SCHOPENHAUER AND THE QUESTION ABOUT THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SELF IN IDEALISM

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Abstract

This dissertation is about the immortality of the self and whether from a transcendental idealist perspective, one could sustain this notion based on theoretical grounds. It is well known that Kant closed this door in the *Critique,* and this is the position that Kantian scholars defend. But has Kant set up a series of dogmatic premises that presuppose that we accept conclusions for which Kant offers no argument? Thus, this dissertation aims at a minimal ontology of the human self within an idealist framework. To do this, I turn to Schopenhauer's '*perfected* system of criticism.' Without abandoning idealism, Schopenhauer introduces an objective perspective that suggests a more ontological robust understanding of the self. Although Schopenhauer's position can be interpreted in a way favorable to theoretical arguments for the immortality of the self, his commitment to an identity of brain/mind, and the consequences that he draws from this, obscures some of his most important contributions. To tackle this issue and others, I analyze the Plotinian perspective, a philosophical position that blends epistemology and ontology which I think solidifies my interpretation of Schopenhauer and breaks the supposed identity between brain/mind. Thus, theoretical arguments for the immortality of the self are possible when idealism is an account in which epistemology and ontology intermingle.

Specifically, an argument is supported by a premise that is accepted by both Plotinus and Schopenhauer, namely, that of the existence of Ideas, real objects external to the human mind which are responsible for the existence of sensible individuals. These ideas are in themselves unified by a higher principle which Plotinus names the One and Schopenhauer the Thing in Itself. In absolute terms, this ultimate reality is the root of our true self, but we are not identical to it because in human beings there is multiplicity which manifests itself in us by how we cognize things as external to ourselves (understanding) and how we desire things that we do not find within us (will).

Chapter 1 opens with a discussion about the 'true self' according to Kant. Although this true self could be identified with the pure apperception of the Transcendental Deduction given that Kant argues that it is the source of unity of experience, after examining the different degrees of unity in representations, I conclude that the unifying principle of all sensible experience and the subject itself exist in a non-sensible world. The intelligible character of the Third Antinomy could be that principle, but I reject this in favor of the thing in itself. Nevertheless, the intelligible character's residence as an individual in the non-sensible world hints at the construction of theoretical arguments for the immortality of the true self.

Chapter 2 argues that Schopenhauer also rejects the role assigned to the pure apperception: only the thing in itself is the original source of unity. Schopenhauer accepts the Kantian intelligible character with clear indications that it is an ontologically real entity.

The ontological import of the intelligible character reinforces its role in seeking a theoretical argument for the immortality of our true self. I propose that a pathway to a theoretical argument in favor of the immortality of the true self is also suggested in Schopenhauer's doctrine of Ideas. The subject of cognition, through the alteration of its cognitive faculties in aesthetic contemplation, discovers itself as the correlate of a Pure Subject of Cognition whose objects are Pure Objects or, as Schopenhauer calls them, Ideas. In this alteration, the empirical subject of cognition is 'elevated' to the intuitive grasping of Ideas as a Pure Subject. Among Ideas, I argue that Schopenhauer points to something that can be interpreted as an idea of individual. Given the immortal nature of Ideas, we must also be immortal.

Chapter 3 focuses on the question about immortality in both Kant and Schopenhauer. On the one hand, I show that Kant has not abandoned the notion of the human soul or its immortality. Instead, he claims to have clarified the origin of all disputes regarding the human soul while laying out the rules for guarding ourselves against future errors. On the other hand, Schopenhauer has no problem accepting that immortality is a fact of common sense, but he rejects that the individual survives. He bases this conclusion on his conviction that individuality emerges with the intellect, while the intellect only emerges with the brain. The subjection of the intellect to the brain is one of the most salient features of Schopenhauerian psychology.

However, I propose that Schopenhauer's objective perspective, a perspective whose implications are hardly at the center of attention in Schopenhauer's studies, cannot be used to its full potential – as for example to defend that the individual human being is immortal too – unless this identification of intellect and brain is abandoned. To find arguments that can be used to differentiate the mind from the brain, I propose the study of Plotinus.

Chapter 4 aims to provide a framework to illuminate the possibilities built into Schopenhauer's objective perspective. The survey of Plotinus' philosophy of self and immortality in this chapter suggests interesting starting points for a new interpretation of some of Schopenhauer's insights. An important consequence of this study is the formulation of arguments to show that the mind or intellect cannot be characterized as identical to the brain. After studying Plotinus, a fact becomes clear, namely, that Schopenhauer, although critical of the concept 'soul', does not discard its content; instead, he finds ample use of it for his own unique purposes.

Chapter 5 concludes that the discussion of Kant's and Schopenhauer's psychology reveals the flaw in their respective projects, namely, their demand that cognition of the human soul should mirror cognition of sensible objects. This is a conclusion that is also revealed by the study of Plotinus. However, I reaffirm my position that Schopenhauer's idealism is a step forward in the right direction. I discuss four 'great themes' – born from the encounter between Schopenhauer and Plotinus – which provide the general context that helps me propose how the theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self works in transcendental idealism.

I argue that these four great themes, areas where ontology and epistemology intersect, refocus not just Schopenhauer's philosophy by helping us to become aware of the nonverbalized implications of his metaphysics, it even suggests that Plotinus' metaphysics could benefit from the Schopenhauerian reflection.

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“One comes to know philosophers only from their own works, not from the distorted image of their theories that is presented by a commonplace mind.”

- Arthur Schopenhauer

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Introduction

My first encounter with Immanuel Kant happened many years before I decided to pursue a doctorate in philosophy. Since that encounter, the philosophy of Kant has fascinated me and had a significant influence on how I came to interpret the world. But in my mind, there was always a lingering reluctance to accept some of his conclusions. The one that always bothered me most was Kant's insistence that I should act *as if* I was immortal, but that I could never act *knowing that* I am immortal. Kant asserted in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that no theoretical arguments proved the immortality of the soul. From a transcendental idealist's perspective, theoretical arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul are no longer valid, thus, we are forced merely to act *as if* we are immortal, given the demands of practical reason and morality. In a way, Kant considers these conclusions as a favor to people of faith: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for *faith*" (Bxxx). Kant's conviction in this area has remained so powerful among his followers that one of them declares that "his criticism[s] of rational psychology were devastating, and that discipline never really revived."[1]

Many years later, at the beginning of my doctoral studies, I read many of Pascal's *pensées*, and one of them particularly caught my attention: "It affects our whole life *to know* whether the soul is mortal or immortal." There are reasons to think that Pascal would never have accepted Kant's conclusions that this knowledge which we seek is not theoretical. Thus, the existential implications of this topic are evident: whether I stay home,

[1] Hatfield (2006, 223).

read a good book, and practice self-mortification, or go to a party with my friends and engage in actions that will lead to drunkenness and reckless behavior – all of these are influenced by my convictions regarding the questions of whether I am mortal or immortal. Unlike Kant, I thought that these choices had infinite consequences, not just because of some practical consideration of reason, but because we are theoretically convinced one way or the other.

In doing research for this dissertation, I was surprised to find in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics a thought similar to the one expressed by Pascal: "The greatest yearning of a human being is not to know the actions of the soul, which one cognizes through experience, but rather its future state."[2] Notice here the connection between (theoretical) knowledge and the soul's future state. Therefore, Kant, following a venerable philosophical tradition, considers that the future state of our self after death is one of the most important questions that any philosopher needs to answer. I think that Kant's ultimate answer in the *Critique*, if one were to press him, would be to say: "That knowledge which you seek is not theoretical, but transcendental" – which for Kant, I think, is to declare that philosophy, when treating certain topics, can only follow a *via negativa*. I am persuaded that this is a very unsatisfactory assumption.

These considerations led me to formulate a question: could one reject Kant's position regarding what he calls theoretical arguments about the immortality of the soul and still be sympathetic to his idealist project? I was not able to fully visualize a way out of the Kantian conundrum until I became familiar with the philosophy of two other towering figures, namely, Arthur Schopenhauer and Plotinus, whom I see as members of the idealist camp.

[2] M.L1 76 (28:263).

Specifically, Schopenhauer taught me about Kant's flaws and made me suspicious of accepting all Kant's arguments as valid. On the other hand, Schopenhauer's incorporation of the Kantian account of the intelligible character and his criticism of Kant's use of the (Platonic) Ideas revealed to me that he had some important metaphysical insights. But given his insistence that philosophy must remain a merely immanent account of existence, he stops from fully exploring those possibilities, declaring that to go beyond experience is to enter the realm of religion and mysticism. It was not until I began reading Plotinus that I started to fully realize why some of Schopenhauer's conclusions left me unconvinced. The connections that I found between Plotinus and Schopenhauer were so significant that I began to think that perhaps Plotinus' philosophy could help me resolve some of the so-called contradictions or inconsistencies in the Schopenhauerian system. The key result of thinking my question through the lenses of these two philosophers is offered in this dissertation.

But what is specifically offered by these two philosophers that helps me problematize the Kantian position? Without abandoning the subjective perspective of idealism – namely, that part of idealism that studies the subjective faculties of cognition and its *a priori* structures – Schopenhauer argues that idealism, if it wants to be a full explanation of existence, must include a meditation on the world from the perspective of its objectivity.

> The opposite way of investigating the intellect is the *objective* way, which starts from the *outside* and does not take one's own consciousness for its object but

> instead takes the beings that are given in outer experience …it takes the world and the animal beings present in it as simply given, since it proceeds from these.[3]

Although this dissertation is not a defense of every Schopenhauerian conclusion, Schopenhauer's objective standpoint, I will argue, suggests a more ontologically robust understanding of the existence of something like the true self without abandoning an idealist epistemology. This is accomplished, among other things, by working into the Kantian system insights from sources in ancient and Eastern philosophy to which Kant paid little or no attention.

The mostly unexplored implications of Schopenhauer's account based on this objective perspective, with the help of Plotinus, will play a major role in my thesis that theoretical arguments about the soul are compatible with some form of transcendental idealism. One important consequence of this account is, according to Schopenhauer, that through the alteration of the cognitive faculties in aesthetical contemplation, the sensible world is revealed as an image and copy of a non-sensible universe populated by Platonic Ideas. Thus, Schopenhauer's idealism acknowledges, for example, that the sensible world loses existence if you were to take away the non-sensible universe of Ideas, whereas if the sensible world were to lose existence, this does not take away the non-sensible world's existence.[4] At this point, I could not fail to notice how Plotinus comes to the very same conclusion in his own philosophy while also being absolutely convinced that the human soul is immortal and that this can be establish through theoretical arguments. According to

[3] WWR II, 285.
[4] As one commentator observes, for Schopenhauer the physical world is symbolic: "it points to something beyond itself; it hints at a deeper reality beyond representation of any kind" (Kastrup 2020, 100-101).

Plotinus, the freer we become from this world of sense, the more we grow in awareness that this world reflects what Plotinus calls the 'intelligible place', that place where Intellect and Ideas reside and we realize that without Intellect, the sensible world and we as members of that world would not exist anymore. This 'intelligible place' is also the origin of our soul, and it shares in that place's immortality. Plotinus' perspective, where epistemology and ontology coincide, is what ultimately transcendental idealism, at least in its Schopenhauerian revision, also reveals to us. Thus, in some way, it seems to me, Schopenhauer's idealism must be compatible with the immortality of the human soul!

To be clear, in this dissertation I am not aiming at orthodoxy regarding Kant's transcendental idealism. I am not trying to 'save' Kant by interpreting his position in the *Critique* consistently or resolving tensions so as to claim that his philosophy is the truth simply as stated in the text. An important feature of this dissertation and its thesis is precisely the interpretation of what I mean by 'transcendental idealism'. This dissertation treats Kant and Schopenhauer as founders of transcendental idealism. This is to distinguish them from other versions of idealism such as the ones found in Schelling and Hegel. However, to what degree we can call Kant and Schopenhauer transcendental idealists is complicated by the fact that both philosophers struggled with this name and in their public writings did not settle on this tittle to describe their philosophies. In any case, at minimum, a philosophy that considers the mental, non-sensible as ontologically primary is idealist. Furthermore, idealism attains its most metaphysical explanatory power when it brings together ontology and epistemology; a movement that is found in both Plotinus and Schopenhauer.

This exploration of transcendental idealism as a metaphysics is supported by recent commentators who have noticed that Kant's transcendental idealism can be interpreted as a metaphysical doctrine, and this emerges most clearly when idealism is understood as a doctrine that brings together epistemology and ontology. These interpretations help us to discover news ways of looking at the textual data. Unfortunately, it is uncommon for Kantian and Schopenhauerian scholars to challenge the 21st century rejection – rooted in the 18th and 19th century – of an all-encompassing metaphysics that brings together epistemology and ontology. In that regard they are faithful followers of Kant (and to a certain degree of Schopenhauer), but they ignore that many of Kant's issues against the metaphysics that he inherited are grounded in assumptions of his intellectual and cultural milieu.

Today, we must use the same critical mind that these Enlightenment philosophers defended to assess how they also created a set of 'prejudices' from which we need to set ourselves free. In other words, Kant's invitation, *sapere aude!*, has perennial value. Metaphysics and cognition cannot be reduced to a scientific, rationalistic, materialist, or naturalistic model, as I think Kant and Schopenhauer do in different degrees. Evidently, they can be reduced to that, but that does not mean that no argument can be brought forward against these kinds of reductions. Therefore, I want to defend a metaphysical reading of transcendental idealism but reject the Enlightenment constrictions on what counts as rational cognition. My overall goal with this is to suggest possible theoretical grounds, even from a modified transcendental idealist perspective, for the immortality of what is traditionally called 'soul' and the preservation of our true self after death.

There are two major misconceptions about transcendental idealism that I want to challenge in this dissertation. First, given Kant's reputation as 'destroyer' of metaphysics, I want to challenge the notion that transcendental idealism is antimetaphysics or whoever engages in transcendental idealism is not a metaphysician. The centrality of metaphysics for philosophy is a recurrent issue in Kant's writing and teaching: "Metaphysics is the spirit of philosophy. It is related to philosophy as the spirit of wine is to wine. It purifies our elementary concepts and thereby makes us capable of comprehending all sciences. In short, it is the greatest culture of the human understanding."[5] The lectures on metaphysics provide ample evidence of Kant's concern with highlighting the importance of metaphysics. This is evident in his identification of transcendental philosophy with pure metaphysics, that is, with that part of philosophy that has the most fundamental task. Thus, transcendental philosophy is to metaphysics what logic is to philosophy.[6]

Second, I want to challenge the notion that the distinction between representations and the thing in itself coupled with the claim of ignorance regarding the thing in itself means that transcendental idealism denies objectivity, that is, denies that there is something besides representations to a mind. This misconception concludes that transcendental idealism radicalized the Cartesian turn to the subject paving the way to postmodern subjectivism; thus, a return to the objects is needed. Schopenhauer's whole system is an argument about the falsehood of such a supposition. Schopenhauer plainly struggles to make as clear as possible that consciousness and its representations do not exhaust reality. What Schopenhauer's philosophy wants to teach us is to train us to recognize that what we call 'real', and 'objective' is not necessarily what our instinct tells us is real and objective.

[5] M.Mr 286 (29:940).
[6] M.Mr 116 (29:755-756).

For Schopenhauer, non-sensible entities like Ideas and the thing in itself are what count as real, whereas all representations, including intuitive representations like plants and animals, are ideal. I think that this view, once again, shows the link between Plotinus and Schopenhauer. In any case, any serious engagement with transcendental idealism as exposed by its founding fathers dispels these misconceptions.

If my view is accepted, then the Kantian conclusion regarding theoretical arguments for immortality has less persuasive force. Specifically, an argument could be put forward which is supported by an ontology that is accepted by both Plotinus and Schopenhauer, namely, an ontology in which Ideas exist and are responsible for the existence of sensible individuals. This ontology rescues the Platonic Ideas from the Kantian faculty of reason and restores them to their proper ontological place. I will argue that it is precisely Schopenhauer's doctrine of Ideas that suggests the possibility of bringing transcendental idealism into a unified whole with Plotinian metaphysics. In this dissertation, I propose that we think of ourselves as members of that intelligible universe.

This dissertation is divided in three main sections and five chapters. The first main section deals with Kant's and Schopenhauer' accounts of what I call the 'true self', namely, that which makes us the individual that we are. Chapter 1 opens with a discussion about the 'true self' according to Kant. Although this true self could be identified with the pure apperception of the Transcendental Deduction given that Kant argues that it is the source of unity of experience, after examining the different degrees of unity in representations, I conclude that the unifying principle of all sensible experience and the subject itself exist in a non-sensible world. The intelligible character of the Third Antinomy could be that principle, but I reject this in favor of the thing in itself. Nevertheless, the intelligible

character's residence as an individual in the non-sensible world hints at the construction of theoretical arguments for the immortality of the true self.

Chapter 2 argues that Schopenhauer also rejects the role assigned to the pure apperception: only the thing in itself is the original source of unity. Schopenhauer accepts the Kantian intelligible character with clear indications that it is an ontologically real entity. The ontological import of the intelligible character reinforces its role in seeking a theoretical argument for the immortality of our true self. I propose that a pathway to a theoretical argument in favor of the immortality of the true self is also suggested in Schopenhauer's doctrine of Ideas. The subject of cognition, through the alteration of its cognitive faculties in aesthetic contemplation, discovers itself as the correlate of a Pure Subject of Cognition whose objects are Pure Objects or, as Schopenhauer calls them, Ideas. In this alteration, the empirical subject of cognition is 'elevated' to the intuitive grasping of Ideas as a Pure Subject. Among Ideas, I argue that Schopenhauer points to something that can be interpreted as an idea of individual. Given the immortal nature of Ideas, we must also be immortal.

The second main section has only one chapter. Chapter 3 focuses on the question about immortality in both Kant and Schopenhauer. On the one hand, I show that Kant has not abandoned the notion of the human soul or its immortality. Instead, he claims to have clarified the origin of all disputes regarding the human soul while laying out the rules for guarding ourselves against future errors. On the other hand, Schopenhauer has no problem accepting that immortality is a fact of common sense, but he rejects that the individual survives. He bases this conclusion on his conviction that individuality emerges with the intellect, while the intellect only emerges with the brain. The subjection of the intellect to

the brain is one of the most salient features of Schopenhauerian psychology. However, I propose that Schopenhauer's objective perspective, a perspective whose implications are hardly at the center of attention in Schopenhauer's studies, cannot be used to its full potential – as for example to defend that the individual human being is immortal too – unless this identification of intellect and brain is abandoned. To find arguments that can be used to differentiate the mind from the brain, I propose the study of Plotinus.

In the third and last main section, comprised of two chapters, I examine the philosophy of Plotinus to spell out the arguments that I think are necessary to show that Schopenhauer's view can be compatible with the immortality of the individual after death. Thus, chapter 4 aims to provide a framework to illuminate the possibilities built into Schopenhauer's objective perspective. The survey of Plotinus' philosophy of self and immortality in this chapter suggests interesting starting points for a new interpretation of some of Schopenhauer's insights. An important consequence of this study is the formulation of arguments to show that the mind or intellect cannot be characterized as identical to the brain. After studying Plotinus, a fact becomes clear, namely, that Schopenhauer, although critical of the concept 'soul', does not discard its content; instead, he finds ample use of it for his own unique purposes.

Finally, chapter 5 concludes that the discussion of Kant's and Schopenhauer's psychology reveals the flaw in their respective projects, namely, their demand that cognition of the human soul should mirror cognition of sensible objects. This is a conclusion that is also revealed by the study of Plotinus. However, I reaffirm my position that Schopenhauer's idealism is a step forward in the right direction. I discuss four 'great themes' – born from the encounter between Schopenhauer and Plotinus – which provide

the general context that helps me propose how the theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self works in transcendental idealism. I argue that these four great themes, areas where ontology and epistemology intersect, refocus not just Schopenhauer's philosophy by helping us to become aware of the nonverbalized implications of his metaphysics, it even suggests that Plotinus' metaphysics could benefit from the Schopenhauerian reflection.

At its core this is a study of Schopenhauer and finding resources in his own system to justify the claim that there can be individuality after death. The goal is not to provide an argument to accept theoretical proofs for the immortality of the individual true self that satisfies Kant's criteria or demands, that is, necessity and universality. Schopenhauer teaches that metaphysics cannot aspire to such certainties and leaves that to logic and arithmetic.

CHAPTER 1

Kant and the Quest for the True Self

Introduction

The protagonist of this dissertation is our most true self and its immortality, namely, the question of the *immortality of our true self*. Most philosophers and studies do not speak about this topic in these terms, instead they use the more standard "immortality of the soul". For the time being, let us follow the familiar way to express the question. I say that this dissertation is about the question of the "immortality of the soul" but what do I mean by this? Many things could be supposed from this statement that may or may not be what I am investigating. What I am pursuing is this: whether our character survives the body's death.[1] If the answer is 'yes,' could a theoretical argument be put forward? Moreover, could this still be possible if I accept a transcendental idealist perspective? To answer these questions, I must start from Kant's conclusions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*[2] for I take him as the founder of the system known to us today as *transcendental idealism*.[3] From a transcendental idealist perspective, theoretical arguments in favor of the immortality of the

[1] Here 'character' is identified with what is called 'soul.' The 'character' is what makes me different from other human beings, whatever distinguishes Kant from Socrates. It is our personality and individuality, our idiosyncrasy. Are these immortals? Do they survive bodily death?
[2] All references to CPR are from Kemp Smith's translation unless otherwise noted.
[3] In the *Prolegomena*, Kant struggles with this name; see Prol. 33-34:292-294. In PP I, 76-77, Schopenhauer discusses the meaning of 'transcendental.'

true self are no longer valid, thus, we are forced to act as if we are immortal given the demands of practical reason and morality.

The arguments by which Kant reached these conclusions will be discussed below, what is valuable about them will be retained and what can be challenged will be discarded. Overall, this study seeks to reverse course from what is taken as the canonical view of the *Critique* and aims at a minimal ontology of the human self among Kant's (claimed to be) purely epistemological statements.[4] In doing so, I will question the meaning of 'transcendental' in Kant's transcendental project. I suspect that Kant creates this label to shield himself from ignoring the tensions inherent in his claims, especially his denial that he has a metaphysical point of view when he makes certain descriptions about the mind. In doing this, I am indebted to Schopenhauer's '*perfected* system of criticism'[5], a name that he uses to present his philosophy as the modified version of Kant's transcendental project. Although this study is not a defense of every Schopenhauerian conclusion, Schopenhauer develops an objective standpoint[6] that suggest a more ontological robust understanding of the self without abandoning an idealist epistemology. This is accomplished, among other things, by working into the Kantian system insights from sources in ancient and Eastern philosophy to which Kant paid little or no attention.[7]

The focus of this chapter and chapter 2 is determining who, according to Kant and Schopenhauer, the true self is while the question of its immortality is taken up in chapter

[4] As Marshall (2010, 7) observes, "The self or mind is the object of investigation in the *Critique* – so Kant surely must have had some positive conception of what he was investigating."
[5] MR I, 38.
[6] The best explanation of the objective perspective is given in WWR II, chapter 22: "The opposite way of investigating the intellect is the *objective* way, which starts from the *outside* and does not take one's own consciousness for its object but instead takes the beings that are given in outer experience …it takes the world and the animal beings present in it as simply given, since it proceeds from these" (WWR II, 285, jans tras).
[7] Gardner (2012, 375). Likewise, Guyer and Wood (1998, 6), note that Kant never cared much about the history of philosophy.

3. This chapter will focus on Kant's philosophy of self. In the *Critique*, Kant speaks of two selves,[8] one self is described as transcendental and another self is described as empirical. In the first *Critique*, Kant gives us much information regarding the transcendental self. This transcendental self is the 'I'[9] which transcendental idealism describes as having cognitive faculties such as 'sensibility' (*Sinnlichkeit*), 'understanding' (*Verstand*), and 'reason' (*Vernunft*). According to Kant, it is the possessor of sensible forms of intuition, namely, space and time, its understanding is the seat of the 'categories' needed for the synthesis of sensible experience and its reason is the seat of three regulative ideas. Although the transcendental self does not provide a complete picture of Kant's conception of a human being, it gives us some starting points to eventually reach a full comprehension of what a human being is.

When reading Kant's first *Critique*, is the clear picture of the transcendental self, as I presented it above, obvious? Unfortunately, the picture is not that clear. Digging deeper into Kant's text one finds that the issue of the transcendental self is perplexing and complex. For what I described above as the transcendental subject, Kant provides a variety of notions that, at first glance, complicates this narrative. It is sometimes called 'synthetic unity,' 'pure apperception', 'intelligible character', or 'original consciousness'. In different contexts, all these names could be considered *the* transcendental subject. To make things more complicated, as I mentioned above, we also discover that the 'transcendental subject' is also an 'empirical subject' or that there is an 'empirical apperception'. So, the transcendental subject seems to have two 'lives' or two 'histories', but then, how are these

[8] Longuenesse (2017, 111).
[9] According to Longuenesse (2017, 107), "many passages indicate that Kant takes it [the I] to *represent* an entity, whatever that entity might be. 'I' represents an entity that is conscious of itself in virtue of being conscious of its own thinking (synthesizing) activity."

two related? Many studies have tried to resolve these questions. My position is that this distinction should not be taken as two numerically distinct selves. Additionally, I will suggest that a good candidate for this true self is what is revealed as an 'idea'. Evidently, I do not mean a Kantian idea, although there are some overlaps with how Kant interprets this notion. Before I get to this point, Kant's notion of reason and 'ideas' must be examined, something that I will do in chapter 3.

I propose that we look at these issues with fresh eyes. To give an appropriate answer to my question, not only do we need to determine what or who the transcendental subject or self is, but we must examine the extent to which Kant's epistemological premises are even worth accepting. To gain clarity on these problems, I suggest that we begin by tracing Kant's account of subjectivity from the lectures on metaphysics[10] to its development in the first *Critique*.[11] In this chapter, I will focus on the lectures leading up to the publication of the A-edition (*Metaphysik L1*), and in the time of its the publication (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*). The discussion of the lectures around the time of publication of the B-edition (*Metaphysik Volckmann*), given that its content focuses on the proofs of immortality, will be postpone until chapter 3.

My study reveals the need to study the two selves of which Kant speaks in continuity because their relationship is characterized by a prior/posterior vertical causality.[12] Even if Kant's presentation of the subject is complicated by a bifurcation between empirical and pure self, the true self exists as both thinker (apperception) and willer (intelligible

[10] For general introductions to the lectures on metaphysics see Ameriks and Naragon (2001), Fugate (2019); and Clewis (2015, 64-137).
[11] I prefer to focus on the first *Critique* given my preference for Schopenhauer's modified transcendental idealism. This will be further developed in chapter 2.
[12] The notion of vertical causality is discussed in chapter 4 in greater detail. For the moment, this causality is ontological. A lesser thing has its existence from a greater thing. The greater does not lose anything by producing a lesser and the lesser cannot sustain itself in existence without the greater.

character). In describing these two sides of one subject, I do not believe that Kant is breaking new ground. However, Kant wants to break new ground by arguing that the subjective perspective (the pure apperception) is responsible for how human beings cognize the sensible world by being the source of its unity through *a priori* structures. Although Kant spends a lot of space in the *Critique* to prove this point, I show that Kant is mistaken in considering the transcendental apperception as absolute unity and source of unity in general. While the intelligible character that Kant introduces in the Third Antinomy seems like a better candidate to be the source of unity, after examining the different degrees of unity in representations, I conclude that the unifying principle of all sensible experience and the subject is the thing in itself. Nevertheless, the intelligible character's residence as an individual in the intelligible world suggests some paths in constructing a theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self.

I. The Status of the Transcendental Status

An integral part of my project is to think of transcendental idealism as more than mere epistemology. It is almost a dogma for doing transcendental idealism that we must follow Kant in this path; however, I think that there are good reasons to not do this. The first reason to suspect Kant's shift of ontological problems to epistemological questions is to think thoroughly what exactly we should understand by the Kantian 'transcendental' status of some of his claims. This is important because one could say that my discussion of the apperception that follows is misleading for Kant takes the apperception to be a

transcendental fact, and simply as an epistemological transcendental of which it would be to betray Kant's intention if one were to speak of it in metaphysical or ontological terms.

Much ink has been spilled in describing the nature of transcendental arguments and how exactly Kant intended them to work.[13] However, Kant never provided a detailed account of what he meant by transcendental arguments[14] and when he did, he suggests two models on how they are supposed to work. One model suggests that a transcendental argument "established the universal and necessary validity of certain concepts and/or principles that are given and known a priori as the necessary condition of the possibility of any knowledge of objects at all."[15]

> The transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognised as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience, alike of the intuition which is to be met with in it and of the thought.[16]

Transcendental arguments not only aim at establishing the condition of possibility of objects, but also discover *a priori* conditions for sensible experience itself.

[13] For some, transcendental idealism falls or stands in the possibility of transcendental arguments. Kant tried to describe transcendental arguments in the Doctrine of Method, but most interpreter find that discussion obscure and not clarifying, so they turn towards the *practice* of these arguments in the first part of the *Critique*. See Moore (2010) for a discussion of transcendental arguments in the Doctrine of Method.
[14] See A782-94/ B810-822.
[15] Guyer (1999, 97).
[16] A94/B126.

> Through concepts of understanding pure reason does, indeed, establish secure principles, not however directly from concepts alone, but always only indirectly through relation of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely, *possible experience*.[17]

The other model suggests that transcendental arguments "assumes the existence of some particular body of synthetic a priori knowledge, and provides an explanation of the possibility of such knowledge which may in turn imply the existence of other synthetic a priori knowledge, not previously assumed."[18]

> We have therefore some, at least uncontested, synthetic knowledge a priori, and need not ask *whether* it be possible (for it is actual) but *how* it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given knowledge possible the possibility of all the rest.[19]

So, what Kant offers regarding transcendental arguments could be summarized in two points. 1) These arguments set out to prove that we have *a priori* cognition (space, time, categories) that are the conditions of possibility of any cognition at all. 2) Or these arguments assume synthetic *a priori* cognition (the law of causality) and they seek the conditions (*a priori* forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding) for that to be the case. The second points appear to condemn Kant's position to circularity, but Guyer argues that this is not the case and a fairer assessment of (2) would be to say that by

[17] A736-37/B764-65.
[18] Guyer (1999, 98).
[19] Prol 4:275. See B 40.

assuming the law of causality as synthetic *a priori* cognition, Kant adopts as noncontroversial what in fact is highly controversial.[20]

Schopenhauer found Kant's transcendental argument suspect. In that Schopenhauer was not alone, for many defenders of Kant tried to understand and fortify his project. One important example from the period is the attempt by Karl Leonhard Reinhold. He did his best to make Kantianism thoroughly "systematic and therefore genuinely 'scientific'"[21] and his philosophy seeks to provide the first principle that, according to him, Kant's theoretical philosophy lacks. In the process, Reinhold and others undermined Kant to the point of making him irrelevant or abandoning him altogether. Thus, the critical system remained insecure in its foundations. Unlike other post-Kantians, Schopenhauer's solution was to accept that the justification of the transcendental project was impossible. As he at one point declares: "there is really no knowledge of the principles that form the basis of all knowledge…there is no knowledge of knowledge."[22]

There cannot be transcendental arguments for transcendental knowledge; the latter is where all explanation comes to an end. Schopenhauer stirs away from the skeptic path that this conclusion may suggest and instead embraces a perspective that restores the descriptive task of philosophy, more in line with the Greek tradition of metaphysics.[23] That the transcendental project cannot find firm ground is taken by Schopenhauer as a datum that carries metaphysical significance; thus, he felt entitled to relieve metaphysics of the

[20] Guyer (1999, 99). As Guyer notes (112-113) for the arguments presented in the three 'Analogies' and the 'Refutation of Idealism' Kant relies on the premise that 'time itself cannot be perceived.' Of this premise, one could ask: what is its epistemic status?
[21] Breazeale (2018).
[22] MR II 453–54.
[23] I consider that Schopenhauer wants to revive the metaphysical aims of the pre-Socratics. According to Feser (2008, 28), the Pre-Socratic philosophers "were fascinated by the question of what the basic principle is that underlies all reality and unifies all the diverse phenomena of our experience." This explanation sprang from how human knowledge was supposed to reflect the inner arrangement of the *kosmos*.

demanding burden of accounting of its claims to knowledge in the terms demanded by Kant.[24] "[T]he task of metaphysics is…[the] accurate explanation of experience as a whole."[25] Accordingly, metaphysics is possible, but metaphysics must be understood in a concrete way: "Transforming the world into a text, the metaphysician has to read it so that the rectitude of its reading comes from the immanent verification of the reading itself."[26] Accordingly, Schopenhauer argues that philosophical investigations should not rely on a chain of reasoning in order to prove that they are true, for their logical coherence is not evidence for why we should accept them and a good rhetorician can manipulate language; instead, every claim, if true, is in agreement with reality.[27] It is the underlying unity of the world that philosophy mirrors in its propositions. If there is agreement between the sensible world and the propositions, Schopenhauer believes that this is enough evidence. This differs from Kant's architectonic approach where it is how the propositions are organized in a systematic way, each propositions supporting each other that justifies the truth of a philosophy.[28]

As for the method that Schopenhauer will follow in his philosophy, he makes very clear what are the differences between him and Kant.

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[24] Gardner (2012, 393-394).
[25] WWR II, 206.
[26] Barrenechea (1989, 102).
[27] Schopenhauer writes that his system "does not, like all previous ones, float in the air high above all reality (*Realität*) and experience, but descends to this firm ground of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) where the physical sciences receive the learner in turn" (WN, 323). Consider Schopenhauer's own assessment on what makes him different from the pantheist: "That I proceed from experience and the natural self-consciousness given to everyone, and lead on to will as that which alone is metaphysical, hence take the ascending, analytic path. The pantheists, by contrast, go the opposite way, taking the descending, synthetic path: they procced from their *θεός*, which, although sometimes under the name of *substantia* or Absolute, they entreat or defy, and this wholly unknow thing is then supposed to explain all that is better known" (WWR II, 720).
[28] Schopenhauer distinguishes the exposition of a *system of thoughts* from the exposition of a *single thought*. The former is Kant's approach, and the latter is Schopenhauer's approach. See WWR I, 5 (jan tras).

> An essential difference between my method and that of Kant is the fact that he begins with mediated, reflected cognition, while I start from immediate and intuitive cognition. He can be compared to someone who measures the height of a tower from its shadow, while I am like the person who puts the measuring stick righty up against it. That is why philosophy for him is a science *from* concepts, while for me it is a science *in* concepts, drawn from intuitive cognition (the only source of all evidence) and grasped and formulated in universal concepts. He skips over this whole intuitive, multifaceted world around us, a world that is rich in meaning, and keeps to the forms of abstract thinking; this presupposes (although Kant never states as much) that reflection is the ectype of all intuition, and thus that everything essential in intuition must be expressed in reflection, and indeed in a very condensed forms and features that are for this reason easy to overlook.[29]

Philosophy, according to Schopenhauer, begins in perception and essentially provides abstract expression to the most salient features of perception.[30] In summary: following Kant, at most, we can show *that* we have all these *a priori* cognition, but we cannot explain *why* these, and no more or less than these.[31] On the other hand, Schopenhauer objects that transcendental knowledge does not need a transcendental argument. This kind of cognition is simply self-evident.[32] This is the task that Schopenhauer sets out to establish in his dissertation, *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. In his dissertation, Schopenhauer 'internalizes' the principle of sufficient reason[33] by identifying it with

[29] WWR I, 481.
[30] "The method of philosophy must always be to base its abstractions on what is evident in perception," even the most abstract like principle of sufficient reason is an expression of what is evident in perception (111). "[T]he 'primacy of perception' is the basis for Schopenhauer's positive philosophy as well as his critique of Kant" (111).
[31] See B 145-46.
[32] FR, 32.
[33] Gardner (2012, 390).

human intellect. Given this, all objects that make up our everyday existence are mere objects for a subject, namely, representations (*Vorstellungen*).[34] Schopenhauer classifies all representations into four classes: i) real objects, ii) concepts and judgments, iii) space and time, and iv) human wills. All our representations take the form of seeing one thing as determined by a sufficient reason and an analysis of our representations reveals that there are four forms in which things are determined by another: i) the law of causality, ii) connection of concepts and judgments, iii) spatio-temporal ordering and iv) motivation. Each of these four reasons answers the question, why?, for example, they give the 'reason for' a change in real objects (causality) or the motivation for an action (law of motivation).

Another illustration of why I think that Kant's notion of transcendental is problematic becomes clearer when we examine the example of the pure apperception. Its transcendental status is born from both Kant's rejection of rational psychology in the Transcendental Dialectic and his denial that the Transcendental Analytic is empirical psychology. On the one hand, the results of empirical psychology cannot provide Kant with what he wants, namely, a justification for why, for example, the law of causality is universal and necessary. The laws of association that the study of the empirical 'I' discovers are interesting, but they are too weak to explain the necessity aspects of experience, which (as he argued) only transcendental idealism can. Rational psychology, which Kant conceives as an *a priori* study of a persistent substance (soul), does not count for him as reliable knowledge. Kant concludes that no theoretical argument can determine that the soul is immaterial or immortal. Accordingly, the 'I' of rational psychology is no longer an object of cognition. So, what does Kant has left? He introduces in the Transcendental Analytic a 'pure

[34] *Vorstellungen* (representations) are the immediate content of consciousness, independently of their being caused by another or whether they point to something else (White 1999, 88).

apperception', a being which is not supposed to be the 'I' of either empirical or rational psychology. The only possible answer left for Kant is that the pure apperception is a transcendental fact. But here Kant is forcing us to accept the pure apperception as an entity that falls within the scope of *a priori* cognition given his demands of what counts as metaphysical knowledge. Nonetheless, Kant's answer has not satisfied all his readers; for example, because it seems that Kant is introducing a third self.[35]

Interpreters have grappled with this issue and have tried different approaches so as to keep Kant consistent. For some, the pure apperception is just a logical structure,[36] for others a form or structure of the mind[37], or an unconscious thing.[38] I think that Kant is guilty of encouraging these readings: "the consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an intuition, but merely *intellectual* representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject" (B 277).[39] Trying to make sense of what Kant means by 'spontaneity' is a good illustration of what most interpreters do with the transcendental status of some claims. For example, Di Maria says of Kantian spontaneity that "it is possible that our intellects are not spontaneous even though they must be conceived as such."[40] I, on the other hand, fail to see why it is unreasonable to speculate that Kant's spontaneity of the pure apperception is more than just a purely epistemological description. How this spontaneity is expressed by Kant seems

[35] Zöller (1999, 21). See also Zöller (1993, 445-466). This bifurcation of the 'I' is evidently confusing and bizarre for transcendental idealism. Another issue that seems to follow from this is whether pure apperception must be conceived as a universal or particular mind. Part of this is explored in Walsh (1966, 189-190).
[36] An example of which is Allison's 'epistemological' reading of the *Critique*. See Allison (2004, 4).
[37] The position of Di Maria (2009, 27) and Rosenberg (1986, 513); on the other hand, Hatfield (1990, 87) calls it "transcendental knowledge."
[38] For Kemp Smith, Kant is not describing the activities of any empirical self. Paton (1936) argues that Kant describes processes that are logical rather than real. For Walsh's disagreement with these positions, see Walsh 1966, 195-198.
[39] See also A351.
[40] Di Maria (2009, 27).

to me that he is making a metaphysical claim about a real property of an entity; therefore, there must be nuances in Kant's claims about metaphysical ignorance.

But if we follow Di Maria and others, this pure thinking that is the pure apperception, this consciousness in general is supposed to be nothing in the sense that it is there but we cannot say anything about it other than it is there; it is wholly unknowable, except for its bare existence. These interpretations conclude, without saying it this way, that when it comes to the ultimate explanation or whatever grounds the empirical, philosophy is a *via negativa.* Besides the fact that it is possible to challenge the strong anti-metaphysical reading of Kant among Kantian scholars,[41] I am persuaded that the claims that philosophy is exhausted in a *via negativa* (which the question of the transcendental status epitomizes), are deeply unsatisfactory.

One could ask, what is the *status* of transcendental cognition? To show what motivates this question, let us look at how Di Maria presents the transcendental nature of Kant's claims: "the metaphysical conclusion that the noumenal self *really* is the ground of thinking is not warranted from the *concept* of it as the ground of thinking…[T]he subject of apperception…can retain transcendental status since they are not being identified with the noumenal self."[42] According to Di Maria, the subject of apperception has 'transcendental status' and everything we say about it is *negative* even though it is expressed in a positive statement ("the apperception is spontaneous"); furthermore that whatever we predicate of it is a 'transcendental predicate', so it also has a special status. Because of this perspective,

[41] "Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them that we call *nature*, and moreover we would not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there" (A125). This statement would be nonsense unless Kant presupposed certain things about the mind that, somehow, he knew. See Marshall (2010).
[42] Di Maria (2009, 30).

even though Kant says that the transcendental subject is "the self proper, as it exits in itself" (A 492/B 520), this must be understood as a negative statement.[43]

The inability of these interpretations to see the limits of studying Kant's project as purely epistemology endeavor and to recognize that the transcendental status points to something more than just a claim to absolute metaphysical ignorance stems from their uncritical acceptance that metaphysics must submit to the parameters established by 18th century philosophy. I do not deny it, perhaps the Kantian system cannot never provide a satisfactory or coherent answer to this problem. The *Critique* lacks the apparatus to work out this problem. I think that Schopenhauer understood some of these tensions and tried to present an alternative. What I have tried to accomplish in this section is still incomplete because I have not discussed Schopenhauer, but by the end of chapter 2, I hope to provide more reasons to accept that transcendental idealism can be more that just epistemology.

II. The True Self in the Lectures

As anticipated, I will begin my discussion of Kant by studying his lectures on metaphysics. I will discuss the lectures leading up to the publication of the A-edition (*Metaphysik L1*)[44], and while the A edition is published (*Metaphysik Mrongovius*).[45] The lectures on metaphysics discuss what 18th century academic philosophy considered to be the central themes of metaphysics, namely, the world (ontology and cosmology), the soul

[43] Pippin (1987) rejects this reading. The statements themselves that claim to be *a priori* could be questioned: are statements about the transcendental status of some claims empirical or *a priori* statements? If *a priori*, are they analytic or synthetic?
[44] See Ameriks and Naragon (2001, xxx-xxxiv).
[45] See Ameriks and Naragon (2001, xxxiv-xxxvi).

(psychology) and God (theology). Kant will, for the most part, adhere to the terminology and arguments that were familiar to students of philosophy. In Kant's time, discussions about subjectivity were explored in a discipline called psychology.[46] This branch of philosophy was divided into empirical and rational psychology,[47] a distinction introduced by Christian Wolff in 1720.[48] The former established that there was a soul and the latter sought cognition of its nature. In his classes, Kant follows this distinction and, while he communicates the inherited tradition[49] regarding the content of this discipline, Kant's own voice makes occasional appearances for those who are attentively listening.

Metaphysik L1 (mid-1770's)

In the notes leading up to the publication of the A-edition, namely, *Metaphysik L1* (*ML1*) we do not encounter any mention of a transcendental subject as it is known to us who are more familiar with the *Critique*; instead, what we encounter, especially at this time of Kant's career, is the discussion of traditional topics of what Kant will call later, dogmatic positions. Thus, psychology is divided into 'general and 'special': the former treated thinking in general and the latter the human soul.[50] We encounter the Lockean distinction between 'outer' and 'inner' sense. 'Thinking' is the specific difference of the object of

[46] For the background on early modern psychology, see discussions in Hatfield (1990, 70-77).
[47] Discussions of empirical and rational psychology are found in Kitcher (2006, 176-177) and Hatfield (1990, 73-77).
[48] Dyck (2014, 3).
[49] 'Tradition' here must be understood in specific way. Kant presents an eclectic view of soul with traces to different traditions. Some things sound Platonic, others Cartesian or Aristotelian. The determination or approximation to the identification of the exact lineages (besides the immediate predecessors) of all Kant's arguments in the lectures or the *Critique* is still missing on the literature. Dyck (2009) and (2014) discuss the immediate predecessors to Kant, for example, Wolff and Leibniz.
[50] M.L1 43 (28:222).

inner sense. The consideration of this object of inner sense divides psychology into 'empirical' and 'rational'. Kant defines 'empirical psychology' as "the cognition of the objects of inner sense insofar as it is obtained from experience."[51] On the other hand, Kant defines 'rational psychology' as "the cognition of the objects of inner sense insofar as it is obtained from pure reason."[52] The distinction is important for Kant because the higher knowledge, that is, the metaphysical knowledge is the one that has its origin in pure reason, not from experience.[53]

In *ML1*, as we can infer from the previous summary, the 'subject' is considered from two points of view: empirical and rational. The notes tell us is that the "substrate <*substratum*> which underlies and which expresses the consciousness of inner sense is the *concept of I*, which is merely a concept of empirical psychology."[54] This concept of the I, "which expresses and distinguishes the object of inner sense" is the foundation of the concept of substantiality:

> Substance is the first subject of all inhering accidents. But this I is an absolute subject, to which all accidents and predicates can belong, and which cannot at all be a predicate of another thing. Thus the I expresses the substantial; for that substrate <*substratum*> in which all accidents inhere is the substantial. This is the only case where we can immediately intuit the substance. Of no thing can we intuit the substrate <*substratum*> and the first subject; but in myself I intuit the substance immediately. The I thus expresses not only the

[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid. Here and from now on, we must keep in mind the distinction between 'cognition' (*Erkenntnis*) and 'knowledge' (*Wissen*) found in Watkins and Willaschek (2017, 87-88). The discussion of Kant's account of cognition (*Erkenntnis*) is found in Watkins and Willaschek (2017, 102-106).
[53] Already showing how Kant is moving to the definition of metaphysics as found in the *Critique* and *Prolegomena*.
[54] M.L1 44 (28:224).

> substance, but rather also the substantial itself. Indeed, what is still more, from this I we have borrowed the concept which we have in general of all substances. This is the original concept of substances.[55]

Any discussion of the subject then must begin with the data of experience for it is from there that we get the concept.[56] The subject is something that has consciousness, which says 'I'. When the 'I' examines itself, it intuits two set of things: 1) that it intuits an 'I' and an extended body; and 2) an 'intelligence' connected to a body. Kant argues that intelligence is a something that only appears in inner sense. We could say that, according to *ML1,* intelligence is inner sense *par excellence*. In *ML1*, an embodied consciousness is what empirical psychology calls a human being. Through empirical psychology we learn that this subject or I, conscious of mental states but also conscious of objects of an external world has two important faculties related to cognition. Kant calls them lower (passive) and higher (self-active) faculties. The former is the faculty of representations as far as we are affected by objects (sensibility) and the latter is "a power to have representation from ourselves" (intelligence)[57]. The way this subject has cognition of the world is by having the intuitions of sensibility subsumed by the rules of the higher faculty. These are, more or less, the conclusions of empirical psychology.

When we turn to rational psychology, the following texts is illustrative of the kind of arguments presented by this part of psychology.

[55] M.L1 45-46 (28:226).
[56] An important feature that Kant learned from Wolff. See Dyck (2014, 19-27) for discussion of Wolff's methodology.
[57] M.L1 48 (28:228).

> When I speak of the soul, then I speak of the I in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*>. We receive the concept of the soul only through *the I*, thus through the inner intuition of inner sense, in that I am conscious of all my thoughts, accordingly that I can speak of myself as a state of inner sense. This object of inner sense, *this subject*, *consciousness* in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*>, is the soul. I take the self in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*> insofar as I omit everything that belongs to my self in the broader sense <*in sensu latiori*>. But the I in the broad sense <*in sensu latiori*> expresses me as the whole human being with soul and body. But the body is an object of outer sense…Now so far as I feel myself as an object and am conscious of this, this means the I in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*> or only selfhood alone, the soul. We would not have this concept of the soul if we could not abstract everything outer from the object of inner sense: therefore the I in the strict sense <*in sensu stricto*> expresses not the whole human being, but rather the soul alone. (78-79; 28:265)

What Kant seems to be aiming at in this text is a distinction between two ways of referring to substance. On the one hand, we have substance (S_1) as the ultimate subject of predication; on the other hand, we have substance (S_2) as an enduring substratum with attributes that inhere in it. As Kant explains, we know *a priori* certain things from the consideration of the I. One of those things is that "I am a (S_1) substance".

> The *I* means the subject, so far as it is no predicate of another thing. What is no predicate of another thing is a substance. The I is *the general subject* of all predicates, of all thinking, of all actions, of all possible judgments that we can pass of ourselves as a thinking being. I can only say: I am, I think, I act, etc. Thus it is not all feasible that the I would be a predicate of something else. I cannot be a predicate of another being; predicates do belong

> to me: but I cannot predicate the I of another, I cannot say: another being is the I. Consequently the I, or the soul through which the I is expressed, is a substance.

What conclusions can we draw by taking *ML1* in isolation? When it comes to the subject or 'I' studied by empirical and rational psychology, Kant follows his predecessors quite closely. If he did so *entirely* is still to be determined. Although the 'I' is considered from two perspectives, namely, as an object of empirical intuition and from a pure or rational perspective where experience is bracketed, the 'I' is considered in both perspectives as a single substance. Both empirical and rational 'I' seem to be accessible through some form of intuition.

Another important element that we are introduced to in the notes is to a subtlety that we can miss if we do not pay attention. I am talking about what, according to empirical psychology, constitutes a human being. Kant described a thinking in general, an 'intelligence' that undoubtedly is not corporeal, but it has its own existence. This disembodied intelligence is not what Kant defines as a human being. Do we have to accept this? Can we not call into question the view that says that human beings only exist when they are embodied? These questions will be explored at a later stage. Finally, at this stage we must be familiar with the insights from both empirical and rational sources of knowledge because, as we will see in chapter 3, in the lectures, Kant discusses arguments for immortality which come from experience *and* pure reason.

Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783)

Whereas *ML1* belongs to the pre-critical phase of Kant's thought, with *Metaphysik Mrongovius* (*MMr*) we move to Kant's critical phase.[58] The notes collected as *MMr* are illuminating to understand the first *Critique* for they come from the years around its publication. Although *MMr* overlaps with and repeats *ML1* in many places, *MMr* does present some developments in Kant's treatment of psychology as expected from the now author of the *Critique*. In terms of overlaps, the soul is still an object of inner sense, and the powers of the soul are still cognition, pleasure/displeasure, and desire. The notes preserve the division between empirical and rational psychology.

The interesting topic mentioned above about the essence of thinking and its implications for what constitutes a human being is expanded. "The soul is merely our I," the notes say, "not the body, but body and soul together, as human consciousness, are also called I."[59] The notes expand on this notion and explains that 'the self' can be understood in three ways: 1) I think as intelligence (subject of thinking), 2) "I think as subject which has sensibility, and am soul" (247), and 3) I think as intelligence and soul, and am a human being. Although the notes do not expand on this, what the notes are telling us here has serious implications to any reflection about who 'I' and what a human being is. If what the notes report is Kant's own view, the thinking thing (1-2) is not strictly speaking human. In this view, only (3) is a human being. This has consequences for our investigation about the true self. Now, it is in this context that Kant mentions, for the first time, the concept 'apperception'[60]: "what the identity of its self consists in is difficult to know, everything is

[58] For the main developments in Kant's though from 1746 to the publication of the *Critique* in 1781 see Beiser (1992).
[59] M.Mr 246 (29:877).
[60] The writer of the notes reports that this concept is from the *Critique*. This does not mean that Kant is the creator of the concept, but that this concept plays an important role in Kant's argument in the *Critique*.

related to this, everything can change, only consciousness and apperception, or the faculty for referring representations to one's self, remain."[61] The 'I' or consciousness of myself is apperception. It is important to remember that the context of this discussion is empirical psychology, not rational; for Kant will change this in the *Critique*.

As far as the lectures on metaphysics go, the subject of cognition knows itself as intelligence, a thinking thing. But although the self can know itself as intelligence, it knows that it is an *embodied* intelligence, that is, a soul. But sensibility is not enough for cognition; in his discussion of the faculty of understanding, the notes establish the role of the apperception as Kant will do in the Transcendental Deduction. "In this I represent to myself a one in a manifold. The logical function of this consists in generality. This is the analytic unity of apperception, and many in one is its synthetic unity. The analytic unity of apperception represents nothing new to us, but rather is merely conscious of the manifold in one representation. The synthetic deals with many, insofar as it is contained in one"[62]. Clearly, we can see Kant's own notions from the first *Critique* being presented in this lecture.

> By *synthesis* in the most general sense, however, I understand the act of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. . . . The synthesis of a manifold . . . is what first brings forth a cognition . . . [it] is that which properly collects the elements for cognition and unifies them into a certain content.[63]

[61] M.Mr 248 (29:878).
[62] M.Mr 257 (29:889).
[63] A 77/B 103.

When *MMr* turns to rational psychology, the notes discuss even more notions that appear in the first *Critique*. At first, we get the expected teachings about the nature of the soul as we encountered them in *ML1*. The notes report, "The soul is substance, and not only that, but rather I am also conscious of the substantial of the soul."[64] This is a reasonable straightforward statement of traditional rational psychology. But the notes go on to discuss something unexpected: I know that the soul is a substance, but reason cannot know the nature of this substance. We have no proper concept of the substantial other than it is something, an X. We understand that substance is that which remains through all alterations; however, if we consider soul in itself, we only experience that it persists throughout different alterations in this life, but what happens after the alteration known as 'death'? The notes conclude that the certitude that the soul is a substance means that we are using 'substance' in lieu of 'subject'. Thus, in speaking of soul as substance, we know that soul is like the subject in a proposition, it is a purely logical (formal) construction, while its counterpart in the sensible world remains hidden to us. These reflections are distant from what Kant was teaching in the mid-1770s, when Kant said that soul was the definitive origin of 'substance' as the only things we know persists.

Given this position, it is not surprising that the notes turn to Mendelssohn's argument for the perdurability of the soul based on its simplicity. Kant agrees that the soul is simple but disagrees that we can infer from this its perdurability. Mendelsohn's inference would be valid, the notes argue, if divisibility was the *exclusive* way in which something can perish. Kant posits that it is not unreasonable to consider that soul could perish in other

[64] M.Mr 270 (29:904).

ways, for example, it could diminish and vanish (evanescence).[65] Overall, the arguments that Kant seem to make against any proof in favor of the immortality of the soul lean towards a progressive identification of mind and brain to the point that we cannot separate them. In any case, this point will fully blossom in Schopenhauer who argues that the mind is the brain.

These notes confirm Kant's negative conclusions in the *Critique* regarding our access to this X, namely, that our real self is never given in intuition and thus remains a total mystery for us. As we saw in the lectures, rational psychology claimed to prove substantiality of the soul precisely in the pure intelligence, but in the *Critique,* Kant introduces a distinction between 'categories' and 'schemas'. Whereas the categories are formal conditions of thought, just an empty structure that can only be 'filled' with content from sensible experience, the schemas are a mediating representation between pure categories and sensible intuitions. Another way of explaining this is that schemas are categories applied in time. For example, Kant introduces a break between substance and permanence by what he calls 'schematized substance:' "The schema of substance is permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a substance of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding while all else changes" (B183). Consequently, permanence is added to substance only in the phenomena. In the case of the self, Kant does not claim that as pure category, we could speak of the self as a substance that endures. This is because we can never apply the schema substance to the 'I'. We encounter this argument in the following text:

[65] Both Kant and Schopenhauer articulate the same objection to this argument. While this is not a defense of Mendelssohn's argument, I think that the big mistake in Kant's counterargument is that it assumes that the soul is, at minimum, in time. For evanescence can only occur in time. The soul, whatever it is, is not in time or is a sensible object.

> In so doing I am confusing the possible *abstraction* from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible *separate* existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have *knowledge* that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject. But all that I really have in thought is simply the unity of consciousness, on which, as the mere form of knowledge, all determination is based (B427).

As follow from the text, Kant denies that we can conclude that the pure apperception is a substance in the schematized sense. While we have no intuition, no object of experience, permanence cannot be a predicate of substance. The pure category of understanding can only be applied and be given objective content when applied to objects in time; only then do we speak of a substrate that *remains* in time.

III. The True Self in the *Critique*

Transition to Kant's Pure 'Transcendental' Psychology

With the *Critique*, we enter the main arguments that I will use in my determination of the Kantian true self. In what follows, the content of the lectures remains in the background of my reading of the *Critique*. The Lectures have helped us as a way of introduction to Kantian psychology, its conclusions, nevertheless, should be accepted with reservations given that they claim to report what Kant said and they were not written by him.

Kant, as we will see, seems to argue in the *Critique* for a unique psychology that is neither empirical nor rational, but pure and transcendental. Not all interpreters agree with this view or what it even means. This however does not eliminate the challenges of interpreting Kant's texts. What exactly is 'transcendental psychology'? According to Hatfield (1990, 83), is difficult to know "what transcendental psychology is the psychology *of"*. It cannot be the psychology of an immaterial intellect conceived as a thing in itself, but it cannot be either the psychology of an empirical intellect. For some this means that Kant's psychology has its own 'status'. But this amounts, in one interpretation, to saying that Kant's psychology is noumenal and therefore in violation of Kantian restrictions about things in themselves.[66] This points to the fact that any study of Kant's psychology needs to take a position regarding this fundamental issue.

As I discussed above, the two main divisions of psychology were empirical and rational. When we turn to the *Critique*, at first glance, Kant carries over the psychological categories from the traditional disciplines, words such as 'understanding,' 'sensibility,' 'reason,' 'I think' are found all over the *Critique*. However, something new is brought to the discussion which Kant claims as his unique perspective: the *transcendental* investigation. According to Kant, transcendental "signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment" (A57/B81). At the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant claims that his investigation is transcendental although the topics he treats there are part of empirical psychology. So, what is exactly the difference? In the Metaphysical Deduction of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant explores the faculty of the understanding (*Verstand*) from where he seeks to derive

[66] Other interpretations: Kitcher (1984, 130) and Hatfield (1990, 70, 86).

the *a priori* origins of the pure concepts or categories.[67] These play an important part in how the understanding synthesizes what is given from intuition. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant justifies that the categories only apply to experience. In the end, cognition (*Erkenntnis*) in the strict sense is limited to experience and objects given in experience. The determination of the limits of human cognition is an important task of the *Critique*. But, in looking at psychology, Kant cannot base his conclusions on empirical psychology given the reasons stated above. On the other hand, the objects of rational psychology cannot be objects of possible experience, so they remain unknown. Accordingly, Kant seems to argue for the mechanics of a transcendental psychology, of concepts that while *a priori* are directed to experience. This leads us to the problem of interpretation: against all of Kant's protestations, is the *Critique* merely a work on psychology? And empirical psychology no less?[68]

For the time being, I will take Kant's position to be unproblematic, although my thoughts regarding the transcendental status should be kept in mind. The major text in which Kant develops this transcendental psychology is the Transcendental Deduction,[69] where Kant seeks to establish the *quid iuris* of the categories.[70] Kant clearly states in the Transcendental Deduction that his project is not empirical, but transcendental: "Plainly the only deduction that can be given of this knowledge is one that is transcendental, not

[67]Categories "are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, since we have no intuition at hand to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which constitutes the whole content of these forms, could be applied, and in being so applied determine an object. Only *our* sensible and empirical intuition can give to them body and meaning" (B148-149). See Proops (2013, 221-224).
[68] Discussion in Hatfield (2006, 209-217) and Walsh (1966, 186-191).
[69] The literature about the Transcendental Deduction is vast. Some illuminating discussions are found in Guyer (1992, 2010); Shaddock (2013, 2014, 2015, 2018); Pollok (2008); and Proops (2003).
[70] The categories' existence is established by what Kant calls in the B edition the 'Metaphysical Deduction'. Specific discussions of the Transcendental Deduction and psychology in Guyer (1989, 56-68) and Proops (2003).

empirical. In respect to pure *a priori* concepts the latter type of deduction is an utterly useless enterprise which can be engaged in only by those who have failed to grasp the quite peculiar nature of these modes of knowledge" (A 87/B119). No empirical investigation, that is, no findings from empirical psychology could support the claim that the categories have necessary and universal validity which are Kant's requirements for something to be scientific. Empirical laws of association, for example, cannot explain the unity among representations or the unity of a representation, even less could they explain the synthetic unity of apperception (A 100, 121; B 151-152).[71] In the Transcendental Deduction, a key element in the argument is the subject; but Kant no longer calls it that; instead, he uses the Leibnizian term 'apperception.'[72]

This apperception is called differently in both editions of the Transcendental Deduction. In the A edition, Kant calls the apperception 'transcendental apperception' (A107), and 'the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself' (A108). Whereas in the B edition, the apperception is called 'pure apperception', 'original apperception', 'the transcendental unity of self-consciousness' (B137) and 'transcendental unity of apperception' (B139). The closest to a concise definition of what Kant means by apperception in the *Critique* is given at A 107: "that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible.

[71] "At two places in the A Deduction he argues that the 'laws of association,' which are merely empirical laws, cannot provide the needed account of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception (A 100, 121). In the B Deduction he makes a similar point in distinguishing the empirical unity of consciousness, based on association, from 'original' unity of consciousness, by stressing the contingency of the empirically based unity and thus its unsuitability for explaining the necessity and universality of the original or 'objective' unity of consciousness (B 139-40)" (Hatfield 1992, 206). Thiel (2001, 474) argues that Kant's account of apperception is different from his predecessors. His most significant contribution was the distinction between an empirical and a pure apperception (474).

[72] According to Rohlf (2020). Discussions of apperception in Guyer (1980), Ameriks (1983). For a concise history of the use of apperception in Kant's work see Serck-Hansen (2009, 14-142).

This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name *transcendental apperception*."[73] Pure apperception is understood as "the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations" (A116). What all these names have in common and what they seem to aim at is the notion that knowledge is possible for us only if there is a unifying principle, a context of intelligibility,[74] in which empirical representations can be given to us.[75] At this point we must assume that under these assorted names, Kant means to identify the same thing: the thinking thing that is discussed in the lectures.[76]

The apperception has a crucial role in the argument of the Transcendental Deduction: there is no world of experience for us if *this* world is not a representation for the apperception. In the B Deduction, Kant tells us that the "principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (B135). This is a very bold claim, and we need to determine to what Kant is committed by this claim. The apperception is the higher principle which gives unity to the manifold.[77] Kant writes, "all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception" (B 130). These conditions are what Kant calls 'categories' or 'pure concepts of the understanding'. Whatever is manifold in intuition as far as it is combined in one

[73] This definition could be applied to the Plotinian Intellect, that hypostasis which thinks. I will discuss the Plotinian Intellect in chapters 4 and 5.
[74] Kraus (2021).
[75] According to Thiel (2001), "that consciousness of self must be primary or 'original' for knowledge and thought in general to be possible" was an argument fully developed by Kant against those who, like Wolff, argued that consciousness of one's self depended on consciousness of our empirical self. Dyck (2014) discusses at length the Wolffian teaching that rational psychology was build upon empirical psychology and how Kant abandoned this position to argue for a truly pure and rational psychology. This stricter version of rational psychology would no longer yield the same conclusions as before, eg., the soul is a simple substance.
[76] Other things that we assume are connected or identical with apperception are 'self-consciousness,' 'the self,' the 'I'. In other words, in some way, as a member of humanity, I am this apperception.
[77] Kant writes, "There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name *transcendental apperception*" (A 107).

consciousness, is determined by the categories (B137). Kant states that sensible experience is presented in consciousness as a single united whole, this is possible because the human mind brings about this unity through the application of rules by the understanding to intuitions.

Kant furthermore insists that there is a difference between consciousness and self-consciousness. The former is related to the pure apperception and the later to the empirical apperception. Kant concludes that "I have no *knowledge* of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself" (B158). Kant mentions in the Transcendental Deduction that 'to think' and 'to know' are two different actions. For Kant, thinking is possible by the presence of categories in the understanding. But this is mere thinking because they are "forms of thought, through which alone no determinate object is known" (B150) and have "no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience" (B147-148). The implications for self-knowledge are that what I call 'self-knowledge' is a thought connected to a category (e g substance), but there is no intuition to connect it with, so no proper knowledge of the self.

> I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense)[78], namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded. Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself

[78] According to Pippin (1987, 463-465), by the time Kant writes the first *Critique*, 'inner sense' must be understood in contrast to the pure apperception.

> in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its *intuition* were intellectual (B159).

Accordingly, we can anticipate that Kant's pure rational psychology will not meet the parameters that Kant establishes to do metaphysics as he understands it. Kant has insisted nevertheless that the pure apperception is synthetic. What exactly this means for Kant is not immediately evident. Based on the *Critique*, this could have three meanings. 1) There are only two kinds of representations, analytic or synthetic. Kant says that it is synthetic because it is not analytical and there is no third option. 2) That the apperception is synthetic is the conclusion of a transcendental argument, not a deductive argument. 3) The apperception is the result of a mental act of synthesis. These options rank from weakest to strongest meaning. Option (3) is the strongest because it requires that Kant describes the kind of synthesis that results in awareness of oneself as unified/one.

Let us summarize the results about the 'subject' of the *Critique* at this stage. i) The pure apperception is 'pure thinking', a disembodied consciousness. ii) The pure apperception has a faculty called understanding which thinks through categories. Although understanding and categories can think without the need of sensible experience, it seems that Kant's account suggests that their 'essence' is to have a 'teleological' relationship with a sensible cosmos. They fulfill their role when they relate to empirical objects.[79] iii) Who cognizes sensibles? Given Kant's determination of what counts as cognition, any intelligence could cognize a world. In the case of human intelligence, we cognize a sensible, corporeal world. By what activities do human beings cognize a sensible world?

[79] Kant does not describe their relationship to a sensible world as teleological. The topic of teleology is taken by Kant in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

According to the *Critique*, the sensible world or nature can only be cognized by human beings when the manifold of intuitions is combined with the categories in an empirical apperception; however, this is only possible through the 'spontaneity' of a pure apperception.[80] It is important to notice that the 'existence' of this pure apperception for Kant is a fact, as certain as the existence of the soul in the empirical psychology part of the lectures. The apperception abides throughout all changes in the sense that it is always present in all representations.

The combined view presented so far gives us the unique tenets of the *Critique*, what Kant could consider his greatest contributions to the history of philosophy: i) the order, regularity and unity in appearances, which we entitle 'nature' is introduced by the spontaneous[81] action of a mind – supposedly human[82]; ii) nature is the sum of all appearances (B163)[83]; iii) the unity of nature is dependent on the unity of the apperception; iv) there is *a priori* knowledge, namely, metaphysics of objects of possible experience alone.[84] In the B edition, Kant tells us that he had to put limits in knowledge in order to

[80] Consequently, all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can come to empirical consciousness, that is, all appearances of nature, must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the categories. See B 165.
[81] The spontaneity of the mind is one the most unique ways in which Kant describes 'thinking' but Kant does not discuss the topic in any systematic way. For discussions of spontaneity see Pippin (1987), Kohl (2020) and Choi (2019).
[82] "The order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an *a priori* certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid" (A 126).
[83] "But when we consider that this nature is not a thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representations of the mind, we shall not be surprised that we can discover it only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on account of which alone it can be entitled object of all possible experience, that is, nature" (A 114).
[84] Cf Roche (2013, 589).

open up space for objects of faith, such as God and an immortal soul.[85] Kant decided to call these objects 'ideas' and put them in the faculty of reason just as the categories belong in the understanding. By this single move, Kant made his philosophy even more obscure because he decided to take possession of a word loaded with metaphysical meaning.[86] These ideas of reason are demanded by this faculty because it requires systematic completion and an unconditioned object that grounds conditioned cognition. For example, when it comes to the unified consciousness in which the world is given as nature, the idea of soul provides the framework to unify all that content as a single unconditioned subject. All the problems with this view will be examined in chapter 3, where I will problematize Kant's doctrine of ideas and his relegation of immortality to the practical concerns of reason.

The key tenets of the *Critique* are taken by some interpreters to support the traditional interpretation of Kant as the 'destroyer of metaphysics.'[87] One way of summarizing this interpretation is through Strawson's 'principle of significance' which says: "there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application."[88] Or, "knowledge is possible only of what can be experienced, and nothing can be experienced except as subjected to the forms imposed by our sensibility."[89] If we accept this interpretation as

[85] We can interpret this as 'good', that is, that Kant accomplish something good in isolating faith from the corrosive effects of Newtonian physics or as 'bad', that is, that Kant wanted to justify the Enlightenment rejection of faith as something objective. For the former position, see Brook and Wuerth (2020).
[86] Nuzzo (2003) discusses Kant's appropriation of the doctrine from Plato.
[87] Marshall (2010, 2-3) argues that Kant rejects Metaphysics, described as "dogmatic enterprise aimed at establishing the reality of…immortality". In his view, Kant is an anti-Metaphysician about the self, but not an anti-*m*etaphysician about the self. The latter is understood as "metaphysics in the contemporary sense."
[88] Strawson (1966, 16).
[89] Strawson (1966, 21).

definitive, then there is no way to provide a metaphysical account of our true self or 'I'[90] as it is in itself. However, in the last decades, some interpreters have challenged this consensus and they have tried to articulate criticisms against this interpretation and suggested ways in which Kant offers a plausible and minimal metaphysical account of the self.[91] With some qualifications, this desire to restore metaphysics to Kant's project already began with Schopenhauer. Following their lead, my own contribution to this interpretation is through an examination of Kant's claims regarding apperception.

Unity and Apperception

In §16 of the B Deduction, Kant calls the apperception 'the original synthetic unity of apperception'. In this charged description, each word, 'original', 'synthetic' and 'unity,' deserves careful analysis.[92] Here I will focus on 'unity'. We could ask, is the apperception the *absolute* source of unity (*Einheit*) of all representations or is its unity derived from another? According to the anti-metaphysical interpretation of Kant, he can never give an answer to this question unless he violates his own restrictions. Pure apperception is united, but what is it that makes apperception allegedly a unity and a source of unity? Kant explicitly rules out that the pure apperception is united by the category of unity (B 131). The categories already presuppose unity, so Kant sets out to discover that by which the categories have their unity. He understands that whatever unifies is the most fundamental

[90] Di Maria (2009) argues in favor of this. Di Maria is helpful to understand the grounding of the 'noumenal self' in the pure apperception and for a clarifying statement of the 'transcendental status', but I cannot see how his argument answers the question regarding the status of the transcendental status.
[91] See Marshall (2010).
[92] In A 116, Kant calls it pure, original and unchangeable consciousness.

or absolute source of unity. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant argues that he has found this principle in the pure apperception.[93]

In what follows, I show that the unity of sensible experience or nature is not *fully* explained by Kant's unified pure apperception. Within Kant's transcendental idealism, is there any other principle that could play that role? Our provisional hypothesis is that it could be something within the realm of things in themselves. The implication is that the unity of apperception is not as Kant calls it 'original,' but an image whose source of unity lays outside it.[94] I think that Schopenhauer's modification of Kant's transcendental idealism points towards this conclusion.[95] What follows presupposes that several things are accepted. Specifically, i) the anti-metaphysical interpretation of Kant cannot be the only valid interpretation, ii) Kant's conception of several concepts (reason, ideas, metaphysics) must be revised. The combination of (i) and (ii) provides a way to make certain claims about nature and the self that would help us explain fully the unity that nature and apperception possess. Although I have already suggested ways to justify (i), a full justification of (i-ii) must wait until chapters 2 and 3.

[93] "[A merely reproduced] manifold of representation would never … form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it" (A103).

[94] Kitcher (1984, 126, 146). In another study, Kitcher (2006, 187-194) suggests that the unity of apperception can be interpreted as an overarching rule or principle: "it must be possible to understand all the representations involved in cognition as representations of a single subject of experience (or different sets of representations must be understood as belonging to different subject of cognitive experience)" (Kitcher 2006, 189). This seems like suggesting that the apperception is unity itself.

[95] A full engagement with these issues will have to wait until chapters 2 and 3. In the meantime, a general conclusion could be offered: Kant wanted to ground metaphysics in apodictic, universal, and infallible principles, whereas moving away from this position seems to invite contingency and fluidity, characteristics more proper of the natural sciences than, if we accept Kant's view, of metaphysical discourse. To ground the origin of metaphysics in empirical cognitive sources "deprives it of the apodictic certitude that only a priori knowledge makes possible." For Schopenhauer, only mathematics or logic can enjoy the privilege of so much security. See his discussion in WWR II, chapter 17, 189-195.

How does Kant explain the *unity* of the unity of apperception? Kant uses 'unity' throughout the *Critique* in different senses.[96] Important to realize is that the concept 'unity' is multi-faceted: we can say, "my mind is one" or we can say "That group of things is one, as when we call an assembly of singers a chorus", for example. A concept related to 'unity' is that of 'synthesis'[97]. From what we saw, it seems that through synthesis a manifold is brought into unity; this is an activity that we have characterized as mostly about the spontaneous mind, but this unification happens at the level of sensibility too. Regardless, Kant feels compelled to call the pure apperception, 'original' and 'unified'. I assume that Kant sees the unity of apperception as that which unifies experience, so that the unity we find in nature has its origin in pure apperception. There are good reasons why Kant reached this conclusion, and Kant was not the only philosopher to notice that even though we have several sense organs, we experience the sensible world as a unified whole.

Kant recognizes that a representation will cease to be a representation for us if it did not have some form of unity. They are representations for us precisely because they are unified in our consciousness. I can only say of a representation *this* or *that* if it possesses unity. If they lose this unity, they are nothing to us (A370-1). A tree, a house, an army, etc., are all representations, but when considered from the point of view of their unity, we discover that they possess different *degrees* of unity.[98] Let us consider an army and think about what makes it an 'army.' What we call an 'army' is only that because of its unity. If you take away the unity among the individuals, you no longer have an army. This unity

[96] Serck-Hansen has two: i) "unity can be a property of consciousness or mind, viz., that of being one and not many; ii) "it can be a property of representations belonging to consciousness, viz., that of being a unity or whole" (145).
[97] See A77-79/B102-105.
[98] Compared to representations in the sensible world, pure intuitions (space and time) and the categories express a greater unity.

comes about by how a general arranges the individual soldiers. To see the unique way in which an army has unity, let us contrast it with the unity in a building. The architect brings together different parts that as a unity make up a building. Unlike the army, a building is not an arrangement of individual human beings but an arrangement of continuous parts. [99] Between the army and the building, it seems that unity is 'stronger' in the latter than the former. Just from these considerations we can already see that next to an army or a building, pure apperception possesses a stronger unity. In these examples, the general and the architect play the role of the pure apperception. We could destroy a building or an army, but it would be unity that decides whether the representation remains or not. For example, a building ceases to be a building when we dismantle it, but its parts remain representations if they preserve unity: wood, plastic, iron, etc.

Next to armies and buildings, can we establish stronger unified representations? What about a human body? It seems that the unity of a human body is more constitutive than the unity in a building. A house can be destroyed, and a building can collapse; after such events, we no longer call the house a house or the building a building. Something is lost and it no longer is what it was. The same consideration applies for a human body. 'Bodies' are predicated of different things, but what exactly makes a body a *human* body. We could say a certain arrangement and a specific way in which unity brings the parts together. Thus, when that particular unity is lost, we cease to have a human body.

What unifies the different parts of a human body? Traditionally speaking, the 'soul' was responsible for that, but let us ignore that now. Within the Kantian corpus, I would

[99] Evidently, there is a question regarding when a group of soldiers becomes an army, or a group of materials becomes a building. Indeed, we do not call two soldiers an 'army' or two pieces of wood a 'building'. I am not concerned about the logical problems of this issue, just with the fact that there are armies and buildings.

suggest that it would be the empirical and pure apperception. When apperception disappears from a body, we no longer have a human being. As we saw, the lectures stressed this many times. Based on how the lecture notes report this, a human body without apperception would be reduced to passive matter. Therefore, it seems that Kant's conclusion has some basis on reality: the pure apperception must be the original source of unity and gives unity to all representations. Likewise, it seems clear that Kant has transferred most of the traditional properties of the human soul to the pure apperception.

But have we truly reached the original unity? I say 'no' because we still have the conjunction of 'unity' and 'apperception' and this means that we have two things. 'Unity of apperception' is equivalent to 'the apperception is/has unity'. Now this implies a synthesis between two things, and the is/has proves that 'unity' or 'original' are *distinct* from apperception. With the empirical, and even more so with the pure apperception, we can speak of a level of unity that we do not find in other representations, but apperception cannot be the ultimate source of unity. Its activity of synthesis is crucial to our cognition of the sensible world, but a closer examination reveals that, in itself, apperception has parts because Kant speaks of it as possessing 'understanding' and 'reason'. What the ultimate source of unity is has no parts, and in it we cannot identify any distinctions. Kant strongly argues for the distinctiveness of these faculties within the apperception. Accordingly, 'apperception' does not denote a partless simple, but a unified composite.

What happens if apperception is considered solely as 'pure thinking'? It is very difficult to see how even 'pure thinking' does not imply, at minimum, duality: 'pure I' *and* "pure thought". Kant accepts this and uses it to state his opposition to rational psychology: the 'I' is different from 'thinking' and this thinking does not reveal anything about the 'I'.

Therefore, in this supposedly original unity of apperception, we discover a composite not *Einheit*.

The unity of apperception cannot be the ultimate justification for the unity of nature. We can say that it has a very important role in this, but unity itself remains a mystery. The *Einheit* of apperception is given by some other principle that cannot be confused with apperception. It so happens that after the Transcendental Deduction – where the discussion of apperception begins – Kant introduces in the Third Antinomy a new notion which seems related to it: the intelligible character (A539/B567). The question becomes whether this intelligible character is a much better candidate to justify the unity of apperception. Let us explore this possibility in the next section.

From Pure Apperception to Intelligible Character

As I already discussed, Kant describes in the *Critique* two types of consciousness: (i) 'empirical apperception' and (ii) 'pure or transcendental apperception.' 'Empirical apperception' is simply put the 'I' that sits down and talks to a counselor. It is the 'I' whose chain of memories, wishes, desires, and dreams makes 'my life in this sensible world.' For Kant, this 'life' is a succession of mental states in time. On the other hand, the pure apperception is a consciousness that "produces the representation 'I think'" (B 132). I have hinted above at the mysterious relationship between these two notions and how they relate to a concrete human being's mind – if at all.[100] Whatever relationship they have is not of sensible causality, even though we use 'causal' language when talking about it. I think that

[100] Walsh (1966, 190).

their relationship is better characterized as prior/posterior in an ontological way. We cannot conceive of the empirical character independently of the intelligible character, for example. However, given what I said in the previous section, the pure apperception is not the absolute source of unity. I suggested that we seek the source of unity in something that is more fundamental than the pure apperception, that is, the intelligible character of the Third Antinomy.

The introduction of the 'intelligible character' happens at A 539/B 567:

> Every efficient cause must have a *character* that is, a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause. On the above supposition, we should, therefore, in a subject belonging to the sensible world have, first, an *empirical character*, whereby its actions, as appearances, stand in thoroughgoing connection with other appearances in accordance with unvarying laws of nature. And since these actions can be derived from the other appearances, they constitute together with them a single series in the order of nature. Secondly, we should also have to allow the subject an *intelligible character*, by which it is indeed the cause of those same actions [in their quality] as appearances, but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not itself appearance. We can entitle the former the character of the thing in the [field of] appearance, and the latter its character as thing in itself.

However, the most often quoted passage related to the intelligible character – not necessarily in discussions about it – is A 546/B 574.

> Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.

In rare instances like the above, Kant suggests that human beings have a direct cognition, through introspection,[101] of the self as the subject of the synthetic activities underlying the unity of apperception. At first glance, pure apperception and intelligible character must be Kant's way of referring to the same reality. The synthetic unity of apperception of the Transcendental Deduction is the intelligible character of the Third Antinomy. However, the notions are never mixed in Kant's discussion.[102] Several clues nevertheless point towards the identity of pure apperception and intelligible character. Both apperception and intelligible character share an important Kantian activity, that is, *spontaneity*.[103] In the case of pure apperception, one could argue that this activity is solely of the mind, but the spontaneity of the intelligible character cannot be a cognitive activity but of another faculty within us, namely, will.[104] We do not need to think that Kant argues for two distinct things as if what thinks does not will and what wills does not think, a view that could be attributed

[101] The accusation is that this introspection is a form of intellectual intuition which transcendental idealism rejects.
[102] The only exception is that Kant speaks of the 'transcendental subject' in the Third Antinomy, and it can be identified with pure apperception.
[103] Kant's definition of 'spontaneity': "If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations from itself [*Vorstellungen selbst hervorzubringen*], the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding" (A51/B75).
[104] Discussed by Pippin (1987). Spontaneity is a decisive issue against a purely functionalist reading of Kant's theory of mind (Kitcher 1984). With this spontaneity, Kant seems to argue that the mind is free from every causal system.

to Schopenhauer. With the introduction of the intelligible character, I would argue, Kant acknowledges that a human being is not just his or her cognitive faculties, but that there can be something more fundamental. Therefore, Kant explains that just as we are conscious of thinking we are conscious of willing.

Another of such clues is the notion of 'transcendental subject' which Kant uses to describe both.[105] The transcendental subject is the nexus that brings together pure thinking with what now we can call 'pure willing' because it is always associated with the theory of freedom. What separates them is that apperception is discussed in the context of cognition and the intelligible character in the context of freedom (in the first *Critique*, exclusively in the Third Antinomy). Accordingly, this intelligible character seems like the most obvious candidate to discover the true self. And perhaps the intelligible character – given that it is Kant's last word on the subject in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements – is what gives unity to the pure apperception.

Given the textual evidence, we could theorize that the reason that the intelligible character possesses a more fundamental unity that it imparts on the pure apperception is because it is a thing in itself or it belongs to that realm.[106] The text at A539/B 567, especially the last line, gives credibility to this reading. This impression is reinforced by a nearby passage where Kant says that the intelligible character is a reality that is not under the rule of the categories.

[105] A 346; A 350; A 355; B 427; A 414/B 441; A 479/B 507; A 492/B 520; A 545/B 573. Furthermore, just like the pure apperception is condition of possibility for the empirical apperception, the intelligible character grounds the empirical character (A546/B574; A551/B579; A557/B585).
[106] Wuerth (2010) argues that Kant's pure apperception is an indeterminate thing in itself. Heimsoeth (1984) explores the connection between cognition of self and thing in itself.

> …this acting subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a condition of appearances, not of things in themselves (A539/B567).

The same could be said of A 546/B 574, where we learn that freedom must be non-sensible and the individual of whom we predicate freedom must be a member of a non-sensible world. However, I think that the observations about the degrees of unity in the previous section prevents from defending that the intelligible character is the ultimate source of unity. To show this, the discussion of the degrees of unity is complemented with Schopenhauerian insights, although I do not follow him in every detail.

Though we can speak of intelligible character as a non-member of sensible representation, we should not conclude that it is the thing in itself. [107] The intelligible character is no less the source of unity than the pure apperception is because both are related to the same transcendental subject: we recognize that both thinker and willer are in a subject. In the end, the transcendental subject is composed of parts: sensibility, understanding, reason, and will. Here again we run into the problem of parts, thus of no possibility of having an absolute unity. Therefore, we are forced to recognize a distinction between the thing in itself and the transcendental subject. Of the former, Kant argues that it does not fall under any category, of the latter, we can think of it as having distinct parts.

Drawing from within the Kantian system, I propose that absolute unity is a principle 'beyond pure intuitions, categories, and ideas": the thing in itself. A solution that is inspired by Schopenhauer's philosophy. If we accept this position, the thing in itself is *ultimately*

[107] In this paragraph, I am intentionally speaking in the singular and avoiding using Kant's things in themselves to signal that for Schopenhauer there are no 'things in themselves.' The use of the singular to speak about *the* thing in itself is explained in chapter 2.

the original unity and source of unity for the apperception and intelligible character, to the point of making thinker and willer one 'I'. Unity and subject are not identical, whereas unity and thing in itself are identical because thing in itself is not in space and time and no category applies to it. Schopenhauer discerned that in dealing with will and the intelligible character, Kant stumble upon some important discovery. What Schopenhauer noticed is probably something that should be clear now, whereas the apperception is divided in three faculties, the intelligible character only has one faculty, namely, will. This fact is certainly noteworthy if one is seeking sources of unity. The intelligible character thus points toward a closer answer to the question of unity and comes very close to be a definitive answer.

One important question remains, if the intelligible character is neither thing in itself nor representation, what is its status? It is a member of the non-sensible world, but not the thing in itself; thus, should there be a distinction within the non-sensible world? One would hope that Kant had an answer to this question, unfortunately even when he toys with the possibility of an intuition of our real self as intelligible character (A 546/B 574), he muddies the waters and adds the same clarifications and restrictions to the possibility of having knowledge of this intelligible character as he does for other objects of non-sensible experience like the pure apperception.[108] But what then do we make of all the things that Kant seems to 'know' about the intelligible character? It does not seem possible to answer this question if we remain confined in pure Kantianism. This is the point in which we turn to Schopenhauer for he saw that the intelligible world could only be for ideas in the true

[108] A 540/B568; A 546/B 574; A 557/ B 585; A 558/ B 586. Pure apperception "precedes all data of the intuitions (A 107), "precedes *a priori* all my determinate thinking" (B 134). Furthermore, we have *consciousness*, though not a *cognition* of pure apperception: "Certainly, the representation 'I am', which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thought, immediately includes in itself the existence of a subject; but it does not so include any knowledge of that subject, and therefore also no empirical knowledge, that is, no experience of it."

sense of the word, not what Kant makes them to be. This requires that we put the thing in itself as totally outside the scope of what Kant understands as the intelligible realm, being that which makes possible even the intelligible world. If ideas are neither thing in itself nor representation, could the intelligible character then be an idea? The very possibility of our true self being an idea, given that its residence is the intelligible world, where time and space do not play any role, already suggests that our immortality is not exclusively a rational belief, but based on how things are. I think that this is the best interpretation, but as we will see in chapters 2 and 3, my proposal deviates from Schopenhauer's standard views.

Conclusion

Three notions have been shown to be important in determining what the true self in transcendental idealism is, namely, the transcendental subject, the pure apperception, and the intelligible character. I conclude that these 'names' all refer to one same X. This X appears in time as empirical subject, empirical apperception, and empirical character. The self is constituted of parts, that is, three cognitive faculties and one volitive faculty. What unifies all of them, and what could be called the most real self in the Kantian system, is the intelligible character that is a member of the non-sensible world. But how to exactly characterize this membership is still a question of which we do not have a clear answer.

The whole question could be brushed aside by appealing to the transcendental status of Kant's claims. Although Kant seems to be using these names solely to explain epistemological claims, or transcendental conditions, I suggested that some of Kant's

claims can be read ontologically. For example, when Kant speaks of apperception or intelligible character as being spontaneous, this seems to go beyond a mere epistemological statement. I explored the possibility that both the unity of the intelligible character and experience comes from their being the thing in itself. But this assumption is not correct given an analysis of different degrees of unity in representations; thus, the intelligible character is not thing in itself but it has a different status. The thing in itself is where thinking and willing ceases, that is, where there are no more parts. I have described it as being beyond categories and ideas, and not even a member of the intelligible world.

The unified experience – product of a synthesis by categories – cannot be explained merely by an appeal to a unified consciousness unless that consciousness is proven to be unity itself and ultimate source of unity. I think that Kant has not proven this and cannot prove it given his premises. For this, it is needed to challenge Kant's view of what counts as metaphysical cognition and to rework his doctrine of the understanding and reason. This is the task that I will begin by examining Schopenhauer's perfected system of criticism.

CHAPTER 2

Schopenhauer and the Quest for the True Self

Introduction

Schopenhauer wrote, "I have been faithful to my teacher and master as far as he was faithful to truth."[1] Much like Kant, Schopenhauer is immersed in his cultural, intellectual milieu and endorses many Enlightenment tenets, but unlike Kant, Schopenhauer is not fully committed to all the prejudices of the Enlightenment.[2] He also is not fully committed to the notion that philosophy cannot unravel some of the mysteries surrounding ultimate reality; "like Socrates, Schopenhauer believed that self-knowledge revealed what is ultimate in existence."[3] Nevertheless, Schopenhauer agrees with Kant regarding the subject and, although human beings cognize objects, they do not know anything about the 'I' that cognizes. Schopenhauer uses concepts like 'self-consciousness' and 'mind' but denies that any of this implies cognition of self as it is in itself. Regarding the real 'I' only negative statements can be made. The subject, according to Schopenhauer, is beyond time and space, it has no matter and apparently no individuality. As a condition of all objects of experience, the 'I' transcends experience.

[1] GB. 171.
[2] One of the most obvious departures from that is Schopenhauer's view of the faculty of reason.
[3] Wicks (1993, 181).

This is the picture that a superficial reading of Schopenhauer provides. In this chapter, I show that even though Schopenhauer seems to agree with Kant in many things, he does not follow Kant in important ways. First, Schopenhauer does not think that the unity of apperception is responsible for the unity of experience. Second, within the 'I' there are two distinctions, the subject of cognition and the subject of willing; the point of unity of these two subjects is how I experience 'my own body'. Cognition of the 'will' that manifests itself in my conative actions is the key to unravelling the mysteries of the sensible world, including what the ultimate source of unity is. Third, the subject of cognition, through the alteration of its cognitive faculties in aesthetic contemplation, discovers itself as the correlate of a Pure Subject of Cognition whose objects are Pure Objects or, as Schopenhauer calls them, Ideas.

In this alteration, the empirical subject of cognition is 'elevated' to the intuitive grasping of Ideas as a Pure Subject. This is an obscure and complex area of Schopenhauer's philosophy which I will try to illuminate. In connection to the doctrine of the intelligible character, it will play an important role in seeking a theoretical argument for the immortality of our true self. Among Ideas, I will argue that Schopenhauer points to something that can be interpreted as an idea of individual.[4] Each 'I' then is the manifestation of an Idea and the Idea is an original 'act of will'. Evidently, Schopenhauer takes his account of the 'I' further than Kant who stops at the pure unity of apperception. In what follows, I present the arguments that Schopenhauer uses to justify some of these

[4] Kossler (2012, 473) call Schopenhauer's intelligible character a "timeless individual idea". Although I am hesitant to state unequivocally at this point that Schopenhauer has a doctrine of ideas of individuals, I will show why I think it is correct to think this way.

claims and lay the ground for a deeper discussion regarding what truly we can say about our true self and its immortality using the notion of 'ideas of individuals'.

I. Development of Kant's Legacy

The Legacy of the Critique According to the A Edition

The pursuit for the true self in a transcendental idealist perspective must not stop once we study Kant, as if he is the sole authority on this matter. He is without doubt the founding father, but not the only one. A goal of this study is to argue that the foundation of transcendental idealism is not completed by Kant, but with Schopenhauer's "*perfected* system of criticism."[5] In this dissertation, I take transcendental idealism – in contrast to absolute idealism or German Idealism,[6] – to be the philosophical school born out of the Kantian-Schopenhauerian synthesis.[7]

[5]According to McDermid, "the vast majority of Schopenhauer's most recent commentators agree that [Schopenhauer's] pro-idealist arguments are not compelling" (2002, 222). McDermid (2003 and 2004) explores this issue further. This dissertation is not a defense of why transcendental idealism is the best explanations of the facts of consciousness and the sensible world, but of the implications *if* transcendental idealism is taken to be truth, specially the objective angle of Schopenhauer's analysis. Nevertheless, Shapshay (2011) and Segala (2020) provide some considerations that are counterarguments to McDermid's conclusion.

[6] Transcendental idealisms can be called 'critic idealism' because "it admits that something must be there which gives rise to or occasions our experience (itself being independent of experience)" (Salter 1911, 2). Thus, Schopenhauer rejects ontological idealism, or the notion that there is no mind-independent reality (McDermind, 2002, 221). Absolute idealism, on the other hand, is the position that says that there is nothing but experience and to talk about something that is non-mental is unreal and absurd (Salter, 1911, 2). It is also whatever theory says that there is a subject without an object, or that objects are products of a subject.

[7] This legacy did not end with the Kantian-Schopenhauerian synthesis but continued with Schopenhauer's followers of which I consider Philip Mainländer to be the most important for his desire create a philosophy that synthetizes Kant and Schopenhauer. See the concise summary of Mainländer's philosophy in Beiser 2016, 201-228.

Several reasons could be adduced to support the claim that Schopenhauer is a founding figure of transcendental idealism. The first one seems trivial, but it has an important role in the approach to my presentation of transcendental idealism. One very important fact, but universally ignored by the Kantian literature,[8] is that Schopenhauer is responsible for our access to the A edition of the *Critique*. Today it is easy to assume that the A and B editions of the *Critique* were available to all readers, but this was not the case in the first half of the 19th century; it was certainly not the case when Schopenhauer first encountered Kant during his studies at the University of Göttingen (1809-1811).[9] This had important consequences for Schopenhauer's philosophical development. For example, Schopenhauer's initial criticisms of the Kantian system, published in first edition of *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) as an appendix,[10] were based on Schopenhauer's reading of the B edition. Schopenhauer's encounter with the A edition in the year 1826 made him revise some of this criticism for the subsequent editions of his major work. Moreover, it convinced him that no one who studied just the B edition knew the real Kant.

> But nobody should imagine himself acquainted with the *Critique of Pure Reason* or believe that he has a clear idea of Kant's doctrine if he has only read the second edition or one of the editions to follow that; this is simply impossible, because he has read only a garbled, corrupted, and in some respects inauthentic text. It is my duty here to state this firmly, as a warning to everyone.[11]

[8] As far as I know. Even Guyer (1999) ignores this fact even though he mentions Schopenhauer's preference for the A edition.
[9] Overall, the A edition was not available between 1787-1838.
[10] For a concise summary of the events leading up to the publication of *The World as Will and Representation* see Kossler (2012).
[11] WWR I, 462-463.

Schopenhauer was able to save the A edition for future generation of scholars because he wrote a letter to the editors of Kant's complete works, Karl Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert, in which he pleaded with them to print the unaltered *Critique* according to the first edition.[12] Thus Schopenhauer is solely responsible for the current edition of the *Critique* in which we find the text of both editions, identified as A and B.

Although it is an interesting historical fact that there was a time when the A edition was not available to Kant's readers, we must turn to Schopenhauer's very reasons to fight for A if we want a more substantial argument for why Schopenhauer deserves to be considered a founding figure of transcendental idealism. The most important reason why Schopenhauer wanted to save A is that he thought that Kant had betrayed transcendental idealism itself in his second edition of the *Critique*, which for him was a book filled with contradictions, mutilated, and wasted.[13] Based solely on reading the second edition, Schopenhauer concludes that, whereas Kant seemed to reject any association with Berkeley ("The Refutation of Idealism"), he found in the *Critique* places where Kant apparently endorses a thoroughly "decided idealism"[14] and this led to contradictions in the B edition which made Kant look confused. To his great joy, Schopenhauer saw all the contradictions go away as he read the original text. In the A edition, Schopenhauer found the entire section A 348-392 (the Paralogisms) which was completely reworked in the B edition. As an

[12] Schopenhauer' account in WWR 1, 434-435 and a complete Spanish translation of letter in Lopez 2015, 25-29.
[13] Lopez (2015, 27).
[14] According to Lopez (2015, 14), this decided idealism [*idealismo decidido*] is the idealism that Schopenhauer sees expressed most clearly in the A edition. There Kant expressed an idealism that was analogous to Berkeley's, "according to which the external world existing in space and time is a mere representation of the knowing subject." Another reason that Schopenhauer identifies for Kant's abandonment is the deficient Kantian deduction of the thing in itself.

example of what Schopenhauer considers Kant's decided idealism according to the A edition, he quotes A 383: "if I remove the thinking subject the whole corporeal world must at once vanish: it is nothing save an appearance in the sensibility of our subject and a mode of its representations." The best expression of this idealism is the Fourth Paralogism (A367-380) where Kant writes, for example, "The real outer appearances is therefore real in perception only, and can be real in no other way."[15]

But regarding our object of study, there is a deeper reason to bring up this curious piece of philosophical trivia. In his letter to Rosenkranz, Schopenhauer argues that in addition to the Garve-Feder charge (that his idealism was just a variant of Berkeley's), Kant was forced to write B because of the negative reception of a specific topic in the *Critique*, namely, his demolition of rational psychology. Concretely, Schopenhauer laments Kant's suppression of key texts from the Transcendental Dialectics, which for him where "pages that contained exactly what is unavoidably necessary for a clear understanding of the entire work and whose suppression, as well as the new version that replaces them, leads his entire theory to fall into contradictions with itself."[16] Thus, Schopenhauer argues that restoring and studying these texts helps any reader to fully appreciate transcendental idealism according to the mind of its founder. The transcendental idealism that Schopenhauer extracts from his reading of the A edition is the template from which he works to build up a robust theory that avoids the absolutism of Hegel. This is the transcendental idealism to which I am partially committed and that I examine in connection to the question of who the true self in transcendental idealism is and whether this true self is immortal.[17]

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[15] A376.
[16] Lopez (2015, 26).
[17] Schopenhauer claims that his philosophy was developed because of his own encounter with the philosophical tradition of the West, especially Kant and Plato which could give the impression that no

Perceptive and Abstract Cognition

This study is not interested in an exposition and evaluation of every detail of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's transcendental idealism, but it is important to present a brief sketch of the main criticisms in as much as they affect the arguments of this project.[18] Thus, two things must be known if one wants to understand Schopenhauer's criticisms of Kant: (i) the principle 'no object without a subject or vice versa' that distinguishes the 'decided idealism' that Schopenhauer finds in the A edition and (ii) Schopenhauer's claim that there is a more pronounced distinction between 'givenness' and 'thinking,' which Kant did not respect.

One thing that Schopenhauer finds vexing is the obscurity of the Transcendental Logic. Schopenhauer argues that the obscurity stems from the confusion in Kant's mind regarding intuitive and abstract cognition. One concrete way this confusion is evident is Kant's constant defining and redefining of what he means by understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*).[19] Schopenhauer will argue that Kant passes over too quickly from the forms of perception (space and time), the forms by which sensible objects are given to us through sensibility, to the acts of *thinking*. Further, Schopenhauer says that Kant claims that an *object* is *given* in impressions of sensibility, that is, sensibility already gives us what

contemporary event played a role in his embrace of Kant's transcendental idealism. This is not entirely true; Schopenhauer's arguments are partially explained as reaction to German Idealism and his encounter with Fichte and Schelling. Gardner (2012) argues that some puzzles of Schopenhauer's Kantianism could be resolved if we consider the post-Kantian context in which he wrote.

[18] Studies about the relationship of Kant's and Schopenhauer's philosophy are found in Guyer (1999), Gardner (2012), and Kossler (2012).

[19] See WWR I, 431-434 for a list of Kant's vacillation. This feature extends to other concepts like 'philosophy' and 'metaphysics.'

Schopenhauer calls a real object. Schopenhauer states that Kant's account is mistaken. The impressions, what Schopenhauer calls the mere raw data, is the only thing that we can call absolutely *given,* but they are not objects. In themselves, sensations are indeterminate and lack the properties of what we call objects. Something else – Schopenhauer argues that it is the understanding – is needed in order to move from mere sensations to an object. *Mere* sensations in the sense-organ do not give us objects[20] but only subjective raw stuff. An object only exists for us when the understanding applies to sensations the law of causality making pure subjective events into objective, empirical reality, that is, an object in space and time.

Schopenhauer, like any Kantian reader, is familiar with the famous Kantian statement: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[21] He agrees that thoughts are empty without experience, but rejects that intuition is blind if there are no concepts.[22] Schopenhauer's arguments in favor of this conclusion are one important consequence of his correction of Kant's characterization of the understanding. Kant calls the human understanding "discursive," but Schopenhauer thinks that this is a mistake: the understanding does not think, for this is the proper attribute of reason.[23] The transition by which human beings cognize the sensible world is not reflective, discursive or abstract (this

[20] Schopenhauer studied medicine and scientific language is more common in his philosophy. For Schopenhauer's use of the scientific literature of his day as proof of his metaphysics, see Segala (2010) and Wicks (2012).
[21] A51/B75.
[22] See Schopenhauer's discussion in WWR I, 465-473. Schopenhauer denies that *a priori* are concepts and rejects that the Kantian categories are needed in the way Kant uses them. So, the way in which Schopenhauer could accept the Kantian statement is if by concepts it is meant *a priori* forms, not categories.
[23] Schopenhauer argues, I think correctly, that his view is endorsed by the usage of these words throughout history. All philosophers understood that *nous* and *intellectus* were translated as 'understanding' and that the form of cognition of the understanding was 'intuitive' or non-discursive whereas reason was understood as the faculty of discursive thought.

can only happen through words and concepts), but "intuitive and completely immediate."[24] For Schopenhauer then the understanding is a non-discursive faculty whose sole function is to bring about the empirical, objective world by means of the law of causality.[25] Thus, the sensations in the sense organs are purely subjective events and they do not provide enough data to speak of an objective world. For cognition of an *object*, it requires that the understanding refers any sensations that the body receives to its *cause*. The understating uses space to locate the cause outside the body. To construct sensible objects, the understanding uses all the data provided by the senses, and the pure forms of sensibility.[26] Therefore, the sensible world comes into being in its fullness.

Unfortunately, the limitations of human language make almost impossible to explain a process that happens without reflection. Schopenhauer is not describing a process by which the understanding reason its way to a conclusion, or how space, time and causality are rules that the understanding applies to sensations. What Schopenhauer is trying to clarify is a process that is prerational; for example, in WWR I, he uses the analogy of how the sensible world appears when sunlight appears. We see objects in the dark when something illuminates them, likewise the sensible world is a representation to us when the understanding acts.[27] Another image that Schopenhauer employs to argue his view is that of the newly born baby who goes from receiving pure sensations but perceiving no world to the gradual appearance of words and speech.[28] As the baby grows, he or she can speak

[24] Here is obvious that Schopenhauer is using understanding in its classical meaning as *nous*.
[25] The 'law of causality' can be taken in two senses: actual and reflected. The latter is when we reflect on causality in the abstract, using concepts to define it. The former is the activity itself as it happens in the transition from sensations to perceptions and to the changes that occur in the sensible world. See VC 214.
[26] In Schopenhauer's ontology, properties, or accidents of things in the empirical world are "either determinations of space or of time, or its empirical properties, all of which relate to its activity, and are thus fuller determinations of causality" WWR I, 445-446.
[27] WWR I, 33.
[28] VC 215-216.

because, first, the sensible world appears, second, because concepts are abstracted from sensible objects, and finally concepts are what allow us to speak.

The understanding is described in terms that for me recall the function of organs such as the stomach, that is, as an unconscious organ that acts when it receives inputs. "[T]he understanding first creates and produces this objective external world from the raw stuff [*Stoff*] of a few sensations in the sense organs."[29] The stomach breaks down and assimilates food, and the understanding produces the entire empirical world: both work without planning and thinking. "Only when the *understanding*…becomes active and applies its single and only form, the *law of causality*, a powerful transformation occurs, through which subjective sensation becomes objective intuition."[30] Unfortunately, the analogy both illustrates and obscures Schopenhauer's account.

It illustrates in the sense that for Schopenhauer the understanding's activity is non-reflexive, non-deliberative. The task that Schopenhauer assigns to the understanding is not mediated by concepts. But it obscures and reveals its limits because the stomach is in a strong sense a passive/receptive organ. Whereas the understanding is not a passive/receptive organ, but, as we saw with Kant, a spontaneous faculty. Passivity belongs, both for Kant and Schopenhauer, exclusively to sensibility. Thus, the understanding does not receive input in the same way that a stomach needs to receive food to do its function. It would be more accurate to say that the understanding is always in the look out and acts on what sensibility receives, namely, sensations. The understanding acts

[29] FR, 52. "[T]he modification which the senses undergo is never an intuition, but is the original stuff that the understanding transforms into intuition" (VC, 215).
[30] FR 53. Accordingly, *objects* (intuitions, in Kant's terms) in space and time are *given* to animals without concepts. Properly speaking, animals cannot think because they do not have reason, but just like us, they have an understanding and thus a real world governed by the law of causality. Schopenhauer's condemnation of an ethics that treats animals as mere ends is one of the most salient characteristics of his metaphysics of morals. Shapshay (2019, ix) considers Schopenhauer's ethics his most underrated philosophical contribution.

not when it *receives* sensations, but when it 'sees' sensations. Here Schopenhauer introduces an important distinction between sensation (*Empfindung*) and perception (*Wahrnehmung*) that he believes makes his case stronger.[31] Whereas Kant "identifies perception directly with sensation" or "mere sensation is immediately perception"[32], Schopenhauer argues that sensations are events that happen in the sense organs, but only the understanding makes perceptions possible. The eyes can receive sensations, but that does not mean that we see objects. Removing certain parts of our brain will make us cease having vision, but not stop our eyes from receiving sensations. In this scenario, our eyes seem to be functioning without problems (they have sensations), but we are still blinded because we no longer have what it is needed to see (there is no perception).

Schopenhauer's main problem with Kant can be stated simply: Kant did not provide a full account of what he means by "*given*" leading him to confuse perceptive and abstract cognition.[33] Schopenhauer refers to many passages to support this point, the most concise of his examples is the beginning of the Transcendental Logic:

> Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts). Through the first an object is *given* to us, through the second the object is *thought* in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind).[34]

[31] See FR, 73-81.
[32] Schopenhauer claims that this view is presented in A371-372.
[33] Guyer (1999, 111) suggests that Kant did this in what comes after the Transcendental Deduction.
[34] A 50, Emphasis in original.

I will try to explain how this passage summarizes Schopenhauer's problem with Kant. On the one hand, Schopenhauer has only positive things to say about the Transcendental Aesthetic; he does not criticize anything about it only supplementing it where he thinks a thought can be made clearer. The Aesthetic, claims Schopenhauer, rightly and for perpetuity has proven that sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) has two pure *forms* of intuition, that is, space and time. Kant provides a correct and conclusive discussion of the "universal *forms* of all perception"; however, Schopenhauer questions why Kant did not proceed to explain the logical next step, namely, "some explanation of its *content*, of the way in which *empirical* perception enters our consciousness, of how knowledge of this whole world, for us so real and so important, originates in us" being pleased with just telling us that "the empirical content of perception is *given* to us." Schopenhauer cannot forgive what he considers a hasty jump from the Aesthetic to the Logic.

Kant abandons too soon the world of perception says Schopenhauer, which according to him "is infinitely more significant, more universal, and more substantial than is the abstract part of our cognition."[35] For Schopenhauer, and given his account of the understanding, intuitive cognition is completed, that is, a real object in the sensible world is given to beings with understanding without the need for concepts. According to Schopenhauer, abstract cognition, only possible to human beings and the real distinction between human beings and animals, follows from the act of abstraction that reason performs. This activity of reason is what creates *concepts,* and they are the sole jurisdiction of Logic. Concepts receive their whole meaning and value "from the world of

[35] WWR I, 431.

perception."[36] Against Kant, Schopenhauer proposes that a single public world of sensible experience is cognized by beings endowed with the faculty of understanding. Accordingly, human beings and animals share a world of sensible objects. In human beings, nevertheless, a new faculty appears, that is, *reason* (*Vernunft*) and this faculty is what allows human beings to think. Schopenhauer writes, "if thinking is added, to which spontaneity can certainly be attributed, then knowledge of *perception* is entirely abandoned, and a completely different class of representations, namely, non-perceptible, abstract concepts, enters consciousness."[37] Therefore, Schopenhauer's radical modification of the relationship between sensibility and abstract cognition [*die anschauliche und die abstrakte Erkenntniß*], that is, between understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*) is at the core of Schopenhauer's departure from Kant.[38]

Schopenhauer argues that Kant was confused about the true nature of thinking in his claim that thinking is needed to be added to sensations in order to produce an object in intuition.[39] If this account is true, Kant would be saying that an individual, real object is like a thought object, namely, this real object would be a mixture of sensibility and thinking. Schopenhauer argues that this is a mistake for in this account "thinking loses its essential character of universality and abstraction"[40] which amounts to bringing perception into thinking (*das Anschauen in das Denken*).[41] The pure nature of thinking is always of the abstract and universal; this is a claim that Schopenhauer never gives up. For him, a

[36] Ibid. This, according to McDermid (2002, 210-211), could suggest the notion that Schopenhauer is an empiricist foundationalist. But this position is rejected because Schopenhauer does not ground the ultimate foundations of empirical knowledge in perceptual states, but in the law of causality (212-214).
[37] WWR I, 439.
[38] See Wicks (1993, 182-185).
[39] He provides textual proof of Kant's confusion (A67-69;89; 90; B 135; 139; 153). More in WWR I, 440.
[40] WWR I, 439.
[41] Ibid.

particular sensible individual is cognized by the understanding without the mediation of abstract concepts. Thinking about these real objects is through concepts and this is no longer an individual, sensible object but a universal concept.[42]

In the chapter "On the Differentiation of all Objects into Phenomena and Noumena"[43] of the *Critique*, Schopenhauer finds a clear articulation of Kant's confusion. He brings up this chapter because, given the title, one could think that here Kant would make clear the distinction between perceptive and abstract cognition.[44] Instead, we find statements like the following: "If I remove from empirical knowledge all thought (through categories), no knowledge of any object remains. For through mere intuition nothing at all is thought, and the fact that this affection of sensibility is in me does not [by itself] amount to a relation of such representation to any object."[45] Schopenhauer asserts that all Kant's errors can be seen in this sentence. First, if thinking – which for Schopenhauer is only of universals – is removed the sensible world would still be there for us. Cognition of the sensible world is complete without concepts just like animals also have a sensible world and do not think. For Schopenhauer, proper reflection reveals the opposite of what Kant says here: "concepts obtain all meaning, all content, only form their reference to representations of perception, from which they have been abstracted, drawn off, in other words, formed by the dropping of everything inessential."[46] The sensible objects of perceptions are in no need of abstract concepts to be objects for us, "they represent themselves, express themselves, and have not

[42] Is Schopenhauer consistent when he speaks of a concept of an individual in WWR I?
[43] A 236/B 295 - A260-/B315.
[44] This conclusion is based on the how philosophers throughout history have understood the words 'phenomena' and 'noumena'. Specifically, Kant's use of the word 'noumena' seems to be totally different from his predecessors. See WWR I, 506.
[45] A 153/B309.
[46] WWR I, 474.

merely borrowed content as concepts have."[47] Accordingly, Schopenhauer thinks that Kant did not complete his task in the *Critique* and left him with the mission to fully explain the difference and relationship between the nature of cognition of the empirical world by means of the understanding and what is abstract cognition by means of the abstracting function of reason.[48]

But is anything presented above that different from what Kant says in the *Critique*? In the *Critique*, Kant stresses the importance of the understanding and its contribution to perception, even though Schopenhauer claims that Kant confused sensations and perceptions. But that is as far as the harmony between Kant and Schopenhauer goes because Kant argues that the human understanding is the faculty through which intuitions are brought under *a priori* concepts and it is in the understanding where synthetic judgments about objects are formed, namely, thinking is introduced as needed to constitute real objects.[49] For Kant there is no cognition of real objects without conceptualization. Schopenhauer rejects all of this and insists that the human understanding has only one task, that is, the application of the law of causality, not the employment of *a priori* concepts. The law of causality then assumes a curious status. It is not an *a priori* category or concept, but it is intellectual for it is the only form of the understanding. According to Wicks (1993, 185), Schopenhauer tries to avoid the tension by speaking of causality as a "brain-function." With this solution, Schopenhauer seems to create a circular problem for himself: the brain structures its structure.[50] In any case, perception of sensible objects, according to

[47] Ibid.
[48] WWR I, 448 gives a great summary of Schopenhauer's distinction between perceptive and abstract cognition; also 451.
[49] See A19/B33; A51/B75; A77-83/B103-116; A299/B356.
[50] Wicks offers the following solution: "when Schopenhauer describes the *a priori* forms of empirical knowledge as brain functions, he draws from both aspects of his dual-awareness of himself as the constructor

Schopenhauer, is possible without conceptualizing them; space, time and causality (the only *a priori* cognition) are the artist forming the work, the senses are only the assistants that present the materials.

II. Metaphysics of the 'Self'

Cognitive and Willing Subject

For Schopenhauer, it is incorrect to speak of a 'subject' without object. Nevertheless, as far as I can, I will provide an account of Schopenhauer's 'self' independently of its objects. Again, what I am looking for, if we can find it at all, is the most real self, the ultimate answer to the question who or what I am. Although Schopenhauer takes many things from Kant, as we saw with the distinction between sensible and abstract cognition, when it comes to the 'self' Schopenhauer departs from Kant radically. To begin with, Schopenhauer argues that the core of a human being is not the cognitive faculties, but something he designates as 'will'.[51] Thus, Schopenhauer argues for the primacy of the will over intellect; this primacy is epistemological but most importantly, ontological. Awareness of the latter marks an important break between Kant and Schopenhauer with significant consequences for transcendental idealism. It is true that we saw something like

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of the world, *and* of himself as being located with this construction" (193). This problem (identification of mind-brain), possible solutions, and its role in our argument will be explored in chapters 3 and 5.

[51]Schopenhauer identifies the 'will' with the Kantian thing in itself. Apparently denied by Young (1987). For Schopenhauer, the thing in itself lies outside time and space, thus it is one; but not one in the sense that a thing is one or a concept is one, but "as something to which the condition of the possibility of plurality, that is, the *principium individuationis*, is foreign." Given that Schopenhauer considers space and time as reason of being (*ratio essendi*) we can say that the thing in itself is 'beyond being'.

this in Kant when we identified, besides the pure apperception, the intelligible character. I characterized the former as 'pure thinking' and the second as 'pure willing'. To a certain extent this is Schopenhauer's point. But the 'will' is not just a supplement to the constitution of a human being for, according to Schopenhauer, the will underlies the self, including its intellect, as the source of the self's very being. It can be said that Schopenhauer's 'will' plays the same role that 'soul' played in Aristotle's *De anima*. This point and its implications must be further explored when I consider the immortality of the soul in chapter 3.

Schopenhauer dismisses the traditional divisions of empirical and rational psychology; in his philosophy there is a complete rejection of what his predecessors called 'rational psychology' and the elements of what could be considered 'empirical psychology' are mixed in with Kant's 'transcendental psychology'. When considering the 'I' or 'self', Schopenhauer speaks of a 'subjective' or an 'objective' perspective. Although superficially one could think that this refers to empirical and rational psychology, Schopenhauer soon proves that he is coming at the problem from a new perspective. In his exposition, subjective (transcendental) and objective ('realist') merge into one account which from his point of view is strictly metaphysical because metaphysics is the right explanation of the union of subjective and objective perspectives. As such his discussion combines the manifold of a vast literature on topics that range from biology to chemistry. For him there is no contradiction in doing this. Let us explore these two perspectives before we arrive at any unified account (or metaphysics) of the 'self'.

According to Schopenhauer, two faculties constitute the human 'self', namely, cognitive and willing. Of the 'intellect' or 'understanding' we spoke at length before, here

let us describe the 'will'. His notion is radically dissociated from reason and has nothing to do with Kant's practical reason. The notes from Kant's lectures on metaphysics distinguish several faculties associated with action. Schopenhauer unites them all in his 'will' which covers all affective and volitional side of the self. When referring to the self, Schopenhauer calls one aspect the 'subject of cognition' (*Subjekt des Erkennens*) and the other the 'subject of willing' (*Subjekt des Wollens*). However, this is not the claim that we have an intuition of the self as it is in itself. An illustrative quote that applies to both subjects is:

> The *subject* is the seat of all cognition but is itself not cognized by anything…The subject, on the other hand, having cognition, but never cognized, is not situated within these forms, which in fact always already presupposes it. Neither multiplicity nor its opposite, unity, apply to the subject. We never have any cognition of it; rather, where there is cognition at all, it is what has that cognition.[52]

But even if Schopenhauer describes the cognitive and conative aspect of one 'I', he gives ontological primacy to one aspect in his account. If phenomenologically, we could speak of a dualist perspective of the self in Schopenhauer, for the 'I' is revealed as a subject of cognition or willing, Schopenhauer reminds us that everything is permeated by the ultimate reality. The reality that underlies both cognition and willing is none other than '*Wille'* as the thing in itself. Thus, the primacy is given to 'will'. The willing subject is more real than the cognitive subject and the intellect is a product of the will. Although

[52] WWR 1, 25.

phenomenologically, the distinction between subject of cognition and subject of willing is revealed as an epistemological, not ontological, distinction,[53] I think that in Schopenhauer's account, the lines between epistemology and ontology blend. Ontologically, the thing in itself is prior to all its expressions, but there are entities in Schopenhauer's account that are ontologically closer to the thing in itself that in that regard are more real than others. These entities are the Ideas and the intelligible characters. We reach them through epistemological considerations, but they are obviously ontological entities.

But Schopenhauer is more specific about what unifies the self. He says that it is the immutable nature of our *individual* will or our *character*. Here Schopenhauer builds on what Kant wrote about the intelligible character.[54] Just as Kant, Schopenhauer thinks that the intelligible character is beyond space, time, and causality (the forms of sensible cognition); unlike Kant, Schopenhauer suggests clearly that the intelligible character is a metaphysical real entity.[55] Schopenhauer seems to consider and give a similar answer to our objection regarding Kant's unity of apperception by suggesting that the intelligible character and ultimately the thing in itself is what unifies experience and the self. In that case, he faces the same problem I uncovered in Kant, that is, he jumps illegitimately from intelligible character to the thing in itself. However, Schopenhauer, in a move that suggests to me that he is more aware of the distinctions between the thing in itself and intelligible character, recovers for transcendental idealism the doctrine of the Platonic Ideas and

[53] White (1999, 82).
[54] Janaway (2012, 446-452) summarizes the differences between Kant's and Schopenhauer's notion of intelligible character.
[55] Janaway (2012, 447).

releases this doctrine from its Kantian distortion.[56] I now turn to this issue through the lens of what I think is a development in transcendental idealism, that is, the transition from intelligible character to the idea of individuals.

From Intelligible Character to the Idea of Individual: A New Principle of Unity?

The notion of 'ideas' is not foreign to transcendental idealism; both Kant and Schopenhauer appeal to them. In the *Critique*, Kant speaks of three ideas (soul, world, and God) in the *Transcendental Dialectic* and locates them in reason (*Vernunft*). In Kant, the ideas of reason are concepts that have no empirical counterpart, that is, they do not refer to objects of experience. For example, in the case of cognition related to the experiences of an 'I' there correspond the idea of the soul. They also deceive us through transcendental illusion to take them as objects of sensible intuition from which traditional metaphysics take their subject matter. Schopenhauer tells us about Kant's doctrine of ideas that , "the *ideas* of reason come about by applying *inferences* to the categories, a transaction that *reason* carries out according to its supposed principle of seeking the unconditioned."[57] Schopenhauer's problem with Kant's use of the word 'idea', a use that he describes as incorrect and illegitimate,[58] follows from his criticism of Kant's account of the faculty of reason. For Schopenhauer, reason is not the faculty of principles, but "the use of reason

[56] Probably no topic in Schopenhauer is as controversial as his doctrine of (Platonic) Ideas. For a summary of the major sources of contention see Constanzo (2020). Many issues surrounding the status of Ideas in Schopenhauer's system would find some clarifications if, instead of focusing on Plato's account, commentators would pay more attention to the Neo-Platonic subtext (specially Plotinian) of Schopenhauer's account. Zöller (1999, 36) acknowledges the connection between Schopenhauer's doctrine and the neo-Platonic presentation of Ideas. Kleist (2020, 20) recognizes this but does nothing with it.
[57] WWR I, 457.
[58] Ibid, 154.

consists precisely in our cognition of the particular through the general, the case through the rule, and this through the most general rule, and thus in our attempts to gain the most general point of view."[59] Reason is merely the faculty of concept creation, not *pure* concepts as Kant would like, but of abstract representations whose whole content is taken from the sensible world.[60]

The problem that Schopenhauer has with Kant's ideas should be obvious; the three ideas in Kant are pure concepts, born of a supposed desired for the unconditioned, something that Schopenhauer thinks is the opposite of what Plato established by his doctrine of Ideas. First, somehow Kant ignored that two of the three ideas are not unconditioned, but conditioned. The ideas of soul and the world are conditioned by the solely unconditioned idea of God, so they cannot be necessary productions of this faculty. Second, Schopenhauer argues that if, as Kant claims, the three ideas of reason were necessary productions of the nature of reason, given the transcendental illusion they would impose themselves in every human culture. Unfortunately for Kant, Schopenhauer demonstrates that this is not the case: some cultures do not believe in the soul or in God. Kant certainly did not provide this type of proof in the *Critique*.

For Schopenhauer, Plato's ideas "designate the imperishable forms that, multiplied in time and space, are imperfectly visible in the countless, individual, transient things."[61] This makes ideas a matter of sensible intuition for the Platonic Ideas are related to cognition and visibility of the empirical world and are not abstract concepts. For Kant, ideas designate

[59] Ibid, 514.
[60] Schopenhauer provides a list of Kant's vacillation regarding the nature of reason (WWR I, 459-460). This is proof for him that just like with the understanding, Kant was not clear about his position. Schopenhauer argues that his whole discussion of understanding and reason is supported by the use of these words by all cultures and philosophers throughout time. See note 63
[61] WWR I, 517.

things that lie far away from any possibility of being intuited, something that seems to contradict the meaning that Plato attached to this word. A meaning that, according to Schopenhauer, all philosophers respected until Kant took over the word for his own purposes.[62]

Just as Kant, Schopenhauer argues that sensible experience, in order to be experience for a human being, must be unified in a unified consciousness. One could imagine that Schopenhauer would embrace the Kantian notion of the original and synthetic unity of apperception to explain this fact. And to a certain extent he does uses the word 'apperception' to speak about the unity of consciousness, but we must be clear that Schopenhauer normally avoids Kantian terminology when he thinks that it is not clear enough; 'apperception' is one of these terms that he uses rarely. In the appendix to WWR 1, he says of the Kantian apperception that it is "a very strange thing very strangely described."[63] Schopenhauer quotes the very famous passage at B 131 ("It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations") as illustration of what apperception means for Kant. Given what I said above, the problem with this statement should be obvious. Does Kant mean that all representing is thinking? It cannot mean that because, according to Schopenhauer, then all would be abstract concepts. The probable meaning then, thinks Schopenhauer, is the idealist principle that 'no object without subject and vice versa' but Schopenhauer thinks that this could be expressed more clearly. Schopenhauer says that what Kant means by the pure apperception is "the extensionless center of the

[62] See WWR I, 550-551 where he says that "words are not ownerless" so that every person can do with them whatever they want.
[63] WWR I, 451.

sphere of all our representations, whose radii converge on it."[64] Thus Schopenhauer's preferred way to speak about the pure apperception is to call it the subject of cognition.

Chapter 15 of WWR 2 is a good place to find Schopenhauer's own view of the apperception while pointing out what he sees as limitations of the Kantian apperception. There he describes what he thinks are the essential imperfections of the human intellect. Schopenhauer begins by describing what he takes as self-evident, namely, that the form of our self-consciousness is not in space but only in time. Our thinking does not occur in a three-dimensional plane, but only in one plane. This gives rise, according to Schopenhauer, to the main imperfection of the human beings' intellect, that is, that we "know everything only *successively*, and are conscious of only one thing at a time."[65] While our minds are focused on the present moment, we need to forget the past; when I am thinking of the next word to write I need to forget the previous thoughts. There are many events in our daily life that corroborate this: the eyes get tired, and things begin to blur if we keep our attention focused on one object too long, or when our mind, after spending many hours thinking about one topic, cannot longer keeps it attention. The consequence is that our self-consciousness is only half-consciousness because there is a whole dimension of our mental life of which we need to put aside to focus on the task at hand.

Schopenhauer concludes from these observations that our self-consciousness is fragmentary and forgetful in the sense that our minds are constantly bombarded with all sorts of images, thoughts, constantly distracted by planning for the future, or ruminating about the past; in a endless vacillation about what to do, who to believe, constantly trying to figure out how to survive in a hostile environment. But, Schopenhauer argues, even with

[64] WWR I, 452.
[65] WWR II, 137.

all this chaos, our mental life is presented to us as part of one single thread. In self-consciousness, he argues, the succession of representations forms a unified series. But what makes this possible?[66] What could be the thing that unifies all sensible experiences of the inner and outer life? Perhaps it is our memory that serves as that guiding thread, but Schopenhauer rejects this. Next, Schopenhauer invokes the Kantian *logical I* or *transcendental synthetic unity of apperception*. Would this be enough to account for the single thread of our experience? He acknowledges that the apperception seems like the best possible answer, but he rejects the Kantian answer.

> Kant's proposition: 'The *I think* must accompany all our representations,' is insufficient; for the 'I' is an unknown quantity, in other words, it is itself a mystery and a secret. What gives unity and sequence to consciousness, since, by pervading all the representations of consciousness, it is its substratum, its permanent supporter, cannot itself be conditioned by consciousness, and therefore cannot be a representation.[67]

The reasons for rejecting the Kantian alternative seem perplexing. I will try to make sense of it. First, it is surprising that Schopenhauer is even debating this question when he believes that time is an *a priori* form of sensibility, that there is only *one* time, and all different times are parts of the same time.[68] Should not then time be enough to answer this question of what unifies our metal lives? This would certainly seem to be Kant's proposal.

[66] WWR II, 139.
[67] WWR II, 139.
[68] WWR II, 51.

> Permanence, as the abiding correlate of all existence of appearances, of all change and of all concomitance, expresses time in general. For change does not affect time itself, but only appearances in time.[69]

The problem is that Schopenhauer completely rejects this position. For him, the "now has no endurance"[70] and "succession is the whole essence of time."[71] Thus our mental life, which Schopenhauer said is totally in time, cannot have time as the condition for its unity. For Schopenhauer, a representation cannot be the unifier of all representations or in other words, what gives unity to consciousness cannot itself be conditioned by consciousness, as evidently, time is.[72] However, I think that something deeper is going on in this chapter, and it is revealing of Schopenhauer's own philosophical project. We noted Kant's tendency to shift ontological questions to epistemological questions; this tendency seems to me to be reversed by Schopenhauer and his unsatisfaction with the Kantian apperception suggests to me that he is shifting from an epistemological question to an ontological question.

Schopenhauer is unsatisfied with the answer that a conditioned, whether time or the 'I' of 'I think', is what explains the fact of unity in sensible experience. Schopenhauer seems to confirm my suspicion that the 'self' or apperception in isolation cannot be the source and ultimate giver of unity. He is looking for a real *un*conditioned and this can only be whatever is not a representation, namely, he is trying to do metaphysics in what he understands is the correct meaning of this word. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer, I think, rushes to give us the answer: it is the will. Schopenhauer says that only the thing in itself

[69] A183.
[70] WWR II, 55 (janaway trans)
[71] WWR I, 29.
[72] Kleist (2020, 22).

is *prius* of (or *prior to*) consciousness, the "tree of which consciousness is the fruit."[73] Only the will is "unchangeable and absolutely identical, and it has brought consciousness forth."[74] Thus, the unity of consciousness and experience is grounded in an ultimate reality that gives "unity and holds all its representations and ideas together, accompanying them, as it were, like a continuous ground-bass."[75] In this chapter, Schopenhauer jumps from the representation to the thing in itself; however, unlike Kant, Schopenhauer does not need to make such hasty conclusion because he defends that the Platonic Ideas are real objects outside of the mind and not generated by reason which helps him to create a distinction in the intelligible world that functions as intermediary between the thing in itself and the sensible world.[76]The unity that Ideas have and impart to the representations in the sensible world comes from the real one, the thing in itself:

> Since it is the single and indivisible (and therefore perfectly self-coherent) will that reveals itself in the entire Idea as in an act, then although its appearance divides into different parts and states, it must nonetheless exhibit that unity as a general coherence among these parts and states: all the parts are necessarily related to and dependent on each other, and this reproduces the unity of the Idea in appearance.[77]

[73] WWR II, 139. This is also an example of what is called vertical causality. Schopenhauer's point is not only epistemological. The will is ontologically prior to intellect for its 'life' comes from the will and if one removes the will, the intellect cannot sustain itself in existence.
[74] WWR, II, 149 (jan tra)
[75] WWR II, 140.
[76] The notion that Schopenhauer introduced a new level of reality or a third 'thing' between thing in itself and representation is both viewed as an objection against Schopenhauer's coherence (Janaway 1989, 277; Copleston, 1975, 106; Gardiner 1963, 206) or denied as a false objection (Neeley 2000, 127-129). Here I do not mean a "third level of reality" or a "world in between" as a location in space and time, but in the Plotinian sense in which the Intellect/Forms is "located between" the One and the Soul. Clearly Plotinus does not say that the Intellect/Forms are located in space and time. I will try to make sense of this in chapter 4.
[77] WWR I, 182.

But the introduction of the Platonic Ideas is not the end of what Schopenhauer could say about distinctions in the intelligible world. Besides Ideas, we are informed that there is a Pure Subject of Cognition. Ideas have their copies in the sensible world, but it is not clear if we are to understand the relationship between the subject of cognition and the Pure Subject in the same way. What appears as a straightforward doctrine is revealed, after some reflection, to be confusing or puzzling. As a hypothesis, the neo-Platonic Intellect, in its Plotinian manifestation, could help us make sense of what Schopenhauer is doing with the introduction of the Pure Subject, however, the full development of this hypothesis will have to wait for now. Now the Pure Subject of Cognition has an individual cognitive subject as its correlate in the sensible world, but Schopenhauer also speaks of an 'intelligent character', an 'Idea of human being' and possibly of an 'idea of the individual'; accordingly, are there specific differences that Schopenhauer wants to address by introducing these different names? I think that the Plotinian perspective could also be helpful in seeking an answer to this question. In the meantime, I will show in the next section that the Pure Subject of Cognition cannot be the same as the intelligible character or the idea of individual. What appears certain so far is that the thing in itself, although the ultimate source of unity, imparts unity in different degrees according to different levels of what Schopenhauer calls 'objectification" of the thing in itself.

Distinctions in the Intelligible World: Ideas and Pure Subject of Cognition

Schopenhauer's doctrine of Ideas is introduced in Book II of WWR 1,[78] but only in Book III does he discusses aspects of this doctrine that are relevant to my discussion.[79] At all times Schopenhauer claims that his use of Ideas is the same as what Plato and the Platonic tradition have always taken it to be.[80] However, an important thing to keep in mind is that Schopenhauer views some elements of Plato's exposition as obscured by the use of what he considers mythological language that needs to be purified with a strictly philosophical explanation. This explanation is colored by the Kantian critique.

What are the Schopenhauerian Ideas and what role do they play in a transcendental idealist perspective? I discussed above how Schopenhauer reached the conclusion that the unconditioned entity that fully explains the unity of our mental life is the thing in itself, however, is that conclusion also valid for the sensible world, for the whole representations that Schopenhauer calls real objects and make up the universe? He notes that the sensible world, studied objectively, reveals degrees of complexities or, as it was described in Ancient and Medieval philosophers, levels of beings from inorganic to organic things and from non-conscious to conscious life forms. These different levels are expressions or copies of what Schopenhauer calls 'Ideas' "in so far as they are nothing but particular species, or the original, unchanging forms and qualities of all natural bodies, inorganic no less than organic, as well as the universal forces that manifest themselves according to natural laws."[81] The Schopenhauerian Ideas are "those different levels of objectivation of

[78] The introduction of Ideas occurs in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of nature. In WWR I, Book II, Schopenhauer seeks to enhance the Kantian doctrine of nature by arguing that Kant's philosophy is incomplete because he lacks a robust doctrine of the metaphysical, namely, of the thing in itself. The Ideas are metaphysical objects that are needed to make complete sense of the discoveries of the physical sciences.
[79] For a summary of key questions regarding the interpretation of Schopenhauer's account of the Platonic Ideas see Constanzo (2020, 154).
[80] Something denied by Constanzo (2020, 163-165).
[81] WWR I, 191. Schopenhauer rejects the notion that there are 'mathematical Ideas' and 'valued Ideas'. Schopenhauer justifies his restriction of Ideas to those in nature by appealing to Platonic authorities, but not

the will that exist as the unattained models of the countless individuals in which they are expressed, or the eternal forms of things."[82] The thing in itself "is indivisible and wholly present in every appearance", but the degrees of its objectivation are divided in space and time and each different Ideas are to be considered "separate and intrinsically simple acts of the will, in which its essence expresses itself to a greater or lesser extent."[83] Likewise, the individual subject is the appearance of an Idea (act of will) in time, space, and multiplicity.

From an epistemological perspective, the introduction of Ideas makes sense for Schopenhauer because although the faculty of understanding is sufficient for human beings to cognize individuals in the strict sense, real cognition is what Plato called επιστημη (*episteme*), "cognition of what exists in and for itself and always in the same way."[84] Now, cognition of sensible objects does not meet these criteria in Plato's theory. This conclusion is accepted by Schopenhauer, and he argues that this is ultimately what Kant's position amounts to too.[85] Interestingly, this means that for Schopenhauer cognizing the real world and even subsuming its objects into concepts does not count as cognition in the strict sense. Schopenhauer must present an argument for how human beings cognize these Ideas and thus are capable of real cognition in the Platonic sense. His strategy will inaugurate a new phase in his philosophy on which depending on one's perspective, his originality resides, or his contradictions become more evident.

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to Plato himself (WWR I, 155; 236). However, White (2012, 139-141) makes an interesting suggestion, namely, that Schopenhauer took this restriction from Plato's *Timeaus*. He writes, "Thus, like Plato in the *Timaeus* (again on one reading of that dialogue), he sees the universe as an aggregate of individuals located in space and time, and he invokes the existence of those and only those Ideas that these individuals and their elements are likeness of" (140).

[82] WWR I, 154.

[83] WWR I, 179.

[84] WWR I, 193.

[85] I believe that Kant would not have accepted this interpretation of his view in the *Critique*. I am thinking especially of what he tries to argue in the Analogies.

The Ideas are outside the realm of the principle of sufficient reason and the *a priori* structures of the understanding so they are not objects of cognition in the normal sense. Accordingly, something must happen to the subject of cognition in order to attain cognition of Ideas. Some elements of Schopenhauer's account of cognition must be further elucidated to make sense of the kind of transformation in the human consciousness needed for cognition of the Ideas. First, for Schopenhauer cognition of the sensible world does not appear until the highest levels of biological development, that is, with the advents of brains in the animal kingdom and in human beings. Second, Schopenhauer argues that the human intellect is a product of the thing in itself as will; as such, the intellect cognizes and is initially invested in what promotes the will's perpetual survival. In that regard, all cognition is *interested* or has ulterior motives some of which can be hidden from us. Behind all our most basic decisions in this life, lies the will seeking to keep its most perfect representation, that is, the human body, alive.

Schopenhauer describes all cognition, the one that is called 'scientific', as cognition of *relations* or of Where, When, Why and Wherefore of things. If this is the case, Schopenhauer must find another way in which we cognize objects *without interest for the will*, a type of knowledge that considers the object before us in a more intense and focused way; what he calls 'real knowledge' (*eigentliche Erkenntniß*). Schopenhauer claims to have found this in what he calls aesthetic knowledge.[86] This cognition consists entirely in the consideration of the What: "we devote the entire power of our mind to intuition and immerse ourselves in this entirely…we *lose* ourselves in this object completely, i. e. we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, the clear mirror

[86] White (2012, 140) suggests that what Schopenhauer says of the artists "is markedly similar to what Plato says of the divine creator. Indeed, the divine creator *is* an artist (see *Republic*, 596b-e)."

of the object [*Objekt*]."[87] In ordinary experience, Schopenhauer claims, we tend to focus less on the object itself and more in the concept in which we want to subsume the object, whereas the aesthete, the one with true cognition, endeavors to grasp the Idea of each thing.[88] The more we focus on pure cognition (which opposes subjectivity) the less we are dominated by the will, and this allows us for brief periods to become a pure, will-less and timeless subject of cognition.

The Pure Subject of Cognition is described by Schopenhauer as the "the eternal world-eye", it is "identical with itself, constantly one and the same, and the supporter of the world of permanent Ideas."[89] Its counterpart is the individual subject, concerned with things as his or her will desires or rejects them. Schopenhauer's language suggests that the level in which Pure Subject and Idea coexist is prior to the world of sensible things and thus 'more real' than the latter.[90] It is in the pure cognition of the Pure Subject that the objective world has its true existence; accordingly, the pure Subject is *all things* in so far as he cognizes them. This 'world in between', that is, between the thing in itself and representations is an *eternal present*. Thus, every human being has a twofold existence as individual subject and Pure Subject. This twofold existence is comparable and related to the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible character.

Schopenhauer makes this connection very explicitly in his writing. The novelty is that Schopenhauer synthetizes the Kantian doctrine with his doctrine of Platonic Ideas. Schopenhauer writes, "The intelligible character coincides with the Idea, or more

[87] WWR I, 201.
[88] WWR I, 187.
[89] WWR II, 371.
[90] The intelligible world is real (*real*) and the sensible world is actual (*wirklich*).

specifically with the original act of will revealed in the Idea."[91] Accordingly, the intelligible character is an extra-temporal, indivisible act of will.[92] I believe that Schopenhauer considers the intelligible character, as a member of the intelligible world and an original act of will, to be an expression of greater unity than the consciousness of our empirical character that is revealed in time and space. Taking the cue from Kant, Schopenhauer states that the empirical character is a "temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal and thus indivisible and unalterable act of will, or an intelligible character."[93] Many passages suggest that what Schopenhauer is explaining refers to the general 'Idea of Human Being'.[94]This reading supports the strong 'non-self' interpretation that permeates most Schopenhauer's commentators. However, Schopenhauer strongly hints that individual human beings are not just a manifestation or corporalization of a general idea of human being, but that each individual human being *is* an individual Idea. If this interpretation is justifiable, our true self is in the intelligible world and its unity originates in its being an expression of the thing in itself. In absolute terms, the harmony, coherence, and unity of the universe is explained by the thing in itself, but for individual human beings, what makes us the person that we are is an idea.

The True Self as Idea in the Intelligible World

[91] WWR I, 189.
[92]WWR I, 181. According to Schopenhauer, "the existence of this object in general, and the manner of its existence, i. e. the Idea that reveals itself in the object or, in other words, its character, is an immediate appearance of the will" (313).
[93] WWR I, 328.
[94] A notion that is mentioned 23 times in WWR I, curiously, the same amount as the notion of intelligible character.

That an idea is what makes us the person that we are, is explicitly stated in §25 of WWR 1 while Schopenhauer discusses the differences between animals and human beings in reference to their individuality and character. Animals lack the extremely individuality that human beings display in their personalities; we see this not only in their behavior but in their physiognomy. In that regard, in animals one clearly sees the species character [*Gattungscharakter*] which approximates the universality of the Idea expressed in them. This changes when we consider human beings; unlike animals, if we want to understand a single human being, we must study his or her character very carefully and not even after that can we be certain of how a person is going to act. The individual character [*Individualcharakter*] is so accentuated in human beings that Schopenhauer concludes "every human being is a particularly determined and characteristic appearance of the will, and can even be viewed as his or her own individual Idea."[95] A similar view is expressed in the following text when Schopenhauer connects the notions of individual idea and intelligible character: "Since the character of any particular person is thoroughly individual and not entirely subsumed under that of the species, it can be seen as a specific Idea corresponding to a distinctive act of the will's objectivation. This act itself would then be the person's intelligible character, and the empirical character would be its appearance."[96] We find a corroboration of this in Schopenhauer's definition of 'personhood'; he writes that a person is a "rational animal with individual characters."[97] At this point, things are messy: on the one hand, Schopenhauer speaks about the idea of human being as the

[95] WWR I, 156-57. [*Während nun also jeder Mensch als eine besonders bestimmte und charakterisirte Erscheinung des Willens, sogar gewissermaaßen als eine eigene Idee anzusehen ist*]
[96] WWR I, 183.
[97] WWR I, 314-15. "Only abstract concepts make it possible for people to choose between several motives; and this is the condition for a clear and decisive individual character, which is the primary distinction between people and animals (since animals have almost no character except the character of their species)" (326).

"clearest and most perfect objectivation of the will"[98] where individuals are expressions of that Idea in space and time; on the other hand, each human beings expresses an individual Idea. How to reconcile these contradictory claims?

I propose the following solution. If Schopenhauer has a doctrine of ideas of individuals, then he describes something like this: among the diversity of Ideas there is an Idea of Human Being, but this Idea is unique in that it further expresses a multitude of individual human beings *before* their manifestations in space and time; therefore, each human being is its own Idea or its own intelligible character which it is expressed in an empirical character when that individual Idea appears in space and time. Now, if we accept the existence of an idea of individual this does not mean that this answers Kant's problem regarding the unity of experience and consciousness. This individual idea is unified, but we know that its unity is determined by the thing in itself. But the appearance of this idea of individual opens many fascinating possibilities for a transcendental idealist account of the self because this is a notion that seems to go deeper and beyond Kant's account of intelligible character in the *Critique*.[99] Kant never says that the intelligible character is the expression of an idea. Therefore, I will take this idea of individual as the deeper we can go if we were to know our real true self from a transcendental idealist perspective.

We can ask about this individual idea – which is the most real self – whether it is immortal. Bearing in mind what Schopenhauer says about Ideas, it seems that the answer

[98] WWR I, 178.

[99] Janaway (2012, 446-452) discusses the similarities and differences between Kant and Schopenhauer on the intelligible character. His argues that Schopenhauer should have abandoned the notion of intelligible character (452-453). One of his arguments relates to the problem of individuation, namely, that the non-empirical intelligible character cannot be individual. Both Kleist (2010) and Neill (2007) address this objection from different perspectives in what I think is a satisfactory way. Neither of them considers the possibility that Schopenhauer argues for a different way of unity other than the principle of individuation. Something can be one precisely because it is outside space and time.

is 'yes'. But is the individual idea what, for example, Plato or Plotinus call 'soul'? The answer is not immediately evident. Schopenhauer himself seems ambivalent in this regard: while denying completely that there is an immortal soul, he defends that something in us remains after death, but this is not our character. Evidently, we need to explore these issues more carefully before we jump into any conclusion. That will be the task of the next chapter.

III. Schopenhauer and the Metaphysical Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism

In both chapters 1 and 2, I have alluded to the metaphysical perspective of transcendental idealism and my misgivings regarding the transcendental status. This is a perspective, as a mentioned in the previous chapter, that was already suggested by Schopenhauer. In what follows, I can finally offer a full argument for this perspective. My hope is to use this interpretation as a framework in the argument for the immortality of the real self.

Since the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* transcendental idealism has been perceived or criticized as a form of subjective idealism. Kant is viewed as the inaugurator of postmodern thought, especially its subjectivism. According to Kant's critics, the mind, not reality sets the terms for cognition.[100] All of this is done despite Kant's protestation to the contrary.[101] To counter the accusation of subjectivism, some commentators argue that

[100] Hicks (2011 32-44).
[101] Beiser (2008) speaks of this point. Kant wants to return to objectivity after Descartes and this is very obvious in Prol. 30: 288. For example, Kant writes, "I grant by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us…yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procure us, and which we call bodies."

transcendental idealism is primarily an epistemological doctrine[102] while others insist on the metaphysical character of transcendental idealism.[103]

Before discussing transcendental idealism as a metaphysical doctrine, let me review the non-controversial claims about transcendental idealism.[104] There are three central claims: (1) the distinction between appearances and things in themselves; (2) humility[105], namely, the claim that we do not and cannot have cognition of things as they are in themselves, and (3) idealism,[106] namely, the claim that appearances are mind dependent. This last claim could be further expanded to form a core understanding of what is meant by 'idealism' in this study. Idealism comes in different flavors depending on how the relationship between sensible object and mind is understood. The transcendental idealism considered here, began by Kant and refined by Schopenhauer, posits that sensible objects have three interrelated natures: (1) the idealist argues that the empirical object which appears in space/time or time alone is not reality as it is in itself (Berkeley); (2) the transcendental idealist argues that this empirical object is mind-dependent in the sense that space and time are merely subjective forms of sensitivity. If the empirical object was not mind dependent it would not be ideal. Although the empirical object is not reality in itself, it is a real object given to consciousness. It exists as an object of a mental act (Kant). However, if this was all we could say about objects, then we would have solipsism; (3) thus, the idealist understands empirical representations as constituted by the duality subject-object and realizes that this is still considering the empirical object in a manner

[102] Collins (1999); Beiser (2009); and Allison (2004).
[103] Guyer (1987); Langton (1998); and Westphal (2004).
[104] Garfield (1998, 21-23) adds the three distinct natures that must be found in a phenomenon to count as idealism.
[105] Langton's (1998) term.
[106] From Allais (2004).

similar to the first nature. That something is mind dependent is not cognition of reality itself. Another step is needed that overcomes the representational nature of empirical objects and brings us closer to the thing itself. Reality itself must be non-spatiotemporal, totally different from any form of representation (Schopenhauer).[107]

This view of the empirical object having three natures does not mean that they are three distinct natures; the view is that they mutually implicate each other. Another important feature of this interpretation of idealism is that it is as much epistemological in character as it is ontological. An epistemological consideration, for example, the distinction subject-object leads to the consideration of how things are independently of this distinction. Finally, this transcendental idealism does not say that outside human mental existence/dependence, there is absolutely nothing. Although it is problematic to use the category of existence to describe it, there is a reality that 'exist' without dependence to the human mind.

Similar considerations could be made by focusing on the perennial question of how to deal with the Kantian distinction between appearances/things in themselves.[108] Several possibilities are available: i) the total rejection of the distinction; ii) the defense of the distinction by interpretating it in epistemological or metaphysical ways; and iii) a defense of the distinction that merges epistemology and metaphysics. Schopenhauer argues that to take the distinction as exclusively epistemological (eg. Allison's Two Aspect View) leads to a description of the world that remains *physical* or an explanation that only describes

[107] Garfield (1998) argues for the progression of Western idealism based on Vasubandhu's doctrine of the three natures.
[108] McWherter (2012) raises important questions regarding the effectiveness of transcendental idealism to claim that there are things in themselves. This creates a problem for the very distinction appearances/things in themselves.

what physics can study about reality. This is mostly what can be quantified or measured.[109] On the other hand, an exclusively metaphysical view has the danger of going too far abandoning the realm of philosophy to enter the realm of divine revelation. Transcendental idealism cannot claim to solve all problems but point to the best reasonable solution. Thus, I think that transcendental idealism is better understood as the doctrine that combines epistemology and ontology.[110]

Here I want to emphasize the metaphysical aspects of transcendental idealism because if we take Kant's transcendental idealism as the model, we end up with at most, a very minimalist metaphysics whereas I think that metaphysics, even in transcendental idealism, can have a broader scope. The problem here is unavoidable when transcendental idealism is view exclusively from Kant's point of view, no matter if we interpret it in an epistemological or metaphysical way. To explain this point, I am inspired by Schopenhauer's observation that Kant's *Critique* remains ultimately a philosophical physics. What Schopenhauer means by this is that Kant reduced metaphysics to a study of the *a priori* structures of human cognition.[111] This reduction, argues Schopenhauer, does not satisfy human being's quest for solutions to the problem of ultimate reality. Kant's answers remain at the level of the appearance, but for Schopenhauer this amounts to a physics without a metaphysics: "what goads us to further research is simply the fact that we are not satisfied with knowing that we have representations…We want to know the

[109] McWherter (2012) argues that if transcendental idealism is merely an epistemology, it is self-refuting and, although, he does not commit to a metaphysical reading of it, his arguments suggests that this reading may be needed if one wants to overcome the unresolvable problems of a purely epistemological reading.
[110] Allais (2004) writes: "Although we can introduce Kant's distinction in terms of different ways of considering things, it is not a distinction between ways of considering, but between the mind-independent and unknown intrinsic nature of things, and thins as they are in our experience of them; this is surely a distinction that is both ontological and epistemological" (681). Roche (2011, 364) argues that Allais' overall argument is not idealistic enough.
[111] From where Kant took this position.

meaning of those representations."[112] According to Schopenhauer, human beings are unsatisfied with just knowing the Why or How (physics); thus, they desire to know the What (metaphysics).

According to Schopenhauer, only metaphysics can give us the What of experience. As he defines it in WWR II, chapter 17:

> By *metaphysics* I mean all supposed cognizance that goes beyond the possibility of experience, and so beyond nature or things in their given phenomenon, in order to inform us as to how, in one or another sense, they are conditioned, or, to put it in popular terms, as to that which is behind nature and makes it possible.[113]

Without an account of the thing in itself, Schopenhauer claims that transcendental idealism lacks the necessary component to be metaphysical. Schopenhauer criticizes Kant for not providing a metaphysics but only a physics given Kant's refusal to investigate the thing in itself. This leaves the *Critique* as an incomplete work that needs to be supplemented by *The World as Will and Representation*. In this point, Schopenhauer draws a clear line between his and Kant's philosophy:

> Kant teaches that we cannot know anything beyond experience and its possibility; I concede this but maintain that experience itself, in its totality, is capable of an explanation, and I have attempted to provide this by deciphering experience like a

[112] WWR I, 123. Although Allais' (2004: 669-677) discussion of Kant's idealism does not reach this conclusion, her discussion shows that Kant remains at the level of physics.
[113] WWR II, 187. (Emphasis in original)

> written text, but not, like all previous philosophers, by undertaking to go beyond it by means of its mere forms, which Kant indeed had demonstrated to be inadmissible.[114]

This text moves transcendental idealism in the right direction while still carrying over from Kant an issue that will need to be discussed in the future. Transcendental idealism both for Kant and Schopenhauer is supposed to be a purely immanent explanation, even when Schopenhauer speaks about the thing in itself. I think that transcendental idealism must learn to deal with the thing in itself in a less biased way. All this leads to the question of what do I mean by taking transcendental idealism as a metaphysical doctrine? First, it is my conviction that transcendental idealism speaks about and claims to describe actual existing things and it is not one big thought experiment. Even if challenging to interpret, when Kant discusses pure apperception and Schopenhauer the Pure Subject of Cognition, these are in some way actual things. What does it mean to say that they are actual things and what authorizes us to speak about them is another issue. Second, this means to take transcendental idealism in a Schopenhauerian way. However, this is not a blind defense of every aspect of Schopenhauer's take on metaphysics or transcendental idealism (at the appropriate time, I will return to these issues). The most important way in which Schopenhauerian transcendental idealism is a metaphysical doctrine is that Schopenhauer "evinces lingering Kantian scruples with respect to the claim of ignorance about things in themselves;"[115] to this obvious feature of Schopenhauer's thought, I would add something that, from my perspective is also revolutionary for transcendental idealism, namely,

[114] PP I, 41.
[115] Shapshay (2011, 332).

Schopenhauer's use of the doctrine of Ideas which the Kant of the first *Critique* would have found unacceptable.

Schopenhauer's account of the thing in itself, combined with the doctrine of Ideas, provides a metaphysical version of transcendental idealism. Like Kant, Schopenhauer is fully committed to the view that no cognition can be reached through representations of the thing in itself. But Schopenhauer departs from Kant in arguing that we have some intuitive understating of the in-itself of the world via 'immediate' internal awareness of our own acts of will. "The inner experience of our embodiment – though still in the form of time – constitutes a unique kind of representation for Schopenhauer and leads him (with a number of qualifications) to use it as the basis for the identification of the thing in itself with will."[116] Accordingly, Schopenhauer argues that there are two things we can cognize of thing in itself: (i) it is not spatiotemporal and (ii) it cannot be understood in a causal relationship with appearances. The use of categories to (illicitly) describe thing in itself is one constant source of tension between Schopenhauer and Kant. Schopenhauer thinks that Kant fails to see this unwarranted use when he speaks of 'things in themselves' in the plural. If Kant is committed to the claim that things in themselves do not have the spaciotemporal properties, then it makes no sense to speak about multiple 'things in themselves' because, according to Schopenhauer, the principle of individuation is space and time. He explains it in the following way: "It is only by virtue of time and space that something that is one and the same in essence and concept can nonetheless appear as different, as a multiplicity of coexistent and successive things: time and space are thus the *principium individuationis*."[117] Schopenhauer is not ignorant that this principle has been a

[116] Shapshay (2011, 330).
[117] WWR I, 137.

source of controversy in the tradition,[118] but remains convinced that time and space satisfies the qualifications to be the principle of individuation. Therefore, Kant should have talked about an unindividuated 'thing in itself'.

This leads Schopenhauer to speak about the thing in itself as 'one', but he denies that he says anything positive with this. Schopenhauer contrasts the oneness of the thing in itself with the oneness of an object and a concept. Therefore, it seems that we can understand individuation in different senses in Schopenhauer's philosophy. Ideas are distinguished from each other, and in that sense they are one. The thing in itself is *one* but not in the manner of the oneness of an object because, Schopenhauer argues, "an object's unity is known in contrast to a possible multiplicity."[119] On the other hand, the thing in itself is not one in the way a concept is one because "a concept arises only through abstraction from multiplicity."[120] The oneness of the thing in itself is to be understood in "the sense that it lies outside of time and space, outside the *principium individuationis*, i.e., the possibility of multiplicity."[121] A consequence of these claims is that the thing in itself in its oneness is totally present in every object of the universe. The same thing in itself is completely present in a rock and a human being. Schopenhauer accordingly speaks of a degree of objectification of the thing in itself, not of a gradation of the thing in itself in objects.

I agree with Schopenhauer that given the ideality of space and time, we should speak of 'thing in itself' when referring to ultimate reality, at the same time, there is a way in which Schopenhauer's metaphysics speaks of 'thing in themselves'. If we recall the

[118] He alludes to a summary of the issue made by Suarez in *Disp* 5, sec 3.
[119] WWR I, 138.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.

discussion about Ideas, we discover that Ideas are the closest to what Kant could mean by 'things in themselves'. According to Schopenhauer, there are multiple Ideas but an Idea is for example one species ('Dogness') and the Idea multiplies in space and time (dogs). When analyzed form this point of view, a dog is in itself an Idea. The final question is, how does interpreting transcendental idealism as metaphysics help me with the immortality of the true self? The provisional answer is: we're thing in itself, and I, as an individual Idea, participate in thing in itself's immortality. Chapter 5 will fully unpack the implications of this statement and hopefully argue for why we should accept this view.

IV. Concluding Thoughts on the True Self of Transcendental Idealism

Is there such a real self in transcendental idealism? Given Kant's and Schopenhauer's account of 'self', what conclusions can we reach? We say many things about it, but according to Kant and Schopenhauer we never cognize it as it is in itself; the 'self' and subject is never an *object* of cognition. What to do with this paradox? The self of transcendental idealism cognizes, and it is the center that experiences the ever flowing of inner and outer events. This self has representations, these include other objects that have an 'I'. Through self-reflection (or critique of reason according to Kant), the self discovers the *a priori* structures of his or her understanding (intellect) that condition his or her representations.

Unlike the absolute idealist, the 'I' of a transcendental idealist recognizes that whatever representations are, cannot be exhausted in their being representations. If that were the case, then there would be no way to ground the claim, for example, that there are other

selves. Schopenhauer considers that the view that says that there is nothing else but representations is precisely the position of the skeptic.[122] Schopenhauer calls this view 'theoretical egoism'[123], and this is the position of a madman. Schopenhauer rejects solipsism and acknowledges that there is another aspect of things, namely, the metaphysical. No object without a subject and vice versa is the creed of Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism as he extracted it from the 'decided idealism' of the A edition.[124] But what things could be besides subject and object? The thing in itself.

The true self of transcendental idealism may overcome the Cartesian problem of mind-body interaction, but the distinction of two selves, one intelligible and the other empirical, in order to resolve problems like freedom does create new challenges.[125] In Kant we encounter the empirical and intelligible character and in Schopenhauer, not only did we encounter the Kantian distinction of two characters, but also an obscure presentation of a Pure Subject of Cognition that is not an individual. Moreover, this Pure Subject is the subjective pole of the Pure Object (Ideas) because the general form of cognition is an object for a subject – while claiming that each 'I' is the expression of an individual Idea. The Pure Subject is not an Idea, but then how is it that 'I' becomes it if 'I' is an Idea. Thus, more clarification is needed on what Schopenhauer is trying to accomplish with the introduction of the Pure Subject in Book III.[126]

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[122] McDermid writes, "Schopenhauer thinks that the skeptic, although wrong, is at least right to wonder what the world is besides being our representation. Yet, he goes on to suggest that only metaphysics can resolve what appears initially to be an exclusively epistemological issue" (2002, 228).
[123] WWR I, 128-129.
[124] See Schopenhauer's imaginary dialogue between Subject and Matter in WWR II, chapter 1, 20-22.
[125] Janaway (1984, 153).
[126] This problem seems more difficult to me than determining whether Ideas are consistent with Schopenhauer's principles.

Regardless of these questions, the true self of transcendental idealism seems to have a twofold existence that cannot be reduced to a pure mental and corporeal existence but seems to touch the whole we call 'I', as knower and willer. But there seems to be no satisfactory way to explain the identity of these two, just as there seems to be no satisfactory way to explain how the intelligible character is identical to the empirical character, that is, that the same who speaks, writes and eats is the same 'I' that is not located in space and time. The self in transcendental idealism has not overcome a substance-dualist perspective (assuming it is something to be overcome). There seems to be no bridge, no way of explaining the connection. This is the perennial problem of transcendental idealism – just as, in the Platonic tradition, the problem of how soul descends to body is a perennial problem. This brings us to the question of the exact 'status' in which Kant and Schopenhauer 'locate' the intelligible character and why they give to it the functions that ancient philosophy assigned to 'soul'?

At this point we have done enough work to elucidate some of the key elements of the true self. Now, I will like to turn to the next horn of the question, namely, its immortality. I suggest that we do two things to incorporate an argument for immortality from a theoretical perspective in transcendental idealism. 1) examine Kant's and Schopenhauer's arguments in favor and against immortality (chapter 3). 2) contrast their views with Plotinus' account of the immortality of the soul as an example of a traditional account that is supposed to be affected by transcendental idealism's destruction of metaphysics (chapter 4). Although I had laid some ground in this chapter, the work of the following chapters should lead us to a full articulation of how the argument could go in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3

Reconstructing the Immortality of the Self in Transcendental Idealism

Introduction

The question about the immortality of the true self is a complex issue in the Kantian-Schopenhauerian tradition of transcendental idealism. If we are to believe Kant, the question about a future state of the self after corporeal death is what started all metaphysical reflections. Thus, one would think that this was a central issue in Kant's project. However, Kant's actual engagements with the arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul and his repudiation of them are nowhere to be found in the *Critique*. For that we need to turn to his lectures on metaphysics where Kant discusses what he calls the traditional *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments for the immortality of the soul in the sections that he dedicates to rational psychology. On the other hand, Schopenhauer abandons the distinction between empirical and rational psychology. Moreover, he argues against the notion that the intellect, identified with the human soul, is the eternal principle that survives corporeal death: only the will survives death. Our individual consciousness disappears when its foundation, the human brain, dies. Likewise, Schopenhauer's characterization of the intelligible character implies that this entity is not destroyed by death.

This chapter then is divided in three parts. In the first part, I will explain the arguments for immortality as reported in Kant's lectures and how that discussion helps us to understand the evolution of Kant's thought that led to the Paralogisms in the *Critique*. The discussion on the *Critique* will lead to a presentation of the faculty of reason and its ideas by which Kant justifies that we can hold a rational belief about the immortality of the soul. Kant concludes that if I use my theoretical mind, which I take him to mean, the mind of the physicist or mathematician that studies nature, that mind, says Kant, cannot cognize nor study an object that past philosophers have called 'soul.' If we want to philosophize about the soul, we must do it within the realm of practical reason. To make sense of reason's demands in the realm of morals, we must pretend, believe *as if* true, that human beings have an immortal soul. Therefore, Kant argues that a rational belief alone is what we can hope to attain in any philosophical discussion about the immortality of the soul. [1]

The second part is dedicated to Schopenhauer who, although did not read Kant's lectures, seems to provide an answer to one of Kant's main objections against the *a priori* argument for the immortality of soul. But in answering, Schopenhauer subverts the traditional view on what is immortal in the self. For Schopenhauer, the human soul is not the most fundamental dimension of what makes us human beings. Thus, although Schopenhauer embraces the conclusions of the Transcendental Dialectic regarding the human soul, it does not follow for him that human beings are not immortal in some sense and this can be established through theoretical arguments. Immortality is not a feature of individual existences, namely, it is not Kant or Socrates who survive death, but the will that is manifested in them; will is the only 'abiding substance.'

[1] See discussion in Surprenant (2008).

This will is that dimension in them that is the thing in itself. Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer does not consider the thing in itself to be *absolutely* unknowable. But this does not mean for him that we cognize ourselves as an abiding personal substance. Schopenhauer accepts the *Critique* as the total demolition of the notion that the 'I' is at its core a soul. According to Schopenhauer, only the species is immortal, not the individuality manifested in history. Our analysis of Schopenhauer in this chapter suggests that he does not have a doctrine of ideas of individuals. However, this issue will be further explored with a reassessment of Schopenhauer's account of the intelligible character.

The last part of the chapter will be devoted to an assessment of both Kant's and Schopenhauer's position regarding immortality, where I praise what is good and criticize where I think that they are mistaken. On the one hand, I hope to show that Kant has not abandoned the notion of human soul or its immortality. Instead, he claims to have clarified the origin of all disputes regarding the status of the human soul while laying out the rules for guarding against future errors. The discussion of Kant's psychology and his rejection of theoretical arguments also points to the flaws in Kant's project, namely, his demand that cognition of the human soul should mirror cognition of sensible objects. On the other hand, I propose that Schopenhauer's objective perspective, a perspective that is hardly the center of attention in Schopenhauer's studies, cannot be used to its full potential unless we free the human intellect from the human brain. The subjection of the intellect to the brain is one of the most salient features of Schopenhauerian psychology. However, only when the intellect is not identified with the brain, can the intellect be recognized as another generating principle of the sensible world.

To achieve this task, I will propose that we look at two interconnected sources for inspiration, namely, the philosophy of Plotinus and contemporary substance dualism. This will help us to achieve two things: free the intellect from the corporeal brain and grasp in what sense can we say that the intellect is a generating principle of reality.

Part I

I. The Immortality of the Self in the Lectures

The Soul from the Perspective of Rational Psychology

In chapter 1, I avoided the details regarding the teachings of rational psychology according to the lectures on metaphysics. Before analyzing the arguments presented in the *Critique*, it would be helpful to know what Kant teaches in his lectures regarding the nature of the soul from an *a priori* perspective. I think that it is important to state from the beginning what exactly the scope of the discussion of immortality is and what this means for Kant. As revealed by the lectures, the immortality of the soul is a nuanced discussion. Immortality is discussed exclusively as a topic of rational psychology even though 'soul' is an empirical concept. Within rational psychology, immortality is a question regarding the connection of the soul with other things and of the interaction (*commercio*) soul/body.

As in chapter 1, I begin with *Metaphysiks L1*. In this set of notes, Kant explains what the subject matter of rational psychology is: the study of the human soul from *a priori* concepts. If in empirical psychology we study the human soul from the perspective of

sensible experience, in rational psychology we ask how much we can cognize about the soul through reason. Kant calls this cognition metaphysical. Rational psychology assumes *that* we have a soul. This study is divided in three parts: the soul (i) in and for itself, (ii) in comparison to other things, (iii) and in connection to the body. In this section, I will focus on (i) and (ii). In the study of the soul in and for itself, Kant speaks of the use of transcendental concepts of ontology to describe the soul. These concepts are 'substance', 'simple', 'single substance' and 'spontaneous agent'.

Thus, in rational psychology, I cognize of the soul that it is a substance or that I am a substance. This is how Kant explains this point:

> The *I* means the subject, so far as it is no predicate of another thing. What is no predicate of another thing is a substance. The I is *the general subject* of all predicates, of all thinking, of all actions, of all possible judgments that we can pass of ourselves as a thinking being. I can only say: I am, I think, I act. Thus it is not at all feasible that the I would be a predicate of something else. I cannot be a predicate of another being; predicates do belong to me; but I cannot predicate the I of another, I cannot say: another being is the I. Consequently the I, or the soul through which the I is expressed, is a substance.[2]

Overall, Kant retains this view throughout the 1780's but in the *Metaphysiks Mrongovius* notes we encounter a more critical stance regarding the substantiality of the soul. In general, Kant still holds that we are a substance, and that we are conscious of the substantial nature of the soul. But now he says that "of the substantial, in body as well as in me, I have

[2] M.L1 79 (28:266).

no proper concept."[3] Of the substantial we only know that it is *something*, but nothing can be derived from such a sterile concept as 'something'. Kant now denies that we can infer substantiality from perdurability. 'Substance' is that which remains throughout all alterations, but we have only experience of the soul before death, and we do not know what happens after death. If we call the soul 'substance' it must be taken as a logical function, that is, that the soul is always subject and never a predicate.

'Platonic' A Priori Proof

Immortality is usually associated with a future state, with the question, will I live after death? However, this is not the only way to deal with this topic and Kant makes that clear in his discussion. The question of immortality refers not only to what happens after death, but what happens before birth; this follows from Kant's requirement that the soul should be immortal *necessarily* and by its nature. As Kant defines it in *Metaphysics L1*, "*Immortality is the natural necessity of living.*"[4] And this applies not only to after life death but to life before birth. Now, these concepts, 'life' and 'necessity', need to be explained to further clarify what we are doing here. First, I will say something briefly about 'necessity'. Here Kant means an *a priori* necessity of the kind we encountered in the *Critique*. For Kant, it is important to establish that the soul is *by nature* immortal, not that it survives because a supreme being like God keeps it in existence, but that God created a being that lives necessarily.

[3] M.Mr 270 (29: 904).
[4] M.L1 94 (28:285).

As for life, as I mentioned before, Kant discusses the issue of immortality in relation to the interaction (*commercio*) between body and soul. Now, this interaction is studied according to its relationship with time. From the point of view of time, the interaction begins as soon as we have a human being. Kant identifies this beginning with *birth* in time; this is an arbitrary decision made by Kant because one could debate the claim that a human being begins to be a human being at the moment of birth. But for the sake of charity, I will accept Kant's determination that the beginning of the interaction of the body/soul is birth. Kant defines 'life' as the interaction of the soul with the body, specifically the *duration* of that interaction.

For the moment, 'life' seems to refer to the period in which the soul interacts with the body, thus to a purely biological perspective of life. But Kant makes clear that 'life' here refers to the life of a human being so that when a human being dies that means the end of life for a human being and not to the end of the soul. Kant concludes: "Birth, life, and death are thus only *states* of the soul, for the soul is a simple substance."[5] As we see here, Kant adheres to the view that the soul is a simple substance, and this justifies that the soul cannot be produced with the body or decomposed with the body.[6] The birth of a human being is not the beginning of the principle of life. In Kant's discussion of the soul, this 'principle of life' plays an important role.

Kant now passes to the discussion of soul *before* birth and *after* death and what he says here has important ramifications for immortality. Given that Kant considers the soul a simple substance that begins interacting with a body at birth, Kant describes life before

[5] M.L1 92 (28:282).
[6] "The principle of life is a simple substance…for a simple substance does not arise and passes away according to natural laws" (M.L1 93, 28:283).

biological life: "*before* birth we were in a pure, spiritual life; and that through birth the soul, so to speak, came into a dungeon, into a cave, which hinders it in its spiritual life."[7] The Platonic undertones are obvious, but unlike the Platonic account of *Phaedrus*, the state of the soul "before birth was thus without consciousness of the world and of itself."[8] The soul in the spiritual world is a pure spiritual principle of life, unconscious, but with its faculties in potentiality. Here Kant approaches a more Aristotelian/Scholastic view where sensible things are needed to awake the potentialities. Only when the soul interacts with a sensible world can there be consciousness and self-consciousness.

Now I turn to the question of what happens after the end of biological life, when the soul/body interaction ends. As I mentioned above, the issue for Kant is twofold: whether the soul will live after death and whether the soul by its nature *must* live (Kant's requirement for necessity). According to Kant, 'life' does not imply immortality because God can keep the soul alive after corporeal death either for rewards or punishments. But in this case the soul survives because of a divine act, not because the soul cannot cease to live. Following this discussion, Kant will present four arguments for the immortality of the soul. Kant divides them in two groups, namely, *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments. The first two discussed are *a priori* arguments, the next one is an *a posteriori* argument taken from empirical psychology and the last one is an empirical-psychological argument based on an analogy with nature (what Kant calls an argument with cosmological grounds). Given the scope of this dissertation, I will focus on the first *a priori* argument because the second only proves according to Kant the *hope* for immortality but not the necessary survival of

[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.

the soul.[9] In *Metaphysics L1*, only the first *a priori* argument successfully proves that the soul lives necessarily. Here Kant speaks of a *transcendental* proof: "the proof which is taken from the nature and the concept of the matter itself is always the only possible proof, and this is *transcendental.*"[10] Kant informs us that the proof goes like this: "life is nothing more than a faculty for acting from an *inner* principle, from spontaneity."[11] Kant argues that in the concept 'soul' we find this: "it is a subject that contains spontaneity in itself for determining itself from the inner principle."[12] The soul animates the body, it is its source of life. For Kant, matter is lifeless; thus, everything that belongs to life cannot come from matter.[13]

To illustrate this proof, Kant introduces an image that will be used frequently in the discussion of this proof, namely, that of a human being attached to a cart. In this analogy, the human being plays the role of soul and the cart the role of the body. The cart does not move itself, but its movements come from the human being. We would not say that the human being could not keep moving if we detach him or her from the cart; we would see that the human being can move even better without the cart. Kant uses this image to justify that biological life is a hindrance to life, and the soul as principle of life is more itself when it is detached from the body. Kant concludes, "Thus death is not the absolute suspension of life, but rather a liberation from the hindrances to a complete life."[14]

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[9] M.L1 98 (28:290).
[10] M.L1 94 (28:285).
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] "]L]ife is nothing more than a faculty for acting from an *inner* principle, from spontaneity. Now it lies already in the general concept of the soul that it is a subject that contains spontaneity in itself for determining itself from the inner principle…The act <*actus*> of spontaneity cannot proceed from an outer principle, i. e., there cannot be outer causes of life, for otherwise spontaneity would not be in life" (M.L1 94, 28:285).
[14] M.L1 96 (28:287).

Further development of this proof is found in the *Metaphysiks Mrongovius* and *Metaphysiks Volckmann*[15] notes. First, in *Metaphysiks Mrongovius* Kant speaks about the origin of the soul, that is, the question of the soul before birth. If the soul were material, it would come to be at the same time as matter or come to be at the same time as the body. But this cannot be true for the soul because of its simplicity; a simple thing, argues Kant, can only come to be through creation. The body is composed of parts and that means that the parts existed before the composite, thus the composite does not need to be created in the same way a soul needs to be created. Kant rejects that this creation is *actuatio ex nihilo* because the concept of simple substance already implies this, namely, creation is actuation of substance (*actuatio substantiae*). Accordingly, Kant rejects that the human souls are generated by parents and defends that it is God who does this. Moreover, Kant argues that the soul is created at the beginning of the world. His reasonings are interesting but betray a series of 18th century academic prejudices. For Kant, the creation of a soul is a miracle and like a good Enlightenment philosopher, Kant thinks that miracles are extraordinary events, it is their very rarity that marks their miraculous status.[16] This is a presupposition and not something that it is proven, or accepted universally by those who study miracles. Thus, Kant thinks that if God were to create souls all the time it would cease to be a miracle.

Kant once again speaks about three kinds of proofs: from experience, through rational psychology and by analogy. These are the same *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments mentioned before. What Kant calls the rational proof is the *a priori* proof that I discussed from *Metaphysics L1*. It mostly follows what I discussed before; it begins by stating that all "matter is lifeless, has no faculty for determining itself, and the principle of life is

[15] Ameriks and Naragon (2001, xxxvi).
[16] A view shared by Hume; see *Enquiry* 10.1.90/114-115.

something other than matter."[17] From this it is concluded that matter is "mere receptivity or passivity. The principle of life, however, is spontaneity or the faculty of determining oneself from inner principles."[18] Kant goes on to repeat his image of the person attached to a wagon or cart and he arrives at the same conclusions.

However, by the 1780's Kant had identified objections to this *a priori* proof. First, the lifelessness of matter is "merely a property of appearances, namely of the body."[19] According to this, we do not know if "the substance underlying the body also has life". Kant seems to be using the critical lens to assess the *a priori* proof, however it is not immediately intuitive what Kant means here. How to interpret this? Is Kant talking here about the thing in itself? Or is he talking about something like 'prime matter' or 'unformed matter'? The matter of a body has a form, and this form apparently does not contribute to life (it is lifeless) but whether matter in itself could have life without a form is impossible to know. Regardless of the complexities of interpreting this passage, Kant has another hesitation. Even if the body does not contribute anything to life, it "can still be the sole condition on which life depends."[20] A soul separated from the body would still have its 'life powers' but no longer life. Here the role of sensations is highlighted, and the body may be a requisite for us to have memory or even to be able to think.

In the final notes, *Metaphysiks Volckmann*, we find less material related to this proof. In a curious turn, Kant now says that the *a priori* proof and the analogy proof are part of rational psychology. The *a priori* proof is still based in the concept of the principle of life, but Kant qualifies this and speaks of the life of a being with intellect (*intelligens*).

[17] M.Mr 278 (29:913).
[18] Ibid.
[19] M.Mr 279 (29:914).
[20] Ibid.

Nevertheless, the objection remains the same: "here matter means only the appearance of outer things, these we indeed find lifeless, but we do not cognize whether the substance that underlie them perhaps contain life."[21] The study of *Metaphysiks Volckmann* leaves us with the same interpretative challenges encountered before; we do not know exactly what Kant means here by 'substance' that underlies appearances.

As Kant's thinking evolves, he becomes more critical of the *a priori* proof for immortality. He eventually rejects this argument completely. Although this argument remains useful to counter the objections of the materialist, Kant notes that a proof for immortality should not only concern itself with continued existence, but persistence of personal identity, something that the *a priori* argument fails to do.[22] We see this evolution play out in the lecture notes of the 1790's. In *Metaphysiks L₂*, Kant gives a small summary of the *a priori* proof, but dismisses it without much discussion. The proof may have an esteem tradition behind it, but it decides nothing, and "too much follows from it, one is delivered by it into wild fantasy [*Schwärmerei*]."[23]

The next important discussion is in *Metaphysiks Vigilantius*.[24] According to these notes, Kant argues that the assumption of life for the soul after death requires two proofs: i) the survival of the substance after death, namely, its permanence, and ii) the survival of its person, namely, retention of individuality. Regarding (i) Kant now has the conclusions of the *Critique* that lead him to deny this possibility. Perdurance is an empirical concept and can only be established in objects of sensible experience. While the soul is in this

[21] M.Vol 290 (28:441-42).
[22] Oaklander (2001, 185) argues that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is *both* what we are and what continues after our bodily death. The issue of personal identity is discussed by Kant in the Third Paralogism.
[23] M.L2 352 (28:592).
[24] Ameriks and Naragon (2001, xxxviii-xl).

world, we can speak of it as a permanent thing but after death we cannot determine this. The discussion of (ii) is a little more elaborated but with no less negative conclusions. Empirically speaking we only know that we retain memories in this life although we also know that we forget things. Accordingly, we could imagine that after death we will remember who we are, but never give an *a priori* proof of it.

Given that we cannot take an empirical event to ground a claim for personal identity after death, Kant turns to the *a priori* proof from the nature of the soul as he discussed it before. By now, Kant has ended his love affair with this proof. He states that "one must *distinguish the survival of the principle of life, or the faculty for living, from the act <actu> of life itself*."[25] Kant admits that the principle of life can survive without a connection to corporeal thing (body), but "an experience" is needed to establish that the "soul can exercise acts <*actus*> of life without connection to the body". By 'acts of life' I understand Kant to mean the actualization of the potentialities of life, for example, cognition and willing. Kant demands that we present an experience that shows that life can act without being connected to a body. Experience teaches the opposite, that is, that acts of life only occur in connection with a body. However, this is not the last word regarding this argument in this study. There is the impression that Kant supports a tendency to identify brain and mind, a tendency which becomes fully realized in Schopenhauer.

In summary, the lectures give us a good picture of Kant's theoretical evolution regarding the topic of the immortality of the soul. Specific empirical arguments (e.g. ghosts, apparitions, visions) are not good to him because they can never ground a necessity that he requires. Moreover, he straightforwardly denies that they are even possible. Thus,

[25] M.Vig 504 (29:1039).

he dismisses all forms of empirical arguments and never goes into any detailed discussion of them.[26] On the other hand, he considers a series of arguments that he finds more convincing. Two arguments have a special place in Kant's thought, the *a priori* and the analogy argument. I discussed the first one in detail, from Kant's acceptance to his total rejection. Although the evidence points that Schopenhauer did not read Kant's lectures on metaphysics, Kant's more critical stance towards the theoretical arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul will be echoed by Schopenhauer. On the positive side, the principle of life argument is refurbished by Schopenhauer, and it plays a major role in his own proposals about immortality. Schopenhauer uses this argument to validate his metaphysics in which he argues that all appearances are manifestations of the principle of life. Without being aware of what Kant said in the lectures, Schopenhauer argues that it is possible to establish that life is "the substance underlying the body." For Schopenhauer, even matter is generated by the principle of life; thus, what may be considered objections from Kant's perspectives are corroborations of his view. I think that Schopenhauer offers a solution that suggests there is something immortal in us. But before exploring that, I want to study the issue of immortality as it is presented in the A edition of the *Critique*. What Kant says there is important for Schopenhauer's discussion of this topic given that, if we believe Schopenhauer, it was the negative reception of this topic that led Kant's to rewrite this section in the B edition.

[26] Schopenhauer does not follow Kant in this radical dismissal. For him, the reports of ghosts and other paranormal phenomena is so prevalent throughout history that this must find a philosophical solution. Schopenhauer was also very interested in the occult. See his *Essay on spirit-seeing and related issues* in PP I, 198-272.

II. Kant's (Transcendental) Rational Psychology

Rational Psychology in the Critique of Pure Reason

Although the general impression is that Kant destroyed rational psychology by the time he wrote the *Critique*, this is not the whole truth. In the Architectonic of Pure Reason, a section of the *Critique* that is overlooked by most readers, Kant still has a place for rational psychology even after the critique of reason.[27] Unfortunately, Kant does not say anything in that section about what exactly the content of this rational psychology is. Possible answers could be glimpse from secondary literature.[28]

In Kant's milieu, rational psychology was a philosophical discipline whose goal was to study the human soul's nature according to *a priori* reasoning.[29] According to Wuerth, "The sole purpose for the rationalist's ventures in psychology…is to establish the immortality of the soul" (2010, 210). In order to do this, they needed to establish three things about the soul: its permanence, incorruptibility, and personality. But, according to Kant, they do not provide any argument for this. Instead, they argued, for example, for the conclusion 'the soul is a substance' and, from their point of view, this entails permanence.

For Dyck, "rational psychology is that science that purports to derive metaphysical claims of the soul independently of any experience" (2006, 249). Unlike other attempts at the study of the soul in which the body or the "I" of inner experience (or as Kant calls it

[27] See A846/B874-A849/B877.
[28] Dyck (2009) argues that Kant proposes a radical new interpretation of rational psychology in his introductory remarks to the Paralogism of the first *Critique*. In this new rational psychology, the concept of the soul is derived from the merely formal *I think* rather than the empirical *I*.
[29] For the context and innovation of Kant in the area of rational psychology, see Dyck (2009, 251-264).

the empirical 'I') is taken into consideration, Kant proposes a study of the soul that starts for the 'pure I', specifically, the *I think*. Only in this way could rational psychology claim to be a "pure" science (A342) in which I am not seeking to learn "in regard to the soul anything more than can be inferred, independently of all experience" from this 'I' (A342). For Kant, the problem with rational psychology is that it claims to be a science whose object – soul – can be studied just like any other object of sensible experience. But, he argues, no permanent, enduring 'I' is given in sensible intuition. Kant suggests that what rationalists call 'soul' is the 'transcendental apperception,' an *a priori* condition that is never given in intuition. The 'I' or pure *apperception* which remains after we peel off the layers of thought "expresses, if anything, only the generic form of self-referential thought, but does not provide the representation of a sensibly noticeable and thus temporally enduring substance."[30]

Turning to Kant's *Critique* to find a systematic treatment of the theoretical proofs of immortality as we find in the lectures can be disappointing. In the A edition of the *Critique*, there is no place where one can find a discussion of this topic. On the other hand, given what we know about Kant's transcendental method, we can anticipate that empirical arguments are not going to play any role. Turning towards the section of the Paralogisms we find Kant's complete rejection of the metaphysical-theoretical approach as we have encountered in the lectures. Accordingly, we see the development of Kant's thought from the lectures to the *Critique* not as a drastic transformation but as a careful meditation on this topic.[31] Nevertheless, any discussion of the *a priori* proof for immortality, so frequent

[30] Kraus (2018, 81).
[31] Dyck (2016) shows this in his study of the 'inner sense' from the Silent Years to the publication of the *Critique*.

in the lectures, is practically absent from the *Critique*. What remains of that discussion is Kant's connection between permanence and personal identity as the crucial point for a comprehensive discussion of the immortality of the human soul.[32] But the conclusions of the *Critique* fortify Kant's conviction that we, at most, speak of the human soul as permanent and a person while in this life, and no necessary argument can be brought forward to claim that this fact remains so after dead, at least theoretically.

Paralogisms

The Paralogisms section aims to show that the 'transcendental concepts' used by rational psychology are not applicable to the object of inner sense, that is, the human soul. The consequence of this move is that the metaphysical arguments used to defend the continuation of the human soul and its personal identity fall apart, which together make the content of what 'immortality' means. For example, in the First Paralogism, Kant argues that rational psychology cannot provide an argument to connect substantiality and permanence in the human soul. The reason is that "pure categories, and among them that of substance, have in themselves no objective meaning, unless they rest on an intuition and can be applied to the manifold of this intuition as functions of synthetic unity."[33] This text presupposes an important distinction made by Kant in the *Transcendental Analytic*, namely, between the pure category of substance and the schematized category of

[32] See A 401, B 415.
[33] See A 348-9.

substance.[34] I alluded to this distinction in chapter 1, now I must further unpack this distinction in order to make full sense of Kant's argument in the Paralogisms.

The following texts is a good place to start:

> Substance, for instance, when the sensible determination of permanence is omitted, would mean simply a something which can be thought only as a subject, never as a predicate of something else. Such a representation I can put to no use, for it tells me nothing as to the nature of that which is thus to be viewed as primary subject. The categories, therefore, without schemata, are merely functions of the understanding for concepts; and represent no object. This [objective] meaning they acquire from sensibility, which realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it."[35]

As this passage reveals, 'substance' can be understood as a pure category of the understanding, "meaning something which can exist as subject and never as mere predicate."[36] This sense of substance has only a pure logical function; it is not a category that yields objective knowledge, but it is merely the form of thought "for the making of knowledge from given intuitions."[37] On the other hand, Kant introduces a break between substance and permanence by what he calls 'schematized substance:' "The schema of substance is permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a substance of empirical determination of time in general, and so as abiding while all else

[34] McLear (2020) argues that there are *three* distinctions, not just two. This third distinction cannot be inferred from the two previous distinctions, but it is found at the intersection of both distinctions. Likewise, this third concept is that of a subject in which accidents inhere.
[35] A147/B187.
[36] B149.
[37] B288.

changes."[38] Therefore, permanence is added to substance only in the phenomenon. While we have no intuition, no object of experience, permanence cannot be a predicate of substance. The pure category of understanding can only be applied and be given objective content when applied to objects in time; only then do we speak of a substrate that *remains* in time. This basic distinction is fundamental for the success of Kant's argument.

It is the schematized substance that Kant discusses in his most focused argument for the permanence of substance, that is, in the First Analogy.[39] There, Kant argues that "the substratum of all that is real, that is, of all that belongs to the existence of things, is *substance*; and all that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination of substance."[40] This substratum is permanent, a conclusion that Kant establishes through the essence of time, that is, the *a priori* form of sensibility: "the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change."[41] "Permanence," Kant writes, "as the abiding correlate of all existence of appearances, of all change and of all concomitance, expresses time in general."[42]

Given this knowledge, we can understand how Kant applies this distinction to the *I think* so as to deny the rationalist's argument for the permanence of soul. The First Paralogism[43], according to the first edition, states:

> That, the representation of which is the *absolute subject* of our judgments and cannot therefore be employed as determination of another thing, is *substance*.

[38] B183.
[39] A182/B225-A189/B232. McLear (2020) has a different view.
[40] B225.
[41] B225.
[42] A183.
[43] Rosenberg (1986).

I, as a thinking being, am the *absolute subject* of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be employed as predicate of any other thing.

Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am *substance*.

Kant calls this argument a paralogism because one deceives oneself through it[44] and the conclusion does not follow from the premises. This fallacy involves an equivocation in the middle term; in the case of the First Paralogism, the middle term of the major premise – *absolute subject* – is ambiguous or not common to the major and minor premises. As we saw, Kant speaks of two ways in which we can interpret the *absolute subject* or *the concept of a subject that is never a predicate*: one is the pure category of substance, which is indeterminate and does not imply permanence and the other is the schematized substance which is determined and permanent. Rationalists fail to see this distinction and infer from the *immediate apperception*, the pure 'I', an object of intuition which they call 'soul.'

We learned from the lectures that permanence is not the only criterion to prove the immortality of the soul, but a proof of immortality must also show that the human person survives. This is what Kant tackles in the Third Paralogism. Here is Kant's formulation of the paralogism of personal identity:

That which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself at different times is in so far a person,

[44] A298/B354.

Now the soul is conscious, etc.

Therefore it is a person.

Kant deals with this syllogism in much the same way as he did with the First Paralogism. Kant accuses the rational psychologist of confusing the way in which we are conscious of the numeral identity of the *I* of the *I think* with the way in which we are conscious of the numeral identity of external objects. The ambiguous term in the Third Paralogism is "that which is conscious of the numerical identity of itself in different times" which makes use of the category of unity. In the major premise, the category is used in a transcendental way, that is, in a way that just states what condition an object in general must meet in order to be subsumed under that concept. The problem comes with the minor premise where Kant argues that the middle term is used in both transcendental and empirical ways.

Empirically, the concept of unity refers to what is one in space and time, what is one throughout time is what remains even after changes of its state. In contrast to this, the transcendental meaning refers to the logically necessary unity of an object of possible experience rather than its persistence in time. The rational psychologist is deceived by the illusion of permanence of soul into taking the merely formal unity of apperception for an empirical unity and based on that to take the consciousness of our identity in time with the identity of our own substance. Thus, the identity of the person through time is taken from how we cognize objects in time when in reality we only have an awareness of a mere consciousness of the unity of the logical subject of thought (*I think*).

Kant's discussion in the Paralogisms ignores the arguments for the immortality of soul and only focuses on what the lectures call 'transcendental concepts.' What we encounter

in the Paralogisms is an application of the conclusions of the Aesthetic and Analytic to the arguments of rational psychology. Nothing of what the traditional rational psychologist claimed to cognize by introspection or self-knowledge, no privileged access to the subject is possible. Therefore, for Kant there is no way to connect true self, substantiality and permanence.

Reason, Idea of Soul, and the Aims of Reason

The conclusions defended by Kant in the *Critique* should not make us assume that he rejects the following claims: i) that there is a human soul and ii) that the human soul is immortal. In the *Critique*, he argues that theoretical arguments put forward in favor of these statements are false or inconclusive. Kant claims that what he calls theoretical arguments in favor of the substantiality and immortality of the human soul fail to deliver when examined from the perspective of the rules set up in both the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. All conclusions or arguments that lead beyond possible experience "are deceptive and without foundation."[45] But Kant finds a way to keep the traditional view that human beings have an immortal soul which will live in a heavenly, or moral realm. He supports these conclusions with his account of reason and its pure concepts, namely, the ideas. This doctrine, combined with the practical use of reason, allows Kant to reintroduce into philosophy what the Paralogisms seem to deny. However, this reintroduction has a very different role than what Kant's predecessors thought: the immortality of the soul is a postulate of reason that helps us live moral lives.

[45] A642/B671.

The first thing that I need to present is the new faculty that Kant discusses in the Transcendental Dialectics, that is, reason (*Vernuft*). Before the Dialectic, Kant uses the word 'reason' in a wider sense, sometimes it is interchangeable with the understanding, sometimes is all *a priori* cognition. It is not until he discusses the faculty of reason in the Dialectic that he decides to provide a narrow sense of reason, now presented as a distinct faculty distinct from the understanding.[46] Kant differentiates reason from understanding because he argues that this faculty provides its unique set of *a priori* principles that plays a role in giving a greater and systematic unity to the judgments of the understanding.[47] Reason is then a higher-order faculty that aims to unify judgments of the understanding under more universal principles.[48]

According to Kant, reason demands a complete explanation for given facts. Reason wants to find an ultimate explanation to all things because it assumes that there must be such an explanation and it wants to reach it. Kant's term for a complete explanation is "the unconditioned." So, the essence of reason, in Kant's terminology, is the demand for the unconditioned for a series of conditions. This means that reason believes that there is an explanatory principle that is universal, namely, that it does not admit or requires further explanation. Kant argues that reason reaches this principle through a series of syllogisms, but instead of the expected path of inferring from the major premise to the conclusion, Kant explains that reason starts from the conclusion until it reaches something that fully explains

[46] Rohlf (2010, 195).
[47] "Reason is never in immediate relation to an object, but only to the understanding; and it is only through the understanding that it has its own [specific] empirical employment" (A643/B671).
[48] Thus reason relates itself only to the use of the understanding, not indeed insofar as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the absolute totality of conditions is not a concept that is usable in an experience, because no experience is unconditioned), but rather in order to prescribe the direction toward a certain unity of which the understanding has no concept, proceeding to comprehend all the actions of the understanding in respect of every object into an **absolute whole** (A 326–7/B 383).

the conclusion. Once we cannot give an answer to the question why?, all questions cease and, in Kant's view, we have reached the unconditioned, which Kant calls 'ideas'. Thus, transcendental ideas are "inferred concepts" of the unconditioned.[49]

One could think that Kant is presenting reason as a faculty that demands cognition of transcendent, extra mental entities, but the paradox is that the Transcendental Analytic has closed all possibilities of cognizing such entities. Kant claims that reason generates, from its very nature, ideas of such transcendent objects, such as, the ideas of soul, whole-world, and God. Kant justifies his use of ideas to describe the pure concepts generated by reason through a short discussion of Plato where he implies that he may have understood Plato better than Plato understood himself.[50]

The idea of soul, 'I' or thinking nature is the regulative principle that allows us to have systematic unity of the manifold of empirical knowledge in relation to inner sense. It allows us to "connect all the appearances, all the actions and receptivity of our mind, *as if* [*als ob*] the mind were a simple substance which persists with personal identity."[51] If one were to know the properties of the thinking nature, one would need to interrogate experience. But this would only give us an empirical answer, a series of conditions with no systematic unity. Here is where reason enters, it "takes the concept of the empirical unity of all thought; and by thinking this unity as unconditioned and original, it forms from it a concept of reason, that is, the idea of a simple substance, which, unchangeable in itself (personally identical), stands in association with other real things outside it; in a word, the idea of a simple self-subsisting intelligence."[52] Kant clarifies that in doing this, reason is not

[49] A 310/B 366; A 322/B 379
[50] A 314.
[51] A672/B700.
[52] A682/B710.

accessing some transcendent plane where it intuits the properties of a substance called soul. All these properties are only the "schema of this regulative principle" and in no way are they actual properties of the soul. If those properties are real, they rest on grounds that are not accessible to the human mind.

Kant insist that the soul itself can never be represented *in concreto*, that if I were to ask whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature, "the question would have no meaning."[53] A 'spiritual nature' implies not only abstraction from all corporeal nature, but from nature in general, namely, from all possible predicates of any possible experience. And, as Kant has insisted, no concept can have any meaning for us if it does not apply to an object in sensible intuition.

In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues that all the confusions and disagreements in philosophy stem from taking these ideas as objects of sensible experience. The ideas in themselves are neutral, it is how we use them that creates or solves philosophical problems. Kant identifies two possible uses of ideas, namely, constitutive, and regulative. Several texts in the *Critique* urge us to not use ideas in a constitutive way.[54]

> [Ideas] ought not to be assumed as existing in themselves, but only as having the reality of a schema – the schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all knowledge of nature. They should be regarded only as analoga of real things, not as in themselves real things.[55]

[53] A684/B712.
[54] A689/B717.
[55] A674/B702.

However, human reason has a natural tendency to transgress the limits of possible experience. For Kant this means that ideas are used in a transcendent way, as if they represent real objects beyond possible experience leading to paralogisms in the case of the human soul and endless debates about God among philosophers. In the Appendix to the Dialectic, Kant does give a "transcendental deduction of all the ideas of speculative reason," which argues that although the idea of the soul does not give us information of an object that transcends possible experience, it is always beneficial and never detrimental for us to use this idea as a regulative principle. These ideas make experience systematically coherent, especially our cognition of experience itself, especially in empirical science.[56] For Kant then, the idea of soul is needed to advance the study of empirical psychology.

Thus, the pure idea of soul is valuable as the principle that unifies all inner experiences and helps us construct a systematic empirical psychology. Kant argues that the idea of soul, when used regulatively, helps to advance the empirical study of the inner lives of human beings. On the other hand, Kant argues against using the idea of soul constitutively, not only because it generates contradictions and "reason is led away into mistaken paths," but because it dispenses us from "all empirical investigation of the cause of these inner appearances". What Kant seems to suggest in these passages is that those who take the idea of soul as the intuition of an object, think that their privileged access releases them from the task of investigating sensible experience. If we use the idea of soul constitutively, Kant claims, all empirical investigations are nullified. Kant is here showing himself as a friend to the Empiricist tradition in that all investigations that claim to expand our knowledge must have some basis on sensible experience.[57]

[56] A 671/B 699, A 687/B 715.
[57] A 689.

The sections dedicated to the lectures notes and the Paralogisms above have presented how Kant moves from accepting the rationalist account of the human soul to his rejection of it in the 1780's. I have said however that Kant is not a philosopher who rejects the human soul or its immortality, what he argues is that these notions cannot be used constitutively, namely, as if these notions have some basis on sensible experience. Kant only accepts the regulative use of these notions which at most are only objects of rational belief. But if reason by its very nature has interests and if the speculative path to attain them is definitively closed, perhaps it is still possible to satisfy reason through its practical employment. The strategy that Kant will adopt to preserve the traditional view of the immortality of the soul is already at work in the solution to the Third Antinomy where Kant – in a move that seems to me out of place with everything that has preceded in the *Critique* – suddenly becomes highly interested in safeguarding freedom from the corrosive conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic.[58] Now, to safeguard morality at large from the conclusions of the *Critique*, Kant needs to turn to the practical again. The practical is defined as "everything ... that is possible through freedom."[59]

Kant explores this issue in the second section of the Canon of Pure Reason where he summarizes the interest of reason in three core questions.[60] It is the last question, "What may I hope?", that is of concern for our discussion. According to Kant, this question is both practical and theoretical in that it asks theoretical questions on the basis of the practical moral law. If I do what ought to happen, what the moral law demands, what can I hope for

[58] Because as a philosopher of the Enlightenment, Kant would be highly interesting in preserving human freedom. Without assuming and defending human freedom, Kant's political and moral theories would make no sense and we know that Kant thought very highly of the political developments of the Enlightenment.
[59] A 799–800/B 827–8.
[60] A 804–05/B 832–3.

in the future? This question "comes down to the inference that something is ... because something ought to happen" – that is, the theoretical concerns about God and immortality are a conclusion based upon the practical demands of the moral law.

> Thus without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration but not incentives for resolve and realization, because they would not fulfill the whole end that is natural for every rational being and determined a priori and necessarily through the very same pure reason.[61]

The idea of the soul and the belief in its immortality are revealed, Kant argues, by the aims of practical reason to be necessary for systematizing the demands of morality. If morality is to have any significance, we must act *as if* there is a God and there is a moral world which is invisible to us. These ideas are postulates of practical reason, purely immanent, because they serve to advance the work of reason in guiding human moral action. Just as Kant argued in the Dialectic, the practical use of these ideas does not point towards objects beyond sensible experience. They only serve as rules for unity and systematicity in relation to human life in this sensible world. In the end, Kant "has only the modest merit of guarding against error"; his *Critique* is only good to show us the limits of cognition. Instead of flying to heavenly realms beyond this world, reason, in both its theoretical and practical nature, uses its ideas to guide us through the natural and moral experiences of human life, not to transcend them. Therefore, Kant has not abandoned the soul, in his mind he has

[61] A 813/B 841.

accomplished a very important thing for philosophy: he has discovered for perpetuity that all misconceptions about the human soul "rest on a mere delusion by which they hypostatize what exists merely in thought, and take it as a real object existing, in the same character, outside the thinking subject."[62] These problems disappear if we accept Kant's distinction between the immanent or transcendent use of the idea of soul, and we construct all our theories of the human soul based on the immanent use.

Part II

III. The Metaphysical Longing: Schopenhauer on the Satisfaction of Ultimate Explanation

Kant's account of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic reveals, to my judgment, a philosopher who is concerned with at least one traditional feature of philosophy, namely, the longing of humanity to find an ultimate explanation to a given datum of the world. I call this fact a longing for the metaphysical. For many reasons, Kant has merited the reputation of being a destroyer of metaphysics, some of these reasons have been explored in these pages but focusing on this side of his philosophy fails to recognize this profound aspiration that Kant exhibits for resolving the questions of philosophy. This is revealed from the very opening words of the *Critique*.

[62] A384.

> Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.

Our discussion of the faculty of reason should allow us to decipher this text. According to Kant, reason, by its very nature, demands the unconditional and in so doing it generates at least three ideas: soul, world and God. For Kant, these three objects are originators of all metaphysics and for centuries they have been taken as transcendent objects which are accessible to human cognition. Reason has the peculiar fate to be always driven by this longing, a desire to know more about the transcendent objects that fully explain the facts of the sensible world.

However, and this is Kant's contribution in the *Critique*, reason is not able to find a conclusive answer, at least not the answer that philosophers have tried to defend in the past. But this is not totally true for if we accept Kant's conclusions in the *Critique*, we *have* found some answers: the ideas should be used regulatively and when this is done, all is good. Metaphysics will achieve peace. But if we use ideas constitutively which for Kant means to use reason "transcending all its powers", then indeed reason will never be able to answer any of the questions that drive it. In any case, what I want to highlight here is a detail that is easy to overlook, that is, in many instances Kant is very clear that there is a metaphysical yearning in human beings, and he is trying to find a final solution to questions that have made metaphysics a battlefield of endless controversies.[63]

[63] A viii.

I think that in Schopenhauer's public works, he does not recognize this dimension of Kant's thought. This is an unfortunate omission because Schopenhauer could have used this fact to draw even more attention to the connection between Kant and him, something that he never misses an opportunity to do. What Schopenhauer calls the metaphysical need of human beings is a persistent theme in his works to the extent that he dedicates an entire chapter in the second volume of his major work to this topic.[64] I would explain this omission as the result of Schopenhauer's aversion to Kant's account of reason, where, in my opinion, Kant's own metaphysical desires are most evident. Schopenhauer could not rescue anything positive from the Kantian reason and his desire to demolish Kant's account may have prevented him from identifying how Kant and he overlapped at least in spirit if not in the letter.

It is time to turn to these issues. They have an important role to play in our understanding of Schopenhauer's rejection of Kant's rational psychology as developed in the *Critique* and his contributions to any discussion regarding the immortality of the true self. In what follows, we need to understand Schopenhauer's rejection of the entire Kantian project regarding the faculty of reason. Once the Kantian reason is eliminated, the transcendental illusion and the entire doctrine of ideas of reason is abandoned. Finally, when the previous notions are abandoned, Schopenhauer will also reject Kant's account of practical reason. Although all these notions are either abandoned entirely or reinterpreted, the spirit of what I think Kant was trying to accomplish with them remains very strong in Schopenhauer. Furthermore, none of this implies that Schopenhauer abandons the faculty

[64] Chapter 17, 169 where he calls human beings, metaphysical animals.

of reason and a distinction between theoretical and practical use of reason,[65] but it means that Schopenhauer will not locate the metaphysical longing in a specific cognitive faculty. The objects of that longing in Kant, the ideas of reason, will go back to an objective place, more in line with Plato's thought. Schopenhauer's use of the ideas is, against Kant's protestations, constitutively. This will have important ramifications in Schopenhauer's account of immortality.

The knowledge that Schopenhauer seeks about immortality, the answer to the question about our perdurance after death has nothing to do with a practical postulate or a regulative idea needed to satisfy the demands of morality. The only reason that impels Schopenhauer to consider immortality is to alleviate the fear of death that has so much power over human beings and to argue in favor of his metaphysics of the thing in itself.

Against Kant's Reason

Let us begin by showing how Schopenhauer views the Kantian doctrine of the faculty of reason, one of the areas where Schopenhauer is at great odds with Kant. I have already alluded to how Schopenhauer conceives the faculty of reason himself in contrast to Kant's doctrine. I will not repeat much of what I already said; thus, what I will discuss below serves to expand the previous discussion. To begin with, Schopenhauer notices Kant's vacillation regarding a definition of this faculty.

[65] Shapshay (2019) writes, "Schopenhauer holds that the only 'true and authentic sense' of pure practical reason is the ability to 'retreat into reflection' in order to manage one's affairs more efficaciously or even to gain some measure of tranquility" (109).

> [O]n A11/B24[66]…, reason is the faculty of *a priori* principles; on A299/B356 he once again says that reason is the faculty of *principles*, and that it is opposed to the understanding which is the faculty of *rules*!...But this vast difference is supposed to lie in the simple fact that *rules* are cognized *a priori* through pure intuition or the form of the understanding, and principles only come *a priori* from mere concepts.[67]

Schopenhauer settles on the notion that ultimately Kant adopted as the essence of reason that it is the faculty of principles. A principle, according to Kant, is cognition from pure concepts, yet nonetheless synthetic.[68] Schopenhauer alludes to several passages of the *Critique* where he sees Kant describing the essence of reason, but he believes that he can express it better: "If the conditioned is given, then the totality of its conditions must be given as well, and thus the *unconditioned* too, through which alone every totality is complete."[69] Schopenhauer agrees that this statement is synthetic for nothing follows analytically from "conditioned" other than it is a condition. However, he rejects that this proposition is either *a priori* or *a posteriori* and proposes his own way to show that it has only an illusion of truth. His explanation requires that we agree with him regarding his doctrine of the principle of sufficient reason and its four roots.

Schopenhauer denies that when a conditioned is given, reason demands the complete series of conditions and the unconditioned. Instead, when a conditioned is given, the

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[66] I have added the contemporary way to cite the *Critique* which is different to how Schopenhauer referred to both the first and second edition of the *Critique*.
[67] WWR I, 459. See there more inconsistencies.
[68] WWR I, 510. Schopenhauer has problems with this, but we will not go into that here.
[69] WWR I, 510. This is very close to A307/B364. His own gloss on this notion is "reason would like to have a starting point for the causal chain that goes back to infinity" (WWR I, 511).

totality of conditions is contained in its most proximate ground (*Grunde*)[70], "the ground from which it follows immediately and which is a *sufficient* ground only in this way." For example, I want to start a fire, for the fire to appear (effect) all the necessary states need to be present (cause). If I want to speak of a series, I will need to go back to the previous state, for example, the state that led me, for example, to want a fire, but in that instance once again reason is content with the necessary states that produced the effect. There is no series of conditions for a conditioned, only "an alternating series of conditions and conditioned, and with each link that is set aside the chain is interrupted and the demands of the principle of sufficient reason are completely withdrawn; it starts up again when the condition becomes a conditioned. Thus, the principle of *sufficient* reason only ever demands the completeness of the *most proximate* condition, never the completeness of a *series*."[71] Schopenhauer argues that only someone captivated with abstract cognition without recognizing its dependance on intuitive cognition could say that a series of causes and effects should be seen as a successive series with an unconditioned beginning.

The principle of sufficient reason does not demand a series but is satisfied when the ground has been discovered; only when the ground is considered as a consequent or effect does the principle demands again to know what grounds it. Schopenhauer believes that a demand for the unconditioned is an absurdity that can only surface when an investigation of the relation between abstract cognition and immediate, intuitive cognition, an investigation that proceeds by descending from the undetermined generality of the former to the fixed determination of the latter is abandoned. In this context, Schopenhauer alludes to the appearance in post-Kantian philosophy of the 'the Absolute.' The obvious

[70] WWR I, 511.
[71] WWR I, 512.

connection with this discussion is that some philosophers believe that they have found the unconditioned, that which ends all explanations and where all investigation ceases in 'the Absolute'. For Schopenhauer, this appeal to 'the Absolute' is to reintroduce the cosmological proof in philosophy, and even if Schopenhauer does not accuse Kant of this, it is tempting to think that, even though Kant has denied that the cosmological proof is valid to prove God's existence, the same logic of this proof is not used by him in his discussion of reason's demand for the unconditioned. Nevertheless, the example of cultures that do not have an Absolute and instead see the universe as an infinite series of causes and effects is enough proof for Schopenhauer that reason does not impose the Kantian demand for the unconditioned.

Kant, according to Schopenhauer, confuses reason's act of simplifying our cognition through a comprehensive view of things for the hunt after an unconditioned that we presupposed. That we try to subsume truths under more general truths is simply reason seeking cognition of the particular through the general, the case through the rule as we move towards the most general point of view.[72] This is precisely what differentiates human beings from animals.

Against Kant's Ideas of Reason

Schopenhauer, not without irony, identifies the three Kantian ideas with the favorite topics of metaphysics in the Scholastic tradition and Christian Wolff. These traditions have made these concepts almost self-evident to many philosophers, but for Schopenhauer it is absurd

[72] WWR I, 514.

that "in the absence of revelation, these concepts necessarily proceed from the development of anyone's reason, as a product characteristic of its essence."[73] If Kant wanted to prove this, he needed to investigate different cultures and times and show how entities such as soul or God irrevocably arise in every corner of the world throughout history. Schopenhauer argues that this is not the case.[74] As such, Schopenhauer states that Kant cannot be taken seriously when he says that these ideas advance our cognition of nature, they are "impediments, and deadly for all investigations in nature."[75]

To Schopenhauer, Kant's attempt to make Platonic ideas into ideas of reason is unacceptable. This is a corollary of his modification of Kant's account of understanding and reason. The Schopenhauerian faculty of reason is a faculty of abstract, universal cognition.[76] Human reason is reduced to "what is made possible only by abstract, discursive, reflective, mediated cognition, tied to words, but not to the merely intuitive, immediate, sensible cognition that animals also share."[77] It is the faculty that generates concepts that are used by human beings to develop language and communicate with each other. All the material from which reason works to generate concepts is drawn from the sensible world. In this process of generating concepts, reason abstracts from the sensible object all the properties that make up an individual object thereby losing all its complexities and richness. In Schopenhauer, reason is both the most exalted faculty that separates human beings from animals and the poorest source of cognition of the sensible world because

[73] WWR I, 515. Rudolf (2010, 206-209).
[74] See his reasoning in WWR I, 516-17. Rickabaugh (2016) argues that the belief in a human soul, distinct from the body is a pre-theoretical belief that is almost universally present in cultures throughout time. This article is not addressing the Schopenhauerian objection, but it does raise some considerations that may help the Kantian case and restrain the strong Schopenhauerian thesis.
[75] WWR I, 544. This would be rejected by defenders of some sort of substance dualism because they argue that the existence of the human soul is the only way to make sense of certain data.
[76] WWR I, 514.
[77] FR, 105.

concepts, especially as we ascend in abstraction, are so far removed from sensible experience.

Given this account, Schopenhauer cannot accept that reason generates ideas, especially when this is presented as taken from Plato. Nevertheless, it is fascinating that how Kant and Schopenhauer arrive at the doctrine of ideas is basically driven by the same motive, that is, to find the ultimate ground of a fact in sensible experience. In Schopenhauer, this is clearly recognized in Book 2 of WWR I. For example,

> Each universal, original force of nature is thus in its inner essence nothing other than the objectivation of the will at a low level: we call each of these levels an eternal *Idea* in Plato's sense. A *law of nature* however is the relation of the Idea to the form of its appearance. This form is time, space and causality, which are necessarily and inseparable connected and related to each other. The Idea multiplies itself into countless appearances in space and time: but the order in which the Ideas emerge in those forms of multiplicity is firmly determined by the law of causality: this is, as it were, the rule for the limit points of those appearances of the different Ideas, and it regulates how space, time and matter are distributed among them.[78]

Physics tries to reduce the phenomena of the sensible world to patterns and attempts to discern more general patterns that it calls laws. The goal is to establish an explanation that does not require a further explanation, as is the case with gravity and other fundamental

[78] WWR 1, 159.

forces.[79] Schopenhauer also designates gravity as an original force of nature which he locates as outside space and time and thus identifies it with an idea. What Schopenhauer describes in the realm of the physical world is analogous to what I have already discussed in relation to the intelligible character and the idea of a human being: "[m]otives determine the external shape of the course of a life, not its inner meaning and substance: these follow form the character, which is the immediate appearance of the will and thus groundless."[80] The ultimate explanation of my actions is the intelligible character whose expression as empirical character happens in space and time. The intelligible character, envisioned as an idea, is the ultimate explanation of my empirical character, but we must always remember that the intelligible character is not 'unconditioned'.[81]

The departure from Kant could not be more evident: Schopenhauer locates the Kantian unconditioned, not in ideas generated by human reason, but in the Ideas generated by the thing in itself. Ideas are objects that ontologically precede the sensible world and human reason. As human beings we are not satisfied with purely physical explanations of the sensible world, we want more, we long for the metaphysical and the first moment that satisfies that desire is our discovery of Ideas. The human soul then is not an idea of reason inferred from the 'I think' nor it is an unconditioned object. I turn now to discuss what exactly Schopenhauer takes the human soul to be.

[79] "The lowest and therefore most universal expression of will is gravity, so it has been called a fundamental force essential to matter" (WN 392).
[80] WWR I, 163.
[81] This paradoxical statement should be interpreted in the following manner: the intelligible character is not the thing in itself *simpliciter*, but an expression of it. Only the thing in itself *as it is in itself* is considered unconditioned. Therefore, the intelligible character, in some sense, is conditioned by the thing in itself.

IV. Schopenhauer's (Non-Transcendental) 'Rational Psychology'

The Original Misstep: Soul as Avatar of Intellect

Whereas Kant allows some form of rational psychology in the architectonic of philosophy, Schopenhauer closes this door and states unequivocally that there is no more rational psychology after Kant.[82] Schopenhauer's position in this debate is important because, unlike the silence of the Paralogisms, there is no ambiguity regarding the target of Schopenhauer's criticism: all philosophers who have argued in favor of the immortality of the soul since Plato. Schopenhauer's arguments, although inspired by Kant, are new and offer a unique challenge to any form of considering the question of the immortality of the soul as has been defined in this study. At the same time, Schopenhauer engages in philosophical speculation regarding Kant's intelligible character and the permanence of our true nature after death without appealing to practical reason which suggests important developments in transcendental idealism.

Given his antagonism toward any form of rational psychology, Schopenhauer does not have a systematic approach to the topic of the human soul. The closest to a settled definition of soul given by Schopenhauer is found in WWR II:

> 'soul' signifies an individual unity of consciousness which obviously does not belong to that inner being [thing in itself]; and generally, since the concept 'soul' supposes knowing

[82] PP II, chapter 1, 19.

> and willing to be in inseparable connection, and yet independent of the animal organism, it is not to be justified, and therefore not to be used.[83]

A few observations about this definition are in order. One important thing to notice here is how this definition does not appear to be influenced by Kant in any way; there is no talk of an unconditioned subject of thinking. Schopenhauer argues extensively throughout his career that willing is ontologically prior to thinking;[84] thus, thinking is a product of willing. Consequently, for him one can separate thinking from willing, just like in a certain way the Platonic and Cartesian tradition argues for the separation of the soul/mind from the body. In Schopenhauer's definition and characterization of the human soul throughout his works, he assumes that the soul is always associated with thinking, specifically rational thinking. This assumption, so Schopenhauer tells us, is what defines the history of the human soul in the Western tradition. But thinking can no longer function for Schopenhauer as what proves the immortality of the human soul because in his philosophy, discursive thinking relates to the brain and reason; thus, he considers them posterior products of the thing in itself.

Thus, a couple of things come into focus about Schopenhauer's 'psychology'. The first one is that he sees the history of philosophy in the West as making an important mistake: "All philosophers have made the mistake of placing that which is metaphysical,

[83]WWR II, 349. Another definition is given in *On the Will in Nature*: soul is "this metaphysical entity in whose absolute simplicity 'cognizing' and 'willing' were bound and fused into an eternally inseparable unity" (WN, 338-339). Notice how here Schopenhauer's problems with the human soul is its bringing together intellect and will. The next problem is the subordination of will to intellect. Another important text that helps us understand what concept of 'soul' Schopenhauer was criticizing is BM 152-155. In this passage, the rejection of soul boils down to making the soul an essentially cognitive entity whereas for Schopenhauer the volitive is original and primordial.

[84] WWR II, chapter 19.

indestructible, and eternal in man in the *intellect*."[85] As Schopenhauer sees it, identifying the innermost essence of human beings with the thinking part or intellect, calling it soul and then adding to it that it is indestructible, or immortal is false. It is important to underscore that this 'thinking' is understood by Schopenhauer as the activity of reason as he has defined this faculty in his works. This already anticipates why he considers a problem to say that the soul is the most real in human beings. This intellect is identified with consciousness and self-consciousness. When intellect appears, individuality or 'I' appears.[86] This means that individuality and self-consciousness are derivative phenomena and not what describes our most true self.

Schopenhauer identifies this consciousness with the subject of cognition; he writes, "The subject of knowing…is a secondary phenomenon…it is the point of unity of the nervous system's sensibility, the focus, as it were, in which the rays of activity of all parts of the brain converge."[87] Here we find another feature of Schopenhauer's 'psychology', namely, that the intellect is identified with the brain:[88] "the intellect is a secondary phenomenon, and is conditioned by the brain, and therefore begins and ends with this."[89] This strong identification of consciousness with the brain leads to an obvious conclusion for Schopenhauer, the life of the subject of cognition is intrinsically tied to the brain' existence.[90] When the brain disappears, there is no longer consciousness.

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[85] WWR II, 495.
[86] "Everyone, however, places his I or ego in *consciousness*; therefore, this seems to him to be tied to individuality" WWR II, 490.
[87] WWR II, 499.
[88] Does Schopenhauer hold an *identity* theory as we understand this doctrine today? Several passages support this reading, but I think that there is room for nuance. Schopenhauer's doctrine also flirts with something called emergent dualism, that is, that the mental emerges from the physical (Gasparov 2013, 116).
[89] WWR II, 495.
[90] "Consciousness is the life of the subject of knowing, or of the brain, and death is its end" (WWR II, 500).

Schopenhauer argues that consciousness does not prove that there is a soul in organic beings. The sight of a corpse tells me that sensibility, blood circulation, etc. have disappeared from it. From this, I can conclude that whatever caused these things, which was hidden to me before, is no longer there acting in the body. But Schopenhauer continues, it "would be a conclusion not merely unjustified, but obviously false"[91] if I concluded that the reason that sensibility or irritability have disappeared from the organism is because it no longer has consciousness and intellect (soul). According to Schopenhauer, consciousness has always appeared as the *effect* of organic life, not as the *cause* of organic life. Consciousness always appears attached to organic life, not independently of it.[92] There is a certain agreement here between Kant and Schopenhauer on the point that experience only teaches that the acts of life only happen when the principle of life is united to corporeal reality.[93]

Additionally, no individuality can be inferred from consciousness,[94] just as "everywhere in nature I see each particular phenomenon to be the work of a universal force active in thousands of similar phenomena."[95] When we have an instance of gravity, we do not infer that this instance has a unique personality. We know that it is one force behind this phenomenon. Therefore, when life is manifested in individual beings in space and time, this is the manifestation of a single force named 'life'.

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[91] WWR II, 470.
[92] The view that there cannot be consciousness without corporeal organism is consistent with Schopenhauer's rejection of theism.
[93] Kant might suggest a way to weaken this argument in the 3rd proof discussed in L_1 (28:291) which he describes as "from experience." This is aot a positive proof, but a negative proof, namely, that from the observation of a corpse cannot be disproven that the soul is immortal.
[94] There is also the problem of the possibility self-knowledge: "But the I or ego is the dark point in consciousness, just as on the retina the precise point of entry of the optic nerve is blind."
[95] WWR II, 470.

If the intellect or soul is not primary and original, is there anything that fulfills that requirement? The answer is given by Schopenhauer in the next sentence of text quoted above: "All philosophers have made the mistake of placing that which is metaphysical, indestructible, and eternal in man in the *intellect*. It lies exclusively in the *will*, which is entirely different from the intellect, and alone is original."[96] This should not come as a surprise at this point. Schopenhauer argues that death is not to be feared because it does not mean the end of our innermost being. This brings us back to Kant's *a priori* argument or the argument from the principle of life and how Schopenhauer makes it an important part of his metaphysics.

V. Immortality of Self in Decided Idealism

Enduring 'Willing': What Lies and Remains Beneath

Schopenhauer wrote that "with death consciousness is certainly lost, but not what produced and maintained consciousness; life is extinguished, but with it not the principle of life which manifest itself in it."[97] Here I come back to the 'principle of life' argument but from Schopenhauer's perspective. His discussion of the principle of life reminds us of how Kant discusses it in his lectures but, as it will become apparent, Schopenhauer departs from Kant's position in important ways.

[96] WWR II, 495.
[97] WWR II, 496.

> Since the will is the thing in itself, the inner content, the essential aspect of the world, while life, the visible world, appearance, is only the mirror of the will; life will be as inseparable from the will as a shadow from its body. And where there is will, there will be life and world as well…as long as we are filled with life-will [*Lebenswillen*], we do not need to worry about our existence, even in the face of death.[98]

I single out this passage because it helps us to see Schopenhauer's position and what moves he will make to speak about immortality. An important element in this passage is that he makes a distinction between the thing in itself and life, the former is reality itself and the latter is reality as it presents itself in consciousness. But they are not entirely distinct things, one is the mirror of the other, or its shadows so that whenever there is thing in itself, there is life. The last sentence of the text is important. There Schopenhauer announces that, as thing in itself, there is in us something that does not fear death, concretely, it is not destroyed by death. Therefore, 'life' for Schopenhauer is a concept that has broader scope than just merely life in time and space; life in Schopenhauer's view cannot be reduced to the mirror, that is, to the biological.

All of this should sound familiar from our discussion of Kant. The *a priori* argument that takes the nature of soul as the principle of life lurks behind Schopenhauer's words. But Schopenhauer is modifying this argument to accommodate it to his metaphysics. Without addressing it directly, Schopenhauer is giving an answer to Kant's doubts regarding this argument. Kant said that we do not know whether the substratum of matter could be alive; Schopenhauer says that all things are a manifestation of the thing in itself, thus they all have a principle of life as ground. The same will that is manifested in us as human will, is

[98] WWR I, 301.

the same will that manifest itself in a rock.[99] Just as Kant discussed that soul should be able to live before birth and death, Schopenhauer says "neither the will…nor the subject of cognition, the spectator of all appearances, are in any way touched by birth or death."[100] In WWR II, Schopenhauer insists on the importance of this point for the question of immortality. The problem of immortality has two horns. He observes that the Western tradition has obsessed about our future survival, but theoretically, "the one is a problem just as near at hand and just as legitimate as the other." Whoever has an answer for one problem should be able to give an answer for the other. Any proof for the continued existence of the soul after death should apply to life before birth and thus prove that life does not begin with birth.[101]

Schopenhauer does not think that there is a survival of the individual, there is no personal identity that remains after death. Schopenhauer refers to this as the doctrine of continual existence (*Fortdauer*).[102] For him, there is no immortality of the 'I' only of the species: horses die, but Horsehood is immortal. There is no need to argue in favor of this notion for morality's sake like in Kant. For Schopenhauer, "the individual holds no value for nature"[103] and when we connect this view with his doctrine of Ideas we get the following statement: "Ideas, not individuals, have genuine reality, ie. are the complete objecthood of the will."[104] Evidently, this conflicts with my conclusions in chapter 2 where

[99] "It is not as if there is a smaller part of the will in a stone and a larger part in a person, since the relation between part and whole belongs exclusively to space…[the thing in itself] reveals itself just as fully and completely in a *single* oak tree as in millions" (WWR I, 153).
[100] WWR I, 301.
[101] WWR II, 467.
[102] WWR I, 308.
[103] WWR I, 302.
[104] WWR I, 303.

I argued that Schopenhauer has a non-developed doctrine of Ideas of individuals. But before I take up this point, let us hear what Schopenhauer has to say.

For Schopenhauer, the *present* is the only form of all life; from the present's perspective, there is no life in the past nor in the future. The present is of the same nature as life, and it is ever present (the *Nunc stans* of the Scholastics); thus, nothing can take away the 'present' that belongs necessarily to life. Schopenhauer thinks that arguments in favor of the continuation of life for the individual are extremely inadequate and proofs against them are strong and numerous. However, immortality does not require proof, "common sense knows it as a fact, and it is fortified as such by the confidence that nature lies as little as it errs; nature presents its deeds and essence openly."[105]

The individual as a particular appearance in space and time has a temporal beginning and end because it is a cerebral fiction, but what this individual is in itself, *that* remains untouched. As an appearance, the individual is different from all things in the world, while as thing in itself the individual is the will that appears in everything, "and death annuls the deception that separates his consciousness from everything else: this is continued existence." Death is "the temporal end to the particular temporal appearance."[106] It is precisely the loss of our individuality that causes so much fear of death. But in reality, we should have as little fear of death as the sun has of the night. This provides another image to illustrate Schopenhauer's argument. Death for him is like the sun setting and disappearing. We know that the sun is not destroyed by the night; likewise, our innermost being is not destroyed by death. Only our individuality disappears.

[105] WWR I, 308.
[106] WWR I, 309.

Schopenhauer ties this argument to Kant's discovery of the ideality of time. So, in this case, the doctrine of immortality follows from transcendental idealism itself. Schopenhauer writes, "To begin, to end, and to continue are concepts that derive their significance simple and solely from time: consequently, they are valid only on the presupposition of time."[107] Obviously, it makes no sense to speak of time when referring to the thing in itself. Time is just the form of our knowledge of things in the physical world; thus, it is limited to mere phenomenon.[108]

VI. Schopenhauer Against Kant's Rational Psychology

I turn now to Schopenhauer's assessment of Kant's criticisms of rational psychology. Schopenhauer both praises and attacks some of Kant's views. What this discussion adds to the argument in this chapter is a complete picture of Schopenhauer's total rejection of rational psychology and his contention that our true self is something more fundamental than the intellect. Schopenhauer initial criticisms of Kant's presentation focuses on his assessment of the table that lays the foundation for rational psychology in the *Critique*.[109] He writes that Kant,

> introduces the *simplicity* of the soul under quality. But this is just a quantitative property and has absolutely no relation to affirmation or negation in judgment. Nevertheless, quantity is supposed to be occupied by the *unity* of the soul, although this is already

[107] WWR II, 493.
[108] Schopenhauer notes an antinomy that arises from these premises and recognizes that "death remains a mystery" (WWR II, 493).
[109] A344/B402.

> included in simplicity. Then modality is forced into this in a ridiculous manner; namely, that the soul is related to *possible* objects. But 'being related' belongs to relation; only this is already occupied by substance.[110]

As for the critique of rational psychology by Kant in the *Critique*, Schopenhauer prefers the refutation of rational psychology according to the A edition. Overall, Schopenhauer finds the refutation acceptable, but he disagrees with many of its details. According to Schopenhauer, Kant "derived the necessity of the concept of the soul…by applying the demand for the unconditioned to the concept of *substance.*"[111] Consequently, he disagrees with Kant's description that the soul is something that can exist only as subject and never as predicate.[112] For Schopenhauer, "Absolutely nothing exists as both subject and predicate, since these expressions belong exclusively to logic and signify the relation of abstract concept to each other."[113] This criticism is a direct result of making a distinction between how objects are given and how we think them, that is, between intuitive and abstract cognition.

In the present context, by 'exists' Schopenhauer means given in space and time. In the empirical world, 'substance' and 'accident' could be considered that from which reason abstracts the concept of subject and predicate. In the intuitive world, one already finds, without doubt according to Schopenhauer, what is always subject and never predicate, namely, *matter*.[114] Schopenhauer writes, "matter is really the final subject of all predicates

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[110] WWR 1, 500.
[111] WWR 1, 518.
[112] A323/B412.
[113] WWR 1, 518.
[114] Interestingly, there are three occasions when Kant speaks about *matter* while discussing substance. In B278, Kant writes, "we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only *matter*." The next reference occurs in the First Analogy, there Kant writes, "He thus

of every empirically given thing, namely what remains after we have discounted all of its qualities of every sort."[115]

Schopenhauer criticizes that Kant confuses the realm of logic (how we think about objects) with the realm of intuition (how objects are given). 'Subject' and 'predicate' are only logical determinations that apply exclusively to abstract concepts, whereas 'substance' and 'accident' belong to the realm of empirical intuition where they are identical "with matter and form or quality."[116] 'Matter', in Schopenhauer's philosophy, is the empirical correlate of 'substance' and 'form or quality' of 'accident.'

Given his position, Schopenhauer takes substance to imply permanence, something he shares with Aristotle. This is the consequence of his argument that matter is the empirical ground of the abstract concept 'substance.' More arguments for this position are given in Schopenhauer's discussion of Kant's First Analogy. Schopenhauer laments that in his proof, Kant "entirely disregards its supposed origin from the understanding and the category, and proceeds from the pure intuition of time."[117] Schopenhauer claims that the proof is completely wrong. He writes, "It is false to say that there is *simultaneity* and *duration* in mere time: these representations only arise after *space* has been unified with

presupposed as undeniable that even in fire the matter (substance) does not vanish, but only suffers an alteration of form" (A185). In the first case, Kant is discussing his own position, whereas in the second case he is describing the hypothetical thoughts of a philosopher. Finally, in B291, Kant writes, "in order to obtain something *permanent* in intuition corresponding to the concept of *substance,* and so to demonstrate the objective reality of this concept, we require an intuition in space (of matter). For space alone is determined as permanent, while time, and therefore everything that is in inner sense, is in constant flux." These examples provide evidence that Schopenhauer's criticism has some force. Schopenhauer would consider these 'Freudian slips' as corroborations that Kant had an awareness regarding the true justification of substance. Interestingly, Schopenhauer never mentions these examples where his own position seems to be confirmed by Kant.

[115] WWR 1, 518.
[116] WWR 1, 519.
[117] WWR 1, 501.

time."[118] For Schopenhauer, the essence of time is fluidity; accordingly, a time that remains is a contradiction.

Permanence of substance is so certain that it is *a priori*, but Schopenhauer deduces the principle of permanence from his claim that the law of causality essentially concerns only *alterations*, that is, the successive *states* of matter, not matter itself.[119] Once again, matter is the key concept in Schopenhauer's argument. Matter, by its very essence, is indestructible. It is matter that is present in our consciousness as the enduring foundation of all things; it is not subject to becoming or passing away and thus always exists. The deeper argument behind this claim is offered in the main text of WWR I. Against Kant, Schopenhauer argues that the *a priori* certainty of persistence is derived entirely from the role that space plays in matter.[120]

Schopenhauer's discussion of 'permanent substance' has consequences for his take on Kant's criticisms against rational psychology. As I mentioned above, he disagrees that a permanent 'I' is the origin of the concept of 'soul.' Accordingly, Schopenhauer proposes another origin to this concept: it begins with two different points of view, one objective and the other subjective. Objectively, human beings apprehend themselves as bodies, an extended thing. Subjectively, human beings apprehend themselves as thinking and willing things, lacking all the qualities that apply to corporeal things. From these considerations, the notion of two distinct substances, 'body' and 'soul,' is born.[121] But specifically, the concept of soul as a substance (something permanent) appears when human beings apply

[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] For Schopenhauer, matter reconciles in itself "the fleeting course of time and the rigid and unchanging persistence of space" (WWR 1, 31).
[121] Historically speaking, Schopenhauer traces the origin of the introduction of 'soul' into philosophy to Plato and considers Descartes to be the most articulate proponent of the notion of the soul as a distinct substance.

the principle of sufficient reason to something that is not an object, but a subject of cognition and willing. Accordingly, they take thinking, willing and cognition as *effects*; but when they cannot find a cause in the body, they assign the cause to an incorporeal thing. Thus, the immaterial, simple, and indestructible soul is the result of the hypostatization of this immaterial cause of thinking or willing.[122] According to Schopenhauer, after philosophers had preestablished this concept of 'soul' did they then proceeded to justify it by using the concept of substance.[123]

To recap, a clear statement of a possible Schopenhauerian psychology both in its positive and negative conclusions is found in *On the Will in Nature*:

> For me, what is eternal and indestructible in humans, what thus also constitutes the principle of life in humans, is not the soul, but, to use an expression from chemistry, the radical of the soul – and this is *will*. The so-called soul is already compounded: it is the union of will with νοῦς, intellect. This intellect is that which is secondary, the *posterius* of the organism, and as a mere brain function, is conditioned by the organism.[124]

Without doubt, this passage shows that Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism has operated a transformation on what Plato's *Phaedo*, Aristotle's *De anima*, and Plotinus' *Enneads* call 'the principle of life.' The soul, according to Schopenhauer, is not what traditional psychology since Plato supposed it to be. Basically, Schopenhauer's philosophy

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[122] One thing that Schopenhauer seems to miss in this description is that the 'witnessing subject' apprehends *both* perspectives as external to himself or herself. So, it is not completely accurate to say that one perspective is objective and the other subjective.
[123] WWR 1, 519. Schopenhauer argues that 'matter' is prior to 'substance.' Accordingly, substance can be dispensed with "because its only true content is contained in the concept of matter" (WWR 1, 521). Substance was created in order to introduce the notion of *immaterial substance*.
[124] WN, 339-340.

asserts that aspects of the soul discussed by philosophers of the past are properties of the thing in itself. Instead of being the principle of life and that which constitutes the essence of a human being, soul is a derivative of a higher principle which is the true principle of life. The very transformation and transferal of certain traits of 'soul' to the thing in itself operated by Schopenhauer is what opens new interesting possibilities for future research.

Schopenhauer understands his continuation of Kant's rejection of rational psychology as the definitive end to any speculation regarding the human soul and its purported immortality. At the same time, as we saw in the quote from *On the Will in Nature*, he engages in reflections about what is permanent, indestructible, and eternal in human beings. As we saw, these reflections turn towards the thing in itself, just as Kant did when speaking about freedom. The findings of these sections invite us to take a deeper look at the relationship between the thing in itself, Pure Subject and Ideas and explore how these affect the question about the immortality of our individuality. In the future, I will suggest that we use the Plotinian framework of One, Intellect and Ideas to spell out a more coherent narrative of how these Schopenhauerian entities relate and interact.

VII. A Deeper Look at the Schopenhauerian Intelligible Character

At this point, I need to discuss the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the intelligible character in greater detail for this notion carries, according to my argument here, implications regarding the immortality of the self. In chapter 2, I introduced the concept and discussed some of its elements. The discussion here is needed to supplement what was said there and prepare the

ground to make some conclusions regarding Schopenhauer and the immortality of the true self. My aim is to clarify what and who the intelligible character is.

The first important thing to remember is the 'location' of the intelligible character in the Schopenhauerian system. Schopenhauer does not leave any doubts about this point, the intelligible character is a member of the non-sensible world, where time, space and the law of causality have no effect. I also said that the intelligible character cannot be the Pure Subject of Cognition. The way Schopenhauer describes the Pure Subject suggests that a human being becomes this Pure Subject through an alteration of the cognitive faculties. I become a Pure Subject when I contemplate a Platonic idea, during that encounter, I am 'elevated' to the realm of ideas. I assume that this realm of ideas is the same non-sensible world in which the intelligible character lives. But Schopenhauer never says that the Pure Subject and the intelligible character overlap or coincide or are identical. This creates a complicated picture that is not easy to resolve.

One possible solution would be to say that the Pure Subject is the name that Schopenhauer uses to describe how our cognitive faculties function or are present in the non-sensible world. The reason for this being that Schopenhauer only speaks of the Pure Subject in topics related to Book III, that is, aesthetics. As I have said before, for Schopenhauer, ideas can be objects of cognition, they are intuited in aesthetic experience. The intelligible character is never brought up in these discussions and it only makes an entrance in Schopenhauer's philosophy in topics related to Book IV, that is, ethics.[125] Recall how Kant speaks differently about the self depending on whether he is talking about cognition or if he is speaking about volition. Thus, the Pure Subject is an individual seen

[125] And in his discussion of freedom in the Prize Essay

from the side of cognition and the intelligible character from the side of volition. If this solution is reasonable, the Pure Subject and the intelligible character are one same self. Given that this self is a member of a non-sensible world, this self lives eternally.

Unlike Kant, Schopenhauer takes these entities – Pure Subjects and intelligible characters – in a realist way. By realist I mean the objective perspective that Schopenhauer introduces as complement to Kant's subjective perspective. A perspective which I think is the hallmark of Schopenhauer's philosophy and his greatest contribution to a more solid transcendental idealism. To Schopenhauer's disadvantage, we tend to focus so much on the opening statement in his major work ("The world is my representation") that we hardly remember that he also says that the world is the objecthood of the will. This is where, I propose, Kant ends, and Schopenhauer begins. True metaphysics, something that Schopenhauer accuses Kant of not doing, reveals that the whole physical world is a product of something spiritual, of a will.[126]

The same Schopenhauer who insists on the representational nature of the content of self-consciousness argues that as "appearance, as object, each thing is thoroughly necessary: *in itself,* this same thing is will, which is completely free for all eternity."[127] The intelligible character benefits from this ontological status; it "is an immediate appearance of the will" and as such, it is totally free to be or not to be. It comes to be in an atemporal act of the thing in itself. The ontological status of the intelligible character is never in doubt; it is a member of the non-sensible world. It is not a metaphorical way of speaking about human beings or a theoretical postulate. I do not think that Schopenhauer leaves any doubt regarding the realness of this entity.

[126] WN, 340.
[127] WWR I, 313.

In chapter 2, I explored the question regarding whether the intelligible character is an idea in the Schopenhauerian sense. Schopenhauer seems to endorse this position. For example,

> The intelligible character coincides[128] with the Idea, or more specifically with the original act of will [*ursprünglichen Willensakt*] revealed in the Idea: to this extent, not only the empirical character of every person but also of every species of animal, indeed…even every original force of inorganic nature, can be seen as the appearance of an intelligible character, i.e. of an extra-temporal, indivisible act of will.[129]

In this text, there seems to be a qualification or (new?) distinction between two ways of regarding the intelligible character, that is, the intelligible character coincides either with an idea or with an original act of will. Of the original act of will we learn that it is extra-temporal and indivisible; the reason behind this is that this original act of will happens in a non-sensible world where time, space and causality do not apply. Schopenhauer never clarifies what the intelligible character is an idea of, so I presume that it is, at the very least, of the Idea of Human Being. For me a more evocative interpretation is that Schopenhauer is here implying that the intelligible character coincides with the idea of what we identify as the persons Kant or Socrates. This text in isolation could not fully support this reading because it would also imply that every animal is a person, something that Schopenhauer never says. Thus, only by looking at what makes human beings different from the rest of

[128] The verb used here is *zusammenfallen*.
[129] WWR I, 180-81.

the sensible world, could we fully grasp how a person could be an idea in the Schopenhauerian sense. If this was the best interpretation, then the original act of will is the generation of the subject known in history as Kant or Socrates whose intelligible character is the way of speaking of his volitional side.

In any case, the intelligible character coincides with an idea so as I stated before, it is still true that Schopenhauer goes a step further than Kant in this regard and we can say that the true self is an idea. Not only Schopenhauer rejects that ideas are products of human reason and have no objective status as in Kant, he locates both our cognitive and volitive sides in a non-sensible world. This non-sensible world has ontological priority to all our cognitive faculties and even the world that we say is representation to us is revealed as an image of this non-sensible world. This is not revealed through a purely physical investigation of the sensible world, but through other cognitive ways to relate to the world. Therefore, our deepest self is an act of the thing in itself "to the extent that it appears in a particular individual, to a particular degree."[130]

In the *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, Schopenhauer establishes that the human character has four characteristics: it is individual, empirical, constant, and inborn.[131] Because he only mentions empirical, one could think that this does not apply to the intelligible character, but there is no reason to think this way when Schopenhauer insist that the empirical character is a temporal expression of the intelligible character.[132] The next important point is that the human character is individual, "it is different in everyone" (68). No two persons, no matter how similar their education or personal history is, will

[130] WWR I, 315.
[131] FW, 68.
[132] WWR I, 180, 314.

have alike reactions to one event. Here we encounter a fact that separates human beings from other beings in the world. However, the explanation of the origin of this individuality is problematic in Schopenhauer, something that does not seem to bother him. Individuality is the product of the principle of individuation, but the intelligible character is not supposed to be located in space and time, so how can it be understood as an individual? I will come back to this issue below. In the meantime, what Schopenhauer means by empirical refers to how this character is discovered in time and space, specifically in history.

By constant, Schopenhauer means that it never changes, and this can only make sense if the character is not simply empirical. For that to be the case, the character must be inalterable, extra-temporal and indivisible. These are predicates that can only be consistent for an entity that cannot be destroyed, that shares the eternity of the thing in itself and that is why it is immortal. The same reasoning applies to the innateness of human character. Our character is "the work of nature itself"[133] but this nature cannot be merely chemical or physical processes; instead, it must refer to what generates nature which as we know is ultimately the thing in itself. Finally, the inborness of our character is such that according to Schopenhauer, our character reveals itself already in the child.[134]

The picture that I am reconstructing here of the intelligible character is focusing on its nature as a member of a non-sensible world and not on its relationship with the empirical character in history. In the same *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, Schopenhauer introduces the intelligible character in order to reveal the true meaning of moral freedom. Now, one implication of discussing morality is that one can act differently, that is, out of empirical character. Moreover, Schopenhauer's account of denial of the will implies that

[133] WWR I, 72.
[134] FW, 72; WWR I, 320.

we change, that my character evolves and is not static. This is possible because freedom resides in the intelligible character, not in human actions.

In this study, I am setting aside the question of whether our empirical character is immortal. The immortality of the empirical character could be understood in two senses. First, everything about our empirical character which we cognize in time and space is already present in the intelligible character. In this view, the distinction between empirical and intelligible character is weak because they are the same. Everything about the empirical character is already in the intelligible character. Second, our empirical character is the result of our intelligible character's life in space and time, being shaped by different experiences in the sensible world. If this were the case, certain features of our empirical character are added to what is already in our intelligible character. The view that I am defending here is closer to the second sense.

I am arguing that our intelligible character already holds our idiosyncrasy and, in that sense, we are immortal as individuals. This is why I am insisting on Schopenhauer's view that our character is changeless. We are already who we are as an intelligible character, this is what I mean by the idea of individual. Something about our character is set in eternity as that original act of the will. For me, this is enough to sustain that one can present theorical arguments in favor of the immortality of the self as an individuality that remains even when the brain or the body is destroyed, even if one holds transcendental idealism. This does not reject the possibility that our character can be enriched by living in time and space or that we are not responsible for our human actions because our character is 'set' for all eternity.[135] But this is another issue that I am setting aside in this study.

[135] Shapshay (2019, 133) argues that Schopenhauer own us "an account of how the freedom of the will as thing-in-itself *explains* the possibility that the intellect of an individual may break free of its servitude to that

Before I close this section, I will address the problem of individuality and intelligible character that I raise up above. Let me begin by stating as clear as possible the connection between the empirical/ intelligible character and individuality.

> Our character is to be seen as the temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal and thus indivisible and unalterable act of will, or an intelligible character; and this act irrevocably determines everything essential, i.e. the ethical content of how we conduct our lives, which must express itself as such in its appearance, the empirical character.[136]

In this text, the intimate continuity between intelligible and empirical character is described in no ambiguous terms. The empirical character, known *a posteriori* in history, presents itself temporally. According to Schopenhauer's insistence that the principle of individuation is time and space, it follows that for Schopenhauer "each individual already has a distinctive empirical character."[137] Our inclination is to interpret the individuality of which Schopenhauer speaks here as the features, not just physical, but of personality that make me an individual. Kant and Socrates are not only recognizable because I see two different bodies, but also because there are a multitude of things that differentiates them. I would say that Schopenhauer must be referring to the personalities when he describes the empirical character. This personality manifests something unalterable, indivisible, extra-

individual's will" in such a way that we can act out of character. The argument that I am making here in favor of the immortality of the self suggests an answer to this problem, namely, the human intellect can be as free as the will because, as I have argued, the human intellect must be also in the thing in itself as the Idea of Human Being and it is not just a product that appears when the brain appears. Schopenhauer cannot give us the account that explains the freedom of the human intellect because he refuses to see the intellect as separated from the brain.

[136] WWR I, 328.

[137] WWR I, 180.

temporal, but then its individuality is not simply an effect of being in history, it must also be an individual in a non-sensible world. This is already the case with the Schopenhauerian ideas.

However, as we have seen, Schopenhauer holds that individuality disappears as soon as we abandon the principle of individuation, thus it would not be possible to claim that the Schopenhauerian ideas or the intelligible character are individuals. Evidently, we have run into some serious problems here. "One could also ask how deeply the roots of individuality penetrate into the essence in itself of things. To this we can at best answer: they penetrate as deeply as the affirmation of the will to life; they come to an end where negation begins, because they arose with affirmation." Schopenhauer refuses to resolve this problem because for him there is no possible solution.[138] I believe that a more satisfactory answer is found in another philosopher, namely, Plotinus. From Plotinus we can learn how the principle of individuation is not just time and space, but the very presence of the ultimate reality in all its manifestations, a solution that is already available to Schopenhauer, but he seems to ignore it.

Another issue with individuality and character that lurks behind this discussion is that Schopenhauer seems reluctant to establish clear boundaries of what is meant by 'individuality' and the extent in which the empirical or intelligible character participate in this concept. Consider the following texts: "all human deeds are just the constantly repeated expression of the intelligible character, only somewhat varied in form, and the empirical character is an induction based on the summation of these expressions."[139] Here it seems that the intelligible character is not individuated or, to put in other terms, there is no

[138] See WWR II, 657-659 for a whole sleuth of questions that Schopenhauer's philosophy does not answer.
[139] WWR I, 316.

intelligible character for each individual empirical character. The implication is that the intelligible character is a kind of generality, all the possible combination of empirical characters that only become individuals when discovered in time.[140]

I believe that it is attractive to read Schopenhauer in this way because it goes well with his conclusions that there are no individuals except those that fall under the principle of individuation. Thus, there is no intelligible or empirical character for Kant or Socrates, these two men are simply a concretization of specific traits flowing from a generic intelligible character. What we call Kant or Socrates is what Schopenhauer calls the 'acquired character' "which is only acquired over the course of a life and through contact with the world."[141]

Nevertheless, I think that there is sufficient proof to establish that when Schopenhauer speaks of human beings, he believes that each member of humanity is an expression of an idea. This idea is not Humanity itself but something like an 'idea of Kant'. The name 'Kant' here evidently does not come from the idea, this was given to this person who lived in the 18th century. But the way Kant lived and how he reacted to events in this life are historical manifestations of the intelligible character, just as his genius, manifested in his writings, discloses to us his grasping of the ideas.

Part III

[140] The context of WWR I, 316 reveals the reason for thinking that this is a problematic text.
[141] WWR I, 329.

VIII. The Metaphysical Longing, and Areas of Disagreement

Assessment of Kant' Soul Doctrine

I think that any assessment of Kant's account of the soul in his mature period needs to begin by answering the following question, what does *Kant* mean when he uses the word soul in the *Critique*? Kant proposes that soul is an inferred concept, not from experience but from the general form of thinking, "I think". To be more specific, soul is an inferred concept from the 'idea of soul', that is, those concepts (such as God and the world) that, unlike the categories, do not refer to a sensible object. If we consider the content that Kant assigns to the idea of soul, we get something like this: the soul is the absolute unity of the subject of thought in general, or the unconditioned subject of thinking to which all our thoughts relate as predicates. How Kant concludes that the soul is an 'absolute unity', or an 'unconditioned subject of thinking' is never explained. What is very clear to me is that there are philosophers who will consider that Kant's description of soul is unacceptable. For them, as the example of Plotinus in chapter 4 will show, the human soul is not an absolute unity, nor an unconditioned subject.

The first problem with Kant's account then is that his very conception of the human soul is not universally accepted. The second problem is with that 'idea of soul' which Kant locates in human reason. It is not obvious, and the Platonic tradition would certainly agree, that Kant is using here 'ideas' in its proper meaning. Platonists would deny that Kant understood Plato better than himself. They will probably say that Kant's ideas are the product of his demands and conclusions in the *Critique* leading up to the Dialectic, not

with anything related to Plato. Furthermore, Schopenhauer has persuaded us to not admit as true everything that Kant wrote. Accordingly, Schopenhauer accepts important Kantian conclusions, but he does not accept Kant's doctrine of ideas. Thus, if the edifice that Kant constructs for reason in the Dialectic falls apart, then this whole doctrine of ideas disappears.

I agree with Kant on one point, namely, that ultimately the question about the immortality of the soul is a question about the supposed demonstration that whatever X survives after corporeal death and preserves its personality is the soul. When I say the "immortality of the soul" I mean, for example, that when I die, I could meet another soul and that soul is whom in history I called Kant. It means that a human soul remains *human* even if not directly associated with a body. I do not need Kant's body to recognize this soul as Kant. How is this possible? Could we give arguments in favor of this view? If I interpret Kant correctly, theoretical philosophy cannot give an answer to this question. However, a series of assumptions would need to be accepted without question to fully agree with Kant, but it would be odd to think that Kant wants to create a set of prejudices that cannot be questioned; thus, going against his public views.[142] He, moreover, invites us in the *Prolegomena* to disagree with him and bring forward alternatives.[143] Ultimately, Kant wrote many passages in the *Critique* that suggest a *via negativa* approach to the question, that is, philosophy cannot reach any definitive conclusion regarding this issue.[144] With that other great transcendental idealist, Schopenhauer, I think that Kant has proven certain things that cannot be toss aside. But even Schopenhauer could not follow Kant to where he

[142] A738-39/B766-67; A744/B772 and *What is Enlightenment?*
[143] Prol 8:263-64.
[144] Cf A 741/ B 769. But there are other texts where Kant seems to have a more agnostic approach, cf A 753/ B 781.

was leading and concede that the boundaries established in the *Critique* were enough to "penetrate the secrets of nature."[145] An important Schopenhauerian thesis is that this can only be accomplished with a more robust doctrine of the thing in itself, the proper subject matter of metaphysics.

As I have mentioned before, I propose that the first step towards exploring the immortality of the soul in the sense that I indicated above is to reverse Kant's tendencies. By this I mean Kant's tendency, which has been noted by Kant's readers, to change ontological questions into epistemological questions.[146] For this, Kant's understanding of metaphysics, its essence, and its scope must be questioned. Transcendental idealism is amenable to metaphysics and ontology as we discovered in the works of Schopenhauer. Kant's approach to philosophy invites us to always begin with sensible experience, and sensible experience is the foundation of any philosophy that desires to be everlasting. The investigation of the possibilities of our cognition of that world is essential to keep our philosophies grounded. But in choosing to start there, we are tempted to become hyper focused on certain aspects of reality, those studied by physics and mathematicians to name a few, to the detriment of others. I think that Kant fell into this temptation and never truly managed to free himself from it.[147] Moreover, this temptation blinds us to the acknowledgement that our cognitive encounter with reality is more expansive than those areas studied by physicists and mathematicians.

To name one example, the cognition of the sensible world that we gain through the study of a work of art, let us say Homer's *Iliad* or Bosch's *The Garden of Earthly Delights*,

[145] A 702/B730.
[146] Guyer and Wood (1998, 25) identify this in the *Nova dilucidatio* (1755).
[147] A662/B690 – A663/B691 is a good example of Kant measuring everything in reality by focusing on the physical aspects of reality.

is of the same, if not of a higher truth, than those truths established by the categories of the understanding. This reveals that the way we cognize the world is not exclusively from the scientist's perspective, but that our cognitive faculties are altered by our encounter with certain objects in experience. Here the clear distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy is blurred. Although in honesty it could be said that the next two *Critiques* were written to address this problem, Kant fails to free himself from the chains of the first *Critique*. He set up very strict rules in the first *Critique* and his attempt to make these areas of reality that cannot be explained in purely physical or mathematical ways conform to these rules vitiates his conclusions.

This tendency can be observed in Kant's view of what life is and how this view affects his assessment of the human soul and the argument of the soul as a principle of life. Life is a concept that can be reduced to *biological* life, the type of life that it is studied in biology. When this is the case, life cannot function other than as an observable process in an organic entity. The conclusions of the *Critique* reinforce the tendency to see life as simply something that is only observable in the sensible world. Given this perspective, that soul itself is life and life is not merely a biological process is unacceptable. Here too Schopenhauer surpasses Kant because for him, life is much more than just something biological. As we will see, to a certain extent, Schopenhauer endorses the principle of life argument but in so doing he claims that the immortal life of which the Ancients or Christians spoke is what he calls the will, not the soul.

Assessment of Schopenhauer' Soul Doctrine

Notwithstanding my final assessment regarding Schopenhauer's psychology, as given, transcendental idealism presents several challenges to any account of immortality defined as "the continued individual existence of our entire personal consciousness after death."[148] Among these challenges, I want to focus on the fact that both Kant and Schopenhauer strongly agree that the subject of cognition is not an object of the world;[149] according to them, it is impossible for the subject of cognition's nature to reveal itself to us. Kant stated that this would amount to claiming cognition of the thing in itself and Schopenhauer said that the only thing that is revealed when the subject of cognition turns to himself is that it is a subject of willing.

The cognitive self is a blind spot, the eye that does not see itself. The cognitive subject in itself can never be cognized because it will cease to be the subject and become an object. These observations are aimed at the rationalist tradition that claims to cognize the subject of cognition and conclude from this cognition that it is a permanent substance and an abiding person. Allegedly, if someone could provide arguments to doubt this position, then transcendental idealism is wrong. There are two considerations that I would like to propose in order to assess Kant's and Schopenhauer's position. One is a general remark and the second is more directed at Schopenhauer. As for the first consideration, I think that transcendental idealism is too seduced by the cognitive faculties that it studies, specifically with the nature of human cognition of the sensible world at the level of physics. Kant's and Schopenhauer's arguments prescribe that if we want to approach cognition of the subject

[148] PP II, 267. However, it should be clear by now that Schopenhauer does not deny a specific understanding of the immortality of the true self. Our true nature is will, and this will is eternal; what is not eternal is our individuality.
[149] Wittgenstein writes, "Nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye."

of cognition, we must do it from the perspective of the physical paradigm. But this seems to me to be a demand that we do not need to accept.

> Because the physical realm has such a dominant role in our conceptual scheme, we become conditioned to treating physical objects as the model for *all* concrete objects, and so come to suppose that an objective conception of the nature of a basic subject must have a similarly externalist form. Thus we come to suppose that, to characterize such subjects as they are in themselves; we have to be able to stand back from them and specify how they would appear to an ideal observer who could veridically perceive their spiritual substance, or how they would be characterized by some fully developed spiritual science.[150]

I think that at a basic level, when we are dealing with the objects of the sensible world, it is undeniable that the best word to describe the way the human mind works is with the word 'intentionality.'[151] Although neither Kant nor Schopenhauer use the word 'intentionality' to describe the human mind, it is clear to me that this is how they see the mind operating, at minimum, at a basic level. The conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic and Book 1 of the WWR are that in our daily life our mental states point to something else, are always directed outward and that is why the cognitive subject is inaccessible. For Kant it is that the categories are only meant to be applied to objects of possible experience; if there is no sensible object to which categories apply, the categories are meaningless. It is more complicated to specify how this mentality appears in Schopenhauer because he admits things like Platonic ideas, but his commitment to never

[150] Foster (1991, 235).
[151] Searle (1983, 1): "Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world."

accept that the subject of cognition is accessible is based on his Kantian epistemology. Thus, if we were to have some access to what the cognitive subject is itself, it would require that we are in a mental state that is not 'intentional'. This mental state which allows a cognitive subject to know itself by redefining the line between subject and object is described by Plotinus in his discussion of the self-knowledge of the Intellect. I propose that we investigate it to determine if there is something that transcendental idealism can learn from it.

In any case, Schopenhauer has insinuated that there are mental states in which intentionality is no longer present, this is cognition free from its subjugation to the will. This is the background of his discussion of aesthetics and morality. The alterations in the human intellect that needs to happen in order to speak meaningfully of art and virtues points towards the way in which there is more to cognition than intentionality. This promising account unfortunately disappoints because Schopenhauer does not free himself from the view that the human intellect is nothing less than a brain function. Therefore, even though he describes in unsurpassable prose phenomena such as aesthetic contemplation and the self-denial of the saint, all of it is just brain activity and as such purely immanent. As such these phenomena do not reveal the existence of realities that should not be immanent. This is the second consideration that I want to propose. I briefly discussed this identification intellect-brain, but it needs further scrutiny because this identification of intellect with brain is problematic not only considering criticism leveled against the Identity Theory[152] in the

[152] For an introduction to the Identity Theory, see Heil (2004, 71-87) and Feser (2006, 50-55). A basic definition of the theory says that "any given mental state…is *the exact same thing as* the firing of such-and-such a clump of neurons in your brain" (Feser 2006, 64). This process is not *causal* (the neuron affects the mind), but strictly identical, for example, anger *is* the firing of such and such neurons. By looking at the firing of neurons in a machine, one is looking at the mental event.

20th century, but because Schopenhauer seems to acknowledge that this creates problems (Schopenhauer's antinomy of cognition)[153] and I am not completely persuaded by his solution. More than that, I wonder if his solution has more implications to Schopenhauer's metaphysics that he is willing to exploit. Here again I think that the study of Plotinus could be beneficial. In Plotinus' own language, he describes the relationship of brain and human intellect, but he argues that the human mind is 'above the brain'. Plotinus' position, combined with substance dualism, can function as a response to Schopenhauer's identity theory.

For me, this is one of the biggest weaknesses in Schopenhauer's otherwise fine philosophy. This flaw moreover could be exploited to attack Schopenhauer's denial of the immortality to the individual. Schopenhauer is a unique paradox because he recognizes the limitations of the physical paradigm; indeed, that is the basis of his accusation that Kant only provides a philosophy of nature but not a true metaphysics. Nevertheless, for him "consciousness rest primarily on the intellect, but this on a physiological process. For it is obviously the function of the brain and, therefore, conditioned by the co-operation of the nervous and vascular systems, more specifically by the brain that is nourished, animated, and constantly agitated by the heart."[154] Against Schopenhauer, we must say, it is certainly *not* obvious that the intellect, mental states, etc. are a function of the brain. The hyperphysicalization of the human intellect is one blind spot in Schopenhauer's thinking that does not allow his other insights to fully attain their explanatory power. If the human

[153] The so-called 'antinomy of cognition' is well-articulated in chapter 22: "Certainly in my explanation the existence of the body presupposes the world of representation, to the extent that it too, as physical body or real object, exists only in representation: but on the other hand, representation itself presupposes the body to the same extent, since representation only arises through the function of an organ" (WWR II, 289).
[154] PP II, 273 (payne tran). Innumerable passages testify to this identification of intellect with the brain.

intellect is no longer identified with the human brain, a door for personal and individual immortality opens, even from a Schopenhauerian perspective.

Schopenhauer is a staunch believer in the notion that Western philosophers decided to – incorrectly – identify the human being's most true self with the rational/intellectual soul. This immortal thinking substance has access to all sorts of eternal truths beyond the sensible world. A bigger mistake was made by making the will subordinate to the intellect and making all the phenomena associated with will (desires, etc.) mortal.[155] Schopenhauer argues to have shown the falseness of this view: the true has been unveiled: the human intellect is the product of an unconscious process, that is, of the will. Therefore, when Schopenhauer reports about Platonic ideas and intelligible characters (conclusions that he reaches through his intellect) we cannot get too excited because it all collapses into merely brain processes.

This identification of the human intellect with the brain plays an important role in Schopenhauer's denial of personal immortality. He writes, "An *individual consciousness* and this a consciousness in general is not conceivable in an *immaterial or incorporeal being*, since the condition of every consciousness, knowledge, is necessarily a brain-function really because the intellect manifest itself objectively as brain."[156] Both the life-process that lead to the appearance of the brain, and consciousness are products of the will; thus, Schopenhauer argues that will and intellect can be separated and only will can sustain itself, it is, to used classical language, a true substance. But this also means that when the brain dies, consciousness disappears and with consciousness personality.

[155] In PP II, 277 the origin of this view is attributed to Plato.
[156] PP II, 273.

For Schopenhauer, death means a return to our original state, that state peculiar to will, that is, as the force that creates the life that is now disappearing. More properly, it is to be called the state of the thing in itself. We go back to where we came from and as we return to the thing in itself there is no need for cognition because after death the sensible world disappears. To desire cognition in that original state would be like offering crutches to a lame man who is cured.[157] Schopenhauer argues then that the cerebral life is not needed after death because through death we enter the realm of the thing in itself. We could have accepted this account if Schopenhauer had never talked about ideas. He has led us to believe that the ideas' existence does not depend on human consciousness. Now we are supposed to accept that our entering into the state of the thing in itself means that the ideas are not present to us in any way. This is the unfortunate result of making the intellect identical with the brain. A more consistent position suggests that death should free us to contemplate the ideas for all eternity. The Ideas are not supposed to be the kind of entities that are only accessible during a sensible lifetime. The Pure Subject of Cognition is not supposed to be capable of dying. However, here is where the problem with identification of mental life with brain processes blinds Schopenhauer to deeper truths.

There is one passage in *PP II* that reveals to me how Schopenhauer was aware that his position had some important limitations. His view of death rests on an important assumption, namely, that we only imagine a non-conscious state from the perspective of cognition or consciousness. Our point of view from where we are describing this non-conscious state could be vitiated because we do not describe it from the unconscious' point of view. Thus, the state of the thing in itself could be described as a state of consciousness

[157] PP II, 274.

where there is no more clear distinction between knower and known[158] but without cognition, specifically, discursive cognition.

> Now if through death we forfeit the intellect, we are thereby shifted only into the original state which is *without knowledge*, but is not for that reason absolutely *without consciousness*; on the contrary, it will be a state that is raised above and beyond that form where the contrast between subject and object vanishes because that which is to be known would here be actually and immediately identical with the knower himself; and thus the fundamental condition of all knowing…is wanting.[159]

Consciousness does not necessarily imply the subject/object dichotomy that is the form of our cognition in this sensible life. Schopenhauer has already toyed with this notion in his doctrine of aesthetic contemplation. But I also believe that once we prove that the human intellect cannot be reduced to the brain, intellect, like will, is revealed as another original force that has generated the world. For me, the objective perspective that Schopenhauer introduces in transcendental idealism is populated not just with the thing in itself and Schopenhauerian ideas, but with intellects.

My interpretation of Schopenhauer seeks to recognize the untapped potential of this side of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. I prefer the path in which transcendental idealism can be reinterpreted in a way in which ontology and epistemology are not like closed monads. This interpretation is the path in which Schopenhauer has put transcendental idealism, but evidently, I believe that there are some problems with his account. I think that secondary

[158] A state of noetic cognition like the one described in aesthetic contemplation.
[159] PP II, 274-275.

literature in Schopenhauer's metaphysics does not appreciate the objective perspective enough, nor do the implications of what he is saying are taken seriously.

In the next chapter, I want to introduce the philosophy of Plotinus. He alongside supporters of substance dualism, will help me to distinguish between intellect and brain processes. But the study of Plotinus is not only valuable to comprehend the true nature of intellect, but it will also provide an opportunity to contrast the ways in which Kant and Schopenhauer have described for us the human soul. Plotinus, I believe, would have never accepted their views, at least he would have been suspicious. Finally, Plotinus can help us to comprehend better what Schopenhauer tries to describe in Book III when he discusses the encounter between Ideas and the Pure Subject. Here lies the key to comprehend how we know ourselves as knowers. This will have beneficial consequences for Schopenhauer's metaphysics because once the intellect is no longer identified with the human brain, i) the antinomy of cognition that Schopenhauer struggles with disappears, ii) the human intellect's essence is no longer the preservation of the organism, and iii) a door is open for the intellect to also be immortal, just like the will.

It is my conviction that bringing together the philosophies of Schopenhauer, as the philosopher of the Will, and Plotinus, as the philosopher of the Intellect, would only lead us to a more comprehensive discussion of the faculties of thinking and willing. These meditations would guide us to a deeper truth: the world is generated by intellect and will; this sensible world is an image in the strict sense of the word.[160] The sensible world is the reflection in a mirror of a non-sensible world where intellect and will are original, unalterable, and indestructible.

[160] VI.4.10,1-15.

CHAPTER 4

Plotinus' 'Undescended' Self and the Historical 'I'

Introduction

In previous chapters, I discussed the lights and shadows of transcendental idealism understood as a philosophical doctrine inaugurated by Kant and modified by Schopenhauer. The specific topic that I wanted to analyze is that doctrine's account of the immortality of the true self. In Kant, the account ends in the negative, that is, there is no ground for a theoretical necessity of immortality; we only have a rational faith that the human person will survive death. On the other hand, for Schopenhauer, the doctrine of a thing called 'soul' that refers to an eternal, inmost self is revealed as a false claim based on ignoring the primacy of the will. But next to this radical rejection, Schopenhauer adds that human beings should not fear death because there is an eternal principle in us that is not destroyed by death. This eternal principle, the will, is established through theoretical arguments.

In chapter 1, I established that Kant's introduction of the intelligible character in the first *Critique* is the closest creation of a new doctrine to substitute the traditional account of soul that he seems to reject. In chapter 2, I showed that Schopenhauer builds upon the Kantian intelligible character and that there are good reasons to believe that he identifies it with an Idea. Thus, I proposed that transcendental idealism, as revised by Schopenhauer,

has an inchoate theory to ground the continuous existence of the individual after death. However, Schopenhauer's account of Ideas, Pure Subject of Cognition, and intelligible character is notoriously difficult to systematize and interpret. I suggested some possible ways to reconcile Schopenhauer's complex narrative, but that argument remained incomplete. My proposal for revisiting Schopenhauer's doctrine is inspired by my own reading of Plotinus and the overlap of his philosophy with the Schopenhauerian variant of transcendental idealism. Therefore, I propose that we turn to the tradition found in Plotinus' *Enneads*[1] to get a better understanding of some of its principal tenets before closing my thoughts regarding the problems raised so far.

Important post-Kantian philosophers resonated with and found echoes of transcendental idealism in Plotinus' thought.[2] To fully unpack why this is the case would be to go stray from the scope of this study, thus, I will not present a systematic explanation of every aspect of Plotinus' philosophy. I will focus exclusively on those aspects that bear some impact on the overall thesis of this dissertation. My aim is not to conclude that Plotinus' philosophy is superior to transcendental idealism and that it has given a final solution to the epistemological and metaphysical issues raised by the problem of the immortality of the human person. Instead, I have the more modest aim of using the framework of Plotinian metaphysics and epistemology to illuminate the possibilities built into Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism and to suggest ways in which the topic of immortality of human persons is still a valid discussion for philosophy even after Kant's

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to *The Enneads* are from Gerson (2019).
[2] Schopenhauer being one of them, who in his brief history of philosophy identifies Plotinus as a precursor of Kant, see PP I, 55-56. There he also describes *Ennead* IV as "excellent". Beierwaltes (2002, 393-395) discusses the historical connections between Schelling and Plotinus. For a discussion of the Platonic tradition and German philosophy see: Mojsisch (2003), Gersh (2019, 183-216).

critique. A survey of Plotinus' philosophy of self and immortality could suggest good starting points for a new interpretation of some of Schopenhauer's insights. The synthetic task of bringing together the Plotinian and Schopenhauerian insights will take place in chapter 5.

Therefore, I propose the following topics as illuminating for that purpose i) a survey of Plotinus' epistemology to show how Plotinus takes seriously the sensible world to ground his more metaphysical claims; ii) Plotinus' account of the nature of the human soul and the justification of its immortality; iii) what counts as true self for Plotinus and whether this account is compatible with the immortality of the self as expressed in the historical 'I'; and iv) Plotinus' account of Intellect and Ideas to show the necessary connection between these two things.

I. Human Cognition, and the Question of Plotinus' Idealism

Transcendental idealism, as conceived by Kant, emphasizes that before we venture into the land of metaphysics we must sit down and consider whether we are even capable of doing metaphysics. Among its many aims, it seeks to establish the conditions for any meaningful metaphysical account.[3] Following this desire, the transcendental idealist takes inventory of how we could even cognize metaphysical objects such as soul. Kant's *Critique*, for the most part, is a long examination of the cognitive faculties, and *The World as Will and Representation* begins in Book 1 with what Schopenhauer calls *dianoiology*, that is, a study

[3] Schopenhauer's defense of Kant against Hegel. Kant is an accountant not a swimmer. I have not been able to retrieve this reference. The closest refence is FR, 100.

of the understanding.[4] Plotinus acknowledges a similar starting point for his philosophy. "All human beings, when they are born, from the beginning use sense-perception [αἰσθήσει] prior to intellect, and, necessarily, encounter sensibles [αἰσθητοῖς] first" (5.9 [5].1, 1-2).[5] Plotinus, like Schopenhauer demands for any good philosopher, takes the empirical data seriously. Although Plotinus does not have the systematization of Kant or Schopenhauer, his metaphysical claims are not made in the abstract but are grounded in the observation of the sensible world.[6]

When Schopenhauer attempts to justify that the philosophies of Kant and Plato "are like two completely different paths leading to a *single* goal,"[7] he uses an example that can be helpful here to start our discussion of Plotinus' epistemology.[8] Schopenhauer imagines a living animal standing in front of the respective philosopher and what would Plato and Kant say about it if asked what they have in front of them. Given the proximity in thought between Plato and Plotinus, I will give the answer that Schopenhauer attributes to Plato.

[4] Schopenhauer argues that philosophy studies experience itself, not this or that definite experience. As such, the first thing that philosophy must consider is "the medium wherein *experience in general* presents itself, together with the form and nature of that medium" (PP II, 17-18, Payne). This medium is the human being's understanding; it is in the understanding where sensible things are given to us.

[5] See B355 and A702-3/B730-31 for examples of how Kant and Plotinus share a similar view on the origin of cognition for human beings.

[6] The thematic organization of the *Enneads* also reveals the movement from the human being and sense perception to the ultimate reality of the One (Gerson, 2022, 3). Nor is Plotinus' occasional mystical passages a substitute for serious rational research as Dodds (1960, 7) writes, "Mystical union is not a substitute for intellectual effort, but its crown and goal." Plotinus himself also considers that the one seeking to cognize truth must ask if he or she has "the right sort of 'eye' that is able to see, and whether it is fitting for it to seek these things. For if the things sought are alien to it, why should it seek them?" (V.1[10].1.30-35)

[7] WWR I, 193.

[8] "With complete originality and in an entirely novel way, Kant discovered, from a new angle and along a new path, the same truth that Plato tirelessly repeats, usually expressing himself, in his on language, as follows: this world that appears to the senses does not have true being, but is instead only an incessant becoming, it is and it is not, and apprehending it does not involve cognition so much as delusion" (WWR I, 445).

> This animal does not really exist, but only appears to exist; it is a constant becoming, a relative existence that could just as well be called a non-being as a being [*Seyn*]. The only thing that truly is, is the Idea that shows itself in this animal, or the animal in itself which is independent of everything and exists in and for itself, not becoming, not coming to an end, but rather always existing in the same way. Now to the extent that we recognize the Idea in this animal, it is irrelevant and a matter of complete indifference whether what we have in front of us is this animal or its ancestor from a thousand years ago, whether it is here or in a distant country, whether it is this or some other individual of its type: all this is unreal and concerns only appearance: the Idea of the animal is the only thing that has true being and is the object of actual cognition.[9]

We can use this provisional answer to identify the main tenets of Plotinian epistemology. I want to emphasize two things from this text. As it will be discussed later, Schopenhauer attributes here a position to Plato that is fully developed by Plotinus, that is, that 'substance' belongs to the realm of the intelligible, namely, that against Aristotle, Plotinus does not believe that individual, sensible things are properly speaking, substances.[10] We see this when Schopenhauer writes "the Idea of the animal is the only thing that has true being." The things that we encounter in the world of becoming are called by Plotinus 'pseudo-substances' (*ousia legomene* or *aisthêtê*).[11] Second, in this hypothetical Platonic answer, Schopenhauer does not state in clear terms an important Platonic doctrine regarding Ideas, namely, that Ideas are not Aristotelian universals. For the Platonic tradition, the Ideas'

[9] WWR I, 194-195.
[10] VI.1-3 [42-44]. "At most, this kind is only homonymously *ousia,* or, better yet, a becoming, *genesis*" Remes 2005, 278. See VI.3 [44].2.1-4.
[11] VI. 3 [44].3, 28. For a discussion of Plotinus' criticism to Aristotle's theory of categories see Wagner (1982, 65-72).

individuality does not come from their union with matter, but it comes from somewhere else. According to Plotinus, "a particular human being is such due to his participating in Human Being."[12] Schopenhauer's text, on the other hand, might suggest that Ideas are not individuals for he only gives individuality ('thisness') to the animal in the sensible world. Individuality, somehow, seems to be missing in animality itself.[13]

We know that for Plato human beings are their soul, and these souls are individuated without being united with a body.[14] Furthermore, the souls are immortal. However, our question in this study is not exclusively about the immortality of the soul in general but about the permanence after death of the human person that we encounter in the empirical world. We saw already how Schopenhauer denies that the empirical person, what he calls the individual human being, survives death. On the other hand, in Plotinus' philosophy, we encounter a discussion regarding whether there are ideas of individuals (εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστόν ἐστιν ἰδέα). What is this discussion about? And can it give us some clues regarding the permanence of the empirical human person? I will explore these questions below.

Given what I stated earlier, the concern with the existence of ideas of individual human persons is not a strictly Platonic concern. The distinctive personalities that we encounter in the world of becoming seem to have their ground in the individual souls. Ideas, for example, Humanity itself, are regarded as 'one over many' and independent from individuals; they do not have the idiosyncrasies that differentiate one dog from another

[12] VI.3 [44].9,30.
[13] When Schopenhauer discusses his doctrine of Ideas outside the context of what supposedly Plato would have said, he does refer to Ideas as universals, but this can be misleading for he distinguishes between Ideas proper as *universalia ante rem* and concepts as *universalia post rem*. The latter are more in line with the Aristotelians universals. See WWR II, 383.
[14] *Alcibiades 1* 129e-130; *Phaedo* 115c-d; *Laws* 959a-b.

(color, size, behavior) in the empirical world. For the Platonist philosopher, the aim was to lose himself more and more in the contemplation of truth, to leave behind the world of becoming and unite his soul with the Good. There is no indication that in this union the individual human person remains. Therefore, if we encounter that Plotinus seems to struggle with how to preserve the historical 'I' in something like a theory of ideas of individuals – understood as the intelligible grounding of an empirical character – this is to be considered a significant development in ancient thought.[15]

In the hypothetical Platonic answer above, Schopenhauer does not say anything regarding what processes were needed for the animal to be perceived by Plato' eyes, namely, there is no mention of the nature of sight.[16] Does the person who sees the animal sees it because the form of the dog imprints itself in the viewer's eyes or is something else involved in cognition? Given that for Plotinus there is a self in the intelligible and another self in the empirical world, how the empirical self sees the dog is not as simple as the dog puts itself in front of the beholders' eyes and that is the end of the story.

It is generally accepted that Plotinus speaks like a direct realist or a nonrepresentational realist about objects of sense perception.[17] According to this interpretation, Plotinus is committed to the existence of qualities that exist in an object independent of the knower's intellect. The proof is that Plotinus insists that our sight is directed towards the object of sight and the object is not in us or causing impressions in us.[18]

[15] Rist (1963, 223).
[16] That Schopenhauer failed to mention this fact does not mean that Plato does not have a theory of sight. In fact, Plato has a complex theory of sight in the *Timaeus*.
[17] The following account follows Emilsson (1996). For discussion of Plotinian realism see Gurtler (1989).
[18] IV. 6 [41]. 1, 15-17.

One thing seems certain, that sense-perception can only occur when the human soul encounters the external qualified object. Plotinus teaches that the human soul alone "will apprehend merely what is within itself, and all that will take place [within itself] will be intellection" (VI.4 [22].23, 5-10). By its very nature, soul can only grasp intelligible things while sensible things cannot affect the human soul. But sense-perception is apprehension of sensible things; thus, somehow the human soul must encounter sensible things. For Plotinus there must be a third thing that bridges the gap between the intelligible and the sensible, that is, between the human soul and the sensible objects. Something that will assimilate the form of the objects while being able to be in contact with the sensible object. That role is assigned by Plotinus to the ensouled sense organs. They are affected by an external object; this affection (*pathos*) is, by the time it reaches the soul, an intelligible (form) or judgment.[19] Corporeal organs, according to Plotinus, must be able to both "receive and to report." They are not identical to the soul because they can be affected by sensible things, but they are not identical to sensible things because they only assimilate the form and not the matter of the sensible object. In summary, the affection in the body is a sensation, (presumably) a nonconceptual presence of the external quality in a sensible object. But Plotinus qualifies this by adding that the sensation in the sense organs is both intelligible and sensible, "somehow connecting the extremes with each other" (IV.4 [22].23, 25-30). Finally, the soul's judgment is about the sensible object and not about the affection in the senses. When I say that this animal in front of me is a dog, according to Plotinus, I am making a judgment about the sensible world outside of my soul, and the qualities that my soul see are possessed by a dog that is external to the soul. Plotinus rejects

[19] The full account of this in IV.4 [28].23 and IV 5 [29].

that in saying that this animal is a dog, I am communicating subjective states of my soul, or I am speaking of a dog that my soul creates.

However, there are some troubling passages for a purely realist interpretation of Plotinus which has induce some interpreters to argue that Plotinus is an idealist.[20] One of such passages that presents a challenge for a strictly realist position is found in V.5 [32].1. Plotinus' concern here is the question of how to ascribe perfect infallible knowledge of what is real to the Intellect.[21] According to Plotinus, only if the Forms are internal to Intellect could we say that Intellect has such infallible knowledge.

> But as for those things they concede are self-evident to it – from where will they say their being self-evident comes? And from where will Intellect derive the conviction that things are self-evident to it? For even sensibles, which certainly seem to bring with them the most self-evident conviction, do not, in fact, convince us that their seemingly real existence is in substrates rather than in our experiences, and that they are not in need of intellect or discursive thinking to make judgments about them. For even if it is agreed that the sensibles are in their substrates, the apprehension of which sense-perception will bring about, what is known by means of sense-perception of the object is a reflection [eidolon] of the thing; it is not the thing itself that sense-perception receives, for that object remains outside it (V.5 [32].1.12-19).

The source of tension with a direct realist interpretation comes from the fact that Plotinus says in this passage that sense-perception does not provide 'the thing itself' but a reflection

[20] See Wagner (1986).
[21] For a good introduction to the Plotinian hypostasis see Igal (1982, 35-62) and O'Meara (2011, 306-310).

or image of the thing that remains outside it.[22] It is important to clarify that for Plotinus the reflection or image that sense-perception grasp is the qualitative features of a sensible object and not its 'essence' or 'substance' of which the qualities are an expression. According to Emilsson, the view that "perceptible qualities of an object are representations or images of an intelligible essence, which is the real thing, is a standard Plotinian view as is the claim that sense perception fails to grasp essences."[23] This grounds an important feature of Plotinus' metaphysics, namely, that sensible 'substances' are not real substances but quasi-substances for only Forms and Intellect are Substantiality and the form that enters in a relationship with matter is an image of the Form and not the Form itself.

Emilsson, nevertheless, finds a way to interpret the passage quoted above in a realist way. The difference between the cognition of Intellect and the cognition through sense-perception of the human soul is that Intellect cognizes the Forms and it is constituted by this cognition of Forms. Whereas for the human soul, the forms assimilated through the sense organs always come from outside, for the Intellect the Forms are internal to it. The human soul does not cognize the Form itself, but it still cognizes the external act of a sensible object's formative principle. Therefore, Emilsson advocates for a realist interpretation of Plotinus' claims in V.5 [32].1; even though our faculty of sense does not apprehend the object outside or its internal activity, it is the very object's activity that the soul cognizes.

[22] A similar way of speaking is found in I.2 [19].4, 20-29.

[23] Emilsson (1996, 222). From Emilsson: In general Plotinus calls the forms perceptible in matter representations (eidola, sometimes mimemata or eikones or uses other words meaning "image," "trace," or "shadow"). Thus, the general sense of "representation" in Plotinus is "ontologically derivative." All this is just standard Platonism based on such passages as Rep. VII.5i6a7; 520c4; Phdr. 25ob2-d5; Soph. 239d4ff. Epist. VII.342b2, etc.

Even with Emilsson's interpretation, I am not convinced that the question about Plotinus' idealism is settled. At this point, the study of Schopenhauer's modified transcendental idealism reveals its significance. The question is adjusted now to what kind of idealism can we predicate of Plotinus. I dare to say that Plotinus' idealism is, as it were, veiled within the more accepted view that Plotinus is a realist.[24] I will attempt to explain myself. Plotinus, I think, is an idealist in the way that Schopenhauer considered himself an idealist. The idealism that I identify in Plotinus is like the idealism that is found in Schopenhauer's work. In that idealism, if we recall what I have discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there is not just a subjective study of the faculties of the human mind, but an objective angle in which the sensible world is revealed as an image, a copy of a non-sensible world. Moreover, the sensible world, and its individuals (trees, dogs, human beings) are 'relative entities that do not exist in themselves."[25] They are always understood in relationship to another thing and to a knower. Only the items of the non-sensible world have an independent existence.[26] This idealism argues that the sensible world disappears if you take away the non-sensible world, and this can never happen in the reverse way. The non-sensible world remains even if there was no sensible world. Taking Schopenhauer as point of departure, we can say both that Plotinus's philosophical conclusions can be discovered through and are compatible with Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism.[27] The

[24] Moran (1999, 56-58) shows how 'idealism' is not a univocal term and how it can be applied to Ancient and Medieval philosophers like Plotinus. Moran argues that even if philosophers like Plotinus are realist, that does not mean that "their peculiar kind of realism is not necessary opposed to idealism, if by idealism we understand a thesis about the *nature* of the really existing world rather than as a kind of skepticism about the external world" (56).

[25] Rappe (1996 78). Remmes (2005, 292), concludes that the being that sensible objects possess is their existence between two extremes of time, namely, their coming to be and passing away.

[26] To a certain extent, they depend on the absolute transcendent principle which Plotinus calls the One and Schopenhauer the thing in itself, or Will.

[27] There are evidently significant differences, some more obvious than others. I will not go into details about this and may bring up some in chapter 5.

importance of this recognition strengthens my goal to use Plotinus's philosophy to spell out some of the implications of Schopenhauer's philosophy.

I will now explain the elements that back my idealist reading of Plotinus. One of the main doctrines of VI.3 [44]. is that qualities and quantities in matter, that which is cognized by the sense organs, are in some way unreal.

> And there is no call to have qualms if we make sensible substance from factors which themselves are not substance. For the whole is not true Substance, but is modeled on the true one, which has being without any of the factors around it, even though the other things come to be out of it, because it is truly. Thus, even the foundation is unfruitful, and insufficient to be Being, in that the other things do not originate in it, and it is shadow and a painting, that is, an appearance, on something that is itself shadow (VI.3 [44].8, 30-38).[28]

In this passage, Plotinus does not claim that the individual *human* soul or intellect produces the sensible object. We can only speak of the human soul constituting a sensible object in the case of the different arts, but the works of nature are not products of the human soul. The qualities in objects are not unreal in the sense that they are products of *our minds*. They are unreal in the sense that their existence is defined by being dependent on another and part of this interdependency includes their nature as perceptible objects, known objects to a knower. That their existence is also bound to our interactions with them is part of what makes them unreal. When we confuse sensible things for real things it is like mistaking a

[28] Similar thoughts are found in III.6 [26].13, 44: "For this reason, then, the images in mirrors are not believed to exist or to exist to the same degree because what they are in is visible and remains when the images go away. But in the case of matter it is not visible both with and without the images. Yet, if it was possible for the images with which the mirrors are filled to remain while the mirrors themselves were invisible, we would not doubt that the images were true [beings]."

mirror image for the real object. Unlike the Intellect thinking Form, through the mediation of Soul, the human intellect is not what sustains the existence of the sensible cosmos. For Plotinus, if you take away the human intellect, the cosmos remains as it is and does not disappear. The human intellect will always receive forms from an outer qualified object. Idealism, understood as the human mind being the generator of the sensible world's existence, is not found in Plotinus. Idealism does not need to be the theory that says that the sensible world is constructed by the human mind, as the study of Schopenhauer's idealism helped me to establish. Our study of Plotinus helps us discover that Plotinus could be considered a precursor of this kind of idealism.

In chapter 2, we saw how Schopenhauer, adopting what he calls the objective perspective, argues that Ideas are prior to their images in the empirical world. What remained an open question is whether there is in Schopenhauer something that takes the role of the Intellect, a question that will be answered in the next chapter. According to Plotinus, the Intellect thinking Forms is real and ontologically prior to the sensible cosmos. The Forms are internal to the Intellect, unlike the forms that come from outside to the human soul.[29] Intellect sees things in themselves, that is, Beings, as opposed to their images. "Intellect must be identical with the intelligible, because if they are not identical, there will not be truth, for that which possesses things different from Beings, will have an impression, which is not true."[30] The sensible things exists, ultimately, because there is Intellect thinking Forms; thus, "remove the Beings, none of the things now visible in the

[29] "[Intellect] is not related to its objects as if it did not possess them, either seeking to acquire them or passing through them in order as if they were not already available – for these are states that the soul experiences – but stands fast in itself being 'all things together', and does not bring each one into existence by thinking them" (V.9 [5].7.10-12).
[30] V.3 [40].5, 22-25.

sensible world would ever at any time appear" (III.6 [26].13.37-38).[31] The form that is found in the sensible objects "comes to it from something else, and is an image of that from which it comes" (V.9 [5].5, 20-22).

According to Plotinus, the human soul judges that an object is beautiful because the undescended soul contemplates Beauty itself. The Form by which we call something beautiful is ontologically prior to the sensible objects and the Forms are thoughts of Intellect. To conclude, this is the kind of idealism that we can predicate of Plotinus: that at all levels of reality, there is intellection.[32]

In this discussion of the nature of sense perception, I have introduced a series of issues that will be revisited in the next sections. I wanted to lay out as clearly as possible the most basic epistemological commitments for Plotinus given that this is where transcendental idealism claims to begin. As a positive result of this discussion, we can see that Schopenhauer's use of the theory of Ideas is not an anomaly to be dismissed or explained away, but as seen in Plotinus, idealism understood in a specific way, is compatible with the doctrine of Ideas. In the end, Schopenhauer has a theory of Ideas closer to the Platonic spirit than Kant ever did. Schopenhauer illuminates the way in which we can understand Plotinian idealism and Plotinus teaches how to make sense of the Schopenhauerian use of Ideas.

[31] Wagner 1986, 61 calls this 'vertical causation': "The term 'vertical causation' indicates that our cosmos is the product of a higher reality – that its existence and nature result from eternal, invariant principles which are neither parts of it nor separate entities from it." See VI.4 [22].2.1-6

[32] See III.8 [30].8. According to Emilsson, Plotinus' identification of primary being with acts of thought counts as idealism: "for Plotinus absolutely everything has a mental cause and everything that deserves the name of 'being' is thinking of some sort" (249). Wagner (1986, 82) argues for a strong idealist reading of Plotinus given his denial of positive existence of matter and vertical causation. See also O'Brien (1991) for arguments in favor of the generation of matter from non-material sources.

II. Soul, Human Soul, and Immortality

In the previous section, I introduced the concept 'soul' as used by Plotinus in his theory of sense-perception. Now, I want to look at soul itself in Plotinus' philosophy. This discussion presents certain challenges given the many 'souls' that Plotinus describes; there is the human soul, but also Plotinus speaks of the world-soul and the hypostasis Soul. Before dealing with the individuality of the empirical human person, I want to discuss the immortality of soul, an issue that is self-evident for Plotinus. Then, the relationship and connection between the survival after death of the individual human person and the form of individual must be evaluated.

Ennead IV is dedicated to the soul and a variety of issues that any Platonist must address regarding soul, from the existence of soul to its nature. In several treatises, Plotinus addresses the opinion of materialists and others regarding soul which in turn are objections that, as seen from my discussion of Kant and Schopenhauer, have been raised by philosophers throughout history against traditional accounts of soul as the one defended by Plotinus. In these treatises, for example, Plotinus offers counter arguments to Kant's position in the late lectures on metaphysics and against Schopenhauer identification of intellect with the brain. Given the complexities of that discussion, for now I will defer that debate to the next chapter and focus on Plotinus' own positive contributions to the doctrine of soul's immortality. This section proves that Plotinus's account of soul is more nuanced and sophisticated than what Kant and Schopenhauer assume in their judgments about the tradition that they criticized.

Plotinus dedicates the early treatise IV.7 [2] to the topic of the immortality of the soul. In chapter 1, Plotinus introduces the key elements of the discussion: "A human being is certainly not something simple, but there is in him a soul, and he also has a body, whether in the role of an instrument for us, or connected to us in some other way." Line 1 begins by asking the questions of whether human beings are just bodies that disappear or are destroyed, or whether something in us is immortal. In this chapter there is no doubt that the parts that persist forever constitute the 'self' ("the soul is the self"[33]). Between chapters 2-8, Plotinus evaluates and rejects the position of the Stoics and Peripatetics regarding the soul's nature. As I said above, I will examine the content of these chapters at a later point.

After Plotinus presents the views that he rejects, he elaborates his own position in chapters 9-15. Chapter 9 begins with a summary of Plotinus' view regarding the nature of the intelligible world. Concretely, the subject matter of this chapter is the intelligible world and Intellect. Plotinus' theory of the immortality of the human soul must be understood within the context of his theory of progression (πρόοδος).[34] In its simplest form, this theory says that the Intellect is a progression from the One, the Soul is a progression from the Intellect and that this progression "is the real metaphysical foundation of our universe."[35]

For Plotinus, there is a distinction between 'here' and 'there' (ἐκεῖ); by 'here' Plotinus means the world of becoming, the phenomena, what is called the empirical world. He says of corporeal reality that it "is merely [said to be] Substance equivocally or not Substance at all, since it is accommodated to the conception of things in flux; properly, it is called

[33] ἑκατέρως δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός. IV.7 [2].1.1-5; 20-25. In this treatise, Plotinus is very committed to the Platonic view of soul.
[34] Wagner (1982, 51). O'Meara (2000, 310) prefers 'derivation.' 'Emanation' is rejected by Igal (1982, 34-35).
[35] Wagner (1982, 51).

'becoming'." Accordingly, there is a distinction between phenomena-flux and real-substance.[36] Therefore, the world of becoming is an image in the sense that 'there' is the original. 'There' is the world of Intellect, this world is real and prior as cause. Plotinus says of this level of reality that it is true being [ὄντως ὄν] and true substantiality [ὄντως οὐσίαν]; whatever is in this world is eternal and does not change. By its priority, we can say that everything comes from it and is dependent on it. Within this perspective, whatever the lowest reality possesses is given by the superior reality; accordingly, the general characteristic that Plotinus attributes to the intelligible world are the framework in which Plotinus locates the nature or essence of soul.

In IV.7 [2]. 9, Plotinus speaks of a nature that has existence from itself "which neither comes to be nor is destroyed." It is by this nature that all things in the sensible world come to be and if soul or Intellect were to suffer destruction, the former would also be destroyed. This nature serves as "'principle of motion,' providing motion to all things … bestowing life on the ensouled body, while possessing it of itself." Given the theory of progression, we know that the individual human soul receives from the Intellect, through the hypostasis Soul, substantiality, and life. This last concept, life, plays an important role in Plotinus' arguments: Intellect is said to have a life and be Life itself. The life it has, it never loses because it comes from its very nature. Plotinus writes that, "it is not the case that everything enjoys a life sourced from outside – that would lead to an infinite regress – but there must be some nature that is primarily alive, which must necessarily be 'indestructible and immortal,' inasmuch as it serves as a principle of life for all other things as well" (IV.7

[36] A similar distinction is used by Schopenhauer for similar purposes. For Schopenhauer there is a distinction between actual and real. The 'actual' is also called the 'ideal' in the Kantian sense that space and time are ideal. The real is not the sensible world because the sensible world is characterized by eternal changes of states, thus only the ideas or the thing in itself are considered real, given their inalterability.

[2].9, 10-12). This reasoning, which evokes Kant's *a priori* argument from the lectures, is enough for Plotinus to declare the human soul immortal. In this chapter, Plotinus has no doubts that some things are lifeless; soul is not "something dead, like a stone or a log." Whatever is life itself cannot be 'not-life'; Plotinus argues that this is soul. The chapter probably refers to the hypostasis Soul, but it is obviously applicable to the souls that come from Soul, namely, the individual souls and the world-soul.

In IV.7 [2]. 10, Plotinus turns to soul itself. There is an important premise in chapter 10 that is important for Plotinus: soul is not a body and nothing in it is corporeal.[37] Soul is akin to the intelligible world and life cannot be an essential quality of body. Soul has no shape, nor color and it is intangible. In this chapter, Plotinus proposes that the philosopher focuses on a soul in isolation, a soul without relationship to the corporeal if he or she want to cognize the true essence of soul. For Plotinus, soul is good while it is engaged with the contemplation of the Forms, and it turns bad when it gets engaged in mundane activities. It is this engagement with corporeality that, according to Plotinus, makes us forget our true origin in the divine realm and Plotinus seems to suggest that this confusion with the world is the impetus behind corporeal theories of soul.

There is a subtle argument for soul's immortality in this chapter. The argument, inspired by lines 18-22, goes like this: that which in human beings does philosophy is eternal because philosophy, if possible, must be assimilation of the eternal.[38] Plotinus does

[37] According to Hubler, corporeal nature in Plotinus exists because of soul and the powers and activities that we see in the body are from soul. What we observe in the human body is observable in the entire cosmos "for the laws of nature in Plotinus' system can be nothing other than the expression of the intellectual order at work in the visible cosmos through the mediation of the soul's activity" (Hubler 2008, 334). See V.1 [10]. 4, 1-10; IV.8 [6]. 7, 30.

[38] "For he will see an intellect viewing no sensible, nor any of mortal things here, but grasping with the everlasting aspect of itself the everlasting reality, all the contents of the intelligible world, a world itself intelligible and suffused with light being illuminated by the truth radiating from the Good, which beams its truth upon all the intelligibles" (IV.7 [2]. 10, 32-26).

not put it in these terms, instead he speaks about the capacity of soul to receive wisdom.[39] For soul, wisdom is a virtue because it is the nature of virtue to come from outside. Now wisdom is the intelligible world, it is its own activity, and it does not have it as derived from another. It is in the intelligible world that unchanging and stable Being is found. In this sense Being is immortal so I think that it is plausible that Plotinus argues for the immortality of soul based in its capacity for cognition of and ascent to Being.

In the following chapters (11-14), we found summaries of Plotinus' arguments in favor of soul's simplicity and immateriality, issues that he has examined in the preceding chapters of IV.7 [2] and will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter. But before looking at these issues, one topic that concerns this dissertation is what am I ultimately and will that survive death?[40] Will the historical person that I know in the sensible world, call him Socrates, survive after death and will I recognize Socrates in the intelligible world? We saw that Plotinus said that the soul is the self. However, things are not that simple. When it comes to human beings, Plotinus introduces a distinction between descended and undescended soul. For example, "And if, against the belief of others, one is to venture to express more clearly one's own view, the fact is that even our own soul does not descend in its entirety, but there is something of it always in the intelligible world" (IV.8 [6].8.1-3). This introduction of an undescended soul seems to be the way in which Plotinus tries to explain how human beings have access to transcendent reality. This part of our soul is always at residence in the transcendent Intellect.[41] But, which of these souls is the real me? Following what I said above, we need to find ways to determine whether the undescended

[39] The "Platonic sense of wisdom (σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις, 6, 12) is contemplation of those things which in intellect are held by immediate contact" (Gurtler 2022, 129).
[40] An investigation on who is the 'I' of IV.8 [6].1.1-10.
[41] VI 4 [22]14, 16-22.

soul is Socrates or if we can only call 'Socrates' the descended soul. Is Socrates' character a manifestation of his substance or a historical accident? Each human being in the cosmos is a soul, and I experience myself as a unique individual,[42] but is this individuality somehow preserved when I go back to Intellect or unite to the One? To find some answers, I will explore the issue of ideas of individuals in Plotinus.

III. Idea of Individual Person, The Historical Ἡμεῖς, and Immortality

Plotinus, as discussed above, has no doubts that the soul present in a human body is immortal, its eternal life a gift from a superior principle. Plotinus furthermore believes that he has proven this through sufficient epistemological and metaphysical arguments. Now let us remind ourselves that the question which Kant was trying to answer in the *Critique* was not only whether the soul is a permanent substance, but also whether Kant, the character who lived from 1724-1804, who learned philosophy and experienced joys and sadness was going to survive death. It is to the question of the immortality of what Plotinus and Kant called empirical or sensible self – the historical 'ἡμεῖς' – to which I turn now.[43] I propose to approach this topic through the lens of ideas of individuals in Plotinus' philosophy.[44] As I suggested in chapter 2, I believe that Schopenhauer's account of

[42] According to Sorabji, in Plotinus there is a tension: in this world we forget our divine origin the more we become distracted with corporeal things (V.1 [10].1, 5-15). It would be best for us to remember our origin and seek to go back to the One where our self is at home. On the other hand, Plotinus is interested in what make us distinct from each other in this world, for example, souls are different, and this does not seem to be bad (2008, 119-120). Armstrong (1977) also speaks about becoming more our real self, the more we become universal. The issue of why souls came to be in bodies is the topic of IV.8 [6].

[43] It can also be called the historical personality (Armstrong 1977).

[44] In this study, I assume the existence of such forms in Plotinus. For favorable discussions see: Rist (1963); Mamo (1969); Rist (1970); Armstrong (1977); and Kalligas (1997). Blumenthal (1966, 1996), on the other hand, is not convinced that the textual evidence provides enough support for the claim that Plotinus is in favor of ideas of individuals. Blumenthal (1996) identifies several possible answers to the problem of forms

intelligible character would be stronger if we associate an Idea with the intelligible character.

As we have seen, immortality as essential to the nature of human beings is defended even by Schopenhauer and to a certain degree by Kant. But the immortality of the individual Socrates or Kant, meaning their historical selves adds a new layer to the discussion. Plotinus argues in favor of immortality, however, is it the empirical individual person who is immortal? The immediate answer seems to be 'no' which makes Plotinus and Schopenhauer share the same opinion.[45] However, Rist (1963) suggests a nuanced approach arguing after examining V.9 [5].12 and V.7 [18].1-3 that Plotinus did become interested in trying to safeguard the historical Socrates even though Plotinus believed in reincarnation.

The notion of ideas of individuals, according to Rist, appears for the first time in V.9 [5].12, but he argues that this text presents an earlier and inconclusive approach. The question is introduced by Plotinus at the end of V.9 as part of a series of problems related to the Platonic theory of Forms, namely, are there forms of artifacts, evil, individuals, sensible particulars, mud and dirt (V.9 [5].10-14)? This list of questions could have originated in Plato's *Parmenides* (130c6) and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (A, 9, 990b16), but

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of individuals that Plotinus considers. The first option is that matter takes care of each person's individuality, but this will not work in a metaphysics that says that "body depends for its nature on a soul that is superior to it."[44] Blumenthal considers V.7 [18].1.18-21 as a possible compromise where Plotinus appears to attribute individuation to both form and matter. Plotinus writes, "it is not the case that there is the identical expressed principle for different individuals, nor is the identical Human Being sufficient as paradigm of human beings differing from each other not only in matter, but in thousands of unique ways." But Blumenthal thinks that this evidence is not enough to decide the issue. Other negative conclusions are discussed in Vassilopoulou (2006) and Zwollo (2018, 97).

[45] "If for a soul to be 'present' in a particular body is for it to manifest itself through its concern for that particular body, then for a soul to ascend is for it to relinquish this concern … for an individual to ascend is for it to cast off its individuality and, at least initially, to share in the universal responsibility of the World-Soul" (Wilberding 2005, 333-334).

it is unclear how the question of individuals has its origins here. In these texts, the question is about the extent of the Forms, how the Form is 'one over many'[46], whereas the form of individual, if such a thing exists, is about 'one over one'. Socrates itself is expressed in one man, the historical Socrates. Thus, a more relevant text has been identified by scholars in fragment 3 of Aristotle's *On Ideas* as preserved in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on *Metaphysics* A, 9:

> The argument that tries to establish that there are Ideas from thinking is as follows. If whenever we think of man or footed or animal, we are thinking of something that is both among the things that exist yet is not one of the particulars (for when the latter have perished the same thought remains), clearly there is something apart from particulars and perceptibles, which we think of whether the latter exist or not. ... Now he (i.e. Aristotle) says that this argument also establishes Ideas of things that are perishing and have perished, and in general of things that are both particulars and perishable - e.g. of Socrates, of Plato.

The problem for Platonists, as Aristotle sees it, is that the argument in favor of Forms implies an argument in favor of forms of individuals. Platonists seem to ignore that their doctrine of Ideas demands not only that there are Ideas of perishables, Horse itself, but Ideas of perishable horses. The problem with this is that there would be a form that perishes, whereas Ideas ought to be of what is constant and independent of the destruction of individuals that participate in it. In light of this observation, we can frame the question of forms of individuals as part of the set of problems that Platonism needs to resolve.

[46] "We have been in the habit, if you remember, of positing a Form whenever we use the same name in many instances, on Form for each 'many'" (*Rep*. 596a, tr. A.D. Lindsay).

Therefore, whether there are forms of individuals relates to the problematic extension of the Forms, that is, to the question of whether there are Forms of what perishes.[47]

Although Plotinus begins V.9 [5].12 by asserting the canonical view that there is no Socrates itself but just Man itself, he immediately wonders whether in the case of human beings we can conceive a form of individual.[48] Plotinus points to the differences in physical features, how a nose is different across multiple people. Rist argues that this is not a strong argument because an Aristotelian can always reply that these differences are explained by matter. And focusing on physical features is putting emphasis on what could be seen as inessential to what a human being is. But the point of lines 5-12, argues Mamo, seems to be that Plotinus is attacking the Aristotelian position that all differences of physical features are inessential.[49] The distinction that Plotinus is trying to spell out is between formal traits and particular manifestations of these traits.[50] "There is individuality because the identical characteristic varies from individual to individual" (5). What allows me to recognize this man as Socrates are formal differences that must be included in its archetype. When we do this, we get εἶδος Σωκράτους, not simply ἀνθρώπου. Indeed, what is as stake is much more important: "how individuals are individuals? How great are the minimum differences which mark off one human being from another?"[51]

[47] See Kalligas (1997: 206-208) for more details regarding the origin of the discussion of ideas of individuals and its significance.
[48] For Mamo (1969:83) V.9.12 contains a tentative and incomplete attack on the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition expressed in Plotinus initial statement that there is a Form of man but not of Socrates. Blumenthal (1966) understood this chapter as denying the form of individuals, but this is based, as shown by Igal (1973, 97), on an erroneous reading of lines 1-4.
[49] Mamo (1969, 80-83).
[50] Mamo (1969, 82). "Individual Forms are to be assumed wherever a real formal difference can be detected, as it can be clearly in the case of the true, higher selves of individual men" (Armstrong 1977, 56).
[51] Rist (1963, 224).

Rist turns to V.7 [18] given that for him V.9 [5].12 is inconclusive. Let us consider now the one text that, according to Rist, has two arguments in favor of the existence of the form of individuals and happens to be universally accepted as being in favor of forms of individuals.[52]

> Is there an Idea (ιδέα) of each individual (καθέκαστος)? In fact, there is, if I (ἐγώ) and everyone else (ἕκαστος) have a means of ascent to the intelligible (νοητόν), and the principle (ἀρχή) for each of us (ἕκαστου) is in the intelligible world (ἐκεῖ). If Socrates, that is, the soul of Socrates, is eternal (ἢ εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ Σωκράτης καὶ ψυχὴ Σωκράτους), there will be a Socrates Itself (Αὐτοσωκράτης), insofar as each individual is its soul and, as was just said, the principle for each of us is in the intelligible world. (V.7 [18].1.1-5)

The two arguments are: 1) if Socrates' soul is eternal, "then there must be a Form of Socrates in the Intelligible World, since, presumably, there are Forms corresponding to whatsoever is eternal."[53] 2) Since each soul contains all the λόγοι that there are in the cosmos, its archetype must be in the intelligible world. Obviously, Plotinus is arguing here from a completely different point of view from that of V.9 [5].12. Some[54] say that this text does not prove the existence of forms of individuals, only that Socrates' soul is immortal. If one were to prove the existence of forms of individuals, other premises would be necessary. Some seek the premises in other treatises, but Rist finds them within V.7 [18].1. Plotinus, after seemingly admitting the existence of ideas of individuals, raises an objection: if Socrates' soul can become Pythagoras, then it would not be true that there is

[52] An exception is Vassilopoulou (2006).
[53] Rist (1963, 224).
[54] See note 44. This argument is like Schopenhauer's view of immortality.

Socrates itself, but his historical self is a product of historical circumstances and disappears after death. Plotinus comments that if Socrates is not eternal and may change, through reincarnation, into Pythagoras there will be no individual form of Socrates. Against this, Plotinus argues that even if the universe repeats itself in different cycles, and even if the soul is Socrates in one period and Pythagoras in the next, there are no two identical persons within the same cosmic period. The differences between human beings within one period cannot be resolved by participation in Humanity itself or purely physical differences.

> If, then, it is not the case that there is the identical expressed principle (λόγον) for different individuals, nor is the identical Human Being sufficient as paradigm of human beings (οὐδὲ ἀρκεῖ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς παράδειγμα τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων) differing from each other not only in matter, but in thousands of unique ways (διαφερόντων ἀλλήλων οὐ τῇ ὕλῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδικαῖς διαφοραῖς μυρίαις). (V.7 [18].1.19-21)

The phrase ἰδικαῖς διαφοραῖς μυρίαις is key and, to Rist, it may be a recognition of non-material differences such as the idiosyncratic differences between Socrates' and Pythagoras' character. It is precisely the differences that cannot be accounted by matter or historical circumstances that invite a reflection on the existence of ideas of individuals. In chapter 3, Plotinus provides an important example to explain his argument in favor of a form of individuals. Plotinus speaks of a craftsman who sets out to construct an object. Whatever object the craftsman is going to build, he must have it first as a model in his intellect, but he must envision the model and the product as two distinct objects. This distinction is essential to Plotinus. Important here is that the distinction is not qualitative but numerical. The two objects, based on what we see, are identical, but they are not one

object: there are *two* identical *objects*. In the products of nature, Plotinus argues, we observe the same distinction, "its distinctness from others of an exactly identical kind must be included in its archetype."[55]

What Plotinus wrote in V.7.3 helps further to clarify, argues Rist, why even though Plotinus seems to support the doctrine of reincarnation,[56] that position does not make a theory of ideas of individuals inconsistent. In that chapter, Plotinus argues that numerical, non-qualitative distinction is a mark of existential difference. Not even two identical twins – or in the possibility of cloning a human being – will have the same character. This unique character, so seems to argue Plotinus, is not explained by historical accidents or the union with matter.[57] Turning to reincarnation, given what Plotinus says in chapter 3, even if X is reincarnated as Y, Y can never eliminate that X in fact existed. The existence of the historical Socrates in a cosmic period is possible because there is Socrates itself, even though the soul is now manifested as Pythagoras in another cosmic cycle.

A text that is not usually discussed in the context of ideas of individuals is VI 7, 4-5. More than in other places, here Plotinus seems to be moving his thought away from the Platonism that he received. Here he seems interested in somehow safeguarding or preserving the historical self. O'Daly summarizes this point: "Man *qua* Being, living Being, is in the intelligible. Now the intelligible is a living thing, and so the complete Living-Form (*Lebewesen*): if this is so, it cannot lack any form or manifestation of life. Now historical man is alive: therefore, historical man can be said to be in the intelligible,

[55] Rist (1963, 226). For a discussion and criticism of Rist's position see Mamo (1969, 90-92).
[56] Mamo (1969, 87) believes that there is no clear evidence that Plotinus accepted transmigration.
[57] This is in contention with what Plotinus says in IV 3 [27]7 and II 3 [52], 14-15. That there are features of our unrepeatable character that are not accidents of history or environment is one important feature of what I want to argue here.

living Reality."[58] This is an example of a principle enunciated in this treatise: "Does then the world there have everything that is here? Yes, everything that is made by forming-principle (λόγος) and according to Form" (VI.7 [38]. 11, 3-4).

The historical man of which O'Daly speaks nevertheless could be interpreted as just the general man of the sensible world. It is precisely Plotinus' wish in VI.7 [38].1-10 to prove that the sense organs in the sensible world are not there because the Divine Mind planned that those human beings needed them to survive in the world. Instead, already in the intelligible world, human being perceives with intelligible organs the 'sensibles' there. It seems that the historical man does not mean the empirical personality, the unique character that we encounter here. This notion seems reinforced by Plotinus insistence that it is a mistake to call the Socrates here, Socrates. He says that to do that would be like confusing the painting with the model.[59] Porphyry tells us how Plotinus declined to be immortalized in painting. "Isn't it enough that I have to carry around the image that nature has clothed me with?" (*Life* 1.5). Plotinus' attitude confirms what he wrote: the Plotinus that Porphyry met is not worth remembering. Why leave a long-lasting image of an image when the real Plotinus is in the intelligible?

To this, I answer: the question about the grounding or preservation of the historical human being after death is not exclusively about the identification of what the empirical human being is because he or she lived in the 3rd or the 21st century, but about the conviction that there are features of one's character that make me unrepeatable and different from everybody in history – whether from the past, present or future – that cannot be reduced to historical circumstances. It is about the unfolding of an insight that Plotinus

[58] O'Daly (1973, 32).
[59] VI.3 [44].15, 28.

wrote in III. 2 [47].17: "For even before the play, they were actors of a particular kind when they gave themselves to the play." The actors are individual human beings, and each of them possesses a character and individual personality *before* they enter the stage, a perennial image used to describe life in this world. This character, I argue with Schopenhauer, is immortal, and it is a manifestation of the real me. Ultimately, the quest for the immortal true self seeks an answer to the question of *Ennead* I.1 [53]: 'What is the Living Being and What is the Human Being?' Chapter 1 suggests that the question refers to the individual for Plotinus writes, "what is the thing which is itself considering the investigation of these questions," in other words, who is the subject of cognition, desires, feelings? Is it the individual? Is there a subject or are we only a stream of consciousness? Is there some anchor or just an endless drift of events? I think that Plotinus wants to give an answer to these questions. How successful he was in this is another issue.[60]

IV. If Ideas, Must There Be an Intellect?

In this last section, I want to touch upon a topic that will be important in the next chapter, but it connects with what has been said above. We have seen that Plotinus has a theory of Ideas that he appropriated from Plato. However, just as Schopenhauer claims that his theory is Platonic when truly it is his own take on that theory, Plotinus does not just repeat what Plato says; instead, he reworks this doctrine to suit his purposes. The most obvious difference between Plato and Plotinus is that the latter hypostasizes Intellect and makes the

[60] O'Daly (1973, 48) believes that, ultimately, Plotinus fails to give a comprehensive definition of 'self'. On the other hand, Gurtler highlights the broad understanding of the self that Plotinus develops: "The self is that center of unity that makes us most like the One, and from which comes the manifold activities that allow the self to navigate in the intelligible and sensible worlds as it seeks the One" (Gurtler 2022, 67).

Ideas thoughts of this Intellect.[61] I want to discuss how Plotinus arrives at this conclusion and why there is a necessary connection between Ideas and Intellect.

The way that I am framing this question is odd if one is familiar with the Plotinian point of view, but it is a necessary question for evaluating Schopenhauer's theory of Ideas. I will note two things about Schopenhauer that make sense for a person imbued in Schopenhauerian thought but would be strange for a Plotinian philosopher. The first thing is that even though Schopenhauer rescues the Platonic doctrine of Ideas from its Kantian interpretation, immediately, there is nothing in his theory that takes the role of the Intellect. This could be the case given his claim that his doctrine is the same as Plato. The second thing is that Schopenhauer does not believe, unlike Plotinus, that Ideas are intellects, another teaching that Schopenhauer could say brings him closer to Plato. Both things are interesting, but here I will focus on the first point; therefore, my aim is to show how Plotinus conceives the origin of Ideas in the Intellect that "became a multiple from a one, and in this way, in cognizing it, it knew itself, and then it became sight that sees" (V.3 [49].11,9-10). The aim is to propose that Schopenhauer needs a theory of intellect if he wants to keep the ideas. If he embraces the theory of a non-sensible Intellect, some of the obscurities in his metaphysics could be resolved.

Before saying anything about the relationship between Intellect and Ideas, a brief word on the origin of Intellect. Plotinus posits the One as the productive power of all things (V.1 [10].7.10) and the Intellect is an image of the One. This generation is explained by Plotinus as an example of his principle of two acts[62] which he explains in the following way: "There

[61] Igal (1982, 49-50). Although even in the example of the Intellect Plotinus would argue that he found it in the Platonic dialogues (Gerson, 2022, 8). See V.1 [10].8.11–14.
[62] See discussions in Igal (1982, 28-29) and Gurtler (2022, 11-19).

is activity which is activity of the substance and there is activity which arises from the substance of each thing … For example, in the case of fire, there is the heat which fills out its substantiality, and there is another heat deriving from it, which at once comes to be when fire is actualizing its native substantiality by remaining fire" (V.4 [7].2, 28-34). Thus, the Intellect is an activity generated by the One while It remains "unmoved, neither inclining, nor having willed anything, nor moving in any way" (V.1 [10].6.28-29).

The Ideas are generated through the Intellect's contemplation of the One. The Intellect that is produced as the second activity of the One is like a sight that has not seen, it is the inchoate Intellect that functions as intelligible power for the Forms. This Intellect, desiring to possess all things (III.8 [30].8,34) turns towards its source and this seeing in potency becomes sight in actuality. As Plotinus writes, "intellection is a vision in which seeing and what is seen are one" (V.1 [10].5.19). The Intellect does not grasp the One as One, but "*as it is thinkable*, i.e., as expressed as a determinate multiplicity."[63] The activity of Intellect brings about the Ideas for "acts of intellection are the Forms or shape of Being, and its actuality" (V.9 [5].8.18-19) Intellect, being real, thinks Beings and causes them to exist.

For Plotinus, there is a reciprocal relation between Intellect and Ideas[64] in which the two sides entail one another. The Ideas' existence is established by the very act of thinking of the Intellect, as such, they do not enjoy a separate existence from the Intellect. This is impossible, moreover, by what we have discussed about the internality of ideas. The ontological status of ideas depends thus entirely on their being thought by the Intellect. But this could confuse Plotinus' account because we can lose sight of the reciprocity of their

[63] O'Meara (2011, 311).
[64] Crystal (1998, 273).

relation. The very Ideas, by being thought are responsible for the existence of that which thinks them.[65]

Given Plotinus' doctrine of Intellect, the world that we experience as individual human beings is not reality for true reality is hidden from us by our constant care and distractions with corporeal things.[66] The freer we become from this world, the more we grow in awareness that this world reflects what Plotinus calls the 'intelligible place', that place where knower and known meet and we realize that without Intellect, the sensible world and we as members of that world would not exist anymore. This perspective, where epistemology and ontology coincide, is what ultimately transcendental idealism, at least in its Schopenhauerian strand, also reveals to us.

Conclusion

I set out to study Plotinus not to break any new ground in Plotinian scholarship but in service of my study of Schopenhauer. It is this later philosopher who explicitly sees Plotinus as one of Kant's precursors. The first important task was to determine that Plotinus is not a philosopher who ignores the data from the sensible world in order to construct a metaphysics without foundation. His deep examination of this world is what he uses to 'elevate' himself to invisible realities, to the transcendent. Next, I argued that Plotinus could be read as an idealist when idealism is understood from a Schopenhauerian perspective. This is important because I believe that Plotinus provides ways to clarify

[65] V.1 [10].4, 27-30.
[66] In Intellect, there can be no subconscious activity of which the Intellect is not aware, this is something that only happens in a human being's intellect because there is always something that it not presently conscious to it (Rappe 1996, 252).

Schopenhauer's own account of the intelligible world. Specifically, Plotinus helps us see the possibilities and missing gaps in Schopenhauer.

The investigation of Plotinus' account of soul and its immortality helps us to understand that the way transcendental idealism speaks about this issue is incomplete. Plotinus' psychology, as an example of how philosophy has dealt with this issue in a premodern mode, is revealed to be more complex than what Kant presents in the *Critique* and the Lectures. For Plotinus, the human soul is not an unconditioned subject, but totally conditioned by higher levels of reality. Even the life that the human soul has is a 'gift' from Life itself which precedes the soul. There are some elements of Plotinus' philosophy that I need to discuss before I give my final thought on how Schopenhauer, who exhibits more command of the history of philosophy, also seems to have mistaken views of how his predecessors thought about the human soul.

Plotinus, to a certain extent, meets Kant's requirements for a pure psychology as articulated in the *Critique*. Kant argued that a study of the nature of the soul isolated from its communion with the body is what constitutes the true task of pure psychology. According to Plotinus, if we want to know what soul is, we must seek it in its pure form, free from any 'impurity' of the empirical world. "Let us for this purpose focus on a soul that has not, in the body, taken to itself non-rational appetites and passions and made itself the receptacle of other emotions, but one that has cleansed itself of these, and as far as possible has nothing in common with the body" (IV.7.10). Furthermore, this soul in its purified state shares features with the intelligible character as described by Kant and Schopenhauer. After studying Plotinus, it becomes more evident that Kant and

Schopenhauer, although suspicious of the concept ‘soul’, do not discard its content; instead, they found ample use of it for their own unique purposes.

Finally, Plotinus speaks of two important levels of the self, the intelligible and the empirical. It is clearly established by Plotinus that the intelligible self is immortal; however, the empirical self, the one that we encounter in history does not seem to be important. A confirmation of this seems to be that Plotinus rejected leaving behind a painting of his empirical self. Rist and others had tried to problematize this view though. For them, Plotinus may have been interested in explaining that the things that makes us unique and different from other human beings is grounded in an individual form. I think that the historical self must be preserved in the sense that the character that manifest itself cannot be reduced to historical accidents. This is a possibility that I want to fully explore in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

Chapter 5

Rescuing the Immortality of the True Self

Introduction

In Hume's essay titled *Of the Immortality of the Soul*, the Scottish philosopher tells us that, "All doctrines are to be suspected, which are favored by our passions. And the hopes and fears which give rise to this doctrine, are very obvious."[1] Thus, if we believe Hume, then the desire to prove the immortality of the human soul is born from our passions and has no rational basis. Hume's sentiments are closely aligned with some of Kant's and Schopenhauer's objections to the philosophical accounts regarding an immortal soul. In chapters 1, 2, and 3, I presented both Kant's and Schopenhauer's doctrine regarding the true self and whether we can say that it is immortal. I argued in favor of Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism and have even suggested that his position can sustain a view of the immortality of the individual person. However, some aspects of his account remain problematic and challenging to my interpretation; thus, I think that some objections must be raised to his position to open the possibility of making a case in favor of the preservation of our character after death. To accomplish this, I have introduced the Plotinian perspective which I have presented as favorable to an idealist position like the one encountered in Schopenhauer.

[1] Hume (1854, 554).

Now, all the cards are on the table, and we have all the elements necessary to assess whether the discussion about an immortal soul is meaningless conversation with no philosophical rigor or a topic that keeps challenging philosophy even after great minds have denied that possibility. Now that we have encountered an account in Plotinus that strongly emphasizes and argues in favor of the soul's immortality, we are better equipped to examine Kant's and Schopenhauer's arguments. We must remember that they think that their arguments are definitive, even against traditions that go as far back as Plato. Before examining Plotinus' position, we could not judge the truth of these claims; now we have gained a greater understanding of the arguments from both sides.

In this last chapter, there are three main parts. In the first part, I will go back to some of Kant's and Schopenhauer's arguments regarding the immortality of the soul. The purpose of this part is to provide some concluding thoughts regarding their respective positions. I reaffirm my claim that Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism is a step forward in the right direction, but that not even he was able to see beyond some of the limitations of his time. The second part, which will take the most space in this chapter, will focus on four 'great themes' that appear when the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Plotinus encounter each other. I argue that these four great themes refocus not just Schopenhauer's philosophy, but even suggest one way in which Plotinus' metaphysics benefits from the Schopenhauerian reflection. Furthermore, these four great themes are areas where ontology and epistemology intersect. Thus, they provide the general framework that helps me to propose how the theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self comes back to transcendental idealism. In the last part, I articulate this possible argument based on all the preceding sections.

Part I

I. Back to Kant

There are not many things to add to what has been said about Kant previously. I have accepted Schopenhauer's position regarding Kant's account of reason; and with that move all Kant's edifice of ideas has fallen. This means that there is no more idea of the soul generated by human reason or postulate of immortality. From that perspective there is not much to salvage from Kant's discussion of the immortality of the true self. The alternatives are to recover the traditional proofs or propose an alternative theory as Schopenhauer does. Nevertheless, in chapter 3, I discussed a quote from Kant's *Critique* that sets up well what I would like to add in these concluding remarks.

> Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather *would be the one unanswerable objection*, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving *a priori* that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently. . . personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena.[2]

[2] B409 (emphasis mine).

There are many ways to prove things but proving them *a priori* means for Kant that something is *necessary* or as Kant also says, *apodictic* and *universal*. According to Kant, if something is proven *a priori* then there is no way to deny its truth. What precisely Kant argues that cannot be proven *a priori* is that (1) "all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances" which means that there is no experience given in which this proposition could be justified. The arguments in favor of this conclusion have been presented in previous chapters. But that is not the only thing that Kant denies; he adds that it cannot be proven *a priori* that (2) thinking beings have personality (called 'intellectual memory' in Kant's lectures) and (3) that they remain human beings "separate and distinct from all matter."[3] But do we have to accept Kant's restriction of necessity and *a priority* for what counts as metaphysical cognition? Schopenhauer disagrees with Kant on this point, and in this I follow the former.[4] Furthermore, there are good reasons – some of them following from Plotinus' analysis – to sustain that human beings retain their humanity even if they are separated from their bodies.

However, the tension with B 409 is revealed in the last sentence. In previous chapters, I did not examine in detail what Kant says there; now, given what we know, I would like to add some comments. If (1-3) were proven *a priori*, Kant would take that as having taken "a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena." Thus, given the conclusions of the *Critique*, the issue of immortality must always remain a postulate, a necessary belief to ground morality or something that is a thought experiment. From a theoretical point of view, Kant forces us to be dogmatic regarding what counts as cognition

[3] These remarks could imply that the brain is identical with the intellect.
[4] "Metaphysics is…a unifying and sense making account of the world as we experience it" (WWR II, xix).

and what the scope of cognition is.[5] The human mind's faculties fulfill their function when they ground the conclusions of physics and the philosopher is condemned to be a philosopher of nature. Other than that, the human mind hallucinates, or falls for an illusion. The absolute restriction to the 'world of sense' is a demand that Kant puts on us based on his conception of what it means for something to be a science.[6] To a certain extent, Kant succumbs to the seduction of corporeal cognition, and as Plotinus warns us, this makes him take this type of cognition as the norm of all cognition. Moreover, this blinds him to fully integrate realities that cannot be explained in corporeal terms because he thinks that the only meaningful language is scientific language.

The problem is that every cognitive process that Kant describes is not possible without the presence of something like a soul.[7] Who is the author of the *Critique*? Kant, but who is Kant? He who discovered that the categories are only applicable to objects of possible experience; he who revealed the ideality of space and time. This person lives independently of the conclusions of the *Critique*, this is its true self. He who recognizes what he sees as perennial truths and is interested in communicating them must share some similarity with what he discovers. Thus, much like Schopenhauer, Kant has shifted the content of concept 'soul' to a new principle called 'pure apperception.' After discussing Plotinus, it is even

[5] Transcendental idealism, from a purely Kantian perspective, makes us 'transcendental machines,' no less than Descartes' automatons. The only true cognition is a form of materialism at the end because the other things that would makes us something besides matter are transcendental and are purely formal.

[6] What I am trying to reject here is an attitude that was noted by Augustine when he writes of shallow-minded persons who have "fallen into thinking that nothing exists except what they perceive with those five well-known sources of information of the body. Even when they try to detach themselves from their senses, they still want to keep the deceits and images they have garnered from them and think they can best assess the inexpressible innermost recesses of truth by their fatal and deceptive standards" (Augustine 2005, 116).

[7] That it is 'transcendental pure apperception' does not, in my view, solve the problem. What is the ultimate difference between 'empirical' and 'transcendental'? Whatever is 'transcendental' is not transcendent, but if it is not transcendent, what is it? It must be a third undefined thing or empirical because there are no other options.

clearer how this pure apperception plays a similar role as the Plotinian human soul in terms of its faculties and their function for cognition.

Furthermore, it is not obvious to me that Kant's objections to the immortality of the human soul or the persistence of our individuality are conclusions that follow from his transcendental idealist epistemology. And we have no choice but to accept these conclusions if one supports idealism. To a certain extent, Kant's conclusions follow from his premises in the sense that these premises add for Kant more reasons to suspect the traditional proofs. But his arguments are not original as, for example, a cursory reading of Hume's essay on immortality would show. Likewise, Kant's denial of substantiality and persistence of an 'I' is already present in many Buddhist traditions.[8]

Now, according to Kant, there is no way to be certain that there is such a thing as a disembodied human intellect. In *Metaphysics Vigilantius* we found a distinction that Kant makes between 'soul' and 'spirit' where the former is whatever thinks in communion or interaction with a body (human beings) and the latter is whatever can think without communion or interaction with body (God, angels). As we saw before, by the 1790's, Kant says that "one must *distinguish the survival of the principle of life, or the faculty for living, from the act <actu> of life itself*."[9] Kant is willing to concede that the principle of life can survive without a connection to a body, but "an experience" is needed to establish that the "soul can exercise acts <*actus*> of life without connection to the body". We lack, according to Kant, such experience. Thus, experience teaches the opposite, that is, that acts of life, like cognition, only occur in connection with a body. But the problem is that contrary to

[8] Kant had some knowledge of eastern philosophy as his lectures show. Hinduism and Buddhism are religions that Schopenhauer associated with idealism. For idealism and Indian philosophy see Wayman (1965); Giles (1993); and Garfield (1998).
[9] M.Vig 504 (29:1039).

Kant's belief, cognition itself seems to be fully independent from the body to perform its operations. I will fully explore this when I examine Schopenhauer's identification of intellect and brain.

The thinking itself that we do as human beings is always an immaterial process in no strict need of the body to exist. A lesson that Plotinus teaches forcefully, "it is impossible for a collection of bodies to produce life, and for things lacking intellect to produce intellect."[10] To argue that the mental process of thinking can be explained purely in materialistic terms means explaining a mental phenomenon devoid of what makes it essentially mental, namely, privacy, qualia, consciousness, etc. The *Critique of Pure Reason* would have never been written if Kant's thought process was bound to a body and/or reduced to brain activity. In any case, the proposition that cognition and brain are identical is a good transition to Schopenhauer.

II. Back to Schopenhauer

As Schopenhauer has demonstrated, transcendental idealism is an incomplete philosophy if it does not have a metaphysics,[11] which for him means some account of the thing in itself. Transcendental idealism cannot remain a purely subjective or transcendental description of the mechanics of the mind for this leads to theoretical egoism, namely, the view that the only mind that exists is my own. Further, Kant's merely philosophy of nature must be

[10] IV.7 [2].2.18. See also IV.7 [2].8.
[11] Defenders of substance dualism argue similarly regarding the limits of a purely physical investigation to determine the nature of the mental, see Foster (1989, 21-21) and Rodriguez (2014, 204).

enhanced with a metaphysic to provide a fully comprehensive explanation of reality.[12] Schopenhauer defends that our investigation of reality must start from the consideration (and eventual unification) of two standpoints or angles: one is subjective and the other objective.[13] In the one hand, the subjective standpoint is the standpoint that considers consciousness as given and analyzes the mechanism of cognition.[14] "The world is my representation" is established as true in this standpoint. On the other hand, the objective standpoint starts with the beings in the world and assumes them as given. This empirical investigation of reality reveals that the brain "is the final product of nature, and presupposes all of its other products."[15]

What, according to Schopenhauer, the subjective angle establishes as 'thinking,' the objective angle views as a function of the brain. The significance of these two standpoints, I think, is not always appreciated and its implications not completely spelled out in the literature. In chapter 2, I focused for the most part on the subjective standpoint, although I introduced some elements of the objective angle in that chapter too. I dedicated more space to the objective angle in chapter 3 and there I explained that this angle has more to offer. In what follows, I continue the reflection that I began in chapter 3 with the aim to fully articulate the reasons why we should focus more on the objective angle.

A way to clearly appreciate the dynamic between these two standpoints is to consider the perspective that Schopenhauer mostly adopts in his books. At the beginning of *The*

[12] Schopenhauer writes, "But we cannot have cognition of anything wholly and completely until we have gone completely around it and have reached the starting point on the other side. This is why we must not, like Kant, proceed merely from the intellect to the cognition of the world, even with the vital fundamental cognition under discussion, but also, as I have done here, proceed from the world, taken as existing, to the intellect." The physiological investigation becomes a supplement to the transcendental investigation (WWR II, 302-303).
[13] WWR II, chapter 22.
[14] Locke and Kant are identified as the two major figures of this angle.
[15] WWR II, 286.

World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer states that the world is *my* representation, that the galaxies are sustained by an eye that sees them. The human mind is what makes possible the world that we experience. But that is not all that Schopenhauer says. Schopenhauer will inform us that the brain and consciousness in which the world is grounded is the outcome of a process in which the thing in itself unfolds itself through different beings. When Schopenhauer situated himself from that point of view, we have a very different picture from those first lines of his major work. In Schopenhauer's 'cosmology' there is, as ultimate reality, thing in itself 'beyond being', then the Ideas, then a process that goes from inorganic to complex organic lives culminating in the appearance of human beings and consciousness. This leads to a paradox or, in Schopenhauer's words, to a true antinomy.

In this objective standpoint, the 'vertical causation'[16] is clear: Ideas would not be there, if there was no thing in itself, and individuals would not exist if there were no Ideas. Schopenhauer never says that these truths or conclusions are the product of rational belief, or postulates of practical reason. Instead, in no ambiguous terms he states that these are truths that can be reached by any rational human being. Concretely, these truths about reality are discovered by the individual consciousness that does philosophy. But as we know, when Schopenhauer speaks about this individual consciousness, he belittles what other philosophers have concluded from its existence. Against them, Schopenhauer declares that this 'I' is the subject of cognition, the knower who is never known whose existence is bound to the brain's existence; moreover, it is the focal point of all brain

[16] Wagner (1982).

activity. Schopenhauer declares that this 'I' is never a substance but a 'state.'[17] Given what we learned from Plotinus, let us evaluate Schopenhauer's account.

The challenges that Schopenhauer poses for us, as well as the limitations of his position, are better uncovered if we pay attention to Schopenhauer's text. To begin with, let us take the two quotes that I introduced in chapter 3 which provide the most concise view of Schopenhauer's psychology. I present them now in chronological order. The first text comes from *On the Will in Nature*, where Schopenhauer writes,

> For me, what is eternal and indestructible in humans, what thus also constitutes the principle of life in humans, is not the soul, but, to use an expression from chemistry, the radical of the soul – and this is *will*. The so-called soul is already compounded: it is the union of will with νοῦς, intellect. This intellect is that which is secondary, the *posterius* of the organism, and as a mere brain function, is conditioned by the organism.[18]

First, Schopenhauer acknowledges that human beings have an eternal and indestructible principle. Whereas Plotinus calls that principle, 'soul', Schopenhauer calls it 'will'. The text also provides us with the rationale to prefer 'will' over 'soul': the will is 'simple', and the soul is 'compounded'. According to this text, the soul is the union of will and intellect, while the will is just will. Moreover, the organism, let us say, the human body, is identical with will because, according to Schopenhauer, will keeps the organism together. The intellect is 'a mere brain function'. It is not obvious in this text if Schopenhauer thinks that intellect is identical to or if it supervenes in the brain. The key issue for Schopenhauer is

[17] WWR II, 291.
[18] WN, 339-340.

that intellect is posterior to will and as such, it cannot be claimed that intellect is the definitive feature of the essence of a human being.

Similar notions are encountered in the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, a book that was published eight years after *On the Will in Nature*. In the following text, we found the closest definition of soul given by Schopenhauer:

> 'soul' signifies an individual unity of consciousness which obviously does not belong to that inner being [thing in itself]; and generally, since the concept 'soul' supposes knowing and willing to be in inseparable connection, and yet independent of the animal organism, it is not to be justified, and therefore not to be used.[19]

Here Schopenhauer adds something that is absent in the previous passage, that is, that the soul is an "individual unity of consciousness". This unity is "obviously" not part of the thing in itself, something that, ironically, is not obvious from the text itself. What Schopenhauer means here is, once again, that the soul is not simple but "supposes knowing and willing to be in inseparable connection". Schopenhauer does not say anything about the inferior nature of intellect but does remark on the fact that the soul is supposed to be independent of the body and how this is unacceptable. Evidently, Schopenhauer does not consider soul to be an independent and eternal principle; for Schopenhauer, only will is that which survives death.[20]

[19] WWR II, 349.
[20] Schopenhauer's talk of 'will' should not confuse us; he is not claiming that the *human* will is what survives death. This human will is one manifestation of the thing in itself; at that level, Schopenhauer recognizes that it is accompanied by intellect and motivations. Thus, the human will is also 'compounded' to a certain extent.

However, these texts point towards, in my judgment, a whole set of obscurities that are not easy to resolve with the information that Schopenhauer provides. For instance, Schopenhauer's whole discussion of intellect, will and the thing in itself seems to gloss over the doctrines of Pure Subject and Idea of Human Being and the impact that this doctrine may have on the account of soul. What I mean is that when Schopenhauer speaks about the essence of human beings or what constitutes our real self, he tends to connect his arguments with the metaphysics of the thing in itself, while jumping over or ignoring a whole set of notions that he introduces with his doctrine of Platonic Ideas. This tendency feeds the narrative that Schopenhauer's philosophy needs to rid itself of this strange theory.

'Willing', according to Schopenhauer, has primacy over all things; this willing produces Ideas which even for Schopenhauer are Pure Objects for a Pure Subject. How can we make sense of this? Can 'willing' alone be responsible for Ideas? The Pure Subject must be of the same nature as Ideas in order for it to cognize them. Therefore, there is already thinking in this 'world of ideas' that is prior to the world of sense. If true, this goes against Schopenhauer's view that thinking only appears when there is a brain.

Furthermore, if the Idea of Human Being or the hypothetical idea of an individual has any role in this discussion about what is eternal in us, does this not also create some problems for Schopenhauer? He says that intellect is the brain and with the end of the brain the intellect disappears. He implies that consciousness is something that only appears in space and time, the last product of a physical process. But there is no physical brain in the idea of human beings. The question is then, is intellect not an essential feature of the Idea of Human Being? Let us just consider the following: according to philosophers of mind, there are brain/physical (public) events, pure mental (private) events, and mixed (writing a

letter both requires intention and movement of fingers) events.[21] Schopenhauer never observes these distinctions. Schopenhauer holds the following: the intellect is the seat of space, time, causality, but *simultaneously*, space, time, and causality (the only conditions which can give any meaning to statements like "the brain is the final product of nature") give rise to intellect. Intellection can happen without embodiment as the Schopenhauerian account suggests. Therefore, the intellect in itself cannot be *merely* a function of the brain, *absolutely* reduced to the brain.

Part II

III. The Four Great Themes

As I anticipated above, I turn now to a series of themes. These four 'great themes' – born from the encounter between Schopenhauer and Plotinus – provide the general framework that helps me to propose how the theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self works in transcendental idealism. I argue that these four great themes, areas where ontology and epistemology intersect, refocus not just Schopenhauer's philosophy by helping us to become aware of the nonverbalized implications of his metaphysics, it even suggests that Plotinus' metaphysics could benefit from the Schopenhauerian reflection. My treatment will be incomplete and deficient in some details given that each theme would require a lengthier discussion. In this study I must simply suggest and make the case that these are

[21] The distinction between mental and physical events is a vast discussion among supporters of any kind of dualism. For some examples see Foster (1989, 39); Emilsson (1991, 153); Swinburne (1997, 157); Robinson (2003, 85-86); Heil (2004, 74-76); Lowe (2006, 5).

things worth pursuing in the future. The future of transcendental idealism and Schopenhauerian scholarship would greatly benefit from this endeavor.

1st Theme: Self-Knowledge of the True Self

In this section I want to further explore the sense in which as knowers we can cognize ourselves, that is, to what degree the Rationalist tradition, Plato and Descartes[22] were on the right track when they argued that we cognize ourselves as more than a corporeal being, that we can say that some element of who we truly are is not a sensible object, whether we call it a soul or something else. I want to focus on this question because it is the one objection – one could say it is the basic objection of Kant, echoed by Schopenhauer – to any pre-Kantian, rationalist psychology. In this section, I want to explore a Plotinian solution to this issue.

There is one main concern in Kant's discussion of the immortality of soul in the *Critique*. Kant insists, against for example Descartes, that the subject can never know its nature through self-reflection. Kant writes, "We do not have, and cannot have, any knowledge whatsoever of any such subject."[23] From thinking alone, one cannot derive an 'I' or that the thinking thing is a substance. This problem is not only discussed by Kant, but as we saw, Schopenhauer agrees with Kant on this point. The *subject* of cognition is never an *object* of cognition. The only thing that the subject of cognition encounters,

[22] I am not claiming that all these philosophers say the same thing, I am only alluding to a trend that one finds in their thought, namely, that there is a non-material substance that can survive without the human body.
[23] A 350.

according to Schopenhauer, is the subject of willing. Now, how these two are the same is for Schopenhauer a mystery and the miracle *par excellence*.

A brief glimpse into the history of philosophy reveals that Kant's position is not new to philosophy. The problem traces its origins as far back as Plato's *Charmides*[24] where the question is asked whether there is knowledge of knowledge or can knowledge be directed to knowledge. Later, Sextus Empiricus makes a similar argument: "Man cannot apprehend…himself, nor can his intellect, any more than sight can see itself."[25] A more contemporary way of understanding the issue is to ask whether the unique feature of the human mind is intentionality. For Kant this seems to be the case, the human mind is essentially outward oriented.[26] Thinking or judging at the level of discursive reasoning are always about something else, and it is not possible for the mind to know itself or the subject to be an object of cognition.

Aristotle tried to solve this issue by distinguishing self-thinking from self-perceiving and his argument that a disembodied intellect is identical with what it thinks. The latter seems like a paradox – a position that must be denied by any who argues that the human mind is always intentional. Aristotle illustrates this point in *Physics* 3.3 where he argues that the act of teaching and the act of learning are *one* activity even though 'teaching' and 'learning' mean two different things. This is called a *numerical* identity that applies in the case of a disembodied intellect or mind because in that case it consists just in its activity of thinking. In any case, given that Kant and Schopenhauer share this denial, I will discuss

[24] See 167a-169c.
[25] Quoted in Sorabji (2008, 209). See discussion in Rappe (1996, 253-255). For Sextus Empiricus, see *Adv. Mathematicos*, VII 310-312.
[26] Another proof that Kant has a metaphysics of the mind before his negative conclusions in the *Critique*.

this topic from the Plotinian perspective below, which is inspired by the Aristotelian solution.[27]

We can distinguish two levels in this discussion. On the first level, there is the question regarding whether we can cognize ourselves as something other than sensible in this sensible world. This means whether there is no way around the notion that our 'intentionality' in this world is the only meaningful way to speak of the capacities of human cognition. No matter how hard I try, subjectivity itself will always remain closed to me. Another way to describe this level is whether we can know ourselves using discursive thinking (the Plotinian διάνοια). I have granted to Kant and Schopenhauer that while we live in this sensible world, meaning in our daily non-philosophical lives and using discursive thinking, it is accurate to say that there is no access to a non-sensible self. It can be added now that Plotinus shares a similar opinion.[28] In the non-philosophical stance, I can feel that I know the subject of cognition which I am, but from this stance, the I remains the eye that cannot see itself. [29] However, and this is the second level, I have denied that this daily life perspective of cognition exhausts the capacities of human cognition, and that besides discursive thinking there is non-discursive thinking (νόησις).[30] Thus, I agree with Schopenhauer that there are alterations in our cognitive faculties because our relationship to the world is not exclusively corporeal. There are other experiences, like aesthetic and moral, that seem to open for us an entire world that we, as creatures concerned with

[27] Cf Lloyd (1964, 191-199) and Crystal (1998, 279-283) to see how Plotinus breaks away from the Aristotelian tradition.
[28] V.3 [49].5,1-15. Crystal (1998, 265).
[29] Although Foster (1991, 214) argues that "it is not clear why we need to have an *impression* of the self in order for our concept to pass the empiricist test." I agree with Forster to the degree that he challenges that the empiricist or modern scientific method should be accepted as the criteria to have cognition of the self.
[30] It can be described as the activity of reading without consciousness that I am reading (cf. IV.4 [28].2,2-8).

nourishing our bodies, are not always conscious of. It is these alterations that lead to states of non-discursive cognition, which I want to further explore now.

In Plotinus we find a similar notion of alteration of cognitive faculties. For Plotinus, the human intellect can 'go up' and be united to the hypostasis Intellect.[31] For that to happen, something needs to change in the human intellect: from a hyper concern with corporeal realities[32], it needs to be reminded of its origin.[33] The more the human intellect purifies itself from the attraction to corporeal realities, the more it focuses on itself and its non-sensible nature, the more it unites itself to the hypostasis Intellect. The question that we could ask is whether in this union of human intellect with the Intellect we learn something about the nature of the cognitive self that is hidden from the perspective of discursive thinking. The Plotinian Intellect cognizes its objects in a unique way that is different from how our intellect cognizes things, I have explained this before as the Plotinian Forms being internal to the Intellect; indeed, this intimacy of Intellect and Forms is such that Plotinus also speaks of it in terms of the identity of the Forms and Intellect.[34] Let me recall that Schopenhauer describes aesthetic contemplation as the union of the Pure Subject with the Idea, and this union is described as achieving identity between the two.[35] With this background, I want to test if it would be possible to say that when the distinction between the one who cognizes and the cognized is blurred, when we pass from discursive thought to non-discursive thought, Kant's and Schopenhauer's negation regarding the

[31] IV.8 [6].1, 1-10.
[32] IV.8 [6].4, 10-20; V.1 [10].1, 1-20.
[33] V.1 [10].1,25-35; 12,15-20
[34] For the identity between Intellect and Forms, see O'Meara (2000, 308-309) and Emilsson (1996, 234).
[35] Schopenhauer was fully aware that this union is not the unity of the thing in itself.

impossibility of the subject of cognition to reveal itself disappears, or at a minimum has less persuasive force.

To answer these questions, I will need to examine the nature of this identity between Intellect and Forms in Plotinus, the nature of the union between Pure Subject and Ideas in Schopenhauer, and whether the Plotinian framework helps us understand better the implications of Schopenhauer's doctrine; finally, a synthesis between the Plotinian and Schopenhauerian perspective that opens the possibility for the one who cognizes to be revealed.

Let me begin with the first item, that is, with the doctrine of the identity of Intellect and Ideas.[36] All that I will say here is meant to supplement my discussion of Intellect in chapter 4. One thing must be recalled in order to make sense of what will follow. The whole discussion regarding the internality of Forms in Intellect is supposed to resolve the problem regarding the Intellect's self-knowledge and whether the Intellect could be in error. This problem was raised by an unnamed opponent who denied that there could be self-knowledge ("Noῦς has knowledge of as many things as are objects of intellect. But does the intellect that knows these objects also know itself?").[37] Unlike the hypostasis Soul, the Intellect (νοῦς) remains entirely indivisible[38] even though it is made up of Forms. The Plotinian Intellect is an "indivisible unity of the activity of thinking and its objects of thought, in act and not in potentiality… [Thus] [e]ach Form is both thought and thinking, an intellect, and all are Intellect"[39] Yet the unity of the Intellect is a multiplicity. The unity-multiplicity in the Intellect, the "greatest degree of unity of any multiplicity whatever is

[36] V.8 [31].10,35-45.
[37] V.3 [49].1.22.
[38] O'Meara (2000, 308).
[39] Ibid, 309.

reached in the identity of thinking and its objects.[40]" The identity of thinking and its objects is the reason that Plotinus says that the Intellect identifies with the things that it intellects[41], that it is at the same time thinking and the object of thinking[42], and Intellect and the Forms are one thing, namely, identical: "In this way, therefore, Intellect and that which is intelligible are one; and this is primary Being and indeed primary Intellect which has the Beings, or rather which is identical with them."[43] The Forms are real Beings; thus Intellect is the true Being. If the Forms were not identical to Intellect, it would not be a true Intellect because it would only possess a stamp of the true Beings, not the Beings themselves.[44]

This identity does not compromise the unity of the One or makes the Intellect another One: the Plotinian Intellect is one-many (ἓν πολλά). For Plotinus all thinking (νόησις), regardless of whether is discursive or noetic, is always about some sort of object or content which to think (τινός).[45] The difference between the forms of thinking is based on the type of relationship that the subject has to the object. This real identity between Intellect and the Forms does not suppress the metaphysical duality that constitutes the Intellect and its thinking: "We have, then, made one out of two in our account, but the contrary is the case: the two actually come from one because it thinks, making itself two, or rather, because it thinks it is two, and because it thinks itself, it is one."[46] Unity and plurality are indispensable criteria of the primary Intellect.[47]

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[40] V.1 [10].4.26-33; V.9 [5], 7-9.
[41] V.9 [5].5,7.
[42] See VI.9 [9].2,36-37. See V.1 [10].7; V.2 [11].1; III.8 [30].8–11; VI.7 [38].15–16; V.3 [49].10–11 for the Intellect's thinking itself.
[43] V.3 [49].5, 26. See also I.4 [46].6,10; II.9.1, 46-51; III.8 [30].8, 8-11; V.1 [10].8,17; V.6 [24].1,4-13; V.9 [5].5,6-10; VI.6 [34].15,19-24; VI.7 [38].41,18.
[44] V.3 [49].5, 23-25; V.5 [32].1,19-23.
[45] VI.7 [38].40,5-6.
[46] V.6 [24].1, 23
[47] V.6 [24].1, 6-7

Now that we have examined the identity of Forms and Intellect and how this is necessary to ensure that Intellect knows the truth, what consequences can we draw for the Intellect's image, namely, the human intellect? In what sense do we have self-knowledge and does this reveal the nature of the cognitive self? The answer is complex, but I will attempt to present a reasonable account. To a certain extent, Plotinus invites us to problematize what we are trying to discover when we seek to cognize ourselves as subjects of cognition. We are trained by Kant and, to some degree by Schopenhauer, to view discursive thinking as the paradigm of cognition because Kantian epistemology is so much an object of our studies. Only what is visible, measurable, and immanent counts as cognition in the proper sense. Thus, we feel compelled to seek discursive cognition of ourselves, we want to apply the same criteria to ourselves and cognize the subjective under the same conditions as we cognize sensible objects. But Plotinus argues against this view and proposes that we are mistaken to take discursive thinking as the archetype of cognition. His examination of the knowing hypostasis Intellect, the archetype of human intellects, reveals that cognition in itself is non-discursive.

True knowledge, disclosed in the knowing hypostasis Intellect, must dispense with all intermediaries, affections and images coming between the subject and object known.[48] Rather than being external, the object known must be internal to the Intellect and this is the proper sense in which we can speak of self-knowledge. As was discussed before, this is at its strongest in the Intellect, here we arrive at total knowledge: an identity of thinking subject and object thought.[49] The human intellect is not the Intellect, but an image of it; thus, as an embodied intellect, its form of knowledge must differ while it is turned towards

[48] O'Meara 2000, 316.
[49] V.5 [32].1.1-2.

objects in this sensible world. Plotinus calls it discursive or calculative thinking (διάνοια), the type of cognition that is "examining externals and busying itself with them."[50] As I have mentioned before, from this perspective there cannot be properly speaking self-knowledge and Plotinus seems consistent in denying that while our thinking remains at this level, self-knowledge cannot be predicated of human beings.

Somehow, we must leave behind the thinking that is examining externals and busying itself with them to enter the type of thinking that examines and busy itself with its own affairs (νόησις). Now we know that this is to become like the Intellect. This is possible, Plotinus argues, because our intellect is an image of the Intellect.

> By means of these arguments, our soul, too, goes back up to it, supposing itself to be an image of it, so that its life is a reflection and likeness of it, and whenever it thinks, it becomes god-like, that is, 'Intellect-like'. And if one were to ask the soul, 'What sort of thing is the Intellect that is perfect and complete and that knows itself primarily?', it would actually use itself as evidence, referring to things of which it possessed memories, since it was originally in Intellect, or ceded its activity to Intellect. So, it is in some way able to see Intellect because it is a kind of image of it, an image which is likened to it as closely as any part of the soul can come to being like Intellect.[51]

Plotinus encourages his readers to recognize that there is only one place where the 'birth pains' cease: the original state of the intellectual side of the soul. The "reaching of self-knowledge *is* a return to the life of Intellect: to *know* oneself and one's origins is to *live*

[50] V.3 [49].3,15.
[51] V.3 [49].8, 45-50.

otherwise."[52] Thus, we need to enter a process of purification, of recognizing that the sensible objects are not real objects. What Plotinus describes here is like the Schopenhauerian denial of the will to live, and the results are the same (but I will discuss this later). In any case, when the human being returns to the "well-governed fatherland" after much wandering, the human intellect becomes like the Intellect. This alteration in our intellect by which we ascend to the Intellect must leave some imprints on the self. Plotinus describes this ascension and union as enjoyment of the "best quality of life" and as a repose in the divine. Plotinus furthermore argues that something of that experience can always be communicated, even if our language is limited. For this communication to be possible, there must be a way in which we remember what happened. For us to have some memory of the experience additionally our intellect must remain alert and conscious, that is, our self cannot be annihilated during the union. [53] Here we can add to our discussion of the Plotinian forms of individuals that it seems that Plotinus leaves the door open to the possibility of retaining individuality because he says that one becomes 'Intellect-like'[54] not 'Intellect itself' or 'identical to Intellect.' Given these considerations, in what sense are we justified when we speak of knowing ourselves as subjects of cognition?

Ironically, Plotinus seems to suggest that we should not be concerned with this question because it is not possible to give an answer from the perspective that Kant or Schopenhauer require.[55] On the other hand, Plotinus states that "someone who knows himself knows where he is from."[56] If this is to be an intelligible statement, Plotinus must accept that in

[52] O'Meara (2000, 320).
[53] Like our consciousness is awake even during deep sleep. The ultimate union does not seem to imply annihilation (VI.9 [9].7; 11.38–42; VI.7 [38].34; 36.6–21). Rist (1989, 190-197) argues that Plotinus presents a 'theistic' union with the One in which the self remains distinct from the One.
[54] V.3 [49].8, 50.
[55] V.3 [49].6, 10-25.
[56] VI.9 [9].7,30.

some way we know ourselves. The argument seems to be that how we achieve this position is not through discursive thinking. Plotinus argues along the lines that "we are most completely aware of ourselves when we are most completely identified with the object of our knowledge."[57] This means that we know ourselves when we are not actively looking for ourselves but instead are absorbed in union with intuition of the ideas. This intellection is the result of an ascent by which we detach ourselves from the ways of thinking that characterize our life in the sensible world.

To summarize: Plotinus states that self-knowledge is possible only when the intentional structures in which objects are normally present to a consciousness are circumvented. The intentional structure must give way to a non-intentional cognition in which the distinction between subject and object does not obtain. In III.8 [30].6.23 for example, Plotinus contrasts intellectual knowledge in the hypostasis Intellect, in which the identity between knower and known prevails, with discursive thinking in the human intellect: "And by bringing [the known] forth [the human intellect] becomes, in a way, different from it and, when it reasons, looks upon it as being other than itself." Thus, for a human being to attain self-knowledge, he or she must ascend to the Intellect. In this ascent, discursive thinking gives way to noetic intuition. In this state, there is 'seeing the seeing', the very thing that is denied by Kant and Schopenhauer. When the experience ends, we still remember that union and this experience provides the content about who we are as cognitive subjects.

It is revealed in this ascent that Intellect is pure intellectual activity; hence, intellect necessarily engages in knowing and the objects of this cognition are ideas.[58] Accordingly, the true nature of cognition is revealed to us; what we called cognition in this life is a

[57] O'Daly (1973, 78).
[58] V.8 [31].8,6

second-class product that can never satisfy our need for metaphysics. The very awareness of the limitations of our human cognitive faculties, awareness that discursive thinking is not the archetype of cognition, is the result of having self-knowledge. As entities that are human intellects, we will not have objects internal to ourselves and in that capacity, we will always know them as representations. But without access to the forms, sensible things would be meaningless to us. The result from this discovery is that there must be Knowledge that is rule and criterion which allows any human being to say, 'I have knowledge', to point at X and say, "that is knowledge."[59] The human mind attains self-knowledge, not by developing a conception of what it is to be a knower through discursive thinking, but rather by uncovering self-knowledge through a process of gradual detachment from the objects of consciousness:

> If, however, someone is unable to grasp a soul such as this, one that thinks purely, let him grasp a soul which has beliefs, and next let him ascend from this. But if he cannot do even this, let him take sense-perception in itself with its powers and already immersed in the forms. Or if someone wants, let him ascend to the generative soul and keep going until he arrives at the things it produces. Then, when he is there, let him ascend from the forms that are at one extreme to the Forms that are at the other extreme, or rather to the primary ones.[60]

After examining the Plotinian perspective on self-knowledge and the identity of Intellect with the ideas, let me turn to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the pure subject of cognition. As I will show, the similarities are striking and although Schopenhauer basically discusses the

[59] Rappe (1996, 257). For Moran (1999, 64), "the divine self-intellection is productive of the human self-knowledge which mirrors it."
[60] V.3 [49].9.28-35.

cognitive significance of contemplation in his aesthetic theory or metaphysics of the beautiful, it is undeniable that this theory must have consequences for other dimensions of human life. My aim in what follows is to give a more detailed account of the Pure Subject, its relationship with Ideas and what happens in contemplation. In my opinion, this is a portion of Schopenhauer's philosophy with much untapped potential because even though he dedicates some pages to discussing these notions, he devotes more time to explaining how they interact in different works of art; not too much effort is dedicated to the implications for other parts of his philosophy. However, here is where the study of Plotinus reveals its rewards: he gives us the tools to analyze the Schopenhauerian account as much more than elements in a theory of art.

Whereas Plotinus narrates how the soul is curious and concerned with things outside of itself, how it goes out of the original unity to multiplicity and loses itself in it, Schopenhauer speaks of an ever striving will to live. The accounts use different images, but the outcome is the same: as human beings we are attracted and attached to sensible things. Plotinus explains this as an intellectual attachment,[61] but Schopenhauer associates it with the will; in itself, intellect is a pure state of unwillingness. Thus, the intellect does not desire things. On the other hand, Schopenhauer agrees with Plotinus that a pure intellect, not embodied intellect, is a pure cognitive activity. Plotinus invites us to remember our divine origin and return to the place of rest; on the other hand, Schopenhauer advises the liberation from the will or its denial, thus attaining the state of unwillingness

[61] In Plotinus, 'thinking' is a form of desire to reach that which one does not have: V.6 [24].5.8-10). For Schopenhauer, this is a completely mistaken way to characterize the faculty of thinking. This desire to reach something that one does not have is the unique realm of 'willing.'

which rewards with pleasure, and pleasure without attachments to the will is what we experience as the beautiful.

That as human beings we experience aesthetic pleasure is a fact that Schopenhauer seeks to explain. He argues that the pleasure of contemplating a work of art and the cognition that is revealed through it are the result of an alteration in our cognitive faculty. To grasp what Schopenhauer is trying to say, let us imagine the following scenario: it is a hot and humid summer afternoon, and I am looking for some shade because I am too warm. Suddenly I see a big linden tree that casts a big shadow. As an individual who is experiencing dehydration, this linden tree is an object of interest. I am interested in this tree for what it can provide to me, I do not care about its history, or its biological properties; this tree is good to me because I desire to give comfort to my body. It is very pleasant to sit under this tree because my body is relieved. Schopenhauer sees that as individuals this is how we relate to all individual things in this sensible world. Our attraction or repulsion towards individual things goes hand in hand with how our will desires or rejects something. This phenomenon happens because, according to Schopenhauer, at our core we are will and the cognitive faculty (here the human intellect) is subordinated to the will. Our interest-oriented relationship to all things in this world is the origin of pains and dissatisfactions.

However, Schopenhauer identifies one phenomenon in human lives where we experience satisfaction and pleasure without a stirring of the will, namely, the experience of the beautiful. Schopenhauer theorizes that this is only possible if the intellect acts independently of the will: “Now for that required change in the subject and object, the condition is not only that the power of knowledge is withdrawn from its original servitude and left entirely to itself, but also that it nevertheless remains active with the whole of its

energy." Thus, the beautiful is what we experience when we cognize something without attachments to the will. If we apply this to the scenario that I presented above, what would happen if, instead of considering the linden tree as an object of interest, I found myself captivated by it? I recognize beauty in the linden tree when I intuit it, not as an object of my interest, but, disregarding its position in time and space and thus its individuality, I intuit it as Treeness itself. The tree is no longer related to me in its individuality, but as the tree that makes all trees possible.

> Here everything must go automatically; knowledge must be active without intention and so must be will-less. For only in the state of *pure knowing*, where a man's will and its aims together with his individuality are entirely removed from him, can that purely objective intuitive perception arise wherein the (Platonic) Ideas of things are apprehended. [62]

As I have said before, the beautiful arises when the human intellect is acting without the influence of the will. This is a pure intellect, the state of pure cognition. Unlike Plotinus, Schopenhauer holds that the intellect gets attached to things only when it is subjugated by the will. It is this principle, almost a Schopenhauerian hypostasis, which is responsible for making us marvel at sensible things, for our love of and dependency on them; for the never-ending cycle of pain because we cannot satisfy the will. The activity of a pure intellect, on the other hand, is the contemplation of the ideas which causes in us the ceasing of suffering for as long as contemplation lasts. Moreover, for Schopenhauer cognition free from the will becomes perfectly *objective* because the objects that it cognizes are pure objects, that

[62] PP II, 417.

is, ideas. Thus, in ascending from the sensible thing to cognition of the intelligible idea, the pure object and pure subject arise simultaneously.[63]

> [I]f…we devote the entire power of our mind to intuition and immerse ourselves in this entirely, letting the whole of consciousness be filled with peaceful contemplation of the natural object that is directly present, a landscape, a tree, a cliff, a building, or whatever it might be, and, according to a suggestive figure of speech, we *lose* ourselves in this object completely, i.e., we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object existed on its own, without anyone to perceive it, and we can no longer separate the intuited from the intuition as the two have become one, and the whole of consciousness completely filled and engrossed by a single intuitive image…this is precisely how someone gripped by this intuition is at the same time no longer an individual: the individual has lost himself in this very intuition: rather, he is the *pure*, will-less, painless, timeless *subject of cognition*.[64]

This text evokes the many Plotinian passages where he describes how the ascent from human intellect to Intellect occurs. We see the invitation to focus on our attention or awareness of what happens inside of us and how this losing ourselves in the intuition of the object suddenly unveils the reality of the intelligible world. This exercise makes us aware of the things that are already there but are not the immediate object of our attention, the way the light that makes us see objects is not the immediate thing that we recognize when we see an object. We presuppose the light, or we forget how important it is. Likewise, this text introduces us to the next notion that I want to discuss, namely, how in the

[63] Ibid.
[64] WWR I, 201.

description of contemplation Schopenhauer also speaks of an identity between knower and known.

> When the Idea emerges, subject and object can no longer be distinguished within it because the Idea…arises only to the extent that subject and object reciprocally fill and completely permeate each other; in just the same way, the individual cognizing and the individual thing thus cognized are, as things in themselves, indistinguishable.[65]

The corollary of this discussion is that the investigation of contemplation leads to the discovery that the pure subject and ideas are the archetype of the sensible world. The more we discern the nature of this pure subject the more we comprehend that "he is the condition, which is to say the bearer, of the world of all objective being [*Daseyn*], because this now presents itself as dependent on him."[66] The view that Schopenhauer seems to put forward here is that there are as many pure subjects of cognition as there are human intellects, but he never speaks in the plural when talking about the pure subject. One level of reading then is that Schopenhauer is just speaking of the human intellect, but I think that there can be another level of reading in which human intellects are images of a pure Intellect or Schopenhauerian Pure Subject understood as archetype.

Although I hold that this pure subject is the non-sensible way which Schopenhauer uses to describe the human cognitive faculties, and from this angle we can speak of a plurality of pure subjects, I think that the Pure Subject is better understood as the Plotinian Intellect. Thus, the human intellects, as images of this Pure Subject understood as an Intellect, can

[65] WWR I, 203.
[66] WWR I, 203-204.

contemplate the ideas through the rising up and leaving behind of the world of sense. The subject of cognition participates in the eternal cognition of the Pure Subject, whose cognition of the ideas is complete because they are one and the same. The following text could be interpreted in this light.

> This is why I have described the pure subject of cognition that remains as the eternal eye of the world: this looks out from all living beings, albeit with very different degrees of lucidity, untouched by their coming to be and passing away and so, as identical with itself, as always one and the same, is the support of the world of permanent Ideas, i.e., the adequate objecthood of the will; by contrast, the individual subject, clouded in its cognition by the individuality that stems from the will, has only particular things as its objects, and, like these, it is ephemeral. – Everybody can be attributed a twofold existence, in the sense described here.[67]

The same results that I described for the human intellect that unites itself with the Plotinian Intellect apply to Schopenhauer's account of the human intellect that becomes Pure Subject. The Schopenhauerian account is not simply a theory of the beautiful but has very important consequences for epistemology. We can conclude that Schopenhauer sees the transition from cognition *qua* individual to pure cognition as the passage from discursive to noetic thinking. In the former, the principle of sufficient reason rules over all the possible objects of cognition, in the latter, the principle of sufficient reason is no longer valid, and the subject and object distinction is blurred. The subject of cognition indeed is never discovered under the rules of the principle of sufficient reason, but this is not the only form

[67] WWR II, 388.

of cognition possible. Our cognitive faculties are altered by the different ways in which we relate to objects. The experience of the beautiful is the path that Schopenhauer chooses to describe a form of cognition that is not constrained by the principle of sufficient reason. Knowing ourselves in the sense of knowing the nature of our cognitive self is only possible when we unite ourselves to the Pure Subject in its pure activity of thinking. But Schopenhauer would resist and fight against this type of interpretation. The one major obstacle comes from his commitment to seeing the intellect as identical with the brain. I have already raised doubts regarding this view. Now it is time to turn to this issue.

2nd Theme: That the Human Intellect is not Identical to the Human Brain

It will not be possible to give a full account of the discussion regarding the problems that follow from defending the position that the intellect or mind is identical or reduced to the brain.[68] I have argued that Schopenhauer seems committed to this position and that this is one of his most vulnerable weaknesses.[69] We cannot classify Schopenhauer as an identity theorist in the contemporary sense because he is not strictly speaking a materialist, even though he sounds like one when talking about the mind.[70] Nevertheless, as I have already shown on several times, Schopenhauer seems very committed to the notion that the human intellect is identical to the brain, and this is qualified in different ways such as when he

[68] See more in Gasparov (2013, 110, 117) and Rodriguez (2014, 204).
[69] Lowe (1996, 44-48) makes several points against a position that resembles Schopenhauer's position. For him we can say, at most, that there is "an empirical correlation between mental activity and brain-function" (44). But he rejects completely that a mental activity can be the result of a purely biological process (48). Finally, he points to human society and different creations in arts, sciences, etc. that cannot be reduced to brain activity (49). Rodriguez (2014, 220-221) argues that the creative aspect of language has nothing to do with the brain. In this activity, the soul/mind is totally spontaneous.
[70] As we saw in chapter 3, the notion of matter is a complex topic in Schopenhauerian philosophy.

writes that the intellect is a function of the brain, or is just the brain, or a product of the brain. Nevertheless, we have seen that Schopenhauer argues that when the brain dies or is destroyed, that marks the end of intellectual life, consciousness, individuality, and the sensible world. This is the case because Schopenhauer makes the brain the seat of the *a priori* forms of space, time and causality.

Schopenhauer is not the first philosopher to make such claims about the relationship between the brain and intellect. Plotinus dedicates several passages of the *Enneads* to combat those philosophers that had a materialistic approach to explaining the human soul. We found some of these polemics in IV.3 [27].23 where Plotinus states that the intellectual capacities were located by the ancients "at the highest point in the animal, in the head, not in the brain as such."[71] This image of the intellect being above the human head was used to illustrate that the intellect of human beings could not be identified with any of its corporeal components, such as the brain. For Plotinus, the soul is present throughout the whole body, not just located in a specific place. But in accordance "with the suitability of an organ for a given function, the soul provides the power appropriate for that function."[72] Accordingly, the view was that wherever the origin of a power was located, for example, the power of touch and sense-perception began in the brain, that is where the appropriate soul power was located.[73]

But in IV.7 [2] we find a more extended discussion aimed at those who want to support materialist theories of the soul – a notion that Plotinus cannot tolerate: "it is quite

[71] IV.3 [27].23,25. Plotinus is here interpreting *Timaeus* 90a5.
[72] IV.3 [27].23,1-5.
[73] The location is not meant spatially, but as an activity (ἐνέργεια). This chapter of the *Enneads* also proves that Schopenhauer uses 'will' instead of 'soul' to describe similar phenomena. For Schopenhauer, the will is present throughout the entire body – it is identical with the body – and it produces the sense organs to strive for whatever is needed to preserve the organism.

impossible for a composition of bodies to generate life, and for things devoid of thinking to generate intellect."[74] A general thesis of Plotinus, that to a certain extent we find in Schopenhauer, is that a non-sensible principle is what generates the sensible world. If accepted, this means that the whole corporeal realm exists because the non-sensible reality is always present to it.[75] The best image to describe this is how the images in a mirror can only exist while the model is facing the mirror, if the model steps aways the image disappears. Plotinus applies this schema to the soul and the body; thus, the very existence and movement of the body is possible because there is a soul present to it.[76] All this is found and defended by Schopenhauer in his metaphysics. What separates him from Plotinus is that he argues that this non-sensible principle is the will.[77] But at least we see that the general principle that Plotinus uses is acceptable to Schopenhauer; what needs to be shown is how this is also possible for the operations of the cognitive side of human beings. This is a challenge because for those familiar with Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, many chapters from IV.7 [2] argue for things that in many ways are acceptable to Schopenhauer and many of Plotinus' arguments are repeated by Schopenhauer, again with the difference that he substitutes 'will' for what Plotinus considers is the soul.

If we are to find some solution to this problem we must focus on the intellective or rational soul. These are the activities that Schopenhauer says are ultimately brain activities. Fortunately, Plotinus speaks about this in IV.7 [2].8. In chapter 8, Plotinus begins with the thesis that intellection would not be possible if the soul were corporeal (lines 1-5). In

[74] IV.7 [2].2,18.
[75] IV.7 [2].2,20;3,22,35-36
[76] "After all, no body would even exist if the soul's power did not exist" (IV.7 [2].3,18).
[77] Here we see that Schopenhauer has no problem with accepting that the will is not dependent on corporeal beings to exist. Moreover, the will precedes all corporeality.

Schopenhauerian terms, it would be impossible for the understanding and reason to work as Schopenhauer describes them if, as he asserts, they were nothing more than the brain. Next, in lines 5-6 Plotinus says that if sensation consists in the soul perceiving sensible objects through the body, intellection or thinking cannot be a corporeal activity because then it would be no different from sensation. If intellection is perceiving without the body, so much more is the one who thinks incorporeal. This Plotinian observation would turn Schopenhauer's criticism against Kant, as described in chapter 2, against Schopenhauer himself. We saw that Schopenhauer accuses Kant of not drawing clear distinctions between intuitive and abstract cognition. But if we accept Plotinus' view, we could accuse Schopenhauer of not realizing that everything that he describes about intuitive and abstract cognition implies that these processes cannot be reduced to cerebral activity. The brain alone cannot perform the activities of cognition. What Plotinus seems to imply is that the language of cognition cannot apply to a material organ.

The next considerations in lines 8-12 point towards one of the most important arguments that Plotinus brings forward against any identification of soul with matter, that is, what contemporary philosophy of mind calls the 'unity of consciousness' problem.[78] To understand the point that Plotinus makes here we must recall that both Plotinus and Schopenhauer agree that there is intuition of (Platonic) ideas. If this is accepted, namely, that human beings can cognize ideas, Plotinus asks how it would be possible that something without magnitude (an idea) be cognized by something that has magnitudes or parts (the brain). Schopenhauer has accepted that there can be pure thinking; but that could not be the case, if thinking is just a cerebral activity. For contemporary supporters of substance

[78] IV.7 [2].6. See Emilsson (1991, 148-163) for a good summary of this issue in relation to Plotinus, and against materialist perspectives on the soul/mind. Cf Lowe (2006, 10; 2010, 441) and Gasparov (2013, 117).

dualism, it is not possible that the brain is identical with the mind precisely because the brain is a complex structure, whereas we experience the sensible world in a unified manner. Even if a Schopenhauerian were to argue that this pure thinking is done by one part of the brain, Plotinus would insist that this part cannot be corporeal.

> If, then, they will concede what is, in fact, the truth, namely, that the primary acts of thinking are of those objects which are most entirely free from contamination with body, that is, the 'what it is itself of each thing'[αὐτοεκάστου], it is also necessary for them to recognize that that which is thinking will think its objects by being or becoming purified of the body.[79]

In the next lines (19-24), Plotinus speaks to what Schopenhauer would consider activities of the faculty of reason, namely, dealing with abstractions. The very act of abstraction cannot be performed if the faculty of reason is a purely material process. This is an important observation because it makes one realize that the way that Schopenhauer has described reason carries the connotation that this faculty cannot be reduced to cerebral activity. Reason works by eliminating the corporeal from sensible objects and works with concepts[80]; thus, it would stand to reason that this cannot be done by something that is itself corporeal. The separation or abstraction of a triangle from a sensible object does not happen in association with anything corporeal.

Previously I said that I could not agree with Schopenhauer regarding his view of aesthetic contemplation if it all came down to merely a brain process; moreover, I said that

[79] IV.7 [2].8,15.
[80] The Plotinian examples of 'circle', 'triangle' etc. in the text are proof that Plotinus is thinking of concepts. They are also called 'secondary intellections', or forms abstracted from matter (Igal 1985, 503).

if that were the case, his entire metaphysics of the beautiful is built on sand. This is an opinion that is shared by Plotinus: "Beauty and Justice are both, I presume, without magnitude; and, therefore, so is the intellection of them. So, when they present themselves to it, our soul will receive them by means of its partlessness, and they will repose in it as in something partless."[81] I will not say anything about justice because that is another separate discussion in the philosophy of Schopenhauer that will take us to far away from our current discussion, but what Plotinus says here of the beautiful applies perfectly to Schopenhauer. The processes in the brain alone could not explain the creation of art or the experience of the beautiful. The person who experiences these things, experiences them with something that is not corporeal. The rest of the chapter, lines 27-45, is used by Plotinus to discuss the virtues, and this is another analysis that we must ignore at this juncture because Schopenhauer has his own theories of what virtues are. Nevertheless, I will only say that once again Plotinus argues that what is immortal (like virtues) cannot be in a body that is in constant flux. Therefore, the virtuous person (a reality accepted in the Schopenhauerian system) cannot be an individual that just exists as a thing in a state of flux; if he or she *possesses* and is *informed* by virtues, that means that he or she must be of the same nature as them and not be in themselves pure becoming.[82]

3rd Theme: Hypostatic Thinking and Willing

Up to this point, there has been an unspoken debate in the background that I need to bring to the foreground because it is key in the discussion about the immortality of human beings

[81] IV.7 [2].8, 25.
[82] IV.7 [2].8,45.

in both Schopenhauer and Plotinus. We have seen that these two philosophers claim that one principle is responsible for both the sensible world that we experience and for how we understand what we ultimately are. Two main principles define the nature of reality: thinking and/or willing. Whereas Schopenhauer, in general terms, is the philosopher of the will, Plotinus is, in general terms, the philosopher of the intellect. By this I mean that, in general terms, these philosophers have focused intensely on one of the faculties, somewhat to the detriment of the other. On the question of immortality and who is our true self, it should be obvious by now that whichever one is considered the primary thing (either intellect or will) defines one's arguments. Thus, the third theme that I need to articulate is to what extent Schopenhauer reveals how willing has been ignored in the Western tradition and made subservient to consciousness, cognition and discursive thought. Schopenhauer elevates the Will to the category of hypostasis in the Plotinian sense. Now he has done this to the detriment of intellectual activities. I think that Plotinus, even though he puts the intellectual at a very high level in his metaphysics, offers some important hints as to how the faculty of willing is part of the vertical causality in his theory of progression. Meanwhile Schopenhauer can teach the Plotinian philosopher how willing is distinct from thinking.

Schopenhauer openly argues that 'willing' is primary, the only thing that could be described as a Plotinian hypostasis or substance in his ontology. Everything depends on the Will, but it depends on no one. This notion is scattered throughout all his works but in the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer has an extended discussion of this in chapter 19. The very first paragraph of that chapter offers a summary

of his position and a good place to start. I will break up the paragraph into three sections to make its content more intelligible.

(1) As thing in itself, the will constitutes the true, inner and indestructible essence of the human being: in itself, however, it is not conscious. This is because consciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and intellect is a mere accident of our essence, being a function of the brain which (along with the nerves and spinal cord attached to it) is merely a fruit, a product, even a parasite of the rest of the organism, not interfering directly in the organism's inner workings, but serving the purpose of self-preservation by regulating the organism's relations to the external world.

The first sentence captures the issue: the will is simple, and it is not conscious, namely, it is not intellect. Here we have a great example of how Schopenhauer has abandoned the concept of 'soul' but not what was meant by it. Our essence is not identified with a rational thinking thing as philosophers like Plato and Descartes may have done, but with the unconscious will. I am ultimately an indestructible and simple will. However, this is not true just of human beings, but it is a truth that goes to the very core of reality: will reigns over all things. Intellect and consciousness appear because the will wants organisms to engage with the external world. Here we encounter a curious paradox, in what sense the will "wants an organism to engage with the external world". For what? Schopenhauer says that for self-preservation of the organism, but does not this imply discursive thinking? Some minimal planning and purpose by the will and thus not absolutely unconscious?

(2) The organism, for its parts, is the visibility, the objecthood of the individual will, its image as it presents itself in that very brain…, and hence as mediated by its forms of cognition, space, time and causality, and so presenting itself as something extended, acting in succession, and material, i.e. efficacious. Only in the brain are the limbs both sensed directly and intuited by means of the senses.

Here we encounter another articulation of the great Schopenhauerian antinomy. The very brain that makes possible the world of sensible experience, is itself the result of a process that seems to require space, time and causality. The will is what makes possible the eventual appearance of an organism. In this passage we also encounter something that I have alluded to in other parts, namely, a tendency by Schopenhauer to gloss over the ideas in this process of how an organism comes to be. The specific problem is that, given what is said here, the ideas are not needed, or they seem to simply be no different from the thing in itself, and thus rendering them superfluous. In any case, we could say that from the thing in itself's 'perspective' there is no process in the sense that we speak of processes in time, just as in Plotinus "Intellect constitutes itself and is completely constituted from the One, atemporally and non-spatially."[83] I think that Plotinus' theory of progression could help articulate solutions to the Schopenhauerian antinomy.

(3) Accordingly, it can be said: the intellect is the secondary phenomenon, the organism is the primary i.e. the direct appearance of the will; the will is metaphysical, the intellect physical; the intellect, like its objects, is mere appearance; only the will is thing in itself; similarly, in an increasingly *figurative* sense and therefore metaphorically: the

[83] V.1 [10].6.19-22.

> will is the substance of the human being, the intellect the accident…the will is the heat, the intellect the light.

In this introduction to chapter 19, Schopenhauer establishes that the thing in itself is primary, and intellect is secondary. The rest of the chapter is spent in an analysis of diverse phenomena that Schopenhauer presents as confirmation of his thesis. I will not discuss each single item that Schopenhauer uses to prove his thesis, but I will discuss the main points of his argument. Overall, Schopenhauer's strategy is to show the interplay of will and intellect in the world of sensible experience; this allows him to demonstrate that will has a greater role in existence than intellect. For example, our body's healing mechanism is infallible compared to the clumsiness of our intellect trying to solve a health problem. The mistake that human beings have made in identifying intellect as what defines their most inner self, or their soul, is based on how great the role of intellect in our survival is.[84] But just by looking at animals we recognize that willing plays a larger role than intellect. It is easy for us to see that the animal is driven by longing, cravings, aversions, etc. just as we do; in our experience of willing we share the same animal nature with even the simplest of animals.

The intellect grows weaker but not the will which always retains its identical nature. The intellect is put in motion by the will because in itself it is inert.[85] Schopenhauer

[84] The question of whether the human senses are given to human beings as part of a plan in order to help them survive in the sensible world is explored by Plotinus in VI.7 [38].1. He answers this question in the negative, that is, there is no planning in the Intellect. Thus, the sense organs are not the result of Intellect planning how best to help human beings survive in the sensible world. Schopenhauer's position is paradoxical: the will gives human beings the senses to help its body survive, but this does not mean that the will has a plan. In any case, for both Schopenhauer and Plotinus whatever is responsible for the generation of the sensible world does not plan.

[85] This could only refer to the embodied human intellect and not to a pure disembodied intellect. Schopenhauer has argued that the will-less intellect is capable of perfect intuition of ideas, thus it can perform its intellectual activity separated from the will.

illustrates the derivative nature of intellect by comparing the will to water, the intellect to a reflection in the water that disappears when the water is disturbed. Another image that Schopenhauer uses is that of a smith and his hammer. Plotinus would consider the smith to be the intellect and the hammer the will, but Schopenhauer argues the opposite. The appearance of the intellect in the world of sense experience is gradual, for example, the child's intellect takes time to develop whereas his or her will is fully present from the moment of conception. This is even true before the child displays any sign of having intellect when it is through will, argues Schopenhauer, that the zygote becomes an embryo without the need of intellect.

In the last section of chapter 19, Schopenhauer turns to the phenomenon of deep sleep where cognition disappears but willing remains.[86] Just as in the womb, the will works without the need of intellect (of which it is a product anyway), when human beings go into deep sleep, the will keeps our bodies alive. For Schopenhauer the metaphysical nature of will is demonstrated by the fact that will itself is never tired; the kernel of our being can never pause if biological life is to continue. The heart does not stop beating because unlike other muscles it is less dependent on the intellect. When exercising, for example, the chest muscles get tired and pain follows, but this tiredness is on the brain not the will.[87]

[86] WWR II, 253-257.

[87] Unfortunately for Schopenhauer, there seems to be evidence to support that even during deep sleep there is consciousness: see Windt, J.M., Nielsen, T. and Thompson, E. (2016, 871-882); Thompson (2017, 231-272); and Rodriguez (2014, 205-206). What seems more damaging for Schopenhauer is that this view is found in some Buddhist schools. Nevertheless, I think that what Schopenhauer says and what contemporary research is discovering or confirming can be harmonized. All that Schopenhauer says of the will regarding deep sleep applies to the intellect too because, unlike what Schopenhauer believes, the intellect is not identical to the brain, namely, the intellect is also metaphysical. The whole truth then would be that in deep sleep, the two primary principles remain active. Furthermore, if this is accepted for deep sleep, all the other processes that Schopenhauer describes in WWR II, chapter 19, require in some minimal sense that both willing and thinking faculties are always at work.

What Schopenhauer seems to be aiming at is that in willing there is no subject-object distinction, whereas cognition is divided in subject-object. The thesis seems to be, as we saw before, that the only pure simplicity is willing while the self of human beings is a composite of will and conscious intellect. I think that in this argument, we encounter another indication that Schopenhauer is moving from epistemological questions to ontological considerations.

Going back to the point that was raised above, Schopenhauer explores in chapter 22 the intellect from the objective standpoint. In this chapter, Schopenhauer deepens some of the arguments that he has made already, but the limits of his position become clearer. Schopenhauer does not abandon his commitment that from the objective standpoint thinking is merely a brain activity. He does not say that thinking is something that we usually locate in the brain but, in reality, it is more than mere brain activity; instead, his commitment seems at times to a full identity between thinking and the brain; just as the body, again from an objective standpoint, is identical with its will. He repeats the notion that the concept 'soul', namely, the abiding thinking 'I' is suggested to us as a remedy for the surprise that thinking is brain activity. Cognition, says Schopenhauer, arises from the need of the will to preserve an organism in a world populated by multiple beings. Thus, it is because of individuality that cognition arises. The 'jump' from the simplicity of the thing in itself to a multitude of beings is something that Schopenhauer, in many texts, glosses over, and it is incomprehensible unless we keep in our minds his doctrine of Platonic Ideas.

But this primacy of the will is not without precedent. Plotinus writes about Will and the One, "In fact, there is will in its substantiality; therefore, there is nothing different from its substantiality. Or was there something like willing, which it was not? It [the One],

therefore, was entirely willing, and there was nothing not willing it. *Therefore, there was nothing prior to willing. Therefore, willing is primarily itself*."[88] The last two sentences could have been written by Schopenhauer. Taken as written, Plotinus seems to endorse the Schopenhauerian primacy of will because the inference is that the One is identical to its willing and the One is a reality on which Plotinus writes "do not look for anything outside it; everything posterior to it is within it."[89] But this role of willing is not exhausted in treatise VI.8. Indeed, one could talk in Plotinus' metaphysics of how ultimately one founds a 'will' (a desire) at the very core of and responsible for existence. The Intellect *wills* to contemplate, *wills* to grasp its origin, and from this non-sensible desire, the sensible world is generated.

In Plotinus's account of Intellect there is a 'rhetoric of volition' where the Intellect is described with volitional predicates although it is a thinking hypostasis. For me this is evidence that Plotinus is not as attentive to the unique features of willing as Schopenhauer is. The references to a 'rhetoric of volition' regarding Intellect are scattered throughout the *Enneads*. For example, in V.3 [49].11,12 ("Prior to this, it was only desire and a sight that is without impression."), VI.6 [34],18, 50,[90] III.8 [30].8,34 ("it unfolded itself in its wish to have everything") and III.8 [30].11, 20.[91] These interior dispositions of the Intellect make it 'convert' towards its progenitor. Ultimately, there is an eternal longing in the Intellect for the One, which is eternally unsatisfied because the Intellect cannot never fully possess the object of its desire.[92] Do we not find here Schopenhauer's eternal striving of a

[88] VI.8 [39].21.12-16, (emphasis mine).
[89] VI.8 [39].18.1.
[90] "And the whole of this cosmos wants both to be alive and be wise, so it may be, and all soul, and all intellect desires to be what it is."
[91] "[W]hereas in Intellect there is desire and it both desires and attains forever, the Good neither desires…nor attains, for it did not even desire."
[92] V.3 [49].11,1-16.

will that cannot ever be satisfied? Other corollaries follow from identifying aspects of willing in Plotinus' account of the generation of the intelligible and sensible world. These original desires that Plotinus assigns to the Intellect can be described as the Schopenhauerian 'original acts of the will' that give rise to the ideas. Just as the inchoate Intellect desires to grasp the One, each Schopenhauerian idea is born from an original act of will. Although Schopenhauer never admits as much, this original act of will is a desire for the thing in itself. To speak more accurately, ideas are not distinct from the original act, but they are this act itself. Thus, just as for Plotinus each idea is an intellect,[93] so for Schopenhauer each idea is an act of the will. Ultimately, one could argue that the Plotinian ideas are not only intellects but willers/agents that desire to grasp the One.

The discovery of elements of will in the generation of the sensible world should make us pause regarding a strict interpretation of Plotinus as simply a philosopher of the Intellect. The questions that this consideration opens for us are the following: are 'willing' and 'thinking' (intellection) principles in the same sense for Plotinus? Is it still possible to hold that for Schopenhauer willing alone is a principle, even though it can be shown that he must accept some form of disembodied cognition if his aesthetic theory is not to be rendered meaningless? The consequences of changing our perspective based on accepting that intellect cannot be reduced to the brain's activity are many, one of them being the possibility that there is an eternal part of us that is also an intellect. If from a purely Schopenhauerian perspective, we may be forced to do more speculation and reinterpretation when dealing with the relationship between the thing in itself and intellect, in Plotinus the issue seems to be clearer. Plotinus argues in VI.8 [39].21 that "will comes

[93] V.1 [10].4,27.

before intellect"[94] as we saw in the text above. Intellect and intellection are activities that come after the One whose being is will. "The One, therefore, is not any of the things of the universe: He precedes all these things, and consequently, He precedes Intelligence, since the latter embraces all things in its universality."[95] Thought, as said above, is always directed to or about something, while will is pure self-affirmation, thus, it is simple.

Why does Plotinus not conclude from his view that will is ultimately behind everything to the same so-called pessimism of Schopenhauer? Why does Plotinus not follow Schopenhauer in his view that this is the worst possible of worlds given that there is an eternal frustration at the level of Intellect that must permeate the whole universe? The answer to these questions cannot be pursued here. It could be because Plotinus has a completely different theory of what 'willing' entails. It could be because Plotinus argues for a more dynamic relationship between will and intellect. Perhaps Plotinus' Intellect is not just a brain product, and the role of Ideas is more important than what Schopenhauer recognizes.

4th Theme: The Schopenhauerian Intellect and Intelligible World

From the objective standpoint of Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism, I found evidence that his concerns, his questions, and conclusions bear a striking resemblance to Plotinus' metaphysics. Of the many possible examples, I have focused on a particular one, namely, the similarities between the Intellect and its noetic activity and the Pure Subject and aesthetic contemplation. I have used Plotinus' account of Intellect to expand what

[94] Corrigan (2017, 20).
[95] V.3 [49].11,16.

Schopenhauer says. In this section I want to make a final case for the notion that the generation of the sensible world in the Schopenhauerian account benefits from assigning to it an Intellect. Let me illustrate the point with one example. Consider the following Schopenhauerian passage:

> Just as a magic lantern exhibits many different images while one and the same flame makes them all visible, so too in all the diversity of appearances that fill the world alongside each other, or (as events) follow each other and push each other out of the way, there is just *the one* will that appears; everything is its manifestation, its objecthood, and it remains unmoved in the midst of that change: it alone is the thing in itself, while all objects are appearance, phenomenon as Kant puts it.[96]

Now, consider this Plotinian passage:

> For what is in the One is many times greater than what is, in a way, in Intellect. It is just as when light is scattered abroad from a single source, which in itself is luminous. The scattered light is an image, its source is the true original. The scattered image, Intellect, does not differ in form; it is not chance, but each [element] in it is an expressed principle and a cause but the Good is the cause of this cause.[97]

One could discourse about the subtle differences between Schopenhauerian and Plotinian metaphysics, but it would be dishonest to ignore the striking similarities in language and content between the two passages. Take away the reference to Kant in Schopenhauer's

[96] WWR I, 178.
[97] VI.8 [39].18.35-40.

passage and this text could find its way into the *Enneads* without disrupting the integrity of the text. First, an important reminder: Schopenhauer is committed to the ontological priority of the thing in itself, which should always be qualified in the case of the thing in itself: Schopenhauer does not say that the thing in itself is a thing, or an object. As I have stressed before, it is 'beyond being and categories."[98] This commitment is obscured by the subjective standpoint that dominates Schopenhauer's presentation. Both Schopenhauer and Plotinus are committed to the 'existence' of this ultimate reality and to the task of clarifying the connection – the absolute dependence – between the world of senses and this ultimate reality.

Schopenhauer describes the thing in itself as a flame, a luminous object in the Plotinian lexicon. The 'thing in itself-flame' is a source of light that goes out of itself; it is willing and what this willing generates. This light that goes out of the thing in itself is absolutely dependent on the thing in itself as source and if you take it away, the light disappears. Light itself has no independence, just as ideas and things in the world of senses have no independence from the thing in itself. Schopenhauer introduces the 'magic lantern' figure as something in between the flame and the projected forms to explain the fact that in the world of sense we do not encounter unformed matter, that is, the magic lantern is used to justify the origin of distinctions between individuals. Between the flame and the light there is something that delineates and gives direction to the light. This thing has a variety of shapes through which the light passes so that even in the individual (the final product of the shaped light) we encounter a trace of the flame. Thus, the individual's existence is

[98] That is why it should be preferable, when speaking of the thing in itself in the Schopenhauerian sense, to drop the determinate article 'the' because this signals better the fact that we are speaking of a reality that it is not a determinate object.

dependent on the activity of the flame. If one takes away this activity, the individual disappears. No one can deny that this is the position that Schopenhauer articulates in his public works. This powerful image confirms the intimate connection between all levels of Schopenhauer's ontology, something that can be forgotten given Schopenhauer's more frequent concern to indicate the differences between things as for example, the difference between 'understanding' and 'reason'. Moreover, as this analysis of Schopenhauer's image has revealed, knowing Plotinus' philosophy helps readers of transcendental idealism to explore the vast richness of that doctrine. Schopenhauer may have used the image innocently, but its use is far richer than what he suggests.

After unpacking the implications of Schopenhauer's objective standpoint, I turn now to the Plotinian passage. The immediate difference that a critic can note between Plotinus and Schopenhauer is the former's use of 'One' and 'Intellect' to describe some members of the Plotinian ontology. But let us put this problem aside and focus on what Plotinus says. In Plotinus we find that the One is ultimate reality, it is the ultimate source of what exists, and it is 'greater' than Intellect. The One is described as a luminous source and the scattered light that comes out of it is Intellect. This Intellect is posterior to the One and its existence is dependent on the One. In Plotinus' words, in relation to the One, the Intellect is a copy and the One is "the true original". The Intellect does not differ in form from the One because the One has no form or determination. We get more information about Intellect, namely, that it is or has content (expressed principle and a cause). These are the Forms which generate the existence of individuals in the sensible world. Whatever power the Intellect and Forms have it has its ultimate source in the One.

While I think that it is easy to connect the 'One' and Schopenhauer's 'thing in itself'[99], it is not immediately evident in the passage from *The World as Will and Representation* quoted above whether we can identify anything that parallels Plotinus' Intellect. According to the text, the magic lantern contains all the shapes (Forms) that determine the light and it is responsible for the projection in a surface that gives rise to the individual. But some important differences challenge that identification. To begin with, the magic lantern is not a product of the flame, it does not come out of the flame's activity. It is produced independently of the flame and put there. The magic lantern has its own activity (it is what it is) but it has no connection to the flame. Similarly, the shapes in the magic lantern are not coming from the flame but are put there. In the Intellect, the Ideas come about from the Intellect's contemplation of the One, but the shapes in the magic lantern are not born out of looking at the flame.

Does this mean that we must abandon this analysis? I do not think that the differences identified above are decisive against identifying some element in Schopenhauer's philosophy that could parallel Plotinus' Intellect. Perhaps Schopenhauer is on to something when he posits a lantern between the flame and the objects of sensible intuition. Perhaps he understands that one cannot claim that there are Ideas, but no 'place' where these Ideas are. Moreover, he may sense that Ideas, which are Pure Objects, cannot come directly out of Will, but require a subject.[100] This willing alone is not enough to justify Ideas. We have seen some evidence of this in our analysis of the faculty of willing in Kant and

[99] If, that is, we put aside for the moment the question of the Plotinian identification between the 'Good' and the 'One'. I do not think, nevertheless, that this is an objection against my interpretation. On the one hand, the thing in itself is such a reality that we cannot predicate anything of it, it is neither Good nor Evil. On the other hand, Schopenhauer's characterization of willing in itself is too anthropomorphic. As Plotinus shows (VI.8 [39].19-20, 1-21), willing in itself does not imply the evil that Schopenhauer defends.
[100] Atwell (1995, 142).

Schopenhauer. Willing is the activity that is always simple throughout its manifestations. Thus, what comes after the thing in itself cannot be just willing because there would be no difference between the thing in itself and its product. Furthermore, if Ideas are real existing things, they cannot be floating around in an undisclosed location. I think that Schopenhauer's introduction of the Pure Subject of Cognition is, among other things that have been mentioned before, his way of dealing with these problems.

This is where the study of Plotinus' Intellect could help us to put the pieces together of Schopenhauer's account. Given that Schopenhauer considers intellection a purely cerebral activity, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion regarding a nonembodied Intellect. To do this, we must start from another point of view, namely, that of the nature of Ideas and the manner of their generation from the thing in itself. We must keep in mind that the thing in itself and the Ideas are not identical in Schopenhauer's account. Still, some of the ways he describes the generation of Ideas may give the impression that the thing in itself is like a piñata that suddenly explodes, and all these Ideas burst out of it. However, this is an incorrect way to read this event. We must recall that for Schopenhauer, the thing in itself is the absolute, original unity. Whatever comes after the thing in itself must be, at minimum, two distinct things because if it is one and simple, then it would not be distinct from the thing in itself. These two things are the form of all cognition, that is, the one who knows and the known. I conclude that this is the case because Schopenhauer names those objects Ideas. It must be that way because thinking is the activity that has two distinct poles, unlike willing which is never described by Schopenhauer as being two things, for example, the willer and the willed. For Plotinus, the entity that has lost the simplicity of the One is

the Intellect that has turned towards its origin and grasped it incompletely, giving rise to the Ideas.

Schopenhauer could argue that he satisfies this requirement because, after the thing in itself, there are multiple Ideas. However, whatever comes immediately after the thing in itself, must have the greatest degree of unity possible and cannot be a scattered multiplicity. Thus, the multiplicity of Ideas must have unity to the degree that, as Plotinus says of the Intellect, it must be a one-many. This is manifested as the distinction between thinker and object thought. Thus, the Schopenhauerian Ideas have a reciprocal relation with a Schopenhauerian Intellect. Although Schopenhauer's discussion of Ideas normally ignores the issue of the unity among Ideas, it is obvious that this unity must exist among them. This unity is what makes them not just a scattered multiplicity that we just run into occasionally, but a unified world which is the archetype of that unity of the sensible world. In any case, Schopenhauer could not be seriously arguing that the thing in itself generates multiple *knowns,* but does not generate the *knower.* This would be a great problem for a philosopher who puts so much emphasis on the principle 'no subject without an object'. It would be absurd to argue that the knower is in this case the will because Schopenhauer has completely ruled out that the will is a knower. Thus, the hypothesis stands: the Schopenhauerian thing in itself generates both the Ideas and the Pure Subject.

Another reason that I think motivates us to speak of a Schopenhauerian Intellect is that the Pure Subject cognizes outside of space and time. The narrative in Schopenhauer is that an embodied intellect is altered, and it becomes the Pure Subject. At one point, the human intellect cognizes sensible objects and these are objects external to the intellect because the understanding locates them in space and time. However, when the embodied intellect finds

itself regarding the external object as a Pure Object or Idea, the externality of the object disappears and now the relationship to that object changes. Schopenhauer says that in that state of cognition, which remember, he calls pure intellection, the distinction between subject and object is no longer present. This Pure Subject cannot cognize this object anymore as something external to it, but the perfect cognition implies that it cognizes it as interior to it. This cognition which happens outside of space and time cannot depend for its existence on an individual human being as if it only exists when a human intellect achieves it. Instead, this eternal cognition remains even when no human being is in it.

In Schopenhauer's text regarding the analogy between the thing in itself and the flame, it is unfortunate that Ideas *qua* Ideas are never brought up and seem to play no clear role; they are, as if were, ignored and the origin of individuals is the result of an immediate action of the 'thing in itself-flame'. Many times, Schopenhauer writes as if that is the case, but we know that he was not convinced and thought that he needed to introduce the Platonic Ideas to fully complete his metaphysics. The text presented above is an example of Schopenhauer's tendency to gloss over this doctrine in important places, as I indicated before. Ideas must always be connected to a sort of intellect, to something that is capable of cognition. If they are, as Schopenhauer claims, true cognition, they must at minimum be cognition to some subject. The way the Pure Subject of Cognition knows the Ideas is the key to understanding the parallels between the Pure Subject and Plotinus' Intellect. A simple being does not need cognition, this is only applicable to the thing in itself, but its product, such as the Pure Subject, if it is not to be identical to the thing in itself, needs to cognize objects.

Schopenhauer's so-called 'pure cognition' is either an unresolvable paradox or it is a cognition different from discursive cognition. Schopenhauer describes this cognition as the end of the distinction between subject and object. Thus, the Pure Subject knows the Idea not just as something external, the way we in the worlds of representations only cognize the 'shell' of objects given the restrictions of the principle of sufficient reason. The Pure Subject knows the Idea completely, and Schopenhauer states that this cognition is true and not exposed to error. The Idea, to use Schopenhauerian imagery, is naked to the Pure Subject which cognizes it completely. Plotinus teaches that this is only possible for a hypostasis which cognizes its objects as interior to or identical to it. We could translate this doctrine to the Schopenhauerian lexicon by stating that for the Pure Subject of Cognition there is no distinction between 'appearance' and 'thing in itself'[101] in the Idea, a distinction that holds for our cognition of the sensible world.

Plotinus says that through purification, our intellect reaches Intellect, that is, that we become aware of the existence of this Intellect and its Ideas. For Schopenhauer, we become aware of this Pure Subject and its Ideas by the alteration of the subject of cognition through aesthetical contemplation. The result of this cognition – a cognition that evidently is no longer the discursive or abstract thinking of everyday life – is not the ecstatic union of the mystic, but the self-intellection of the Plotinian Intellect where Intellect is revealed as the real and the original of the world of sensible experience. This, in Schopenhauer's lexicon, is the pure world of representation. It is still a world of 'representations' because there we encounter the archetypes of sensible representations, and our cognition of the sensible

[101] This is a true statement to a certain extent. The Pure Subject of Cognition knows the Idea thoroughly, however, the Idea is not identical to, but has traces of, the thing in itself. The multiplicity of Ideas, no matter how unified they are, speaks of a higher unity in which there is no multiplicity.

world is an image of the true cognition that happens in aesthetical contemplation. The Pure Subject of Cognition (as well as its correlates, the Ideas), is "the condition, which is to say the bearer, of the world of all objective being, because this [world of sense] now presents itself as dependent on him."[102]

Part III

IV. The Return of Theoretical Arguments

The last thing to consider, the aim of everything written so far, is whether those who hold to transcendental idealism can present theoretical arguments in favor of the immortality of the true self, that is, in favor of the permanence after death of our deepest idiosyncrasy. If anything that I have said so far is reasonable and acceptable, I think that the answer presents itself and I can conclude that there are rational grounds to hold that death is not the end of who we are, and we can maintain this even if one holds transcendental idealism. Several paths lead to this conclusion. An important path in this study requires that the Schopenhauerian objective angle or perspective be accepted. In previous chapters, I have presented the unexplored possibilities of this part of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. I think that if this side of Schopenhauer is acknowledged and is understood as fully integrated within a transcendental idealist epistemology, it is difficult not to accept that immortality has been proven theoretically. The one point of contention that remains is whether that

[102] WWR I, 203-204.

survival is of the individual. Here the discussion is not as clear as we would like; nevertheless, I have presented some arguments to support that we can defend the survival of the individual human being.

One possible argument would go as follows: according to Plotinus, philosophy is born when the eternal is present to an eternal; thus, if the *Critique of Pure Reason* and *The World as Will and Representation* contain truth, which is to say that, as far as transcendental idealism is true, then the authors of these books are immortal. Philosophy is cognition of what remains true, not just today, yesterday or tomorrow, but true as long as there are human beings capable of recognizing it. Both Plotinus and Schopenhauer accept this statement. Thus, Plotinus, Kant and Schopenhauer did not write because they thought that what they discovered was merely good for their contemporaries. They, if asked, would have said that their words carry the sign of the immortal. Why would they say that? Kant would speak of apodicticity and universality and the strange transcendental status which somehow is immanent and does not point towards transcendent realities. Schopenhauer would say that philosophy is the result of an encounter with reality itself given in its fullness, that is, the intuition of an Idea. Just as the greatest paintings are the result of the aesthete's encounter with an Idea, so great philosophical books are the result of the philosopher's encounter with Ideas.

The philosopher is capable of cognition of Ideas, cognition that is eternal truth because he or she is himself or herself eternal. This immortal nature that I am comes from me being an expression of both the Idea of Human Being and the Idea of Individual manifested in the space-time continuum. The former makes the philosopher a member of the species human being, a being endowed with intellect and will, and the latter gives to the

philosopher his or her idiosyncrasy, uniqueness, and unrepeatability. Is this idiosyncrasy a contingent result of time and cultures? Does an individual have a character because he or she was born in a certain year and had a specific socio-economic background? Both Plotinus and Schopenhauer seem to suggest that this is not the case. Plotinus suggests that each human being possesses his own characteristic and individual personality before entering the drama of life.[103] In a similar way, Schopenhauer describes the intelligible character, a series of traits and ways of being that predate the empirical character that is manifested in space and time. This is well expressed in chapter 19 of WWR II, where Schopenhauer speaks about personal identity.[104]

Personal identity, says Schopenhauer, is not based on a material aspect, nor in the form of the body, in other words, Schopenhauer rejects, much like Plotinus,[105] that space and time are the origin of our character. This character is elusive if we look for it in the physical realm except "for an expression in the eyes by which you can still recognize a person even after many years…[where] something in him still remains fully untouched."[106] Furthermore, personal identity is not grounded in memory or consciousness but it "is grounded in the identical *will* and the inalterable character itself". This character, once known, is never forgotten, "it is exactly the same now as it formerly was." The reason that character is identical throughout life, and our idiosyncrasy not contingent on where or when we are born is that "will… is not physical… but rather metaphysical", a thesis that can only be understood if we accept Schopenhauer's teaching that intellect and consciousness is

[103] "For even before the play, they were actors of a particular kind when they gave themselves to the play" (III.2 [47].17.28).
[104] This section illustrates well the thesis that Schopenhauer discards the concept 'soul' but uses its content to explain 'will'.
[105] See Rist (1970, 298-299; 303).
[106] WWR II, 251.

identical with brain activity.[107] However, I reject Schopenhauer's identification of intellect and aesthetic contemplation with brain activity. Therefore, my view is that both willing and intellection point to the metaphysical nature of human beings.

This argument is supported by an ontology that is accepted by both Plotinus and Schopenhauer, namely, an ontology which affirms the existence of ideas, that is, real objects external to the human mind and responsible for the existence of sensible individuals. To be more accurate, this argument is supported by an idealist account in which epistemology and ontology intermingle, because the idealism that is upheld in this study is an idealism about the *nature* of the real world.[108] In Schopenhauer, this ontology is encountered in what he calls the objective angle. These ideas are in themselves supported by a higher principle which Plotinus names the One and Schopenhauer the Thing in Itself. In absolute terms, this ultimate reality is the root of our true self, but we are not identical to it because in us human beings there is multiplicity which manifests itself in us by how we cognize things as external to ourselves and how we desire things that we do not find within us. Plotinus and Schopenhauer, in different degrees, help us to realize that cognition and willing in us reflect a principle that is higher than us. Plotinus calls it Intellect, and Schopenhauer calls it Pure Subject of Cognition. There are many nuances in this proposal because both Schopenhauer and Plotinus struggle to present a balanced account of intellect and willing, although I think that Plotinus gets closer to that possible balance between intellect and will. However, in the end, both give a very exalted portrayal of the faculty that they accept as the most fundamental of all.

[107] "[A] thinking being without a brain is like a digesting being without a stomach" (WWR II, 71).
[108] Moran (1999, 56).

Plotinus sees intellection at all levels of reality, while Schopenhauer sees willing at all levels of reality. They show this not just theoretically and in the abstract, but by pointing to examples that range from very obvious to less evident; they show this beginning from the very inorganic rocks to the heights of organic life in human beings. As such, it seems that we reach an impasse that can only be resolved if philosophers walk the fine line that unites the two towers of intellect and will. If in any way, there could be a synthesis of Plotinian and Schopenhauerian thought, the world will reveal itself to be both intellection and willing.

To conclude, a final comment on the issue of ideas of individuals. Schopenhauer, as we have seen, writes strongly against the notion that individuals survive death or that individuals are ultimately real. Only the species are eternal, a position that is also accepted by Plotinus.[109] Is there a way around this? I say that there is no compelling argument in Schopenhauer to deny that if Socrates or Kant are unique, they could be the sole examples of a species, though still partaking in the Idea of Human Being and being a member of the species human being. Schopenhauer himself argues that a concept, which shares the universality of an Idea, can have one single member, namely, that there can be a concept of an individual.[110] So it is not inconceivable that there is one Idea for Socrates and one Idea for Kant. The richness and infinite human characters that one encounters in the world of sense are generated as original acts of the will. I am who I am because my oneness is unified by the thing in itself, and this oneness is immune to the flux of beginnings and ends.

[109] See VI.5 [23].8.21-42; VI.2 [43].22.11-17.
[110] "'[H]olding true of many things' is not an essential but merely an accidental property of a concept. There can be concepts through which only a single real object is thought" (WWR I, 65).

Conclusion

This dissertation shows that Kant's conclusions regarding theoretical arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul are based on assumptions that we are not compelled to accept. Kant was not doing any favor to believers by imposing limits on philosophy in order to open space for faith because, for Kant, religious experiences, mysticism, and revelation are impossible. That is why he completely rejects and, not even entertains, what he calls empirical arguments for the immortality of the soul both in the *Critique* and the Lectures. When, through the teachings of Schopenhauer and Plotinus, one learns to see that metaphysics cannot be constrained with the Kantian shackles, the arguments in favor of the immorality of the human soul recover their persuasive force.

Given the encounter between Schopenhauer and Plotinus, we can conclude that there is a distinction between ultimate reality and the true self. Strictly speaking, it is only the ultimate reality – the Plotinian One and the Schopenhauerian Thing in Itself – which is beyond cognition and is ineffable. But the self is not the ultimate reality – a view that can be attractive considering the subjective perspective of transcendental idealism. We can say that the true self is generated by the ultimate reality, and traces of it are in the true self, such as unity. The true self is not the Thing in Itself because we have identified parts on it: the intellect and the will. Kant and Schopenhauer attribute to the true self the unknowability and ineffability that Plotinus attributes to the One which makes one suspect that – to some

degree – Kant and Schopenhauer locate the Plotinian ontology and its hierarchy in the human self.

I have taken Schopenhauer's description of the real world as an account that wants to reveal to us an ontology of entities that exist independently of human consciousness. I have argued that it is in this ontology, specifically in his theory of Ideas and intelligible character that we can locate a theory for the survival of the individual. This is goes against the clear intentions of Schopenhauer; however, I have presented arguments to suggest that my interpretation is plausible. More work could be done to show the plausibility of my argument by challenging Schopenhauer's commitment to the view that ultimate reality is an undifferentiated unity. Another important step to defend the survival of individuality after death, is the rejection of Schopenhauer's view that intellect emerges with the brain. I think that I have presented serious objections to this view, and, moreover, I have shown how to make sense of his doctrine of Ideas, we must introduce something like the Plotinian Intellect in the account.

Seen from this perspective, the subject of transcendental idealism is an Idea, that is, a member of an Intellect, who has being prior to experience, but it is directed towards a possible sensible experience. This individual Idea that 'descends' has a divine origin; thus, it is immortal.

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