. 87.
[1121] Ibid., p. 84.
[1122] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (1994), p. 158.
[1123] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), p. 101. Kato Tomosaburo highlighted the strategic imperative of avoiding a war with the U.S. because the national strategy should "operate on the basis of total mobilization" to "maximize the national strength," including economic and industrial power, and not simply military power. He noted that Japan might not be able to "cope with further American naval expansion" given its "financial difficulties in completing her own 8-8 programs." Admiral Kato Tomosaburo (Washington) to Navy Vice Minister Ide (Tokoy), December 27, 1921, Cited in Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka*, (London, Henley and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 289-290.
[1124] Ibid., pp. 102-103.
[1125] Ibid., pp. 107-108.

The Japanese navy directed its endeavors to counterbalance "quantitative inferiority" with "better weapons and better tactics under the principle of using a few to conquer many."[1126] In addition to submarines, cruisers and destroyers lied at the center of the Japanese navy's strategic and tactical planning. Specifically, the heavy cruiser was conceived to substitute the battleship in a hypothetical decisive battle and play a central role in "Japanese torpedo operations" and the destroyer was designed to be "a highly specialized type of attack vessel." For example, the Japanese cruisers of the *Yubari*, *Furutaka*, and *Myoko* classes in the 1920s spearheaded the reform in cruiser design, setting off a world-wide cruiser competition. Furthermore, Japan had built the 24 destroyers of the *Fubuki* class from 1926 to 1931.[1127]

Japan's asymmetric naval strategy and construction in conjunction with "relentless night drills" for which Kato Kanji pressed from 1926[1128] were driven by expansionist naval leaders that could not help but admit the Washington naval system due to the remaining political command of non-expansionist elites. Though the policy of financial retrenchment was momentarily reversed by the Kanto earthquake of 1923 with "the expansion of credit via emergency bills," a newly formed coalition cabinet of 1924, led by the Kenseikai party aligned with "urban financiers," again underscored "balancing budgets" as well as the sound balance of payment. Then Finance Minister, Hamaguchi Osachi, strongly argued for "vital importance that we carry out a retrenchment and readjustment of government finance" in July 1924.[1129]

In spite of the opposition of the bureaucracy and the Seiyukai members, the coalition cabinet curtailed 6% of the government budget. After the coalition cabinet collapsed by July 1925, all-Kenseikai cabinet stayed in power until another banking crisis of March 1927,[1130] which seemed to "have claimed 11% of deposits nationwide" and seen 32 banks suspend operations.[1131] Before the banking crisis of 1927 compelled the cabinet's resignation, the Wakatsuki cabinet not only pursued "the final disposition of the bad debts incurred by the Kanto earthquake"[1132] but also placed "the political necessity of cooperating with the U.S." over naval expansion at the Geneva Conference of 1927. It is no wonder that the Japanese navy, the fleet faction in particular, "unwillingly acquiesced in the Government's decision."[1133]

Notably, Prime Minster Wakatsuki carefully selected Admiral Saito, the Admiral with a long career and then incumbent governor-general of Korea, to curb the expected opposition from the hardliners of the navy. The appointment of Saito apparently aroused the fear on the part of Kato Kanji that "an admiral-statesman such as Saito might overrule the narrow strategic views of his naval advisers to reach a political compromise" as Kato Tomosaburo previously did in Washington. His fear materialized when Saito scolded the

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[1126] Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Naval Construction, 1919-1941," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit*, (2001), pp. 96-97.
[1127] Ibid., p. 97.
[1128] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (1994), pp. 160-161.
[1129] Jonathan Kirshner, *Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Univerisity Press, 2007), pp. 62-64.
[1130] Ibid., pp. 64-65.
[1131] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 533-534.
[1132] Masato Shizume, "The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period: Instability in the Financial System and the Impact of the World Depression," *Bank of Japan Review*, (2009), p. 3.
[1133] Sadao Asada, (1994), p. 162.

hardliner's view and made the case for a broader view of defense and national strength that involved "winning greater respect and understanding from the rest of the world." Saito averred, "we should not opportunistically attempt a sudden expansion of our navy in one conference of two."[1134]

Whereas Navy Vice Minister Osumi, an ally of Kato Kanji, denounced any compromise with the 70% ratio and reprimanded Chief Naval Advisor Kobayashi who recommended proposing the 65% ratio by virtue of "Japan's international position," Chief delegates, Saito and Ishii, turned a deaf ear to Osumi's protest and were even willing to "go below 65% to reach a compromise on the maximum ratio acceptable to the U.S.", which they presumed was 63%.[1135] As the Geneva conference broke down due to rift between the U.S. and Britain, the U.S. and Japan did not have to undergo an altercation on the ratio of auxiliary vessels. Instead, Saito was given a chance to play a role of "an honest broker," which Vice Admiral Yamanashi acclaimed as "fair-mindedness" that "enhanced Japan's international prestige and position."[1136]

A short return of the Seiyukai cabinet from 1927-1929 indicated a mild shift in the economic policy and not Japan's departure from the Washington naval system yet. Not only had the Chief Japanese delegates deemed the ratio below 70% in auxiliary warships as acceptable at the Geneva conference, but also the ratios of military expenditures and naval budgets to total government expenditures and national budgets barely diverged from 1927-1929. For example, the percentages of military expenditures to central government expenditures were 30.3%, 29.4%, and 29.5% and those of naval budgets to total national budgets were 14.6%, 14.6%, and 15.2% from 1927 to 1929. It was not until 1933-1934 that the relative ratios of both military expenditures and naval budgets remarkably soared.[1137]

When the Tanaka cabinet fell in July 1929, the cabinet of the Minseito Party that originated from the Kenseikai Party rose to power. Hamaguchi Osachi, the former Finance Minister of the Kenseikai Party, returned to the Minseito cabinet as Prime Minister, promoting fiscal responsibility, austerity measures, and a return to the international gold standard. Inoue Junnosuke, who used to serve as the Bank of Japan and Finance Minister in the early 1920s, became Finance Minister and "was resolute about a deflationary policy," restoring the gold standard in 1930. On the other hand, the Hamaguchi cabinet also brought back Shidehara Kijuro as Foreign Minister to retain "a policy of international cooperation and trade," overriding objections of hardliners in the Navy regarding the deal at the London conference of 1930.[1138]

On the whole, non-expansionist[1139] elites understood that political cooperation with the U.S. was quintessential to ensure "access to international finance and foreign markets" and required military restraint. In this regard, the policies of financial retrenchment and reduced military spending of the cabinets of the Kenseikai and

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[1134] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), pp. 114-116. Saito clearly warned the hardliners by invoking Japan's interest in "continuing to be ranked among the nations supporting peace." Kobayashi Tatsuo, "The London Naval Treaty, 1930," in James William Morley*, op.cit*., (1984), p. 14.

[1135] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B)., pp. 116-120.

[1136] Ibid., p. 121.

[1137] Hugh T. Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in James William Morley, *op.cit.*, (1971), p. 251, Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), p. 297.

[1138] Jonathan Kirshner, *op.cit.,* (2007), pp. 65-66, p. 69, Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), p. 535.

[1139] As previously stated, non-expansionism is defined in military terms and not economic terms.

Minseito clashed with the interests of expansionist elites from the military. As early as 1921, Kato Tomosaburo explicitly mentioned, "we cannot find any country apart from the U.S. which can supply us with a loan."[1140] Japan's foreign policy became increasingly enmeshed with "internal economic conditions" and economic expansion. As such, the authority of the Finance Ministry grew and the Japanese cabinets of the 1920s generally were capable of limiting "the autonomy of the military."[1141]

American isolationism and the Washington Naval System, 1921-1933

In his inaugural address on March 4 of 1921, President Harding announced, "we seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old World. We do not mean to be entangled." Opposing the idea of "a world super government," he asserted, "it is not aloofness, it is security."[1142] Though the U.S. continued to leverage its diplomatic and financial influence in Europe and East Asia,[1143] the Harding administration prioritized "improving the performance of the nation's economy" in the face of an economic downturn at the expense of bolstering the nation's naval strength.[1144] In Gaddis's expression, there was no "significant attempts to shape political-military developments" in Europe on the part of the U.S. after 1920. With regard to Japan's rising navy, the U.S. "focused on handling that problem" through multilateral naval arms limitation treaties.[1145]

Though the U.S. Navy sought to forge "a sense that real threats existed from the Japanese and the British,"[1146] it was Congress that fixed "the size, composition, and command hierarchy of the services" and acted on "trade, arms treaties, international organizations, colonies, and overseas bases." Ironically, Congress and its committees were barely informed of "War Plan Orange," the American war plan against Japan, whose strategic principles had been laid down from 1906-1914.[1147] With the deflated political support for naval buildup and strategic interest in freezing the maritime status quo in the Pacific as well as driving "a wedge into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,"[1148] the Harding administration desired "a negotiated settlement over naval strength."[1149] The Washington system resolved the mostly intractable commitment problem.

[1140] Admiral Kato Tomosaburo (Washington) to Navy Vice Minister Ide (Tokyo), December 27, 1921, Cited in Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 290.
[1141] Yamamura Katsuro, "The Role of The Finance Ministry," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 287-288.
[1142] Warren Harding, "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1921, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-49
[1143] Charles A. Kupchan, *op.cit.*, (2020), pp. 255-268.
[1144] Ibid., p. 257.
[1145] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (New York: Oxford University Press,1997), p. 7.
[1146] Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), p. 153.
[1147] Edward S. Miller, *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 8-10, pp. 16-18.
[1148] Timothy W. Crawford and Khang X. Vu, "Arms Control as Wedge Strategy: How Arms Limitation Deals Divide Alliance," *International Security*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Fall 2021), Pp. 104-111.
[1149] Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), p. 151.

Whereas Wilson "unintentionally" sponsored "the offensive campaign" by approving the 1916 program and neutralizing "Japan's Pacific-island trophies of World War I," the subsequent three Republican presidents of the 1920s were not interested in "war plans and preparations."[1150] By 1921, Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, offered to "scrap all of the United States' 1916 program vessels," establishing the basis of the Washington naval treaties. The naval arms control process "dominated much planning" through the Geneva Conference of 1927 and the first London Conference of 1930. Hughes disregarded most of the U.S. Navy's positions and President Hoover desperately strove to cut a deal with Britain to avert "an expensive cruiser construction race" before the first London Conference in 1930.[1151]

The Washington naval system consisted of the stated Five-Power Treaty, the Four-Power Treaty, and the Nine-Power Treaty in conjunction with the agreement on auxiliary vessels at the first London Conference of 1930. Along with the limitation of the aggregate capital ship tonnage, the Five-Power treaty also stipulated the non-fortification of current naval bases of the U.S., Britain, and Japan in East Asia. The Four-Power Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty were the commitments to the territorial status quo in East Asia, China's territorial integrity, the Open- Door policy and consultations in case of crisis.[1152] Historically, this was an uncommon strategic settlement that addressed almost all sources of the commitment problem, ranging from the naval power shift to the spheres of influence on land and at sea in the Asia-Pacific.

The Washington naval treaties were welcomed by the majority of Americans. The Senate ratified the Five-Power Treaty, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Four-Power Treaty by a vote of 74 to 1, 66 to 0, and 67 to 27 respectively. Drawing on the Washington treaties, President Harding moved on to "cancel" the naval construction plans and "reduce the naval budget."[1153] By April 1922, Congress began to debate reducing the naval budget and the spending on the fleet sharply dropped from $476,775,000 to $312,743,000 between fiscal years 1922 and 1926.[1154] After a sudden death of Harding in 1922, Coolidge succeeded the presidency and adhered to "more naval arms control." Coolidge's priorities were to repay the national debt and curtail taxes. The naval budget consequently reached its nadir of the interwar period in 1926.[1155]

With respect to foreign affairs, Coolidge suggested "one cardinal principle", "an American principle," be that "we attend to our own affairs" and "conserve our own strength" in his first annual message in December 1923. He further insisted on "a drastic but orderly retrenchment" of the government spending because "our main problems are domestic problems" and "financial stability is the first requisite of sounds government."[1156] Depicting "business" as "the chief business of the American

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[1150] Edward S. Miller, (1991), p. 10.
[1151] Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), pp. 151-153.
[1152] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), p. 168.
[1153] Charles A. Kupchan, *op.cit.*, (2020), pp. 263-264.
[1154] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), p. 180.
[1155] Ibid., p. 181. The naval budget plummeted to $318.909,000 by 1926.
[1156] Calvin Coolidge, "First Annual Message," December 6, 1923, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/first-annual-message-20

people,"[1157] Coolidge engaged in dollar diplomacy through the Dawes plan that alleviated Germany's war reparations and J.P. Morgan's investments in Europe and Asia and truncated the budget for the naval construction program.[1158] By virtue of "tax reduction" and financial stability, "naval and military accretions" were discouraged in the 1920s.[1159]

Because the Five-Power Treaty capped the ratio of capital ships and aircraft carrier strength at a level of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 and not cruisers, the U.S. Navy could have alternatively pressed for a larger construction program of cruisers had Congress empathized with its cause. Unfortunately, there was no such a sympathy on the part of Congress from 1922-1926. As the U.S. Navy came to be left behind the British and Japanese in cruiser strength,[1160] the General Board expressed its discontent regarding the cruiser deficiency and demanded 8 new 10,000-ton cruisers for fiscal years 1927 and 1928. Even though Congress "finally approved of eight large Washington-class cruisers" in 1924, Congressional authorizations didn't necessarily guarantee appropriations and Congress was apparently seldom enthusiastic about building the eight cruisers.[1161]

As the British navy kept pace with the French challenge of torpedo boats and cruisers "for trade protection" in the late 19th century, the U.S. Navy would have kept up with the British and the Japanese in the cruiser race in the early 20th century. But Congress ended up financing only one cruiser of the eight authorized cruisers by the end of 1926. This one and only cruiser, one submarine, and six river gunboats were "the totality of American naval construction between 1922 and 1926."[1162] In the meantime, while abiding by the treaties of the Washington naval system, Britain appeared to be "thriving with its cruiser strength" and Japan didn't hesitate to lay down "18 new cruisers," which was "more than the British and Americans combined" from 1919-1924.[1163]

The Admiralty voiced the need to be prepared for a Japan's attack against "our trade and outlying portions of the Empire" in which case "a war with Japan would certainly be a cruiser war of oceanic proportions for the first twelve months."[1164] In a similar vein, the General Board considered a war with Japan more likely than "the possibility of Britain's going to war with the U.S." from 1924-1925. Hence, the General Board wished the U.S. fleet to be sufficiently robust so as to "engage and defeat the Japanese in the Western Pacific" and the Orange War Plans were updated and modified in accordance with this view.[1165] When Thomas Butler, Chairman of the House Naval

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[1157] Calvin Coolidge, "Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D.C.," January 17, 1925, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-american-society-newspaper-editors-washington-dc

[1158] Charles A. Kupchan, *op.cit.*, (2020), pp. 258-259.

[1159] Gerald E. Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931*, (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1963), pp. 105-108.

[1160] Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), pp. 153-154.

[1161] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), pp. 180-181.

[1162] Ibid., 181, Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Edit., Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), p. 154.

[1163] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), pp. 183-184.

[1164] CAB 24/171, "Navy Estimates," February 5, 1925, cited in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), p. 184, p. 203.

[1165] Ibid., p. 182, p. 203.

Affairs Committee, informed Coolidge, "the British had laid down three times as many cruisers as America" by late 1926, Coolidge sought a conference on auxiliary ships.[1166]

Like his two Republican predecessors, President Hoover, a Quaker with pacifist sensibilities, likewise attempted to "spend as little on the armed forces as possible" and search for a solution of the Anglo-American disagreement that the Geneva conference left off.[1167] The economic downturn in late 1929 further led him to "restrain government spending on the fleet," which he deemed "a wasteful drain on the national economy."[1168] Hugh Gibson, Chair of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva Conference, first hinted at "some sort of yardstick" that could accommodate both the American and the British demands in late April 1929.[1169] In his Memorial Day Address, Hoover confirmed the enduring interest in "a reduction of armament" and "a rational yardstick with which to make reasonable comparisons for their naval units and ours."[1170]

With the agreements at the first London conference, Hoover swiftly made additional efforts to "reduce the naval budget." As a result, "naval personnel were reduced by 4,800 and two aircraft carriers, three cruisers, one destroyer, and six submarines" were removed from the Navy's building program. In 1931, Hoover pressed Admiral William Veazie Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations, to further reduce naval spending. During the tenure of Hoover, naval spending declined from $374 million in fiscal year 1930 to $349 million in fiscal year 1933. There existed only a meager gain in cruiser construction for the U.S. Navy.[1171] Japan was also presented with a different formula of compromise in which it would be "given the 10-10-7 ratio for smaller cruisers and destroyers" and "the right to parity" in submarines.

According to the Reed-Matsudaira compromise, the U.S. would be permitted to construct 18 heavy cruisers but each sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth cruiser would not be laid down until 1933, 1934, and January 1, 1935 correspondingly. The Reed-Matsudaira agreement was at odds with "the studies judgment of the General Board and the advice of naval advisers to the delegation." The U.S. navy's view of "the trans-Pacific operations" on the basis of "10,000 cruisers armed with 8-inch guns for defense of Philippines, trade route protection, and carrying a war into the Western Pacific" was rejected by Senator Reed and the State Department.[1172] For instance, Under Secretary of State in 1929, Joseph Cotton, asserted that the U.S. would not need "a navy large enough to defend Philippines" that "would alarm Japan."[1173]

The Chairman of the American delegation at the first London Conference and Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, in large part concurred with Cotton, then the Acting

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[1166] Ibid., p. 186.
[1167] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), p. 210.
[1168] Ibid., p. 247. Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Edit., Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), p. 154.
[1169] Gerald E. Wheeler, *op.cit.*, (1963), p. 156, Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), p. 210.
[1170] Herbert Hoover, "Memorial Day Address," May 30, 1929, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/memorial-day-address-arlington-national-cemetery
[1171] Ibid., pp. 218-219.
[1172] Gerald E. Wheeler, *op.cit.*, (1963), pp. 174-175.
[1173] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State [Cotton], July 1929, D/S, LNC Box 48, Cited in Ibid., p. 175.

Secretary of State in 1930.[1174] In March 1930, Cotton wrote to Stimson that "a compromise with Japan giving her larger cruiser strength and reducing her strength in submarines and destroyers below present suggestions" became "a much less important concession." Cotton sanguinely anticipated, "the Japanese fleet would still be greatly inferior to the American fleet and no national anxiety as to our dominance in the Pacific in case of controversy need be caused by it."[1175] Though the General Board regretted being unable to "build 21 heavy cruisers", not a few members of the Navy Department "strongly supported the treaty when it was under consideration in the Senate."[1176]

In spite of the non-expansionist proclivity of the three Republican administrations and Congress, the American resource-extraction capacity for naval mobilization in the 1920s was generally greater than the Japanese counterpart given the asymmetric industrial potential as well as Japan's "numerical inferiority" in capital ships and auxiliary vessels assigned by the Washington naval treaties of 1921-1922 and the Reed-Matsudaira agreement of 1930. Since the domestic political arrangements in both the U.S. and Japan were comparably poised for non-expansionist nationalism or imperialism, the *ex-ante* asymmetric naval power balance had been maintained and not significantly altered. But, from the 1930s onwards, Japan's expansionist imperialism markedly mounted in a fashion that offset its smaller industrial potential.



Figure. 21. The balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval armament, 1921-1941[1177]

Japan's expansionist imperialism and defiance of the Washington Naval System, 1934-1941

[1174] Ibid., p. 176. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 191-192.
[1175] The Acting Secretary of State [Cotton] to the Chairman of the American Delegation [Stimson], Washington, March 5, 1930, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1930, Vol. 1,* p. 46.
[1176] Gerald E. Wheeler, *op.cit.*, (1963), pp. 177-178.
[1177] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), p. 503, p. 591.

By 1931, there were a number of indications that the domestic political balance started to tilt toward expansionist imperialism and the political foundation of Japan's commitment to the Washington naval system had been considerably undermined. Within the Japanese navy, Kato Kanji was again "appointed a member of the Supreme Military Council" after the resignation as Chief of the Naval General Staff even though his submission of resignation as a protest to the emperor in June[1178] could have "warranted force retirement under normal circumstances." Likewise, Suetsugu, another naval leader of the fleet faction, was not rebuked by Kato Kanji and able to remain in the navy despite his unauthorized release of "an intentionally misleading statement to the press" on March 17 1930.[1179]

In contrast, some members of the Navy Ministry Group, or the treaty faction, namely Yamanashi and Hori, were apparently relocated to insignificant positions to be in charge of the Sasebo Naval District and the Third Squadron respectively. The Supreme Military Council had indeed stated in its "official reply to the Throne that the Navy was opposed to the continuation of the London naval treaty beyond its expiration in 1936" on July 23 1930, which meant that the Navy would not renew the existing naval treaties. Suetsugu conveyed "the prevailing naval view" to Kato Kanji, "As things stand now, there is no way left but to force our way to the abrogation of the fatal treaty." Kato also revealed "his indignation" and noted "It is as if Japan were bound hand and foot and thrown into jail by the Anglo-American powers!"[1180]

After the ratification of the London treaty, Navy Minister Abo Kiyokazu soon pushed for "approval of the Navy's supplemental budget plan." Togo, Kato, and Suetsugu even menaced with the intention to "overthrow the government if their demand was not met." Prince Fushimi was on the side of the fleet faction and pressed Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke who at last approved "the first supplemental building program" that would span the years of 1931-1936. As such, Japan had moved ahead to maximize its naval capabilities under the treaty constraints early on from 1931.[1181] The first supplemental building program aimed at "building each category of ship to treaty limits, construction of ships not covered by the treaty, and expansion of naval aviation."[1182]

This was the first of so called "circle plans." As a matter of fact, the negotiations between the Japanese Navy and Finance Ministry were initiated in 1928 and paused by the London conference. As stated, the first circle plan resulted from the pressure from expansionist naval leaders "to provide additional funds to minimize the limitations on Japanese naval strength in return for acceptance of the arrangements of the London treaty."[1183] In consequence, the Japanese naval capabilities reached almost 95% of the treaty strength, whereas the American counterpart hovered around only 65% of the treaty strength by March 1933.[1184] On the other hand, the Japanese army was no less

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[1178] Ryuji Hattori, *Japan at War and Peace: Shidehara Kijūrō and the Making of Modern Diplomacy,* (Acton: Australia, ANU Press, 2021), p. 193.
[1179] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), p. 156.
[1180] Ibid., p. 157, Sadao Asada, *op.cit*., (1994), p. 183.
[1181] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), p. 188.
[1182] Ibid., p. 330.
[1183] Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Naval Construction, 1919-1941," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit*, (2001), p. 99.
[1184] Cordell Hull, *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p, 287.

disgruntled than the Navy by the non-expansionist foreign policy of Shidehara who happened to be acting Prime Minister once Hamaguchi was assaulted.

With the creation of "staff officer A" (*Ko buin*) in May 1933, a post "charged with formulating national policy" in liaison with the Army General Staff, the Army Ministry, and "to a lesser extent" the Foreign Ministry, the influence of the Navy General Staff began to seep into the realm of foreign policy.[1185] Alongside the enhanced political clout of the Navy General Staff, senior moderate leaders, arguably "the treaty faction,"[1186] were ousted, or "placed on the reserve list," during the years between 1933 and 1934. As a result, there was virtually "no counterforce" in the Navy left to keep "the Kato-Suetsugu," or the fleet faction, in check.[1187]

At the meeting with the U.S. delegation in October 1934, the Japanese Ambassador Matsudaira emphasized, "any treaty agreement not to build beyond a certain level within the maximum would constitute, in essence, a disguised continuance of the ratio system and would be interpreted as a perpetuation of naval inferiority by the Japanese people."[1188] Japan defected from the Washington naval treaty in 1935, as it had announced, and withdrew from the second London naval conference by 1936.[1189] The domestic and international constraints on Japan's aggressive naval expansion were removed by the year of 1936. The death of Takahashi ended the "reflation period" and the military was "entrenched" in a stronger position, "perhaps impossible to dislodge."[1190]

The Cabinet Planning Board was instituted in October 1937 to take over from the Finance Ministry "the task of coordinating budgetary matters," where army and navy officers seized influential positions on the board and devised policies for each ministry. Finance Minister became more of "a mere administrator" than "a policymaker" after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.[1191] Military expenditures tripled in 1937 and spiraled afterwards.[1192] In addition to the establishment of the Cabinet Planning Board in October 1937, the Diet enacted laws to reinforce the central control of some industries and imports, based upon the Important Industries Control Law of 1931, Temporary

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[1185] Sadao Asada, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 232.

[1186] These non-expansionist leaders, such as Yamanashi, Sakonju, and Hori, had the commitment to the Washington naval system. Sadao Asada, *op.cit*., (1994), p. 183.

[1187] Ibid., pp. 231-232, Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), p. 193.

[1188] "The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State", London, October 24, 1934, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 1,* (Washington: Department of State, 1943), pp. 254-255.

[1189] Sadao Asada, *op.cit*., (1994), pp. 183-184.

[1190] Hugh T. Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in James William Morley, *op.cit.*, (1971), p. 259.

[1191] Yamamura Katsuro, "The Role of The Finance Ministry," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 288-289.

[1192] Hugh T. Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in Edit., James William Morley, *op.cit.*, (1971), pp. 250-251. Finance Minister Baba Eiichi of the Hirota cabinet, who succeeded Takahashi, found it impossible to dismiss the military's demands and approved "a five-year large-scale armament expansion plan for the army and a six-year plan for the navy. Takafusa Nakamura, "Depression, recovery, and war, 1920-1945," in Peter Duus, eds., *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 2005), pp. 476-477.

Capital Adjustment Law and Temporary Export and Import Commodities Law, which culminated in the National Mobilization Law of 1938.

Thus, Japan's resource-extraction capacity for military armament had been hugely enhanced as its economy grew into "a wartime-controlled economy" since 1937.[1193] On the basis of "Fundamentals of National Policy" that put forward "expansion toward both south and north" on August 7 1936, the Navy acquired appropriation for "a huge Third Replenish Program," which planned to construct "sixty-six new ships, including two Yamato-class super-battleships and fourteen flying corps within five years."[1194] Thus, the supplemental plans of 1937 and 1939 were implemented in the post-treaty period, which were virtually "restrained only by the financial, material, and industrial[1195] limits of Japan." From 1939-1941, there were other supplementary plans designed to expedite some project within the 1937 plan.[1196]

The third replenish program, or "the Circle Three Plan," was in fact conceived by the Navy General Staff and Navy Ministry in the moment of "complete naval autonomy" in October 1935. Because of the defiance of the Washington naval system, they were freed from the treaty limitations and focused on "qualitative superiority to compensate for its quantitative deficiencies" relative to the U.S. The Circle Three Plan was launched in 1937, and consequently, four "armament acceleration plans" were undertaken to accelerate some projects in the Circle Three Plan, all of which were carried out from 1937 to 1939. These additional plans modernized larger fleet units and constructed or refitted smaller warships.[1197]

By 1938, the Navy High Command contemplated "the next major expansion," originally scheduled for 1940, but the Second Vinson Act of 1938 prompted the General Staff to speed up the planning. "The Circle Four six-year expansion program" was produced in September 1939. It had proposed to build "two more Yamato-class super battleships, a fleet carrier, six of a new class of planned escort carriers, six cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, twenty-five submarines." The Circle Four Plan also placed weight on naval air power where the Japanese Navy wished to "take the lead," calling for "175 ship-based aircraft and nearly 1,500 aircraft to be allocated seventy-five new land-based air groups." The onset of the European War in the fall of 1939 again compelled the Japanese Navy to discuss "the next round of naval construction."[1198]

The consultations continued into 1940. Although the Japanese naval leaders had become dubious as to the feasibility of maintaining its 70% ratio of naval strength vis-à-vis the U.S., they were resolute in achieving parity in aircraft carriers and pressed for "the

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[1193] Takafusa Nakamura, "Depression, recovery, and war, 1920-1945," in Peter Duus, *op.cit.,* (1988, 2005), p. 482.

[1194] Sadao Asada, *Culture Shock and Japanese-American Relations: Historical Essays*, (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2007), p. 152.

[1195] The Japanese shipbuilding industrial capacity had been boosted by subsidies as well as a number of laws that promoted the autonomous production of ships from the 1920s to the 1930s. Seymour Broadbridge, "Shipbuilding and the State in Japan since the 1850s," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4, (1977), pp. 608-609.

[1196] Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Naval Construction, 1919-1941," in Edit., Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit*, (2001), p. 100.

[1197] David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 356-357.

[1198] Ibid., p. 358.

conversion of the shadow fleet of merchant liners." The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 baffled the Japanese Naval High Command. When the staff and ministry officers were "finalizing the Circle Five expansion plan," they were baffled by the intelligence of the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940. Alarmed again, the Navy General Staff pondered adding "more super-battleships" to the ship. Nonetheless, because the shipyards "were already working at full capacity," such a scheme appeared to be infeasible.[1199]

The Circle Five Plan was eventually drafted in May 1941 but "few ships were ever completed" due to "the more immediate necessities of the Pacific War," let alone the planned ships of the Circle Six Plan. The Japanese Navy followed through with "all the construction itemized under the Circle Three Program,"; "half of the Circle Four and half of the provisional program were well under way;" "a portion of the follow-up programs was completed," delivering "a total of 230 warships and 160 other vessels" on the eve of the Pacific War.[1200] In spite of the Circle Five and Six Plans that ultimately fizzled out, the Japanese Navy attained an impressive force of "10 battleships, 10 aircraft carriers, 38 cruisers, heavy and light, 112 destroyers, 65 submarines, numerous auxiliary warships or lesser size" by December 1941.[1201]

Year	Japan's military expenditures	Japan's naval expenditures
1931	462.00	227.00
1932	705.00	313.00
1933	886.00	410.00
1934	953.00	483.00
1935	1,043.00	536.00
1936	1,089.00	567.00
1937	3,299.00	645.00
1938	5,984.00	679.00
1939	6,495.00	804.00
1940	7,967.00	1034.00
1941	-	1497.00

Table. 21. Japan's military and naval expenditures, 1931-1941[1202]

The resilient response of the U.S. to the Japanese naval expansion, 1934-1941

When Roosevelt adopted the Keynesian approach after the Great Depression, his concern was hardly purely of economic nature. Looking back the years of the Washington and London naval treaties, Roosevelt was no less clear-eyed about the maritime balance of power, particularly vis-à-vis Japan, which had rather become

[1199] Ibid., p. 359.
[1200] Ibid., p. 360.
[1201] Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Naval Construction, 1919-1941," in Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit*, (2001), pp. 100-101.
[1202] Millions in original currency. Hugh T. Patrick, "The Economic Muddle of the 1920s," in James William Morley, *op.cit.*, (1971), p. 250, George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,* (1988), p. 341. The expansion of Japan's military expenditures "on this scale," particularly after 1936, had to resort to debt financing along with regular tax revenues. Resultantly, the Japanese national debt outstanding ballooned from 6,819 million yen in late March 1931 to 31,078 million yen in late March 1941. Respective domestic bonds outstanding were 4,476 million yen and 28,611 million yen. Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction,* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973 [The University of Minnesota Press, 1949]), p. 5.

undesirable for the U.S. in 1933. Replying to the Reverend Malcom Peabody who protested Roosevelt's program of naval expansion, he wrote, "That Navy program was wholly mine," and expressed his "dismay" regarding the U.S. having been incapable of keeping its navy up to the Treaty quotas. Roosevelt saw the treaty ratios as largely 10:10:7 among the U.S., Britain and stressed that "the Japanese had built and kept up to the Treaty provisions" and "Britain had done so in large part."[1203]

During his first hundred days as President in 1933, he raised $238 million through the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) to build "thirty-two vessels over a three-year period."[1204]Among the 32 ships, in addition to 17 vessels already underway, 2 aircraft carriers, 4 light cruisers, and 20 destroyers were included. As the Democratic Party simultaneously took control of both the Senate and the House with Roosevelt from March 1933, the Congressional leadership favored Roosevelt's initiative of naval expansion. Congress "funded or authorized new tonnage for the navy not far from doubling that in existence" from 1933-1934. Specifically, the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 enabled "blanket authorization for ship construction and replacement up to treaty limits."[1205]

In light of the Washington and London treaty quotas, Roosevelt's assessment was not a sheer exaggeration. Especially, the U.S. navy had fallen much behind the Japanese and British in cruiser strength throughout the 1920s. Barring "the cruiser program approved after the Geneva Conference," where the U.S. was "shabbily treated by the British," the navy received scant attention until the ascent of President Roosevelt.[1206] Carl Vinson, the Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, had already informed Roosevelt of how the U.S. navy lagged behind the British and Japanese counterpart in auxiliary vessels on December 28 1932. Vinson noted that the U.S. had built "40 ships, of a total of 197,640 tons, as compared with 148 ships of a total of 472,311 tons, for Great Britain, and 164 ships of 410,467 tons for Japan" since 1922.[1207]

For instance, the U.S. navy possessed only ten light cruisers, whereas Britain and Japan had thirty-four and eighteen respectively. As for destroyers, according to Vinson, the U.S. "would have five underage destroyers to Britain's forty-five and Japan's sixty-three." Likewise, the U.S. would have "only twenty underage submarines compared to thirty-six for Britain and forty-seven for Japan." Moreover, due to the naval arms race in auxiliary vessels between France and Italy, Britain had weakened its East Asian fleet to strengthen the Mediterranean fleet, which unwittingly left "Japan and the U.S. alone in the Pacific."[1208] Given the geographical distribution of naval forces as well as Japan's

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[1203] Roosevelt to the Reverend Malcom E. Peabody, Northeast Harbor, Maine, [Washington] August 19, 1933, in Edgar B. Nixon eds., (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1: January 1933-February 1934*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969A), p. 370.

[1204] Ibid., p. 221. Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 199.

[1205] Ibid., p. 207.

[1206] Phillips Payson O'Brien, "Politics, Arms Control and US Naval Development in the Interwar Period," in Edit., Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.,* (2001), p. 154, pp. 159-160.

[1207] Roosevelt Papers, PPF 5901, Carl M. Vinson to Roosevelt, December 28, 1932, Cited in Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 77, p. 248.

[1208] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

naval buildup, Roosevelt had a legitimate reason to comment, "I am not concerned about" the British navy, "but I am about" the Japanese navy.[1209]

The Vinson-Trammel[1210] Act of 1934 was introduced in January 1934 and finally signed by Roosevelt on March 27 1934. Interestingly, a large number of non-expansionist nationalists, or "isolationists," turned out to be supportive of the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934. They understood it "as a way of separating the U.S from the world" and being militarily "self-sufficient" and "prepared to protect America to the fullest extent against the other nations of the world." Other congressmen who preferred the continuation of naval arms control endorsed the act to "give America greater leverage" at the second London naval conference. Consequently, 78% of all senators voted for the Vinson-Trammel act of 1934.[1211] Afterwards, naval appropriations surged every year, "doubling by 1937," and budgets were not constraints on naval buildup by 1940.[1212]

Under the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934, Congress appropriated funds for "twenty combatant vessels in 1935, twenty-two in 1936, and thirty in 1937."[1213] While Japan had declined the U.S. request for the information concerning its naval construction,[1214] the Second Vinson Act, or the Naval Act of 1938, was passed in early 1938, which authorized the U.S. fleet to "exceed treaty tonnages by 20%," as Roosevelt hoped,[1215] and "a total of eighteen battleships."[1216] Accordingly, Congress funded the construction of "two battle ships in 1937, four battleships in 1938," two more battleships in 1939." In addition, the Roosevelt administration acquired funds for "two cruisers, eight destroyers, and eight submarines" as well as "the modernization of five older capital ships" in 1939.[1217]

When Germany swept across the European continent, eventually occupying France, and Japan steered its expansion toward the Southeast Asia and South Seas with its increased naval strength by 1940, the Roosevelt administration and Congress further swiftly answered the General Board's call for building "to the utmost capacity of existing facilities."[1218] Congress appropriated funds "for the ships authorized" in the Second Vinson Act of 1938, and also approved a "bill authorizing an additional 1,325,000 tons of naval construction" since the naval program of the Second Vinson Act had become quite insufficient to meet the global challenge in two oceans.[1219] In June and July 1940,

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[1209] Roosevelt to the Reverend Malcom E. Peabody, Northeast Harbor, Maine, [Washington] August 19, 1933, in Edgar B. Nixon (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *op.cit.,* (1969A), p. 370.
[1210] Park Trammell was the Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee.
[1211] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), pp. 222-223.
[1212] Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 199.
[1213] Merze Tate, *The United States and Armaments*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 195.
[1214] Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), pp. 200-204.
[1215] Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 215.
[1216] Merze Tate, *op.cit.*, (1948) p. 195, Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), p. 197.
[1217] Ibid., p. 197, p. 205.
[1218] Ibid., pp. 209-210.
[1219] Ibid., p. 210.

Congress authorized "an 11% increase" in naval tonnage and passed the Two-Ocean Navy Act that expanded the size of the U.S. fleet by 70%.[1220]

In a certain sense, "naval building picked up worldwide" over the years between 1936 and 1941, as O'Brien observes. Under the auspices of the NIRA program and the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934, the American resource-extraction capacity for naval defense considerably increased. The U.S. laid down the *North Carolina*, "America's first modern capital ship since the Washington conference," in 1937 and "the modern aircraft carriers," "*Yorktown* and *Enterprise*," were already "under way" prior to the Second London Conference adjourned in March 1936.[1221] In the years of 1936-1939, the U.S. had launched the construction of 5 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, and 43 destroyers, whereas Japan initiated building 2 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, and 24 destroyers.[1222]

As Japan launched the massive third replenish program, which was no longer bridled by the Washington naval system, and engaged in the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, Roosevelt expressed his "growing concern" with respect to the fact that "a whole many nations" were "enlarging their armament programs." Calling upon the U.S. to "recognize" such "facts," the President suggested that "supplementary estimates for commencing construction on a number of ships" be required along with "the preliminary estimates for appropriations to commence during the fiscal year 1939, two battleships, two light cruisers, eight destroyers, and six submarines" by late December 1937.[1223] In January 1938, noting "the piling up of additional land and sea armaments in other countries," Roosevelt again proposed that the Congress authorize "increased armaments."[1224]

The Roosevelt administration recommended the increased appropriation for both the Army and the Navy for the fiscal year 1939. In particular, the recommendation placed emphasis on "additions to anti-aircraft material in the sum of $8,800,000" for the Army and expanding "the existing authorized building program for increases and replacements in the Navy" by 20%. In particular, Roosevelt presented that the Congress allocate funds to lay down "two additional battleships and two additional cruisers" in the calendar year 1938 and a sum no more than $15,000,000 to manufacture "new types of small vessels in light of new developments among Navies."[1225] In his rationalization, he asserted that "adequate defense" should mean the protection of "our oceans," "our communities far removed from the coast," and "the Panama Canal."[1226]

[1220] Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 218.

[1221] Phillips Payson O'Brien, *op.cit.*, (1998), p. 243.

[1222] Ibid., p. 254.

[1223] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Letter to Appropriations Committee," December 28, 1937, in Samuel I. Rosenman, eds., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1937, Volume: The Constitution Prevails,* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 554.

[1224] Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 28, 1938, in Samuel I. Rosenman, eds., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938 Volume: The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism,* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), pp. 68-69.

[1225] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

[1226] Ibid., pp. 70-71. Roosevelt alluded to the idea of defending the two oceans, viz., the Pacific and the Atlantic, where the Panama Canal was "the connecting link", and beyond. The President penned, "we must keep any potential enemy many hundred miles away from our continental limits."

Year	U.S. naval expenditures
1931	353.77
1932	357.52
1933	349.37
1934	296.93
1935	436.27
1936	528.88
1937	556.67
1938	596.13
1939	672.72
1940	891.49
1941	2313.06

Table. 22. The U.S. naval expenditures, 1931-1941

On one hand, Roosevelt's invocation of the Panama Canal and the hemispheric defense resonated with a number of isolationists who agreed that the U.S. "needed more ships to defend the Monroe Doctrine unilaterally," which in turn created a rift among isolationists. On the other hand, Japan's persistent refusal to not disclose "specific information" on its shipbuilding and defiance of the Washington naval system reinforced the political leverage of the Roosevelt administration.[1227] This was also because Congressmen were divided depending on whether they envisaged "U.S. naval construction" as a factor that would contribute to a vicious cycle of arms race or a legitimate policy because of Japan's withdrawal from the arms limitation treaties. Even "the former isolationist" Senator Norris endorsed "Roosevelt's lead on the issue."[1228]

At last, the Second Vinson Act of 1938 was passed "through the House by a vote of 294 to 100 and through the Senate by a vote of 56 to 18" on May 17 1938. While the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 was geared toward bringing the U.S. fleet up to the treaty limits, the Second Vinson Act of 1938 enabled the enlargement of the existing program by 20%. Especially, given the concrete requests for "anti-aircraft matériel" and "a number of new types of small vessels," in addition to two more battleships and two more cruisers, the naval program under the Second Vinson Act of 1938 seemed to be predicated upon the operational considerations in case of a war, which were developed in late 1937. It was articulated in a memo written by Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and shared with Roosevelt.

Admiral Yarnell presumed that the U.S. would play "a prominent role" in securing "control of the Atlantic" and "superiority in the Pacific" in case of "a general war" if "British and French naval strength can contain Germany in the North Sea and Italy in the Mediterranean." He argued that such a war should be conceived as "one of strangulation," "an economic war," and "an almost purely naval war in the Pacific" insofar as the U.S. was concerned. Based on a rather sanguine prospect for available allies, Yarnell's strategic plan put much less emphasis on "fleet battle" and focused on destroying "enemy commerce" and preserving "command of the air along the line of

[1227] Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), p. 204.
[1228] Wayne S. Cole, "The Role of the United States Congress and Political Parties," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 309-310.

bases" until Japan could be "strangled to death." Hence, "naval air force, submarines, and light forces with cruisers, and anti-aircraft equipment" were "vital."[1229]

Amidst the European and Asian war, Roosevelt announced, "there is a vast difference between keeping out of war and pretending that this war is none of our business. We do not have to go to war with other nations, but at least we can strive with other nations to encourage the kind of peace that will lighten the troubles of the world, and by so doing help our own nation as well" on January 3 1940. While he noted that he could "understand the feelings of those who warn the nation that they will never again consent to the sending of American youth to fight on the soil of Europe," he appealed to the public and Congress, "we must be prepared to take care of ourselves if the world cannot attain peace." As 1940 saw "continuing world uncertainly," Roosevelt asked "the Congress for Army and Navy increases," "the only important increase of the budget."[1230]

Proposing "the budgeted estimate of $1,800,000,000 for national defense," Roosevelt explained that "these estimates" consisted of "our normal defense preparations" and "the emergency expenditures required for the War and Navy Departments, the Coast Guard, Department of Justice, and the Panama Canal."[1231] The collapse of allied forces in Europe, culminating in the fall of France in June 1940, in conjunction with Japan's relentless naval construction led the General Board to inform the Assistant Secretary of the Navy that "the second Vinson program was entirely inadequate" and "the U.S. should build to the utmost capacity of existing facilities."[1232] The members of the General Board were unmistakably aware of Japan's increasing naval capabilities and the unreliability of Britain and France in the Atlantic.

The third Vinson program, which was designed to authorize 11% increase, became already outmoded when it was legislated by June 1940.[1233] The General Board reported, "Japan is rapidly increasing her flee, and, without extraordinary efforts on our part, will attain approximate parity during the years, 1941-1943." In addition, the board exhorted, "work should be commended with the greatest possible dispatch to provide the U.S. with sufficient naval strength to provide for freedom of action in one ocean and maintain an effective defensive action in the other."[1234] Synchronously, the Joint Board started to think hard about "the problems of acting as an alliance member within the context of a global war and approved the Plan D, or Plan Dog, which "called for an offensive in the Atlantic and a defensive campaign in the Pacific," in December 1940.[1235]

[1229] Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet) to Admiral William D. Leahy, (Chief of Naval Operations), October 15, 1936, [PSF: Navy:T], in Donald B. Schewe eds., (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Second Series, Volume 7: October-December 1937*, (New York and Toronto: Clearwater Publishing Company, 1995D), pp. 186-189.

[1230] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Annual Message to Congress," January 3, 1940, in Samuel I. Rosenman, *op.cit.,* (1941), pp. 1-8.

[1231] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Annual Budget Message," January 3, 1940, Ibid., pp. 14-16.

[1232] Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), pp. 209-210.

[1233] Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, *op.cit.,* (1973), p. 218.

[1234] Roosevelt Papers, Safe File, Japan, Naval Intelligence Report on Japanese Capital shipbuilding program, October 11, 1939; U.S. Department of the Navy, Records of the General Board, 420.2 Memo from the Chairman of the General Board to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, May 3, 1940; W. R. Sexton to Admiral H. R. Stark, June 18, 1940, Cited in Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), p. 210, p. 261.

[1235] Steven T. Ross, *op.cit.*, (1997), pp. 6-9.

The fall of France and Japan's unrestrained aggression also impelled Congress and Roosevelt to react immediately. Congress "passed the appropriation for the ships authorized in the Second Vinson Bill of 1938" in June and further approved "a bill authorizing an additional 1,325,000 tons of naval construction" on July 19. In the span of no more than two months, Congress assigned funds "for almost 250 warships," which was virtually twice "the number of vessels that it had granted" in the first 6 years of the Roosevelt administration. With the information that Japan were producing battlecruisers against heavy cruisers, the Navy was able to additionally acquire funds for 6 battle cruisers of 27,500 tons. The Two-Ocean Navy Act of July 1940 enlarged the size the U.S. fleet by 70%.[1236]

By May 1941, Roosevelt recollected, "a year ago, we launched, and are successfully carrying out, the largest armament production program we have ever taken," announcing a state of "unlimited national emergency."[1237] As Hitler's Germany plunged into another warfront to fight the Soviet Union and the negotiation with Japan failed to make headway, the President rationalized "the development and extension of the whole program of supplies for our own Army and Navy for the future, and also under lend-lease," which he thought could be called "a comprehensive program," or "an all-out program" in October 1941.[1238] While pushing for an exorbitant increase in the production of heavy bombers and tanks,[1239] Roosevelt admitted that the U.S. Navy had grown "to unprecedented size" and was "ready for action" on October 27 1941.[1240]

Spatial Preventive Motivation of the U.S. and Temporal Preventive Motivation of Japan

In a nutshell, Japan's second building program of 1934, third replenish program of 1937, fourth replenish program of 1939 were correspondingly countervailed by the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934, the Naval Act of 1938, and the Two-Ocean Navy Acy of 1940. The formerly asymmetric balance of the resource-extraction capacity between the U.S. and Japan, predicated on the Washington naval system and non-expansionist nationalism of the U.S., turned into a symmetric one from the second half of the 1930s to 1941. As a consequence, the bilateral naval power gap was bridged to a considerable extent. Even so, the absolute superiority of the economic and industrial potential of the U.S., approximately 12 times larger than the Japanese counterpart by 1941,[1241] inhibited Japan from attaining naval power parity with the U.S.

Though the Plan Dog placed the strategic priority on the Europe-Atlantic theater, but the Roosevelt administration, and the President himself in particular, had been no less vigilant in taking into account the shifting naval balance in the Pacific and a possible maritime confrontation against Japan since 1934 onwards. The strategic priority of the Europe-Atlantic theater didn't necessarily imply the U.S. willingness to accommodate the

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[1236] Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), pp. 210-211.
[1237] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "A Radio Address Announcing the Proclamation of an Unlimited National Emergency," May 27, 1941, in Samuel I. Rosenman, eds., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941 Volume: The Call to Battle Stations,* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 181.
[1238] "The Seven Hundred and Seventy-eighth Press Conference," October 24, 1941, Ibid., p. 429.
[1239] Ibid., pp. 429-430, Roosevelt to Stimson (The Secretary of War), May 5, 1941, Ibid., p. 153.
[1240] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Navy and Total Defense Day Address," October 27, 1941, Ibid., p. 442.
[1241] 山田朗, 軍備**拡**張の近代史―日本軍の膨張と崩**壊**, 吉川弘文館 (1997), [NISHIDA Setsuo, Modern *History of Military Expansion: The Expansion and Collapse of the Japanese Military*, (1997)]

Japanese naval expansion in the Asia-Pacific theater at the expense of its interest and prestige in the region. The correspondences between the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, and Roosevelt from late 1940 to early 1941 compellingly displayed the American reasoning as to how to best meet the Japanese challenge in the Asia-Pacific theater amidst of the pressing naval power shift.

Asked by Roosevelt's initial suggestion, Grew conveyed his "own conception of the problem" in connection with "Japan and all her works" from Tokyo in December 1940. The Ambassador contemplated, "we are bound to have a showdown some day, and the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that show down ***sooner*** or to have it ***later***." From the standpoint of Grew, three "chief factors in the problem" were (1) "whether and when Britain is likely to win" in Europe; (2) "whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe;" and most notably (3) "to what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies ***now and later***."[1242]

The Ambassador addressed the strategic priority of the European theater and Britain's survival but plainly revealed the preventive motivation of the U.S. vis-à-vis Japan in regard to the ongoing change in the relative maritime balance between the U.S. and Japanese navies. Likewise, Grew reminded Roosevelt that "the principal point at issue" was not "whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program," but "when." Grew's conclusion boiled down to taking measures to assure Japan that the U.S. "mean to fight if called upon to do so" to remove "the necessity for war."[1243] It was a subtle and nuanced recommendation based on the preventive motivation in that undertaking such resolute actions would inexorably entail the risks of a war. At any rate, the U.S. could not completely do away with taking the risks of a war.

Naval Powers	Battleships	Carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines
The U.S.	9	3	24	80	56
Britain	2	0	8	13	-
Dutch and Free French	0	0	4	7	13
Total (Allied Forces)	**11**	**3**	**36**	**100**	**69**
Japan	**10**	**10**	**36**	**113**	**64**

Table. 23. The balance of naval forces in the Pacific by the fall of 1941[1244]

On January 21 1941, Roosevelt replied, "I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions." The President reiterated, "our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute to our total security." Roosevelt surmised that Britain would be certainly in need of assistance in East Asia "so far as the capacity of the United States in concerned."[1245] In fact, the maritime strength of allied forces alone could hardly match

[1242] Grew to Roosevelt, Tokyo, December 14, 1940, Quoted in Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, Vol. 2*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 1255-1256.
[1243] Ibid., p. 1257.
[1244] Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), p. 221.
[1245] Roosevelt to Grew, Washington, January 21, 1941, Ibid., pp. 1259-1260.

up with that of the Japanese navy in the Asia-Pacific theater without the U.S. navy, as Table 25 presents. Germany's threat in the Europe-Atlantic theater as well as the geographical dispersion of the American naval forces in the two oceans rendered the preventive motivation of the U.S. less linear and straightforward.

After all, the global relative ratios of naval forces between the U.S., Germany, and Japan were 0.326, 0.109, and 0.239 respectively in 1941. Still, the concentration of the U.S. fleet in the Atlantic, which amounted to 40% of the U.S. fleet, created "a 7.5 to 6 ratio" in favor of Japan in the Pacific theater. In addition, the total oil embargo and asset freeze imposed by the Roosevelt administration in late July of 1941 provided Japan with the preventive war motivation in reverse.[1246] A few days prior to the U.S. oil embargo, Nagano, Navy Chief of Staff, opined, "although there is now a chance of achieving victory, the chances will diminish as times goes on" at the 40th Liaison Conference on July 21, 1941. Nagano anticipated that it would "already be difficult for us to cope with the U.S. by the latter half of next year."[1247]

Nagano preferred a settlement "without war" but called upon the Japanese leaders to soberly reckon with the fact that "if we conclude that conflict cannot ultimately be avoided, we will be in a disadvantageous position as time goes by."[1248] The naval leaders of Japan had already decided to "step up preparations for war" in August 1940 and planned to initiate "preparatory fleet mobilization stage on operations on November 15, 1940." By August 26 1941, Nagano reported, "over 90% of all vessels and units planned for the fiscal year's war footing have been organized into the Combined Fleet."[1249] The Japanese navy's preparatory fleet mobilization was virtually completed in September 1941.[1250] As the effect of the oil embargo and asset freeze kicked in, Prime Minister Konoye took the time constraint seriously in the same month.

	The U.S.			**Japan**
Type	Total	Atlantic	**Pacific**	
Battleships	17	8	**9**	**10**
Aircraft Carriers	7	4	**5**	**9**
Cruisers (heavy)	18	5	**13**	**18**
Cruisers (light)	19	8	**11**	**20**
Destroyers	214	147	**67**	**112**
Submarines	114	60	**54**	**64**
Number of Ships	389	232	**157**	**233**
Total tonnage	1,426,000	662,000	**763,000**	**976,000**
Navy Aircrafts		5,500		3,202

Table. 24. The naval strengths of U.S. and Japan before the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific war

At the Imperial Conference of September 6 1941, Konoye commenced the meeting by calling attention to "the international situation" that had become "increasingly strained." He added, "if we allow this situation to continue, it is inevitable that our

[1246] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, *op.cit.,*(1988), p. 124, Dale C. Copeland, *op.cit*., (2011), pp. 122-125.
[1247] "40th Liaison Conference," July 21, 1941, in Nobutaka Ike, ed., *Japan's Deision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences,* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 103-107.
[1248] Ibid., p. 106.
[1249] James William Morley, ed., *The Final Confrontation: Japan's Negotiations with the United States, 1941*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 199.
[1250] Ibid., p. 206.

Empire will gradually lose the ability to maintain its national power, and that our national power will lag behind the that of the United States, Great Britain, and others."[1251] Nagano chimed in and repeated the Japanese logic of the preventive war, "we cannot avoid being finally reduced to a crippled condition [if we delay too long]. A number of vital military supplies, including oil, are dwindling day by day…it would be very dangerous for our Empire to remain idle and let the days go by."[1252] Japan resolved to "commence hostilities" if there was no prospect of a diplomatic settlement by October.[1253]

As the bilateral resource-extraction capacities for naval defense between the U.S. and Japan had sharply become symmetric from 1934-1941, both the U.S. and Japan exhibited the preventive motivation of different kinds. As the established naval power in the Pacific, the Roosevelt administration proportionately reacted to the Japanese naval buildup to stay ahead of Japan and sought to roll back the Japanese expansion on the basis of geographical preventive motivation as the U.S. was hardly an economically declining power and the German threat in the Atlantic compelled the geographical diversion of its naval forces. By contrast, Japan went the extra miles to highly centralize its resource-extraction capacity to minimize the naval power gap in the Pacific only to be on the cusp of economic and industrial strangulation in late 1941.

6.2. Japan's geographical expansion:
the continental periphery ➡ the first line of maritime defense in the Pacific theater

This section unveils how the U.S. preventive motivation was activated by the redirection of Japan's power projection toward Southeast Asia and the South Seas, which was considered the first line of maritime defense in the Pacific theater by the U.S. Although the Washington naval system stipulated that the signatories respect the integrity of China and maintain the maritime status quo in the Pacific, the Japanese endeavors to enlarge its spheres of influence in continental Asia were not absent even during the 1920s as much as the Japanese navy bypassed the Washington treaty by constructing more auxiliary vessels. The succeeding part elaborates the ways in which Japan had pursued the imperial expansion and readjusted its direction, which led to the high expectation about the contagion effect on its naval defense.

6.2.1. Japan's bounded expansion in continental Asia, 1921-1929:
➡ Low expectation about the contagion effect on the first line of naval defense of the U.S.

In the 1920s, as Akira Iriye puts, "Japanese expansion on the continent"[1254] continued, albeit not in an outrageous manner. But it didn't incur substantial loss of the U.S. interest and prestige. Meanwhile, as the U.S. assumed that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had emboldened Japan in a manner that gave it "a free hand" during the First

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[1251] "Imperial Conference," September 6, 1941, in Nobutaka Ike, ed., *op.cit.,* (1967), pp. 133-138.
[1252] Ibid., pp. 138-139.
[1253] Ibid., p. 135.
[1254] Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931*, (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 6.

World War, there was "no compromise" in the slightest with regard to the matter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance on the part of the U.S.[1255] Though Shidehara, then the Ambassador to the U.S., assured, "the Alliance should in no case be directed against the United States," in July 1921, the U.S. was immovable.[1256] In contrast, Hughes, Secretary of State, told the U.S. delegates to the Washington conference that the U.S. "would never go to war over any aggression on the part of Japan in China."[1257]

When Japan became suspicious of the Anglo-American intent to strip away "the special interests that it had asserted in Manchuria and Mongolia," or "drive Japan into a corner," with the invitation to the Washington naval conference, Hughes gave Shidehara his personal assurances to "maintain an impartial stand between Japan and China at the coming conference."[1258] The Far Eastern Division had prepared a memo for discussion "not only of Shantung and Siberia but also of Japan's spheres of influence in South Manchuria, eastern Inner Mongolia, and Fukien." But Hughes chose not to contest with Japan "on these issues" but to object to "any overt move to obtain a free hand in Manchuria or another recognition of its special interests there."[1259] The interpretations of the "Open Door" in Asia remained nebulous.

In principle, the U.S. was unequivocally averse to Japan's claim in Manchuria and beyond. But in practice, the American leaders more acquiesced or acceded to the Japanese demand. The "new international loan consortium for China" after the Paris Peace Conference was a case in point.[1260] As the U.S. took the initiative to formulate "a new consortium" of American, British, French, and Japanese bankers" for China, the Hara cabinet reacted "favorably to the proposal." Conceivably, the Japanese bankers proposed that south Manchuria and inner Mongolia be excluded from "the sphere of operation of the new consortium."[1261] Albeit unwillingly, the U.S. agreed to the exclusion of certain railways in Manchuria and Mongolia and that the consortium would evade "any operation inimical to the vital interests of Japan" by March 1920.[1262]

Shidehara "trusted" that the practical exclusion of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia from the application of Open Door would be rationalized by the security clause of the Root resolution.[1263] When the Japanese plenipotentiary, Hanihara, brought up "the understanding" of the new Four-Power consortium to clarify whether the U.S. shared a similar interpretation at the meeting of the Pacific and Far Eastern committee on December 3 1921, Hughes "confirmed the understanding." Therefore, it is not inexplicable that Japan had barely done away with the claim of its distinct interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. The Japanese delegation led by Kato and Shidehara, let alone

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[1255] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 15.
[1256] Dr. Morinosuke Kajima, *op.cit.,* (1980), Section 3: Conclusion of the Four Power Treaty on the Pacific, pp. 560-563.
[1257] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (Oct, 1961), p. 65.
[1258] Ibid., pp. 63-64.
[1259] Memo prepared by the Far Eastern Division, "Tentative Schedule of Far Eastern Matters Suggested for Discussion," n.d., 500.A41a/161, Cited in Ibid., p. 65.
[1260] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 129-130.
[1261] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 14-15.
[1262] Ibid. p. 15, Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 130, Japan assigned extravagant importance to this statement and interpreted that the Western powers "clearly recognized" Japan's special interest in Manchuria and inner Mongolia "in an official document." Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (Oct., 1961), p. 67.
[1263] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (Oct., 1961), p. 69.

the Japanese cabinet in Tokyo, didn't judge that its engagement at the Washington conference would weaken "the basis for the reservation on Manchuria and Mongolia."[1264]

Besides, Japan granted the U.S. permission "to unload and operate the submarine cable connecting Yap and Guam, as well as any future cables that would connect to Yap" in return for the U.S. recognition of the Japanese mandated islands on February 11 1922. The area surrounding Yap Island was crucial for "the laying of submarine cables" for the U.S. The South Sea Islands remained intact as the Japanese mandate.[1265] Shidehara went to great lengths to personally persuade the other powers in the negotiations that Japan "would pull out."[1266] During the year of 1922, Japan did withdraw its troops from Shandong, North Manchuria, and Siberia.[1267] Ratifications of the Washington conference treaties were exchanged on August 17 1923 in Washington.[1268]

In comparison with South Manchuria, or North China, and Eastern inner Mongolia, Japan's interest in Eastern Siberia and Northern Sakhalin was less salient especially after the Soviet Union reclaimed its control over these areas. The Japanese leaders conceived that they were entitled to have special interests in Manchuria and inner Mongolia, as disclosed at the Washington conference. Meanwhile, the Shidehara diplomacy from 1924-1927 placed economic interests that necessitated "international cooperation" over unbounded "territorial expansion." For instance, Inoue Junnosuke, Finance Minister from 1923-1924, had stressed "a means of peaceful expansion" in dealing with the strategic problems Japan might face with respect to "population and foodstuffs." Likewise, Shidehara prioritized non-intervention in China and maintaining "the great market of China.[1269]

Even so, the underlying notion of Japan's distinct interest in Manchuria among the leaders hardly dissipated. The Tanaka cabinet that succeeded the Wakatsuki cabinet dispatched the troops to Shandong thrice from 1927-1928 in the course of the Nationalist's Northern expeditions. [1270] Admittedly, Tanaka's decisions on the three Shandong expeditions were "an important departure from Shidehara's policy against the use of force."[1271] However, it was by no means a momentous break. The fundamentals of Japan's China policy didn't remarkably shift from Shidehara to Tanaka. After all, Tanaka came to re-endorse the previous policies of Japan vis-à-vis China, such as "noninterference with the Chinese civil war, respect for the popular will, and the determination to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals" at the Eastern conference of 1927.[1272]

[1264] Dr. Morinosuke Kajima, *op.cit.,* (1980), Section 2: China Question and Conclusion of the Nine-Power Treaty, p. 554.
[1265] Ibid., p. 20. Ryuji Hattori, *op.cit.*, (2021), pp. 66-67.
[1266] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 138.
[1267] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 25.
[1268] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 142-143.
[1269] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 154-155.
[1270] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 155-156, Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 158-160.
[1271] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 147.
[1272] Ibid., p. 152, p. 156. Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 159. The Eastern conference was held in Tokyo from June 27 to July 7 and joined by Yoshizawa, Minister to China, Consuls General Yoshida Shigeru of Mukden, Yada Shichitaro of Shanghai, and Takao Toru of Hankow, the commander of the Kwantung Army, and the governor of Kwantung Leased territory, and 16 officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, Finance, and the General Staff.

Indeed, Tanaka and participants of the Eastern conference did make a distinction between Manchuria-Mongolia and China proper in a way that underscored that Japan had "special rights" in the former and concerned itself with stability in the latter.[1273] Yet, in general, they converged on the position that moderate civilian officials championed and not "strong policy of the military." They concurred that Japan should ramp up its efforts to "promote economic expansion" and prevent the Chinese civil from spreading beyond the Wall. These final positions were well aligned with Shidehara's policy,[1274] viz., "non-intervention in China's domestic affairs and maintenance of Japan's rights and interests there."[1275] Though there were advocates of "a strong policy" in the cabinet, Tanaka preferred the protection of Japan's rights in Manchuria through the local forces.[1276]

In brief, Tanaka and Shidehara diverged in their views concerning the necessity of the use of military force in securing Japan's rights and interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. Nevertheless, because Tanaka pursued recognizing both the Nationalist and Chang Tso-lin in a manner that could retain Japan's influence over Manchuria, Tanaka's objective was virtually identical to Shidehara's. This is the reason why "both Shidehara and Tanaka encouraged the trend away from radicalism" in the end.[1277] The Tanaka cabinet had not only not fallen for the Kwantung Army's local scheme, but also brought back the troops from Jinan in 1929, overruling the military that wished for a prolonged stay of the troops. In addition, the Tanaka cabinet diplomatically settled the Nanjing, Hankow, and Jinan incidents.[1278] The force deployment was a means and not an end in itself.

In a similar vein, Iriye remarks that "the difference" between Shidehara and Tanaka "lay in policy execution, and not in policy itself." At root, they shared a belief that "Japanese rights in Manchuria could somehow be treated separately from Japanese policy in China proper" and that Japan's political-economic expansion in Manchuria would not give rise to insuperable opposition from other powers of the Washington system, particularly the U.S.[1279] Some Japanese officials reckoned with a possibility that "a vigorous policy in Manchuria" could result in "suspicion on the part of the powers of the Washington system but Shidehara and Tanaka deemed such a possibility of "American-Japanese conflict" in East Asia "very remote." They didn't posit that active policies in Manchuria "would necessarily antagonize the U.S. or any other power."[1280]

[1273] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 166.

[1274] Ibid., p. 172, Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 160.

[1275] Shidehara summed up the two goals of Japan's China policy when discussing with journalist in September 1928. Quoted in Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 294-295.

[1276] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 167-172. In a statement which was not publicized, Tanaka put, "the stabilization of Manchuria's political conditions should best be left to the efforts of the Manchurian people. If an influential Manchuria should respect our special position in Manchuria and Mongolia and sincerely devise means to stabilize political conditions there, the Japanese government would support him as it considers proper."

[1277] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 158.

[1278] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 162-163, In highlighting the difference between Shidehara and Tanaka, Nish interprets that Tanaka "decided to revise his policies fundamentally," which amounted to "a complete volte face and a reversion to the former Shidehara policy" in 1929. But as articulated, there was no fundamental and intrinsic difference between Shidehara's perception of Japan's special rights and interests in Manchuria and Tanaka's.

[1279] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 191.

[1280] Ibid., p. 184.



Figure. 22. Japan's expected gain and The U.S.'s expected loss from 1921-1929

While the American response to the Shandong expeditions of Japan had been equivocal in the middle-to-late 1920s, Shidehara and Tanaka were not completely erroneous to hold a belief that Japan's unilateral action could be tolerated and would not deal a blow to the bilateral relations with the U.S. The U.S. had kept "its policies toward China and Japan separate" to a certain extent, and not based its Asia policies on the undesirable developments in Manchuria, as most of the major powers in Asia had done. Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union found it more convenient to be on good terms with Japan throughout 1927 and the U.S. was not an exception.[1281] The U.S. continued to express "adherence to the principle" of Open Door and "suspicions" of Japan's moves in Manchuria but when the push came to shove in 1927 the State Department remained silent.[1282]

On the one hand, since their different understandings of Japan's special rights in Manchuria and inner Mongolia were simply glossed over at the Washington conference, the U.S. was far from being disposed to give an impression that it endorsed "the Japanese special position in Manchuria." When the South Manchurian Railway, Japan's state-company, looked for a loan in 1927, President Coolidge doubted "the desirability of loans" in March as it might leave an impression that the U.S. "accepted a special position in Manchuria."[1283] After Tanaka's first Shandong expedition, Chang Tso-lin as well as the Chinese Foreign Minister protested against the American loan to the South Manchurian railway in November and December of 1927. For the Chinese, the South Manchurian railway was "a symbol and instrument of alien domination" over China.[1284]

Consul General Myers at Mukden took note of Tanaka's "positive policy" and suspected that Japan resolved to "ultimately separate" Manchuria from China "as a region where Japan's economic interests would predominate" after the Eastern Conference. Although Myers proposed that the U.S. should be clearer about whether to "acquiesce in the trend" or "protest to further ties with China," the State Department didn't choose either. This was again revealed by the State Department's position over the issue of another loan proposed by the J.P. Morgan Company to the South Manchurian Railway.[1285] Statements

[1281] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 184-185.
[1282] Ibid., pp. 185-186.
[1283] Herbert Feis, *The Diplomacy of The Dollar, 1919-1932,* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1950, 1966), p. 36.
[1284] Ibid., p. 37.
[1285] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 186-187.

by the president of South Manchuria Railway and a call at the State Department by Thomas W. Lamont of the Morgan firm generated "considerable publicity," and Kellogg defined it as "a private matter" when asked.[1286]

Neither the first Shandong expedition in 1927 nor the occupation of the Japanese forces in Jinan and Tsingtao following the Jinan incident of May 1928 did alter the U.S. policy in China and East Asia. As in the case of the South Manchurian railway, the U.S. had "no interest" in either changing "our policy in regard to Manchuria" or "taking sides in the Sino-Japanese dispute." The U.S. leaders in Washington were not compelled to "resolve the dilemma implicit in applying separate policies to China and Japan" at all.[1287] When Japan rationalized its occupation of Jinan that "general hostilities near Peking would directly affect Manchuria" and it was "determined to prevent hostilities from extending to that region," Kellogg merely called for "the greatest caution" to "prevent the U.S. from being involved in any way."[1288]

All in all, Japan's geographical expansion had been confined in scope during the 1920s and the U.S. strove to "avoid involvement in the Sino-Japanese conflict." Even the Tanaka cabinet had not devised the Shandong expeditions to indefinitely seize a land and the State Department chose not to announce its view when the Nanjing [Nationalist] regime asked for President Coolidge's view. Instead, Assistant Secretary Johnson retorted to the Swedish Minister who held that the Japanese behavior was not in harmony with the Nine-Power Treaty, "it didn't seem to us at the present time that the treaty was in any way involved."[1289] Stanley Hornbeck, "the new chief of the Far Eastern division," supposed that there was little "the U.S. could or should do" because Japan had not looked for "the assent or approval of the U.S. in its action."[1290]

6.2.2. Japan's series of fait accompli in continental Asia, 1929-1934

➡ Low expectation about the contagion effect on the first line of naval defense of the U.S.

Japan's penetration into Manchuria, inner Mongolia and Northern China

In the years between 1929 and 1934, the domestic political balance among elites and the public that used to restrain an outright occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia was greatly shaken up in a way that strengthened expansionist imperialism. The domestic popularity of the Manchurian invasion of 1931 as well as the central government's inability to control, let alone overrule, a series of fait accompli in continental Asia indicate this critical change in the domestic political environment. The Manchurian invasion of September 1931 was neither the first instance of the local armed forces' insubordination given the comparable circumstances from 1928-1929, such as Chang

[1286] The Secretary of State [Kellogg] to the Chargé in China [Mayer], Washington, December 3, 1927, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, Vol II,* pp. 489-490.
[1287] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 189-190.
[1288] The Ambassador in Japan [MacVeagh] to the Secretary of State [Kellogg], Tokyo, May 17, 1928, Ibid., p. 224, The Secretary of State [Kellogg] to the Ambassador in Japan [MacVeagh], Washington, May 18, 1928, Ibid., p. 226.
[1289] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), pp. 218-219.
[1290] Ibid., p. 220.

Tso-lin's assassination,[1291] nor the random outcome of "insubordination on the part of free-wheeling military activists."[1292]

Anderson points to "weak civilian control over the Japanese military rather than technological limitations of the time" in the case of Japan's "unauthorized peripheral expansion" by the Kwantung Army in 1931.[1293] In a similar vein, Iriye comments that "a strong government in Japan might have restrained army action in Manchuria" but "the government in Tokyo was too weak and too unwilling to risk its existence by a strong stand."[1294] In the midst of the mounting political pressure against the Wakatsuki cabinet, on September 18 of 1931, the Kwantung Army implemented its well-prepared plan to destroy "a few meters of easily repairable track of the South Manchurian Railway" in Liutiaohu to lay the blame for the Chinese and launch "a full-scale invasion" in Manchuria.[1295]

At this point, the ways in which the Wakatsuki cabinet and the Kwantung Army perceived Japan's gain of interest and prestige from its downright occupation of Manchuria were hardly coherent. From the viewpoint of the Kwantung Army, Japan's gain might have been high. But as the cabinet favored a localization of the crisis, the gain couldn't be as high as the Kwantung Army posited. For instance, Wakatsuki was rather concerned about losing Japan's standing "in the world" if "it turns out to be an act of conspiracy by the Japanese army." [1296] As Nish puts in a nutshell, the Wakatsuki cabinet "resisted, occasionally to some effect" but could not preclude the army from carrying out its own expansionist scheme in Manchuria after all. The Minister of War and senior colleagues instead nipped the attempted Coup d'état, the October incident of 1931, in the bud.[1297]

The Kwantung Army was able to fulfill its military objectives against the Fengtian Army in a few hours and proceeded to put all three northeastern provinces under its control.[1298] While the Inukai cabinet replaced the Wakatsuki cabinet in December 1931, the Kwantung Army seized Chinchow and Harbin from January and February 1932.[1299] By the late February 1932, Japan took over Manchuria, northeastern Inner Mongolia, and the easternmost portion of Mongolia. In the meantime, the Japanese opened up a second front in Shanghai by using "a brawl" between the Japanese and Chinese as a pretext. The Shanghai incident of 1932 gave the Japanese navy a chance to display "its repertoire" amidst the Japanese army's arguably unrestricted expansion towards Manchuria and eastern Mongolia.[1300]

In 1933, Japan captured "the mountain barrier of Shanhaikuan" in January and invaded the province of Jehol by February,[1301] which was the operation endorsed a month

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[1291] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p. 100.
[1292] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), p. 580.
[1293] Nicholas D. Anderson, *op.cit.*, (Winter 2022/2023), p. 161.
[1294] Akira Iriye, *op.cit*, (1969), p. 295.
[1295] Yoko Kato, *SOREDEMO NIHONJIN WA SENSOU O ERANDA*, Asahi Press, (2009), Translated in Korean by Hyunmyung Yoon, Seunghyuk Lee, (Paju, Korea: Booksea Publishing, 2018B), pp. 271-272, S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p. 115.
[1296] Ibid., p. 7.
[1297] Ian Nish, *op.cit.,* (1993), p. 43.
[1298] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 582-583.
[1299] Ibid., p. 584.
[1300] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), pp. 115-116.
[1301] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 585-586.

ago by the cabinet and the Emperor.[1302] The Kwantung Army seized the northeast region of Chahar and established a de-militarized zone by co-opting local Mongolian leaders. By 1934, Japan's implicit assertion of its special interest and rights in Manchuria and eastern Mongolia until the Manchurian invasion of 1931 developed into an explicit territorial occupation of Manchuria and eastern Mongolia. Though Anderson attributes the cabinet's non-expansion policy to "their expectations of the geopolitical risks" associated with the Soviet Union, Britain, and the U.S., their responses after September 1931 didn't much shift from their reactions to the Shandong expeditions in 1928-1929.

The Japanese Army in Tokyo was determined to bypass the cabinet's non-expansion policy.[1303] Moreover, the Kwantung Army endeavored to foster the public support through "setting up a propaganda office, holding regular briefings, distributing pamphlets, and broadcasting patriotic songs and messages over the radio." [1304] In the face of the insurmountable political pressure, the Wakatsuki cabinet was internally divided and replaced by the Inukai cabinet of the Seiyukai in December 1931.[1305] On March 1, 1932, the State of Manchukuo was announced and the House of Representatives in the Imperial Diet advocated the recognition of Manchukuo three months before Japan's diplomatic recognition. Foreign Minister Uchida assured the Diet of a "scorched-earth diplomacy" to keep this position.[1306]

Therefore, although the Manchurian invasion of 1931 had been drawn up and implemented by the Kwantung Army, it appears that the majority of the Japanese Army and the public strongly propped up the Kwantung Army's initiative for the reasons clarified, as the Kwantung Army had wished and promoted. The opposition party, the Seiyukai, took the advantage of the development in Manchuria to remove the Minseito party from power. As the economic crisis fueled the public discontent of the agriculture and military, the Wakatsuki cabinet was considerably too susceptible and weak to even restrain the Army at the outset by September 1931. The pollical agitations of the opposition party, the Army, and the Kwantung Army made it more impossible for the next cabinet to reverse the trend of Japan's fait accompli, though the Tanggu truce was signed in May 1933.



Figure. 23. Japan's expected gain and The U.S.'s expected loss from 1929-1934

[1302] Yoko Kato, *op.cit.*, (2018B), p. 332.
[1303] Shimada Toshihiko, "Extension of Hostilities, 1931-1932" trans. Akira Iriye, in Ibid., pp. 246-247.
[1304] Nicholas D. Anderson, *op.cit.*, (Winter 2022/2023), p. 165.
[1305] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), p. 180.
[1306] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 584-585.

Diplomatic non-recognition with low expectation about the contagion effect

In response to Japan's series of fait accompli toward Manchuria and eastern Mongolia from 1931-1934, the U.S., or the Hoover administration, espoused no more than "the doctrine of non-recognition,"[1307] referred to as either "the Hoover doctrine" or "the Stimson doctrine," in line with its traditional understanding of the Open-Door policy and the Nine-Power treaty.[1308] As Hoover and Stimson both reveal in their memoirs, President Hoover "firmly opposed the suggestion of any economic or military action."[1309] According to Hoover's account, Stimson proposed two courses of action, viz., "(1) some form of collective economic sanctions against Japan" and "(2) the exercise of diplomatic pressure and the power of world public opinion, to try to get as fair play as possible for the weaker power, China, in the eventual negotiated settlement," in October 1931.[1310]

Hoover's rationale of his favor of the second proposal over the first proposal, which "greatly disturbed him," was fairly straightforward. The American loss of interest and prestige from Japan's continental expansion into Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, albeit highly undesirable, was barely high. In Hoover's view, it was "primarily a controversy between China and Japan" and the U.S. friendship with Japan compelled the administration to "consider her side also." In brief, "neither our obligation to China, nor our own interest, not our dignity requires us to go to war over these questions" because "these acts do not imperil the freedom of the American people, the economic, or moral future of our people."[1311] He believed that the U.S. "should not go around alone sticking pins in tigers, or alone impose futile sanctions" when Stimson "was prepared to go it alone."[1312]

Britain was even more reluctant to be take active measures against Japan, as the Japanese impinged upon Shanghai in 1932, Hoover broached "a joint appeal" that "should be directly sent to the Emperor of Japan" of the leaders of non-combatant states signatory to the Nine-Power treaty and Stimson sounded out Britain, France, and smaller states of the Nine-Power treaty. The British reply was "a plain rebuff."[1313] Stimson was still unwilling to abandon the idea of economic sanction in February 1932 but Hoover undisputedly disagreed with Stimson.[1314] Stimson's preference was not representative of the Hoover administration except the principle of non-recognition and moral pressure. He justified his position by invoking "the American interest in world peace" and Japan's "flagrant violation" of international treaties but was forced to rely on "a bluff of force."[1315]

Stimson's policy preference was a minority voice in the Hoover administration unlike his position against Japan in the later period. When Hoover inquired his military advisers about the military preparedness for a war with Japan, he was told that "a large

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[1307] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *op.cit.*, (1947), p. 237.
[1308] Stanley K. Hornbeck, *The United State and the Far East: Certain Fundamentals of Policy*, (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1942), pp. 30-31.
[1309] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *op.cit.*, (1947), p. 258.
[1310] Herbert Hoover, *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 366.
[1311] Ibid., pp. 368-369.
[1312] Ibid., pp. 366-367.
[1313] Ibid., p. 374, Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *op.cit.*, (1947), pp. 237-239.
[1314] Herbert Hoover, *op.cit.,* (1952), p. 375.
[1315] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *op.cit.*, (1947), pp. 226-227, p. 245.

army and a great transport fleet to land it in China or China" would be necessary and the U.S. "must either withdraw from the Philippines or lose them until victory was won" though it would be a victorious outcome after 4 to 6 years.[1316] Hoover "was willing to go to war for the preservation of American" but unwilling to "sacrifice American life for anything short of this." In his view, a war would be more than "a naval operation," requiring the U.S. to "arm and train Chinese." He wished to go hand in hand with the League of Nations that had already taken up the subject, too.[1317]

Stimson well recollected that the principle of non-recognition and moral sanction was "a maximum measure" for Hoover. Stimson admitted that "the country," "the President," and "the major European nations," were all not in favor of sanctions because of the friendship with Japan had enjoyed and "the simple reason that Asia was no great concern of theirs."[1318] As elaborated earlier, the different interpretations between Japan and other great powers with regard to the Nine-Power Treaty and the definition of China, or China proper, and Manchuria were never new and indeed found from the Washington naval conference. Japan and the U.S. simply drew up a way to circumvent their different understandings to manage the relations until the Manchurian invasion of 1931.

Hoover supposed that the Japanese expansion "onto the continent of Asia at the expense of China was no new policy" and "the Manchurian invasion was just one more step" as "a late-comer among the nations that seize parts of China."[1319] Because Stimson considered that the covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were interrelated[1320] and the U.S. had "farsighted interest" and "prestige" in China,[1321] he was disturbed by Japan's attacks of Chinchow, Tsitsihar and its diversionary operation in Shanghai.[1322] But he forced to make use of no more than the "strong restatement of principles," or "the policy of bluff." Prodded by Stimson, Hoover agreed to leave the U.S. fleet at Hawaii in mid-February 1932 and issue an open letter to Senator Borah with respect to the U.S. position on the Japanese expansion in Asia.[1323]

Even so, along with the principle of non-recognition of Japan's fait accompli, Hoover strove to maintain "the attitude of impartiality between China and Japan," which the League of Nations and the Lytton report also sought to keep in dealing with the Manchurian invasion of 1931, unlike the conventional notion that the League of Nations, and the Lytton report, virtually sided with China.[1324] When some members of the League of Nations called for economic sanctions against Japan during Japan's attack of Shanghai, Hoover was still "strongly opposed" due to its escalatory effects on Japan. On February

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[1316] Herbert Hoover, *op.cit.,* (1952), p. 367.
[1317] Ibid., pp. 367-371.
[1318] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *op.cit.*, (1947), pp. 226-227, p. 258.
[1319] Herbert Hoover, *op.cit.,* (1952), p. 362.
[1320] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *op.cit.*, (1947), p. 227.
[1321] Ibid., p. 226, p. 234.
[1322] In the case of Shanghai, the Japanese army high command was concerned that an extension into central China could trigger "joint intervention by the powers" and pulled out the troops once the occupation of Shanghai was completed. Ikuhiko Hata, "Continental Expansion, 1905-1941," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in Peter Duus, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan: Twentieth Century, Vol. 6* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 297.
[1323] Ibid., pp. 245-254.
[1324] William Starr Myers, *The Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover, 1929-1933*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 160.

23, 1933, he wrote to Stimson, "the imposition of any kind of sanction would provoke the spread of the conflagration." He added that the doctrine of non-recognition was important in both "invoking world opinion" and avoiding "precipitant action."[1325]

Thus, it is unclear that the U.S. administration had decided that "it was time to risk a more confrontational policy" by late 1931.[1326] On the other hand, as the Japanese scholarship shows, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations had less to do with the Lytton report than its fear of economic and financial sanctions and forced expulsion from the League of Nations associated with the Article 16.[1327] China had already appealed to the League of Nations on the basis of the Article 11 and 15 when Japan invaded Manchuria and Shanghai from 1931-1932. As Japan penetrated into Rehe in February 1933, the next step China could take was to appeal to the Article 16 if Japan insisted on staying in the League of Nations, which would have led to Japan's eviction from the League and economic as well as financial sanctions.[1328]

6.2.3. Japan's bifurcated aggressions vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union, 1934-1938

➡ Low expectation about the contagion effect on the first line of naval defense of the U.S.

Japan's expansion into Central China and the Soviet Borders

From the years between 1934 and 1938, Japan prolonged its geographical expansion on the Asian continent against both China and the Soviet Union in spite of intermittent truce agreements with them. Neither had the Army and the Navy been able to reconcile their opposite directions of preferred power projection and the Army haphazardly went down the path toward a quagmire in China beyond Manchuria. The Japanese Army originally professed the need to "tap the resources of Manchuria and build a heavy industrial plant" to wage a war against the Soviet Union.[1329] However, as the battles against the Soviet Union from 1938-1939 reveal, it had been an unrealistic strategic plan particularly when the most troops were deployed in China and the Chinese resistance turned out to be increasingly resilient and staunch after 1937.

On the other hand, while the Japanese army moved on to both Hebei and Chahar, the Soviet Union was prompted to bolster its military posture around the border areas. For example, in addition to deploying more infantry divisions and aircrafts, the Soviet Union launched "the double-track expansion of the Amur Railway" to double its "transportation

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[1325] Ibid., pp. 162-169.

[1326] Stacie E. Goddard, *op.cit.,* (2018), pp. 149-151, p. 161.

[1327] The Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant stipulates, "1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1

[1328] Yoko Kato, *op.cit.*, (2018B), pp. 325-337.

[1329] James B. Crowley, "Introduction: Designs on North China, 1933-1937 by Shimada Toshihiko," in James William Morley, ed., *The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 6.

capacity" and fortified "in-depth defenses constructed around Tochka" along the Manchurian-Soviet border.[1330] Besides, transoceanic heavy bombers had been relocated "into the Maritime Provinces."[1331] Externally, the Soviet Union entered the League of Nations in September 1934 and cultivated contacts with the Chinese though it had offered little aid. The Soviet Union also concluded the Franco-Soviet Pact as well as the mutual assistance pact with the Mongolian People's Republic in March 1936.[1332]

It was no wonder that there was a salient increase in the number of border disputes between the Soviet Union and Japan from 1935. Whereas there were 152 disputes in the two-and-a-half years between the Manchurian invasion of 1931 and 1934, the year of 1935 and 1936 saw 136 and 200 incidents respectively.[1333] Such changes didn't go unnoticed. Japan adapted its operational plan against the Soviet Union in 1933 and Ishihara attempted a "major expansion of the forces in Manchuria," calling for 6 divisions in Manchukuo and 2 divisions in Korea after his appointment as Chief of the Operations Section of the Army General Staff in August 1935. However, the Hirota cabinet[1334] warned against a move "that might trigger conflict" and Ishihara's program was barely implemented as Japan's main forces were concentrated on "the China front" from 1937.[1335]

In principle, Japan's threat on the Asian continent was the Soviet Union. But in practice, the main adversary against which Japan fought in a fiercer manner became China from 1937. The First Army headed towards Wuhan through the Beijing-Wuhan railway and the Second Army marched to Nanjing in line with the Tianjin-Pukuo railway. "A third smaller campaign" was launched along the Beijing-Suiyuna railway toward Chahar and inner Mongolia. In Shanxi, Datong, Xinkou, and Taiyuan were consecutively captured by the Japanese from September to November. Nanjing fell in December 1937.[1336] Japan plunged into Wuhan, Chongqing, and Guangzhou in 1938.[1337] At this stage, the Soviet Union also played a critical role in bogging Japan down in continental China by assisting China militarily as well as showcasing its fighting capacity in the North.

A month after the onset of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937, the Soviet Union and China signed a non-aggression pact in Nanjing on August 21 1937. Once the anti-

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[1330] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *A History of Russo-Japanese Relations: Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition*, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 207.

[1331] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 130-131.

[1332] Ibid., pp. 131-132, Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), p. 207, S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), pp. 121-122.

[1333] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the U.S.S.R, 1935-1940,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 133.

[1334] The Okada cabinet was dissolved after the incident of February 26 1936 and succeeded by the Hirota cabinet.

[1335] Ibid., pp. 132-133, Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 207-208.

[1336] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), pp. 123-125.

[1337] Ibid., p. 126.

Comintern pact was concluded between Japan and Germany in November 1936,[1338] Stalin was in search of "some power to deflect either Germany or Japan" and China deemed suitable. The Russian military equipment kept arriving in China from September 1937. Russia "sent 1,235 planes, 1,600 artillery pieces, 50,000 rifles, over 14,000 machine guns, over 300 advisers, over 2,000 pilots, over 3,000 engineers and technical experts, thousands of drivers to deliver the goods" from 1937-1941.[1339] Japan intended to "restrain Russia from aiding China, both militarily and economically" by consolidating the anti-Comintern pact with Germany and Italy in late 1938 to no avail.[1340]

Further, the Soviet Union directly stunted the Kwantung Army's bid to expand into the area of the Soviet-Manchurian border with "a sizable increase in the Soviet military might" in East Asia by 1938.[1341] Despite "the inadequacy of strength and equipment available," the Kwantung Army "tenaciously" persisted in its "resolute anti-Soviet stance." Officially backing the Mongolian People's Republic from March 1936 and building up military capabilities in East Asia, the Soviet Military became confident of its capacity to "cope with enemies on both the eastern and western frontiers at any time" by January 1937.[1342] The negotiations to demarcate the border lines between Manchukuo and outer Mongolia constantly broke down due to the repeated border clashes from 1935-1937.[1343]

In May-June 1938, the Japanese Army set off a campaign around the disputed areas near the Korean-Russian-Manchukuo border. The Soviet troops and the Japanese forces fought "a pitched battle" from July to August 1938, known as the battle of Lake Khasan or the Changkufeng incident of 1938. The Soviet Union was able to deploy "a force of 21,000 against 3,000 Japanese" and won a victory. The Japanese retreated and agreed on a cease-fire.[1344] Nonetheless, the Japanese Army didn't take the battle of Lake Khasan "as necessarily constituting a defeat."[1345] Meanwhile, in spite of a brief suspension of the Wuhan campaign because of the battle of Lake Khasan, the Japanese had already occupied Xuzhou, Anqing, and Jiujiang from May to July 1938. After Wuhan fell in late October,

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[1338] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 208-209.

[1339] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p, 122, p. 124. Russian pilots participated in the Sino-Japanese war from "Nanjing, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Xian, and other places." The Chinese Nationalists depended on the Soviet air force until the U.S. replaced its role in 1942.

[1340] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 208-209. Hata comments that "the Japanese army know that the military value of aid from the U.S., Britain, and France was negligible" and "Only the Soviet aid coming in through the northwest was at all substantial." Ikuhiko Hata, "Continental Expansion, 1905-1941," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in Peter Duus, ed., *op.cit.,* (1989), pp. 308-309.

[1341] Anastasia S. Lozhkina, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Kirill E. Cherevko, "Soviet-Japanese Relations after the Manchurian Incident, 1931-1939," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 229-230.

[1342] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 132-133.

[1343] Ibid., pp. 134-140, Sören Urbansky, *Beyond the Steppe Frontier: A History of the Sino-Russian Border*, (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020), pp. 186-187.

[1344] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p. 127, Anastasia S. Lozhkina, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Kirill E. Cherevko, "Soviet-Japanese Relations after the Manchurian Incident, 1931-1939," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), p. 231.

[1345] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 140-157.

all of north China as well as the Yangzi river-valley were in possession of Japan, including the Beijing-Tianjin area, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Guangzhou by late 1938.[1346]

The extent to which Japan gained military-economic interest from its relentless expansion into North and Central China is elusive. Manchuria once betrayed the Japanese military's dream of securing stable and high-quality raw materials. As the Chinese resistance was buttressed by the Soviet Union and intensified from 1937, the Japanese operation seems to have been dictated by its pursuit of imperial prestige in the Sino-Japanese war rather than by a fine integration of political objective and the use of force. Though Japan took hold of "China's five key centers of economic activity," such as Manchuria, the Beijing-Tianjin area, Shanghai, Wuhan, and Guangzhou, by the fall of 1938, the Chinese insurgency continued to undercut Japan's security in the rear and blocked "economic development" in the occupied area. Japan "lacked the forces to garrison" China.[1347]



Figure. 24. Japan's expected gain and The U.S.'s expected loss from 1934-1938

The American observation of Japan's movement through the lens of maritime defense

Although the U.S. signaled some assurance of Japan's interest and position in Manchuria at the Washington naval conference earlier, as elaborated with the Root clause, it was little more than an implicit and diplomatic gesture. The U.S. had little interest in publicly acknowledging Japan's special interests, if not spheres of influence, in Manchuria and Mongolia or agreeing on Japan's interpretation that Manchuria doesn't belong to China proper at the very outset. Thus, in spite of stark contrast between Hoover and Stimson concerning the policy option to be taken toward Japan during the years between 1929-1933, they could easily settle on the non-recognition doctrine. Certainly, Roosevelt was less non-expansionist and more concerned about Japan than Hoover but the U.S. expectation of its loss from Japan's aggression was not noticeably high from 1933-1937.

After the Manchurian invasion of 1931 and the Japanese recognition of Manchukuo in 1932, Norman Davis, as the Chairman of American Delegation of the London Naval Conference, wrote to Roosevelt, "it is clearly in our interest to make a statement if only to show a continuation of policy and anxious watchfulness," while he feared that "the trouble"

[1346] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), pp. 125-131.
[1347] Ibid., pp. 131-133.

would be extended without a "hope for a solution" on January 10 1933.[1348] Roosevelt was sworn in March 1933 and informed of a memorandum written by Stanley Hornbeck, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, with respect to "Manchurian situation: Question of Japanese mandates in the Pacific." Hornbeck understood the U.S. as "a Pacific Power" that had "an interest in law in these islands" but suggested that there was "no need" of "action on our part" before "action by Japan or the League."[1349]

According to Hornbeck's reasoning, "there would be nothing to be gained – and there might be something to be lost – by a manifestation by the American Government at this time of interest or concern with regard to the matter." Roosevelt was primarily keen on how Japan's withdrawal from the League would affect the U.S. interest in the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific and originally asked "a question in regard to the Japanese mandates in the Pacific." In response, Phillips shared Hornbeck's memorandum with the President. The U.S. policymakers approached the Japanese question from the viewpoint of its maritime interest and prestige in the Pacific. The Division of Far Eastern Affairs estimated, "the rights of the U.S. in relation to Japan's Mandate would not be affected by the fact of Japan's ceasing to be a member of the League."[1350]

When the Chinese Minister, Mr. Soong, requested a more active mediating role of the U.S. as the conflict spread into South of the Great Wall, Hornbeck argued, "Better that the situation between Japan and China remain fluid."[1351] This was because such an effort could fail by virtue of Japan's refusal and "an early and satisfactory solution" would be stultified if the Japanese forces "advance into China proper." More fundamentally, Hornbeck elaborated that "the U.S. has not much to lose" and "there is nothing there that is vital to us" in connection with "materials interests" although "the principles of our Far Eastern policy," "our ideals," and "our trade prospects" could be somewhat damaged. He submitted that "a complete exposure of Japan's program, her strength and/or weakness" would best serve the U.S. interest although it was not "humanitarian."[1352]

Grew penned a message to Roosevelt that the U.S. might lose its "treaty rights," "the Open Door," and "vested interests," in case of a withdrawal from the region "in the long-term," it is in fact an indirect admission that no vital interest of immediate concern was at stake for the U.S. Since Hornbeck didn't make a case for a withdrawal, his position did not vary from Grew's recommendation that the administration should "insist, and continue to insist, not aggressively yet not the less firmly, on the maintenance of our legitimate rights and interests in this part of the world," viz., the continuation of "the non-recognition of imposed change." Roosevelt and Hull largely adopted the positions of Hornbeck and Grew

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[1348] Norman H. Davis, Chairman, American Delegation, London Naval Conference, to Roosevelt, New York, January 10, 1933, in Edgar B. Nixon (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *op.cit.*, (1969A), pp. 2-3.

[1349] William Phillips, Under Secretary of State, to Roosevelt, Washington, April 3, 1933, [Enclosure 1] Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, to William Phillips, April 3, 1933, Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[1350] The Division of Far Eastern Affairs also assumed that Japan's withdrawal from the League would not automatically deprive Japan of "its rights in relation to a Mandate." Résumé of Memorandum, February 2, 1933, [PSF: Japan:T], Ibid., p. 34.

[1351] [Enclosure] Memorandum by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, to William Phillips, May 9, 1933, Ibid., pp. 103-105.

[1352] Ibid., pp. 104-105.

and followed the Republican precedents in the period of Japan's extended operations in North China.[1353]

By April 5 1934, Hornbeck deliberated about the "problem of Japanese-American Relations" and conveyed his thought to Hull that "the real problems" arose out of "facts and factors in the Far East" and not those "on this side of the Pacific Ocean" yet. He rightly speculated that Japan "could and probably would" expand not only into Manchuria and Mongolia but also into "certain portions of China and Siberia" if the U.S. and Britain "would stand aside." Calling for the adherence to the non-recognition, he affirmed, "we have taken no steps against "Manchukuo;" there are no reasons why we should take any steps in its favor." There was no logical ground "why we should especially favor any country in the Far East" because the U.S. had "a world policy" and "its application in relation to the Far East," and "no Far Eastern Policy" as "a thing separate" from it.[1354]

At the same time, Hornbeck acknowledged the potential maritime challenge that Japan's ambition could bring about in the Pacific. He noted that if the U.S. and Britain adopt "the policies of abandonment," Japan would develop its naval strength so as to be "invulnerable in the Pacific Ocean north of Singapore and west of Hawaii."[1355] As examined earlier, Roosevelt also heeded more attention to the looming naval threat that Japan might pose in the Pacific, when Japan distanced itself from the Washington naval system, than Japan's bifurcated expansion into North China and the Mongolian-Manchuria border from 1933-1936. Evidently, Roosevelt's threat perception toward Japan increased and was more salient than Hoover's. Like Hornbeck, Roosevelt expected that Japan's expansionist scheme would persist and was "concerned about" its Navy.[1356]

Whereas the American reaction to the Japanese expansion in North China and Mongolia was to let the Chinese resistance combat the Japanese and cling to muster diplomatic pressure against Japan, the Roosevelt administration showed a more vigilant and proactive response to the matters of naval arms limitation and spheres of influence in the Pacific. The U.S. had been notified of the Japanese intention to "terminate the Washington Naval Treaty" as early as September 1934[1357] unless their demand of "a common upper limit," namely naval parity, was accepted by the other great powers.[1358] Roosevelt instructed Davis to seek "at least a gentleman's agreement" that they would hold

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[1353] Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 33-34.

[1354] [Enclosure] Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, April 5, 1934, in Edgar B. Nixon (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2: March 1934-August 1935*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969B) pp. 54-62.

[1355] Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[1356] Roosevelt to the Reverend Malcom E. Peabody, Northeast Harbor, Maine, [Washington] August 19, 1933, in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., *op.cit.,* (1969A), p. 370.

[1357] The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State, Tokyo, September 18, 1934. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 1,* (Washington: Department of State, 1943), pp. 253-254.

[1358] The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State, London, October 24, 1934, Ibid., pp. 254-256.

onto the naval treaties until the expiration date.[1359] In November, the President received reports on Japan's alleged fortification of the Mandated islands and new types of vessel.[1360]

Afterwards, Roosevelt was prompted to order Swanson, Secretary of the Navy, to investigate "the possibility of establishing one or two very large air bases in the Philippines with a small base in Guam, and the still smaller bases in the Midway-Hawaiian chain and in the Aleutian chain of Islands" on December 17 1934, which was to be considered as "highly confidential."[1361] Along with Roosevelt's question in relation to the Japanese mandated islands in 1933, this order exhibits how Roosevelt envisioned the first line of maritime defense for in the Pacific in a tangible manner, as the U.S. was sure of Japan's future naval armament in the years after 1936. The subject of the first line of national defense in the Pacific and the Atlantic was again brough back to the President's discussion with the members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee in January 1939.

As such, in addition to restoring the American naval armament that used to fall behind Japan during the years of the Washington Naval System,[1362] the Roosevelt administration braced for a naval challenge in the Pacific by revisiting its first line of maritime defense in the Pacific. In the meantime, when the Japanese military strove to detach the five provinces in North China in 1935, Secretary of State, Hull, did no more than reaffirming the American support of "the principle of respect for treaties" and admitting that "a political struggle" in North China though the U.S. had "treaty rights and obligations and the commercial and cultural interests" in that area.[1363] It was another reiteration of the Stimson doctrine of 1932[1364] and the diplomatic position that the U.S. had not discarded ever since.

Hull recollected the situation, suggesting that "the two courses open" to the U.S. were either a gradual and graceful withdrawal from East Asia, which could have nullified its treaty rights and the open door, or an insistence "on the maintenance" of its "legitimate rights and interests" in the region. Hull's remark is precisely consistent with Grew's recommendation and the U.S. plainly "chose the second course."[1365] Yet, until the Japanese expansion was pushed to concentrate in the first line of maritime defense in the Pacific from 1938-1941, it had been a minimum measure the Roosevelt administration was able to preserve. Any kind of economic or military coercion did not constitute the central topic of the internal policy debate within the Roosevelt administration from 1933-1936.

[1359] Roosevelt to Hull, The White House, November 14, 1934, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, Vol. 1*, (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1950A), p. 431.

[1360] Roosevelt to Admiral J.M. Reeves, [Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, U.S.S. New Mexico, San Pedro, California], Washington, November 8, 1934, in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., *op.cit.,* (1969B), pp. 261-262.

[1361] Roosevelt to Claude A. Swanson [Secretary of the Navy], Washington, December 17, 1934, in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., *op.cit.,* (1969B), pp. 322-323.

[1362] Roosevelt to Claude A. Swanson, [Secretary of the Navy], Washington July 2, 1935, Ibid., p. 546, See pp. 39-40, above.

[1363] Stanley K. Hornbeck, *op.cit.*, (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1942), p. 34.

[1364] Stimson announced that the U.S. "cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto" and "any treaty or agreement entered" in Manchuria on the basis of "the treaty rights of the U.S.," "the open door policy," and Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact after the Manchurian invasion of 1931 on January 7 1932. The Secretary of State (Stimson) to the Ambassador in Japan (Forbes), Washington, January 7, 1932, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 1,* (Washington: Department of State, 1943), p 76.

[1365] Cordell Hull, *op.cit.*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 290-291.

Nevertheless, partly because Japan was soon to break with the constraints of the Washington Naval system by the end of 1936, Roosevelt's alertness regarding the first line of maritime defense repetitively surfaced from 1936-1938. In March 1936, Roosevelt expanded on what defense meant for the U.S. in a correspondence to the Bishop of Albany. In his view, the U.S. had "two coasts to defend against Naval attack and communication between the two must be kept open through adequate defense of the Panama Canal." In the event of an attack coming from the Western Pacific, "the key to the whole defense is Hawaii" because if Hawaii falls into the hand of an enemy fleet "that fleet could act either in a Naval attack or to cover an actual invasion against any point on the whole length of our Pacific Coast, or against the Panama Canal itself."[1366]

The introduction of the Second Vinson-Trammel Act of 1938 and the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 were not only the American reply to Japan's forthcoming naval arms buildup but also the Roosevelt administration's endeavor to secure the requisite capabilities to realize the protection of the first line of maritime defense and sea lines of communication, as envisaged by the President, albeit belatedly. As seen from Roosevelt's remark, the expected contagion effect of a hypothetical enemy's power projection into Hawaii was profoundly high but the U.S. would by all means have the geographical preventive motivation to act long before the adversary closes in on Hawaii. Given Roosevelt's instruction in 1934, the U.S. first line of maritime defense could possibly range from Philippines, Guam, Midway, Hawaii, to Aleutian islands, covering a vastly wide maritime realm.

Roosevelt was specifically heedful of the maritime defense in the Pacific. In January 1938, Roosevelt felt, "national defense represents too serious a danger especially in these modern times where distance has been annihilated." Respecting "the Pacific Coast, especially," he mentioned to James Roosevelt, Secretary to the President and his son, "the defense of the Coast line lies not on the Coast, but between three and four thousand mils from the Coast." He asserted that "once the defense of the Coast is withdrawn to the Coast itself, no government can give adequate security to Portland or any other city within two hundred miles of the Pacific Ocean."[1367] Even though where the active defense ought to be launched against an enemy's expansion was obscure, Roosevelt assumed that an adversary's expansion into the first line of naval defense ought to be prevented.

Considering Roosevelt's gestation of the first line of maritime defense and the geographical preventive motivation from 1934-1938, it is not puzzling that his idea of "a joint Anglo-American long distance naval blockade of Japan" emerged in late 1937.[1368] The eruption of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937 and the subsequent Japanese expansion from North China to Central China were largely seen through the viewpoint of the maritime

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[1366] Roosevelt to the Right Reverend G. Ashton Oldham, Bishop of Albany, Washington, March 3, 1936, in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 3: September 1935-January 1937*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969C), pp. 228-229.

[1367] Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, Secretary to the President, January 20, 1938, [PPF 1820: CT], in Donald B. Schewe ed., (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8: January -February 1938*, (New York and Toronto: Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc, 1995E), pp. 124-125.

[1368] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt & the Isolationist, 1932-45*, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 299. John McVickar Haight, Jr, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (May, 1971), pp. 203-204.

defense in the Pacific by Roosevelt who had to contend with the noticeable clout of non-expansionists at home. Although the extension of the Japanese operation in North and Central China from 1937-1938 caused a modest growth in the U.S. expectation about the contagion effect, the direction of Japan's expansion was bifurcated and not decidedly concentrated toward the naval defense line of the U.S. in the Pacific.

On January 9, 1937, Hornbeck still judged, "although conditions in China are unsettled, generally speaking, the situation in the Far East does not at present give cause for any serious apprehension."[1369] In-mid July, Hull announced the American position that it "avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments" but pursue "cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles" of the international treaties. Indeed, the U.S. did offer "its good offices" on some occasions as the Sino-Japanese hostilities "moved southward and westward."[1370] When Britain proposed a joint diplomatic approach with the U.S. and France to China and Japan to press them to suspend "further movements of troops" in July, Hull opposed it because he thought that none of them "thought of employing force" to back such a diplomatic initiative.[1371]

While the extant forces of non-expansionism were a domestic factor that in part affected the administration's decision,[1372] the pivotal international factor was the direction of Japan's power projection that didn't trigger the high expectation about Japan's contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense. Behind the scene, Roosevelt unequivocally revealed that his position was not aligned with non-expansionism and also that his focus principally lied at the first line of maritime defense as well as the prevention of Japan's geographical movement in the Pacific. As shown, Roosevelt quite welcomed Yarnell's idea of a long-range blockade, or a naval war of strangulation in the Pacific, where "a naval superiority" in "a main line of bases, Dutch Harbor, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, Java and Singapore" and "scattered minor bases" was paramount.[1373]

The President commented that Yarnell "talks a lot of sense" and his idea "goes along with the word "quarantine," which he used in his famous Chicago speech in October 1937.[1374] In fact, according to Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State from 1937 to 1943, Roosevelt envisioned "a long-range naval blockade of Japan" after the onset of the Sino-Japanese war in mid-July 1937 and spoke with the Navy about "drawing an actual line in the Pacific to be maintained by the U.S., if the British would agree to, beyond which Japan would not be permitted to trade or to expand in the event she persisted in the policy of military conquest of China." At this moment, Roosevelt had a rather sanguine about the

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[1369] Memorandum by Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Departmet of State, January 9, 1937, [PSF: China:TS], in Donald B. Schewe, ed., (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4: January -February 1937*, (New York and Toronto: Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc, 1995A), p. 28.

[1370] Stanley K. Hornbeck, *op.cit.*, (Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation, 1942), pp. 34-37.

[1371] Cordell Hull, *op.cit.*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 538.

[1372] Cordell Hull, *op.cit.*, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 540, p. 546, Wayne S. Cole, *op.cit.,* (1983), p. 299.

[1373] Admiral Harry E. Yarnell (Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet) to Admiral William D. Leahy, (Chief of Naval Operations), October 15, 1936, [PSF: Navy:T], in Donald B. Schewe, (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), ed., *op.cit.*, (1995D), pp. 186-187.

[1374] Roosevelt to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations, November 10, 1937, [PSF: Navy: CT], in Ibid., pp. 204-205.

prospect of an escalation in case of the American naval denial of Japan in Southeast Asia,[1375] yet too sanguine in hindsight.

When asked about "the danger" of a war, Roosevelt answered, "Japan was already heavily committed to China that her economy was stretched to the breaking point. If trade were cut off, she would bog down long before she could get access to the oil and other raw materials in Southeast Asia that [so]…she would not dare risk war at this juncture." The President shelved the plan of "a blockade of Japan" in September but his attention to the Pacific lasted. According to British Foreign Secretary, Norman Davis told him, "the President was deeply perturbed at the prospects in the Fat East. He thought that …the U.S. might someday have to deal, maybe alone, with a greatly strengthened Japanese power across the Pacific. It was formidable prospect that was making the President wish, if he could, to do something to check the tendency now" on November 2.[1376]

Roosevelt's initial scheme of a naval blockade was based on a concert of other powers, such as Britain and France. In his conversation with the French Chargé d'affaires in Washington, Jules Henry, Roosevelt addressed the French decision to halt "the shipment of arms through Indo-China to Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist forces at Japan's demand" and depicted France as "scared rabbits" for its retreat from Asia. His notion of the contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense was displayed in this context again. Roosevelt challenged the French, "Doesn't one clearly see in France that a Japanese attack upon Hong Kong or Indo-China or the Dutch East Indies means an attack upon the Philippines? If this should happen……we would have to protect them" on November 6.[1377]

The *Panay* incident, where the Japanese bombed the U.S. gunboat *Panay* and three standard oil tankers on the Yangzi River, claiming three Americans on December 12, not only offered "an opportunity" to bolster the American naval buildup through the Second Vinson-Trammel Act of 1938[1378] but also prompted him to explore "other steps to bring direct pressure upon Japan." On December 14, he permitted the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry J. Morgenthau, Jr., to examine "plans to freeze Japanese financial assets in the U.S."[1379] The Roosevelt administration's plan of "engaging in hostilities without being at war," viz., naval and economic quarantine of Japan, was in the offing. The President expanded on a joint naval blockade plan with Britain from the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, Guam, to Singapore but "didn't want to go to war" on December 17, 1937.[1380]

The imposition of an economic, and naval if necessary, blockade before Japan was expected to intrude on the maritime defense line without fighting a war seemed to be what the Roosevelt administration was gearing up for. This sophisticated nature of the U.S. quarantine plan should be taken into account in the unresolved debated on Roosevelt's resolve for confrontation and war. As Roosevelt expressed, his administration wanted

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[1375] Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions that Shaped the World*, (New York, 1950), pp. 71-75, Cited in John McVickar Haight, Jr, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan," *op.cit.,* (1971), p. 204.

[1376] Anthony Eden, *Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Vol. 1, Facing the Dictators*, (Boston, 1962), pp. 609-610. Cited in Ibid., p. 206.

[1377] Henry to French Foreign Minister, November 7, 1937, in "Roosevelt's Kriegswille gegen Japan, Enthullungen Aus den Atken des Quai d'Orsay," *Berliner Monatshefte*, February, 1945, pp. 56-58, Cited in Ibid., pp. 206-207.

[1378] Stephen E. Pelz, *op.cit.*, (1974), pp. 203-204.

[1379] John McVickar Haight, Jr, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Naval Quarantine of Japan," *op.cit.,* (1971), p. 209.

[1380] Ibid., p. 211.

"peace" but it did not "want the kind of peace" that might mean "definite danger to us."[1381] As such, "things international still drift in the wrong direction" despite Japan's quick apology for the Panay incident.[1382] Regrettably, Japan's additional redirection of expansion from North and Central China as well as outer Mongolia to South China and the South seas, gradually but resolutely, rendered this quarantine tighter from 1938-1941.

6.2.4. Japan's redirected advance toward the South Seas, 1938-1941

➡ High expectation about contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense of the U.S.

Japan's strategic redirection from the North to the South, 1938-1941

Until the end of 1938, Japan's geographical expansion in China looked as if it could not be deterred by any other powers. The Japanese war machine conquered China's political centers, such as Beijing, Nanjing and Wuhan, as well as key regions of economic activity along the Yangzi river from 1937-1938. Japan had become virtually dominant in North and Central China.[1383] Though Japan continued to conquer Hankow and Canton in October 1938, China's center of gravity grew more elusive as the Chinese forces resorted to guerilla warfare for the sake of "protracted war" by the end of 1938. After the occupation of Hankow and Canton in the fall of 1938, Japan switched its military posture from active offensive to strategic defense and stopped pursuing the Chinese army as the Nationalist regime moved its interim capital to Chongqing in Western China.[1384]

The vastness of the Chinese continent and anti-Japanese nationalist resistances of both the Nationalists and the Communists posed almost inexorable challenges to the Japanese. Another puppet regime established by Japan, led by Wang Ching-wei, was unequivocally unpopular among the public and ineffective.[1385] In a certain sense, Japan had been mired in China from 1939. For example, the Japanese troops had advanced no more than 1.1 kilometers per day in 1939, whereas they used to proceed 17.6 kilometers and 7.6 kilometers in the second half of 1937 and 1938 respectively on a daily basis.[1386] On top of the overextension of Japan's operational lines, the Soviet Union and Germany compelled Japan to reconfigure the direction of future power projection in the year of 1939.

Although the Japanese did not necessarily take the outcome of the battle of Lake Khasan, or Zhanggufeng, as a defeat in 1938,[1387] the battles of Khalkhin Gol from May to September 1939, which were triggered by the Kwantung Army's attempt to augment its control over a border line between inner Mongolia and outer Mongolia, forced them to

[1381] F.D.R. to Rhoda Hinkley in Poughkeepsie (letter in F.D.R.L.) The White House, December 16, 1937, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *op.cit.,* (1950A), pp. 733-734.
[1382] Roosevelt to Arthur Murray, Argyll, Scotland, December 31, 1937, [PPF435: CT], in Donald B. Schewe (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library), ed., *op.cit.,* (1995D), p. 526.
[1383] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), pp. 130-132.
[1384] Ikuhiko Hata, "Continental Expansion, 1905-1941," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in Peter Duus, ed., *op.cit.,* (1989), p. pp. 306-307.
[1385] Ibid., pp. 307-308.
[1386] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p. 130.
[1387] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 154-155.

acknowledge their weakness in the Northeastern front.[1388] The Soviet and Mongolian forces, led by Georgii Zhukov, killed or wounded about "79 percent of front-line Japanese troops," which in turn practically frustrated the Japanese Army's long-standing war plan for "the Northern Advance on Russia" at least for a while despite the repeated internal debate in 1941.[1389] Having kept an eye on the Kwantung Army's conduct, Tokyo treated it as a local issue and decided, "the non-enlargement policy should be retained."[1390]

In fact, the Soviet Union was resolved to draw a clear line in the Mongolian border by the end of May 1939 when the Japanese incursions along the Mongolian frontier didn't subside despite its previous warning. On May 31, Molotov repeated his warning to the Japanese ambassador Togo, "the Soviet Government will not tolerate any provocations on its frontiers on the part of Japanese-Manchurian military units…We will defend the border of the Mongolian People's Republic…as decisively as our border…to all patience there is a limit." The outcome of the Soviet riposte from August was the devastating defeat of the Kwantung Army in the following September, which created "a new breathing-space" for the Soviet Union.[1391] The armistice negotiations between Togo and Molotov followed from 9 to 15 September and the battles were suspended on September 16.[1392]

When the fighting at Khalkhin-Gol almost came to an end, the Japanese were struck by "a diplomatic typhoon" on August 23 when Germany signed "the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union," namely the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939. As a consequence of the Khalkin-Gol defeat and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the continental balance of power between Japan and the Soviet Union considerably tilted in favor of the Russian side in 1939, let alone Japan's endless China quagmire.[1393] Though the Japanese Army's offensive war plans were not abandoned by the General Staff[1394] and Matsuoka, a recklessly pro-German Foreign Minister, called for "a strike in the North" after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941,[1395] Japan's northern expansion ceased from September 1939 and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact was signed in April 1941.

Blocked by the Soviet Union's military capacity and confounded by the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact of August 1939, it was not until 1939 that the Japanese Army searched for its "exit from the war in China" by turning its eyes on the South as a variety of "efforts at peace" with the Chinese appeared "virtually hopeless."[1396] Only after 1939 did the Army entertain "somewhat more purposeful war plans in respect to the United States." But because the Army's central focus had been almost always "on the Asian continent" and it expected that fighting the U.S. would be primarily a task of the Navy, these plans conceived

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[1388] Ibid., pp. 157-171.

[1389] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p. 128. Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), p. 635.

[1390] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 171-175.

[1391] Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-1941*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), p. 130, p. 133.

[1392] Ibid., pp. 136-137, Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 174-175.

[1393] Jonathan Haslam, *op.cit.*, (1992), pp. 135-136.

[1394] The Kwantung Army also "continued a military buildup" in the event of "a possible full-scale war" until 1945 but the Army eventually threw its weight to the Southern advance. Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 627-628.

[1395] Alvin D. Coox, "The Pacific War," in Peter Duus, ed., *op.cit.,* (1989), pp. 322-323.

[1396] Nakano Satoshi, *Japan's Colonial Moment in Southeast Asia, 1942-1945: The Occupiers' Experience*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 28, p. 40.

"attacks only on the Philippines and Guam" and included "no overall program for a conflict with the U.S." As such, in spite of its "little consideration" to the U.S., the Army played a pivotal role in Japan's shift towards the South.[1397]

Most notably, and fatally, the Army's strategic transition was predicated on its inaccurate assumption that "it could separate Britain and the U.S. and avoid fighting the latter."[1398] This was the moment at which the paradox of peripheral expansion emerged as the French did during the Fashoda crisis. If a challenger fails to understand how the leading sea power perceives its first line of maritime defense and takes it seriously, the peripheral nature of a certain region emboldens a challenger's expansion to a great extent that prompts the leading sea power to take risks of a military conflict by opting for more coercive measures. The turbulent external developments in Europe from 1939-1941 further boosted the Army's interests in the South but the presupposition of the Army's move was destructively wrong in the first place.

At least, unlike the Army, the Japanese Navy knew that "Britain and the United States were strategically inseparable" and viewed that "an attack on Hong Kong and the Malay Peninsula would cause the U.S. to come to the aid of Britain, making it impossible to limit the war."[1399] Nonetheless, even before the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, which initiated the war in Europe, the Japanese started to target "China's trade and aid from outside" in the southern coastal area. Specifically, the troops launched amphibious attacks on "the treaty ports of Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou (Foochow), and Shantou (Swatow)" and extended the operations in Guangdong, or Canton, from May to October 1938. Guangzhou, the port city, fell on October 21. Responding to "air raids on Canton" in May, the U.S. announced the "moral embargo" on aircraft in July.[1400]

While the Army proceeded to seize Chongqing and conducted the amphibious assault on the southern coastal cities, the Navy supported the amphibious operations and blockaded coastal areas. As the Guangdong campaign was designed in September 1938, the Japanese Navy also called for invading Hainan, which could serve as a stepping stone for the southern expansion in the future. The Navy's ambition was endorsed by the Imperial conference in January 1939. The Japanese took over Hainan in February and Paracel as well as Spratly islands in March 1939. In the aftermath of the Japanese operations in Guangdong and Hainan, Britain helped China to establish the Burma Road to assist the Chinese Nationalists. The U.S. likewise responded by extending loans to China from February 1939.[1401]

By and large, the Japanese Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministry converged on the necessity of Japan's southern advance though the strategic concerns they had differed from 1939-1941. The progress the European war especially gave rise to greater interests. the Foreign Ministry assumed that Germany "would invade the Netherlands" during the war and feared a preemptive move on the part of Britain or the U.S. In this context, Foreign Minister Nomura, who ended up as the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. who negotiated

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[1397] Fujiwara Akira, "The Role of the Japanese Army," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 190.
[1398] Ibid., p. 191.
[1399] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the U.S. in Japan's view, 1937-1941," in Ian Nish, ed*., Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers of the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 65. Sadao Asada, *op.cit.,* (2006B), pp. 214-219.
[1400] Ibid., p. 216. Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.* (2007), pp. 77-78.
[1401] S.C.M. Paine, *op.cit.*, (2017), p. 135.

with Hull until late 1941, noted that "Britain or the U.S. might take military or political action to protect the Dutch East Indies at the request of the Netherlands" by November 1939. Japan should "establish its right to participate in any future settlement involving the Dutch East Indies" and "prevent" them from edging out Japan.[1402]

As such, the real-time outcome and prospect of the European war directly shaped the level of interest and prestige that Japan expected to acquire from its additional expansion in the South. The onset of the Nazi's invasion from September 1939 as well as the fall of the Netherlands and France by June 1940 were momentous junctures for Japan. In the meantime, the economic strangulation that Roosevelt had gestated was soon set in motion as Japan's expansion was being conspicuously redirected towards the South Seas and judged to be much closer to the first line of maritime defense in the Pacific. Along with Hainan and Spratly and Paracel islands, the Japanese forces seized hold of two more coastal cities, Xiamen (Amoy) and Shantou (Swatow), respectively in May and June 1939.[1403]

Ironically, among the Army, the Navy, and Foreign Ministry, the Navy's determination for the southern advance seemed to be relatively most wavering than that of the two other ministries. To some degree, this was because the top leadership of the Navy Ministry was more clear-eyed about the inseparability of the U.S. and Britain as regards to the question of the South Seas and the insurmountable consequences in the event of the southern advance. The Naval leaders, including Yonai, Yamamoto, Inoue, and Yoshida, managed to withstand the pressure from middle-echelon officers of the fleet faction, who demanded "a Tripartite Pact and southward expansion" until the Navy Minister, Yoshida, physically collapsed in September 1940.[1404] After Oikawa, "a yes-man," replaced Yoshida, the Navy consented to the Tripartite pact and the southern expansion.[1405]

Unfortunately, hardline middle-echelon officers were inclined to advocate the case for the southern advance and this view gained more currency in the Navy as Germany invaded Norway and Denmark in April and swiftly conquered France and the Low countries by June 1940.[1406] With the insuperably growing pressure from below, the Navy Minister, Yoshida, was soon almost isolated within the Navy from July to September in 1940.[1407] The middle-echelon officers in the Army came to share a very similar position when France surrendered to Germany and "an English defeat in the aerial battle" looked as if "the strong possibility." The Army General Staff Headquarters suddenly discussed and envisaged "military action against French Indochina and Hong Kong" as a part of "dealing with" the Sino-Japanese war.[1408]

Against this backdrop, "the Outline of the Main Principles of Coping with the Changing World Situation" was drafted by middle-ranking officers of the Army Ministry and General Staff and authorized by the Army Ministry and General Staff on July 3, 1940, whose policy principles were followed by the Army until December 1941. This ambitious policy plan sought to free Japan from "its dependence upon Britain and the U.S….through

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[1402] Ibid., p. 126.
[1403] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), pp. 621-622.
[1404] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), pp. 212-226.
[1405] Ibid., pp. 222-226, pp. 235-237.
[1406] Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 242-247.
[1407] Ibid., pp. 241-262.
[1408] Nakano Satoshi, *op.cit.,* (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), pp. 28-31.

the establishment of a self-sufficient economic sphere" that would range from the Indian Ocean to the South Seas north of Australia and New Zealand." As stated, the Army's proposal was based on the deadly flawed assumption that Britain and the U.S. were strategically distinguishable and if Japan's attack is "directed only against Britain," viz, Hong Kong and Singapore, "there will beno war with the U.S."[1409]

The Navy Minister, Yoshida, and officials generally recognized that the Army's underlying assumption was fundamentally unrealistic. They tended to be more cautious since "a large-scale map maneuver" showed that "a surprise attack on the Dutch East Indies would lead to simultaneous war with the U.S., the Netherlands, and Britain" in May 1940.[1410] Specifically, during this war game, even when Japan attacked "only the Dutch East Indies" and took "every precaution to avoid hostilities with the U.S," such an attack especially on Borneo and the Celebes, where the oil fields and nickel mines beckoned, would eventually develop into "an attack on Malaya and a protracted war" against the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands.[1411] However, the problem was that the Navy concurred with the importance of securing natural resources and the cautious voices were minority.

Regrettably, Yoshida, the Navy Minister, was nearly alone within the Navy in challenging the southern advance. He asked Ugaki Matome, Chief of Operation Division, whether "an attack upon the Dutch East Indies" was not "nonsense" if Japan could not "secure the sea routes to bring back their natural resources" when obtaining petroleum and other important raw materials. The political pressure from the middle-class officials were prevalent in both the Army and the Navy.[1412] The more officers in the Navy clamored for the southern expansion after the U.S. announced its willingness to abrogate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce after 6 months in July 1939, which enabled the U.S. to impose economic sanctions moving forward.[1413] About a year later, on July 26, 1940, the Roosevelt administration put exports of aviation fuel, scrap, and steel under federal license.[1414]

The Army's lethal assumption that Britain and the U.S. could be dealt with individually survived these years and was incorporated in the imperial policy during the tenure of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, namely from July 1940 to July 1941. Although the Yonai cabinet and Foreign Ministry of Arita Hachiro might have been less assertive in 1940 than the middle-echelon officers of the military as well as Matsuoka,[1415] as mentioned, the naval leaders who possessed a sensible strategic perspective lost their clout in the Navy and were sidelined. The Army had a great deal of military interest in severing the Burma Road and a way out of China while the Navy shared the high interest with them in obtaining essential materials for its operation in the long run. Foreign Ministry simply went ahead of them with diplomatic means towards the South Seas from 1940.

Along with high strategic interest from the southern advance, the middle-echelon officers' unflagging expansionist imperialism, ultimately shared by the Japanese leaders,

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[1409] Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 246-249.
[1410] Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), pp. 235-236.
[1411] Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 244-246.
[1412] Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), p. 246.
[1413] Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 78-79.
[1414] Ibid., pp. 88-92, Sadao Asada, *op.cit.*, (2006B), p. 236.
[1415] Ian Nish, *op.cit.*, (1977), pp. 232-236.

indicated that the level of prestige pursued by Japan was also high in this case. To illustrate, the Navy embraced the Army's position that "the most opportune time" to resolve the problem of the south "was near" and that "it would still be possible to wage war with Britain alone while not refraining from facing the inevitable aggravations" in connection with the U.S. in mid-July of 1940. The Navy solely convinced the Army to add a sentence, "While operations should be structured so that no war against the U.S. results, sooner or later military action against the United States may become inevitable."[1416] It was the ill-fated compromise that the Navy made with the Army.

Matsuoka, who subscribed to this strategic reasoning that "differentiated Britain from the U.S.,"[1417] took office as Foreign Minister on July 22, 1940. On August 1, he proclaimed the infamous "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," which included the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina straightforwardly. He stipulated that the scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere involved "Southern areas, such as the Netherlands Indies and French Indo-China; the three nations of Japan, Manchuria and China are one link."[1418] The inclusion of "Southern areas" demonstrated a departure from Japan's previous geographic focus on Manchuria, inner Mongolia, and China evinced in Konoye's "The New Order in East Asia" of December 1938.[1419]

In accord with the declarations, Japan's Foreign Ministry simultaneously negotiated with the Dutch government to demand its political-economic interests in the Dutch East Indies amidst the European War from May 1940 to June 1941.[1420] For example, Foreign Minister Arita asked the Dutch counterpart for "definite assurances that it would sell Japan annually the following 13 vital commodities," including petroleum of 1,000,000 ton and scrap iron of 100,000 ton, along with other political demands on May 20, 1940. The Dutch initially accepted the requests overall in June and afterwards delayed the negotiations and stiffened its position in close liaison with Britain and the U.S. By June 11 of 1941, Japan recalled its delegation from the negotiation with the Dutch.[1421] Japan advanced to Northern and Southern French Indochina in September 1940 and July 1941.

High expectation about the contagion effect and the tightened quarantine, 1938-1941

Accordingly, the U.S. could not dismiss Japan's geographical redirection towards the South Seas during the years between 1938 and 1941. Insofar as the Japanese expansion was largely conducted as a mere extension of the Sino-Japanese throughout 1938, the Roosevelt administration did not activate the economic and naval quarantine plan. Though

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[1416] Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 249-253.
[1417] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the U.S. in Japan's view, 1937-1941," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 65-66.
[1418] Matsuoka Yosuke, "Proclamation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," *Asahi Shimbun*, August 2, 1940, Quoted in Joyce C. Lebra, ed., *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 71-72.
[1419] Konoye Fumimaro, "The New Order in East Asia," *The Japan Times*, December 23, 1938, Quoted in Ibid., pp. 68-70.
[1420] Paul W. Schroeder, *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 17-18.
[1421] Nagaoka Shinjiro, "Economic Demands on Dutch East Indies," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 125-153.

Roosevelt "considered seizing Japanese assets, embargoing raw materials exported to Japan, and establishing a blockade around Japan" after the Panay incident of December 1937,[1422] Roosevelt and Hull collectively replied to Chiang Kai-shek that "we could not make specific promises of direct aid," when Chiang pleaded for help in January 1938.[1423] It didn't mean that Roosevelt was not sympathetic to the Chinese given his remark that the Japanese terms to the Chinese were never "very lenient" on January 4.[1424]

As Roosevelt still held that "the defense of the Coast," "especially the Pacific coast," should be undertaken at least "between three and four thousand miles from the Coast" in January 1938,[1425] the State Department broke ground for researching economic sanctions against Japan in the spring and summer of 1938. The 1911 U.S.-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation turned out to be the legal barrier to various measures from "the prohibition of importing and exporting certain goods to the total rupture of economic relations."[1426] When the Chinese Nationalists shifted the capital to Chongqing, the Sino-Japanese hostilities kept moving southward and westward and the Japanese troops gained control of some southern coastal cities and Hainan from 1938-1939. In the course of the war, Japan frequently bombed the cities, endangering American lives and property.[1427]

The moral embargo of 1938, which Roosevelt agreed, basically meant that the U.S. would "frown upon" selling airplanes that could be used for "bombing civilians" according to Hull. The Roosevelt administration informed "the 148 U.S. aircraft manufacturers and exporters" that it would issue "export licenses for warplanes and their munitions" only with "great regret" on July 1, 1938.[1428] Though it hardly generated any binding effect, it might have been the first step that the U.S. took towards the implementation of Roosevelt's scheme of an economic and naval quarantine of Japan. The expected contagion effect of Japan's operations in the Chinese southern coast was not remarkable yet. But the U.S. embarked on incrementally tightening the quarantine of Japan when the Japanese movement in the coastal region kept spreading into further south.

With the death toll rising to tens of thousands, Roosevelt and Hull particularly felt compelled to "take further steps to discourage it" after "air raids on Canton," or Guangdong, in May 1938. As already indicated, the moral embargo was issued by Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions control that the Department would be "extremely reluctant to issue any licenses authorizing such exports to countries" attacking civilians without mentioning Japan in July 1938.[1429] At this point, Hornbeck, then the Adviser on Political Affairs, already suggested to Hull that the U.S. be prepared for exerting material pressure by considering ending the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in July and

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[1422] Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Political Life*, (New York: Viking, 2017), pp. 291-292.
[1423] Cordell Hull, *op.cit.*, (1948), p, 567.
[1424] Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, The White House, January 4, 1938, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, Vol. 2*, (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1950B), p. 741.
[1425] Roosevelt to James Roosevelt, Secretary to the President, January 20, 1938, [PPF 1820: CT], in Donald B. Schewe, (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), ed., *op.cit.,* (1995E), pp. 124-125.
[1426] Chihiro Hosoya, "Miscalculation in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (1968), p. 98.
[1427] Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 41.
[1428] Ibid., p. 78.
[1429] Cordell Hull, *op.cit.*, (1948), p, 569, Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 77-78.

December 1938.[1430] As Walter Lippman depicts, the moral embargo of 1938 was the beginning of a chain of measures taken "just short of war" from 1938-1941.[1431]



Figure. 25. Japan's expected gain and The U.S.'s expected loss from 1938-1941

These measures short of war from 1938-1941 were no less than a graduated execution of the economic and naval quarantine plan that had been discussed in the Roosevelt administration over the previous years. The European crisis and war in these years impelled the U.S. to divide its naval forces in both the Atlantic and Pacific and at last prioritize the former as well as Britain's security by the time the Plan Dog, or the Plan D, was drafted by Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, in November 1940.[1432] The strategic priority of the Europe-Atlantic theater as well as the remaining influence of non-expansionism at home constituted Roosevelt's motivation to be not dragged into a full-scale war in the Pacific theater. However, the conventional overemphasis on this aspect tends to underappreciate his seriousness about the maritime defense in the Pacific.[1433]

The geographical redirection of Japan's power projection towards Southeast Asia and the South Seas was displayed in Japan's political statements, diplomatic engagement with the Dutch, most evidently, the occupations of Northern and Southern French Indochina especially from 1940-1941. Along the line of Yarnell's recommendation of the economic and naval strangulation, Roosevelt not only pushed ahead with the second Vinson-Trammel Act of 1938 and the Two Ocean Navy Act of 1940 but also persistently contemplated the first line of maritime defense and a long-range blockade in the Atlantic as well as in the Pacific. On September 19, 1938, Roosevelt conversed with British

[1430] Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 42.
[1431] Walter Lippman, *U.S. War Aims*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1944), p. 22.
[1432] Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 220-221.
[1433] I'm inclined to suggest that the underappreciation of Roosevelt's resolve to execute the defensive quarantine to prevent Japan's contagion effect on maritime defense in the Pacific may be a source of the unending debate between the proponents of the backdoor thesis and their opponents on Roosevelt's decision.

Ambassador to the U.S., Ronald Lindsay, and said that the Western powers "should carry it on purely by blockade and in a defensive manner."[1434]

In late January 1939, Roosevelt led the discussion with the members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, addressing "national defense" and "the first line of defense." After noting he and the Senators would not want to "frighten the American people" but "want them to gradually realize what is a potential danger," he clarified, "the first line of defense of the United States in the Pacific is a series of islands, with the hope that through the Navy and the Army and the airplanes we can keep the Japanese – let us be quite frank – from dominating the entire Pacific Ocean and prevent [ing] us from having access to the west coast of South America." He added, "it is all a question of defending against Japan. We cannot say it out loud; it may be considered as unfriendly."[1435] He spoke of the contagion effect of Japan's intrusion into the Pacific, which he had taken seriously.

But for the remainder of 1939, the Japanese power projection was extended into the southern coastal cities of China and South China Sea and foiled by the Russians in the North from February to September, while Nazi Germany launched a blatant invasion of other European states, starting from Poland in September. The preliminary phase of the economic quarantine, including economic sanctions and "direct aid to China," was implemented in 1939. The U.S. instituted another "moral embargo" on "airplanes and parts to Japan" in January 1939 and "a cessation of credits" followed in February, whereas the loans extended to China.[1436] In fact, the Congress played a certain role in operating the economic quarantine against Japan at this point because the majority of congressmen in "both parties" were generally "anti-Japanese and sympathetic to China."[1437]

For instance, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, "an isolationist Republican from Michigan," urged the administration to abrogate the 1911 Commercial Treaty with Japan and introduced a resolution on July 18, 1939.[1438] With the agreement of Roosevelt, Hull gave "a formal notice" of the termination of the 1911 Commercial Treaty from January 26, 1940 to the Japanese Ambassador, Horinouchi, on July 26 in 1939. Hull intended to "bring them to a sense" and provided the Japanese with little clarification of the reason for the termination. Though it was proposed by the Congress and an abrupt "shock to Japan,"[1439] the abrogation of the 1911 Commercial Treaty matched up well with the economic component of Roosevelt's quarantine plan, which paved the way for substantive economic sanctions later beyond the former moral embargoes that lacked teeth.

Roosevelt indeed was in favor of "controlling exports of eleven strategic raw materials and restriction of iron and steel exports" while the State Department was averse to export controls that "clearly targeted Japan as the largest buyer." Once Britain and

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[1434] Lindsay reported, "several times in the conversation he showed himself quite alive to the possibility that somehow or other indefinable circumstances to the United States might again find themselves involved in a European war." Wayne S. Cole, *op.cit.,* (1983), p. 300.

[1435] Conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee in the White House, January 31, 1939, 12:45 P.M. [PPF1 - P:CT] in Donald B. Schewe, (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), ed., *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol. 13: January -February 1939*, (New York and Toronto: Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc, 1995F), pp. 197-202.

[1436] Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 42.

[1437] Wayne S. Cole, "The Role of the United States Congress and Political Parties," in Ibid., pp. 311-312.

[1438] Ibid., pp. 318-319.

[1439] Cordell Hull, *op.cit.*, (1948), pp. 636-638.

France went to war against Germany in September, the President also assembled Congress in special session on September 21 to repeal the arms embargo and maintain the cash-and-carry rule to prop up Britain and France as Germany was "blockaded and cash poor." The Senate responded favorably and repealed the arms embargo by a vote of 63 to 30 on November 4, 1939.[1440] This neutrality amendment of November 1939 mostly targeted Germany and did little harm to Japan because it still "had dollars and ships for purchase and transport of war-related materials."[1441]

Nevertheless, Roosevelt was putting his ideas to safeguard the first line of maritime defense in the Atlantic and the Pacific into action slowly but surely. Additional ships and planes were sent to Manila and Hawaii with the announcement of ending the 1911 Commercial Treaty. Sometime after October 1939, Grew, the Ambassador to Japan, took note of "an unmistakable hardening of the Administration's attitude toward Japan and brought up his concerning view to the President. Grew pointed out that if the U.S. "once start sanctions against Japan we must see them through to the end, and the end may conceivably be war." Particularly, Grew warily anticipated, "if we cut off Japan's supple of oil…she will in all probability send her fleet down to take the Dutch East Indies." Roosevelt replied, "then we could easily intercept her fleet."[1442]

More directly, Roosevelt agreed with the opinions of Hull and Grew that the U.S. "should defer action applying the 10% tonnage levy on Japanese ships beginning January 26, 1940…as a temporary measure and to show that we have no desire to push them into a corner or bear down on them unduly as long as there is any reasonable possibility of reaching a new commercial treaty" on December 14. Nonetheless, Roosevelt qualified, "information should be unofficially conveyed to the Japanese that this has been done by me…it should be made clear to them…that this is a temporary action on our part and that if in the future it should unfortunately become necessary to impose the additional 10% levy, a thirty day notice would be given them."[1443] At last, the expiration of the 1911 Treaty entailed "no new restrictions or discrimination against trade with Japan.[1444]

Taking into account the opposition of the State Department against "a total embargo," which Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau advocated, Roosevelt limited the licensing requires to aviation fuel, No. 1 heavy melting steel and scrap iron on that day.[1445] While the measures to control the flow of critical raw materials on the part of the U.S. were preliminary ones at this moment, the looming advance of Japan towards the South Seas brought the economic and naval quarantine to the fore from the-mid 1940. In May 1940, when Germany was on the verge of sweeping across the Western Europe, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. fleet to remain at Pearl Harbor to deter "a Japanese attack in the Indies," which the U.S. thought Germany and Italy could induce Japan to launch.[1446] The U.S. expectation about Japan's contagion effect on the South Seas started to heighten.

[1440] Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 79-80.
[1441] Ibid., p. 80.
[1442] Joseph C. Grew, *op.cit.,* (1952), pp. 1211-1212.
[1443] Roosevelt to Cordell Hull, (Memorandum in F.D.R.L.), The White House, December 14, 1939, in Ibid., p. 969.
[1444] Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 43-44.
[1445] Nagaoka Shinjiro, "Economic Demands on Dutch East Indies," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), p. 139.
[1446] Ibid., pp. 244-246.

The redirection of Japan's geographic advancement toward Southeast Asia and the South Seas became remarkably patent with its engagement with the Dutch and the French from 1939-1940[1447] as well as Matsuoka's declaration of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in August and culminated in the Army's drive into the Northern French Indochina in late September, 1940. The Roosevelt administration accordingly ratcheted up the economic and maritime pressure in line with the quarantine plan of action. Though the U.S. added more moral embargoes of metals in December 1939 alongside the previous notification of ending the 1911 Commercial Treaty, the American embargoes before the middle of 1940 barely rendered coercive impacts as to Japan's civilian economy because they aimed at inhibiting "only items of direct military use."[1448]

On May 4, 1940 the U.S. West Coast fleet was ordered to station at Hawaii. Admiral Stark explained to the Pacific Fleet Commander that the executive viewed that "the presence of Fleet at Hawaii…would serve as a deterrent."[1449] Needless to say, the German occupation of Holland and France from May-June in 1940 and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of 1940 also caused the Roosevelt administration to take the Japanese redirection into the South Seas more seriously. The President recruited and recalled Frank Knox and Stimson as Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War in July 1940. Besides, Roosevelt attempted to bolster the naval deterrent in the Pacific by recalling General MacArthur to command the 22,000 U.S. troops in Manila and reinvigorate training of the 110,000 Philippine troops.[1450]

Neither the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, nor the Philippines were not overrun by Japan's southern expansion from September 1940 to July 1941. The militarily occupied areas in September 1940 and July 1941 were respectively the Northern and Southern French Indochina. Nonetheless, the geographical redirection of Japan's military movement for the South Seas increased the U.S. expectation about Japan's encroachment on the Dutch East Indies and Malaya, if not Philippines, in these years. Aside from the absolutely consequential impacts of the U.S. asset freeze and total embargo from July-August 1941, it is worthwhile to note that the policy of the southern advance had been adopted, succeeded, and reaffirmed as Japan's imperial policy in July 1940, February 1941, and in April 1941 before the U.S. asset freeze and total oil embargo actually kicked in.

During October 1940, the President seriously contemplated possible moves in the event of "a further Japanese advance southward," including "a total embargo on Japanese trade" and "a long-range blockade" along the line of Yarnell's idea in 1937. He envisioned setting up "two lines of patrol, one from Sama to the Dutch East Indies and another from Hawaii to the Philippines, to intercept Japanese commerce" as he told Grew in late 1939. Roosevelt's expectation that Japan's southern advance would not simply stop at a current point became increasingly salient. Drawing on this expectation, he was searching for economic and naval means for putting a brake on Japan's southward power projection,

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[1447] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Army's Move into Northern Indochina," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 155-208.
[1448] Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), p. 83.
[1449] Chihiro Hosoya, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 106.
[1450] Michael J. Green, *By More than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), p. 178.

although Admiral Richardson, Commander in Chief of U.S. Fleet, dissuaded the President due to the unpreparedness of the fleet in the Pacific.[1451]

Roosevelt's naval scheme of "a long-range blockade" was again found in the note of Grew, who had been previously uneasy about harsh economic sanctions, around November 1940.[1452] Even though Grew used to belong to a more dovish group in the State Department and Administration, along with Hull and Maxwell Hamilton in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, as opposed to Hawks such as Hornbeck, Stimson, Knox, and Morgenthau, he recognized that the U.S. strategy "would involve a long-range blockade, a partial concentration of the fleet at Singapore and a strengthening of our defenses in the Philippines." Furthermore, he highly doubted that the U.S. could "afford to see Japan occupy progressively Hong Kong, the Malay States and Burma and the Dutch East Indies while awaiting Britain's ultimate victory."[1453] Japan's movement had to be stopped beforehand.

Hence, regardless of whether they were doves or the President, not to mention Hawks, the U.S. policymakers at least in late 1940 coalesced around the increased expectation about Japan's contagion effect in the South Seas. The thorny issue was that the U.S. naval forces were not ready and the maritime defense in the Atlantic would have to be relatively prioritized. As Iriye annotates well, "President Roosevelt did not want Japanese penetration of South-East Asia, but he was not ready to involve American force actively in the region [Pacific] which would surely result in a war with Japan…the best strategy, he reasons, was therefore to do something to prevent Japan's southward expansion."[1454] Hence, the economic sanctions should be calibrated in a delicate manner that could inhibit Japan's southward penetration without provoking Japan too much.

As such, the President once signed an order to include petroleum and scrap iron in the export license system on July 25, 1940 but was pushed to revise the order to limit aviation gasoline of 87 octane, lubricants, heavy melting iron and steel scrap by the moderates in the State Department, represented by Acting Secretary Wells at the cabinet meeting on 26th. For instance, Hamilton stated that a restriction of petroleum and scrap iron "would tend to impel Japan towards moving into the Dutch East Indies," recommending "no restrictions" on exports of petroleum products, on June 7. Similarly, Welles resolutely stood against Stimson and Morgenthau "on the basis that this measure might provoke a southern advance."[1455] Japan was not much inconvenienced as it could purchase gasoline just below 87 octane and high-grade California oil that its refineries could upgrade.[1456]

Japan reciprocated the export control of aviation motor fuel, heavy iron, and steel scrap by moving into the Northern French Indochina in late September 1940. The warning of the moderates in the State Department turned out to be not erroneous.[1457] On September 26, the U.S. revoked all scrap export licenses from October 15 and new licenses would be

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[1451] Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 219.
[1452] The change in Grew's position is known to have occurred with his "Green Light Message" on September 12, 1940, Joseph C. Grew, *op.cit.,* Walter Johnson ed., (1952), pp. 1224-1229.
[1453] Ibid., pp. 1231-1233.
[1454] Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, (London: Longman, 1987), p. 98.
[1455] Chihiro Hosoya, *op.cit.*, (1968), pp. 106-107.
[1456] Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 88-89.
[1457] Robert Dallek, *op.cit.*, (2017), pp. 405-407.

only approved for Britain and Western Hemisphere destinations. Still, No. 2 scrap was not subject the license until December 10, 1940.[1458] On November 13, 1940, Roosevelt confided to Eleanor Roosevelt, his wife, "if we forbid oil shipments to Japan, Japan will increase her purchases of Mexican oil and furthermore, may be driven by actual necessity to a descent on the Dutch East Indies. At this writing, we all regard such action on our part as an encouragement to the spread of war in the Far East."[1459]

Japan's expansion into Southeast Asia and the South Seas elevated U.S. expectations about the contagion effect on a chain of islands in the Western Pacific, including the British, Dutch and American islands. As illustrated, the first line of maritime defense of the U.S. was consistently understood to be a long-range naval and economic blockade. Britain could be by no means a disparate naval power for the U.S. especially from late 1940 to 1941. Nevertheless, the Japanese southward advance, which originally stemmed from the impractical logic that Britain and the U.S. could be dealt with independently from 1939-1940, further proceeded in late July 1941. It was true that "the view" that the U.S. and Britain were "separable on the strategic level" began to dwindle from February to April 1941 when the Army leaders were amenable to the "indivisibility" idea.[1460]

Even so, the consequence of the Japanese realization of the strategic indivisibility between the U.S. and Britain amounted to no more than the Army-Navy agreement that "military operations" in Southeast Asia "were to be undertaken only if 'absolutely unavoidable' and not in response to 'a favorable opportunity' during March and April of 1941. There was no fundamental shift in the direction of Japan's geographical expansion. According to "the Army-Navy Draft Policy of April 17, 1941," though "diplomatic means" should be first used to build close relations with Thailand, French Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies, if "no other means are available," "the empire will exercise military means for the sake of its self-existence and self-defense…in accordance with the developments in the European war and…diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union."[1461]

Thus, the Army persistently interpreted that the revised outline policy "would still permit a southern advance so long as it did not provoke war with the United States" in April 1941. More impressively, "the Outline of Policy toward the South" of April 17, 1941 elaborated the two conditions under which military means would be employed in the South, viz., "a) if the empire's self-existence is threatened by embargoes imposed by the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands, and others. b) if the U.S., alone or in cooperation with Britain, the Netherlands, and China, gradually increase its pressures to contain the empire."[1462] Despite U.S. assistances, Britain was more or less isolated by Germany in Europe and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty was just signed on April 13, 1941. Economic quarantine measures of the U.S were simultaneously hardened at this point.

Likewise, between September 1940 and July 1941, Japan strove to exploit the fierce border disputes between French Indochina and Thailand, which spread into "the entire

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[1458] Ibid., pp. 92-93.

[1459] Roosevelt to Mrs. Roosevelt, (memorandum in F.D.R.L), The White House, November 13, 1940, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *op.cit.,* (1950B), p. 1077.

[1460] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the U.S. in Japan's view, 1937-1941," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 71-72, Michael A. Barnhart, "Japan's economic security and the origins of the pacific war," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 4, No.2, (1981), pp. 118-119.

[1461] Tsunoda Jun, "The Navy's Role in the Southern Strategy," trans., Robert A. Scalapino, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1980), pp. 294-295, p. 303.

[1462] Ibid., p. 295, pp. 303-304.

border region" at the end of November 1940. The Army and Navy devised a mediation plan in the border dispute to attain the French admission of "their demand for bases in Southern Indochina and establishing a military alliance with Thailand." The Japanese gunboat diplomacy in Southeast Asia was adopted in the Outline Policy "towards Thailand and French Indo-China" on January 30, 1941. While the Army augmented its occupation troops in Northern Indochina, the Navy deployed its warships and aircraft around Hainan, sending two destroyers to Saigon and Bangkok by February 1941. Britain's expectation about the contagion effect on Malaya and the Dutch East Indies rapidly grew.[1463]

Expectedly, the U.S. clenched economic sanctions in the same period. The President placed "iron and steel of every variety, from ores and scrap" under the embargo system on December 10, 1940. Since the beginning of 1941, the Roosevelt executive had expanded "the list of commodities under license" at a rapid rate. The most critical nonferrous metals, copper, bronze, zinc, nickel, lead and more were added from January to mid-April. On May 28, with the Congressional approval, Roosevelt "extended licensing to exports to Japan from the Philippines." By July 25, "the only major commodities" that could be freely exported to Japan were cotton, food, and non-aviation oil files.[1464] As a result, the percentage of U.S. exports subject to license surged from 25% in December 1940 to 44-47% in April-May 1941. Machinery and most metals were halted by June 1941.[1465]

Almost all conditions for Japan's use of force in Southern French Indochina, laid out in their Outline of the Policy towards the South of April 1941, seemed to be met except an imposition of embargoes that menaced the survival of the Japanese empire. A MAGIC decrypt on June 17, 1941 indicated that "Japan was seeking German help in forcing Vichy to grant it air and sea bases in Southern Indochina." Another decrypt showed that the targeted based would include Saigon, the harbor at Cam Rahn Bay, Hue, Nhatrang, Soctrang, Kom-pantrach, Siemriep, and Pnomphen on June 19. Meanwhile, the Dutch declined to offer Japan's special interests and more oil and put the negotiations to an end on June 7. U.S. policymakers were substantially attentive to Japan's future direction of power projection as Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet on June 22.[1466]

With the Hull-Nomura talk in deadlock, Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, wrote to Roosevelt that "there will never be so good a time to stop the shipment of oil to Japan as we now have" because "Japan is so occupied with what is happening in Russia…that she won't venture a hostile move against the Dutch East Indies." Roosevelt then asked if an oil embargo "were to tip the delicate scales and cause Japan to decide either to attack Russia or to attack the Dutch East Indies" on June 23.[1467] Ickes's reply on June 25, "foreign wars cannot be fought without oil and gasoline," unveiled the assumption, shared among the hawkish officials that Japan would or could not fight a war against the U.S. in the event of an oil embargo. Apparently, Roosevelt was inclined to believe the provocative effect of the oil embargo more so than the hawks in his administration.

[1463] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the U.S. in Japan's view, 1937-1941," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 66-67.
[1464] Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), p. 93, p. 95.
[1465] Ibid., pp. 96-97.
[1466] Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 98-99.
[1467] Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes in Washington (letter in F.D.R.L.), The White House, June 23, 1941, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *op.cit.,* (1950B), p. 1173.

On July 1, Roosevelt again reminded Ickes that the Japanese leaders were intensely debating "to decide which way they are going to jump – attack Russia, attack the South Seas (thus throwing in their lot definitely with Germany) or whether they will sit on the fence and be more friendly with us." The President admitted, "no one knows what the decision will be…it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep peace in the Pacific….I simply have not got enough Navy to go round."[1468] Due to the geographically dispersed U.S. naval forces, the President indubitably placed the strategic priority on the Atlantic theater. But at the same time, Roosevelt or U.S. policymakers were unwilling to condone Japan's extended intrusion into the South Seas. Roosevelt was not in favor of the oil embargo if it would trigger Japan's another southern advance.

Grew became much convinced that "no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive" domestically and "only insuperable obstacles" would prevent Japan from "digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance" in Tokyo on December 14, 1940. While conceding that whether and when Britain was likely to win and whether a war with Japan would "handicap our help to Britain" would be two other major factors shaping the course of action of the U.S. vis-à-vis Japan, he called for taking into account the shifting naval balance of power between the U.S. and Japan for temporally arranging its policy decision. After all, Grew foresaw that "the southward advance" would proceed and "the principal point at issue" was "not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program, but when."[1469]

Grew called for the continuation of "our policy of unhurried but inexorable determination in meeting every Japanese step with some step," or measures "short of war" with "real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary."[1470] On the whole, the Roosevelt administration followed through on what Grew had foresaw and exhorted. Roosevelt found himself "in decided agreement" with Grew's conclusion. Though Roosevelt qualified that he imagined that Japan's possession of the Dutch East Indies and Malay would not decrease the chance of England's ultimate victory against Germany, he admitted that the U.S. might be the only power that could engage in "a rearrangement" in the Western and Southern Pacific if the U.S. failed to keep Japan "within bounds." The U.S. interests were menaced "both" in Europe and East Asia.[1471]

As Roosevelt described as "a real drag-down and knock-out fight among themselves,"[1472] Matsuoka insisted on "a strike to the North" to assign meaning to the Axis pact, as a pro-Axis and German statesman after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. However, as clarified, such a call did run against Japan's diplomatic and military policies and the Japanese Army already proved to be militarily either incompetent

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[1468] Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes in Washington (letter in F.D.R.L.), The White House, July 1, 1941, in Ibid., pp. 1173-1174.

[1469] Grew to Roosevelt, The American Embassy, Tokyo, December 14, 1940, in George McJimsey ed., *Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, Vol. 7, U.S.-Japan Relations: Trade Relations and the Sino-Japanese War, 1938-1940*, (University Publication of America, 2002), pp. 770-774.

[1470] Ibid., pp. 770-774.

[1471] Roosevelt to Grew, January 21, 1941, in George McJimsey ed., *Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, Vol. 9, U.S.-Japan Relations: January-December, 1941*, (University Publication of America, 2001), pp. 11-13.

[1472] Roosevelt to Harold L. Ickes in Washington (letter in F.D.R.L.), The White House, June 23, 1941, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *op.cit.,* (1950B), p. 1173.

or unprepared for a showdown against the Soviet troops. Moreover, Stalin still maintained his military strength in Eastern Siberia as weeks wore on.[1473] Embarrassed by Matsuoka, Prime Minister Konoe resigned on July 16 and reformed his cabinet without Matsuoka afterwards.[1474] In the meantime, the tightened economic quarantine of the U.S. up to June and July 1941 rendered the validity of the indivisibility argument stale.

Consequently, Japan indeed settled on seeking bases and dispatching its troops into Southern French Indochina on the basis of a policy document, titled "Acceleration of the Policy Concerning the South," should diplomatic means not produce French Indochina's acceptance on June 12, 1941 at the 30th Liaison Conference. On June 25, a revision of the policy document was made and the clause stating that Japan would not refuse to risk a war with Britain and the U.S. was dropped. Yet, there was no little revision in the substantive policy.[1475] At last, the Japanese military was given permission to obtain bases in Southern French Indochina and to "take over the Foreign Settlements in China," after the "Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation" was presented at the Imperial Conference on July 2.[1476] The MAGIC decrypts of the mid-June were correct.

At the Imperial Conference of July 2 1941, a war against the Soviet Union was decided to be "reconsidered at a later date, depending on changes in the international situation." The policy objectives were "the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere…no matter what changes may occur in the world situation." As usual, diplomatic means was supposed to be pursued first but Japan was "determined to remove all obstacles to achieve the objectives." "For the security and preservation of the nation," Japan would take steps "to advance south." The participants of the conference acknowledged the possibility of war with the U.S. They concurred that Japan would move ahead as planned in Southeast Asia even if it finally resulted in war against the U.S. and Britain. They resolved to pay attention to "putting the nation on a war footing."[1477]

As the early confusion of a Soviet-Japanese confrontation on the part of the U.S. waned and the Japanese southern expansion loomed large, the American officials made every effort to make the best use of the economic quarantine plan by drawing up the penultimate sanction. As early as July 10, Welles notified the British Ambassador of Roosevelt's determination to push against "any Japanese thrust into Southeast Asia with economic and financial embargoes." Roosevelt was informed of "a decoded message" of the Japanese ultimatum to France for "naval and air bases in Indochina" a few days later. By July 23, Nomura confirmed that the Japanese signed an agreement with French Indochina, the Vichy regime, that allowed their occupation of Southern Indochina. Lastly, Roosevelt offered a proposal of neutralization of Indochina in return for Japan's restraint.[1478]

No response from Japan after Roosevelt's last diplomatic proposal of July 24 finally caused Roosevelt to issue Executive Order No. 8832, freezing Japanese assets in the U.S. and "thereby effectively terminating all U.S commercial and financial relations with Japan"

[1473] Michael A. Barnhart, *op.cit.*, (1981), p. 119.
[1474] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), p. 635.
[1475] "30th Liaison Conference," June 12, 1941, "32nd Liaison Conference," June 25, 1941, in Nobutaka Ike, ed., *op.cit.,* (1967), pp. 51-60.
[1476] "Imperial Conference," July 2, 1941, Ibid., p. 77.
[1477] "Imperial Conference," July 2, 1941, Ibid., pp. 77-90.
[1478] Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), pp. 48-49.

on July 26.[1479] The U.S. played its trump card by freezing assets and placing a total oil embargo against Japan and the final stage of a U.S.-Japanese confrontation had been set up.[1480] At this juncture, in part because of the failed economic and naval deterrence of the U.S. in the previous year, U.S. policymakers' expectation about the Japanese contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense in the South Seas were greatly enhanced. As a matter fact, these expectations were confirmed not only by the past actions of Japan but also by the stream of information from MAGIC.

American leaders were strongly confident that Southern French Indochina was "not the ultimate state of the southward advance." Naval and air bases in Southern French Indochina would turn into a stepping stone in order to launch a swift attack possibly on Singapore or Hong Kong and the Philippines at the same time, according to a decoded message on July 19.[1481] The geographical preventive motivation was at work in late July 1941.[1482] It is indisputable that the E.O. 8832 and the subsequent total oil embargo was intended to be a deterrent in the best-case scenario. However, it is also absolutely feasible that Roosevelt might have wondered whether this economic trump card could have pushed Japan into a corner, as he himself, correctly and repetitively, foresaw at least three times in December 1939, November 1940, and June-July 1941.

After Japan occupied Southern French Indochina as scheduled on July 28-29, the enhanced U.S. expectation about the contagion effect of Japan's southward thrust on the first line of maritime defense in the Western Pacific theater from 1939-1941 amounted to the high loss of interest and prestige of the U.S. from Japan's naval build and power projection. Japan's geographical expansion was highly expected to disrupt "a chain of islands" in the Pacific he had presented at the meeting with the Senators in 1939. The Pearl Harbor attack was a tactically surprise attack but didn't seem to be a complete surprise attack on the strategic level. On November 24, 1941, Roosevelt shared a last proposal for modus vivendi with Japan with Churchill and wrote, "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon."[1483]

On November 28, 1941, Roosevelt displayed his vividly highest expectation about Japan's contagion on the American line of naval defense in the Western Pacific during the press conference. As he likened Japan's expansion into French Indochina to Hitler's fait accompli in Europe, the President expounded, "because Hitler method has always been aimed at a little move here and a little move there, by which complete encirclement, or the obtaining of essential military points, was merely a prelude to the extension of aggression to other places…and we are of course thinking of not only about the American flag in the Philippines, not only about certain vital defense needs…but we are thinking about something even more important, and that is the possible extension of control by aggression into the whole of the Pacific area."[1484]

[1479] Edward S. Miller, *op.cit.*, (2007), pp. 191-192. Norman A. Graebner, "Japan: Unanswered Challenge, 1931-1941," in Margaret F. Morris and Sandra L Myres, ed., *Essays on American Foreign Policy.*, (Austin and London, TX: The University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 141.
[1480] Chihiro Hosoya, *op.cit.*, (1968), p. 110.
[1481] Waldo Heinrichs, *op.cit.,* (1988), pp. 123-128.
[1482] Ibid., pp. 144-145.
[1483] Roosevelt to Churchill, (cablegram in F.D.R.L.), The White House, November 24, 1941, in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *op.cit.,* (1950B), pp. 1245-1246.
[1484] Roosevelt, "Press Conference," November 28, 1941, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/excerpts-from-the-press-conference-72, Interestingly,

Bogged down in China, militarily and diplomatically blocked off from the North, Japan expected to secure the high level of interest and prestige from acquiring the naval and air bases in French Indochina from which it could further project its power into the South Seas from 1939-1941. Facing the ultimate economic quarantine that halted the flow of oil, dollars, and other war materials. Japan wavered with the recognition of the cold reality in which it could not eventually win a war strategically if the war prolonged for more than two or three years although it might pull off a tactical success for the first year or two. From September, Japan self-imposed "tentative deadlines" for the negotiations with the U.S. After a cabinet change, Japan lastly reached a decision to fight a war with the U.S. from late November to early December 1941.[1485]

6.3. Alignment opportunity: open [1921-1936] ➡ less open [1936-1939] ➡ closed [1939-1941]

Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the closing of alignment opportunity

Though the Washington naval system began to be eroded by Japan's demand of naval parity and unrestrained expansion from the 1930s, alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan was not wholly closed until the third powers' critical decisions and their consequences in Asia and Europe virtually left these two naval powers alone in the Asia-Pacific theater by 1941. Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany and China played a bigger role than others, such as France and the Netherlands, in reshaping the bilateral alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan particularly in the Asia-Pacific, the theater of the naval power shift. Among others, Nazi's expansions and the emergences and reversals of the neutrality pacts in Europe and Asia deprived the U.S. and Japan of available allies and a potential common adversary in the Asia-Pacific.

On balance, Britain's more conciliatory posture toward Japan and the equivocalness of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Germany and Japan constituted the relative openness of alignment opportunity in the Asia-Pacific until the mid 1930s. However, as Japan started moving closer to Germany from 1936, Germany not only undermined the British availability in the Asia-Pacific theater as a maritime power but also rose as the primary common threat to Britain and the U.S. by 1939. At the same time, the Soviet Union was able to countervail the Japanese continental challenge from the position of strength and sided with the Chinese via military aids and the non-aggression pact with China. The alignment opportunity was considerably closed by Nazi's extension of war, the Tripartite Pact, and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of April 1941.

The Anglo-Japanese negotiations of 1934 and the Soviet overture, 1921-1936 [open]

Graebner attributes Roosevelt's decision on E.O. 8832 and the total oil embargo to his belief that "Japan would not fight the U.S. and the British empire simultaneously," which was the exact flipside of the Japanese Army's impractical belief that Britain and the U.S. were strategically divisible. Norman A. Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed., *op.cit.*, (1973), p. 49.

[1485] "Imperial Conference," September 6, 1941, "Imperial Conference," November 5, 1941, "Imperial Conference," November 29, 1941, "Imperial Conference," December 1, 1941, in Nobutaka Ike, ed., *op.cit.,* (1967), pp. 133-138, pp. 208-239, pp. 260-278.

The U.S. wedge motivation effectively crushed a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the process of instituting the Washington naval system and the Anglo-Japanese alliance lapsed in 1923.[1486] However, Japan and Britain did not cease to engage in diplomatic consultations to work out a more accommodative scheme to make up for the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at least from 1934 even when the naval arms limitation agreements were crumbling. The Anglo-Japanese negotiations over a non-aggression pact evinced this subtle diplomatic dimension.[1487] On the other hand, having embarked on "a Five-Year Plan" in 1928,[1488] the Soviet Union broached a non-aggression pact proposal in December 1931 to appease Japan due to the lack of "the means to deter Japan." The Soviet Union again made overtures for a détente with Japan from 1934-1936.[1489]

As the foregoing part elucidated, the U.S. interest was not greatly damaged by the Japanese penetration from Manchuria, inner Mongolia, and North China from 1931-1934, like Hornbeck, Hull expressed that "there was no issue between the United States and Japan not capable of friendly adjustment" by early 1934.[1490] Even after the withdrawal in March 1933, Japan's diplomacy was not predetermined to be "a complete rejection of international cooperation" with Britain and the U.S. At least, three courses of diplomacy were envisioned by the Japanese leaders from 1933-1936. These formulae involved "cooperation with the Soviet Union embodied in a non-aggression pact," "cooperation with Britain and the U.S." predicated on an Anglo-Japanese as well as a U.S.-Japan non-aggression pact, and "cooperation with Germany through an anti-Comintern pact."[1491]

In particular, the second formula could have widened the alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan through the British mediation. In fact, the Japanese overture for an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact were welcomed by Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain and Treasury Undersecretary Warren Fischer in 1934. But the British cabinet was internally divided as the Foreign Office and the Far East Division stood up against the optimism shown by Chamberlain, Fischer, and then Foreign Secretary John Simon. The Defense Requirements Subcommittee (DRC) presented a report that unveiled the tension between these two lines, "the Imperial faction" and "the Treasury faction," in late February 1934. Ultimately, in spite of the exchange of communiques and commissioned studies, the Anglo-Japanese rapprochement bore no fruit at the end of 1934.[1492]

Interestingly, the report gave the first priority to "(1) the protection of British possessions and interests in the Far East" over "(2) defense capability in Europe, and (3) the securing of India against the Soviet aggression." However, the report concluded that Britain "could not fight Japan and Germany at the same time"[1493] and called for "the improvement of relations of Japan" and a conciliatory policy that could "restore our old

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[1486] Timothy W. Crawford and Khang X. Vu, *op.cit.*, (2021), pp. 104-107.
[1487] Ian Nish, "Japan in Britain's view, 1919-1937," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 37-50. Chihiro Hosoya, "The 1934 Anglo-Japanese Nonaggression Pact," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 3, (Sep., 1981), pp. 491-517.
[1488] Maurice B. Jansen, *op.cit.,* (2000), p. 580.
[1489] Jonathan Haslam, *op.cit.*, (1992), pp. 5-8, pp. 46-53.
[1490] Paul W. Schroeder, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 6.
[1491] Chihiro Hosoya, *op.cit.*, (1981), p. 492.
[1492] Ibid., p. 491, p. 495.
[1493] Ian Nish, "Japan in Britain's view, 1919-1937," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 45-46.

terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan." The lingering sympathy for the Anglo-Japanese alliance as well as economic and financial interests in China were the key drivers of those pressed for a non-aggression pact. Chamberlain argued, "the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance…had been a great blow to their amour-propre."[1494]



Figure. 26. Alignment opportunities in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, 1921-1941

On March 14, 1934, unlike the DRC report, Chamberlain made the case for a national defense posture to deal with "the growing Nazi menace" and "a concert with Japan" in Asia. Fisher similarly lamented on April 19, 1934, "we gave up a completely satisfactory treaty with Japan for a completely unsatisfactory naval Pact of Washington…We should effect a thorough and lasting accommodation with the Japanese." Navy Minister Bolton Eyres-Monsell leaned to Chamberlain and said, "Japan wanted equality in armaments but she might not press this demand if she had a pact of mutual nonaggression with this country." But Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald feared that it might be viewed "as an alliance" by the U.S. Foreign Office and the Far Eastern Department also had a solid position that "there was no need to revise the British policy."[1495]

The two camps did engage in "a heated national defense debate" between May and July of 1934. The desire for a rapprochement was mutual. After Japan delayed and turned down a non-aggression pact proposal of the Soviet Union from 1931-1932,[1496] Foreign Minister Hirota brought up the issue and said to the Ambassador to Japan, Robert Clive, "Japan would be ready to conclude nonaggression pacts with America and Great Britain" on July 3, 1934. Though Clive took it as "a passing whim," his communication "stirred sizable ripples" within the cabinet on August 7. In fact, Japan had approached the U.S. on

[1494] Chihiro Hosoya, *op.cit.*, (1981), pp. 494-495.
[1495] Ibid., pp. 493-497.
[1496] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 201-204.

a non-aggression pact in June after the Ambassador Saito and Secretary Hull discussed a U.S.-Japanese "joint declaration" to mutually "stabilize power in the Pacific" twice in May. On September 25, Britain agreed to open unofficial talks with Japan.[1497]

At this juncture, Hirota struggled to improve relations with the Anglo-American powers to minimize the deleterious aftermath of Japan's withdrawal from the League and growing distrusts over the naval arms limitation talks. The Japanese were not ignorant of Britain's more favorable feeling toward Japan than the American. Shigenori Togo, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Euro-American Section, stated, "in China, Japan and Britain have significant shared interests. With England, we have more grounds for cooperation than with any other nation" in April 1933. Notwithstanding, as examined, the fleet faction of Kato Kanji and Nobumasa Suetsugu prevailed in the Japanese Navy and hardly flinched from the counter-arguments of the moderates of Foreign Ministry in 1934.[1498]

The Okada cabinet assumed office on July 7 and Hirota as well as Prime Minster Okada fruitlessly countered the hardline position of the Navy. Hirota and Okada hoped for "avoiding a rupture" of the upcoming Second London Naval Conference, pushing for "a plan for the gradual implementation of an equal ratio" in vain. After all, the Japanese cabinet finalized the Navy's hardline policy for the Second London Naval Conference on September 7.[1499] The two factions within the British cabinet managed to draft a joint memorandum on October 16, which endorsed the British effort to conclude an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact but not without the three conditions associated with China, the U.S. and the Second London Naval conference. All three needs could be hardly met by the hardened position of Japan at this point in mid-October.

The British conditions consisted of "(1) a Japanese guarantee of the territorial integrity of China proper, south of the Great Wall; (2) to explore with the United States the establishment of a tripartite Anglo-Japanese-American non-aggression pact; (3) to use pact negotiations with Japan as a lever to soften Japan's demands at the disarmament conference." The chance of the Japanese acceptance of the first and third conditions was almost nil, let alone the U.S. reaction to Japan's demand of naval parity. Hirota came up with an evasive response to the British formula that proposed "the extension of the Four-Power Pact" instead of an Anglo-Japanese-American non-aggression pact" on October 29. By November 6, Roosevelt adamantly expressed his opposition against the British diplomacy with Japan.[1500]

Foreign Secretary Simon tried his best to avert "the breakup of the parlay" in the last minute by submitting a last formula to Matsudaira on October 30. The British suggested, "(1) a conference declaration accepting the right to equality in armaments; (2) a secret, trilateral gentlemen's agreement on naval construction, for a specified time, to prevent a naval arms race; (3) an Anglo-American-Japanese nonaggression…However, Japan would have to reject territorial aggression in China." Neither could the U.S. nor Japan accommodate the British compromise proposal. Non-aggression in China as well as another naval arms limitation were almost a non-starter for Japan in late 1934. As Hosoya

[1497] Chihiro Hosoya, *op.cit.*, (1981), pp. 498-501.
[1498] Ibid., pp. 500-502.
[1499] Ibid. p. 503.
[1500] Ibid., pp. 509-512.

precisely diagnoses, "the objective conditions for an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact were nearly all absent at the time."[1501]

Consequently, the Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact didn't materialize and the alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan via Britain's mediation was accordingly narrowed by 1934. Foreign Office and the Imperial faction made sure that the Treasury faction did not trump the Anglo-American alignment in Asia.[1502] Still, the successor of Simon, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, carried on his predecessor's scheme for Anglo-Japanese accord to a certain extent in the midst of even more strained relations with Japan from 1935-1938. Eden and the Ambassador Yoshida exchanged "preliminary observations on an Anglo-Japanese understanding" from the fall of 1936 to the first half of 1937. Along with the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Sino-Japanese war that erupted in July 1937 practically put an end to any plan for an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement.[1503]

Meanwhile, a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was not entirely ruled out as an option by Japan although it had been lukewarm to the Soviet overture in the early 1930s. Togo wrote, "Japan had no reason to decline the conclusion of the non-aggression pact, and a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression pact might also have a pre-emptive effect on future rapprochement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union." He recommended beginning with negotiations dealing with "the conclusion of a trade agreement, boundary demarcation, revision of fishery treaty…the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway with an eye to its future purchase" because of the unfavorable domestic situation and the Soviet's unclear interest in the same memorandum of April 1933, where he advocated an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement.

Therefore, Foreign Ministry contemplated a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union as a feasible option. Hirota was replaced by Ota Tamekichi as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Ota strongly called upon "the conclusion of the non-aggression pact" in September 1933. He ascribed the increasing Soviet military buildup in the Far Eastern Area to the Japanese reluctance to sing a non-aggression pact and the anti-Soviet military. For Ota, Japan should neutralize the Soviet threat with a non-aggression pact if it were to focus on "the development of Manchuria." Unfortunately, as the Navy didn't help the cabinet and Foreign Ministry to make headway into an Anglo-Japanese non-aggression pact, the Army stood in the way of a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact until its defeat at the battle of Khalkhin-gol and the Soviet-Nazi nonaggression pact in 1939.[1504]

When the Japanese leaders reexamined their policies on the Soviet Union in the preparation for the Second London Naval Conference in London, the hardliners of the Army insisted that Japan "apply pressure on the Soviet" to settle the contested issues and "remove the menace posed by Soviet military reinforcements in the Far East…by resorting to all forcible means and aiming at the disintegration of the Soviet State from the inside." There was an unbridgeable gap between the position of Foreign Ministry and that of the Army. Since the Soviet Union adhered to a "peaceful policy" to dissuade Japan's aggression, based on the intelligence reports of the Interior Department and the State

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[1501] Ibid., pp. 511-516.

[1502] Ian Nish, "Japan in Britain's view, 1919-1937," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 46-47.

[1503] Ibid., pp. 47-50. Britain regarded the Anti-Comintern Pact "as a real possibility any time" from 1933.

[1504] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 204-205.

Security Service with regard to Japan's military preparedness in 1934,[1505] Stalin broadly appeased Japan in the negotiations over the Chinese Eastern Railway from 1933-1935.[1506]

But, as already noted, the Soviet appeasement didn't proceed without the massive expansion of its military in these years. Instigated by the unruly expansion of the Japanese military toward Northern Manchuria, inner Mongolia and outer Mongolia,[1507] the Soviet Union undertook a sizable reinforcement of its military strength in the Far East from 1933-1936.[1508] According to estimates of the Japanese Army General Staff, "the Soviet forces in the Far East at the end of 1935 exceeded the total troop strength of the Japanese forces stationed in Korea and Manchuria by threefold, and the gap was still growing." The continental power shift was taking place on the local level between. New proposals of the nonaggression pact were occasionally put forward by Japan from 1935 but the Soviet Union had no serious interest until the settlement of the Khalkhin-gol battle in 1939.[1509]

The Japanese-German alignment and the Anglo-Japanese alienation, 1936-1939 [less open]

The failure of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations of 1934 over a non-aggression pact slightly narrowed the alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan but the British engagement with Japan for an Anglo-Japanese reconciliation had not been completely abandoned until the mid-1937. Also, whether the Soviet Union could be a potential common threat to the U.S. and Japan or a continental ally of the U.S. was yet opaque. Nonetheless, the years between 1936 and 1939 saw a conspicuous further closing of the alignment opportunity. Nazi's rearmament and alignment with Japan from 1936-1939 as well as the initiation of the Sino-Japanese war of 1937 that completed the Anglo-Japanese alienation contributed to the increased closedness of the alignment opportunity. The effect of the Soviet Union's move, such as the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact, was vague.

As mentioned, Roosevelt once clarified his view on "the first line of defense" of the U.S. in late January 1939. As to "the Atlantic," he said to the Senators, "our first line is the continued independent existence of a very large group of nations," including "Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Persia…with those possible exceptions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania…then you have France and England." In other words, the U.S. had a number of potential continental allies as the first defense of the Euro-Atlantic theater. Insofar as these

[1505] Anastasia S. Lozhkina, Yaroslav A. Shulatov, and Kirill E. Cherevko, "Soviet-Japanese Relations after the Manchurian Incident, 1931-1939," in Ibid., pp. 225-227.
[1506] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Ibid., pp. 205-206.
[1507] Jonathan Haslam, *op.cit.*, (1992), pp. 48-50.
[1508] Hata Ikuhiko, "The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939," trans. Alvin D. Coox, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 131-133.
[1509] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 206-208.

European states were able to withstand the challenges from the Axis powers, the ally availability in the Euro-Atlantic could keep the U.S. from fighting the aggressors.[1510]

The ally availability in the Euro-Atlantic theater started to diminish to a degree as Germany quickly rearmed, moved into the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, supported the Franco regime in Spain, and annexed parts of the Sudetenland, Anschluss, and Czechoslovakia from 1935-1939. Hitler's Hossbach Memorandum that laid out "the policy of enlarging Germany's Lebensraum in Europe" was produced in November 1937 and he virtually assumed "personal command" of the Army, the Navy, Air Force, and Foreign Ministry through his personnel by 1938.[1511] Though it is impossible to verify Roosevelt's remark, he gave a verbal warning to the Senators that the U.S. obtained "the pretty definite information" about "a policy of world domination between Germany, Italy, and Japan," particularly Hitler among them, "about three years ago" on January 31, 1939.[1512]

Given the Roosevelt's idea about the first line of defense and ally availability in the Pacific and the Atlantic, Japan's closer alignment with Germany, first publicly demonstrated by the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936, indicated that the level of the alignment opportunity was on a downward trajectory. Even though Japan made lots of efforts to manage the phraseology and limit the scope of the pact "to an exchange of information and opinion concerning countermeasures to be taken against the subversive activities of the Comintern," the Soviet Union easily recognized that "the pact was an anti-Soviet move."[1513] Even though Japan vigorously sought to minimize the Pact's negative effect on Britain and the Foreign Ministry prepared a draft Anglo-Japanese treaty, Britain became even more wary of Japan's move, further straining their bilateral relations.[1514]

The more strained relations with Britain implied that the alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan was tapering off after 1936. The subsequent plan of the Pact was to include more states in the Pact to maximize the deterrent pressure on the Soviet Union. But it was out of question for the Netherlands to which Japan reached out from October 1936, not to speak of the U.S. and Britain. The Japanese inclination to "view Britain separately from the U.S." constituted the basis of such a blindly wishful diplomacy in some measure. For instance, the Ambassador Yoshida drew up a proposal for "the development of Anglo-Japanese cooperation" and conveyed it through Chamberlain in October 1936. In April 1937, the Hayashi cabinet adopted "a new China policy" whose emphasis was placed on "the economic co-operation with Britain and the U.S."[1515]

Not only was the Foreign Office's reply to "the Yoshida memorandum," the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war from July 1937 but also nearly shut down the chance

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[1510] Conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee in the White House, January 31, 1939, 12:45 P.M. [PPF1 - P:CT] in Donald B. Schewe, (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *op.cit.,* (1995F), pp. 201-203.

[1511] Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Commintern Pact," trans., Hans H. Baerwald, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 48-49.

[1512] Conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee in the White House, January 31, 1939, 12:45 P.M. [PPF1 - P:CT] in Donald B. Schewe, (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *op.cit.,* (1995F), p. 200.

[1513] Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Commintern Pact," trans., Hans H. Baerwald, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 32-39.

[1514] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[1515] Hosoya Chihiro, "Britain and the U.S. in Japan's view, 1919-1937," in Ian Nish, ed*., op.cit.*, (1982), pp. 21-23.

of an Anglo-Japanese political understanding. Foreign Minister Hirota belatedly instructed his subordinates to prioritize the Anglo-Japanese relations over extended negotiations with respect to the Anti-Comintern Pact. But Foreign Secretary Eden, who once sided with the pro-Japanese and Treasuary faction in 1934, turned his back on Japan and "told the House of Commons on July 21, 1937 that Anglo-Japanese negotiations would not be considered."[1516] While Japan wished the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 to be "a vague promise," or "an agreement in grey," so as to not much antagonize the Soviet Union and other great powers, Britain in particular, such hopes were barely realistic.[1517]

Germany and Japan shared substantive interests in balancing the Soviet continental threat in Europe and Asia. Germany aimed at countervailing the conclusions of the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty and the Soviet-Czechoslovakia Mutual Assistance Treaty in May 1935. As for Japan, the border disputes intensified as the Soviet military strength grew and the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1937 was signed and the Soviet persisted in sending military aids to the Chinese forces. Furthermore, the Japanese Army did not swerve the direction of its geographical expansion yet until 1939. Though the ally availability for the U.S. in Europe was expected to shrink, the Western and Eastern European states were not smashed in this period and the Soviet Union not only backed the Chinese but also stayed as a potential continental ally to the U.S.

As Hitler's European invasion plans matured from late 1937 to 1938, the value of a stronger alignment with Japan increased for Germany. Britain and France, and not the Soviet Union, were the central adversaries at this point. Nazi's appeal for "a general defensive military alliance" began from January 1938. But Japan's Navy and the Foreign Ministry were not prepared to take risks of antagonizing Britain, France, and the U.S. more and overruled the Army. The German alliance project was aborted, though the internal debate ensued from January 1938 to August 1939 in Japan.[1518] In fact, the Pact of 1936 and Japan's vain moves toward Britain and the Netherlands were primarily driven by its desire to escape from isolation and to find available alignment partners.[1519]

The non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union was not wholly off the table for Japan for the same reason. Unlike the Japanese hope, the Anglo-Japanese relations significantly deteriorated from 1938-1939. After Konoe's announcement of "the creation of a New Order" on November 3, 1938, the U.S. expressed its opposition and joined Britain and France in the non-recognition of the Japanese declaration. The Japanese blockade of Tianjin was understandably not helpful, either.[1520] Instead, only Italy, Spain, and Hungary were brought in the Pact from 1937-1939.[1521] Hence, an alignment consistency of some kind was arising to a certain extent by 1939. However, the Soviet's multidimensional position in Europe and Asia hampered the most simplistic alignment consistency through the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of 1941.

Nazi's wedge, the Tripartite Pact, and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality, 1939-1941 [closed]

[1516] Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Commintern Pact," trans., Hans H. Baerwald, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 44-45.
[1517] Ibid., pp. 28-33.
[1518] Ibid., pp. 47-51.
[1519] Ibid., pp. 39-41.
[1520] Ibid., pp. 107-109.
[1521] Ibid., p. 42.

The bilateral alignment opportunity between the U.S. and Japan almost fully closed in 1939-1941. Following its annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, Nazi marched through the Eastern and Western Europe and conquered France and the Netherlands by June 1940, reducing the ally availability both in Europe and Asia for the U.S. The first line of defense in the Atlantic, a large number of independent states in the Eastern and Western Europe were confronted with the invasion of either the Soviet Union or Germany. The Tripartite Pact of 1940 reinforced the former Japanese-German alignment in a manner that perforce antagonized the U.S. and Britain although Japan managed to evade an obligation that could drag them into the European war.[1522] The Soviet Union was transformed into a continental ally in Europe but not in Asia by the mid 1941.

From the Japanese perspective, the extended attempt to cling to available allies on the other side of the world ironically left no available allies in its own home theater, the Asia-Pacific after September 1940. The Four-Power entente proposals that purposed to bring in the Soviet Union in the Tripartite Pact was a part of Japan's ill-fated last endeavor to maximize its almost non-existent ally availability in Asia. Once the Four-Power entente proposals were scotched, Japan managed to conclude the neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941. The Soviet Union was unwilling to be an ally of Japan as Matsuoka wished but at least the Japanese northern front was neutralized for the forthcoming southern advance. The Soviet Union could have continued to be a potential continental ally of the U.S. had it not been for the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact.

As Nazi's expansion proceeded to Prague after the fallout of the Munich accords in March 1939, Britain strove to back up "the continued independence existence" of other European states no less than Roosevelt cared about on January 31 of the same year,[1523] extending "its commitments in unprecedented fashion" to preserve "the independence of Poland, Rumania, and Greece, and to seek an alliance with the Soviet Union."[1524] But the British commitment was of indirect nature in that it expected "a guarantee to Warsaw to get Poland to defend Rumania" and "the Anglo-French alliance with Poland" aimed to cultivate conditions under which Germany and Poland could reach a negotiated settlement.[1525] To make matters worse, Germany leaders foresaw Britain's balancing and effectively acted to forestall "an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance."[1526]

Ribbentrop alerted Hitler as early as late May that the Soviet Union seemed to be determined to join "the English policy of encirclement." Hitler offered up attractive territorial accommodations to the Soviet Union in the Baltic region, Poland, and Southeastern Europe, especially Bessarabia, which made the Anglo-Franco alliance look less appealing to Stalin. In short, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was a better alternative, more conducive to Soviet interests, and led Stalin to downplay an Anglo-

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[1522] Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 252-257.

[1523] Conference with the Senate Military Affairs Committee in the White House, January 31, 1939, 12:45 P.M. [PPF1 - P:CT] in Donald B. Schewe, (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York), *op.cit.,* (1995F), p. 200.

[1524] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 217.

[1525] Ibid., pp. 217-218.

[1526] Timothy W. Crawford, "Powers of Division: From the Anti-Comintern to the Nazi-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet Pacts, 1936-1941," in Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, ed., *op.cit.,* (2012), p. 253.

Franco-Soviet alliance proposal.[1527] Germany effectually pulled the plug on the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet coalition by accommodating Russia's territorial interests,[1528] which in turn diminished the ally availability for Britain and the U.S. on the European continent until the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

In the Asia-Pacific theater, Japan was utterly caught off guard by the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 1939 to the extent that the champion of pro-German policy, the Army, "lost its enthusiasm" and a discussion of the Tripartite alliance project became taboo for a time within the Army Ministry.[1529] This was acidly frustrating because Japan had been dragging its feet as Germany demanded forming a defensive alliance in order to "minimize its unfavorable impact" on other states, namely Britain and France, except "Russia" from January-June in 1939.[1530] The military defeat at the battle of Khalkhin-gol dealt another decisive blow at Japan in late August. As Slavinsky writes, "the Japanese army's crushing defeat" and the shock of "the Soviet-German non-aggression pact" altered Japan's war plan and pushed it to reconcile with the Soviet Union.[1531]

The Japanese resolved to engage in normalization of the Soviet-Japanese relations and asked that the Foreign Ministry "undertake a study in relation to their new foreign policy proposal."[1532] The normalization, or at least neutralization, of the Soviet-Japanese relations correspondingly implied a turn to the southern advance whose risks were fatally underestimated by the Army due to its unworkable assumption about divisibility of Britain and the U.S. Both the southern expansion and the Tripartite Pact of 1940 were incompatible with the improvement of the U.S.-Japan relation. But Japan announced that its objectives were "solving the China Incident," not intervening in the European war, and improving relations with the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union on September 9, 1939. Matsuoka "judged" that it could advance south and avoid a war with the U.S in July 1940.[1533]

The Japanese expansion had already reached the coastal cities in South China, Hainan, and Spratly as well as Paracel islands by the mid 1939 and the U.S. took one more step forward in the economic and naval quarantine by notifying its decision to abrogate the 1911 Commercial Treaty within six months on July 26, 1939. This baffled the Japanese who scrambled to ask Hull about a reason as to the seemingly sudden decision, which Hull intentionally didn't give at all. Therefore, the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union was achievable but not that with the U.S. at this stage.[1534] By December 1939, one section of a non-aggression pact proposal with the Soviet Union by the Foreign Ministry

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[1527] Ibid., pp. 253-254, For the original texts, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/secret-supplementary-protocols-molotov-ribbentrop-non-aggression-pact-1939

[1528] Timothy W. Crawford, "Powers of Division: From the Anti-Comintern to the Nazi-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet Pacts, 1936-1941," in Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, ed., *op.cit.,* (2012), pp. 255-263.

[1529] Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 191-193.

[1530] Ohata Tokushiro, "The Anti-Commintern Pact," trans., Hans H. Baerwald, in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 79-81, pp. 83-86, pp. 100-105.

[1531] Boris Slavinsky, *The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941-1945*, trans., Geoffrey Jukes, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 16.

[1532] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), p. 209.

[1533] Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), p. 194, pp. 214-216

[1534] Ibid., pp. 194-195.

stipulated, "in order to carry out its policy against the U.S., Japan should give the impression that it was seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union."[1535]

Schroeder correctly comments that the Tripartite Pact "linked Japan to Germany and Italy in September 1940," which welded the Asian war and the European war.[1536] But Soviet-Japanese relations and U.S.-Japanese relations were conceived to be tied with each other by the Japanese Foreign Ministry at least from December 1939, if not earlier. Germany's courting for the Tripartite Pact, a general alliance with Japan, did not halt even after the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Germany had several key strategic motivations to pursue an alliance with Japan. Japan's maritime capabilities deemed valuable in "diverting Britain's naval power" and Germany would be in need of "supplies from the South Seas" in the event of Britain's economic blockade. Ribbentrop's basic idea was to ultimately build "a political union" of Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.[1537]

Ribbentrop's scheme of "a Four-Power bloc" was not alien to Japan. In July 1939, Konoe was presented with a policy paper that toyed with "a Japanese-Soviet-German-Italian combination," whose primary aims were to detach the Soviet Union from the Chinese Nationalist, forge "a Four-Power block" against the Anglo-American bloc, and neutralize the threat in the North.[1538] The Japanese cabinet slowly appeased the Soviet Union and the negotiations on "a trade agreement," "border dispute," and "territorial delimitation" after the armistice agreement at Khalkhin-gol in September. Togo insinuated "the possibility of a Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact" to Tokyo as "a provisional arrangement was soon reached" between him and Molotov after November 1939. Yet, the Abe cabinet was cautious and let the negotiations stall until the mid-April 1940.[1539]

The German victories in Western Europe forced the Low countries and France to capitulate and the Soviet Union seized the moment to annex the Baltic states and expanded into a part of Rumania in accord with the secret protocol of the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact. Subsequently, Japan became more confident in aligning with Germany and appeasing the Soviet Union from May-June of 1940.[1540] Foreign Minister Arita instructed Ambassador Togo to move on to negotiate the conclusion of a neutrality treaty to break off "the current deadlock" in the engagement with the Soviet Union in late May. The Foreign Ministry and Togo initially sounded out Molotov with a neutrality pact, and not a non-aggression, in order to curtail the negative impact on the relations with the U.S. and Britain in July.

[1535] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), pp. 209-210.

[1536] Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management", in Klaus Knorr, ed., *op.cit.*, (1976), p. 218, Paul W. Schroeder, *op.cit.*, (1958), p. 2.

[1537] Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact," in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), p. 196.

[1538] Timothy W. Crawford, "Powers of Division: From the Anti-Comintern to the Nazi-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet Pacts, 1936-1941," in Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, ed., *op.cit.,* (2012), p. 264.

[1539] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), p. 210.

[1540] Timothy W. Crawford, "Powers of Division: From the Anti-Comintern to the Nazi-Soviet and Japanese-Soviet Pacts, 1936-1941," in Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Steven E. Lobell, ed., *op.cit.,* (2012), pp. 266-267.

The second Konoe cabinet, driven by Matsuoka, precipitated the Japanese bid for the more cohesive alignment with Germany and Italy and "dramatic adjustment of diplomatic ties with Soviet Union."[1541] The Tripartite Pact was at long last signed on September 27, 1940 and Germany and Japan collectively began to convince the Soviet Union to participate in a non-aggression treaty for a Four-Power entente in October until the Berlin conference between Germany and the Soviet Union fell apart by November.[1542] With the deterioration of the Soviet-German relations in early 1941, the Soviet Union consented to Japan's neutrality pact proposal on April 13. Though Matsuoka concluded the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact without foreseeing that Germany would invade the Soviet Union soon, Japan preemptively neutralized a continental ally for the U.S.[1543]

6.4. Conclusion: Japan's redirection and the activation of the U.S. preventive motivation

Japan's naval buildup was constrained by the Washington naval system from 1921-1936 and the U.S. was more inclined to not let go of Japan from the Washington naval system. But the underlying condition of naval arms race was significantly solidified as the Japanese broke ground in its remarkable shipbuilding after its withdrawal from the Washington naval system and the Roosevelt administration proportionately responded with a series of the Naval Acts in 1934, 1938, and 1940 as the British in the previous cases of the 19th century. In terms of total naval fighting capacity, there was no naval overtake by Japan despite the symmetric level of resource-extraction capacities of both naval powers. But the American fleet had to be dispersed across the two oceans and there seemed to be naval parity, if not overtake, on the regional level in the Pacific theater.

	A challenger's gain of interest and prestige from naval armament and geographical expansion		
The leading sea power's loss of interest and prestige from naval and geographical expansion		Low	High
	Low	[1921-1933] → [1934-1938]	
	High		[1939-1941]

Figure. 27. The U.S.-Japan dyad, 1921-1941

Accordingly, the degree of the U.S. preventive motivation greatly surged from 1936-1941, increasing its expected loss. On the other hand, with the imposition of the asset freeze and total oil embargo in late July 1941, the Japanese had a temporal preventive motivation. On September 3, Admiral Nagano, Chief of the Navy General Staff, remarked at the Liaison Conference, "as time goes by we will become more and more crippled…I am

[1541] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), p. 211-212.
[1542] Hosoya Chihiro, "The Tripartite Pact" and "The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact," in James William Morley, ed., *op.cit.,* (1976), pp. 252-255, pp. 51-74.
[1543] Tobe Ryochi, "Japan's Policy toward the Soviet Union, 1931-1941: The Japanese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact," in Dmitry V. Streltsov and Shimotomai Nobuo, ed., *op.cit.*, (2019), p. 212-216.

convinced that if we strike now we have chance for victory."[1544] General Staff's studies suggested, "there is little hopes of success" for the first two years, but implied that "there is a strong probability of losing" and "little chance of winning" from the third year.[1545] The immediate factors that drove them into the war were Japan's encroachment on the first line of maritime and the American expectation that its contagion effect on "a chain of islands" in the Pacific would be disastrous.

Roosevelt, naval officials, and other members of the administration largely conceived of a potential conflict with Japan as a long-range economic and naval blockade, or "strangulation," preferably in concert with available naval allies from 1934-1938. It was not until early 1939 when Japan steered the direction of its expansion toward the coastal cities of South China and South China Sea that the early stage of economic sanctions was activated. Once the whole redirection of Japan's military penetration into Southeast Asia and the South Seas became plain from 1939-1941, severe economic quarantine measures were taken to a large extent that the took risks of an armed conflict if necessary. The developments in the European war and the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of 1941 also took away available naval and continental allies of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific theater while the Japanese allies were geographically and strategically nearly useless for Japan.

[1544] Tsunoda Jun, "The Decision for War," in James William Morley, *op.cit.,* (1994), pp. 266-267.
[1545] Tsunoda Jun, "The Decision for War," in Ibid., pp. 267-270.

Chapter 5. Conclusion and implications for U.S.-China relations

The realist paradigm's strength lies in its attentiveness to the change in relative power or the differential growth of power, especially among great powers. In this sense, balance of power theory and a variety of hegemonic theories still constitute the backbone of the realist paradigm. However, concerning the dynamics between the leading sea power and a challenger with the second largest naval capabilities, the systemic anticipations of these two flagship theories were only partially right, as illustrated by the foregoing analysis. This is in part because the possession of substantial naval capabilities enables the two powers to overcome geographical distance, or the stopping power of water, and bolsters the impact of geographical power projection on a war or peaceful settlement during a naval power shift.

To redress their indeterminacy, an interactive theory of power projection integrates variation in geographical power projection to better capture the proximate factors that determine a major war or strategic settlement over naval arms races. Since the works of Modelski and Thompson, a theoretical focus on naval capabilities and maritime security has drifted away from security studies.[1546] Likewise, after Levy and Thompson's argument that states are less likely to balance against the leading sea power than they are to the continental power, no mid-range theory has been produced to challenge this essentialist hypothesis and shed light on distinct balancing behaviors of a challenger with the second largest naval capabilities against the leading sea power. An interactive theory of power projection fills this gap.

Unlike the conventional wisdom, according to which a naval power doesn't pose menaces to a distant challenger and the maritime realm is characterized by non-zero sum dynamics, the major cases of an interactive theory of power projection show that the likelihood of a conflict between the two naval powers depends more on the direction of a challenger's power projection and the leading sea power's expectations about its contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense than on whether these two powers are conceived to be either continental powers or naval powers. From the 17th century to the 20th century, the dyads of the leading sea power and a challenger were associated with wars when a challenger expands into the central theater or the peripheral theater in a way that generates high expectations about the contagion effect on naval defense.

In all three major cases, the leading sea power's preventive motivations were deactivated by a challenger's power projection into the peripheral theater that the leading sea power expected to be of low contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense. For instance, the French annexation of Nice and Savoy aggravated Britain's threat perception and dented its status quo policy in Europe, but when France redirected its territorial ambition towards the Rhine region, which was of continental significance, Britain's expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of naval defense

[1546] A number of recent publications call for the need to revive the research on maritime security against this backdrop. See Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, "Beyond seablindness: a new agenda for maritime security studies," *International Affairs*, Vol. 93 No. 6, (2017), pp. 1293-1311. Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds, and Barry J. Ryan, "Maritime security: the uncharted politics of the global sea," *International Affairs*, Vol. 95 No. 5, (2019), pp. 971-978, Jonathan D. Caverley and Peter Dombrowski, "Too Important to Be Left to the Admirals: The Need to Study Maritime Great-Power Competition," *Security Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (2020), pp. 579-600, Jonathan D. Caverley and Peter Dombrowski, eds., *Security Studies in a New Era of Maritime Competition*, (New York: Routeledge, 2023).

deflated and hence deactivated the preventive motivation. France's territorial expansions into other parts of Africa, except the Upper Nile, likewise didn't trigger Britain's expectations about the contagion effect on maritime defense.

In the cases of the Fashoda crisis and the Asia-Pacific war, the most immediate causes of a crisis and war were the direction of a challenger's power projection that was expected to further disrupt the first line of maritime defense in the peripheral theater, especially Alexandria and a chain of islands in the South Seas. However distant a challenger's expansion from the central theater may be, the leading sea power's preventive motivation is more likely to be activated by its beliefs that a challenger's expansion is surely headed towards the first line of maritime defense even in peripheral regions. In other words, the likelihood of a war or negative dynamics *increases* if a challenger's expansion is believed to be of high significance for naval defense.

The geographical dimension is additionally incorporated into the other two conditions of an interactive theory, namely the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup and alignment opportunity. Though the most original theoretical contribution of an interactive theory is the aforementioned interactive dynamics, the geographical dispersion of naval forces and alignment opportunities in the theater of the naval power transition are specified and synthesized to complement this key variable. This geographical specification indicates that, beyond the relative balance of total naval capacities, the geographical distribution of naval forces also shapes the level of the preventive motivation at the regional level and that the changes in the third power alignment matter especially in the theater of the naval power transition.

The liberal-rationalist framework, trade expectations theory, and theories of domestic pathology offer alternative explanations for some of the major cases but do not cut across all three cases. This is partly because the scope condition of these theories does not concern a naval power shift between the leading sea power and a challenger with the second largest naval capabilities. More specifically, these theories do not explain why the leading sea power sometimes has the salient preventive motivation in the peripheral theater in the first place and the conditions under which such a preventive motivation is activated or deactivated. My theory contributes to the existing security studies by clarifying the source of the leading sea power's preventive motivation in the peripheral theater and how a challenger's expansion activates or deactivates it.

The following sections summarize my findings on major cases and consider implications for U.S.-China relations in light of the three conditions of an interactive theory of power projection. Chapter 2 unpacked the puzzle of the Crimean system from 1856-1870, namely the absence of war or a serious crisis between Britain and France in spite of near naval parity and the French annexation of Nice and Savoy in the early 1860s, not to mention geographical proximity between them. Chapter 2 found that the direction of France's geographical expansion in this period largely fell into the peripheral theaters of Britain and barely triggered the British expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense. The French annexation of Nice and Savoy in 1860 did alarm Britain, but Britain had few expectations about its contagion effect.

While British alertness in the early 1860s stemmed from the closing naval power gap with France, the high level of the preventive motivation from 1856-1862 was deactivated by France's expansion into Syria, Alegria, Mexico, Southeast Asia, and China in addition to Nice and Savoy. Britain's expectations about the contagion effect

might have been higher had France succeeded in expanding into Belgium and Holland, but France's bid for another territorial rearrangement in the Rhine region didn't materialize after 1862. From 1863-1870, the level of the preventive motivation dropped as France's resource-extraction capacity for naval buildup petered out in a manner that brought the naval arms race to an end. Moreover, the presence and movements of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, rendered alignment opportunities quite open.

Chapter 3 delved into the puzzle of the untypical preventive motivation of Britain and the higher likelihood of a war during the Fashoda crisis in 1898. Chapter 3 showed that the shift in Britain's first line of maritime defense in the Mediterranean, the Franco-Russian alliance, and the geographical dispersion of Britain's naval forces all shaped the untypical preventive motivation from 1894-1898, despite high naval disparity maintained throughout this period. Not unlike the years of the Crimean system, France's power projection pointed toward the peripheral theaters of Britain. But as Britain's first line of naval defense in the Mediterranean shifted from Constantinople to Alexandria by 1898, Britain's expectations that France intended to further encroach upon the Upper Nile and Egypt were strengthened by the Fashoda crisis.

France's incursion into the Upper Nile triggered Britain's expectations about the contagion effect, activating its untypical preventive motivation. At the same time, alignment opportunities between Britain and France closed dramatically from 1894-1898 on account of the Franco-Russian alliance, the collapse of the Mediterranean entente, and the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897. Russia, the traditional common threat, became an ally of France, and potential allies or partners for Britain, such as Austria, Germany, and Italy, were not available by 1898. Nor was Russia willing to assist France over Fashoda. France's redirection of power projection within the peripheral theaters of Britain and the re-opening of alignment opportunities from 1898-1904, shaped by the failed Anglo-German alliance negotiations and Germany's maritime rise, produced the Entente Cordiale.

Chapter 4 investigated why, on the one hand, Japan redirected its geographical expansion from 1939-1941 and why, on the other hand, the U.S. willingly rank the risk of fighting a preventive war in the peripheral theater by 1941. Chapter 4 can be divided into the two periods, viz., from 1921-1934 and 1934-1941. In the first period, the Washington naval system restrained Japan from closing the naval power gap with the U.S. beyond the inscribed naval ratio. Moreover, Japan's geographical expansions into Shandong, Manchuria, and Rehe did not arouse U.S. expectations about the contagion effect on naval defense. Hence, the preventive motivation was low and the direction of Japan's power projection hardly activated the preventive motivation. Alignment opportunities were open due to Britain's efforts to mediate and the Soviet Union as a potential common threat on the Asian continent.

All the three conditions of an interactive theory were reversed from 1934-1941. In spite of the asymmetric balance of resource-extraction capacities in absolute terms, Japan renounced the Washington naval system and substantially closed the naval power gap by 1941. Though the U.S. passed a series of naval expansion acts and didn't allow Japan's naval overtake, the symmetric turn of resource-extraction capacities increased the level of preventive motivation. Besides, the emergence of the German threat in the Euro-Atlantic theater compelled the spatial dispersion of U.S. naval forces, leading to near naval parity at the regional level in the Pacific theater. Most importantly, the critical reorientation of

Japan's expansion from the continental North to the maritime South activated the U.S. preventive motivation from 1939-1941.

Japan's redirection of power projection at the strategic level was driven by the paradox of peripheral expansion where a challenger is emboldened to underestimate the leading sea power's resolve by the peripheral nature of the theater. As much as France didn't make a critical distinction between West Africa and the Upper Nile, Japan misperceived that the U.S. would not undertake a decisive measure if it occupied the British spheres of influence in Southeast Asia and the South Seas. The quagmire in China and the military defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union in 1939 additionally motivated Japan to advance towards the South. Roosevelt and his administration already envisioned a naval and economic blockade, or "strangulation," in the Asia-Pacific theater from 1937, which was carried out from 1939-1941 as Japan moved to the South Seas.

Roosevelt and his administration had been cautious so as to not quickly provoke Japan into a war from 1939, but they were not willing to make a concession simply to prevent a war in the Asia-Pacific by mid-1941. From 1939-1941, Roosevelt unambiguously noted that a harsh economic sanction might push Japan to seize the Dutch East Indies and the South Seas at least three times. When the oil embargo and asset freeze decision was not reversed by Roosevelt after mid-1941, the Roosevelt administration appeared to have taken risks of fighting a war. The Roosevelt administration's expectations about the Japanese contagion effect on a chain of island in the Asia-Pacific were examined in Chapter 4. Japan's redirected expansion from 1939-1941 engendered high expectations about the contagion effect, activating the preventive motivation.

Last, alignment opportunities in the Asia-Pacific theater were severely closed from 1937-1941. To say nothing of the British decision to abandon its mediation endeavors by 1937, Japan not only allied with Germany through the Tripartite Pact but also eliminated the Soviet Union as a potential available ally for the U.S. via the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact of 1941. Besides, Germany's invasion of Europe from 1939-1941 isolated Britain in Europe and removed other available European allies in the Asia-Pacific. There were virtually no available allies for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific in the event of Japan's southern advance. Similarly, Germany and Italy were of no strategic value for Japan in the Asia-Pacific theater. It is evident that three conditions of an interactive theory vividly differed in the former period and the latter period.

Three conditions of an interactive theory and case studies generate pertinent policy implications for U.S.-China relations in the 21st century. First, the relative balance of resource-extraction capacities for naval buildup between the U.S. and China is expected to be asymmetric at least until 2030, if not until 2040 or 2050. China's quantitative naval overtake has already taken place "sometime between 2015 and 2020" in terms of the number of battle force ships.[1547] In theory, the preventive motivation of the U.S. might have been high during the years between 2015 and 2020. However, the asymmetric trend of resource-extraction capacities for naval armament has already set in since then and the level of the U.S. preventive motivation could decrease moving forward with all other things being equal.

[1547] Ronald O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, RL33153, January 30, 2024, pp. 1-12.

On the other hand, the geographical dispersion of naval forces and the presence of a naval ally in the theater of the naval power shift must be considered in determining the level of the preventive motivation at the regional level as well. While U.S. naval forces cannot be as concentrated in the Indo-Pacific theater as much as the Chinese naval forces, U.S. naval allies in the Indo-Pacific theater may complement American quantitative naval inferiority. Nevertheless, since the geographical dispersion of naval forces is a disadvantage for the U.S., near naval parity at the regional level, which could heighten the preventive motivation, is unlikely. If the U.S. wishes to maintain a naval balance in the Indo-Pacific with less numerical inferiority, a long-term and large investment in updating its shipbuilding infrastructure seems to be necessary.

Since naval arms buildup is not an issue to be easily solved in the short-term, U.S. policymakers should think through whether an increase in the federal budget of naval arms buildup and modernizing the industrial capacity is politically feasible and weigh the costs and benefits of a short-term retrenchment to restore a long-term naval balance in the Indo-Pacific theater. Second, an interactive theory can attribute the absence of a serious crisis or a military confrontation between the U.S. and China during this period to the direction of China's power projection with its increased capabilities, which didn't result in high expectations about the contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense. China's geographical power projection has been concentrated in its central theater, namely near-seas.

Additionally, China's extra-regional expansion in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Baltic is limited in scope, though China's military guideline of 2014 and 2019 stipulates the primary direction of its military strategy is "continental Southeast and maritime Western Pacific."[1548] China is in possession of only two overseas bases, Djibouti and Cambodia's Ream naval base—a small presence relative to the far-flung network of U.S. military bases across the globe. The likelihood of a military confrontation will depend upon the extent to which China is determined to project its power into the first line of maritime defense of the U.S. in the Western Pacific. In this regard, the Taiwan question is the pivotal issue where China's power projection and the U.S. expectation about contagion effect meet.

Even so, the 2019 Chinese stipulation of "continental Southeast and maritime Western Pacific" is a reaffirmation of the previous doctrine without substantive changes in its naval strategy. Given the rapid and massive naval modernization China has undertaken, a new development of China's naval strategy appears to lag behind its increased naval capabilities. This leads one to question the extent to which China is resolved to project its power towards the Western Pacific aside from its near seas. Further, U.S. military and intelligence leaders, such as Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, are more inclined to assess that China is either unprepared to invade Taiwan, perhaps until 2027, or not confident in its capacity to successfully conduct an amphibious operation in Taiwan.[1549]

[1548] Joel Wuthnow & M. Taylor Fravel, "China's military strategy for a 'new era': Some change, more continuity, and tantalizing hints," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (March 2022), pp. 1-36.

[1549] Kevin Baron, "Lower the Rhetoric on China, Says Milley," *Defense One,* March 31, 2023, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/03/ukraine-victory-unlikely-year-milley-says/384681/, Dustin Volz, "CIA Chief Says China Had Doubt About its Ability to Invade Taiwan," *Wall Street Journal*, February 26, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-chief-says-china-has-doubts-about-its-ability-to-invade-taiwan-670b8f87

Therefore, given the interactive dynamics of a challenger's expansion and the leading sea power's expectations about the contagion effect, my theory implies that amplifying certain beliefs—namely that China will invade Taiwan and not stop at Taiwan,[1550] and that the strategic crack would irreversibly run deep in the event of China's invasion of Taiwan[1551]—would likely feed into a more counterproductive dynamic or vicious cycle of crisis escalation. Beyond its more assertive activities in near-seas, it is unclear whether China's geographical expansion would be directed toward the first line of naval defense of the U.S. in the Western Pacific at this juncture. Last but not least, alignment opportunities in the Indo-Pacific do not seem to be entirely closed, even though it is unlikely that a common threat in Asia or elsewhere would rise soon.

The U.S. still enjoys high ally availability in the Indo-Pacific theater, including both bilateral alliances as well as multilateral security partnerships, such as AUKUS and QUAD. At the same time, even though China doesn't have a formal ally except North Korea, most U.S. allies and security partners maintain various political-economic ties with China and prioritize more stable U.S.-China relations in the long-run. A naval bipolarity has surfaced in the Indo-Pacific, but it doesn't necessarily indicate a high level of alignment consistency will be fossilized soon. In theory, the alignment opportunity implies that the presence of third powers in the theaters could create an alternative path to a confrontation. The U.S. should be able to capitalize on available allies and partners in a manner that induces more stability than instability in the region.

[1550] Elbridge Colby, "China's military buildup shows its ambitions go well beyond Taiwan," *Nikkei Asia,* April 7, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-s-military-buildup-shows-its-ambitions-go-well-beyond-Taiwan

[1551] Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, "Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan," *International Security*, Vol. 47, No. 1, (Summer 2022), pp. 7-45, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, "The Conquest of Conquest: Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 101, No. 4, (Summer, 2022), pp. 97-106.

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