To Bomb or Not To Bomb

Abstract

What explains the changing strength and weakness of the “anti-strategic bombing norm” (ASB) during conflicts in the 20th century and beyond? The ASB norm encourages states to avoid the use of strategic bombing (targeting civilians to destroy enemy morale) in conflict. Yet these periods of conflict have had an inconsistent effect on the strength/weakness of the ASB norm. What explains this variation? I use qualitative historical cases of “key” conflicts in the 20th and 21st century to assess the strength/weakness of the ASB norm using the Ben-Josef Hirsch and Dixon (2021) “Indicators of Norm Strength” scale (see Table 1.1). Once I determined norm strength in each case, I then analyzed the norm strength in each case using four hypotheses derived from IR theory and previous ASB research. These hypotheses include (1) high enforcement, strong norm, (2) high enforcement, weak norm, (3) hegemonic leadership, and (4) technology used by states. I find that the “high enforcement, strong norm” hypothesis best explains the rise and fall of the ASB norm- but that sources of enforcement other than the hegemon itself are key. Indeed, contrary to some theories, the hegemon often weakens rather than strengthens the norm in this case.