SPIRIT, EXPRESSION AND COMMUNITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDITH STEIN

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Abstract: This dissertation examines and elucidates the notion of spirit (*Geist*) in Stein's work, particularly the role it plays in her philosophical anthropology and her understanding of intersubjectivity and community. While this notion is central to Stein's philosophy, very little scholarship focuses on it directly, and there has never been an attempt to trace its development over the whole of Stein's corpus. I argue that the key to understanding Stein's notion of spirit is to understand spirit as expressive, and in so doing to recognize expression (or "going out from oneself") as a fundamental characteristic of the human person. This approach to spirit sheds light on the resolutions Stein's philosophy offers to the issue of the relationship between body and mind, and of the human person's place in connection to both the world of physical causality and the world of willing, valuing, meaning, and reasoning (in other words, the world of spirit). Understanding spirit as fundamentally expressive helps us to make sense of what it means to be an individual human being and what it means to be a part of the human community. Although she draws from and synthesizes the ideas of a number of thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein's approach is distinctive and, I argue, uniquely suited to comprehensively addressing these questions.

I develop this idea of spirit as expressive by examining Stein's claim that the person is a psycho-physical-spiritual unity that is revealed through empathy. In other words, I know the other to be a person because their being expresses itself to me. This starting point

leads to an analysis of Stein's understanding of the nature of the human person. In examining this psycho-physical-spiritual nature that Stein proposes, her singular notion of *Entfaltung* or "unfolding" emerges. She claims that the character of the individual person is grounded in a *Persönlichkeitskern* or "personal core" out of which unfolds the actualization of individual potentialities. Thus, the identity of the individual person is not created by action, but rather is uncovered, revealed, and comes to fruition through action. In unfolding, the individual expresses his or her personhood through spiritual acts, insofar as the individual encounters the world as meaningful and creatively and freely responds to this meaning. In this way, the spiritual self goes out toward the world, and the spiritual life is what Stein calls a "superabundant, diffusive life" of self-expression and self-transcendence toward life outside of the self. Furthermore, in unfolding out toward the world and toward other individuals, we also are opened up to receive this self-expression from others (their "going out of themselves").

Thus, to be spiritual is to participate in a shared world and to be shaped by it; to express oneself to the other, and to be receptive to the other's expression of spirit. When spirit "goes out of itself" in self-expression, it expresses itself *to someone*, and the community of self-expressing persons is a community of beings that "mean together," beings that participate in the sharing of spiritual content and the fruit of spiritual acts. Yet, this self-transcendence is at the same time not a leaving behind of the self; in spiritual acts, individuals "become themselves" as the unfolding of one's personal core is expressed and uncovered not only to others but also to oneself. In the creativity and freedom of spiritual acts, individuals are brought outside of themselves and at the same time become more at

home within themselves insofar as, with the actualization of the individual *Persönlichkeitskern*, individuals more fully know and express their unique individuality.

In this way, I argue, the notion of expression is not only crucial to making sense of Stein's own account of spirit (and thereby her account of personhood, intersubjectivity, and community), but furthermore, provides a way of understanding the person as inextricably bound up in community without compromising individual identity. In going out toward others in spiritual expression, one becomes more oneself.

To Benny and Toni;
you show me the world of value.

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Abbreviations (alphabetical)

Aufbau	Stein, *Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person: Vorlesungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie*
Empathy (*Einfühlung*)	Stein, *The Problem of Empathy* (*Zur Problem der Einfühlung*)
FEB (*EES*)	Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being* (*Endliches und Ewiges Sein*)
Ideas	Dilthey, *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology*
Ideas I, II (*Ideen I, II*)	Husserl, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological Philosophy I, II (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I, II*)
Ingarden Briefe	Stein, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden*
PA	Stein, *Potency and Act* (*Potenz und Akt: Studien zu einer Philosophie des Seins*)
PPH (*Beiträge*)	Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities* (*Beiträge zur Philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften*

Introduction

In 1916 at the University of Freiburg, Edith Stein submitted her doctoral dissertation, "*Das Einfühlungsproblem in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung und in phänomenologischer Betrachtun*g,"[1] which would later be published as "*Zum Problem der Einfühlung*."[2] In his letter approving her dissertation for defense, her professor Edmund Husserl praises Stein's "phenomenology of empathy and its use in making clear the phenomenological origin of the concepts of body, soul, individual, spiritual personhood, social communion and the structure of community."[3] In a brief sentence, Husserl unknowingly draws attention to the fact that Stein's first philosophical work predicted the arc of her future philosophical corpus. In *Empathy* she (albeit briefly) touches on virtually all of the themes and questions that arise in ever more mature and fleshed-out forms in her later work. The relationship between the material body and the immaterial soul and mind of the person, and thereby nature of the person as a unity of body, soul and spirit, the distinction of and relationship between nature and spirit, and the implications of these questions on the formation of and living out of human life in community are all, in some rudimentary form, touched upon in Stein's dissertation. Even the one question that Husserl

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[1] "The Historical Development and a Phenomenological Treatment of the Problem of Empathy."

[2] *On the Problem of Empathy.*

[3] "*Das Schwergewicht der Arbeit liegt aber in den systematischen Versuchen des II. – IV. Theils zu einer Phänomenologie der Einfühlung und den Anwendungen derselben auf die Klarlegung des phänomenologischen Ursprungs der Ideen Leib, Seele, Individuum, geistige Persönlichkeit, sociale Gemeinschaft und Gemeinschaftsgebilde.*" Edmund Husserl, "*Gutachten Edmund Husserl zur Dissertation Edith Steins*," in *Selbstbildnis in Briefen I (1916-1933)* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2010), 3.

does not mention in his *Gutachten*, the "*Gottesfrage*" (the question of God), which in later years becomes central in Stein's writing, can be glimpsed in the *Empathy* text.[4]

What ties these issues together and emerges as one of the central topics in Stein's philosophy is the notion of spirit. What does it mean for persons to be spiritual, despite their connection to the physical world? Is the disjunct between the world of nature and the world of spirit an unbridgeable chasm? Can the spiritual characteristics of personhood such as valuing and willing be reduced to physical causality? What is our relationship to one another, and in what way does it manifest in the sharing of our thoughts, ideas, cultural objects and traditions, and love for one another? What is our relationship to God as pure spirit? These are the kinds of questions that Stein spent her life's work (and her life) pursuing. Yet little scholarship on Stein has centered directly around clarifying her concept of spirit and its ramifications, and there has never been an attempt to trace its development over the whole of Stein's corpus.

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[4] See, for example, *On the Problem of Empathy* (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989), 11 (*Zum Problem der Einfühlung* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 11). Although the mention of God is extremely fleeting in *Empathy*, even in 1917 (prior to her conversion several years later) Stein writes the following to Roman Ingarden:

> [I]t is impossible to complete a theory of the person without addressing questions of God, and it is impossible to understand what history is. Of course I don't understand all of this yet at all. But as soon as [the editing of Husserl's *Ideen*] is finished, I would like to approach these issues. They are the questions that really interest me.
>
> [*e*]*s ist unmöglich, eine Lehre von der Person abzuschließen, ohne auf Gottesfragen einzugehen, und es ist unmöglich zu verstehen, was Geschichte ist. Klar sehe ich natürlich da noch gar nicht. Aber sobald die Ideen fertig sind, möchte ich an diese Sachen herangehen. Es sind die Fragen, die mich interessieren* (*Briefe an Roman Ingarden*, Brief 9, November 20th, 1917; translation mine).

This present inquiry aims to begin the work of filling this lacuna (to come even close to fully mining Stein's work on this topic would require volumes; though it is my hope that Stein scholarship continues to develop in this direction). I examine and seek to elucidate the notion of spirit (*Geist*) in Stein's work, particularly the role it plays in her philosophical anthropology and her understanding of intersubjectivity and community. I argue that the key to understanding Stein's notion of spirit is to understand spirit as expressive, and in so doing to recognize expression (or "going out from oneself") as a fundamental characteristic of the human person. Although she draws from and synthesizes the ideas of a number of thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein's approach is distinctive and, I argue, uniquely suited to comprehensively addressing these questions. The view of the person that her work offers is one in which the physical and the non-physical are interwoven and integrated, offering solutions both to approaches that reduce the human being to the physical body, and to approaches that present the body and physical experience as unimportant. Stein's analysis gives us an understanding of the person as an embodied being that lives in the world and shares it with other embodied beings, but in this very living and sharing, moves beyond the material bounds of embodiment and constitutes the world as a world of meaning and value; a being whose individual and unique identity is made manifest through this living and sharing.

Thus, this exploration of spirit seeks to shed light on the resolutions Stein's philosophy offers to the issue of the relationship between body and mind, and of the human person's place in connection to both the world of physical causality and the world of willing, valuing, meaning, and reasoning (in other words, the world of spirit).

Understanding spirit as fundamentally expressive helps us to make sense of what it means to be an individual human being and what it means to be a part of the human community. Stein draws a picture of the human person as, at the same time, a subsisting subject that is something unto itself, and in relation to others. She does this by characterizing persons as essentially spiritual, and thus essentially expressive. A person is not simply relational (I am my self independent of your self), yet what it means to be a person is to uncover ever more layers of one's self; by looking inward to then turn out toward the world and others, and in expressing one's self outwardly, to more fully actualize one's potential and become more at home in one's self.

Thus, in relating to others our own distinct, individual selves become more fleshed-out and apparent, and we unfold into actualizations of our personhood. In this way, I argue, the notion of expression is not only crucial to making sense of Stein's own account of spirit (and thereby her account of personhood, intersubjectivity, and community), but furthermore, provides a way of understanding the person as inextricably bound up in community without compromising the individual. In going out toward others in spiritual expression, one not only forms community with the other; one also becomes more oneself.

I begin in Chapter One with Stein's philosophy of empathy, and the way in which empathy reveals the person as a psycho-physical-spiritual unity. In other words, I know the other to be a person because their being expresses itself to me. Stein asserts that empathy should by no means be confused with the inference of the foreign subject based upon the perception of the other's physical body; rather, the foreign subject is directly given to me in empathy, and I perceive the person rather than physical signs that indicate the person. When I come face to face with the other I perceive his or her body as a lived body (*Leib*)

rather than simply a physical body, and thus as the body of a conscious "I" that is just as much a subject as I am, that is "an 'I' that senses, thinks, feels, and wills."[5] I argue that for this reason, it is necessary to begin an analysis of spirit with empathy (as Stein herself did), because it is through empathy that spirit is made known to us, and we are capable of empathy because we are spiritual.

Chapter Two examines Stein's understanding of the nature of the human person. I trace her examination of the pure ego as the foundation of experience, and the way in which reflection on the ego leads beyond it to the personal "I" with individual characteristics, that responds to experience in a way that reveals an inner life that is nevertheless bound to and affected by the physical, external world. Through this exploration of the "I," the soul emerges as the individual bearer of experience. In deepening her understanding of the soul, Stein develops her singular notion of *Entfaltung* or "unfolding." She claims that the character of the individual person is grounded in a *Persönlichkeitskern* or "personal core" out of which unfolds the actualization of individual potentialities.

Thus, the identity of the individual person is not created by action, but rather is uncovered, revealed, and comes to fruition through action. In unfolding, the individual expresses his or her personhood through spiritual acts, insofar as the individual encounters the world as meaningful and creatively and freely responds to this meaning. In this way, the spiritual self goes out toward the world, and the spiritual life is what Stein calls a "superabundant, diffusive life" of self-expression and self-transcendence toward life outside of the self. Furthermore, in unfolding out toward the world and toward other

[5] Stein, *Empathy*, 5/3.

individuals, we also are opened up to receive this self-expression from others (their "going out of themselves").

After this explication of Stein's claims about the nature of the human person, Chapter Three more deeply explores the spiritual aspect of the body-soul-spirit unity that is the human person. Stein argues that we experience the world not just as a world of natural causal connections, but as a world of values and volition. In order to lay the groundwork for this claim, I explore her efforts to differentiate between causality as the "lawfulness"[6] governing the physical events of the material world, and motivation governing the intentional acts of the spiritual world. The spiritual subject is, Stein says, "an 'I' in whose acts an object world is constituted and which itself creates objects by reason of its will."[7] In other words, spiritual beings encounter the world as meaningful and valuable, and creatively and freely respond to this value.

In this way, spirit transcends the self in going out toward the world. In living and being with one another, we show who we are by what and how we value, and how we choose to act in response to these values. We recognize the individual personhood of the other by recognizing that they are valuing, willing, free subjects as we are. Furthermore, in these spiritual acts, we not only recognize the other or express to the other our own individuality, we also allow our own individual nature to unfold to ourselves. In spiritual acts, "humans become themselves", yet this becoming is not a movement away from the self, but a revealing of the self and a bringing of it to light. In their creativity and their

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[6] *PPH,* 1, translation modified; (*Beiträge*, 3).

[7] *Empathy*, 96 (*Einfühlung*, 107).

freedom, spiritual acts are movement out to the world and a transcending of the boundaries of the self, but not a severing from the self or the creation of a new self. Thus, in moving from potency to actuality the self does not simply develop into something that it was not; rather, it unfolds out of itself toward what is outside of it.

Chapter Four builds upon what was learned in the previous three chapters in order to draw attention to some of Stein's significant philosophical influences in developing her understanding of spirit. In working through her thought on the spiritual nature of the human person, Stein engages with a number of philosophers, both contemporaries and figures in the history of philosophy. Several key thinkers serve as compelling interlocutors to Stein—in this chapter, specifically Wilhelm Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius—and exploring their work illuminates Stein's own view in the way that she engaged with them, took up aspects of their thought, and approached it with her own original nuance.

Dilthey provides Stein with important insight into the *Geisteswissenschaften* as the shared products of human beings' spiritual activity, and their distinction from the natural sciences. Husserl (whose relationship to Stein need hardly be introduced) introduced her to phenomenology, fostered her ideas on empathy, and inspired her in his efforts to overcome reductive naturalist approaches to the world and to the person. Conrad-Martius accompanies Stein in her turn toward her explorations of being (though I argue that Stein never fully abandons phenomenology for the sake of metaphysics), and her ontology provides a nuanced account of the nature of the person and the person's relationship to God that allows Stein to strengthen and deepen her own through engaging with it.

In Chapter Five I explore the ways in which Stein's thought on spirit blossoms into a rich understanding of what it means for a community of spiritual beings to "go out toward" each other through expression. As Stein asserts in *FEB*, "As spiritual soul [the soul] rises above itself, gaining insight into a world that lies beyond its own self—a world of things, persons, and events—communicating with this world and receiving its influences."[8] Furthermore, it is of the nature of spirit not simply to receive the world as intelligible, but to reflect this intelligibility back to those with whom we share the world.

In this way, we as spiritual beings are fundamentally communicative, and in communicating with one another, we create community built upon shared meaning, values, customs and characteristics. Furthermore, what we as human beings express, communicate, and share is not simply what it is that we value, will, understand, and feel. In doing so, we also express ourselves as valuing, willing, understanding, and feeling individuals. In this way, I argue, Stein shows us that to be spiritual is to share the world with another by expressing one's own selfhood and receiving others' expression of their selfhood. Furthermore, in expressing our selfhood in this way, and in the unfolding and making actual of our individual personhood, Stein claims that we unfold out not only to other human beings, but ultimately to God as pure spirit, the source of our being who draws us to unity with him. An ever-recurring theme in this dissertation is the notion that, it is in going out of ourselves that we come to more deeply know ourselves and become "at home" in our irreducible individuality. As Stein's philosophy of spirit culminates in *FEB*, it becomes clear that she sees this pull of the divine, which draws us back to itself but does

[8] *FEB* 373 (EES, 317).

not threaten to absorb or subsume us into a selfhood-destroying absolute. Rather, according to Stein, in growing closer to the source of our being, we unfold into the fulfillment of what and who we are meant to be.

Chapter I. Empathy as the Grasping of Psycho-Physical-Spiritual Unity

A. Why start with empathy?

As I have claimed in the introductory chapter, it is clear that the notion of spirit [G*eist*] is crucial to Stein's anthropology, but it is not at all clear what this notion entails and what its parameters are. In order to shed light on the question of spirit, I will start with her notion of empathy [*Einfühlung*]. This, of course, prompts the question of why it is necessary to start with empathy in order to understand spirit. It could be argued that empathy is a logical starting point for a study of Stein's work simply because this is where Stein herself begins---starting here allows us to trace the development of her thought as her attempt to describe a relatively narrow concept (empathy) widens into larger questions about the nature of the human person. While this historically-oriented approach is certainly not without value, it is not in itself enough to justify this starting point.

More importantly, Stein herself argues that it is through empathy that spirit reveals itself in other subjects and in ourselves. She starts her philosophical inquiry with empathy because it is how we ourselves recognize persons as spiritual, and we can only do so because we ourselves are also spiritual. Thus, it is not the case that her move from empathy to spirit simply indicates the chronological development of her thought. Rather, Stein's work in describing the phenomenon of empathy lays the groundwork for her philosophical anthropology. She finds empathy to be the most reasonable theoretical starting point because it is also the point at which, in actual experience, we begin to understand what it means to be a person, and what it means that we are persons.

While the stated purpose of *On the Problem of Empathy* (*Problem der Einfühlung*, 1917) is to conduct a "basic investigation" of "the question of empathy as the perceiving [*Erfahrung*] of foreign subjects and their experience [*Erleben*],"[9] the question of what empathy is (the perceiving of foreign subjects) must include the question of the constitution of the individual "I" that is doing the perceiving.[10] As a phenomenologist, Stein's initial point of consideration is to begin with what is given. It is indubitable, she says, that I am an experiencing subject, and what is also indubitable is "the phenomenon of foreign psychic life" (though she is careful to clarify that *knowledge* of the experience of other individuals is doubtable).[11] The recognition of another individual as "itself the center of orientation of… a phenomenal world" leads us to recognition of the foreign subject as more than just a physical body, but an individual that is also sentient and spiritual and a separate I-center that is not directly accessible to me.

Thus, Stein's phenomenological investigation of the individual reveals the psycho-physical-spiritual nature of the human person, and also reveals that empathic perception (or rather, the perception-like act that is called empathy)[12] of the other is actually the

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[9] *Empathy*, 1 (*Einfühlung*, 1).

[10] *Empathy*, 38ff. (*Einfühlung*, 41ff.).

[11] *Empathy*, 5 (*Einfühlung*, 3).

[12] While what Stein describes as empathy could be described as a kind of perception (one that is in some ways analogous to but distinct from outer or sensory perception), the use of 'perception' in this context is imprecise. Dan Zahavi explains that while empathy is like perception, it differs from perception insofar as its key characteristic is the non-primordiality of its content:

> [For both Husserl and Stein] empathy is both like and unlike perception. Empathy is unlike perception in that it does not give us its object, the empathized experience, originally. There will always, and by necessity,

"condition of the possibility of constituting our own individual."[13] Grasping others' nature as psychological, physical, and spiritual goes hand in hand with our own self-understanding, and our understanding of human nature as such. It is only after laying this groundwork that we can narrow in on the notion of spirit itself. This chapter, then, will consist of a close analysis of *On the Problem of Empathy*, in order to take a thorough look at Stein's theory of empathy and what this theory tells us about the human person as a psycho-physical-spiritual unity, and thereby to set the stage for a deeper look at spirit in following chapters.

B. The Psycho-Physical-Spiritual Individual

> remain a difference in givenness between that which I am aware of when I empathize with the other, and that which the other is experiencing. Indeed, what distinguishes empathy is precisely that the empathized experience is given as belonging to the other. However, although empathy differs from perception by not giving us the object originally, it does resemble perception insofar as its object, say, the empathized pain or distress, is given directly, unmediated and non-inferentially as present here and now (Stein 2010, 5). To exemplify, consider a situation where a friend tells me that he has lost his mother, and I become aware of his distress. What kind of awareness is this? I do not see the distress the same way I see the colour of his shirt, rather I see the distress ''in'' his pained countenance (Stein 2010, 5). On her account, this more complex act that allows for a co-apprehension of that which is expressed in the expression still deserves to be called a form of perception. Why? Because although I certainly do lack a first person experience of the distress—it is not given as my distress—it is nevertheless the case that I experience rather than imagine or infer my friend's distress. (Dan Zahavi, "Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality," *Topoi* Vol. 33 (2014): 134).

The distinction between experiencing, imagining, and inferring is explored in more detail in section C. 1.

[13] *Empathy*, 63 (*Einfühlung*, 71).

Stein's inquiry into empathy is multi-layered, and these layers are interwoven so tightly that it requires some work to extricate them so that they may be examined one by one. One layer is her argument for what the act of empathy itself is---namely, the givenness of the foreign individual as an experiencing subject (rather than simply as an object in nature), and the grasping of the experiences of the foreign subject. Another layer is her analysis of the constitution of the individual and its experiences, and her subsequent move to the foreign individual. While explaining that the foreign individual is perceived by me as a subject with experiences just as I am, she then concludes (as seen above) that the foreign individual is the condition for the possibility of my own constitution of myself, and further, this intersubjectivity is the condition for the constitution of the objective world.

Here the difficulty of unraveling the topic of empathy (and the ambitiousness of Stein's project) becomes evident. Stein chooses to start with a definition and description of the act of empathy, but this very definition and this description rest necessarily on her claim that what is primarily and indubitably known is one's own subjectivity and phenomenal experience. Only once subjectivity is asserted is it possible to explain empathy as the recognition of the subjectivity of the foreign individual, but this very subjectivity of this other (which I perceive through empathy) is that which allows me to constitute my own subjectivity, as well as the objective world. Stein's choice is reasonable, since she is in part responding to and correcting what she argues are deficient theories of empathy.[14] By first descriptively establishing what empathy looks like, she is able to effectively differentiate her theory from these others, and then once it is clear what kind of act is being discussed,

[14] Lipps, Prandtl, Mill, Scheler, et al., though she argues that Scheler's theory is far more comprehensive than the others that she critiques.

she can then go on to explain more fully the way in which empathy and intersubjective constitution are inextricably bound. Before examining these rejected theories, however, a few words must be said about Stein's understanding of the person[15] and how the person is intersubjectively constituted. Having established the possibility of perceiving the other as a subject, I will then turn to Stein's claims about what this perceiving is like.

The foundations of Stein's thought are familiar to those who have encountered Husserlian phenomenology. She asserts that, in bracketing the question of existence through the phenomenological reduction, what remains is "my experience of [a] thing (the perception, memory, or other kind of comprehension) together with its correlate, the full 'phenomenon of the thing' (the object given as the same in series of diverse perceptions or memories)." Even when all scientific and empirical conclusions about the nature of the world are set aside, "this phenomenon retains its entire character and can be made into an object of consideration… Thus there remains the whole 'phenomenon of the world' when its positing has been suspended."[16] Furthermore, if these phenomena remain, the result of this reduction is the indubitability of the subject experiencing these phenomena.

In keeping with her Husserlian background, Stein differentiates here between the pure "I" as the subject of phenomena (an "otherwise indescribable, qualityless subject"[17]), and the "empirical 'I' of this name and station, given such and such attributes." This individual "I"---that is, what Stein refers to as "a characteristically structured psycho-

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[15] A more comprehensive analysis of Stein's philosophical anthropology follows in Chapter II.

[16] *Empathy*, 4 (*Einfühlung*, 2).

[17] *Empathy*, 38 (*Einfühlung*, 41).

physical unit,"[18] which can be thought of as my own experience of my particularly differentiated self---is not primary. As she explains, "My whole past could be dreamed or be a deceptive recollection. Therefore, it is subject to the exclusion, only remaining an object of consideration as a phenomenon"[19] The "I", however, that is the center of experience, to which phenomena appear, cannot be denied, and is the foundation of a sense of the self. Patrick Byrne points out that "Stein is not saying that there is some primordial moment in time when the pure "I" exists in consciousness all alone. Rather, she is giving an analysis of an already richly layered phenomenon, and identifying the pure "I" as the most elemental strata in that complex composition."[20] Nevertheless, in an analysis of the constitution of the self, the pure ego can be conceived of on its own (and in fact, is all that can be truly conceived of on its own after bracketing all other phenomena).

From this "pure I" we can begin to move toward acknowledgment of the "individual I" by recognizing that it is not simply the subject of any single experience, but rather the "unity of a stream of consciousness."[21] One experience is united to the next by their connection to this "I," which can then no longer be called qualityless since it is qualified by the particular experiences that make up this stream of consciousness. Furthermore, this stream can be said not only to have particular qualities, but also that these qualities are particular to this "I" as a particular self, with a particular standpoint toward the "stream of

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[18] *Empathy*, 39 (*Einfühlung*, 43).

[19] *Empathy*, 4-5 (*Einfühlung*, 2).

[20] Patrick Byrne, "Empathy, Insight and Objectivity: Edith Stein and Bernard Lonergan," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2020): 57.

[21] *Empathy*, 38 (*Einfühlung*, 41-2).

experiences" of which it is conscious. This standpoint belongs only to this "I," and any other standpoint must be said to be an "other 'I.'"[22] Thus, the "I" appears to not only have qualities, but also to be distinguished from other "I's." This contrast between "I" and "other" indicates selfness---a distinction between experience which is *mine*, and experience which is *other*. Stein asserts that it is these two ways of thinking about individuality (selfness and qualitative distinctness) that together give a picture of the "individual 'I.'" As she explains,

> Qualitative peculiarity without selfness would be insufficient for individualization because we can also arrive at qualitative variation of the stream of consciousness by thinking of the one given stream as qualitatively modified in the course of experience. This does not mean that its affiliation with the same "I" ceases; the stream only becomes another by belonging to another "I."[23]

Thus, our experience of ourselves as "selves" is an experience not only of unity of consciousness, but also of contrast. My continuous experience has particular qualities, and it is mine and no other's. Stein explains that the bearer of this unified, persistent stream of experience is "the substantial soul" or the psyche.[24] This bearer of experience is given with particular, individual psychic attributes, such as the way in which particular feelings manifest themselves, their intensity, the energy or lack thereof which an individual brings to certain experiences and actions, the manner in which our senses take in external stimuli, etc.

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[22] *Empathy*, 39 (*Einfühlung*, 42).

[23] *Empathy*, 39 (*Einfühlung*, 42).

[24] *Empathy*, 40 (*Einfühlung*, 43). The soul is described in greater detail in Chapter II.

Furthermore, she states that just as the pure ego can never really be apart from the individual ego, in the same way while we may conceptualize the soul in isolation in order to better understand it, in reality "the soul is always necessarily a soul in a body."[25] My experience as a unified individual is always experienced as embodied, and unlike other physical objects, my experience of my body is not simply as "given… in acts of outer perception," though it is also given in this way---that is, I can perceive the physical matter of my body with my senses; I can look at my hands, touch my skin, etc.. Rather, I always experience my body as from within it, as something that I cannot achieve distance from in order to regard at arm's length and view it in full. As Stein puts it,

> [E]very other object is given to me in an infinitely variable multiplicity of appearances and of changing positions, and there are also times when it is not given to me. But this one object (my physical body) is given to me in successive appearances only variable within very narrow limits. As long as I have my eyes open at all, it is continually there with a steadfast obtrusiveness always having the same tangible nearness as no other object has. It is always "here" while other objects are always "there."[26]

In this way, not only is my outer perception of my body limited in a way that my perception of other objects is not; these very limitations lead me to realize that this experience of my body does not just differ from my perception of other objects, but rather cannot be characterized as simply outer perception at all. Elisa Magrì points out that the way in which we sense our bodies orients us as being spatially located in the physical world:

> [T]he lived body participates in the horizon of my perceptual field, providing orientation in space. If I pay attention, I can discern a variety of

[25] *Empathy*, 41 (*Einfühlung*, 44).

[26] *Empathy*, 41-2 (*Einfühlung*, 45).

> bodily features that limit my visual field: for instance, the curve of my nose, the movements of my body, my posture etc. In this sense, perceiving outer objects does not coincide with perceiving oneself as having a certain position in space.[27]

This becomes apparent to me when I recognize that I could never feel myself to be apart from my body even if I could not perceive my body through the physical senses. Stein continues on to explain that

> [E]ven if we shut our eyes tightly and stretch out our arms, in fact allowing no limb to contact another so that we can neither touch nor see our physical body, even then we are not rid of it. Even then it stands there inescapably in full embodiment (hence the name), and we find ourselves bound to it perpetually. Precisely this affiliation, this belonging to me, could never be constituted in outer perception. A living body [*Leib*[only perceived outwardly would always be only a particularly disposed, actually unique, physical body, but never "my living body."[28]

Here we see on display Stein's distinction between body as *Körper*, the body as corporeal, material stuff, and *Leib*, the living body or lived body: the body of a living, conscious subject that senses, feels, thinks, values, wills, and lives out this subjectivity while physically embodied, expressing her subjectivity through her body. Through sensation, my body is given to me as "mine" when I experience it as the central point of these sensations. Stein points out that sensation is not centered in the ego---sensation is "perhaps very near to it but never in it." Furthermore, I recognize that "this 'somewhere' [where sensation is localized] is not an empty point in space, but sometimes filling up space." I experience

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[27] Elisa Magrì, "Affectivity and Self-Displacement in Stein's Early Phenomenology on the Role of Self-Experience in Empathy," *Phenomenology and Mind* No. 11 (2016): 69.

[28] *Empathy*, 41-2 (*Einfühlung*, 45).

sensation as coming from parts of my body, such as when I touch something with my hands, or see it with my eyes.

Nevertheless, I do not experience these parts as separate from myself, though they are physically locatable. Rather, "All these entities from which my sensations arise are amalgamated into a unity, the unity of my living body, and they are themselves places in the living body."[29] While the parts of my body feel at a certain distance from the ego, I nevertheless experience them as inseparable from myself, and thus experience them differently than any other material object with which I come into contact, since those I experience exclusively as objects of my perception and my sensation, and at a distance not only from my ego but also from my body, even in cases in which they are physically close to my body (such as when I hold a cup in my hand---there is no mistaking the difference between the cup and my hand, and the "distance" from my ego to my hand is qualitatively very different from the distance between my ego and the cup, and also different from the distance between my hand and the cup).

More will be said about the body and its relationship to the psyche in later chapters.[30] What is of significance for this chapter's purposes is that we realize, as Stein notes, that "the senses have already constituted the unity of 'I' and living body for us… Also the causal relationship between the psychic and the physical already confronts us in the province of the senses."[31] When we come into contact with physical objects or physical

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[29] *Empathy*, 42 (*Einfühlung*, 46).

[30] Particularly Chapters II, in which the nature of the person as psycho-physical-spiritual unity is treated more fully, and in Chapter IV, which deals with physical and psychic causality and spiritual motivation.

[31] *Empathy*, 48 (*Einfühlung*, 53).

events affect our bodies, our "sensual feelings" in response are not purely physical phenomena. Rather, feelings "issue from my 'I,'" and my experience of a feeling is not simply the experience of something happening to physical matter, but rather something happening to me. Likewise, general feelings such as vigor and sluggishness, as well as moods such as cheerfulness and melancholy, influence my body.[32] In this way, the psychic and the physical are intertwined.

Thus, Stein posits that the individual is a unity of the psychic and the physical. She goes on to observe, however, that just as it proved impossible to discuss the body and the psyche separately, we find that we cannot discuss their unity without already recognizing that the person is spiritual:

> In the constitution of the psycho-physical individual something already gleamed through in a number of places that goes beyond these frames. Consciousness appeared not only as a causally conditioned occurrence, but also as object-constituting at the same time. Thus it stepped out of the order of nature and faced it. Consciousness as a correlate of the object world is not nature, but spirit.[33]

My experience of the world is not simply the experience of physical objects; in all experience, "as physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts, so a new object realm is constituted in feeling." I experience a "world of values" which are the objective correlates to spiritual acts.[34] In recognizing value, I feel in response to them. These feelings motivate

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[32] *Empathy*, 49 (*Einfühlung*, 53-4).

[33] *Empathy*, 49 (*Einfühlung*, 54).

[34] *Empathy*, 49 (*Einfühlung*, 54).

me to act in accord with these values. Furthermore, I am conscious of myself as feeling, valuing, and willing, thereby recognizing myself as not just a thing in nature but a subject. As Byrne puts it, " I become aware of myself as feeling the value of something other than myself, but also become aware of the value of myself, one who is capable of constituting such value awareness. Such awareness is awareness of oneself as person (i.e., as personal 'I')."[35] In this way, we recognize ourselves as psycho-physical-spiritual unities.

This recognition, however, and our recognition of the entire world of values as well as the world of nature, do not occur in a vacuum. Not only does this recognition of myself enable me to recognize other subjects as themselves subjects (i.e. to perceive them empathically), but also this recognition of other subjects reflects back to my own self-recognition, such that through this empathy for other persons I likewise better understand what it means that I myself am a person. And in our real world experience, we do not start with an analysis of our own constitution and then apply this to others. Rather, in our experience of the world, we encounter other human persons and perceive them through empathy; this is the actual starting point of our coming to understand what it means to be a person.

C. Empathy as the Grasping of the Foreign Subject

1. Primordial and non-primordial experiences

Equipped with this description, we now move beyond the individual subject to the foreign subject. Stein and others who have dealt with the problem of empathy observe that

[35] Byrne (2020), 61.

the experience of the foreign subject (and thus, recognition of their subjectivity) is far more perplexing than we take it to be in everyday life. As subjects, we are given to ourselves as the center of our own experience, and everything outside of us is given to us as phenomena. How, then, are we able to recognize that certain objects of our experience (i.e. other human beings) are not only objects but subjects, who are their own centers of experience? What is the nature of this experience of foreign individuals? What is the best way to describe what is happening when we recognize an other as another subject like ourselves?

As we have seen, Stein claims that my fundamental experience is as the subject to which phenomena appear. Built upon this fundamental experience are experiences that originate in my own subjectivity, or in other words, experiences that are primordial to me. As Stein explains, "All our own present experiences are primordial. What could be more primordial than experience itself?"[36] It is possible, however, for one's own experiences to be given non-primordially---for example, the experience of remembering an experience of strong emotion is primordial in the sense that the act of remembering is a present experience. The recalled emotion, however, and the event or circumstance that evoked it, are no longer present but are only experienced as memories of a past that once was present. Thus, while the act of memory is primordial, the experienced content of the memory is non-primordial.

In other words, "the present non-primordiality points back to the past primordiality."[37] In remembering a past joy, I can reflect upon it as an object, or I can enter

[36] *Empathy*, 7 (*Einfühlung*, 6).

[37] *Empathy*, 8 (*Einfühlung*, 7).

into the memory, as it were, "allowing the past experiential sequence to reawaken, living in the remembered experience instead of turning to it as an object." In doing so, it may be the case that I feel joy similar to what I felt at the remembered time, even though the joyous circumstance is no longer reality. While this current joy may be primordial, however, the content of the past experience cannot be primordial, but only represented (even if this representation then evokes present emotion). As Stein says, "the memory always remains a representation with a non-primordial subject which is in contrast with the subject doing the remembering."[38] This non-primordial subject is the "I" that was present at the time of the experience, and thus is distinct from myself as a present subject. I can remember myself experiencing something, but the subject of that experience is not the same as the subject of the experience of an act of remembering that past experience.

This circumstance is helpful in understanding what an experience of empathy is like, since it is also "primordial as present experience though non-primordial in content."[39] Just as in memory, when I encounter a foreign individual I am presented with experiential content that is not my own. For example, when I am aware that a friend is sad, this awareness is not the same content as their sadness, even if I myself become sad in response. Rather, my experience is of recognizing my friend's experience. In perceiving that experience I am able to recognize that they are the subject of an experience that is primordial to them, but not to me. As Fredrik Svenaeus explains, "Stein's point is that the empathy experience is non-original in a way that is similar to the act of remembrance, but

[38] *Empathy*, 9 (*Einfühlung*, 8).

[39] *Empathy*, 10 (*Einfühlung*, 9).

with the important difference that the content of the experience has never been bodily present to me but is present as such only to the other person that I am empathizing with."[40] In short, I am perceiving my friend not just as the object of my experience, but as an individual that experiences as I do, that is their own "center point" of orientation toward phenomena.

This is the crucial difference between empathy and the example of memory; in memory, while the remembered subject (myself in the past) is not the same as the subject of the current experience of memory (myself presently), the individual who is the subject is the same in both instances. In empathy, however, I am doing something unique and significant: without, as Stein says, "the continuity of experience" connecting me to this other subject, I am able to perceive this subject as presently experiencing phenomenal content that is not presenting itself directly to me.

Stein breaks this perception down into "three levels or modalities of accomplishment"[41] that characterize an empathic experience (as well as experiences of memory, expectation, and fantasy). The first of these modalities is "(1) the emergence of the experience," which is self-explanatory (an experience is given to us, similarly to experiences that are given in sensory perception). In the case of empathy, this experience is given non-primordially; that is, I recognize that the other with whom I am empathizing is experiencing something. I see joy on the face of the other and "When it arises before me

[40] Fredrik Svenaeus, "Edith Stein's Phenomenology of Sensual and Emotional Empathy," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* Vol. 17 (2017): 744.

[41] *Empathy*, 10 (*Einfühlung*, 10). She notes here that "in a concrete case people do not always go through all levels but are often satisfied with one of the lower ones."

all at once, it faces me as an object" (that is, the joy itself is the object which I am intending).[42] Following the emergence of the experience is "(2) the fulfilling explication" in which I understand what I perceive to be joy, perhaps occasioned by a particular event. In seeking to understand the content of the other's experience, I am drawn into the experience such that what I am now intending is not the joy itself as an object of my perception, but rather that toward which the joyful other is oriented in their joy. As Stein explains, "when I inquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself), the content, having pulled me into it, is no longer really an object. I am now no longer turned to the content but to the object of it, am at the subject of the content in the original subject's place."[43] Now I am attending to that which occasioned the joy, and the way in which it is joyful, as if I were the one experiencing the joy. It is important to note, however, that I myself may not necessarily feel joy even though I have been "pulled into it." This second stage "exhibits the non-primordial parallel to the having of the experience," yet it is itself still non-primordial. I have not transitioned into experiencing and explicating my own joy, but rather have turned my attention from the joy that is given before me to the object of that joy. This stage is followed by "(3) the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience," in which I attend again to the joy as an object.

[42] *Empathy*, 10 (*Einfühlung*, 10).

[43] *Empathy*, 10 (*Einfühlung*, 10).

In all of these levels, Stein observes, the other is the true subject of the experience that is being empathized, whereas my experience is an experience of the other having this experience. She says,

> [T]his is what is fundamentally new in contrast with the memory, expectation or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two subjects are separate and not joined together, as previously, by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience. And while I am living in the other's joy, I do not feel primordial joy. It does not issue live from my "I"... This other subject is primordial although I do not experience it as primordial. In my non-primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in my non-primordial experience.[44]

Thus, this "drawing into" or "being led" by the other's experience does not meant that I myself become identified with the other with whom I am empathizing, nor that my understanding of her experience (or my recognition of her personhood) derives from a comparison to a similar experience on my own part. Rather, I am experiencing the other experiencing; my intentionality is not trained upon my own experience, and in an empathic experience I do not turn toward self-reflection but am pulled out of myself to the other's experience.

2. *Empathy as direct grasping*

This centering of the other as subject is the crux of Stein's disagreement with certain previous theories of empathy that she considers and rejects in her text. She notes that Theodor Lipps, for example, proposes "a complete coincidence with the

[44] *Empathy*, 10-11 (*Einfühlung*, 10).

remembered, expected, or empathized 'I,' that they become one."[45] It is worth noting that Stein prefaces her critique with the admission that "Lipps' description of the experience of empathy agrees with ours in many respects" (*Empathy* 12). Zahavi describes Lipps' theory as found in his article (with which Stein was certainly familiar) "Das Wissen von fremden Ichen" (1907) in the following way:

> Lipps argues that our knowledge of others is a modality of knowledge *sui generis*, something as irreducible and original as our perceptual experience of objects or our memory of our past experiences. It is a novum that in no way can be explained by or reduced to some kind of analogical inference… In fact, Lipps launches a comprehensive---and quite successful---attack against the argument from analogy. He emphasizes the role of expression and argues that gestures and expressions manifest our emotional states, and that the relation between the expression and what is expressed is special and unique, and quite different, from, say, the way smoke represents fire.[46]

Thus far, this description bears significant similarity to that which Stein proposes in *Empathy*, and in which she acknowledges her debt to Lipps' influence on her thought. Nevertheless, she emphatically rejects the notion that the experiences of the I and the other coincide.

For Lipps, my encounter with the other gives rise to a primordial experience in myself, which Stein asserts is thereby not an experience of empathy at all, but rather a turning of attention from the other's experience to my own. She refers to Lipps' position as the "theory of imitation [*Nachahmung*]],"[47] in which the expression of the other induces

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[45] *Empathy*, 13 (*Einfühlung*, 12).

[46] Zahavi, "Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz," *Inquiry* Vol. 53, No. 3 (2010): 288.

[47] *Empathy*, 22 (*Einfühlung*, 23-4).

in me that which is expressed, and I am thereby "at one" with the other and her experiences" and thus understand the other's experience.[48] If this is what I am doing, Stein argues, I am not empathizing with the other but rather putting myself in their place as subject of the experience. She additionally claims that this is simply not the way in which the other is given to me in the first place:

> This assertion is not only refuted by its consequences, but is also an evidently false description. I am not one with the acrobat but only "at" him. I do not actually go through his motions but *quasi*. Lipps also stresses, to be sure, that I do not outwardly go through his motions. But neither is what "inwardly" corresponds to the movements of the body, the experience that "I move," primordial; it is non-primordial for me. And in these non-primordial movements I feel led, accompanied, by his movements. Their primordiality is declared in my non-primordial movements which are only there for me in him (again understood as experienced, since the pure bodily movement is also perceived outwardly).[49]

Thus, Lipps' theory fails insofar as it confuses my primordial experiences and emotions with the experiences of the other that I perceive non-primordially. Certainly if I were to take the acrobat's place and actually perform the acrobat's routine, I would recognize a difference between *my* experience of moving my body and the acrobat's experience which I had previously witnessed that absorbed me and carried me along with it. When watching the acrobat, even if I feel transported into an experience of flying through the air, it is still an experience of being led by the acrobat's experience, and I do not actually feel as if I am flying through the air in my own body. Stein acknowledges that there are certainly cases

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[48] Stein references Lipps' example of an acrobat in whose performance I become so absorbed that I "feel" his movements and furthermore feel a oneness with him, as if I myself were performing flips and tumbling through the air.

[49] *Empathy*, 16-17 (*Einfühlung*, 17).

in which we "imitate" the other, and in such imitation our own primordial experiences are produced. This experience would, however, be an experience of "transference of feeling" rather than empathy.[50] Someone else's cheerful smile might be so contagious as I walk past them on the street that I myself feel more cheerful and continue on with a brighter attitude than before, but it is possible that this experience of mine does not result in the intending of the other's experience as particularly theirs. As Stein explains,

> We are familiar with the fact that feelings are aroused in us by witnessed "phenomena of expression." A child seeing another crying cries, too. When I see a member of my family going around with a long face, I too become upset. When I want to stop worrying, I seek out happy company. We speak of the contagion or transference of feeling in such cases. It is very plain that the actual feelings aroused in us do not serve a cognitive function, that they do not announce a foreign experience to us as empathy does… It is certain that we are saturated by such "transferred" feelings, we live in them and thus in ourselves. This prevents our turning toward or submerging ourselves in the foreign experience, which is the attitude characteristic of empathy.[51]

Thus, such experiences of sympathy are unsuccessful in revealing to us the other as subject, as the centerpoint of their own experience. While empathy may be accompanied by sympathy (certainly I can empathize with someone's experience, and at the same time their experience can evoke in me my own sympathetic emotion), but a sympathetic experience on its own is not enough to bring us out of ourselves toward the other, nor is it even necessary for sympathy to be present in an experience of empathy. As Svenaeus points out, "Empathy is neither a matter of sharing the experiences (feelings) of the empathee in the

[50] *Empathy*, 23 (*Einfühlung*, 24-5).

[51] *Empathy*, 23 (*Einfühlung*, 24-5).

strict sense, nor is it necessarily a compassionate feeling for her."[52] It is possible for me to directly grasp (i.e. empathize) the other's feelings without feeling those feelings myself, or "putting myself in the other's shoes," and I can understand this feeling even if it is one that I myself would never have---perhaps the other is elated over some event that I find to be unimportant and unmoving. Nevertheless, in empathy this feeling of elation is given to me in my encounter with the other, and I can recognize and understand the experience that she is undergoing even while I myself do not undergo it.

Thus, empathy is not imitative. Nor is it an experience of association, as described by Prandtl and Siebeck, for example. According to Stein, advocates of association theories claim that when I encounter a physical gesture (or other physical expression of a response to an experience), I am able to recognize their similarity to my own gestures in response to similar experiences, and in projecting my former experience onto the other's current experience, I am thereby able to understand what the other is experiencing. Stein gives the example of witnessing someone stamp their feet in fury, and reflecting that "I remember how I myself once stamped my feet at the same time as my previous fury is presented to me. Then I say to myself, 'this is how furious he is now.'"[53] Such an experience, Stein claims, does not have the character of empathy because it is not a direct grasping of a subject.

Once again, what is given to me is my own experience, and while I can perhaps gain insight into that which the other might be trying to express by comparing her

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[52] Svenaeus (2017), 745.

[53] *Empathy*, 24 (*Einfühlung*, 26).

expression to my own experience, this not the same as intuitively grasping her expression itself (and thereby grasping her as the subject that is expressing). Stein points out that "on these grounds we could conclude that this is another's experience. But in empathy we draw no conclusions because the experience is given as foreign in the character of perception."[54] In an associative experience, on the other hand, it is not the other's experience that is given as foreign, but my own. In superimposing my own experience onto the other in order to understand what it is that the other is expressing, I am making my own experience into a foreign object. Again, Stein notes that this is not in itself an impossible act. It may be the case that in a particular instance an at-first cryptic expression of the other becomes clear to me by connecting it to an experience I have had. But such experiences, Stein claims, "only mediate knowledge" and not inner conditions.[55] Through it I may gain information about the other (such as "he stamps his foot because he is angry" or "she's closing her notebook because she wants this meeting to be over") but I will not grasp the inner condition of the other.

Another theory which Stein rejects is "the theory of inference by analogy," notably held by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, but as Stein points out "was almost generally acknowledged before Lipps opposed it."[56] What is claimed here is that I know that I have a physical body, and that I have experiences. When I encounter other physical bodies in

[54] *Empathy*, 24 (*Einfühlung*, 26).

[55] *Empathy*, 24 (*Einfühlung*, 26).

[56] *Empathy*, 26 (*Einfühlung*, 28).

the world, I recognize that these bodies are similar to my own and infer that these bodies must also be attached to experiences, in the same way that mine is.

Once again, Stein dismisses such a theory as failing to capture what it means to grasp the other directly. The significance of Stein's rejection becomes even clearer when we recall what she claims about the nature of embodiment. As we have seen, she describes the human person as a psycho-physical-spiritual individual, and these particular ways of talking about the person (that is, embodied, ensouled, and spiritual) can only artificially be separated from one another. If this is the case, then psychic and spiritual feelings and experiences are expressed in an embodied way, and the body is not simply a physical representation for the individual, but "lived." That which I perceive, Stein claims, is the person and not just signs of the person. This person is grasped directly, rather than being mediated through sensory appearance. I do not infer an immaterial subject indicated by a physical body, nor do I attain "more or less probable knowledge of the foreign experience" by simply comparing the other's experience to my own experience and observation.[57] As Zahavi explains,

> Stein… contrasts empathy with a more cognitive comprehension of the other's experience that intends the foreign experience without grasping it directly. This could for instance happen, if somebody wrote me and informed me that he was sad. Based on this information I could then grasp his state of mind, but his sadness would not be given to me perceptually… In this latter case, we would be dealing with an indirect comprehension of the other that is derivative and refers back to empathy understood as a more basic experiential grasp of the other's experience… It is precisely the possibility of such an experiential givenness that on Stein's view is ignored by those favouring the argument from analogy. Now, Stein is by no means denying that we occasionally employ this kind of inferential reasoning, but

[57] *Empathy*, 27 (*Einfühlung*, 29).

> on her view, it never provides us with an experience of other minds, but only with a… probable knowledge of others' mental states.[58]

In such a case, what I am experiencing is my own primordial content, not the non-primordial content of a foreign experiencing subject. Inference of foreign consciousness is by no means perception of consciousness; rather, all that is perceived are "physical soulless and lifeless bodies."[59] Such a way of understanding the other could be likened to Descartes' assertion that when he looks out of his window at passersby on the street, he may very well be seeing hats and coats.[60]

3. The I and the other: Stein's disagreement with Scheler

The above-mentioned theories of empathy, which Stein relatively quickly dismisses, all ultimately err in their description of what we recognize about the other. Rather than coming to see the other as another subject, separate from myself and no less an "I" than my own "I," these theories essentially reduce my experience of the other to an experience of myself that is evoked by or related to the presence of the other. When Stein moves on from these to address Scheler's thought (which, she notes, "deviates considerably" from the others[61]), she is again dissatisfied with the blurred distinction

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[58] Zahavi, "Empathy and Other-directed Intentionality," Topoi Vol. 33: (2013), 134-5.

[59] *Empathy*, 26 (*Einfühlung*, 29).

[60] René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Indianopolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993), p. 22.

[61] *Empathy*, 27 (*Einfühlung*, 30). Like Stein, Scheler is critical of a number of positions on empathy, particularly Lipps'. It is also worth noting that Scheler does not consistently use the word '*Einfühlung*' in his own description of perception of the other. According to Zahavi, "he used terms such as *Nachfühlen* (reproduction of feeling), *Nachleben*

between self and other, but not because Scheler does not adequately account for the other. Rather, the disagreement between Stein and Scheler is rooted in the latter's understanding of the self.

Specifically, Stein argues that for Scheler there is no essential difference between the experience of the "I" and the "I"'s experience or perception of the other's experience. "According to Scheler" she writes, "we perceive the foreign 'I' with its experience innerly just as we perceive our own 'I'... Initially there is a 'neutral stream of experience' and our 'own' and 'foreign' experiences are first gradually crystallized out of it."[62] While Stein (and Husserl) begin with the pure ego, then coming to the psychic experience of the I, and thereby to recognition of the experience of the other through empathy, Scheler's experiences are first experienced, then recognized as belonging either to "I" or "other." This distinction, Stein claims, is indicative of an incorrect understanding of the difference between inner and outer perception. She explains

> Scheler [claims] that inner perception is not the perception of self, for we can perceive ourselves as our bodies outwardly, too. Rather, inner perception is distinguished from outer perception by being directed toward acts. It is the type of act giving us the psychic. These two modes of perception are not to be distinguished on the basis of a difference of objects. Conversely, the physical is to be distinguished from the psychic because, in principle, it is differently given.[63]

(reproduction of experience), or *Fremdwahrnehmung*… [and] only uses the German term *Einfühlung* rather sparingly and when he does frequently rather dismissively as part of his criticism of Lipps" (Zahavi 2014, 132). For this reason Stein points out that "We need not go into his polemic against empathy, since it is not directed against what we call empathy" (*Empathy* 27 (*Einfühlung* 30)).

[62] *Empathy* 27 (*Einfühlung* 30).

[63] *Empathy*, 28 (*Einfühlung*, 31).

According to this view, psychic experiences, whether they are designated as an experience of the self or an experience that the self has of an other, are given in the same way; that is, through inner perception.[64] Stein is skeptical that such a view can account at all for a distinction between self and other. In fact, she claims, even Scheler's own explanation of his theory is self-contradictory and serves to underscore the actual distinction between self and other:

> If we take his discussion of a neutral stream of experience seriously, we cannot conceive of how a differentiation in this stream can occur. But such a stream of experience is an absolutely impossible notion because every experience is by nature an "I's" experience that cannot be separated phenomenally from the "I" itself. It is only because Scheler fails to recognize a pure "I." always taking "I" as "psychic individual," that he speaks of an experience present before "I's" are constituted. Naturally, he cannot exhibit such an "I-less" experience. Every case he brings up presupposes our own as well as the foreign "I" and does not verify his theory at all.[65]

[64] Zahavi contends that the difference between Stein's and Scheler's positions on inner perception may, in fact, be overblown (though he does not definitively claim this): "[Stein and Husserl's] worry is obviously that Scheler by making such a claim downplays what they take to be an essential difference between self-experience and other-experience, thereby leading to fusion and confusion. I think, however, that this specific controversy is more apparent than real." He claims that "In and of itself, this definition [of inner intuition] does not involve or entail a disregard of the difference between one's own experiences and those of the other," and thus does not appear to ultimately contradict Stein or Husserl in a substantive way (Zahavi 2014, 137). Nevertheless, the main concern of the present examination is Stein's view on empathy (and ultimately, what it tells us about her view on spirit), and so her perception of Scheler's position is more valuable to this inquiry than the actual specifics of his position. Her criticism of Scheler serves to highlight the importance that she places on inner perception as perception of the self, and the importance of her distinction between primordial and non-primordial experience in understanding our empathic perception of the other.

[65] *Empathy*, 28 (*Einfühlung*, 31).

Thus, Scheler's understanding of what we are doing when we experience the other fails (in Stein's estimation) because he does not first properly explain the "I"'s experiences. By separating experience from the self, Scheler renders experience itself meaningless, since experience that "takes place" in a neutral, shared stream cannot even really be experienced. This is one of the reasons why Stein's distinction between primordial and non-primordial experience is significant: all primordial experience is by definition an experience of the self, and this can be discovered phenomenologically by bracketing everything outside of the pure ego. Once this has been done, I can begin to recognize myself as a psychic individual that is distinct from other individuals. This distinction, though, can by no means arise out of the "crystallization" of a neutral experiential stream, but rather must come from the "I" reflecting on experience that is primordial to it, and recognizing that indeed not all experience is primordial.

We begin to see here, in Stein's objection to Scheler's neutral stream of experience, a central component of her theory of the person that will become more clearly articulated in her other, later works. Namely, while relationality is crucial to Stein's understanding of the person, this relationality is firmly rooted in a substantial self. Yes, I am my individual self insofar as I am distinct from and relate to other individual selfs that are not me, but the essence of who I am does not emerge out of this relation, just as my experiences are not filtered out from a common stream. Rather, I relate to the other because both I and the other are individual substances.

4. Empathy and the spiritual subject

In recognizing that the foreign subject is "the center of orientation" of his own phenomenal world I am presented not simply with the body of an "I", but with the realization of an embodied 'I', a person who is not simply an 'I' nor simply a body, but a unity of the psychic and the physical. Furthermore, we have seen that in asserting this psycho-physical unity we already move beyond body and psyche to attend to the person as spiritual (and thus, as Stein says, having "stepped out of the order of nature and faced it"). In empathy, I no longer see the other as an object in nature wholly subject to physical causality. Just as I experience myself as embodied (and what's more, experience myself not just as having a body—I experience myself in and through my body), my experience of the other is the experience of an "individual… not given as a physical body, but as a sensitive, living body belonging to an 'I,' an 'I' that senses, thinks, feels, and wills.

Thus, grasping the other in empathic acts means that the other is given as a psychic-physical-spiritual unity. This is why empathy is a *sui generis* kind of perception-like act: as willing, valuing beings, that is, as spiritual beings, we recognize through empathy the other as a valuing and willing being, who partakes with us in the life of the spirit. Stein's description of this *sui generis* act offers a framework for understanding how it is that we know each other as embodied, but not simply as bodies. She explains that "the foreign living body [is] the bearer of phenomena of expression," and that the body perceived through the senses can be seen as symbolic of the individual.[66] Rather than a sign pointing to a spiritual reality divorced from the physical, spirit is expressed *through* the lived body. In fact, Stein claims, this contact with the lived body is the only way in which we have

[66] *Empathy*, 75ff (*Einfühlung*, 85).

access to the other as spiritual. She asks, "Is it essentially necessary that spirit can only enter into exchange with spirit through the medium of corporeality?" And then answers that "I, as psycho-physical individual, actually obtain information about the spiritual life of other individuals in no other way."[67]

Thus, when I encounter another person I encounter her as a feeling and valuing individual, who by her very nature expresses to me what she values. In such an encounter I not only recognize the personhood of the other; I am also led to recognize and come to knowledge of the external world. I recognize that the world that appears to me is independent of me, since it appears to others, and thus "by the help of empathy… [I can] obtain the same world's second and third appearance which are independent of my perception"[68]. Thereby, through empathy, the external world is constituted intersubjectively. The way in which the lived body expresses the other to me reveals the other to me as someone who is affected by and affects the external world (and so, affects *my* world). Zahavi points out that

> [T]he other, rather than being given to me simply as a nucleus of experiences, is given as a centre of orientation, as a perspective on the world. To put it differently, the other is not given in isolation or purity for me, rather the other is given as intentional, as directed at the same world as I, and the other's world, and the objects that are there for him, is given along with the other… This is of course, one reason why our perception of others is so unlike our ordinary perception of objects. As soon as the other appears on the scene, my relation to the world will change, since the other will always be given to me in a situation or meaningful context that points back to the other as a new centre of reference.[69]

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[67] *Empathy*, 117 (*Einfühlung*, 131).

[68] *Empathy*, 64 (*Einfühlung*, 72).

[69] Zahavi (2014), 137.

In encountering the other, I open myself up to her expression of herself, her experiences, and her world---in other words, I recognize her not simply as an ego or as a subject but as a person. Through this expression we are able to share that which we value, what we will, and what we create. Since the body is not an indicator but an expression, the fact that this sharing takes place in embodied encounters with each other "through the medium of corporeality" is not a hindrance to understanding, but precisely the way in which we are given to each other to be grasped in empathy.

Thus, having seen the way in which Stein argues that the person is revealed in empathy, the next chapter will more fully flesh out the theoretical understanding of personhood that Stein develops throughout her body of work.

II. The Nature of the Human Person

A. The Emergence of the Question of the Meaning of Personhood

At the heart of Stein's philosophy is her philosophical anthropology, and the notion that human beings are persons. Undergirding all of her work is the question of what personhood is, and how it is known and understood (both in terms of what it means to be the kind of being that is a person, and in terms of what it means to know and understand who an individual person is). Although only her *Aufbau der menschlichen Person: Vorlesungen zur philosophischen Anthropologie* is explicitly aimed at the question of personhood, a number of readers point out that virtually all of her writings ultimately lead to the consideration of this question.[70] As we saw in the previous chapter, Stein's first step toward understanding the person is her examination of empathy, which begins with the assertion that empathy is more than just the outer perception of a natural object, and ends with a reflection on the nature of the person as a psycho-physical-spiritual unity. In *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, what begins as a study of causality becomes two treatises on the human person's unique situation as both physical and the spiritual, and

[70] Notably, Roman Ingarden makes this claim in his tribute to Stein in the 1979 issue of the *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* (Peter Schulz points this out in "Toward the Subjectivity of the Human Person: Edith Stein's Contribution to the Theory of Identity," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, trans. Christina Gschwandtner, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2008: 163). Ingarden writes that "In the works of Edith Stein, whether they concern 'empathy' or the 'individual and the community' (the foundations of sociology, so to speak), one question is continually brought out and emphasized: the question of human nature, the nature of the human person" (translation mine). See also Beate Beckman-Zöller, "Edith Stein's Theory of the Person in Her Münster Years (1932–1933)," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, trans. Amalie Enns, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2008): 47.

the interplay of the natural world and the human community. In *Potency and Act* and *Finite and Eternal Being*, her analyses of being ultimately serve the purpose of elucidating the human person's distinction from and relationship to God as divine Person.

Despite Stein's ever-present targeting of the notion of personhood, however, her treatment of it is not necessarily systematic. Though she is remarkably consistent (she rarely contradicts herself or abandons an idea, though the shapes of these ideas develop and different facets are drawn out in different works), her theory of personhood sprawls across her entire body of work. Even the *Aufbau*, which seems by its very title to promise this comprehensive picture, is not exhaustive. Though it provides a thorough, step-by-step examination of the structures of personhood, it is more of an overview than a complete and definitive presentation of Stein's anthropology. This is unsurprising, since the text consists of material from a lecture series given to students of pedagogy during her time at the *Deutschen Institut für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* in Münster (1932-33). It is clear that the lectures are focused on understanding the person in order to then explore how best to teach the person, and also that the lectures are intended for an audience that is not necessarily familiar with the rest of Stein's work. As such, the text frequently gestures toward issues that Stein deals with more fully in other works---for example, her explanation of empathy is abbreviated; her thoughts on individual essence are more fully worked out in *PA* and *FEB*; and surprisingly, the notion of the "personal core" ("*Kern der Person*" or "*Persönlichkeitskern*") only appears briefly. Thus, a clear and comprehensive picture of Stein's anthropology must be pieced together from various works, and its layers gradually uncovered (not unlike the way in which the depths of an individual are gradually discovered through empathy).

Her pursuit of the question of personhood begins with phenomenology. It is unsurprising that her first attempts at understanding the person in her dissertation (written under Husserl) are phenomenological, but it is important to note that her inquiry retains a phenomenological character even in her later works (including the "metaphysical" texts, *PA* and *FEB*). Though Stein's growing interest in Thomas Aquinas (and her interest in questions about being) may at first be perceived as a move away from Husserl, Stein herself explicitly identifies Husserlian phenomenology as her chosen methodology. Her thought is distinct from Husserl's, and her philosophical inquiry branches off in pursuit of her own questions and concerns, but she never ceases to be a phenomenologist. She praises Thomas' anthropology in *Aufbau* but decides against using it as the basis for her lectures, firstly because it would require dealing with Thomas' entire body of writings (since he provides no single work in which his anthropology is clearly laid out); secondly, because although it would be "a significant and beautiful task," it would also be a complicated one "since I am unable to simply follow St. Thomas' teachings; rather, on several significant points my views differ from his."[71] Though her exploration will be guided by Thomas in some important ways[72], she states, "The method by which I seek a solution to the problem is phenomenological; that is, the method developed by E. Husserl… but which, I am convinced, had already been applied by all the great philosophers, though not exclusively

[71] *Aufbau*, 28 (since no English translation of this text has been published, all translations are my own). "*Das wäre an sich eine große und schöne Aufgabe, sie würde sich aber für mich erheblich komplizieren, weil ich nicht in der Lage bin, einfach den Lehren des hl. Thomas zu folgen, sondern in einigen wesentlichen Punkten andere Auffassungen habe.*"

[72] As we will see, for example, she references Thomas when she examines the notion of the soul as the form of the body, and builds up her description of the person by analyzing the soul as vegetative, animal and human (see *Aufbau* 40 ff.).

and without reflective clarity about their methods."[73] In the introduction to *FEB* she writes of herself (in the third person) that the "philosophic home [of this book's author] is the school of Edmund Husserl, and her philosophic mother tongue is the language of the phenomenological thinkers. She therefore uses phenomenology as a starting point to find her way into the majestic temple of scholastic thought."[74]

Phenomenology is distinctly suited to developing an anthropology, Stein claims, because of the fundamental prescripts to attend to "the things themselves" and to grasp essences.[75] While describing the phenomenological reduction in *Aufbau*, she remarks that "If we want to know what the human being is, then we must transfer ourselves in as vivid a way as possible into the situation in which we experience the human *Dasein*; that is, what we ourselves experience and that which we experience in our encounter with others."[76] Phenomenological reduction and the intuition of essences allow us to enter into this examination of experience. Stein claims that it reveals not just a subject of experiences, but an individual substance relating to the world on multiple levels, unfolding out toward the

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[73] *Aufbau*, 28. "*Die Methode, mit der ich eine Lösung der Probleme suche, ist die phänomenologische, d.h. Die Methode, wie sie E. Husserl ausgebildet… hat, die aber nach meiner Überzeugung von den großen Philosophen aller Zeiten bereits angewendet wurde, wenn auch nicht ausschließlich und nicht mit reflektiver Klarheit über das eigene Verfahren*."

[74] *FEB*, 12 (*EES*, 21) .

[75] *Aufbau*, 29.

[76] *Aufbau*, 29. "*Wenn wir wissen wollen, was der Mensch ist, so müssen wir uns möglichst lebendig in die Situation versetzen, in der wir menschliches Dasein erfahren: d.h. Das, was wir in uns selbst erfahren, und das, was wir in der Begegnung mit anderen Menschen erfahren*."

world from a personal core.[77] The being of this individual, Stein says, is a unity of body, soul, and spirit.[78] Disentangling these various aspects of the unified person and understanding what Stein means by them, however, is a complicated and delicate task, since they are not simply distinct "components" that exist in conjunction with one another. Rather, each is what it is (and thus, the whole person is what she is) because of its unity with and relatedness to the other two. And Insofar as this unified individual is aware of its own being, it is an "I."

B. From Pure Ego to Person

1. Consciousness and the "I"

In her early texts Stein approaches the person by first reducing to the pure ego: the "otherwise indescribable, qualityless subject of experience," that is left when the world of the natural attitude is bracketed.[79] As Schulz explains when describing Stein's use of the notion, "The "pure I" is known to those familiar with phenomenology. It is the immediate correlate of the content of experience that is at the foundation of all experience."[80] Stein introduces the ego in *Empathy* when she posits that "it is not indubitable that I exist, this empirical 'I' of this name and station, given such and such attributes… But 'I,'the experiencing subject who considers the world and my own person as phenomenon, 'I' am

[77] *Persönlichkeitskern* (sometimes translated as 'core personality' or 'core of the person.')

[78] *FEB*, 365 (*EES*, 365).

[79] *Empathy*, 38 (*Einfühlung*, 41).

[80] Schulz, 167.

in experience and only in it, am just as indubitable and impossible to cancel as experience itself."[81] Insofar as phenomena appear to the ego, in turning to examine consciousness it is impossible not to posit the conscious ego that is experiencing these phenomena. In *Empathy* Stein continues by explaining that the individuality of this ego is revealed in the givenness of an other ego in empathy, an "I" which is "at first not qualitatively distinguished from [my 'I'], since both are qualityless, but only distinguished as simply an 'other.'"[82] This encounter with the other allows for the experience of the "I" as a self. Furthermore, the "I"'s individuality is not just visible in this distinction between self and other, but also insofar as the "I" is recognized to be the unity of a stream of conscious experiences that are qualitatively unique to this "I." Through empathy, the nature of the ego begins to be revealed, and it is no longer the pure and undifferentiated ego, but the individual and personal ego.[83]

Stein consistently identifies the ego as the necessary starting point for understanding the person, even in those texts that are not considered her main "phenomenological works." In *FEB* she remarks that "Whenever the human mind in its quest for truth has sought an indubitably certain point of departure, it always encountered the inescapable *fact of its own being or existence.*"[84] In this sense she echoes Descartes and

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[81] *Empathy*, 4-5 (*Einfühlung*, 3).

[82] *Empathy*, 38 (*Einfühlung*, 41).

[83] *Empathy*, 38 (*Einfühlung*, 41). See Chapter I for a more thorough treatment of empathy, including the sense in which 'I' and 'other' are distinct, and the way in which this givenness of the other leads to an awareness of the personal "I."

[84] *FEB*, 35 (*EES*, 35).

Husserl, though she is careful to articulate that this certitude is given, and is not the product or end result of rational inquiry, as in Descartes'*cogito*:

> For in all of this—in the "I live" of St. Augustine as much as in the "I think" of Descartes, and in Husserl's "being conscious of" or "experiencing—there is implied the same *I am*. And this I am is not a conclusion, as seems to be suggested by saying, *Cogito, ergo sum*, but it is implicitly given: I *am*, whether I be thinking, or willing, or in whatever other ways I may be intellectually active: and I am conscious of my being… This certitude of my own existence is in a sense the most *primordial knowledge* I have. It is *not* my first knowledge in any *temporal* sense, for a person's natural attitude tends above all else to the external world, and it takes a long time to learn to find oneself. Nor is this knowledge first in the manner of a *first principle* from which all other truths may be deduced or by which they may be measured. The certitude of my existence is rather most primordial in the sense that it is the most intimate or immediate knowledge I have: It is a knowledge of that which is inseparable from me, and it is therefore a primordial starting point.[85]

Stein goes on to explain that the primordial, immediate and unreflective surety of one's own being that she describes in this passage is deepened when one turns inward to reflect upon one's consciousness of one's being. In doing so, it becomes clear that the ego that is immediately given in conscious experience is, as Stein explains, "alive in every now."[86] In other words, its being is not simply its experiential content, but rather its life is the flow of the ever rising and falling stream of experience. While experiences come to be and pass away, the ego persists. This is what it means for the ego to be "alive"---this bearing of the flow of experience, and this self-recognition of the ego as this carrier of experiences that are its own. In this way, the being of the ego is actual, and past and future experiences live

[85] *FEB*, 36 (*EES*, 36). We see here echoes of Stein's claim in the *Aufbau* that history's great philosophers were unwitting phenomenologists.

[86] *FEB*, 48 (*EES*, 43).

in it in potency through memory and anticipation.[87] Thus, the ego is tied up with a sense of temporality. The very way in which we are conscious of our own being is through the experience of the ego as having a past, present, and future, as persisting throughout this flow of experience. Its life is the totality of the stream of past, present and future experiences, though it is alive in actuality only in the present.

This leaves open the question of how the ego arises in the first place, and of the origin of the experiences that appear to it. Stein writes

> The ego, as we have pointed out, is always alive, but it is nevertheless unable to keep enduringly alive those experiential contents which it needs to sustain its own life. Without these contents, the ego is an empty nothing… Furthermore, whence does the ego acquire those contents without which it is nothing? When, for example, a noise "breaks in upon me" from *without*, this noise obviously does not originate in the ego but only "falls upon" the ego… If, on the other hand, joy arises "within me," then this experience evidently originates *within*, though as a rule it responds to some external stimulus[88]

Thus the ego, as described up to this point, does not seem to account either for its own existence or the existence of the experiences it has. I have no insight into the source of this being, and thus it cannot be its own source but must come from something else. As Dermot Moran explains, Stein invokes Heideggerian "thrownness" in positing that "humans do not know the 'whence' of their existence… My self-experience runs off into vagueness. I do not have awareness or direct intuition of the origins of my ego. There is always a horizon of vagueness. It is precisely this sense of horizontality that leads Stein to think of the ego

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[87] Stein's intention to couple the phenomenological method with scholastic concerns about being is certainly evident in these passages on the actuality and potency of the ego.

[88] *FEB*, 53-54 (*EES*, 47).

as finite and created."[89] In the section of *FEB* in which Stein discusses the being of the ego, she posits that this finitude points toward eternality; pure being from which the ego receives its being.[90]

Furthermore, this reflection on the limits of the ego allows her to move beyond the pure "I" to analysis of the person, since it becomes clear that the conscious life of the ego is not the entirety of the being of the person. Rather, conscious life seems to arise out of an obscure "dark ground"[91], which only becomes known to us insofar as it "manifests itself in and through the medium of the surface."[92] This is indicated, Stein notes, by the fact that although we may look back to a past moment in the life of the ego and even revive it and "re-live" it, not all of the stream of experience is accessible to the present ego. There may be lacunae in memory, gaps in the ego's experience (e.g. during sleep), and certain experiences that elicit the certainty that there are "things hidden 'within me'... which are unknown to me,"[93] thereby pointing toward an inner, unconscious world, which becomes known gradually as it rises up into my consciousness.

This inner world comes to the surface in daily experiences, the content of which evidently has its source in me, unlike experiences of external perception of the external

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[89] Dermot Moran, "Immanence, Self-Experience, and Transcendence in Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Karl Jaspers," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. 82, No. 2 (2008) p. 287, 289.

[90] *FEB*, 53-4 (*EES*, 40).

[91] *FEB*, 377 (*EES*, 303).

[92] *FEB*, 364 (*EES*, 303).

[93] *FEB*, 47 (*EES*, 48).

world (such as the loud noise that Stein describes above as "break[ing] in upon me"). For example, Stein explains, when I experience joy at receiving good news, there is a distinction between the news itself (and my experience of hearing it) and the joy that I experience when I hear it, and I experience emotions such as joy arising from some "place" within me of which I am not fully conscious. When I feel joy, I become aware of an inner movement, of something arising from within me and coming to consciousness; a part of myself that was hidden and is now illuminated, and is not fully accounted for by simply attending to the actuality of the ego as the life of a flow of experiential content.

In other words, there is some particularity underlying the ego that affects the kinds of experiences it has and the way in which it experiences them. Stein expands her example of joy to consider the experience of receiving what should be happy news that inexplicably does not elicit joy. Even if I am unable to determine what it is about me that keeps me from feeling joy, I am nevertheless "convinced… that the reason… 'lies in me' even if I find it impossible to track down." This experience not only indicates inner content; in doing so, it indicates that the ego is not pure and qualityless. Rather, the characteristics of an individual begin to surface in the life of the ego. As she says in *FEB*:

> What… is the meaning of this *within*? Does the joy originate in the *pure* ego? If by pure ego we understand with Husserl only that self which is alive in every "*I* think," "*I* know," "*I* desire," etc. and which is conscious of itself as a thinking, knowing, desiring ego, then we must conclude that this joy originates in a transcendent [*jenseitige*] depth which discloses itself in the conscious experience of joy, without, however, becoming transparent. The conscious life of the ego depends thus by virtue of its contents on a twofold *beyond*… an *external* and *internal* world both of which manifest themselves in the conscious life of the ego, i.e., in that ontological realm which is inseparable from the ego[.][94]

[94] *FEB*, 54 (*EES*, 43).

Thus, though I start only with the fact of my own being and do not fully understand it, I begin to be able to make sense of it as it emerges and is brought to my awareness. Stein illustrates this idea with with the example of an experience entirely too familiar to many academics:

> I am thinking about a difficult problem, and I have been trying in vain to find a solution. I finally give up, because today I am too dull. I cannot perceive my dullness with my external senses…. Nor can I be "immediately conscious" of my dullness in the way I am conscious of my thinking, the slow process of which my dullness reveals to me. But I "experience" this dullness nonetheless---it becomes evident to me in the same sense in which I experience the bluntness of a knife which refuses to cut a loaf of bread. [95]

My "writer's block" is not imposed upon me from outside. My dullness on this particular day is not presented to me in the same way as a droning noise, yet it is presented to me as an experience just as real as a sensorily perceived sound. If I examine this experience of dullness and inability to work through a problem (that, at another time, might have intrigued me), I bring to consciousness aspects of myself that make the experience more comprehensible to me, and in so doing I become more comprehensible to myself (though Stein is careful to point out that I am never fully transparent to myself). She claims that

> What I perceive internally and learn to know better and better in the course of my life is a thing-like something. It has enduring properties (as, for example, mental gifts---a greater or lesser facility of comprehension, keenness of judgment, the ability to discern connections and relations). It entails changing emotional states, extending to longer or shorter periods of time… It engenders varying modes of action, is subject to external influences, while it in turn exerts an efficacy that transcends its own inner

[95] *FEB*, 365 (*EES*, 303).

> world, integrating this latter with the cause-and-effect nexus of the total world of experience.

The "I" is a particular, finite being, with potentialities that may or may not be actualized, and particularities that shape experience. I may have the intellectual acuity to solve this problem with which I am struggling, but I may also be particularly affected by the gray winter light, which accounts for my experience of this ineffectual dullness which today renders my problem seemingly impenetrable.

These observations not only reveal that I am an individual and unique being, but also that I am a person whose being arises up from the obscure and hidden depth of an unreflected inner world, and yet whose inner world is bound to an external, material world insofar as my experience of material objects can draw out an inner response. In this way, an examination of what Stein means by 'person' can now move from examining the ego to examining the soul as "the center of the being"[96] of the person that is physically embodied as well as conscious (and therefore spiritual).

2. *The soul as the bearer of experience and its relation to the body*

Stein's early works (such as *Empathy* and *PPH*) focus on examining the soul in terms of its unity with the body. In *Empathy* the soul is described as a psychic unity that is both shaped by my unique stream of experiences (insofar as it is the bearer of all experiences that are "mine") and shapes my stream of experience insofar as it bears them according to its own unique structure.[97] In this way, in the *Empathy* text 'soul' is

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[96] *FEB*, 369 (*EES*, 303).

[97] *Empathy*, 37-39 (*Einfühlung*, 40-42).

synonymous with 'psyche'. In her later works, as she more explicitly explores the influence of scholastic thought, her approach to the soul takes into account the Thomistic description of the soul as the substantial form of the body, though she does not wholly adopt it.[98] It is in this context that she develops her notion of the soul as personal core (*Persönlichkeitskern*).[99] Although the depth of her analysis of the soul deepens, however, she again remains consistent, and her earlier insights do not make way to her later ones, but rather are nuanced by them. As previously discussed, Stein's starting point at the notion of empathy is apt, since it is through empathy that we are able to reflect back on ourselves to better understand what we are as persons and who we are as individuals.[100]

If we look more closely at the individuality that emerges from the qualitative distinctness and the selfness of the experiencing ego, we can posit an individual bearer of the experiences that constitute this particular stream of consciousness. Stein asserts that "Among our experiences there is one basic experience given to us which, together with its persistent attributes, becomes apparent in our experiences as the identical "bearer" of them. This is the substantial soul."[101] She continues on to describe the "persistent attributes" of this basic experience:

> The acuteness of our senses apparent in our outer perceptions is such an attribute. Another is the energy apparent in our conduct. The tension or

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[98] See Section 2.2.3. of this chapter.

[99] E.g. *PA* 264 (181).

[100] See my discussion of *Empathy*, 63 ff. in Ch. 1, "Empathy as Perception of Psycho-Physical-Spiritual Unity."

[101] *Empathy*, 40 (*Einfühlung*, 43).

> laxity of our volitions manifests the vivacity and strength or the weakness of our will. Its persistence is found in its duration. The intensity of our feelings, the ease with which they appear, the excitability of our sentiments, etc. disclose our disposition.[102]

Thus, the soul is more than simply the individual stream of consciousness, and it is more than a unified stream of experiences. Rather, it is my experience of having a standpoint in regard to this stream of experiences, the experience of this standpoint being *mine*, and the experience of my own individuality as characterized by certain attributes that indicate this particularity. As Stein explains,

> This substantial unity is "my" soul when the experiences in which it is apparent are "my" experiences or acts in which my pure "I" lives. The peculiar structure of psychic unity depends on the peculiar content of the streams of experience; and, conversely, (as we must say after the soul has been constituted for us) the content of the stream of experience depends on the structure of the soul. Were there streams of consciousness alike in content, there would also be souls of the same kind or instances of ideally-the-same soul.[103]

We see, then, that while the soul is not simply a collection of experiences, neither is it simply a collection of attributes. It is the fundamental experience underlying the stream, the "bearer" of all other experience, that is on the one hand given shape by these experiences (since they are particularly mine, and this experience of "bearing" them is also particularly mine) and on the other hand shapes this stream (since it is particular to these experiences that they are being "born" by my particular soul, in the way in which this

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[102] *Empathy*, 40 (*Einfühlung*, 43).

[103] *Empathy*, 40 (*Einfühlung*, 43).

particular soul bears them according to its particular attributes). We would be mistaken, however, if we were to conclude that we have managed to adequately describe the individual person, now that we have built a picture of it up from the pure "I" to the individual "I," and refined this understanding of the individual "I" with this notion of "soul." As Stein explains in *Empathy*, "we do not have the complete psychic phenomenon (nor the psychic individual) when we examine it in isolation."[104] In other words, we cannot understand the unity of our experience and ourselves as the unified center of that experience without looking at our own embodiment and our relation to the world outside of us.

Thus, it is necessary to recognize that the soul is always united with a body, and that the separation of soul and body presumed in the previous steps in order to examine the soul on its own is "an artificial one;" in actual fact the two cannot be separated.[105] Furthermore, contiguity of soul and body is not the reason why they cannot be separated---when Stein says that "the soul is always necessarily a soul in a body," the 'in' ought not to be overinterpreted.[106] It is not the case that I, as the center of my experience, am my soul. Rather, I as a psycho-physical individual am the center of my experience.[107] This is

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[104] *Empathy*, 40 (*Einfühlung*, 44).

[105] *Empathy*, 41 (*Einfühlung*, 44).

[106] *Empathy*, 41 (*Einfühlung*, 44).

[107] I particularly avoid use of the word 'composite' to describe this soul-body unity, since this term can carry with it the implication of two separate parts that are "fused" together to form a whole (though it certainly is not exclusively used in this way). As such, it fails to adequately emphasize the artificiality (mentioned above) of considering either of these aspects of the person without the other. The term 'psycho-physical individual' more accurately indicates that to separate soul and body from each other, even as a thought experiment, renders an impoverished picture of both notions.

clear because I experience my body differently than I experience any other object. While I can, on the one hand, experience my body as the object of my perception (e.g. I can look at my own hands), on the other hand it presents itself to me as located at the "zero-point of orientation" out of which all my perceptual experience radiates.[108]

What she means by this is that any other physical object (or object of "outer perception," to use Stein's own words[109]) can be viewed from different vantage points, viewed in relation to myself, experienced through various senses at the same time, etc. As discussed in the chapter on empathy, I can never remove myself from or take a different vantage point toward my body, as I can with other objects. Stein designates this inescapability of my embodiment as experienced through my "*Leib*" or "living body," distinguishing it from "*Körper*" which she uses to indicate the physical body available to sensory perception in the same manner as a physical object.

She points out that our experience of the living body as present, so to speak, at the "zero-point" of experience is observable when we attend to the experience of sensation. This experience is had *by me*, and is as given and fundamental as acts of consciousness are (and, indeed, Stein claims that "sensations are among the real constituents of consciousness, of this domain impossible to cancel"[110]); however, it is irremovably located "in" the body which takes up physical space. While my body (since it takes up physical space) cannot be said to be the same as the zero-point of the "I", it nevertheless is

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[108] *Empathy*, 43 (*Einfühlung*, 46).

[109] She uses this term frequently, from page 7 ff. (*Empathy*; *Einfühlung* 6).

[110] *Empathy*, 42 (*Einfühlung*, 46).

experienced as "at" that zero-point insofar as I can never remove myself from the experience of embodied "surrounding" of this point. Thus, the experience of embodiment is distinguishable both from purely conscious acts and from the experience of other physical objects. Stein explains that

> The sensation of pressure or pain or cold is just as absolutely given as the experience of judging, willing, perceiving, etc. Yet, in contrast with these acts, sensation is peculiarly characterized. It does not issue from the pure "I" as they do, and it never takes on the form of the "cogito" in which the "I" turns toward an object… sensation is always spatially localized "somewhere" at a distance from the "I" (perhaps very near to it, but never in it)... And this "somewhere" is not an empty point in space, but something filling up space. All these entities from which my sensations arise are amalgamated into a unity, the unity of my living body, and they are themselves places in the living body.[111]

Despite this localizability of sensation in the body, however, it is clear that this experience is not merely physical (in fact, a purely physical experience would go against the meaning of 'experience'). The experience of sensation through my body must be differentiated from my experience of the object that is being sensed, and my sensing of my body is inextricable from my experience of sensation through my body:

> [T]he distance of the parts of my living body from me is completely incomparable with the distance of foreign physical bodies from me… "Body space" [*Leibraum*] and "outer space" are completely different from each other. Merely perceiving outwardly, I would not arrive at the living body, nor merely "perceiving bodily" at the outer world. And in this doubled givenness it is experienced as the same… What makes the connection between sensation and bodily perception particularly

[111] *Empathy*, 42 (*Einfühlung*, 46).

> intimate is the fact that sensations are given at the living body to the living body as senser.[112]

This "double givenness" draws attention to the effect of physical causality (which we are able to experience by nature of our living bodies) has on the soul. Stein points out that sensations themselves are "purely physical events," in the sense that they are caused by physical objects coming into contact (in one way or another) with the physical body. The accompanying sensual feelings (*sinnliche Gefühle*), however, are more than a physical effect of a physical cause; they are "not only there [at the surface of the physical body] but at the same time also in me; they issue from my 'I'."[113] The same can be said of moods. These are more properly considered psychic feelings than sensual feelings, but Stein points out that sensual experiences and moods can have a noticeable influence on each other; for example, physical discomfort can negatively affect one's mood. Psychic experiences, Stein asserts, are "body-bound consciousness," meaning although they are not purely sensual experiences, they are grounded in physical causality.

Here Stein points out that we have, almost inadvertently, come to a point in speaking about the psycho-physical individual in which we have outrun the categories of 'physical' and 'psychological.' In examining feelings, it becomes clear that we experience certain feelings that are only "accidentally psychic" and "not body-bound,"[114] and therefore do not fit into what has been said about sensual feelings or moods. These are spiritual

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[112] *Empathy*, 43-4 (*Einfühlung*, 47-8).

[113] *Empathy*, 49 (*Einfühlung*, 53).

[114] *Empathy*, 50 (*Einfühlung*, 55).

feelings, since it is conceivable that they could belong to a non-embodied subject (a thought experiment which is logically conceivable, whereas a body cannot be conceived of separately from soul). Certainly non-physical experiences can have a bodily effect, such as when we burst into tears out of sadness, or experience goosebumps while receiving good news that fills us with joy. These sensations, however, are not inherent to the spiritual feeling that occasioned them; if the sensation is removed, the content of the spiritual feeling remains the same. Stein points out that "It must be conceded that God rejoices over the repentance of a sinner without feeling His heart pound or other 'organic sensations,' an observation that is possible whether one believes in God or not."[115] Likewise, though it may be the case that a human, embodied individual will not experience purely spiritual feelings, these feelings are still no logical impossibility (although it goes without saying that in an embodied individual, spiritual feelings do not occur apart from the body-soul unity).

Thus, we have seemingly stumbled into an analysis of the spiritual. Since she grounds her description of the psycho-physical individual in the "I" of consciousness (that is, her description emerges from the affirmation of the human being as a subject), it is not possible to limit the human person to the world of physical causality. The human being as a subject, that is, the centerpoint of orientation toward experienced objects, is not simply the subject of sensory phenomena. Rather, as Stein's description of feeling indicates, the human being is also the subject of experiences of values which are revealed by those feelings. She claims that

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[115] *Empathy*., 50 (*Einfühlung*, 55).

> in every comprehension of an act of feeling, we have already penetrated into the realm of the spirit. For, as physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts, so a new object realm is constituted in feeling. This is the world of values. In joy the subject has something joyous facing him, in fright something frightening, in fear something threatening. For him who is cheerful, the world is bathed in a rosy glow; for him who is depressed, bathed in black. And all this is co-given with acts of feeling as belonging to them.[116]

As we see here, the value-oriented nature of the human person expresses itself in a feeling-response to an experience of an object of value, and spiritual feelings express themselves through the individual's embodiment[117]. Stein notes, however, that the expressive nature of spirit indicates that experiences of value are not simply responses to physical objects; rather, in valuing an object the individual brings something to the object. She claims that this notion is

> revealed still more strikingly in the realm of the will… what is willed not only has an object correlate facing the volition, but, since volition releases action out of itself, it gives what is willed reality; volition becomes creative. Our whole 'cultural world,' all that 'the hand of man' has formed, all utilitarian objects, all works of handicraft, applied science, and art are the reality correlative of spirit.[118]

Thus, the human being is not simply psycho-physical, but psycho-physical-spiritual; that is to say, that the human being is physical, sensate, experiencing, feeling, willing, and valuing.

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[116] *Empathy*, 92 (*Einfühlung*, 102).

[117] We saw in Ch. 1 that this insight is of great significance to Stein.

[118] *Empathy*, 92 (*Einfühlung*, 102-3).

3. The soul in a new key

We will return to and examine more closely this idea that the person is experiencing, feeling and willing, but first it is worthwhile to look at the way in which Stein's phenomenological analysis of the soul in her early works is transposed in her later ones, while still expressing the same fundamental understanding of the human person as a psycho-physical-spiritual unity. In *PA,* the *Aufbau*, and *FEB* her description of the relationship between soul and body uses the scholastic vocabulary of "form" and "matter", and "act and "potency[119] while also heavily referencing the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, whose *Metaphysische Gespräche* contains an extensive section on the nature of the soul.[120] In doing so, she explores the nature of the soul not by starting with intersubjective empathy, but rather by looking first at the "lower souls" of plants and animals and working her way up to human souls.

She begins by asserting that the physical material of the body is precisely a body because of its formation by the soul:

> The body [*Körper*], with its particular self-contained and regularly structured shape [*Gestalt*], is taken by us to have inner cohesiveness. Its outer shape is arranged from the inside. It carries something within itself, that makes it to be that which it is, and this occurs namely through a progressive process of shaping [*Gestaltungsprozeß*]: we see that the body undergoes a transformation. This formation of itself from inside is

[119] Though she notes that Thomas' theory of the soul can be understood phenomenologically: "At this point we are referred to phenomenological analysis, which can tell us about the essence of body and soul and help us to understand its ultimate ontic structure" (*PA*, 230; 159).

[120] Hedwig Conrad-Martius*, Metaphysische Gespräche*, Halle (Saale): Niemeyer (1921), 26-86.

> a peculiar way of being [*Seinsweise*], the way of being of that which is alive. That which is shaped from within Thomas of Aquinas designates as inner form [*Form*]... The living form, the "soul," makes the human body an organism.[121]

We see here the idea that the soul is not simply the "inner shape" of a material object that gives it its particular qualities as a kind of thing (after all, rocks and other non-living objects are formed in this way). Rather, Stein argues, the soul is the source of a being's life, that moves it and brings it to actuality. "Following the lead of H. Conrad-Martius," she explains, "we have regarded it as a particular characteristic of the *soul* to be the center of the being [*Seinsmitte*] of the animate existence [*Lebewesen*] and the hidden source from which this existent draws its being and rises to its visible form."[122]

Furthermore, the soul is the source of a living thing's being not just in the sense of its coming-into-being, but also insofar as the ensouled being develops and changes. Stein asserts in *PA* that

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[121] *Aufbau*, 38. As mentioned in the previous chapter, since there is no published English translation, all translations of the *Aufbau* are my own. Here and throughout I also provide the original text:

> *Der Körper mit seiner bestimmten, in sich geschlossenen und regelmäßig gegliederten Gestalt wird von uns als ein innerlich Zusammenhängendes genommen. Seine äußere Gestalt is von innen heraus gestaltet. Er trägt etwas in sich, was ihn zu dem macht, was er jeweils ist, und zwar geschieht das in einem fortschreitenden Gestaltungsprozeß: Wir sahen ja, daß der Körper einen Gestaltwandel durchmacht. Dieses Sichgestalten von innen her ist eine eigentümliche Seinsweise, die Seinsweise des Lebendigen. Das von innen her Gestaltende wird von Thomas von Aquino als innere Form bezeichnet… Die lebendige Form, die "Seele," macht den menschlichen Körper zum Organismus.*

[122] *FEB*, 369 (*EES* 350).

> Living things [*Lebewesen*] obviously receive their qualities progressively from within---they are shaped and reshaped---over the entire duration of their being *as* living things, whereas nonliving things are "finished" from the beginning of their existence and are not further shaped and reshaped unless "set in motion" by outside forces. Being moved and shaped from within is the peculiarity of living things, their mode of being; it is *life*. And the *living* inner form that gives life is the soul. The forming and shaping of the whole that the soul belongs to is the effect of bringing the potential to actuality, for the soul itself is actual and active.[123]

This description of the soul as that which makes a thing to be a certain kind of thing and that which animates living things is not yet enough to understand the human soul, however. It still must be determined what particular kind of living thing the human person is.

In the *Aufbau*, Stein reminds her audience that for Thomas Aquinas ("following Aristotle"), beings are hierarchically arranged into the levels of "material things, plants, animals, humans, [and] pure spirits," and each level of being including and expanding upon the last.[124] Thus, to be a human being is "to be at the same time material thing, plant, animal and spirit; but all of these in a unified way… the human being is all that it is through an inner form, through its human soul which is rational and thereby distinct from plant and

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[123] *PA*, 248 (164). Here she continues on to point out that

> According to the ontic definition of spirit that we attempted in the last section, we ought to call this actual life-giving soul "spirit." I mean that we should see it as an objectively spiritual item but not as a spiritual subject or person since its living works from the inside out; in itself it is nothing; its being is not an inner spiritual living, self-conscious and receptive of and open to the outside.

[124] *Aufbau*, 40. "*In der Kosmologie, wie sie Thomas von Aquin im Anschluß an Aristoteles entworfen hat, erscheint die geschaffene Welt als ein Stufenreich von Gebilden: materielle Dinge, Pflanzen, tiere, Menschen, reine Geister.*"

animal souls, but possesses them in it as lower parts."[125] To elaborate on this distinction, however, Stein argues that "it will be necessary to achieve clarity about the lower forms in order to grasp the higher ones"[126] by examining the characteristics of vegetative and animal souls. Particularly in *Aufbau* and *PA*, Stein's analysis of the different *"Stufen*" or tiers of soul continues to closely follow that of Conrad-Martius. As Michele D'Ambra points out,

> [Conrad-Martius'] analysis, following a phenomenological method, reveals the complexity of nature and of the human being as its very peculiar manifestation. Within nature, in fact, the human being stands out; this being includes in itself all the different aspects of reality and presents itself as the place where nature becomes self-aware. This happens thanks to his/her specifically constituent element, that is the spirit, through which s/he becomes aware of himself /herself and of the reality and acts in an absolutely and really free way towards them.[127]

In other words, though the soul of the human being enforms physical matter and gives it life, its life is also not fully bound to matter insofar as it is self-conscious, rational and free--that is, insofar as it is also spiritual.

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[125] *Aufbau,* 40.

> *Mensch sein heißt danach: zugleich materielles Ding, Pflanze, Tier und Geist sein, dies alles aber in einhietlicher Weise… Der Mensch ist alles, was er ist, durch eine innere Form, durch seine Menschenseele, die Vernunftseele ist und dadurch von der Pflanzen- und Tierseele unterschieden, aber das der Pflanzen- und Tierseele Eigene als niedere Teile in sich enthält.*

[126] *Aufbau,* 40. "*Auf alle Fälle wird es nötig sein, über die niederen Formen Klarheit zu gewinnen, um die höheren zu begreifen*."

[127] Michele D'Ambra, "Spirit and Soul in Hedwig Conrad-Martius's *Metaphysical Dialogues*: From Nature to the Human Being," *Axiomathes* 18 (2008): 491.

i. The vegetative soul

Stein describes the vegetative "plant soul" as a source of life and organic growth, an "inner principle of life [*inneres Lebensprinzip*]."[128] The plant soul organizes matter, and the plant as a whole thereby grows and develops through the physical nutritive process, but lacks the capability of self-movement. Here Stein echoes Conrad-Martius, whose description of plant life is summarized by D'Ambra: "In this movement, which shows itself simply as a process and not as an action, the plant grows up rising from the bottom to the top and exhausts its being in manifesting its form. It lives on the surface of its being, thus showing a lack of depth. It is a one-layer being in which the setting up of external shape appears as an end in itself."[129] The plant unfolds into the actualization of its potential by stretching upward toward the light[130], but in doing so it never stretches out beyond itself (a key characteristic of human unfolding, as will be discussed in Section C of this chapter), nor turns inward in self-consciousness. The life of the plant is simply to uncomplicatedly live, in a way that Stein describes as "innocent" and "peaceful," and "selfless."[131] The plant, Stein says,

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[128] *Aufbau*, 41.

[129] D'Ambra, 500.

[130] *Aufbau*, 42. Stein calls this growth toward light "the tendency to be as fully as possible what the actual being of the plant is," and remarks that "H. Conrad-Martius called this the guiding idea encompassing all forms of vegetative being." ["*Wir können aber noch eine andere Tendenz im pflanzlichen Lebensprozeß erkennen: nämlich die Tendenz, möglichst vollkommen das zu sein, was das eigentliche Wesen der Pflanze ist---Entfaltung zum Licht. H. Conrad-Martius hat es als die leitende Idee bezeichnet, die über allen Formen des pflanzlichen Seins steht.*"]

[131] *Aufbau*, 44.

> wants nothing for itself, draws nothing into itself in order to keep it for itself. Then again, it turns toward no one to disclose its being, it simply stretches toward the light. So, notwithstanding the candor with which it presents itself, in a strange way it is aimed simply at itself. In this way we see it as characterized by calm and peace. Accordingly, it does not move itself about freely, but rather remains firmly rooted in place.[132]

Thus, the vegetative soul is wholly self-contained, not only bound in one place but also wholly bound only to the matter that it enforms, without any interior movement in response to what is outside of it.

ii. The animal soul

In contrast, the sensitive "animal soul" is characterized by the capability to initiate spatial movement, as well as both outward sensation (openness to that which it encounters outside of itself) and inner sensation.[133] Stein explains in *FEB* that "the meaning of *soul* finds an even more authentic fulfillment where *interiority* is no longer merely a forming-of-matter but a being-in-itself [*Sein in sich selbst*], where each soul is a self-enclosed inner world, even though this 'inner world' is not severed from the body and from the totality of

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[132] *Aufbau*, 41.

> *Sie will nichts für sich haben, nichts in sich hineinziehen, um es für sich zu behalten. Anderseits wendet sie sich mit der Offenbarung ihres Wesens an niemanden, sie strebt nur zum Licht. So ist sie, unbeschadet der Offenheit, mit der sie sich darlebt, in eigentümlicher Weise in sich beschlossen. Das gibt für uns den Charakter des Ruhigen und Friedvollen. Damit steht es im Einklang, daß sie sich nicht frei im Raum bewegt, sondern an ihrem Ort festgewurzelt ist.*

[133] *Aufbau,* 46 ff.

the real world."[134] This inner world is revealed in the way in which an animal responds to sensory stimuli. These reactions are clearly different than the effects of external environmental factors on the growth and development of plants (though animals, as well as humans, also experience such effects on their physical bodies).[135] As Stein describes in the *Aufbau*,

> the animal's sensitivity (*Empfindsamkeit*) appears to us in connection with the reactive character of its movement. The movements and drives through which it is identified come "from within" and are interiorly felt (*gespürt*)... along with the animal body (*Leib*) is grasped an animal soul that has an inner life. And only now have we reached what 'soul' indicates in an actual sense. "To have a soul" means to have an inner center, in which everything that comes from outside is palpably felt, and out of which bursts forth everything about the living body's behavior that appears to come from within. It is the transfer point affected by stimuli and from which reactions emanate… The animal soul is rooted to the living body; it forms the body, gives it life, lives within it; feels (*spürt*) what happens to the body, and feels it in and through the body: the body's organs are the soul's organs, the soul moves the body just as it needs, its drives serve the body's preservation and unfolding by desiring what is necessary and being repelled by what endangers. Lastly… the soul expresses itself in the body, the body serves as the expression through which the soul and the soul's inner life are made sensibly manifest.[136]

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[134] *FEB*, 369 (*EES* 350).

[135] For example, in a dim room a plant bends toward the light of a window not because of any sensory perception of the light or desire for the warmth of the sun, but because of biological processes that aim at ideal growth conditions. Certainly similar processes occur in animal and human bodies (the absorption of vitamin D is not a sensitive or conscious reaction).

[136] *Aufbau*, 47.

> *Die Empfindsamkeit des Tieres zeigte sich uns im Zusammenhang mit dem reaktiven Charakter seiner Bewegungen. Die Bewegungen und die Triebe, durch die sie bestimmt werden, kommen "von innen her" und sind innerlich gespürt… Es wird mit dem Tierleib eine Tierseele aufgefaßt, die ein inneres Leben hat. Und erst damit haben wir erreicht, was "Seele" in einem eigentlichen Sinne besagt. "Seele haben" heißt ein inneres Zentrum haben, in dem spürbar alles zusammenschlägt, was von außen kommt, aus dem*

These observations highlight the idea that the soul is not simply something that serves the body and is contingent upon it; rather, soul and body are a living, integrated unity. What happens to the body is felt by the soul, and the soul's desires affect the movement of the body. We see this in Stein's claim that

> [The] soul life [of the animal soul] is thoroughly body-bound [*leibgebunden*]. It does not rise above bodily life as a quasi-autonomous vital sphere of independent meaning. Whatever befalls the body is sensed and felt, and there follows a response from within, from the center of life, in the form of movements and instinctive acts which serve the preservation and heightening of bodily life. It would be wrong nevertheless to regard the animal soul as merely an "instrumental device" [*Einrichtung*] in the service of the body and as such subjected to the body. There is rather a balance between the external and the internal, whereas in the plant the external is completely predominant and in people the soul has a meaningful life even apart from the body.[137]

> *alles hervorbricht, was im Verhalten des Leibes als von innen herkommend erscheint. Es ist die Umschlagstelle, an der die Reize angreifen und von der die Reaktionen ausgehen… Die Tierseele ist dem Leib verhaftet; sie formt ihn, sie gibt ihm Leben, sie lebt in ihm; spürt, was ihm widerfährt, und spürt es in ihm und durch ihm: Seine Organe sind ihre Organe; sie bewegt ihn, und zwar so, wie es ihm nottut, ihre Triebe stehen im Dienst seiner Erhaltung und Entfaltung: als Begehren dessen, was ihm nottut, und Abwehr dessen, was ihn gefährdet. Schließlich… Die Seele spricht sich im Leib aus, er dient ihr als Ausdruck, durch den sie selbst und ihr inneres Leben in sinnenfällige Erscheinung tritt.*

At first glance this discussion of the emotional "life of the soul" would seem to be a better description of the sensitive aspect of the human soul than a description of the animal soul, though Stein makes clear that she is not yet ready to discuss the human soul. However, though it may seem strange to refer to an animal's wrath or sorrow, what Stein describes does seem to correspond with animal behavior. For example, a dog yelping when its tail is stepped on is responding to something happening to its body, while a dog aggressively guarding its front yard is not. The key point here is that the animal is (presumably) unable to reflect on its "emotions," and they are always at the level of sensory affectivity rather than spirit (e.g. your dog may express something akin to joy upon seeing you come home after work, but will be unmoved by a beautiful poem).

[137] *FEB*, 370 ((*EES* 351).

what the soul expresses through the body is not simply an automatic, physiological response to bodily stimuli, but also an inner life that is brought to light by the body (though this inner life is still "thoroughly body-bound). This expression of the sensitive soul, she says, makes manifest to us "joy and sorrow, wrath and fear, an entire scale of affects and emotions, an actual life of the soul that speaks to us."[138] Furthermore, what is expressed through the body is not simply the current sensory experiences or affective states that the animal is undergoing, rather, "the external appearance of the animal makes manifest something permanent, its 'character,' its peculiarity."[139] In other words, the particular ways in which the animal responds to stimuli, the way in which it seems to be affected point to a persistent unity in the kind of thing that it is. It tells us something about the animal's species as a general type (dogs in general tend to be friendlier than birds) and also something about this particular animal (the family dog may be sweet and goofy while the neighbor's dog is unfriendly and anxious).[140]

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[138] *Aufbau*, 47. "*Freude und Trauer, Zorn und Furcht, eine ganze Skala von Affekten oder Gemütsbewegungen, ein aktuelles seelisches Leben, das uns anspricht und mit dem wir in innerem Kontakt stehen.*"

[139] *Aufbau*, 47. "*Darüber hinaus aber prägt sich im Äußeren des Tieres etwas Bleibendes aus, sein 'Charakter,' seine Eigenart*." Stein does not elaborate on the nature of this difference at this point, claiming that this short explanation is only the hint of a deeper analysis on the difference between humans and animals. In brief, human beings are spiritual in a way that non-human animals are not. Later she will discuss the difference between animal sounds and human speech, an analysis which sheds further light on the essential distinctions between animal and human. I take a closer look at this section in Ch. V.

[140] *Aufbau*, 47.

iii. The human soul

At this point Stein transitions from an analysis of the animal soul to the human soul. Though human souls have a sensitive aspect in a similar way to animal souls, they are "not simply sensitive beings."[141] As beings with a spiritual aspect, we are not only subject to sensory perception, we are also able to look inward and examine these sensory experiences. As Stein explains in *PA*, "The human soul *feels* joy and sorrow, pain and anger, love and hate, in itself… But it is aware of them in an intellectual manner, for the I that enjoys and is conscious of this joy can turn to it in reflection and know it."[142] What we discover in so doing is that these very sensory experiences carry meaning that is not reducible to what is given through sense perception, though it is sometimes difficult for us to separate out sensory stimuli from the objects in which they inhere, and at other times these stimuli are so potent that we respond as if out of instinct, as Stein notes in the *Aufbau*:

> Generally we experience sensory impressions not as pure sensory stimulus, but as objectively shaped and ordered in the structure of sensorily experienced world of things (*dinglich*). We see colors as the colors of things, we hear tones coming from a particular place and as produced by things that give off sounds, we experience tactile qualities as the hardness, smoothness, etc. of bodies. In many cases, we must abstract from this objective meaning (*Bedeutung*) and the ordering of these sense qualities in order to grasp what about them is actually sensory. In some cases we are simply in able to do this. In others, one's own sensory affectedness obtrudes in an unmediated way: when I perceive a thing's hardness, I feel a pressure on my finger. I feel strong light as uncomfortable light stimulus before closing my eyes; a grating noise "hurts me" until I cover my ears. In all of these cases we feel a sensory affectedness; we feel it in our body or even in connection to certain organs in the body; we simply feel the body sensorily and react with instinctual movement.[143]

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[141] *Aufbau*, 74 "[*W*]*ir* [*sind*] *nicht bloß sensitive Wesen*".

[142] *PA*, 257 (*PuA*, 170).

[143] *Aufbau*, 74-75.

In examining sensory experience in this way, however, we also notice that we experience "general affective states" that are not traced back to a specific sensory stimulus. We may feel contented, or dull, or we may crave a certain food. Though these affective states are not specifically sensory perceptions, they are nevertheless responses to the sensory world, and responses that we observe outwardly in other humans and animals. In examining these experiences in ourselves, however, we uncover "movements of the soul." Our ability to examine them (that is, our consciousness of our own inner experiences and our ability to intend them) points to the distinctly spiritual aspect of the human soul. Unlike plants and animals that simply live without reflection or introspection, Stein says "I know about my

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> *In der Regel erfahren wir sinnliche Eindrücke nicht als pure Sinnesreize, sondern gegenständlich gestaltet und eingeordnet in den Bau einer sinnlich erfahrenen dinglichen Welt. Wir sehen Farben als Farben von Dingen, wir hören Töne an einem bestimmten Ort im Raum und als hervorgebracht von tönenden Dingen, wir erfahren Tastqualitäten als Härte, Glätte usw. Von Körpern. Wir müssen in vielen Fällen erst von dieser objektiven Bedeutung und Einordnung der Sinnesqualitäten abstrahieren, um das eigentlich Empfindungsmäßige davon zu fassen. In manchen Fällen will uns das gar nicht gelingen. In andern drängt sich das eigene sinnliche Betroffensein unmittelbar auf: Wenn ich die Härte eines Dinges wahrnehme, so empfinde ich dabei einen Druck am Finger. Starke Helligkeit empfinde ich als peinlichen Lichtreiz, vor dem ich die Augen schließe; ein kratzendes Geräusch »tut mir weh«, sodaß ich mir die Ohren zuhalte. In allen diesen Fällen spüren wir ein sinnliches Betroffensein; wir spüren es an unserm Leib oder doch im Zusammenhang mit gewissen Organen des Leibes; eben damit spüren wir empfindungsmäßig den Leib selbst; und wir reagieren darauf mit triebhaften Bewegungen.*

being and my life."[144] While being part of the world, I am able to "stand opposite" to it and understand it.

It now becomes clear that the various aspects of the soul, which we have examined individually up to this point in order to grasp the way in which it forms a unity with the body, can only be artificially separated and examined. In reality, the spirituality of the soul is present in its living and its sensing, and for the human being, sensory experiences have meaning beyond the physical reactions that they evoke. Stein elaborates on this idea when she explains that "We saw earlier that we can only get to pure sensory material through a laborious abstraction. Our sense data are always already integrated into an order through which they express something to us. Our spiritual gaze passes through them into an objective (*gegenständliche*), sensorily qualified world."[145] In this way, experiences of the physical world are never merely physical. At the same time, however, the human being is never fully able to depart from the physical body and its sensory experience. The person is self-conscious and free insofar as she is spiritual, but this freedom is not without limits:

> The range of people's freedom does not coincide with the total amplitude of their being. And the soul is here a *central* medium or mean [*Mitte*] in a new sense. It mediates between spirituality and bodily sentient being [*Leib-Sinnenhaftigkeit*]. The traditional tripartition of body-soul-spirit must, however, not be interpreted as if the human soul were a third realm interposed between two other realms subsisting without the soul and independently of one another. Rather, it is in the medium of the soul that that spirituality and bodily sentient being meet and intertwine. And this is precisely what distinguishes the particular being of the spiritual soul from

[144] *Aufbau*, 78. "[*I*]*ch weiß um mein Sein und Leben.*"

[145] *Aufbau*, 81. "*Wir haben früher gesehen, daß wir nur durch eine mühsame Abstraktion zu einem bloßen Empfindungsmaterial gelangen können. Unsere Sinnesdaten sind immer schon einer Ordnung eingefügt, in der sie uns etwas bekunden. Unser geistiger Blick geht durch sie hindurch in eine gegenständliche, sinnenfällig qualifizierte Welt.*"

> the being of the sentient soul, on the one hand, and from the being of the pure spirit, on the other. People are neither brutes nor angels, because they are both in one. Their bodily sentient being differs from the sentient being of brutes, and their spirituality differs from that of angels… People sense or feel [*spürt*] what happens in or with their bodies, but this feeling is a *conscious* experience and is ordained to a passing over into an *understanding apperception* of the body and of bodily functions and processes as well as into an apperception of these impressions of the external world which "strike the senses."[146]

Here we are reminded of Stein's discussion in *Empathy* of the *Leib*, the living body. The human soul is both spiritual and bodily, and thereby the human body (formed by a human soul) is not simply physical matter, nor are physical sensations purely sensations, but conscious experiences.

Furthermore, Stein points out that examining our own experience or observing another person's reactions to their experiences does not only indicate something about the present moment that is being experienced. Rather, it also expresses "lasting characteristics [*Eigenschaften*] or capabilities [*Vermögen*]" of the experiencing individual.[147] This is similar to the way in which the persistent characteristics of animals are revealed to us, with the difference that we are able to discover these characteristics in ourselves, and our very discovery of them forms and shapes them. As Stein says,

> By achievements of the senses we recognize their fitness, by emotional outbursts we recognize temperament, and so forth. And this knowledge relation is founded in an ontic relation: in its potentialities the present soul-life has its ontological foundations, and in acts these potentialites pass into a new form of being. On the other hand, this "actualization" has an effect on the potentialities: they are not rigid and unchangeable, but rather insofar as they are active they also undergo a transformation: a heightened ease and

[146] *FEB*, 371 (*EES*, 244).

[147] *Aufbau*, 76.

> readiness to pass over into actuality. We call the present activity, insofar as it has such an effect, exercise. The potentialities themselves that have, through activity (or through other means), undergone such a transformation are what the Scholastics identify as *habitus*.[148]

Thus, an individual's acts are not only expressive of her experiences, but also of who she is in her individuality, and in this very revealing she brings into fruition aspects of herself that were previously undeveloped.

Stein points out that this is not wholly different from the animal soul, which also has potential that can be actualized through training. In the self-conscious "I" that is a human being, however, this actualization results from freely chosen action. She explains this in *FEB* when she asserts that "If it pertains to the ego as such that its life emanates from its own being and that it is aware of this life as its very own, then the personal ego must in addition be capable of understanding its own life and of molding it freely out of its own self."[149] This ability for self-reflection and self-determination is characteristic of

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[148] *Aufbau*, 76.

> *An den Leistungen der Sinne erkennen wir ihre Leistungsfähigkeit, an den Affektausbrüchen das Temperament usw. Und diese Erkenntnisbeziehung ist in einer ontischen Beziehung begründet: Das aktuelle Seelenleben hat in den Potenzen seine Seinsgrundlage, die Potenzen gehen in den Akten in eine andere Seinsform über. Diese "Aktualisierung" ist anderseits nicht ohne Rückwirkung auf die Potenzen: Sie sind nichts Starres und Unwandelbares, sondern erfahren, indem sie sich betätigen, selbst eine Umformung: eine erhöhte Leichtigkeit und Bereitschaft, in Aktualität überzugehen. Wir nennen die aktuelle Betätigung, sofern sie eine solche Rückwirkung hat, Übung. Die Potenzen selbst, die eine solche Umformung durch Betätigung (oder auch auf andere Weise) erfahren haben, bezeichnet die Scholastik als Habitus*[.]

[149] *FEB*, 362 (*EES*, 324).

beings with spiritual souls at their center, that are not reducible to the self-contained life of plants or the reactive, sensing life of animals. In other words, "Insofar as human beings---according to their essence---are spirit, their 'spiritual life' is an outgoing life that enters into a world which discloses itself to them, while they yet retain a firm hold on their own selves."[150] The human person is capable both of moving beyond herself in response to the spiritual significance perceived in external objects, and of turning inward toward herself, bringing that which is external into herself by seeking to understand this meaning:

> The I has been awakened, and its vision moves in an outward and inward direction. The I is capable of viewing the multitude of external impressions in the light of its understanding and of responding to them in personal freedom. And *because* the human I is *capable* of doing this, people are spiritual persons, i.e., *carriers* of their own lives in a preeminent sense of a personal "having-oneself-in-hand [*des persönlichen 'In-der-Hand-habens'*]."[151]

The spiritual human being is not simply subject to natural causality. Rather, she undertakes acts on the basis of motivated response to value. The spiritual person does not simply relate to the world through sensory perception, and the inner life of the spiritual person is not just reaction to sensory stimuli. As Stein says in *Empathy*, "as physical nature is constituted in perceptual acts, so a new object realm is constituted in feeling. This is the world of values."[152]

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[150] *FEB*, 363-64 (*EES*, 325).

[151] *FEB*, 270 (*EES*, 243).

[152] *Empathy,* 92 ((*Einfühlung*, 102).

Thus, the person's responses to this world of values express who the person is on a deeper level. Stein remarks in *PPH* that

> … we maintain that there are properties which pertain to personality more closely than the intellectual [properties do]. This isn't just the specific moral qualities of the person---receptibility to moral values [*die Empfänglichkeit für sittliche Werte*] and acquiescence to them. Rather, its openness to value in general [*die Aufgeschlossenheit für Werte überhaupt*], which has manifold capabilities, and which has as its precondition the feeling of values of various kinds… As it were, we see what the person *is* when we see which world of value she lives in, which values she is responsible to, and what achievements she may be creating, prompted by values.[153]

What is revealed here is not simply one's character, but the core being of the person, the ground from which her valuing arises. Furthermore, in her response to value, the person carries responsibility for, as Stein says "what becomes of her and does not become of her."[154] One cannot actualize all the potentialities that are available. In choosing to pursue certain ways and abandoning others, the person chooses not only the way in which her personality is revealed, but also the way in which it unfolds.

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[153] Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, trans. Mary Catherine Baseheart, Marianne Sawicki (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000), 227. Translation modified: Baseheart and Sawicki render '*Empfänglichkeit'* here as 'susceptibility' and '*Aufgeschlossenheit*' as 'permeability.' I use this edition of the text since it is the standard English version of the text, though it suffers from several notable deficiencies. Perhaps most perplexing is the translation of '*psychisch*' as 'sentient' and '*Geist*'/'*geistlich*' as 'mind'/'mental', although in virtually all of Stein's other translated works these are rendered as 'psychic' and 'spirit'/'spiritual'. Accordingly, I modify the Baseheart/Sawicki translation throughout, for the sake of continuity and also because I consider these latter terms more faithful to the original.

[154] *Aufbau*., 78 "*was aus ihm geworden und nicht geworden ist.*"

C. The Person Unfolds

1. The Persönlichkeitskern

We have seen that the person expresses not only what is experienced in the present moment, but also in acting reveals a persistent character that has been formed through *habitus*. This character, however (that is, "the 'shape' [*Gestalt*] the person assumes when his potencies are formed in habits"[155]) is not a formation out of nothing, but rather the actualization of potential rising out of the soul, which is one's "personal core" (*Persönlichkeitskern*). Schulz explains that for Stein, the soul as personal core is "that substrate of personal identity which is irreducible to the conscious life of the subject."[156] Furthermore, he says, "As the individual specificity of the person, this core not only remains identical in the development of the person, but it also announces itself in the positions, interests, decisions by which the person is motivated. As the basis of unity of the person the core founds the entire body-soul unity."[157] This identity is not created by the person in their actions, rather, it is the grounding for their actions and shines through their actions.

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[155] *PA,* 181 (*PuA*, 121).

[156] Schulz, 168.

[157] Schulz, 171.

Stein examines this core closely in *PA*.[158] It is, as she says "what [the person] is in himself and what perdures as the *how* varies."[159] That is, despite the varying ways in which one's life may take shape, and how one chooses to go about one's life, this "how" is undergirded by the being of this core, and the myriad possible ways in which one's life may develop all proceed from this core. As Stein explains, "the person himself is constantly changing, although the core that determines the whole shaping process from within is not shaped or changed in this way."[160] While a person's life contains many potentialities that may or may not be actualized (and, in fact, that cannot all be actualized), this does not mean that the core itself comes to be through this actualization. Though one's action shapes one's life (as we have seen, the person is thereby responsible for what he or she becomes), this shaping is not in regard to the personal core; rather, the person's responsibility lies in how (and how much of) the core is actualized. In other words, the particulars of a person's life along with their chosen actions contribute to the way in which the core unfolds, but do not themselves form the core.

2. *Unfolding* (*Entfaltung*)

Thus, this notion of the person is not the existentialist notion of something that creates its own essence in its living and choosing. While the circumstances of one's life

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[158] In this text Stein compares her idea of the personal core with that of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, who first proposed this notion. Conrad-Martius' influence on Stein's thought, including in this regard, are discussed in the following chapter.

[159] *PA*, 183 (*PuA*, 122).

[160] *PA*, 183 (*PuA*, 122-3).

and the ways in which one chooses to respond to them contribute to the formation of one's character, the effects of circumstance emerge from a finite set of possibilities built into one's individual essence. Stein writes in *PPH* that "we know that the sentient state of a person at any given time does not depend only upon the 'history' of her life and the present 'circumstances.' Rather her entire life is decided by the "*core personality*," by that invariable repertoire of being that is not a result of development but, on the contrary, prescribes how the development proceeds."[161] In this way, what motivates a person to act (that is, what a person values) is in a sense limited by this core. Though one may value and choose any number of objects and actions, the kind of person that one is has bearing on the motivations that emerge.

In this way, in action the core unfolds and is revealed not only to others, but to the individual herself. We saw at the beginning of this chapter that, though our most intimate and primordial knowledge is of our own existence, the foundations of our existence remain opaque to us. Self-consciousness arises as the life of the ego, but this life itself rises up out of the inscrutable "dark ground" of the soul. Insofar as it is given its existence by something else, the being of the personal core is not fully known. As Hans Rainer Sepp puts it, "the person is characterized by unfathomable depth."[162] Thus, though it may be primordially grasped that we are individual, who we are as individuals must be discovered.

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[161] *PPH*, 92-3 (*Beiträge*, 80) .

[162] Hans Rainer Sepp, "Edith Stein's Conception of the Person Within the Context of the Phenomenological Movement," in *Empathy, Sociality and Personhood*, eds. Elisa Magri and Dermot Moran, Cham: Springer (2017), 57.

In *FEB*, Stein illustrates this idea with the example of an artist who creates a fictional character according to certain *Urbilder*, or archetypal images, according to which the actions and development of the character are meaningful. For instance, "it follows from the nature or essence of Homer's Achilles that he cruelly avenges the death of his beloved friend, [etc.]... This is the way then in which the quid [*Was*] and the nature [*Wesen*] of Achilles unfold." It is in this unfolding that "the nature discloses itself fully and becomes actual in doing and suffering."[163] Stein remarks that, although the artist is rightfully called the creator of his or her characters, those which are "true to life" seem to unfold "before [the artist's] very eyes", and it seems that the being of these archetypal forms precedes the artist's creation of the character.

Likewise, in the unfolding of the personal core, the person's character "proceeds from an essential form," and thereby not only does this real being move from potentiality to actuality, but in this unfolding its intelligibility is made visible (*Offenbarwerden*).[164] Thus, the kind of person that one is can be revealed in her actions and character. Stein explains that "in them, the core blooms outward. And they allow what inwardly fills your soul to become visible. Kindliness means *more than* just the capability for kind actions. Whoever is kind also acts kindly; but kindness belongs to him even if he never gets the chance to do something kind."[165] In becoming actual, not only does it reveal itself to others, but also to oneself.

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[163] *FEB*, 158 (*EES*, 111)

[164] *FEB*, 331 (*EES*, 383).

[165] *PPH*, 231 (*Beiträge*, 193).

It becomes clear that this unfolding and revealing of the essence of the individual to herself is a movement inward toward the uncovering of the "dark ground" of the soul. Stein explains that "When the ego lives in this interiority, i.e., in the ground of its being where it is truly at home and in its own, it experiences in some measure the meaning of its being… And when the ego's life issues from this interiority, it lives a *full* life and attains to the height of its being."[166] As the essence of the individual is made manifest and the individual grows in self-knowledge, she grows in understanding of her essential potentiality, and thereby through her actions seeks to become the actuality of her being. In choosing to act in accord with this potentiality, the grounding of her being is increasingly unveiled, and she is drawn more deeply inward. As the individual grows in knowledge of her own interiority, she increasingly understands the significance of her experiences and actions in light of this interior being.

[166] Baseheart (1992),. 438.

III. The Valuing and Willing Person

A. Causality vs. Motivation

In Chapter I, we saw that empathy reveals the integrated dimensions of the person---the physical, the psychic, and the spiritual. Chapter II examined the mechanics of Stein's theory of personhood---how these dimensions are defined, and what makes the category "person" distinct. As she makes clear in the *Aufbau*, human and animal souls share the aliveness that is characteristic of plant souls, and human souls are subject to sensory and psychic feelings as animal souls are. However, the human person is set apart from plants and animals insofar as she is an individual whose identity unfolds from her personal core, and this individual is self-conscious, volitional, and motivated by value. In other words, the human person differs from plants and non-human animals insofar as she is spiritual---yet, this spirituality is expressed through physical means. In this way, the person occupies a unique place in the world.

Stein points out in *Empathy* that, even as previously in the text she had examined the human body among physical bodies, and the movements of the psyche "as natural occurrence" conditioned by this body, nevertheless it proved impossible to discuss the human being as natural without beginning to see nature's intertwining with spirit. While the person can be examined as an object, just as rocks and trees and birds can be, the person is not simply an object. Rather, she found that "Consciousness appeared not only as a causally conditioned occurrence, but also as object-constituting at the same time. Thus it stepped out of the order of nature and faced it."[167] The conscious, volitional, evaluative

[167] *Empathy*, 91 (*Einfühlung*, 102).

person is not only a part of the natural world, but also capable of regarding the natural world from a vantage point set apart from it. The human person is a part of the world of physical causality insofar as she experiences the world as embodied and insofar as this embodied experience allows for the expression of an inner, spiritual life. Insofar as she experiences and expresses this spiritual life, however, she participates in a world that is governed by motivation rather than by causality.

Thus, to understand the spiritual aspect of the person, and thereby to understand the human person's unique status as both embodied and spiritual, it is necessary to examine the way in which these two "worlds" overlap and are fused in the person, and also where the boundaries between these worlds can be discerned. The first step in doing so is distinguishing between the physical causality and psychic or experiential causality[168], and then distinguishing between causality and motivation.[169]

1. Physical and psychic causality

[168] Not to be confused with the psychic causality of, for example, Sigmund Freud. As we will see, Stein's conception of psychic causality is particular to her, and as we will see, does not ultimately carry the deterministic connotations that the term may convey when used by other thinkers.

[169] Stein's most extensive treatment of this distinction is in the first treatise of *PPH*, "Psychic Causality" (*PPH* 2ff., translation modified (*Beiträge*, 5ff.)), which she says is an attempt "to work out plainly the twofold basic lawfulness---causality and motivation---operating together within one psychic subject with a sensuous-spiritual essence [*die doppelte Grundgesetzlichkeit, die in einem psychischen Subjekt von sinnlich-geistigem Wesen zusammenwirkt*]." (*PPH* 1, translation modified *Beiträge*, 3.; as previously noted, I translate '*psychisch*' and '*geistlich*' throughout as 'psychic' and 'spiritual', where Baseheart and Sawicki use 'sentient' and 'mental').

The idea the physical events cause and are caused by other physical events is obviously familiar, both philosophically and in everyday life. The difficulty that arises from this basic idea is, as Stein points out, "the old dispute between determinism and indeterminism." If natural objects have a causal effect on other natural objects, what then can be concluded about our experience as free human persons? Are we also natural objects, causally conditioned by other natural objects and events? Stein observes that "[from this dispute] the question emerges whether to classify the living human soul within the great causal network of nature,"[170] and it is this question she tries to address by exploring feelings through the lens of psychic causality and values through the lens of motivation.

Stein invokes the classic example of a ball striking another ball to illustrate mechanical causality, "the basic case of causality (to which physics tries to reduce all other causal relations": "[W]e distinguish an *originating* occurrence---the movement of the ball---and *originated* occurrence---the movement of another ball---and an *incident* that intervenes between the two and that we can designate specifically as "origin": that the one ball bumps into the other."[171] This kind of causal relationship is characterized by necessity; given the material characteristics of the originating event, the intervening incident (or "origin") will predictably result in the originated event, which follows as the effect of the originating event also because of its material characteristics. What occurs occurs according

[170] *PPH*, 2-3 (*Beiträge*, 5). She notes here that "The problem is not always posed in this way. Various and quite different things get mixed up under the headings "freedom" and "necessity." Sometimes the issue is dependence of the will on theoretical reason, sometimes it's the dependence of human willing on the divine, and sometimes it's general causal lawfulness… In the more recent literature, however, the question hinges essentially on the last issue."

[171] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 16).

to the kinds of things that these objects or events are, and the kind of relationship that they have to each other (a relationship conditioned by their material characteristics). In Stein's words, "Upon the condition of the originating event depend, first, the determination of the origin, and thenceforward the determination of the originated event (the "effect"). But both the originating and the originated events are determined in their condition by the peculiar kind of *substrate* these events have."[172] She goes on to say that

> In physical nature there are 'things,' substantial unities, that stand in causal relations and for which the causal occurring is at the same time constitutive. What emerges there as origin are incidents that come to pass with things, and what emerges there as effect are alterations of the capabilities of things. The properties that make up the array of being of the thing betray themselves in these alterations. And conversely, the knowledge of those properties contains a knowledge of the possible effects that it can exert or undergo.[173]

In other words, causal relationships follow a predictable pattern, which is therefore a knowable pattern. The characteristics and conditions of particular objects allow for a certain particular set of events that lead necessarily to other particular events, and insofar as the characteristics of certain things are revealed in our experience of them, we can draw conclusions about how these objects will affect or be affected by events and other objects. If a billiard ball is struck, it shoots away from the player rather than toward her. The mass and shape of the ball, as well as the angle and force at which it is struck, determine its direction, which leads to it striking another ball, which then moves in a predictable way---

[172] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 17).

[173] *PPH*, 16 (*Beiträge*, 17).

at least, predictable to a skilled player who has spent enough time observing the physics of billiard balls to be able to determine the most advantageous shot.

Thus, we see and experience causal relationships between physical objects.[174] But our experiences themselves are psychic phenomena. The question Stein seeks to address is whether or not these, too, are causally governed in the same manner as physical phenomena, and thus whether or not the psyche is reducible to the physical. If this were the case, then it would seem that feelings that we experience in response to stimuli are determined in the same way that the course of a ball rolling down a hill is determined. She begins by pointing out that these psychic phenomena are experienced not as discrete, fragmentary units, but rather as a unified flow. In this sense, it is perhaps imprecise to inquire into the connection between experiences:

> The original current of consciousness is a pure becoming. Experiencing flows along. What's new takes its place in a steady production line, without your being able to ask "through what" the becoming is being produced (= originated). At no point in the current is the going forth of one phase out of another to be apprehended as a "being effected." One flows forth out of the other and the original "whence" lies in obscurity. Because the phases flow *into one another*, no series of disjoint phases emerges, but just a single steadily expanding current. Therefore it wouldn't make any sense to ask about a "connecting" of phases. Connecting is required only with links of a chain, but not with one undivided and indivisible continuum.[175]

Nevertheless, while pre-reflectively all experience flows unbroken in this single current, in attending to this experiential flow it becomes clear that we can observe the "phases" Stein

[174] *Pace* Hume and the question of whether or not it is actually possible to experience causal connection itself. Regardless, it is clear that at least according to our experience, certain objects and events are connected in a way that we perceive as causally related.

[175] *PPH*, 9 (*Beiträge*, 11).

mentions above, and these phases form their own unities within the flow of consciousness.[176] It is possible to identify distinct "classifications" or types of sensory experiences (for example, "color sensation, tonal sensation, sensuous 'condition,' and so forth")[177], and furthermore, various experiences of different classifications are experienced as grouped together in complexes or moments.

She is careful to point out that these phases do not simply follow each other consecutively, one phase disappearing to make way for the next---it is not the case that we have "a displacing of phases by each other, so that at any given time the old is fading away and sinking into nought with the becoming of the new."[178] Conversely, it is not the case that experiences are produced one after the other, solidifying as more come into being and forming a solid, static mass, "like production of a line."[179] Rather, experiences build like waves, swelling and filling with both that which is present and that which is past but still lives on in the present experience; that which is present pushing the wave forward even as that which is past begins to fall and flow back. In Stein's words,

> First of all, there is a "live" persisting of what's "concluded" while what's new is producing itself, so that one phase of the current contains alike what's just becoming, and what's already been but is still alive (what is being experienced *as* such, as *still* alive, thus what stands out, through an index of pastness, from what's "now" entering into life). Coherent

[176] *PPH*, 11 (*Beiträge*, 13).

[177] *PPH*, 11 (*Beiträge*, 13).

[178] *PPH*, 9 (*Beiträge*, 11).

[179] *PPH*, 9 (*Beiträge*, 11-12). "Yet neither is it so, that what's being generated at any given time is becoming stiff and then lifeless as an enduring entity, persisting stiff and unchanged, while what's new is coming to be and taking its own place."

> experiences form in this: that what's ebbing away within experiencing, yet *still* alive, coalesces with what's newly arising.[180]

Thus, that which is becoming past does not simply cease to be, replaced by a present experience, nor is it simply preserved and set in place for new experiences to be set alongside. What is passing away and what is coming to be form the same wave, even as that which is new swells up over that which is passing away and pushes the wave forward while that which is past sinks down. Individual experiences are formed, just as individual waves swell and break, yet the flow of the tide is continuous:

> One such coherent experience is concluded as soon as it doesn't append any more new phases. There is, then, a "dying" of what's generated that is not a total submerging. What has ebbed away in its aliveness is past, but a more or less hollow consciousness of it stays behind. And because the ebbing experiencing remains preserved in such a modification and the new experiencing follows upon it, the unity of a current of experience develops a constituted current, congruent with the current that was originally generating, lately constituting. This constituted current fills up phenomenological time, in which experience adjoins experience in a succession. But besides the "succession," the "coincidence" in experiential time has to be considered. Every moment is complexly filled up. In the momentary phase, alongside what's just entering into life and what's still living, we have what's extinct, what has died away.[181]

In this way, coherent experiences are discernible in the flow of consciousness, yet at the same time these experiences are barely separable from each other---since each moment is "filled up," there is no real "space" between each coherent experience.

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[180] *PPH*, 9-10 (*Beiträge*, 12).

[181] *PPH*, 10 (*Beiträge*, 12).

While experiences are evidently associated with each other in this way, this does not yet imply a causal relationship between experiences, and this does not mean that experience complexes are a collection of causally related experiences. Stein says that "this kind of 'association' isn't any causal occurring. The emergence of a complex is pure becoming---like the coming to be of an experience. It isn't being produced as an effect. The awakening of the overall complex with the touching off again of one part isn't any causal production either."[182] Nevertheless, Stein asserts that there is a psychic "*causality* of the experiential sphere" that is an "analog" to physical, mechanical causality.[183] This dissertation has already touched upon her idea of *Lebenskraft* or life force that emerges when we analyze our experience.[184] This "layer of experience," Stein says, reveals a causal element in the sphere of experience.[185]

The kinds of experiences described above are accompanied by a shift in one's life force, shifts which are not only affected by that which we experience but also have a causal influence upon these experiences. As Stein explains,

> Each shift in the sphere… of life feelings… requires a shift in the total course of simultaneous experience. If I feel myself to be weary, then the current of life seems to stagnate, as it were. It creeps along sluggishly, and everything that's occurring in the different sensory fields is involved in it. The colors are sort of colorless, the tones are hollow, and every 'impression'---each datum that is registered with the lifestream against its will, so to speak--is painful, unpleasant… If the weariness subsides, then a shift enters the other spheres as well. And in the moment where the

[182] *PPH*, 14 (*Beiträge*, 16).

[183] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 16).

[184] See, for example, Ch. 2.

[185] *PPH*, 14 (*Beiträge*, 16).

> weariness changes into vigor, the current starts to pump briskly, it surges forward unrestrainedly. Everything that's emerging in it carries the whiff of vigor and joyfulness.[186]

Here a causal effect can be observed in the sense that these life feelings color and influence one's experience of an object or event. For "Just as a rolling ball sets in motion another ball that it bumps, just as the motion induced depends on the 'momentum' of the impacts as to direction and speed, so the 'impetus' that goes out from the sphere of life determines the manner of the course of the rest of the experiencing."[187] The experience is the kind of experience that it is because of the experienced life feelings that accompany it; that is, the life feeling has a causal effect on the experience as a whole.

Stein points out, however, that though this kind of causality is "an analog"[188] to the mechanical causality of physical nature, experiential causality should not be mistaken for it. In mechanical causality, while the causal event that intervenes between and relates the "originating" and "originated" events (e.g. the initial movement of the first ball and the ensuing movement of the second, struck ball) is a necessary bridge required in order for the effect to follow from the cause, it is by no means necessary to the original event. It is possible for the moving ball to not strike anything (for example, if no second ball is placed in its path), and if it did not there would be no second movement. In Stein's words, "the originating event emerges independently of the incident that leads to the triggering of the

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[186] *PPH*, 14-15 (*Beiträge*, 16).

[187] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 16).

[188] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 16).

originated event, and without the onset of such an incident it would elapse ineffectually."[189] When we look to experiential causality, on the other hand, we see a slightly different structure:

> [T]he "origin" may be seen in the fact that a shift enters the lifesphere. The life feeling of the moment corresponds to the originating event, and the course of the rest of the experience corresponds to the originated event… in the experiential sphere, the incident that we designate specifically as origin is not inserted between originating and originated event. Rather, the incident determines the originating event, which cannot possibly elapse "ineffectually."[190]

Thus, the shift that is experienced as a change or development in life feeling establishes the life feeling which is currently being experienced, and this life feeling makes the experience to be what it is. If the "origin" is a shift from a feeling of weariness to vigor, then the vigor (the "originating event") causes the experience as a whole to be one of attentiveness and enjoyment (the "originated event") where before I experienced boredom, distaste, heaviness.

In other words, the psychic experience itself can only conceptually be parsed into origin, cause, and effect. Unlike two otherwise unrelated balls that happen to strike each other and thereby participate in a causal chain of physical phenomena, the experienced life feeling and its effect on the experience are necessarily related. Nevertheless, physical and psychic causality are both kinds of causing because in both cases "the effect cannot possibly fail to happen if origin *and* originating event are initiated and, at the instant where

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[189] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 17).

[190] *PPH*, 15 (*Beiträge*, 17).

that is the case, engaged."[191] While the original ball may not necessarily strike another ball, insofar as it does, the second ball cannot help but be set into motion because of the physical characteristics of both balls, and the particulars of the laws of physics that come into play when these particular kinds of objects strike each other. In the same way, if I feel vigorous and lively, I cannot help but live the current experience as a joyful and exciting one, because this is characteristic of a vigorous life feeling. As Stein points out, "You can no more think that weariness 'enlivens' the current of consciousness, than you can imagine that a ball that's flung down rises up as a result of the pitch."[192] Thus, while the movements of the psyche cannot be reduced to simply physical events, they are nevertheless experienced as causal.

Furthermore, while this causality differs from physical causality, this does not mean that the psychic is wholly divorced from the physical[193]. In order to elaborate on this distinction, Stein claims it is necessary to analyze the parts into which experience can be broken down; namely, "a *content*" such as sensory data (content which is "extra-egoic") or a feeling (content which is "intra-egoic") such as enjoyment, "the *experience*" of having a sensation or feeling, and "the *consciousness* of that experiencing."[194] Experiences of different content can vary in intensity, and our consciousness of an experience is more focused as the experience grows more intense. As Stein says, "I can be devoted to an extra-

[191] *PPH*, 16 (*Beiträge*, 17).

[192] *PPH*, 16 (*Beiträge*, 17).

[193] Such a conclusion would contradict what was said in Ch. 2 on the psyche and the role of external sensory content play in psychic feelings.

[194] *PPH*, 16-17 (*Beiträge*, 18).

egoic content or given over to an intra-egoic content with greater or lesser intensity. With higher tension, the extra-egoic content emerges more sharply and clearly and the intra-egoic takes possession of me more exclusively… [and] the more intense the experience, the more luminous and alert is the consciousness of it."[195] Furthermore, this intensity of experiencing seems to correspond to the life feelings discussed above, and as life feelings transition and experiencing changes in intensity, so does consciousness become sharper and the content clearer to us:

> Its intensity is low if I'm weary; and with increasing vigor, it rises. If we're concerned about measurable magnitude, then each increment of the vigor of living can be keyed to a determinate degree of the intensity of the experiencing. Only secondarily do either consciousness or contents become co-engaged. As vigor climbs, the awareness of the experiencing increases and so do the clarity, salience, and, we say, the downright "aliveness" of the contents.[196]

Thus, these life feelings seem to have a causal influence on our experiences (even as they themselves are a part of our experience).

Here, too, we are reminded that the distinction between physical causality and psychic causality should not induce us to starkly separate the physical and the psychic. Our experiencing of extra-egoic content such as visual stimuli or painful sensation is tied up with intra-egoic feelings such as joy and sorrow, and our experiences of these sensations and feelings are connected to life feelings, which both affect and are affected by both external and internal content. When I happen upon a stunning view while in a vigorous

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[195] *PPH*, 18 (*Beiträge*, 19).

[196] *PPH*, 19 (*Beiträge*, 19).

state, the colors of the landscape appear all the more brilliant and pleasing to me, and I feel joy at having the privilege to have seen it. In a depleted state, I may experience a relatively minor physical injury as much more painful and distracting than I would otherwise, since I do not have the energy to brush it aside and focus on something more pleasant. Likewise, an experience of intensely felt sadness can seem to me to be physically painful, and the body can undergo physiological changes from such an experience.

In this way, individual characteristics and properties are revealed, as well as characteristics of the content of one's experience---analogously to the way in which the particular "substrate" of a physical object (such as the aforementioned rolling balls) is revealed in observing physical causal events. Stein explains that

> [E]xperiences themselves as well as their contents, to some extent, are manifestations of real conditionalities and properties such as the life feelings. The receptivity of the subject manifests itself in sensations---or more precisely, in the having of sensations---and, to be sure, first of all as a momentary status. Yet, in the fact that a different receptivity comes to givenness according to the peculiarity of the contents and their experiencing, the different conditionalities appear as modes and simultaneously as manifestations of an enduring property that likewise is designated as receptivity in the customary way of speaking: the enduring property within shifting conditionalities. And it's this enduring property whose shifting modes depend on the shifting states of life or are brought about by them.[197]

That is, the way in which one receives the content of experience tells one something about that content, and something about the I that is having the experience.[198] She continues on to say:

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[197] *PPH*, 25 (*Beiträge*, 24).

[198] Recall the analysis of Stein's understanding of the personal ego in Ch. 2, and its distinction from the pure ego. Here, too, while discussing psychic causality, she draws

> The real causality of the psychic manifests itself in the phenomenal causality of the existential sphere. The enduring properties of the real ego, or psychic individual, appear as a substrate of the psychic causal occurrences which persists in a regulated changing of modes of these properties; so that a determinate property---lifepower---is singled out as both setting the mode of the other by its own momentary modes, and set in its own states by them in turn. The fact that powers are supplied to or withdrawn from lifepower is a "cause" of the psychic occurrence. The "effect" consists in the alteration of other psychic properties.[199]

Nevertheless, in speaking of psychic events and psychic properties in terms of "cause" and "effect," it is important not to conclude that it is possible to predict these effects with certainty, or even to definitively identify causes. Stein claims that it is impossible to objectively determine the amount of lifepower in the way that one could objectively determine, for example, the weight, speed, angle, etc. of one ball careening toward another. In fact, she points out, it is absurd to talk about lifepower as if it were "a *numerically expressible quantum*."[200] Furthermore, even attempting to qualitatively express distinct life feelings can only be approximate, since they are not discrete objects but rather moments of a continuum. No matter how many nuanced words we may use to describe life feelings, we will never be able to "select *every single* quality of feeling and cover it with a *proper name*,

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attention to this distinction when she points out that "the ego that is in possession of this real property shouldn't be confused with the pure ego originally experienced as point of radiation of pure experiences. The ego is grasped only as a bearer of its properties, as a transcendent reality that comes to givenness by manifestation in immanent date but never becomes immanent itself. We shall designate this real ego, its properties and statuses, as the *psychic*" (*PPH* 23, translation modified; *Beiträge*, 22).

[199] *PPH*, 25, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 24).

[200] *PPH*, 34 (*Beiträge*, 31).

and do so for every imaginable intensity level."[201] Thus, it is impossible to identify "causal laws" for every particular life feeling and every resulting intensity.

This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to conclude anything at all about life feelings. Stein references Bergson, explaining that while she agrees with his claim that "differences of *intensity* of sensate states are in truth differences in *quality*, and that they can be ascertained neither quantitatively nor in any unequivocally identifiable manner at all." On the other hand, "What we cannot concede to him… is that the discussion of intensity is something really completely unwarranted here"[202] It is certainly possible to distinguish distinctly different life feelings from one another, though shades of a particular life feeling may be unnoticeable and the transition point between one similar feeling and another may be indiscernible (and, in fact, non-existent, just as there is no real transition point between "adjacent" points on a line, though it is easy to identify points near opposite ends of the line). Stein calls this "the discernibility of stable qualities that encompass an infinite multiplicity and blur at their edges." In making these distinctions, we are able to form "inferences of *probability*," such as when I conclude while exhausted that my fatigue will keep me from being able to focus on my work.[203] By observing how I feel in particular situations and the manner in which I receive experiences, I can come to a better understanding of myself and my own lifepower. I can become attuned to the level of

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[201] *PPH*, 34 (*Beiträge*, 31). Stein compares the attempt to describe the fine distinctions in life feeling to a painter that is able to distinguish between many subtly different colors and shades. The implication is that despite this nuanced understanding, the painter would still be unable to identify or name every possible variation in a color gradient.

[202] *PPH*, 35 (*Beiträge*, 32).

[203] *PPH*, 36 (*Beiträge*, 33).

exhaustion at which it is futile to work, or begin to recognize how much more intensely I am able to respond to good news when I am vigorous and awake.[204]

Again, this examination of the psyche reveals the intertwining of material and immaterial in the human person that is so integral to Stein's philosophy. When my body is fatigued from lack of sleep, I know that my lifepower may not be sufficient for intense mental labor. I also know that, even if I am tired, the long-awaited confirmation of some good news may lift my mood so much that I am reinvigorated despite my physical exhaustion. Furthermore, this understanding of the psyche draws attention not only to psychic-physical unity, but also to the role of spirit in this unity, and thereby to the lawfulness that governs spirit (motivation), just as causality governs nature. Mette Lebech explains in "Stein's Phenomenological Value Theory" that feelings "are experienced as pertaining to both networks, that of nature and that of the spirit: they cause something in me (the blood to rush, the hands to sweat, the knees to weaken) and they are motivated by something that comes to me as a message sounding something like 'this is valuable',

[204] It is worth noting that according to Stein, the fruit of these observations is particular to each individual. We do not all possess the same "amount" of lifepower, nor is this lifepower manifested in life feelings in the same way from person to person. "Thus," she says, "it's possible that achievements of which one individual is capable are denied to another, even with the most favorable supply of his or her lifepower." This relates to her assertions about the personal core or *Persönlichkeitskern*. While the direction of an individual's life is not pre-determined by personality, it is simply the case that one's range of potentialities is not limitless, and that this range differs in each individual. In the same way, while it is impossible to predict with complete accuracy what life feelings one may have and to what intensity, and to conclude with certainty what their effects may be, it is by all means possible to observe, for example, that one person's lifepower is not significantly affected by physical fatigue, while another person is simply incapable of mustering the energy to work in such a state.

'dangerous', 'horrid', 'beautiful'."[205] Thus, the psyche is the nexus point at which the two "worlds" of human life, physical and spiritual, mesh. Lebech continues on to say that

> The psyche is the sounding board, which transforms spiritual energy into causal phenomena and makes me feel physically what otherwise is invisible and does not belong to the world of nature at all. The psyche is the antenna that captures the signal, the network that stores the message; the feeling is the act in which I detect this (slight, perhaps, but nevertheless significant) physical reaction, this fluctuation in life power, caused by the spiritual energy passing through.[206]

In examining experience, we find that it includes not just receptivity on the part of the psyche, but also mental/spiritual activity---that is, intentionality; the ego "deploy[ing] its mental gaze and 'point[ing]' itself at something."[207] An experience does not always simply wash over us in the way that Stein first described in order to pinpoint psychic causality; in conscious experience the ego turns toward an object to grasp it. Once we move from an examination of receptive experience to these egoic acts, we must also move from a discussion of causality to a discussion of motivation.

2. Motivation

Stein introduces her object in the first treatise of *PPH* as the attempt "to work out plainly the twofold basic lawfulness---causality and motivation---operating together within

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[205] Mette Lebech, "Stein's Phenomenological Value Theory," *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society* (2010), 143

[206] Lebech (2010), 143.

[207] *PPH,* 39 (*Beiträge*, 35).

one psychic subject with a sensual-spiritual essence."[208] This latter "lawfulness," according to Stein, governs and accounts for the connection between acts of the ego. In other words, motivation is the lawfulness of spirit. She explains that:

> In the realm of acts, we confront new means of connection that we haven't yet encountered up to now. If the gaze points itself successively at a series of continually subsiding data, or rather points on through the data at "external" objectivities, then we have not only a succession of detached apprehensions of a single shape, but *one continuous apprehension*, an *appending* of the later to the earlier ("*apperception*") a *combination* of single apprehensions ("*synthesis*") and a being-set-in-motion of the later by the earlier ("*motivation*"). All this makes no sense outside the realm of egoic acts. You can't talk about taking, grasping, and moving in the sphere of pure passivity, which we were dealing with before.[209]

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[208] *PPH,* 1, translation modified; (*Beiträge*, 3).

[209] *PPH,* 40 (*Beiträge*, 35-6). Stein points out that this approach to motivation is non-standard:

> If we designate the connection of acts that we have in view here quite broadly as *motivation*, then we're aware of departing from the customary linguistic usage which restricts this expression to the area of "free acts," especially of willing. However we believe that this broadening is warranted, that what we now have in view is a structure valid in general for the entire range of intentional experiences, a structure that simply undergoes various configurations according to the particularity of the acts that adapt themselves to it.

Stein's footnote on this passage points the reader to Husserl's *Ideas I* as a basis for this broad concept of motivation. Sawicki points out in an editorial gloss that *Ideas II* elaborates on the topic, though Stein herself refrains from referencing this text since it was unpublished---an inconvenience which she manages by adding a disclaimer to the foreword of *PPH*. She informs her readers that while *Ideas II* and other Husserlian manuscripts certainly influenced her intellectual grappling with these topics, citation of them is impossible, not only due to their unpublished status, but also because her highly involved editing work meant that "very often I was not sure whether I would have to regard something as my own research result or as an internal appropriation of transferred thought motifs" (*PPH*, 2 (*Beiträge*, 3-4)).

Thus, while physical phenomena are governed by a physical causal network of motions, and the psyche is governed by the causal connection of life feelings, the spirit is governed by the motivated connection of intentional acts. Compared to the preliminary description of psychic causality, motivation is "not a mere blending like that of simultaneously or sequentially ebbing phases of experiences, or the associative tying together of experiences, but an *emerging* of the one [act] *out of* the other, a self fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one *on the basis of* the other *for the sake of* the other… The 'pivot' at which the motivation starts, so to speak, is always the ego. It executes the one act *because* it has executed the other."[210] In other words, an egoic act (that is, intentionality toward an object) is explained by another act, which motivates the occurrence of the subsequent act. Stein gives as an example the belief that something exists, which is motivated by the givenness of the object in perception. This belief may then motivate, for example, a judgment of the object's value, which may then motivate willing or acting in response to that value.[211] The action is done for the sake of the perceived value of the object, because the value "confronts you as something that ought to be,"[212] and as something in response to which a certain action appears to be most appropriate.

This means that motivation shines light on the intelligibility of conscious acts. If intentionality is redirected from the existence of the object itself to the sense of the object as "carrier of a unitary essential substance,"[213] one can then examine this substantial unity

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[210] *PPH,* 41 (*Beiträge*, 36).

[211] *PPH,* 41 (*Beiträge*, 36).

[212] *PPH,* 43 (*Beiträge*, 38).

[213] *PPH,* 42 (*Beiträge*, 37-8).

and recognize its intelligibility, and thereby begin to comprehend the rationality of the motivation to which it gives rise. Stein explains that

> Living in the execution of an act, the ego is turned toward the object and, progressing from act to act with a steadily changing substantial sense… the ego takes the object to be; yet the ego does this without being turned thereby to the sense itself and to the framework of motivation. Nevertheless there exists the possibility at any time of making the sense into an object, unfolding it, and from it inferring norms for the process of motivation.[214]

For example, she points out that "it belongs in the sense of two particular judgments that they can combine into the unity of a syllogistic connection in which they have a third judgment for consequence," and that grasping a value includes the recognition that "the norm is to be inferred, that whoever brings a value to givenness… should set himself the goal of its realization." The conclusion drawn from these examples is that "the entire life of acts comes under rational laws, which the subject itself can teach itself by insight, and by which the subject can assess the factual process of its motivations."[215] Thus, if we attend to our motivations, we can come to better understand both ourselves and our values, and the nature of the objects of our valuing.

This does not mean, however, that a motive necessitates one particular act. Rather, motive "defines a range of possibilities" that could intelligibly follow from an act of the ego. The basis for this range of possibilities is the individual's personal core and the "*repertoire of meaning*" that has built up during her life. Stein claims that "What can

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[214] *PPH,* 43 (*Beiträge*, 38).

[215] *PPH,* 43 (*Beiträge*, 38).

become a motive for a person, and in what respect, depends upon which meaning-ensembles it can fit into, that is, which meanings it finds already there."[216] Not everyone will be motivated in the same way, because different meanings arise from varying experiences and the way in which a particular personality is disposed toward these experiences. In fact, she goes on to say, "the mental life of an individual is co-determined by the peculiarity of [the personal core] to such an extent that what is a plausible motive for this individual depends upon it."[217] Thus, when I seek to understand someone's motives, I thereby come to a deeper understanding of their unique and particular personality, and a deeper understanding of one's personality makes it easier to foresee and grasp their motives in a particular situation.

In this way, my response to my grasping of a particular value is not predetermined, since there are a number of possible attitudes I could take toward it that would be equally rational, and some that would be clearly irrational, such as if I were to avoid looking at sunsets specifically because I find them beautiful and delightful. Furthermore, it is possible in some cases that a motive "*permit* certain modes of behavior without *requiring* any one of them," Stein points out. "The one is *understandable* from the other, yet it's no longer a matter of any relationship of *rational grounding*. It's quite understandable, though neither reasonable nor unreasonable, for a noise in my vicinity to attract my attention, or for me then to be inclined to relocate to a vicinity in which I feel comfortable."[218] Here Stein

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[216] *PPH,* 95 (*Beiträge*, 82).

[217] *PPH,* 95 (*Beiträge*, 82).

[218] *PPH,* 44 (*Beiträge*, 39).

distinguishes between what she calls "rational motives" which "rest upon a relationship of rational grounding" and "incentives" which "have only an understandable connection." Nevertheless, both terms describe kinds of motivation.

This points us to the distinction between causality and motivation. As mentioned above, Stein observes that acts of consciousness do not simply flow along in the current of experience. Rather, she says,

> An act is always an emerging from the current. The act expands out in front of the current but is not totally involved with the current. The act "grasps" after something not lying in the course of the current. It keeps on propagating as long as it's got ahold of that (the object), and ceases when it lets go. Therefore we have no continuum of acts in the current, no steady flowing over of act into act, no steadily filled "field of acts" analogous to the sensory fields. The acts are "deposits," "sections" in the current (whose continuity is still not breached, thanks to the steadily filled experiential fields that remain).[219]

Thus, these intentional acts stand out from the current and are characterized by "insightful doing" rather than the "blind occurring" of non-active experience. In the latter, our experience is shaped by shifting life feelings that simply happen to us, while complexes of acts are shaped by the motivations upon which they are grounded, and upon the basis of which we decide to act.

In this way, Stein says, "the realm of 'sense' and 'reason' begins with acts and their motivations. Here you can talk about accuracy and falseness, discernment and obtuseness, in a sense that doesn't even come up in the sphere of 'actless' consciousness."[220] I can

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[219] *PPH*, 44-5 (*Beiträge*, 39).

[220] *PPH*, 46 (*Beiträge*, 40).

examine these acts and motivations, and after the fact I can call to mind the reasons grounding the actions which I have chosen, gaining insight into my intentional acts and the objects toward which they are directed, such as when I recall an object of my valuing and recognize that according to this value I chose to act in such a way that is fitting to that value. On the other hand, an examination of a causally conditioned experience offers insight into the object of that experience (and of my own life feelings) by revealing the causal connections whose effect is experienced. Sawicki and Baseheart succinctly summarize this distinction in an editorial footnote in *PPH*, in which they remark that "We recognize causality by seeing the necessity of an event. We recognize motivation by re-executing the original transition from act to act while understanding in what ways that transition was optional."[221] When life feelings change under the influence of experience, or when my reaction to an experience is affected by the state of my life feelings, I can later recognize the connections between them; for example, that I feel depleted of energy after receiving some demoralizing news, or that a new flavor of ice cream tastes especially delicious and pleasant because I am currently feeling vigorous and able to appreciate this enjoyable sensory experience. When I respond to a value, however, my later reflection does not tell me that this value caused my action, but rather that I chose to act in such a way that seemed to be the most reasonable and appropriate response to this particular value, and in a way that shows how valuable this object is to me. If I choose to take the longer route to work in order to stop at the house of a friend that lives along the way, this does not mean

[221] *PPH* 46, fn. 69 (*Beiträge*, 40).

that my friend's residence there causes me to walk this route. Rather, my valuing of our friendship motivates me to seek her out.

What these examples make evident, however, is that the very distinction between psychic causality and motivation points to the integratedness of the physical, psychic and spiritual aspects of the human person. Our psychic life feelings can arise in response to external objects and can be detected in the physical body, and they also accompany our spiritual motivations. Lebech's assertion quoted above (in which she describes the psyche as the "sounding board" or the "antenna"[222] that signals spiritual acts in physically-manifested feelings) gives a picture of the psyche as mediating between the spiritual and natural spheres, such that the spiritual is made visible. While these images are immensely helpful in clarifying the conceptual distinctions between body, soul, and spirit, 'mediation' is in this case a metaphorical and somewhat imprecise notion. As we have seen, Stein does not conceive of the physical, psychic, and spiritual aspects of the human person as fully discrete parts that are linked together to form a person. The person is not a composite piece of machinery made up of three main components. Rather, the person is a unity that is psychic-physical-spiritual; she is these three at once, and the operations of these aspects involve all three together.

The psyche is not simply a bridge between spiritual acts and bodily occurrences; rather, nearly every act is felt by the psyche and exhibited in the body, and nearly every physical occurrence (at least, those that are recognized) is accompanied by a psychic response and an act of consciousness. When I receive bad news about the loss of something

[222] See the last paragraph of Section 3.1.1. of this chapter, "Physical and Psychic Causality."

I value, and I am depleted of energy, not only does my body feel weary but I also find it almost impossible to will myself to get back to work. When I am full of vigor while enjoying a sunny day and eating ice cream, the pleasant taste brings me joy and I decide this is my new favorite flavor. When I run across a friend in the street, my affection for her and my valuing of her are shown on my face as I smile and greet her. In this way, our spiritual acts are not cut off from the natural sphere, but rather expressed by it. As Lebech explains,

> [Feelings] are a kind of physical measure of the effect of spiritual energy on the psyche. As the mercury that rises in the thermometer indicates heat in the surroundings because mercury expands, thus anger is felt in the blood rushing to the back of the brow and the tension of the body preparing for aggression. Love is felt in the inclination of the heart, the loosening of the limbs, the easy acceptance of the presence of the other in close proximity. With them they carry the message: this makes me angry, I love that man: the object they present to us has the formal quality (as Aquinas would say) of being "uneasily avoidable evil," or "good," and hence reveal to us a valuation we have always already performed when we feel.[223]

Thus, the psychic feelings that emerge in my body reveal my motivations, and in this emerging my body expresses my motivations and the spiritual acts which they motivate. In this way, spiritual content is made accessible through empathy. In encountering others empathically, we become privy to their inner life; we see what they value, and what choices they make. Indeed, what we are doing when we empathize is recognize that this object of our perception is not simply a physical object, nor even simply an animal with psychic feelings, but is a person who is capable of self-consciousness and spiritual activity.

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[223] Lebech (2010), 44.

Thus, when we grasp someone's personhood through empathy, part of what we are grasping is the person's motivation, expressed in their body, voice, facial expression, etc.. Lebech explains that even when we are attending to someone's sensory perception, we are able to grasp not just that they are perceiving and what they are perceiving, but we are also able to grasp the motivation behind their perceiving, revealing the spiritual aspect of the person with whom we are empathizing:

> Perception as well can be empathised, but not really without empathising its motivation. What we see when seeing someone watch, is that they watch something, aeroplanes, for example. We might wonder why they do that, but then we are already preoccupied with motivations, just as we are, when we wonder what they are watching. Motivations, generally speaking, interest us far more than the sheer perception of things, as this perception only makes sense in relation to its motivation.[224]

When we empathize we recognize the other as motivated, and when we recognize these motivations we recognize what they value. The same, of course, applies to us when the other empathizes with us and thereby recognizes who we are. This is the basis for our ability to connect with each other, to communicate with each other, to form communities, and to deeply understand each other in individual relationships. It is by recognizing others' motivations (and thus their values) that we are able to share experiences, and to be able to say something about them to each other (whether verbally or non-verbally). I can understand someone's experience even if I myself have never had a similar experience, because the motivation behind the experience is intelligible. Lebech goes on to say that "Experience, as we experience it in common, is experienced as motivated, otherwise

[224] Lebech (2010), 140, fn. 5.

communication about it would not be possible."[225] In all that we do, we show ourselves to others and receive what they show us about themselves.

Thus, knowing another person means coming to understand the spiritual content that is shared with you, and likewise expressing yourself to others and being understood by them. In order to more fully explore what exactly we express to one another, however, it is necessary to look more closely at value, and what it means to say that human persons are evaluative beings.

B. Value

1. How values are grasped

As discussed on Ch. 1, Stein argues that emotions are both directed toward objects and disclose values.[226] Íngrid Vendrell Ferran points out that "this claim was shared in one form or another by all the early phenomenologists," and furthermore that "From Brentano, Stein inherits the idea that emotions are related to what is valuable."[227] In other words, when we perceive an object which provokes an affective response, our intentionality is directed both toward the object itself and toward an objective value (that is nevertheless an intra-egoic object even when the valued object is extra-egoic) that we grasp as adhering in

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[225] Lebech (2010), 141.

[226] See Ch. 1, "Empathy as Perception of Psycho-Physical-Spiritual Unity."

[227] Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, "Intentionality, Value disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model," *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood* (2017), 75. Vendrell Ferran takes care to assert here that Stein's understanding of "the relationship between emotions and values," while taking its starting point from Brentano and other phenomenologists such as Husserl, is not a restating of the views of any one of these thinkers, or even simply a synthesis of several.

the object, and which is correlated to my subjective attitude that is motivated by this value. Stein explains that this shows emotions to be "founded acts," that is, "they are stance-takings toward an allegedly factual material."[228] She illustrates this with the following example:

> If when full of gladness I contemplate a beautiful landscape, then the foundation of the gladness is not only the sensory data, which are contributing 'stuff' in the intuition of the landscape. Rather, the gladness itself for its part contains 'hyletic' components, only not 'extra-egoic' but 'egoic' ones: a feeling of enjoyment, a comfortableness, and the like.[229]

In this way, the feeling reveals the value as objective content. According to Stein, "a mental apprehension springs up on account of the egoic contents, turning them into bearers of a gift of sense, and… these egoic contents in their 'function of manifestation' reveal to the subject the view into a new object world. This new object world, which unfolds before us as we feel, is the world of value."[230] Thus, an affective attitude is not simply a sensory response to an object of perception (which, as Stein points out, "the psychological faction" attempts to claim[231]), but also a grasping of value and an affective response to this grasping. In sensory perception we look outward to grasp something about the nature of the object,

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[228] *PPH*, 157 (*Beiträge*, 133).

[229] *PPH*, 158 (*Beiträge*, 133).

[230] *PPH*, 158 (*Beiträge*, 133).

[231] *PPH*, 158 (*Beiträge*, 133). "Over and over again, the psychological faction has sought to contest the unique being of feelings and to explain them as 'complexes of organ sensations.'"

and in affective acts we likewise grasp a reality outside of ourselves, though that which reveals this reality is an "inner" feeling.[232]

After making this claim, Stein points out that when we talk about "feeling", we are actually talking about two things that she conceptually distinguishes from each other in order to understand the relationship between feeling and value, and the way in which value is constituted. On the one hand, feeling (*das Fühlen*) is "the acts in which we are confronted with values, with objects as value-endowed, as 'goods," and on the other feelings (*Gefühle*) are also "the attitudes [*Stellungnahmen*] that these values invoke in us."[233] We can say that we feel a value in the sense that it is disclosed to us and we "sense" it, and we can also say that we feel a certain way in response to a disclosed value. It would appear that the affective response (*Gefühl*) is founded upon the feeling of the value: "at first it looks as though, on the basis of the 'fact-recognition' ['*Sachkenntnisnahme*'] (the intuition of the landscape), first the value-recognition [*Wertkenntnisnahme*] (the feeling of the beauty [*das Fühlen der Schönheit*]) occurs and then the affective response [*Gemütsstellungnahme*] (the gladness.)"[234] So, it seems it is the recognition of beauty that founds the feeling of

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[232] Of course, it is not just objects of sensory perception that evoke recognition of values. Stein points out that "values do come to givenness where extra-egoic data are playing no role at all: with respect to pure thought formations (an 'elegant' proof, a 'harmoniously' constructed theory), or with respect to your own inner life, such as the value of joyful pardon or the disvalue of a grudge, and the like" (*PPH*, 160 (*Beiträge*, 134)).

[233] *PPH*, 159 (*Beiträge*, 133).

[234] *PPH*, 159, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 133). '*Wertkenntnisnahme*' and '*Sachkenntnisnahme*' are translated by Baseheart and Sawicki as 'value-information' and 'fact-information,' possibly based on the commonly used phrase '*zur Kenntnisnahme*,' which is routinely translated into English as the colloquial phrase 'for your information.' This phrase, however, is essentially the only instance in which '*Kenntnisnahme*' would be translated as 'information,' and the phrase could be more precisely rendered as something like "I bring this to your attention for the purpose of informing you" or "I tell you this so

gladness.[235] Vendrell Ferran notes that this position is "defended by Scheler, Geiger, and Ortega y Gasset."

Stein disagrees, though she initially somewhat evasively signals her disagreement by observing that "Nevertheless it's not so easy to detect how the foundational relationships here lie."[236] She goes on to make clear, however, that she does not think that the intentional affective act can be separated from the affective response.[237] To grasp a value (beauty, for example), is for it to "place [a] claim on me;" it "insists that I inwardly open myself to it and let my inner self be determined by it," unlike qualities known through sensory perception.[238] Thus, to grasp a value is to affectively respond to it. If I am numb to its demand and do not open myself up to it, then I have not fully grasped it, since

> [F]or as long as this inner contact is not effected, for as long as I withhold the response which beauty requires, beauty doesn't entirely divulge itself to me. The intention inhering in the mere recognition [*Kenntnisnahme*] remains unfulfilled. Thus the completely fulfilled value-perception

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that you are aware of it." The implication of '*Kenntnisnahme*' is not that it refers to a piece of information, but rather the awareness or recognition of something (such as information). Additionally, the meaning of the phrase '*das Fühlen der Schönheit*' is not fully clear when translated either as Baseheart and Sawicki's 'the feel of beauty' or as my 'the feeling of the beauty,' since *das Fühlen* is the nominalized form of the verb '*fühlen*' ('to feel'), as distinct from the affective attitude '*Gefühl*' ('feeling'). In this way, *das Fühlen* refers to the act of feeling/sensing or detecting the beauty of the landscape, while *das Gefühl* refers to the feeling/emotion that is evoked.

[235] Vendrell Ferran (2017), 76.

[236] *PPH*, 159 (*Beiträge*, 133).

[237] In *Empathy* she voices this position more directly (though she explains it in less depth) when she asserts that "I do not believe that these two designations ['*das Fühlen*' and '*Gefühl*'] indicate different kinds of experiences, but only different 'directions' of the same experience" (98-99 (*Einfühlung*, 110)).

[238] *PPH*, 159 (*Beiträge*, 133).

> [*Wertnehmen*] is always a feeling [*ein Fühlen*] in which the value intention and the response-reaction are united.[239]

In intending a value-object (in other words, in valuing it), I am moved by it, and it motivates my emotional response to it. Both of these facets of affective experience (the intending of the value and the feeling-response) are a part of my perception of a value.

2. *The nature of values*

Having clarified what makes up a value-perception, the question now arises of what, then, we are perceiving in the first place when we perceive a value. What constitutes this value that demands of me a response? Stein acknowledges that in analyzing the experience of value-perception, one may at first conclude that the value is constituted by qualities perceived in the sensory object:

> It almost looks as though the extra-egoic data that assemble the object itself were to be made responsible for the constitution of the objective value; for beauty emerges with respect to the color and shape, for example, and in short, with respect to qualities of the object perceivable by the senses, as something accruing to those qualities themselves.[240]

It is clear, however, that it is not the case that the extra-egoic data constitute value, because otherwise it would not be possible for different subjects to perceive a variety of value-qualities in the same object.[241] It may be the case that I perceive a landscape as beautiful

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[239] *PPH*, 159, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 134).

[240] *PPH*, 160 (*Beiträge*, 134).

[241] *PPH*, 160 (*Beiträge*, 135).

and peaceful, evoking a feeling of serene calm. Meanwhile, the person I am with may perceive it as dramatic and awe-inspiring, evoking a sense of gravity and a bit of fear. While we are both perceiving the same sensory object, we intend different values attached to that object. Furthermore, it is even possible to be blind to certain values or to grasp a value in an unfulfilled way, such that acknowledgement of the value does not result in an intuitive grasping of value accompanied by an affective response. If values were constituted on the basis of extra-egoic data, then anyone perceiving the same sensory data would also perceive the same value.

Stein lists three possible ways in which this insensitivity to value may manifest itself. First, "You can confront a bodily present thing without having any hunch that it's the bearer of a value." I am not beckoned to by a particular value; I do not recognize or intend the value, nor does it motivate an emotional response. When two people hear the same skilled performance of a great work of music, one may recognize a deep melancholy in the piece and in the emotion of the performer, while to the other it is simply pleasant music, and she cannot fathom why her companion is crying. Second, one can accept that a certain value may exist in an object, but be unable herself to recognize or grasp this value: "You can have a thing in front of you and know, on the basis of a message, that it possesses a value, without catching sight of this value yourself." It is possible, for example, that when two people encounter a finely crafted table one knows on the basis of experience that it must have required an admirable and rare amount of skill, and thereby recognizes the beauty and intricacy of the piece, while the other simply sees a useful piece of furniture and would never guess that it is any more special than any useful table, but she trusts the expertise of the friend who assures her that it really is a piece of fine craftsmanship. Both

of these are cases of value-blindness; your perception of the object itself "is of no consequence for your relationship to the value." A third possibility that Stein observes is the instance in which "You can have an object in front of you and catch a glimpse of its value without being inwardly filled up with it. The egoic contents that belong to a complete value-experience are not available here."[242] Two people may look at the same landscape and one is filled with joy and exhilaration, while the other recognizes that the view is unparalleled but can't enter into the same state of delight because she desperately wants to go home and finally have dinner.

Nevertheless, the possibility of this blindness to a particular value or lack of fulfillment of a value-perception does not mean that there is no relationship between value-perception and the perception of extra-egoic data. It may be that I am blind to a particular value, but it is not possible to perceive an object without valuing it in some way (whether or not this valuing is fulfilled). According to Stein,

> If value-qualities appear with respect to factual qualities perceivable by the senses, as an inseparable appurtenance of theirs, then from that fact it's to be understood that extra-egoic data proper never emerge unaccompanied by egoic data. A value-constitution goes hand in hand with every object-constitution. Every fully constituted object is simultaneously a value-object. Basically, the value-free world of mere things is an abstraction that's suggested to us by the fact that we aren't equally persuaded by all the intentions that can arise on the basis of available material, but rather alternate between different "orientations." When oriented theoretically, we see mere things. When axiologically oriented we see values, and in particular, aesthetic, ethical, religious values, and so forth.

[242] *PPH*, 162 (*Beiträge*, 136).

Every experience of an object entails that there is a subject that is having the experience. It is not possible for a subject to encounter an object apart from the situation of experiencing the object, and in experiencing the object the subject also experiences the object as valuable, and responds to it affectively. Thus, the only way to regard an object as a "mere thing" is to artificially separate our contemplation of the nature of the thing from our experience of the thing.

In asserting that our experiences of objects is inherently evaluative, Stein is claiming that valuing is integral to the nature of what it means to be a person, and to act as a human is to encounter objects in the world (including other persons) as valuable, or rather, "value-tropic."[243] Furthermore, in recognizing an object's value, we express something about our own relation to value insofar as there are certain values to which we are particularly attuned. When it comes to other persons, we not only encounter them as having value, but we also encounter the values which they themselves hold. In this way, a part of

[243] *PPH*, 227 (*Beiträge*, 190). Baseheart and Sawicki note that "*Werthaftes Sein*, 'value-tropic being,' literally means to exist in a value-attached manner." This translation choice is a useful one, since it connotes a relationship to value that is not captured by the word 'valuable.' To an English speaker, 'valuable' may imply the notion of degrees of worth (e.g. a diamond is more valuable than a cubic zirconia). When we identify a being as "value-tropic," we are not assessing that being's worthiness in comparison to other beings. Rather, we are recognizing that values are attached to this being that evoke in us an affective response (in other words, it is impossible to encounter an object as "value-free," except in abstraction). While Stein would certainly agree that the human person is valuable in the sense of having inherent worth and dignity, that is not the point that she is making here. Rather, the person, who "exists in a value-attached manner," manifests values to those she encounters; she is not a mere object with no relation to value. It is worth noting that Stein does not use the term '*Werthaft*' only to refer to persons, but to any being in which value can be recognized (see *PPH*, 230 (*Beiträge*, 192)). Unlike other value-objects, however, the person is not only "value-attached" insofar as she expresses values, but also insofar as she can recognize value in others, and come to know both herself and other persons more fully through the experience of value-recognition.

what it means to perceive a person through empathy is to perceive them as related to value. Stein writes,

> Now, the "natural orientation" toward another person is to "take a stance." A person doesn't confront us as a value-free being, but rather as a value-tropic being [*Werthaftes Sein*], and the value response is the most "natural" behavior toward her, and accordingly, toward the characteristics through which her value predominantly emerges.[244]

We will return to the question of what we are doing when we encounter another's values through empathy in Chapter Five, which deals with the sharing of spiritual content in interpersonal relationships and community.

What we see in all of the above points in Stein's analysis of value is first, that values are not wholly subjective or created by the subject, since in perceiving them a new world is opened up to the subject; and second, that the constitution of value does require that something come from the side of the subject. Vendrell Ferran points out that Stein's theory of value may be examined in comparison to the value realism[245] of Max Scheler and

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[244] *PPH*, 227 (*Beiträge*, 190). Baseheart and Sawicki render the latter half as "the value response is the 'most natural' behavior for the person, and accordingly, for the properties in which value is predominantly evident to her as well." In the original text, Stein writes "*die Wertantwort ist das 'natürlichste' Verhalten zu ihr, und dementsprechend auch zu den Eigenschaften, in denen ihr Wert vorwiegend zutage tritt.*" By not accounting for this "*zu ihr*" ("toward her"), Baseheart and Sawicki do not make clear that this particular passage is not simply explaining that valuing is an attribute of the human person in general (though this is Stein's position). Rather, the passage points out that when I encounter another person, it is natural to me to have a value response *to her*, because she is presented to me as having value. The passage is not primarily about what I am doing when I am valuing, but rather about the particular manner in which both the value of the other, and those values which the other holds, emerge in an empathic experience.

[245] Value realism, Vendrell Ferran explains, is the position that " values exist independently of the possible reactions they may elicit in feeling subjects" (Vendrell Ferran (2017), 69).

Dietrich von Hildebrand, who both reject the notion of constitution on the part of the subject.[246] She notes that

> Authors like Scheler defended robust versions of this doctrine, according to which values exist independently of the subjects who grasp them and the objects in which they are given. They consider the perception of values to be prior to the perception of their bearers and it is this value perception that determines our thinking and willing."[247]

She contrasts this view with that of Husserl who, she writes "claimed that the subject has an active role in the disclosure of values… we first have access to the objects that are given to us in cognitive acts such as perceptions or judgments, and then we may recognize a value in these objects, i.e. we experience them as valuable."[248] She claims, however, that despite this contrast Husserl, Scheler and Hildebrand all adhere to a realist account of values, insofar as all three assert that values are not created by the subject. Thus, while she concludes that "Stein's version of realism is closer to Husserl than to Scheler," she affirms that all four of these thinkers belong in "the early phenomenological tradition of axiological realism," and asserts that Husserl's and Stein's commitment to the notion of constitution by no means preclude value realism.

While Vendrell Ferran places Stein in this axiological-realist sphere, she notes that she is in disagreement here with Lebech, who, she says "claims that Stein's theory of values

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[246] See Vendrell Ferran (2017), 78ff. She points to Scheler's discussion of value blindness in *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value*, as well as Hildebrand's treatment of the same topic in *Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntniss*, as demonstrations of their commitment to strong value realism.

[247] Vendrell Ferran (2017), 79.

[248] Vendrell Ferran (2017), 79-80.

cannot be interpreted as either value realism or subjectivism."[249] It is perhaps more accurate to attribute the explicit assertion of this position to John Drummond, who Lebech cites in her article, though the latter does remark that he does so "for good reason.".[250] She explains that

> John Drummond [*Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy. A Handbook*, Kluwer (2002): 8] gives up situating Stein as either a realist axiologist (understanding values to exist independently of the evaluator) or an idealist subjectivist (which existentialists or value constructivists could be said to be) and for good reason. She, like the early and middle Husserl, understands the constitution of values to rely on the subject as much as on the object constituted (which as constituted, and intersubjectively constituted, must have essence). This intentional structure of all experience is the key to the inseparability of subjective perspective and objective analysability in early transcendental phenomenology: Stein would understand the label"'transcendental" to refer to exactly this necessity, which could be likened to a Möbius band whose inner and outer side is so connected that it is neither and both.

Lebech's own position is stated somewhat more diplomatically (insofar as she does not explicitly assert that Husserl's and Stein's positions place them outside of both the axiologist and "value constructivist" camps):

> Stein's phenomenological value theory… stands in many ways between Scheler's theory, stressing the *a priori* of the values and of the hierarchy they form and Husserl's, which is interested in describing the act of valuation and sees values as founded on things. It also stands between Sartre's later subjectivist existentialism and Levinas' insistence on the Other as the ground of obligation.[251]

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[249] Vendrell Ferran (2017), 80, fn. 24. Here she references Lebech (2010), 139.

[250] Lebech (2010), 139, fn. 4.

[251] Lebech (2010), 13.

In this way, while Lebech seems to agree here with Drummond that Stein is neither a realist nor a subjectivist when it comes to value, in substance her position does not greatly differ from Vendrell Ferran's; namely, that Stein embraces the idea that the subject must be involved in the constitution of value. Insofar as values are given in affective experience, objects must be experienced by valuing subjects in order to be valued. Despite what Lebech and Drummond say, however, it does seem to be the case that Stein sees herself as an axiological realist, though she acknowledges reasons why one may be induced to think of values as wholly subjective when she writes that "The fact that it's egoic data which constitute values for us, the fact that these values decisively influence our inner life and have an entirely personal meaning for us---this is what makes it understandable that they're so often made out to be 'merely subjective' or 'private.'"[252] She goes on to assert, however, that

> Basically, the egoic data and the objects that they constitute aren't any more subjective than the extra-egoic data and the outer world. Both kinds of data have about them something private as such which is also not inconsequential for constitution, but rather winds a ribbon around the individual and his environment (the world of things as well as the world of values). But both kinds of objects also have a core sense separable from private experiential coloring, which makes them capable of the constitution of *super-individual* objects.[253]

While our private experience of objects, our personal characteristics and personalities affect the way in which values are constituted for us, the objects themselves call out to us

[252] *PPH*, 164 (*Beiträge*, 138).

[253] *PPH*, 164 (*Beiträge*, 138).

in such a way that their value can be seen and shared by many subjects. This, too, will be revisited in Chapter Five's examination of communal experience and shared value.

C. Volition

Having explored the way in which we recognize value, and in seeing that it opens up for us this sphere of spiritual content, we have already (though not explicitly) begun to take into account free acts. When confronted with a value, the feeling that the value evokes arises unbidden, as is the attitude that arises toward this object as valuable. This attitude, however, can be willingly accepted or rejected. I can fully give myself over to it, or I can act as if this object is not valuable, or choose to ascribe a value to it that I don't actually perceive (maybe because I think that I should find it valuable in a certain way). Similarly, I may adopt or deny a belief with which I am confronted. This acceptance or rejection of an attitude is a free act that has its source in the ego. As Stein asserts, "When adoptions or denials of an attitude are executed as experiences in their own right, then we have 'free acts' in the genuine sense, where the ego not only experiences but also emerges as boss of its experiencing."[254] These egoic acts do not simply arise; rather, I choose to enact them.

Stein observes that when we pay attention to an object by perceiving or grasping it (when "objectivities come to givenness for us"[255]), this initial grasping of information is not freely done---after all, the object is simply given to us. However, this grasping motivates further attention:

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[254] *PPH*, 52 (*Beiträge*, 45).

[255] *PPH*, 47 (*Beiträge*, 41).

> The ego does nothing that it could abstain from doing; rather, it receives the one bit of information for the sake of the other. However, joined with this receptive acceptance, other acts emerge that are placed within the discretion of the ego: *paying attention* to the object about which I already had some information, and going on to further data. A certain uptake must already have happened so that the attention-paying can ensue. What has been taken up, in the entire determinate manner of its givenness that is proper to it before the attention-paying, serves as a motive for paying attention, or, better, as an incentive for paying attention. It exerts a pull upon the ego, which the ego can obey, but which the ego can also fail to register. The "freedom of paying attention" subsists in this twofold possibility.[256]

Thus, motivated by the interest that is awakened in me by an object, I must choose to take up the object by considering it and further understanding it. I could, however, choose to suppress my interest in the object or to ignore its "pull" on me. In the same way, the information that I gain about the object by attending to it motivates the attitude that I form toward the object (and thus, as we have seen, my evaluative stance toward the object). As Stein writes, "The perception of a thing allows me to develop belief in its existence. The knowledge of a state of affairs allows me to develop the conviction of its continuance. The grasping of a person's outstanding qualities allows me to develop admiration for her."[257] When I have attended to an object and thereby gained insight into it, an attitude arises accordingly. As discussed in Section A of this chapter, my motivated attitude is intelligible on the basis of my insight into the object, and therefore it is not my choice to experience the attitude or not. Rather:

> Forming attitudes, like absorbing information, is something that "befalls" me. I cannot execute them in the same manner in which I freely pay attention. I cannot decide for or against them as I please. This is so for two

[256] *PPH*, 47-8 (*Beiträge*, 42).

[257] *PPH*, 48 (*Beiträge*, 42).

> reasons. (1) The attitude is due to the objective whatever-it-is that it holds for; that's what requires the attitude. Therefore the attitude is not merely aroused, but *grounded*. If I could make up my mind against it, then I would be offending against norms of insight (which is generally not the case when I stop paying attention). (2) Attitudes don't usually put themselves on offer before their emergences, as happens with paying attention. Rather, attitudes are simply there on the basis of information uptake. I'm not faced with any choice. They seize possession of me.[258]

It is absurd to imagine that an attitude would arise in me that is contrary to this intelligibility (just as, in the example I give above, it is absurd to think that I would abhor sunsets because looking at them is delightful).

This does not mean, however, that there is no freedom in the way in which I approach these attitudes. Once the attitude has befallen me, I can choose to either adopt it or deny it. In other words, I can affirm it as the attitude I "ought" to and want to have---I can affirm it as the attitude appropriate to this object---or I can distance myself from it, rejecting it and acting as if the state of affairs that motivated it is not actually the case. Stein explains that,

> [T]here exists a possibility that is not available with mere information. I can "take a stance" toward the attitude, in a new sense. I can accept it, plant my feet upon it, and declare my allegiance to it; or, I can comport myself negatively against it. Suppose I accept it---that means that if it emerges in me I give myself over to it, joyously, without reluctance. Suppose I deny it---that doesn't mean I eliminate it. That's not under my control. "Canceling out" a belief would require new motives, through which the motives of the original belief are invalidated and from which the cancellation is established instead "all by itself." But I need not acknowledge this belief. I can comport myself just as though it were not present; I can make it inoperative. (It is this, the comporting, that Husserl designated as *epoché*. The acts rendered inoperative are "neutralized.")[259]

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[258] *PPH*, 48 (*Beiträge*, 42).

[259] *PPH*, 49, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 43).

In addition to invoking Husserl's *epoché*, she uses examples such as the mother of a fallen soldier refusing to take an attitude of belief toward her son's reported death, or a person who feels attracted to someone who she thinks she ought not to like and thus she refuses to admit to herself that this really is attraction. In all of these cases---as well as inverse cases in which we adopt an attitude toward a state of affairs that doesn't exist, such as when we convince ourselves that a hoped-for event will take place while knowing that this will not realistically occur---we freely choose our stance toward the attitude which arises (even if this stance is not fully consciously considered in a way that could be verbally articulated).

Unlike attitudes, Stein says, "Adoptions and denials cannot seize possession of me gradually, somehow stirring softly in the background at first. Rather, I must generate them out of me, spiritually striking a blow, as it were."[260] We have seen that motives carry a "range of possibilities,"[261] no specific one of which we are compelled to follow. Through this mental act, this "striking a blow" or *fiat* in which we make a move toward one particular possibility, I carry out an act that has its source in my own ego. We see here again the distinction between causality and motivation come into play:

> In all of these cases, with "adoption" and "denial" of an attitude, with acknowledgement and rejection of a state of affairs, with affirmation, reassurance, and lying, we're dealing with free acts that the ego accomplishes from out of its depths, but that it can just as well abstain from. We have seen that these acts---just like attitudes---have their motives and, it may be, have grounds that don't coincide with the motives. But the availability of motives does not *compel* the ego to accomplish the acts in question. These acts do not simply impose themselves on grounds of

[260] *PPH*, 52 (*Beiträge*, 45).

[261] Section 3.1.2.

> motives, as attitudes do. The ego can have and acknowledge the motives and it can abstain from the acts in spite of that… if I'm stuck in the struggle of conflicting motives, if I'm placed before a decision, still *I* am the one to whom the decision falls.[262]

Thus, free acts are not a part of a necessary causal chain of events. Nor do they simply arise (or "impose themselves"). Rather, in acts of the will, "the ego grasps a state of affairs as something that is to be realized by itself."[263] I can assess the weight of various motives and choose between them.

In this way, my freely chosen acts reveal something about my relationship to value. In adopting or denying certain attitudes, and choosing to act in certain ways, I am acknowledging and affirming values. I am motivated to action by a certain object when I find this object to be valuable. I judge certain motivations to be weightier than others, and in doing so I say that I value one course of action over another. When I choose to meet with a friend rather than stay home, I am expressing that what I know of my friend is of more value to me than what I know I could accomplish at home. Furthermore, in choosing acts I am not only affirming the value of other objects, or expressing something about them. I am also choosing to express myself through my valuing. In admiring someone's qualities, I not only acknowledge that they display a certain value, I am also displaying which values I respond to, and thus displaying the kind of person that I am or want to be (or sometimes, displaying the person I am but do not want to be---Lebech notes that our valuing can reveal

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[262] *PPH*, 54-5 (*Beiträge*, 48).

[263] *PPH*, 72 (*Beiträge*, 62).

things about ourselves to ourselves that we would prefer not to acknowledge[264]). In this way, my spiritual acts tell who I am. This expression is fundamental to what it means to live in community.

[264] Lebech (2010), 149. "[My personal value response, expressed in action,] brings me up against the fact that I cannot flee from who I have become in my own eyes, from myself, from what I have made of myself as a psycho-physical individual person in the light of the values I am (in fact) motivated by."

IV. Stein's Spiritual Influences

A. Dilthey, *Geisteswissenschaften* and the Nexus of Human Life

In examining Stein's understanding of spirit and its consequences, it is helpful to contextualize her work among some of the thinkers who helped to form her intellectually, and whose ideas served as inspirations and foils for her own insights (her spiritual products, as it were). Her work is rich with nuanced reference to, elaboration on, and sometimes correction of nearly all significant figures who addressed the topics that concern her; as such, it would be impossible to follow all such threads in a work of the size and scope of this dissertation. However, there are certain key figures that serve well as paradigmatic influences on Stein, and who can be used to facilitate examination of the topics that were most essential to her philosophical work.

For example, although Stein is most frequently discussed in connection with phenomenology and Husserl, a discussion of her relationship to the work of Wilhelm Dilthey is enlightening when it comes to her thought on spirit, especially insofar as he influenced her thought on the *Geisteswissenschaften* (human sciences).[265] While her work is deeply phenomenological, it is also open to approaches and thinkers (such as Dilthey)

[265] It must be pointed out that Dilthey and Husserl mutually admired each other's work, so their influences on Stein should not necessarily be seen as in conflict. See Husserl's *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures from the summer of 1925 and Dilthey's "Studies Toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences," as well as their correspondence, in which they discuss Husserl's critique of Dilthey in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," which he later calls a misunderstanding (the exchange of letters between Dilthey and Husserl is found in *Husserl: Shorter Works*; see Sebastian Luft, "Dilthey and the Phenomenological Movement: A Reassessment," https://www.academia.edu/32041740/Dilthey_and_the_Phenomenological_Movement).

that are not themselves rooted in phenomenology. Her debt to Dilthey notwithstanding, she does take care to distinguish herself from him in *Empathy* when she critiques his notion of descriptive psychology and its consequences (even as she lauds him for the nuanced way in which he distinguishes it from explanatory psychology). While this particular objection seems to have been influenced by Husserl's subsequently recanted criticism, it does provide the occasion for Stein to elaborate on her own distinct understanding of person and psychology, and how these are related to the notion of spirit. This leads to her more significant departure from Dilthey's ideas in her attention to the individual as not simply a product of the psycho-spiritual nexus connecting him or her with the rest of humanity, but rather as a unique being in possession of a *Persönlichkeitskern*, a being that is ever unfolding and changing but nevertheless arises out of the "dark ground" of completely unique individuality.[266]

1. *The distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences*

One of Dilthey's significant achievements was his work on the human sciences or *Geisteswissenschaften* (that is, as John Scanlon says, "all sciences directed toward knowledge of human-social-historical life"[267]), which is foundational to his philosophy as a whole. Like Stein and Husserl, Dilthey rejects the notion that the human sciences can be subsumed into the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*), and he attempts to map out the

[266] *FEB*, 364. While it is not the case that Dilthey denies the individuality of the person, as we will see he focuses much more emphatically on the experiences and shared content that contribute to forming the "psychic nexus" of the person.

[267] John Scanlon, "Dilthey on Psychology and Epistemology," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1989): 349.

way in which the human sciences are distinct.[268] He argues that the *Geisteswissenschaften*[269] necessitate a distinct methodological approach, since they are concerned with a different kind of experience of the world than that with which the *Naturwissenschaften* are concerned. While the natural sciences draw conclusions based on the observation of causal events in a physical world that is separate from us,[270] the *Geisteswissenschaften* study experiences of mental content. In "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology" he argues that

> The human studies differ from the sciences because the latter deal with facts which present themselves to consciousness as external and separate phenomena, while the former deal with the living connections of reality experienced in the mind. There exists a system of nature for the physical and natural sciences only through inferential conclusions that supplement the data of experience by means of combinations of hypotheses. In the human sciences by contrast, the continuum or nexus of psychic life is an original or basic given.[271]

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[268] See R. Anderson, "The Debate Over the *Geisteswissenschaften* in German Philosophy" for an historical overview of the various contours and figures of this controversy (in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 219-234).

[269] Since the term 'human sciences' is considerably less descriptive and meaning-laden than '*Geisteswissenschaften* (notable for its explicit reference to 'spirit'/'mind'), going forward I use the original German term throughout.

[270] That is, separate insofar as we are examining it scientifically. As we will see in the next subsection, Dilthey is critical of the overzealous separation of humans from the physical world, and the danger of a mistaken rupture of the relationship between the material and the mental.

[271] Wilhelm Dilthey, "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology" in *Dilthey: Selected Writings*, ed. H. P. Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 89.

This distinction between outer and inner experience, and specifically the fact that we infer conclusions about nature while directly experiencing "mental connections," necessitates distinct terms to refer to what we do when we grasp these different kinds of experiences. Dilthey uses '*verstehen*' to indicate how we know mental content and '*erklären*' for how we know nature:

> We explain [*erklären*] nature but we understand [*verstehen*] mental life. Inner experience grasps the processes by which we accomplish something as well as the combination of individual functions of mental life into a whole. The experience of the whole context comes first; only later do we distinguish its individual parts. This means that the methods of studying mental life, history and society differ greatly from those used to acquire knowledge of nature.[272]

Thus, the *Geisteswissenschaften* and the natural sciences are methodologically distinct. Our mental content is not simply an experience of discrete pieces of information which we then inferentially connect to form those conclusions that we "explain" by way of such inferences. This distinction between '*erklären*' and '*verstehen*' can be seen as a counterpart to Stein's (and Husserl's) distinction between causality and motivation. Causality explains natural phenomena and the makeup of the physical world, while motivation is our means of understanding the spiritual.

However, just as Stein cautions against too stark a separation of physical and non-physical (lest we forget to view the human person as embodied and sensing), Dilthey also rejects the idea that these are completely separate and opposed realms. He claims that the person is a psycho-physical unity, and therefore it amounts to a dualist view of the human

[272] Dilthey, "Ideas."

person to, as Jos de Mul describes, "Divid[e] reality into a material substance (*Materie*) and a spiritual substance (*geistigen Substanz*)."[273] On the contrary, our mental content takes the shape that it does in part because of our experiences of the natural world. Dilthey explains this in *Ideas*:

> This inner mental structure is conditioned by the person's situation within an environment… The reality surrounding us calls forth sensations. These show us the nature of the various external things which cause them. So we continually find ourselves physically and mentally conditioned by outer causes. According to this hypothesis our feelings express the value these external forces have for our bodies and instincts. Conditioned by these feelings, interest and attention select impressions on which they focus. This increased consciousness in attention is, intrinsically, a process. It consists of distinguishing, identifying, combining, separating and perceiving. This is the origin of perceptions, images and, ultimately, thoughts which enable the person to control reality up to a point. A firm system of reproducible ideas, valuations and acts of will is gradually formed. Now the person is no longer at the beck and call of stimuli. He inhibits and controls his reactions; he chooses when he will adjust reality to his requirements. What is more, when he cannot control reality he can adjust his own vital processes and control the unruly passions and the play of ideas by an inner act of will. This is life.[274]

Thus, as de Mul writes, "Natural and human sciences are not primarily concerned with different parts of reality, but are based on different ways of experiencing the same reality."[275] It is the way in which an object appears and is experienced that determines

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[273] Jos de Mul, "Leben erfaßt hier Leben," *Interpreting Dilthey*, ed. Eric Nelson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 43.

[274] Dilthey, *Ideas*, 95.

[275] De Mul, *The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life*, trans. Tony Burnett (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 133.

which scientific domain is relevant. But the subjects of these "domains" are, in actuality, almost inextricably intertwined. In Stein, we see this in her writings on *Lebenskraft* and the effect of the body on the psyche, and in discussion of the *Leib*, the lived body that, while made up of physical matter and subject to physical causality, is also the embodiment of a psychic and spiritual subject.

2. Spiritual Understanding

In describing the distinction between the content of natural science and the content of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, Dilthey describes mental experiences as forming, not a causal chain of events, but a relational nexus. He writes:

> Various kinds of inner relation permeate this manifold web of various factors in the genetic system of the processes of psychic life. And each kind has the characteristic that the lived experiences belonging to it are connected with one another into a system by this inner relation. The relations within such a system form a main part of the permanent basic structures---the anatomy, as it were---of the developed psychic nexus, according to its permanent uniform existence.[276]

This psychic nexus of mental experiences makes up who we are and how we exist in the world. In examining this nexus, the *Geisteswissenschaften* reveal us to ourselves. Furthermore, when we examine our own mental life, we begin to understand not only our own inner particularity, but also how our inner lives are connected to the lives of other persons and to the world as a whole. Dilthey writes that "We understand human life, history

[276] Dilthey, *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*, ed. Rudolf Makreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 45-6.

and all the hidden depths of the human mind because we experience these transitions and effects and so become aware of this structure which embraces all passions, sufferings and human destinies."[277] In this way, our psychic nexus is both shaped by history and culture, and also is a part of that very history and culture. In other words, the *Verstehen*[278] that is characteristic of the *Geisteswissenschaften* reveals universal and objective content.

Dilthey claims that when we examine the psychic nexus of mental life, we discover what he calls the "objectively engaged and objectively valid conceptual cognition of the interconnectedness of lived experiences in the human-historical-social world."[279] Human science is not simply the study of individual minds. Rather, the *Geisteswissenschaften* "refer what happens and what has happened---the unique, the contingent, the momentary---to a system of value and meaning."[280] In other words, descriptive psychology reveals spiritual reality, and (unsurprisingly), the *Geisteswissenschaften* aim not just at mental content but at spiritual (*geistlich*) content. Furthermore, just as Dilthey rejects the dualistic severing of the psychic and the physical, he also rejects the dualistic notion that Austin Harrington describes as the "rigid dichotomy between objective thought-contents on the one hand and mere subjective *Geist* on the other."[281] What is understood through the

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[277] Dilthey, *Ideas*, 94.

[278] 'Understanding' in its nominal form, indicated by the capitalization of the first letter of '*Verstehen*.'

[279] Dilthey, *Formation of the Historical World,* 196.

[280] Dilthey, *Formation of the Historical World,* 196.

[281] Austin Harrington, "In Defense of Verstehen and Erklären: Wilhelm Dilthey's Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology," *Theory & Psychology,* Vol. 10 Nol 4: 435–451.

Geisteswissenschaften is the shared context, history, culture, and social reality of humanity as a whole. Dilthey goes on to say that

> Individuals are linked by a commonality that involves belonging together, continuity, similarity, and affinity. This same relation of continuity and similarity pervades all spheres of the human world. This commonality is expressed in the selfsameness of reason, in sympathy as part of the life of feeling, and in the mutual commitments of duty and justice accompanied by a consciousness of obligation… What human beings have in common is the starting point for all the relations between the particular and the universal in the human sciences. A basic experience of commonality permeates the whole conception of the world of human spirit. This experience connects the consciousness of a unitary self, that of similarity with others, the selfsameness of human nature and individuality. This is the presupposition for understanding.[282]

Thus, individual human persons can come to understand themselves as parts of a whole, at once shaped by and shaping the commonality in which all human persons participate.

We have already seen in previous chapters that Stein also asserts that there is an objective structure to mental content, and thus to the content of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, and furthermore that this structure is not studied in the same way that the physical structure of the material world is studied through the natural sciences. In *Empathy* she devotes a section of her final chapter on understanding spiritual persons to Dilthey's influence (noting that "we have already stressed how much our interpretation is like Dilthey's"[283]). She writes that Dilthey teaches us:

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[282] Dilthey, *Formation of the Historical World*, 163.

[283] *Empathy*, 113 (*Einfühlung*, 126).

> there must be an objective basis for the cultural sciences beside the clarification of method, an ontology of the spirit corresponding to the ontology of nature. As natural things have an underlying structure, such as the fact that empirical spatial forms are realizations of ideal geometric forms, so there is also an essential structure of the spirit and of ideal types. Historical personalities are empirical realizations of these types. If empathy is the perceptual consciousness in which foreign persons come to givenness for us, then it is also the exemplary basis for obtaining this ideal type, just as natural perception is the basis for the eidetic knowledge of nature.[284]

In this way, she transposes Dilthey's claims about history and culture into her own insights about empathy in claiming that it is through empathy that we recognize these ideal types. Because of the rational structure underlying mental life, we are able to move beyond our own subjectivity to recognize the other and what we share with her. As we have seen, though, Stein argues that there is not only an objective structure to humanity that forms the basis for shared human culture; there is also a rational structure to each individual person, according to which her personality unfolds into expression of its individual nature. In this way, in empathy we recognize the other person not simply as a member of our shared human community and culture, but as this specific, individual person that is like and yet unlike every other person partaking in this community. This understanding of individual other persons, however, goes hand in hand with a deepened understanding of humankind as a whole—as we become more and more able to recognize individual personhood, we better understand individual persons' contributions to humanity's shared spiritual content, and deeply understanding and appreciating this content brings us to a deeper understanding of and appreciation for the individual.

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[284] *Empathy*, 95-6 (*Einfühlung*, 105).

B. Husserl and the Life-World

1. Stein's and Husserl's tangled threads

Certainly no discussion of Stein's philosophical influences would be complete without attention to her first mentor and philosophical inspiration, Edmund Husserl. The extent to which Husserl's and Stein's positions are related to and distinct from one another is a thorny question, however; perhaps especially so when it comes to the present investigation of Stein's thought on spirit. For this reason, a few words must be said about the extent to which Stein had contact with Husserl's ideas on spirit.

Husserl expressed appreciation for the questions posed by thinkers such as Dilthey and Simmel on "life-philosophy,"[285] and he himself took up the topic of the relationship between natural science and the *Geisteswissenschaften* (and thus the relationship between nature, psyche, and *Geist*) in lectures as well as written texts, though some of these only emerge posthumously from his vast unpublished materials. Stein had access to a significant portion of these materials (for example, the second volume of the *Ideen*, which will be discussed more below), and she certainly would have been familiar with his *Natur und Geist* lectures, which Calcagno connects with her decision to write her dissertation on

[285] See Andrea Staiti, *Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 170 ff. See also the note in the previous section of this chapter referencing Husserl's evolving views on Dilthey's work (Ch. IV.A, fn. 255).

empathy.[286] She also continued to follow the public careers of Husserl and other phenomenologists after her own departure from academia.[287]

Furthermore, given her close relationship with Husserl, his thought informally influenced hers through conversation. Stein notes in the introduction to her dissertation that "the statement of the problem and my method of work have grown entirely out of intellectual stimuli received from Professor Husserl so that in any case what I may claim as my 'spiritual property' in the following expositions is most questionable," though she does immediately clarify that "Nevertheless, I can say that the results I now submit [to the faculty] have been obtained by my own efforts." She also claims that, since completing the dissertation, her reading of the unpublished manuscript of *Ideen II* made it impossible to revise her work on empathy without making reference to this text.[288] Furthermore, in the foreword to *PPH* (which, it must be noted, Husserl saw fit to publish in the *Jahrbuch*[289]) she claims that Husserl's influence on her work was so profound that it was difficult, even for her, to distinguish their positions:

> I've been helping Professor Husserl for nearly two years with the preparation of large publications. During this time, all his manuscripts have

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[286] Calcagno (2020), 626. The 1919 and 1927 iterations of Husserl's *Natur und Geist* lectures have been published as Hua-Mat. IV (ed. Michael Weiler, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002) and Hua XXXII (ed. Michael Weiler, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002).

[287] Moran notes that "Stein continued to engage with phenomenology into the nineteen thirties, even writing a short review of Husserl's *Crisis* when it appeared in *Philosophia* in 1937" (Dermot Moran, "Edith Stein's Encounter with Edmund Husserl and Her Phenomenology of the Person," in *Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood* (2017), 43.

[288] *Empathy*, 2-3 (*Einfühlung*, 2).

[289] *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* 5 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1922), 1-283.

> been at my disposal (among them those that have to do with the topic of psychology and the humanities as well). It goes without saying that important influences on my own work came out of the stimulation that I was receiving in this way and in many conversations. Today I myself no longer am able to keep track of the extent to which this has been the case. It just wasn't possible for me to give references through citation, because the material in question is unpublished and also because very often I was not sure whether I would have to regard something as my own research result or as an internal appropriation of transferred thought motifs.

This statement that she is uncertain which aspects of her text originated with Husserl and which originated with herself leads us to another difficulty in separating Husserl's and Stein's distinct positions.

Namely, this question is further complicated by the fact that it is not only a question of what Stein received from Husserl, but also of what Husserl received from Stein. The latter's role as the former's assistant entailed laborious editing of his copious notes and manuscripts, which necessarily involved significant editorial decision-making on Stein's part, most notably for the manuscript of *Ideen II*. While for a number of years it was seen as a Husserlian text assembled by Stein, recently scholars have realized that it is impossible to ignore the fact that Stein's contributions to the text were more than simply organizational, and in fact that some parts of *Ideen II* could be considered more Stein's than Husserl's. Calcagno argues that Husserl was reticent to publish *Ideen II* and to launch into questions about nature and spirit because of their potential to compromise his work in establishing phenomenology, and claims that the emergence of these questions in the later two *Ideen* volumes is largely a result of Stein's editing:

> Stein's argument for the interrelationship of psyche and spirit can be interpreted not only as a critique of psychologist and positivistic tendencies in psychology and the natural sciences, but also as a critique of Husserl's own project. Though Husserl privately wrote and lectured about the

> relationship between psyche and spirit, he was reluctant to publish anything in his lifetime about it, as it would compromise the transcendental purity of his project, which needed to make a fine break with the empirical sciences and empirical data. The Husserl that Stein knew and worked with was struggling to defend the transcendental idealism of *Ideas I* and the logic of the *Logical investigations*. Stein was convinced of the need for a discussion of the interrelation between the natural/psychic and the spiritual that she arranged *Ideas II* and *III* to show how these realms were to be interrelated, knowing that Husserl would find this troublesome. She confesses her "heresy" to Roman Ingarden in a letter, admitting that she sees the need for phenomenology to better explain the relation between the two realms (Stein 1993, cited from Kindle edition, location 707 of 77742). Husserl was never satisfied with Stein's texts and he never published them in his lifetime.[290]

It is certainly the case that Husserl continually put off dealing with the manuscript edited by Stein, and never finally approved it for publication.

Some scholars disagree, however, that Husserl avoided approving *Ideen II* out of fear that the questions it raises could compromise his philosophical project. For example, Staiti argues that Husserl's thought on "nature, spirit, and life" is integral to his project as a whole:

> While there is some truth to the fact that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of nature, psyche, and culture are rather advanced and that they presuppose at least some basic familiarity with the phenomenological method in general, they cannot be considered as dealing with a delimited sphere of problems that can be safely isolated and left out of consideration. On the contrary, these analyses are crucial to understanding both the import and the scope of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological philosophy as such. To give just one example, the rationale behind the performance of the phenomenological *epoché* and reduction is bound to remain obscure if the burning questions about the ontological status of psyche and the scientificity of psychology are not adequately understood.[291]

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[290] Calcagno "Edith Stein," *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 630.

[291] Staiti (2014), 10.

Husserl is known for his reluctance to call any work finished, and for his continual (some might say "incessant") attempts to refine the foundations of his method. Nevertheless, his phenomenological method was not developed simply for its own sake. Bracketing the world and examining acts of consciousness are meant to only be the first step toward understanding ourselves, others, and the world which we share. It seems clear that Husserl and Stein both knew this, as evidenced by the topics that they chose to explore together, and that Stein was inspired to explore through her contact with Husserl (and, it might be added, that she pushed Husserl himself to explore). It may or may not be the case that Husserl intentionally avoided publishing on the nature-spirit relationship for professional reasons, but Staiti's argument that analysis of this relationship is crucial to Husserl's project is a convincing one.

Regardless of whether Husserl actually disagreed with Stein that more discussion of the relationship between nature and spirit was necessary, or was simply unable to fully devote himself to the problem (and to the publication of *Ideen II*) while working on a number of other issues,[292] the fact remains that the currently available version of *Ideen II*,

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[292] Indeed, upon closer inspection the referenced letter from Stein to Ingarden seems to indicate the latter rather than the former. In describing her difficulties in editing the text, she worries that "[Husserl] will never see the project through himself, and only ever be stuck on particulars" (Stein, Brief 6, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2001; translation mine). She continues on to describe the "heresy" that she cannot yet bring herself to confess to Husserl:

> By the way, in the course of [a conversation with Husserl] I had a breakthrough, after which I dare say I'm pretty certain what constitution is—but, in breach with Idealism! It seems to me that an absolutely existing physical nature on the one hand, and a precisely structured subjectivity on the other must be assumed, in order that an intuitive nature can be constituted [*Übrigens hat sich im Anschluß daran ganz*

which has been long been seen as a significant source for understanding Husserl's thoughts on topics such as empathy, intersubjectivity, the relationship between nature and spirit, and the life-world, is not a straightforwardly Husserlian work. Thus, it is important to clarify Stein's influence on the text in order to better understand what exactly constitutes Husserl's own position. To this end, a new critical edition of *Ideen II* has been prepared by Dirk Fonfara as part of the *Husserliana* series, with a prospective publication of 2024.[293] In a text published in 2022, James Jardin gives an in-depth analysis of Husserl's thought in light of this new edition, and undoubtedly the upcoming years following the *Husserliana* volume's release will yield much fruitful scholarship. As such, I do not focus here on a detailed explication of what exactly came from Husserl and what came from Stein; rather,

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> *plötzlich bei mir ein Durchbruch vollzogen, wonach ich mir einbilde, so ziemlich zu wissen, was Konstitution ist – aber unter Bruch mit dem Idealismus! Eine absolut existierende physikalische Natur einerseits, eine Subjektivität bestimmter Struktur andererseits scheinen mir vorausgesetzt, damit sich eine anschauliche Natur konstituieren kann*] (translation mine).

It is not at all clear from this letter that she explicitly intends to arrange the text of *Ideen II* to highlight the relation between nature and spirit, nor that she intends to interpolate the "heresy" of her disagreement with idealism into the text. In other letters she does express her frustration at having to forge ahead to later parts of the text without Husserl approving her already-completed work, due to his slowness to read her edits. She also sees the need to to take her own initiative to clarify "*dunklen Punkte*" in what she claimed was an unreadably complex text (*Ingarden Briefe*, Brief 1, January 12th, 1917). As such, it is unsurprising that her own views would color the text of *Ideen II*, as current scholarship agrees that it did.

[293] The prospective publication date given on the website of the Husserl Archiv at the Universität zu Köln: https://husserl.phil-fak.uni-koeln.de/editionen/editionsprojekt-urschriften-der-ideen-ii-und-iii).

in the following sections I will take a brief look at the sort of questions that occupied Husserl and his approach to examining themimpacted Stein and her work.

2. *Husserl contra naturalism*

Husserl's explorations of spirit are anchored in his efforts against naturalism---an endeavor which is arguably what drew Stein toward Husserl's work in the first place.[294] In order to respond to the prevailing acceptance of naturalism seeping through European philosophy, which was at odds with his phenomenological project, Husserl needed to explore and delineate the topics of nature and spirit in order to show the impoverishment of a purely naturalistic approach to the world. As Maria Celeste Vecino explains,

> [I]n… Husserl's philosophy, the mode of being of something is correlated to the way a subject *constitutes* it, that is to say, makes sense of it or discloses its meaning. This means, among other things, that the predominant naturalistic perspective of his—and arguably, our—time that considered the truth of an object to lie in its quantifiable (scientifically observable) characteristics was, in his eyes, mistaken. This perspective plays a vital role in Husserl's reflections on the being of Nature (*Natur*) and Spirit (*Geist*).[295]

Stein shared Husserl's view that naturalism is mistaken.[296] The entirety of her philosophical anthropology, and indeed the entirety of her philosophy, rests upon the claim that reality is

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[294] See Calcagno (2020), 626. Calcagno describes Stein's disillusionment with the naturalistic trend in the field of psychology during her time at the University of Breslau, and her first encounter with the *Logical Investigations*, which inspired her to transfer to Göttingen.

[295] Maria Celeste Vecino, "Nature, Spirit, and Spirituality in Husserl's Phenomenology," *Religions* 12, 481 (https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12070481): 1.

[296] Stein's disagreement with naturalism is hopefully clear from the previous three chapters of this attempt to show how crucial the notion of spirit is to her thought.

not only explainable through physical causality, and that human persons are more than physical beings (and more than psychological beings, for that matter). This position already emerges in *Empathy*, in which the final section directly addresses the notion of spirit, but also in the entire premise of the text. As we have seen, the approach to empathy that both Stein and Husserl take (and on which they seem to closely agree)[297] emphatically rejects the idea that our perception of others is a purely sensory/psychic experience.

Stein further reinforces her position against naturalism in *PPH*, in which she distinguishes between physical causality and motivation, a view which also resonates with Husserl's, though Jardine points out the §56 of *Ideen II*, which explores motivation in depth, contains what are mostly likely "significant elaborations by Stein." Nevertheless, he says, "it remains the case that a rich and detailed analysis of motivation was undertaken by Husserl in the manuscripts he authored for *Ideen.*"[298] Stein herself claims in *PPH* that only phenomenology can overcome "the blow that Hume's devastating critique dealt" to the notion of causality, and even references *Ideen II* as one of the source texts for her examination of causality[299]:

> Husserl's phenomenology is nothing other than this method toward which we're spurred by Hume's way of posing the problem, rightly understood. Its guiding principles are laid down in the *Ideas*. Accordingly, it seems to me, it's only on the ground of phenomenology that a fruitful consideration of psychic causality is possible. Certainly it would be a great help in our considerations if we could rely on an available phenomenological analysis

[297] See Jardine (2022), 6 and Moran (2017), 33.

[298] Jardine (2022), 180.

[299] In light of this statement, it seems plausible that Stein saw the "significant elaborations" that she made to §56 of *Ideen II* as clarifications of Husserl's position and in line with his wishes for the text.

> of causality in the domain of material nature. The unpublished second part of the *Ideas* contains fundamental arguments along that line… In our investigation we link into that groundwork wherever we're required to take material causality into consideration.[300]

Only phenomenology, she claims, can give a comprehensive enough picture of consciousness and experience, and adequately distinguish psyche from consciousness (and thus, distinguish causality from motivation). She explains that in the *Ideen* as well as in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," this distinction forms the basis for Husserl's distinction between phenomenology and psychology as "a 'natural' or 'dogmatic' science."[301] Thus, she explains, only phenomenology is adequate to form the basis of her own inquiry in *PPH*, in which she too explicitly positions herself against naturalism.

3. Husserl's "attitudes"

Vecino claims that this aim of rebutting naturalism is a likely reason why the 1919 version of the *Natur und Geist* lectures (as opposed to that from 1927[302]) presents an approach, also taken in *Ideen II*, in which "a strong opposition between the spiritual and the natural realms and a relationship of mutual exclusion in which Spirit reveals itself to be absolute and foundational in the face of a relative and inessential Nature."[303] She notes that it is unlikely that this opposition is Husserl's actual position, but rather a focus that he

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[300] *PPH* 5 (*Beiträge* 7-8). Translation modified.

[301] *PPH* 6 (*Beiträge* 8).

[302] In which, she writes, "Nature and Spirit are presented as abstractions of a concrete whole, and their fundamental entanglement is stressed" (Vecino 2).

[303] Vecino 1.

takes in order to contrast more strongly with the "reductionist" naturalistic approach.[304] He shows how the "realms" of nature and spirit can be examined individually through the adoption of distinct attitudes: the naturalistic attitude, and the personalistic attitude.

In the naturalistic attitude, the things of the world are regarded merely as physical, as the objects of natural scientific inquiry. In the personalistic attitude, we recognize value, meaning, and subjectivity; in other words, the world is seen as the object of the *Geisteswissenschaften*. As Staiti explains, "The naturalistic and the personalistic attitude are presented as two different ways of looking at the world, highlighting certain features to the detriment of others… The naturalistic and the personalistic attitude are thus two basic options for interpreting the world: one that filters out subjectivity and another that privileges it."[305] While Stein rarely uses the word "attitude," this notion of interpreting the world from these distinct vantage points is nevertheless present in her work, most especially in her early texts.

In *Empathy*, her discussions of the *Körper*, seen only as physical matter, as opposed to the living, personal *Leib*, are in line with a distinction between attitudes, and as we have seen the discussion of causality vs. motivation in *PPH* also follows this same approach. This distinction even initially appears to represent the kind of "strong opposition" between nature and spirit that Vecino recognizes in Husserl's earlier work. Stein quickly makes clear, however, that such opposition is artificial (though useful for investigatory purposes), and moves beyond it toward an integrated view of the person as a unity of body-soul-spirit,

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[304] Vecino 2.

[305] Staiti (2014), 99.

and of the world as both physical and spiritual, in which the things that we encounter in our everyday lives and the physical phenomena that occur are imbued with meaning and value.

Thus, a solely naturalistic approach may be of use in the natural sciences, but when looked at without such a myopic lens, it becomes clear that even nature itself is not merely natural, but also spiritual, insofar as there are physical-psycho-spiritual persons experiencing, participating in, and communing with one another in the world as feeling, willing, valuing beings. This view, too, is found in Husserl; as Staiti explains, "the overwhelming bulk of the objects that we encounter in our human world are endowed with predicates of significance, and it is only by way of a willful abstractive impoverishment of the total content of our experience that we can isolate a sphere of pure nature, which comprises exclusively ultimate substrates and their 'real predicates' such as extension, size, etc."[306] The structure of our environment, the shared significance of our experiences, make up the "life-world," as Husserl calls it in the *Crisis*. It is through the life-world that Husserl shows how to, as Staiti describes it, "*visualize* the world as a whole, before jumping to theorize about it."[307] This visualization allows us to recognize the integration of nature and spirit, rather than setting them against each other.

Stein forgoes use of the distinctive term 'life-world,' yet the concept echoes throughout her work, as do other Husserlian concepts, or concepts that arose through her closeness to and work with Husserl. Although she distinguishes herself from him in

[306] Staiti (2014), 142-3.

[307] Staiti (2014), 267.

producing her own original thought, especially in the texts she produced after her departure from the university, she never rejects or outright contradicts his thought. Rather, she acknowledges and continues to build on her Husserlian foundation, even in those later texts which draw on Aristotelian and Thomistic/scholastic thought. In *PA*, her work on the *Persönlichkeitskern* and her analysis of the nature of the person's individuality, as well as the unfolding and actualization of the individual person's potential, go beyond what Husserl was able to accomplish even as he took up questions on the person more explicitly in his later works. These trains of thought continue in *FEB*, where Stein's exploration of the Divine come to fruition, to an extent that Husserl never achieves (though it is clear that especially later in life his thoughts were occupied by the "*Gottesfrage*"[308]). As she pursues "the questions that really interest [her],"[309] she never abandons the phenomenological method as her entry point into these questions.

C. Conrad-Martius's Ontology

As Stein continues to flesh out these questions that are of particular interest to her, another figure emerges as a singularly significant influence. Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a close friend of Stein, was a member of the Munich and Göttingen circles of

[308] See, for example, Amelie Jaegerschmid "Gespräche mit Edmund Husserl 1931-1936," *Stimmen der Zeit* 199, 1 (1981): 48-58. For a detailed examination of Husserlian thought on God, see Angela Ales Bello, *The Divine in Husserl and Other Explorations* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009).

[309] See my introduction for a more contextualized reference to this line in one of Stein's letters to Roman Ingarden, in which she discusses her plans for her philosophical inquiry after finishing her editing work on *Ideen II* (*Ingarden Briefe*, Brief 9, November 20th, 1917).

phenomenologists and one of those most strongly opposed to Husserl's transcendental idealism.[310] Her philosophy centers around her *Realontologie* or realist ontology, with which she explores the foundations of reality through the intuition of essences. While this phenomenological approach to understanding reality took root during her time studying with Husserl, her work quickly parts ways with his, and it is perhaps inaccurate even to categorize her as one of his followers.

Furthermore, it is clear that her influence on Stein is not strictly as a fellow phenomenologist, but rather as a metaphysician that Stein references most noticeably in her later texts such as *PA* and *FEB*, and whose ideas had a distinct influence on the philosophical anthropology described in the *Aufbau*. It is perhaps indicative of the framing of Conrad-Martius' thought that the texts in which she appears most conspicuously are also those in which Stein more explicitly engages with Ancient and Medieval philosophy in order to explore questions of being. As Simona Bertolini remarks, "Stein discovered in the *Dialogues* a metaphysical perspective that was able to provide several prompts for her own theoretical plan to unify phenomenological and Scholastic streams of thought."[311] Thus, engagement with Conrad-Martius' thought accompanies the broadening scope of Stein's philosophical concerns and approach.

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[310] Daniele De Santis, "Contribution towards Reconstructing a Neglected 'Schism' in Early Phenomenology: the Cases of Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein," *Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein: Philosophical Encounters and Divides*, ed. Antonio Calcagno, Ronny Miron (Cham: Springer, 2022), 46. Bertolini refers here to Hedwig Conrad-Martius' *Metaphysische Gespräche* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1921).

[311] Simona Bertolini, "Edith Stein and Hedwig Conrad-Martius: A Metaphysical Dialogue on the Origin of the Human Soul," in Calcagno and Miron (2022), 16.

She makes use of Conrad-Martius' insights particularly in her working out of the nature of the human person, and her methodical parsing out of the three key aspects of person (body, soul, and spirit), as well as in her attempts to philosophically understand God and the person's relation to God.[312] As mentioned in my introduction as well as the previous section of this chapter, it was Stein's intention from early on in her career to philosophically explore "*Gottesfragen*," and her intellectual and personal intimacy with Conrad-Martius unquestionably played a role in this ambition and its execution.[313] In this way, Conrad-Martius' influence on Stein is particularly relevant to this present inquiry on Stein's conception of spirit, and Stein treats Conrad-Martius as a key interlocutor for her analyses of the person as spiritual and God as pure spirit.

1. Spirit as a realm of being

Chapters 1 and 2 both address Stein's understanding of the person as a unity of body, soul, and spirit. In Chapter 2 especially, we see that Stein made significant use of Conrad-Martius' understanding of soul as a basis for formulating her own definition, especially in *PA*. She draws heavily both from Conrad-Martius' *Realontologie* and her *Metaphysische Gespräche*, in which, according to Michele D'Ambra, Conrad-Martius

[312] While my primary concern here is Conrad-Martius as an inspiration to Stein, it is worth remembering that since their relationship was characterized by intellectual exchange and the sharing of ideas, Stein was not only influenced by Conrad-Martius, but the latter was surely also likewise influenced by the former.

[313] The effect of her relationship with Conrad-Martius both on her philosophical exploration of religious questions and on her own faith and religious conversion is well documented (see Calcagno, Miron (2022), 7).

"intends to investigate and describe the different strata which reality consists of."[314] While Conrad-Martius' basis for eidetic intuition is Husserlian, a starting point that she explicitly acknowledges in *Realontologie*,[315] her primary interest is not consciousness but an analysis and differentiation of the "realms" of being, and their relationship to each other insofar as this relationship sheds light on different kinds of essences and how they are known.

Stein remarks in *FEB* that "the differences by which the several realms of nature are set off rigidly from each other… play a major part in the discussions of H. Conrad-Martius, because she is primarily interested in pointing out the clear boundary lines."[316] In articulating these distinctions, her analysis begins to take on the terminology of the Ancients and Scholastics, specifically Aristotelian notions of "potency," "actuality," "form," and "matter;" a development also prominent in Stein's analysis (and in keeping with the latter's explicit aim to bring together phenomenology and Thomistic thought). In Stein's thought these examinations clearly serve the ultimate purpose of illuminating the nature of the human individual---even her exploration of the pure spirit of eternal being is not ultimately concerned simply with the nature of eternal being as such, but rather culminates in the finite human individual reaching out to and coming into communion with God's eternal Being. This is by no means to say that the human person's relationship to God was not of interest to Conrad-Martius (certainly it was at least on a personal level, given her religious faith that was an inspiration for Stein's own). However, her ontological

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[314] Michele D'Ambra, "Spirit and Soul in Hedwig Conrad-Martius's *Metaphysical Dialogues*: From Nature to the Human Being," in *Axiomathes* 18 (2008): 491.

[315] Conrad-Martius (1923), 1.

[316] *FEB*, 267.

examinations are clearly for their own sake; while Stein seeks to understand being in order to understand specifically personal and human being, Conrad-Martius seems to see her primary philosophical "calling" to be the exploration of being, and her philosophical interest in the human person is as a certain way of being that is distinct from others. This difference in focus notwithstanding, her explorations of different kinds of being offers Stein rich insights in her effort to understand the person.

The backbone of Conrad-Martius' analysis is her examinations of the three different "realms" of being: the natural realm of corporeal being, the "infra-earthly" [*Unterirrdisch*] realm of the soul as the grounding center-point of beings, and the spiritual realm of fully actualized being, free of the constraints of material nature.[317] In the human person, these realms are united, and the soul of the person grounds both material being rooted in nature and spiritual being that transcends that materiality. Unique to the human soul, (unlike animal and plant souls), is that it is the center point from which the individual moves out of itself in spiritual expression.[318] Conrad-Martius explains, in a passage from *Realontologie* that Stein quotes in *FEB*, that spirit freely moves beyond all corporeal boundaries, having "a certain lightness… and, therefore, the ability to move in every region of the being with a certain freedom," as D'Ambra says. In Conrad-Martius' own words,

> Corporeal being is essentially a kind of being in which an entity possesses itself in a quasi-fully-born-out [*ausgeboren*] form, i.e., in a form which is

[317] Hedwig Conrad-Martius, "Realontologie" in *Jahrbuch for philosophie und phänomologische Forschung* 6 (Halle: Niemeyer. 1923), 252. Quoted in *FEB*, 245 (translated by Kurt Reinhardt).

[318] Bertolini notes that "Both thinkers… emphasize the strict connection between the soul and all manifestations of human beings' spiritual being-open. The former is described as the driving force of the latter[.]" (Bertolini (2022), 18).

> actually unfolded and thus self-enclosed and self-delimited. Such a formal structure, resting in itself, represents and makes manifest what it is… The being of the soul is the hidden "life" or the hidden source which empowers such an entity to attain to corporeality… On the level of spiritual being, however, a thus substantiated corporeal entity is in turn capable of transcending itself in a selfless and non-fixed [*unfixiert*] manner and---purified and freed from the mass of the limited self---to "give itself freely" to others in vital participation.[319]

This self-transcending is, as Bertolini calls it, the "ontic condition of self-consciousness," insofar as the person partakes in the realm of spirit and thereby is able to reflect back to herself and understand herself as both material and spiritual. She not only has interiority unfolding out from the soul into bodily actualization, she also is able to grasp and regard this interiority as if from outside of it.

James Hart describes the self-consciousness of the person in Conrad-Martius' thought when he explains that "Man is freed from his body 'once more' in as much as not only does he have his body-soul being, but he also has this very having. Here the mere selfhood of the animal essence is transformed into the I-ness [*Ichheit*]."[320] Thus, while grounded in the interiority of the soul that unfolds in physical development, as a being of the realm of spirit the human person is thrown beyond that interiority and able to recognize her own external material being and the interiority of her soul. In this way, while the spheres of nature and spirit are, as Stein says, "different and mutually irreducible genera of

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[319] Conrad-Martius (1923), 251. Quoted in *FEB*, 245 (translated by Kurt Reinhardt).

[320] James Hart, *Hedwig Conrad-Martius' Ontological Phenomenology*, ed. Rodney Parker (Cham: Springer. 2020), 89.

actuality,"[321] they are united in the human person, who not only "has" her body, but also "has" spirit and inhabits the spiritual realm.

2. *Spirit as source of being*

Thus, what is unique in human persons is their "possessing" of spirit as part of their nature, even while the formally delimited material being of the body is also a part of this nature. As spiritual and self-conscious beings, however, humans also see material reality through a spiritual perspective and in this way the essences of the things of the world reveal themselves to the person. Hart (making reference to "the basic Husserlian thesis of the 'excessiveness' of a particular experience"[322]) describes Conrad-Martius' notion of the "body-face" [*Körpergesicht*], in which a seen object reveals itself in its entirety rather than simply the truncated perspective that is given in sensory perception (in other words, the object is known through intuition). In this way, Hart explains, "Conrad-Martius attempts to show the harmony and disclosure power of the various aspects of the total phenomenon of nature. She thereby attempts to overcome the abyss which the natural sciences are supposed to uncover between what really is and what appears."[323] In other words, things are more than they appear to be, and all things have meaning that discloses itself and can be grasped, and in this way they participate in spirit.[324]

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[321] *FEB*, 272. Stein remarks here that "The investigations of H. Conrad-Martius and our own concur in [this regard].

[322] Hart (2020), 10.

[323] Hart (2020), 17.

[324] Conrad-Martius describes this participation as "exhaling" spirit (*Metaphysische Gespräche* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1921), 233.

Thus, for Conrad-Martius as well as for Stein, spirit "pervades the whole real world."[325] This points to the idea of the divine or "absolute spirit" that is the source of being, and which orders nature according to a spiritual structure. As Angela Ales Bello states, "In Conrad-Martius's view of nature, everything is included, and every single thing has its own unique place."[326] While the being of a non-human natural thing is not in itself spiritual, it receives its essence, and thus its meaning, from this divine spirit, and thus is able to be grasped and understood as a substance and in its connection to the rest of the world, beyond mere sensory perception of its physical qualities. In this way, matter is raised up by divine spirit, and all of reality is ordered in a hierarchy of being that ascends toward spirit.

Up to this point, the aspects of Conrad-Martius' thought discussed bear a noticeable relationship to Stein's. Here it is necessary, however, to acknowledge a point of disagreement between the two thinkers that arises in the *Metaphysische Gespräche* and is addressed by Stein in *PA*. While Conrad-Martius claims that all of reality receives its being from the divine, she also posits that material things are brought into being from the "primal depth" of abysmal nothingness. Stein calls attention to the following claim from Conrad-Martius about this primal depth: "It contains nothing, even but in potency, and it can become everything and anything. Yet in longing…, in hunger, in craving, it does contain everything and anything. It is not lifeless material but nothingness [*Nichtigkeit*] alive---it

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[325] Bertolini, 21.

[326] Angela Ales Bello, "Philosophy of Nature and Metaphysics: The Relevance of Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Edith Stein on Divine-Human Ontology," in Calcagno, Miron (2022), 74.

is not fullness without quality but void driven about in all qualities."[327] In this way, the being of things is founded both "from above" and "from below."

Stein questions this position on what, as she points out, can be likened to the notion of prime matter. She notes that the *Metaphysische Gespräche* does not clearly specify whether this prime matter "[has] its origins in God," and furthermore, "can we imagine this nothing as living, as driving greedily for being? Life is surely a kind of being. The life of earthly creatures is naturally not pure being; it is rather a constant transition from potentiality to actuality but from a potency that is not mere empty possibility."[328] This disagreement further deepens when it comes to the origin of the human individual. As material beings, humans have their origin in this primal abyss---in Conrad-Martius' words, they are born "from below.". As beings that rise up toward spirit, humans are reborn "from above," and thereby become aware of their personhood and able to actively choose to move toward spirit. According to Stein, Conrad-Martius' position is that

> Man's spirit awakens to his freedom and openness; more precisely, man awakens as free and open. He does not awaken by himself, nor is he *originally* free and open by himself. But once awakened, once having his original freedom and openness, it is up to him to keep himself free and open. At the same time, it is possible for him to lose both. If he does not "keep himself on high," he can fall back into the being of nature from which he has awakened to personally spiritual being.[329]

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[327] *Metaphysische Gespräche* 188, quoted by Stein in *PA*, 273 (187).

[328] *PA* 282 (192).

[329] *PA* 409 (279).

Stein disagrees with this notion that the being of the human person has two "births." It is true, she points out, that beings are "from above" insofar as they are brought into existence by God, and "from below" insofar as they are "given a nature" that partakes in materiality and is thus finite and separated from pure spirit. But the nature of the human person is such that "he is given an analogy with divine being that sets him apart from all nonpersonal creatures," and thereby is able to participate in a life of God's grace and grow close to the divine "simply because of his original openness."[330] The person is not given another, spiritual nature "from above" that is added on to her material nature which rose up "from below." Rather, the nature of the person that is brought into being by God makes her the kind of thing that, while finite, was made for unity with the divine.

Despite this disagreement about the nature of the person, the thoroughness and care with which Stein approaches Conrad-Martius' thought on spirit indicate the extent to which she found her friend's position compelling, and the fact that she bases a significant portion of her analysis in *PA* on the groundwork laid by Conrad-Martius indicates the depth to which it influenced her own thought and spurred her on to pursue the questions that they shared or that were inspired in Stein by their relationship.

[330] *PA* 410-11 (280).

V. Personal Relation and Community: The Spiritual Life as Expressive and Transcendent

A. Openness to the world and openness to the other

The core of Stein's understanding of the human person is the notion that the person is a spiritual being, whose spirituality is intertwined with, experienced in and expressed through the physical and the psychic. We have seen that plants are characterized by being contained wholly within themselves, animals receive the external world into themselves through senses, and human beings go outside of themselves to encounter a world of value and meaning, and to understand and be understood by other human persons. Thus, at the heart of her philosophical anthropology is the idea that spirit is expressive, and that this expression (or "going out from oneself") as a fundamental characteristic of the human person. The identity of the individual is uncovered, revealed, and comes to fruition through valuing, willing, and acting, and in the unfolding of one's *Persönlichkeitskern*, the individual expresses his or her personhood through spiritual acts, insofar as the individual encounters the world as meaningful, and creatively and freely responds to this meaning.

In this way, the spiritual self goes out toward the world, and the spiritual life is what Stein calls a "superabundant, diffusive life" of self-expression and self-transcendence toward life outside of the self. Furthermore, in unfolding out toward the world and toward other individuals, we also are opened up to receive this self-expression from others (their "going out of themselves"). Thus, to be spiritual is to participate in a shared world and to be shaped by it; to express oneself to the other, and to be receptive to the other's expression of spirit. When spirit goes out of itself in self-expression, it expresses itself *to someone*, and the community of self-expressing persons is a community of beings that mean together,

as it were; beings that participate in the sharing of spiritual content and the fruit of spiritual acts. Yet, this self-transcendence is at the same time not a leaving behind of the self; in spiritual acts, individuals *become* themselves as the unfolding of one's personal core is expressed and uncovered not only to others but also to oneself. In the creativity and freedom of spiritual acts, individuals are brought outside of themselves and at the same time become more at home within themselves insofar as, with the actualization of the individual *Persönlichkeitskern*, individuals more fully know and express their unique individuality. In going out toward others in spiritual expression, one becomes more at home within oneself. Thus, this chapter examines the way in which Stein's notion of spirit provides a way of understanding the person as inextricably bound up in community without compromising individual identity.

To pursue this aim, first more attention must be paid to what it means for a person to "go out from oneself." We have seen in previous chapters that the psychic feelings of the subject are made outwardly visible through the physical body, such as when "I blush for shame, I irately clench my fist, I angrily furrow my brow, I groan with pain, am jubilant with joy."[331] Such expression naturally arises out of an embodied life. Stein explains that "as I live through the feeling, I feel it terminate in an expression or release expression out of itself… feeling by its nature demands expression."[332] Chapter IV discussed the way in which persons, as spiritual, perceive value and are motivated by these perceived values to freely act. Up to this point these analyses have focused on the experience of the first-person

[331] *Empathy*, 52-3 (*Einfühlung*, 58).

[332] *Empathy*, 52-3 (*Einfühlung*, 58).

subject, but of course it is impossible to exclude the fact that this feeling, valuing and acting is always in relation to others, and expresses something about ourselves and the world to those in relation to us. No attempt to understand the human person is complete if all that is examined is an individual person, since it is fundamental to the nature of the human person that we are in relation to one another. As Baseheart explains, "In Stein's plan, the investigation requires the study of the individual person in relation to community, since the nature of person is a going-beyond self and an openness not only to the object world but also to the world of other subjects. Intersubjectivity demands analyses of the phenomena of community."[333] While the starting point for an analysis of empathy is my realization of my own perception and experience of another subject, this perception is a response to the other's expression of her personhood to me, and part of my realization of the subjectivity of the other is a realization that the other perceives me as well---in other words, the realization that I am myself an expressive being that is perceived by the other as a subject.

This is why, as we have seen, recognizing the other as an "I" already entails recognizing the spiritual person. Stein states that even when focusing on the psychic and physical aspects of the person in an effort to better understand them, "We have already taken along the 'I' of the foreign living body as a spiritual subject by interpreting this body as the center of orientation of the spatial world."[334] By re-orienting myself to the perspective of the other and perceiving the other as a subject, I see the subject as valuing and willing, and "in every literal act of empathy, i.e., in every comprehension of an act of

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[333] Mary Catherine Baseheart, "Edith Stein's Philosophy of Community," *The Personalist Forum* Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992): 164.

[334] *Empathy*, 92 (*Einfühlung*, 102).

feeling, we have already penetrated into the realm of the spirit.."[335] In empathically perceiving one another, the other and I share with each other our feelings, our thoughts, our desires, and our general way of relating to the world.

In this way, we directly perceive the other as valuing (not only as sensing), and the feelings and thoughts that the other expresses (and the actions through which she expresses them) pertain to this world of values. As discussed in Chapter III, our fundamental way of relating to the world is relating to it as valuable and meaningful; as Lebech points out, "value theory allows us… to know that there is nothing that is not important in one way or another, nothing that has no value and cannot be explored to find out about the essential relationships pertaining to being a person in the world."[336] As a valuing person, the world is charged with meaning to me, and in valuing the world I reflect and express this meaning to other valuing persons, as they do to me. By way of this expression, my opening up to a world of value is not simply a matter of my own valuing, but also of recognizing that values are not simply a part of my subjective interiority. I can recognize the objective value of a thing either by recognizing that both I and the other perceive this value, or by becoming aware of a value which I had not previously perceived through the other's valuing of it. Vendrell Ferran explains that in this way, recognition of value requires not only my own perception of the world, but also my experience of empathy with the other's perception of the world:

> Access to the general feelings and moods of others show us different ways of being in the world. More important, however, is the possibility

[335] *Empathy*, 92 (*Einfühlung*, 102).

[336] Lebech (2010a), 149.

> of empathizing with spiritual feelings and sentiments, because they give us access to the world of values. Empathizing with the sadness of another or with her aesthetic appreciation makes us see the world according to the value system of this other individual, which can differ strongly from ours and which offers us a new perspective towards what matters. Thus, empathy with the different layers of feelings of other individuals is a basic form of intersubjectivity that has important consequences for outer perception and access to the world of values.[337]

In this way, my experience of the other and our sharing of spiritual content expands my world of value, opening up my understanding of the meaning of the world around me.

This perception of spiritual content does not only open my eyes to the objective world that is constituted intersubjectively; in perceiving what the other expresses to me, I not only understand information about the world but also perceive and understand the other person herself as an individual. Stein claims that

> *Shared* psychic reality is possible only insofar as the psychic occurrence is a realization of *spiritual life*. *Spirit* is a going out from yourself, an openness, in a twofold sense: openness for an objective world, which is *experienced*; and openness for someone else's subjectivity, someone else's spirit, *along with* which the objective world is *experienced* and *lived* in common.[338]

The feelings and experiences of the other that I perceive empathically can be fulfilled in comprehension of the other, not because I "gather information" about the other, as it were, and thereby infer and conclude about her; rather, because I am directly confronted with her in my experience of her, and thereby can (at least potentially) know her, as I know other

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[337] Vendrell Ferran, "Empathy, Emotional Sharing and Feelings in Stein's Early Work," *Human Studies* 38 (2015): 491.

[338] *PPH*, 295-96 (*Beiträge*, 247).

objects which I directly experience, though I do not simply know the individual as an object (this would be contradictory to everything that has already been said about empathy). Perceiving what the individual is involves knowing that this individual is not simply a "what", or a unit in a category, but a "who." I perceive a person as having an individual essence, as having a *Persönlichkeitskern* that is not (and cannot) be fully revealed to me, yet becomes more and more visible as the other opens up to me and I to them. In other words, as persons we are unique and particular spiritual beings that express this spiritual nature in our living in the world. As Stein explains,

> If we call a thing an individual, this individuality amounts to no more than identity: the thing is itself and not another one, which has no more to do with its qualitative substance than the fact that a substantial meaning and a certain continuity in its variation are generally presupposed… Individuality in the sense of a qualitatively unique substance of its own, is what the discrete thing doesn't have… Only in the realm of spirit is there a qualitative peculiarity that can't be grasped as an intersection of common lawfulnesses, but is grounded in the inner uniqueness of the individual.[339]

The experience of the other necessarily entails knowing the other as an actor, whose actions arising out of her spiritual being have an effect on the world. Knowing such an individual (not simply knowing *that* this thing is an individual, nor simply knowing *what* this individual is as an object) is possible, though not exhaustively. Stein claims that "The experiential context of spiritual subjects is an experienced (primordially or empathically) totality of meaning and intelligible as such."[340] The individual is not simply causally

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[339] *PPH* 305-6; translation modified (*Beiträge*, 254-5).

[340] *Empathy*, 96 (*Einfühlung*, 107).

determined by the natural world; however, the meaning expressed by the individual is intelligible as the essence of this individual.

Thus, it becomes clear that what is most human is this ability to go outside of oneself; to transcend the world of nature and the bounds of corporeality.[341] Since this transcendence takes the form of expression and sharing of spiritual content, this means that we are essentially communicative beings. Everything about our way of being in the world says something, to others that we encounter and also to ourselves---since we are self-conscious, we express ourselves even to ourselves in our efforts to understand and "explain ourselves" through self-reflection.

B. Communication of Spiritual Life

Chapter I discussed at length the way in which empathy is a direct perceiving of the other as a human person. Stein takes great care to show that this perception is not simply inference of the existence of a person based on physical and bodily "signs" pointing to a subject to whom they are attached. Rather, she claims that the body expresses the person in the manner of a symbol. When I experience something, my body expresses my psychic feelings in response to this experience, thereby showing the other what something feels like to me (and vice versa) through facial expressions, bodily movements, etc. When something causes me pain, I wince, and the other sees that I am in pain. Furthermore, I can choose to attempt to hide my pain by controlling my facial expression, which may

[341] "Most human" because other corporeal beings are not transcendent in this way, and purely spiritual beings have no need to transcend corporeality.

communicate to the other that I am a particularly stoic person, if the other recognizes that whatever has occurred to me must have been painful, or it may convey to the other the false impression that I am not actually experiencing pain.[342] In this way, I communicate (both voluntarily and involuntarily) something to the other about the current state of affairs as well as something about myself and the kind of person that I am.

Of course, human communication encompasses more than bodily expression. While everything in the world "means" something[343], we as conscious and spiritual persons are capable of meaning intentionally. That is, not only not only do we display who we are involuntarily simply by living and acting, and being perceived by others through empathy; we are also capable of choosing to express our thoughts, values, ideas, feelings, and individuality through language, and to seek to make ourselves understood by our fellow persons. Thus, what is being shared is not simply our responses to the world of nature, but also our participation in the world of spirit. As will be seen, this participation and its expression is the basis not just for individual human relationships, but also for the formation of larger human communities. Before examining this further, however, it is worthwhile to first look more closely at what Stein says about bodily expression.

In *Empathy*, Stein draws attention to the idea of the "symbolic relationship" between an experience and its expression, which, as she says "we find portrayed by Fr. Th. Vischer and especially Lipps," and which she claims is also represented in the relation between word and meaning described by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*, in which

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[342] See *Empathy* 86-7 (*Einfühlung*, 98-9) for Stein's treatment of deception and misunderstandings in empathic experiences.

[343] C.f. the reference to Lebech above.

he claims that "there are phenomenal unities which cannot be made at all intelligible by allusions to an association."[344] Molly Brigid Flynn indicates this when she states that "Just as word–body and meaning are united in the expression, living body and spirit are united in the expressive whole, the person."[345] A sign, Stein explains, "means that something perceived says to me that something else exists," such as when we infer the existence of fire from a perception of smoke. A symbol, on the other hand, "means that in something perceived there is something else and, indeed, we co-comprehend something psychic in it."[346] There is, for example, a "symbolic relation" between sadness and a sad countenance. Unlike the sign-relation between smoke and fire (in which the smoke points away from itself to "the object of my actual turning-toward," the fire), in the case of a sad countenance the emotion is "co-given" with its expression. That is, "The sad countenance is actually not a theme that leads over to another one at all, but it is at one with sadness… The countenance is the outside of sadness. Together they form a natural unity."[347] According to Lipps, this kind of symbolism can be present in facial expressions, in vocal tone, in words, in gestures,

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[344] *Empathy*, 76 (*Einfühlung*, 86). Stein remarks that though Lipps' early work (e.g. the *Ethischen Grundfragen*, 1899) describes "the externalizations of life" as signs and not symbols, he later "energetically rejects" this formulation in favor of the term 'symbol' rather than 'sign' in those of his texts that appeared after 1903 (e.g. *Ästhetik I*,1903*, Leitfaden,* 1903*,* and the second edition of the *Ethischen Grundfragen*, 1905). She posits that the *Logical Investigations* "could have stimulated Lipps to revise his views" (*Empathy*, 76).

[345] Molly Brigid Flynn, "The Living Body as the Origin of Culture: What the Shift in Husserl's Notion of 'Expression' Tells Us About Cultural Objects," *Husserl Studies* Vol. 25, No. 1 (2009): 69.

[346] *Empathy*, 76 (*Einfühlung*, 86).

[347] *Empathy*, 76-77 (*Einfühlung*, 87).

and in general "the whole outer habitus of a person."[348] Stein agrees that it is more accurate to call bodily expressions symbols rather than signs, though it is worth noting that she claims Lipps' position is still too imprecise.

This imprecision arises in his assertion (paraphrased here by Stein) that "Symbols… are gestures, movements, resting forms, natural sounds, and words."[349] She does agree that expressions such as gestures and natural sounds (e.g. crying out in fear) are symbolic; however, she states, "it is a complete mistake to designate the word itself as a symbol, to contend that there is an act of interpretation in the speaker's statement of the act of judgment, as sadness is in his countenance, to contend that the comprehension of speech is based on this."[350] This is the case because "verbal expressions are not themes themselves, but only the intermediate points to the theme, namely, to that which they designate. They arouse a tendency to transition that is restricted if they themselves are made into themes."[351] When we encounter a person with a sad countenance, the countenance *is*, in a way, the person's sadness expressed bodily. When I look at someone who is sad, and see this sadness in their face, I do not think to myself that I am looking at a face that tells me it belongs to a sad person; rather, I tell myself that I am looking at a sad person. On the other hand, if someone tells me that they are sad, then these words themselves are not this person's sadness, but a way of designating sadness.

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[348] *Empathy*, 78 (*Einfühlung*, 88).

[349] *Empathy*, 77 (*Einfühlung*, 88).

[350] *Empathy*, 78 (*Einfühlung*, 89).

[351] *Empathy*, 79 (*Einfühlung*, 89).

While words are not simply signals in the same way that smoke is a signal for fire or an arrow marks a hiking path, they are more aptly described as a certain kind of sign than as symbols; namely, signs that express meaning rather than simply indicating something. Here she follows Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* I, where he states that

> Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has 'meaning', a 'sense that the sign 'expresses'… From indicative signs we distinguish *meaningful* signs, i.e. *expressions*… We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility, that each instance or part of *speech*, as also each sign that is essentially of the same sort, shall count as an expression, whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed with communicative intent to any persons or not.[352]

Thus, while spoken or written words are indicative[353], they are not simply "characteristic qualities suited to help us in recognizing the objects to which they attach."[354] It is important to note here that Husserl distinguishes between the word as communicative, which "serve the hearer as signs of the 'thoughts' of the speaker," and the interior, uncommunicated word which does not indicate.[355] This distinction does not, however, change the fact that a word is expressive whether or not it is communicated. What it expresses is an ideal unity or meaning that is "the same thing, whether we address [the word] to anyone or not."[356]

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[352] Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations* Vol. 1, ed. Dermot Moran (New York: Routledge, 2001), 183, 187.

[353] *Logical Investigations*, 189.

[354] *Logical Investigations*, 183.

[355] *Logical Investigations*, 189-90.

[356] *Logical Investigations*, 190.

Stein does not address the role of language in empathy beyond positing this analogy. However, in turning to the spiritual person, it becomes clear that language itself (not simply as an analogy) plays a large role in empathically perceiving the other as a spiritual person, and in the fulfillment of this perception in knowledge of the other as an individual. This assertion seems at first to contradict what Stein says about empathy, since she distinguishes between knowledge of the other that is gained through the other telling me something about himself, and knowledge gained through empathy. Because of this, commentators of both Stein and Husserl emphasize the role of the body in empathy, and focus on the fact that empathy is direct perception,[357] though a few words must also be said about linguistic communication in understanding one another on a spiritual level. Specifically, language plays a role in comprehending the other as an individual person insofar as it is through language that we share value, and thus present ourselves as valuing individuals. This can be seen not only in interpersonal relationships, but also in the way in which the humanities reveal the spiritual person.

In describing words as expressions, Husserl explicitly excludes "facial expression and the various gestures which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent, or those in which a man's mental states achieve understandable 'expression' for his environment, without the added help of speech."[358] It is strange, then, that Stein references the *Logical Investigations* precisely in the section of *Empathy* in which she discusses the body as expressive, and specifically refers to facial expression and gesture. A plausible

[357] See, for example, Luo (2017).

[358] *Logical Investigations*, 188.

explanation for why Stein sees no need to point out the passage quoted above is the fact that she had access to the unpublished manuscript of *Ideas II*, in which Husserl's understanding of expression appears to be less narrow.[359] Regardless, while Stein agrees that words are not symbolic while bodily expression is, she does use the case of linguistic expression to shed light upon bodily expression. She refers to "a verbal living body [*Wortleib*]" and claims that "the living body and the soul of a word form a living unity."[360] She does not explain what she means "the living body and the soul of a word," but it seems clear that she is referring to the "physical" word in speech or writing, and the word itself as meaningful, whether spoken or mental. In the same way that a body is always the body of a person, the word always means something. Both are expressive, though the word expresses meaning and the body expresses the individual.

Where these diverge is in the way in which they express. Stein explains that

> Meaning is always a general one. In order to comprehend the object intended right now, we always need a givenness of the intuitive basis of the meaning experiences. There is no such intermediate level between the expressed experience and the expressing bodily change. But meaning and symbol have something in common which forces them both to be called "expression" repeatedly. This is the fact that together they constitute the unity of an object, that the expression released from the connection with what is expressed is no longer the same object (in contrast with the signaling physical body), that the expression proceeds out of the experience and adapts itself to the expressed material.[361]

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[359] See Flynn (2009).

[360] *Empathy*, 80 (*Einfühlung*, 91).

[361] *Empathy*, 81 (*Einfühlung*, 92).

She points out here that speaking about an object is not the same as having an object presented to you. On the other hand, an encounter with the lived body is a direct perception of the experience expressed by the body—though this does not mean that I fully understand the experience; only that what I am perceiving is the experience. Furthermore, when we do understand what is expressed bodily, this understanding is based upon empathy, that is, "comprehending the foreign living body already interpreted as a living body of an 'I'"; on the other hand, it is possible, Stein points out, to understand the meaning expressed by someone's words while utterly forgetting the "speaking individual."[362] It seems, then, that language and empathy are simply two different ways of knowing, and directed at two different objects. If we move to Stein's description of the spiritual person, though, it seems that it is possible for language to play a role in revealing the person empathically, and not simply verbally expressing the meaning of whatever information the person is talking about.

While in empathy we grasp the other's personhood directly, it would seem that language reveals the other indirectly, giving us information about the other but not giving us the other herself. This indirect expression only concerns the meaning of words, however, and it is possible that there is more to linguistic communication than this meaning. Certainly speech itself expresses something about a particular object that is being talked about, and this object is expressed indirectly. This object does not, after all, need to be directly and intuitively present to you for you to understand the information that is being conveyed about it. However, when individuals communicate, their communication is not

[362] *Empathy*, 82 (*Einfühlung*, 93).

simply about the object discussed. Rather, in speaking to another person about something, I am directly presenting myself to them by "opening my mind", so to speak, and displaying myself as acting, willing, and valuing. As we saw, Stein claims that "A person doesn't confront us as a value-free being, but rather as a value-tropic being,"[363] and what the other values is presented to me when we speak with one another.[364] Language is not just for the purpose of conveying information, but also for meeting the other in a shared world of values and thereby forming community with the other. This is indicated by the fact that our use of language is not always efficient or clear. We do not speak in unconventional, cryptic or poetic ways if our goal is merely to share data. We do so because we desire, rather, to share our understanding of spiritual realities, and to reveal who we are as unique individuals. In fact, even when we do not explicitly desire this, the revelatory nature of language is such that our manner of speaking betrays something about who we are.

Thus, while the meaning primarily expressed by language is not known empathically, language can also play a role in presenting the givenness of the spiritual subject, even when (and perhaps especially when) what is said is not "about" the speaker. When I consider the meaning of the words on their own, "without regarding the speaker and all that is going on in him," word and speaker recede into the background as I grasp the meaning of the words. This is the case when what is said has nothing to do with the speaker, such as in Stein's example of the sentence "it is raining", which we can understand

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[363] *PPH*, 227 (*Beiträge*, 190).

[364] Or rather, what it is that the subject values is presented (not the valued objects themselves).

without coming to any knowledge of the subject[365]; it is also the case when the words express something that the subject wants me to know about himself—e.g., "Should someone say to me that he is sad, I understand the meaning of the words. The sadness I now know of is not an 'alive one' before me as a perceptual givenness."[366] When, in listening to the words, I attend to the psycho-physical-spiritual unity which is this individual "I", I perceive the person speaking as an individual who is communicating with me. Stein explains that when this happens, the words "are no longer merely the expression of something objective, but at the same time are the externalization or the announcement of the person's meaningful act as well as of the experiences behind it, such as a perception."[367] In such circumstances, the language of the speaker functions in a similar way to bodily expression—it is the "outwardness" of the person doing the expressing, just as the sad countenance is the outwardness of sadness.

Furthermore, when that which is being spoken about is not simply a report or a neutral observation (such as in "it is raining"), even more of the individual person is revealed. What I choose to communicate and how I choose to communicate it expresses that which I value, what I feel in response to value, what I desire, what disgusts me, what I think I ought to do, etc. (even when these feelings, values, actions, etc. are not themselves what I intend to communicate). When I draw your attention to a beautiful sunset, I am not just communicating that the sunset is beautiful and that I think you ought to look at it; I am

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[365] *Empathy*, 82 (*Einfühlung*, 93).

[366] *Empathy*, 81 (*Einfühlung*, 92).

[367] *Empathy*, 82-3 (*Einfühlung*, 94).

also communicating that I value beauty and want you to share this valuable experience, and to value it yourself. When you respond by starting a conversation about why the beauty of the sunset matters, and what it makes you feel when you look at it, you are expressing something not just about beauty and not just about the sunset, but about yourself and your relationship to beauty as a value.

In expressing ourselves in this way, it is possible to move beyond simply informing each other of our ideas and enter into a relationship of shared ideas and shared motivation. In such a relationship, you and I are not only communicating who we are---displaying the personalities that have thus far unfolded, as it were---but also growing and unfolding through the communication itself. Stein explains that in addition to simply perceiving a motive as belonging to a subject (and not to myself), I can also take up and experience this motive for myself, and in this way new motives and realizations can arise that belong neither simply to the other or to myself, but are shared:

> [T]he overlap of motivation from one subject to the other is intelligible only if mutual understanding [*Wechselverständigung*][368] exists between them. A motive of thought can be effective in me only when it is an *experienced* motive. What impels me to advance along a coherence is the *realized* sense and not the objectively subsisting sense. While the motive can be experienced as deriving from someone else, or as playing out from me to someone else, still it doesn't necessarily have to be able to develop [into] a communal experience. The experience of the one and that of the other merely must stand in the relationship of *realization* and *re-realization*. When the other is "imparting" his thoughts to me, the sense originally constituted in his

[368] Baseheart and Sawicki translate '*Wechselverständigung*' as 'reciprocal notification,' and note that it "can mean two-way communication: being online, as it were" (*PPH* 170, fn. 58). However, since the context in which this term is used here is Stein's assertion that this kind of communication leads to a "thinking together," and new, shared realizations, 'notification' seems a less adequate translation of '*verständigung*' than 'understanding.'

> thinking is dawning upon me step by step in understanding. And when I am experiencing that sense, it is moving me to "further thinking" that no longer is a re-realization but rather an original realization, and in which new portions of the total sense-coherence disclose themselves to me. So in the "exchange of thoughts" a thinking-together arises that no longer is experienced as an experience of one or the other, but as *our* common thinking.[369]

Thus, part of what is expressed in this kind of interpersonal communication is the nature of our relationship to each other and the nature of the community that we form through our relationship. Perhaps what this description most readily brings to mind are relationships of close friendship, in which I and my friend deeply value each other and inspire one another to deeper contemplation through conversation. Additionally, however, Stein beautifully describes the way in which such a relationship of shared thinking is lived out in the relationship between teacher and student:

> The spiritual nature of the human being – reason and freedom – demands spirituality of the pedagogical act: a supportive working together between educator and pupil toward the gradual awakening of spiritual activity, during which the primary activity of the educator more and more gives room to the pupil's own activity, finally to let him move completely on to self-activity and self-education. The limits of his activities, of which every educator must himself be conscious, are first the nature of the pupil, from which not everything and anything can be "made," his freedom, which can oppose the educator himself and can frustrate his efforts, finally his own inadequacy: the narrowness of knowledge, which himself, e.g. the nature of the pupil, also with the best will, cannot provide complete insight. (Thereat is specially to be remembered that the individuality is something mysterious, and further, that with every generation something new breaks forth that is not completely comprehensible to the older.)[370]

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[369] *PPH* 170, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 143).

[370] *Aufbau*, 14. Since this text is Stein's lectures on the nature of the human person given at the pedagogical institute at which she taught in Münster, it is unsurprising that part of the text touches on the student-teacher relationship and how the teacher can best recognize and acknowledge the personhood of her students.

In this way, both student and teacher learn from and grow in this relationship, building upon thoughts and ideas that transcend them both, yet each bringing to the relationship their own individuality and freedom, transforming these thoughts and ideas into something particular to their relationship.

Thus, in sharing my thoughts, they are no longer simply my thoughts, but become a manifestation of the shared meaning, values, customs, and characteristics that make up our relationship of unity with each other, and in turn contribute to the continued deepening and transformation of this relationship. Such relationships are built not only on a shared recognition of a reality external to the relationship (as when both subjects recognize an object that they mutually value), but also on the mutual recognition of each other's value.

In this way, human relationships are founded upon the spiritual nature of the human person, and no communication can ever be reduced to the simple conveying of information, except artificially or in cases in which one is negligent in attending to the other's subjectivity. Since every interaction also expresses the individuality of the person communicating, my interaction and communication leads not only to increased knowledge about them in a factual sense, but also to knowing the other in the sense of direct contact, of deepened acquaintanceship, of heightened intuitive grasp of their individual essence---in other words, I not only know more *about* the other, I also *know* the other directly. This way of knowing reveals the way in which the spiritual dimension of the human person is lived out relationally. In receiving the other and expressing myself to her, my personality unfolds through our knowing, thinking, feeling, and valuing together. Our expression of

our feelings toward the world and toward each other form the basis for communal living, in which we live not only alongside each other but also for each other and that which we share. In doing so, we live out our identities as valuing and free persons, and acknowledge this identity in others by forming community with them. Baseheart notes that "Only the person as spirit, [Stein] finds, can go beyond the self and relate cognitively and affectively to other subjects in the full sense of these relations. The knowing, loving, and serving and the joy of knowing, loving, and serving constitute the life of spirit, the proper sphere of freedom."[371] Furthermore, she continues,

> Communication between persons takes place not only by the transmission of mind connected, language-expressed states-of-affairs, the effect of which is the understanding of meaning-content, but also by means of other social acts which apply to other persons in their individual quality and touch the very core of their being. Examples of these are positive attitudes, such as love, trust, and gratitude, and negative attitudes, such as distrust, aversion, and hate, by which the person is affirmed or denied.[372]

Thus, interpersonal communication both unites us with others, transforming my thoughts and your thoughts into our thoughts, and at the same time draws attention to and affirms the unique subjectivity of the individual person. This mutual expression is perhaps most readily recognizable in one-on-one relationships, yet it also becomes clear when we take a closer look at the relation that binds entire communities together.

C. The Formation of Community and the Sharing of Communal Values

[371] Baseheart (1992), 164.

[372] Baseheart (1992), 165.

1. Solidarity and communal experiences

I have already argued for the fittingness of empathy as the starting point to Stein's lifelong inquiry into the nature of the human person (and as the starting point of any inquiry that seeks to understand Stein's philosophical contributions). In following this thread now to the communal aspect of personhood, it becomes all the more clear why understanding empathy is crucial to understanding Stein's philosophical anthropology, and how it leads us to where we are now. If it is of the nature of the person to express spirit, and this expression is lived out through empathy, then it is the fulfillment of our nature to live together as in relationships of spiritual understanding. In this way, community is the empathic relationship writ large, and in participating in community we perceive not only the individuals with whom we come into contact, but also a larger whole of which we are a part. Stein notes this in the introduction to the Second Treatise of *PPH*, "Individual and Community," when she explains that even the "microsomic" investigation into the individual's governance by causality and motivation conducted in the first treatise made implicitly clear how necessary "a broadening of this framework" really is:

> We saw that the "mechanism" of psychic occurrences isn't self-contained. The lifepower that keeps it in operation undergoes influxes "from without," and you've got to trace those influxes to their sources if you wish to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the individual psyche. So there are two major directions to be pursued: the insertion into the network of material nature, and the insertion of [of the lone psyche] into the network of the spiritual world… Before anything else, if you want to understand in what sense you can talk about a universe of psychic reality into which the lone psyche fits as member, you've got to clarity a determinate form of the living together of individual persons.[373]

[373] *PPH* 129 (*Beiträge*, 110).

Thus, what has emerged in regard to causality and motivation as the lawfulness of psyche and spirit is ultimately only coherent when we recognize the way in which these systems are relational.

In describing what she means by community, Stein references Ferdinand Tönnies' distinction between 'association' and 'community,'[374] asserting that for the purposes of her investigation these two social structures can be understood as follows:

> Where one person approaches another as *subject* to *object*, examines her, "deals with" her methodically on the basis of the knowledge obtained and coaxes the intended reactions out of her, they are living together in *association*. Conversely where a subject accepts the other *as a subject* and does not confront him but rather *lives with him* and is determined by the stirrings of his life, they are forming a *community* with one another. In the association, everyone is absolutely alone, a "windowless monad." In the community, solidarity prevails. It's easy to see that factual personal alliances are mostly mixed forms of these basic types, but that in principle, an association that would be *only* an association, and not to a certain extent *also* a community, would be inconceivable.[375]

This bare association is inconceivable precisely because the particular way in which we perceive other human persons is through empathy, though individuals' awareness and recognition of others' subjectivity may be more or less acute; when this difference is reflected in someone's behavior toward others we call her more or less empathetic. Differences in degrees of awareness notwithstanding, Stein has already claimed to show in

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[374] She provides the caveat that she does not wish to fully "hold [herself] exactly to the demarcations as they might be found in Tönnies" (*PPH*, 130 (*Beiträge*, 110)). Here she also notes the influence of Tönnies' distinction on other thinkers such as Scheler.

[375] *PPH* 130-31 (*Beiträge*, 111).

her dissertation that recognition of an other's subjectivity (that is, empathy), is the basic way of responding to other human individuals who we encounter, and it is almost impossible not to recognize this subjectivity, even when its dignity is not respected. This empathy is not yet community; as Calcagno points out,

> One experiences community when one seizes the sense of "solidarity" of living in the experience of the other with the other. In intersubjectivity, we are aware of the experience of the other's mind, but we do not always or necessarily have solidarity. In the lived experience of community, there is a solidarity of minds experiencing and living through the same content of a particular lived-experience; one lives in experience the togetherness of the community.[376]

In the same way, it is virtually impossible to live simply in association with others and not in community.[377]

We see, then, that the centrality of community is evident throughout Stein's writings. Though her approach to the question changes as her investigations into the nature of the person mature, the question itself remains key to her understanding of personhood. Calcagno remarks that as Stein's body of work develops, she approaches the notion of

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[376] Antonio Calcagno, "Edith Stein's Philosophy of Community in Her Early Work and in Her Later Finite and Eternal Being: Martin Heidegger's Impact," *Philosophy and Theology* Vol. 23, No. 2 (2011): 234.

[377] To this last point, Stein gives the example of the demagogue as seemingly "the purest example possible of an 'association man'" insofar as he seeks to use a crowd (or an entire society) for his own gain, and rather than living in solidarity with them views them as objects that are means to his purposes. Nevertheless, in order to win the trust of the crowd and thereby effectively achieve his purposes, he must present himself as a "community man." There is no escaping an acknowledgement of others' subjectivity (no matter how exploitative the use of this recognition may be), because "in order to come as close to someone else's inwardness as is necessary for his purpose, you've got to be able to give yourself over to it. You can't make the subject into an object without having first having accepted it once simply as a subject" (*PPH*, 131 (*Beiträge*, 112)).

community both phenomenologically, by looking at what our experience is as members of this community, and ontologically, by looking at what the being of community is and what this tells us about our own being as participants in communal structures:

> In her earlier work, Stein argued that the phenomenological sense of a community or, more precisely, the lived-experience of community (Gemeinschaftserlebnis) was, in part, constituted by a particular form of consciousness, which she called "solidarity," whereby one lived in the experience of the other, for and with the other. In order to achieve this awareness of solidarity, deep bodily, psychic and *geistlich*, or spiritual, structures are required. In *Finite and Eternal Being*, the theme of community is once again taken up, but from an ontological perspective. The primacy of the phenomenological mind, which constitutes the essence of, or gives sense to, our experience of community, is replaced by a more fundamental account in which the being of the individual entity is seen to belong to the whole or "all" of a larger sense of being. A unity is postulated between individual being and a plurality of beings.[378]

Thus, we see in Stein's work a progression in the way in which she approaches the question of interpersonal relationships in order to account for this continuity between individual relationships and larger human structures. In *Empathy*, the focus is unsurprisingly on the way in which we perceive other individuals as individuals, culminating in an examination of the way in which this perception reveals the individual's spirituality. In *PPH*, her attention shifts to the relationship between individual members of communities of various types and sizes, such as families and religious communities, and in *An Investigation Concerning the State* she explores the grounds for and nature of the political state as a

[378] Calcagno (2011), 232.

larger social structure.[379] In her later works, most notably in *FEB*, her analysis of human community leads to her position that the fulfillment of our human nature is to be in communion with God, and it becomes clear that her image of human community is that it is a reflection of humanity's relationship with God (both as individual humans and collectively).

As Stein explains in the quotation above, in an integrated community we live not just alongside each other, but with each other; thinking, feeling, and valuing together. In this way, the many subjects of a community form one "super-individual subject" with a "super-individual current of experience."[380] By this she does not mean that the community is an ego in the way that the individual is (it is not the "place of origin" of experiences as the individual ego is), though the community does possess its own distinctive collectic character. This character, however, and the communal experiences that shape and are shaped by it, is only possible based on the individuals that make up the community. In this way, the individuals of a community are not subsumed by the community and never become an undifferentiated "we." As Calcagno explains,

> Stein never posits we-intentionality and she believes that all states of consciousness are accompanied by a form of ego consciousness, understood as the pure I of Husserlian consciousness, which does not mean that all consciousness is accompanied by an experience of an I in natural or empirical experience. The ego, however, can also experience not only empathic understanding of another mind but also solidarity with another mind: one lives in and with the other in experience. This solidarity is never fusional, as is the case with Gerda Walther's

[379] It should be noted that Stein does not designate the state as simply a kind of community, since an already-existing communal formation is not enough to bring about the existence of a political state.

[380] *PPH* 133-4 (*Beiträge*, 112-13).

> Vereinigung (Walther 1923, 132). The solidarity or togetherness that marks community, though experienced in the ego, is conditioned by a communalising structure of mind that allows reality to be experienced not only as a unity or within a unified field of experience, but also as intimately linked in solidarity with others; such is the nature of the Steinian view of community.[381]

One always faces the world from the standpoint of the individual ego. In fact, part of the essential structure of empathic relationships is the realization that the other is herself just as much a unique individual and centerpoint of her experiences as I am. Nevertheless, experiences affecting the community as a whole are "our" experiences and are experienced in a different way than purely individual experiences; even as we each have our own individual experiences of this communal occurrence, our experiences of it are as an experience we share, as something that we are experiencing together.

For example, when experiencing the death of an integral member of the community, she writes, "Certainly I the individual ego am filled up with grief. But I feel myself to be not alone with it. Rather, I feel it as *our* grief. The experience is essentially colored by the fact that others are taking part in it, or even more, by the fact that I take part in it only as a member of a community. *We* are affected by the loss, and *we* grieve over it."[382] This grief has a particular character that differentiates it from private grief, though each individual remains the center of an individual experience of communal grief:

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[381] Calcagno (2011), 235.

[382] *PPH* 134 (*Beiträge*, 113). In posing this example, Stein differentiates it from the example of a deeply personal loss such as in the death of a close personal friend. The communal experience of grief (the specific image Stein uses is a military unit that has lost its commander) affects us precisely because the loss affects the structure of the community

> Thus everyone has grief that's individually *his or hers*; even though its legitimate to say, on the other hand, that they all feel 'the same' grief. This 'selfsameness' has significance that merits precise exposition. The grief is quite a private content that I feel, but it is *not only* that. It has a *sense*, and by virtue of that sense it claims to count for something lying beyond the private experiencing, something subsisting objectively, through which it is rationally substantiated… the correlate of the experience is the same for everyone who participates in it. And correspondingly, the sense-content of each of the individual experiences applying to this correlate is *idealiter* the same, notwithstanding the private veneer that encloses it at any given time.[383]

Thus, our presence in a community affects the character of our experiences. Furthermore, these communal experiences affect our personal, individual experiences, building upon them and deepening them. In perceiving and receiving each others' expression of self, individual members are brought out of themselves toward unity with other members of the community, as Baseheart describes:

> Genuine community aims at union, a community of life and a community of being that is rooted in the personal *Umwelt* and touches the core of the personality of the subjects. It is characterized by genuine feelings arising from the personal "I" of each. Essential to it is the direction toward an objective beyond the members themselves, and this objective requires reciprocal giving. The essence of genuine community becomes visible not only in the working together toward the aim of community life but also in the influence of the individuals on one another.[384]

Though this reciprocal giving is from "the core of the personality of the subjects," communal life is by no means an abandoning or effacing of the self. On the contrary, truly communal relationships facilitate and encourage the unfolding of the individual self. By

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[383] *PPH* 135-6 (*Beiträge*, 115).

[384] Baseheart (1992), 169.

giving of that which is most deeply and fully oneself, by going out of oneself toward others in the community, through being known by them and knowing them, the individual also becomes more knowable to herself, and with this interior understanding becomes more capable of going out from herself toward unity with others. Though it may seem that belonging to a larger unity is a constraint to one's personal freedom (and in some ways may be, since the good of the community must be taken into account when weighing actions), this unity affords the individual the freedom to move beyond her own interiority, to unfold out toward others, to share her ideas (and thus her spirit, and thus her individuality) and the ideas of others.

When Stein describes the "thinking together" that occurs in a communicative relationship that was discussed in the previous section[385], she goes on to explain that this "common thinking" forms the basis for all human intellectual achievement and affects all aspects of my experience. We cannot separate our experience as subjects from our experience as members of the human community. She states that

> All scientific activity is executed in this form [of thinking together]. That which I contribute to it "on my own," achievements of original thinking, arise on the basis of the already accumulated repertoire [of thought] that I take over, and for its part, it becomes the basis upon which others build further. And with this spiritual doing of mine, I find myself inserted into a great network of motivation, the knowledge-process of humanity.[386]

[385] See Section V. B. of this chapter.

[386] *PPH* 170, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 143).

Furthermore, she writes, "The intellectual coherences, however, are only one example of super-individual motivations. Analogous relations are to be found in all fields of spiritual life."[387] In this way, my expression of my own spiritual life is not only influenced by but also contributes to my community's "unity of a coherence of motivation."[388] In the same way, this shared motivation leads to the communal undertaking of acts of the will. When I express my motivation for aiming at a certain object, others are able to enter into this motivation and take it on as their own, such that "what I set forth for them as worth aspiring to, becomes an objective for them as well, and they contribute toward its attainment."[389] When my motivation becomes a shared motivation with another (or others), my individual act of the will is joined with their individual act of the will in response to this motivation, and we are both oriented toward the completion of the same goal, and this shared motivation may in turn give rise to new goals that we strive to attain together. This is both how communities grow and develop together, and how they form in the first place. Lebech remarks that

> Community arises from the experience of being already organised by one's subjective initiative and personal creativity (i.e. by one's personality) into larger overlapping realities of 'likeminded' people, i.e. of people engaged in realising the same values as one self. These persons share mental lifepower with each other and consequently experience themselves as being able to say 'we', and to pertain to the same super-individual subject.[390]

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[387] *PPH* 170, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 143).

[388] *PPH* 169 (*Beiträge*, 142).

[389] *PPH* 191 (*Beiträge*, 160).

[390] Lebech (2010b),

As our individual personal core unfolds and is expressed through our actions, we form community with those who share our values. Likewise, in communities of shared value, in expressing and developing ideas, thoughts, feelings, and values, these develop and transform as they are communally experienced, taken up, and added to.

Thus, the "openness" of spirit[391] brings about communal life, and reveals the nature of the person to be a unique individual that is nevertheless inextricably (and by nature) connected to other unique individuals. Stein claims that

> [T]his openness does away with the isolation of the individual and inserts him or her into the network of the spiritual world. The spiritual individual *can* isolate himself as well. He can withdraw himself with regard to "theoretical" openness and push the spiritual world away from himself as well, considering it as a *mere* object. But this isolation is an artificial one, a thwarting of original spiritual tendencies. Spirit, in its original lifestyle, is opened to the influx of spiritual life out of the universe of the spiritual world. *This* openness is the foundation upon which all super-individual spiritual realities rest (*even* the associations that owe their existence to spontaneous acts of creation of artificially isolated individuals). Since this openness belongs to the original lifestyle of the spiritual individual, you can rightly say that the individual's essence is just as originally social as individual. But that doesn't cancel out the fact that social patterns are founded in individuals.[392]

To be spiritual, then, is to be in community, and vice versa. Spiritual beings are essentially connected to one another through the open expressiveness of the life of the spirit, and likewise all community ultimately consists of the union of spiritual beings, since only spiritual beings can recognize each other as subjects and express themselves as subjects,

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[391] See Section 5.1.

[392] *PPH* 296, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 247).

and thus live "with and for" each other rather than simply alongside each other. Stein expresses this in the *Aufbau*:

> Humanity is a great whole: deriving from one root, directed towards one goal, interwoven in one destiny. The angels do not form such a unity. They each stand for themselves before God. Also the various animal species are not so bound. Here are also cohabiting groups (families, packs), but no solidarity over space and time. This relates to the spiritual nature of the human being: it enables the common accomplishment of action… The spiritual nature also makes possible communal ownership of objective spiritual goods and development of spiritual goods through one person for others. This objective ownership is fundamental to connection across space and time.[393]

As we saw in the section on Dilthey in Chapter IV, this is why the *Geisteswissenschaften*, the spiritual sciences, are also accurately called the human sciences, since they are the spiritual products of the shared motivations of the human community, whose individual members transcend spatial and temporal boundaries[394] in order to preserve, share, and express these motivations and their spiritual fruit. Thus, Stein asserts,

> *All genuine super-individual realities are spiritual*. The unification of psychic individuals happens on the basis of their spiritedness, although where such a unification takes place, psychic networks also are shared. Social patterns, whose components are psychic-spiritual individuals, are determined in their structuration just as much by the psychic as by the spiritual character of their components. But they owe the possibility of their existence exclusively to the binding power of spirit. As soon as we imagine spiritual life stricken from the world, psychic reality disintegrates into a set of physical monads.[395]

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[393] *Aufbau*, 27.

[394] Meaning, that content which makes up human culture and the *Geisteswissenschaften* is not limited to present experience. I can experience, understand, and share the motivations of an author that died centuries before I encountered him or her.

[395] *PPH* 296, translation modified (*Beiträge*, 247).

Thus, it is spirit that gives community its essential structure and being, and it is essential to human beings as spiritual that they participate in communities.

2. Unity with God

The fulfillment of this communal nature is found in the human person's relationship to God, as Stein explores in *Finite and Eternal Being*. Her striving to understand the being of the human person, first as an individual, then as a being in relation to others, leads her finally to explore the source of being. As we saw in Chapter II, she asserts that the ego cannot be the source of its own being, but must have received this being, since it is clearly finite, and as she explains in *FEB*, "Everything finite is placed into and sustained in existence and therefore by itself incapable of positing and sustaining being or existence."[396] The realization of our own finite being reveals the source of that being as eternal being (i.e. God), "the support and ground of my own unsupported and groundless being."[397] We have already seen that it is the nature of spirit to express itself, and that the fullness of human life is for the ego to be both at home in the soul's "innermost being" and to reach out from this being toward that which is outside of it.[398] Stein claims in *FEB* that when we are spiritually motivated to reach out to that which is meaningful, "the being-moved of the soul has to do… with a *call* [*Aufruf*] and a *response*,"[399] which summons the person to be the

[396] *FEB*, 55 (*EES*, 48).

[397] *FEB*, 58 (*EES*, 50).

[398] *FEB*, 438 (*EES*, 285). See Chapter II on the nature of the person.

[399] *FEB*, 438 (*EES*, 285).

fullness of what he is meant to be. The ultimate source of this call is the source of all being, namely eternal being.

While the community is an image of the unity that the individual is called to with God, it is only an image. While relationships with others evoke the self-expression and unfolding of our nature for which we exist, on a human level it is never possible to fully bring to light the fullness of who we are as individuals. Those who know me, and I myself, can never fully know who I am in my fullness, and I cannot know them. Stein explains that the depths of who I am can only be revealed in unity with God:

> The innermost and most authentic nature of human beings remains hidden most of the time… Whatever we know or divine of this deeply hidden nature in ourselves and in others remains dark, mysterious, and "ineffable." But when our earthly life ends and everything transitory falls away, then every soul will know itself "as it is known," i.e., as it is before God: in the what, the why, and the whither which God had in mind when he created this personal soul, and this is essential in the status which it has attained in the orders of nature and grace by virtue of its free choices.[400]

Thus, our going out toward other human beings with whom we are in community, and our deepening understanding of ourselves that comes from this communal life, points toward that union with eternal being toward which we (and all other beings) are ultimately drawn.

As we have seen, spirit expresses itself most fully and clearly when it issues from the depths of the individual, and furthermore, in going out toward others the individual gains deeper understanding of her own interiority, and is thereby better able to "unfold" into a life in accord with who she knows that she is, and to all the more clearly express this

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[400] *FEB*, 505 (*EES*, 326).

individuality. Stein explains that in seeking the source of our own being, we turn to our own interiority, and are thereby brought out of ourselves toward that which is greater than us. In an explicitly Augustinian move, Stein posits that as our individual nature unfolds, it becomes clear that the call inward to the deepest life of the soul is ultimately a call from "outside" of our nature, from the supernatural. The "masters of the inner life of every age" she says, "were drawn into the innermost center of their being by some force stronger than the entire external world, and they thus experienced the breaking through of a new, mighty, superior life—a life supernatural and divine."[401] We find the divine in the deepest part of ourselves, that is most fully "us", and thereby discover that the fullness of our essence is to partake in the life of the divine, and to respond to this call to unity, which is ultimately the call of Divine love. We come to recognize that the meaning of our being is to know and love God by coming to know ourselves; that is, by the unfolding of our personal core which is simultaneously a going out of oneself and a deepening of one's "being at home" within oneself.

Furthermore, the unfolding of our essence which takes place throughout our lives, and is facilitated by the choices we make, the values that we pursue, and the communities in which we participate, does not culminate in leaving our individuality behind in order to be subsumed into the divine; rather, in grasping *who* I am, I also grasp *why* I am, as this particular, individual person. Stein states that

> God is the plenitude [*Fülle*] of love. Created spirits, however, are incapable of receiving into themselves and of sharing to the fullest extent the total plenitude of divine love. Their share in divine love is rather determined by the measure of their being, and this implies not only a "so much" [*Soviel*],

[401] *FEB*, 443 (*EES*, 288).

> but also a "thus" [*So*]. In other words, love always bears the stamp of personal individuality. And this explains in turn why God may have chosen to create for himself a special abode in each human soul, so that the plenitude of divine love might find in the manifold of differently constituted souls a wider range for its self-communication.[402]

Thus, what it means for our individual essence to fully unfold, and for the meaning of our being to be fully actualized, is to receive God's love in the fullest measure, in a manner that is wholly our own. We have come, then, full circle, back to what Stein asserted in her early chapters, and which was briefly discussed above. Namely, that though we seek the source of our being in the deepest recesses of the life of the soul, what this self-knowledge reveals to us is that we cannot be the source of our own being; rather, it is received as a gift. The giving of this gift draws us out of ourselves, while allowing us to be most fully ourselves. In this way, according to Stein, spirit finds its clearest and most authentic expression in the individual's unity with God. In this unity, all that I am, and all who I am, is revealed and fulfilled.

[402] *FEB*, 506 (*EES*, 327).

Conclusion

While I have by no means said all there is to say about Stein's philosophy of spirit, I have reached the point where I see the present task as complete. My aim in this dissertation was to establish a framework for understanding what Stein says about spirit, and to trace out its development through her philosophical texts. I have argued that for Stein, it is the nature of spirit to express itself, and the nature of the human person, as a spiritual being, to unfold out from oneself and reveal oneself through the expression of spirit. In making this argument, I have attempted to closely examine the increasing depth and complexity of Stein's work on spirit as she refines it throughout her philosophical body of work. It is my hope that in doing so, I have drawn attention to aspects of Stein's philosophy that are worthy of attention and offer potential for deeper discussion and study. For example, Stein's work on the *Geisteswissenschaften* is relatively understudied. Her thought on the political state, while not unknown, is another fruitful avenue to pursue in light of a more comprehensive understanding of her approach to spirit.

Another undertaking that I have not attempted here is to explicate the value of Stein's thought on spirit to the daily living of our lives, beyond its significance to the history of philosophy or the study of phenomenology. For the most part, I reserve this task for other projects. Before closing, though, I offer a few thoughts on what Stein's philosophy of spirit gives to us.

Through her understanding of spirit, Stein shows us our place in the world. By elucidating the spiritual aspect of the person, she draws attention to what sets human beings apart from other living beings, and shows us that we are not reducible to our physical

bodies. In illuminating for us our nature as free, willing, valuing persons, Stein helps us to understand that while insofar as we are embodied we are subject to physical limitations, it is our nature to transcend the merely material to dwell in the world of ideas, human emotion, empathy, responsiveness to other persons, and recognition of meaning and value. Nevertheless, our existence in this world of spirit is not a rejection of our physical nature, but rather an elevation of it. Rather than encouraging us to escape from the material world and its travails, Stein's philosophy of spirit invites us to love the world, to be at home in it, to participate in it, to value it, to embrace its beauty. Because it is in our nature to be spiritual and thus to approach the world as valuable, becoming more attuned with spirit also means deeper attunement to the meaning of all being that we encounter in life.

In this way, Stein shows us that any human activity, even regarding the trivial concerns of everyday life, can be the living out of our movement toward spirit and the unfolding of our *Persönlichkeitskern*. Life in the world is suffused with spirit, and all that we do bears the mark of personhood. In responding to the world, we deepen our self-understanding and our understanding of our place in a whole. When encountering others in our everyday lives and responding to them in empathy, we express our personhood to them, and receive them as persons. By attending to the personhood of others, reflecting on one's own individual personhood, and attuning ourselves to the way in which spirit speaks through the world around us, we become more attuned to the value of the other persons with which we share the world, and to the fact that this world, these persons, and one's own self are gifts of the spirit that is the source their being. As we recognize spirit in the world, others, and ourselves, it becomes clear that our individual position in the world places ethical demands upon us, and we are motivated to respond to these demands, to

respond to all being that we encounter according to its value. May Stein's philosophy of spirit inspire us to live our lives as in this manner of recognition and response.

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