Securing Status

Abstract

Why do smaller partners differ in the support that they provide to the foreign policy plans of a larger partner? Why have the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments differed in supporting the same United States (U.S.) policy plans? I argue that their actions stem from their status-seeking. My theory, deferential status competition, explains outcomes of support—and a lack thereof. I argue that a smaller partner varies in the degree of deference that it shows to a larger partner, owing to the strong-or-strained quality of their bilateral relations and its positive-or-negative assessment of a given policy plan. My theory assumes that deference yields status in the form of recognition from the larger partner; thus, smaller partners have a competitive incentive in their status community to provide support. Those smaller partners that are earlier and fuller supporters often gain reputational rewards that other, initially non-deferential peers may seek to gain by enhancing their levels of support. I evaluate my theory against two alternatives: levels of expectation from the larger partner and forms of societal preferences within the smaller partners. I use the qualitative methods of within-case process-tracing and interviews with numerous analysts, diplomats, and scholars to compare three core cases: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait. I show that Qatar and the UAE are more status-oriented, and more competitive in their support to the U.S., than is Kuwait. My dissertation aims to contribute a timely evaluation of U.S.-Gulf relations amid systemic polarity shifts and to design a theory that explains the supportive dynamics of the U.S.’s asymmetric alignments in and beyond the Middle East.