A Roman Catholic Account of the Flourishing and Virtuous Agency of People with Schizophrenia in the United States

Abstract

This dissertation develops a Roman Catholic account of the flourishing and virtuous agency of people with schizophrenia in the United States. At least two million people in the United States live with this brain disease, whose symptoms (e.g. delusions and avolition) complicate virtuous living. This dissertation remedies the neglect of schizophrenia in Catholic ethics and advances Christian ethics beyond the best available work done on the flourishing and virtuous agency of people with it by Protestant authors by: a) drawing its understanding of the content of human flourishing and of the theological and cardinal virtues from Christian theological and ethical commitments rather than from non-Christian sources; b) grounding the social supports that would increase the likelihood of clinical recovery and, therefore, of agency, habituation, virtue, and flourishing; c) showing via careful work in virtue theory whether, why, how, to what extent, and under which circumstances people with schizophrenia can live virtuously; and d) clarifying the meaning of the theological and cardinal virtues and their relevance for people with schizophrenia. Chapter One elucidates the challenges confronting people with schizophrenia in the United States from their illness itself and from the nation’s failed social response to them, as well as the opportunities available to them through clinical, functional, and personal recovery. Chapter Two concludes that, despite their liabilities, recent secular interpretations of the good life can or do conceptualize flourishing as possible even as constraints such as those associated with schizophrenia endure rather than only after they have been removed. Chapter Threes and Four find that Roman Catholic magisterial teachings about schizophrenia and an analogized reading of Luke 8:26-39 can helpfully ground necessary social supports, but the former requires greater conceptual clarification and development, while the latter emphasizes Jesus’s agency rather than that of the Gerasene man and depicts a total healing from total brokenness that is unavailable to or not fully representative of people with schizophrenia today. Chapter Five argues that Thomas Aquinas’s understandings of perfect and imperfect beatitude provide the best way for Christian ethics to conceptualize the possibility, content, and requirements of the flourishing of people with schizophrenia. Thomistic ethics can ground necessary social supports, and Aquinas’s virtue theory, as interpreted by William C. Mattison and developed by the scientifically-informed and socially-attuned threshold thesis, can show whether, why, how, to what extent, and under which circumstances people with schizophrenia can live virtuously before onset of illness, between onset and the threshold point of clinical recovery, and at and beyond the threshold. Chapters Six and Seven use Thomistic virtue ethics to explain the meaning of the theological and cardinal virtues, respectively, and their relevance for people with schizophrenia. The result is a wider and deeper Christian assessment of their possibilities for agency, habituation, virtue, and flourishing, even as schizophrenia’s challenges continue to varying degrees.