

# THE *IMAGO TRINITATIS*: TOWARDS AN ANALOGY OF INTERPERSONAL MIND

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# **The *Imago Trinitatis*: Towards an Analogy of Interpersonal Mind**

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Abstract: This dissertation draws upon the work of Thomas Aquinas and Bernard J. F. Lonergan in order to put forward an integrated theorem of the *imago Trinitatis*. The theorem of the *imago Trinitatis*, in Catholic theology, is a theorem about how human persons imitate and reflect the triune God. In Aquinas and Lonergan, the *imago Trinitatis* is identified with the intelligent emanations of word and love that occur within the human mind. But, according to Aquinas, the *imago Trinitatis* can be considered in two respects: first, as a likeness by analogy—that is, an analogical likeness—and, second, as a likeness by conformity between the human and the divine. The first two chapters explain each of these likenesses in Aquinas, and the next two chapters explain each of these likenesses in Lonergan. The final chapter of this dissertation proposes a complementary analogical likeness of the Trinity in humans: an analogical likeness based upon shared intentionality. It further explains how this likeness is related to the analogical likeness based upon intelligent emanation in Aquinas and Lonergan. In doing so, this dissertation defends an integrated conception of the analogical likeness of the Trinity in human beings, as it unites the analogical likeness based upon intelligible emanation occurring in the human mind and the analogical likeness based upon shared intentionality as interpersonal, coordinated activity. The *imago Trinitatis*, then, is at once personal and interpersonal, and the analogues for the Trinity in humans are both psychological and communal.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <i>De Trin</i> | Augustine, <i>De Trinitate</i> . English translations are based on Augustine, <i>The Trinity</i> . Edited by John E. Rotelle. Translated by Edmund Hill. Vol. 5: The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century. Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1991.   |
| <i>De ver</i>  | Aquinas, <i>Quaestiones disputatae De veritate (Disputed Questions on Truth)</i> . English translations are based on Thomas Aquinas. <i>Truth</i> . Vols. 1-3. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, and Robert W. Schmidt, S.J. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994.   |
| <i>In BDT</i>  | Aquinas, <i>Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate (Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate)</i> . English translations based on Thomas Aquinas. <i>Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius</i> . Translated by Armand Maurer. Mediaeval Sources in Translation 32. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987; Thomas Aquinas. <i>The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius</i> . Translated by Armand Maurer. Mediaeval Sources in Translation 3. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986. |
| <i>Method</i>  | Bernard J. F. Lonergan. <i>Method in Theology</i> . Edited by Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 14. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017 [1972].  |
| <i>QDVcom</i>  | <i>Quaestio disputata De virtutibus in communi (Disputed Questions on Virtue in General)</i>   |
| <i>SCG</i>     | Aquinas. <i>Summa Contra Gentiles: Books I-IV</i> . Translated by Laurence Shapcote O.P. Vols. 12 and 13: Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Green Bay, WI: Aquinas Institute, 2018.  |
| <i>ST</i>      | Aquinas. <i>Summa Theologiae</i> . Edited by John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón. Translated by Laurence Shapcote, O.P. Volumes 13-20: Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Green Bay, WI: The Aquinas Institute, 2012.  |
| <i>Verbum</i>  | Bernard J. F. Lonergan. <i>Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas</i> . Edited by Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997 [1946-49, 1964.  |



## INTRODUCTION

Pressures from various quarters call for a new conception of the image of God. The pressures are levied directly from sources within the church—that is, from the magisterium, from laity, from theologians—and indirectly from sources tangential to the church—for instance, from the insights of evolutionary anthropologists, from recent methods and insights of philosophers, and so on. Classical conceptions of the image of God, if they are to remain valid, need to be conceived in a new light, in a more comprehensive frame of reference that includes elements simply unavailable to the classical theologians who did not have, and could not have had, the various materials on offer in the modern period. It is therefore incumbent upon contemporary theologians to consider the relevant pressures and to address these pressures with honesty and diligence. To fail to do so would be to fail to make progress in theological anthropology where some progress could, in fact, be made.

But if contemporary theology errs to the degree that it does not consider the contemporary pressures and incorporate them into a new frame of reference, it errs just as much to the degree that it fails to figure out both what is of lasting value in the classical sources *and* what prevents them from meeting the legitimate contemporary pressures. In other words, there are two demands, each requiring a good deal of labor: there is, to use

the rallying cry of Vatican II, the demand for *ressourcement* and the demand for *aggiornamento*. The ongoing project of revising our conception of the image of God requires that theologians meet each of these demands in an adequate way. Meeting these demands cannot be accomplished by one person alone—the sheer range of relevant data is far too large—and instead requires the collaboration of many theologians who each contribute their share to the overall project. It is within this collaborative project that the present dissertation is situated.

The present dissertation aims to contribute to the ongoing and collaborative project of re-conceiving the image of God, and in doing so selects two relevant and integral parts of the project. First, the dissertation inquires about the meaning of the *imago Trinitatis* (image of the Trinity), which is a further determination of the image of God. Second, it considers the *imago Trinitatis* according to two different Catholic theologians, namely, Thomas Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan. The reason why I have chosen the *imago Trinitatis* in particular, rather than the *imago Dei* in general, is because a large number of relevant issues in systematic theology converge in the theorem of the *imago Trinitatis*. Hence, in asking about the meaning of the *imago Trinitatis* in Aquinas and Lonergan, the dissertation seeks to understand their meaning in light of their philosophical and theological methods, their philosophical anthropologies, and their trinitarian theologies. As I show below, both thinkers provide us with significant contributions to the question of the *imago Trinitatis*.

In the remainder of this introduction, I do two things. First, I put forward my understanding the various stances in the current literature on trinitarian theology and the *imago Trinitatis* by framing the various stances according to some foundational

differences. I propose two different typologies through which we can understand the field in its current form and against which I can explicate, in later chapters, Aquinas's and Lonergan's positions (and eventually some of my own position) vis-à-vis the current debate. Second, I provide a brief outline of the dissertation and my rationale for dividing the five chapters the way I have.

## **TYOLOGIES OF CONTEMPORARY TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY**

For the sake of clarity, I would like to situate, in a very general way, Aquinas's and Lonergan's approach to the *imago Trinitatis* within the milieu of recent discussion. Hence, in the present section, I sketch two different typologies of contemporary trinitarian theology and contemporary reflection on the *imago Trinitatis*. The two typologies are the *gnoseological typology* and the *formulaic typology*. I explain each of the typologies in more detail below, but as a rough overview, it can be said here that thegnoseological typology is a typology of *what* and *how much* can be understood and verified in trinitarian theology and in reflection on the *imago Trinitatis*, and the formulaic typology is a typology of the manner of speaking in trinitarian theology and reflection on the *imago Trinitatis*, whether the manner of speech should be imaginative or technical, poetic or explanatory. Each of these typologies is concerned, not with the particular issues of trinitarian theology or the *imago Trinitatis*, but rather with the approach one takes to the enterprise of trinitarian theology.

In order to achieve some clarity with regard to the current terrain, grouping according to these various typologies has, for me, proven helpful. Other typologies are possible, of course. In each of the following subsections, I break one of the typologies down into more discrete types and summarize the position of a theologian who, to my

mind, serves as contemporary representative of that type.

Before proceeding, however, a stipulation is in order. Although I use the work of certain theologians to illustrate the various types, it needs to be emphasized that interpreting the work of a theologian is always more complex than shuffling them into some type. Hence, the following typologies are not meant to exhaustively account for all of the dimensions of the work of the following theologians. They are only meant to be heuristics or ideal types, and are not meant to replace the more exacting work of interpreting each of the following theologians on his or her own terms and in as comprehensive a way as possible, a task I will undertake later in the dissertation with regard to the work of Aquinas and Lonergan. Hence, although I classify a contemporary theologian in a particular way, and although I take my classification to capture a central dimension of his or her theology, I also readily concede that there may be elements of the theologian's work that exemplify a competing type. Nevertheless, it will be useful to have the general types and competing approaches in mind when we turn to situating the work of Aquinas and Lonergan.

### **The Gnoseological Typology**

The set of concerns and questions underlying the gnoseological typology are questions about what and how much can be understood of the Trinity and of the *imago Trinitatis* and about what and how much lies outside the bounds of verifiable human speech. Among contemporary theologians, there is a range from pleromatic to apophatic approaches.<sup>1</sup> The difference between them lies in what we can properly lay claim to in

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<sup>1</sup> I borrow the term "pleromatic" from Cyril O'Regan, *Theology and the Spaces of Apocalyptic* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009), though, of course, the term has antecedents in both the

the field of trinitarian theology, questions about what and the how much can be said with some veracity in the discipline.

### *Pleromatic Trinitarian Theology*

Pleromatic trinitarian theology is based upon the assumption (whether explicitly stated or not, defended with arguments or not) that the Trinity—especially the Persons and their relations to one another—can be used as a model for human realities. The human realities for which the Trinity is said to serve as a model might be those of ethical and political life,<sup>2</sup> those of gender and sexuality,<sup>3</sup> and so forth. In any case, the Trinity is, by a kind of

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New Testament and Gnostic texts. While O'Regan uses the term in contradistinction from “kenomatic” and “metaxic” forms of contemporary apocalyptic theology, I am using the term in contradistinction from “apophatic” understandings of contemporary trinitarian theology, and for a couple of reasons. First, the theologians whom I am discussing classify themselves as “apophatic” theologians. Second, kenomatic theology, on O'Regan's typology, appears to operate apart from the classical trinitarian doctrines. As we will see, apophatic trinitarian theology, on the other hand, upholds the trinitarian doctrinal formulations but denies that we should try to understand them in a systematic fashion.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., Jürgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God*, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981); Miroslav Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation* (Nashville, TN, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996); idem., “‘The Trinity Is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,” *Modern Theology* 14, no. 3 (1998): 403–23.

<sup>3</sup> E.g., Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory*, vol. 3, *The Dramatis Personae: The Person in Christ*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), esp. 283–317. For exposition, see Robert A. Pesarchick, *The Trinitarian Foundation of Human Sexuality as Revealed by Christ According to Hans Urs von Balthasar: The Revelatory Significance of the Male Christ and the Male Ministerial Priesthood*, vol. 63, *Tesi Gregoriana. Serie Teologia* 63 (Rome: Gregorian University, 2000).

extension, employed to justify some position in a distinct field, often a position that is fraught with disagreement. Trinitarian theology, as Nancy Dallavalle observes, then becomes “a theological supermodel,” as it provides “service in anthropology, ecclesiology, and practical theology to give a theological account of the human person and the church.”<sup>4</sup> In such a paradigm, the images or arguments employed for trinitarian theology are in turn employed as standard images or arguments for another field of inquiry. Although there are a number of possible candidates for the pleromatic approach, I will take Miroslav Volf as a representative.<sup>5</sup>

In his works *After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity* (1998) and “‘The Trinity is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement” (1998),<sup>6</sup> Miroslav Volf proposes that the doctrine of the Trinity ought to inform and serve as a model of our understanding of various human realities, including our understanding of personal identity,<sup>7</sup> our understanding of non-hierarchical, egalitarian personal relations,<sup>8</sup> and our understanding of the Church.<sup>9</sup> Let us focus on how, according to Volf, the Trinity informs our understanding of personal identity.

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<sup>4</sup> Nancy A. Dallavalle, “Liturgy, Gender, and Order: Trinitarian Considerations,” *Liturgy* 30, no. 1 (2015): 50–59, at 52f.

<sup>5</sup> There many theologians exemplifying the pleromatic approach in recent decades. I use Volf because his work is fairly recent, but he was a student of Moltmann, who could just as easily be used as an illustration.

<sup>6</sup> Miroslav Volf, *After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity*, Sacra Doctrina (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1998); “‘The Trinity Is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape of Social Engagement,” *Modern Theology* 14, no. 3 (July 1998): 403–23.

<sup>7</sup> Volf, *After Our Likeness*, 208-214; “Trinity is Our Social Program,” esp. 407-412.

<sup>8</sup> Volf, *After Our Likeness*, 214-220, 236.

<sup>9</sup> Volf, *After Our Likeness*, 191-282.

According to Volf, the Christian doctrine of trinitarian perichoresis—that the divine Persons mutually indwell one another—provides us with resources for thinking about human identity and relations. The Christian doctrine of perichoresis, Volf argues, conveys that the trinitarian persons are personally interior to one another.<sup>10</sup> This means two things. First, it means that personal “identity is non-reducible.”<sup>11</sup> The persons of the Trinity are distinct from one another, and cannot simply be collapsed into their relations to one another. On these grounds, Volf criticizes the theological traditions, including the Augustinian tradition, which claim that the Persons are subsistent relations: “Persons cannot,” Volf contends, “be fully translated into relations. A person is always already outside of the relations in which he or she is immersed.”<sup>12</sup> Second, perichoresis implies that personal “identity is not self-enclosed.”<sup>13</sup> The trinitarian persons, Volf argues, are not closed in upon themselves and completely separated from one another. Rather, personal identity is both inhabited by and shares in the personal identity of others. “The other,” Volf writes, “is always already in the self and therefore the identity of the self cannot be defined simply oppositionally.”<sup>14</sup> These two affirmations regarding the trinitarian persons

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<sup>10</sup> Volf, “The Trinity Is Our Social Program,” 409.

<sup>11</sup> Volf, “The Trinity Is Our Social Program,” 410.

<sup>12</sup> Volf, “The Trinity Is Our Social Program,” 410. The “outside of” and “immersed in” imagery seems to conflict here. How can one be outside of what one is immersed in? The only way to affirm that possibility would be to suppose that part of the divine person is immersed in relations, whereas another part is outside of those relations.

<sup>13</sup> Volf, “The Trinity Is Our Social Program,” 410.

<sup>14</sup> Volf, “The Trinity Is Our Social Program,” 410.

and relations—which are, in Volf’s words, “inscribed by the doctrine of the Trinity”<sup>15</sup>—must also shape our understanding of the relationship between identity and relations among human beings.

Though he employs the Trinity as a model for understanding various other realities, Volf also claims that there are limitations for such a procedure,<sup>16</sup> since there is a difference between the divine persons and human persons. As related to personal identity, human persons do not inhabit the subjectivity of other human persons. Volf writes, “Another human self cannot be internal to my own self as subject of action. Human persons are always external to one another *as subjects*.”<sup>17</sup> The trinitarian persons, on the other hand, are internal to one another as subjects. But despite the difference, Volf continues,

[In humans] the *interiority of personal characteristics* can correspond to the interiority of the divine persons. In personal encounters, that which the other person is flows consciously or unconsciously into that which I am. The reverse is also true. In this mutual giving and receiving, we give to others not only something, but also a piece of ourselves, something of that which we have made of ourselves in communion with others; and from others we take not only something, but also a piece of them.<sup>18</sup>

Though the divine persons give and receive the whole of themselves while human persons only give and receive parts of themselves, nevertheless the giving and receiving that occurs in interpersonal interaction among humans corresponds to the giving and receiving that occurs among the trinitarian persons. Because Volf is employing the Trinity as a model to understand human realities, he is employing a pleromatic approach.

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<sup>15</sup> Volf, “The Trinity Is Our Social Program,” 411.

<sup>16</sup> See especially *After Our Likeness*, 198ff for a general but clear explanation of the limitations.

<sup>17</sup> Volf, *After Our Likeness*, 210f.

<sup>18</sup> Volf, *After Our Likeness*, 211.



### *Apophatic Trinitarian Theology*

Apophatic trinitarian theology, on the other hand, imposes restrictions upon the judgments that can be made in trinitarian theology. The major concern for the apophatic approach is the transcendence of God—that God surpasses all of our finite understanding—and such a concern gives rise to a kind of intellectual asceticism. The transcendence of God, on the apophatic view, implies a radical otherness to God, a radical difference between the finite, created world and the infinite, uncreated God. As a result, very few, if any, correlations between the life of the Trinity and the life of human beings can be sustained, as any such correlation falls apart due to the infinite difference between God and human beings. On the apophatic view, theologians ought to be very circumspect about making positive claims about the Trinity that go beyond biblical (and, for some, conciliar) statements. Whereas the pleromatic approach enjoys a kind of liberty with regard to their affirmations in trinitarian theology, readily employing the Trinity as a model for certain dimensions of human life, the apophatic approach tends to view such liberty as issuing in ungrounded and unverifiable statements, which are more often the product of human imagination than based in the reality of the triune God. Again, although there are a number of possible candidates for the apophatic approach in contemporary theology, we might take Karen Kilby as a recent representative.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Although Kilby serves as a clearer representative for the apophatic approach, Kathryn Tanner has also done a lot of work in this area and has the some of the most incisive and wide-ranging criticisms regarding what I am calling the pleromatic approach. See Kathryn Tanner, *Christ the Key* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 207-246.; idem, “Trinity,” in *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Theology*, ed. William T. Cavanaugh and Peter Scott (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2019), 363–75. For a recent review of the apophatic approach, E. Jerome Van Kuiken, “‘Ye Worship Ye Know

Karen Kilby explicitly develops her position in contradistinction from what I have been calling pleromatic trinitarian theology, which she calls a “robust, self-confident trinitarianism”.<sup>20</sup> The issue for Kilby is that the pleromatic approach inevitably entails a kind of pride and idolatry, which she argues takes the form of a two-stage, Feuerbachian projection. In using the Trinity as a model for human realities, the pleromatic trinitarian theologians inevitably project some dimension of human reality that they find valuable onto the life of God and, in turn, take that projection to be the moral standard to which human beings must aspire, though they can never attain it.

Her argument is specifically leveled against recent social trinitarian theologians, though her argument has implications for many other theological traditions. Social trinitarian theologians, as others have noted, begin with the distinction of the divine persons and thereby have a problem with how to unite the persons to one another.<sup>21</sup> In

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Not What’? The Apophatic Turn and the Trinity,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 19, no. 4 (2017): 401–20. In addition to Kilby, van Kuiken includes Sarah Coakley and Katherine Sonderegger as representatives of the apophatic approach to trinitarian theology.

<sup>20</sup> Karen Kilby, “Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 12, no. 1 (January 2010): 65–77, esp. 65f.

<sup>21</sup> This is not merely an external criticism, as the social trinitarian theologians affirm as much: Moltmann, for instance, writes, “it seems to make more sense theologically to start from the biblical history, and therefore to make the unity of the three divine Persons the problem, rather than to take the reverse method — to start from the philosophical postulate of absolute unity, in order then to find the problem in the biblical testimony” (*Trinity and the Kingdom*, 149). Leonardo Boff also affirms as much: after saying that he will choose to start with the three persons rather than the unity, he writes, “This choice carries a risk of tritheism, but avoids it through perichoresis and through the eternal communion existing from the beginning between the three Persons” (Leonardo Boff, *Trinity and Society*, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll,

order to solve this problem, according to Kilby, social trinitarian theologians proceed in three steps. She writes,

First, a concept, perichoresis, is used to name what is not understood, to name whatever it is that makes the three Persons one. Secondly, the concept is filled out rather suggestively with notions borrowed from our own experience of relationships and relatedness. And then, finally, it is presented as an exciting resource Christian theology has to offer the wider world in its reflections upon relationships and relatedness.<sup>22</sup>

The first stage is naming whatever is being sought: in this case, perichoresis. The second stage is human-to-God speech: it takes what is found in the finite world—in this case, notions about human relatedness—and applies it to God. The third stage is God-to-human speech: it takes what attributed to the divine and offers it as an “exciting resource” and, often, as a moral standard for human life. There is thus a two-stage projection: human realities are projected into God and then the divine realities are projected back into humanity as a standard for human action.

In contrast to the alleged projectionism of the pleromatic approach, Kilby argues for an apophatic approach, which refuses both human-to-God speech (the second stage) and God-to-human speech (the third stage). The third stage is the most problematic and potentially dangerous of the stages, especially because various social trinitarian theologians arrive at different conclusions about what the relations of the trinitarian persons are like and thereby impose mutually exclusive moral standards on people.<sup>23</sup> She

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N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1988), 5).

<sup>22</sup> Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” *New Blackfriars* 81, no. 957 (2000): 432–45, at 14.

<sup>23</sup> Kathryn Tanner also develops the idea that such an approach can be politically dangerous, though for slightly different reasons. See Tanner, *Christ the Key*, 228.

notes the differences between Jürgen Moltmann and Patricia Wilson-Kastner, who both advocate a social doctrine of the Trinity but who ascribe different properties to the trinitarian persons. Moltmann, who was concerned primarily with the evils of an excessive individualism, argues that the trinitarian persons are constituted by their relationships with one another, and so humans should view themselves as also being constituted by their relationships with one another. In contrast, Wilson-Kastner, who is concerned with securing women's autonomy in society, argues that the trinitarian persons are "three centers of divine identity" mutually and reciprocally transcending themselves into their relations with one another. These contrasting ascriptions regarding the divine persons and their relations lead Kilby to write the following:

From an examination of particular examples of social theories of the Trinity, then, one can form the impression that much of the detail is derived from either the individual author's or the larger society's latest ideals of how human beings should live in community.<sup>24</sup>

Because the ascriptions of different properties to the trinitarian persons arises from the ideals of the individual authors and then these very same properties are said to be the standard for human relationships, Kilby argues that a Feuerbachian projection is here at work.

But though the third stage is the most problematic, it should be evident by now that, on Kilby's assessment, the second stage—what I have called human-to-God speech—is also theologically unwarranted and, indeed, at the root of the problem. God is transcendent, and what we can say about God is limited. The problem is that the second stage seeks insight into God, attempting to understand what God is. She writes,

If not the social doctrine, what then? The beginnings of an alternative are present

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<sup>24</sup> Kilby, "Perichoresis and Projection," 441.

already in what was said above. I suggested that problems arise when one looks for a particular insight into God of which the doctrine of the Trinity is the bearer. My own proposal then, is not that one should move from the social back to, say, a psychological approach to the Trinity—this would be to look for a *different* insight—but rather that one should renounce the very idea that the point of the doctrine is to give insight into God.<sup>25</sup>

On Kilby's estimation, Christian doctrines are supposed to be understood only as second-order, grammatical rules by which the narrative of scripture is to be interpreted.<sup>26</sup> As second-order grammatical rules, doctrines are abstractions from the scriptural texts. Kilby provides an example: the claim that God is "one substance and three persons" is more abstract than the claim that God is "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."<sup>27</sup> But though the doctrine is more abstract, it ought never to "break free" from the scriptural texts and "become an independent source of ideas and intellectual insights, an independent object of contemplation."<sup>28</sup> Kilby's claim is that doctrines need to remain tied to the scriptural texts they make sense of—as grammatical rules, I suppose, make sense of sentences. Theologians begin to err when they treat the doctrines as a new starting point for inquiry. A doctrine, according to Kilby, "can never become the beginning of a new enquiry. Or at least it ought not."<sup>29</sup> Seeking any further insight into God in this way, according to Kilby,

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<sup>25</sup> Kilby, "Perichoresis and Projection," 443.

<sup>26</sup> Kilby, "Perichoresis and Projection," 443.

<sup>27</sup> Kilby, "Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?," 35.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 36.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 36. A few pages later, Kilby criticizes the structure of Augustine's *De Trinitate* in the following way: "Augustine's procedure, complex and elusive though it is, seems to give some comfort to the notion that once one has arrived at the doctrine of the Trinity, at the end of a long struggle, one can then safely use it as the *starting point* for a new investigation, and this is precisely what I am suggesting must be resisted" (ibid., 41). In other words, Kilby agrees with roughly the first half of *de Trin*, but strongly disagrees with

does more harm than good; it is seeking answers where, in this life, only projections can be found. The better approach is an intellectual asceticism and apophatic approach.

### **The Formulaic Typology**

The formulaic typology is concerned with the various kinds of formulations we find in a theologian's trinitarian theology and reflection on the *imago Trinitatis*. It regards, not *what* or *how much* can be said, but rather *how* what can be said is, in fact, said. I will here discuss the poetic type of formulation and the explanatory type of formulation. It should be noted, however, that although the typology between pleromatic and apophatic trinitarian theology is, at times, exemplified rather clearly in the literature—with theologians deliberately adopting either one approach or the other—the formulaic typology tends not to be found so explicitly in the literature. Much more common, rather, is a blending of the two types of formulation, with theologians employing poetic formulations when they deem these to be appropriate and explanatory formulations when they deem those to be appropriate. Nevertheless, distinguishing the two types is useful in allowing us to locate the various formulations.

#### *The Poetic Formulation*

The poetic formulation in trinitarian theology is one in which affectively-charged images are employed to convey something of the Trinity and of human beings in their imaging of the Trinity. There is a good deal of poetic formulation within the contemporary literature. I will use the work of Leonardo Boff to illustrate, since he explicitly advocates for the use of poetic formulation.

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the second.

Consider the following from his *Trinity and Society*:

The universe in the triune God will be the body of the Trinity, showing forth, in the limited form of creation, the full possibility of the communion of the divine Three. ... This is the festival of the redeemed. It is the celestial dance of the freed, the banquet of sons and daughters in the homeland and household of the Trinity, of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In the trinitized creation, we shall leap and sing, praise and love the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And we shall be loved by them, praised by them, invited to dance and sing, sing and dance, dance and love forever and ever, amen.<sup>30</sup>

A fair bit of poetic imagery can be found in this passage: there is the festival of the redeemed, the celestial dance, the banquet, the homeland and household, leaping and singing, and so forth. Since these images are employed to speak about the eschaton as a trinitarian event, part of their value, on Boff's view, is that they communicate in an affectively-charged way that for which human beings may hope.

Employing poetic formulations in trinitarian theology, Boff contends, serves an important purpose. He writes,

The conceptual language of devout reason is not the only means of access to the mystery of the Trinity. The church has also developed the symbolic language of imagery. This emphasizes the significance the Trinity has for human existence, particularly in its longing for wholeness. The wholeness is the mystery of the Trinity. It is best expressed through symbols which spring from the depths of the individual and collective unconscious, or from humanity's common religious stock. Symbolic language does not replace conceptual language, but is basic to the formation of religious attitudes.<sup>31</sup>

The primary distinction in this passage is between conceptual language and symbolic language of imagery. Though Boff recognizes the indispensability of conceptual language, poetic language conveys the significance of the Trinity in a more adequate way. Boff says that "significance" is "the affective content, the existential vibration set

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<sup>30</sup> Leonardo Boff, *Trinity and Society*, 231.

<sup>31</sup> Boff, *Trinity and Society*, 235.

up in our lives.”<sup>32</sup> He continues:

The images and symbols through which we come to an overall relationship to the Trinity—or rather, to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit—belong to this realm of significance. Images are not substitutes for technical terms nor for the defined teachings of the church; we need to know what we want to say and what we should not say of the triune God when we try to think about the mystery. But images can lend definition and embodiment to what we learn from abstract concepts.<sup>33</sup>

Conceptual language, which Boff claims is found paradigmatically in the conciliar doctrines, serves a guardrail function: it indicates what should and should not be said about the Trinity, thereby setting boundaries. But the problem with conceptual language, according to Boff, is that it is abstract and distant from human experience. Only images can serve the function of conveying the significance of the conceptual language, granting the conceptual language “definition and embodiment.” The concern, for Boff, is that the doctrine of the Trinity has become far removed from lived experience,<sup>34</sup> and Boff believes that the best, or perhaps the only, way to fix the problem is to return to symbolic imagery; hence, his preference for poetic formulation.

### *The Explanatory Formulation*

Unlike the poetic formulation, the explanatory formulation does not invoke images, but rather aims for a precise meaning. The limitation with poetic formulation is that it does not so much settle questions as ignite affection, and the explanatory formulation does little to ignite affection (except, perhaps, for those who wish to understand), and is rather meant to settle a set of issues and to eliminate confusion. Indeed, almost all theologians

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<sup>32</sup> Boff, *Trinity and Society*, 101.

<sup>33</sup> Boff, *Trinity and Society*, 101.

<sup>34</sup> Karl Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1997), 10.



employ explanatory formulations, but some aim to employ such formulations more often than others. Not only do some employ them more often, but some further seek to order their explanatory formulations methodically, organizing them in such a way so as to evoke, as far as possible, ease of understanding for readers. It is important to note, however, that explanatory formulations, of themselves, do not conclusively settle a matter. Further questions, of course, still remain possible, and any explanatory formulation must be subject to a process of verification. In other words, while the aim of an explanatory formulation is to settle a question or set of questions and eliminate confusion, whether any particular explanatory formulation is adequate or not is subject to further inquiry. I will use Karl Rahner's *The Trinity* to illustrate the explanatory formulation.

In his compact *The Trinity*, Rahner puts forward his well-known *Grundaxiom*, which has deeply influenced the field of trinitarian theology: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity, and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.”<sup>35</sup> The axiom is clearly low on affective content, but aims to eliminate a basic confusion that arises in the field of trinitarian theology when, Rahner argues, theologians treat the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity as two separate realities or as two isolated subjects of discourse. Indeed, Rahner argues that many claims from classical Augustinian-Thomist theology—to take just a few examples, that any of the divine persons could have become incarnate, that the divine operation is common to the three persons, and that the “Our Father” is addressed “indifferently” to the Trinity, rather than

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<sup>35</sup> Rahner, *The Trinity*, 22.

to the Father<sup>36</sup>—have effectively rendered Christians, “in their practical life, almost mere monotheists.”<sup>37</sup> The problem, in other words, is that the doctrine of the Trinity has been separated from our understanding of salvation, so that the Trinity finds little resonance in the practical life of Christians. Indeed, part of Rahner’s aim in *The Trinity* is to show how we truly encounter the Trinity in the history of salvation and thereby to show how Christians commune with the triune God, and not merely with God’s representation in creation—a representation that just as easily could have been otherwise. Part of the function of the axiom, in other words, is to bring the doctrine of the Trinity closer to our understanding of salvation.<sup>38</sup>

The conclusion that Rahner draws from the axiom is that theologians could begin with either the economic Trinity or the immanent Trinity, and he then advocates beginning with the economic Trinity for a number of reasons, which need not be examined here. The main point to which I want to draw attention is that Rahner’s axiom is an explanatory formulation—one which may be correct or incorrect, adequately formulated or inadequately formulated—because it seeks to settle a set of issues and to eliminate confusion.

### **A General Statement regarding the Approach of Aquinas and Lonergan**

If we were to use the typology of formulation to situate Aquinas’s and Lonergan’s approaches to systematic theology, including their theology of the *imago Trinitatis*, there

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<sup>36</sup> See especially, Rahner, *The Trinity*, 10-21.

<sup>37</sup> Rahner, *The Trinity*, 10.

<sup>38</sup> Rahner writes, “the Trinity is a mystery of salvation, otherwise it would never be revealed.” Rahner, *The Trinity*, 21.

can be little doubt that both of them embrace explanatory formulation in their systematic theology. This is not to say that for either of them there is no role for poetic formulation in the theological enterprise. Lonergan, for his part, becomes especially clear about such roles in *Method in Theology*, where systematic theology is only one functional specialty among many other functional specialties, which include research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications.<sup>39</sup> Though poetic formulations do not have a role in systematic theology for Lonergan, they do have a place in other parts of the theological enterprise, including interpretation, history, and—most crucially—communications. In systematic theology, however, poetic formulation needs to be provisionally sidelined in order for systematic theology to pursue its singular goal of advancing understanding. The meaning and rationale for these claims will become clearer when we turn to the method of Aquinas in Chapter 1 and especially that of Lonergan in Chapter 3, but it is useful to indicate at the outset that explanatory formulations are integral to the systematic theologies of Aquinas and Lonergan.

Situating Aquinas's and Lonergan's approaches in systematic theology in the gnoseological typology, however, is more complex. In a general way—a way to be clarified in the ensuing chapters—one can say that Aquinas's and Lonergan's approaches both accord with and dissent from the pleromatic and apophatic approaches. They accord with the apophatic approach in denying God-to-human speech and in denying that the Trinity can serve as a model for human realities, but dissent from the apophatic approach by affirming both that further questions can be asked in regard to the doctrines and that human-to-God speech (or, better, analogy) is possible. They accord with the pleromatic approach, on the other hand, in affirming that more can be understood about the doctrines

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<sup>39</sup> See *Method*, CW14, 121-138.

of the Christian faith, but dissent from the pleromatic approach by denying that the Trinity can serve as a model for human realities. Accordingly, it seems fitting to label the approaches of Aquinas and Lonergan—which are, as I will show, in a number of ways very different—as moderate, which is an approach that I do not find adequately represented in the recent debate.

### **PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF PRESENT DISSERTATION**

The purpose of the dissertation is to contribute to the ongoing effort to re-conceive the *imago Dei* by interpreting and critically evaluating the meaning of the *imago Trinitatis* in Thomas Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan. Before proceeding to that task in the body of the dissertation, I need to make two brief remarks about the tradition of theological inquiry within which both Aquinas and Lonergan are operating. The first remark has to do with how the concept of the *imago Trinitatis* became possible, and the second has to do with how the distinction between “image” and “likeness” is understood in this tradition.

First, then, in the history of Christian theology, theologians have offered many different ways of interpreting the biblical claim that human beings were created in the image and likeness of God.<sup>40</sup> Beginning in the early Christian tradition, a number of theologians argued that the term “image of God” in the biblical texts properly refers to the Word who became incarnate, rather than properly to human beings.<sup>41</sup> Hence, the proper meaning of “image” in Genesis, on this interpretation, refers to the Son, the

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<sup>40</sup> For Catholic canonical texts referring to the image and/or likeness of God, see Genesis 1:26-28, 5:1-3, 9:6; Book of Wisdom 2:23; Ecclesiasticus 17:3; Romans 8:29; 1 Corinthians 11:7; 2 Corinthians 3:18, 4:4-7; Colossians 1:13-15, 3:10; Hebrews 1:3; James 3:9. Also, in apocrypha, see 2 Esdras 8:44.

<sup>41</sup> E.g., Origen, *Homilies on Genesis*, 1.13.

archetype and final end of human becoming. The implication of this interpretation is that human beings were created in or to the image of the Son, but not the Father or the Spirit. On these grounds, the concept of the *imago Trinitatis* would not make sense. Augustine, however, raises several arguments against this line of interpretation. Consider the following from his *De Trinitate*:

If the Father ... made man to the image of the Son in such a way that humans are not the Father's image but only the Son's, then the Son is unlike the Father. But if devout faith teaches, as indeed it does, that the Son is like the Father to the point of being equal in being, then whatever is made to the likeness of the Son must also be made to the likeness of the Father. Finally, if the Father did not make man to his own image but to the Son's, why did he not say "Let us make man to your image and likeness" instead of saying 'our'? The reason must be that it was the image of the trinity that was being made in humans, and this is how humans would be the image of the one true God, since the trinity itself is the one true God."<sup>42</sup>

In this brief passage, Augustine raises two criticisms, which I will take in reverse order. First, he argues that the lines in *Genesis* employ the plural—"Let *us* make man to *our* image and likeness"—and Augustine interprets the Latin *imaginem et similitudinem nostram* as indicating the image and likeness of the three persons together, rather than as indicating only one of the persons, namely, the Son. That is, whereas theologians interpreted "our image and likeness" in *Genesis* as designating only the Son (as, analogously speaking, a baseball player would say "our shortstop" when referring to another member of the baseball team), Augustine interprets the same phrase as designating the Trinity, the three Persons of one essence (as the baseball player would say "our baseball team" when referring to the entire team). Second, if human beings are created only in the image of the Son, but not the Father or the Spirit, then the implication

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<sup>42</sup> Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XII.6.

is that the Son is unlike the Father and the Spirit, not equal in being with them.<sup>43</sup> But the devout faith, Augustine argues, clearly affirms that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are equal in being. Hence, according to Augustine, humans must have been made in the image of the Trinity, not only of the Son. On these grounds, it makes sense to discuss the *imago Trinitatis*.<sup>44</sup>

Second, something needs to be said about the distinction between “image” and “likeness.” In a major interpretive tradition, which I will call the perfect likeness tradition, the “image of God” is a property of all human beings, whereas the “likeness of God” is a property that human beings may have possessed prior to the fall,<sup>45</sup> do not possess after the fall, and (re)gain through God’s redemption of human beings. In this perfect likeness tradition, “image” functions as the more general category, and “likeness” functions as the more specific category: there is, on the one hand, the image with likeness (prior to the fall and obtained through the redemption), and, on the other, there is the image without likeness (subsequent to the fall and prior to redemption).<sup>46</sup> In another tradition of interpretation, which I will call the general likeness tradition, the likeness of God is found in all created things, inasmuch as God is their archetype, but the image of

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<sup>43</sup> See also, *de Trin.*, VII.12.

<sup>44</sup> It might be useful to note the following. We can say that the first criticism concerns biblical interpretation, and the second criticism concerns doctrine. The extent to which the first criticism is guiding the second or the second guiding the first in Augustine’s reasoning is probably impossible to determine, but if the biblical statements can be interpreted in one of two directions, then it seems likely that the doctrinal issue is of more fundamental importance.

<sup>45</sup> The major figures whom I am grouping in this tradition differ on whether the likeness existed in human beings prior to the fall, which also concerns the meaning of the fall.

God is found only in human beings.<sup>47</sup> In this tradition, “likeness” functions as the more general category, and “image” functions as the more specific category: there is, on the one hand, a likeness without image (in all created things, besides humans), and there is, on the other, a likeness with an image (in humans).<sup>48</sup>

Aquinas follows Augustine in claiming both that humans image the triune God, not merely the Son, and that “likeness” is a more general category and “image” a more specific category.<sup>49</sup> In doing so, he argues that, though likenesses of the Trinity can be found in other created things (as *vestigia*), the image of the Trinity exists properly only in humans.<sup>50</sup> But in conceiving the image of the Trinity, Aquinas does not entirely disregard the perfected image tradition, wherein image functions as the more general category and likeness functions as the more specific. Again, like Augustine before him, Aquinas argues that the image is corrupted (though never lost) in sin and that the image is made perfect through grace. In *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 7, Aquinas distinguishes between two different likenesses of the Trinity in human beings—two ways in which the *imago Trinitatis* could be said of human beings. He argues that there is a *similitudo secundum analogiam* (likeness according to analogy) and a *similitudo secundum conformationem* (likeness according to conformity).<sup>51</sup> (For economy of expression, I will shorten these to

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<sup>46</sup> Origen, *On First Principles*, 3.6.1.

<sup>47</sup> See Augustine, *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis*, par. 57f.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Aquinas, *ST* 1, q. 93, a. 1-2.

<sup>50</sup> Aquinas, *ST* 1, q. 93, a. 2; *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 7. Also, Augustine, *de Trin.* XI.1, 3, and 8f;

<sup>51</sup> This distinction is, in a way, prefigured in Augustine’s *de Trin.* XIV.15-26. The difference, however, is that Augustine does not distinguish explicitly between either likeness, and then when the issue arises in

likeness by analogy and likeness by conformity.) According to Aquinas, the likeness by conformity is a more perfect representation of the triune God in humans than the likeness by analogy.

This dissertation assumes the traditional interpretation of the image/likeness as referring to the Trinity rather than particularly to the Word. The argument is organized according to the difference between the likeness of the Trinity by analogy and the likeness of the Trinity by conformity. I have organized the five chapters of this dissertation as follows. There are two chapters on the *imago Trinitatis* in Aquinas, one on the meaning of the likeness of the Trinity by analogy (Chapter 1) and another on the likeness by conformity (Chapter 2). Following that, there are two chapters on the *imago Trinitatis* in Lonergan, one on the meaning of the likeness by analogy (Chapter 3) and another on the likeness by conformity (Chapter 4). The purpose of these four chapters is both interpretative and probative. It is interpretative inasmuch as it seeks to understand their own meaning on their own terms, but it is probative inasmuch as it asks questions of their meaning, questions which they did not explicitly answer but whose answers might be pieced together and reconstructed through their arguments on various other subject matters. Because the probative nature of parts of these chapters can, at best, render only tentative conclusions, I flag the probative questions and my attempts to reconstruct

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Book XIV of *de Trin*. Augustine argues that the image of the Trinity is in the mind, not when it understands and loves itself, but when it understands and loves God. Hence: “This trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made” (*de Trin*. XIV.15). As we will see in Chapter 1, Aquinas argues that there is a real image and likeness of the Trinity in the mind when it understands and loves itself.



answers to them in these chapters. The purpose of these chapters is ultimately to interpret the meaning of the *imago Trinitatis* in Aquinas and Lonergan and show how Lonergan's conception is an advance from Aquinas's conception, meeting some of the contemporary pressures in a more adequate way.

In the final chapter of the dissertation, I critically evaluate one of Lonergan's arguments in *The Triune God: Systematics*. Based upon a shortcoming in Lonergan's proposal, I suggest that there is a need for a new analogy, though one that is not really in competition with the analogy proposed by Lonergan, but complementary to it. I then draw out the meaning of the analogue in human terms. Finally, I explain its relation to the likeness by analogy proposed in Chapter 3 and explain how the new analogy might function in a full-scale trinitarian theology, a project which I will have to postpone to a later date. My limited aim in this final chapter is simply to propose the new analogue, explain its meaning, and make some preliminary proposals regarding its position and function within a full-scale trinitarian theology. The outcome of this chapter is that the *imago Trinitatis* ought to be re-conceived in a straightforwardly interpersonal context, one in which the crucial insights of both Aquinas and Lonergan are incorporated.

## 1.0 AQUINAS: ANALOGIA MENTIS

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The argument in this chapter and the next focuses on the *imago Trinitatis* in the work of Aquinas. The first step is to understand the method by which Aquinas arrives at his conception of the *imago Trinitatis*. The first main section (1.2) of this chapter will attend to the general contours of Aquinas's method. It will not delve into all of the nuances of Aquinas's method, but focus on what is necessary to answer the question: how does Aquinas conceive of the *imago Trinitatis*.

The remainder of both the present chapter and the following chapter pivots on a distinction raised in *De veritate* between a likeness of the Trinity according to analogy and a likeness of the Trinity according to conformity.<sup>52</sup> Both likenesses occur in the

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<sup>52</sup> In contrast to Merriell, I translate “conformationem” as conformity rather than conformation. The issue is what it means for the human being to be conformed to the Trinity. Merriell prefers the latter because he claims that that conformation “conveys the active sense of the Latin words better than the English word ‘conformity,’ which has a sense of something already achieved and static.” There is something to his claim. However, as I will show in the next chapter, he assumes something is more differentiated than it actually is in *De Veritate*. D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas's Teaching* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990): 135, n. 117.

human mind. The likeness by analogy, however, takes the following form: as A is to B, so C is to D. As processions occur in the human mind, so processions occur in God. The task of the second main section of this chapter (1.3) is to explain the likeness by analogy. However, the likeness by analogy is only one likeness of the Trinity listed in *De veritate*; the other is a likeness by conformity. The pilgrim *in via* operates according to a likeness by conformity. The next chapter explains how and why the likeness by conformity inverts the likeness by analogy: at the deepest level, the pilgrim *in via* does not operate according to the ordering of intellectual and volitional processions that serve as the analogue for the trinitarian processions, but rather according to an inversion of those processions. Whereas in the likeness by analogy intellect moves will, in the likeness by conformity will moves intellect. Only through such an inversion is the soul of the human being made to conform to the triune life of God. The argument in these two chapters thus takes the following form. In theory, the likeness by analogy helps us to understand, in an imperfect way, the triune God. But in the practice of Christian life, the analogy walks on its head.

## 1.2 METHOD AND ANALOGY IN AQUINAS'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

In order to explain how Aquinas's trinitarian theology fits into his broader theological project, I turn primarily to the *Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*.<sup>53</sup> Though this work is unfinished and has been dated as an early work of Aquinas, the commentary on

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<sup>53</sup> Unless otherwise noted, the following English translations are from Thomas Aquinas, *Faith, Reason and Theology: Questions I-IV of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, trans. Armand Maurer, Medieval Sources in Translation 32 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987) and Thomas Aquinas, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Questions V and VI of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, trans. Armand Maurer, 4th ed., Medieval Sources in Translation 3 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1986)). Latin text comes from the Leon edition.

Boethius's *De trinitate* has the merit of explaining specifically and at length Aquinas's theological method, both in terms of natural theology and in terms of how he uses natural analogies to explain revealed truths. It is, in fact, one of Aquinas's most systematic expositions of the theological method. Furthermore, it was most likely written during the first Parisian period (1252-1259), the same period in which Aquinas finished the *Questiones Disputatae de Veritate* (1256-1259),<sup>54</sup> which figures prominently throughout the present chapter. The commentary, in particular, expounds Aquinas's theological method and his understanding of the role of analogy in theology. Each of these issues plays a role in the infrastructure of his treatment of the *analogia mentis* and its inversion in practice. Hence, the goal of this section is to foreground the method of Aquinas's theology, especially as regards the role of analogy in his theology as *fides quaerens intellectum* in which the intelligibility attained are *rationes convenientiae*. The present section thus deals first with method and then with analogy.

### 1.2.1 Method in the Commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*

Aquinas's treatment of theological method is set within the context of a discussion of the division between and methods of the various sciences, as they were practiced in a pre-modern, Aristotelian context. In accord with Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, Aquinas claims that, in general, science treats of necessary matters and, as such, treat things that are for the most part not subject to change.<sup>55</sup> The sciences thus have as their objects true and certain knowledge by their universal and necessary causes, on account of the fact that

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<sup>54</sup> For dating, see Jean-Pierre Torrell O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 1: The Person and His Work*, tr. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

<sup>55</sup> In *BDT*, q. 5, a. 1. Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 1.6 74b5-75a37.

matter and motion entail change and thus contingency or a lack of necessity.

Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of science: natural science, mathematics, and the divine science. They are united in that they intend objects separated from matter and motion, but are distinguished from one another according to the degree to which their respective objects are separated from matter and motion. The divine science, which will mainly occupy us here, is thus distinguished from the other sciences—natural science and mathematics—based on the degree to which its objects are separated from matter. Hence, the best way to gain clarity on the peculiarity of theological method is to juxtapose the degree to which its objects are separated from matter and motion with the degree to which the objects of the natural sciences and mathematics are separated from matter and motion. Doing so, however, will require us first to explain the ways in which the objects of the natural sciences and mathematics are separated from matter and motion.

The following diagram will serve as a touchstone throughout this section.

| <b>Objects depend on matter:</b>      | <b>for their being</b> | <b>not for their being</b> |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>for their being understood</b>     | Natural Sciences       | --                         |
| <b>not for their being understood</b> | Mathematics            | Divine Science             |

Let us first consider the left-hand column, and then turn to the right-hand column. The objects of both the natural sciences and mathematics, Aquinas argues, depend on matter for their being, since they can exist only in matter. That is, the objects studied either in the natural sciences, such as the physical realities or the souls of subrational beings, or in mathematics, such as geometrical figures, are not able to exist without matter.

Nevertheless, the natural sciences are distinguished from mathematics because the objects of the former require matter for their being understood while the objects of the latter do not. Aquinas's meaning is precise. The way in which their respective objects either require or do not require matter for their being understood does not have to do with whether knowledge in these two sciences either begins in sensation or does not begin in sensation. In this life, the human intellect is unable to understand without a phantasm, for phantasms are related to intellect "as objects in which it considers (*insplicit*) whatever it considers (*insplicit*)."<sup>56</sup> Following Aristotle's argument in *De Anima* III, Aquinas claims that phantasms are changes in the soul resulting from acts of sensation.<sup>57</sup> Hence, all knowledge, for Aquinas, begins in sensation. The distinction, instead, has to do with the way in which the objects of the natural sciences and mathematics are conceived and defined. The objects of the natural sciences depend upon matter for their being understood since they in some way refer to matter within their definitions; the objects of mathematics do not depend upon matter for their being understood since their definitions do not refer to matter.

The object of any science is separate from matter and motion, and yet the objects of the natural sciences require matter for their being and for their being understood. There may seem to be a contradiction, but it is only apparent. Aquinas argues that while the natural sciences require matter for their being understood, nevertheless particular, individualized matter as such does not enter into the definition of the objects in the natural sciences. Only common matter enters into the definition. Common matter

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<sup>56</sup> *In BDT*, q. 6, a. 2, ad. 5. Translation modified. Cf. *In BDT*, q. 1, a. 2, resp.

<sup>57</sup> *In DA* III, lec. 7, nos. 655-659.

includes the kinds of bodily parts essential to that particular kind of natural thing. The natural scientist cannot conceive, say, what an antelope is without including common matter in its definition, that is, the kinds of bodily parts normally essential to what it is to be an antelope. Still, determinate matter is excluded. For instance, the definition of what an antelope is will include flesh and bones, but not *this* flesh and *these* bones of *this* particular antelope. Hence, Aquinas argues that the natural scientist abstracts from the *hic et nunc* proper to determinate matter and, in that respect, then, they treat an object as separate from matter and motion.<sup>58</sup>

More specifically, Aquinas argues that the natural scientist conceives a whole by prescind from the parts as such, which (to the possible surprise of modern readers schools in the natural sciences) gets described as abstracting a universal from a particular. Abstraction in the natural sciences, Aquinas argues, “corresponds to the union of whole and part; and to this corresponds the abstraction of the universal from the particular. This is the abstraction of a whole, in which we consider a nature absolutely, according to its essential character, in independence of all parts that do not belong to the species but are accidental parts.”<sup>59</sup> The movement from lacking scientific knowledge to attaining it thus requires the natural scientist to prescind from the accidents of any particular antelope—

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<sup>58</sup> In *BDT*, q. 5, a. 2., resp. “because every motion is measured by time, and the primary motion is local motion (for without it there is no other motion), a thing must be subject to motion inasmuch as it exists here and now; and it exists under these conditions insofar as it is individuated by matter having determinate dimensions. Consequently, natures of this kind, which make possible sciences of things subject to motion, must be thought of without determinate matter and everything following upon such matter; but not without indeterminate matter, because on its notion depends the notion of form that determines matter to itself.”

<sup>59</sup> In *BDT*, a. 5, a. 3, resp.

e.g., its particular size, particular speed, etc.—in order to understand and conceive what holds universally and necessarily for antelopes as such.<sup>60</sup> The natural scientist formulates an object that is separate from particular, determinate matter, while nevertheless including common matter. In doing so, the natural scientist achieves a first degree of separation from matter.

The objects of mathematics, on the other hand, require matter for their being, but not for their being understood. Again, Aquinas's meaning is precise. He does not mean, in conceptualist fashion, that we could come to an understanding of mathematical realities without the aid of phantasms. All human knowledge begins in sensation. Rather, the objects of mathematics do not require matter for their being understood in the sense that the formulation of mathematical objects excludes any kind of matter from their definitions. Neither common nor individual matter is included when one is defining, for instance, a curve or a line. To see this more clearly, consider the difference between curvature and a person's bowleggedness.<sup>61</sup> While bowleggedness can only exist in a leg,

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<sup>60</sup> For Aquinas, such scientific knowledge is also normative in the sense that it can be used to evaluate particulars belonging to the intelligibility of the class or genus. He writes, "Science treats of something in two ways: in one way, primarily and principally; and in this sense science is concerned with universal natures, which are its very foundation. In another way it treats of something secondarily, as by a sort of reflection; and in this sense it is concerned with the things whose natures they are, inasmuch as, using the lower powers, it relates those natures to the particular things possessing them. For a knower uses a universal nature both as a thing known and as a means of knowing. Thus, through the universal nature of man we can judge of this or that particular man. (*In BDT*, q. 5, a. 2, ad. 4).

<sup>61</sup> Aquinas's stock example is that between the definition of snub and that of curve (*In BDT*, q. 5, a. 3, *sc and resp*). But since no one speaks of the snub nose of Socrates anymore, bowleggedness seems more a *propos*.



curvature does not depend upon any specific kind of matter in which curvature inheres. The formulation of mathematical objects, Aquinas argues, is the abstraction of a form from matter. Aquinas writes, “a form can be abstracted from matter if the essential nature of the form does not depend on that particular kind of matter; but the intellect cannot abstract form from the kind of matter upon which the form depends according to its essential nature.”<sup>62</sup> The mathematician thus abstracts from both individual and common matter and achieves what the scholastics named a second degree of abstraction.

Finally, the objects of the divine science do not require matter either to exist or to be understood. Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that the divine science has as its object the most universal and necessary principles and that such principles of themselves are separate from matter and motion. Furthermore, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of principles. On the one hand, “Some are complete natures in themselves and nevertheless they are the principles of other things, as heavenly bodies are the principles of lower bodies and simple bodies are the principles of mixed bodies.”<sup>63</sup> On the other hand, “There are some principles, however, that are not complete natures in themselves, but only principles of natures, as unity is the principle of number, point the principle of line, and form and matter principles of natural bodies.”<sup>64</sup> The distinction is between principles that are complete in themselves and principles pertaining to constitutive parts of complete beings. While the sun is an example of a complete being in itself and yet still the principle of life on earth, form and matter are not complete of themselves but are partial yet constitutive principles of composite things.

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<sup>62</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 3, resp.

<sup>63</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.

In studying the most universal and necessary principles, the divine science can consider these principles in either of these two ways, that is, either as complete in themselves or as constitutive parts of complete things. Aquinas writes, “because these divine beings are the principles of all things and nevertheless they are complete natures in themselves, they can be studied in two ways: first, insofar as they are common principles of all things, and second insofar as they are beings in their own right.”<sup>65</sup> Aquinas thus distinguishes between two kinds of divine science, metaphysics, which is independent of revelation and *sacra doctrina*, which is dependent on revelation. There is a further distinction between the two, according to the ways in which their respective objects are separate from matter and motion. On the one hand, metaphysics considers the most universal and necessary principles insofar as principles are common, constitutive principles of all beings. It treats what “by its nature does not exist in matter and motion; but it can exist without them, though we sometimes find them with them. In this way, being, substance, potency, and act are separate from matter and motion, because they do not depend on them for their existence ...”<sup>66</sup> By way of metaphysics, we know the divine realities only through their effects; that is we know them through a demonstration *quia*, not *propter quid*. On the other hand, there is the theology of *sacra doctrina*, which considers the same divine realities insofar as they are complete beings. The theology of *sacra doctrina* treats of what by its nature “in no way can exist in matter and motion, as God and the angels said to be separate from matter and motion.”<sup>67</sup> Because our intellect

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<sup>64</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.

<sup>65</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.

<sup>66</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.

<sup>67</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.

grasps intelligibilities in phantasms as its proper object, we are incapable of adequately knowing these universal and necessary principles insofar as they are complete in themselves. As complete beings that lack matter, they are known by us, Aquinas claims, only insofar as “they reveal themselves.”<sup>68</sup>

One last important distinction ought to be mentioned. Aquinas argues that knowledge in the various sciences terminates in distinct ways.<sup>69</sup> The terminus of knowledge is that to which the intellect is conformed in the act of true judgment. The sciences, according to Aquinas, are thus distinguished according to that in which their knowledge terminates: natural science terminates in the senses; mathematics terminates in imagination; divine science terminates in the intellect alone. Hence, in the natural sciences, the judgment of the intellect conforms to things in the senses; in mathematics, it conforms to things as capable of being imagined; in the divine science, it conforms to

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<sup>68</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp. Aquinas makes the same point earlier in the treatise. He writes, “the knowledge of divine realities can be interpreted in two ways. First, from our standpoint, and then they are knowable to us only through creatures, the knowledge of which derives from the senses. Second, from the nature of the divine realities themselves. In this way they are eminently knowable of themselves, and although we do not know them in their own way, this is how they are known by God and the blessed. Accordingly, there are two kinds of science concerning the divine. One follows our way of knowing, which uses the principles of sensible things in order to make the Godhead known. The other follows the mode of divine realities themselves, so that they are apprehended in themselves. We cannot perfectly possess this way of knowing in the present life, but there arises here and now in us a certain sharing in, and a likeness to, the divine knowledge, to the extent that through the faith implanted in us we firmly grasp the Primary Truth itself for its own sake” (q. 2, a. 2, resp.).

<sup>69</sup> Aquinas considers this question at length in q. 6, a. 2, resp., with regard to whether the divine science should entirely abandon the imagination.

things in intellect alone. Only the termini of natural science and divine science will be treated here, since understanding these issues sheds light upon the *imago Trinitatis* as conceived by Aquinas.

First, then, natural science. Although human knowledge begins in the senses, not all human knowledge terminates in the senses. Only the knowledge acquired in the natural sciences terminates in the senses. For the things studied in the natural sciences, Aquinas writes, “the properties and accidents of a thing disclosed by the senses adequately reveal its nature, and [thus] the intellect’s judgment of that nature must conform to what the senses reveal about it. So the terminus of knowledge in the natural sciences must be in the senses, with the result that we judge of natural beings as the senses manifest them.”<sup>70</sup> If, for instance, the natural scientist made a judgment that oak trees were sentient but no sentient acts could be verified through the senses, then the scientist’s judgment would not be conformed to the senses and the natural scientist’s judgment would be false.

Turning now to the divine science. Like other human knowledge, the divine science begins in the senses, but unlike other human knowledge, knowledge sought in the divine science terminates in intellect alone. This applies to both kinds of divine science, that is, both to divine science as considering universal and necessary principles as constitutive parts of composite beings and to divine science as considering complete beings separate from matter. The claim that the divine science terminates in intellect means that an act of judgment in the divine science is true only when the judgment conforms to what is present in and by means of the intellect alone. The realities about

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<sup>70</sup> In *BDT*, q. 6, a. 2, resp.

which the intellect judges in the divine science are purely intellectual, not sensible. Hence, in the divine science, the judgment of the intellect ought to conform to realities in the intellect alone. However, because the human intellect understands by means of intelligibilities in phantasms, knowledge in the divine science is difficult to achieve and error difficult to avoid. Here, the human mind is like the eye of an owl at noonday.<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, some knowledge, Aquinas argues, is possible in the divine science, and such knowledge will always terminate in intellect alone.

As has been mentioned, the principle that the divine science terminates in intellect alone applies to both metaphysics and *sacra doctrina*. Metaphysics considers universal and necessary principles insofar as the principles can exist with matter and motion but do not have to exist with them. Examples given in the quote above were being, substance, potency, and act. Each of these metaphysical principles are purely intellectual, though they are also applicable to entities existing in matter and motion. For instance, the metaphysical component, act (*actus essendi*) can occur in a body, as does the soul. Nevertheless, although the principles may exist in matter and motion, in general, any judgment about the principles themselves are true only if the judgment terminates in the intellect alone. For instance, when the metaphysician makes a judgment about the relationship between substance and act, the judgment of the metaphysician must conform to strictly intellectual realities, though the natural scientist can borrow such principles from the metaphysician and make judgments about how, for example, a sentient soul informs a body of an antelope. The scientist's knowledge would terminate in the senses, while the metaphysician's knowledge would terminate in the intellect.

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<sup>71</sup> *In Meta* II, lect. 1, nos. 286.

The terminus of knowledge remains the same for theology as *sacra doctrina*, that is, for the divine science considering the separate substances insofar as they are complete in themselves. The theology of *sacra doctrina* also terminates in intellect alone. However, Aquinas does not consider in much detail how this is so. The most extensive treatment comes in his reply to an objection that the divine science should entirely abandon the imagination. The objection runs: “Divine science was never more appropriately taught than in Sacred Scripture. But treating of the divine in Sacred Scripture we resort to images when the divine things are described for us under sensible figures. Therefore, in divine science we must turn to images.”<sup>72</sup> The objection states that because Scripture itself uses images to reveal the divine realities, so too the divine science, specifically theology as *sacra doctrina*, should render its judgments in such a way that its judgments are in conformity with the imagination; for instance, that God “came down” from heaven or that there are three divine, imaginable persons. Aquinas replies to the objection in the following way: “Sacred Scripture does not present divine things to us under sensible images so that our intellect may stop with them, but that it may rise from them to the immaterial world.”<sup>73</sup> Although theology as *sacra doctrina* begins in sensible images as they are presented in the Scriptures, the aim of Scripture, according to Aquinas, is not that we would form judgments about the realities revealed by the Scriptures according to the senses or imagination—that is, according to the way the Scriptures present them—but rather, that we would form judgments about them, inasmuch as we are able, according to how these realities actually are, that is, as strictly

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<sup>72</sup> *In BDT*, q. 6, a. 2, ob. 1.

<sup>73</sup> *In BDT*, q. 6, a. 2, ad. 1.

immaterial and intellectual realities. As a result, judgments in theology as *sacra doctrina* ought also to terminate in the intellect alone, which itself is immaterial.<sup>74</sup> Images reveal the divine realities, but the human intellect by means of theology as *sacra doctrina* goes beyond the images to attain some understanding of the realities as immaterial and as existing purely in the intellectual order. It does so, principally, by means of analogies.

### 1.2.2 Analogy in the Commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*

Before turning to the *analogia mentis* in particular, it will be useful to say a brief word on Aquinas's treatment of analogy in general in *Super Boethium de Trinitate*. In the commentary, Aquinas speaks of analogy always within the context of the theology of *sacra doctrina* and not within the context of metaphysics alone. For better or for worse, recent scholarship has lavished attention on the way analogy is employed in the metaphysics of the *Prima Pars*. Such scholarship has been responding especially to the last century's post-Barthian debates within philosophy and systematic theology on the viability of the *analogia entis* and its relationship to both dialectical and apophatic forms of theology. While this debate has illuminated central issues within metaphysics, it has often unnecessarily restricted the application of analogy to that same field. Aquinas's treatment of analogy within theology as *sacra doctrina* in the Boethius commentary, however, provides an important component to his understanding of the role of analogy in theology of *sacra doctrina* in general and its role in trinitarian theology in particular.

The most that we can attain is an imperfect understanding of the realities of the separate substances. But for the sake of an imperfect understanding, Aquinas argues,

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<sup>74</sup> In other words, human intellect, as Lonergan writes, is only extrinsically conditioned by space and time (*Insight*, CW3, 538-543).

theology as *sacra doctrina* employs analogies, drawn principally from philosophy. Aquinas thus argues that philosophy can function in the divine science “by throwing light on the contents of faith by analogies, just as Augustine used many analogies drawn from philosophical doctrines in order to elucidate the Trinity.”<sup>75</sup> When carefully selected, the analogies allow the human mind to move incrementally from an understanding of the divine realities as they are revealed in image-laden form in the Scriptures to an explanatory, immaterial understanding of the divine realities. Hence, the analogies are drawn principally from metaphysics, since metaphysics also terminates in the intellect alone. Again, Aquinas argues, “the theology of Sacred Scripture treats of beings in the first sense [that is, as what cannot by nature itself exist in matter and motion] as its subjects, though it concerns some items in matter and motion insofar as this is needed to throw light on divine things.”<sup>76</sup> The items in matter and motion spoken of here are principally those employed in metaphysics, since judgments about these objects also do not terminate in either imagination.

As will become evident, the fact that theology as *sacra doctrina* ought to terminate in the intellect alone provides Aquinas with *prima facie* rationale (aside from the authority of Augustine) for selecting the operations of the mind as the prime analogue for the processions within the Trinity. It does more than that, though. It also shows why the ordering of the intellectual operations employed for the analogy needs to be inverted if the human mind is going to be able to be in conformity with the divine realities as they are in themselves. Aquinas indeed hints at the issue when he claims that the intellect

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<sup>75</sup> *In BDT*, q. 2, a. 3, resp.

<sup>76</sup> *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.



needs to “rise” to the “immaterial world.” This will be the topic of the next chapter, however. For now, we turn to the analogy of mind.

### 1.3 THE ANALOGY FOR THE TRINITARIAN PROCESSIONS

This section is divided into three subsections. The first explains the various kinds of analogy in Aquinas. The second explains the analogy in the mind’s knowing of itself. The final subsections explains the analogy in the mind’s loving of itself.

#### 1.3.1 The Forms of Analogy

Analogies are useful in many, if not all, areas of *sacra doctrina*, including trinitarian theology. Aquinas will use an analogy from the operations of the human mind in order to conceive (imperfectly) the processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, that is, in order to conceive what it is like for the Son to be begotten and for the Holy Spirit to be spirated. There are a variety of reasons, Aquinas believes, for selecting the operations of the mind as the analogue for the trinitarian processions. Three can be mentioned: one from scripture, another from the theological authority of Augustine, and still another from philosophy. Scripture states the human being is said to be made according to the *imago Dei* in the *Genesis* 1:27, implying some likeness between God and human beings. Relying upon the Scriptural text, Augustine selects the operations of the human mind as the analogue for the trinitarian processions. The philosophical reason is that the intellectual operations of the human being occur in virtue of the strictly immaterial part of the soul, which must be distinguished from the soul’s operations in relation to material functions of the human being.<sup>77</sup> These three reasons do not stand apart from one another,

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<sup>77</sup> See *De ver*, q. 10, a. 3, resp.

and Aquinas will rely upon all three in formulating his trinitarian theology and the *imago Trinitatis*. Although the Scriptural reason is the most authoritative, the analogy drawn from philosophical psychology helps Aquinas to transcend the intrinsically material analogies based on the senses alone. Aquinas follows Augustine's lead because it was he who offered the first immaterial analogy in Western Christianity. In doing so, Aquinas sheds light upon the meaning of the Scriptural and later doctrinal claims about the triune God, as well as on the fact that the human being has been made in the image of God. The claim is that there is a likeness of the Trinity in the mind of the human being.

In *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 7, Aquinas distinguishes between two different kinds of likenesses of the Trinity in the mind. Because of its centrality in the ensuing argument, I quote the *respondeo* in full, though it is rather long:

Likeness brings the character of image to completion. However, for the character of image not every likeness is sufficient, but the fullest likeness, through which something is represented according to its specific nature. For this reason, in bodies we look for the image more in their shapes, which are the proper marks of species, than in colors and other accidents. There is a likeness of the uncreated Trinity in our soul according to any knowledge which it has of itself, not only of the mind, but also of sense, as Augustine clearly shows in *de Trin.*, Book IX. But we find the image of God only in that knowledge according to which there arises in the mind the fuller likeness of God.

Therefore, if we distinguish the knowledge of the mind according to objects, we find in our mind a threefold knowledge. There is the knowledge by which the mind knows God, by which it knows itself, and by which it knows temporal things. In the knowledge by which the mind knows temporal things there is no expressed likeness of the uncreated Trinity, either according to adaptation or according to analogy. It is not according to the first, because material things are more unlike God than is the mind itself. Thus, the mind does not become fully conformed to God for being informed by knowledge of these material things. Nor yet is it according to analogy, for a temporal thing, which begets knowledge, or even actual understanding of itself in the soul, is not of the same substance as the mind, but something extraneous to its nature. Thus, the consubstantiality of the uncreated Trinity cannot be represented through it.

But in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, knowing

itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. But in that cognition by which the mind knows God the mind itself becomes conformed to God, just as every knower, as such, is assimilated to that which is known.

But there is a greater likeness through conformity, as of sight to color, than through analogy, as of sight to understanding, which is related to its objects in a way similar to that of sight. Consequently, the likeness of the Trinity is clearer in mind, as knowing God, than as knowing itself. Therefore, properly speaking, the image of the Trinity is in the mind primarily and mainly, in so far as the mind knows God, and it is there in a certain manner and secondarily, in so far as the mind knows itself, especially when it considers itself in so far as it is the image of God. As a result, its consideration does not stop with itself, but goes on to God. There is no image in the consideration of temporal things, but a kind of likeness of the Trinity, which can partake more of the character of vestige. Such is the likeness which Augustine attributes to the sensitive powers.<sup>78</sup>

The original question was whether the image of the Trinity is in the mind only as the mind knows material things, or only as it knows eternal things. Although the question is framed in terms of a binary, Aquinas in his response introduces a third term, effectively also answering the further question of whether the image of the Trinity is in the mind as it knows and loves itself, which is neither material nor eternal. His claim is that the image of the Trinity is present in the mind, not as it knows material things, but rather as it knows itself and as it knows eternal things, though in different ways: there is a likeness of the Trinity in the mind when the mind knows and loves itself, and there is another likeness when the mind knows and loves eternal things.. The former is called a likeness by analogy (*similitudo secundum analogiam*); the latter is called a likeness by conformity (*similitudo secundum conformationem*).<sup>79</sup>

My task in the remainder of this chapter is to explain the likeness by analogy, and

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<sup>78</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, resp.

<sup>79</sup> At most, it is in the mind when it knows temporal things only by way of trace or vestige (*vestigium*). See *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7c.

the following chapter will turn to the likeness by conformity. As analogies are used in *sacra doctrina* to shed light upon the separate substances, so the mind knowing and loving itself is used in Aquinas's trinitarian theology to shed light upon the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit in God.

Before proceeding, however, a clarification of the term "likeness by analogy" is required.<sup>80</sup> As with Augustine, *similitudo*, which is often translated as "likeness," in Aquinas's writings is a general term has a variety of meanings. Its specific meaning depends on the context in which Aquinas is using it. In general, however, Aquinas follows Aristotle's claim in the *Metaphysics* that a likeness between two things is due to a oneness in quality (*unum in qualitate*).<sup>81</sup> The oneness in quality does not have to exist in one and the same thing. For instance, a child might have a likeness to their parent in appearance, and the quality of appearance exists separately in the child and the parent.

A likeness by analogy is a specific kind of likeness, and in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 11, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of likenesses by analogy. The first kind is variously named an analogy of proportion (*proportionis*), an analogy of attribution, or a *pros hen* analogy. According to this kind of analogy, many is ordered to one. Aquinas's stock example is health in an animal. Both food and urine, for instance, are called healthy on account of health in the animal, but for different reasons. Food is called healthy as a cause of health in an animal, and urine is called healthy as a sign or effect of health in an animal. They are called healthy as ordered to some one thing, that is, the health of the animal: if the food did not cause health in the animal or if urine did not come from the

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<sup>80</sup> I will wait until the next chapter to clarify the term "*similitudo secundum conformationem*."

<sup>81</sup> *ST I*, q. 93, a. 9, resp. Aristotle, *Metaphysics V*, 1021a.

health of the animal, each respectively would cease to be called healthy. As a result, food, urine, and the animal can be said to be healthy on account of a oneness of quality, but they are called healthy for different reasons: respectively, as a cause, as an effect, and properly. They thus have a likeness to one another according to analogy of proportion.

Aquinas calls the second kind of analogy an analogy of proportionality (*proportionalitatis*). To clearly distinguish it from the other, I will call this one an isomorphic analogy. In an isomorphic analogy, there is a likeness between the relations obtaining between two or more terms in one set and relations obtaining between two or more terms in another set. Aquinas's stock example comes from arithmetic. As four is to two, so six is to three.<sup>82</sup> The relation obtaining between the two terms in the first set (four and two) bears a likeness to the relation obtaining between the two in the second set (six and three): in both sets the second term is related to the first as its half. An isomorphic analogy, then, has the following general form: as A is to B, so C is to D. The crucial point for Aquinas is that, in the isomorphic analogy, the likeness between terms in different sets is not due to some reference to some third, extrinsic term, but is rather due to similar relations obtaining between the terms within each set.

When Aquinas says that the image of the Trinity is in the mind as it knows itself by way of a likeness by analogy, he means a likeness by an isomorphic analogy and not according to an analogy of proportion. Hence, Aquinas writes, "in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, knowing itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering

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<sup>82</sup> *De ver*, q. 2, a. 11, resp.

Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.”<sup>83</sup> There is, in other words, an isomorphic analogy between the processions in the human mind and the processions in God. There are two processions in the human mind, the begetting of a word and the spirating of love, and two in God, the begetting of the Word and the spiration of the Spirit. The isomorphic analogy, then, can be expressed as follows: as the human mind, knowing itself, begets a word expressing itself, so the Father begets a Word from eternity; and as the human mind in knowing itself and in begetting a word expressing itself spirates love, so the Father and the Son spirate the Spirit. The next subsection explains the isomorphic analogy of the first procession; the following explains the isomorphic analogy of the second procession.

But in order to grasp why a likeness by analogy is present in the mind knowing and loving itself, it would be helpful to first examine why such a likeness cannot be present in the mind knowing and loving temporal things.<sup>84</sup> As mentioned above, only vestige or trace of the Trinity is present in such knowing and loving. In the body of the relevant article in *De veritate* (q. 10, a. 7), Aquinas in a swift argument rules out a likeness according to analogy in knowledge of temporal things on the grounds that “a temporal thing, which begets knowledge, or even actual understanding of itself in the soul, is not of the same substance as the mind, but something extraneous to its nature. Thus, the consubstantiality of the uncreated Trinity cannot be represented through it.”<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, resp.

<sup>84</sup> Aquinas does affirm at the end of the same article that a likeness by way of vestige is present in the knowing and loving of temporal things, but denies that a likeness by analogy is present there. He maintains this position in *ST* 1, q. 93, a. 8, resp and ad. 2.

<sup>85</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, resp.

Because temporal things play some part in begetting knowledge in the soul and bringing the intellect to an act of understanding, Aquinas denies that a likeness by analogy is present in the mind's knowledge of temporal things. The temporal thing is not of the same substance as the mind but is rather extrinsic and adventitious to the mind, which means that the act of understanding elicited in the intellect is accidental to (yet still a perfection of) the mind itself. The mind in its knowledge of temporal things cannot be said to be the image of God, according to Aquinas, because any image would display a likeness in which central features would be represented and, here, the central feature of the consubstantiality of the divine persons is not represented.

Aquinas lists other reasons why the knowing and loving of temporal things does not present a likeness by analogy in his reply to the objections. He argues, "physical things as such are not intelligible or lovable and so there is not this equality in the mind with reference to them."<sup>86</sup> Although it may be surprising for the modern reader to learn that physical things as such are neither intelligible nor lovable, Aquinas's meaning is precise: physical things are not of themselves actually intelligible or lovable, but only potentially intelligible and lovable. The English language, to some degree, is misleading here, since intelligible and lovable are words, like other words ending -ible or -able, implying potentiality. Hence, saying that they are neither actually intelligible nor actually lovable seems to imply that they cannot be known or loved at all. Aquinas's point, however, is that physical things are actually intelligible and lovable only through another. They require a relation to mind for their intelligibility and lovability to be brought to act. For Aquinas, only realities in act in the order of intelligibles are actually intelligible and

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<sup>86</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, ad. 2.

lovable. The realities in the order of intelligibles include the human intellect as pure potency, God as pure act, and the angels as a composite of potency and act.<sup>87</sup> God and the angels (the separate substances) are actually intelligible and lovable in virtue of themselves simply because their being consists in intellect in act, that is, an informed intellect. As we will see in a moment, the human intellect, because it is pure potency in the order of intellects, is not actually intelligible or lovable unless it is brought to act. Physical things, on the other hand, are not actually intelligible or lovable of themselves, but require a relation to an intellect in order to become so. Because any physical thing only becomes actually intelligible through the operation of the intellect, it follows that the physical thing is not equal to the mind. The mind's knowing and loving of physical things thus cannot stand as a proper image of the Trinity.

### **1.3.2 The Mind Knowing Itself as a Likeness by Analogy**

Although the mind's the knowing and loving of temporal things does not, according to Aquinas, display a likeness by analogy, such a likeness is nevertheless present in the mind's knowing and loving of itself. In order to show how such a likeness is present in the mind's knowing and loving of itself, Aquinas will have to show that the mind is able to know itself in some way through itself rather than through some likeness, which would be adventitious to and of lesser nobility than the mind itself. Only if the mind knows and

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<sup>87</sup> The explanation for this distinction can be found in a variety of places, but perhaps one of the clearest is in *De ver*, q. 8, a. 6, resp.: "in the genus of intelligibles, one being, the divine essence, is in act only; another, the possible intellect, is only in potency, and for this reason the Commentator says that the possible intellect in the order of intelligibles is like prime matter in the order of sensibles. All the angelic substances lie in between; for they have something of potency and of act, not only in the genus of being, but also in the genus of intelligibility."



loves itself in some way through itself, and not through some likeness, can the mind's operations represent in a finite way the consubstantiality of the trinitarian persons. Some work will be required to understand how the mind can know and love itself through itself, since, in the body of the article, Aquinas provides only a brief explanation. He writes,

in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, knowing (*cognoscens*) itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.<sup>88</sup>

Hence, the word expressed on the basis of the mind's understanding of itself and the love proceeding from both the understanding and the expressed word as true are the analogues for the processions of, respectively, the Son and the Holy Spirit. As mentioned above, for Aquinas the underlying issue is the fact that the operations of the mind represent in a finite way the consubstantiality of the Trinity. Hence, in the knowing and loving of itself the representation of the Trinity must be present based on the fact that the mind's knowing and loving of itself proceed in some way on the basis of the mind itself, rather than from a likeness of the mind.

There are complications, however. The main complication regards an apparent contradiction between two claims: (1) that the human intellect is pure potency in the intellectual order in the same way that prime matter is pure potency in the order of being; and (2) that, in accord with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IX, Aquinas claims that everything "is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality."<sup>89</sup> Together, these claims seem to lead to the conclusion that the human intellect of itself is not intelligible.

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<sup>88</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, resp.

<sup>89</sup> *ST* 1, q. 81, a. 1.

Indeed, Aquinas claims that it is only intelligible insofar as it is brought to act by its reception of an intelligible species illuminated in a phantasm. But this seems to make the mind's knowing and loving of itself an instance of the knowing and loving of temporal things, i.e., things that exist only because they involve the shift from potency to act, in which the likeness by analogy cannot be found. It is perhaps with this problem in mind that the very next article in *De veritate* (q. 10, a. 8) asks whether the mind knows itself through its essence or through some species. Aquinas's answer is more thorough in *De veritate*, but he deals with the same question in *Prima Pars* q. 87, a. 1 in a far more succinct way, which will be useful for our purposes here. In the later text, Aquinas writes:

the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligent beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible." Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. ... But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object ... it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act.<sup>90</sup>

On a cursory reading, the quote may appear to confirm the suspicion: because the essence of human intellect is pure potency and because things are known only insofar as they are in act, the human intellect is not known by itself. In other words, the mind's knowledge

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<sup>90</sup> *ST I*, q. 87, a. 1. The same line of argument is made, but in less compact form, in *De ver*, q. 10, a. 8. Echoing the last point in the block quote, Aquinas writes in *De ver*, "For our soul holds the last place among intellectual things, just as first matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator shows. For, as first matter is in potency to all sensible forms, so our possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms. Thus, it is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality. Therefore, as matter is sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it."

of itself is only possible through an adventitious intelligible species abstracted from phantasms of sensible things, which informs the passive or potential intellect and thus brings it to act. Self-knowledge, then, would for the human being be dependent upon understanding of material things. The main complication is thus summarized as follows: if no likeness by analogy is present in the mind's knowing and loving of material things, by what warrant can Aquinas claim both that the mind can only know itself when it is brought to act in its understanding of material things, which are its proper object, *and* that a likeness by analogy is present in the mind's knowing and loving of itself? Does not the mind's knowing and loving of itself simply collapse into the knowing and loving of temporal things?

To resolve the complication is to rely on the claim that the mind knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. Although human intellect, as possible intellect, needs to be brought to act through its being informed by an intelligible species, it is nevertheless the human intellect itself that is being brought into act. As a result, the human intellect becomes knowable for itself in its act of understanding of temporal things. Aquinas is not claiming that only the act is intelligible to the human mind and that the essence of the mind remains shrouded in unintelligibility, but only that it is not by means of its own essence that the mind knows its own essence. Rather, the essence is known by means of its act, an issue we will explore in more detail in a moment. On these grounds, Aquinas can affirm that the human intellect is intelligible to itself even while affirming both that the human intellect is a pure potentiality and that things are only intelligible inasmuch as they are in act. Aquinas thus writes in *De veritate*, “[our possible intellect] is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality.

Therefore, as matter is sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it.”<sup>91</sup> As a pure potency, it is intelligible to itself inasmuch as it is brought to act when informed by an intelligible species.

It must be added, however, the act of the mind is not that which is first known by the mind in its act of understanding. Aquinas writes, “one perceives [*percipit*] that he understands only from the fact that he understands something. For to understand something is prior to understanding that one understands.”<sup>92</sup> Understanding temporal things, in other words, stands prior to understanding the act of the intellect.<sup>93</sup> The priority of the understanding of temporal things, however, should not be understood as if a new act of understanding were needed in order for the mind to perceive itself in its act. Having to understand other things before one can understand one’s own act of understanding is thus not akin to having to learn, for instance, the natural sciences before

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<sup>91</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 8, resp.

<sup>92</sup> *De Ver*, q. 10, a. 8, resp. The point is also made in *ST Ia*, q. 87, a. 3, resp.

<sup>93</sup> As an aside, it could be noted that, because understanding something is always prior for the human being to understanding that one understands, in Aquinas’s thought there is the possibility of deepening the Augustinian position, accounted for most memorably in *Confessions*, that the human being is often lost in external, sensible things, forgetting to return to herself and, through herself, to God. Aquinas places the Augustinian problem within a technical metaphysical framework that can explain how the human being can become lost in external, material things. Such a problem is peculiar to the human being who, in sin, loses herself in the material world and is hindered from returning to herself. If we follow Aquinas’s reasoning, the angels are not able to lose themselves in the same way, since the first object of an angel’s act of understanding is that angel’s own essence. Hence, their sin is both less comical and more malicious.

one can learn metaphysics or having to learn arithmetic before one can learn algebra.<sup>94</sup> Rather, it is by one and the same act of understanding that both the temporal thing and the human intellect become actually intelligible, since an intelligible species and the human intellect are constitutive elements of any human act of understanding. The two elements, furthermore, are related to one another in humans as form is to matter:<sup>95</sup> just as matter is

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<sup>94</sup> For Aquinas's account of the ordering of the sciences, see, for instance, *In BDT*, q. 5, a. 1.

<sup>95</sup> Therese Scarpelli Cory makes the point emphatically in her "Knowing as Being? A Metaphysical Reading of the Identity of Intellect and Intelligibles in Aquinas," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 91, no. 3 (2017): 333-51. Her article is helpful especially insofar as she refutes the interpreters of Aquinas who want to view the intelligible species in a representationalist paradigm, wherein the intelligible species serves as a medium through which the external, material thing is intuited by the intellect. Her overall claim is that the function of the intelligible species in Aquinas is formal in relation to possible intellect, and thus that possible intellect and the intelligible species are best understood in a hylomorphic paradigm where the former serves as a material principle and the latter serves as a formal principle. The identity of intellect in act and the intelligible in act, then, is not used to bridge a subject-object split (which would be an anachronistic reading of Aquinas), but rather to indicate a hylomorphic unity attained whenever an intelligible species informs the intellect. While, in my estimation, Cory is correct in her affirmation of the hylomorphic unity of the intelligible species and intellect, she seems to unduly restrict the identity principle. That she unduly restricts the identity principle is evident from the following quote from Aquinas: "For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act" (*ST* 1, q. 87, a. 1, ad. 3). In other words, the identity principle includes three terms for Aquinas: the intellect in act, the intelligible in act, and the intelligible species. Cory, it seems to me, wants to restrict the identity principle to two terms: the intelligible species and the intellect in act while leaving out of her account the intelligible in act or, more precisely, identifying the unity of the intellect in act and intelligible species completely with the intelligible in act.

only known inasmuch as it is informed, so too potential intellect is only known inasmuch as it is informed by an intelligible species. Nevertheless, just as form and matter can be distinguished in any material thing, so too the intelligible species and potential intellect can be distinguished in any act of understanding. As a result, potential intellect is only known inasmuch as it is informed and thus brought to act, but it is nevertheless distinguished from the intelligible species as that which is informed and brought to act from that which informs and brings to act in the act of understanding.

Aquinas's position is thus that the understanding of temporal things is prior to the mind's understanding of itself, but nevertheless that by its understanding of temporal things, the human mind can come to know itself through its own act. As a result, the mind's knowing of itself cannot be categorized as an instance of the knowing of temporal things, even though the knowing of temporal things is prior to the mind's knowing of itself.

More is needed, however, to grasp what it means for the mind to know and love itself and for there to be, in knowing and loving itself, a likeness of the Trinity according to analogy. In both *De veritate* and the *Prima Pars*, Aquinas distinguishes between two different kinds of self-knowledge. Again, although the exposition is more thorough in *De veritate*,<sup>96</sup> the relevant points for our purposes are put more succinctly in the *Prima Pars*. In the latter text, Aquinas continues:

The intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. ... There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices

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<sup>96</sup> See *De ver*, q. 10, a. 8.

for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence, many are ignorant about the soul's nature, and many have erred about it.<sup>97</sup>

Aquinas thus distinguishes between two ways in which the intellect can have knowledge of itself: either it has knowledge of itself in a particular way through perceiving (*percipit*) or in a universal way through inquiring. Error is uncommon, perhaps impossible, in the first way; absence of error is uncommon, though not impossible, in the second way. The reason why error is uncommon in the first way is because the person is only perceiving her own intellectual act and thus an operation of her own intellectual soul. Rising from perceiving to a reasoned account about the nature of the intellectual soul, however, is difficult, abounding with the possibility of error. Achieving a reasoned account, Aquinas argues, only occurs through *diligens et subtilis inquisitio*. The two kinds of knowledge are nevertheless related inasmuch as the universal self-knowledge intended in the inquiry is in some way predicated upon the first kind of self-knowledge: hence, Aquinas says that for universal knowledge, a “mere presence of mind does not suffice, and *there is further required* a careful and subtle inquiry.”<sup>98</sup>

Aquinas does not tell his readers which kind of self-knowledge, singular or universal, stands as an element of the likeness by analogy for the trinitarian processions. Each has reason for suggesting itself. On the one hand, singular self-knowledge seems to stand as an element in the likeness by analogy on the grounds that it is immediate and free from the possibility of error. That is, singular self-knowledge stems immediately and

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<sup>97</sup> *ST* 1, q. 87, a. 1, resp.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

without error from the presence of the mind which is the “principle of action” whereby the mind perceives itself. On the other hand, universal self-knowledge seems to be that likeness on the grounds that its knowledge is more perfect. Indeed, Aquinas often categorizes singular self-knowledge as a kind of perception, but never does so regarding universal self-knowledge.

Although Aquinas does not state his position on this point, it seems that universal self-knowledge has a better claim to the likeness by the analogy present within the human mind. In the following lines, Aquinas argues that universal self-knowledge allows the human being to know how “it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.”<sup>99</sup> In the more thorough treatment of *De veritate*, Aquinas makes the point at greater length: “it is through [singular self-knowledge] that one knows whether the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a soul. Through the other type of knowledge [i.e., universal self-knowledge], however, one knows what the soul is and what its proper accidents are.”<sup>100</sup> Singular self-knowledge thus attains to knowing that one performs certain operations, such as understanding, and thus, in a nominal way, that one has an intellectual soul. However, it is not able to conceive precisely what the nature of the intellectual soul consists in: that it, it does not know in an explanatory way the formal cause. Singular self-knowledge thus corresponds to the knowledge of the person of experience, spoken of in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* I: “people with experience know the what, but do not know the why.”<sup>101</sup> On these grounds, it seems, Aquinas claims that singular self-knowledge is a kind of perception: just as by touching and remembering we

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<sup>99</sup> *ST* 1, q. 87, a. 1, resp.

<sup>100</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 8, resp.



know that fire is hot, so by perceiving we know that we understand. Unfortunately, Aquinas does not explain by which faculty or which collection of faculties the human being is able to perceive that she understands.<sup>102</sup> Even so, rooting singular self-knowledge in a kind of perception rules out the possibility that in it can be found likeness by analogy to the Trinity.

Universal self-knowledge, however, promises more. Commenting on the *Metaphysics*, Aquinas writes, “Those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are more knowing and wiser than those who merely know that it is so but do not know why.”<sup>103</sup> The cause sought in the inquiry for universal self-knowledge is not an extrinsic cause, such as an efficient cause, but rather an intrinsic one: more specifically, a formal cause. To know the formal cause of a living thing is to know the sorts of activities and the powers that are proper to it. Hence, the *diligens et subtilis inquisitio* is meant to arrive at a reasoned account of what it is for the human being—her included—to have an intellectual soul, what the proper accidents are of the intellectual soul, and how that intellectual soul differs from the souls of other living things. The primary way to do this in the Aristotelian framework, to which Aquinas is indebted, is to distinguish the powers and the acts properly belonging to the intellectual soul, and to show how at least some of

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<sup>101</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 981a29f.

<sup>102</sup> Clearly, it cannot be one of the external senses. What remains, then, are the five internal senses: common sense, fantasy (*phantasiam*), imagination, estimation, and memory. It would be an interesting to pursue the question: by what internal sense, according to Aquinas, we are able to know or perceive that we understand? It is perhaps on this point, as Lonergan argues later on, that faculty psychology suffers the most.

<sup>103</sup> *In Meta* 1, lect. 1, 24.

those powers and acts distinguish the human soul from other sorts of souls. If the philosopher does not have such an understanding of the intellectual soul, then she does not have universal self-knowledge. On these grounds, it seems that universal self-knowledge is an element of the likeness by analogy of the Trinity.

However, not every element of universal self-knowledge is included in the mind's knowing of itself as analogous to the procession of the Son from the Father. On Aquinas's account, the person with universal self-knowledge is able to distinguish between those acts of the intellectual soul that pertain to the immaterial mind and those acts that are not of the immaterial mind. By universal self-knowledge, in other words, the mind understands itself through knowing the acts that are proper to it, the acts that are not proper to it, and in what the difference consists. Universal self-knowledge includes knowledge of the various non-intellectual powers, habits, and acts of the soul. But the mind, Aquinas argues in *De veritate*, does not designate the whole essence of the soul, but rather designates either "a power of the soul" or the essence of the soul "only inasmuch as such a power flows from the essence."<sup>104</sup>

There is some debate about the meaning of Aquinas's claim here. Merriell argues that the mind in *De veritate* is not any one power, but rather a group of powers; in particular, the powers of intellect and will. Or, when mind is referring to the essence of the soul, it is not the whole soul but only part of the soul. In his exposition of *De veritate*, Merriell writes, "The mind is properly the higher intellectual part of man's soul, to which belong the particular faculties of intellect and will."<sup>105</sup> Contrary to Merriell, John

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<sup>104</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 1, resp.

<sup>105</sup> Merriell, *To the Image*, 115.

O'Callaghan argues that Aquinas in *De veritate* conceives of mind as a general power, rather than a group of powers.<sup>106</sup> To support his argument, O'Callaghan refers to Aquinas's claims in the replies to the objections that the mind stands as a "general power" in relation to the particular powers of intellect and will as a whole stands to its parts. For instance, "there is nothing to prevent a general power from embracing many powers as parts, just as one part of the body includes many organic parts, as the hand includes the fingers."<sup>107</sup> Or again, "Mind, when taken for a power itself, is not related to understanding and will as subject, but as whole to parts."<sup>108</sup> As O'Callaghan rightly shows, the concept of a general power is puzzling since, according to Aquinas's methodology, powers are specified by their acts and acts are specified by their objects. Because a general power has neither a specific act nor a specific formal object, it is impossible to say how it is specified as a power.

The debate, it seems, is grounded in the fact that Aquinas in *De veritate* identifies mind primarily with a power of the soul and only secondarily with the essence of the soul.<sup>109</sup> As a result, his formulations oscillate between terminology reflective of a unity

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<sup>106</sup> John P. O'Callaghan, "Imago Dei: A Test Case for St. Thomas's Augustinianism," in *Aquinas the Augustinian*, ed. Michael Dauphinais, David Barry, and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 100-141, esp. 111-115. He further argues that, because a general power does not have a function—neither a proper act nor a proper object—Aquinas later drops the term mind or identifies it simply with intellect.

<sup>107</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 1, ad. 9.

<sup>108</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 1, ad. 8.

<sup>109</sup> O'Callaghan argues that Aquinas's primary concern here is to distance himself from Augustine's claim in *De Trinitate* that the mind simply is the essence of the soul, so he claims that the mind is not the essence of the soul but rather a power of the soul.

and that reflective of a plurality. He posits a general power to maintain the unity and posits parts of the whole general power to maintain the plurality. However, despite his failure to acknowledge the problems associated with the term “general power” as clearly as O’Callaghan does, Merriell seems to have a more reasonable reading of the text when he argues that, by “general power,” Aquinas means that the intellectual and volitional powers are radicated in the part of the soul from which such powers flow. Mind is thus not a power in the strict sense, but rather a group of powers as radicated in the same part of the soul.<sup>110</sup> Because Aquinas affirms that the likeness by analogy includes acts of both intellect and will, and because the concept of a general power does not really make sense, it seems more fitting to claim that the mind’s knowledge and love of itself is the knowledge and love that the intellectual part of the soul has of itself through acts of intellect and will.

Aquinas’s terse claim that there is a likeness of the Trinity in the soul according to analogy can now be understood more easily. The likeness, he writes, “lies in this, that the mind, knowing itself in this way begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten a Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.”<sup>111</sup> The mind knows itself through universal self-knowledge and by means of such self-knowledge expresses itself in a reasoned formulation of what the mind is. But the likeness is only a likeness because, unlike divine

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<sup>110</sup> This interpretation, further, seems to find additional grounding in Aquinas’s claim that those with intelligence also have volition (see, e.g., *SCG* 2, ch. 47; *ST* 1, q. 59, a. 1). Even though mind is not a distinct power, there is nothing wrong, on Aquinas’s terms, for grouping certain powers together in order to classify them more easily. Mind, it seems, serves that function in the relevant texts in *De ver.*

<sup>111</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 7.

self-knowledge, human self-knowledge is attained through what Aquinas calls a careful and subtle inquiry, which only reaches its term through a change in the knower from potentially knowing to actually knowing. But unlike other kinds of minds, the human mind is a potency and, if it is to have self-knowledge, it must attain it.<sup>112</sup> While the human being expresses its reasoned account on the basis of attained universal self-knowledge, the Father does not have to attain anything in order to express Godself—the infinite act of understanding. Again, while the reasoned account expressed by the human being possessing universal self-knowledge is only expressed over a long period of time and with many words (consider Questions 75-89 in the *Prima Pars*, which is, as with all else in the *Summa Theologiae*, only meant to be a clear and brief instruction for beginners<sup>113</sup>), the Word expressed by the Father is expressed, as it were, in one utterly simple but infinitely comprehensive Word. But despite the enormous differences between the human and the divine, a likeness still remains, specifically of the procession of the Son from the Father. The likeness takes the form of an isomorphic analogy: as the explanatory formulation proceeds from universal self-knowledge in the human being, so too does the Son proceed from the Father. Hence, leaving aside the important differences, a similarity in relations between the way in which the explanatory formulation proceeds on the basis of acquired self-knowledge and the way in which the Son proceeds from the Father still exists.

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<sup>112</sup> The case is different for God and the angels, who understand themselves by their own essence, for God simply is God's own act of understanding, while the angel is not identical with its own act of understanding but nevertheless has its own essence as its first and direct object of its act of understanding.

<sup>113</sup> *ST* 1, prologue.

### 1.3.3 The Mind Loving Itself as a Likeness by Analogy

In order to explain in a complete way the likeness by analogy present and accessible within the human mind, however, we must also consider how the mind's love for itself proceeds from acquired self-knowledge and its self-expression in an explanatory formulation. The problem at this point is that Aquinas does not explain in any detail what it would mean for the mind to love itself. By far the majority of his attention in *De veritate* and elsewhere is dedicated to how the mind knows itself. In order to have a complete understanding of the likeness of the Trinity according analogy, however, we will have to piece together various claims from his work to develop a Thomistic account of the mind's love of itself. It will be necessary, first, to understand the distinction between intellect and will, since any act of intelligent love is an act of the will. After treating the distinction between intellect and will, we will be in a better position to turn to what it means for the mind to love itself.

Intellect and will are both powers of the intellectual, not the sensitive, part of the soul, but they are distinct powers because one is an apprehensive power and the other is an appetitive power. Aquinas differentiates between apprehensive and appetitive powers in the following way: "a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul: one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul's manner and not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred [*comparatur*] to the thing in its own existence."<sup>114</sup> A power is apprehensive, then, because, by such a power, something else comes to be "in the soul in the soul's own manner and not its own," and a power is appetitive when, by such a power, "the soul is referred to the thing in its own existence." The distinction between

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<sup>114</sup> *De ver*, q. 22, a. 10, resp.

apprehensive and appetitive powers applies both sensitive and intellectual powers. A sensitive power may be apprehensive or appetitive, and an intellectual power may be apprehensive or appetitive. With regard to the intellectual powers—our principal concern here—intellect is the apprehensive power, and will is the appetitive power. Hence, the intellect is an apprehensive power by which things are in the soul in the soul's own manner of existence, and will is an appetitive power by which the soul is referred to the thing in the thing's own manner of existence. (Such a way of differentiating between the two intellectual powers is going to be especially significant when we turn to the problem of how a likeness of the Trinity is in the mind according to conformity in Chapter 2.) But what does it mean for the will to be referred to a thing in the thing's own manner of existence?

Consider, first, the meaning of inclination in Aquinas. "Some inclination," he writes, "follows upon every form."<sup>115</sup> A thing's intelligible form is the principle by which and that according to which anything is inclined. To take an example, Aquinas argues (in keeping with premodern science) that fire has the natural inclination to rise and that earth has the natural inclination to fall. The natural inclination of fire to rise is a function of what fire is, and so too is the natural inclination to fall a function of what the earth is. Their proper natural inclinations, of course, may be violated by extrinsic causes (a stone, for example, can be thrown into the air, violating its natural inclination to fall), but their natural inclinations hold in general, all things being equal, which is to say that absent some extrinsic, violating principle, fire will rise and a stone will fall.

In an analogous way, sentient and intelligent beings have natural inclinations to

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<sup>115</sup> *ST* 1, q. 80, a. 1.

act proper to their sentient and intelligent souls. There is, however, an important difference between non-sentient, unintelligent inclinations, on the one hand, and sentient or intelligent inclinations, on the other. Aquinas writes,

the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate in knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those that lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to its nature. ... But in those which have knowledge each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect.<sup>116</sup>

In other words, although all beings are naturally inclined according to their forms, what distinguishes an inclination of a nonsentient being from that of a sentient or intelligent being is that the nonsentient being follows its natural inclination without being receptive of anything else, while the sentient being follows its natural inclination often through the reception of the (sensible or intelligible) forms of other things. Fire, in other words, cannot receive any other form without its being extinguished, but an animal is able to receive the sensible forms of other things through sensitive powers, and an intelligent animal is able to receive the intelligible forms of other things through its power for understanding. These capacities allow sentient and intelligent beings to receive the forms of other things without being changed into something else in doing so; an animal remains that very same animal even as it receives the visible form of green grass, and a human remains that very same human even as it receives the intelligible forms of other things. Indeed, sentient and intelligent beings, in a sense, become more of what they are when they receive the forms of other things since their powers move from potency to act.

An appetitive power is that by which the soul “desires what it apprehends, and not

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<sup>116</sup> *ST* 1, q. 80, a. 1, resp.



only that to which it is inclined by its natural form.”<sup>117</sup> Whereas fire is inclined to move upward, an appetitive power of the soul allows the animal to desire what it apprehends and thus what is distinct from itself. Because apprehensions change, animals are, generally speaking, able to learn what they desire. Aquinas distinguishes, however, between the ways in which sentient beings and intelligent beings are inclined toward that which they apprehend. Sensuality—that is, concupiscence or irascibility—follows upon apprehension through the senses,<sup>118</sup> and will follows upon apprehension through the intellect. Each one enables the animal to desire what it apprehends. It is important to note, however, that what the apprehensive powers receive is some species, whether that species be sensible or intelligible. The species, Aquinas clarifies in a number of places, is that by which one apprehends, not that which one apprehends.<sup>119</sup> By means of sensible species, the bobcat apprehends the hare, but it is the hare, not the sensible species, which the bobcat desires and for which it has an appetite; a sensible species, after all, will not satisfy his hunger. Similarly, a human apprehends what would be good to do in a concrete circumstance through an intelligible species, but that same human ultimately desires whatever is good in the concrete circumstances, not merely the intelligible species

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<sup>117</sup> *ST* 1, q. 80, a. 1, resp.

<sup>118</sup> *ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2; *De ver*, q. 25, a. 1. Regarding the distinction between the concupiscible and irascible appetitive powers, Aquinas writes, “since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible” (*ST* 1, q. 81, a. 2).

of that good; the mere intelligible species of some good will not, after all, satisfy his conscience. In sum, any appetitive power, for Aquinas, takes the animal beyond itself through desiring something that is apprehended. It is for this reason that, by an appetitive power, the soul is referred to a thing in the thing's own manner of existence.

At this point, one may very well be perplexed about what it means for the mind to love itself. If the will is an intelligent appetitive power because by it one is inclined toward that which one apprehends through intellect to be good, what does it mean for the will to desire and thus be inclined toward the mind itself? Doesn't the mind's loving itself simply result in a self-referential egoism? How can such an egoism stand as an element in the likeness by analogy of the Trinity?

An answer to these questions hinges upon the mind's having an adequate understanding of itself, which is provided in the explanatory formulation through which it expresses and knows itself. As explained above, the human mind in the order of intellects is similar to prime matter in the order of being. It is dependent upon intelligible species understood in phantasms for it to be moved from potency to act. If we recall that a likeness by analogy is not in the mind when it knows temporal things because, in its knowledge for temporal things, the consubstantiality of the persons was not adequately represented, then we can infer that the same consubstantiality is only represented when the mind loves itself with a love equal to what it is by nature.

By nature, however, the human mind is a pure potency in the order of intellects. Hence, its love for itself reflects the consubstantiality of the persons only to the extent that the mind is loved as a pure potency in the order of intellects. But any potency is

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<sup>119</sup> *ST* 1, q. 85, a. 2.

ordered to some act, and the potency of the intellect is ordered to the act proper to it, the act of understanding. Hence, the mind's love of itself reflects the consubstantiality of the persons when the mind is loved as a potency ordered to and perfected by acts of understanding. Acts of understanding only occur in the mind because intelligible species are received in the mind, as forms are received in matter. The intellect as pure potency, in other words, implies that the intellect is dependent upon other things in order to attain its perfection. So the mind's proper love for itself is a love whereby it wills for itself acts of understanding of other things. In other words, the mind's proper love for itself is a love whereby it wills to be drawn beyond itself through its reception of the species of other things. Far from being a self-referential egoism, the mind only loves itself insofar as it wills for itself an understanding of things other than itself; without the understanding of things other than itself the mind remains a potency, unable even to know and love itself. (Relatedly, because human minds are by nature the same, to love the minds of other human beings is to will their own perfection in acts of understanding and thus to will them to be drawn beyond themselves.) The consubstantiality of the Trinity is thereby reflected: just as the human intellect is a pure potency, so too its love for itself is a love fitted to a pure potency.

Furthermore, the mind's love for itself must be an intelligent love, rather than a mere sensual love; otherwise, the consubstantiality of the mind's operations would not be represented. As an intelligent love for itself, it follows upon the affirmation of itself in universal self-knowledge. Still, there are various kinds of intelligent love, and two in particular are important here. First, there is delight, which is a kind of love, according to

Aquinas, which can exist in either the intelligent or sensitive parts of the soul.<sup>120</sup> Properly speaking, the love of the mind for itself, at least insofar as there is in the mind a likeness of the Trinity according to analogy, is delight. According to such a likeness, the human mind delights in itself and its knowledge of itself as a pure potency in the order of intellects. Indeed, by the recognition of and delight in the mind's being a pure potency, one is able to move with clear-eyed deliberateness from being a potency in the order of intellects to receiving some act within that same order. This leads us to the second kind of love, namely, hope, which, according to Aquinas, is a love for something not yet obtained but difficult and possible to obtain.<sup>121</sup> Although, properly speaking, the likeness by analogy is present in the delight the mind has in the knowledge of its own essence as a pure potency, nevertheless such a delight immediately spills over into hope. In recognizing that it is a pure potency, the mind desires what is not yet obtained by its own nature: its own perfection in acts of understanding. The simplest and most comprehensive of these acts of understanding lies in quidditative knowledge of God's own essence, and in stretching out in hope for such knowledge, the mind moves from possessing only a likeness of the Trinity according to analogy to also possessing a likeness of the Trinity according to conformity. It is to the latter likeness that we turn in the next chapter.

## 1.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has been concerned with the *imago Trinitatis* in the work of Aquinas. In order to understand the conception of the *imago Trinitatis*, I began with Aquinas's

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<sup>120</sup> E.g., *ST* 1-2, q. 31, a. 3-4. In the intellectual part of the soul, delight (*delectatio*) is properly called "enjoyment" (*fruitio*).

<sup>121</sup> *ST* 1, q. 40, a. 1-2.

general theological method, differentiated it from the methods of the various sciences, and explained the function of analogy in theology. Turning then to the *imago Trinitatis* in particular, I noted a distinction between two ways in which the *imago Trinitatis* is present in the human mind: one by a likeness by analogy and another by a likeness by conformity. The remainder of this chapter explored the first likeness, explaining the isomorphic analogy between the mind's knowledge and love of itself and the processions of the Son and the Spirit in God. The following chapter discusses the *imago Trinitatis* as a likeness by conformity.

## 2.0 AQUINAS: CONFORMATIO MENTIS AD DEUM

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I argue that the praxis of a holy life through sanctifying grace, according to Aquinas, entails an inversion of the absolute relation between the operations of knowing and loving as they were present in the mind's knowing and loving of itself. The argument has so far been that, for Aquinas, the trinitarian processions are conceived on the model of the absolute relation between intellect and will in the mind. As I will show in this chapter, however, that relation is inverted when the human being understands and loves to an object higher than its own nature, that is, whenever a *similitudo secundum conformationem* is in the process of being attained. In that process, willing and loving informs, perfects, and orders intellect, and the ordering of intellect and will *simpliciter* is thereby inverted. Through the subordination of understanding to loving, the human being is enabled to transcend his or her own nature, thus bringing that human being into conformity with something superior to his or her own nature.

In *De veritate*, Aquinas provides only a brief remark about that in which the likeness by conformity consists. He writes, "there is a greater likeness through conformity, as of sight to color, than through analogy, as of sight to understanding, which

is related to its objects in a way similar to that of sight.”<sup>122</sup> A likeness by analogy is thus found in the relationship between sight and understanding and a likeness by conformation is found in the relationship between sight and color. Although the last chapter already explained the likeness by analogy, it will nevertheless be useful to explain briefly how the likeness by analogy in the mind maps onto the relation between sight and understanding, as this will shed light on the topic of the present chapter, the likeness by conformation. Sight is analogous to understanding because they are related to their respective proper objects in similar ways. Just as the power of sight is reduced to act whenever it receives the formality (*ratio*) of color, so too the power of understanding is reduced to act whenever it receives the formality (*ratio*) of an intelligible species. Hence, the kind of analogy between sight and understanding stands as follows: sight : color :: understanding : form. A likeness is present, in other words, because the relations between the terms in each set are identical to one another. The analogy, as we have already said, is an isomorphism. Similarly, Aquinas is claiming, the mind’s uttering a word expressing itself and loving of itself is analogous by way of proportionality to the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit in God.

Aquinas argues that there is a greater likeness of the Trinity by conformity than by analogy. He provides an example for a likeness by conformity: the relation between sight and color. According to Aquinas’s metaphysics of sight, whenever someone is seeing some color, there is a conformity or identity between the seeing and the color seen. As Aquinas repeats in a number of places, “sensus in actu *est* sensible, propter

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<sup>122</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, resp.

similitudinem sensibilis.”<sup>123</sup> The conformity, in other words, is based on the fact that there is one formality in which both sight and that which is seen share in the act of seeing. Due to the identity of a sensible species, in other words, there is thus a conformity between the seeing and the being seen. (The same principle holds, it should be noted, for the way in which knowing and reality are related. In the natural sciences, for instance, there is an identity between the knowing and the reality known on account of the intelligible species: a formality (*ratio*) shared by the knower and the reality known.) Aquinas is thus claiming that just as sight is related to color by way of conformity, so too the mind’s knowing and loving may be related to God’s knowing and loving by way of conformity. When the mind knows and loves God, there occurs in the mind an identity between, on the one hand, the mind knowing and loving and, on the other hand, God being known and loved. Hence, while the likeness by analogy consisted in an isomorphism—a similarity of the relations obtaining between differing terms in different sets—the likeness by conformity consists in a formal identity being attained between two realities. Because God is not at all subject to change, the change by which conformity is obtained occurs in the human being, properly and primarily in the mind and diffusively and instrumentally in the rest of the human being. It is the mind, in other words, that is made to conform to God precisely in and through its acts of knowing and loving.

The principal question of this chapter is what it means, precisely, to say that the mind is conformed to God, thus becoming in some sense formally identical to God. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The task of the first main section (2.2) is to lay bare the contours of these relations. It will do so by, first, dealing with the way in

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<sup>123</sup> E.g., *ST* 1, q. 87, a. 1, ad. 3; q. 14, a. 2, resp.



which intellect and will are “simply” (*simpliciter*) and “relatively” (*secundum quid*) related to one another and, second, dealing with what it means for loving to inform, perfect, order the intellect. The second main section (2.3) then turns to a discrepancy: on the one hand, the ordering of operations reflective of the trinitarian processions seems to be inverted in the likeness by conformity—loving transcends and perfects knowing and understanding, but on the other, Aquinas argues in *De veritate* that the equality of the trinitarian persons is more adequately represented in likeness by conformity than in the likeness by analogy. The task of the third main section (2.4) is to resolve, as far as possible, the apparent discrepancy. These sections will do so by discussing the likeness by conformity in terms of grace and by drawing on Aquinas’s more mature work in order to do so. I now turn to Aquinas on the various forms of the relation between intellect and will.

## 2.2 THE RELATION BETWEEN INTELLECT AND WILL

### 2.2.1 Their Relation *Simpliciter*

As intellect and will are distinct powers of the soul, so understanding the ways powers can be related to one another in general sheds light upon how the powers of intellect and will are related to one another in particular. According to Aquinas, distinct powers of the soul can be related to each other in a variety of ways.<sup>124</sup> Two are especially pertinent to our topic: by way of genesis and by way of perfection.

The first has to do with the way higher powers proceed genetically from lower powers. Aquinas writes, “the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation

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<sup>124</sup> *ST* 1, q. 77, a. 4 and 7.

to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same can be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual.”<sup>125</sup> With regard to the way sentient powers proceed genetically from nutritive, a case in point is the way a developing animal first has the vegetative power of growth (for example, early in its gestation or incubation periods in the womb or fertilized egg) and subsequently develops sentient powers for seeing and hearing. The vegetative powers are prior in terms of generation within the life of the animal; without them, it would be impossible for the sentient powers to come into being. Furthermore, the vegetative powers of growth and reproduction are common to all living things, including plants. Sentient powers are proper only to animals and thus distinguish animal life from plant life, though even in the life of an animal they depend upon the vegetative powers for their generation and, in a contemporary idiom, their emergence. With regard to the way intellectual powers of the soul proceed genetically from sentient powers, a case in point would be how the intellect relies upon phantasms generated through inner and outer sense in order to be brought to act. In this way, the intellectual powers of the soul proceed genetically from the lower powers of the soul, namely, the sentient powers.

The second way powers are related to one another has to do with a hierarchical ordering among the powers. To use Aquinas’s idiom, in this order, the powers are related to one another by way of perfection.<sup>126</sup> Perfection, for Aquinas, is a result of matter or

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<sup>125</sup> *ST* 1, q. 77, a. 4c.

<sup>126</sup> The previous quote was from an article in which Aquinas is explicitly distinguishing the powers from one another. He also mentions, but does not develop, the second way to be explained in the present paragraph. I’m turning to another passage to shed more light on the way in which powers are related to each other hierarchically. Here is the relevant quote from the *Prima Pars*: Powers of the soul can be related

potency receiving form. In the ordering of perfection, a lower power of the soul serves as matter that receives the formal principle of a higher power. Aquinas writes, “in the case of human acts, the act of a lower power is related as matter to the act of a higher power because the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power’s actualizing it; for the act of the first agent is related as a form to the act of its instrument.”<sup>127</sup> The idea of instrumentality, for modern readers, often invokes ideas of efficient causality. However, for Aquinas, the causal power of a higher power cannot be understood properly on the model of efficient causality, as some recent defenders of emergentism still captivated by a Cartesian mind-body split are liable to do. It must rather be understood on the model of hylomorphism. The higher power in act provides a formal principle for a lower power, while the lower power provides a material principle for the act of the higher power. For example, the decision to study, when things proceed in a fully integrated way, provides the formal principle to sensitive powers, so that what the eyes are doing when they are seeing and what the imagination is doing when assembling images is assisting in studying, that is, serving as an instrument for a higher order activity of deciding to study.<sup>128</sup> Without an act of decision, the eyes on their own cannot be said to study. They

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to one another “according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things ... [Thus] the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.” *ST* 1, q. 77, a. 4, resp.

<sup>127</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 17, a. 14; quoted in Daniel De Haan, “The Interaction of Noetic and Psychomatic Operations in a Thomistic Hylomorphic Anthropology (Part II),” *Scientia et Fides* 6, no. 2: (2018), p. 12.

<sup>128</sup> In line with the more common understanding of instrument, an informed decision of some agent informing and mobilizing her sentient and locomotive powers is able to incorporate a tool, such as a nail

are only incorporated into that higher order activity through the hierarchical ordering between the powers, according to which the lower powers are potential in relation to the higher powers that, in operating, actively inform them and thus enlist them within the higher order activity.

Having these two orders in mind, we can turn to the relationship between intellect and will. Aquinas's discussion of their relationship is often cast in terms of whether intellect is superior to will or whether will is superior to intellect. The question of which power is superior is a question of which power serves as a perfecting principle to the other. As will be explained, each can serve as a perfecting principle for the other, though in different ways. Furthermore, the question about the relationship between the intellect and the will typically arises with the greatest degree of focus in the articles on the will in the various works. In this context, Aquinas discusses the relationship between the intellect and the will in terms of a distinction between their relation to one another "all things being equal" (*simpliciter*) and their relation to one another "in a qualified way" (*secundum quid*). For the sake of clarity, it will be worthwhile first to attend briefly to their relationship all things being equal, though their relationship in a qualified way will be especially important for understanding how there may be present a likeness by conformation in the human mind.

Aquinas argues that intellect is superior to will, because, all things being equal, the intellect is an active principle in relation to the will, a passive principle. The relation

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gun, into some higher order activity, such as building a shed, which depends intrinsically upon the informed decision. Of course, the instrumentality of the eyes is constitutive for the act of studying; hence, their instrumentality is distinct from the extrinsic instrumentality of a nail gun in the act of building a shed—a hammer could achieve the same end.

between intellect and will is thus modeled on the powers related hierarchically to one another by way of formal causality. The power of willing is subordinate to the power of understanding in such a way that the intellect provides a formal principle to the will, thus informing the act of the will. In other words, when the will is brought to act, it receives a formal principle from the intellect: *what* the will wills is provided by the intellect. The intellect, all things being equal, is thus superior to will. The qualification “all things being equal,” however, is significant, because the superiority of intellect over will holds in all cases where what is known and loved is proportionate to the powers of the knower and lover, that is, where the active potency of the knower and lover is sufficient to render the object actually intelligible and thus loveable. For human beings, such an active principle is agent intellect, which is able to make forms of material things move from being potentially intelligible to actually intelligible. Hence, whenever the object to be understood falls within the active power of the knower, Aquinas argues, intellect is superior to will. Such a relationship holds, all things being equal, because Aquinas is prescinding from the mode in which the intelligent being knows and loves and from concrete aspects of what is known and loved, both of which will be considered in the investigation on their relationship in a qualified way.

There are other reasons, for Aquinas, why the intellect is superior to the will, all things being equal. Aquinas provides two sets of reasons in *De veritate* q. 22, a. 11 and *Summa Theologica I*, q. 82, a. 3. The sets of reasons are related. They both show that intellect is more noble than will by referring to the formalities of the objects intended in acts of intellect and will and thus showing that, all things being equal, the formality of the object intended in acts of intellect is superior to the formality of the object intended in

acts of willing. In relevant text from *De veritate*, Aquinas argues that intellect is superior to will because “it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to have within oneself the nobility of another thing than to be related to a noble thing outside oneself. Hence, if the will and the intellect are considered absolutely [*simpliciter*], and not with reference to this or that particular thing, they have this order, that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will.”<sup>129</sup> The argument here relies on the principle distinguishing apprehensive from appetitive powers, which was discussed in the previous chapter. Aquinas adds, however, that intellect is superior to the will because, all things being equal, it is better for the nobility of another thing to be in oneself, as it is through an apprehensive power, than for the soul to be related to some extrinsic thing, as it is through an appetitive power. On these grounds, Aquinas claims, intellect is superior to will. What, though, does it mean for it to be more perfect to have the nobility of another thing in oneself than to be related to the noble thing outside oneself?<sup>130</sup>

The corresponding article in the *Summa Theologica* provides an answer. There, Aquinas refers to the dignity of the objects themselves, arguing that the object of the intellect is “more simple and more absolute” than the object of the will. He writes,

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<sup>129</sup> *De ver*, q. 22, a. 11, resp.

<sup>130</sup> A claim like this is likely to raise suspicion for the modern reader. D. C. Schindler explores some reasons why it would raise these suspicions, especially in an audience influenced by Heidegger, in a powerful essay. See: D. C. Schindler, "Towards a Non-Possessive Concept of Knowledge: On the Relation between Reason and Love in Aquinas and Balthasar," *Modern Theology* 22, no. 4 (2006): 577-607. The problem, according to Schindler and to both Heidegger and Balthasar before him, is the idea of knowledge as possession and as something to be grasped. It should be clear by now that grasping is in many ways not a suitable metaphor for understanding.

If ... the intellect and the will be considered with regard to themselves [rather than with regard to something else], then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will.<sup>131</sup>

Whenever the intellect comes to an act of understanding, the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm and comes to reside in the intellect. Aquinas's argument is that the form in the intellect is nobler than the form in the material thing in virtue of its being both abstract and simpler in the intellect. It is abstract because understanding the form is understanding any particular with that form, so that knowledge of, say, the form of leopard is simultaneously knowledge of any individual leopard. Furthermore, as we explained above, the form of leopard in the intellect abstracts from individual matter, as does all natural science. It is simpler because when the form exists in material things, it is in composition with a material principle, which individuates that form and thus subjects it to both space and time. On the other hand, the form in the intellect is not individuated by any material principle, and so is not in material composition. As was explained in the first chapter, the objects of the natural sciences depend upon matter for their being understood only in the sense that the intellect abstracts from here and now of individual matter in formulating its definitions and includes only common matter.

However, although Aquinas claims that the formalities of the objects of the intellect are superior to the formalities of the object of the will on the grounds of their being more abstract and simpler in the intellect, he does not tell us here why exactly a higher degree of abstraction and a higher degree of simplicity implies superiority. One

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<sup>131</sup> *ST* 1, q. 82, a. 3.

may, however, turn to a brief claim in the *Sentencia Libri De Anima*. There, Aquinas writes,

in virtue of material being, which is confined by matter, each thing is only that which it is—in the way that this stone is nothing other than this stone. In virtue of immaterial being, in contrast, which is expansive (*amplum*) and in a certain way infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by matter, a thing is not only that which it is but is also in a certain way other things. This is the reason that all things exist, in a certain way, in the higher immaterial substances, as if existing in their universal causes.<sup>132</sup>

The reason why it is nobler to be abstract and simple in the intellect than concrete and in composition in the material thing is because, in the material thing the form is confined to that particular material thing whereas in the intellect the form is, in some way, united with other things inasmuch as they too are identified with intellect. The ability to be identified with intellect and through intellect to be united with the forms of other things is due to the immateriality of the form, which allows for it not to be limited to one thing as it is in material things. In that way, the form has more nobility in the soul than it does in material things. Because the form is in the intellect according to the intellect's own manner of existence whereas the will is related to the thing in the thing's own manner of existence, and because in the intellect the form is immaterial whereas the will intends the thing as material, intellect is superior to will, all things being equal.

### **2.2.2 Their Relation *Secundum Quid***

Only a fraction of Aquinas's argument focuses on the relationship between intellect and will when all things are equal. The remainder is dedicated to their relationship "in a qualified way" (*secundum quid*), specifically in relation to different kinds of objects. The reason why much of his attention is dedicated here is due to two closely related factors:

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<sup>132</sup> In DA, 2, lect. 5, 283.



(1) intellect and will are not, in the concrete, related to each other in an absolute way, but are always related to each other relative to some object and (2) the will is often said to move intellect, implying that the intellect can serve as a passive principle with respect to the will, an active principle. Gaining clarity on these complicating factors will ultimately shed light upon that in which the likeness of conformity of the Trinity in the mind consists.

In the concrete, intellect and will are never, all things being equal, related to one other, but are rather always related to one another in a qualified way, that is, with regard to some concrete object. In the same articles of *De veritate* and *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas distinguishes between different sorts of relationships the two powers can have to one another based upon the kind of object to which one is in relation in acts of knowing and loving. He thus discusses, on the one hand, whether intellect is superior to will when the human being is in relation to material things and, on the other hand, whether intellect is superior to will when the human being is in relation to separate substances. In summary form, Aquinas's argument is that, when the human being is in relation to material things, intellect is superior to will and, when in relation to separate substances, will is superior to intellect. We will consider each in turn, discussing, first, how intellect is superior to will in relation to material beings and, last, how will is superior to intellect in relation to separate substances. In between, though, we will consider whether intellect is superior to will in relation to oneself and other human beings, even though Aquinas himself, to the best of my knowledge, does not consider this question. The reasoning for why and how will is superior to intellect in relation to the separate substances, however, will occupy most of our attention, since it is most directly relevant to our current purposes.

First, then, if the object is of lesser dignity than the human being, such as any nonhuman material being, then it is better to understand than love that object and thus, in relation to that object, intellect is superior to will. Aquinas's arguments here are almost identical to his arguments supporting the claim that, all things being equal, intellect is superior to will. The reason behind this, as mentioned above, is that when claiming that intellect is superior to will all things being equal, Aquinas is assuming a consideration of objects that are proportionate to the intellect as it is possessed by a certain kind of being. In other words, intellect is superior to will in any kind of being whenever that being in relation to a being proportionate to the intelligent being's mode of understanding. Because nothing is beyond the proportion of divine intellect, intellect is always superior to will in God, at least with regard to our order of conceiving. (In reality, intellect and will in God are identical to one another, since there is no real distinction within the divine operation, save what stands as relatively opposed on the basis of the processions.) With regard to human beings, intellect is superior to will whenever the human being is in some intelligent relation to an object proportionate to its human's mode of understanding, that is, any object having its own proper mode of existence in matter. It is better, in other words, to understand than to love that object simply because that object has a higher mode of existence in an intellect than it does in a material being, as has already been explained.

Second, and rather strikingly, Aquinas does not consider whether intellect is superior to will or vice versa, in relation to oneself or other human beings. He only focuses their relationship to one another with regard to beings which are of lesser dignity than the human being and on beings that are of greater dignity. However, based on the

arguments from the last section, the most reasonable argument seems to be that, simply speaking, neither is superior to the other in relation to oneself or to other human beings at least with regard to our minds. Rather, because of the “consubstantiality” of each of the operations with the nature of the mind, in relation to human beings, neither intellect nor will is superior to the other. The question, indeed, becomes more complicated by the fact that the human being is not merely a mind, but is rather a composite with material principles (both the body and the lower powers) that the mind perfects and informs. As a result, the question about whether, in relation to the human being, the intellect or the will is superior can, in a way, be divided into two, and perhaps more. With regard to the mind of the human being, neither intellect nor will is superior to one another. To understand our own minds and the minds of others and to love them are of equal rank. With regard to the material principles, however, intellect is superior to will, just as it is in relation to any other material thing. It is better to know than to love (that is, delight in) these parts of the human being.

Third, if the object is superior to the mode of understanding of the human being, then will is superior to intellect. In general, whenever an intelligent being is considering an object beyond the proportion of its own natural power, then it is better to love than know that object. Aquinas writes in *De veritate*,

it may happen that to be related in some way to some noble thing is more excellent than to have its nobility within oneself. This is the case, for instance, when the nobility of that thing is possessed in a way much inferior to that in which the thing has it within itself. But if the nobility of one thing is in another just as nobly or more nobly than it is in the thing to which it belongs, then without doubt that which has the nobility of that thing within itself is nobler than that which is related in any way whatsoever to that noble thing. Now the intellect takes on the forms of things superior to the soul in a way inferior to that which they have in the things themselves; for the intellect receives things after its own fashion, as is said in *The Causes*. And for the same reason the forms of things

inferior to the soul, such as corporeal things, are more noble in the soul than in the things themselves.<sup>133</sup>

What is superior to the human mind are the separate substances, namely, God and the angels. Because the human being understands through its own active potency only forms in phantasms and thus forms of material things, any object whose form is not individuated by matter is superior to the human mind and beyond the proportion of what the human mind can know through its own natural principle. In other words, while the judgment of human intellect is naturally able to conform to forms of material things through an intelligible species, it is not able of itself to conform to that which is superior to the human mind, the forms of God and the angels. The problem, however, is not that the separate substances are unintelligible. As mentioned above, Aquinas argues that the separate substances are intelligible in virtue of themselves.<sup>134</sup> That is, unlike the forms of material things, which are only potentially intelligible and require agent intellect to bring their intelligibility to act, the separate substances are actually intelligible in virtue of themselves. But the human mind, having forms in matter as its natural object, does not possess the requisite power to understand the separate substances. For this reason, Aquinas, following Aristotle, claims that the human mind in relation to the separate substances is like the eye of the owl at noonday.<sup>135</sup> The human's limitations in knowing them, in other words, lies on the side the human intellect, not on the side of the separate substances themselves.

This is not to say, as was explained in the last chapter, that the human being

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<sup>133</sup> *De ver*, q. 22, a. 11, resp.

<sup>134</sup> E.g., *In BDT*, q. 4, a. 2; *In Met*, 282.

<sup>135</sup> *In BDT*, q. 4, a. 2; *In Met*, 282, 286,

cannot have any knowledge of the separate substances. The human mind knows them, not merely by means of abstraction, but by means of composition and division; that is, in a discursive way through *quia* demonstrations based on causation, remotion, and transcendence and through the separate substances revealing themselves, as reported in the Scriptures. But in themselves the separate substances are either entirely simple (God) or simple with respect to the fact that they are not susceptible to the generation and corruption of matter (angels). Because they are simple in themselves and yet the human mind only knows them through composition and division, they possess a lower degree of nobility in the human mind than they possess in themselves. To use the language from earlier, they are both simpler and more abstracted from matter in themselves than they are in the human mind. On these grounds, the separate substances possess their own formal principles in a more noble way than the human intellect of itself can possess them. It is thus better for the human to love than to know these objects: that is, it is better for one to be related to the separate substances in their own manner of existence than for one to possess the nobility of the separate substances in one's own manner of existence. Hence, in relation to the separate substances, will is superior to intellect, which means that the act of willing serves as a higher order activity through which acts of the intellect are informed and into which they are enlisted.

### **2.3 THE AMBIGUITY OF THE LIKENESS BY CONFORMITY IN *DE VERITATE***

In *De veritate*, Aquinas provides his readers with a few clues about that in which the *similitudo secundum conformationem* consists. In the introduction to this chapter, we have already explained how the likeness by conformation differs from the likeness by analogy. Aquinas, it may be recalled, writes, “there is a greater likeness through

conformity, as of sight to color, than through analogy, as of sight to understanding, which is related to its objects in a way similar to that of sight. Consequently, the likeness of the Trinity is clearer in the mind, as knowing God, than as knowing itself.”<sup>136</sup> Hence, the likeness by conformity consists in a formal identity between acts and objects, an example of which at the sensitive level is the identity between an act of seeing and color. Claiming that there is a likeness of the Trinity in the mind according to conformity implies, therefore, that there is, according to this likeness, an identity between the acts of the mind and the essence of God. That is, in the likeness by conformity, God will be the object of the acts of the mind, thus bringing the mind into conformity with God.

The *respondeo* of the present article in *De veritate* is relatively muted in its exposition of the *similitudo secundum conformationem*. It does not explain how, precisely, such a conformity is constituted in the mind. The responses to the objections, however, provide the reader with important clarifications. One of the objections to the claim that there is a greater likeness of the Trinity in the mind knowing and loving eternal things than knowing and loving temporal things is that the equality of the trinitarian persons is more adequately represented in the latter. The heart of the objection runs as follows:

the equality of the persons is better represented in the mind as knowing things of time than as knowing eternal things, since the latter are infinitely above the mind, whereas the mind is not infinitely above things of time. The origin of the persons, too, is displayed in cognition of things in time as well as in cognition of things eternal, for in both instances knowledge proceeds from the mind and love proceeds from knowledge.<sup>137</sup>

The main two points of the objection are that our minds are closer in being to temporal

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<sup>136</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 7, resp.

<sup>137</sup> *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 7, arg. 2.

things than to God and that there is no greater likeness in the knowing and loving of eternal things than in the knowing and loving of temporal things, since in both knowledge proceeds from the mind and love proceeds from knowledge.

In his reply to the objection, Aquinas argues the following:

although there is greater inequality between our mind and God than between our mind and a temporal thing, yet between the memory which our mind has of God and actual understanding and love of God there is greater equality than between the memory it has of temporal things and the understanding and love of them. For God is knowable and lovable of Himself and is understood and loved by the mind of each to the degree in which He is present to the mind. His presence in the mind is memory of Him in the mind; thus, intelligence is proportioned to the memory of Him, and will or love is proportioned to this intelligence.

However, physical things as such are not intelligible or lovable and so there is not this equality in the mind with reference to them. Neither is there the same order of origin, since these are present to our memory because we have understood them, and so memory arises from understanding rather than conversely. The opposite of this takes place in the created mind with reference to God from whose presence the mind participates in intellectual light so that it can understand.<sup>138</sup>

This is an important passage, and three points are especially worthy of note. First, memory is a key technical term for understanding the likeness by conformity. Whereas memory of temporal things follows upon knowing them, the memory of God precedes the mind's knowledge of God. Second, the memory of God is the presence of God to the mind. Although, as I will explain in a moment, Aquinas argues in earlier articles of question 10 in *De veritate* that memory is an expansive term, he does not tell us in this article how the memory of God in the mind is equivalent to the presence of God in the mind. The only clue provided here is that the presence of God in the mind implies a created participation in intellectual light enabling the creature to understand. Third, God can be present in the mind in different degrees, and different degrees of knowledge and

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<sup>138</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7, ad. 2.

love of God proceed in the mind in proportion to the degree to which God is present to the mind. The second and third points stand in need of further clarification.

As is well known, the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions present two conflicting accounts of memory, and part of the task for Aquinas is to integrate the two into a synthetic theorem. For Aristotle, understanding does not, properly speaking, know the singular as singular, and as a result does not understand “a present and a past thing as this present and this past thing.”<sup>139</sup> But memory is always of the singular. Hence, memory cannot belong, properly speaking, to the intellectual part of the soul, but rather must belong to the sensitive part, which apprehends the singular as singular. On the other hand, for Augustine, memory is clearly intellectual rather than the sensitive. For instance, in *De trin*, Augustine is willing to use memory as the first element in one of his more well-known triplets for conceiving the trinitarian persons. Memory, however, could not serve that function unless it were intellectual. Augustine, Aquinas claims, “intends to assign to memory everything in the mind which is stored there habitually without passing into act.”<sup>140</sup> If there is a memory of God in the mind, then, the implication is that God is habitually present in the mind and, when God is thus present, acts of knowledge and love of God are able to proceed in proportion to such a habitual presence. To use an analogy, just as courageous acts flow with relative ease and pleasure from someone with the habit of courage, and just as theorems and deductions proceed with relative ease and pleasure from someone with the habit of scientific understanding, so too acts knowing and loving God proceed with relative ease and pleasure from someone with the habitual presence of

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<sup>139</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 2, resp.

<sup>140</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, a. 2, resp.



God in the mind. Acts of knowing and loving God flow in proportion to the degree in which God is habitually present to the mind.

However, aside from its relative brevity, the exposition of the *imago Trinitatis* in *De veritate* possesses a significant limitation. Although it affirms that God can be present in the mind in varying degrees, it does not specify the principle by which the varying degrees can be distinguished from one another. A question then remains about how to distinguish the varying degrees of God's presence in the mind. As a result, the category of the *similitudo secundum conformationem* is a general term, but remains relatively undifferentiated in *De veritate* inasmuch as it posits varying degrees but does not clarify how they are differentiated.

Later texts, however, do specify varying degrees in which God can be present to the mind. A principal text is *Summa Theologiae* 1, q. 93, a. 4. The article addresses the question of whether the image of God exists within every human. In the *respondeo*, Aquinas writes,:

The intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in humans in three ways. First, inasmuch as humans possess a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all humans. Second, inasmuch as humans actually and habitually love and know God, though imperfectly, and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Third, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. ... The first is found in all humans, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.<sup>141</sup>

Aquinas thus argues that the *imago Dei* exists in people in three degrees: by nature, by grace, and by glory. In each, God is the object known and loved, but the degree to which God is known and loved differs. The image of God is in all humans by nature inasmuch

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<sup>141</sup> *ST* 1, q. 93, a. 4, resp.

as all humans have a natural aptitude to know and love God; it is in the just inasmuch as they actually and habitually know and love God in an imperfect way through grace; and it is in the blessed inasmuch as they know and love God perfectly through glory. However, Aquinas only applies the threefold distinction to the *imago Dei*, not to the *imago Trinitatis*, which is the subject of the next four articles in question 93. The task in the remainder of this chapter is to conceive the *imago Trinitatis* in terms of grace.<sup>142</sup>

Before turning to that task, it is worthwhile to attend to a few possible objections to my procedure. One might object at the outset that since the distinction between the image according to nature, according to grace, and according to glory is stated in the articles on the *imago Dei*, the text of Aquinas does not give us warrant to apply the same distinction to a conception of the *imago Trinitatis*. However, using a distinction from Aquinas's treatment of the *imago Dei* to understand more adequately the *imago Trinitatis* is in keeping with Aquinas's principles about the unity of the *imago Dei* and the *imago Trinitatis*. Aquinas writes,

to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.<sup>143</sup>

Because God is Trinity, there is a basic convertibility between the *imago Dei* and the *imago Trinitatis*. As Torrell notes, "It is rather remarkable that when Thomas says 'image

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<sup>142</sup> I defer discussion of the *imago Trinitatis* in terms of glory until another occasion. I do this because the present dissertation is concerned with the likeness of the Trinity in this life, and considering the likeness of the Trinity in terms of glory would require answering a number of questions in eschatology, which lie outside the purview of the dissertation.

<sup>143</sup> *ST*, 1, q. 93, a. 5, resp.

of God,’ he means at the same time ‘image of the Trinity.’”<sup>144</sup> Merriell notes the same point but rightfully points out that the conception of the *imago Trinitatis* adds to the conception of the *imago Dei* “a reflection of the divine processions.”<sup>145</sup> Hence, although Aquinas distinguishes between the *imago Dei* according to nature, the *imago Dei* according to grace, and the *imago Dei* according to glory, the same distinctions apply to the *imago Trinitatis* but require the addition of processions. In keeping with this principle, the following section will focus on how the *imago Trinitatis* according to grace might be conceived within Aquinas’s framework, even though he did not directly address the question.

One might further object that Aquinas’s reticence on the topic seems to be a sufficient ground for avoiding it. Merriell, for instance, notes that Aquinas himself did not explicitly address the relation between the *imago Trinitatis* and its conformation to the Trinity in grace and glory through the divine indwelling, and he lists three possible reasons for the absence of such treatment.<sup>146</sup> Nevertheless, Merriell, at the very end of his

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<sup>144</sup> Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, v. 2, p. 86f, n. 14.

<sup>145</sup> Merriell, *To the Image*, 199f.

<sup>146</sup> Merriell, 232ff. First, the treatment of divine indwelling and the treatment of the *imago Trinitatis* occur in two different parts of the *Prima Pars*: respectively, the treatment of the divine missions and the treatment of creation of humanity. Second, while the *imago Trinitatis* exists in all humans by nature, divine indwelling occurs only in the just and the blessed. Third, the *Summa* is a handbook for beginners marked by simplicity, and the relation of the divine indwelling and the *imago Trinitatis* is a complex concept requiring a synthesis of material from various questions in various parts of the *Summa Theologiae*. On the last point, Merriell writes, “Finally, it should be noted that Thomas makes no reference to the indwelling of the Trinity in the *Summa* outside of the question on the divine missions. There are some insignificant texts that mention the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in relation to grace and charity ... Thomas did not want to

treatment of the *imago Trinitatis* in the *Summa Theologiae*, claims that the divine “indwelling is in fact a participation by grace in the divine processions of Word and Love, a state that cannot reasonably be distinguished from the *imago recreationis* in which by grace the soul knows and loves God at the actual or at least at the habitual level.”<sup>147</sup> Merriell thus identifies the *imago Dei* in the just at the level of grace with the *imago Trinitatis* in the just at the level of grace. But because Merriell’s book serves as an interpretation of Aquinas and because of Aquinas’s own reticence on the subject, Merriell does not explore the issue in any more depth. In fact, he claims that his own assertion in the previous quote is a conjecture about what Aquinas’s position might be rather than an argument that can be verified explicitly in the text of Aquinas.<sup>148</sup> As a conjecture, however, there is possibility to explore the issue in more detail, using the work of

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burden his beginners with an oversubtle system of theology in which the connections between one part and another were painstakingly elaborated. The *Summa* is characterized by simplicity. Thomas runs through the essentials of a topic, and then tends to leave it and move on to the next. The notion of the indwelling is a complicated notion that Thomas preferred not to employ in the elucidation of other topics in the field of theology. It is not surprising, therefore, that he avoided the complexity of making an explicit connection between the difficult notion of the indwelling and the equally complex notion of the image [of the Trinity].” Merriell, *To the Image*, 233f.

<sup>147</sup> Merriell, *To the Image*, 234. See also, D. Juvenal Merriell, “Trinitarian Anthropology,” in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 123–42, at 132-138.

<sup>148</sup> He thus continues: “Nevertheless, it is a conjecture to attribute this conclusion to Thomas himself. It is truer to see the resemblance between his doctrine of the image and indwelling as a result of the consistent application of the insights of Augustine’s *De Trinitate* to both topics [i.e., the image of the Trinity and the divine indwelling]” (Merriell, *To the Image*, 234).

Aquinas to do so and thereby developing a Thomistic answer to the issue.<sup>149</sup> I will take up this possibility in the remainder of this chapter.<sup>150</sup>

### 3.4 THE LIKENESS BY CONFORMING GRACE

#### 3.4.1 The First Procession

In order to conceive a Thomistic account of the likeness of the Trinity according to grace, the present section will examine relevant material primarily (though not exclusively) from Question 93 of the *Prima Pars* on the term of the production of humankind, Questions 109-114 of the *Prima Secundae* on grace, and various questions in the treatise on the theological virtues and their relevant gifts in the *Secunda Secundae*. In these questions, Aquinas presents the clearest formulation of the way in which God is present to the mind through grace and provides clues about what constitutes the likeness of the

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<sup>149</sup> Rather oddly, Merriell says, “it should be noted that Thomas makes no reference to the indwelling of the Trinity in the *Summa* outside of the question of the divine missions. There are some insignificant texts that mention the divine indwelling of the Holy Spirit in relation to grace and charity” (Merriell, 233). While the indwelling of the Holy Spirit might not seem to be the same thing as the indwelling of the Trinity, it is very odd to call these “insignificant texts.” As we will see, they are the major clues for understanding the relation of the image of the Trinity to the divine indwelling and thus for seeing how the image of the Trinity is conformed to God.

<sup>150</sup> I use the term Thomistic in the way that Lonergan does in *Verbum*. With regard to seeking an epistemology in Aquinas’s work, Lonergan writes, “Aquinas himself did not offer an account of the procedure he would follow; so it is only by piecing together scattered materials that one can arrive at an epistemological position that may be termed Thomistic but hardly Thomist” (*Verbum*, CW2, 96). Accordingly, the following account will be a Thomistic, but hardly Thomist, account of the likeness of the Trinity according to grace.

Trinity in the mind according to grace. For the latter, we will need to attend to the ordering of processions in the mind when grace is present. The ultimate claim will be that charity proceeds from sanctifying grace and that either informed faith or the gift of wisdom proceed from sanctifying grace and charity. Hence, the first procession is an act of the will, and the second is an act of the intellect, and the ordering of the two processions corresponds to Aquinas's claim that, in relation to that which is more noble than ourselves, will is superior to intellect—loving superior to understanding. Since Aquinas says that the *imago Dei* according to grace consists in knowing and loving God both habitually and actually, both of these processions can be conceived of either as actual (second act) or habitual (first act). But if we are to remain in line with Aquinas's theology of the *imago Trinitatis* elsewhere, then we should say that the *similitudo secundum gratiam* is present in both the acts and the habits, but it is nevertheless present more perfectly in the acts than the habits.<sup>151</sup>

Aquinas's claim that the *imago Dei* according to grace is found in the just indicates that the *imago Dei* is found in those with sanctifying grace.<sup>152</sup> Grace, for Aquinas, is a term encompassing many meanings, and the scholastics, Aquinas included, distinguish between a variety of kinds of graces and do so by variety of principles of differentiation. One principle of differentiation accords with how the reception of grace affects the (a) the operations in the powers of the soul, (b) the powers of the soul themselves, and (c) the essence of the soul. Let us consider each in turn.

(a) Grace may affect the operations in the powers of the soul, specifically its

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<sup>151</sup> *ST* 1, q. 93, a. 7. See also, *De ver*, q. 10, a. 3.

<sup>152</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 113, a. 1-3.

intellectual and volitional operations, without affecting either the powers themselves or the essence of the soul. These acts of grace (called actual, operative grace) are transient, and if the human receiving such grace does not consent to and cooperate with the grace so received in the operation of the soul, then grace may fail to take root in either the powers or the essence of the soul. The person has thus not been justified.

(b) Grace may affect the powers of the soul, endowing them with certain imperfect and inchoate habits or dispositions, without affecting the essence of the soul itself. In particular, the supernatural virtues of faith and hope are supernatural habits, respectively, in the intellect and will. The infused virtues of faith and hope, which are infused together with sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, are not included in this category, which is restricted only to the “imperfect and inchoate virtues” of faith and hope, both of which exist in the powers without sanctifying grace and charity.<sup>153</sup> Grace

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<sup>153</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 65, a. 4. On the claim that all of the theological virtues are infused together, see *ST* 1-2, q. 65, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 3. Saying that faith and hope can be inchoate virtues, from what I can tell, seems to be analogous to saying that a well-reared adolescent can have courage in the irascible power but lack the experience required for prudence in the intellect. Just as the virtue of courage is only inchoate and imperfect without the virtue of prudence, so too faith and hope are inchoate and imperfect without the virtue of charity. In other places, Aquinas will favor the term “disposition” in place of “inchoate and imperfect virtue” for speaking about what precedes the infusion of grace (e.g., *ST* 1-2, q. 112, a. 2). The reason why, most likely, is that disposition implies a lower degree of perfection than a habit such as a virtue. In keeping with our previous example, a well-reared adolescent, then, may have a disposition in their irascible power for courageous acts, but courageous acts as such and thus the virtue of courage as such cannot exist, properly speaking, without the experience necessary for prudence. Whether the meaning of “inchoate and imperfect virtue” is distinct from the meaning of “disposition” is difficult to assess (I suspect that it is not), but either way, disposition seems like the more economical term as “inchoate and imperfect

present in the powers takes root deeper in the human than (a) actual grace by itself. But because the habits only occur in the powers of the soul, grace has not yet taken root in the essence of the soul. The person, therefore, has still not been justified.

(c) Grace may affect the essence of the soul, infusing it with an entitative habit—in distinction from an operative habit in a power—called sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*).<sup>154</sup> Only then is a person rendered pleasing to God and thus justified. What, however, is sanctifying grace? And how does it factor into the *imago Trinitatis* according to the conformity of grace?

Sanctifying grace, as has been mentioned, is an entitative habit. A habit is a quality added to a potency, and it disposes and determines the potency to act in a certain manner.<sup>155</sup> Habits can either be operative or entitative, depending upon whether the potency is, respectively, of a power or of an essence. Habits in the operative powers, such as the habit of courage in the irascible power or the habit of prudence in the intellect, affect acts occurring in those powers in various ways. The habit of courage, for instance, makes courageous acts easy, pleasurable, and frequent, and without the habit, such acts are difficult, painful, and infrequent. The same goes for the habit of prudence in the intellect. An entitative habit, on the other hand, is not in a specific power of the soul, but rather comprises the whole entity or a relative whole of the entity, such as the body. It adds a quality to the whole, which—it is necessary to note—consequently affects the powers and thereby the operations of the whole. Health, for instance, is an entitative habit

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virtue” requires qualifiers, though “inchoate and imperfect virtue” does have the merit of signifying a good quality rather than a bad one, which “disposition” does not do.

<sup>154</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 110, a. 2 and 4, q. 111, a. 1.

<sup>155</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 49, a. 1-3.



of the body: it is a determination of the whole body, and, as a result of such an entitative habit, healthy acts occur.<sup>156</sup> To say that sanctifying grace is an entitative habit, then, is to say that it is a determination added to the essence of the soul that affects the powers and thereby the operations of the soul.

More precisely, sanctifying grace is a supernatural created participation in the divine nature infused as an entitative habit into the essence of the soul.<sup>157</sup> It is, of course, unusual in many ways, not least on account of the fact that no other entitative habit exists in the essence of the soul. There are, Aquinas claims, entitative habits proper to the body in relation to the soul, such as health or beauty,<sup>158</sup> and there are operative habits proper to the powers of the soul, such as courage or prudence. But the only entitative habit in the essence of the soul is sanctifying grace (and even then, only by infusion). Aquinas thus writes,

habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul—that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter 1, “that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature”: then nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence ...<sup>159</sup>

The reason why sanctifying grace is a habit in the essence of the soul is because it orders and disposes the essence of the soul to God in a distinct way. While the human soul is always ordered to God in a way proportionate to its own nature, that is, to natural

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<sup>156</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 50, a. 2, resp.

<sup>157</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 110, a. 4.

<sup>158</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 50, a. 1.

<sup>159</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 50, a. 2, resp.

knowledge and love of God under the aspect of the cause of the universe, sanctifying grace is a supernatural habit in the essence of the soul because it orders the soul to God, not merely under the aspect of cause, but, more perfectly, as God is in Godself (*uti in se est*). No other entitative habit exists within the essence of the soul because every other part of the human being is ordered to the perfection of the whole and the whole is not by nature ordered to anything other than its own proportionate perfection. Only sanctifying grace orders and disposes the whole of the human being to something exceeding its own natural perfection (namely, eternal beatitude) and, in doing so, orders and disposes all other parts of the human being, primarily through the proximate powers of intellect and will, to a supernatural perfection. It is for this reason called a supernatural entitative habit infused into the essence of the soul.

Why does any of this matter for the *similitudo Trinitatis secundum gratiam*? As a created participation in the divine nature, sanctifying grace enables the human to attain God through processions in the will and the intellect in a distinct, supernatural way. In the *Prima Secundae*, Aquinas writes,

As humans through their intellective powers participate in the divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in their powers of will participate in the divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the divine nature, after the manner of a likeness ...<sup>160</sup>

Sanctifying grace is thus a created participation of the divine nature enabling supernatural acts in the will and the intellect. While human nature possesses its own natural light by which the human being is able to know and will in a way fitting to its own nature, sanctifying grace endows the human being with a supernatural participation in the divine light by which the human being is able to will and know in a way exceeding its own

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<sup>160</sup> *ST I-2*, q. 110, a. 4, resp.

nature but fitting to the infused grace. However, although the quote above seems to imply that, through sanctifying grace, the just participate equally in divine knowledge through the virtue of faith and in divine love through the virtue of charity, other parts of Aquinas's writing show the implication to be misleading. Aquinas claims in numerous places that what flows from sanctifying grace principally and most perfectly is charity,<sup>161</sup> that is, a perfection in the will. That charity proceeds principally and most perfectly from sanctifying grace implies that the first procession in the *similitudo secundum gratiam* is an act of the will.

In order to understand this procession, more needs to be said about charity. It has already been noted that the will is an appetitive power of the soul by which the human being is inclined to the nobility of a thing in the thing's own manner of existence. As a theological virtue, charity has God as its formal object.<sup>162</sup> Hence, charity, as a perfection in the will, enables the human being to be inclined to God in God's own manner of existence and, indeed, inclined to God in such a way that friend is inclined to friend. While one can be inclined to God in a number of ways, only charity loves God in a way that is neither proud nor concupiscent, that does not love God simply for the sake of one's personal advantage or to possess God for oneself. An especially clear description of

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<sup>161</sup> E.g., *DV*, q. 14, a. 5; *ST* 1-2, q. 65, a. 2 and 3. This is not to say that charity flows first temporally; rather, Aquinas argues that inchoate and imperfect faith and hope often precede charity temporally, that is, in the order of generation. As noted in the passages cited, none of the virtues, both theological and natural, can be said to be "infused" apart from charity. The principal reason for this is, first, all of the virtues are infused together and, second, that "grace has no ordination to act except through charity" (*De ver*, q. 14, a. 5., ad. 13).

<sup>162</sup> See note 174 below.

this occurs in *Quaestio disputata De virtutibus in communi* (most likely written contemporaneously with the *Secunda Secundae*<sup>163</sup>) where Aquinas proposes an analogy between and a true love of the political good and charity's love of God. Aquinas writes the following:

to love the good of any community so that it might be had or possessed does not constitute the political good. Thus does a tyrant love the good of the community in order to dominate it, which is to love himself more than the community; for he desires this good for himself, not for the community. But to love the good of the community so that it might be preserved and defended, this is indeed to love the community, and this constitutes the political good. So much is this so, that men would expose themselves to dangers of death or neglect their own private good, in order to preserve or increase the good of the community. Therefore, to love the good in which the blessed participate so that it might be had or possessed does not make man well-disposed toward beatitude, because the wicked also desire this good. *But to love that good for its own sake in order that it might remain and be made wide-spread, and that nothing might act against that good, this does dispose man well toward that society of the blessed. This is charity, which loves God for His own sake, and loves fellow-men who are capable of attaining beatitude as it loves itself;* charity resists every hindrance both in itself and in others; charity can never exist with mortal sin, which is an obstacle to beatitude. Therefore it is clear that charity is not only a virtue, but even the most powerful of the virtues.<sup>164</sup>

In loving God for God's own sake, charity does not seek to love God merely for the sake of one's own good or in order to possess God for oneself, that is, to attain some (perhaps exclusive) personal reward in doing so. In other words, the just participate in divine love, the love of God for God: as God loves God for God, the will of those with charity is conformed to the will of God.

In loving God by charity, there is friendship between God and the human being. Drawing upon Aristotle's treatment of friendship in Book IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aquinas claims that charity is friendship with God on account of a mutual good will

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<sup>163</sup> Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol 1, 204f and 336.

<sup>164</sup> *QDVCom*, q. 2, a. 2 (translation modified and emphasis added).

between God and human beings.<sup>165</sup> Not only is there mutual good will, however, as there could be between distant relatives or between strangers, but in friendship there is also communion and a union of the affections:<sup>166</sup> a union can only come through a friendship in which each friend affirms and loves the good of the other and loves the good of the other for the other's own sake.<sup>167</sup> Such a union of affections between God and the just implies that, to the extent that the just has charity, the human being loves whatever God loves and detests whatever God detests,<sup>168</sup> and, if such is not perfectly the case, then there is a movement in the just toward such a perfect union of affections by a removal of any obstacle that hinders such a union.<sup>169</sup> Furthermore, Aquinas claims that by charity God is loved immediately.<sup>170</sup> If imagination is given free reign, one is likely to think that even in charity some distance between God and humans still obtains. In keeping with Aristotle's theory of action, however, Aquinas argues that, in the order of intention, the end of the will is immediate and the means are mediated insofar as they are considered and intended in the light of the end.<sup>171</sup> Because the end of charity is God *uti in se est*,<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 23, a. 1. See also, q. 65, a. 5.

<sup>166</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 27, a. 2.

<sup>167</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 23, a. 1.

<sup>168</sup> Friendship with God, of course, is different from any friendship among humans simply because God is perfect in a way that no human is. Whereas a human friend may be mistaken or may even increasingly partake in moral evil, God could never do these.

<sup>169</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 184, a. 2, resp. For more on charity resulting in the impression or affection of the object loved, see *ST* 1, q. 37, a. 1, resp.

<sup>170</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 27, a. 4.

<sup>171</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 1, a. 1, ad. 1; also, q. 1, a. 4c.

<sup>172</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 23, a. 6c.

God is immediately present to the person with charity, as the beloved is present to the lover.<sup>173</sup> As a result, the mind attains God through charity, or, put in the idiom of *De veritate*, by means of charity, God is present to the mind. The language of the order of intention, however, may seem to imply that God is only present to the mind by charity as that which is to be attained through the means in some order of execution. The implication is misleading insofar as by charity the mind already enjoys God and has been united to God.<sup>174</sup> Charity is thus more like a lover already united in friendship with a beloved and nevertheless acting in order to preserve and deepen the friendship with the beloved than an admirer having yet to attain a friendship with the admired.<sup>175</sup> In charity, there is thus a conformity between the mind and God, and if it is correct to say that charity is the first procession from sanctifying grace, there is good reason to claim that charity is the first procession in the *similitudo secundum gratiam*, which, it should be recalled, is one species of *De veritate*'s *similitudo secundum conformationem*.

Before moving to the second procession, three additional points must be made. First, charity's perfection of the will is that by which any other supernatural perfection in the human being occurs. Aquinas makes this point most emphatically in *De veritate*:

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid. See also, *ST I*, q. 43, a. 3c.

<sup>174</sup> Hence, Aquinas writes, by charity "the will is directed to [supernatural beatitude] ... as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end ... For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end." *ST 2-2*, q. 62, a. 3, resp.

<sup>175</sup> It is for this reason that charity does not simply remove hope—which is a desire for an object not yet obtained—but rather perfects and quickens it. E.g., *ST 2-2*, q. 23, a. 6, ad. 3; 1-2, q. 62, a. 4.

“grace has no ordination to act except through the mediation of charity.”<sup>176</sup> Charity is thus said to be the root, mother, and form of the all the other virtues, including the other theological virtues.<sup>177</sup> Any other perfection in the human being, Aquinas argues, is rooted in charity. Even the perfection of the senses, according to Aquinas, is consists radically in charity.<sup>178</sup> That charity perfects all of the powers, virtues, and operations of the human being implies that charity functions as the higher order activity into which all other activities of the human being are enlisted. In this way, charity serves as the exemplar cause of all of the other virtues.<sup>179</sup> This leads, however, to the second point.

Second, the reason why charity is able to perfect all of the powers, virtues, and operations of the human being is because in this life no other power, virtue, or operation attains God *uti in se est*. The senses, of course, by their very nature are not able to attain God *uti in se est*: they are always constrained by the conditions of matter. The only other power by which a human would be able to do so is intellect. Even with charity, however, the intellect not yet conformed to God, as the intellect of the just does not possess the light of glory by which God is attained *uti in se est* in beatific understanding, but only the light of faith by means of which God is known with only imperfect understanding and, to use St. Paul’s phrase, “through a glass dimly” (1 Cor 13:12). Hence, although the will of the just is conformed to God, the rest of their faculties are not so, or at least not perfectly so. The conformity of the mind to God through sanctifying grace and charity, therefore, is not its complete conformity to God, as will occur for the blessed in glory with the

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<sup>176</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 5, ad. 13.

<sup>177</sup> *QDVCom*, q. 2, a. 3c; *ST* 1-2, q. 65, a. 2 and 4; 2-2, q. 23, a. 6-8.

<sup>178</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 184, a. 1, ad. 1.

<sup>179</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 5, ad. 3f.

*similitudo Trinitatis secundum gloriam*, but only, properly speaking, a conformity of the will to God. However, the other powers of the soul, through a diffusion of and a participation in charity, are able to approximate such a conformity and attain some semblance of it, an imperfect conformity, so to speak.

Third, Aquinas argues that there is a likeness of God in the mind inasmuch as the human being is able to know and love God. The likeness by grace, furthermore, exists in the mind “inasmuch as the human actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly.”<sup>180</sup> Because the first procession of the *similitudo secundum gratiam* was in the will, the second procession must, firstly, be in the intellect and, secondly, have God as its object. Bearing these conditions in the mind, I turn now to the second procession.

### **3.4.2 The Second Procession**

The second procession in the *similitudo secundum gratiam* proceeds from sanctifying grace and charity, and it is either a procession of informed faith or a procession of the gift of wisdom. Both are acts in the intellect, and, as I will show, both have reasons to recommend them. Although it ultimately seems more reasonable to say that the gift of wisdom stands as the second procession, there are also reasons based in Aquinas’s texts to say that informed faith may rightfully stand in that place. I will consider faith then wisdom, explaining the reasons why either one of them may stand as the second procession. I will then explain why it seems more reasonable to say that the gift of wisdom rather than informed faith stands as the second procession.

First, there are reasons to think that an informed faith is the procession from sanctifying grace and charity. Regardless of whether it is formed or unformed, the act of

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<sup>180</sup> *ST* 1, q. 93, a. 4.



faith occurs in the intellect and has God as its formal object.<sup>181</sup> The formal object is the medium by which a material object is known, as the conclusion of a syllogism is known through its premises.<sup>182</sup> The material object in the act of faith consists in the articles of faith. Hence, faith is an act by which the articles of faith are known through God, that is, through God revealing them.<sup>183</sup> However, because the meaning of the material object (for instance, that God is triune or that the Word became incarnate) exceeds what the human being can, without the light of glory, understand and conceive, the act of faith only knows God imperfectly. The affirmations or denials made in faith, in other words, do not occur on the basis of perfect human understanding;<sup>184</sup> rather, Aquinas claims, these affirmations and denials occur in humans on the basis of an act of the will and are thus called, properly speaking, acts of believing. In contrast to the affirmation of first principles (for instance, that a whole is greater than its parts), which is based upon perfect understanding in the intellect as soon as the terms of the principles are understood (here, the meaning of whole and the meaning of part), and in contrast to science, which attains a perfect understanding in the intellect by reducing conceptions to first principles, the intellect's act of believing occurs when the intellect cannot be determined one way or another through sufficient understanding and instead relies upon an act of the will.<sup>185</sup> Although Aquinas repeats this claim in various places in *Summa Theologiae*,<sup>186</sup> the most thorough

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<sup>181</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 2 and 8; *ST* 2-2, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>182</sup> *ST* 1, q. 1, a. 1-2.

<sup>183</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>184</sup> Though, of course, they do occur on the basis of perfect divine understanding.

<sup>185</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 1.

<sup>186</sup> E.g., *ST* 2-2, q. 2, a. 1, esp. ad. 3.

treatment occurs in *De veritate*:

Sometimes ... the understanding can be determined to one side of a contradictory proposition neither immediately through the definitions of the terms, as is the case with principles, nor yet in virtue of principles, as is the case with conclusions from a demonstration. And in this situation our understanding is determined by the will, which chooses to assent to one side definitely and precisely because of something which is enough to move the will, though not enough to move the understanding, namely, since it seems good or fitting to assent to this side. And this is the state of one who believes. This may happen when someone believes what another says because it seems fitting or useful to do so.<sup>187</sup>

Hence, any act of belief, including the act of faith, is dependent upon an act of the will moving the intellect on account of the act of the intellect being useful or fitting as a means to some end. The sailor, for instance, has not verified whether his map is correct, but believes the map because it is generally useful to do so. As soon as it is not useful to do so—for instance, if the map has betrayed him or if he hears from another sailor that the map is incorrect—he no longer believes. The same is true of the act of faith, according to Aquinas. The act of faith first occurs because the person finds it either fitting or useful to believe, at least initially, on the basis of a desire for eternal life: “We are moved to believe what God says because we are promised eternal life as a reward if we believe. And this reward moves the will to assent to what is said, although the intellect is not moved by anything which it understands. Therefore, Augustine says: ‘Man can do other things unwillingly, but he can believe only if he wills it.’”<sup>188</sup> In other words, the act of faith is dependent upon the act of love in the will moving the intellect to believe on account of the usefulness or fittingness of believing in relation to some end.

Because the act of faith depends upon an act of the will, the quality of the act of

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<sup>187</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 1.

<sup>188</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 1.

faith depends upon the quality of the will and what the will principally loves. If the will does not have charity, then it is weighted by pride and cupidity, loving its own particular good at the expense of higher, more encompassing goods, especially the good of God; if the will does have charity, then it loves God and all things, including its own good, in God.<sup>189</sup> The distinction between a will with pride and a will with charity grounds the distinction between unformed, lifeless faith and formed, living faith. In either case, will serves as a higher order activity through which acts of intellect, specifically, believing, are enlisted. Unformed faith, for Aquinas, has not been properly perfected by a higher order activity, precisely because the higher order activity is itself defective. Furthermore, voluntary acts are specified by their end.<sup>190</sup> Hence, because the assent of faith is voluntary inasmuch as it depends upon the will, an unformed act of faith is an act of pride or cupidity: it is assenting to the truths of faith out of love for the self, that is, out of love of one's own particular good as the ultimate end. According to the example Aquinas employs, it is an assent to the truths of faith out of the wish for the personal reward of

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<sup>189</sup> Charity and pride are contraries, like courage and cowardliness. See *ST* 1-2, q. 24, a. 10, ad. 2. Aquinas's most thorough treatment on pride, from what I can tell, can be found in *De Malo*, q. 8, esp. a. 2c. Contrasting pride with charity, Aquinas writes, "charity, that is, love of God, governs all the other virtues. And so charity, although it is a special virtue if we should consider its proper object, is nonetheless common to all the virtues by reason of the diffusion of its governance. And so we call charity the form and mother of all the virtues. And likewise, pride, although it is a special kind of sin by reason of its proper object, is nonetheless a sin common to all sins by reason of the diffusion of its governance. And so we call pride the root and queen of all sins ..." Although Aquinas uses pride as the contrary to charity in several places, in others he uses cupidity or concupiscence, since cupidity or concupiscence wills the good of oneself and uses other things for oneself. See, for example, *ST* 2-2, q. 23, a. 1, resp.

<sup>190</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 1, a. 3.

eternal life (or, conversely, out of a wish to avoid eternal punishment), desired merely in reference to one's own particular good. Other examples besides Aquinas's might come to mind, such as the person who assents to the truths of faith for his own reputation within a community or to protect his own ego. In any of these cases, faith is unformed: the assent is made on account of a love for one's own particular good, and is thus specified as an act of pride or cupidity, which defects from what and how the will ought to love.<sup>191</sup>

Faith only becomes formed when it receives a formal principle from the perfected higher order activity of loving God for God's own sake, that is, from charity. Faith thereby participates within the higher order activity of loving God, and when the person with charity assents to the truths of faith, his or her acts of assent can adequately and

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<sup>191</sup> It should be noted that my position is distinct from that of Eberhard Schockenhoff, who stands in a venerable interpretive tradition of Aquinas. He argues that Aquinas departs from Augustine's stark opposition between cupidity and charity. The natural virtues, he argues, fall on neither side of the opposition, but rather occupy a middle position, thus cutting through the Augustinian dialectic between sin and grace. While his claim is no doubt true when considered *in abstracto*, Aquinas nevertheless argued that the species of any act is designated by its end. And since he, following Augustine, denotes the two primal species as cupidity and charity, natural virtues *in concreto* fall into one of the two camps. Any act—if it is not informed by charity—is ultimately specified as an act of cupidity, although some proximate goods may be attained through these acts. The same principle applies to the theological virtues of faith and hope. They can be either unformed or formed, and as such, they are specified either as cupidity or charity. Schockenhoff seems to want his claim to apply not only *in abstracto*, but also *in concreto*, for he considers the natural virtues to be a “third alternative” between cupidity and charity. But Aquinas's point is that these natural virtues are either informed or unformed, and as such no third alternative is present. See Eberhard Schockenhoff, “The Theological Virtue of Charity (IIa-IIae, qq. 23-46),” trans. Grant Kaplan and Frederick Lawrence, in *The Ethics of Aquinas*, ed. Stephen Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 244-258, at 251.

truthfully be called an act of loving God. In other words, with charity, the person's believing is caught up into a higher order activity, which is specified by the end to which the act of believing is ordered: charity specifies the *why* (the final cause) for which one believes. On account of friendship with God, the person with charity directs his or her voluntary acts to the end of the good of God, and because voluntary acts receive their specification from their end, all of that person's voluntary acts, including his acts of assenting to truths in the intellect, can be called charitable acts—that is, can be called acts of loving God. Thus, returning to a point made earlier in the chapter, with regard to supernatural acts, which have God as their object, the will is superior to the intellect, in the sense that the act of the will provides the formal principle through which the act of the intellect receives its own perfection.

In both *De veritate* and the *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas employs an analogy to illuminate how faith is subordinate to yet perfected by charity. He uses the habits of the lower moral virtues, such as temperance or courage, in relation to reason as analogues for the habit of faith in the intellect in relation to charity. Again, while the same point is echoed in the *Summa Theologiae*,<sup>192</sup> the more thorough treatment occurs in *De veritate*, Aquinas writes,

Temperance is in the concupiscible power only in so far as it participates to some extent in reason. For, since the good of the act of a power requires its subjection to a higher power by following its command, it is necessary not only that the higher have the perfection to command or direct correctly, but that the lower have the perfection to obey promptly. Hence, he who has right reason, but an uncontrolled concupiscible appetite, does not have the virtue of temperance, because he is harassed by his passions, even though he is not led astray by them. [So, they're continent but not virtuous.] ... But, to have temperance, the concupiscible appetite itself must be perfected by a habit so that it is subject to the will without any difficulty. It is in this way that the habit of temperance is said to

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<sup>192</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 4, a. 2 and 5; also, q. 65, a. 4.

be in the concupiscible appetite. Similarly, for the understanding promptly to follow the command of the will, there must be a habit in the speculative understanding itself. This is the divinely infused habit of faith.<sup>193</sup>

In other words, so much is the intellect subordinate to the will in relation to the separate substances that God infuses a habit in the intellect in order to enable it to remain subordinate to the command of the will in its love of God. Just as the habit of courage resides in the irascible power and allows the courageous person to perform acts of courage with ease and some degree of pleasure, so too the habit of faith resides in the intellect and allows the faithful person to perform acts of believing the truths of faith with ease and some degree of pleasure. Moreover, just as the virtue of courage prevents feelings of fear or of overconfidence from interfering with the practice of practical reasoning, so too the virtue of faith prevents acts of believing or of failing to believe from interfering with the practice of loving God. The habit of faith thus allows the intellect to remain subordinate to the will, and in remaining so, the intellect does not interfere with the will's love of God *uti in se est*. The will is thus superior to intellect in such a way that any act of the intellect not ordered to love of God for God's own sake will be uprooted and excised, and only those acts of assent ordered to such love will be actively reinforced.

Furthermore, although acts of faith in the intellect may precede the infusion of sanctifying grace and charity in the order of generation, both sanctifying grace and charity precede acts of faith in the order of perfection.<sup>194</sup> As higher powers perfect lower

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<sup>193</sup> *De ver*, q. 14, a. 4, resp.

<sup>194</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 62, a. 4. However, because God's imparting of grace is not dependent upon human activity, God can impart sanctifying grace and the habit of charity even when imperfect acts of faith have not occurred and when, more generally, no disposition had been present to receive such grace. A case in point,

powers, so charity perfects faith. Hence, while unformed acts of faith may precede sanctifying grace and charity, formed, living, meritorious acts of faith depend upon them and proceed from them.<sup>195</sup> Although in one respect the beliefs proper to faith may already be present within the intellect prior to the infusion of sanctifying grace, they only attain their perfection and become worthy of the love of God (both in the sense that God is pleased with them and in the sense that the person with perfect charity would willingly preserve them) when both sanctifying grace and charity are present. Furthermore, because God is actually and habitually known through acts of faith (though imperfectly), formed, living, and meritorious faith stands as a possible candidate for the second procession in the *similitudo secundum gratiam*.

Turning now to the second possibility: the gift of wisdom may be what proceeds from sanctifying grace and charity. The gift of wisdom, Aquinas claims, is a habit in the intellect by means of which the intellect in its operations of affirming and denying is able to follow the prompting (*instinctus*) of the Holy Spirit.<sup>196</sup> Contrasting the gift of wisdom to the acquired intellectual virtue of wisdom, Aquinas writes,

it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to judge well about them on account of connaturality with them. Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that ‘Hierotheus is perfect in divine

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Aquinas says, is the conversion of the Apostle Paul. See *De ver.* q. 23, a. 3, ad. 19; *ST* 1-2, q. 113, a. 10. Furthermore, while interpreters of Aquinas have never tired of emphasizing his principle that one can only be directed to their supernatural end through charity when by acts of faith one is able to know the end toward which to direct their actions, no less attention needs to be given to how informed or perfected faith itself depends upon charity in the order of perfection.

<sup>195</sup> *De ver.* q. 14, a. 3 and 5; *ST* 2-2, q. 4, a. 3.

<sup>196</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 2.

things, for he not only learns divine things, but also suffers (*patiens*) them.<sup>197</sup>

While wisdom as an intellectual virtue is an acquired virtue by which the human being is able to render judgments about divine things, that is, matters pertaining to the divine science, wisdom as a gift of the Spirit allows a person to make judgments about divine things on account of a sympathy or connaturality with them. In the same article, Aquinas illuminates the point by drawing an analogy from ethics. There is a difference between someone who makes a judgment about ethical matters, such as matters of chastity, on account having studied ethics as a scientific discipline and someone who makes a judgment about the same matters on account of having a virtue, such as the virtue of chastity. While both are, in principle, able to render the same judgments, only the person with the virtue of chastity does so from sympathy or connaturality. The chaste person is the standard in matters of chastity because the virtue makes his or her concupiscible power connatural to relevant moral principles and thereby allows them to judge with felicity in such matters. Similarly, the person with the gift of wisdom is the standard in divine matters because the gift makes his or her intellect to be connatural to such matters and thereby allows them to judge properly in such matters. One may even extend the analogy by drawing upon Aristotle, who claims that the concupiscible and irascible powers can “listen to” (*euêkoôteron*) and “speak with the same voice” (*homophônei*) as reason.<sup>198</sup> The chaste person’s concupiscible power is thus connatural to the principles of

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<sup>197</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 2 (translation modified).

<sup>198</sup> Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.*, 1.13, 1102b 27-28. I am indebted to Jonathan Lear for emphasizing this point. See the following excellent article: Jonathan Lear, “Integrating the Non-Rational Soul,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, v. 114 (2014): 75-101, esp. 75. Plato makes the same point in the *Republic* Book IV, saying that reason and the non-rational soul are able to “sing the same chant together” (432a).



reason in such a way that his or her sexual appetites both listen to and speak with the same voice as the dictates of prudence. The gift of wisdom, by analogy, renders the intellect to be connatural to divine matters in such a way that his or her judgments both listen to and speak with the same voice as God.

Furthermore, as the analogy from the moral virtues implies, the gift of wisdom, according to Aquinas, does not merely allow one to judge properly in speculative matters, as the intellectual virtue of wisdom (*sapientia*, not *prudencia*) allows one to do, but also allows one to judge properly in practical matters. That is, the gift of wisdom applies to both speculative and practical matters, though to practical matters principally through speculative matters. Citing the authority of Augustine in a very brief article, Aquinas writes,

As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason, according to the same authority (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of the heavenly," that is, divine, "types"; it [1] considers them, in so far as it contemplates divine things in themselves, and it [2] consults them, in so far as it [2a] judges of human acts by divine things, and [2b] directs human acts according to divine rules.<sup>199</sup>

Relying upon the Augustinian distinction between higher and lower reason, which is one and the same reason concerned, respectively, with divine and earthly matters,<sup>200</sup> Aquinas argues that the gift of wisdom pertains properly to higher reason and by extension to lower reason. Wisdom, as Aquinas most eloquently argues in the prologue to the *Summa contra Gentiles*, is the habit by which a person is able to order things.<sup>201</sup> But one is only able to order things inasmuch as one in some way knows the end to which things should

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<sup>199</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 3, resp.

<sup>200</sup> *De ver*, q. 15, a. 2; *ST* 1, q. 79, a. 9; 2-2, q. 74, a. 7; *QDM*, q. 7, a. 5.

<sup>201</sup> *SCG* 1, ch. 1.

be ordered and knows how things ought to be ordered to that end. Because higher reason is concerned with what is ultimate, the gift of wisdom pertains to higher reason. Furthermore, Aquinas claims that [1] the first function of the gift of wisdom is to consider [*conspicio*] or contemplate [*contemplo*] the divine types [*rationibus divinis*] in themselves. But in contemplating the divine types, the gift of wisdom also allows humans to [2] consult such types in practical affairs in two ways: first, by [2a] judging human acts through the divine types and, second, by [2b] directing human acts in accordance with such types. One might wish for more detail from Aquinas on precisely such a crucial matter,<sup>202</sup> but we are here probably running up against the mystery of grace, the point where words convey little and where one, if one had the gift of wisdom, would almost taste the light of glory.

But why believe that the gift of wisdom is the second procession? One might note that the gift of wisdom already meets the condition stipulated earlier, namely, that because the first procession occurs in the will, the second procession must occur in the intellect, on account of the fact that the *similitudo secundum conformationem* is based in knowing and loving God.

The principal textual reason to hold that the gift of wisdom is what proceeds from

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<sup>202</sup> Some more detail could be gained, perhaps, if we had the space to consider how higher reason could go wrong and then to use such considerations as clues for considering how higher reason could be complemented by the gift of wisdom. The most extensive treatment of how higher reason can go wrong, from what have seen, occurs in *QDM*, q. 7, a. 5. As an aside, because the distinction between *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior* occupies a pivotal place in Augustine's *De trin*, an interesting project would investigate Aquinas's reception of that distinction. It is, in a way, perhaps already implicit in Aristotle's distinction between *sapientia* and *prudentia*.

sanctifying grace and charity is found in the following line:

Now this sympathy or connaturality for divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently, wisdom as a gift has its cause in the will, particularly, in charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge well.<sup>203</sup>

Aquinas is clearly using the language of procession: the intellect's connaturality to divine things results from charity and therefore proceeds from it. Aquinas repeats the point in a later article, arguing that God "in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause but the effect of charity."<sup>204</sup> It is thus stated again that the gift of wisdom, the intellect's connaturality to the divine, proceeds from charity.

But what does it mean, precisely, for the intellect's connaturality for divine things to proceed from charity? The clue arises in Aquinas's discussion of the pursuit of wisdom, not the gift of wisdom, in the early chapters of the *Summa contra Gentiles*. There, Aquinas claims that the pursuit of wisdom is the most excellent of all human pursuits for the following reason: "insofar as humans give themselves to the pursuit of wisdom, so far do they even now have some share in true beatitude."<sup>205</sup> Moreover, through the pursuit of wisdom, "humans especially approach to a likeness to God who 'made all things in wisdom' (Ps. 103:24). And since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially joins man to God in friendship."<sup>206</sup> In these lines, Aquinas is

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<sup>203</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 2, resp.

<sup>204</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 6, ad. 2.

<sup>205</sup> *SCG* 1, ch. 2. In the next line, Aquinas quotes Sirach 14:22.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.* In the next line, Aquinas quotes Wisdom 7:14.

speaking about the pursuit of wisdom as a human endeavor, that is, as the philosophical pursuit of inquiring about ultimate causes. But even as a human endeavor, the pursuit of wisdom endows human beings with (1) a share in true beatitude, (2) a likeness to God, and (3) a conjoining to God in friendship. However, while the pursuit of wisdom leads to the attainment of these qualities, the gift of wisdom is founded upon these qualities having already been obtained in a more perfect way through infused charity.<sup>207</sup> The intellect, in other words, is made connatural to the divine precisely because charity has already impressed within the human being (1) a share in beatitude, (2) a likeness to God, and (3) a conjoining to God in friendship. Moreover, because charity is supernatural, exceeding the proportion of human nature, the share of beatitude, the likeness to God, and the friendship with God issuing in and concomitant with the gift of wisdom far exceed the semblance of these qualities attainable through the philosophical pursuit of wisdom. Consider the following passage from Aquinas,

According to the Philosopher (*Meta* 1, 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: "As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation." On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.

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<sup>207</sup> We have already spoken of how charity attains a likeness to (conformity with) God in the will and how it attains friendship with God. It also attains a share in beatitude inasmuch as (1) it flows from sanctifying grace, which is a created participation in the divine nature, and (2) a consequence of charity—by which God is present to the mind as what is loved is in the lover—is spiritual joy, a taste of ultimate beatitude. See *ST* 2-2, q. 28, a. 1 and 3.

Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: "The spiritual man judgeth all things," because as stated in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), "the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the Holy Ghost.<sup>208</sup>

The order of nature leads from the intellectual pursuit of wisdom to some imperfect attainment of these qualities, but the order of grace infuses these qualities into the will and the very essence of the human, thereby elevating the intellect so that it may, through the promptings of the Holy Spirit, judge by connaturality with the divine.<sup>209</sup> This complex of relations, it seems to me, gives more reason to consider the gift of wisdom as what proceeds from charity in the likeness of the Trinity according to grace.

There are two additional reasons to believe that the gift of wisdom flows as the second procession from sanctifying grace and charity, the first being perhaps incidental and the second being more substantial. First, the gift of wisdom, Aquinas claims, exists in all of those with sanctifying grace and charity.<sup>210</sup> It may exist in them in various degrees, some having the gift in an extraordinary way, but nevertheless everyone with sanctifying grace is endowed with the gift of wisdom at least some degree.<sup>211</sup> The reason for this, it seems, is that from sanctifying grace flows charity, both of which render the soul and the will conformed to the divine and, in doing so, impart the gift of wisdom to the intellect, allowing it to judge properly in divine matters. This reason is only incidental, however, because many other qualities exist in all with sanctifying grace and charity (for example, infused courage), including other perfections in the intellect (infused faith, infused

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<sup>208</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 1.

<sup>209</sup> See *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 1, ad. 2

<sup>210</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 5; 2-2, q. 45, a. 1.

<sup>211</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 5.

prudence, and the gifts of understanding, knowledge, and counsel), so singling out the gift of wisdom merely on these grounds seems to be insufficient. Nevertheless, this first reason is crucial for the second.

Second, and more importantly, the claim that all of those endowed with sanctifying grace and charity obtain the gift of wisdom also aligns with Aquinas's claim in the treatise on the order of the effects of grace. He writes, "Now there are five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory."<sup>212</sup> The first two effects of grace have already been spoken of: sanctifying grace heals (and elevates) the soul and, consequently, results in charity in the will so that it may perfectly desire the good. The fourth, perseverance, does not add anything specifically new, and the fifth occurs only in the following life. However, the third effect—namely, to carry into effect the good proposed—is made possible in the most perfect way through the gift of wisdom by means of which one can judge through the promptings of the Holy Spirit about how precisely to carry that good into effect. As was shown above, Aquinas claims that grace only has an ordination to act through charity, and the ordination to act is further carried out through the intellect's judgment about the means by which the good proposed—the good to which the will is perfectly inclined through charity—can be achieved. A measure of the gift of wisdom, Aquinas claims, is given to all with sanctifying grace so that they are able to make the correct judgments necessary to attain salvation.<sup>213</sup> Because the gift of wisdom is practical insofar as the intellect's connaturality

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<sup>212</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 111, a. 3.

<sup>213</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 5, resp.

with divine matters allows the human through the prompting of the Holy Spirit to consider and consult the divine types, the human is able to judge affairs and courses of action by the divine types and direct human acts according to divine rules, in order to carry the good proposed into effect. Because, as Aquinas claims, carrying the good proposed into effect proceeds from the healing (and elevating) of the soul and the desire for the good, there is additional reason to believe that the gift of wisdom stands as the second procession.

While the arguments that the gift of wisdom stands as the second procession seem stronger than the arguments supporting infused faith, nevertheless some textual evidence in Aquinas can be marshalled for both sides. It will be beneficial at the end of this section to go through the arguments supporting each, beginning with the arguments supporting infused faith.

The principal reason supporting infused faith seems to be the following: whichever is more excellent—infused faith or the gift of wisdom—has at least a *prima facie* claim to serve as the second procession. But Aquinas explicitly says that the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Spirit. Hence, infused faith seems to serve as the second procession. Aquinas thus writes,

The theological virtues are those whereby the human's mind is united to God ... On the other hand, the gifts of the Holy Spirit dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the divine motion.

Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which the human is united to the Holy Spirit his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Spirit and regulate them.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> *ST* 1-2, q. 68, a. 8.

As the intellectual virtue of prudence perfects the moral virtue of courage, so too the theological virtues perfect the gifts of the Spirit. Infused faith is among the theological virtues, which implies that infused faith is more excellent than the gift of wisdom. Furthermore, Aquinas argues that the theological virtues unite the human's mind to God, on account of which they are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which only render the powers of the soul amenable to the Spirit's promptings. If Aquinas means that the human mind is united to God through all three of the theological virtues, then by faith the human mind is united to God and, therefore, faith is more excellent than the gift of wisdom. Because Aquinas does not say in this article whether any of theological virtues principally unites the human mind to God, there seems to be at least *prima facie* evidence that infused faith is more excellent than the gift of wisdom and, therefore, that infused faith most likely stands as the second procession.

However, other textual evidence suggests that the mind is united to God only through charity, not of itself through faith. Aquinas thus writes,

Although matters of faith are divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.<sup>215</sup>

More directly, in his discussion of the gift of wisdom, Aquinas states,

Uncreated Wisdom ... in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom, which is a gift, is not the cause but the effect of charity.<sup>216</sup>

The claim that charity is that by which the mind is united to God seems to require the

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<sup>215</sup> ST 2-2, q. 9, a. 2, ad. 1.



reader to qualify Aquinas's relatively undifferentiated claim in the *Prima Secundae* that, on account of their uniting the mind to God, the theological virtues are more perfect than the gifts of the Spirit. For, it turns out, the theological virtue of charity is what unites the mind to God. Hence, Aquinas's earlier claim can be more differentiated in the following way: while the theological virtue of charity is more perfect than the gifts of the Spirit, the other theological virtues of faith and hope are not necessarily so. The more likely interpretation, then, is that the gift of wisdom is more perfect than the theological virtues of faith and hope, though not charity. Indeed, the claims in the last two quotations seem to go even further: the gift of wisdom proceeds as an effect of charity in the intellect and allows the human being "to know in themselves the very things we believe [in faith], by a kind of union with them."<sup>217</sup> The implication is that the gift of wisdom is more perfect than infused faith: the latter allows us to believe in an informed, living, and meritorious way, the former allows us "to know in themselves" the very things we believe in that way. Hence, on account of its excellence, the gift of wisdom seems to stand as the second procession.

There are other reasons to support the claim that the gift of wisdom stands as the second procession. The gift of wisdom seems proportionate to charity and sanctifying grace in a way that infused faith is not. If my interpretation of the relation between charity and infused faith is correct—that is, that charity serves as a higher order activity in which lower order activities, such as infused faith, are enlisted and find their perfection—then charity transcends and perfects infused faith. As an act of intellect, faith

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<sup>216</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 45, a. 6, ad. 2.

<sup>217</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 9, a. 2, ad. 1.

does not have a sufficiency of itself: it is an assent without perfect understanding. But even when perfected by charity, perfect understanding is still not attained, and for this reason, Aquinas claims, discursivity (in the form of theological reasoning) and the assent of faith run parallel to one another.<sup>218</sup>

Furthermore, aside from the way the powers and operations are related to one another, charity also attains God *uti in se est* while infused faith attains God only imperfectly. The gift of wisdom, on the other hand, seems to proceed from charity, not as that which is less perfect is subsequent in the order of nature from that which is more perfect, but more as one equal proceeding from another. For the gift of wisdom seems to attain God *uti in se est*, though, it should be noted, not in a perfect way as will occur with the light of glory, but rather in a momentary sort of way: the gift of wisdom relies upon

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<sup>218</sup> This is unlike the sciences, for instance, wherein discursivity ceases as soon as an assent is made. For in the sciences an assent is made on the basis of understanding. See especially, *De ver*, q. 14, a. 1c: “assent and discursive thought are roughly parallel. For the assent is not caused by the thought, but by the will, as has just been said. However, since the understanding does not in this way have its action terminated at one thing so that it is conducted to its proper term, which is the sight [*visio*] of some intelligible object, it follows that its movement is not yet brought to rest. Rather, it still thinks discursively and inquires about the things which it believes, even though its assent to them is unwavering. For, in so far as it depends on itself alone, the understanding is not satisfied and is not limited to one thing; instead, its action is terminated only from without. Because of this the understanding of the believer is said to be “held captive,” since, in place of its own proper determinations, those of something else are imposed on it: “bringing into captivity every understanding...” (2 Cor. 10:5). Due to this, also, a movement directly opposite to what the believer holds most firmly can arise in him, although this cannot happen to one who understands or has scientific knowledge.” That discursivity and faith can run parallel to each other implies that theological reasoning only attains imperfect understanding of the divine things and also that theological reasoning

the promptings of the Holy Spirit occurring transiently in the soul if actual judgments according to the divine types are to be made, while by the light of glory we will know God securely and according to aeviternity. Such seems to be the implication of claiming that a connaturality to the divine proceeds in the intellect as the gift of wisdom on the basis of charity whereby there is a conformity between God and human beings.

### 3.4.3 Comparison with the Likeness by Analogy

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is necessary to briefly set the *similitudo secundum gratiam* in contrast to the *similitudo secundum analogiam*. As was stated earlier, the *similitudo secundum gratiam* is the likeness of the Trinity existing in the mind as it is being conformed to God. It would be a mistake to believe that the ordering of the processions in the *similitudo secundum gratiam* ought to mirror the processions in the *similitudo secundum analogiam*. For while the latter is a likeness of the Trinity according to an isomorphism, the former is a likeness by which the mind is being made to conform to God. Hence, the ordering of the processions in the *similitudo secundum gratiam* do not present an isomorphism to the ordering of processions within the triune God. Again, the ordering of the processions in this likeness are rather that by which an identity between the ordering of the processions in the human mind and the ordering of the processions in the triune God will be attained, where the word that the blessed utter is the eternal Word and the love that the blessed spirate is the eternal Spirit.<sup>219</sup>

Hence, the procession of charity from sanctifying grace is not an analogy for the procession of the Word from the Father, and the procession of either infused faith or the

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continues so long as the mysteries remain mysteries.

<sup>219</sup> See Merriell, "Trinitarian Anthropology," 137.

gift of wisdom from sanctifying grace and charity is not analogous to the procession of the Spirit from the Father and the Word. However, since charity is a procession in the will and infused faith or the gift of wisdom is a procession in the intellect, and since the procession in the intellect follows upon the procession in the will, Aquinas's claim emphasized earlier in the chapter that in relation to the separate substances, will is superior to intellect is maintained in my interpretation *similitudo secundum gratiam*. From a love in the will flows a perfection in the intellect, and through both the pilgrim mind is evermore conformed to God. Nevertheless, because processions in the will and intellect occur and because these processions have God as their object, there is a likeness of the Trinity in the mind, albeit only a likeness *in via*.

Furthermore, while an act of understanding was that from which processions occurred in the *similitudo secundum analogiam*, an act of sanctifying grace serves the same function in the *similitudo secundum gratiam*. As the basis of processions, both the act of understanding and sanctifying grace must be in act, and only on the basis of their being in act are processions able to occur. However, while the processions in the *similitudo secundum analogiam* were dependent upon an act of understanding occurring in the intellect, which was a complete but nevertheless passing act with reference to the essence of the human being, the processions in the *similitudo secundum gratiam* are dependent upon sanctifying grace being infused into the very essence of the soul, and as the soul is always in act for as long as it remains, so too is sanctifying grace in act for as long as it remains. Again, while the mind understanding itself is by nature a pure potency, sanctifying grace infused into the essence of the soul stands as a supernatural entitative habit. The mind may return to potency, whereas sanctifying grace does not return to

potency, but remains as both first and second act as long as the soul remains.<sup>220</sup> There is, concretely, never just the form of sanctifying grace without the second act of sanctifying grace.<sup>221</sup> As a likeness of the Trinity, the *similitudo secundum gratiam*, therefore, has less the character of transience than the *similitudo secundum analogiam* and thereby possesses a more excellent likeness of the Trinity than the latter.

Finally, a parallel might be noted: the last processions in either of the likenesses seem to impel the mind beyond its own current state. In the *similitudo secundum analogiam*, the last procession was the love whereby the mind delighted in knowing itself. However, because what the mind knows itself to be is a pure potentiality in the order of intellects, the mind was led beyond itself to hope for its own actualization in further acts of understanding and ultimately in understanding God. In the *similitudo secundum gratiam*, on the other hand, the mind is led beyond itself through the gift of wisdom by which the Holy Spirit prompts the human being to know and judge according

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<sup>220</sup> Unless, Aquinas argues, it is removed on account of mortal sin.

<sup>221</sup> Sanctifying grace, furthermore, remains in act for as long as it remains. Just as health as an entitative habit is always in act for as long as it remains, so too sanctifying grace is always in act for as long as it remains. There are not times when sanctifying grace is merely a capacity and other times when sanctifying grace is an actuated capacity. Either sanctifying grace is present and in act, or it is not present at all. Claiming that sanctifying grace is rooted in the essence of the soul, furthermore, implies its perdurance throughout change. Just as one remains healthy in body both when one is exercising and when one is asleep, so too one remains with sanctifying grace throughout all sorts of activity and inactivity, save acts of mortal sin, which remove sanctifying grace. Sanctifying grace, then, is not the activity of any one power or group of powers, but rather an activity of the whole, just as health is an activity of the whole body. So far has grace taken root in the soul that gracious activity has become identified with the human being as a constituent of his or her soul.

to the divine types.<sup>222</sup> The *similitudo secundum analogiam* and the *similitudo secundum gratiam* are then not in competition with one another: the mind by nature has a natural inclination toward conformation with the divine mind and its processions find their own terminus within the divine processions. No doubt charity has already impelled the mind beyond itself, but the gift of wisdom allows one almost to taste the perfection of the beatific vision, the full realization of which only occurs through the light of glory. Hence,

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<sup>222</sup> Incidentally, Merriell argues that in the *Summa*, Aquinas drops the analogy of proportionality in favor of an analogy *unius ad alterum*. A “flat parallelism” between the human and the divine mind is dropped in favor of an analogy by which the human mind is referred to its supereminent principle and terminus of God’s self-knowledge and self-love. It is true that the articles in *ST* I, q. 93 appear to drop the focus on the mind’s understanding, knowledge, and love of itself, but an absence of explicit affirmation does not amount to the presence of a rejection. Plus, there are a few reasons to be skeptical of Merriell’s claim here. First, the reality of the *similitudo secundum analogiam* in the *De ver* already implies that the mind’s love of itself already draws the mind beyond itself to a love of God as the mind’s proper fulfillment. So, the claim that a “flat parallelism” applies even to the *similitudo secundum analogiam* in *De veritate* needs to be differentiated. Second, rather than claiming that the *Summa* drops the analogy of proportionality in favor of an analogy *unius ad alterum*, it would make more sense to claim that the *Summa* preserves both sorts of analogy in the *imago Dei*. Aquinas, for example, writes the following: “the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (*De Trin.* xiv, 8), the ‘the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God.’ But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God” (*ST* I, q. 93, a. 8). Merriell reads such a claim as implying that Aquinas has dropped the analogy of proportionality, but it rather seems that he includes the mind’s knowledge and love of itself—the analogy of proportionality—in the more comprehensive movement of its turning toward God, which corresponds

even though the gift of wisdom is already a perfection by which the intellect is connatural to divine matters, it anticipates a higher degree of perfection, which will only occur in perfect form in the *similitudo secundum gloriam*.

## 2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided Thomistic meaning for the likeness of the Trinity in the human mind according to conforming grace. It has shown how, for Aquinas, in relation to the separate substances, will is superior to intellect. It has then shown how this principle is not only crucial for understanding the *imago Dei*, but also for understanding the *imago Trinitatis*, specifically in relation to the likeness of the Trinity in the human mind according to conformity. It has argued that, because intellectual and volitional processions are crucial to Thomistic conception of the *imago Trinitatis*, the processions of charity in the will and either infused faith or the gift of wisdom in the intellect serve as the processions for such a likeness of the Trinity.

The argument in this chapter has been based in the claim that, through loving the what is higher than itself, the intelligent being is being conformed to that reality. As Candace Vogler's beautifully says, "it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself."<sup>223</sup> But only through loving what is nobler than

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with the argument we have been making in these first two chapters.

<sup>223</sup> Candace Vogler, "The Intellectual Animal," 663. She continues with two examples, one on the humanity of Christ participating in the Word and another on the way in which the sensitive part in human beings participates in the intellectual part. She deals with the second example at length in the essay. In her words, "Hence the human nature of Christ is of a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent in itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union

oneself does one come to obtain a greater dignity by existing in that nobler reality. In loving, the mind is drawn toward that higher reality, desiring union with it. Of course, in loving what is nobler than the human mind, one also desires to know that reality, and no perfect union with that reality would occur except through knowing it. However, such a union is reserved for the next life for the blessed, and the gift and the task for the pilgrim in this life is to evermore approximate such a union through the conforming work of grace and charity.

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with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.”



### 3.0 LONERGAN: ANALOGIA MENTIS

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The present chapter deals with the likeness by analogy in Lonergan, and the following turns to the likeness by analogy. The questions guiding the present chapter are these: What would it mean, in Lonergan's terms, for the mind to know and love itself, and in what sense is his meaning an advance from Aquinas's meaning?

Before proceeding, however, it should be noted that, as far as I am aware, Lonergan does not explicitly distinguish between a likeness of the Trinity according to analogy and a likeness by conformity in either his trinitarian theology or in his reflections on the *imago trinitatis*.<sup>224</sup> Given his mastery of the relevant articles in Aquinas, it is improbable that he never considered that distinction.<sup>225</sup> The implication may be that he

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<sup>224</sup> The one passing reference of which I am aware occurs in Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, vol. 2, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 192, n. 5. Even then, he makes this distinction in order to state that he is only focusing on the analogical likeness.

<sup>225</sup> He refers several times to the relevant article in *De ver* in *Verbum*, indicating that he would be familiar with the distinction. See *Verbum*, CW2, 13, n. 3; 221, n. 138; 103, n. 211 and 212.

believed the distinction to be unimportant in relation to more central points in Aquinas's trinitarian theology or that he thought the distinction to be ill-conceived and proper only to an immature position of Aquinas, a distinction to be more or less discarded in later works. Whatever Lonergan's reasoning, he did not focus on that distinction in writing, and so one may, quite legitimately, inquire whether we should impose that distinction upon Lonergan's work if we are not to misrepresent his thought. While I acknowledge that concern, the distinction between likeness by analogy and likeness by conformation enables us to sort through and organize a number of contentious themes in the early and later works of Lonergan, including issues that have been at the heart of discussions among Lonergan's students. Hence, although the distinction may, in one respect, be foreign to his thought inasmuch as he did not devote attention in writing to it, in another respect, the distinction is germane to his thought inasmuch as it can help us organize and put in relief central themes of his theology and resolve a few central disputed issues in the secondary literature. The task of the next two chapters is to explain how the distinction can help us make sense of various issues that arise in Lonergan scholarship relating to his theology of the Trinity.

In the present chapter, I argue that Lonergan provides readers with far more resources to conceive of the mind's knowledge and love of itself, issuing in a significant advance from the work of Aquinas which meets the tensions of the modern period through a technique for objectifying consciousness. I proceed in three steps. First, I deal with method in Lonergan's systematic trinitarian theology, beginning first with Lonergan's position on the shortcomings of Aquinas, turning next to his position on the radical changes that need to occur to meet the demands of the modern period, and finally

dealing with method in systematic trinitarian theology properly speaking. Second, I turn to the meaning of intelligible emanation (also called “dynamic consciousness” in *De Deo Trino: Pars Systematica* (1964); henceforth, *The Triune God: Systematics*), noting how Lonergan’s methodological breakthrough places the conception of intelligible *emanation* into a new empirically verifiable context and how such a new context allows for intelligible emanation to be characterized in a unique way. Third, we turn to the question of the way in which the likeness by analogy ought to be conceived when the methodological breakthrough becomes fully radicalized in the work of the later Lonergan.

### **3.2 METHOD IN LONERGAN’S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY**

Lonergan’s distinctive contributions in trinitarian theology are informed, in part, by his philosophical method. Any account of the likeness by analogy—the mind’s knowing and loving of itself—in Lonergan would therefore have to explain the novelty of Lonergan’s philosophical method. Some of his advances in trinitarian theology are due to his advances in philosophy and can only be understood against that backdrop. However, because this dissertation is not about theological method, but about the *imago Trinitatis*, I remain at a somewhat general level and select only what is relevant to the present topic.

The present section argues that Lonergan transitions from a metaphysically based psychology of faculties to a technique for objectifying consciousness, in order to show in later sections how the technique for objectifying consciousness enables an empirically verifiable dimension to the *imago Trinitatis*. In the first subsection, I exposit Lonergan’s philosophical method by drawing upon a wide range of Lonergan’s writings from the 1940s into the 1960s, since during this period Lonergan became increasingly more

explicit about his philosophical method and its improvement upon classical methods, such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas.<sup>226</sup> The second subsection deals with method in trinitarian theology, drawing primarily upon Lonergan's five articles on the meaning of *verbum* in Aquinas and his textbook *The Triune God: Systematics*, where Lonergan develops his own insights in systematic trinitarian theology at greatest length.

### 3.2.1 From the Old Regime to the New: Metaphysics to Intentionality Analysis

The text currently known as *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* was originally a set of five articles published in *Theological Studies* between 1946 and 1949. The five articles were collected into a book, edited by David B. Burrell, C.S.C., and published two later in 1967. Lonergan wrote an introductory essay for the collection in 1964, and editors included the essay in the 1967 edition. In the introductory essay, Lonergan explains the methodological problems he encountered when first drafting the articles, and the editors of the Collected Works edition (1997) inform readers that the methodological problems Lonergan encountered were indeed enormous.<sup>227</sup> Even after one or two years of collecting, indexing, and organizing the material, Lonergan needed almost a year to figure out how to draft the first article to be published in 1946, though once the first article was conceived and written, the others flowed without serious impediment. But what were the methodological problems Lonergan first encountered?

At the end of the first article published in 1946, Lonergan relates the following: "I

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<sup>226</sup> For thorough and insightful treatment of Lonergan's development during this period, see Jeremy D. Wilkins, *Before Truth: Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem of Wisdom* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 131-230.

<sup>227</sup> *Verbum*, CW 2, xvi.

have begun, not from the metaphysical framework, but from the psychological content of Thomistic theory of intellect: logic might favor the opposite procedure but, after attempting it in a variety of ways, I found it unmanageable.”<sup>228</sup> The primary distinction is that between a metaphysical framework and a psychological content. In Lonergan’s neo-scholastic context, the customary procedure in philosophy would require one to begin with a metaphysics that establishes general categories applicable to any science and then to proceed to more determinate realities, such as organisms, sentient organisms, or intelligent organisms. When first drafting the articles, Lonergan attempted to organize and write the articles following that procedure, but found that he could not adequately communicate what he wanted to communicate when doing so. He found, in other words, that the procedure was unable to deal properly with the meaning of human psychological realities, including those that serve as the analogue for the trinitarian processions in general and the meaning of *verbum* in particular. Hence, Lonergan followed a different route in order to shed light upon and adequately formulate the psychological realities.

While Lonergan indicates the novelty of his procedure in the original articles, he makes the new procedure completely explicit twenty years later in the introductory essay for *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. The title of the introductory essay, as we have it in the Collected Works edition, is “Introduction: Subject and Soul,”<sup>229</sup> which captures the

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<sup>228</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 59.

<sup>229</sup> The title of the introduction is, in one sense, Lonergan’s own and, in another, an addition by the editors of the Collected Works edition. After drafting in 1964 the introduction for the 1967 version, Lonergan was asked to contribute a special article to the journal *Philippine Studies*. He submitted the introductory essay he drafted for the collected *verbum* articles, but since it would not make sense to entitle it “Introduction,” he entitled it “Subject and Soul.” Hence, the editors of the Collected Works edition have taken the liberty

major methodological breakthrough that occurred for Lonergan through writing the *Verbum* articles. As Lonergan frames it, the medieval theologians, including Aquinas, situated their account of *verbum* within a more encompassing metaphysics of the soul. Any explanatory conception of the soul is embedded within a particular explanatory framework, and both Aristotle and Aquinas conceived of the soul in a framework where metaphysics served as the basic and comprehensive science from which all other sciences derived their principles. Lonergan writes,

The Aristotelian framework was impressive. First, it was a general theory of being, a metaphysics. Secondly, it was a general theory of movement, a physics in that now antiquated sense. Thirdly, it was a general theory of life, a biology. Fourthly, it was a general theory of sensitivity and intelligence, a psychology.

Since in this framework the prior components are comprehensive, the latter are not pure but cumulative. Because movements exist, physical statements are not just physical; they are determinations added to metaphysical statements. Because living things move, biological statements are not just biological; they are determinations added to metaphysical and physical statements. Because sentient and intelligent beings are alive, psychological statements are not purely psychological; they presuppose and employ and determine what already has been settled in metaphysics, physics, and biology.<sup>230</sup>

Hence, the realities studied in every science besides metaphysics are intelligible insofar as they are derived from and are further determinations of basic and comprehensive metaphysical categories. Indeed, as I tried to show in Chapter 1, Aquinas assumes the basic Aristotelian framework when conceiving of the methods of the various sciences and their relations to one another. When he argues, for instance, that the realities known through the natural sciences depend upon matter for their being and for their being understood and that the realities known through metaphysics depend upon matter neither for their being nor for their being understood, Aquinas is claiming, in effect, that the

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of combining the two titles. For more detail, see *Verbum*, CW2, 253, note a.

realities known through the natural sciences have additional determinations in comparison with the realities known through metaphysics.

Lonergan further argues that there is a second foundational shortcoming pertained to the Aristotelian framework. That framework was characterized, Lonergan argues, by a single, uniform method for understanding and conceiving of the various kinds of souls, which were generically distinguished as vegetative, sensitive, and intelligent. He writes,

Aristotle's *De anima* is at once biological and psychological. It does not confuse plants, animals, and men. At the same time, it fails to bring out effectively the essential difference between an investigation of plant life and an investigation of the human mind; much less does it work out the methodological implications of that essential difference.<sup>231</sup>

The Aristotelian procedure for investigating the soul was uniform, according to Lonergan, because the various kinds of soul were investigated according to one and the same method: in the order of discovery, various kinds of objects pursued led to a differentiation of acts by which they were pursued, a differentiation between various kinds of acts led to a differentiation of powers in which acts occurred, and the differentiation of powers led to a various kinds of souls.<sup>232</sup> While the Aristotelian procedure for investigating the soul was fruitful inasmuch as it provided a systematic way to differentiate various forms of life, it was also limited in the sense that it applied one and the same procedure to various realities, thereby anticipating that rational beings

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<sup>230</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 4.

<sup>231</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 4.

<sup>232</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 4f. In the order of teaching, on the other hand, the order is reversed. So, in Aristotle's *De Anima*, we find that various kinds of souls are specified according to the powers proper to them; powers, in turn, are specified according to the acts; and acts, in turn, are specified according to the objects attained through such acts.

would be conceivable in terms generically identical to those in which botanical life was conceivable. Hence, the fruitfulness of such a procedure was not without its limitations, especially if the objects attained through the acts of rational beings were attained in ways far different from how vegetative and sensitive beings attained their own respective objects.

All of this might seem far removed from trinitarian theology. However, because Aquinas relied upon Aristotle's framework in order to formulate his own account of the intellectual and volitional operations of the soul, and because his trinitarian theology relies upon an analogy drawn from the intellectual and volitional operations, Aquinas's own trinitarian theology is constrained by the very same limitations facing the Aristotelian system. For example, when considering whether the intellect is superior to the will or vice versa, Aquinas considers their relationship to one another in terms of the distinction between potency and act. One power is superior to another when one serves as an active, formal principle and the other serves as a passive, material principle. Hence, Aquinas's analogies for trinitarian theology remain indebted to the Aristotelian system, wherein metaphysics serves as the basic and comprehensive science. The problem with such a procedure, according to Lonergan, is not that it leads to incorrect conclusions,<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> Lonergan, in fact, argues that Aristotle and Aquinas arrive at mostly correct conclusions and that they could only have arrived at those conclusions if they performed some psychological introspection. The problem is that neither Aristotle nor Aquinas thematize the technique of psychological introspection by which they arrive at those conclusions. Lonergan writes, "Aquinas explicitly appealed to inner experience and, I submit, Aristotle's account of intelligence, of insight into phantasm, and of the fact that intellect knows itself, not by a species of itself, but by a species of its object, has too uncanny an accuracy to be possible without the greatest introspective skill. But if Aristotle and Aquinas used introspection and did so



but rather that the metaphysical framework tends to shroud the psychological content. The same could be said of the uniform method employed to analyze the soul. Although proceeding from objects to acts to powers and finally to the soul provides a rather sophisticated method for analyzing the soul and explaining the distinctions between the various kinds of souls, nevertheless it does little to explain the unique ways in which each kind of living thing attains its respective objects. This limitation has repercussions for trinitarian theology because the unique conscious processes by which humans attain their objects—truth, being, goodness, and so on—remains out of focus. A new method is therefore required.

### **3.2.2 The New Regime: The Return to Experience**

Many philosophers and theologians in the modern and post-modern periods have unequivocally rejected the Aristotelian framework on the grounds that any metaphysics serving as a general theory of being inevitably distorts our understanding of reality, confining all of reality into a general conceptual structure which is not properly fitted for reality in all of its complexity.<sup>234</sup> While partly agreeing with such concerns, Lonergan takes a more nuanced position. He writes,

The use of such a framework gave Aristotelian thought its majestic coherence and comprehensiveness. The interlocking of each part with all the others precluded the possibility of merely patchwork revisions. ... [T]o correct Aristotle effectively,

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brilliantly, it remains that they did not thematize their use, did not elevate it into a reflectively elaborated technique, did not work out a proper method for psychology, and thereby lay the groundwork for the contemporary distinctions between nature and spirit and between the natural and the human sciences” (*Verbum*, CW2, 5f).

<sup>234</sup> See, for instance, Jean-Luc Marion, *God without Being*, 2nd Edition, tr. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

one must go beyond him; and to go beyond him is to set up a system equal in comprehensiveness and more successful in inner coherence and in conformity with fact. Still, such attempts have been made and, indeed, in two quite different manners. There have been open repudiations of Aristotle, as in modern science and in much modern philosophy. There also has been the more delicate procedure of sublation that developed and transformed Aristotelian positions to the point where the incorporation of further and profounder doctrines became possible. Such was the method of Aquinas ...<sup>235</sup>

There are, then, two different ways to approach the Aristotelian framework: either open repudiation, such as we have in much of the modern period, or sublation of the Aristotelian framework into a deeper and more developed framework. Lonergan argues that Aquinas, for his time, opts mainly for the second approach. Lonergan, too, opts for the second approach but the exigencies of the modern period—especially due to the success of modern science, to the emergence of historical consciousness, and to the privileged place of subjectivity—requires a new sublation, not only of the Aristotelian framework, but also of those fundamental insights from the modern period. Lonergan’s ambitious aim, then, is to sublimate the Aristotelian and Thomistic frameworks with a new framework, as he writes in the quote above, “equal in comprehensiveness and more successful in inner coherence and in conformity with fact.”

Accordingly, although Lonergan maintains the value of the Aristotelian framework for its own day, he also claims that such a framework is by now obsolete. Whereas scientific pursuits in the Aristotelian framework depended upon general metaphysical categories, scientific pursuits in the modern period do not depend upon such categories in order to make progress in understanding their respective objects.<sup>236</sup> As

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<sup>235</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 3f.

<sup>236</sup> For Lonergan on the relationship between science and metaphysics, see *Insight*, CW3, 521f, 532f.

Lonergan notes elsewhere,<sup>237</sup> the natural sciences in the modern period have asserted their respective autonomy from metaphysics and have made immense progress without having to conceive of their findings with any explicit reference to metaphysical categories. The hallmark of modern science is turning to the empirical data and raising questions about such data in order to understand the functions and ideal frequencies pertaining to some segment of reality.<sup>238</sup> Lonergan argues that a similar turn also needs to be undertaken in philosophy, which at least since the modern age has found itself in a morass of conflicting and seemingly irresolvable opinions. The most fundamental reason for the apparent irresolvability of such conflict is that philosophers do not have a way to verify their categories through empirical investigation. In other words, without a way to verify their categories, incommensurate philosophies abound and philosophical skepticism increasingly appears to be the most reasonable path.<sup>239</sup> Philosophy, Lonergan thus argues, needs to take an empirical turn, as the natural sciences took an empirical turn in the early modern period. Only to the degree that such a turn is undertaken, Lonergan contends, will philosophy be able to cut through this morass and thereby be able to contribute to the theological issues that in one way or another depend upon adequate philosophical categories, including, as we shall see, issues in trinitarian theology and in the theology of the *imago trinitatis*.

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<sup>237</sup> E.g., Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, vol. 14, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 82, 91ff.

<sup>238</sup> Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 3, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 57-92 and 126-162.

<sup>239</sup> See *Insight*, CW3, 544-552.

Despite the similarity, however, there is an important difference between the turn undertaken in modern science and the turn required in philosophy. Whereas in modern science the relevant data are the data of sense experience, in philosophy the relevant data are the data of consciousness.<sup>240</sup> Further, whereas modern science succeeds only to the degree that it considers and inquires about the sensible data, philosophy succeeds only to the degree that it considers and inquires about the data of consciousness.<sup>241</sup> Lonergan thus writes in *Insight*,

Data include data of sense and data of consciousness. Data of sense include colors, shapes, sounds, odors, tastes, the hard and soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, wet and dry, and so forth. The direct mode of cognitional process begins from data of sense, advances through insights and formulations to reach reflection and judgment. Thus, empirical science pertains to the direct mode of cognitional process. On the other hand, the data of consciousness consist of acts of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, reflecting, judging, and so forth. As data, such acts

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<sup>240</sup> For the distinction between data of senses and data of consciousness, see e.g., *Insight*, CW3, 358 and *Method in Theology*, CW14, 12f. For a corresponding distinction between exterior and interior experience, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, trans. Michael G. Shields, vol. 7, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 158-161.

<sup>241</sup> As Lonergan writes, “consciousness stands to introspective inquiry as sensible objects stand to direct inquiry. For that reason, just as what is known sensibly is attributed to external experience, so what is present through consciousness is attributed to interior experience. As outer experience is prior to direct inquiry, so inner experience is prior to introspective inquiry. As outer experience is not, properly speaking, human knowing in second act or first act but only in first potency, so too inner experience is not, properly speaking, human knowing in second act or in first act but only in first potency” (Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Incarnate Word*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Jeremy D. Wilkins, trans. Charles Hefling, vol. 8, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 480f, see 478-483 for detail; also, *Insight*, CW3, 358.

are experienced; but as experienced, they are not described, distinguished, compared, related, defined, for all such activities are the work of inquiry, insight, and formulation. Finally, such formulations are, of themselves, just hypotheses; they may be accurate or inaccurate, correct or mistaken; and to pronounce upon them is the work of reflection and judgment.<sup>242</sup>

The data of sense and the data of consciousness are distinct, then, but nevertheless possess a similarity. They are distinct because the data of sense are received principally through the five senses, whereas the data of consciousness pertain to consciousness itself. They are similar, however, because both can be subjects for investigation. As modern science has an empirical touchstone in the data of sense, Lonergan's philosophy has an empirical touchstone in the data of consciousness.

Before proceeding, however, a clarification is in order. The terms "conscious" and "consciousness" are used in our culture in a variety of ways,<sup>243</sup> and two of the most prominent ways can be gleaned from the following examples. First, people say that they become "conscious of" themselves when they are in front of people, that they were formerly "unconscious of" some aspect of a situation, or that they had "no consciousness of" that aspect of the situation. Second, people say that someone became "conscious" upon coming out of a coma, that someone went "unconscious" after suffering a blow to the head, or that someone is going in and out of "consciousness." These two ways of using the terms conscious and consciousness are distinct from one another for the following reason. The first way of using the term is transitive and connotes an object, which is the reason for the phrase "conscious(ness) of ...." The second way, on the other hand, is intransitive and does not connote an object; rather, all that is connoted is some

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<sup>242</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 299.

<sup>243</sup> See Mark D. Morelli, "Consciousness Is Not Another Operation," Lonergan Workshop 23 (2009): 401–11.

basic awareness that is present when one is awake but absent when one is deeply asleep, comatose, under general anesthesia, and so forth. As will soon become evident, Lonergan almost always employs the second, intransitive meaning of “conscious” and “consciousness” when developing a constructive argument, and almost always uses the first, transitive meaning only to show why it is inadequate.<sup>244</sup> Although in everyday discourse we understand what people mean when they employ the term as a transitive, the transitive meaning for explanatory purposes, according to Lonergan, is not adequately specified. As we will see below, the transitive meaning is more adequately expressed through intentional acts.<sup>245</sup>

Lonergan thus defines consciousness as preliminary and unstructured awareness.<sup>246</sup> Such awareness is preliminary because it is both temporally and logically prior to adverting to and inquiring about consciousness or about conscious acts. If we were not first conscious, any advertence and inquiry, including those into the nature of consciousness, would be impossible.<sup>247</sup> The same awareness is unstructured because only through inquiry and understanding does anything, including the data of consciousness, for us become intelligibly formed.<sup>248</sup> Lonergan thus writes, “consciousness is prior to

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<sup>244</sup> For discussion of the inadequacy of the transitive use, see *Insight*, CW3, 344; *Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 172-175. For a couple of exceptions, see *Verbum*, CW2, 56 and *Insight*, CW3, 650.

<sup>245</sup> *Method in Theology*, CW16, 11.

<sup>246</sup> Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael G. Shields, vol. 12, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 382f; *Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 160f. *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 480f and 484f.

<sup>247</sup> *Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 158f, 166f; *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 480f.

<sup>248</sup> *Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 158f.

intellectual inquiry and, like [sensible] experience, needs to be completed by it.”<sup>249</sup> Importantly, Lonergan does not mean that consciousness lacks a latent structure—as we will see, he argues that there is a latent, dynamic structure operative in our conscious performance—but only that in preliminary consciousness the structure is not yet understood. In other words, humans operate by means of the structure of consciousness before they understand, affirm, and choose that structure. Each of these attributes of consciousness indicates that consciousness is not simply another object. One can be conscious and yet not advert to, understand, and affirm the nature of consciousness. Adverting to, understanding, and affirming the nature of consciousness require both one to be conscious and an inquiry into the nature of consciousness. But one can be conscious without undertaking such an inquiry. Consciousness then is preliminary and unstructured, though one can seek to understand it and, insofar as one understands it, discern a structure latent within it.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> *Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 160f.

<sup>250</sup> Importantly, there are different kinds of inquiry into consciousness. On the one hand, there is a technical and philosophical inquiry into consciousness, which Lonergan undertakes in *Insight*. On the other, there is an everyday or ordinary inquiry into consciousness where one inquires about what one is feeling, whether one has understood, and so on. In either case, there is an inquiry into consciousness and so a kind of introspection. Consciousness is preliminary and unstructured, Lonergan argues, regardless of “whether this further intellectual inquiry is carried out in a technical and scientific manner or is something that can be, and commonly is, done by anyone. Both the technical and the scientific introspection and the common everyday reflection go beyond consciousness to further intellectual inquiry, though in different ways” (*Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 165). See also, *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 480f. Nevertheless, discerning the dynamic structure intrinsic to human consciousness is accomplished through the technical, scientific inquiry, principally because such an inquiry seeks the relations of the various elements pertaining to

Broadly speaking, Lonergan classifies the data of consciousness according to three distinct categories. These are (1) objects intended, (2) acts by which objects are intended and by which subjects are conscious, and (3) the subject as the one for whom such acts occur and to whom objects are made present.<sup>251</sup> To distinguish between (1) the objects intended from (2) the acts by which they are intended, Lonergan asks us to consider a few examples: what is seen is distinct from the act of seeing, what is heard is distinct from the act of hearing, what is understood is distinct from the act of understanding, what is affirmed is distinct from the act of affirming. A distinction is thus obtained between the objects and the acts of consciousness. But although they are distinct from one another, acts and objects are intimately related to and mutually dependent upon one another: there would be nothing seen without an act of seeing, nothing understood without an act of understanding, etc., and conversely, there would be no act of seeing without what is seen, no act of understanding without what is understood, etc. Objects are made present as that which is intended. Let us call this intentional presence.

The acts of consciousness, however, not only intend objects and make them present, but also, Lonergan argues, render the subject present to him or herself. Lonergan writes,

*by one and the same act* an object is present in the second sense of presence, and the subject performing such an act is present in the third sense of presence. It is not ... that colors being seen are present by one act, while the subject is present to himself by another act, and the seeing, by which the subject sees the colors, is present by yet a third act. Rather it is a single act that effects both the presence ...

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consciousness to one another.

<sup>251</sup> The most succinct differentiation between these, from what I have found, occurs in *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 474f. The distinction, however, is employed in many places throughout Lonergan's work.



of the object and the presence ... of the subject and his acts.<sup>252</sup>

Though one and the same act renders both object and subject present, it does so in different ways. While acts of consciousness make objects present as that which is intended, they make present the subject as the one for whom intentional acts occur. Let us call the latter self-presence. Importantly, self-presence is not a species of intentional presence.<sup>253</sup> The subject is not made present as another object in every intentional act, but rather as the one for whom such acts occur. As Lonergan writes years later in *Method in Theology*,

the presence of the object is quite different from the presence of the subject. The object is present as what is gazed upon, attended to, intended. But the presence of the subject resides in the gazing, the attending, the intending. For this reason the subject can be conscious, as attending, and yet give his whole attention to the object as attended to.<sup>254</sup>

Self-presence, Lonergan argues, is immanent in any act of consciousness, regardless of whether the act is an act of seeing, hearing, remembering, planning, or otherwise.<sup>255</sup> It is

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<sup>252</sup> *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 482f.

<sup>253</sup> Lonergan distinguishes between various sorts of presence, though not always employing the same terms: see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe et al., vol. 5, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 20f; Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Topics in Education: The Cincinatti Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, vol. 10, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 81-82; Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Cognitive Structure," in *Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and Frederick E. Crowe, vol. 4, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 205-22, at 209f; *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 476f; *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 504-507; *Method in Theology*, CW16, 12.

<sup>254</sup> *Method*, CW16, 12.

<sup>255</sup> Lonergan thus argues that consciousness, which includes self-presence, is an "awareness immanent in

often not adverted to, although one could always in principle advert to it. If one does advert to it, consciousness and its acts would become an object for itself, that is, one would objectify one's own consciousness and attain an intentional presence of consciousness to itself. More will be said about intentional presence of consciousness to itself in a moment. For now, it is important to reiterate that simple self-presence is not the same as the intentional presence of consciousness to itself. Simple self-presence, rather, is immanent in every intentional act, though it is not always adverted to.

Because one is self-present by conscious acts, different kinds of conscious acts will render one self-present in different ways. Lonergan distinguishes between kinds of conscious acts in several ways. To consider a first way of distinguishing between them, there is a distinction between psychic or sentient acts on the one hand, and intelligent acts on the other.

Psychic or sentient acts, like all other conscious acts, occur within consciousness and render the subject self-present in a distinct way. They are generically classified by Lonergan as acts of experience. Acts of experience intend anything imaginable, that is, anything seen, touched, tasted, heard, or smelled, anything constructed from the objects of the senses by imagining, and any feelings occurring within consciousness, such as fear, delight, jealousy, admiration, and so on. Importantly, each of these acts of experience render the subject self-present in different ways; as, for instance, one who feels afraid or as one who feels shocked, as one who is seeing or as one who is hearing. Lonergan argues that, though a basic unity is given in consciousness,<sup>256</sup> consciousness is

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cognitional acts" (*Insight*, CW3, 344f).

<sup>256</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 349-352.

qualitatively different according to the various conscious acts.<sup>257</sup> That is not to say that the self-present subject distinguishes between the various sentient acts or between the various ways she is self-present by means of those acts. For to distinguish between them at least requires one to advert to these acts and the way in which they are self-present by means of such acts, and we both perform these acts and are rendered self-present prior to

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<sup>257</sup> Consciousness, Lonergan argues, is “a quality of cognitional acts, a quality that differs on the different levels of cognitional process, a quality that concretely is the identity immanent in the diversity and multiplicity of the process” (*Insight*, CW3, 350). Elsewhere, he writes, “the quality of consciousness changes as the subject performs different operations” (*Method*, CW14, 12), and “different operations yield qualitatively different modes of being conscious subjects” (*ibid.*, 14). Lonergan often categorizes the quality of cognitional acts according to the various levels of consciousness—empirical, intelligent, rational, and responsible, all of which I will explain in the body of the chapter in a moment. In doing so, however, he may inadvertently conceal the fact that each of the various conscious acts, not merely the different so-called levels on which such acts occur, yield different modes of being a conscious subject. This is not to say that Lonergan is incorrect to group the various conscious acts according to the different levels with their respective operators, which again I will explain soon, but only to say that we should not think of merely three (in *Insight*) or four (post-*Insight*) or perhaps five kinds of self-presence, but rather many more. To take but one example, being present to oneself as formulating is distinct from being present to oneself as understanding, since in each case there are different operations yielding different qualities of consciousness. Although being present to oneself as understanding and being present to oneself as formulating may be helpfully grouped under what Lonergan calls intelligent consciousness, the grouping itself should not blind us to the difference between the various kinds of self-presence. Further, the quality of consciousness is, most likely, also inflected by patterns of experience. For the latter point see, Mark D. Morelli, “The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness and the Prospects for a Lonerganian History of Philosophy,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (1995): 379–402; and, more fully, Gerard Walmsley, *Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

adverting to the acts and the ways in which we are self-present.

Intelligent acts also occur within consciousness and render the subject self-present. Acts of intelligence, however, possess a condition that distinguishes them from acts of experiencing: acts of intelligence are intrinsically conditioned by the desire to know, which manifests itself in both explicit and implicit questioning. In other words, acts of intelligence are dependent upon questioning and the desire to know, whereas acts of experiencing are not so dependent. In the concrete, of course, a person may be, say, imagining because she desires to know, but because she may also imagine without inquiring, sentient or psychic acts cannot be said to be intrinsically conditioned by the desire to know. Among the intelligent acts, Lonergan includes understanding, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing evidence, grasping the (virtually) unconditioned, affirming, deliberating, and deciding.<sup>258</sup> The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but the common element for each of these acts (and others classifiable as intelligent) is that they are either proximately or remotely dependent upon inquiry. A human person, for instance, neither understands nor marshals and weighs evidence unless she first asks questions.

But questions differ, and different kinds of questions have the potential to set forth different streams of conscious acts. In *Verbum* and elsewhere, Lonergan distinguishes between two different kinds of questions: questions for direct understanding and questions for reflective understanding. Questions for direct understanding generally

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<sup>258</sup> For various lists of conscious acts, not merely intelligent acts, see “Cognitional Structure,” CW4, 206; *Method*, CW14, 10; *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 474f. The differences between the precise items on each list should not distract from the fact that the lists are employed merely to indicate what is meant by conscious, intentional act, not to provide an exhaustive account.

take the form “What is it?” while questions for reflective understanding generally take the form of “Is it so?”<sup>259</sup> The first question—“What is it?”—seeks some intelligibility in the data, while the second question—“Is it so?”—seeks to know whether the intelligibility one has understood is adequate and true, whether it can be affirmed to be so. An answer to a question for direct understanding terminates in a concept, whereas an answer to a question for reflective understanding terminates in a yes or no judgment. Between the question “What is it” and its termination in a concept lie the conscious act of constructive imagination as one seeks an act of direct understanding (a grasp of some intelligibility in a phantasm) and the conscious act of formulating one’s direct understanding into a concept. Between the question “Is it so?” and the expression of its answer in a yes or no judgment lie the conscious act of marshalling and weighing the evidence as one seeks an act of reflective understanding, and the conscious act of affirming in a yes or no judgment. The two different kinds of questions, then, have the potential to set forth two distinct streams of conscious acts.

Because the two streams of conscious acts make the subject present to him or herself in distinct ways, Lonergan argues in *Insight* that each kind of question inaugurates a distinct level of intellectual consciousness, namely, intelligent consciousness (also called in *Verbum* “the spirit of wonder and inquiry”) and rational consciousness (in *Verbum*, the spirit of critical reflection).<sup>260</sup> Although the metaphor of the levels of consciousness only arises in works subsequent to the articles on the meaning of *verbum*

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<sup>259</sup> See *Verbum*, CW2, 104f.

<sup>260</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 60.

in Aquinas, Lonergan already lays the groundwork for the metaphor in those articles.<sup>261</sup> Questions for reflection do not arise unless there has already been some act of understanding and some act of conceiving. One asks “Is it so?” in relation to the concept that has been formulated on the basis of an act of understanding. However, questions for reflection also complete questions for direct understanding. If the evidence is sufficient, then the understanding and the concept expressing it is affirmed to be correct and true. If the evidence is insufficient, then the understanding and concept expressing it is shown to be incorrect or untrue and the understanding and concept are thereby denied. If evidence is insufficient, then one must return to a question for direct understanding, “Well, again, what is it?” Questions for reflection thereby complete questions for direct understanding by determining whether or not the understanding and concept arrived at through questions for direct understanding are adequate and true.

Intelligent acts are also included in the data of consciousness. However, unless they are adverted to and interrogated, they are included in the data only as experienced, but not as understood, defined, evaluated, or affirmed.<sup>262</sup> In other words, people experience their intelligent acts—questions for direct understanding, acts of direct

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<sup>261</sup> For instance, see *Verbum*, CW2, 77f: “There are two levels of activity, the direct and the reflective. On the direct level there occur two types of events: there are insights into phantasm which express themselves in definitions; there is the coalescence or development of insights which provides the hypothetical syntheses of simple quiddities. On the reflective level these hypothetical syntheses are known as hypothetical; they become questions which are answered by the *resolutio in principia*. This return to sources terminates in a reflective act of understanding, which is a grasp of necessary connection between the sources and the hypothetical synthesis; from this grasp there proceeds its self-expression, which is the *compositio vel divisio*, the judgment, the assent.”

understanding, acts of conceiving, questions for reflection—before they advert to such acts and inquire about the differences between them and their relations to one another. As a result, one can experience one’s own intelligent acts without having yet understood, conceived, affirmed, and known the nature of one’s own intelligent conscious acts. This is the meaning of the above claim that consciousness is both preliminary and unstructured. Furthermore, because of the difference between the various intelligent acts, the subject is rendered present to him or herself in different ways. Being present to oneself as questioning is different from being present to oneself as understanding; being present to oneself as understanding is different from being present to oneself as marshaling and weighing the evidence; and so on. Again, such differences in self-presence are not often adverted to, and yet they are nevertheless experienced differently: not only do the acts themselves differ, but so too does one’s experience of oneself when, say, marshaling and weighing the evidence differ from the feeling one has when one is affirming or denying.

Sometime after Lonergan finished *Insight* but before finishing *The Triune God*, he claims that there is also a fourth level of consciousness,<sup>263</sup> which he variously names rational self-consciousness or moral self-consciousness.<sup>264</sup> (There is, it should be noted, a

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<sup>262</sup> See e.g., *Constitution of Christ*, CW7, 161.

<sup>263</sup> The earliest mention of a fourth level of consciousness, from what I can tell, is in *Understanding and Being* [1958], CW5, 16 and 228.

<sup>264</sup> Indeed, Lonergan already employs the terms “rational self-consciousness” and “moral self-consciousness” in Chapter 18, “The Possibility of Ethics,” of *Insight*. See *Insight*, CW3, 625-629, 634-638, 640, 642, 646, and 651. He does not explicitly designate rational/moral self-consciousness as a new level of consciousness, and his claims are somewhat ambiguous about whether it might constitute a fourth level.

shift in Lonergan's thought on the fourth level of consciousness, a shift that occurs after *The Triune God*. I will, however, defer treatment of that shift until Chapter 4, principally because Lonergan's major works on trinitarian theology are written before that shift and secondarily because the meaning of that shift is more appropriately discussed in the next chapter.) Already in *Insight*, rational self-consciousness is said to be an "enlargement" and a "transformation" of consciousness. He writes,

there is a succession of enlargements of consciousness, a succession of transformations of what consciousness means. Waking replaces dreaming. Intelligent inquiry emerges in waking to compound intelligent with empirical consciousness. Critical reflection follows understanding and formulation to add

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For the affirmative: First, he speaks about an enlargement and transformation of consciousness occurring from rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness. For instance: "But the final enlargement and transformation of consciousness consists in the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject (1) demanding conformity of his doing to his knowing, and (2) acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably (637). Second, he speaks of judgment as the act of rational consciousness, but decision as the act of rational self-consciousness (636), and the levels are distinguished, in part, by the acts proper to each. For the negative: First, he does not use the term "level" to speak of rational self-consciousness. Second, he writes, "Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing" (622). Third, he speaks about an "extension" of rational consciousness into rational self-consciousness, which depending on the meaning of "extension," may imply that rational self-consciousness is not fundamentally different from rational consciousness.

My own opinion on this matter, for what it's worth, is that Lonergan would have affirmed that rational self-consciousness constitutes a distinct level, but that Lonergan had not yet begun to rely upon the metaphor of levels to communicate his thought and so there was not as much of an exigence to say that rational self-consciousness constitutes a distinct level. In other words, as Lonergan begins to rely upon that metaphor, and as he (for better or worse) more frequently uses it as shorthand to communicate a cluster of central ideas, there then becomes a need to clarify that rational self-consciousness constitutes a new level.



rational consciousness to intelligent and empirical consciousness. But the final enlargement and transformation of consciousness consists in the empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious subject (1) demanding conformity of his doing to his knowing, and (2) acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably.<sup>265</sup>

The key difference between the first three levels of consciousness and the fourth, then, is that whereas the first three levels of consciousness concern knowing, the fourth level of consciousness concerns doing. Indeed, as the first three levels were inaugurated by a certain kind of question—"What is it?" for the second level, and "Is it so?" for the third level—so, too, the fourth level of consciousness is inaugurated by a certain kind of question, which Lonergan formulates as "What am I to do?"<sup>266</sup> When moving to the fourth level, then, the concern animating consciousness "shifts from knowing being to realizing the good."<sup>267</sup>

Furthermore, as the questions animating the second and third levels have the potential to set forth distinct streams of conscious acts, so too the question animating the fourth level has the potential to set forth a distinct stream of conscious acts. In *Insight*, Lonergan includes acts of practical understanding, acts of reflecting upon those insights, and acts of deciding. It should be noted here that, unlike the prior levels of consciousness, Lonergan's exposition of the fourth level includes acts that are proper to the lower levels of consciousness.<sup>268</sup> Acts of insight and acts of reflection are proper to the second and

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<sup>265</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 636f.

<sup>266</sup> *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 228. Lonergan does not specify the question in *Insight*. He only says that there is an exigence for consistency between our knowing and our doing.

<sup>267</sup> "Cognitive Structure," CW4, 219.

<sup>268</sup> This may lend more evidential support to Patrick Byrne's thesis that the "phrase 'level of consciousness,' refers primarily and directly to the subject as subject, and only derivatively and indirectly to the acts of consciousness" (Patrick H. Byrne, "Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as

third levels respectively, but the question of the fourth level—“What should I do?”—invites a host of questions requiring practical insights into possible courses of action and reflection upon the merits and shortcomings of each of those possible courses of action.<sup>269</sup> More crucially, however, whereas the second level of consciousness terminates in a concept and the third level terminates in a judgment, the fourth level terminates in a decision. The act of deciding does not occur on the previous levels, which were concerned with knowing, not doing. Lonergan writes in *Insight*,

the decision itself is an act of willing. It possesses the internal alternatives of either consenting or refusing. It may also possess external alternatives, when different courses of action are considered simultaneously, and then consent to one and refusal of the others constitute a choice.<sup>270</sup>

As the act proper to the third level of consciousness is either an affirmation or denial, so the act proper to the fourth level of consciousness is either consenting or refusing. These are what Lonergan calls the internal alternatives. When a number of possible courses of action are understood, then there are what Lonergan calls external alternatives. The one to which the will consents is chosen; those which the will refuses are not chosen. This is important to have in hand when we consider Lonergan’s claims about the likeness of the Trinity in us.

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Subject,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 2 (1995): 131–50, at 132). It would only be imperfect evidential support, first, because it relies upon the supposition that Lonergan would affirm a fourth level of consciousness in *Insight* and, second it relies upon the additional supposition that properties belonging to the fourth level (in this case, it includes acts proper to lower levels) also belong to the lower levels.

<sup>269</sup> This sheds some light upon Lonergan’s claim in *Method*, “Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact” (*Method*, CW14, 37).

<sup>270</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 636.

Although Lonergan's treatment of consciousness and its acts—which I have only sketched here—may seem far removed from trinitarian theology, we will see in a moment how it plays a fundamental role in his own trinitarian theology. Before that, however, we need to understand how Lonergan conceives of the method of trinitarian theology.

### 3.2.3 Method in Systematic Trinitarian Theology

At the beginning of Chapter 2 of *The Triune God: Systematics* stands one apparent contradiction for which the ensuing text is to provide the solution. At one and the same time, the Son, the second Person of the Trinity, is said to be both *a se* and not *a se*. The problem could, of course, be somewhat resolved by saying that the Son is *a se* because He is God and not *a se* because He is from the Father. This solution, indeed, provides two distinct arguments by which each of the claims is supported: *because* the Son is God, He is *a se*, and *because* He is from the Father, He is said to be not *a se*. Such a solution is an advance from the plainly-stated, apparent contradiction because it states the conditions upon which each side of the apparent contradiction is based, thereby making explicit the two distinct arguments through which each claim is defended. But inasmuch as the two claims and arguments supporting them stand opposed or, at least, remain unintegrated with one another, the apparent contradiction has not yet been fully resolved, but only relocated into two distinct sets of premises from which each claim is deduced.<sup>271</sup> But how are the two distinct conditions to be understood in relation to and union with one another? How is the Son's being from the Father integrated with being God?

There is thus a need for an act of understanding that can unify what, without such

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<sup>271</sup> The issue here is moving from questions for coherence to questions for understanding. See *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 20-24.

an act of understanding, lies in disunity.<sup>272</sup> The disunity in the claims that the Son is *a se* and not *a se* is not the only disunity that needs to find some integration through an act of understanding. Other apparently contradictory claims would also need to be resolved: to take but a few examples, that the Holy Spirit is both *a se* and not *a se*, that there are three Persons and one divine essence, and that there is one divine operation *ad extra* but three distinct Persons cooperating. Still more, such an act of understanding would draw into a unified whole a series of claims that are not apparently contradictory, but that have nevertheless yet to be intelligibly related to one another. Again, a few examples: that the Son is in Scripture called the Word, that the Spirit is often identified as Love, that the procession of the Son is called generation but the Spirit's is not, that the procession of the Spirit is called spiration but the Son's is not, and so on. The goal of Lonergan's *The Triune God: Systematics* is to formulate an act of understanding comprehensive enough to draw into a unified whole all of the affirmations made in faith about the Trinity and to show how such an act of understanding, in fact, sheds light upon each of the various affirmations. The goal, in other words, is systematic.<sup>273</sup>

Lonergan also expounds upon the intrinsic limitations of any such act of understanding. He argues that such an act of understanding will be mediated, imperfect,

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<sup>272</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 62-65, 166-169.

<sup>273</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 24f. Lonergan writes, "the problem of understanding is solved not because individual answers are provided to individual questions one at a time and separately, but because the whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by the efficacy of the first solution, because a system of definitions is introduced through which the solutions can be formulated, and because a technical terminology is developed for expressing defined concepts."

analogical, obscure, and incrementally attained.<sup>274</sup> It will be imperfect because, while a perfect understanding of the triune God can only be attained in the beatific vision when the human's intellect is informed by the divine essence, the theologian's intellect is informed only by a finite intelligibility. It will be analogous because the finite intelligibility is verified (in a way to be discussed in a moment) to be illuminative for us of an infinite reality. It will be obscure because, following the Fourth Lateran Council, the analogical similarity between the finite and the infinite is always vitiated by a "still greater dissimilarity."<sup>275</sup> The upshot of all of these limitations is that the act of understanding unifying all of the doctrines will be no more than a hypothetical. As the theorem of tectonic plates provides an explanation for a variety of data, such as volcanoes, earthquakes, fossil locations, and so forth, so too the task of *The Triune God: Systematics* is to provide a hypothesis to explain the relevant doctrines, namely, the Christian doctrines of the Trinity in their relations to one another.<sup>276</sup> But, again, as the

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<sup>274</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 14-19.

<sup>275</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 17. In *Verbum*, Lonergan metaphorically says, "do not think that Aquinas allows the psychological analogy to take the place of the divine essence as the one sufficient principle of explanation. The psychological analogy is just the side door through which we enter for an imperfect look" (*Verbum*, 216).

<sup>276</sup> Lonergan notes in the opening chapter of *The Triune God: Systematics* that there is a difference between modern science and theological reflection, in that modern science begins with the data of sense while theological reflection begins with the affirmed doctrinal realities. He thus writes, "theological science differs from natural or human science in that theological science begins not from data but from truth. The natural sciences seek an understanding of sensible data; they approximate to truth by understanding sensible data; and they hope for no more than to attain greater plausibility and probability by means of successive and ever better hypotheses and theories. ... But the meaning that is found in the word of God

theorem of tectonic plates is only a hypothesis, even if a currently verified one in geology, so too the act of understanding used in Lonergan's trinitarian theology aims to be only a hypothesis, albeit one to be verified in a way appropriate for systematic theology.

To the degree that the hypothesis virtually provides answers for all of the relevant questions arising from the doctrines, the hypothesis is verified. Although Lonergan does not refer in these passages in *The Triune God* to his arguments about verification in *Insight*, and although Lonergan does not discuss in *Insight* the verification of hypotheses in systematic theology, nevertheless his arguments in the earlier text shed a good deal of light upon the verification of hypotheses in systematic theology. A hypothesis is a formulated insight which attempts to explain some set of already known facts, and verifying or disproving the hypothesis occurs principally through asking a question for reflection—"Is it so?"—with regard to the hypothesis. Raising the question for reflection invites a host of further questions, which, if followed through, test the original hypothesis for any vulnerability. These further questions, in other words, are meant to test whether the hypothesis successfully explains the relevant data. Lonergan writes in *Insight*,

Let us now distinguish between vulnerable and invulnerable insights. Insights are vulnerable when there are further questions to be asked on the same issue. For the further questions lead to further insights that certainly complement the initial insight, that to a greater or less extent modify its expression and implications, that perhaps lead to an entirely new slant on the issue. But when there are no further questions, the insight is invulnerable. For it is only through further questions that there arise the further insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial

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proceeds from God's infallible knowledge, and so a theology that begins from revealed truths is called a knowledge subordinated to divine knowledge. ... Since this is so, theological understanding is true in the sense that it consists in understanding the truth that God has revealed" (*The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 33).

approach and explanation.

... When an insight meets the issue squarely, when it hits the bull's eye, when it settles the matter, there are no further questions to be asked, and so there are no further insights to challenge the initial position. But when the issue is not met squarely, there are further questions that would reveal the unsatisfactoriness of the insight and would evoke the further insights that put a new light on the matter.<sup>277</sup>

An insight and its formulation in a hypothesis, then, is vulnerable precisely to the degree that further relevant questions remain unanswered, and it is invulnerable precisely to the degree that further relevant questions are answered. Again, an insight and its formulation in a hypothesis is vulnerable to the degree that further additions and nuance remain possible for the original insight, and it is invulnerable to the degree that all of the additions and nuances have been realized. Accordingly, if the hypothesis for understanding the trinitarian processions is to be invulnerable, it will need to provide, at least virtually if not explicitly, an answer for the all of the relevant questions in trinitarian theology; to the degree that it does not provide at least a virtual answer to such questions, the hypothesis is vulnerable. Lonergan thus writes in *The Triune God*, “one who reaches not just any understanding but one that is most fruitful does not solve just one single problem in a sterile fashion without bearing further fruit but solves one problem directly in such a way that one simultaneously reaches a virtual solution to many others.”<sup>278</sup> An insight and its formulation are fruitful, possessing explanatory potential for a whole range of questions, only insofar as they are invulnerable.<sup>279</sup>

The hypotheses of the systematic theologian, however, can only be affirmed as, at

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<sup>277</sup> Lonergan, *Insight*, 309. See also, *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 122f.

<sup>278</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, 42f.

<sup>279</sup> Though, of course, an insight and its formulation can be invulnerable but not very fruitful: for instance, “the door jambs in my dining room are brown.”

best, probably true.<sup>280</sup> That is, the hypotheses of systematic theologians can never be affirmed as certainly true. But this limitation is not unique to the hypotheses in systematic theology; it is also shared with the hypotheses in modern empirical science. On the latter, Lonergan writes,

Positively, the scientist can say that if the theory or the hypothesis is true, then it conforms to the data. But he cannot establish the alternative, namely, that there is no other theory that would cover all the data we have at present and account for further data that at the present are not accounted for. His argument, then, is really a matter of affirming the consequent; and the hypothetical argument in which one affirms the consequent is not logically valid. ... The scientific argument from verification is generally of the following type: If A, then B; but B; therefore A. If the theory, A, is true, then we have all these things that we account for; but we have all these things accounted for; therefore, the theory is a fairly good account of them. This is not a logically valid argument; but it is an approach towards having A established. When you establish 'If A, and only if A, then B,' then you can say, 'B, therefore A.' But in general, scientific theory is not that type of thing, and consequently the scientist says that his theory is probable; he is satisfied to keep on explaining as many of the data as he can, moving on to more and more satisfactory theories and hypotheses.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> The articles of faith, on the other hand, can be affirmed as certainly true. The claim becomes more differentiated when Lonergan hits upon the notion of functional specialization and the function of doctrines in *Method in Theology*; see especially, CW14, 298-307. Especially relevant is the transition from dogmatic theology in the classical framework to doctrinal theology in the empirical framework.

<sup>281</sup> *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 126. Here is the illustration Lonergan uses in the preceding paragraph: "The law of the free fall is practically certain, so close to sensible data that it is very difficult to conceive a possibility of things being thought of otherwise. However, insofar as this law is understood on the assumptions of a Euclidean space, it has to be revised when special relativity is introduced and space is no longer strictly Euclidean. In other words, assumptions that lie on a remote level may be changed, and then the law will not be used in exactly the same sense as before. In general, where measurements are involved and the law is very close to the measurements, one can be almost certain; but the higher one ascends in the scientific superstructure, the greater the possibility that some element in the theory that at the present time is assumed as basic may later lose its basic position" (ibid., 125). See also, *Insight*, CW3, 226ff.



The judgments of scientists and systematic theologians are probable at best because their arguments take the form of affirming the consequent. Such arguments, Lonergan argues, do not—and in principle cannot—exclude the possibility of the emergence of other hypotheses that may explain the data more adequately.<sup>282</sup> However, to avoid any confusion, probable judgments in modern science and systematic theology are not just guesses. The guess, Lonergan writes, “is a nonrational venture beyond the evidence ...” whereas “the probable judgment results from rational procedures.”<sup>283</sup> The rationality that results in probable judgments links conditions (the evidence) to a conditioned (the hypothesis), grasps that the conditions are fulfilled, but knows that other hypotheses may eventually arise that explain the data, along with new sets of data, in a more adequate way.

To illustrate Lonergan’s argument a bit further, consider the following (rather mundane) syllogism: if it rained, the ground is wet; but the ground is wet; therefore, it rained. The logician would keenly inform us that this syllogism is invalid. Affirming the consequent that the ground is wet does not warrant the conclusion that it rained, because there are other possible reasons why the ground is wet: for instance, that the sprinkler was running. However, the conclusion to the syllogism, Lonergan argues, becomes more and more probable as other competing possible explanations are reasonably excluded: if we know, for instance, that the sprinkler was not running. But the procedure of excluding

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<sup>282</sup> Lonergan argues in *The Triune God: Systematics* that the hypothesis in trinitarian theology cannot be proven or demonstrated (e.g., see p. 48f and 164f). By this he means that they cannot come as the conclusion of a syllogism: it cannot be deduced from scriptures or doctrines, much less from any other source. Rather, all that can be said is that, if X is supposed, then the doctrines follow (p. 50f and 168f).

<sup>283</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 325.

possibilities is indefinite, since there may be possibilities one has not considered and there is no way to say that one has considered absolutely all of the possibilities. The most that can be said is that all of the possibilities one has considered have reasonably been excluded, and so the judgment is probably true (in this case, that it rained). Lonergan's argument is that verifying hypotheses in modern science and systematic theology follows the same rational procedure, which is why their hypotheses can be affirmed as, at most, only probably true.

Hence, through a continual process of verifying, the probability of the truth of the hypothesis in modern science or systematic theology may rise and increasingly approach the standard of the invulnerable insight, though never reach that standard. An insight is invulnerable when no further relevant questions remain, and the hypotheses of modern science and systematic theology may approach that standard as to a limit.<sup>284</sup> In his discussion in *The Triune God*, Lonergan writes, "A hypothesis is more probable the more problems it has the potential of solving. And it moves closer to certitude as every other way of solving the same problems equally well or better is excluded."<sup>285</sup> Hence, the probability that a hypothesis in systematic theology is true is a function of the degree to which it can answer the relevant questions within its domain and the degree to which other hypotheses are found wanting. If the hypothesis provides an answer to some questions but not others, or if other hypotheses can provide answers to the relevant questions just as easily, then the probability of its truth is low and the hypothesis is vulnerable. But if the hypothesis provides answers to the relevant questions in its domain,

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<sup>284</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 325. See p. 326-329 for his discussion of the probability of hypotheses in modern science.

<sup>285</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 42f.

and does so more adequately than other available hypotheses, then the probability of its truth is high and the hypothesis approaches invulnerability. The hypothesis approaching invulnerability, according to Lonergan, is not merely a hypothesis, but a theory. He writes, “something is not just a hypothesis if it is arrived at and conceived and formulated in such a way that there follow from it as from a principle items that are of faith as well as items that are concluded from faith, and if no step in the process is demonstrably contrary to reason. It is then a theory that is verified in many different ways.”<sup>286</sup> Hence in the same way that the hypothesis of tectonic plates is no longer a mere hypothesis but now a theory verified in many different ways, so too a hypothesis in systematic theology does not remain merely a hypothesis but, through a careful and continual process of verification, may become a theory.

As with any hypothesis, the implicit goal of a hypothesis in systematic theology is to advance understanding. Hence, even while remaining limited in various ways, there is an exigency for some hypothesis simply because the mind, when given free reign, desires to know everything about everything and, in particular, the mind in love with God desires to know everything that can be known about God. Writing of theologians concerned only with doctrines and dogmas, but not with systematic understanding, Lonergan writes,

those who neglect the systematic part [of theology] in order to hold faithfully and exactly to the dogmatic [part] so resolve the one divine revelation into many different mysteries that no move can be made back from this multiplicity to unity; from what God has revealed for all to understand, they devise in the course of time a technical expression of that revelation, but they do not grasp how these technical matters are to be taught and learned. They know with certainty many technical matters, but choose to overlook the understanding of what they are certain of. They rummage through the past collecting and accumulating technically established information concerning the councils, papal documents, the Fathers, the theologians, but they avoid the task of assembling a wisely ordered,

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<sup>286</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 52f.

intelligible compendium of all these matters. And after all this, they stand amazed that devout people reject dogmatic theology and take refuge in some form of biblicism that is itself hardly secure.<sup>287</sup>

In other words, if the doctrines of the Christian faith are not united with one another through some principal act of understanding, the doctrines stand as fragments lacking a unified explanatory context, and the mind, if left to wonder, cannot help but inquire whether and how the fragments are related to one another. To neglect the systematic function of theology is to remain satisfied with the fragments, but also to fail to communicate the truth of divine revelation in a unified way. When that occurs, the doctrines and dogmas may be felt, by inquisitive minds, to be mere impositions on thought, rather than stimulants for further thought. Again, as with any hypothesis, the relevant data—the realities for which the hypothesis provides an explanation—need to be included virtually. The realities of earthquakes, volcanoes, fossil locations, and the shapes of continental coastlines, for instance, are virtually included as *explananda* in the hypothesis of tectonic plates; if they were not included in that way, the hypothesis would fail to do what it was meant to do, namely, to provide some verifiable, though only probable, understanding of these realities. In a similar way, Lonergan's hypothesis in *The Triune God* is meant to virtually include (albeit imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely) all of the doctrines on the Trinity as *explananda*.<sup>288</sup>

The exigency, then, is for a systematic hypothesis for trinitarian theology, and Lonergan argues that intelligible emanation in humans (sometimes in *The Triune God* called dynamic consciousness) can best fill that role.<sup>289</sup> Intelligible emanation, as we will

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<sup>287</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 64-67.

<sup>288</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, esp. 43 and 169.

<sup>289</sup> For example, "Indeed, we do not know that there is a dynamic consciousness in God; all we arrive at is

see, is a type of procession, but whereas processions come in many forms—such as organic, sentient, and intelligent—only the last type would be able to serve as an analogy for the trinitarian processions and thereby pave the way for an understanding of the other matters relevant for trinitarian theology.<sup>290</sup> The first task, then, is to explain what is meant by intelligible emanation. This is no easy task, and many have been unsuccessful. In *Verbum*, Lonergan mentions Ludovicus Billot, who claims that the analogue for the trinitarian processions could just as easily and just as fittingly be drawn from human imagination as from human intelligence.<sup>291</sup> Such a claim, Lonergan contends, reveals Billot's lack of understanding of his own intelligent performance and his inability to distinguish in a precise and adequate way his own intelligent performance from his imaginative performance.<sup>292</sup> In other words, what he lacked was an adequate advertence to and understanding of his own conscious acts in their distinctness and relations to another. As I expand upon below, certain intelligent performance bears the characteristics of autonomy, self-possession, and production that imaginative or otherwise sentient performance does not bear, and such characteristics are relevant for explaining the

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this: that, if it is supposed that divine consciousness is dynamic, then what is concluded from the truths of faith follows" (*The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 169f). See also, *ibid.*, 50f and 164f.

<sup>290</sup> There are several reasons for this. One reason is that only intelligible emanation is autonomous, which will be explained below. A second is that only intelligible emanation is properly spiritual; organic and sentient emanations, on the other hand, are material. The explanatory distinction between the material and the spiritual, Lonergan argues in *Insight*, is between that which is constituted and intrinsically conditioned by space and time and that which is neither constituted nor intrinsically conditioned by space and time (though it may be extrinsically conditioned by it). See *Insight*, CW3, 538-543, esp. 539ff.

<sup>291</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, p. 11, n. 11 and 12f, 192.

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

trinitarian processions.

Evaluating Lonergan's claim that only intelligible emanation can serve as a systematic analogue for the trinitarian processions would require an interrogation of the whole of *The Triune God: Systematics*, in which one would carefully assess whether and how intelligible emanation sheds light upon each of the relevant questions for trinitarian theology, including the questions relevant to the processions, the relations, the persons, and the missions. It would also require a careful treatment of questions that may not be included in *The Triune God*, discerning whether intelligible emanation virtually includes answers to these questions. In the rest of this present chapter, I must more or less evade the all-consuming task of evaluating Lonergan's claim, though I respond to it in some detail in Chapter 5. All that will be highlighted here is a purely formal or structural dimension of Lonergan's argument: because of the systematic ordering of trinitarian theology, intelligible emanation as a hypothesis will allow the theologian to resolve subsequent questions only by resolving antecedent questions. That intelligible emanation can resolve questions on the trinitarian relations or the persons only occurs because it has already resolved questions on the trinitarian processions; similarly, the questions on the persons can be resolved only because the questions on the relations have already been resolved. Hence, if the hypothesis of intelligible emanation sheds light upon all of the issues in trinitarian theology, it does so only in a mediated and cumulative way, beginning first with the processions.

### **3.3 THE MEANING OF INTELLIGIBLE EMANATION**

The practice of Lonergan's philosophical and theological methods allows for an empirically verifiable account of intelligible emanation. The present section explains the

new meaning of intelligible emanation, the various forms of intelligible emanation occurring within human consciousness, and the meaning of the autonomy of freedom, specifically existential autonomy. In existential autonomy, I argue, Lonergan locates the mind's knowing and loving of itself: the likeness of the Trinity by analogy.

### **3.3.1 Intelligible Emanation as Empirically Verifiable**

Perhaps the easiest way to understand Lonergan's account of intelligible emanation is to reflect upon the following. Each of us, Lonergan trusts, has had the experiences of uttering a rote definition and of uttering an insightful definition, of making a rash judgment and of making a sound judgment, of performing a morally evil act and of performing a morally upright act. But what, in fact, distinguishes an insightful definition from a rote definition, a sound judgment from a rash judgment, a morally upright act from a morally evil act? How should we characterize, in a precise and adequate way, what in each of these cases distinguishes the former from the latter?

Before proceeding, a remark on the nature of the question is in order. The question Lonergan poses is not meant to direct one to abstract or theoretical principles, which may have been acquired in one's own lifetime from common sense notions or various philosophical systems, but is rather meant to have one reflect upon and appeal to one's own experience. Such experience is not the experience of sense data, that is, the data of what is seen, heard, tasted, touched, and smelled; it is rather the data of consciousness, that is, the data of one's own conscious and intentional acts to which one can attend and into which one can inquire. Appealing to the data of consciousness has a variety of implications, but two of them are necessary to note here. First, intentional acts are first and foremost experienced. Through an advertence and inquiry into experience,

misconceptions and inadequate judgments about intentional acts and their relations to one another are able to be corrected, and adequate conceptions and adequate judgments are able to be verified. Second, because Lonergan foregrounds experience, consciousness and the conscious subject will also be foregrounded in a way not possible for Aquinas before him. The foregrounding of consciousness and the conscious subject enables Lonergan both to specify the analogue for the trinitarian processions in a unique way and to make a number of innovations in the field of trinitarian theology, as we will see below.

Lonergan contends that insightful definitions, sound judgments, and morally upright acts in each case proceed from acts of intelligence, whereas rote definitions, rash judgments, and morally evil acts in each case proceed from a relative failure of intelligence. A sound judgment is such because it proceeds or emanates from an act of intelligence regarding the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence, whereas a rash judgment, inasmuch as it is rash, proceeds from a failure of intelligence; similarly, an insightful definition is such because it proceeds or emanates from an act of intelligence regarding the intelligibility of some datum given in experience, whereas a rote definition, inasmuch as it is rote, proceeds from a failure of intelligence. In other words, the good judgment, insightful definition, or morally good act in each case occurs *because of* and *in accordance with* a prior act of intelligence; conversely, a failure in the prior act leads to rote (or muddled) definitions, rash judgments, or morally evil acts. Because insightful definitions, sound judgments, and morally upright acts proceed from acts of intelligence, Lonergan writes that they proceed by way of intelligible emanation.

Although Lonergan argues that intelligible emanation stands as the analogue for the trinitarian processions, he also recognizes that there are other acts constituting our



conscious performance as human beings, acts that are irrelevant to understanding the trinitarian processions. Adequately selecting intelligible emanation as an analogue thus requires both an ability to understand intelligible emanation within the whole of conscious life and an ability to differentiate intelligible emanation from other elements of consciousness. We have already mentioned that, according to Lonergan, the analogue for the trinitarian processions cannot be drawn from imagination, and yet acts of imagining and their imagined contents are present within consciousness. What, then, is the mark of intelligible emanation that allows it to stand as the analogue for the trinitarian processions?

Although Lonergan in *The Triune God* foregrounds the conscious subject, he will sometimes revert to classical metaphysical terms and relations in order to develop his argument. He follows Aquinas in arguing that part of what distinguishes intelligible emanation from other conscious elements is that intelligible emanation is not an act from a potency, but rather an act from act. However, Lonergan in *The Triune God* innovates on these terms and introduces a further distinction between a “spontaneous” procession and an “autonomous” procession<sup>293</sup> It is important to note that there is not an exact, one-to-one correspondence between, on the one hand, the classical distinction between an act from potency and act from act and, on the other, the distinction between spontaneous and autonomous processions. As we will see in a moment, there are some spontaneous processions that are act from act. Hence, although the classical metaphysical terms and relations are, in some places, guiding Lonergan’s reasoning, his inclination for characterizing the realities in terms and relations appropriate to the new procedure

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<sup>293</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 142f.

nevertheless remains present and modifies the argument of *The Triune God*.<sup>294</sup>

What, then, is the difference between a spontaneous and an autonomous procession? A spontaneous procession is one in which either the proximate condition of the procession, or the term of the procession, or both are not possessed wholly by the subject of intellectual consciousness; an autonomous procession, on the other hand, is one in which both the proximate condition and the term are possessed wholly by the subject of intellectual consciousness.

Examples of spontaneous acts are feeling the chills, smelling an odor, having an insight, and feeling sad upon understanding that one's friend has just suffered some tragedy. Note that when Lonergan says that an act is spontaneous, he does not mean that the act is wholly unconditioned. There are, in fact, no such acts in the finite world. (Even sinful acts have conditions, though these conditions are not proportionate to explain the occurrence of a sinful act, which, to the degree that is sinful, is by definition absurd and unintelligible:<sup>295</sup> any reason given would be an excuse.<sup>296</sup>) His meaning, rather, is that a

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<sup>294</sup> Though the context is rather different, for a longer discussion of the relation between classical metaphysical terms and relations and psychological terms and relations, especially as they play a role in systematic theology, see Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Method and Metaphysics in Theology: Lonergan and Doran," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 5, no. 2 (October 1, 2014): 53–85.; *ibid.*, "On Metaphysical Equivalence and Equivocation: An Essay in Conversation with Daniel Monsour and Robert Doran," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 9, no. 2 (October 1, 2018): 75–99.; *ibid.*, "Dialectic and Transposition: Lonergan, Scholasticism, and Grace, in Conversation with Robert Doran," *The Irish Theological Quarterly* 85, no. 3 (2020): 286–306.

<sup>295</sup> Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, ed. Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, and Jeremy D. Wilkins, trans. Michael G. Shields, vol. 9, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 306f.

spontaneous act does not have its proximate condition or term in intellectual consciousness. In the case that the condition is not so possessed, spontaneous acts occur when consciousness receives at least a partial determination from a source extrinsic to intellectual consciousness. Hence, one feels the chills because the room is cold, or one smells an odor because the food has turned rancid, or one has an insight because the image was suitably disposed. The proximate condition, it should be emphasized, only has to be extrinsic to intellectual consciousness, not extrinsic to the person or even extrinsic to consciousness as such. Hence, one may feel the chills because of a fever; or one may smell an odor because of a side-effect of some medication; or one may have an insight because of a properly disposed phantasm, which occurs through empirical consciousness. In each of these cases, what follows the “because of” is not possessed wholly by intellectual consciousness. In the case that the term is not so possessed, spontaneous acts occur when consciousness has received a determination through some intelligent act and yet what proceeds from that determination, such as feelings or images, are not possessed wholly by intellectual consciousness.

On the other hand, an autonomous procession has both its proximate condition and its term wholly within intellectual consciousness. After speaking about spontaneous acts, Lonergan thus writes,

In another, more autonomous way, a subsequent act originates from a prior act and is proportionate to the prior act; thus, we define *because* we understand and *in accordance with* what we understand; again, we judge *because* we grasp the evidence as sufficient and *in accordance with* the evidence we have grasped; finally, we choose *because* we judge and *in accordance with* what we judge to be useful or proper or fitting or obligatory.”<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 690; *Redemption*, CW9, 256f.

<sup>297</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 142f.

Whereas, at most, only the proximate condition or the term of a spontaneous procession is possessed by intellectual consciousness, both the principle and the term of an autonomous procession is possessed wholly within intellectual consciousness. An autonomous procession, Lonergan argues, does not occur unless intellectual consciousness has already been determined in some way and the term proceeding from that determination is in intellectual consciousness. At a later point in *The Triune God*, Lonergan lists three different types of autonomous procession, which he calls the autonomy of clarity, the autonomy of rationality, and the autonomy of freedom. He writes,

there are different kinds of processions by virtue of intellectual consciousness. For whenever intellectual consciousness is determined by some conscious act, then another act proceeds from that determinate consciousness as from its proximately proportionate principle. Such is the case with the *autonomy of freedom* whenever we choose because we ourselves judge and because our choice is in accordance with our judgment; such is the case with the *autonomy of rationality* whenever we judge because we grasp the evidence and because our judgment is in accordance with the grasped evidence; such is the case with the *autonomy of clarity* whenever we define because we grasp the intelligible in the sensible and because our definition is in accordance with grasped intelligibility.<sup>298</sup>

The autonomy of clarity, the autonomy of rationality, and the autonomy of freedom are different kinds of intelligible emanation in consciousness: respectively, the emanation of a clear definition from an act of direct understanding, that of a sound judgment from an act of reflective understanding, and that of a morally upright choice from a moral judgment. Each of them is in metaphysical terms a certain kind of procession of act from act within intellectual consciousness. The term of each procession can only occur when intellectual consciousness has already been determined.

But why, exactly, is such a procession of act from act in intellectual

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<sup>298</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 176f. Emphasis added.

consciousness called autonomous? Being autonomous is often defined as being a law unto oneself, and intelligible emanation is autonomous both because intellectual consciousness possesses both the principle and the term of the procession *and* because the procession itself is under the control and guidance of intelligent consciousness. Although in *Verbum*, written more than a decade earlier, Lonergan does not use the word autonomous to describe intelligible emanation, there is nevertheless some indication that his meaning is similar. Consider the following passages:

Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of understanding; such self-expression is possible only because understanding is *self-possessed*, conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding ... it is in the self-possession of understanding as the ground of possible conceptualization that one may best discern what is meant by saying that the self-expression of understanding is an *emanatio intelligibilis*, a procession from knowledge as knowledge, and because of knowledge as knowledge.”<sup>299</sup>

To introduce a term that will summarize this, we may say that the inner word is *rational*, not indeed with the derived rationality of discourse, of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but with the basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness, with the rationality that can be discerned in any judgment, with the rationality that now we have to observe in all concepts. For human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in the phantasm, yet is not content with an object in this state. It pivots on itself to produce for itself another object which is the inner word ... And this pivoting and production is no mere matter of some metaphysical sausage machine, at one end slicing species off phantasm, and at the other popping out concepts; it is an operation of rational consciousness.<sup>300</sup>

Although the terms “rational” and “self-possessed” take on a more precise meaning in Lonergan’s later writings, including *The Triune God*, their meaning in *Verbum* implies

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<sup>299</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 56. Emphasis added. Note that Lonergan here uses the transitive meaning of “conscious,” which indicates that in the early period he has not yet fully streamlined his own language.

<sup>300</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 47. Again, the term “rational” acquires a distinct meaning in Lonergan’s work following the *Verbum* articles, a further indication that he is still attempting to find adequate technical terms to convey his meaning.

that intelligible emanation occurs under the control and guidance of intellectual consciousness. That control and guidance is possible because of a sort of reflexivity: intellectual consciousness is able to pivot upon the proximate condition of the procession in order to generate the term of the procession.<sup>301</sup> Intelligible emanation is autonomous, then, because intelligence already determined by an act of understanding can reflexively pivot on itself in order to express such understanding.

Lonergan's formulation in *The Triune God* is more precise. He argues that such an autonomous emanation is mediated by intellectual consciousness. He writes,

when act consciously originates from act, sensitive consciousness mediates in one way and intellectual consciousness in another. A sensitive act originates from another sensitive act according to a particular law of nature. But an intellectual act originates from another intellectual act in accord with the conscious, transcendental exigencies of intellect itself, which are not bound to any particular nature but are ordered to all that is intelligible, all that is true, all that is being, all

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<sup>301</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 86f: "Sense knowledge, because unreflective, is irrelevant to the procession of the Word. For exactly the same reason, namely, because it is not reflective, sense does not include knowledge of truth. On the other hand, intellect does include knowledge of truth because it does reflect upon itself: 'secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur.' Sense knowledge is true; sense is aware of its own acts of sensation. But sense, though true and though conscious, nevertheless is not conscious of its own truth; for sense does not know its own nature, nor the nature of its acts, nor their proportion to their objects. On the other hand, intellectual knowledge is not merely true but also aware of its own truth. It is not merely aware empirically of its acts but also reflects upon their nature; to know the nature of its acts, it has to know the nature of their active principle, which it itself is; and if it knows its own nature, intellect also knows its own proportion to knowledge of reality. Further, this difference between sense and intellect is a difference in reflective capacity. In knowing, we go outside ourselves; in reflecting, we return in upon ourselves. But the inward return of sense is incomplete, stopping short at a merely empirical awareness of the fact of sensation. But the intellectual substance returns in upon itself completely. It is not content with mere empirical awareness; it penetrates to its own essence."

that is good.<sup>302</sup>

Note, first, that a procession of “act from act” in metaphysical terms does not perfectly correlate to “autonomous” procession in psychological terms: some processions of act from act are sensitive, not intelligent. They occur, as Lonergan writes, according to a particular, though probably very complex, law of nature (or, more likely, according to some scheme of several laws), which implies that they are not autonomous, but spontaneous. The more crucial point of the passage, however, is that autonomous acts occur because intellectual consciousness is under the constraints of a more demanding exigency. Intellectual consciousness does not remain satisfied with some determinate act and so pivots upon that determinate act to produce a definition, judgment, or choice through which the human spirit reaches incrementally toward a more complete attainment of intelligibility, truth, being, and goodness. Lonergan thus writes,

an intellectual emanation arises not from the object but from the conscious intellectuality of the subject. Because intellectual consciousness *owes it to itself* to express to itself its own understanding, and to express it truly, it follows that what is being understood ought to be expressed truly. Because intellectual consciousness *owes it to itself* to bestow its own love rightly, it follows that what is judged as truly good ought also to be loved.<sup>303</sup>

The central phrase of this passage is “owes it to itself.” Intellectual consciousness mediates an intelligible emanation by placing demands upon the original act of understanding in order to conform intellectual consciousness completely to the intelligible, the true, the real, and the good. When an act of direct insight has occurred, intellectual consciousness owes it to itself to conceive such an insight with clarity and precision (hence, the autonomy of clarity); when an act of reflective insight has occurred,

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<sup>302</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 142f.

<sup>303</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 214f. Emphasis added.

intellectual consciousness owes it to itself to render a sound judgment in accordance with the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence (hence, the autonomy of rationality); when a judgment concerning an appropriate good has occurred, intellectual consciousness owes it to itself to make a choice for that appropriate good (hence, the autonomy of freedom). Of course, the implication of Lonergan's claim that intellectual consciousness owes something to itself is that such consciousness can fail to generate the term of the procession: one can have a direct insight and yet fail to define properly; one can have a reflective insight and fail to affirm; one can make a judgment about some appropriate good and yet fail to choose. In each of these cases, intellectual consciousness has received some determination and fails to provide itself what it by nature owes itself. This is a failure in autonomy—a failure of intellectual consciousness to mediate such a procession—and thereby a failure preventing an autonomous procession to occur.

### **3.3.2 Various Autonomies of Freedom**

If there are various types of intelligible emanation (i.e., clarity, rationality, freedom), we might ask whether each type can equally serve as the analogue for processions in God. Lonergan argues that the most fitting analogue occurs in the autonomy of freedom, and more specifically in what he calls existential autonomy. I explain the meaning of the autonomy of freedom in the present subsection and the meaning of existential autonomy in the following.

Though I have been discussing the commonality of the various autonomous acts, it is also important to discuss their differences. The principal difference between the various types of autonomy lies in the fact that each type is positioned at a distinct location along the interval of the internal dynamism of the human spirit in its ordering to



intelligibility, truth, being, and goodness. The first section of this chapter has already sketched Lonergan's metaphor of the levels of consciousness, and each type of autonomy occurs on a distinct level of consciousness. The autonomy of clarity occurs on the second level, the autonomy of rationality occurs on the third, and the autonomy of freedom occurs on the fourth. For now, it is important to note that there are no autonomous acts occurring among first-level acts of experience. Furthermore, as there is a hierarchy in the levels of consciousness, so there is a hierarchy among the various kinds of autonomy. The higher levels of consciousness both rely upon and yet complete the lower levels of consciousness. Accordingly, the autonomy of rationality both relies upon and completes the autonomy of clarity, and the autonomy of freedom both relies upon and completes the autonomy of rationality. Because the higher type of autonomy relies upon the lower type, any failure in the lower will impinge upon the higher. For instance, a failure to formulate a clear concept even when one has understood impinges upon one's marshaling and weighing the evidence in support of or against that concept, and thereby impinges upon one affirming that concept to be true or false. Conversely, because the higher completes the lower, any failure in the higher means that the potentialities in the lower remain are not elicited. For instance, a failure to affirm or deny when one has adequately assessed the evidence means that the truth or falsity of the direct understanding and the formulated concept, regardless of how clearly it is formulated, is not acknowledged as such.

Lonergan locates the systematic analogy for the trinitarian processions in the autonomy of freedom. There are a few reasons for this. First, only with the autonomy of freedom is there a procession of love in the will, which is required for the analogue for the procession of the Holy Spirit. This is an important reason in the context of *Verbum*

and *The Triune God*, but once Lonergan withdraws completely from faculty psychology—including its distinction between the intellect and will—the issue becomes a bit more complicated, as we shall see below. Second, higher degrees of autonomy complete lower degrees, and the analogues for God are to be taken from what is most perfect in the created world. This reason is more or less maintained even when Lonergan withdraws completely from faculty psychology.

In *The Triune God*, Lonergan specifies even more directly wherein the analogy is located, since the autonomy of freedom, Lonergan claims, “is exercised in three ways.” He writes,

[1] In the first way, it is exercised in practical matters insofar as one understands, judges, and chooses what is to be done and made. [2] In the second way, it is exercised in speculative matters insofar as one asks questions regarding the universe, understands it as much as one can, passes judgment as to its origin and nature, so that, finally, one breaks through to a contemplative love of the universe. [3] In the third and final way, it is exercised in the existential sphere insofar as one asks about oneself, understands what kind of person one ought to be, judges how one can make oneself that kind of person, and from all of this there proceeds an existential choice through which, insofar as one is able here and now to do so, one makes oneself to be that kind of person.<sup>304</sup>

In the first way, the autonomy of freedom is exercised in practical matters when one makes an artifact or chooses a discrete course of action, such as how or when to write an article for publication. This kind of autonomy, Lonergan argues, may serve as an analogue for God as creator and as agent.<sup>305</sup> In the second way, the autonomy of freedom is exercised in speculative matters when one considers the origin and principle of the universe and breaks forth in a contemplative love for all created being. Such an autonomy of freedom, Lonergan argues, may serve as an analogue for “God insofar as God

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<sup>304</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 178f. Numbering added.

<sup>305</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 178f.

understands and judges and loves all things”.<sup>306</sup> Finally, in the third way, the autonomy of freedom is exercised in existential matters when one decides upon and commits oneself to being a particular kind of person. Such autonomy is concerned with self-constitution: determining the kind of person one is to be. Lonergan argues that the autonomy of freedom in the existential sphere ought to serve as the analogue for the trinitarian processions in God. Why?

The task of trinitarian theology, Lonergan argues, is to consider “God inasmuch as God is in himself eternally constituted as triune, and so one takes one’s analogy from the processions that are in accord with the exercise of existential autonomy.”<sup>307</sup> The conscious acts by which human beings directly constitute themselves in time, when adequately performed, is the analogue for the self-constituting of God as a Trinity of Persons in eternity.

### **3.3.3 The Nature of Existential Autonomy**

What exactly is existential autonomy, and how is it used as the analogue for the processions in God? To answer this question, we turn to what it means for the self-constituting of human beings to be adequately carried out. After all, humans can deliberately constitute themselves in many ways, and not all of them are good. Surely, there are evil forms of self-constitution—such as deliberately being fraudulent or deliberately being exploitative of other human beings—which cannot be called an analogue for trinitarian life. However, even good self-constitution can take a variety of forms: for one, it may be good to be a carpenter, for another to be a scholar, for still

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<sup>306</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 178f.

<sup>307</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 178f.

another to be a nurse, and so on. Again, for one, it may be good to be married, for another celibate, and so on. Examples can be multiplied according to the totality of significant variables in the concrete lives of human beings. In conceiving the trinitarian analogy from the autonomy of freedom in the existential sphere, however, Lonergan prescind from these concrete factors and asks whether there is a way of constituting oneself that can be called good without qualification. The “without qualification” is critical, first, because the *imago Trinitatis* is said to exist in all human beings and, second, because the many concrete conditions upon which it is good for one to be, say, a carpenter are not identical to the many concrete conditions upon which it would be good for one to be, say, a lawyer. In seeking a way of constituting oneself that can be called good without qualification, Lonergan is seeking a way of speaking about a good way of constituting oneself as a human being *qua* human being, not *qua*, for instance, a lawyer or a lawyer in training, though clearly to constitute oneself well without qualification has ramifications for constituting oneself in any particular sphere of life.

An important passage in *The Triune God* provides us with a clue regarding good existential self-constitution without qualification. Lonergan argues that human subjects are “*per accidens* the subjects of their intellectual nature before they are *per se* the subjects of their intellectual nature as actuated.”<sup>308</sup> He thus argues that there are two phases of being a subject of one’s own intellectual nature: “the first is a prior phase, when, by one’s natural spontaneity one is the subject of one’s actuated intellectual nature, the second is a subsequent phase, when, as knowing and willing, one is by one’s own intention the subject of one’s intellectual nature both as actuated and as to be actuated

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<sup>308</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 402f.

further.”<sup>309</sup> The autonomy of existential freedom is good without qualification, I will argue, when one chooses to live as a *per se* subject of one’s own intellectual nature and thus to live according to that intellectual nature.

The difference between being a subject of one’s own intellectual nature *per accidens* and *per se*, Lonergan claims, is the difference between one being a subject of that nature outside of one’s intention and being a subject of that nature by one’s own intention. Because, as was shown above, consciousness is preliminary and unstructured on the side of the object, one is the subject of the various conscious acts prior to adverting to and inquiring about the nature of being a subject of those acts and about the nature of the acts themselves, including one’s own intellectual and volitional acts. This is what it means to be in the first phase, a subject of one’s own intellectual nature *per accidens* and outside of one’s own intention. One enters the second phase, becoming a subject of one’s own intellectual nature *per se* and by one’s own intention, when one knows what it means to be such a subject and when consistently chooses to operate in accordance with its intrinsic demands. In other words, one is not in the second phase merely by being conscious and performing acts of intelligence. Rather, in order to enter the second phase, the various conscious acts that occur in preliminary and unstructured consciousness must become the object of the various intentional acts.

First, then, these acts must be known: they must be experienced, understood, conceived, affirmed, and judged. In various places in his work, Lonergan calls knowing one’s own intellectual acts and their relations to one another a “duplication” and a

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<sup>309</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 404f.

“heightening” of consciousness.<sup>310</sup> To take but one example, consider the following from Lonergan’s essay “Cognitive Structure” (1964), which was published in the same year as the two-volume *De Deo Trino*:

Where knowing is a structure, knowing knowing must be a reduplication of the structure. ... But if knowing is a conjunction of experience, understanding, and judging, then knowing knowing has to be a conjunction of (1) experiencing experience, understanding and judging, (2) understanding one's experience of experience, understanding, and judging, and (3) judging one's understanding of experience, understanding, and judging to be correct.

... there follows at once a distinction between consciousness and self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is the reduplicated structure: it is experience, understanding, and judging with respect to experience, understanding, and judging. Consciousness, on the other hand, is not knowing knowing but merely experience of knowing, experience, that is, of experiencing, of understanding, and of judging.<sup>311</sup>

As we noted above, consciousness is preliminary and unstructured on the side of the object. However, through the duplication and heightening of consciousness, the very same consciousness becomes structured on the side of the object: that is, the structure latent but operative in consciousness becomes understood and affirmed through the very same operations by means of which we know anything else, the operations which Lonergan generically classifies as acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging.

The duplication and heightening of consciousness leads to a fuller integration of consciousness and its various acts in human beings. Any act of direct insight effects an

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<sup>310</sup> See *Verbum*, CW2, 99 and “Cognitive Structure,” CW4, 208 for (re)duplication of consciousness (he also uses heightening in “Cognitive Structure,” but his meaning is different—by “heightening” in this article, Lonergan only means ascending the levels of consciousness, not intending the acts of consciousness and their relations to one another); see *Insight*, CW3, 345; *Method*, CW16, 18f, 27 for heightening of consciousness as experiencing, understanding, and affirming one’s own conscious acts and their internal relations.

<sup>311</sup> Lonergan, “Cognitive Structure,” CW4, 208.

integration in a sensible manifold: what was relatively unintegrated at the experiential level becomes integrated at the intellectual level. Common sense insights and scientific insights share this feature: a common sense insight into, say, the purpose of various tax forms in the United States allows one to understand the inscriptions “1040” and “1099” on sheets of paper, and a scientific insight into, say, atomic structure of various elements allows one to understand why salt dissolves in water. Insight into the data of consciousness also effects an integration in an experiential manifold: what was relatively unintegrated at the experiential level becomes integrated at the intellectual level. A person experiences his or her acts of consciousness prior to adverting to and inquiring about such acts and their relations to one another, but these acts prior to advertence and inquiry are merely experienced and not yet understood. Through inquiry and insight into the data of consciousness, the relations of the various acts of consciousness to one another become integrated in such a way that the various conscious acts are situated within an understood structure. As lower operations in the structure of consciousness are completed by higher operations, so too the lower operations of experiencing one’s own conscious acts are completed by higher acts of understanding and affirming one’s own conscious acts.

The duplication and heightening of consciousness does not directly change one’s conscious performance, though it may indirectly do so. Consider the following analogy: as understanding the nature of fire does not change fire, so understanding the various relations of the conscious acts to one another does not change these relations. Accordingly, the basic structure of consciousness remains the same even after it has been known. But, to continue the analogy, as understanding the nature of fire allows one to

exercise some control over fire in various ways, so too understanding the structure of consciousness allows humans to exercise some control over their conscious acts in various ways. The self-duplication and heightening of consciousness is what allows humans to direct their own conscious performance in a controlled and fruitful way, the performance by which one comes to know and choose anything at all. Of course, even within the bounds of controlled direction, spontaneous conscious acts remain constitutive of human consciousness: for instance, no one can, by a sheer act of will, cause themselves to have an insight. But nevertheless, the various operations over which one is autonomous—conceiving clearly, affirming rationally, and choosing morally—become more readily subject to conscious control and direction. Hence, although in its basic structure, the self-duplication and heightening of consciousness is just like other kinds of knowledge, it is nevertheless unlike all other forms of knowledge in providing human beings with the resources to exercise a limited but important control in their conscious performance.

There is another sense in which the self-duplication and heightening of consciousness allows for more control over one's own conscious performance, which can be introduced through the following analogy. As understanding the nature of fire allows humans to understand the various conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for fire to occur, so too understanding the relations of one's own conscious acts in their ordering to truth and goodness allows humans to understand the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for truth and goodness to be realized in human living. Conversely, as understanding the nature of fire allows human beings to understand why fire fails to be produced or sustained in certain circumstances, so too understanding the relations of one's own



conscious acts allows human being to understand why truth and goodness fail to be realized in human living. In other words, the self-duplication and heightening of consciousness provides human beings with the resources to recognize more easily the failures in consciousness that obstruct the full attainment of truth and goodness in concrete human life: for instance, when people fail to understand, fail to define clearly, fail to reflect carefully, and so on.

Adequate existential self-constitution, then, is based upon the duplication and heightening of consciousness. However, such self-duplication and heightening, if it remains merely as a form of knowledge, is not sufficient. One must also choose to live in accordance with the basic structure in its fundamental orientation to intelligibility, truth, reality, and goodness by systematically excising any inclination or habit within oneself that is contrary to that intrinsically structured dynamism, habits such as indolence or grandiloquence in formulation, rashness or fearfulness in judgment, and so on. In other words, the principal constituent of existential self-constitution, when adequately carried out, is a decision to live in a certain way: namely, a way that, positively speaking, accords with and meets the demands of the dynamic structure of intellectual consciousness and that, negatively speaking, eliminates, as much as possible, any tendency or habit preventing oneself from meeting those demands. The decision is, in fact, a choice, since there are what Lonergan calls external alternatives: it is always possible—often tempting—to act in such a way that discords with and fails to meet the demands of the dynamic structure of intellectual consciousness: whenever we desire to evade a question because it is uncomfortable, or to fabricate evidence to support a judgment that would otherwise be unreasonable, and so on. But when we decide to live in accordance with and

under the demands of intellectual consciousness, we are practicing good existential self-constitution without qualification. Such existential self-constitution, by extension, provides the fundamental rationale for why it is good for a particular person to be, say, a teacher whereas it would be just as good for another person to be a nurse. If it is good relatively speaking for one person to choose the occupation of a teacher, it is fundamentally because he or she has not failed in his or her conscious performance when coming to that decision, whereas if it is good relatively speaking for another person to choose the occupation of a lawyer, it is fundamentally for the same reason. The same could be said for any other variable in human living.

The upshot of these claims is that good existential self-constitution without qualification is founded upon becoming a subject of one's intellectual nature *per se*, which provides one with the resources to exhibit conscious control when engaging in existential self-constitution in any particular endeavor, regardless of whether it is beginning or advancing in an occupation, contributing to or fighting against a political cause, beginning or ending a romantic relationship, or otherwise. However, while there are conditions under which each of those decisions would be unreasonable, there are no conditions under which the decision to live in accordance with and under the demands of the dynamic structure of intellectual consciousness would be unreasonable. Because the analogue for the trinitarian processions, Lonergan claims, is founded upon good existential self-constitution, the theologian needs to isolate the analogue for the trinitarian processions in the subject becoming a *per se* subject of his or her own intellectual nature. The analogue for the trinitarian processions, then, is intelligence reflectively understanding itself in its own worth, affirming itself in its worth, and choosing to live in

accordance with its intrinsic demands. As I will show in the next section, this is a substantial advance from Aquinas's claims regarding the likeness of the Trinity according to analogy.

### 3.4 THE LIKENESS BY ANALOGY IN HUMAN BEINGS

As discussed in the first chapter, Aquinas identifies the likeness of the Trinity by analogy in the following way:

in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, aware of itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.<sup>312</sup>

Although Lonergan does not disagree with Aquinas's statement, I have tried to lay the groundwork to show how Lonergan differentiates the statement in a number of ways. This final section explains exactly how Lonergan's meaning is an advance from Aquinas's meaning.

Lonergan does so, first and foremost, by locating this likeness of the Trinity within an empirically verifiable account of consciousness, which does not take its bearings from a general and comprehensive metaphysics, but begins with the empirical data, as does the practice of modern science. The empirically verifiable context allows the philosophical aspects of the account regarding the likeness of the Trinity to be tested and verified, thereby preventing it from becoming subject to endless, seemingly interminable disputation. Furthermore, while the classical account is relatively abstract inasmuch as it relies upon theoretical terms and relations that are basically metaphysical, the empirically verifiable account is relatively concrete inasmuch as it relies upon the

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<sup>312</sup> *De ver*, q. 10, 7c.

data of consciousness and understands the intelligibility latent within that data.

Second, Lonergan differentiates between various kinds of intelligible emanation occurring within the human mind and selects the intelligible emanations occurring within the autonomy of free existential self-constitution as the analogue for the trinitarian processions. He distinguishes between the various kinds of intelligible emanation in a clearer and more adequate way than his predecessors, including Aquinas. Here are two examples.

First, Lonergan argues in *Verbum* that Aquinas's account of judgment is somewhat unclear. Aquinas often speaks about the second operation of the intellect as the operation of composing and dividing. According to Lonergan, such an operation, in fact, belongs to the first operation of the intellect or, in Lonergan's terms, the second level of consciousness:<sup>313</sup> humans grasp synthetic unities through direct insight and formulate those synthetic unities in propositions that are either positive or negative. The unique element of the second operation of the intellect is not composition and division, but rather the act of positing, that is, the act of affirming as true or false. Lonergan appears to believe that this element is virtually present in Aquinas's writings, but not clearly expressed.<sup>314</sup> Nonetheless, to the degree that the element of positing is not clearly expressed in Aquinas's writings, so neither is the second kind of inner word—a judgment from an act of reflective understanding—clearly expressed. Moreover, inasmuch as the

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<sup>313</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 71f.

<sup>314</sup> Lonergan writes, "In Aristotle, this distinction between the merely synthetic element in judgment and, on the other hand, the positing of synthesis is not clearly drawn. In Thomistic writings, I believe, the use of Aristotelian terminology obscures to some extent a more nuanced analysis. In any case it was only by making this distinction that I was able to organize the materials I had collected ..." *Verbum*, CW2, 62.

second inner word is not clearly expressed in Aquinas, so neither is the first inner word, since its location and function are not clearly differentiated from the location and function of the second inner word. In clearly differentiating between the two, Lonergan's formulation is an advance from Aquinas's formulation.

Third, Lonergan's discussion of the autonomy of intelligible emanation is an advance from Aquinas. On Lonergan's interpretation, Aquinas argues that the emanation of inner word follows necessarily upon an act of understanding: once one understands, it cannot be otherwise that an inner word follows. Consider the following from *Verbum*:

We are not concerned with the necessity of the occurrence of *verbum* in our minds. That is perfectly simple: Once one understands, the proportionate cause for the inner word exists; once the proportionate cause exists, the effect follows, unless some impediment intervenes; but no impediment can intervene between understanding and its inner word.<sup>315</sup>

The following is Lonergan's footnote appended to the above passage:

The will can prevent the occurrence of *intelligere* by preventing the occurrence of a corresponding phantasm. Again, the will is the cause of an act of belief, but though the latter is a *verbum*, it is not a *verbum* proceeding directly from an *intelligere*. But we cannot permit the occurrence of *intelligere* and yet prevent the procession of its immediate *verbum*. Hence, granted we understand, it necessarily follows that we utter an inner word.<sup>316</sup>

The nature of the articles on *verbum* makes it difficult to assess whether the above quotations express Lonergan's own position at the time of writing the articles or only Lonergan's interpretation of Aquinas's position.<sup>317</sup> Either way, on both counts, Lonergan

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<sup>315</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 199.

<sup>316</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 199, n. 33.

<sup>317</sup> The rhetoric of the passage seems to indicate that it is also Lonergan's position, not just his interpretation of Aquinas's position. But if so, Lonergan's own position during the years writing *Verbum* seems to be somewhat ambiguous. Consider the following quote: "human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in the phantasm, yet is not content with an object in this state. It pivots

interprets Aquinas as arguing that the procession of the inner word is in some way automatic, that once an act of understanding has occurred, an inner word must follow. Needless to say, it is difficult to affirm that one is autonomous over a such a procession.

Several years later, Lonergan differentiates his own (possibly revised) position from that of Aquinas. Here is Lonergan characterizing his own position vis-a-vis that of Aquinas to one of his students, who asks whether “the relation between concept and conception [is] that of content and act”:

There is possibly room for some sort of distinction there. The question about conception gives rise to difficulties, at least historically. In Aquinas, for example, the concept does not seem to be conceived as an act, but simply as a content. However, I don't think that way myself. Certainly judgment is an act, and judgment for Thomas was an expression in the way the concept is an expression; I would therefore be inclined to say that there is an act for conception too.<sup>318</sup>

Lonergan thus argues that conception—or better, “conceiving,” which he uses more regularly and which is less ambiguous—is an act of consciousness, and it is an act that mediates between the act of understanding and the concept in which such understanding is formulated. Over such an act, one is autonomous, principally because the original

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on itself to produce for itself another object which is the inner word as *ratio, intentio, definitio, quod quid est*. And this pivoting and production is no mere matter of some metaphysical sausage machine, at one end slicing species off phantasm, and at the other popping out concepts; it is an operation of rational consciousness” (*Verbum*, CW2, 48). Furthermore, the distinction between apprehensive and formative abstraction, which Lonergan introduces in order to interpret Aquinas’s manifold use of *abstrahere* and its variants (it is not a distinction explicit in Aquinas’s writings), seems to indicate that Lonergan has some sense that conceiving (i.e., formative abstraction) is an operation of rational consciousness and that the concept is not merely a necessary resultant of understanding. See *Verbum*, CW2, 162-179 and esp. 187-190.

<sup>318</sup> *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 280.

insight contains a “virtual generality” that is only made explicit through the often labor-intensive act of conceiving,<sup>319</sup> in which, according to Lonergan, “[o]ne has to think of the general case, and attention to the general case may not be had automatically.”<sup>320</sup> In conceiving, Lonergan argues, “one wants to state what is necessary and sufficient to have the insight,” which is not always something that occurs with ease and certainly does not always occur necessarily and without impediment.<sup>321</sup> Because consciousness mediates and because the procession, as Lonergan argues in *The Triune God*, is autonomous, the human being can fail in conceiving and thereby fail in producing a clear inner word from the original act of understanding.

Fourth, although an account of the mind’s love of itself in Aquinas can be pieced together from various sources within his oeuvre, as I tried to show in Chapter 1, Aquinas

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<sup>319</sup> *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 282.

<sup>320</sup> *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 42.

<sup>321</sup> *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 42. A further question in this regard is difference between the procession of an inner word in the enterprises of common sense and the procession of an inner word in theoretical enterprises. Common sense understanding tends to be experienced as leading to formulation more easily than theoretical understanding, at least for adults. This may be because we already have language at our disposal, allowing most well-functioning adults to meet familiar situations with ease; for a toddler, perhaps, inner words may proceed with difficulty as they are acquiring language. Nevertheless, it is interesting that, when discussing the concept and the labor of conceiving in *Understanding and Being*, Lonergan speaks about insight as into the particular case and conceiving as producing a general formula, and uses the Socratic dialogues as illustrations of people having understanding but lacking the ability to provide a general formula for their understanding. That difficulty, according to Lonergan, arises when one is attempting to meet the theoretical ideal. For relevant texts, see especially *Understanding and Being*, CW5, 38-40, 41-45, 280-287.

does not deal with this question in a focused way. Lonergan, on the other hand, provides a thorough account of the mind's knowledge and love of itself through what he calls the heightening or duplication of consciousness, which occurs within the wider context of becoming a *per se* subject of one's own intellectual nature. Although every human being is a subject of his or her own intellectual nature, one may be only so *per accidens*, which means one has not yet adverted to one's own intellectual operations, inquired about them, correctly understood them, and chosen to live in accordance with them. As a subject of one's own intellectual nature *per accidens*, the desire to know—which is the principle of all intellectual operations—stands as merely one desire among other desires, and the desires one chooses to pursue in the concrete are, more often than not, a function of the desires that others are pursuing. By becoming a *per se* subject of one's own intellectual nature, one is more easily able to recognize the manifestations of the desire to know in the stream of experience and privilege such a desire for its ability to set forth the higher conscious operations that can integrate all other desires in a dynamic orientation towards intelligibility, truth, being and goodness. Lonergan thereby transposes the abstractly conceived mind's love for itself into the dynamism of historical human beings seeking an evermore complete attainment of intelligibility, truth, being, and goodness.

Fifth, and perhaps most central to the larger question guiding this dissertation, is that Aquinas's abstract conception is hindered by a basic metaphysical framework and does little to locate the analogue for the trinitarian processions within the pulsing flow of human experience, thereby making the analogue for the processions relatively distant from the course of everyday human affairs. Indeed, an important aspect of the criticism of the social trinitarian theologians, along with a number of other theologians of the 20th



and 21st century (including Rahner), is correct: Aquinas's account places the *imago Trinitatis* at a distance from everyday practical affairs. Part of the reason for this is that Aquinas's writings are circumscribed by a distinction between practical and speculative or theoretical reason. Practical reason, for Aquinas, is concerned with the everyday affairs of human life and is thereby proper to the active life, whereas speculative reason seeks to understand the principle and cause of the universe and is thereby proper to the contemplative life.<sup>322</sup> As we saw with the three kinds of the autonomy of freedom—practical, speculative, and existential—Lonergan complicates the binary distinction through an introduction of a third term: namely, the existential. Indeed, he argues further that the practical and the speculative autonomies of freedom alone are not adequate to serve as an analogue for the trinitarian processions; the theologian must rather take the analogue from existential autonomy, which integrates both of them. The consequence of such an argument is that practical everyday affairs are no longer relegated to a merely lower, preparatory sphere, nor are speculative endeavors enshrined in a higher sphere. Both are rather caught up into the autonomy of existential self-constitution, in which humans make decisions variously to pursue practical and theoretical endeavors, and the *imago Trinitatis* is found in such existential self-constitution.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> *ST* 2-2, q. 182, a. 1 and 4.

<sup>323</sup> Relatedly, an interesting aspect of Lonergan's account of the *imago Trinitatis* is that he does not, to my knowledge, advert to the distinction between higher and lower reason. In fact, I do not know of any place in his work where he adverts to that distinction from classical philosophy and theology, much less where he argues either in support of or against that distinction. It may be the case that the classical distinction could be transposed into new terms through Lonergan's distinction between knowledge of proportionate being, on the one hand, and general and special transcendent knowledge, on the other. (For the meaning of

### 3.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have shown how Lonergan's innovations in philosophical and theological methods, coupled with his penetrating analysis of consciousness, leads to a radical conception of the analogical likeness of the Trinity in human beings. Because this likeness in human beings consists in existential self-constitution, we are transported from the abstract, theoretical frameworks of the scholastics into the concrete world of meaning

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proportionate being, see Insight, CW3, 416; for the relation between proportionate and transcendent knowledge, see Insight, 633. Understanding the surrounding text for each of these passages would be necessary for understanding Lonergan's meaning in the cited passages.) Both Augustine and Aquinas argue that the *imago Trinitatis*, properly speaking, is located within higher reason, not within lower reason. (See, for instance, Aquinas, *De ver*, q. 10, a. 7c; ST I, q. 93, a. 8, ad. 2.) Higher reason, on Aquinas's account, is not a distinct power from lower reason; both higher and lower reason are one and the same power, but are distinct in virtue of the realities understood and loved. If the realities are lower than the intellectual soul, such as physical or biological realities, then understanding these realities involves lower reason, whereas if the realities are higher than the intellectual soul, then understanding these realities involves higher reason. As noted in the first chapter, Aquinas argues that the *imago Trinitatis* is not found in the mind's knowledge and love of material, temporal things, which implies that it is not found in lower reason. Because Lonergan locates the analogy in existential autonomy, and seemingly prescind from whether the *imago Trinitatis* is in higher or lower reason, he provides a more sufficient ground for showing how the *imago Trinitatis* is present within a wider range of human activity. That is, the *imago Trinitatis* is found in the acts of human beings even when they are considering realities lower than themselves, so long as their consideration of such realities is under the guidance of and in accordance with the demands of unqualifiedly good existential self-constitution. The physicist, the biologist, and the engineer, to use but a few examples, manifest the *imago Trinitatis* in their practical endeavors principally when they decide to act in accordance with and under the demands of intellectual consciousness and thereby constitute their practical endeavor, and by extension themselves, in an unqualifiedly good way.

and value that is in some part constituted by human beings. But if the likeness by analogy consists in existential self-constitution, what does the likeness by conformity consist in?

Chapter 4 seeks to answer this question.

## **4.0 LONERGAN: CONFORMATIO MENTIS AD DEUM**

### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous chapter focused on the likeness by conformity in Lonergan's theology, and the present chapter will turn to the likeness by conformity. Lonergan does not deal with the latter half of the distinction in an explicit way, but his treatment of grace throughout his career presents the reader with several indications of the shape that the likeness by conformity would take in his thought. More importantly, however, some of Lonergan's students, especially (but not only) Robert Doran, have attempted to devise an account of what seems like a likeness by conformity from Lonergan's writings. In Doran's work, the likeness by conformity come under the headings of the "supernatural analogy" and the "four-point hypothesis." In treating the likeness by conformity in a Lonerganian key, the present chapter will analyze and assess Doran's account of the supernatural analogy and the four-point hypothesis, while showing how Doran draws upon Lonergan's thought on these points. It will also indicate the strengths and limitations of Doran's approach in order to pave the way for a revised position.

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section (4.2) examines the shift in Lonergan's thinking in *Method in Theology*, a shift that functions as a catalyst for a good deal of innovative work among Lonergan's students. The second section (4.3) will deal

with what Doran calls the “supernatural analogy,” which is for him an integral part of the four-point hypothesis. Doran changed his position on the supernatural analogy throughout his career, at one point grounding his interpretation of the analogy in Lonergan’s later work and, at a later point, explicitly departing from Lonergan’s later work in order to put forward a distinct analogy. The final section (4.4) expounds the various criticisms Doran has received in the literature and advances several other criticisms of Doran’s approach to the likeness by conformity. It thereby sets the groundwork for what I take to be a more adequate groundwork for the likeness by conformity in Chapter Five and the Epilogue.

#### **4.2 LONERGAN’S RADICALIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY ANALYSIS**

Lonergan formulates the transition in his own thinking in a few different places. For instance, in his paper “Insight Revisited,” which was delivered in 1973 at the annual convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association (in the year following the publication of *Method in Theology*), Lonergan writes,

In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is known in judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one’s decisions. Just as intelligence sublates sense, just as reasonableness sublates intelligence, so deliberation sublates and thereby unifies knowing and feeling.

Again, in *Insight* the treatment of God’s existence and nature, while developed along the lines of the book, nonetheless failed to provide the explicit context towards which the book was moving. In *Method* the question of God is considered more important than the precise manner in which an answer is formulated, and our basic awareness of God comes to us not through our arguments or choices but primarily through God’s gift of his love. It is argued that natural and systematic theology should be fused in the manner of Aquinas’ *Contra Gentiles* and *Summa*

*theologiae*.<sup>324</sup>

In the above passage, Lonergan characterizes the difference between his earlier and later work according to two principles. I will briefly state the two principles and then delve into each of them more deeply in the next two subsections, as each principle is important for the argument in this chapter. The first concerns the good: whereas the good is intelligent and reasonable in *Insight*, it becomes a distinct notion in *Method*. In the earlier work, Lonergan characterizes decision as an extension of our knowing; the human spirit demands self-consistency between our knowing and our doing.<sup>325</sup> In the later work, the good becomes a distinct notion intended in the transcendental question, “is this worthwhile?” The distinct notion is not reducible to or a mere extension of knowing, but, as Lonergan claims, “unifies knowing and feeling.” The second difference between the earlier and later work concerns the question of God. In *Insight*, the question of God in Chapter 19 was concerned with arguments for the existence and about the nature of God.<sup>326</sup> In *Method*, however, the priority is given to the conditions for the emergence of

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<sup>324</sup> Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” in *A Second Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, vol. 13, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (University of Toronto Press, 2016), 221–33, at 233.

<sup>325</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 622.

<sup>326</sup> It should be noted, however, that Chapter 19 of *Insight* comes on the heels of Chapter 18, which concludes with the radical and permanent need of human liberation from evil, and prior to Chapter 20, which speaks of a higher integration of human living through the supernatural. There thus seems to be an ambiguity in Lonergan’s claim that *Insight* “failed to provide the explicit context towards which the book is moving.” Lonergan’s original intention in writing *Insight* was to develop a theological method in later chapters, which the circumstances of his life prevented him from accomplishing, so perhaps this is his meaning. By all estimates, the theological method that Lonergan would have developed in the 1950s would

question itself, not the arguments provided to answer the question, and the basic awareness of God's presence is given principally through God's grace. Each of the next two subsections is concerned with these differences.

#### **4.2.1 The Revised Conception of Decision and the Good**

In Chapter 3, I explained how, after the publication of *Insight*, Lonergan explicitly began to affirm a fourth level of consciousness concerned with decision, which he variously named rational self-consciousness or moral self-consciousness. In the years leading up to *Method in Theology*, Lonergan continues to affirm a fourth level of consciousness, but two factors significantly reshape his understanding of the fourth level.

The first is a fuller radicalization of intentionality analysis. Lonergan's *Insight*, of course, practices intentionality analysis, but when Lonergan turns to the problem of ethics in Chapter 18, a residue from the metaphysical frame of reference guides and structures his arguments: namely, the distinction between intellect and will. In Chapter 2, I explained the manifold relations between intellect and will in Aquinas, and did so with reference to the metaphysical principles of potency and act. In Chapter 18 of *Insight*, Lonergan presupposes the distinction between intellect and will. Following Aquinas, he defines will as "intellectual or spiritual appetite" and draws an analogy: "As capacity for sensible hunger stands to sensible food, so will stands to objects presented by

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have been far different from what he developed when *Method in Theology* was published in 1972. It is also possible that his meaning of "explicit context" is the one that is, in fact, communicated in *Method*, namely, our basic awareness of God that comes to us through God's love. In other words, his meaning may be that context is more explicit in *Method* because it is concerned with the priority of God's love, on the basis of which the questions and arguments about God would even become a concern.

intellect.”<sup>327</sup> More fundamentally, Lonergan argues that there is a “parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics.”<sup>328</sup> The parallel between the two is drawn through a number of analogies, the most basic of which is the following: “just as the dynamic structure of our knowing grounds a metaphysics, so the prolongation of that structure into human doing grounds an ethics.”<sup>329</sup> The interpenetration of the two occurs throughout Chapter 18. For instance, the notion of the will is conceived in metaphysical terms as will (potency), willingness (form), and willing (act), and the constitution of the notion of the human good is similarly conceived as objects of desire (potency); intelligible orders within which desires are satisfied (form), and the values involved in choosing or rejecting such orders (act); human activity is conceived within a metaphysics of finality. The principal interpenetration, however, is due to the identity between the good and “the intelligibility that is intrinsic to being.”<sup>330</sup> It is for this reason that in “Insight Revisited,” Lonergan claims that the good was conceived as “the intelligent and reasonable.”

In the years approaching *Method*, however, a further radicalization of intentionality analysis leads Lonergan to jettison the parallel and interpenetration of metaphysics and ethics in favor of an empirically verifiable account of decision, which is ultimately rooted in the data of consciousness. There are a number of consequences of such a shift, but the most principal consequences for our purposes are, first, the transposition of the distinction between intellect and will, second, the introduction of the

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<sup>327</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 621.

<sup>328</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 626f.

<sup>329</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 626.

<sup>330</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 628.



good as a distinct notion intended in questions for deliberation, and, third, the significant role of feelings in the deliberative process. The transposition of the distinction between intellect and will occurs principally because intellect and will are not among the immediate data of consciousness, but were rather terms embedded within a context with a number of theoretical suppositions, including the distinction between apprehensive and appetitive powers in a faculty psychology and the foundational role of metaphysical terms and relations. In place of the distinction between intellect and will, Lonergan argues that there are four levels of consciousness and that the fourth, which is concerned with deliberating, is not reducible to or merely an extension of the first three levels of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Hence, rather than speaking of a self-consistency between our knowing and our doing, as he does in *Insight*, Lonergan in *Method* speaks about the transformation and sublation of our knowing in our deliberating and deciding.<sup>331</sup> Each of the levels of consciousness (aside from the first) is correlated to a distinct transcendental notion: the second level is correlated to intelligibility; the third to being; the fourth to the good. As the notion of being transforms and sublates the notion of intelligibility into correct or incorrect intelligibility, so too the notion of the good transforms and sublates the notion of being into valuable or valueless reality.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>331</sup> See *Method*, CW14, 227 for Lonergan's definition of sublation: "I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."

<sup>332</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 349. In *Method*, Lonergan writes, "Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact. They differ in content, for one can approve of what does not exist, and

Most crucially, the shift enables Lonergan to include feelings as intrinsic to the deliberative process, not merely as thwarting, interfering with, or, in some instances, supporting the detached and disinterested desire to know.<sup>333</sup> Lonergan distinguishes between types of feelings in various ways, but the most general distinction is between, on the one hand, non-intentional states and trends and, on the other, and intentional responses.<sup>334</sup> The former type of feelings do “not presuppose and arise out of perceiving, imagining, representing the cause or goal.”<sup>335</sup> The latter type, on the other hand, “answer to what is intended, apprehended, represented. The feeling does not relate us to a cause or an end, but to an object.”<sup>336</sup> The distinction, in other words, is that between feelings that are prior to and do not depend upon other intentional acts, and feelings that are subsequent to and depend upon other intentional acts. I mentioned in Chapter 3 how, for

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one can disapprove of what does” (*Method*, CW14, 37).

<sup>333</sup> In *Insight*, Lonergan writes, “It is difficult enough for our purely cognitive activities to be dominated by the detached or disinterested desire to know. How are such detachment and disinterestedness to be extended into human living?” Here, it is clear that feelings may interfere with the unrestricted desire to know and its extension into human action.

<sup>334</sup> The most thorough treatment of this, by far, occurs in Patrick H. Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment: Lonergan’s Foundation for Ethics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 115-168. Byrne takes issue with Lonergan’s distinction between non-intentional and intentional feelings and rather opts for a distinction between somatic feelings and feelings that are intentional responses that intend values (see especially p. 121). Both sorts of feelings are intentional—in that they have a noematic content—but somatic feelings arise principally due to neural functions, while feelings that are intentional responses that intend values arise from the noematic content of other intentional acts, such as seeing, hearing, understanding, and so on.

<sup>335</sup> *Method*, CW14, 32.

Lonergan, intentional acts make objects present to a conscious subject. Whereas feelings as non-intentional responses do not require such intentional acts, feelings as intentional responses are feelings that arise because of the objects that are made present through other intentional acts. The object of any kind of intentional act—seeing, hearing, touching, understanding, conceiving, affirming, etc.—may give rise to feelings. One may, for instance, be disgusted with what one sees, with what one understands, with what one affirms to be true, with what one decides.

Feelings as intentional responses are crucial to the deliberative process because, through such feelings, we apprehend values.<sup>337</sup> Lonergan writes,

Such feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power. Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin. Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope or despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning. We have feelings about other persons, we feel for them, we feel with them. We have feelings about our respective situations, about the past, about the future, about evils to be lamented or remedied, about the good that can, might, must be accomplished.<sup>338</sup>

Feelings as intentional responses, then, usher us into the world endowed with felt value, and such felt value is an integral factor in our deliberation and our decisions. Apart from feelings, mere knowledge of facts is often not sufficient for motivating us to action, especially when the action requires long-term commitment: feelings play the crucial role in orienting our lives “massively and dynamically.”

Although many of our feelings are fleeting, arising and departing with the rise of

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<sup>336</sup> *Method*, CW14, 32.

<sup>337</sup> *Method*, CW14, 38.

<sup>338</sup> *Method*, CW14, 32.

intentional objects, some feelings take deeper root in human living. Feelings, Lonergan writes,

are not merely transient, limited to the time that we are apprehending a value or its opposite, and vanishing the moment our attention shifts. There are, of course, feelings that easily are aroused and easily pass away. There are too the feelings that have been snapped off by repression to lead thereafter an unhappy subterranean life. But there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life.<sup>339</sup>

Indeed, the feelings that orient us massively and dynamically in human life are principally the deep feelings that guide and give structure to our lives. Indeed, these feelings, as Lonergan notes, may be deliberately reinforced—Lonergan does not state by whom, whether oneself or others—and to the degree that they are so reinforced, they assimilate many other factors in human living. The feeling of love of victory, for example, may be reinforced, both by oneself and by others, to such a degree that the world appears as something to be conquered.

As the example indicates, Lonergan is not saying that feelings—whether transient or enduring—are self-validating. Our apprehension of value may be malformed: the objectively evil might enrapture us and the objectively good might bore us. Because such feelings are not self-validating, there is required both an understanding and a judgment concerning our feelings and the values apprehended through them. Both understanding and judgment, in turn, require questioning the feeling and the value apprehended, attaining direct and reflective insights with regard to them. In other words, responsible consciousness—the fourth level of consciousness—elicits the full range of conscious acts, what is generically classified by Lonergan as acts of experiencing, understanding,

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<sup>339</sup> *Method*, CW14, 33.

and judging. Feelings and the values apprehended through them, then, are not self-validating because they need to be subject to the dynamism of the human spirit, through which one's feelings and their corresponding values can be determined as either legitimate or illegitimate, adequately formed or inadequately formed.

Nevertheless, when adequately formed, feelings and their corresponding values orient us massively and dynamically toward self-transcendence. "In general," Lonergan writes, "response to value both carries us towards self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or of which we transcend ourselves."<sup>340</sup> He continues a few pages later,

Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person, or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements. For we are so endowed that we not only ask questions leading to self-transcendence, not only can recognize correct answers constitutive of intentional self-transcendence, but also respond with the stirring of our very being when we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of moral self-transcendence.<sup>341</sup>

Feelings as intentional responses that apprehend values, then, serve a crucial function in our deliberation inasmuch as they orient us towards both intellectual and moral self-transcendence. They do so intellectually as they apprehend the values of understanding and of truth, and do so morally inasmuch as they apprehend the values of persons and of beauty, virtue, and great achievements. Furthermore, such feelings serve as impediments to the flight from self-transcendence, as their obverse is a disdain for obscurantism, falsity, misanthropy, and so on. Because such feelings and their corresponding values can be deliberately reinforced, they can come to take over the whole of the person in his or

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<sup>340</sup> *Method*, CW14, 32.

<sup>341</sup> *Method*, CW14, 39.

her conscious dynamism. The person, then, habitually loves understanding and truth and disdains obscurantism and falsity, loves persons, virtue, and beauty and disdains misanthropy, vice, and brutality. The values that the person loves then become the objects for the sake of which or the persons for the sake of whom the person transcends themselves in acts of deliberation and decision. It is for this reason that Lonergan says, in “Insight Revisited,” that deliberation and decision sublate and unify both thinking *and* feeling, thereby integrating the whole of the conscious person.

#### **4.2.2 The Question, Presence, and Love of God**

In “Insight Revisited,” Lonergan mentions a second difference between *Insight* and *Method*. In the earlier work, the questions of the existence and the nature of God were pursued in a theoretical context, and arguments were advanced to prove the existence and the nature of God. In the later work, the priority is given to the conditions in which the question of God emerges in human consciousness, along with the presence of God in consciousness through the gift of God’s love. Although Lonergan never says that the arguments in *Insight* were incorrect, in *Method* he adverts to the more fundamental problem about what would even make a person concerned with such arguments or even with the question itself.

Whereas in *Insight* Lonergan foregrounds the intellectual context in which the question of God arises—that is, with regard to the complete intelligibility of being<sup>342</sup>—in *Method*, he foregrounds the ethical and religious context in which the question of God

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<sup>342</sup> See also, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “The General Character of the Natural Theology of Insight,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, vol. 17, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 3–9, at 6.

often arises.<sup>343</sup> The ethical context is evident at the beginning of Chapter 4, “Religion” in *Method*. Lonergan writes,

The facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of our universe. Such questions have been put in very many ways, and the answers given have been even more numerous. But behind this multiplicity there is a basic unity that comes to light in the exercise of transcendental method. We can inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. *We can deliberate whether our deliberating is worthwhile.* In each case, there arises the question of God.<sup>344</sup>

To deliberate about x is to ask whether x is worthwhile. To deliberate about deliberating is to ask whether any deliberating is worthwhile. Has ‘worthwhile’ any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant with this world? We praise the developing subject ever more capable of attention, insight, reasonableness, responsibility. We praise progress and denounce every manifestation of decline. *But is the universe on our side, or are we just gamblers, and if we are gamblers, are we not perhaps fools, individually struggling for authenticity and collectively endeavoring to snatch progress from the ever mounting welter of decline?* The questions arise, and clearly our attitudes and our resoluteness may be profoundly affected by the answers. Does there or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness? Are cosmogenesis, biological evolution, historical process basically cognate to us as moral beings or are they indifferent and so alien to us?<sup>345</sup>

Lonergan is arguing that the question of God is more adequately situated within an ethical context; indeed, in a foundational context wherein the worthwhileness of being ethical is at stake. In deliberating about whether deliberating itself is worthwhile,

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<sup>343</sup> The claim regarding *Insight* may need some qualification, as the discourse on God follows upon the problem of human liberation. In other words, already in *Insight* there is some ethical framework in which the question of God is arising. Nevertheless, the premises adduced for the arguments about God in *Insight* all have to do with the intelligibility of being. The ethical context is not foregrounded in Chapter 19 on general transcendent knowledge, though it does become much clearer in Chapter 20 on special transcendent knowledge.

<sup>344</sup> *Method*, CW14, 96.

<sup>345</sup> *Method*, CW14, 97f.

questions emerge about the place of being ethical within the wider frame of the universe. As the italicized parts indicate, the questions animating Lonergan's discussion are distinctly expressed by the atheist existential philosophers of the 20th century, for whom the human search for meaning and value was placed against the backdrop of the absurdity of the universe, the silent vacuum that indifferently absorbed and remained unresponsive in the face of any human search for meaning. If there is no moral and intelligent ground to the universe and all of the universe and the processes intrinsic to it—e.g., cosmogenesis and evolution—are fundamentally amoral, if value is merely originated in humans and does not have any other ground, then the prospect of being ethical in our world finds little support. In other words, in deliberating about the worthwhileness of being ethical, the question of God arises.

Perhaps even prior to the question emerging within consciousness, however, God already reaches out to human beings by religiously converting them. Lonergan says that religious conversion is, in the idiom of Romans 5:5, God's flooding of our hearts with God's love. Such a religious conversion affects all dimensions of consciousness, especially our capacity for self-transcendence. Lonergan writes,

The transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence. That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one's being becomes being-in-love. Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds.

As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give. That fulfilment bears fruit in a love of one's neighbor that strives mightily to bring about the kingdom of God on this earth. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfilment opens the way to the trivialization of human life in the



pursuit of fun, to the harshness of human life arising from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the universe is absurd.<sup>346</sup>

Religious conversion, Lonergan argues, is the basic fulfillment of our capacity for self-transcendence. It is not the complete fulfillment, which only occurs in the next life. But it is a basic fulfillment because, while the capacity for self-transcendence exists within everyone, one's own evil moral inclinations inhibit such self-transcendence through, for instance, the trivializing human affairs, the thirst for domination, or the despair that the good can be achieved. Religious conversion is the basic fulfillment because it establishes in a person the dynamic state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion. The state is dynamic because it demands the occurrence of various intentional acts in order to carry out such love, thereby facilitating acts of self-transcendence and the development of the subject.<sup>347</sup> Such a dynamic state is the basic fulfillment of our capacity for self-transcendence, Patrick Byrne argues, "in the sense that it is a feeling of unshakable reassurance that all of our questions have answers (especially all of our questions for evaluation, deliberation, and choice), before we find out just what those answers are."<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> *Method*, CW14, 101.

<sup>347</sup> See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and the Problematic of Habitual Grace," *Theological Studies* (Baltimore) 72, no. 4 (2011): 723–49, esp. 732f and 741-748 for an illuminating discussion of the meaning of being-in-love as a "dynamic state." For Lonergan on dynamic integrations, see *Insight*, CW3, 477f.

<sup>348</sup> Byrne, *Ethics of Discernment*, 218. Although Byrne's gloss is helpful here, Wilkins's point that the dynamic state does not only include feelings, but also includes acts of love (and all that is demanded from us in order to carry out that love), might complicate the gloss. See Wilkins, "Grace and Growth," 732f. Further, the reality of inverse insight implies that not all of our questions have answers, since some of our questions may be misdirected; this, too, would complicate the gloss. Nevertheless, Byrne's point seems to

Lonergan argues that one does not have to know that such religious conversion has occurred in oneself for it to have, in fact, occurred. That is, one may experience religious conversion without knowing that one is experiencing or has experienced it. The basic fulfillment of our capacity for self-transcendence, Lonergan writes,

is not the product of our knowledge and choice. On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on, and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing. ...

To say that this dynamic state is conscious is not to say that it is known. For consciousness is just experience, but knowledge is a compound of experience, understanding, and judging. Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive but fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is an unmeasured love, the mystery evokes awe. Of itself, then, inasmuch as it is conscious without being known, the gift of God's love is an experience of the holy, of Rudolf Otto's *mysterium fascinans et tremendum*. It is what Paul Tillich named a being grasped by ultimate concern. It corresponds to St Ignatius Loyola's consolation that has no cause, as expounded by Karl Rahner.<sup>349</sup>

To say that the dynamic state of being can be experienced without being known is to say that a priority is given to consciousness rather than knowledge. The question of God, even the question that emerges in terms of the worthwhileness of our own deliberation, in certain cases may only arise because the person has already been religiously converted, because God has already established the dynamic state of being in love in an unrestricted fashion in the person. Because the dynamic state is first experienced without yet being known, questions may arise with regard to that dynamic state and with regard to its object. Lonergan writes, "Ordinarily the experience of the mystery of love and awe is not

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indicate that the basic fulfillment is a reassurance in the subject as subject, that is, in the subject's own capacities for intellectual, moral, and religious self-transcendence, and Byrne's gloss seems generally correct.

<sup>349</sup> *Method*, CW14, 102.

objectified. It remains within subjectivity as a vector, an undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness.”<sup>350</sup> Hence, in certain circumstances, there is a priority of love over knowledge: the dynamic state of being in love may exist in a person before the person knows that it exists.<sup>351</sup> The priority given to consciousness rather than knowledge is in line with the fuller radicalization of intentionality analysis in Lonergan.

Furthermore, Lonergan argues in *Method* that the dynamic state of being in love, which God establishes in human beings through grace, occurs on the fourth level of consciousness, which is concerned with deliberation and decision, that is, with being ethical. That is, the dynamic state of being in love primarily concerns a sort of self-presence,<sup>352</sup> one that is distinct from the sorts of self-presence occurring on the first,

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<sup>350</sup> *Method*, CW14, 109.

<sup>351</sup> *Method*, CW14, 118: “It used to be said, *Nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*, Knowledge precedes love. The truth of this tag is the fact that ordinarily operations on the fourth level of intentional consciousness presuppose and complement corresponding operations on the other three. There is a minor exception to this rule inasmuch as people do fall in love, and that falling in love is something disproportionate to its causes, conditions, occasions, antecedents. For falling in love is a new beginning, an exercise of vertical liberty in which one’s world undergoes a new organization. But the major exception to the Latin tag is God’s gift of his love flooding our hearts. Then we are in the dynamic state of being in love. But who it is we love is neither given nor as yet understood. Our capacity for moral self-transcendence has found a fulfilment that brings deep joy and profound peace. Our love reveals to us values we had not appreciated, values of prayer and worship, or repentance and belief. But if we would know what is going on within us, if we would learn to integrate it with the rest of our living, we have to inquire, investigate, seek counsel. So it is that in religious matters love precedes knowledge, and, as that love is God’s gift, the very beginning of faith is due to God’s grace.

<sup>352</sup> See Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, “Sanctifying Grace in a ‘Methodical Theology,’” *Theological Studies* 68, no. 1 (2007): 52–76, esp. 71.

second, and third levels, but ultimately falls into the sort of self-presence occurring on the fourth level. The dynamic state of being in love, Lonergan writes,

is conscious on the fourth level of intentional consciousness. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of inquiry, insight, formulating, speaking. It is not the consciousness that accompanies acts of reflecting, marshaling and weighing the evidence, making judgments of fact or possibility. It is the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely. But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfilment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the *apex animae*.<sup>353</sup>

There seem to be a couple of reasons for Lonergan's claim that the dynamic state of being in love belongs to the fourth level of consciousness. First, the dynamic state of being in love, according to Lonergan, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion, that is, in love with a potentially unknown, infinite object. Such a love only occurs because of some felt apprehension of transcendent value for the sake of which every other value in the universe is oriented and in which every other value finds its proper fulfillment.<sup>354</sup> Because the fourth level of consciousness is concerned with deliberation and decision,

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<sup>353</sup> *Method*, CW14, 103.

<sup>354</sup> Lonergan argues that through religious conversion, transcendent value is apprehended. He continues, "As other apprehensions of value, so too faith has a relative as well as an absolute aspect. It places all other values in the light and the shadow of transcendent value. In the shadow, for transcendent value is supreme and incomparable. In the light, for transcendent value links itself to all other values to transform, magnify, glorify them. Without faith, the originating value is man, and the terminal value is the human good man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is the divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So the human good becomes absorbed in a more all-encompassing good" (*Method*, CW14, 112).

and because the values for the sake of which one acts are apprehended through feelings, the dynamic state of being in love, Lonergan argues, broadens, deepens, heightens, and enriches—but does not supersede—all other values apprehended through feelings.<sup>355</sup> With religious conversion, the range of values about which one deliberates and pursues becomes expanded and the feelings through which one apprehends these values become deepened and refined. Second, as one ascends the levels of consciousness, more and more acts of consciousness are sublated in order for that level of consciousness to attain its term.<sup>356</sup> The second level of consciousness, for instance, requires acts of sensation and their corresponding objects as the materials about which to inquire and attain direct insight and concepts. The fourth level of consciousness, on the other hand, requires acts of all of the lower levels of consciousness and their corresponding objects as the materials about which to inquire and decide to attain through the best possible course of action in the concrete situation. To say that the dynamic state of being in love occurs on the fourth level of consciousness, then, is to say that the whole of the person is drawn up into unrestricted love and that the execution of unrestricted love in the concrete lives of humans demands the full range of conscious, intentional acts available to the person.

In sum, *Method* marks a dramatic turn in Lonergan's thought: the good becomes a

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<sup>355</sup> *Method*, CW14, 228: "that capacity [for self-transcendence] meets fulfillment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so otherworldly love. Then there is a new basis for all valuing and all doing good. ... [A]ll human pursuit of the true and the good is included within and furthered by a cosmic context and purpose, and, as well, there now accrues to man the effective power of love to enable him to accept the suffering involved in undoing the effects of decline."

<sup>356</sup> *Method*, CW14, 116f.

distinct notion, and the existential context in the question of God arises becomes prioritized. Each of these transitions has consequences for how students of Lonergan understand the likeness of the Trinity according to conformity in human beings. It is to this issue that I now turn.

### 4.3 THE PROPOSAL OF A NEW ANALOGY

Much of the discussion among Lonergan's students about a new analogy for the trinitarian processions centers upon a relatively brief passage in Lonergan's 1975 essay "Christology Today." He writes,

The psychological analogy ... *has its starting point in that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love.* Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature.

Now in God the origin is the Father, in the New Testament named *ho Theos*, who is identified with *agape* (J John 4:8,16). Such love expresses itself in its Word, its Logos, its *verbum spirans amorem*, which is a judgment of value. *The judgment of value is sincere*, and so it grounds the Proceeding Love that is identified with the Holy Spirit.

There are then two processions that may be conceived in God; they are not unconscious processes but intellectually, rationally, morally conscious, as are judgments of value based on the evidence perceived by a lover, and the acts of loving grounded on judgments of value. The two processions ground four real relations of which three are really distinct from one another; and these three are not just relations as relations, and so modes of being, but also subsistent, and so not just paternity and filiation but also Father and Son. Finally, Father and Son and Spirit are eternal; their consciousness is not in time but timeless; their subjectivity is not becoming but ever itself; and each in his own distinct manner is subject of the infinite act that God is, *the Father as originating love*, the Son as judgment of value expressing that Love, and the Spirit as originated loving.<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>357</sup> Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Christology Today: Methodological Reflections," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John Dadosky, vol. 16, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 70–93, at 91f.

Although Lonergan does not clearly differentiate this new formulation from his earlier formulation in *The Triune God*, there is an important difference between the two formulations. Whereas the analogy in *The Triune God* begins from an act of understanding, the analogy in the above passage begins with *agape* or, in Lonergan's terms, the "higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love." From the dynamic state of being in love, there proceeds a judgment of value, and from both of these there proceeds a loving act of decision. The procession from the dynamic state of being in love to the judgment of value occurs because of the sufficiency of the evidence perceived by a lover, and the procession from the dynamic state and the judgment occurs because of the known and sincerely affirmed value.

In light of the major transitions in Lonergan's thinking more generally, the meaning of the passage in "Christology Today" has been the subject of dispute among Lonergan's students. A couple of major issues have been disputed. First, in what way does this new analogy really differ from the former analogy? What is the significance, if any, of the difference for trinitarian theology? Second, in what sense, if at all, does Lonergan believe that the new analogy is grounded in natural realities, and in what sense, if at all, does he believe that the new analogy is grounded in supernatural realities? These questions are addressed in the first subsection (4.3.1).

Furthermore, the discussion among Lonergan's students has led Robert Doran to propose an altogether new analogy and a new systematic ordering for trinitarian theology rooted in what Doran calls the four-point hypothesis. Understanding each of these issues is crucial for understanding how the likeness by conformity has been understood among

Lonergan's students. Hence, in the second subsection (4.3.2), I turn to Doran's new analogy, and in the third subsection (4.3.3), I turn to Doran's proposal for a new structure of trinitarian theology and explain how his new analogy fits within that structure. In the next major section (4.4), I turn to criticisms of Doran's project in order to pave the way to a new understanding.

#### **4.3.1 The Difference between the Earlier and Later Formulations**

The principal issue is the degree to which the later formulation is different from the earlier formulation. Some argue that the latter formulation is different from the former because the human psychological realities conveyed in the former differ from those conveyed in the latter. Others argue the later formulation does really differ, but that the difference is not so significant as to change the structure of the analogy. The onus on the first group is to explain how such a difference has consequences for trinitarian theology, and the onus on the second group is to show how the difference does not have so much of a consequence.

Let us deal first with the second group. There are not many representatives of this group, but Charles Hefling has been a prominent voice. He writes,

It is true that the summary in question differs, at least verbally, from Lonergan's other trinitarian writings. The difference lies chiefly in the way deity is conceived. Instead of rational consciousness, as Lonergan would have put it before he wrote *Method*, the analogue for divine being is said to be 'that higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love.' The difference, however, although it is significant, is not so great as it might seem. For Lonergan, love and reasonableness are never opposed. In his early writings, on the contrary, rational consciousness is at once intellectual and moral, so that loving, properly so called, consists in willing a rationally apprehended good.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>358</sup> Charles Hefling, "On the (Economic) Trinity: An Argument in Conversation with Robert Doran,"



Hefling argues that the difference between the earlier and the later formulations is not so great as it may appear, and the reason is that the terms in the analogy are basically the same whether one is operating with three or four levels of consciousness. Hefling thus writes,

Whether the levels are three, as in *Insight*, or four, as in *Method in Theology*, affirmations of value and the decisions they ‘spirate’ both occur at the highest level, the level of ‘rational self-consciousness’ or the ‘existential’ level, as the case may be. Either way, the elements of the analogy—grasping, affirming, deciding—are the same, and so is their intelligible order.<sup>359</sup>

Hence, while there may be a real difference between the earlier and the later analogies, the elements included in the analogy are basically the same. These elements—grasping, affirming, and deciding—do not differ between the earlier and later analogies. The context in which these elements are understood differs—feelings and love enrich the context of understanding these elements—but the elements themselves and their intelligible order remain the same. Hefling also notes that Lonergan’s comments do not immediately imply a supernatural order: the “higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love” does not only include supernatural love, but also includes natural forms of love, such as that between family members or friends.<sup>360</sup>

The main proponent of the first group is Robert Doran, S.J. In a series of articles and in his three-volume *Trinity in History*,<sup>361</sup> Doran argues that the human psychological

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*Theological Studies* 68, no. 3 (September 2007): 642–660, at 653.

<sup>359</sup> Hefling, “Quaetio Disputata,” 654.

<sup>360</sup> Hefling, “Quaetio Disputata,” 653.

<sup>361</sup> The final volume was not published during Doran’s lifetime, though much of it has been published posthumously. See Robert M. Doran, *The Trinity in History. A Theology of the Divine Missions, Volume 3:*

realities conveyed in the earlier analogy are really distinct from those conveyed in the second, and that this difference is significant for trinitarian theology. Over the years, his argument has taken a variety of forms, and in later years Doran defends a version of the psychological analogy that is markedly different from both the earlier and the later formulations of Lonergan.<sup>362</sup> Before turning to Doran's own analogy, I need to explain how Doran defends his position that Lonergan's earlier and later analogies differ in a substantial way.

Doran defends his position in a number of ways. First, Lonergan himself reports in a question and answer session at the 1974 Lonergan Workshop that the first term in the analogy is different. He says,

My systematics on the Trinity [i.e., *The Triune God: Systematics*] is in terms of *Ipsium Intelligere*, and then the Word and proceeding love. You can now start off from *Agapē*. 1 John 4:4-9 and 4:20: God is love, where God is *ho theos*. *Ho theos* in the New Testament is the Father, unless there is contradictory evidence, and there's no contradictory evidence in 1 John. So it is the Father that is *Agapē*, and the *Agapē* is being in love, Absolute Being in Love; and the Logos is the Eternal Judgment of Value; and the Spirit is the Gift; and the person gives his loving, the act of loving; the Spirit is proceeding Love from the Judgment of Value. A minor change: the structure remains the same, but we shift from orthodoxy to orthopraxy.<sup>363</sup>

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*Redeeming History*, ed. Joseph Ogbonnaya (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2022).

<sup>362</sup> The most explicit differentiation occurs in Robert M. Doran, *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine Missions: Volume 1, Missions and Processions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 33-39. See also Robert M. Doran, "Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus *Mysteriorum Fidei*," *Lonergan Workshop* 23 (2012): 165-94. The beginnings of the differentiation are found in Robert M. Doran, "Being in Love with God: A Source of Analogies for Theological Understanding," *The Irish Theological Quarterly* 73, no. 3-4 (2008): 227-42,

<sup>363</sup> Quoted in Doran, "Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling," 183f and *Trinity in History: Volume 1*, 36. The transcript of the question and answer session can be found at [www.bernardlonergan.org](http://www.bernardlonergan.org)

In other words, on a separate occasion, Lonergan explicitly distinguishes between the earlier and the later analogies: the earlier analogy begins with *intelligere*, and the later begins with *agape*. In another respect, however, Lonergan calls this a “minor change” and says that “the structure remains the same,” which may support Hefling’s position. Lonergan also says, rather confusingly, that the minor change between the two analogies concerns a shift from orthodoxy to orthopraxy. In one respect, this remark is confusing because the analogy proposed in *The Triune God: Systematics* was grounded in existential self-constitution, which is explicitly concerned with decision (so orthopraxy, in some sense, was already in the horizon). But even though the structure of the two analogies remains the same, the difference between the earlier and later analogies, on Lonergan’s telling, is concerned with the first term in each of the analogies. How, then, do the two analogies differ? Lonergan does not tell us much directly, and Doran has strived to shed light upon the meaning of the second analogy in order to show how it is different from the first.

In his first formulation, Doran argues that the new analogy ought to take the following form: as the Son proceeds from the Father, and as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, so too do the eyes of faith proceed from the dynamic state of being in love, and the habit of charity proceed from the dynamic state and the eyes of faith.<sup>364</sup> Doran characterizes the processions as follows:

The conscious reflection of the entitative habit [i.e., sanctifying grace] is found in a given grasp of evidence, at a most elemental level, and, at the same level, in a given affirmation of value proceeding or emanating from that grasp (a given

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<sup>364</sup> Robert M. Doran, “The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,” *Theological Studies* 67, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 750–77.

"yes," where "given" signifies "gift," that is, faith as the knowledge or horizon born of religious love, that is, born of the gift of God's love). ... The grasp and the affirmation together ground and are the principle for a proceeding habit of charity that shows itself in self-transcendent schemes of recurrence in human living ...<sup>365</sup>

A few remarks on this passage are in order. First, Lonergan says in *Method* that the dynamic state of being in love is what the medievals called "sanctifying grace," though it notionally differs from it.<sup>366</sup> Whereas sanctifying grace in scholastic theology was conceived as an entitative habit in a theoretical horizon, sanctifying grace in the later Lonergan is the dynamic state of being in love in a methodical horizon. Doran says that the dynamic state of being in love is the "conscious reflection" (or, perhaps better, conscious manifestation) of the entitative habit.<sup>367</sup> It is the manifestation in consciousness of being objectively pleasing to God. However, such a conscious manifestation, Doran argues, is only tacit and elemental: though it could in principle be adverted to and objectified, it might not be. Second, being in love with God, Doran argues, takes the form of an elementally given grasp of the evidence.<sup>368</sup> Third, an affirmation of value proceeds from this elementally given grasp of the evidence—presumably as an affirmation of fact

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<sup>365</sup> Doran, "Starting Point," 761.

<sup>366</sup> *Method*, CW14, 103, 270.

<sup>367</sup> The entitative habit would belong to the whole person, even if they were in a coma or asleep, while the conscious manifestation would only occur if the person were conscious. See Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sanctifying Grace in a 'Methodical Theology,'" *Theological Studies* 68, no. 1 (2007): 52–76. Jacobs-Vandegeer is especially clear about the pastoral concerns animating this claim at 75f.

<sup>368</sup> This claim, in my opinion, is the oddest of them. I turn to it in criticisms of Doran's position below. Doran seems to be relying upon Michael Vertin, "Judgments of Value, for the Later Lonergan," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 2 (1995): 221–248.

proceeds from a reflective insight regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.<sup>369</sup> Such an affirmation of value is correlated to what Lonergan calls “the eyes of faith” in *Method*. Fourth, being in love with God and the affirmation of value give rise to the habit of charity, which Doran defines as “self-transcendent schemes of recurrence in human living.” The terms in the analogy, Doran argues, are all supernatural realities: sanctifying grace, the eyes of faith, and the habit of charity. The principal difference between the two analogies, then, is that while the human component of Lonergan’s analogy in *The Triune God: Systematics* are all natural realities, the human component of the analogy in “Christology Today” are all supernatural realities. Hence, he says that the earlier is a “natural analogy,” while the later is a “supernatural analogy.” To Doran, the difference seems more significant than it did to Hefling.

#### **4.3.2 Doran’s New Analogy**

Rather quickly, however, Doran becomes displeased with the formulation of the supernatural analogy based upon Lonergan’s “Christology Today.” His first complaint concerns the meaning of the dynamic state of being in love.<sup>370</sup> Although in *Method* Lonergan says that the dynamic state of being in love with God really is sanctifying grace, but notionally distinct from it, Doran argues that the dynamic state in Lonergan is actually performing a couple of functions, and doing so in an undifferentiated way.

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<sup>369</sup> Again, see Vertin, “Judgments of Value, for the Later Lonergan,” 221-248.

<sup>370</sup> The first mention of this complain, from what I can tell, occurs in Robert M. Doran, “Consciousness and Grace,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 11 (1993): 51–75. In this article, however, he does not link his claims regarding ambiguity of the dynamic state of being in love to the supernatural analogy. The first place this occurs, from what I can tell, is in Robert M. Doran, *What Is Systematic Theology?* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 99-109.

Aquinas and Lonergan in his scholastic writings distinguish between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and Doran believes that the dynamic state of being in love in Lonergan's *Method* is performing both of these functions. But, Doran argues, the two functions ought to be carefully distinguished. As Aquinas and the early Lonergan distinguish between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity in the realm of theory, so too a methodical theology must distinguish between them in the realm of interiority.<sup>371</sup> In

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<sup>371</sup> This is a controversial point in the literature. Doran's primary reason for maintaining some distinction between the two is grounded in a remark by Lonergan in *Method*. Lonergan writes, "For every [metaphysical] term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness" (*Method*, CW14, 317. Doran interprets this to mean that the terms and relations of scholastic theology, principally in Aquinas's and Lonergan's scholastic works, need to be correlated to psychological realities. The first iteration of this interpretation occurs in Robert M. Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 11 (1993): 51–75. He continues to maintain this interpretation in some form throughout his work. Others have criticized Doran's interpretation, arguing that a critical metaphysics may or may not correspond to Aquinas's or Lonergan's scholastic terms and relations and that these terms and relations cannot simply be assumed. See especially, Charles C Hefling, "On the (Economic) Trinity: An Argument in Conversation with Robert Doran," *Theological Studies* 68, no. 3 (2007): 642–60; Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Method and Metaphysics in Theology: Lonergan and Doran," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* N.S. 5, no. 2 (2014): 53–85; idem, "On Metaphysical Equivalence and Equivocation: An Essay in Conversation with Daniel Monsour and Robert Doran," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* N.S. 9, no. 2 (2018): 75–99; idem, "Dialectic and Transposition: Lonergan, Scholasticism, and Grace, in Conversation with Robert Doran," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 85, no. 3 (2020): 286–306. I agree with the dissenters of Doran's interpretation on this point, but (as with the dissenters) believe that Doran's interpretation of the distinction between sanctifying grace and charity in a methodical theology is worth considering and that, despite the misguided rule, Doran's arguments regarding grace in terms of consciousness may have some merit. In other words, the real issue is not whether Doran successfully correlates scholastic categories to

other words, a major problem with Lonergan's formulation in *Method*, Doran contends, is that he does not distinguish between the sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Doran also notes Lonergan says that the dynamic state of being in love does not distinguish between the two. In a question and answer session at the 1974 Lonergan Workshop, Lonergan claims that the dynamic state of being in love in *Method* is an "amalgam" of sanctifying grace and charity.<sup>372</sup> But for Doran this is a problem. Reintroducing the scholastic distinction between sanctifying grace and charity into a methodical theology, Doran argues, will allow for a more differentiated account of God's grace in human consciousness.

Prior to his project of formulating the supernatural analogy, Doran argued that the dynamic state of being in love is more adequately conceived as a transposition of the habit of charity and that sanctifying grace is more adequately conceived as an introduction of a new level—a fifth level—of consciousness.<sup>373</sup> The distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity in Doran's earlier work is a distinction between being loved and recurring acts of loving. He writes,

The gift of God's love poured forth into our hearts is an uncreated grace (the Holy

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conscious realities, which is a problematic procedure, but rather whether the distinctions he makes between sanctifying grace and charity in consciousness can be adequately verified in religiously and interiorly differentiated consciousness. See Wilkins, "Method and Metaphysics," 81f.

<sup>372</sup> The recording can be found on [www.bernardlonergan.com](http://www.bernardlonergan.com) at 815A0A0E070, and the transcript found at 815A0DTE070. Here is the line in full: "If you conceive sanctifying grace as the state of being in love with God, so that it is an amalgam of sanctifying grace and charity, except that it isn't in faculties seeing that we haven't got faculties, and so on."

<sup>373</sup> Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," 75; "for fuller exposition, see Robert M. Doran, "Revisiting 'Consciousness and Grace,'" *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 2 (1995): 151–59.

Spirit) that effects in us, as a consequent condition of its reception and as a relational disposition to receive it, the created grace of a dimension or level of consciousness that is distinct from the intentional levels discussed by Lonergan in his intentionality analysis. At this distinct and nonintentional level — nonintentional because, while it has a content, it has no apprehended object — we experience what can, upon reflection, be objectified as an inchoate and abiding satisfaction of our intentional longings (and their psychic correspondences) for intelligibility, truth, and goodness. This inchoate and abiding rest from intentional striving, a secure base that sustains and carries us in our intentional operations, can be further objectified, with the help of the revelation manifest in Christ Jesus, as being loved in an unqualified fashion, and being invited and empowered to love in return. ... The initial and grounding nonintentional experience of rest from intentional striving is the conscious basis of our share in the inner trinitarian life of God, of our falling in love with God, and of the dynamic state of our being in love in an unqualified fashion. It is what a metaphysical theology called sanctifying grace. The dynamic state of being in love that it releases (with our assent and cooperation, which themselves are enabled by the gift itself) is what the scholastic tradition called the infused virtue of charity, which is the proximate principle of the operations of charity whereby God is attained as God is in God's own self; but the created, remote, and proportionate principle of these operations— what scholastic theology called the entitative habit or sanctifying grace of a created communication of the divine nature—is a distinct dimension or level of consciousness: the nonintentional experience that can be objectified in Christian terms as a resting in being loved in an unqualified fashion.<sup>374</sup>

The experience of sanctifying grace, Doran argues in these earlier works, is a tacit, non-intentional experience of being loved in an unqualified fashion by God, who invites us to love in return, and the habit of charity is the dynamic state of being in love through which human acts of loving God occur with regularity. Notice that prior to the dynamic state of being in love, for Doran, there is the reception of God's love and the invitation to love in return.<sup>375</sup> Part of the task confronting Doran, then, is to synthesize his earlier arguments with the supernatural analogy. In other words, the dynamic state of being in love should

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<sup>374</sup> Doran, "Revisiting 'Consciousness and Grace'," 155ff.

<sup>375</sup> I agree with Hefling that the distinction Doran is drawing here is more adequately characterized as a distinction between operative and cooperative grace, rather than sanctifying and habitual grace. See Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 656f.



not be the first term in the analogy, but rather the third term, and the reception of divine love ought to be the first term. This leads Doran to reformulate the analogy in a way that departs from (his interpretation of) Lonergan's relatively brief remark in "Christology Today."

The publication of Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer's article "Sanctifying Grace in a Methodical Theology," Doran says, provides him with resources to confront this task.<sup>376</sup> Jacobs-Vandegeer argues that the manifestation of the entitative habit of sanctifying grace in consciousness occurs in a distinct sort of unity of consciousness, a unity of consciousness through which acts of faith, hope, and love are possible. He writes,

when Lonergan spoke of the "dynamic state of being in love with God," he had in mind the unity of consciousness as that unity reflects an entitative habit rooted in the essence of the soul and manifested in diverse acts of faith, hope, and love. Note that the dynamic state does not itself constitute the remote principle [i.e., sanctifying grace as entitative habit]; it reflects the entitative habit interiorly. But since the dynamic state manifests that remote principle in consciousness as a radical enrichment of the unity of consciousness itself, it accompanies the supernatural acts of the virtues while remaining interiorly distinct from them.<sup>377</sup>

Jacobs-Vandegeer, in other words, argues that the manifestation of sanctifying grace in consciousness is a radical enrichment of the unity of consciousness, an enrichment that accompanies acts of faith, hope, and love. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the basic unity of consciousness, according to Lonergan, is given, but consciousness qualitatively differs according to the various intentional acts one performs. In other words, the unity of consciousness is distinct from the multiplicity of intentional acts that make both object

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<sup>376</sup> Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sanctifying Grace in a 'Methodical Theology,'" *Theological Studies* 68, no. 1 (2007): 52–76. Robert M. Doran, "Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei," *Lonergan Workshop* 23 (2012): 165–94.

<sup>377</sup> Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sanctifying Grace," 72.

and subject present, but the unity of consciousness remains immanent within the multiplicity of acts even as consciousness qualitatively differs according to the various acts. Jacobs-Vandegeer is arguing that the manifestation of sanctifying grace in consciousness is the qualitatively inflected unity of consciousness through which conscious acts of faith, hope, and love become possible. However, Jacobs-Vandegeer is also clear that such a qualitatively affected unity of consciousness is able to accompany all other conscious acts. He writes,

in receiving the gift of God's love, the subject as subject undergoes a radical transformation that affects the entire field of consciousness. In this light, the subject may consciously operate on any number of the levels (consciousness as diversified by operations), but the subject does so in a comprehensive state of being in love unrestrictedly (consciousness as an identity immanent in the diversity).<sup>378</sup>

The implication is that the dynamic state of being in love is not a distinct level of consciousness, but rather a quality of the unity of consciousness that remains present on all levels of consciousness: it is a quality that remains even as consciousness qualitatively differs.<sup>379</sup>

In later articles and in *Trinity in History*, Doran appropriates Jacobs-Vandegeer's argument in order to formulate a new understanding of the supernatural analogy.<sup>380</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Sanctifying Grace," 72.

<sup>379</sup> Lonergan often correlates a level of consciousness to the variety of acts that are proper to that level. There is an issue with Jacobs-Vandegeer's account, and it is unclear how he would resolve it. He implies that sanctifying grace as conscious is not a distinct level of consciousness. But he also says that acts of faith, hope, and love manifest sanctifying grace as conscious. But if such acts can only occur with this kind of consciousness, then would not sanctifying grace as conscious be a new level of consciousness?

<sup>380</sup> This does not happen immediately. There is a transitional period where Doran appropriates Jacobs-Vandegeer's argument but does not restructure the supernatural analogy. See, Robert M. Doran, "Being in

Beginning with “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling: A Key to the *Nexus Mysteriorum Fidei*,” Doran begins to formulate a supernatural analogy in contradistinction to Lonergan. Now, the dynamic state of being in love is identified with the habit of charity and with the term of the second procession, the procession of the Spirit. In other words, the dynamic state is no longer the first term in the analogy. In homage to Augustine, Doran names the first term *memoria*. He writes,

we are rejoining Augustine at this point, for whom "memoria," understood precisely as the condition under which the mind is present to itself, functions as the analogue for the divine Father. The condition under which the mind is present to itself, of course, can be lovable-ness or it can be just the opposite, and ultimately it is self-presence that has known "gratia gratum faciens" that is "memoria" as the mind present to itself in a manner that can function as the supernatural analogue for the divine Father.<sup>381</sup>

The presence of Jacobs-Vandegeer’s argument is palpable. Sanctifying grace infused into the essence of the person is manifest in a distinct unity of consciousness and a distinct sort of self-presence. With sanctifying grace, the distinct unity of consciousness is qualified by lovable-ness; without sanctifying grace, the unity of consciousness is qualified by its opposite. Jacobs-Vandegeer thus provides a way for Doran to return to his earlier arguments from “Consciousness and Grace,” where sanctifying grace was experienced as being loved in an unrestricted fashion. For Doran, then, the first term of his own supernatural analogy includes the being loved in an unrestricted fashion as a unique unity of consciousness.

However, on Doran’s interpretation, *memoria* includes something more: a

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Love with God: A Source of Analogies for Theological Understanding,” *The Irish Theological Quarterly* 73, no. 3–4 (2008): 227–42. In this article, Lonergan’s later analogy remains, but Doran uses Jacobs-Vandegeer to conceive the dynamic state of being in love.

<sup>381</sup> Doran, “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling,” 185.

recollection of that love. Unfortunately, Doran does not define recollection, though he employs a variety of terms that shed some light on his meaning. He says, for instance, that “the gift itself [is] recollected and acknowledged in *memoria*.”<sup>382</sup> Doran seems to be moving from holding that the first term in the analogy is tacit, elemental, and non-intentional to holding that the first term must in some way be objectified. Doran thus writes,

The analogy in the order of grace begins with the gift of God's love, retrospectively interpreted as a gift of being on the receiving end of a love that is without qualification and that has about it something that seems to emanate from the foundation of the universe. I suggest that that retrospective interpretation might be linked to Augustine's *memoria*, which was the starting point of the first great psychological analogy.<sup>383</sup>

The first term in the supernatural analogy, then, is a retrospective interpretation of being loved in an unrestricted fashion, by which Doran means that the being in loved in such a way must be cognitively objectified. Again, sanctifying grace, Doran writes, “is experienced, at least as recollected and made thematic in memory, as being on the receiving end of unconditional love and loving.”<sup>384</sup> Saying that being loved in an unrestricted way is recollected, thematized, acknowledged, retrospectively interpreted, etc. implies that such being in love needs to be objectified. But the sense in which it needs to be objectified is unclear. Does it only need to be adverted to? Does it also need to be understood? Does it need also to be conceived? And so on.

Doran does not say his reason for transitioning from the tacit, elemental, and non-intentional to the objectified, intentional, and explicit. The most likely reason, it seems, is

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<sup>382</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 34.

<sup>383</sup> Doran, “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling,” 181.

<sup>384</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 80.

that he is attempting to integrate Aquinas's and the early Lonergan's conceptions of the psychological analogy within his own formulation of the supernatural analogy. Because their conceptions begin with the act of understanding, Doran may be attempting to integrate the act of understanding into the supernatural analogy. Furthermore, because the early Lonergan argues that intelligible emanation is autonomous rather than spontaneous, Doran may be attempting to integrate autonomy into his new conception. It would be difficult to say that the act of emanation of the judgment of value from the dynamic state of being in love (as Doran does in earlier work) is an autonomous procession if neither of these even need to be adverted to. It is probably for this reason that Doran says that the supernatural analogy as he later formulates it here is "isomorphic" with the analogies of Aquinas and Lonergan: the terms are different, but the structure remain the same.<sup>385</sup>

There are, however, several inconsistencies in Doran's own formulation of the supernatural analogy, and I will mention two here. First, although Doran mostly seems to hold that the first term in the analogy needs to be objectified, in other places in the text it seems that the first term does not need to be objectified. For instance, "the felt sense of being on the receiving end of unqualified love precedes a knowledge that in Lonergan's late work is explicitly called 'faith,' where faith is understood as the knowledge born of love."<sup>386</sup> More expansively,

the created analogue in the second analogy allows for the possibility of a basis in the supernatural order, in the experienced gift of God's own love, the felt sense of being on the receiving end of an unqualified love and of being invited to participate in that love wherever such participation will take one. As I said earlier, this is the felt sense, as it were, of "gratia gratum faciens," and so is the conscious manifestation of what theology has traditionally called sanctifying grace.

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<sup>385</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 33

<sup>386</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 160.

Together with the set of judgments of value that constitute the faith that is the eye opened by the reception of such love, it releases the dynamic state of being in love in an unqualified way, the state that corresponds to what theology has traditionally called the habit of charity.<sup>387</sup>

Again, Doran does not define “felt sense” in the passage in *The Triune God*, so the meaning is not immediately clear. Regardless, no objectification of the felt sense seems to be implied in these passages. There is no language of recollection, acknowledgment, thematization, retrospective interpretation, etc. Hence, these passages imply, contrary to the claims made elsewhere in *Trinity in History*, that the first term in the analogy does not need to be objectified. In other words, these lines seem much closer to Doran’s position prior to his transition to a post-Lonergan analogy and his introduction of *memoria*.<sup>388</sup>

There is a second ambiguity. It is not clear whether the remembered reception of love is really the first term in the analogy. Doran writes, for instance, “From the remembered reception of love there flows evidence perceived by a lover, from which one’s judgments of value proceed as act from act.”<sup>389</sup> Doran here is discussing the first procession, that is, the analogue for the procession of the Son from the Father, but he actually mentions two processions: a procession of evidence perceived by a lover from the remembered reception of love, and the procession of judgments of value from the evidence so perceived. It is unclear whether the principle in the first procession is supposed to be the remembered reception or the evidence perceived. This passage implies that the evidence perceived by a lover is the first term, but elsewhere in *Trinity in History*

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<sup>387</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 159.

<sup>388</sup> There is a possibility that Doran wrote this chapter prior to his transition to a new supernatural analogy and just did not return to it to adjust the argument accordingly.

<sup>389</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 225.

Doran says that the remembered reception is the first term. Furthermore, it is unclear how evidence perceived by a lover flows from the remembered reception of love, especially because, according to Doran's argument, the loving response in decision—by which someone can be said to be a lover, rather than only beloved—is the term of the second procession. Though I do not have the space to expound upon this here, I suspect that Doran is relying upon an insufficient conception of the role of feelings in the deliberative process. The language of “felt sense” and “evidence perceived by a lover” as giving rise to judgments of value is questionable, and more compelling formulations of the role of feelings in judgments of value have been put forward in the secondary literature.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>390</sup> I suspect that Doran is relying upon Michael Vertin's arguments regarding the role of feelings in the deliberative process. On one hand, Vertin in earlier work argues that feelings are to judgments of value what reflective insights are to judgments of fact. See Michael Vertin, “Judgments of Value, for the Later Lonergan,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 2 (1995): 221–48. This seems to align with Doran's claim that the “felt sense” issues in a judgment of value and with much of Doran's earlier work on the transposition of sanctifying grace. On the other hand, Vertin argues in later work that feelings are only the conditions of a deliberative insight, not the deliberative insight itself. He writes, “The data immediately pertinent to my *moral* knowing are the subset that comprises my affective intentional responses to intentional contents I grasp” (Michael Vertin, “Deliberative Insight Revisited,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* N.S 4, no. 2 (2013): 107–41, at 128.). Such data provided in feelings, Vertin argues, are the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for a deliberative insight to be reached. This seems to align with Doran's claim that the evidence perceived by the lover (i.e., feelings) flows from the remembered reception of love (i.e., as objectified) and that the judgment of value flows from the evidence so perceived. In either case, the role of feelings in the deliberative process seems to be misunderstood. Feelings as intentional responses give rise to further pertinent questions, but are not of themselves either the grasp of virtually unconditioned value or the conditions that need to be fulfilled in a grasp of a virtually unconditioned value. See Byrne, *Ethics of Discernment*, 169–203 for a magisterial treatment of the role of

Doran's insufficient philosophical conception of the relation between feelings and judgments of value inevitably gives rise to ambiguities in Doran's formulation of the supernatural analogy.

Although there are several ambiguities and inconsistencies in Doran's formulations of the supernatural analogy, his project of seeking a supernatural analogy for the trinitarian processions is situated within a more encompassing project of showing how humans participate within trinitarian life. Assessing the viability of the supernatural analogy, then, is related to assessing of the more encompassing project, to which I now turn.

#### **4.2.3 The Four-Point Hypothesis**

Doran's conception of the supernatural analogy is situated within a wider systematic context, one in which the graced human realities are correlated to the life of the triune God. Beginning with *What is Systematic Theology?* (2005) and continuing throughout the remainder of his career, Robert Doran advanced what he called the "four-point

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feelings in moral judgment. Byrne explicitly responds to Vertin on p. 199f: "Although I agree with [Vertin] that feelings emerge in response to various agent objects and thereby bestow upon them a felt sense of value, I have argued that these feelings are components in our more encompassing horizon of feelings of value. As such, their role is to provide the criteria according to which the individual subject will regard further questions as pertinent to the judgment of value. ... Hence the feelings are not themselves the grasp of virtually unconditioned value, for that is the province of a kind of understanding or insight separate and distinct from either direct or factual reflective insights. Nor are feelings the fulfillment of conditions for the judgment of value, since that comes only when all of the further pertinent questions have been properly answered. Instead, the horizon of feelings determines what further questions will be felt as pertinent to the correctness of judgments of value as felt."



hypothesis.” Doran discovered the hypothesis in a relatively brief passage of Lonergan’s *The Triune God: Systematics* and (though with a slightly different form, to be explained in a moment) and in Lonergan’s lecture notes from his early theology courses on grace at Regis College.<sup>391</sup> The hypothesis has come to be called a “four-point” hypothesis because it claims that the four trinitarian relations (paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration) serve as the four coordinates in which humanity participates through the created realities of, respectively, the grace of union of the human and divine natures in Christ, the beatific vision, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity. In other words, the grace of union is a participation in paternity; the beatific vision in filiation; sanctifying grace in active spiration; and the habit of charity in passive spiration. Both Doran and the secondary literature recognize that the four-point hypothesis is founded in Lonergan’s writings and cannot be discovered in his predecessors, including Aquinas.<sup>392</sup> In this subsection, I explain the theory of grace that allows Lonergan to formulate the hypothesis, Doran’s reception of the hypothesis, and how he attempts to integrate the supernatural analogy into the hypothesis.

Augustine and Aquinas had both argued that every created reality, including

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<sup>391</sup> See especially, “Supplemental Notes on Sanctifying Grace,” in *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 19: Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael J. Shields, ed. Robert Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), p. 630-661. This is Lonergan’s most extended treatment of the so-called four-point hypothesis.

<sup>392</sup> Jeremy Wilkins has shown, however, that some passages in Aquinas may be tending in the direction that Lonergan is going. See Jeremy D. Wilkins, “Trinitarian Missions And The Order Of Grace According To Thomas Aquinas,” in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, ed. Russell J. Friedman, Andreas Speer, and Kent Emery, Jr. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2011), 687–708.

supernatural realities such as sanctifying grace and charity, has the entire Trinity as its efficient principle. There is, as Augustine argued at length in *De trinitate*, a complete unity in the divine operation *ad extra*. No finite reality, in other words, is created by one person of the Trinity apart from the other persons of the Trinity, and this includes any created grace. In his encyclical *Mystici Corporis Christi* (1943), Pius XII reaffirmed the principle: “in all these matters [i.e., matters of our salvation] all things are common to the most Holy Trinity, insofar as they have God as supreme efficient cause.”<sup>393</sup> Doran notes that Pius XII’s encyclical produced a good deal of caution in theologians developing a theology of grace while Lonergan was writing, but that many theologians, including Karl Rahner, wished to relax the so-called ad-extra rule.<sup>394</sup>

Although Lonergan affirms the rule, he argues that efficient principles and constitutive principles ought to be distinguished from one another. All created realities, simply by being created, bear a relation to the Creator; they are ordered to their Creator by a relation of dependence. God is the efficient principle of all finite realities, including the four created graces mentioned above: the grace of union, the light of glory, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity. Hence, Lonergan writes, “Absolutely all grace, inasmuch as it is related to divine love as its effective principle, by that very fact is related not to notional love but to essential love.”<sup>395</sup> That is, all created grace bears a relation to the divine essence—what is common to the three persons—as its efficient

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<sup>393</sup> Pius XII, *Mystici corporis Christi*, par. 78. “Ac praeterea certissimum illud firma mente retineant, hisce in rebus omnia esse habenda Sanctissimae Trinitati communia, quatenus eadem Deum ut supremam efficientem causam respiciant.”

<sup>394</sup> Hefling names the rule as such. See Hefling, “Quaestio Disputata,” 642.

<sup>395</sup> Lonergan, “Supplemental Notes on Sanctifying Grace,” CW19, 628f.

principle, not distinctly to any of the persons. However, the constitution of the four created graces mentioned above are unique, not because they do not have the divine essence as their efficient cause, but rather because “these graces are of such a high degree of perfection that they touch, in a way, subsistent being itself.”<sup>396</sup> Although the divine essence as common is both the efficient and the exemplary cause of all created realities, Lonergan argues that the divine essence as “identical with one or other trinitarian relation—paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration” stands as the exemplary cause for these four created supernatural realities.<sup>397</sup> In other words, these four created supernatural realities are participations in and imitations of the divine relations.

But as the divine relations are relations to distinct terms, that is, to distinct persons of the Trinity, so by participating in and imitating the divine relations, human persons bear relations to distinct persons of the Trinity. In other words, each of these four supernatural realities places humans in a relation to a distinct divine person (or, in the case of the habit of charity, to two distinct divine persons). Lonergan thus writes in *The Triune God*,

There are four divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and therefore there are four very special modes that ground the external imitation of

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<sup>396</sup> Lonergan, “Supplemental Notes on Sanctifying Grace,” CW19, 632f.

<sup>397</sup> There are other created supernatural realities, such as faith and hope, the gifts of the Spirit, various actual graces, and so on. These are not the same as the four supernatural realities, since they are either “dispositions towards the above-mentioned graces or consequent upon them” (“Supplemental Notes,” CW19, 631f). In other words, they do not possess the same degree of perfection as the four graces that Lonergan specifies: the grace of union, the light of glory, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity. Lonergan’s arguments regarding the division and various degrees of perfection of grace are similar to those of Aquinas, which we saw in Chapter 2.

the divine substance. Next, there are four absolutely supernatural realities, which are never found uninformed, namely, the secondary act of existence of the incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory. It would not be inappropriate, therefore, to say that the secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a participation in active spiration, and so has a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a participation in passive spiration, and so has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a participation of sonship, and so in the most perfect way brings the children of adoption back to the Father.<sup>398</sup>

Paternity, then, is the ordered relation of the Speaker (Father) to the Word (Son), and because the grace of union is, according to Lonergan, a participation in Paternity, the grace of union bears a special relation to the Word. Filiation is the ordered relation of the Word to the Speaker, and because the light of glory is a participation in filiation, it bears a special relation to the Father. The final two will be especially important for our purposes. Active spiration is the ordered relation of the Speaker and the Word to Proceeding Love (the Holy Spirit), and because sanctifying grace participates in active spiration, it bears a special relation to the Holy Spirit. Passive spiration, on the other hand, is the ordered relation of Proceeding Love to the Speaker and the Word, and because the habit of charity participates in passive spiration, it bears a special relation to the Father and the Son.<sup>399</sup> Because he desires to focus on human participation within the triune life in the present life, Robert Doran expounds upon these latter two—sanctifying grace and the habit of charity—at some length. In other words, he seeks to show how

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<sup>398</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 470-73.

<sup>399</sup> For criticisms of the language employed and an interesting proposal for new language, see Neil Ormerod, “The Four-Point Hypothesis: Transpositions and Complications,” *The Irish Theological Quarterly* 77, no. 2 (2012): 127–40. Ormerod suggests that, although it is not altogether wrong to say that, for instance, the grace of union participates in paternity, it is more adequate to say that the grace of union is an expression of paternity.

humans participate within active spiration and passive spiration.

Sanctifying grace's imitation of active spiration and the habit of charity's imitation of passive spiration, according to Doran, is included within the supernatural analogy. In all of Doran's writings on the supernatural analogy, regardless of the ways in which he conceived it over the years, sanctifying grace stands as the first principle and the habit of charity as the final term. The correlation becomes most explicit in Doran's later work, and he draws upon some claims of Lonergan in order to defend the correlation between sanctifying grace and active spiration and between the habit of charity and passive spiration. With regard to sanctifying grace, Doran draws upon a line from Lonergan, who writes,

Since active spiration is the principle of the Holy Spirit, is is also the principle of proceeding divine Love itself. Now the principle of love is lovableness, and therefore active spiration is God as lovable, as the principle of love. Hence because sanctifying grace imitates active spiration, it imitates God as lovable, and therefore makes its possessor pleasing to God and lovable by a special divine Love.<sup>400</sup>

According to Doran, the first term in the supernatural analogy—that is, sanctifying grace as conscious—is the remembered reception of divine love, that is, the remembered loveableness given by “the foundation of the universe.”<sup>401</sup> From the first term flows a judgment, and these together constitute an imitation of active spiration and thus bear a special relation to the Holy Spirit. With regard to the habit of charity, Lonergan writes,

charity flows from sanctifying grace as potencies flow from the essence of the soul. For as active spiration is to passive spiration, so is sanctifying grace to the virtue of charity. Just as sanctifying grace imitates active spiration, so does the virtue of charity imitate passive spiration. Now active spiration is to passive spiration as the principle to the resultant. Therefore sanctifying grace is to charity

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<sup>400</sup> Lonergan, “Supplemental Notes,” CW19, 636f.

<sup>401</sup> Doran, *Trinity in History*, Volume 1, 34.

as the principle to its resultant.<sup>402</sup>

The supernatural analogy, then, articulates the human participation in both active and passive spiration in God, and because active spiration bears a relation to the Holy Spirit and passive spiration bears a relation to the Father and the Son, the Trinity can be said to indwell human persons when such persons possess both sanctifying grace and the habit of charity.<sup>403</sup> In other words, the supernatural analogy, as Doran conceives of it, is only part of the more encompassing four-point hypothesis. Doran contends that the integration of the supernatural analogy into the four-point hypothesis provides the basic framework for explaining how human persons in this life participate in the triune God through grace. It explains that by which human beings are conformed to God.<sup>404</sup>

It should be noted before proceeding that Lonergan in *The Triune God* does not develop the four-point hypothesis in any greater detail than what has been quoted above. Doran, however, claims that the hypothesis is the integrating principle for all of systematic theology in our time.<sup>405</sup> The four-point hypothesis, conjoined to a theology of history, provides what Doran calls a “unified field structure” for systematic theology, as it supplies the basic terms and relations for systematic theology.<sup>406</sup> Doran thereby invests

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<sup>402</sup> Lonergan, “Supplemental Notes,” CW19, 638f.

<sup>403</sup> See especially, Doran, “Sanctifying Grace, Charity, and Divine Indwelling,” 165-194.

<sup>404</sup> Other explanatory principles are needed, of course. Even with regard to the four-point hypothesis by itself, the grace of union and the light of glory would need to be included in any explanation of how humanity is conformed to the triune God.

<sup>405</sup> Doran, “The Starting Point of Systematic Theology,” 753f; idem, *Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 11-14.

<sup>406</sup> Doran defines unified field structure as follows: “The unified field structure would be ... an open and heuristic set of conceptions that embraces the field of issues presently to be accounted for and presently foreseeable in that discipline or functional specialty of theology whose task it is to give a synthetic

the hypothesis with far more explanatory potential than what Lonergan himself advocated, at least in writing. In other words, the four-point hypothesis appeared in a couple of places in Lonergan's published work, but was never explicitly considered an integrating principle for the rest of systematic theology. In *The Triune God: Systematics*, the four-point hypothesis appears as one element in the answer to the question, "In what way is an appropriate external term consequent upon a constituted mission?" Even this question is subsequent to a question about the constitution of the missions themselves, which itself is dependent upon a whole host of other questions. In other words, the position of the four-point hypothesis in *The Triune God* is far downstream, as Lonergan employs it very much toward the end of the treatise. It is also not clear that Lonergan would have affirmed any one theorem as being able to integrate all of systematic theology. Doran, on the other hand, argues that formulating a single theorem is a worthwhile pursuit and that it would change the structure of systematic theology in general. He writes,

Precisely because of the trinitarian theologies of Aquinas and the early Lonergan, theologies that begin with the processions, move to the relations, progress to the persons, and end with the missions, we are now able to come full circle and begin a systematics of the Trinity somewhere else: namely, with a synthetic position that treats together both the divine processions and the divine missions. The missions are the processions in history.<sup>407</sup>

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understanding of the realities that are and ought to be providing the meaning constitutive of the community called the church. The unified field structure would be found in a statement, perhaps a quite lengthy one, perhaps even one taking up several large volumes, capable of guiding for the present and the foreseeable future the ongoing genetic development of the entire synthetic understanding of the mysteries of faith and of the other elements that enter into systematic theology. It would guide all work at bringing these elements into a synthetic unity" (Doran, *What is Systematic Theology?*, 62f).

<sup>407</sup> Doran, "The Starting Point of Systematic Theology," 769.

While Aquinas and Lonergan begin the substantive part of their systematics on the Trinity with an analogue for the processions, Doran argues that the analogue for the processions alone should not be seen as basic in systematics trinitarian theology. Rather, on Doran's view, the processions and the missions ought to be treated together at the beginning of systematic theology, and what is needed is an analogue that can treat them together; hence, the first volume of his project is called *Trinity in History: Processions and Missions*. Because the missions are the processions with the addition of an external created term, and because the principal created terms are the grace of union, the light of glory, sanctifying grace, and the habit of charity, Doran contends that systematic theology ought to begin with the four-point hypothesis, which includes both divine realities and supernatural realities in humans, and with the supernatural analogy, which sheds light upon sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and, by extension, upon active and passive spiration. In other words, the likeness by conformity, on Doran's interpretation, principally consists in imitating active and passive spiration in God, which is the same as operating in accordance with the supernatural analogy.

#### **4.3 CRITICISMS OF DORAN'S PROJECT**

Doran's formulation of the four-point hypothesis and the supernatural analogy and his investing the four-point hypothesis with such a high degree of explanatory potential has not passed without criticism. Charles Hefling, Jeremy Wilkins, and others have raised several critical questions with regard to Doran's overall project. I raise my own criticisms here as well.

I briefly state the major issues here and then address them sequentially in the following subsections. First, there is an issue about whether the classical distinction



between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity is viable in a methodical theology (4.3.1) Second, there is an issue about whether theologians should operate with a three- or four-point hypothesis (4.3.2) Third, there are issues with the intelligibility of a “supernatural analogy” and with the intelligibility of the explanatory potential of the four-point hypothesis (4.3.3). I expound these criticisms in order to pave the way for a different approach to the *imago Trinitatis* in human beings in Chapter 5.

#### **4.4.1 The Transposition of Sanctifying Grace and the Habit of Charity**

First, then, there is debate about whether the medieval distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity ought to be transposed into a methodical theology. All sides of the debate agree that the distinction posited in medieval theology occurred within a now-obsolete context. The medieval distinction was based upon a distinction between the essence and the powers of the soul, and all of this occurred within a framework in which metaphysics served as the basic and comprehensive science. Sanctifying grace was said to occur in the essence of the soul, and the habit of charity was said to occur in one of the powers of the soul, namely, the will. Doran argues that every scholastic theological distinction (or at least those of Aquinas and Lonergan in his Latin writings) ought to be transposed into a methodical context. Doran interprets Lonergan as affirming this principle. In *Method*, Lonergan writes, “For every [metaphysical] term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness.”<sup>408</sup> On Doran’s interpretation, the metaphysical terms and relations are those of Aquinas and Lonergan in his scholastic writings, and these include sanctifying grace and the habit of charity; hence, each of these terms, Doran insists, must have some correlation in intentional

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<sup>408</sup> *Method*, CW14, 317.

consciousness. In other words, Doran takes himself to have firm grounding in Lonergan's writings for transposing the distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity.<sup>409</sup>

Several theologians, however, disagree with Doran, and they do so both in terms of the method of transposition and in terms of verifying Doran's transposed distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity in the data of consciousness. I take each in turn.

In terms of the method of transposition, Jeremy Wilkins has argued in a series of articles that the Doran's interpretation of Lonergan is flawed and that the project of transposition is far more difficult than Doran supposes.<sup>410</sup> Wilkins prosecutes his case on a number of fronts, and I will not rehash all of them here. Nevertheless, a few of the most significant points ought to be mentioned. First, on Wilkins's assessment, Doran's interpretation of Lonergan is flawed because, in the above quote (which is apparently Doran's sole means of support), Lonergan does not mean that every metaphysical distinction affirmed by Aquinas or even the scholastic Lonergan himself ought to be correlated to an element of intentional consciousness. He rather means, as the

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<sup>409</sup> See, for example, Doran, "Consciousness and Grace," 52f; Robert M. Doran, "Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology," *Theological Studies* 59, no. 4 (1998): 569–607, at 589ff, esp. ft. 53. Doran adheres to the principle throughout his work.

<sup>410</sup> See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Method and Metaphysics in Theology: Lonergan and Doran," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* N.S. 5, no. 2 (2014): 53–85; , idem, "On Metaphysical Equivalence and Equivocation: An Essay in Conversation with Daniel Monsour and Robert Doran," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* N.S. 9, no. 2 (2018): 75–99; idem, "Dialectic and Transposition: Lonergan, Scholasticism, and Grace, in Conversation with Robert Doran," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 85, no. 3 (2020): 286–306.

immediately preceding line in *Method* implies,<sup>411</sup> that a critical metaphysics would base its terms and relations in corresponding terms and relations in intentional consciousness. Second, Doran's interpretation of the rule, along with his execution of it, seems like special pleading: it is not clear why only Aquinas's theology or the scholastic Lonergan's theology (and they are not identical in all places) ought to serve as the metaphysical terms and relations that need to be transposed. Why could it not be, say, the terms and relations of Scotus or those of Suárez? The project of transposition, Wilkins points out, is far more complicated than merely correlating scholastic metaphysical terms and relations to psychological elements. It requires, with the exception of communications, all of the functional specialties, each of which has its own goals and sets of criteria. Furthermore, even in Lonergan's own remarks, he does not see the need to distinguish between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity in a methodical theology. As was mentioned above, the dynamic state of being in love, for Lonergan, is an "amalgam" of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Wilkins notes that Lonergan, who clearly knew of the scholastic distinction, does seem to take himself to be bound by Doran's rule.<sup>412</sup>

But even if the project of transposition were as easy and as straightforward as Doran supposes, there are criticisms, first, regarding Doran's distinction between the (remembered) reception of divine love and the response in recurring acts of loving and, second, regarding whether the (remembered) reception and the loving response would even correlate to sanctifying grace and the habit of charity or whether it would correlate

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<sup>411</sup> In full, "The point to making metaphysical terms and relations not basic but derived is that a critical metaphysics results. For every term and relation there will exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness" (*Method*, CW14, 317).

<sup>412</sup> Wilkins, "Dialectic and Transposition," 299.

to some other scholastic distinction (or to none at all).<sup>413</sup>

First, then, some have argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between *being loved* and *loving* in consciousness.<sup>414</sup> In one respect, this criticism seems rather weak. While it is true that, in many circumstances, the experience of being loved and the experience of loving are simultaneous, they are not always so.<sup>415</sup> There are, of

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<sup>413</sup> Wilkins also notes the priority of this question. He suggests “that a transposition of the scholastic distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity is not important to Doran’s project. The real issue is not whether the scholastic terms can be made to correspond to psychological terms. It is whether we may legitimately expect a created participation in four real divine relations, and use that expectation heuristically to guide our investigation of the structure of created grace. I do not think it matters especially whether Doran’s distinction between love received and love bestowed ‘transposes’ the scholastic distinction between sanctifying grace and habitual charity. His questions are not the scholastic questions and it remains to be shown that the scholastic questions are still relevant. What matters is whether Doran’s can be independently verified and legitimately related to active and passive spiration” (Wilkins, “Method and Metaphysics in Theology,” 81f).

<sup>414</sup> See especially, Michael Vertin, “Lonergan on Consciousness: Is There a Fifth Level?,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 12, no. 1 (1994): 1–36; Tad Dunne, “Being in Love,” *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 2 (1995): 161–75.

<sup>415</sup> Dunne seems to argue that the two are originally simultaneous: “I venture to say that I have never experienced God’s love for me flooding my heart ‘as such.’ What I have experienced is that I grew up enjoying the company of my family and friends. It was an experience of common consciousness, the experience of acting together as a ‘we.’ It would take many stories to convey how that compact experience differentiated into the knowledge that I had also been loved by my family and friends. Yet all the stories would have one thing in common: I had to believe the people who told me they love me. It was not an experience of being loved ‘as such.’ I had to realize, in a real assent, the truth of the proposition that they loved me” (Dunne, “Being in Love,” 170). While it is true, of course, that (at least for many) the experience in childhood of being loved and loving in return was compact and relatively undifferentiated, in the sense

course, experiences wherein we love, but are not loved in return, or wherein we are loved but do not love in return. All of these experiences may be qualified by a vast array of feelings: loving but not being loved in return may be qualified by feelings of sadness, of resentment, of longing, and so on, whereas the feeling of being loved but of not loving in return may be qualified by a feelings of pride, of boredom, of disgust, and so on.<sup>416</sup> In

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that it was neither adverted to nor interrogated, this ought not imply, as it does for Dunne, that the experience of being loved and of loving are always simultaneous. Nor ought it imply that the experience of being loved is always affirmed in a judgment. In fact, there seem to be instances where one may experience and understand that one is loved and yet make a judgment otherwise for some other reason (e.g., one would rather avoid the vulnerability and the demands that are consequent upon the affirmation that one is loved). Dunne does, however, indicate an interesting path forward when he says that the primary experience is “an experience of common consciousness, of acting together as a ‘we.’” I begin to pursue this path in the next chapter, though I will not have the space to draw out all of the implications.

<sup>416</sup> In an interesting footnote, Wilkins writes, “God’s love for us, as contingent, requires an extrinsic denominator; for Doran it is the relational disposition to receive; but I am inclined to think that the extrinsic denominator of God’s special love for us is simply our special love for God; for what is love, if not a relational disposition to receive?” (Wilkins, “Method and Metaphysics in Theology,” p. 81, ft. 98). Wilkins suggestion here seems correct for whenever Doran defines the extrinsic denominator of God’s love for us as “the relational disposition to receive.” As was noted above, however, Doran’s terms seem to shift fairly often, and in many places Doran characterizes sanctifying grace not as a relational disposition, but rather as a quality of consciousness with various feelings of self-presence. He often describes it as a felt sense. The shifts in terms do not aid in interpreting Doran, but it seems like the distinction between the feeling of being loved and acts of loving can be distinguished from one another. The foregoing, however, does not answer another problem raised by Wilkins, namely, whether the extrinsic denominator of God’s love for us is a felt sense of being loved in an unqualified way or our loving in an unrestricted way. The remainder of the paragraph begins to deal with that issue.

this sense, the criticism seems rather weak.<sup>417</sup>

In another respect, however, there may be an exception with regard to loving and being loved in an unrestricted fashion. That is, perhaps with God's grace it is more difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between being loved and the loving response. These critics interpret Romans 5:5, not as God's love for us poured out into our hearts (as Doran does, in his claims about the reception of love), but rather as God's own love being poured into our hearts.<sup>418</sup> As Dunne writes, "The flood of love is not simply God's offer of love; it is 'total and permanent self-surrender.'"<sup>419</sup> That is, the primary experience of the love of God, for these critics, is not a felt reception of God's love, but rather the undertow of one's subjectivity manifest in recurring acts of loving transcendent value and the universe in the light of that value. Hence, Dunne writes, God "takes up residence in the heart and loves from there. Lonergan calls this the 'inner word' in hearts matched by the 'outer word' of Jesus in history. Most poignantly, I realized that my love for God is the quintessential evidence that God must love me too."<sup>420</sup> Dunne, here, seems to be correct that, if someone loves God, then it follows that God loves them too. The implication of Doran's argument, however, is that, even prior to loving God, there is a

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<sup>417</sup> Aquinas also affirms that loving may arise from being loved: "Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading them to love" (*ST* 2-2, q. 27, a. 1, ad. 3).

<sup>418</sup> See Dunne, "Being in Love," 171-173. Dunne provides a number of passages from Lonergan showing that his own interpretation is more likely to be correct than Doran's. However, he also mentions that contemporary exegetes of St. Paul interpret the passage as "God's love for us," contrary to Dunne's and (most likely) Lonergan's interpretation and in line with Doran's (173).

<sup>419</sup> Dunne, "Being in Love," 171f.

felt reception of the love of God. Indeed, for Doran, it seems that the feeling alone provides sufficient evidence that one is loved by God (see 4.2.2, especially ft. 392). To my mind, Doran has the weaker argument here, since feelings alone do not provide sufficient evidence to make a judgment of value.

Second, some critics have alluded to how the distinction between the reception of God's love and the loving response do not correlate to the scholastic distinction between sanctifying grace and charity, but rather to the scholastic distinction between operative and cooperative grace.<sup>421</sup> Even though the same criticisms regarding the method of transposition apply here as well, this nevertheless appears to be a strong internal criticism, as it supposes much of what Doran supposes but nevertheless finds Doran's conclusion inadequate. For Aquinas, the distinction between operative and cooperative grace is a distinction between God working in us without us and God working in us with us. More fully, in terms of habitual grace, the distinction is between an infused form in itself and the infused form as a principle of proportionate and meritorious acts.<sup>422</sup> Sanctifying grace is operative in the infusion of a new form into the soul—as the efficient cause of this new form is God alone—and cooperative as a principle of meritorious acts—as the cause of such acts is both God and us.<sup>423</sup> The reception of divine love can be conceived as operative grace, as God floods our hearts with God's love for us, and cooperative grace as our (invited) response in recurring acts of love. However, if Doran's distinction is a transposition of the distinction between operative and cooperative grace,

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<sup>420</sup> Dunne, "Being in Love," 170.

<sup>421</sup> See Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 652.

<sup>422</sup> Aquinas, *ST* 1-2, q. 111, a. 2.

<sup>423</sup> Aquinas, *ST* 1-2, q. 111, a. 2.

then it is not identical to the distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity. Each of these are, according to Aquinas and the scholastic Lonergan, habitual graces, occurring in, respectively, the essence of the soul or in one of its powers, and each could be conceived as either operative or cooperative. In that respect, the distinction between the reception of love and the loving response would not align with the distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, and by extension with participations in active and passive spiration. This brings us to the next issue.

#### **4.4.2 A Four-Point or Three-Point Hypothesis?**

The debate whether the sanctifying grace and the habit of charity can be distinguished from one another in a methodical theology has implications for the four-point hypothesis. If they can be distinguished from one another, then the four-point hypothesis is viable, as Doran has argued. If they cannot be distinguished from one another, then it is not viable. Some critics of Doran's position argue that theologians should opt, not for a four-point hypothesis, but rather for a three-point hypothesis. Aside from the obscurity of the distinction between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity in a methodical theology, critics have put forward other reasons to support adopting a three-point hypothesis.

Charles Hefling, in particular, has recommended the three-point hypothesis. In "Quaestio Disputata," Hefling raises a number of objections against Doran's project. The first argument is that "Doran is putting all of his eggs in the basket of a *hapax legomenon*."<sup>424</sup> Hefling notes that Lonergan's only published affirmation of a four-point hypothesis occurs in *The Triune God: Systematics*. (Hefling probably did not know about Lonergan's lecture notes for his courses on grace, which were only published in

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<sup>424</sup> Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 645.



2011. As mentioned above, these lecture notes contain the most detailed explanation of the so-called four-point hypothesis in Lonergan's work.) Hefling observes that, in other works, Lonergan seems more apt to support, not a four-point, but a three-point hypothesis.<sup>425</sup> The reason for this, Hefling argues, is that the principal supernatural realities in these works are not four, but three: the grace of union, the light of glory, and sanctifying grace. The habit of charity, for whatever reason, is not mentioned in these texts.

If we consider the difficulty in distinguishing between sanctifying grace and the habit of charity in a methodical theology and consider that Lonergan often refers to three, not four, principal supernatural realities by which humanity and divinity are united, the implication, Hefling argues, is that we should adopt a three-point, not a four-point, hypothesis. On Hefling's account, the grace of union participates in paternity; the light of glory participates in filiation, and sanctifying grace participates in passive spiration. It is to be noted that both the habit of charity *and* active spiration are excluded on this account. But if the grounds for excluding the habit of charity is that the dynamic state of being in love is an amalgam of both sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, what are the grounds for excluding active spiration?

Hefling's principal reason is that, as Lonergan argues at length in *The Triune*

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<sup>425</sup> See, e.g., Lonergan, *Constitution of Christ*, 154f; idem, *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 558f. It should be noted in these passages, however, that Lonergan does not explicitly correlate the grace of union, the light of glory, and sanctifying grace to, respectively, paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. What is mentioned in these passages are the perfect supernatural created terms, but it is interesting that charity is not included in these lists.

*God: Systematics*, active spiration is not really distinct from paternity and filiation.<sup>426</sup>

Although there are four real divine relations in God, only three of them are really distinct from one another. The persons, Lonergan argues, are defined by relations of mutual opposition, and neither paternity and active spiration nor filiation and active spiration are relations of mutual opposition. Whereas, for instance, paternity and filiation are really distinct in that speaking is mutually opposed to being spoken, paternity and active filiation are not really distinct because there is no relational mutual opposition: speaking the Word is not mutually opposed to spirating Love. Nor are filiation and active spiration really distinct: spirating Love is not mutually opposed to being spoken. Hence, paternity is only notionally, not really, distinct from active spiration, and the same can be said for filiation. Hefling thus writes,

This "extra" relation [i.e., active spiration] does not constitute a divine Person. Still less has it been sent to the human race, as divine Persons have been sent in the incarnation of the Word and the gift of the Spirit. One would hardly suppose this relation had any part to play in the divine "economy," especially since Lonergan devotes several pages in *De Deo trino* to expounding the idea that the Son and the Spirit have been sent on purpose to establish and confirm *interpersonal* relations. So it is odd to find the "four-point" passage assigning an "economic" role not only to each of the three divine relations that are severally identical with the Persons of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, but to the indistinct, subsumed, "extra" relation as well, although it is a relation known to exist only by theological reasoning and is personal neither in the analogical sense that applies to God nor in any other sense.<sup>427</sup>

Because active spiration is only notionally distinct from paternity and filiation, there is no reason, Hefling suggests, to posit a fourth created supernatural reality that participates in the active spiration. Hefling seems to be correct that, although the four-point appears in

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<sup>426</sup> For relevant passages, see *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 246-255. For summary, see Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 646f.

<sup>427</sup> Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 646f.

*The Triune God: Systematics*, its appearance there is rather odd, considering that Lonergan spends pages explaining how there are not four, but only three really distinct divine relations. Moreover, Hefling is certainly correct that the core of Lonergan's argument in the chapter on the divine missions is that the Son and the Spirit are sent in order to establish interpersonal relations between divine and human persons. (Chapter 5 will begin to work out a framework for speaking about interpersonal relations, so that we may speak more adequately about our incorporation into the triune God.)

The only way for Doran to resolve the complications arising from the fact that there are only three really distinct divine relations, it seems to me, would be to say something like the following: sanctifying grace, as a participation in active spiration, is also a participation in the grace of union, which itself is a participation in paternity, and a participation in the light of glory, which itself is a participation in filiation. Although there are perhaps grounds for advancing such an argument, the argument does not at all seem to be parsimonious, at least not parsimonious enough to serve as the integrating theorem for all of systematic theology. This brings us to the next issue.

#### **4.3.3 The Starting Point of Systematic Theology**

One major issue in Doran's project, which does not seem to be discussed in the literature in any great detail, is the merging of the processions and the missions into the starting point of systematic theology and its illumination by the supernatural analogy. Whereas Lonergan's starting point in *The Triune God: Systematics* is deliberately parsimonious and oriented toward the order of teaching—in that it treats more simple realities in the beginning and only moves to more complex realities afterwards—Doran's starting point avoids the canon of parsimony and the order of teaching.

Part of the beginning, for Doran, is the supernatural analogy.<sup>428</sup> The problem with beginning with the supernatural analogy, however, is that its conception presupposes a lot. At the very least, some systematic understanding of the term supernatural is required. Furthermore, what is supernatural is by definition mysterious. Theologians do not have perfect understanding of the supernatural, and the task for systematic theologians is only to provide some imperfect, obscure, but nevertheless fruitful understanding of it. The grace of union in Christ, the light of glory, and sanctifying grace all may all be affirmed in faith, but providing some understanding of these realities is another matter. However, in beginning with the supernatural analogy, Doran is beginning with what is only obscurely understood. Hefling alludes to this problem in a footnote: “Doran recognizes that he is proposing to adopt, as analogous to God's Trinity, realities that are themselves known only by analogy with “natural” realities. Methodologically speaking, this is a notable innovation. Epistemologically speaking, it seems to recommend explaining the mysterious by the mysterious, if not *obscurum per obscurum*.”<sup>429</sup> Doran adopts, in other words, a questionable starting point, and it is difficult to see how the mysteries of faith are illuminated through this methodology.

Another aspect of Doran’s methodology is that he merges at least two different theorems in his starting point. As he argues in “Starting Point” and *Trinity in History*, the starting point ought to be a synthetic conception of the processions and the missions. He merges an analogy for the processions—his supernatural analogy—with an analogy for the participation in the trinitarian relations of active and passive spiration. But it is

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<sup>428</sup> Doran notes that, with the introduction of the supernatural analogy, he is moving “from reporting and interpreting Lonergan to [Doran’s] own direct discourse” (*Trinity in History, Volume 1*, 34).

worthwhile to question the pedagogical effectiveness of Doran's starting point. Consider how many elements need to be understood prior to even beginning: not only does the student need to have already understood the natural analogy, through which the supernatural analogy is analogously conceived, and not only does the student need to have a conception of the transposed sanctifying grace (which, as I indicated above, is unclear even in Doran's own work), the eyes of faith, and the dynamic state of being in love as the habit of charity, and not only does the student need to have a conception of the way in which the supernatural is distinct from the natural, but the student also needs to have understood the meaning of the real relations in God, including active and passive spiration, whose meaning itself is dependent upon a conception of the processions. In other words, Doran's starting point does not seem to be a pedagogically mindful starting point at all, but rather a point dependent upon many other theorems. Lonergan himself only introduces the four-point hypothesis toward the end of *The Triune God*, and even if one doubts whether the hypothesis is viable in a methodical theology (for the many reasons given above), one can at least recognize that the place in which the hypothesis is introduced is at least pedagogically mindful. Its location is far downstream in the treatise on trinitarian theology, precisely because it is dependent upon so much else.

#### 4.5 CONCLUSION

Though Doran's project is interesting and clearly evinces a mind at work, nevertheless the wide-ranging criticisms of his project appear to be almost devastating. Whatever can be salvaged from his project—admirable and ambitious as that project may be—would have to be situated within a new context, one that is explanatorily more adequate and

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<sup>429</sup> Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 654f, ft. 27.

pedagogically more mindful. There are several clues in the literature about what would constitute a more adequate explanatory context. Hefling notices that the main point of Lonergan's chapter on the divine missions in *The Triune God: Systematics* is that the Son and the Spirit are sent in order to establish interpersonal relations between human and divine persons. Wilkins mentions in a couple of places that the context of love is the context of a "whole complex of external terms and their relations" and that the data on being in love "are both data of consciousness consisting in internally related sets of operations and feelings ... and the data of sense consisting in external performance ...."<sup>430</sup> Dunne mentions a priority of the "we" and of the cooperating subjects in understanding grace. Lonergan himself discusses the interpersonal context as a "quasi-operator" for acts of self-transcendence.<sup>431</sup> There thus seems to be an exigence for understanding the human being's conformity to the triune God precisely through interpersonal relations. The following chapter lays the groundwork for that understanding by arguing that shared intentionality ought to be employed as an analogy in a systematic trinitarian theology.

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<sup>430</sup> The first quote is from "Dialectic and Transposition," 300; the second is from "Grace and Growth," 732.

<sup>431</sup> Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Mission and the Spirit," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, vol. 16, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 21–33, at 29.

## 5.0 SHARED INTENTIONALITY AS ANALOGY

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

As was shown in Chapter 3, Lonergan argues that the first task of *The Triune God: Systematics* is to provide a synthetic and fruitful hypothesis for the trinitarian processions. The hypothesis of intelligible emanation, Lonergan argues, virtually contains as *explananda* the doctrines of the Trinity and other questions relevant to trinitarian theology, though what it provides is only an imperfect, analogous, and obscure understanding. Indeed, Lonergan sets the stage for the substantive line of reflection in *The Triune God* by turning the reader's attention to two apparently contradictory claims, namely that the Son is *a se* and that the Son is not *a se*. One of the principal tasks of the text is to show how these two claims (and others like it) do not, in fact, stand in contradiction to one another, but rather find some integral unity through the hypothesis of intelligible emanation.

It is striking, however, that the line of inquiry on the immanent Trinity in *The Triune God* concludes with another apparent contradiction, which appears in Chapter 5, "The Divine Persons in Relation to One Another." The apparently contradictory claims are (1) that "the same divine consciousness is possessed in the same way by the three

persons”<sup>432</sup> and (2) that “the one divine consciousness ... is possessed by the Three in three distinct ways.”<sup>433</sup> The question is how one and the same divine consciousness is possessed by the three Persons. One position claims that each possesses it in the same way, and the other position claims each possesses it in a distinct way. There thus appears to be a contradiction.

Lonergan, of course, recognizes that the claims stand in apparent contradiction to one another, and he provides the premises from which each claim is to be deduced. The first claim is to be understood on the basis of the one essential act, that is, the one, infinite act of loving understanding. Lonergan writes,

since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are really distinct only on the basis of relational opposition, it is impossible that through essential act, which prescind from the relations, the Father should have a distinct consciousness of the Son or of the Spirit; and similarly it is impossible that the Son should have a distinct consciousness of the Father or of the Spirit; and the same is true for the Spirit. ...

just as through essential act as such the same divinity is possessed in the same way by the Three, so that the Father and the Son and the Spirit are God, each of them equally, so also *through essential act as such the same divine consciousness is possessed in the same way by the three persons, so that each of them is equally conscious both of himself and of his essential act.*<sup>434</sup>

Because each of the divine persons is only conceptually, but not really, distinct from the divine essence, the three persons can be said to possess the divine consciousness in the same way.

The second claim is to be understood on the basis of the notional acts. I do not

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<sup>432</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 382f.

<sup>433</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 390f.

<sup>434</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 382f. Emphasis added.



have the space to develop in detail Lonergan's argument regarding the notional acts,<sup>435</sup> but it will suffice to say three things for the sake of the present argument. First, there are four notional acts: speaking, being spoken, spirating, and being spirated. Only three of them, however, are really distinct from one another:<sup>436</sup> speaking is not really, but only conceptually, distinct from spirating, and being spoken, again, is not really, but only conceptually distinct from spirating.<sup>437</sup> Hence, the three really distinct notional acts are speaking, being spoken, and being spirated, and these acts are proper, respectively, to the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. Second, the notional acts are conceptually similar to the processions, but whereas the processions are employed in order to develop an understanding of the relations and thereby of the persons, the notional acts are located after the treatment of the persons in Lonergan's systematic ordering of trinitarian theology. This means that the notional acts are basically the same as the processions, but they are attributed to the persons whereas the processions ground the notion of person and are thus conceptually prior to the persons. Third, the notional acts are called notional because they are only notionally, not really, distinct from the essential act, though they

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<sup>435</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 380-383.

<sup>436</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 260-263. These passages regard the divine relations, arguing that although there are four divine relations, only three are really distinct from one another. The same would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the notional acts, though Lonergan does not explicitly say as much. See 368-373 and 384-389.

<sup>437</sup> The claim is grounded in the doctrine, affirmed at the Councils of Florence and Lyons, that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son *as from one principle*. See *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CW11, 503-577, esp. 503-507.

are really, not merely notionally, distinct from one another.<sup>438</sup> Lonergan's argument here is based in the Council of Florence's affirmation that in God all is one where there is no distinction by relational opposition. Because speaking, being spoken, spirating, and being spirated are not relationally opposed to the essential act, they are only notionally distinct from that act, but because they are mutually opposed to one another (speaking is relationally opposed to being spoken, for instance), they are really distinct from one another.

Lonergan's claim that the three divine persons possess the divine consciousness in three distinct ways is based upon the distinctions between the notional acts. Lonergan writes,

although this divine consciousness on the basis of the notional acts is one, nevertheless since distinct notional acts are proper to distinct persons, one and the same consciousness is had distinctly by the distinct persons. The intellectually conscious Father generates the Son by intellectual consciousness; the intellectually conscious Son is generated into intellectual consciousness by the Father; the intellectually conscious Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by intellectual consciousness; and the intellectually conscious Spirit is spirated into intellectual consciousness by the Father and the Son. But to generate and to be generated are really distinct from each other, and similarly to spirate and to be spirated are really distinct from each other; and to generate consciously, to be generated consciously, and to be spirated consciously are no less distinct from one another. *We must, then, most certainly conclude that the one divine consciousness, considered on the basis of the notional acts, is possessed by the Three in three distinct ways.* This is surely necessary, if indeed the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are, each of them, conscious both of himself and of each of the others, since they could not be conscious of the others by one consciousness

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<sup>438</sup> The clearest statement of the difference between a real distinction and a notional distinction comes up in *Insight*. Lonergan writes, "A distinction is notional if it is true that (1) *P* is not *Q*, (2) *P* is merely an object of thought, and (3) *Q* is merely an object of thought" (*Insight*, CW3, 513). For Lonergan's claim that the notional acts are only conceptually, not really, distinct from the divine essential act, see *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 388-391.

unless each of them possessed the same consciousness in a distinct way.<sup>439</sup>

The Father possesses the divine consciousness *as the one* speaking and spirating by intellectual consciousness; the Son possesses that same divine consciousness *as the one* being spoken into intellectual consciousness and spirating by intellectual consciousness; and the Spirit possesses the same divine consciousness *as the one* being spirated into intellectual consciousness.

The principal difference between (1) and (2), in other words, is that the first requires us to prescind from the processions, relations, and persons, all of which are required for conceiving the notional acts, while the second requires us to include all of these elements. Furthermore, Lonergan emphasizes that divine consciousness on the basis of notional acts is only conceptually, not really, distinct from divine consciousness on the basis of essential act.<sup>440</sup> That is, Lonergan claims both that the divine consciousness is possessed by three divine persons in the same way and in distinct ways.

But, it should be asked, do Lonergan's remarks resolve the apparent contradiction? It can be readily conceded that they bring to light the conditions upon which each of the apparently contradictory claims can be affirmed: on the basis of essential act, Lonergan can claim that the divine persons possess the divine consciousness in the same way, whereas on the basis of the notional acts, he can claim that the divine

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<sup>439</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 386f. Emphasis added.

<sup>440</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 389-91: "For the sake of clarity we have distinguished between divine consciousness as had through essential act and divine consciousnesses as had through the notional acts. But these are not in any way two consciousnesses really distinct from each other. ... since essential act and the notional acts are distinct not really but conceptually, consciousness through essential act is not really but conceptually distinct from consciousness through the notional acts."

persons possess the divine consciousness in distinct ways. However, if the reader recalls our discussion in Chapter 3, the same could be said for the claims, for instance, that the Son is *a se* and that the Son is not *a se*: with respect to His being God, the Son is *a se*, and with respect to His being from the Father, He is not *a se*.<sup>441</sup> Indeed, as Lonergan argues in *The Triune God*, the Son's being from the Father is only conceptually, not really, distinct from his being God.<sup>442</sup> However, according to Lonergan, it was not enough to simply lay out the conditions upon which each claim could be affirmed. What was needed for that apparent contradiction to be resolved was an act of understanding formulated as a hypothesis that could draw each of the claims with their respective conditions into an integrated viewpoint. Accordingly, it is not enough to posit each of the claims about how divine consciousness is possessed and then appeal to the various conditions upon which the theologian affirms each claim to be true. What is needed is a hypothesis that can draw into a unified and integrated viewpoint the two claims and their respective conditions.

To this end, in this chapter I propose a hypothesis, which I call shared intentionality (*participatur/communi/concordis intentione*). This hypothesis has antecedents in Lonergan's trinitarian theology, but it is largely an addition and, I believe, a complement to it. In order to explicate the hypothesis, I draw upon resources from across Lonergan's writings, including selections from *The Triune God*. Further, in the footnotes, I refer to various philosophers and psychologists who discuss shared intentionality, but the sheer number of the relevant theological issues, which are not, of

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<sup>441</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 126-129.

<sup>442</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 256-261.

course, discussed by these philosophers and psychologists, prohibits me from discussing their sometimes conflicting positions in the corpus of the chapter. (I do, however, intend to discuss them at length in future work.) By employing the hypothesis of shared intentionality, my principal theological aims in this chapter are to elucidate the persons of the Trinity in their relation to one another and to resolve a number of issues, including the issue of how the divine consciousness is possessed.

After explicating the hypothesis, I turn to its limitations. In anticipation, I argue that, like the hypothesis of intelligible emanation, the hypothesis of shared intentionality is imperfect, analogous, and obscure. It is imperfect because it will be drawn from a finite reality. It is analogous because it affirms that what is present in a finite reality is also present, though in a different way, in an infinite reality. Lastly, it is obscure because any similarity between the finite and the infinite is met with an ever greater dissimilarity. But these are just formal and rudimentary claims; the precise strengths and limitations of the hypothesis of shared intentionality are discussed below.

Once I have explicated the hypothesis, indicated its limitations, and shown how it resolves the apparent contradiction at hand, I turn to the important question of how the two hypotheses—intelligible emanation and shared intentionality—are related to one another.<sup>443</sup> In anticipation, I note here that, at two different levels, the two hypotheses are not in conflict with one another. On the first level, the two hypotheses complement one another in a systematically ordered trinitarian theology. To use only one hypothesis would lead to unresolved problems, such as the problem about how the divine consciousness is possessed by the persons. On the second level, as a human phenomenon,

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<sup>443</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 388-91.

shared intentionality includes acts of intelligible emanation, and acts of intelligible emanation often occur in order to attain shared intentionality. I discuss their relation to one another in a systematic trinitarian theology at the end of this chapter, and turn to the second issue briefly in the Epilogue.

This chapter thus has three major sections: (II) an account of shared intentionality, (III) the purification of creaturely imperfections from shared intentionality (a *via negativa*) and its application to resolve the apparently contradictory claims about how the divine persons possess the divine consciousness, and (IV) an analysis of how the hypothesis of shared intentionality is related to the hypothesis of intelligible emanation in a systematic trinitarian theology. Each of these sections will pave the way for the Epilogue, where I will indicate future lines of research and the ways in which my argument sheds light upon other lines of inquiry.

## 5.2 THE STRUCTURE OF SHARED INTENTIONALITY

### 5.2.1 Preliminary Note

Lonergan claims in *The Triune God* that there are three ways to treat intelligible emanation: philosophically, historically, and theologically.<sup>444</sup> A philosophical treatment, which he states was one of the tasks of *Insight*, is a more or less complete examination of intelligible emanation, as it would sort through all of its nuances in various domains. A historical treatment, which he states was the task of the articles on the meaning of *verbum* in Aquinas, examines how another philosopher in a different time and place understood intelligible emanation. Finally, a theological or speculative treatment, which he

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<sup>444</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 134f.

undertakes in Chapter 2 of *The Triune God*, examines only those features that are necessary for the task at hand: in this case, understanding the divine processions.

The analysis of shared intentionality below is speculative and theological: I examine only those features that enable us to understand how the divine persons are related to one another and other issues such as how the divine consciousness is possessed by the three persons. While a philosophical treatment of shared intentionality—one that would investigate everything concerning the reality of shared intentionality—is important in its own right and may be required in order to determine the meaning of the *imago Trinitatis* in the most adequate way possible, nevertheless only a speculative or theological treatment of the issue is required for answering the question at hand.<sup>445</sup> Accordingly, the following explanation will abide by the same principle that Lonergan states in *The Triune God*: “we are attempting neither to grasp some philosophical synthesis nor to review and pass judgment on a whole series of opinions, but to go through a simple, brief process of reflection.”<sup>446</sup> Further, just as Lonergan begins his speculative or theological treatment of intelligible emanation in *The Triune God* with a series of disjunctions between intelligent definitions and rote definitions, true judgments

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<sup>445</sup> For various philosophical positions on this issue, see Margaret Gilbert, “Acting Together,” in *Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 23-35; idem, “Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon,” in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. xv, *The Philosophy of the Human Sciences*, ed. P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1990); Michael Bratman, *Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007); Hans Bernhard Schmid, ed., *Plural Action*, vol. 58, *Contributions to Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009).

and rash judgments, and morally upright decisions and morally evil decisions, so too the speculative treatment of shared intentionality here begins with a disjunction between intentional and incidental cooperation.

### **5.2.2 Shared Intentionality: Its Basic Form as Interpersonal Integration**

Consider two different cases of two roommates cleaning their apartment. In the first case, each of the two becomes dissatisfied by the messiness of the area, and so each begins to clean it but does so without knowing the other is also cleaning. Perhaps one cleans one room, and the other cleans another room. Because each begins to clean without knowing the other person's intention to clean, they each clean without a decision to clean together. In this case, the roommates are cooperating; each is, after all, completing a part of one and the same task, namely, cleaning the apartment. But their cooperation is only incidental, since the participants are operating without any intention to do so together and thus without any intentional reference to an operating group. Raimo Tuomela thus calls this form of cooperation "group behavior in I-mode."<sup>447</sup> There is cooperation, but it is only incidental.

In the second case, the roommates communicate to one another their dissatisfaction with the messiness of the area and then decide to clean the apartment together. The two roommates render a shared judgment about the apartment—that it is messy and would be if it were clean—and make a decision to clean the apartment together. In this case, the subjects know about one another's judgment, and in doing so

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<sup>446</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 135

<sup>447</sup> Raimo Tuomela, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007).



they come to make a common decision to clean the apartment together. The ensuing activities (of sweeping, folding, etc.) thus occur under the banner of the two partners agreeing to work together as a *cooperative unit*. Moreover, in order to speak adequately of their first-person perspective in the unit (rather than from a detached, third-person point of view), it might be said that the subjects are cooperating with one another in the first-person plural, that is, in English as a “we.” Tuomela thus calls this kind of cooperation “group behavior in we-mode.”<sup>448</sup> Their cooperation is intentional.

Before analyzing in more detail the differences between the two forms of cooperation, I want to note that these two general forms of cooperation are similar in that the subjects in each are operating in accordance with the laws of self-transcendence intrinsic to the human spirit. To return to our example, all of the roommates were acting for the sake of some perceived good, regardless of whether the subjects were intentionally or incidentally cooperating with one another. They all would have had to ask questions, at least to themselves, about what, if anything, should be done about the messy apartment and would have ultimately judged that they should clean the apartment at that moment. Their judgments, of course, may have been mistaken (e.g., maybe they should have been writing), but nevertheless neither incidental nor intentional cooperation occurs in the human world apart from the self-transcendence of the subjects involved.

Despite the similarity, however, the emergence of a first-person plural—the cooperative unit, or the “we”—indicates that the ontological constitution of intentional cooperation differs from that of incidental cooperation, and the difference in ontological constitution is due to the fact that the intentionally cooperating subjects are integrated

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<sup>448</sup> Ibid.

with one another in a way that the merely incidentally cooperating subjects are not. The difference between them, then, is one of integration. But how should this be understood?

Although he does not in *Insight* apply his general categories to the present issue, Lonergan there puts forward a rigorous ontology of integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds.<sup>449</sup> A higher integration exists, Lonergan claims, whenever some regularity of events cannot be explained adequately through the classical laws pertaining to some subordinate order of being; what is only coincidental with respect to some lower order of being comes to be intelligibly ordered through classical laws pertaining to a higher order of being.<sup>450</sup> For instance, the regularity of chemical reactions occurring in the replication of some species of single-celled organism cannot be understood sufficiently through the laws of chemistry alone,<sup>451</sup> for the chemical reactions occurring in that time and place in fact occur only because they are set within the recurrence schemes proper to the functioning of that species of organism.<sup>452</sup> In an analogous way, I will claim, the first-person plural ought to be conceived as a higher order system by which the acts of self-

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<sup>449</sup> The principal discussion of higher integrations occurs in Ch. 15 of *Insight*, especially s. 3-7. Elements of the discussion are prefigured in Ch. 1, s. 3, Ch. 4, s. 2, and Ch. 8, s. 3-6.

<sup>450</sup> *Insight*, 281: “if the laws of subatomic elements have to regard the regular behavior of atoms as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of chemistry. If the laws of chemistry have to regard the metabolism and division of cells as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of biology. If the laws of biology have to regard the behavior of animals as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of sensitive psychology. If the laws of sensitive psychology have to regard the operations of mathematicians and scientists as mere patterns of happy coincidences, then there is an autonomous science of rational psychology.”

<sup>451</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 281.

<sup>452</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 141-143.

transcending subjects are integrated and as that through which the distinctively human acts occurring in that time and place can at least in part be explained.

Higher order systems, Lonergan contends, do not abrogate the laws of lower order systems, but rather preserve them and place them on a new operational base.<sup>453</sup> As the laws of chemistry are not negated in the organism, so the higher order system of intentional cooperation is constituted through—not against—the self-transcendence and existential autonomy of the individual subjects. Again, as the laws of chemistry are not negated, but rather caught up into the successful functioning of the organism, thereby being integrated into a higher level of functioning, so too the full range of the autonomy of existential subjects is not negated, but rather caught up into the successful functioning of the cooperative unit.<sup>454</sup> In no way, then, can the cooperative unit as a higher order system be conceived as contrary *in principle* to the self-transcendence and the autonomy

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<sup>453</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 281. Lonergan’s later notion of sublation is relevant here. See *Method*, CW14, 227: “what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization in a richer context.”

<sup>454</sup> The most explicit correlation to this in Lonergan’s work, from what I can tell, occurs in an essay entitled “Mission and the Spirit.” There, Lonergan writes, “Within each individual vertical finality heads for self-transcendence. In an aggregate of self-transcending individuals there is the significant coincidental manifold in which can emerge a new creation. Possibility yields to fact and fact bears witness to its originality and power in the fidelity that makes families, in the loyalty that makes peoples, in the faith that makes religions.” Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Mission and Spirit,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Damosky, vol. 16, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 21–33, at 30.

of existential subjects; rather, the properly ordered higher order system perfects the aggregate of self-transcending subjects. But how so?

Any higher integration entails an order in some manifold.<sup>455</sup> In this case, the manifold of self-transcending subjects is integrated through a common decision to work alongside other subjects in and as a cooperative unit. Because of the common decision, the subjects of a cooperative unit devise a way to attain the end for which the cooperative unit had come into existence; in our example, a clean apartment. That way is constituted, in part, by dividing the set of operations required to attain the end among the various participants, so that some participants perform these operations, and other participants perform those operations. On this point, intentional cooperation has a considerable advantage over incidental cooperation. Some ends, when difficult enough to achieve, require human beings to intentionally cooperate with one another and also require the participants to divide the labor among the participants. Since the cooperative unit is ordered to some end or set of ends, the subjects of the cooperative unit order themselves to carry out the tasks necessary to attain that end or set of ends. The cooperative unit, therefore, perfects the self-transcending subjects by integrating them within some order of interpersonal relations necessary for attaining some end or set of ends.

Furthermore, the integration of subjects in a cooperative unit occurs *both* on the side of the object *and* on the side of the subject.<sup>456</sup> Integration on the side of the object

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<sup>455</sup> See *Insight*, CW3, 138-150, 280-292, 463-467.

<sup>456</sup> Recent literature on shared intentionality has disputed what the “sharedness” in shared intentionality consists in. Some (the most prominent voice being Michael Bratman) have argued that the sharedness occurs because the content of individual intentional acts. Shared intentionality occurs, in other words, whenever a number of individuals have the group as part of the content of their intentional act. Other

occurs because the subject understands and affirms that he or she is a participant in some cooperative unit acting for the sake of some end. The cooperative unit—the “we,” the first-person plural—and the participants’ various roles within it is therefore the object of the subjects’ intentional acts of experiencing, understanding, affirming, and deciding. That is, because they are intentionally (rather than incidentally) cooperating with one another, the subjects of a cooperative unit recognize themselves to be members of a first-person plural acting for the sake of some end or group of ends. If one does not have the cooperative unit and one’s role within it as an object of one’s intentional acts, then one cannot be said to participate in the cooperative unit. Of course, they do not need to remain the object of one’s intentional act in every moment of one’s participation, but need to have been the object at some point if one’s actions are, in fact, intentionally cooperative.

Integration on the side of the subject, on the other hand, occurs because the various intentional acts of the participants acquire some patterning, especially in a prolonged cooperative venture. Some patterning on the side of the subject is required for

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theorists (the most prominent, perhaps, being Hans Schmid) have argued that the sharedness occurs, not because of the content, but rather because of the subject of the act. That is, there has to be some subject—some group or so on—to which the intentional act could be ascribed. Whereas the former have been reluctant to speak of groups as entities and have claimed that saying that “group x did y” is only figurative or metaphorical speech, the latter have been reluctant to adopt the methodological individualism of the former group.

My brief argument in the following few paragraphs is situated in between those two schools of thought. That is, in claiming that the integration occurs both on the side of the subject and on the side of the object, I am arguing that both the sharedness in terms of content and sharedness in terms of subject are correct. Their relation to one another will be made clearer in what follows.

carrying out one's set of operations, in order for the cooperative unit to attain its end or set of ends. The patterning, of course, is flexible and subject to change, and only a portion of the subject's intentional acts will come to acquire the patterning. Nevertheless, there is an integration on the side of the subject inasmuch as the intentional acts of the participants take on at least some pattern for the sake of attaining their common end, and given a sufficiently prolonged period of participation in a cooperative unit, the feelings, dispositions, and other psychic patterns of the participants often come to take on a valence according to the participants' respective roles in the internal order of the cooperative unit. Thus, the cooperative unit acting for the sake of some end integrates the subjects and the patterning of their intentional acts.

### **5.2.3 Shared Intentionality and Personal Presence**

I show in this section that a constitutive feature of the integration of subjects in a cooperative unit is the personal presence of the participants to one another. This is yet another way in which the higher integration of intentional cooperation perfects the manifold of self-transcending subjects. Incidental cooperation, by contrast, lacks such a personal presence: the roommates unaware that they are both cleaning the apartment, at least in the time that they are cleaning, are not present to one another, and if they do not do anything together at all, then they are not present to each other at all.

But in what, more precisely, does personal presence consist? As noted earlier, Lonergan discusses the meaning of the word "presence" in a number of places in his corpus,<sup>457</sup> and in each discussion he distinguishes between several meanings of the word.

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<sup>457</sup> *Understanding and Being*, 20f; *Topics in Education*, CW10, 81-82; "Cognitional Structure," in CW4, 209f; *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 476f; *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 504-507; *Method in*

The discussion in *The Incarnate Word*, for instance, distinguishes between presence as spatial proximity (the paint being present to the wall), the presence of an object through an intentional act (the color being present through an act of seeing; the real being present through an act of judging), and the presence of the subject to him or herself.<sup>458</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics* offers a somewhat different list; in fact, the only one-to-one correlation is spatial proximity. Here is Lonergan summarizing his discussion in *The Triune God*:

We have, then, distinguished several meanings of 'presence.' One sort of presence is a matter of spatial proximity, and on this basis one stone would be present to or absent from another. Another sort of presence has to do with the adaptation of sensibility resulting from spatial proximity. A third sort of presence, proper to rational animals, supposes only a remembrance of the past or the imagining of some future possibility. Finally, there is personal presence whereby persons, pursuing a common good of order, are mutually in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover.<sup>459</sup>

Hence, the list from *The Triune God* includes presence as spatial proximity, presence of an intentional object through nonrational sensibility, presence of an intentional object through rational sensibility, and the presence of one person to another.

For our current purposes, there are at least two things to observe about the differences between the list from *The Incarnate Word* and that from *The Triune God*. The first is that the list from the *The Incarnate Word* includes the presence of the subject to him- or herself, which we discussed in Chapter 3, while that type of presence is missing from the list in *The Triune God*. The second is that, whereas the list from *The Incarnate Word* contains a general category for the way in which an object is made present through

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*Theology*, CW16, 12.

<sup>458</sup> *The Incarnate Word*, CW8, 476f;

<sup>459</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 504-507. The discussion being summarized begins at 502f.

an intentional act—what in Chapter 3 was called intentional presence—the list from *The Triune God*, on my interpretation, contains three specific categories for that general category. The three specific categories in the latter text pertain to sensibility in nonrational animals (the way in which a scent is made present to a dog), sensibility as transformed in rational animals (the way in which humans can remember the Alamo), and the presence of persons to one another. Furthermore, the presence of persons to one another, Lonergan claims, does not pertain properly to sensibility, but rather to intelligence. He thus writes, “human beings are persons not because they are animals and use their senses, but because they have an intellectual nature and operate in accordance with it. If, therefore, we are speaking about the presence of one person to another, surely we must not leave out of the discussion the operations that are proper to persons.”<sup>460</sup> In other words, the way in which persons are present to one another falls under the more general category of the way in which objects are made present through intelligent intentional acts, not just through sensible intentional acts.

If we take the liberty to combine these lists, the types of presence might be schematized in the following way:

- I. Spatial proximity
- II. Presence of an object through an intentional act
  - A. Presence of an object through intentional acts of nonrational sensibility
  - B. Presence of an object through intentional acts of sensibility transformed by rationality
  - C. Presence of an object through intelligent intentional acts
    - i. Presence of persons to one another
- III. Presence of the subject to him- or herself

What is most intriguing about such a schema, for our purposes, is that the presence of subjects to one another falls under (II) the presence of an object through an intentional

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<sup>460</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 505.



act. As discussed in Chapter 4, the emergence of the fifth level of consciousness implies that the relation of person to person cannot be located under the general category of subject to object, but is rather *sui generis*. That is, the fifth-level of consciousness is subject-to-subject, which cannot be subsumed entirely under the category of subject-to-object. But even though his classification in *The Triune God* seems to include personal presence under subject-to-object relations, there are indications that Lonergan is already moving toward his later position. In fact, some of the conceptual resources he puts forth in that text for conceiving person-to-person relations are, in my estimation, more adequately stated there than in later work. The movement leads to the position that the presence of person to person occurs *not only* on the side of the object, *but also* on the side of the subject, and it occurs on both sides precisely because the subjects are integrated with one another in a cooperative unit.

There are two related pieces of evidence to support the claim that Lonergan is moving toward that position. First, Lonergan argues in *The Triune God* that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between personal presence and the good of order. This was already mentioned in the block quote above: “there is personal presence, whereby persons, *pursuing a common good of order*, are mutually in one another as the known is in the knower and the beloved is in the lover.”<sup>461</sup> Notice that the pursuit of a common good of order mediates and constitutes the presence of subjects to one another. Lonergan continues, “the degree of perfection by which the good of order is achieved is the same as that by which personal presence is achieved, and similarly, that the degree of perfection by which personal presence is achieved is the same as that by which the good of order is

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<sup>461</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 506f. Emphasis added.

achieved.”<sup>462</sup> Hence, unless the subjects are pursuing some common good of order, they will not be present to one another; or, if they are present to one another, they are so in only a minimal sense, perhaps only in the sense that an object is made present through a sensitive intentional act. Furthermore, any common pursuit of the good of order would have to be a pursuit through intentional cooperation and thus through an act of shared intentionality. Thus, the fact that pursuing a common good of order is constitutive of personal presence seems to provide decent grounds for claiming that the attainment of personal presence occurs because of shared intentionality through which the subjects are integrated.

Second, Lonergan claims that, although persons come to know and love one another through many acts of intellect and will, nevertheless these many acts over time coalesce to form a habitual knowledge and love of the other person. One act or even a few acts of understanding and loving do not suffice for attaining personal presence. Lonergan thus writes,

We understand personal presence, therefore, on the basis of acts, but in such a way that the acts have their foundations in habits. But if we distinguish personal presence from obsession, we must also say that this presence requires not continuous acts but only that frequency that generally results from habits. Just as someone who lives in a house does not stay in the house all the time, so someone who has another person present to him or herself still thinks about and wills and does many different things.<sup>463</sup>

To use a somewhat different analogy, just as a person with the habit of courage is not always performing acts of courage, the persons who are present to one another through intellectual and voluntary habits are not always actively thinking about and loving the

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<sup>462</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 504f.

<sup>463</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 504f.

other. But the fact that persons can be present to one another even when they are not thinking about or actively loving the other indicates that some integration of the persons has occurred on the side of the subject. While earlier I explained that the integration on the side of the subject had to do with the relevant skills, dispositions, and feelings required for carrying out a cooperative task, a new element is now added inasmuch as the presence of the other persons in the cooperative unit is included in the integration on the side of the subject in such a way that the other persons comprising one's cooperative unit enter into and in part constitute the regular flow of one's own conscious life.

Since the integration occurs in each of the subjects, there occurs a “mutual being-in” or a “mutual indwelling” of the persons.<sup>464</sup> But while Lonergan in *The Triune God* conceives personal presence according to the scholastic dictum regarding the way in which the known is in the knower and the beloved is in the lover, there is a sense in which persons are only present to one another—“in” one another—because they themselves are in a cooperative unit that integrates them as persons. Intentionally cooperating with another person, and thereby entering into a cooperative unit with that other, is what allows for there to be mutual personal presence.

#### **5.2.4 Two Species of Shared Intentionality**

We have been discussing the distinction between incidental and intentional cooperation, but there is a further distinction, within the general category of intentional cooperation, between (1) intentional cooperation founded only in a love for an extrinsic good and (2) intentional cooperation founded *both* in a love for an extrinsic good *and* in a love of the

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<sup>464</sup> For Lonergan on mutual indwelling of the trinitarian persons, see *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW3, 412-421; on the indwelling of the trinitarian persons in human persons, see 500-521

subjects for one another. The terms of the distinction, it should be emphasized, are not mutually exclusive: within (2), there is both a love for an extrinsic good—to use our previous example, the love of a clean apartment—and a love of the subjects for one another—the roommates love for one another. But not all cooperative units based in love for a common object also include a love of subjects for one another; the roommates may have little or no love for one another and yet they may intentionally cooperate for the sake of a clean apartment. There is thus a real distinction between intentional cooperation based *only* in a love for an extrinsic good and intentional cooperation based in *both* a love for an extrinsic good *and* a love of the subjects for one another. For economy of expression, I will use the term “extrinsic cooperative unit” for the first kind, and “complete cooperative unit” for the second kind.

Between the two types of cooperative unit, there is a difference in the degree and the type of integration. Both, as I have argued above, attain an interpersonal integration surpassing that of incidental cooperation, but the degree and type nevertheless differs between the merely extrinsic cooperative unit and the complete cooperative unit. The degree differs because the manifold of complete unit is more secure than the manifold of the merely extrinsic unit, and the type differs because the complete unit possesses additional elements in its manifold, which, by the principle of correspondence, requires a different form of integration.<sup>465</sup>

To understand this more adequately, we can use the general categories of static and dynamic higher integrations, as explicated in *Insight*, for conceiving the difference

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<sup>465</sup> Lonergan defines the principle of correspondence: “Significantly different underlying manifolds require different higher integrations” (*Insight*, CW3, 477). The subjects’ love for one another in the intrinsically

between the two kinds of cooperative unit.<sup>466</sup> Lonergan writes in *Insight*,

Every higher integration systematizes an otherwise coincidental manifold, but the systematization may be effected in two different manners. It is static when it dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings about a notable imperviousness to change. Thus, inert gases lock coincidental manifolds of subatomic events in remarkably permanent routines. On the other hand, the integration is dynamic when it is not content to systematize the underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced.<sup>467</sup>

The difference between a static and a dynamic system, to put it briefly, is that the former remains relatively stable, while the latter issues in a development of both the underlying manifold and the integration itself. Lonergan does not apply his general categories to the specific issue of shared intentionality, but if there is a difference between the integrations of the two kinds of cooperative unit, it is worthwhile to ask whether one of them can be classified as static and the other as dynamic. The answer, it seems, is not simple.

In one respect, the complete cooperative unit can be called a static system, in the sense that the participants bound to one another in a community of love are not, all things being equal, effectively free to take leave of that community. The reason for this is that the cooperative unit, in the eyes of its participants, is neither provisional nor instrumental: it is not provisional because the participants' love for one another binds them together in a way that a common extrinsic object—as important as that may be—cannot bind them together, and it is not instrumental because the participants are not merely using the

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and extrinsically based cooperative unit entails a significant difference in the underlying manifold.

<sup>466</sup> The distinction between static and dynamic higher integrations arises in an explicit way at *Insight*, CW3, 477f, but is prefigured far earlier in the text at *Insight*, CW3, 146f. The discussion of personal presence begins at *The Triune God: Systematics*, 504.

<sup>467</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 477f.

cooperative unit for the procurement of their own individual ends. The personal presence of the subjects to one another is thus marked by fidelity, and their being bound to one another in a cooperative unit is analogous—but only analogous—to the way electrons are bound in an atom of helium. In that respect, there is a relative imperviousness to change and thus a static system.

Conversely, the extrinsic cooperative unit is not at all static in the same way, for the members are effectively free to take leave of the cooperative unit once they no longer desire the extrinsic good. The participants, in other words, consider the cooperative unit to be instrumental and provisional: it is provisional because if the object of their love were removed, the cooperative unit would no longer be desired and would thereby be dissolved, and it is instrumental because the participants view the cooperative unit only as a means to their own individual ends, which each participant wants to procure mainly for him or herself or for his or her loved ones. While there is some degree of personal presence among the subjects of the merely extrinsic cooperative unit, inasmuch as the participants must be pursuing some good of order among its participants for the sake of attaining its extrinsic good, the personal presence is not marked by fidelity. Their being bound to one another in a cooperative unit is analogous—but only analogous—to the way electrons are bound in a highly reactive alkali metal. In that respect, there is some volatility in the integration of the cooperative unit, and so the system cannot be called static.<sup>468</sup>

Though the complete cooperative unit may be called the more static of the two

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<sup>468</sup> Just because the extrinsic cooperative unit is not static in the same way that the complete cooperative unit is static does not mean that the extrinsic cooperative unit is dynamic in the sense that Lonergan means.

systems, it can also, in another respect, be called the more dynamic. In the block quote above, Lonergan claims that a dynamic system not only systematizes an underlying manifold, but also keeps modifying and adding to it until a more developed integration replaces its less developed predecessor. Lonergan elaborates on the idea at a later point in the same chapter. He argues that a dynamic higher system

is conditioned by the instability in the underlying manifold, by incompleteness in the higher integration, by imperfection in the correspondence between the two. It is constituted inasmuch as the higher system not merely suffers but provokes the underlying instability; inasmuch as the incompleteness of the higher system consists in a generic, rudimentary, undifferentiated character that can become differentiated, effective, specific; inasmuch as the imperfection of the correspondence is, so to speak, under control and moving towards a limit where the principles of correspondence and emergence result in the replacement of the prior integration by a more developed successor ...<sup>469</sup>

As a dynamic higher integration, the complete cooperative unit is conditioned by instability in the underlying manifold of acts of self-transcendence: since the well-being of the self-transcending participants and of the cooperative unit as a whole is not complete, questions arise among the participants about how to attain well-being in a more complete way. The love of subjects for one another thereby places demands upon the participants to acquire the insights, skills, and feelings required for effectively pursuing both the well-being of everyone in the unit and the survival and well-being of the cooperative unit as a whole. Of course, the extrinsic cooperative unit also places a demand upon the participants to acquire the insights, skills, and feelings required for attaining the extrinsic good for which the cooperative unit was constituted. The difference, however, lies in the fact that the complete cooperative unit places a more

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It would be better to say that the extrinsic cooperative unit is only an unstable integration.

<sup>469</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 490f.

exacting and more expansive demand upon the subjects, since none of the subjects can be concerned only with the attainment of some extrinsic good, but must also be concerned with the complete well-being of the other participants. The latter concern, if it is not to be betrayed, involves raising questions and attending to data surpassing what is relevant for attaining the current end of the cooperative unit, which in turn demand a more expansive range of insights, skills, and feelings from the participants.

Because there is, at any given moment, both an integration of and a flux in the underlying manifold as it attempts to meet the demand for a more complete love among its members, there is also present a lack of correspondence and a tension between the underlying manifold—the conscious and intelligent acts of the participants—and the current integration of the cooperative unit. Furthermore, the cooperative unit not only suffers but also provokes the tension and the instability in the underlying manifold, since attaining the complete well-being of the cooperative unit and its participants demands the full range of the underlying manifold of conscious and intentional acts of self-transcending subjects. Such demands are placed upon the subjects because, in order to attain the complete well-being of its members and of the unit as a whole, the subjects must, whenever required, collectively deliberate upon and renegotiate both the ends for which the cooperative unit is acting and the internal order existing among its participants.

These demands are not present in the same degree in the merely extrinsic cooperative unit, for at least two reasons. First, because the merely extrinsic cooperative unit is based upon an already determined extrinsic end, there is little room for collectively deliberating upon and renegotiating the end for which the cooperative unit is acting. Second, because the complete well-being of other participants is not relevant for the



participants in the merely extrinsic cooperative unit, there is less demand to collectively deliberate upon and renegotiate the internal order existing among the participants. Of course, to the extent that collectively deliberating upon and renegotiating the end and the internal order is relevant for attaining the extrinsic good for which the unit is acting, there will be some demand placed upon the participants. The point to be emphasized is only that these demands are less expansive and less exacting than those made upon the participants in the complete cooperative unit. The principal reason for this, as I have noted, is that the complete well-being of the other participants is not relevant for the participants of the merely extrinsic cooperative unit.

The complete cooperative unit's demand for the well-being of its members and of the unit as a whole, and thus its demand for collective deliberation and renegotiation, when met, gives rise to new insights and feelings in the participating subjects. The course of deliberation among the participants cannot help but elicit new acts of understanding and new apprehensions of value in the participants, and with such new insights and apprehensions of value comes an altered underlying manifold through which, by the principle of correspondence, the previous internal order among the participants is incrementally eliminated and, by the principle of emergence, a new internal order is incrementally established. The complete cooperative unit, in other words, is not a static, self-enclosed, and unchanging system, but rather, to use Lonergan's term, a "system on the move."<sup>470</sup> But the movement is not inevitable. For the demand for collective deliberation and renegotiation runs counter to the integration already existing among the subjects in the cooperative unit, and there is thus present a tension between a general

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<sup>470</sup> For instance, *Insight*, CW3, 491f, 501, 507.

inertia in the group preserving its current integration and a dynamic thrust to a more complete well-being in a more developed integration.<sup>471</sup>

### 5.3 PURIFICATION OF SHARED INTENTIONALITY

Just as Lonergan argues that there are multiple forms of intelligible emanation but only one of them—existential autonomy—is best suited to serve as the analogue for the trinitarian processions, so too I argue that there are multiple forms of shared intentionality but only one of them—the complete cooperative unit—is best suited to serve as the analogue for the relations of the persons to one another. The complete cooperative unit, to be clear, is an analogue for the trinitarian persons in their relation to one another. But, as is the case with all theological discourse, in order to stand as an analogue for God, the removal of creaturely imperfections is required. The analogue, in other words, needs to pass through the second stage of the *triplex via*. All that pertains to the finite *qua* finite needs to be removed if the analogue is to perform its function in serving as a hypothesis to integrate and illuminate various issues in trinitarian theology. Hence, just as Aquinas and Lonergan needed to prescind from every kind of movement from potency to act in order for intelligible emanation to function as a hypothesis for the trinitarian processions, so too the theologian needs to prescind from these same movements in order for shared intentionality to function as a hypothesis for the relations of the trinitarian persons to one another.

Admittedly, the movements from potency to act in human shared intentionality are far more numerous than those in intelligible emanation. Whereas an act of intelligible

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<sup>471</sup> For Lonergan's discussion on such an inertia existing in the static integrations, see *Insight*, CW3, 289f, 476f.

emanation can be grasped by examining one's own intellectual performance, shared intentionality can only be grasped by examining the intellectual performance of many participants cooperating as a unit. Hence, any act of human shared intentionality involves the coordination of a plurality of human subjects, each of whom must make number of movements from potency to act if shared intentionality is to be attained between them. Because cooperative units are not limited to dyads, but potentially include any number of participants, counting the movements of potency to act in human subjects is what Aristotle called a potential infinity: the counting, that is, can continue indefinitely due to no intrinsic limit to the ordered set.<sup>472</sup> Nevertheless, inasmuch as the subjects are actually sharing intentions, some analogue still stands. It is thus necessary to sort through the elements of any act of shared intentionality in order to assess which elements ought to be included and which elements need to be selectively disregarded so that shared intentionality might serve as an analogue for the relations of the trinitarian persons to one another. The next two subsections, in turn, remove the elements of potentiality from human shared intentionality, first, by focusing on the structure of shared intentionality and, second, by focusing on the notion of personal presence.

### **5.3.1 Purification Based upon the Structure of Shared Intentionality**

Any complete cooperative unit, as I indicated above, contains two constitutive elements: first, it aims both at an extrinsic good and at the complete well-being of its members, and second, it contains a dynamic integration among its participants as they organize themselves for the sake of attaining these ends. I consider each of these elements in turn.

First, the extrinsic good for which the cooperative unit aims. The extrinsic good is

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<sup>472</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, Book 3, Ch. 6.

part of the constitution of the human cooperative unit because of some imperfection or potentiality in the unit. The extrinsic good being sought, in other words, would remove some privation within the human community: orchestras gather to perform music, grammar schools emerge to educate children, and so forth. But because God is perfect, there is no extrinsic good for the sake of which the trinitarian persons are operating. Accordingly, Aquinas (along with the rest of the tradition of classical theism) argues that the primary object of God's willing and loving is the infinite good, that is, God in Godself.<sup>473</sup> Aquinas here is employing an analogy from the structure of human action to discuss the divine operation, but whereas human action is (often enough) oriented toward an extrinsic good for the sake of which the human being is acting, God's operation, analogically conceived, is oriented toward the infinite, intrinsic good that is God Himself. While the participants of an orchestra may be cooperating for the sake of putting on an excellent musical performance, which is really distinct from the cooperative group itself, the trinitarian persons are cooperating for nothing really distinct from the cooperative act of the triune God. If human shared intentionality is to be used as an analogue, therefore, the good for which the human cooperative unit is acting needs to be conceived in God as the intrinsic good that is God in Godself.

Second, the complete cooperative unit aims not only at an extrinsic good, but also at the complete well-being of the participants. Again, the reason why the human cooperative unit has such an aim often hinges upon some privation: that is, none of the participants in the human cooperative unit can be said to have attained complete well-being. Of course, the well-being of some participants may, concretely speaking, be more

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<sup>473</sup> See, for instance, Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 19, a. 2-3.

complete than the well-being of others, either on the whole or only in certain respects. Nevertheless, because there is some sense in which complete well-being of any of the participants has not fully been achieved, the complete cooperative unit acts in order to attain such a complete well-being. But, again, because God is perfect, there is no sense in which any of the trinitarian persons might be operating in order to attain the complete well-being of any of persons, as though their good were not already complete. If shared intentionality is to be used as an analogue, therefore, the well-being of the participants for which the human cooperative unit is acting needs to be conceived in God as the intrinsic good that is God in Godself.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the complete cooperative unit was said to be both static and dynamic. It is static in the sense that the participants are bound to one another in love, which prevents the members from treating the cooperative unit and one another as either provisional or instrumental. It is dynamic because the cooperative unit places demands upon its members to deliberate upon and renegotiate both the end or the set of ends for which the unit has been acting and the current internal order existing among its participants. Indeed, more often than not, both of these are in need of renegotiation in human cooperative units. The integration of the trinitarian persons can be said to be static in the most excellent way, since God is eternal and the internal order of the divine persons is not subject to change. It cannot be said to be dynamic, however, because whereas the ends for which the cooperative unit is acting and the internal order existing among the participants is subject to becoming more perfect, neither of these can become more perfect for the trinitarian persons.<sup>474</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> In an interesting paragraph in *Method in Theology*, however, Lonergan writes, “To conceive God as

### 5.3.2 Purification Based upon the Notion of Personal Presence

Shared intentionality integrates human persons with one another and thereby engenders personal presence, that is, subject-to-subject relations. Unless two humans enter into an act of shared intentionality, they will not be personally present to one another. If conceived according to the principles of potency and act, it can be said that any human being is by nature potentially able to enter into a shared intentional act with any other human being but that the movement from potency to act requires certain conditions to be fulfilled, conditions such as communication, spatial or at least virtual proximity, and so on. That is, human beings by nature stand in potency to acts of shared intentionality, and the acts of shared intentionality by which they are integrated with one another are both contingent and really distinct from the persons themselves.

Furthermore, because human persons are potentially able to enter into a shared intentional act with any other human being, they can never be completely defined by their concrete relations to one another in the presently existing internal order of the cooperative unit. That is, although interpersonal relations are constitutive of the concrete identity of any person at any given moment, human persons are never so dissolved into

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originating value and the world as terminal value implies that God too is self-transcending and that the world is the fruit of his self-transcendence, the expression and manifestation of his benevolence and beneficence, his glory. ... He made us in his image, for our authenticity consists in being like him, in self-transcending, in being origins of value, in true love" (*Method*, 113). The implication would seem to be that the integration of the trinitarian persons would in some sense be dynamic in the way that Lonergan means in *Insight*. However, the dynamic integration existing in God cannot be such that God moves from a lesser degree of perfection to a higher degree of perfection. Rather, the dynamic integration existing in the cooperative unit of the trinitarian persons must be such that others are invited to participate within such a cooperative unit.

their relations to one another that they come to be distinct from one another *only because* of those relations. In other words, part of the concrete identity of any person is constituted through his or her relation as a teacher to his or her students, his or her relation as a colleague to his or her colleagues, as a daughter or son to her or his parents, and so forth. But even the aggregate of those relations does not amount to the whole of the human person, since the person is always capable of entering into new acts of shared intentionality with new persons or with the same persons, which inevitably redefines the relations they previously had and thereby redefines part of the concrete identity of that person. The dynamism by which the human person transcends the concrete relations through which that person is presently but only partly defined is also part of the concrete identity of that human person. As a result, regardless of the current relations in which any person stands, new relations always remain a possibility, and the capacity for shared intentionality in human beings is therefore a potential infinity.

The act of shared intentionality in which the trinitarian persons are united, on the other hand, is not contingent, but necessary. The trinitarian persons are defined wholly—are entirely what they are—through their relations to one another; that is, the persons are distinct from one another *for no other reason* than their relations of mutual opposition. The Son is distinct from the Father for no other reason than the Son is the one spoken while the Father is the one speaking, and the Spirit is distinct from the Father and the Son for no other reason than the Spirit is the one spirated, while the Father and the Son are the ones spirating. Moreover, since there is no potency in God, there are not, strictly speaking, new relations into which any of the trinitarian persons enter with respect to their divinity. The implication is that even relations established with human persons in

time are not, strictly speaking, new relations in God, but rather new relations in human persons. Hence, none of the trinitarian persons in their divinity are defined through relations acquired in time, but only through their eternal relations of mutual opposition.

Nevertheless, despite these radical differences between the dynamics of relations and persons in human shared intentionality and of relations and persons in divine shared intentionality, a similarity ought to be noted: as human persons *qua* participants in cooperative units are defined through their relations to one another, so the divine persons in God are defined in their relations to one another. The crucial point, here, is that precisely in operating in a cooperative unit, human persons come to possess relations to one another and come to be defined (in part) *qua* members of the cooperative unit through the functions they perform.

There is, furthermore, a difference between how operation and cooperation are predicated in acts of shared intentionality among humans and how they are predicated in triune shared intentionality. In humans, the operation of the cooperative unit is materially dependent upon the acts of the individual members. More precisely, because cooperative units constituted through shared intentionality stand as a higher integration of a manifold of human operations, the manifold of individual human operations is, in metaphysical terms, the matter informed through the higher integration of the cooperative unit.<sup>475</sup> The operation of the cooperative unit, then, is materially dependent upon and in part constituted through the (co-)operations of the participants in the manifold. However, because in God there is no distinction between potency (or matter) and form and because

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<sup>475</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 463-467. The manifold of individual human operations would, from the viewpoint of the individual operations, be viewed as merely coincidental. Shared intentionality would constitute a higher



in God all is one except where there are mutually opposed relations, it cannot be said that the operation of the Triune God is materially dependent upon the cooperative (notional) acts of the persons, but must be said that the operation of the triune God is completely identified with the cooperative (notional) acts of the Persons.

Nevertheless, despite the radical difference between the relationship between operating and cooperating in human shared intentionality and operating and cooperating in divine shared intentionality, a similarity ought to be noted: as the cooperative acts of human persons can also be said to be the operative act of the unit as a whole, so too the cooperative acts of the trinitarian persons can also be said to be identified with the one divine operation. To return to our earlier example of the roommates cleaning the apartment, the operations of each roommate can also be said to be the operation of the group as a whole. When asked what he is doing at that moment, it would be true for the roommate to answer either that he is cleaning the living room or that he is cleaning the apartment, though the latter, properly speaking, is an act of the unit as a whole. There is thus an identity between his act of cleaning the living room and the cooperative unit's act of cleaning the apartment: his cleaning the living room *is* the unit's cleaning of the apartment. The difference between human and divine shared intentionality on this point, however, is that, the identity notwithstanding, the acts of any of the participants in human shared intentionality can only be said to be *part of* the act of the unit as a whole. There is, to use the terms of *Insight*, a real but inadequate distinction between the acts of any of the participants and the act of the unit.<sup>476</sup> The cooperation among the divine Persons, on the

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viewpoint.

<sup>476</sup> For the distinction between adequate and inadequate distinctions, see *Insight*, CW3, 514: "real

other hand, is so perfect that the notional acts of the persons are not parts of the divine operation, but are rather perfectly and completely identical to it. There is no real distinction—not even an inadequate distinction—between the divine operation and the notional acts of the Persons. It can at most be said that there is a conceptual distinction, since in the order of our concepts—because of a constraint on our part to conceive of the relation between participant activity and unit activity as a part-whole relation—we need to distinguish between the two while knowing that that they are not distinct in reality.

The foregoing has implications for the analogy between personal presence through divine shared intentionality and personal presence through human shared intentionality. It was said earlier in an complete cooperative unit, human beings are rendered present to one another through an integration occurring both on the side of the object and on the side of the subject. On the side of the object, the subjects are rendered present to one another as pursuing the same end; on the side of the subject, the subjects are rendered present to one another as included within each others' regular conscious flow. The major difference between human shared intentionality and divine shared

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distinctions are divided into adequate and inadequate. There is an adequate real distinction between Peter and Paul, between Peter's right hand and Peter's left hand; but there is an inadequate real distinction between Peter and his hands." The difference between an adequate and an inadequate distinction therefore seems to be that an adequate real distinction is between two wholes or two parts of the same whole (or two parts of two different wholes—Peter's right hand and Paul's right hand), whereas an inadequate real distinction is between a whole and any of its parts. The distinction between the operation of the cooperative unit and the acts of any of its members therefore seems to be an inadequate distinction, in the sense that the operation of the unit is the whole while the operations of the participants are parts. In the same way that Peter's hand *is* Peter, so too the cooperative act of any individual participant *is* the operation of the unit as a whole.

intentionality is that whereas human persons are united in shared intentionality across the consciousnesses of the multiple participants, the shared intentionality of the divine persons occurs in the one divine consciousness. In other words, since the conscious acts of the multiple participants stand as the matter to be integrated in the complete cooperative unit, shared intentionality among humans is constituted through the existence of multiple consciousnesses. Shared intentionality among the trinitarian persons, on the other hand, does not have any material principle, and so divine shared intentionality is constituted in the existence of one consciousness.

#### **5.4 INTELLIGIBLE EMANATION AND SHARED INTENTIONALITY**

There are two ways to approach the question about the relationship between intelligible emanation and shared intentionality: (1) as a question of systematic ordering in trinitarian theology and (2) as a question of their relation in the *imago Trinitatis*. I will deal with the first in this section and turn briefly to the second in the Epilogue.

##### **5.4.1 The Ordering of Systematic Trinitarian Theology**

With regard to the question of systematic ordering in trinitarian theology, it seems that the hypothesis of shared intentionality ought to be inserted at the moment when trinitarian theology pivots in its conceptual ordering from moving from processions to persons (the order of our concepts *in fieri*) to moving from persons to notional acts (the order of our concepts *in facto esse*). The present subsection will explain the meaning and the justification for this claim.

Lonergan interprets the structure of Aquinas's mature trinitarian theology in the *Summa Theologiae*—and even a glance through the table of contents of *The Triune God*

would notice that Lonergan follows the same ordering in his own trinitarian theology<sup>477</sup>—  
in the following way:

the *Summa*'s structure ... [contains] a twofold ordering of our trinitarian concepts. There is the order of our concepts *in fieri*, and then the processions precede relations and relations precede persons. There is the order of our concepts *in facto esse*, and then there are the persons as persons, the persons considered individually, and the persons compared to the divine essence, to the relations to the notional acts. Now the two orders are inverse. The processions and the notional acts are the same realities. But the processions are in God prior, in the first order of our concepts, to the constitution of the persons. On the other hand, the notional acts are acts of the persons and consequent to the persons conceived as constituted.<sup>478</sup>

There are thus two major phases in trinitarian theology with a pivot in between the phases. The first phase develops the concepts of the processions, then the relations, and finally the persons, such that the former serve to explain the latter. In this phase, the processions and the relations are conceived as constitutive of the persons. The second phase ascribes to the persons the personal properties (paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration) and the notional acts (speaking, being spoken, spirating, being spirated). The second phase, in other words, treats the persons as distinct supposita who are bearers of the properties and the notional acts. In this phase, then, the persons are conceived as constitutive of, rather than constituted by, the personal properties and the notional acts.

Although he does not mention it in the quote above, Lonergan argues later in the same article that there is a pivot in between the two phases. The *Summa Theologiae*, Lonergan writes, “develops the key concepts of procession, relation, person. Then it

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<sup>477</sup> It is odd, however, that Lonergan does not make this twofold ordering or its rationale explicit in the text of *The Triune God*, not even in its lengthy introduction on method in trinitarian theology.

<sup>478</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 214.

shifts to a higher level, consciously confronts the mystery as mystery, and so [in the second phase] transposes relations to personal properties and processions to notional acts.<sup>479</sup> The shift or pivot in between the phases occurs because the theologian “consciously confronts the mystery as mystery.” Lonergan’s meaning here seems to be that confronting the mystery as mystery consists in confronting the paradox that the persons are *both* constituted by the processions and the relations *and* are constitutive of the processions and relations, which for the sake of clarity are now respectively named the notional acts and personal properties. Operating in the first phase, the theologian explains how the persons are constituted through the procession and relations; operating in the second phase, the theologian explains how the processions and relations are constituted through the persons. Precisely because what are constitutive of the persons and what they themselves constitute are one and the same realities, the mystery as mystery stands as the keystone between the two phases and the theologian deliberately needs to pivot from one phase to the other in order to deal with the mystery in the most systematic, though always imperfect, way possible.

It has already been shown that Lonergan employs intelligible emanation as a fruitful analogue for the processions. However, in *Verbum*, Lonergan also claims that the explanatory potential of intelligible emanation is confined to the first phase of trinitarian theology.<sup>480</sup> He writes,

As we have seen, there is a twofold systemization: first, our concepts are *in fieri*; secondly their order is reversed and they stand *in facto esse*. Now these two orders stand on different levels of thought. *As long as our concepts are in*

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<sup>479</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 220.

<sup>480</sup> What I am calling “explanatory potential,” Lonergan calls “measure of significance” (*Verbum*, CW2, 214ff.).

*development [in fieri], the psychological analogy commands the situation. But once our concepts reach their term, the analogy is transcended and we are confronted with the mystery as mystery.*<sup>481</sup>

The explanatory potential of intelligible emanation, therefore, is confined to the first phase, the order of our concepts *in fieri*.<sup>482</sup> At the end of that phase, “the analogy is transcended” and the theologian confronts “the mystery as mystery.” If one questions whether Lonergan’s meaning is that the transcending of the analogy and the confronting the mystery as mystery occur at the end of the first phase or at the end of the second, one might return to a passage already quoted. The *Summa Theologiae*, Lonergan writes, “develops the key concepts of procession, relation, person. Then it shifts to a higher level, consciously confronts the mystery as mystery, and so transposes relations to personal properties and processions to notional acts.”<sup>483</sup> The overall argument, then, seems to be: the analogy is transcended and its explanatory potential is exhausted when one confronts the mystery as mystery; that confrontation occurs in between the two phases; hence, the explanatory potential of the hypothesis of intelligible emanation is restricted to the first phase, the development of our concepts *in fieri*. This, of course, should not be a surprise.

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<sup>481</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 215. Emphasis added.

<sup>482</sup> In a rather vague remark, Lonergan appears to repeat this interpretation almost 30 years later in a question and answer session in the 1974 Lonergan Workshop. He says, “What is ultimate is that we don’t know God by his essence. Even in my *Verbum* articles, Thomas goes through this whole business, and when he arrives at the divine person, well, he forgets about it, scaffolding. It is a way of getting there.” (Transcript is 815A0DTE070, and recording is 815A0A0E070 at [www.bernardlonergan.com](http://www.bernardlonergan.com)) His meaning seems to be that in Aquinas and in *Verbum*, the psychological analogy is relevant for the first phase, which concludes with the persons, and dropped in the second phase. This evidence, admittedly, is not the strongest, principally due to the vagueness of Lonergan’s statement.

<sup>483</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 220.

Because the first phase deals with that through which the persons are constituted, and because the early theologians had discovered that the persons must be constituted through their relations and that these relations must in turn be constituted through the processions, what is required to explain the constitution of the persons is an analogue for the processions in God. Intelligible emanation, as Augustine and Aquinas argued, is for a variety of reasons the most fitting analogue for the processions, and so possesses an explanatory potential, albeit an imperfect one.

The implication of Lonergan's remarks is that, by the time we reach the second phase, the hypothesis of intelligible emanation has exhausted its explanatory potential and no longer "commands the situation." Again, the second phase inverts the order of concepts and conceives the persons as constitutive of the relations and processions. For instance, in the second phase, paternity, the act of speaking, and the act of spirating are conceived of as belonging to, rather than as constitutive of, the Father. The person of the Father, therefore, is included in their constitution. Precisely because the persons in this phase are conceived as constitutive of, rather than constituted by, the relations and processions, intelligible emanation cannot serve as a fruitful analogy. That is, although intelligible emanation serves as an analogy for the processions in explaining how the persons are constituted, it does not seem to serve in such a capacity for explaining what the persons themselves constitute; hence, his claim regarding the restrictions upon its explanatory potential.

(If the foregoing is Lonergan's meaning in *Verbum*, his claims in *The Triune God* appear to possess a somewhat different meaning. There, he defends the following assertion: "The divine processions ... are understood in some measure on the basis of a

likeness to intellectual emanation; and there does not seem to be another analogy for forming a systematic conception of a divine procession.”<sup>484</sup> At first glance, this assertion seems to align with the claims made in *Verbum*: intelligible emanation will be used as an analogue for the divine processions. The difference, however, lies in his meaning of “systematic conception” at the end of the assertion, which Lonergan defines as “a conception that expresses an understanding that is virtually sufficient for resolving all of the questions of a treatise.”<sup>485</sup> The explanatory potential of intelligible emanation in *The Triune God* is therefore of greater magnitude than what Lonergan considers in *Verbum* to be its explanatory potential in Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*. In *Verbum*, intelligible emanation is said to be used as an analogy in the first phase but transcended at the pivot. In *The Triune God*, on the other hand, intelligible emanation is said to virtually contain (imperfectly, inchoately, and so forth) an understanding for all of the questions arising in the treatise, and so does not appear capable of being transcended (except, of course, in a beatific understanding of the divine essence). But the emergence of unintegrated, apparent contradictions toward the end of the treatise on the immanent Trinity, which I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, seems to belie intelligible emanation’s function as a systematic conception, as Lonergan has so defined it in *The Triune God*. In other words, intelligible emanation does not seem to be “virtually sufficient for resolving all of the questions” in the treatise on trinitarian theology, and *Verbum*’s more restrained judgment on this point seems to be more adequate.

There is another difference between the two texts. In *Verbum*, Lonergan claims

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<sup>484</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 145.

<sup>485</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 151.



that the hypothesis of intelligible emanation “is no more than a hypothesis which does not attempt to exclude the possibility of alternatives.”<sup>486</sup> As a hypothesis, intelligible emanation is meant to provide an explanatory understanding for some set of already known facts. It cannot be deduced from the truths of scripture or doctrine, but is only introduced as a possibly relevant way to shed an imperfect light upon the truths already affirmed. *The Triune God* agrees with these claims, but whereas *Verbum* is open to other hypotheses, *The Triune God* strives for a greater parsimony. In the later text, Lonergan writes,

An analogy can be called systematic if it is employed explicitly and thematically, and if it resolves not just one question but a whole series of questions.

*Thus, one is not proceeding systematically if one is employing analogies but is doing so only implicitly and unthematically, or if in relation to distinct questions, or even in relation to the same questions, one is always bringing forward new and different analogies, so that in the end one arrives simply at an accumulation of rhetorical examples.*

In contrast, a theologian ought to proceed systematically, and this is especially the case if one is investigating the mode of divine procession. Therefore, one does not begin asking about the characteristics of the divine persons but about the processions, since it is well established that the key to the entire trinitarian question lies in the meaning of procession and its mode.

*Since this is the case, we must seek a systematic analogy whose conception of the mode of divine procession is such that every other theoretical question concerning the triune God is already virtually solved.*

My claim that the *Triune God* strives for greater parsimony than *Verbum* is grounded principally in the second and fourth paragraphs of the block quote. There, Lonergan seems to present the following disjunction: *either* the theologian employs one analogy

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<sup>486</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 218. Also, “Psychological trinitarian theory is not a conclusion that can be demonstrated but a hypothesis that squares with divine revelation without excluding the possibility of alternative hypotheses” (ibid., 204).

and thereby proceeds systematically, *or* the theologian uses multiple analogies and thereby accumulates rhetorical examples. But this is a false disjunction. There is, on the contrary, a systematic exigence for multiple analogies if every available analogy has a restricted explanatory potential. In that case, to proceed systematically would be to employ multiple analogies and to employ only those analogies with the most expansive, and with complementary, explanatory potentials. But as we have already noted, intelligible emanation does have a restricted explanatory potential. Hence, there seem to be both a systematic exigence for another analogy and grounds for an openness to other hypotheses. However, it should be added, this does not imply an openness for another hypothesis for the processions—on this point, Lonergan, in my opinion, is entirely correct that intelligible emanation is the most adequate—but rather, as I will show in a moment, an openness for a hypothesis to explain a distinct and complementary set of already known facts.)

If, by the time we reach the second phase, the analogy of intelligible emanation has exhausted its explanatory potential, has been transcended, and no longer commands the situation, then it seems that we need a new analogy with a unique explanatory potential for the second phase. The analogy for the second phase will need to be able to explain, in an imperfect way, how the divine persons as supposits are constitutive of their respective properties and acts and, as such, are constitutive of a distinct sort of unity. My suggestion is that the analogy of shared intentionality fulfills these requirements and ought to be introduced just after the pivot at the beginning of the second phase. There are a few reasons supporting my suggestion.

First, and regarding only of the possibility of introducing shared intentionality, the

two hypotheses—intelligible emanation and shared intentionality—do not stand in conflict with one another, simply because the *explananda* of the hypothesis of shared intentionality is distinct from the *explananda* of the hypothesis of intelligible emanation. Whereas intelligible emanation is meant to shed light upon that through which the persons are constituted, along with the relevant questions in that area, and so stands as a hypothesis for the processions, shared intentionality is meant to explain that which the persons constitute, along with the relevant questions, and so stands as a hypothesis for the persons in their relations to one another and in their unity with one another. Because each hypothesis has distinct *explananda*, the two are not in competition with one another, as, for instance, phlogiston and oxidation are competing, mutually exclusive hypotheses put forward to explain one and the same *explanandum*, namely, the nature of fire. Precisely because they are not in competition with one another, there is the possibility that each hypothesis would complement the other, serving a distinct function in the whole of systematic trinitarian theology.

Second, and more substantively, the unity of God needs to be conceived in two distinct ways, both as prior to the persons and as subsequent to the persons. Just as, for instance, speaking and being spoken can be conceived as prior and as subsequent to the Father and the Son (that is, as procession or as notional act), so too the unity in God can be conceived as prior and as subsequent to the persons.

On the one hand, the unity can be conceived as prior to the persons. In the first phase, the unity is conceived as constitutive of the persons, just as the processions and the relations in this phase are so conceived. Natural theology's affirmation of the perfect simplicity of the divine act of loving understanding stands at the beginning of (or prior

to) the first phase in trinitarian theology. Thus, in *Verbum*, Lonergan argues that employing intelligible emanation as an analogy is a “prolongation of natural theology,” in the sense that it “begins where natural theology leaves off” and reaches a “deeper insight into what God is.”<sup>487</sup> Natural theology’s affirmation of the divine unity and simplicity, then, is not sequestered to a separate treatise when the theologian begins employing intelligible emanation as an analogy,<sup>488</sup> and for a couple of reasons. First, the meaning of analogue needs to be purified of its creaturely imperfections, and the criteria for purification are the conclusions reached in natural theology. For instance, since natural theology arrives at the conclusion that in God there is no movement from potency to act, and since in intelligible emanation in us there are many movements from potency to act, to employ intelligible emanation in us as an analogy for divine processions requires removing all of the movements from potency to act. Second, even after the analogue has been purified, arguments in the first phase often borrow premises from conclusions in natural theology. For instance, that the relations grounded in the processions are also subsistent is deduced from the premise of divine simplicity, a conclusion reached in natural theology.<sup>489</sup> The upshot is that the persons are conceived as constituted, not only through the relations and the processions, but also through divine simplicity.<sup>490</sup> Such is

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<sup>487</sup> *Verbum*, CW2, 215 and 220, respectively. He does not mean that the natural theologian would or should employ intelligible emanation. In fact, he argues that we cannot know that there is intelligible emanation in God by the light of natural reason. The only thing we can say is that intelligible emanation in us serves as a fruitful hypothesis for understanding what has been revealed in Scripture.

<sup>488</sup> In the way that some critics of the division of the treatises often erroneously imply.

<sup>489</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 242-245, 368f.

<sup>490</sup> Contrary, then, to some critics of the Thomistic approach in the last century, there is no separation of *De*

the meaning of the prior unity.

On the other hand, the unity in God can be conceived as subsequent to the persons. In such a conception, the persons are conceived as constitutive of the unity, just as in the second phase the persons are conceived as constitutive of the personal properties and the notional acts. In the second phase, then, the persons enter into the constitution of the perfect simplicity of the divine act of loving understanding, such that the perfect simplicity of the divine act exists only through (would not *be* without) the trinitarian persons. This is not to say that the perfect simplicity of God could not be known without knowing the persons. Said again, one could affirm divine simplicity without affirming anything about the persons. To do so would be to affirm the prior unity. But because trinitarian theology is predicated upon divine revelation, the Christian theologian knows that both that that perfect simplicity is triune and the triune God is perfectly simple. Although these two claims refer to one and the same reality, there needs to be a distinction in the order of our concepts to show both how the divine persons are constituted by divine simplicity *and* how they are constitutive of such simplicity. Furthermore, not only do the persons enter into the constitution of the subsequent unity, but so too do the personal properties and the notional acts. Hence, whereas the prior unity stands at the beginning of the first phase, the subsequent unity stands at the end of the second phase. The subsequent unity, then, is constituted through the persons in their relations to one another and in their cooperative (notional) acts ordered to one another.

While the prior and the subsequent unity are not really distinct from one

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*Deo Uno* from *De Deo Trino*: the conclusions from the former treatise enter as premises into the structure of the latter treatise, and if they did not, tritheism would remain a threat.

another—in God they are mysteriously one and the same—nevertheless in the order of our concepts the two need to be distinguished. After all, the subsequent unity is conceptually dependent upon the persons, personal properties, and the notional acts, whereas the prior unity can be conceived apart from these elements. While the first phase of trinitarian theology begins on the heels of natural theology with its affirmation of the prior unity, my suggestion is that shared intentionality needs to be employed at the beginning of the second phase in order to conceive of the subsequent unity, albeit in an imperfect but nevertheless fruitful way. In the subsequent phase, the theologian begins to treat the persons as supposits to whom the acts of speaking, being spoken, spirating, and being spirated are ascribed. Because of what we already know from the first phase regarding the simplicity and unity in God, such relations and acts can only be notionally distinct—not really distinct—from the one divine act. In other words, the trinitarian persons in their notional acts are so unified that their cooperating is operating, and their operating is cooperating. The only analogue we have for that—as imperfect as it may be—is shared intentionality, in which the cooperative acts of human supposits are constitutive of the operation of the cooperative unit.

Third, unless shared intentionality is introduced, the second phase generates seemingly contradictory claims that do not find some intelligible integration. Because the explanatory potential of intelligible emanation is confined to the first phase, the problems that arise in the second phase—for instance, how one and the same consciousness is possessed by the three persons—terminate in reasoned but nevertheless unintegrated and apparently contradictory answers. For example, on the basis of the analogy of shared intentionality, one could illuminate the seemingly contradictory claims that the divine

persons possess the divine consciousness both in the same way and in a unique way: just as a human person in a cooperative unit is said to possess the act of the unit as a whole precisely through their functional act in the unit, so too the divine persons can be said to possess the one act of loving understanding precisely through their notional acts in the divine society. But as was explained above, because everything pertaining to creaturely imperfections needs to be negated, the shared intentionality of the divine persons does not occur through multiple consciousnesses, but in one and the same consciousness. Hence, although in human shared intentionality each of the participants possesses the act of the unit, the act of the unit is not one conscious act. In divine shared intentionality, on the other hand, the act of the unit is one conscious act. Hence, through their shared intentionality, each of the divine persons possess the divine consciousness in distinct ways—as performing their own notional acts—but also possess the divine consciousness in the same way—as performing the act of the unit.

#### **5.4.2 Lonergan on the Perfection of Act and the Perfection of Order**

Lonergan concludes the chapters on the immanent Trinity in *The Triune God* with an assertion distinguishing between two sorts of perfection in God: the perfection of act and the perfection of order. The material in that discussion is closely related to the material discussed in the present chapter. The present subsection examines this material and adjudicates to what extent my argument and Lonergan's argument align with one another.

Lonergan argues that there are two formalities (*rationes*) of perfection: the perfection of act and the perfection of order. The perfection of act, in general, has to do with the perfection of a substance taken as individual. Lonergan writes, "Being is divided into potency and act in such a way that it is limited by potency and perfected by act;

therefore, each individual being is lacking in perfection to the extent that it is limited by potency, and is endowed with perfection to the extent that it is in act.”<sup>491</sup> A conclusion from natural theology is that, because in God there is no potency whatsoever, there is an infinite perfection of act in God. The perfection of act, therefore, seems to correspond with what I have called the prior unity.

On the other hand, the perfection of order in general has to do with how “many things are ordered to one another in such a way as to constitute a unity. ... A pile of stones or of wood, for example, lacks the unity of order, and yet stones and wood properly arranged make one house.”<sup>492</sup> The unity of order, then, denotes the unity that is constituted through the integration of a multitude. Lonergan argues that, on the basis of divine revelation, we can affirm that there is a unity of order in God, since in the divine relations, “there is verified that mutual ordering that produces [*facit*] an ordered unity.” Lonergan clearly does not mean that the ordered unity is produced, as if there were some temporal process of production or as if there resulted some product extrinsic to the act of production; rather, his meaning is that the mutual ordering in the divine relations constitutes a conceptually distinct sort of unity. Furthermore, although Lonergan uses the term “divine relations” in his formulation of the assertion, his more elaborate defense of the assertion relies, not only upon the processions and relations, but also upon the notion of persons and notional acts. Hence, the perfection of order presupposes a range of concepts already developed in trinitarian theology, which is why it is situated at the end of the treatise on the immanent Trinity. It therefore seems to correspond what what I have

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<sup>491</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 422f

<sup>492</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 422f.



called the subsequent unity.

Lonergan further argues that not all orders are equal and that there is a gradation in the perfection of order. The perfection of order in general can be graded in two distinct ways: either formally or materially.

The formal gradation concerns the degree of unity or integration obtaining in the multiplicity. The scale is comprised of: (1) an order extrinsically imposed, (2) an intentional order existing across multiple consciousnesses, and (3) an intentional order existing in one and the same consciousness. Lonergan writes,

For under the formal aspect, three degrees of perfection can be distinguished. The first degree is the perfection of order that is imposed from without upon what is to be ordered. This sort of perfection is found in artifacts such as stones and wood that are so ordered as to constitute one house. The second degree is the perfection of order that is found in a society, where the good of order is constituted by what is understood, evaluated, and chosen by several persons. The third degree is the perfection of order that is found within intellectual consciousness *per se* and consists in the fact that the good of a well-ordered consciousness is attained because it is understood and therefore affirmed as good and hence responsibly chosen.<sup>493</sup>

The integration attained through (1) is less perfect than that attained through (2), which, in turn, is less perfect than that attained through (3). Here is Lonergan again:

the second degree is more perfect than the first, both because the first is imposed from without while the second emerges from the ordered individuals themselves as intellectual, and because the first exists dividedly in each individual while the second is found intentionally in its entirety in each one. The third degree is more perfect than the second because not only does it emerge from within and exist intentionally in its entirety in what is ordered, but also this total perfection that is intended is achieved in reality by the very fact that, having been understood, it is justly affirmed, and having been affirmed, it is responsibly chosen.<sup>494</sup>

The reasoning behind the claim that (1) is less perfect than (2) is that, in (2), the order itself emerges through the intelligent acts of the members comprising the order, while in

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<sup>493</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 428f.

(1), the order is imposed from without by some agent or group of agents. The reasoning here seems sound.

The reasoning behind the claim that (2) is less perfect than (3), however, is somewhat less convincing. The difference centers around a perfection existing across multiple consciousnesses—and hence, “found in a society”—and a perfection existing in one and the same consciousness. The question is whether—in simply human terms, not for the moment referring to God—the order existing among a group of human persons is by nature less perfect than an order existing in the consciousness of a single human person. Of course, the order existing in the consciousness of a saint is more perfect than the order existing among persons in a fallen world. But, if we prescind from sin and, as the question demands, attend solely to what is more perfect by nature, the question becomes more difficult. Lonergan’s main argument in the block quote above is that the order existing in individual consciousness “is achieved in reality by the very fact that, having been understood, it is justly affirmed, and having been affirmed, it is responsibly chosen.” But, if the order existing among human persons is, as Lonergan says, “constituted by what is understood, evaluated, and chosen,”<sup>495</sup> then the same, it seems, can be said regarding the order existing among a group of human persons. In other words, the order among human persons is also “achieved in reality by the very fact that having been understood, it is justly affirmed, and having been affirmed, it is responsibly chosen.” The only difference is whether such acts occur in one consciousness or across multiple consciousnesses. But if the same can be said about both perfections of order,

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<sup>494</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 428f.

<sup>495</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 428f.

then one cannot be considered, at least on these grounds, more perfect than the other.

In the following paragraph, Lonergan puts forward a couple of arguments to support the claim that the perfection of order existing in God is more perfect than the perfection of order existing among human beings. Some of the material is relevant for the preceding issue regarding the second and third degrees of the perfection of order.

Lonergan writes,

among intellectual creatures the perfection of order as it occurs between such persons is found only in the second and less perfect way, and the third way is attained only inasmuch as accidental acts within a finite consciousness are ordered among themselves on the side of the rational subject. In God, however, the persons are ordered among themselves in the third and most perfect way, so that the divine society of the three persons is not only understood, affirmed, and loved on the side of the object, but is also, on the side of the subject, and according to the intellectual emanations through the truth of the Word and the holiness of proceeding Love, constituted as that understood, affirmed, and loved society of three. Consequently, under its formal aspect the perfection of the divine order must be said to be so great that no greater can be thought of, especially since this perfection cannot be naturally understood by a created intellect.<sup>496</sup>

There is much to unpack in this passage. The principal difference between the human society and the divine society, according to the present passage, is that human persons understand, affirm, and love the human society only on the side of the object, whereas the divine persons not only understand, affirm, and love the divine society on the side of the object, but are also constituted through the processions as the act of understanding, affirming, and loving by which the divine society is loved. The principal difference, in other words, is that the unity of the divine persons constitute one consciousness, whereas the unity of human persons occurs across multiple consciousnesses. This point can be readily conceded. The passage, however, gives the impression that whereas the divine persons are united both on the side of the object and on the side of the subject, human

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<sup>496</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 428f.

persons are only united on the side of the object. The arguments advanced earlier in this present chapter, however, oppose that point, and the principal reason why, I suspect, is that Lonergan had not yet completely transitioned out of his early position that other human persons are present as any other object would be present. That is, subject-to-subject personal presence had not yet been conceived as of a different character than object-to-subject, intentional presence. Hence, his formulations in trinitarian theology, specifically on the different degrees in the perfection of order, including on how the perfection of order among human persons and that among divine persons ought to be distinguished, would need to be reworked in light of the distinctiveness of subject-to-subject presence.

Lonergan's reasoning may be correlated to an argument advanced in *Insight*. Consider the following passage, in which Lonergan discusses the intelligibility of artifacts:

To confine our attention to what man knows best, namely, his own artifacts, there is discernible in them an intelligible design, and their existence has its ground in the labor of production. But before the design is realized in things, it was invented by intelligence; before the sequence of productive operations was undertaken, it was affirmed as worth while for some sufficient or apparently sufficient reason. In the thing there is the intelligible design, but in the inventor there was not only the intelligibility on the side of the object but also intelligent consciousness on the side of the subject. In the thing there is the groundedness that consists in its existence being accounted for by a sequence of operations, but in the entrepreneur there was not only the groundedness of his judgment in the reasons that led to it but also the rational consciousness that required reasons to reach judgment.<sup>497</sup>

In the artifact, Lonergan argues, there is the intelligible design; in the inventor, however, there is a distinction between the intelligence and rationality on the side of the subject, and the intelligibility and groundedness on the side of the object. In the following

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<sup>497</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 346f.

paragraph, Lonergan denotes intelligence and intelligibility as the obverse and reverse on the second level of consciousness and rationality and groundedness as the obverse and reverse of the second level of consciousness. He continues:

In man's artifacts there are the reverse elements of the intelligibility and groundedness, but there are not the obverse elements of intelligence and reasonableness. The obverse elements pertain to cognitional process on its second and third levels; they do not pertain to the contents emergent on those levels, to the idea or concept, to the unconditioned or affirmed; on the contrary, they characterize the acts with which those contents are coupled, and so they are specific differentiations of the awareness of consciousness.<sup>498</sup>

In other words, the obverse elements pertain to consciousness, whereas the reverse elements pertain to the contents that are understood and affirmed.

Although in *Insight* Lonergan uses artifacts to illustrate the distinction in *Insight's* between the obverse intelligence/rationality and reverse intelligibility/groundedness, nevertheless the same distinction sheds light upon the perfection of order existing in society. As noted above, the perfection of order in society, Lonergan writes, emerges from the ordered individuals themselves as intellectual ... [and] is found intentionally in its entirety in each one."<sup>499</sup> In other words, the perfection of order in society does not merely consist in the reverse elements of intelligibility and rationality, but also consists in the intelligent and rational operations pertaining to cognitional process. That is, the perfection of order as found in society does not merely occur on the side of the object, but also occurs on the side of the subject inasmuch as each of the subjects of a complete cooperative order enter into shared deliberation regarding the good for which they are aiming and the internal order existing in the unit.

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<sup>498</sup> *Insight*, CW3, 347.

<sup>499</sup> *The Triune God: Systematics*, CW12, 428f.

Lastly, while Lonergan argues that the perfection of act and the perfection of order in God are only notionally, not really, distinct from one another, the analogy of shared intentionality appears to shed an imperfect light upon how the two perfections are united with one another in God. Indeed, the perfection of act in God can be considered either as antecedent to or as subsequent to the persons, and then it is the perfection of what is conceived of as the prior unity and what is conceived of as a subsequent unity. Lonergan acknowledges what I have been calling the prior unity, which is what he means by the perfection of act. However, the perfection of act can also be conceived as a subsequent unity, that is, as constituted through the cooperation of the multitude comprising it. Then, the perfection of order in God—the order existing among the trinitarian persons—is itself ordered to a unity of act. To state the point succinctly: as human persons are integrated in complete cooperative units and ordered to some end, so too the divine persons are eternally integrated in a cooperative unit and ordered to the infinite act of loving understanding, which is none other than what the trinitarian persons are, both in themselves and in their ordering to one another.

#### **5.4.3 The Invertibility of the Phases**

One might wonder whether the two phases of trinitarian theology could be inverted. Could what Aquinas and Lonergan take as the first phase (namely, the ordering of our concepts *in fieri*) be second in a systematic trinitarian theology, and the second phase (namely, the ordering of our concepts *in facto esse*) be first? Could the theologian first deal with the persons as constitutive of the personal properties, notional acts, and subsequent unity and then deal with the persons as constituted through the relations, processions and prior unity? If it is correct that shared intentionality should be employed

as a hypothesis in the ordering of our concepts *in facto esse*, then, the question continues, can shared intentionality be employed first and intelligible emanation be employed second? These are important questions, and although I ultimately believe that the theologian should maintain Aquinas's and Lonergan's ordering of the phases, there are reasons to affirm that *in principle* the phases could be inverted. In the present subsection, I first clarify what exactly is meant by the two different orderings, then explain why *in principle* the standard ordering could be inverted, and finally explain why I ultimately believe the theologian should maintain Aquinas and Lonergan's ordering.

The standard and the inverted orders could be schematized in the following way:

#### Lonergan's and Aquinas's Ordering of the Phases

(unity) : processions : relations : persons :: mystery as mystery :: persons : personal properties : notional acts : (unity)<sup>500</sup>

#### Inverted Ordering of the Phases

persons : personal properties : notional acts : unity :: mystery as mystery :: unity :  
processions : relations : persons

There are a few things to note about the similarity and difference between the standard and the inverted orderings of the phases. The similarity lies in the formal structure of the two. At the far ends of each ordering stand the same realities, and in the middle—at the pivot—lies the mystery as mystery. The major differences lie in what stands at each end and in what the mystery as mystery consists. With regard to what stands at each end: in the standard ordering, the first phase begins with the prior unity of

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<sup>500</sup> The reason why the prior and subsequent unities are in parentheses is because these unities are not foregrounded in Lonergan's accounting of what I am calling the standard order.

the divine essence and the second phase concludes with the unity as constituted through the acts of the persons, and in the inverted ordering, the first phase begins with the persons as supposits, and the second phase concludes with the persons but now as constituted entirely through their unity in an utterly simple act of shared intentionality. With regard to that in which the mystery as mystery consists: in the standard ordering, the mystery as mystery consists in the meaning of the persons, whereas in the inverted ordering, the mystery as mystery consists in the meaning of the unity. Although neither the theologian operating in the standard ordering nor the theologian operating in the inverted ordering would claim that only the persons or the unity are mysterious, nevertheless each ordering foregrounds the mystery of God in a unique way. If, as we mentioned above, the mystery in the standard ordering is the simultaneity of the paradoxical truths that the persons are both entirely constituted by and entirely constitutive of one and the same realities, then the mystery in the second ordering is the simultaneity of the truths that the unity in God is both entirely constituted by the cooperative acts of the persons and entirely constitutive of their cooperative acts.

(It might be helpful to note that the conception of the orderings here is distinct from the influential conception of the orderings as conceived initially by Théodore de Régnon and adopted by the social trinitarian theologians of the 20th-21st centuries.<sup>501</sup> De Régnon proposes that major the difference between eastern and western trinitarian theology lies in the fact that the eastern approach begins with the persons and concludes to the unity of the divine essence, while the western approach begins with the unity of

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<sup>501</sup> For an important article discussing the influence and the debates surrounding de Régnon's paradigm, see Michel Rene Barnes, "De Régnon Reconsidered," *Augustinian Studies* 26.2 (1995): 51-79.



divine essence and concludes to the persons. Whatever may be said of the so-called eastern approach, it should be clear that de Régnon's conception of the western approach captures only half of that approach, at least insofar as Aquinas may stand as its representative. In other words, to say that the western approach moves from the essence to the persons is to cover, rather imperfectly, only the first phase, the order of our concepts *in fieri*, and to overlook the second phase, the order of our concepts *in facto esse*. Leaving the interpretation of Aquinas to one side, however, I merely want to emphasize that the standard and inverted orderings, as they have been conceived here, integrate a number of features of, but also are far more comprehensive than, the orderings that de Régnon proposes. (Of course, he only proposes them as models for interpreting the history of trinitarian theology; the claim that the standard and inverted orderings are more comprehensive than the so-called eastern and western orderings is more directed against the theologians who incorporate de Régnon's interpretive models into their theology as systematic and normative principles.) Neither the standard nor the inverted ordering is so narrow as to move only from the persons to the unity or from unity to the persons: within each ordering—the standard and the inverted—both movements occur, and the only difference between them is which occurs first. If both did not occur—if one opted for a simpler system of concepts wherein one *only* moves either from persons to unity or from unity to persons—then one would not be able to deal adequately with the twofold ordering of constitution which effectively occludes both the threat of tritheism—a threat forever looming for social trinitarianism, which insists on moving from the persons to the unity—and that of modalism—a threat looming for some approaches to

trinitarian theology, perhaps more predominant in the west than in the east,<sup>502</sup> that privilege divine simplicity to such an extent that the persons become only modes of the divine essence.)

The question, then, is whether the theologian could depart from Lonergan's and Aquinas's standard ordering and adopt the inverted ordering, in which shared intentionality will serve as the analogue in the first phase to be complemented by intelligible emanation in the second phase.

*In principle*, it seems, the theologian could adopt either ordering. The pedagogically concerned theologian seeks to lead the reader from problems more comprehensive in scope—and hence in principle of more explanatory power—to issues less comprehensive in scope. For that reason, Aquinas treated the processions prior to the relations and the persons, and intelligible emanation was employed as a hypothesis for the processions. But if shared intentionality possesses an explanatory potential that complements intelligible emanation, then neither is required, on these grounds, to be positioned prior to the other.

There are, furthermore, reasons one may want to adopt the inverted ordering, which positions shared intentionality prior to intelligible emanation. If it is true that the inverted ordering foregrounds the mystery as mystery in a unique way, in that the pivot lies in between two conceptions of unity in God, then the theologian may, for a variety of reasons, be inclined toward adopting the inverted ordering. Again, if the theologian finds shared intentionality to be an analogue more communicable than intelligible emanation

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<sup>502</sup> To verify whether it is predominant in the west would require a comprehensive study of the history eastern and western trinitarian theology, a study that I am not prepared (or motivated) to pursue.

(not merely to nonspecialists, but also to trained theologians), then there may be grounds for adopting the inverted ordering.

However, while in principle the theologian could adopt either of the orders, there are some pedagogical reasons for maintaining Aquinas's and Lonergan's ordering between the two phases. The theologian doing trinitarian theology in an explanatory mode, after all, has to prescind from the imagination as much as possible, and there is no deeper initial tendency than to try to imagine the persons and their relations to one another. Doing so invites a host of unresolvable problems, or at least problems that are unresolvable to the degree that one continues to try to imagine what the Trinity might look like. But perhaps a pedagogical reason for maintaining Aquinas's and Lonergan's ordering of the phases is unsatisfying to the reader. I will note, however, that if theology ought to follow the *via disciplinae*, then pedagogical reasons are not of merely secondary or tertiary importance but rather of primary importance in the rationale for the ordering of the treatise. More fundamentally, the theologian must rout a legion of problems that arise from basic confusion, and the most basic confusion consists in theorizing about the trinitarian persons as one imagines them. Unlike intelligible emanation, a large segment of shared intentionality among human beings is manifest in sensation. If one begins with shared intentionality, then, the sensible manifestations may be seen as central to the analogue and confusion becomes more likely. Furthermore, because shared intentionality is more complex of a reality than intelligible emanation, beginning with intelligible emanation, which is by nature simpler, may be advisable. The greater complexity of shared intentionality is not due to its being less perfect of a reality, but only due to the fact that multiple subjects are involved. Lastly, because shared intentionality among

human beings occurs in accordance with, and not contrary to, the self-transcending events of human subjects, and because such self-transcendence includes acts of intelligible emanation, employing intelligible emanation first as an analogue seems to be more appropriate.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

In Chapters 1 and 3, I focused on the *similitudo secundum analogiam* in both Aquinas and Lonergan. These chapters showed the ways in which both Aquinas and Lonergan conceived the likeness by analogy in human beings as consisting in the mind's knowing and loving of itself, which was shown to include intelligible emanation. The present chapter, which introduced the analogy of shared intentionality, does not seem to fit neatly with the claim that the analogy of the Trinity consists in the mind's knowing and loving of itself. Shared intentionality is rather constituted by the self-transcending acts of many subjects, and the complete cooperative unit, which I argued ought to be employed as an analogue, includes in a knowing and loving of an end for the sake of which the unit is acting, a knowing and loving of the internal order existing among the participants, and a knowing and loving of the well-being of each of the participants and the group as a whole. In other words, if shared intentionality is to be an analogy, then the likeness by analogy cannot consist merely in the mind's knowing and loving of itself, but must also include these other elements, thereby rendering the likeness by analogy to be intrinsically interpersonal.

It should be evident, however, that this chapter has not been advocating the replacement of a psychological analogy for a social analogy, as many contemporary theologians have advocated. I have rather been advocating both the irreducibility and the

complementarity of intelligible emanation and shared intentionality as analogues. I have provided a few indications in this chapter regarding how the two analogues might broadly function in a broader systematic trinitarian theology, though the actual exposition of such theology, which would demand treatment of a wider range of pertinent questions, lies outside the scope of this dissertation. But to the degree that intelligible emanation and shared intentionality among human beings can be verified as imperfect but nevertheless fruitful analogues for the Trinity, they must both play some role in our conception of the *imago Trinitatis*. It is to that issue that I now turn in the Epilogue.

## EPILOGUE

This dissertation has covered a fair bit of ground. The first four chapters were organized according to the distinction between the two different human likenesses of the Trinity—the likeness by analogy and the likeness by conformity—in the work of Thomas Aquinas and Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J, the likeness by conformity and the likeness by analogy. An adequate understanding of these likenesses demanded that we consider Aquinas’s and Lonergan’s philosophical and theological methods, their conceptions of cognitional and volitional performance, and the explanatory meaning of the analogues for the triune God in their works. In the final chapter, I began to develop a new analogy for the (co)operative unity of the triune Persons based upon human shared intentionality. I worked to show how such an analogy might be related to Aquinas’s and Lonergan’s analogy based upon intelligible emanation in a systematic trinitarian theology and how the analogy possesses its own limited but fruitful explanatory potential.

If my arguments are sound, the analogy of shared intentionality can be leveraged for greater effect in our understanding of the *imago Trinitatis*. In this epilogue, I would like to indicate some of the ways our understanding of the *imago Trinitatis* might be enriched through the hypothesis of shared intentionality, and I do so in two ways: first, with regard to a new understanding of the likeness by conformity and, second, with

regard to the unity of the two analogues, not just in a systematic trinitarian theology, but also in concrete human living. My only aim in these concluding remarks is to provide a few proposals; a more detailed and rigorous explanation will have to be postponed until future work. But I hope the proposals begin to indicate how our understanding of the *imago Trinitatis* might be enriched with the aid of the complementary and functionally related analogies of intelligible emanation and shared intentionality.

With the hypothesis of shared intentionality in hand, it should be possible to conceive the likeness by conformity in a new light. We are not obliged to understand the likeness of conformity in the framework of intelligible emanation, that is, the framework of an analogue for the two processions in God. As I showed in Chapter 4, Robert Doran admirably attempts to determine the likeness of conformity in human beings, but his project suffers from several shortcomings. I suspect that many of these shortcomings are due to the limited framework of employing only one analogy, namely, intelligible emanation.<sup>503</sup> His reliance solely upon the analogy of intelligible emanation obliges him to configure the likeness of conformity into the two processions framework. Indeed, his formulation of the supernatural analogy is simply the analogy of intelligible emanation with new terms, and although, as shown in Chapter 4, Doran's terms are shifty and often ambiguous, my proposal is that the project might be misguided at a more fundamental level. With the introduction of the analogy of shared intentionality, we do not have to find new (supernatural) terms to place into the structure of intelligible emanation. There

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<sup>503</sup> Merriell also attempts to develop an eschatology based upon intelligible emanation, one that is based upon Aquinas rather than Lonergan. See D. Juvenal Merriell, "Trinitarian Anthropology," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 123–42, at 132–138.

is, rather, a complementary systematic analogy through which we may be able to better understand the likeness by conformity.

I propose that the likeness by conformity in human beings is their entrance into and thereafter continued participation in the one triune act of shared intentionality. Several critics of Doran's project have noted the priority of interpersonal relations and of the "we."<sup>504</sup> To take but one example, Charles Hefling observes that the central point of Lonergan's chapter on the divine missions in *The Triune God* is that God, through the missions of the Word and of Proceeding Love, seeks to establish *interpersonal* relations among human and divine persons.<sup>505</sup> Hefling mentions this as a criticism of Doran's use of the four-point hypothesis, but it may also be interpreted as a support for employing shared intentionality in our understanding of the likeness by conformity in human beings. For what is more intimate between persons—what is more interpersonal—than engaging in cooperative action with one another as oriented toward some good known and felt to be common? Indeed, part of the benefit of employing shared intentionality as an analogy is that the interpersonal relations among the divine persons is foregrounded in this analogy. As was explained in Chapter 5, shared intentionality is meant to be inserted for the second phase of trinitarian theology, when the theologian moves from the persons to the subsequent unity. The likeness of the Trinity by conformity in humans is their entrance into and participation in the shared intentionality—the one, shared infinite act of loving understanding—constituted by the triune persons.

Into such a divine act of shared intentionality, human beings are called. Through

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<sup>504</sup> See conclusion to Chapter 4.

<sup>505</sup> Hefling, "Quaestio Disputata," 646.



the mission of the Spirit, the dynamic state of being in love is established in human persons. “Ordinarily the experience of the mystery of love and awe is not objectified. It remains within subjectivity as a vector, an undertow, a fateful call to a dreaded holiness.”<sup>506</sup> This is, at least implicitly, a love for an infinite act of shared intentionality, an act that includes a love for all other persons—human and divine—actively sharing in it (though human and divine persons obviously share in it in different ways) and a love for other human persons as potential participants within it. Through the mission of the incarnate Christ, we know that into which we are called: we know that God has invited us into this shared divine act by becoming one of us, that the incarnate Christ is the exemplar for humanity as completely participating in the one divine act, and that God continually provides us with the graces through which we are able to enter ever more fully into that shared act. The missions of the Son and the Spirit, in other words, establish interpersonal relations between human and divine persons and engender within human beings the possibility of entering into and continually participating in the one divine act of shared intentionality.

Because human persons may enter into and participate in the one act of shared intentionality among the trinitarian persons, it follows that human beings can be said to performing the one divine act as it is manifest in the finite world. I showed in Chapter 5 that, in merely human cooperative units, the act of the unit can be predicated of each of the members. If we are writing a paper together, each of us can be said to be writing the paper, even if you are only writing this part and I am only writing that part. Analogously, in a cooperative unit constituted by human and divine persons, one and the same

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<sup>506</sup> *Method*, CW14, 109.

operation can be predicated of both divine and human persons. If the triune God is working out the redemption of human persons in our world, then when human persons enter into and participate in the triune act of shared intentionality, they (by grace) can also be said to be working out our redemption in our world. The action that the divine persons are undertaking in the finite world can also be predicated of human persons when they participate in a cooperative unit with God. It should be obvious, of course, that there are differences between what the divine persons do and what human persons do in this cooperative unit, as any cooperative unit entails some division of labor: no human person has ever sent the Son, for instance. The missions of the Son and the Spirit in our world are the parts of redemption that can only be accomplished by the divine persons. But human persons have their part to play, too: a part principally dependent upon the part of the divine persons, but a valuable part nonetheless. When humans enter into and participate in divine shared intentionality, both the triune persons and human persons can be said to be engendering a world constituted by the meanings and values of redemption: their operation, in one sense, is one and the same.

Though I recognize that many questions need still to be answered, allow me to move rapidly to my second proposal: intelligible emanation and shared intentionality are functionally related, not only in a full-scale trinitarian theology, but also in concrete human living.

Shared intentionality may, of course, take a variety of forms: there can be shared attending, shared understanding, shared judging, shared deciding, to name just a few. In Chapter 5, I focused on shared decision and cooperative units, principally because shared decision is the most excellent form of shared intentionality—the form that demands the

most of the participants in the cooperative unit—and thus serves as a relatively more suitable analogue in trinitarian theology. Whereas shared attending does not demand much of persons at all—two people waiting at a bus stop, for instance, might look down the road for the bus, and that is as far as their shared act goes—shared decision demands far more from each of the persons involved. The demands placed on each of the persons are demands for intentional acts: consider, for instance, how many intentional acts are required even in a rather mundane shared task such as writing a paper together. In the most comprehensive acts of shared intentionality, such as marriage, what is demanded is more or less the whole of the person.

It is especially important, for our purposes, to note that acts of shared decision among human persons demand acts of intelligible emanation occurring within each of the participants; it requires each of the intelligible emanations that Bernard Lonergan makes explicit in his intentionality analysis. In Chapter 3, I explicated Lonergan's focus on the emanations occurring in the autonomy of freedom and, more specifically, in existential constitution. Each of these emanations is also required in any act of shared decision, but rather than these acts occurring in only one consciousness, these acts must occur across multiple consciousnesses. Indeed, the shared decision is constituted through the acts occurring in each of the participants. No act of shared decision among human beings would occur without humans grasping the value of the course of action to be pursued, judging that the course of action should, in fact, be pursued, and deciding to act in accord with that course of action. Of course, just as much as individual decisions, shared decisions may be good or bad, morally upright or morally abhorrent. Nevertheless, all shared decision, if it is, in fact, decision and not simply coercion, requires acts of

intelligible emanation to occur in the minds of each member. The difference between a morally upright shared decision and a morally abhorrent shared decision is that the former is based upon the participants grasping a virtually unconditioned value and the latter is based upon the participants failing to obtain the virtually conditioned value.

Human self-transcendence, of course, is almost never an individual affair. It is almost always a matter of participating in and carrying out shared decisions with other human beings. The most excellent form of going beyond oneself in human life entails giving oneself to something or someone beyond oneself, and navigating with others the most adequate way in which to do that. Indeed, although one never stops being a person—that is, a distinct kind of unity-identity-whole—when engaging in acts of shared intentionality, there is a sense in which one’s own unity, one’s own identity, and one’s own wholeness is beyond oneself, founded in another, if one is indeed transcending oneself. In a complete cooperative unit, it is founded in the ceaseless activity of the participants to attain the perfect good for each of its members. As was noted in Chapter 5, this activity is constituted, in part, through acts of intelligible emanation, and the complete cooperative unit places demands upon each of the participants to perform such acts.

Of course, the human plight is such that complete cooperative units among humans are rare, and even when they do emerge, their existence does not seem to last long. Individual, group, dramatic, and general bias has a tendency to show its unbecoming face in even the most beautiful of communities, fracturing it and eventually sowing enough discord that, where there once was a complete cooperative unit, now only its painfully scattered remnants remain. The Christian faith attests, however, that the most

complete cooperative unit is not founded by any merely human community. It is rather founded in the triune God, that is, in the triune cooperative unit wherein the divine persons are distinct and yet the divine operation, which is both constitutive of them *and* constituted by them, is perfectly one. It is in such a cooperative unit that human beings find their complete fulfillment: that is, in divine shared intentionality, humans find their own unity, their own identity, and their own wholeness. It is into such divine shared intentionality that human self-transcendence is implicitly oriented, and it is into such shared intentionality that the divine persons invite us.

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