Divided Cities:
Segregation and the Political Geography of Muslim Representation in Western Europe

Selene Campion

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Selene Campion

Advisor: Jonathan Laurence, Ph.D.

Abstract

What explains variation in local minority representation outcomes across Europe? I articulate a theory of residential segregation as a key driver of Muslim representation. I hypothesize that in cities where residential segregation is high, Muslims are more likely to display increased levels of descriptive representation and reduced public goods provision. Within a comparative, cross-national most-different-systems framework of England and France, I use a multi-method research design and exploit both quantitative and qualitative evidence to test these claims. I demonstrate that while segregation increases Muslims' descriptive outcomes, it creates a *population threshold*, beyond which increases in segregation decrease their representation. I show, however, that the presence of Muslim councilors exerts a powerful countervailing effect on segregation's detrimental impact on public spending.

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Glossary

Term	Definition
Banlieue	Outskirts of cities in French cities
Banlieues-dortoirs	Bedroom suburbs
Bidonville	Shanty towns
Biraderi networks	Kinship networks
Blocs de compétences	Spending responsibilities
Centres sociaux	Social centers
Chemin de grue	Railways built on site
Cité	Housing project or estate
Commission nationale de développement social des quartiers	National Commission for the Social Development of the Quartiers
Comptes des collectivités	Communal accounts
Conférences administratives régionales	Administrative constituencies
Conseil de Paris	Paris Council
Conseils communaux de prévention de la délinquance	Municipal Councils for the Prevention of Delinquency
Conseils de quartier	Neighborhoods councils
Cumul de mandats	Holding several positions across municipal government
Départements	Departments
Développement social des quartiers	Quartier Social Development Program
Émeutes de 2005 dans les banlieues Françaises	Riots on the outskirts of Paris
Établissements publics régionaux	Regional councils
État planificateur	Planning state
État-animateur	Organizing state
Français musulmans d'Algérie	French Muslims from Algeria
Front de libération nationale	National Liberation Front
Front National	National Front
Grand ensemble	Large housing estate
Groupe Islamique Armé	Armed Islamic Group
Habitations à loyer modéré	Housing at moderated rent
Ilots Regroupés pour l'Information Statistique	French census tract
Institut national d'études démographiques	National Institute for Demographic Studies
La loi d'orientation pour la ville	Urban Development Act
La loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain	Solidarity and Urban Renewal Act
Laïcité	French secularism
Logécos (logements économiques et familiaux	Low-cost family dwellings
Loi d'orientation du 29 juillet 1998 relative à la lutte contre les exclusions,	Law against exclusion

Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État	1905 Law on the Separation of Church and State
Maison de l'Afrique et des Antilles	House of Africa and the French Caribbean
Marchands de sommeil	Slumlords
Marche contre le racisme et pour l'Égalité des Droits	March Against Racism and for Equal Rights
Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme	Ministry of Reconstruction and Urban Planning
Ministère du travail	Ministry of Work
Missions locales pour l'insertion des jeunes en difficulté	Local taskforces for the social integration of disadvantaged young people
Mixité sociale	Social mixing
Ni gauche, ni droite	Neither right nor left
Parti communiste français	French Community Party
Parti Socialiste de France	Socialist Party of France
Parti Socialiste Français	French Socialist Party
Parti Socialiste	Socialist Party
Politique de la ville	Urban Policy
Quartier	Neighborhood
Quartiers à risque	At-risk neighborhoods
Quartiers en difficultés	Problem neighborhoods
Rassemblement National	National Rally
Secteur aide	State-funded housing sector
Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière	French Section of the Workers' International
Villes nouvelles	New towns
Zone d'Éducation Prioritaire	Priority Education Zones
Zones à urbaniser en priorité	Priority Urban Zones
Zones sensibles	Sensitive areas

To my grandparents.

Acknowledgements

The idea for this dissertation began a decade ago when I was a worked at *L'Arche d'Avenirs*, a homeless shelter in Paris. My time there prompted me to consider how institutions shape the ability of the most marginalized to participate in everyday life. Since then, graduate school has allowed me to explore topics related to housing, religious diversity, and integration, and I owe a great deal of thanks to everyone that has helped me along the way.

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INTRODUCTION

Segregation and Muslim Representation in Western Europe

On New Year's Day 2018 Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen addressed his nation: "We must set a new target of phasing out ghettos altogether…We must close the cracks in the map of Denmark and restore the mixed neighborhoods where we meet people from every walk of life" (Statsministeriet, 2018). Rasmussen's plan for the new year responded to concerns across Europe: segregation between Muslim minorities and White majorities was on the rise, causing social polarization and exclusion.

Segregation in Europe serves as a type of informal institution that creates unofficial boundaries between White majority and Muslim minority populations and carries important consequences for the latter's integration. Yet, the concept remains largely undertheorized in academic scholarship, particularly regarding its potential effects on Muslim political incorporation. Without an adequate analysis of segregation's political dimensions, we miss the institutional forces that generate segregation, overlook the interaction between formal institutional rules and informal institutions, and undervalue the importance of the neighborhood as an avenue for political participation. This dissertation addresses this gap by analyzing the effects of segregation on the political representation of Muslim minorities in Western Europe. In doing so, it locates the spatial settlement patterns of Muslims at the center of their political integration.

The topic of Muslim political incorporation in Western Europe has received considerable attention in recent years, both among academics as well as Western

European leaders.[1] Of particular interest is the electoral inclusion and representation outcomes of Muslims in local office.

Political parties across Western Europe have increasingly looked to Muslims as potential voting blocs and candidates in local political arenas. In large part, their increased interest is due to the growing size of Europe's Muslim population. As Figure 1.1 shows, the percentage of Muslims across Europe is expected to rise if migration patterns remain consistent. Increasing numbers represent an attractive electorate for political parties, who seek to grow their bases by appealing to Muslim voters and nominating Muslim candidates for local office. Indeed, selecting minority candidates has been shown to increase a party's appeal among co-ethnic voters. In the United States, for example, Rocha et al. (2010) show there is an "empowerment effect," wherein African American and Latino voting increased as the percentage of state legislators with co-racial and ethnic backgrounds rose.



[1] See Alba & Foner (2014) and Bird (2005) for discussions on the importance of minority incorporation.

Figure 1.1. Projected Muslim Share of Europe's Population Under Different Migration Scenarios
Source: Pew Research Center, 2017.

Despite sizable Muslim populations across Europe, there remains considerable variation in their local representation outcomes. Yet, the literature exploring the factors that influence minority representation in Europe remains undertheorized (Bloemraad & Schönwälder, 2013), particularly when compared to the extensive research on other integration dynamics, such as labor market incorporation (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2010; Hagan, 2004; Kogan, 2006; Pichler, 2011) or educational attainment (Crul & Vermeulen, 2006; Ichou, 2014; Santos & Wolff, 2011). What accounts for these differences? This dissertation will argue that we need to look, quite simply, at where Muslims live in order to fully understand variation in their local representation levels.

The Argument

This dissertation develops an argument that addresses the factors that shape the local political representation outcomes of Muslims across Western Europe. First, it explains how and when Muslims are able to access local office. I conceptualize access to local office as the percentage of Muslims elected to local council, understood as their level of descriptive representation. Second, it demonstrates the ways in which descriptive representation is deeply intertwined with substantive outcomes by showing how segregation and Muslim representation influence variation in local public spending decisions.

I argue that segregation, or the geographic separation of Muslims and White populations, drives both descriptive and substantive representation outcomes. Across different electoral systems, low and moderate levels of segregation are positively

associated with increased Muslim representation outcomes. However, in cities with sizable Muslim populations, increases in segregation decrease their representation levels. I also demonstrate how segregation shapes substantive representation outcomes. While segregation drives down public spending, the presence of Muslim representatives exerts a powerful countervailing force on segregation's detrimental effects on public goods provision. In doing so, I show the ways in which Muslim political incorporation has been shaped by non-programmatic inclusion strategies, including clientelism and patronage.

How Housing Policy Shapes Segregation

Using a most-different-systems framework and multi-tiered analysis of England and France, I exploit both qualitative and quantitative evidence to test these claims. I engage in archival research and semi-structured interviews to demonstrate how historical processes of space-making reflected political conceptions of the neighborhood. I trace political understandings of space in 20th century England and France to explore the ways in which opposing approaches to urban planning led to divergent mandates for city construction. This variation led to different forms of spatial exclusion, thereby shaping segregation levels across both countries.

Analyzing divergent housing policies across France and England sheds light on differences between each country's approach to managing its increasingly diverse citizenries. Since the post-war period, the French state has used urban housing policy to make its diverse populations "legible" (Scott, 1998). This process is defined by successive attempts to use housing to organize the country's White, native populations and Muslim minority populations, and make them legible to the apparatus of state government. The process of legibility has resulted in housing policies that fragment

populations along ethnic lines; separate initiatives address either the country's White, majority population, or its Muslim minority populations.

In 20th century England, there was little interest in using housing to encourage social cohesion or minority integration. Urban housing policy was segmented along class and tenure, rather than ethnic, lines. Only in the 1990s did Conservative and Labour governments acknowledge spatial polarization as a social issue. Fears surrounding residential segregation and "parallel lives" intensified in the post-9/11 era when segregation became viewed as a security threat.

While both countries pursued distinct urban housing policies, few initiatives seriously addressed segregation. In France, Muslim minorities are more likely to be segregated on the outskirts of major cities. In England, segregation is characterized by Muslim concentration in the inner cities. Muslims in both countries face high levels of spatial exclusion.

How Segregation Shapes Muslim Representation

After exploring historical processes of space-making, I analyze segregation's effects on Muslims' access to local office, as well as their ability to shape public goods decisions. First, I show how segregation positively influences the election outcomes of Muslim candidates across England and France. However, threshold modeling reveals that there is a population threshold across both countries, according to which increases in segregation decrease Muslim election outcomes in cities with sizable co-ethnic populations. These findings highlight the non-linearities associated with segregation's impact on descriptive outcomes and point to the complex and nuanced ways in which spatial exclusion shapes representation.

In England, segregation has facilitated the emergence of clientelism. The Labour Party has been the main beneficiary of this strategy and has co-opted ethnic networks for electoral gain. In France, local party machines have also been common features of political institutions. However, Muslims have been excluded from these machines in favor of White majorities. Muslim demands for representation were historically dealt with using neighborhood councils, thereby excluding Muslims from local office and creating political division along neighborhood lines.

Next, I demonstrate that segregation decreases public goods provision across both England and France. Using a difference-in-difference design and propensity score matching, I find that segregation dampens public spending in both countries. In England, the presence of Muslim councilors on local councils exerts a countervailing effect while also allowing councilors to engage in strategic ethnic favoritism, thereby fragmenting goods along ethnic lines. The political salience of ethnic networks has also allowed clan elders to distribute funds to their co-ethnics in exchange for electoral support.

In France, the presence of Muslim *adjoints* exerts a similar countervailing effect; however, Muslim *adjoints* have no impact on distribution to their own communities.[2] Instead, Muslim goods provision has been relegated to sub-municipal associations. While party machines excluded Muslims from redistribution for much of the 20th century, associations that address Muslim goods provision have become vulnerable to co-optation as a result of decentralization laws. Findings from a series of interviews detailed in

[2] *Adjoints* elected by the municipal council every six years along with the mayor. They must serve as municipal councilors prior to becoming *adjoints*. They serve as mayoral advisors and are tasked by the mayor with various responsibilities, including urban policy, housing, and the environment.

Chapter 7 suggest that there is an increased risk that Muslims will be incorporated into local politics through party machines in exchange for electoral support.

I engage four original datasets to test these claims. The first two datasets cover local election outcomes across England and France. The dataset on English election outcomes includes the results from over 11,000 ward-level elections between 2010 and 2021. The dataset on French election outcomes covers over 50,000 candidates, 1,200 party lists and more than 300 municipal elections between 2008 and 2020.

The second set of datasets include geocoded data on local public spending across England and France. The dataset on public spending in England includes spending outcomes across 94 local authorities and nearly 2,000 communal budgets between 2000 and 2019. The dataset on public spending in France includes spending outcomes across 110 metropolitan areas and 770 communal budgets between 2014 and 2020. Together, these datasets allow for cross- and sub-national analyses of divergent descriptive and substantive representation outcomes.

Conceptualizing Muslim Identity

Analyzing Muslim representation raises important normative and political questions about group categorization. The existing literature has overwhelmingly focused on understanding the religious dimensions of Muslim identity. However, being Muslim in Western Europe cannot simply be reduced to a religious affiliation; it involves political and social identities that extend beyond single categories.

How we understand Muslim identity is prescriptive and carries important diagnostic implications. While Muslim identity has traditionally referenced an individual's religious belonging, it has assumed an added complexity as communities

settle into their fourth and fifth generations, and not all Muslims think of themselves solely in religious terms. I therefore theorize Muslim identity as one that indicates a grouping of individuals whose identity is counted by their name and national origin, rather than solely their religious observance.[3] In this way, my conceptualization of Muslim identity departs from the existing scholarship, which has tended to view their identities primarily in religious terms and understands them as an ethnoreligious group.

Nevertheless, solely referring to the population as "Muslim" can overlook nuanced histories of identity and affiliation. At times, I will refer to the population using other terms, including "minorities," "migrants," "immigrants," or by national origin (e.g., Pakistanis or Algerians). When these distinctions are used, it is because they were the primary identity categories used at the time (e.g., "migrants" in the post-war period), or because relevant policies addressed a specific group, rather than the Muslim population as a whole. Indeed, for much of the 20th century Muslims were identified as either "immigrants" or "minorities;" thus, when discussing 20th processes such as space-making, party inclusion, or state integration approaches, the term "minority" is used to reflect historical categorizations.[4] Otherwise, throughout the dissertation I use the Muslim identity category to refer to the populations concerned.

Muslim Populations in England and France

There are important differences between England and France's Muslim populations, most notably their national origins, entry circumstances, and interaction with their host states. As Chapters 2 and 3 will detail, the primary mass migration movements in England and

[3] For further discussion on religion as an ethnic group characteristic, see Horowitz (2001).

[4] The evolution of these identity categories is further discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

France started in the 1940s. Both countries were looking to fill labor shortages in the post-war period to reconstruct their economies. England imported workers from the West Indies, and later, from the Commonwealth countries of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. France's Muslim population arrived from its former colonies, primarily Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and later, sub-Saharan Africa. Today, England's Muslim population is primarily composed of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, while France's Muslim population is primarily composed of Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans.

Post-colonial migration was the result of French and British initiatives to attract guest workers, but both countries failed to anticipate their permanent settlement. England and France were thus tasked with integrating their growing Muslim populations, and responded in different ways according to their institutional structures (Bleich, 2003). Divergent approaches have resulted in distinct political integration processes and citizen-state relations.

Migrants in England were given voting rights when they first arrived and were able to participate in the political arena much earlier than in France, where the nationality code disenfranchised first-generations. Differences in voting laws were coupled with opposing approaches to managing difference in the public and political spheres. As Chapter 1 details, British multiculturalism officially recognizes ethnic and religious minority groups, and the state has historically accommodated religious demands, such as serving halal meat in public schools, and mosque building. By contrast, French *laïcité* entails a strict separation of church and state, codified in the 1905 Law on the Separation of Church and State (*Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l'État*). In the past decades, there has been significant tension in the law's application

regarding Muslim women's religious clothing, coupled with diverse attempts within the government to "manage" Islam through the creation of national legislative bodies.[5] [6]

These institutional differences are often used to suggest variation in Muslim integration across both countries. Comparative approaches that adopt this line of thinking often use deterministic reasoning that is rooted in normative understandings of managing difference. In England, research on Muslim integration often centers on race relations, ethnic diversity, and multiculturalism. This branch of the literature frequently focuses on the "separate but equal" approach to communities promulgated by British multiculturalism to explain the political integration outcomes of diverse ethnic groups, such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

In France, research on Muslim integration is often bounded within France's *laïque* (secular) approach to managing religion. This literature supposes that France is at best anti-community and color-blind, and at worst, Islamophobic and anti-immigrant. In adopting these nationally bounded approaches, this branch of comparative scholarship concludes that different national frameworks necessarily lead to divergent political outcomes. The tendency to use national frameworks to explain differences in political representation makes my argument about the role of segregation even more powerful,

[5] Controversy erupted in French schools in 1989 over the right to wear the veil at school, resulting in a 2004 law forbidding ostentatious religious symbols in the classroom. In 2010, the niqab was outlawed in public. More recently, the "burkini" – a swimsuit that covers the entire body except for the face – has been prohibited in several cities and towns across France.

[6] The French state has attempted to institutionalize Islam as a tool of integration policy. This has involved several decades of dialogues (consultations) between Muslim representatives and the state, as well as French Council of the Muslim Religion (*Conseil français du culte musulman*, CFCM), created in 2003. It was announced it would be "dissolved" in 2022 due to foreign influence and replaced by a forum (*Forif*).

because I show that it shapes representation outcomes across two very different institutional contexts.

Solely using institutional frameworks to explain representation outcomes also overlooks important similarities between Muslim populations in both countries, most notably their economic conditions, educational and employment circumstances. Across both countries, Muslims are disproportionately likely to suffer from economic deprivation when compared to White, majority populations (Masci, 2005). They are also less likely to graduate from both high school and college (Dronkers & Fleischmann, 2010) and have higher rates of unemployment than White, majority populations (Koopmans, 2016).



Figure 1.2. Segregation Levels Across English Local Authorities and French Communes

Note: The figure on the left illustrates segregation levels across England, while the figure on the right illustrates segregation levels across France. Darker colors indicate higher levels of segregation.
Sources: 2011 Census (England) and 2012 Census (France, INSEE).

Of course, focusing on economic characteristics risks reducing Muslims to an economic class. There are other similarities, too. As shown in Figure 1.2, Muslims live in relatively

high levels of segregation across England and France. There is significant sub-national variation in segregation levels as well. Darker areas in blue and red indicate higher levels of segregation, while lighter areas in light green and yellow indicate lower levels of segregation.

There are also important parallels in political participation. Muslims have been active in local politics much longer than in other European countries such as Greece and Italy, where formal political participation only began in earnest in the 1990s and early 2000s. In England, Muslims became active in local politics as early as the 1960s, while formal political participation in France began in the 1970s. In this way, Muslim populations in both countries have worked to make themselves politically visible since their arrival. Early trends in political engagement may be partly due to both countries' liberal models of citizenship, which have made access to citizenship easier than in other Western European countries such as Germany, which denied citizenship to many guestworkers until the 1990s (Brubaker, 1992).

Muslims in England and France have also been the subject of intense state scrutiny in the wake of 9/11 and later, as a result of Islamist-extremist inspired terror attacks in both countries. In England, a series of four coordinated suicide bombings attacks in the London underground in July 2005, known as the 7/7 bombings, ushered in a series of counter-terrorism initiatives that would define a new period in the state's relationship with its Muslim populations. France has also been the decades-long target of terrorist activity, beginning with the 1995 attempted terror attack by Khaled Kelkal, a French Algerian terrorist affiliated with the Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique Armé*, GIA). France has since witnessed several major terror attacks, including the

Toulouse and Montauban shootings in 2012, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, and the Bataclan terror attack in November 2015.

Governments in both countries have responded with counter-terrorism initiatives that have targeted their Muslim populations. In France, for example, former president Nicolas Sarkozy blamed persistent terror attacks on the supposed failure of Muslim integration. Both countries have responded by targeting radical Islamist preachers suspected of inciting violence and espousing anti-Western views, thereby linking the religious dimensions of Muslim identity with national security concerns.

Taken together, similarities between both countries' Muslim populations merit an investigation into the factors that influence their political representation outcomes. I will argue that regardless of variation in institutional configurations, the spatial exclusion of Muslim populations facilitates their political incorporation and redistributive power, while also creating broader electoral and economic inequalities.

Implications: Representation and Minority Incorporation in Advanced Democracies

In this section I show how my research carries important implications for how we understand minority political incorporation in advanced democracies. In doing so, I demonstrate how the findings contribute to research on minority representation and public goods provision.

First, I advance a novel argument about segregation and its impact on representation. The literature on minority representation has primarily focused on formal institutions, including electoral rules (Moser, 2008; Norris, 2004; Togeby, 2008a) and citizenship regimes (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 2001; Joppke, 2010) to explain representation outcomes. Instead, I show that we need to account for the geographic

distribution of minority and majority groups. These findings are particularly important for understanding representation outcomes outside of first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems, where demographic geographies are assumed to have little impact on representation. Contrary to the prevailing expectation, I show that segregation levels also structure local Muslim representation outcomes in party list systems.

In France's two-round semi-proportional representation list system, candidates are elected at-large. The existing literature would suggest that the distribution of diverse groups at the sub-municipal level should have no significant impact on Muslim representation. However, the findings indicate that segregation has a powerful effect on local election outcomes across France. In communes that fall above the population threshold, segregation creates political disengagement on the part of Muslims, as well as an unwillingness within parties to include them as candidates.

In making these claims, I thus conceptualize segregation in detailed and subtle ways that suggest several modes of measuring spatial exclusion. First, spatial exclusion can be understood as urban/periphery relations, which most clearly describes the situation of French Muslims, who often live on the outskirts of large cities. Second, as inner-city isolation, which is characteristic of Muslim settlement patterns across England. Third, as historical processes of minority ghettoization and spatial entrenchment. Finally, as within-city divisions between Muslim minorities and White majorities. By highlighting these four types of spatial exclusion, my dissertation adopts a fine-tuned analysis of segregation that accounts for variation across institutional contexts.

Second, I argue that urban policies can determine political representation outcomes. I show how these policies reflect the state's conception of its role in fostering

citizen-state relations. In the case of France, the state has used housing policy to make its increasingly diverse populations legible. I demonstrate how 20th-century development imperatives shaped current levels of segregation across European cities and show how these spatial patterns impact contemporary political outcomes. In doing so, I draw an explicit link between urban policy directives, spatial exclusion, and representation outcomes across Europe.

Third, I advance an approach to representation that links descriptive and substantive outcomes. The findings here contribute to the distributional politics literature by demonstrating how Muslim representation impacts goods provision. Muslim representation in both England and France countervails segregation's negative effects on public goods provision. Thus, the demographic makeup of local councils has the potential to structure redistributive outcomes even in advanced democracies with strong welfare states.

Understanding the relationship between descriptive and substantive outcomes also adds to a growing body of research that is interested in exploring new dimensions of Muslim goods and service provision in Western Europe. Until recently, the literature has overwhelmingly focused on the provision of religious goods and services, including mosque permits and building (Cesari, 2005), accommodations in the workplace (Adam & Rea, 2018) or gender-based accommodations for access to public goods like swimming pools (Michalowski & Behrendt, 2020; Shavit & Wiesenbach, 2012). This study departs from the existing focus on religious goods and services provision by examining how Muslims obtain economic resources. In this way, my research addresses an under-

explored dimension of Muslim identity in Western Europe that is focused on its political and economic, rather than religious, dimensions.

Fourth, I examine the evolution of party inclusion strategies to explore the complexities of political incorporation in ethnically diverse societies. A robust literature has shown how parties are important actors in shaping democratic representation. Dahl (1966) shows how parties link broad-based political participation with the organizations that form governments. Mair (2013) demonstrates that parties have the ability to give a "voice to the people" and ensure political accountability.

The standard account of representation that undergirds this responsible party model presents a principal-agent relationship whose outcome is measured by the number of representatives in a given elected body (Castiglione & Warren, 2019; Downs, 1957; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). This literature locates individuals at the center of representative relationships. However, the continued activation of ethnic kinship networks in residentially segregated areas for electoral gain and incorporation through non-programmatic politics suggests the need to reassess the principal-agent relationship to account for varying forms of inclusion and participation, and to reimagine representation along these lines. Taken together, the findings highlight the dilemmas posed by democratic representation and the tradeoffs involved, particularly as they relate to party inclusion strategies.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation provides an argument for understanding Muslim representation in advanced democracies. In Chapter 1, I propose a novel theoretical argument about segregation as a key mechanism for Muslim representation and articulate the ways in

which segregation creates representative and distributional tradeoffs. My theory suggests that segregation positively shapes the descriptive outcomes of Muslims across European cities. In cities with sizable Muslim populations, however, there is a population threshold, wherein increases in segregation drive down the overall percentage of Muslims elected to local councils. I argue that segregation shapes substantive outcomes as well. While segregation drives down overall public spending, increases in Muslim representation exert a countervailing force. I conclude the chapter by presenting an overview of the methodology and introducing the cases of England and France.

To develop and empirically evaluate this argument, I rely on a multi-method research design. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a comparative historical analysis of space-making processes in England and France. I detail how different political conceptions of space structured immigrant and native settlement patterns and laid the groundwork for segregation across both countries. I argue that divergent approaches to urban planning and housing development imperatives structured identity categories and the integration of Muslim populations, reflecting national conceptions of the role of urban governance in structuring integration.

In the case of France, I show how the state used city-building in the post-war period as a process of legibility to shape its citizenry. Its highly technocratic and centralized approach created a system that fragmented native, majority and immigrant housing demands. Processes of majority-minority residential division led to high levels of Muslim isolation on the outskirts of France's major cities, laying the groundwork for current levels of segregation. In England, the state assumed a more detached role to managing civic identity and devolved planning and construction to local communes. City

planning processes meant that Muslims were clustered in the inner cities, rather than on the outskirts, thereby structuring current patterns of segregation. Divergent approaches to managing Muslim population settlement resulted in contrasting patterns of spatial exclusion. Yet, both countries did little to address these issues until processes of segregation had become entrenched. As a result, I show that England and France face different configurations of spatial exclusion but similarly high levels of segregation.

Next, to test the theoretical argument and claim about segregation as the key mechanism, I draw on quantitative analyses of subnational, longitudinal administrative data and elections outcomes. Chapter 4 engages fine-grained local authority election data across England between 2011 and 2021. The local-level evidence provides strong support for the argument about the importance of segregation for Muslims' descriptive representation in England. Indeed, segregation positively influences Muslim representation. However, the findings provide evidence for a population threshold: local authorities with sizable Muslim populations display reduced representation outcomes as segregation levels increase. I situate the election of Muslim councilors within a broader discussion of the decline of Labour-union linkages and demonstrate the ways in which Labour has been able to adopt its electoral strategies to co-opt kinship networks for electoral gain.

Chapter 5 examines the impact of segregation on substantive representation outcomes across England. I show how segregation reduces overall public spending, as well as across a variety of individual budgetary categories. However, the results indicate that Muslim representation exerts a countervailing effect. I further explore the relationship between Muslim representation and public spending using a difference-in-

difference design. Leveraging changes in Muslim representation I find that increases within a given ward are positively associated with goods distribution to co-ethnics. I then show how Labour has co-opted ethnic networks for patronage purposes using Bradford as a case study.

Chapter 6 is interested in understanding how segregation shapes Muslim representation in France. I leverage an original dataset of Muslim representation outcomes between 2008 and 2020 and includes over 50,000 candidate observations across nearly 1,200 party lists. I find that, as in England, increases in segregation are positively associated with increased Muslim representation. However, threshold modeling reveals a population threshold, wherein increases in segregation in communes with sizable Muslim populations decrease Muslim representation outcomes. These results are particularly surprising, given that the geographic distribution of groups is assumed to have little impact on representation outcomes outside of FPTP systems.

Next, I draw on semi-structured interviews with local political figures and residents to further explore the causal pathways linking segregation with descriptive representation outcomes. I find that Muslims living in highly segregated cities with sizable co-ethnic populations are more likely to display political apathy. At the same time, high levels of segregation decrease the political visibility of Muslims and create an unwillingness among local party officials to include them as candidates.

Chapter 7 explores how segregation affects substantive outcomes in France. Using data on 770 budgeting outcomes between 2014 and 2020, I engage propensity score matching to show how segregation reduces overall public spending. I show that segregation's detrimental impact on public goods provision extends to individual

budgetary categories as well. While the percentage of Muslim councilors has little impact on spending decisions, the percentage of Muslim *adjoints* is positively associated with increased public spending.

Using the cases of Lille and Marseille, I show how sustained devolution of Muslim demands has limited the ability of Muslim representatives to engage in co-ethnic goods distribution. Muslim service provision has been relegated to the associational level, thereby excluding public goods demands from the political arena. The cases of Lille and Marseille also highlight the persistence of non-programmatic political strategies and the strength of political machines in 20th century France.

In the conclusion, I revisit my argument and discuss the contributions to the literature and implications arising from this research. I show how the findings add important nuance to existing conceptions of minority representation by adopting a spatial approach that links descriptive and substantive outcomes. This approach allows for a more complete understanding of representation that frames current representation outcomes within a broader discussion of developments within party inclusion strategies across Western Europe. In showing how these outcomes are closely intertwined, my research provides an innovative approach to understanding the political integration of Muslims across Western Europe.

1 CHAPTER ONE

Defining and Explaining Representation

In many ways, the London boroughs of Ealing and Brent are quite similar. They border each other to the north and south, have similar population sizes, including large Muslim populations (15 percent and 16 percent respectively), moderate levels of economic deprivation, and high levels of diversity. Yet, they display significant variation in the percentage of Muslims elected to local office. In Ealing, Muslims made up 10 percent of all elected candidates in 2018, while in Brent they represented 20 percent. There are also notable differences in their public goods provision outcomes. In 2019-2020, Brent spent 50 percent more on overall goods and services than Ealing, and devoted more funds to services such as planning, adult social care, and environmental and cultural services.

What accounts for these differences? I propose an argument that locates segregation at the center of Muslims' representation outcomes across a variety of institutional contexts. I argue that segregation is the key mechanism structuring Muslims' descriptive and substantive representation outcomes. Using England and France as case studies, I demonstrate that where Muslims are residentially constrained through segregation, they are more likely to display increased descriptive representation outcomes. I show, however, that segregation creates a population threshold, wherein Muslims living with sizable numbers of their co-ethnics in highly segregated cities display reduced representation outcomes compared to cities with similar numbers of co-ethnics but lower segregation levels (Table 1.1).

In England's FPTP system, highly segregated cities with sizable Muslim populations display reduced co-ethnic dispersion, thereby stymying the ability of

Muslims to become elected outside a select number of wards. In France, segregation reduces the political visibility of Muslim populations and creates political apathy, reducing the anticipated likelihood of an ethnic block vote and creating an unwillingness among parties to nominate Muslim candidates.

Table 1.1. Descriptive Representation Outcomes Given Segregation and Population Levels

	Muslim Population Below Threshold	Muslim Population Above Threshold
Low-Moderate Segregation	Representation Increase	Representation Increase
High Segregation	Representation Increase	Representation *Decrease*

Next, I show that Muslim councilors are able to exert a countervailing effect on segregation's detrimental impact on public goods provision. I discuss how Muslim inclusion has been conditioned by the use of patronage and clientelism, which has shaped the population's descriptive and substantive outcomes. I situate these discussions within a broader discussion of European party system and inclusion strategies.

This chapter presents an overview of the dissertation's central argument. I begin with a brief discussion of why I focus on Muslim representation. I then review the central representation outcomes – descriptive and substantive – and argue that the two are closely intertwined. The chapter proceeds by articulating a theory of segregation as a key determinant of Muslim representation, before discussing the methodology and case selection.

1.1 Why Muslim Representation Matters

Representation is one of the central concerns of electoral politics. Analyzing the factors that influence minority representation is particularly important, as local politics are often the primary channel for minority political engagement. Who is represented on – or absent from – local councils is also reflective of broader party processes and political integration outcomes.

This dissertation draws on two measures of representation as defined by Pitkin (1967): descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation refers to the extent to which elected officials resemble the people they represent. In this case, descriptive representation is understood as the percentage of Muslims elected to local office. Substantive representation refers to the activity of representatives and the actions they undertake on behalf of the represented. Here, I am interested in the ability of Muslims to influence public goods provision.

Pitkin (1967) maintains that descriptive representation is a "precondition for justifying governmental action," (p. 82) and that the identities of elected representatives matter less than their abilities to deliver substantive outcomes. Mansbridge (1999) however, argues for the value of elected bodies that are representative of their populations. These diverging views are considered by Phillips (1998), who suggests that the "politics of ideas," in which the identities of elected representatives are relatively unimportant so long as they are able to reflect their electors' opinions, is insufficient. Given systematic patterns of exclusion and under-representation, Phillips proposes a "politics of presence," and argues that descriptive representation is a genuine matter of democratic concern. This dissertation follows the arguments proposed by Mansbridge

and Phillips and suggests that the ability of Muslims to access political office carries important implications for understanding representation in advanced democracies.

Among scholars examining descriptive representation, there is a tendency to focus on the normative implications of under-representation. Bloemraad and Schönwälder (2013) suggest that a lack of minority descriptive representation indicates broader social exclusion and "signals a democratic deficit within democratic politics" (p. 565). Ruedin (2020) similarly contends that under-representation "poses a fundamental threat to the legitimacy of liberal democracies" (p. 211). While this scholarship provides insights into the detrimental outcomes of under-representation, it is valuable to consider the converse: representation signals inclusion and reflects both a population's ability to access local office as well as their broader reception in society. This dissertation thus examines the factors that facilitate or constrain Muslims candidates' access to political office.

There are other, practical, reasons for why minority representation is important. First, minority representatives often help their co-ethnics navigate the local political environment (Back & Solomos, 1995; Bloemraad, 2006; Dancygier, 2010). Minority politicians often work with their co-ethnics to understand local bureaucratic practices and can help with naturalization processes. For Muslims, co-ethnic councilors can also help with religious practices, including obtaining mosque building permits and ensuring proper burial grounds. Second, voters often rely on candidate ethnicity to infer potential policy decisions that minority candidates might make once elected. In particular, there is an expectation among voters and political leaders that minority representatives will favor their co-ethnics in the distribution of goods and services. This dissertation investigates these assumptions and considers how the presence or absence of

descriptive representation matters in practice. In doing so, it explores the factors underlying variation in local Muslim representation outcomes across England and France.

1.1.1 Spatial Exclusion and Representation

Throughout the dissertation, I argue that we need to understand minority representation outcomes in the context of local spatial inequalities. Although the institutional roots of segregation run deeper in the United States than in Europe, emerging scholarship on segregation in European cities suggests that similar dynamics are at work. Costa and de Valk (2018) find that ethnic minorities in Belgium live in communities with high levels of spatial isolation. Similar patterns of segregation have been identified in France (Préteceille, 2006) and the England (van Ham & Manley, 2014). Research by Rogne et al. (2020) shows that ethnic minorities living in Norway and Denmark are also likely to live in conditions of residential segregation, although the levels are less pronounced than in Belgium and Sweden.

In this way, segregation has become an enduring reality for minorities across Europe, and Muslims have been particularly impacted by spatial isolation (Body-Gendrot & Martiniello, 2000; Musterd & Ostendorf, 1998). Despite a robust literature documenting its deleterious effects on socioeconomic integration (Bygren and Szulkin 2010; Clark and Drinkwater 2002; Dujardin et al. 2008; Uslaner 2012), segregation's influence on the political representation of minorities remains undertheorized in empirical research. This dissertation addresses this gap by exploring the impact of segregation on the descriptive and substantive representation outcomes of Muslim minorities across Europe.

In order to understand segregation's political outcomes, I draw on Massey and Denton's (1988) definition of segregation as the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another. In this case, I am interested in understanding Muslim segregation from White, majorities. Measures of segregation account for the distribution of groups across a given spatial unit, typically at the city level. Muslim settlement patterns align with Massey and Denton's (1988) understanding of a segregated group as one that is "highly centralized, spatially concentrated, unevenly distributed, tightly clustered, and minimally exposed to majority members" (p. 283).

Research examining the socioeconomic effects of minorities' spatial configurations can be traced to the Chicago School, which introduced space and place into discussions of immigrant integration (Park et al., 1925). Scholars within the Chicago School proposed the concept of spatial assimilation, which links the spatial distributions of groups to their socioeconomic outcomes. This dissertation extends the Chicago School's debates to Western Europe, where discussions surrounding segregation center on the "choice versus restraint" debate, or the degree to which segregation levels are the result of external, institutional factors or settlement preferences. It draws an explicit link between housing policy and the evolution of public and political perceptions of Muslim identities – from temporary workers, to immigrants, and finally to ethnoreligious minorities.

1.2 The Consequences of Segregation and Descriptive Representation Outcomes

1.2.1 Group Size, Co-Ethnicity, and Descriptive Representation

The dissertation first explores the impact of segregation on Muslims' descriptive representation outcomes. Most inquiries into minority representation outcomes rest on the

assumption that there is a positive relationship between a group's size and its election outcomes (Katz, 1997; Powell, 2004; Powell & Jr, 2000; Rae, 1967). This scholarship concludes that the electoral leverage afforded by sizable minority populations will lead to their increased representation (Banducci et al., 2004; Lublin, 1997).

Research examining the relationship between group size and representation outcomes has found that co-ethnicity is a powerful determinant of voter behavior (Chandra, 2007; Cutts et al., 2007; Dancygier, 2017; Wolfinger, 1965). Minority candidates that share an ethnic background with voters are likely to receive a large proportion of votes from their co-ethnics, a process known as ethnic affinity voting (Bird et al., 2016; Matson & Fine, 2006).

Research by van der Zwan et al. (2020) demonstrates that ethnic minority candidates in the Netherlands are more likely to receive a higher proportion of votes in neighborhoods with a larger co-ethnic group size; these effects are stronger in densely populated areas. Here, the size of the ethnic minority population serves as the mechanism determining the share of co-ethnics elected to local office. If ethnicity is a salient predictor of voting behavior, then parties will be more likely to nominate Muslim candidates in areas where there are sizable Muslim populations in anticipation of the co-ethnic vote.

Indeed, research has shown that minority communities also influence the political preferences of their co-residents and their mobilization capacities following candidate nomination (Barreto 2007; Cutts et al. 2007; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2008; Fisher et al. 2015; Landa et al. 1995; Maxwell 2012; Zingher and Farrer 2016). This is particularly common in cities that have dense co-ethnic concentration at the neighborhood level.

Given that group identification shapes voter behavior, the impact of a Muslim group's political preferences should rise as its group size increases.

Absent from these studies is consideration for how patterns of residential concentration aggregate at the city level and interact with the proportion of minority residents, particularly in cities and towns with sizable minority populations. I suggest that the spatial distribution of Muslim groups, particularly their level of segregation, can also shape their representation outcomes.

1.2.2 Segregation and Descriptive Representation

The research exploring segregation's political outcomes has primarily focused on understanding the impact of segregation on the representation of Black populations in the United States. This literature suggests a positive relationship between segregation and representation (Olsen, 1970; Shingles, 1981; Verba & Nie, 1972). Indeed, scholarship has shown that residentially segregated neighborhoods can serve as foundations for the creation of group-specific interests (Olsen 1970; Schlichting et al. 1998; Verba and Nie 1972). Segregation binds residentially isolated populations together to create group consciousness (Shingles, 1981), shape political preferences, and heighten mobilization capacities (Cho et al. 2006; Fisher et al. 2015; Johnston et al. 2000, 2004). In turn, demographic concentration fosters the emergence of political organizations and facilitates political leaders who mobilize along co-ethnic or co-racial lines.

Indeed, research suggests that increased levels of voter turnout and political engagement among ethnic minorities in Western Europe may be due to the high levels of organizational density and social capital that are found in residentially segregated neighborhoods (Tillie, 2004; van Heelsum, 2002, 2005). Voters are galvanized by

members of their ethnic community, and the resulting mobilization shapes voter preferences and increases levels of voter turnout for co-ethnics.

The literature reviewed above suggests that localities with sizable Muslim populations should have increased Muslim representation outcomes due to co-ethnic clustering. However, it would be illogical to conclude that Muslim representation necessarily benefits from high levels of segregation in the aggregate, once sub-municipal divisions and neighborhood fragmentation are considered. Instead, I show that cities with sizable Muslim populations and high segregation levels display reduced Muslim representation. Conversely, cities with sizable Muslim populations that are spread out across several wards or neighborhoods (i.e., low-moderate segregation) display higher aggregate levels of co-ethnic representation.

I find that these patterns hold when considering cross-national institutional variation. As detailed in the following sections, England and France have different electoral rules, which would suggest that they would display divergent Muslim representation outcomes. In England, candidates are elected using the FPTP system, a plurality voting system in which the candidate that receives the most votes is elected to office. In France, elections in communes with more than 1,000 residents follow a two-round list system. Candidates are included on closed party lists and use a majority system with proportional representation. Despite these differences, I find that in both countries, cities with sizable Muslim populations display reduced Muslim representation outcomes when segregation levels increase.

1.3 The Consequences of Segregation and Substantive Representation Outcomes

1.3.1 Diversity, Segregation, and Goods Provision

After considering segregation's effects on descriptive representation, I explore its implications for public goods provision. I analyze how segregation and Muslim representation influence local public spending outcomes, in the aggregate as well as across individual spending categories. The provision of public goods has emerged as a salient issue across advanced democracies. Explaining under-provision is of particular importance in cities with sizable Muslim populations who suffer disproportionally from high levels of economic deprivation. Although there is broad support for increased public spending among minorities (Boustan et al., 2013; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004), the prevailing scholarship has found that diversity stymies goods provision, suggesting that an increased minority presence will dampen provision outcomes.

This branch of the literature has demonstrated that diversity drives down collective investment, leading to reduced overall goods provision across ethnic lines and majority-minority divides (Alesina et al., 1999; Baldwin & Huber, 2010; Hopkins, 2009). The negative consequences of diversity for goods provision have been established across various national contexts (La Porta et al. 1999; Wimmer 2016) as well as at the local level, including cities in the United States (Goldin & Katz, 1999; Vigdor, 2004) as well as villages in Kenya (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005) and India (Banerjee et al., 2005).

Indeed, the relationship between diversity and under-provision is thought to be sufficiently resolved that scholarship has turned to exploring the mechanisms that underpin this relationship. Baldwin and Huber (2010) for example, show that economic inequality along ethnic lines causes preference variation, leading to coordination problems and reducing overall goods provision. Lieberman and McClendon (2013) demonstrate similar patterns of preference divergence across Africa and find that the

relationship is particularly strong in countries where ethnicity is politicized and there are high levels of wealth inequality between groups.

While scholarship has found that diversity drives down collective investment, it overlooks the ways in which the spatial arrangements of diverse populations might affect public goods provision. For example, in Tiebout's (1956) seminal article demonstrating that individuals "vote with their feet" by choosing to live in communities that reflect their public spending preferences, he neglects the role of race and segregation in shaping both preferences and outcomes.

Indeed, scholarship has only recently begun to examine the impact of segregation on goods provision, and much of this research takes place in the United States. La Ferrara and Mele (2006) find that racial segregation reduces spending on public education. Trounstine (2016, 2018) demonstrates that segregation is associated with reduced public expenditures in US cities. Despite an established pattern in the United States, however, studies examining the role of segregation on public goods provision in other advanced democracies remain relatively rare. Yet, there is reason to believe that segregation may have a similar impact on public goods provision. Insofar as segregation represents preferences and attitudes that are incompatible with collective investment, I show that it is the uneven distribution of groups, rather than diversity, that correlates with lower public goods spending.

1.3.2 Muslim Representatives and Public Goods Provision

I argue that segregation is not the only driver of spending, however. Both England and France have strong welfare states that exert a high degree of control over the distribution of local funds. As a result, local representatives are assumed to have little impact on

public spending outcomes, particularly regarding distribution to their co-ethnics. Contrary to the prevailing expectation, I find that the demographic composition of local councils influences spending and, in some cases, can lead to goods distribution along ethnic lines. In making these claims, I push back against the existing literature, which assumes a technocratic and top-down approach to goods provision in advanced democracies and leaves little room for individual agency in shaping spending decisions. The findings thus contribute to the literature on public goods provision by highlighting the role of minority representatives in decision-making processes.

Incentives to target co-ethnics with public goods are particularly pronounced in geographic contexts where ethnicity is highly salient. Thus far, the majority of the studies linking geography and ethnicity are concerned with goods provision in non-Western contexts. Besley et al. (2004), for example, provide convincing evidence that in India, residential proximity to politicians matters for high spillover goods, while for low spillover goods, co-ethnicity matters. More recently, this branch of research has extended to Western democracies, where ethnic identity has been shown to be increasingly politically salient (Bird et al., 2016; Dancygier, 2017). I add to this literature by demonstrating how ethnicity shapes co-ethnic goods provision in countries where there are electoral incentives to geographically target co-ethnics.

1.3.3 Cross-National Variation in Substantive Outcomes

From a comparative perspective, variation in electoral rules can either facilitate or constrain the ability of Muslim representatives to shape public spending and co-ethnic goods distribution. The potential for representatives to influence spending decisions is particularly pronounced in FPTP systems, where politicians have incentives to satisfy

their territorially based constituencies in order to ensure re-election (Rae, 1971). In their study of the German *Bundestag*, Stratmann and Baur (2002) find that politicians elected under FPTP rules are more likely to engage in pork-barrel politics than those elected in a proportional representation system as a result of geographical links to their constituencies.

In England, local representatives are geographically tied to their wards; political interests and decision-making are then aggregated at the local authority, or district, level. While candidates in FPTP systems rely on the party for nomination, their elections outcomes are dependent on support from sub-district geographic constituencies. Muslims elected to local council in France are constrained by the list system, and their nomination and election outcomes are determined by parties and list placement. They are also particularly vulnerable to de-selection and are not geographically accountable to their co-ethnics, as is the case in England. As a result, politicians elected via party list have increased incentive to appease the party, rather than the voters.

Building on this research, I find that electoral rules shape the ways in which Muslims influence spending decisions, particularly in highly segregated cities. In England, Muslim councilors are able to exert a countervailing effect on segregation's detrimental impact on public spending. The FPTP system facilitates the use of strategic ethnic favoritism, in which Muslim councilors target goods and services to their co-ethnic constituencies. In France, the overall percentage of Muslims elected to local office has no significant influence on public spending. Rather, Muslim *adjoints* positively impact local spending decisions as a result of their increased decision-making power. Increased local influence does not necessarily lead to targeted co-ethnic goods, however. French

municipal councils have historically relegated Muslim service provision to the sub-municipal level. In this way, Muslim *adjoints* are unable to influence goods distribution to their co-ethnics. Instead, Muslim service provision demands are primarily dealt with at the associational level, outside of the local political arena.

1.4 Clientelism and Muslim Political Incorporation

Distribution, as well as political inclusion, is also partly shaped by clientelism. Throughout the dissertation I demonstrate how segregation facilitates the use of clientelism by political parties. In programmatic distribution, the principal criterion for receiving a good is membership in the relevant constituency. While certain groups may receive specific benefits, in a programmatic distribution environment it is illegal to exclude an individual from receiving a benefit based on lack of support for the politician or party. Non-programmatic politics violate this assumption.

In clientelist systems, the receipt of goods and services is contingent on an individual's political support, which usually takes the form of a vote (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). In some cases, party machines direct benefits towards their own party members. Usually, this comes in the form of public employment, although not exclusively. This type of benefit is termed patronage. Chubb (2009) shows how the Christian Democrats in Southern Italy developed sophisticated patronage systems to maintain support among different strata of Palermo's population between the 1950s and 1970s. Another form of patronage is pork barrel politics, in which goods and services are targeted at an entire group or constituency.

Studies that link clientelism with ethnicity primarily examine their interaction outside of Western political systems. For example, ethnicity plays an important role in

clientelist systems in India, where inclusion is based on shared ethnic ties between political parties and their clients. Politicians signal who they intend to favor in goods distribution by mobilizing along ethnic lines and appealing to voters of the same ethnicity (Chandra, 2004). When Muslims are included in clientelist systems in Western Europe, they are often ethnically linked to their patrons, as in India. Other times, parties choose to favor co-ethnic links with their White constituencies, thereby excluding Muslims from redistribution. In both cases, ethnicity plays a role in shaping who is included or exclusion from these systems.

Despite similarities between clientelism in Western and non-Western countries, academic scholarship on European politics has largely ignored non-programmatic political engagement because it occurs through informal institutions. Clientelism is often regarded as a political phenomenon that thrives in weak states with faltering, or nonexistent, democratic institutions. However, framing clientelism and democracy as inimical renders it nearly impossible to seriously consider the system as a viable form of political engagement. In reality, clientelism exists within, and can even reinforce, democracy (Chandra, 2007; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).

In fact, local party machines across Western Europe operate within strong democratic states. I push back against traditional understandings of clientelism, which present the system as a vestige of a premodern form of political and social relations by demonstrating the system's persistence in Western Europe. In doing so, I show how Western European clientelism combines several forms of non-programmatic politics that include patronage and vote buying.

1.5 Research Design

1.5.1 Subnational Variation in Representation Outcomes: A Multi-Level, Mixed-Methods Approach

To empirically evaluate my theory of segregation, I employ a multilevel, mixed-methods approach. A mixed-methods approach that draws on both quantitative and qualitative evidence is especially critical, given that segregation has received little attention in research on minority representation. Consequently, the importance of segregation for political outcomes remains underexplored.

Thus, by combining quantitative analyses of original subnational-level data that identify and measure key dimensions of segregation with qualitative, individual-level interview, archival research, and observation that connects individual attitudes with local context and lived experience, I provide a rich foundation to build on for future research on these issues.

My research adopts a novel approach to understanding minority representation and contributes to scholarship on political representation and distributional politics. The literature on minority representation in Europe has overwhelmingly focused on the representation of women in political office (Childs, 2006; Diaz, 2008; Kittilson, 2006). I suggest that the mechanisms for electing ethnic minorities to local office differ; I show that geographic considerations matter considerably more for the latter rather than the former.

Further, the representation scholarship tends to focus on the formal political institutions that shape political outcomes, such as citizenship laws (Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 2001; Joppke, 2010) or electoral rules (Moser, 2008; Norris, 2004; Togeby, 2008a). Yet, national model explanations struggle to account for both cross-national and

sub-national variation (Bloemraad, 2013) and ignore the persistence of informal local institutions. Rather than dismissing national model explanations, my research shows the ways in which they interact with these informal institutions, notably segregation and kinship networks, to shape Muslim representation.

The findings also contribute to the distributional politics literature by showing the degree to which segregation and minority representation matter for goods provision in advanced democracies. First, I make explicit theoretical contributions as to why segregation should matter for public goods provision, demonstrate that it can vary considerably within and across countries, and show why it is consequential for distributive politics. In this way, I add to the existing body of research that focuses on ethnic diversity and its role in shaping public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). However, I show that segregation, rather than ethnic diversity, structures goods provisions outcomes.

Second, the quality of my data, including my measure of segregation and the subnational and cross-national nature of my analysis, provides new and rigorous evidence that segregation determines the degree to which elected representatives favor co-ethnic constituencies in local goods provision. I use fine-grained census data, which allows me to use a higher quality measure of segregation than existing studies. My sub- and cross-national research design allows me to better isolate the impact of segregation both within and across national contests.

Third, I add to a growing literature that links ethnic demography to political outcomes. While the relationship between elites and constituents and goods provision has been well-established in non-Western contexts (Adida, 2015; Carlson, 2015;

Wantchekon, 2003), there has been little research exploring the degree to which local officials in advanced democracies can structure public goods outcomes. I show that the ethnic makeup of a locality affects the distributive strategies of local representatives.

My research complements Ichino and Nathan (2013), who find that ethnic minorities vote across ethnic lines in anticipation of receiving benefits of ethnic favoritism targeting the majority ethnic group. My findings not only confirm their assumption that representatives often favor their co-ethnics in local goods provision but also show that this finding holds under certain conditions, specifically, when ethnic groups live in high levels of segregation. In making these claims, I push back against research that treats descriptive and substantive representation as discrete outcomes and demonstrate that the two are intertwined.

My research thus puts forward an elite-driven explanation of distributive politics in advanced democracies that accounts for both the considerable variation in ethnic favoritism across institutional contexts and the under-provision of goods in ethnically diverse settings. It highlights the importance of the neighborhood as an avenue for the creation of civic and ethnic identities, thereby locating the spatial settlement patterns of Muslim minorities at the center of their political incorporation.

1.5.2 Case Selection

This dissertation explores representation in two Western European countries: England and France. Examining the factors influencing their political representation is increasingly pressing in light of current demographic trends. France has Western Europe's largest Muslim population, estimated around six million, or 9 percent of its

overall population (Pew, 2016).[1] England has Western Europe's second largest Muslim population, around 3 million or around 5 percent of its overall population (Office for National Statistics, 2018). As detailed in the Introduction, Muslims in both countries also live in relatively high levels of segregation.

Yet, the two countries differ considerably in the institutional structures that shape group incorporation, including integration frameworks and electoral systems. As such, the in-depth, within-country analyses of England and France are embedded in a "most-different systems" framework (Przeworski & Teune, 2000). This paired comparison thus enables an examination of common mechanisms and drivers of Muslim representation across divergent settings and helps strengthen and generalize the theory and key arguments beyond single-country evidence.

1.5.3 Cross-National Differences Between England and France

The prevailing comparative scholarship suggests that a variety of institutional and historical differences should lead to divergent representation outcomes across England and France. The countries have opposing institutional approaches to managing diversity, varying histories integrating diverse groups into the political arena, and different electoral rules.

British multiculturalism is contrasted with French *laïcité*, which stresses assimilation at the expense of religious expression in the public sphere (Favell 2001). The latter is assumed to stymie Muslims' access to the political arena as a result of strict regulations that prevent full expression of Muslims' political identities. These divergent approaches often overlap with public perceptions of racism and xenophobia in both

[1] Estimates on the Muslim population in France are difficult to obtain due to the country's prohibition on the collection of religious, ethnic, or racial data.

countries. France is often presented as a xenophobic country that has made little effort to incorporate its Muslim population. Conversely, England is assumed to be tolerant of ethnoreligious differences, and to have made accommodation efforts. According to this logic, France's entrenched racism and xenophobia will create a reluctance among party officials to include large numbers of Muslim candidates and will dissuade majority voters from casting votes for Muslims.

The two countries also have different histories of electoral reform and the political incorporation of diverse groups. In England, the Peterloo Massacre in 1819 was the most notable and early instance of popular demands for parliamentary electoral reform. The Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884 increased the electorate for the House of Commons and were the first to address inequality in representation, particularly for the working classes. The extension of the vote under the Representation of the People Act 1918 extended franchise in parliamentary elections to men over 21 and to some women over thirty. The Representation of the People Act 1928 Act widened suffrage by giving women electoral equality. In France, the extension of the vote was only offered to women in 1945, although they would not case a vote until 1945.

Although most working classes in England were thus enfranchised by 1885, no political parties were willing to represent their interests. In response, trade unions used funds to develop the Labour Representation Committee, which became the Labour Party in 1906. The creation of the Labour Party offered working classes a voice within parliament. As Chapter 4 will detail, Labour created an internal apparatus that allowed the party to incorporate diverse union voices through the use of the block vote.

The French Worker' Party founded in 1880 claimed to represent the country's working classes. However, it was unable to integrate diverse working-class voices and by the 1890s it had split into five socialist parties. Following a series of congresses, two parties emerged in 1889 and 1990: the French Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste Français*) and Socialist Party of France (*Parti Socialiste de France*). These parties would merge in 1905 to become the French Section of the Workers' International (*Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*, SFIO).

In the post-war period, the SFIO emerged as the second-largest party in France. Shortly after, party membership dropped and by the 1950s only averaged a small fraction of the vote. By the 1969 elections the party had dissolved and was succeeded by the Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste*, PS). The fragmented history of the French Left is indicative of its inability to successfully incorporate diverse and dissenting voices. As such, it has no history of group incorporation akin to the Labour Party. Together, these differences would suggest that Britain's Labour Party would be more likely to successfully integrate the country's Muslim population into the electorate, while France's Socialist Party would struggle to incorporate a diverse group into its electorate.

Finally, electoral systems have shaped the opportunity structures that Muslims encounter when they enter the political arena, which can influence their ability to obtain co-ethnic representation (Moser, 2008; Norris, 2004; Togeby, 2008b). The small district magnitudes characteristic of England's plurality system may be advantageous for Muslims because it takes advantage of the geographic concentration of co-ethnics (Engstrom & McDonald, 1993; Marschall et al., 2010; Trounstine & Valdini, 2008). France's majority system holds at-large elections wherein the electoral arena is

comprised of the entire city, thereby reducing the potential impact of the Muslim vote. According to this logic, England's plurality rules should benefit Muslim election outcomes, while France's majority system should dampen them.

Conventional wisdom and prevailing theories of minority representation would suggest that England's institutional structure, political history, and electoral system would facilitate Muslim representation. France's commitment to *laïcité*, the Socialist Party's challenges integrating its working-class populations, and its majority electoral system suggest that Muslims would display reduced representation outcomes.

However, both countries have witnessed a considerable rise in Muslim representation over the past decade. Both countries' Muslim populations are more likely to be proportionally represented on municipal councilors when compared to other non-Muslim minority groups, such as Caribbeans in both countries, or Indians in England. Subnational variation in representation outcomes is also considerable. As such, these two countries provide a fruitful, most-different systems framework for a deeper comparative analysis of Muslim representation outcomes.

Yet, focusing solely on cross-national differences overlooks important sub-national variation. To conduct in-depth research within the comparative, cross-national most-different-systems framework of England and France, I employ a most-similar-systems design. I pair local authorities in England and communes in France that are otherwise similar in their economic and institutional characteristics (e.g., economic deprivation and district magnitude) but that diverge in their levels of representation. This strategy involves choosing localities that have contrasting values on the dependent variable (Gerring, 2006), while holding "common systemic characteristics" (Tarrow,

2010) constant for the dissertation's qualitative components. It is thus well-suited for the identification of inter-systemic differences that account for the local-level variation in descriptive and substantive representation outcomes. It is also advantageous when it comes to identifying and unpacking novel and previously overlooked factors like segregation affecting representation outcomes. The most-similar systems design thus enables me not only to evaluate the key theoretical argument advanced in the study, but also rule out alternative explanations about the economic and institutional factors often associated with minority representation outcomes.

1.5.4 Quantitative Research

In order to understand how contemporary patterns of segregation shape descriptive representative outcomes, I first calculate segregation across England and France. While segregation is the primary measure used in this study, in Chapters 2 and 3 I also include isolation indices. The inclusion of isolation as a measure of spatial exclusion adds additional nuance to our understanding of segregation because it measures the extent to which minority group members are only exposed to one another. As such, it captures the experience of isolation from a minority viewpoint.

I use census data to calculate segregation levels and isolation indices across both countries. For the English case, the demographic data needed to calculate segregation and isolation indices was collected using the 2001 and 2011 censuses. In England, census data on race, religion, and ethnicity is publicly available. In France, demographic breakdowns at the sub-municipal level are far more difficult to obtain, as France prohibits the collection of data on race, religion, or ethnicity, and restricts public access to neighborhood-level data. As a result, I rely on restricted-access data available from

INSEE, the French census agency. The restricted-access data contains demographic information on national origin at the *Ilots Regroupés pour l'Information Statistique* (IRIS) level, which is the French equivalent of census tracts. For the French case, I was able to obtain restricted-access data on the demographic makeup of a given IRIS beginning in 1982 through 2012. However, this data is limited to national origin, rather than ethnic composition. Additional details on these distinctions are provided in Chapter 3 and 6. To account for the likely under-counting of Muslims produced by the segregation and isolation indices, I double, triple, and quadruple the given number of foreign nationals in a given IRIS when conducting quantitative analyses. As noted in Chapters 6 and 7, the results remain consistent with the projected estimates.

Throughout the dissertation I refrain from making direct comparisons between segregation and isolation levels in both countries. Cross-national differences between each country's census tracts, as well as the demographic data available, makes comparing segregation and isolation indices difficult and generally unwise. I thus refrain from contrasting precise levels, although I acknowledge that Muslims in both countries live in high levels of segregation and isolation.

In order to assess segregation's impact on Muslims' descriptive representation, Chapters 4 and 6 engage original datasets of local descriptive representation outcomes between 2008 and 2021. To obtain Muslim representation outcomes, I hand coded over 90,000 candidate-level observations across hundreds of cities and towns in England and France before aggregating them to the district and commune levels. This process allowed me to obtain data on Muslim nomination as well as overall representation outcomes. Although name-coding software exists, it is challenging to identify names on an ethnic

basis; hand coding awards greater certainty regarding a candidate's ethnic identity (Appendix A).

In England, candidates are nominated and elected individually at the sub-district, ward level. Local elections do not occur uniformly and normally one-third of the council is up for re-election each year. I coded local election outcomes for each year between 2010 and 2021, except for 2020 when they were postponed as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. In order to obtain the overall composition of councils, I then aggregated 30,000 candidate-level outcomes across 11,000 ward-level elections to the district level.

In France, candidates are nominated on party lists. I first collected data on more than 50,000 candidates across nearly 1,200 party lists for elections in 2008, 2014, and 2020. I then coded the percentage of Muslims nominated and elected on a given party list, before aggregating the results to the commune level to obtain the overall percentage of Muslims elected to local office.

This data allows for both cross- and sub-national analysis of Muslim representation outcomes. Across both cases, I use threshold modeling to analyze the non-linearities associated with segregation's impact on representation and use the Johnson-Neyman (J-N) technique to assess at what levels segregation is significant for determining Muslim representation.

I then explore how segregation influences public goods provision across England and France. In particular, I am interested in local public spending outcomes, as well as public spending across several individual categories: highway and transport services, public health, environmental services, cultural services, children's services, and fire services. In Chapters 5 and 7, I engage original geocoded datasets of local public

spending across the two countries between 2000 and 2020. For the English case, I collected data on nearly 2,000 district-level budgets between 2000 and 2019. For the French case, data comprised 770 municipal budgets across 110 metropolitan areas between 2014 and 2020.

Next, I use the representation datasets and segregation indices described above to understand how Muslim representation shapes distributional outcomes. I engage a difference-in-difference design to establish causality and show the ways in which segregation and Muslim representation shape public spending and distribution.

1.5.5 Qualitative Research

I supplement the quantitative analyses described above with qualitative evidence. Despite the widespread interest in the topic of Muslim representation, the majority of recent studies seeking to understand variation in Muslim representation outcomes are quantitative in nature. Consequently, past studies have overlooked how segregation and party responses to Muslim segregation influence inclusion strategies and have fallen short in elaborating as to why segregated Muslim populations may not engage with political institutions. By focusing on the motivations surrounding individual and party decisions to include or exclude Muslims from the ballot, the qualitative analyses make a key contribution to our understanding of political inclusion and representation. This section links the quantitative analyses discussed above with qualitative causal mechanisms that explain variation in Muslim representation.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I draw on archival data to explore how space-making processes shaped the settlement patterns of White, majority and Muslim minority populations. I mined these sources to uncover the political imperatives that determined

urban policy across English and French cities in the 20th century. For the English case, archival research was conducted at the British National Archives, the Labour Party Archives in Manchester, as well as local archives in Bradford and Birmingham. Participant observation was conducted in local council meetings in London, Bradford, Manchester, and Birmingham. For the French case, I collected online archival data from the French National Archives.

Between May 2019 and April 2022, I conduced nearly fifty interviews with local residents and politicians across England and France, both in-person and online. Interviews present several advantages for testing my argument. Interviews are particularly well suited to the task of assessing the mechanisms though which segregation shapes representation, and for illustrating the role that segregation plays in accounting for subnational variation in representation outcomes. Interviews typically lasted one hour and were often followed by longer, more informal conversations. To minimize social desirability bias and ensure that my interviewees felt safe to express their views honestly, I refer to them anonymously and do not use any proper names of the localities in which they live.

I first spent several months in England, where I identified potential interviewees before arriving in a given city or town, and then relied on established contacts and their local networks. I was sometimes invited to dinner and social gatherings, which led to additional interviews. When I spoke with councilors, they often invited me to attend local council meetings, during which I engaged in participant observation to understand the dynamics of local political decision-making processes.

My ability to travel to France was limited by the Covid-19 pandemic. For interviews, I had initially envisaged meeting people in typical meeting places, including shops, local restaurants, or community meeting spaces such as mosques, in order to solicit interviews. The reality of the pandemic meant that not only were most of these establishments closed, or not limited to a small number of people, but I was not able to travel to these locations to begin the process of meeting people. As a result, I began my queries online and contacted individuals to schedule an interview. I then relied on the help of interviewees and other contacts for references and information on local associations and groups of individuals nearby. This process proved to be successful and, as detailed in Chapter 6, I was able to conduct 22 interviews over Zoom. My interviewees were residents, Muslim and non-Muslim councilors, and party officials, all of whom were non-Muslim.

Across both cases, the semi-structured format of the interviews and the protection of anonymity helped to mitigate issues related to non-response bias. First, the conversational nature of the interviews helped establish rapport and trust with the interviewees, allowed them to participate in shaping the interview process, and steer the conversation to topics they found most relevant.

The time I spent in the field also enabled me to gain a good sense of not only the localities I examined, but also the types of individuals I initially chose to interview. I was therefore able to direct subsequent efforts at diversifying my sample. The consistency and similarity of the key issues raised by interviewees across different demographic groups thus gives me confidence in that the conclusions drawn are not driven by non-response bias.

This rich qualitative data is particularly well-suited for the task of assessing the key mechanisms related to segregation and the use of clientelism in political incorporation. Using this data, I demonstrate how Muslims and party representatives understand segregation, and how these perceptions shape Muslim representation outcomes. Archival research illuminated the histories of clientelist strategies across England and France. This type of research was particularly helpful for assessing the degree to which clientelism and patronage were entrenched historical practices, while interviews shed light on how they operate in practice.

Of course, it would be unwise to generalize based on these two case studies of individuals in a handful of localities in selected regions. However, the insights drawn from these analyses are particularly helpful when it comes to refining the theoretical arguments and for illustrating the causal pathways and the importance and the complexity of segregation in detail. In so doing, they provide important nuance and individual-level evidence that strengthen the conclusions drawn from the quantitative analyses. Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative evidence provide strong support for the key argument about segregation being a key mechanism in explaining within-country variation in minority representation.

In the following chapters, I show how and why segregation shapes descriptive and substantive outcomes. In so doing, I contribute to the broader debates about representation by offering a novel and more nuanced spatial account of the determinants of local representation.

2 CHAPTER TWO

Housing and Segregation in England

This chapter traces the period of 20th century immigration to understand the ways in which British housing policy shaped Muslim settlement patterns and current segregation levels. I argue that urban housing policy in England was rarely seen as a governance issue; the state was relatively unconcerned with using planning to shape its citizenry. As a result, few policies addressed specific housing provisions for Muslim populations (Table 2.1). Rather, housing in England was bifurcated by class and tenure. Next, I demonstrate how local authorities used ethnic-based exclusionary tactics to create entrenched patterns of segregation across England's inner cities. I draw on segregation and isolation indices calculated across England's ten most populous districts to trace the development of segregation and isolation.

I situate these findings within the ongoing "choice versus constraint" debate, in which observers deliberate over the extent to which segregation levels are the result of external forces or individual choices. The "restraint" argument was first put forth by Rex and Moore (1967) in their study of Sparkbrook, Birmingham, which documented the housing market discrimination faced by ethnic minorities, particularly Pakistanis. Others suggest that minorities preferred to live in conditions of residential isolation. Dahya (1974) argues that Pakistanis chose to live in highly concentrated communities in order to save money and send remittances to their families. Any discrimination minorities faced, Dahya claims, did not lead to increased levels of segregation.

I show how national and local governments consistently refused to acknowledge their role in shaping Muslim settlement patterns, which led to further entrenchment.

Table 2.1. Directives and Acts Concerning British Housing Policy, 1890-2005

Directives and Acts	Purpose
The Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, expanded nationally 1900	Allows council housing construction for working classes
Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1924	Subsidies to local authorities build council housing
British Nationality Act 1948	Fill labor shortages
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962	Restricted emigration from the Commonwealth
Immigration Act 1971	Curtailed primary immigration
Urban Programme 1968	Address social deprivation in inner cities
Community Development Project 1970	Funded twelve community development projects
Dispersal Policy, Birmingham City Council 1969/75	Limit the number of ethnic minorities living on a single block
Race Relations Act 1968	Made it illegal to deny housing based on race, ethnicity, or nationality
Race Relations Act 1976	Addressed indirect discrimination, primarily on housing market
1977 White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities	Linked economic, social, and development policies to address inner-city issues
Partnership Programme 1977	Linked public and private partnerships to address urban regeneration
Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978	Aimed to increase the role of the private sector in regenerating urban areas
Right to Buy Policy 1980	Incentivized homebuying
Urban Development Corporations, est. 1981	Corporations tasked with urban planning, including buying and selling land
English Partnerships, est. 1992	Partnerships between private and public sector to develop unused land
Social Exclusion Unit, est. 1997	Area-based initiative to address social exclusion
New Deal for Communities, est. 1997	Local initiatives to transform 39 “deprived” areas
Regional Development Agencies, est. 1999	Reduce regional inequalities through urban regeneration and economic development
Urban Task Force, est. 1998	Encourage settlement in England’s inner cities
Urban White Paper 2000	Positioned cities as the solutions to economic problems, encouraged increased settlement
Ritchie and Cantle Reports, 2001	Located segregation as the reason for social unrest and rioting
Mixed Communities Initiative, est. 2005	Foster the residential social mixing to reduce economic disadvantage
Commission of Integration and Cohesion, est. 2005	Reduce inequality, engender social cohesion

Successive governments would adopt Dahya's line of reasoning and focus on mitigating economic, rather than ethnic, segregation. Only in the post-9/11 period would fears surrounding social exclusion became overlaid with national security concerns, leading to scattered initiatives that addressed the issue. In tracing these developments, I show how Muslim identity categorization evolved from guest worker, to immigrant, to ethnic group, and finally, religious minority.

The chapter proceeds by considering late 19th century housing policy and its politicization along party lines. It traces the development of inner-city slum clearance programs to illustrate how current Muslim settlement patterns can be located in 19th and early 20th century development imperatives. Next, it considers England's guest worker policies in the post-war period and the eventual permanent settlement of these populations. It examines how local authorities such as Birmingham used segregationist housing policies to limit the number of ethnic minorities allowed on a given block. It then turns to the impact of 9/11 on the perception of Muslims' spatial exclusion and identity categories, before considering current patterns of segregation and isolation across England.

2.1 Housing in Pre-World War I England and the Interwar Period

England and France encountered labor shortages in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but turned to different labor forces to fill their needs. France relied on guest workers, while England looked to its own work force to address shortages until after World War II. As a result, discussions surrounding housing availability and planning were primarily concerned with fulfilling the housing needs of native workers. Housing construction aimed to resolve the "inner city problem," which referred to the housing shortages and

sanitation crises beginning in the industrialization period. Demand for jobs in the textile industry had led to rapid urbanization and overcrowding among working class families. Freeholders, usually large private landlords, took advantage of the need for housing and provided short term leases to families, often on rundown properties. A slum housing system emerged whereby families lived in overcrowded and poorly constructed buildings in England's inner cities (Lund, 2016).

Discussions surrounding "the slums" are some of the only instances in which housing was linked to social integration. The slum was seen as "the locale of vice, crime, delinquency and disease, a disorderly gathering of people beyond society and without community" (Mellow, 1977). To solve the slum problem, the Second Salisbury ministry gave local authorities increased autonomy to construct housing. The Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 permitted the development of council housing in London for working class populations outside of slum areas and was extended nationwide in the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1900.

Local authority involvement in council housing construction provoked hostility from the Right and private actors. Unlike in France, where discussions surrounding housing provision were rarely split along party lines, housing in England quickly became a highly politicized issue. The increased power given to local authorities provoked pushback from the Right, which framed council housing as a class issue. Lord Weymass of the Liberty and Property Defence League, for example, called it "class legislation" likely to destroy "the moral fibre of our race in the anaconda coils of state socialism." Fierce opposition to council housing within the Right foreshadowed tensions that would characterize housing construction for the next century.

Despite the increased accommodation provided for by the 1890 and 1900 acts, working class families continued to face severe housing shortages. As a Conservative backbencher, Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen went against party lines when he introduced two bills to Parliament in 1912 providing central grants to local authorities to supply council housing. The majority of his party, along with Liberal politicians, argued that subsidized housing would undermine the private sector (Lund, 2016). Private landlords were typically well-represented on local councils and resisted the construction of council housing. As a result, local authorities were forced to construct council housing in the inner-city areas, where private construction was less willing to build. These early construction imperatives would foreshadow later settlement patterns for Muslims, many of whom lived in council housing.

In the aftermath of World War I, resentment towards profiteering private landlords increased. Dissatisfaction was coupled with severe housing shortages for the country's working class, which further decreased trust in the private sector and its ability to supply housing. Once again, the issue became political: Prime Minister Lloyd George suggested that the country's working class would turn to Bolshevism if they weren't given adequate housing.

During this period there was significant variation in the number of houses built across local authorities. Under John Wheatley's Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1924, local authorities such as Carlisle and Walsall built over 40 council houses per 1,000 residents, whereas in Salford, Grimsby, Blackpool, and Croydon, less than 1.3 were built (Jennings, 1971). Variation in construction was in part due to the politicized nature of

council housing. Labour-controlled councils were usually enthusiastic builders, but during the interwar period Labour controlled few councils (Lund, 2016).

As local authority involvement in council housing grew, political tensions arose between those who advocated for home ownership (Conservatives and Liberals) and those who pushed for increased council housing (Labour). In 1914, homeownership was estimated at 20 percent of the population (Office for National Statistics, 2013). However, during the interwar period, home ownership for the country's middle class increased rapidly and by 1938, 34 percent of households were homeowners (Lund, 2016). This change was linked to a variety of political factors, notably a growing political ideology that stressed the link between property ownership and social stability. In 1923, Conservative MP Noel Skelton declared England a "property owning democracy."

The interwar period established several tensions and trends in English housing policy. First, the absence of a centralized housing policy meant that local authorities possessed significant autonomy to build (or refuse) council housing. Second, the growing divide between the working classes, which continued to rely on council housing, and the middle classes, which began to seek property ownership. Third, struggles between local authorities and private enterprise to construct housing foreshadowed competition between both sectors in the housing construction process.

2.2 Housing in Post-World War II England

England encountered a serious housing problem in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Nearly 450,000 homes had been destroyed in the war and those that remained had been badly maintained. The dearth of available homes was compounded by the post-war baby boom, which put additional strain on housing availability as families grew and

required larger living spaces. Rather than taking the French approach to the post-war crisis, which upended the planning status quo and necessitated a long term vision for change, the British approach was decidedly more pragmatic and focused on quickly addressing housing needs (Malpass, 2018).

The country's housing shortage became an important topic in the General Election of July 1945. Parties across the political spectrum agreed that local authorities, rather than private enterprise, were best equipped to address the problem. The private sector had been badly disrupted by the war and was ill-equipped to take on the task of rebuilding England. Renting was also more common than homeownership, and households were more likely to trust local authorities to provide housing. Local authorities were also viewed as more efficient; Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health from 1945-50 argued that unlike private builders, local authorities were "plannable instruments."

Although housing remained a political issue, throughout the 1940s and 50s both Labour and the Conservatives largely agreed on the importance of local authorities for housing construction. The political consensus ushered in England's "golden age" of social housing (Harloe, 1985). Data collected from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government shows that local authorities adopted a prominent role in housing construction and built more houses than private enterprise every year until 1958; between 1945 and 1965, they produced 60 percent of all new houses (Figure 2.1). Private and housing associations struggled to compete. Their output rose between 1953 and 1969 but fell from 1969 to 1981. Even after the Conservatives came to power in 1951, local authority housing production reached an all-time high in 1953.



Figure 2.1. Housing Completion by Tenure, 1946-2001
Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government.

Here, differences emerge between France and England regarding the role of local government in housing construction. In France, communes would not become important actors in the housing sector until the period of decentralization in the 1980s. In England, local authorities became the central housing developers in the post-war period, building five million units in 30 years (Donnison & Ungerson, 1982)

In the immediate post-war period, priority was given to new housing construction. Local authorities had two primary responsibilities. First, they provided housing for "respectable" working classes. Second, they responded to growing pressure to demolish Victorian-era slum housing and provide council housing for limited numbers of the poor. Between 1954 and 1974, nearly 1.1 million homes were demolished in England and Wales (English et al., 2017). The slum removal programs substantially changed the urban fabric of England's inner cities. New high-rise estates emerged, followed by suburban expansion for the country's wealthier middle-class populations. Between 1945 and 1950,

less than 11 percent of the accommodation constructed by local authorities was in flats, by 1970, it was more than 50 percent rising to 90% percent in inner cities (Lund, 2016).

Harold Wilson's Labour government supported the construction of high-rise estates in order to quickly meet building targets. To do this, the Wilson government awarded subsidies to large flats constructed in "priority areas." Economic incentives encouraged local authorities to construct tower blocks, rather than low-rise, low-density buildings. In 1965, Leader of the House of Commons Richard Crossman justified building large towers, claiming "The great metropolis needs people who are electricians, needs charladies who will do the cleaning … and we have to build houses for them."

2.3 Post-War Migration and Emerging Minority Settlement Patterns (1948-1970)

As the government worked to address the housing shortage for its native population, it also recruited large numbers of workers from the British Commonwealth to work in the textile industries, including from Pakistan and later, Bangladesh. The British Nationality Act 1948 permitted 800,000 subjects in the British Empire to work in the United Kingdom without a visa. By importing workers, the Act aimed to fill labor shortages in the post-war economy in both skilled and unskilled labor. As British colonies gained their independence in the 1940s and 1950s, emigration from the Commonwealth increased. This wave of migration was also composed of economic migrants, whose numbers rose from 3,000 in 1953 to 136,400 by 1961 (Messina, 2001).

Pakistani and Bangladeshi migration to England dramatically increased in the 1960s in response to the political and social upheaval created by Partition. Early settlement patterns reveal high population concentrations in several regions, particularly in industrial areas. Large numbers of migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh settled in

manufacturing towns in the West Midlands to work in the textile industries, as well as in car and food manufacturing in Luton and Slough. Settlement patterns were in part segmented along ethnic lines, as groups were more likely to settle in area with high levels of their co-ethnics already represented: Pakistanis moved to the West Midlands, including Bradford and Birmingham, while Bangladeshis clustered in East London. Thus, early settlement patterns reveal, in part, conscious choices among newly arrived minority populations to settle among their co-ethnics.

Migration continued until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, which curtailed emigration from Commonwealth countries, and again with the Immigration Act 1971, which further restricted primary immigration. By this time, families had reunited and settled. Although workers may have chosen to live among their own, intraurban settlement patterns in the 1960s show that many had few options. Similar to the residential clustering common among immigrants in the early 20th century in the United States, migrant workers were often forced to live in the deprived and declining inner-city areas.

Institutional factors, notably British housing policy, coupled with de-industrialization in the mid-1960s, helped solidify early settlement patterns and created the foundations for current segregation levels. Kundnani (2001) details how housing policies encouraged the settlement of minorities along ethnic lines, which allocated housing to White populations in separate areas from Asian population.[1] He finds that, for decades, discriminatory housing policy in Bradford allotted only 2 percent of council housing to Asians. Similar policies were enacted in Oldham. Only in the early 1990s

[1] In the United Kingdom, the term "Asian" is used to refer to individuals of South Asian origin and includes both Muslim and non-Muslim populations.

would there be an official recognition on the part of the Commission for Racial Equality on the presence of segregationist housing policy.

There remained widespread discrimination for those who relied on council housing. Although few councils had rules that overtly discriminated against minorities, insidious discrimination was present in the bureaucratic housing process. A minority family was often viewed as a "political liability and an administrative risk" (Burney, 1967, p. 59). Studies have shown that the behavior of housing officers, who were responsible for allocating social housing, contributed to neighborhood-level segregation (Malpass & Murie, 1999; Manley & van Ham, 2011).

It was common practice to allocate dwellings based on ethnicity and socioeconomic status, and housing officers were left to judge whether or not applicants were "deserving" of housing (Clapham & Kintrea, 1984; Henderson & Karn, 1984; Malpass & Murie, 1999). As a result, available council housing was frequently limited to old houses acquired by the council in areas where minorities already lived, rather than in new council housing reserved for native populations, thereby reinforcing minority/White divisions.

Anti-discrimination legislation passed in 1968 ameliorated housing market discrimination. However, this had a limited impact on undoing early settlement patterns. While anti-discrimination legislation stopped the most insidious forms of discrimination, local councils found ways to maintain spatial division. Council housing often included residence qualifications and waiting lists of up to five years. Private housing associations instituted restrictions, such as building society (loan) restrictions for inner-city lending, which cut off minority applications from financial assistance. To remedy this, the

Cullingworth Committee published a report in 1969 suggesting that councils keep track of housing provision according to ethnicity to ensure fair housing access. Local authorities largely ignored these recommendations (Burney, 1971).

Visible signs of deprivation and co-ethnic clustering led to national discussions regarding the supposed "inner city problem" sparked by the rise in immigration (Stewart, 1987). Enoch Powell, for example, called for immigrant repatriation in his infamous "rivers of blood" speech. Growing fear surrounding the "inner city problem" led successive Labour governments to assume a more direct role in the spatial management of deprivation.

Intervention began with the introduction of the Urban Programme in 1968 and the Community Development Project (CDP) in 1970. The former aimed to address social deprivation across England, particularly in areas with sizable immigrant populations. The government selected local authorities deemed showing signs of "urban stress" to deliver aid. The latter program involved funding for twelve community development projects across England and Wales, in which community workers collaborated with residents to address local deprivation. While the CDP was relatively short-lived, the Urban Programme was reconfigured to address economic, rather than social, deprivation. A growing emphasis on the Programme's economic dimensions would foreshadow a new approach to tackling inner-city exclusion in the coming decades.

2.4 Local Segregationist Housing Policy and Entrenching Settlement Patterns (1970-1979)

England's housing transformation would not arrive in earnest until the 1970s. In part, the shift was due to a series of economic crises in the 1970s, notably the 1973-75 recession, which led to high levels of unemployment and inflation. Conservatives pushed back against large public expenditures, including Labour's sizable council housing budget. The housing shortage was less acute than in the post-war period and Conservatives invoked a supposed housing surplus to justify reduced spending.

Along with reduced council spending there was a bipartisan push for home ownership. This was a marked change from the post-war period, when housing minister Aneurin Bevan had urged young couples to rent rather than buy. By 1977, however, his successors in the Labour government argued,

> "As a Government, we welcome the clear desire of many to own their own homes, and we wish to facilitate this wherever we can. We intend to clear the path for home ownership for more people, more quickly by special Government assistance for first-time purchasers" (Baroness Birk, 1977).

Part of the shift towards home ownership was the result of a growing distaste for the types of council housing built in the post-war period. The modernist high-rise towers constructed by local authorities were criticized for being "new slums," and trust had eroded between councils and tenants due to a lack of upkeep (Shapely, 2007). Public opinion had decidedly shifted towards home ownership, and surveys showed that less than 20 percent of council tenants under 55 years would prefer to live in council housing in the next two years (Coles, 1989).

Private construction largely assumed the task of satisfying the public's preference for home ownership. The tide had turned in favor of the market and private enterprise as the most efficient way to deliver housing. Local authorities now took a backseat to private construction.

Kleinman (1996) shows that housing policy became increasingly bifurcated during this period. The market-based approach was directed at housing the middle classes, while social housing was largely restricted to more vulnerable populations. This segmented policy resulted in two distinct approaches, with the latter requiring more state intervention and financial support.

An increased desire to purchase housing among the middle class led to White flight in the 1970s away from cities with large, economically deprived minority populations and into the outer estates. These movements created a dynamic wherein certain areas with sizable minority populations experienced rapid segregation coupled with high economic deprivation. At the same time, White flight caused housing prices to remain low, which incentivized minority families to buy inexpensive homes in the areas they were living. As a result, they settled in the country's most deprived areas with high population densities.

White flight in the 1970s was coupled with the end of the guest worker program in 1974. The permanent settlement of what were assumed to be temporary populations led to a competitive housing market among minorities who chose to settle in England.

The effects of White flight on minority clustering were compounded by discriminatory practices by a variety of housing actors that peaked in the 1970s. First, housing associations laid the groundwork for spatial division by clustering minorities together. Minority populations were overrepresented in housing funded by inner-city housing associations, which confined them to the urban terraced housing (Niner & Karn, 1985). Decisions to allocate a specific type of housing to minorities

foreshadowed future levels of segregation characterized by clustering and high population densities in the inner cities.

Second, discrimination within private markets remained rampant. White preferences for housing in majority White communities led to increased housing prices (Henderson & Karn, 1984). Immigrants, and later first and second generations, were frequently unable to afford to purchase homes in these areas leading to segmented housing along economic and ethnic lines. When minorities looked to buy, private contractors often withheld important finance information from applicants. Further, borrowing restrictions limited the types of housing available, leading to clustering in less desirable areas away from White populations. Controlling for house type, price, and location, Stevens et al. (1982) finds that black buyers found it more difficult than Whites to buy housing. While building societies argued that this was because minority populations were less likely to save or apply for funds, the authors find that Whites were not more likely to save or apply for funds and that minorities were refused more when they did apply.

Those who obtained loans were less likely to borrow on favorable terms, which restricted their housing options. Karn et al. (1986) show that minority populations had minimal access to purchasing and borrowing information and were therefore likely to rely on neighbors or friends. This led them to purchase homes in areas with high levels of their co-ethnics, further entrenching their residential isolation (Ibid). There was slightly less discrimination within the private rental market, but research has shown that minority applicants were more likely to be falsely informed that a house was no longer available in order to keep them out (Great Britain Commission for Racial Equality, 1988). In the end,

many rented from co-ethnics to reduce discrimination, which usually meant they settled in areas of high co-ethnic concentration (D. Phillips & Karn, 1991).

Finally, the reform of social housing to a needs-based system did little to satisfy housing needs for the most vulnerable.[2] Henderson and Karn (1984) find that housing officers and local councilors often held discretionary powers as to which families were given housing. And while a needs-based system aimed to be an objective instrument for housing allocation, research has found that the most deprived populations became concentrated in the most disadvantaged areas (Clapham & Kintrea, 1984; Henderson & Karn, 1984). The needs-based system facilitated a tactic known as "dispersal," wherein local councils worked to deconcentrate minorities to allow for White families to occupy their housing.

2.4.1 Segregationist Housing Policy in Birmingham

The most well-known dispersal policy was instituted by the Birmingham city council from 1969 to 1975. The clustering of South Asian and Afro-Caribbean populations in the inner city was seen as a growing problem and the proposed policy was presented as a remedy for service provision difficulties (City of Birmingham, 1968). Although the council had received central government subsidies to help with services such as education and health, it decided that dispersal would ease the burden on inner-city service provision. It also concluded that dispersing minority populations would facilitate their integration. While dispersal was presented as a form of de-segregation, its practices were

[2] Social housing and council housing are often used interchangeably. However, they differ slightly as to the type of tenancy agreement. Social housing can be owned by housing associations or councils, while council housing is owned exclusively by local authorities.

nearly identical to segregative housing policies instituted in the United States, which limited the numbers of black families that could live on a single block.

Birmingham's policy was introduced in 1969 after nine White tenants in the Ladywood area threatened a rent strike if housing was allocated to a second minority family, either South Asian or Black, on the block. While the Housing Committee officially rejected the petition, it decided to informally limit the number of minority families that could be housed on one block. Beginning that year, the council decided that no more than six houses could be allocated to minority families on any street or block, and that five properties on either side of a minority family must be reserved for White occupants. If the policy had been strictly enforced, it would have meant that no minority family in council housing would have had a co-ethnic or co-racial neighbor. In practice, it resulted in a maximum of one-in-six houses allotted for minority families. Once a minority family moved in, no other minority families were allowed unless one left. Although the practice was never formally enshrined, those on the top of the housing list found that they were passed over for Whites or put in undesirable areas.

The Race Relations Committee pushed back against dispersal policies but had difficulty launching a complaint against an informal practice.[3] Only in 1975 did the Committee present a viable case after an Irish woman filed a complaint with the Race Relations Board, alleging that she had been denied housing at move-in when it became known that she had a Jamaican husband. The Birmingham city council fought the complaint by arguing that its goal was integration and therefore the policy did not violate

[3] The Race Relations Committee was a product of the Race Relations Act 1965, which led to the establishment of the Race Relations Board in 1966 and seven regional subcommittees who were tasked with addressing discrimination.

the Race Relations Act 1968, which made it illegal to deny housing based on race, nationality, or ethnicity. After a lengthy legal battle, the council admitted that a specific allotment policy was, perhaps, detrimental; its dispersal policy was finally repealed.

2.4.2 Government Responses to Segregation

One year later, the Race Relations Act 1976 passed, which addressed the indirect discrimination that minorities faced, particularly on the housing market. Although the Act allowed for some upward mobility, no significant de-segregationist housing policies were implemented. Further, residential dispersion primarily occurred among other minority populations, notably Jews (Newman, 1985) and Italians (King & King, 1977).

As minorities clustered together, separate institutions emerged that reinforced ethnic and religious divisions. Groups were known to settle around temples or mosques and Muslims frequently turned down council housing near Hindus (D. Phillips & Karn, 1991). In Leicester, segregation at the ward level between Hindus and Muslims remained quite high (Ibid). Within Muslim populations, groups were often fragmented along ethnic lines, with Pakistanis worshipping separately from Bangladeshis.

Together, formal and informal patterns of housing discrimination add further nuance to the "choice versus restraint" debate. They demonstrate the relative lack of autonomy that minorities possessed regarding housing choice and suggest that even if some chose to live among their own, these patterns were reinforced by institutionalized patterns of discrimination that gave minorities few other options.

Further, the Birmingham city council case highlights the hesitancy among local government actors to recognize city-level segregation. Their reluctance was reflected at the national level. In part, the national government's refusal to address segregation was

the result of decentralized housing policy that characterized British housing policy for much of the 20th century. A general unwillingness to establish a national response was compounded by complex institutional configurations, including overlapping and conflicting mandates between the Home Office and Department of the Environment. Further, successive governments insisted that settlement patterns were solely "pathological" rather than structural, and therefore did not necessitate state intervention (Stewart, 1987).

A series of Inner Area Studies commissioned by the Department of the Environment in 1972 in London, Birmingham and Liverpool would challenge the government's non-interventionist strategy. The Inner Area Studies highlighted the growing spatial polarization and rampant unemployment in the cities' inner areas, which were marked by rapid deindustrialization. Several years later, the Department of the Environment published the 1977 White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities. The White Paper represented a shift in the state's approach. It argued that the root of the "inner city problem" was economic decline (Deakin & Edwards, 1993). For the first time, the government attempted to link development, economic, and social policies to address poverty and encourage economic revival (Beswick & Tsenkova, 2002). Urban regeneration was no longer solely focused on housing construction but addressed economic development as well.

The White Paper led to the development of the Partnership Programme, which targeted seven urban areas experiencing decline: the Docklands, Hackney-Islington, Newcastle-Gateshead, Manchester-Salford, and Liverpool-Birmingham. Soon after, the Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978 increased private partnerships to move urban regeneration

away from governmental responsibility and into the private sector. While private investment was intended to help with regeneration, it also represented a general unwillingness among government actors to assume responsibility for the task.

While the findings highlighted persistent spatial isolation and economic deprivation, they had little to say about how these issues affected England's minority populations. Instead, initiatives prioritized urban regeneration through private partnership as a means to encourage economic revival, effectively ignoring the housing practices that caused minority residential isolation.

2.5 Conservative Government and Urban Regeneration (1979-1997)

Margaret Thatcher's election in 1979 further bifurcated the housing market after the Conservative government instituted the Right to Buy policy the following year. In keeping with privatization and free market policies, the Right to Buy allowed tenants living in council housing and housing associations to purchase their homes at a significant discount. Proponents believed the plan would allow families to secure financial security by obtaining assets. They also argued that privatization would reduce local authority debt. Critics, however, feared that it would compound the housing shortage for low-income families and lead to gentrification.

The Right to Buy was partially a vote wining measure. The Labour Party had been associated with providing local authority housing and Thatcher hoped to deal Labour an electoral blow (Forrest & Murie, 2013). Beyond electoral calculations, Thatcher reportedly disliked council housing. Jenkins (2007) writes, "When Thatcher was briefly an Opposition housing spokesman in 1974 I offered to show her examples of London's good and bad council estates. She cut me short, 'No, there are only bad ones'"

(pp. 125-26). In a letter sent in 1979 to a council tenant who had written complaining about the condition of their house, Thatcher replied:

> "I hope you will not think me too blunt if I say that it may well be that your council accommodation is unsatisfactory but considering the fact you have been unable to buy your own accommodation you are lucky to have been given something which the rest of us are paying for out of our taxes" (Butler & Kavanagh, 1980, p. 191).

Despite a growing public preference for home ownership, one year prior to Thatcher's election nearly 32 percent of British households still rented from their local councils (Jenkins, 2007). Thatcher's election would severely decrease rented council housing. By the mid-1980s, central housing subsidies for local governments were largely withdrawn and rents increased to incentivize housing purchase. As is shown in Figure 2.2, Right to Buy sales would substantially increase between 1987 and 1989, largely in response to increased incentives to buy. Later, Housing Benefit costs were added to the Housing Revenue Account, which led most accounts into a deficit. By 1989, the Housing Revenue Account was "ringfenced," preventing any subsidy from the local authority's General Fund (Lund, 2016).

These changes were compounded by local development imperatives, which limited the small number of council houses already available and relied on the development of large-scale housing and speculative access to land (Arbaci, 2007). Housing speculation prompted investors to purchase council housing, which led to rising housing costs. As Malpass (2018) argues, "The right to buy accelerated the changing social character of the sector by selectively stripping out the more affluent tenants" (p. 118). The policy allowed middle-class families to purchase homes while England's poorer populations were increasingly left in remaining council housing, which was in

residentially isolated and economically deprived neighborhoods where land was inexpensive.



Figure 2.2. Right to Buy Sales, 1981-1997
Source: Housing and Construction Statistics, Great Britain, June Quarter 1998 Part 2.

One year after the Right to Buy passed, riots broke out in Brixton in April 1981 among black British youths clashing with police. While the immediate cause was tensions between the police and minorities, particularly the use of stop-and-search, scholars agree that inner-city deprivation was a significant underlying cause (Kettle & Hodges, 1982). Riots spread to other cities that summer, notably Liverpool, as well as Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham, and would reappear frequently during Thatcher's time in office, in 1983 and again in 1985.

While the riots highlighted the deprivation faced by minorities living in the inner cities, Thatcher's urban development policies would do little to address these inequalities. In fact, the Thatcher government would upend previous trends in urban development policy by favoring the private sector, which had little interest in addressing issues of minority deprivation.

The 1977 White Paper led to the development of two initiatives that would shape regeneration for the coming decade. First, the Urban Development Corporations (UDC), which had the power to grant planning permission and the ability to buy and hold land, as well as the ability to give grants to private developers. Beginning in 1981, UDCs were established in cities across England (Table 2.2).

Second, Enterprise Zones were introduced as "planning free zones." Development applications were given by a private sector committee directly to developers, thereby bypassing local authorities. This initiative reflected Thatcher's intention to remove power from local authorities, which were seen as "advocates of the Labour Party" (Beswick & Tsenkova, 2002, p. 13).

Table 2.2. Urban Development Corporations, 1980-1991

	Area (ha)	Population	Employment
Birmingham Heartlands	1000	12500	Not known
Black Country	2598	35405	53000
Bristol	420	1000	19500
Cardiff Bay	1093	5000	15000
Central Manchester	187	500	15300
Leeds	540	800	N/a
London	2150	40400	27213
Merseyside	350	450	1500
Sheffield	900	300	18000
Teesside	4858	400	N/a
Trafford Park	1267	40	24468
Tyne and Wear	2375	4500	40115

Source: Thomas and Imrie (1996).

Under the John Major government (1990-1997) the bifurcation of the housing market was complete. In part, this was driven by rising income inequality in the 1980s, which

increased the gap between the rich and poor. Those who could afford to buy their own homes did so, leaving the poorest segment of the population to occupy council housing (Murie, 2018). The Right to Buy exacerbated these inequalities by offering financial incentives to those who were able to purchase homes (Harloe, 1977; Murie, 1997).

At the same time, housing subsidies to local authorities had been greatly reduced, and any available financial assistance was primarily for low-income households through social security Housing Benefits. Reducing subsidies and funneling the poorest populations into local authority housing effectively residualized the housing sector. Housing policy had "come to be seen increasingly as an arm of regeneration policy for low-income inner cities and marginal estates, rather than an end in itself" (Hills, 1998). As part of the residualization, local authorities were pressured to work with the private sector on development projects that aimed to regenerate underused and vacant inner-city land. English Partnerships were created in 1992 by combining the Commission for New Towns (est. 1961) with the national directives of the Urban Regeneration Agency and replaced the Urban Development Agency.

The Major government thus confronted changes that would shape Labour's agenda for the following decades. Thatcher had focused on economic issues, particularly regarding how private partnerships could address economic issues. By the time Major arrived in government, however, by-election results and public opinion indicated a shift in the public's focus from economic to social problems (Allmendinger & Thomas, 1998).

2.6 New Labour and the "Urban Renaissance" (1997-2001)

New Labour arrived in government under Tony Blair in 1997. When Blair arrived in office the market had established precedence in the housing sector. Whereas the post-war

government had presented local authorities as solutions to the earlier housing crisis, fifty years later they were seen as growing problems across the political spectrum. Thus, while the party had traditionally favored local authorities and council housing, New Labour did little to reverse the Conservatives' housing agenda. Data collected from the Department for Communities and Local Government indicates that local authority housing construction continued to plateau under the Blair government and would remain low throughout his tenure as Prime Minister (Figure 2.3).



Figure 2.3. Council Housing Built in the United Kingdom, 1979-2009
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government, Historical Data on Housebuilding.

Together, the increase in owner occupied council housing and exodus of wealthier families in favor of home ownership led to increasing low-income household concentration, particularly among ethnic minorities. The lack of state assistance to working low-income homeowners meant that the poorest households occupied the least desirable homes. Market rents in the private landlord sector also produced spatial

concentration, as they were not allocated according to need, and therefore tended to attract wealthier renters.

In part, these patterns were the outcome of the Right to Buy, which tended to concentrate low-income people in council housing while wealthier households left the estates to purchase homes. Divisions were heightened by New Labour policies, under which local authorities sold their housing stock to housing associations, which then leased the properties to the lowest income families claiming Housing Benefits.

Although New Labour did little to reverse declining council housing rates, it promoted urban regeneration. New Labour's strategy was partly influenced by the architect Richards Rogers, who frequently advised Labour MPs. Rogers stressed the importance of urban design and community spaces and his vision influenced the party's plan for urban regeneration (Rogers & Fisher, 1992). The party positioned itself as the champion of the city, with the goal of urban renewal and fighting decades of "anti-urbanism" present in British discourse (Amin et al., 2000). The property-led urban planning and regeneration of the previous decades was increasingly criticized for failing to produce a "trickle-down effect" (Lawless, 1991; Parkinson, 1989). Rising inequality throughout the 1980s had created pockets of exclusion and deprivation in inner-city areas, particularly in council estates (Forrest & Murie, 1990).

New Labour began to reference social exclusion as a societal ill (Macleavy, 2006) and proposed two area-based initiatives as solutions. First, in 1997 the party launched the Social Exclusion Unit. One year later, the Unit published a report outlining problems in 1,300 of the country's most deprived neighborhoods (*Bringing Britain together: A national strategy for neighbourhood renewal* SEU, 1998). The report criticized

Thatcher's urban policy agenda for focusing too heavily on land use and property development, while acknowledging the difficulties associated with coordinating national and local policy directives. The Social Exclusion Unit proposed holistic and local approach focus on neighborhoods.

Next, New Labour launched the New Deal for Communities (NDC) in 1998. The NDC programme looked to transform 39 deprived neighborhoods over a ten-year period to encourage social" capital. As part of the initiative, the government emphasized community involvement to remedy social exclusion, with the goal of enhancing community cohesion.

At the same time, New Labour was faced with growing inequality and an urban housing crisis. In response, Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were created in 1999 to reduce regional inequalities by coordinating urban regeneration and economic development. RDAs also had implicitly social goals: moving people back into the cities and reducing poverty. In part, their efforts reflected the findings from the newly-created Urban Task Force, whose goal was to encourage movement from suburbs into older inner cities. The report, *Towards and Urban Renaissance*, presented a vision for a new urban center:

> "…A vision of sustainable regeneration of our towns and cities through making them compact, multi-centered, live/work, socially-mixed, well designed, connected and environmentally sustainable. It put on the agenda the need to upgrade the existing urban fabric, and to use the derelict and brownfield land in our cities before encroaching on the countryside" (Rogers, 2002).

Soon after, the government published the Urban White Paper in 2000, which was the first to address urban regeneration since the 1977 White Paper on the Inner City. The Urban White Paper represented a break with previous decades of British anti-urbanism.

Cities were now position as the solutions to economic problems, rather than the reasons for them.

New Labour now had two, potentially conflicting, urban agendas. First, the "neighborhood renewal" plan, which aimed at regenerating poor neighborhoods and fighting social exclusion. Second, the "Urban Renaissance," which focused on economic regeneration. While the White Paper attempted to merge these two policy dimensions it was unable to completely solve the fragmented approach to urban planning. As Amin et al. (2000) note, "The consequence of this [was] to provide one set of policies for the urban middle classes, one for the urban poor, and another for the partial reform of the political establishment governing both" (p. vii).

The government's segmented approach was compounded by the New Labour's failure to address the housing situations of minorities. Despite strong rhetoric stressing economic equality and regeneration, New Labour's Urban Renaissance had little to say about the minorities living in the urban areas, and their degree of deprivation and isolation. Their spatial isolation and economic deprivation were thus once again overlooked.

2.7 The Rise of Mixed Communities and Developments in Minority Categorization (2001-2011)

While the Urban Renaissance of the 1990s reflected decades of British housing policy that ignored the spatial concentration of minorities, riots in the summer of 2001 would upend the status quo. Riots between South Asian and White populations beginning in Oldham in May 2001 were the worst instances of social unrest in England since 1985. Several months later they spread to other northern cities, including Bradford, Leeds, and

Burnley. In response, the Oldham city council commissioned the Ritchie Report, which concluded that segregation was at the root of the city's riots: "Segregation, albeit self-segregation, is an unacceptable basis for a harmonious community and it will lead to more serious problems if it is not tackled." The Cantle Report by the Home Office came to similar conclusions. It proclaimed that residentially isolated communities lived "polarised" and "parallel" lives that prevented interethnic mixing, causing social tensions. The report called for a reevaluation of previous regeneration schemes, which had "forc[ed] equally deprived areas to compete against each other" (p. 75).

Together, the reports introduced two terms into the British lexicon. The first, "parallel lives," described the situation in which minority and majority communities lived close to one another but in mutual exclusion. Segregation was an important factor; minority and majority communities were residentially isolated from one another. The second, "community cohesion," referred to the desired outcome, which would presumably prevent further situations of social unrest. The reports' conclusions – notably that social unrest was the result of self-segregation – overlooked the structural and institutional features that placed minorities in conditions of residential isolation (Manley & van Ham, 2011; van Ham & Manley, 2014). As a result, their proposed solutions did little to address the structural factors at the heart of spatial exclusion.

2.7.1 September 11 and Evolving Dimensions of Minority Identity

September 11 occurred several months after the reports were published. They led to a new dimension in the state's approach to managing minorities through the use of counter-terrorism measures. The attacks also carried important implications for minority categorization. The ethnic dimensions of their identities became amalgamated with their

religion, and public discourse now primarily referred to them as "Muslims." For the first time, the 2001 census included a religious affiliation category, signaling the government's growing preoccupation with the religious dimensions of ethnic identity.

Officials now argued that living "parallel lives" posed security threats. Community cohesion was no longer an end in and of itself but rather a means by which authorities could ensure the prevention of future terror attacks. The "restraint versus choice" debate reemerged, this time with a religious dimension. Scholars such as Peach (2006) argued that Islam played a role in self-segregation of Muslim minorities, while acknowledging that ethnicity, region of origin, and language also structured housing decisions. Varady (2008) argued that Muslims had chosen to self-segregate and concluded that any government dispersal attempts would inevitably fail. Restraint arguments pushed back against the choice scholarship. While this literature acknowledged that Muslims were more likely to cluster together for cultural and linguistic reasons, it showed that segregation was reinforced by the fact that many neighborhoods were inaccessible to Muslim minorities (D. Phillips, 2010; D. Phillips et al., 2008).

Despite growing fears surrounding national security, New Labour's urban policy would do little to address Muslim exclusion. By this time, council housing had become synonymous with poverty and social exclusion. Hills (2007) notes that in 2005, two-thirds of social housing was in the original areas where council estates were built. While council housing was originally composed of working- and middle-class residents, now almost half of social housing was located in the most deprived fifth of neighborhoods. These patterns resulted in spatial dynamics wherein economic and ethnic exclusion were

highly concentrated in council estates – yet it was the former, rather than the latter issue that was officially addressed.

In January 2005 the Mixed Communities Initiative (MCI) was announced as part of *Sustainable Communities Plan*. Planners recognized that housing policy had caused social and economic segregation, and thus intervened with a spatial policy as corrective. While a similar policy was introduced in France to encourage the mixture of classes and ethnic groups, England's vision for mixed communities ignored the ethnic or religious dimensions of the exclusion it purported to address. Indeed, mixed communities in England had little to do with encouraging assimilation and focused on poverty reduction through a mix of housing tenure with the goal of creating more "sustainable" communities.

The MCI had four components. First, to transform deprived areas with better housing, higher employment, reduced crime, and increased educational attainment. Second, to change the housing stock to attract new (i.e., higher income level) populations. Third, to finance development of public lands using private sector investment, and finally, to integrate local government policies to encourage a more "holistic" approach to solving local level issues (Lupton & Fuller, 2009).

However, a lack of coordination between regional and local authorities caused confusion. Both were tasked with planning a "mix" of housing although there was no clear policy as to what a "mix" should entail. In larger areas, the policy focused on achieving a mix of households between tenure and price. In smaller areas, housing mix was supposed to contribute to "mixed communities" regarding the number of households

that needed market or affordable housing (Tunstall & Lupton, 2010). The official policy thus remained underspecified and differed between local authorities.

Further, tenure mix was applied at the ward level (i.e., sub district level). While tenure mix effectively decreased socio-spatial segregation at the ward level, it was still present at the sub ward level. In London, for example, while the Inner Boroughs experienced tenure diversification, street and neighborhood-level segregation remained quite high (Hamnett, 2003). In the East End, which witnessed rapid gentrification as a result of regeneration, there was increased division between the newly developed lofts and council housing estates (Colomb, 2007).

Further, tenure mix did little to facilitate social mixing in other areas, including schools and stores. These spaces remained separate and there was "something of a gulf between a widely circulated rhetorical preference for multicultural experience and people's actual social networks and connections" (Robson & Butler, 2001, p. 77). As such, tenure mix was unable to mitigate the daily isolation experienced by individuals in certain neighborhoods, and the scale at which it was implemented did little to alleviate real patterns of exclusion.

While the MCI overlooked the spatial integration of Muslims, the London 7/7 bombings renewed discussion surrounding the supposed link between residential exclusion and radicalization. Official discourse spoke of tackling extremism in "Muslim communities" and prioritized partnerships with Muslim leaders. In 2006, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) was established as an independent advisory board tasked with preventing extremism in local communities.

The Home Office proposed the Commission of Integration and Cohesion, which would focus on "engendering a sense of Britishness…inclusive of all communities" (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005). In doing so, it would work to address inequalities that "trap people in segregated lives" and encourage communities who "choose to live segregated lives to engage more broadly." (Ibid). Here, the emphasis was again placed on the supposed willingness of Muslim minorities to live in conditions of segregation. The only mention of the structural factors that placed them in isolation was the "inequality" that the proposed Commission would address.

The Commission released its full report in 2007. The report declared that integration and cohesion issues were often local problems, and therefore required local solutions (Commission on Integration & Cohesion, 2007). However, an interim report suggested that segregation was a "red herring" – preventing cohesion in some contexts but not others, and that it was wrong to characterize England as an extremely segregated country.

2.7.2 Segregation: "Red Herring" or Entrenched Pattern?

Was segregation simply a "red herring?" To test these claims, I calculate segregation and isolation indices using data from the 2001 and 2011 census. To calculate segregation levels, I use the dissimilarity index. The index is a standard measure of segregation that ranges from zero (complete integration) to 100 (complete segregation) and measures the proportion of a given group that would have to relocate in order to achieve a uniform population distribution (Duncan & Duncan, 1955; Massey & Denton, 1988; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1976; White, 1986) . As such, it is a measure of the evenness of the distribution of two populations across an aerial unit. The dissimilarity index is appropriate because it

accounts for the spatial distribution of groups at the ward level, which is critical to understanding the implications of group concentration for representation outcomes. I compute dissimilarity indices from Lower Layer Super Output Area-level census data of Muslim and White populations in a given English district.[4] [5]

The level of isolation measures the likelihood that a member of one group will interact with a member from another group, in this case, the likelihood that a Muslim minority will interact with a White person.[6] Thus, the index depends on both the percentage of Muslims in a given area and their degree of spatial isolation. When the percentage of Muslims is small, a segregated neighborhood can result in a high degree of inter-ethnic contact, but when Muslims represent a large proportion of the population, chances for inter-ethnic mixing are decreased even if segregation is moderate. As shown in Table 2.3 for example, there is a 4.2 percent chance that in 2001 a Muslim resident in Birmingham would interact with a member of the majority White group. In 2011, the likelihood fell to 3.7 percent.

As Table 2.3 indicates, on the whole, segregation levels decreased across England's most populous districts, with the exceptions of Sheffield, Bristol, and Newcastle. While the isolation index increased across all districts except for Liverpool –

[4] For the purposes of the following analyses, minority populations are operationalized as the percentage of Pakistani and Bangladeshi residents – the largest ethnic minority populations in England – in a given local authority.

[5] The dissimilarity index is calculated as follows: $\boldsymbol{D} = \frac{\mathbf{1}}{\mathbf{2}}\sum_{\boldsymbol{i=1}}^{\boldsymbol{n}} \left| \frac{\boldsymbol{w_i}}{\boldsymbol{W_T}} - \frac{\boldsymbol{m_i}}{\boldsymbol{M_T}} \right|$, Where W_T and M_T are White and Muslim populations in a district, and w_i and m_i are the Muslim and non-Muslim English populations in Lower Layer Super Output Area i, respectively.

[6] The isolation index is calculated as follows: $F_{fw} = \sum(\frac{n_{im}}{N_m})(\frac{n_{iw}}{n_i})$. Where n_{if} is the number of Muslims in the LSOA, $n_{iw}$is the number of non-Muslim English, $N_m$is the number of minorities in the city or town, and $n_i$is the total population in the tract.

where they remained the same – and in Birmingham – where they dropped by slightly over half a percentage point – this does not mean that the *level* of isolation increased. Rather, the results indicate that between 2001 and 2011 there was a slightly higher likelihood that a Muslim group member would interact with a member of the majority, White group.

Table 2.3. Segregation and Isolation levels in England's Ten Most Populous Districts, 2001 and 2011

District	Segregation 2001	Segregation 2011	Isolation 2001	Isolation 2011
Birmingham	77.0	71.4	4.2	3.7
Leeds	76.4	72.1	.08	1.1
Sheffield	58.2	70.4	1.2	1.4
Bradford	79.8	75.5	3.5	4.9
Manchester	63.1	62.6	2.4	3.2
Liverpool	66.7	60.9	.02	.02
Bristol	54.7	56.2	.06	.08
Newcastle	58.4	64.9	1.2	1.3
Sunderland	70.9	68.1	.02	.04
Wolverhampton	71.8	59.2	.04	.06

Note: London is subdivided into 32 boroughs and therefore is excluded.
Source: UK Census 2001 and 2011. Author's calculations.

Yet, it would be simplistic to conclude that reduced levels of segregation and isolation support the Commission's conclusion that segregation is a "red herring." Taken together, the indices displayed in Table 2.3 demonstrate that segregation levels remain quite high. Further, the isolation indices across the majority of districts suggest that, on average, Muslims remain relatively isolated across England's most populous districts.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter traced the development of segregation in England beginning in the late 19th century. It showed that in the post-war era, the Labour Party's decision to devolve planning and construction to local authorities led to a fragmented planning approach that would come to characterize British housing policy throughout the 20th century. Beginning in the 1970s, an increased focus on urban problems and inner-city issues led to reforms that addressed the economic development of the inner city, once again overlooking the segregation of minority populations. High levels of decentralization meant that local authorities had considerable leverage in deciding who received council housing, and patterns of local housing discrimination and segregative housing policy persisted.

Social mixing policies in the early 2000s would similarly overlook the housing needs of minorities, instead focusing on ensuring a mix of tenure and social class. Discussions would shift in the post-9/11 era when authorities presented segregation as a security threat. Growing fears surrounding the threat of terrorism would lead to a reconceptualization of minority identity that amalgamated its ethnic and religious dimensions. Yet, few policies would seriously address segregation. Indeed, the Commission of Integration and Cohesion suggested that segregation was simply a "red herring." Using data from the 2001 and 2011 censuses, I tested this assertion and found

that while segregation and isolation decreased slightly, they remain relatively high across England. Taken together, the findings from this chapter suggest that while current patterns of segregation may be due in part to housing choice, they are reinforced by formal and informal patterns of discrimination and are strengthened by successive policies overlooking the root of spatial exclusion.

3 CHAPTER THREE

Housing and Segregation in France

This chapter examines patterns of space-making in 20th century France to understand how housing policies shaped current segregation levels. I show how France assumed a highly centralized approach to housing and urban planning beginning in the post-war period. For the following fifty years, the *étatise* (statist) perspective characterized the state's use of housing and urban planning as social tools. Rooted in this approach was the belief that housing would shape the French citizenry, first through the construction of the *grands ensembles* (large-scale, high rise housing), and later with the *villes nouvelles* (new towns). I demonstrate how urban planning thus became a governance question and rationale of the French state, a process which Scott (1998) terms "legibility."

Following the post-war period's guest worker policies, the state became increasingly concerned with its role in assimilating diverse populations. To solve the perceived integration problem, successive governments promulgated segmented housing policies for Muslims and Whites (Table 3.1). I draw on restricted access census data to analyze the progression of segregation and isolation across French cities between 1982 and 2012. I demonstrate that as Muslims occupied an increasingly visible space in the social housing sector, patterns of segregation were created whereby Muslims were clustered on the outskirts of cities, the *banlieues*. Housing thus became bifurcated along ethnic lines, contributing to spatial exclusion.

The chapter begins by introducing the pre-war guest worker period, which continued until the 1970s. It shows the ways in which the French state has concerned itself with the

Table 3.1. Laws, Agencies, and Departments Concerning French Housing Policy, 1944-2000

Laws, Agencies, Departments	Purpose
Ministry of Reconstruction and Urban Planning (*Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme*), est. 1944	Cabinet position tasked with planning post-war France
National Institute for Demographic Studies (*Institut national d'études démographiques*)	Institute tasked with surveying the French public's housing preferences after WWII
Plan Courant, 1953	Plan to construct 240,000 units annually between 1954 and 1957
Sonacotra	Organization that was created to help guest workers, primarily Algerians
Priority Urban Zones (*zones à urbaniser en priorité*), est. 1957	Areas assuming development priority
Debré Law (*Loi Debré*), 1965	Decreed the "reabsorption" of the *bidonvilles*
Vivien Law (*Loi Vivien*), 1970	Required landlords to repair housing or forbid occupation
Prefectural decree of October 1968 (*l'arrêté préfectoral d'octobre 1968*), expanded 1971	Required HLMs to devote 15-20 percent of their housing stock to foreigners
Secretary of State for Immigrant Workers (*Secretariat de l'etat aux travailleurs immigres*), est. 1974	Facilitate the settlement of former guest worker populations
National Commission for the Social Development of the Quartiers (*Commission nationale de développement social des quartiers*), 1976-1983	Commission tasked with the economic and social development of the *quartiers*
Urban Policy (*Politique de la* ville), est. 1980	Tasked with the social and economic development of French cities
Quartier Social Development Program *(Développement social des quartiers*), est. 1982	Addressed the social aspects of the quartiers, including greater resident involvement in housing matters
Priority Education Zones (*Zone d'Éducation Prioritaire*), est. 1982	Address and remedy educational disparities
Municipal Councils for the Prevention of Delinquency (*Conseils communaux de prévention de la délinquance*), est. 1982	Local councils tasked with preventing delinquency
Local taskforces for the social integration of disadvantaged young people (*missions locales pour l'insertion des jeunes en difficulté*), est. 1982	Address the social integration of disadvantaged youths

Besson Law (*Loi Besson*), 1990	Introduced the "right to housing," facilitated access to social housing
Urban Development Act (*La loi d'orientation pour la ville*) + Guidelines to the City, 1991	Combat social exclusion in urban areas
Law Against Exclusion (*Loi d'orientation du 29 juillet 1998 relative à la lutte contre les exclusions*), 1998	Aimed to combat social exclusion
Solidarity and Urban Renewal Act of December 2000 (*La loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain*), 2000	Re-established the duty of communes to have at least 20 percent social housing

Next, it demonstrates how French housing policy encouraged the flight of White families from the outskirts of France's major cities, creating residential fragmentation along ethnic lines. It shows how these settlement patterns created fears of growing segregation, which were compounded by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and riots in the outskirts of France's major cities several years later. In doing so, it traces the development of public and political perceptions of Muslim identity, from guest workers, to immigrants, to ethnoreligious minorities.

3.1 Housing Natives and Guest Workers in Pre-World War I France

Migration to France in the early 20th century was characterized by an influx of guest workers prior to World War I. Successive governments encouraged workers from across Europe to migrate for temporary periods to fill labor shortages as France industrialized. This period of guest worker arrival marks the beginning of the state's preoccupation with housing of migrant workers, although it had little interest in solving these problems, as workers were seen as transitory.

When guest workers first arrived, they were housed in informal housing accommodations. These workers were primarily from neighboring countries, including Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Spain. They rarely intended to settle, and employers were

responsible for providing housing. Clustered around mines (e.g., Italians in Villerupt and Lorraine) or vacant lots in industrial wastelands (e.g., Spaniards in La Plaine Saint Denis), nationwide housing shortages meant that guest workers cobbled together informal styles of housing wherein communitarian housing spaces emerged (sublets, hotels, apartments) (Blanc-Chaléard, 2006).

In the decade after World War I the number of guest workers doubled. Unlike cities such as Berlin and Vienna, whose housing systems were transformed by the arrival of migrants, housing in France during the interwar period was not adapted to accommodate its guest workers. Instead, they were often housed in military camps in the North and East. In other cases, employers opened worker cities to maintain their foreign labor. In the potash mines in Alsace, for example, Polish workers had a right to individual houses, even if the housing quickly became overpopulated (Ponty, 2005). Guest worker population continued to increase, and workers began to occupy aging buildings, contributing to urban growth in the cities' periphery zones. In areas characterized by shacks and other informal housing (*baraques de la zone*) Spaniards, Italians, and Algerians lived alongside one another creating a patchwork of ethnicities and communitarian enclaves in *bidonvilles*.[1] These informal housing systems laid the groundwork for settlement patterns in which foreigner populations were residentially isolated from native populations.

3.2 Housing in Post-War World War II France

[1] The term *bidonville* was imported from North Africa, where it referred to the suburbs of Casablanca or Algiers. In France, it became known as a housing area inhabited by Algerians or Moroccans, often on the outskirts of major cities.

Housing policy following World War II solidified ethnic fragmentation. By the end of the war over 1,800 communes were classified as disaster areas, including large cities such as Marseille, Lyon, and Toulouse (Voldman, 1997). There was also a severe housing shortage: only 14 million units were available to house over 40 million people. Nearly 50 percent of these units had no running water, 80 percent had no toilet, and 95 percent had no indoor shower or bathtub (Clanché & Fribourg, 1998). While guest workers and natives both faced inadequate housing, the French state would first work to address housing shortages for the latter.

The 1946 Constitution of the French Fourth Republic addressed the social and economic problems facing post-war France. A new social contract was established in the Constitution's preamble: "The Nation shall provide the individual and the family with the conditions necessary to their development. It shall guarantee to all, notably to children, mothers and elderly workers, protection of their health, material security, rest and leisure." This section of the preamble reflected the belief that the state should provide for the welfare of its citizens; housing became an important component of this vision.

Unlike in England, which devolved power to local authorities to solve its housing crisis, the French state relied on a heavily centralized apparatus best exemplified by the planning state (*état planificateur*). Rationale for the planning state was rooted in Saint-Simonianism, which stressed a technocratic and scientifically rigorous approach to urban planning, and was facilitated by the institutional legacy of Vichy authoritarianism, now exemplified by a high degree of state intervention in planning and construction (Voldman, 1997). The newly created Ministry of Reconstruction and Urban Planning (*Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme*, MRU), led Raoul Dautry, was tasked

with carrying out this vision.[2] Whereas housing became heavily politicized in post-war England, the MRU was presented as "*ni gauche, ni droite*" (neither right nor left) to emphasize its political neutrality.

Although the MRU was established to respond to the immediate post-war housing crisis, it took several years for planners to take actionable steps. Finally, in 1947 the National Institute for Demographic Studies (*Institut national d'études démographiques*, INED) surveyed the public's housing preferences. When results indicated that respondents overwhelmingly preferred single-family homes, planners largely dismissed the findings. Hesitancy to support the public's housing preferences was rooted in a consensus among French social scientists that single family homes encouraged individualism and exemplified petit bourgeoise values (Magri, 2008). Instead, planners insisted on the potential of large apartments and communal living spaces. The decision to construct large housing units rather than individual homes would determine the course of French planning for the next thirty years.

3.3 The Rise and Fall of the *Grands Ensembles* and the Bifurcation of the Housing System (1950-1975)

The 1950s marked a new period in the stark bifurcation of French housing policy along native/foreign lines. For the native French, the state built large housing estates called *grands ensembles*, while guest workers relied first on informal housing systems, and later, the Sonacotra, which was tasked with providing housing for Algerians, and later, other immigrant populations.

[2] The MRU was constructed from Vichy-era institutions, including the *Commissariat technique à la reconstruction immobilière* (CRI) and the *Délégation générale à l'équipement national* (DGEN), both of which involved reconstructing French cities.

As guest workers arrived from former colonies in Algeria and Morocco, their housing situations became increasingly dire. By 1946, there were nearly 22,000 Algerian guest workers (known as *Français musulmans d'Algérie*, FMA) and 80,000 more arrived between 1948 and 1950 (Blanc-Chaléard, 2006). Before the war, France's Algerian population was primarily single men living in dorms that were closely guarded by the North African brigade. After the war, the dorms became overcrowded and the *bidonvilles* grew in size and number, foreshadowing a broader housing crisis for those excluded from the "slum market" (Bachmann & Le Guennec, 1996; Volovitch-Tavares, 2008). Despite the guest worker housing crisis, urban planning and housing construction in the post-war period largely excluded the foreigner populations. Guest workers were still viewed as temporary, and the government devoted little attention to migrant housing in its state-led planning initiatives.

The native French also experienced housing shortages. While the United Kingdom had built 885,000 new housing units between 1949 and 1951, France had only built 290,000 (Rudolph, 2015). Early disparities in housing construction were due to two factors. First, housing had become a salient political issue across the United Kingdom by the late 1940s and was a prominent focus in the first post-war national election. Second, the United Kingdom devolved its planning to local authorities, which had experience overseeing the construction of council housing in the interwar period and were thus prepared to address the county's housing shortages.

To respond to the housing crisis, Vincent Auriol's government introduced the Plan Courant in 1953. The plan proposed the construction of 240,000 units annually between 1954 and 1957 for the native French, regardless of economic class. As part of

the Plan Courant, *grands ensembles* received substantial funding. Part of their appeal was their relatively simple construction technique; their height allowed for construction on small plots of land using a system of cranes that were moved along railways built on site (*chemin de grue*), resulting in the rectilinear style now associated with *grands ensembles*.

The 1953 Plan Courant exemplified the *état planificateur*'s involvement in the housing sector. It combined land-use legislation with housing finance and funding *Logécos* (*logements économiques et familiaux* or low-cost family dwellings). Land-use legislation reform allowed for the acquisition of large land plots for housing development. The *Logécos* were symbolic of the "golden age" of the state-funded housing sector (*secteur aidé*), which produced more housing than both the private and social housing sectors (Effosse, 2013).

Planners also restructured social housing. In 1954, Parliament devoted 10 billion francs to new housing construction, which highlighted its growing expansion into the state-led housing development sector and a shift towards the development of large-scale housing units. The next year, the state signaled a mandate for collective housing by incentivizing the construction of *Habitations à loyer modéré* (Housing at moderated rent, HLM) units that were higher than five stories.[3] Housing construction was further facilitated by a 1955 law that granted increased power to state-led planning and mandated that the housing ministry, rather than local governments, would give building permits if the proposed housing complex was more than 250 units.

In 1957, social housing initiatives expanded following the creation of the Priority Urban Zones (*zones à urbaniser en priorité* or ZUPs). Nearly 180 ZUPs were created,

[3] In 1950, *Habitations à bon marché* (low-cost housing) were renamed *Habitations à loyer modéré* to dissociate social housing from a particular social class.

with a minimum of 500 units in each zone (Fribourg, 2018). These large housing complexes would become symbolic of the planning state in the 1950s and later, the social landscape of the isolated *banlieues*.

By the 1960s public excitement for the *grands ensembles* had waned. There was a widespread consensus that these types of living situations were "silos for people devoid of social life and amenities" (Cupers, 2014). Photographs captured their immense scale isolation. In the case of the Floréal housing estate outside of Saint-Denis, residents were required to take two buses to get to the old city center "Yes, really, we are here like on an island," one resident lamented (Thery et al., 1966).

Criticism of the *grands ensembles* foreshadowed a serious problem with peripheral housing estates that would characterize the minority housing experience: French planners had effectively ignored the logistics of establishing a geographic link between the *grands ensembles* and neighboring cities and towns. Critics alleged that *grands ensembles* were effectively bedroom suburbs (*banlieues-dortoirs*) much like the interwar housing allotments they intended to replace.

In 1970, the Housing Ministry's urban sociology think tank published a report on social segregation, which concluded that housing policy was largely to blame for increased segregation. The report recommended a new style of housing that included collective spaces to encourage social diversity (*Note Sur La Ségrégation*, 1970). At the heart of these discussions was the connection between housing and integration that had dominated state-led planning since the post-war period.

Indeed, many of the *grands ensembles*' problems were rooted in the state's social vision for the neighborhood. As Cupers (2014) notes, the *grands ensembles* and

modernist concept of the neighborhood were inspired by "slum sociology" in which neighbors were expected to share local amenities to foster a sense of community. In this way, the *grands ensembles* replicated many of the same problems found in the pre-war period's deprived neighborhoods and informal housing.

Faced with growing criticism, planning turned to the development of *villes nouvelles* (new towns), which would be five to ten times the size of the *grands ensembles*. Unlike the *grands ensembles*, which were disconnected from city life and only accessible via a complex route of public transportation, *villes nouvelles* were designed to be self-sufficient cities.

In 1973, Minister of Public Works Olivier Guichard issued a directive that effectively ended the construction of the *grands ensembles* in favor of the *villes nouvelles*:

> "The city and the society, like life, are diverse. The grand ensemble opposes the social diversity of the city. It is the physical aspect of a policy that led to the social segregation in our cities…The grand ensemble opposes the center, while the ville nouvelle re-creates a center. The grand ensemble is without moorings. The ville nouvelle becomes the node in a network of connections" (CAC 19840342/023).[4]

In fact, many of the same worries that were present for native French, namely segregation and exclusion, would be replicated when immigrants moved into the deteriorating *grands ensembles*.

This period of French housing policy, marked by an insistence on urban planning's potential for community creation, was notably distinct from the British vision. French neighborhoods, particularly those developed by the *grands ensembles* architects,

[4] See also "Déclaration sur les orientations de la politique urbaine, par Olivier Guichard à l'Assemblée nationale," *Journal officiel de la République française*, May 17, 1973.

were intended to mediate the space between the state and citizen. The notion of an intermediary sphere was grounded in the social Catholicism espoused by architects Gaston Bardet and Robert Auzelle, who argued that neighborhoods laid the groundwork for national solidarity and that state intervention would foster social cohesion. In this way, the French state turned to urban planning and housing configurations to inculcate notions of neighborhood solidarity. The implications of these early differences would appear in the coming decades as immigrants and their descendants settled in neighborhoods that had primarily housed the native French.

3.4 The Sonacotra and HLM Access for Guest Workers (1956-1974)

While post-war French planners developed housing solutions for their native populations, guest workers faced an ongoing housing crisis. In the early 1950s, most guest workers were housed by their own means. Often, these initiatives took the form of subsidies from private associations, and rarely involved direct state involvement. The Ministry of Work (*Ministère du travail*) estimated that there were 186,418 North African guest workers in France. Among them, only a small number (54,226) were housed by their employers. Others lived in in foyers or centers created by the Ministry of Work or in administrative centers (11,487). An additional 12,000 units were also available in private associations that offered social services to Algerian guest workers (Hmed, 2006). Their situation was largely ignored until the outbreak of the Algerian War in 1954. Public officials became increasingly worried about National Liberation Front (*Front de libération nationale*, FLN) supporters in *bidonvilles*. Guest worker housing thus emerged as an important topic of political discourse.

The Sonacotra was established in 1956 to ameliorate living conditions for guest workers and their families, particularly Algerians, and was led by former MRU minister Eugène Claudius-Petit. Its establishment represented the first step in the state's attempt to assimilate its guest workers. The state's increased attention to communal welfare indicates the importance of housing policy for the categorization of North African migrants in the post-war period. Like the *grands ensembles*, the Sonactora was heavily influenced by social Catholicism. The organization's purpose was in part educative and sought to foster a civic identity for its guest worker populations. To do this, Sonactora housing was built to facilitate interethnic mixing between social classes and ethnicities. It strived to avoid the types of communitarian spaces found in the *bidonvilles*, which were associated with spatial and social segregation (Blanc-Chaléard, 2006). In this way, France became involved in managing the civic identities of foreigners.

Guest worker housing would face additional strain between 1962 and 1966, when nearly half a million workers from North Africa arrived in France. Workers had a choice between living in foyers with other workers, bidonvilles, hotels, or renting from slumlords (*marchands de sommeil*). This period was also marked by the increasing visibility of the *bidonvilles*. In 1966, 89 *bidonvilles* in the Paris region housed more than 400,000 workers, and by 1968, there were more than 250 across the country. Although most guest workers lived in foyers-hotels, *bidonvilles* attracted significant public attention and were viewed as "anachronic in a modern space and to the well-being that supposedly characterized the new *banlieue*" (Blanc-Chaléard, 2006). City-dwellers frequently referred to them as "the shame of [their] cities" and they became emblematic of the residential isolation migrant workers faced. At the same time, additional foyers-

hotels were constructed at the outskirts of cities. They faced difficult negotiations with local governments, which often resisted guest worker housing within their borders (Hmed, 2006). Older *bidonvilles*, less visible to the public, now accommodated the most marginalized workers, many from West Africa. Run-down housing and spatial isolation were particularly stark when compared to the conditions enjoyed by native French workers, for whom municipalities, many of them run by Communist governments, worked to ensure access to a basic living standard.

Issues surrounding the living conditions for guest workers came to the fore in 1965 after five Algerian workers suffocated in a *bidonville* in Aubervilliers; a year later, three children died in Nanterre after a fire. Public outcry against the living conditions in *bidonvilles* led to the Debré Law of 1965 (*Loi Debré*), which outlined a process of "reabsorption," including bulldozing slums, rehousing some guest workers and their families in "transitory" housing, and allotting HLM housing to "evolved" families (official terminology). In 1970, the Vivien Law (*Loi Vivien)* was introduced to accelerate the process. It required landlords to either repair housing that was deemed dangerous or to forbid occupation. The law set clear rules regarding the criteria of unsanitary housing while also instituting a social component by requiring the rehousing of affected residents. In this way, the Vivien Law represented an important step in the state's efforts to address the poor living standards faced by guest workers and their families.

HLMs began to welcome a select number of guest workers following the Debré and Vivien laws. Previously, communes had privileged the French in distributing HLM housing. Paris was the first city to shift its housing prioritization following the prefectural decree of October 1968 (*l'arrêté préfectoral d'octobre 1968*), which expanded in 1971 to

include all French regions. As part of the rehousing initiative, HLMs established foreigner quotas of 15-20 percent, reflecting the state's broader goal of assimilation and social mixing.

There were multiple failures with this policy, however. First, many communes fiercely resisted incorporating foreigners. Second, families living in transitory housing had little upward mobility, especially those with few economic resources. Third, the 15 percent rule was loosely applied. Nicknamed the "tolerance threshold," ambiguity surrounding the rule's application allowed officers to interpret it on a scale ("Le Seuil de Tolérance Aux Étrangers," 1975). At first, the tolerance threshold provided HLM officers with pretext to refuse guest workers and their families. Later, divisions within the HLM sector offered an opportunity to regroup guest workers in HLM housing. Dispersal became too complicated when the Vivien Law came into effect and many foreigners were simply placed in HLM housing. A survey conducted in 54 HLMs outside Paris found that nearly half exceeded the 15 percent rule, and some even 50 percent (Roberrini, 1971).

Despite increased HLM availability, there remained considerable variation in access among foreigners. In 1968, Spanish and Italians represented 43 percent of HLM foreign residents. Portuguese guest workers often refused HLM housing, so beginning in the mid-1970s Algerian families moved into HLMs clustered in Saint-Seine-Denis, La Corneuve, Stains, Sarcelles, Aulnay-Sous-Bois, and sometimes with Moroccans in farther away locations, including Poissy and Trappes. A new social geography emerged, in which Moroccans and Algerians were clustered in HLM housing on the outskirts of major cities, setting the foundation for settlement patterns that would become entrenched in the following decades.

3.4.1 The End of the Guest Worker Program (1974-1980)

Housing policy would once again shift in 1974 when the French government followed other European countries and ended its guest worker program. Those remaining were viewed as immigrants, rather than temporary residents, marking an important period of transition in the state's approach to housing, as well as its categorization of minority identity. The Secretary of State for Immigrant Workers (*Secretariat de l'etat aux travailleurs immigres*, SETI) was created to facilitate their settlement as families began to rejoin migrants. After the dissolution of *bidonvilles*, however, 1.5 million immigrants remained in unsanitary housing and *micro bidonvilles*. In response, SETI convinced employers to devote .02 to one percent of their resources towards immigrant housing construction to ameliorate the situation.

As SETI struggled to address the housing shortage, the Sonacotra faced similar problems following its expansion in 1963 to serve all foreign workers. Shortly before the guest worker program ended, Sonacotra's director Claudius-Petit admitted the organization had encouraged housing policies that led to segregation between guest workers and the native French. Those still living in foyers-hotels faced even further residential and social exclusion. In a meeting with the Secretary of State of Guest Workers Paul Dijoud, Petit publicly defended the foyer as an acceptable solution. As he argued, housing in foyers was only a temporary:

> "The segregative formula is nothing but a stopgap. But in the current context of the lack of social housing, it's still necessary, especially in areas with high densities of foreign workers. In the long term, the ideal would be to intensify the construction of small lodgings to address the needs not only of the foreigners but first and foremost the French…In fact, we should realize that immigration is an artificial and traumatic phenomenon that will have to be ended sooner or later" (CAC 19870056, art. 7).

This admission highlighted an increasingly visible contradiction within the Sonactora's housing policies: while it worked to ensure social mixing, it instead had reinforced immigrant isolation.

As the guest worker program concluded, questions surrounding the integration and residential isolation of former guest workers appeared. In a response letter to a local school director in Sarcelles, Claudius-Petit established a link between segregation and integration:

> "All that's segregative is unreasonable, a foyer-hotel is not ideal, it's a stopgap, but it's with foyer-hotels that we destroyed the bidonvilles that dishonored the Parisian *banlieue*, at the gates of Sarcelles. I understand when you say, 'such a group has no chance of integrating into the population of Sarcelles,' and you imprudently add 'even if the village was willing to welcome them.' Do you believe that the immigrants near the Gare de Lyon can integrate? Do you believe that the immigrants near the Port de Chapelle can integrate? More simply, do you believe that the noble village of Sarcelles would be prepared to welcome immigrant workers so they can be dispersed among the population?" (Lettre d'E. Claudius-Petit à Mme la Directrice de l'école, 1977).

The exchange between Claudius-Petit and the school director highlights the growing number of conversations regarding "immigrant integration" that appeared after the guest worker program's conclusion. Perhaps most importantly, the letter embodies an ideal of integration – both by the state, represented by Claudius-Petit, and the public, represented by the school director – that required the dispersal, or assimilation, of immigrants. In doing so, it established an explicit connection between immigrant settlement patterns, notably their level of segregation, and their social integration.

In many ways, the *ville nouvelle* reflected a similar ambition to encourage dispersion and assimilation. Architects drew inspiration from the urban qualities associated with Paris's Latin quarter and southern European cities, which were

characterized by dense urban centers and social mixing. "The *villes nouvelles* will be groundbreaking because of their markedly urban character," an official report proclaimed. The goal was to "substitute 'a city in pieces' with that which constitutes the soul of the city: the ordering of spaces and neighborhoods, the variety of densities, the landmarks for the inhabitant, mixing and integration of the 'urban functions' (housing, commerce, offices, culture, recreation, and so on), mobility, and communication" (*Rapport Sur Les Villes Nouvelles, Commission Des Villes–Groupe Ad Hoc 'Villes Nouvelles*,*'* 1969).

The Le Vaudreuil *ville nouvelle* in Normandy, for example, aimed to "reconcile the characteristics of scale and animation of a Latin city with the qualities of the contemporary world" (Maze, 1977) in order to "democratize" culture (La Documentation française, 1974). Reflecting the growing emphasis on housing's potential to create social equality, the street became the "democratic space of direct action and animation" (Cupers, 2014). A focus on cultural and social life meant that collective facilities would be integrated into the everyday lives of *ville nouvelle* residents. Housing was thus a rare sector in which separation between the public and private became blurred.

To facilitate an exodus from the *grands ensembles*, state housing provisions were increased to encourage homeownership, a trend that also appeared in England around the same time. Market-led homebuilding of the *villes nouvelles* and suburbs grew as investment in collective housing fell. Single family home construction increased from 200,000 units annually in 1970 to 300,000 by 1980. At the same time, collective housing construction decreased from 300,000 at the start of the decade to less than 150,000 by the end.

After the departure of the middle class in favor of suburban living, former guest workers and their families primarily settled in the social housing sector, in many cases relocating to the *grands ensembles*. White flight was compounded by slum clearance projects, which required the poor to be rehoused in collective housing states on the peripheries of large cities.

Residential mobility among the native French, coupled with government intervention favoring individual homeownership, led to rising levels of segregation, creating residential cleavages along ethnic and class lines. Reports warned that the "the expulsion of the 'rehoused' to the periphery of cities [could] lead to social instability" (*Rapport Final, Groupe Du Long Terme, Commission de l'habitation, CGP*, 1970). Observers only had to look to the urban segregation characteristic of US cities to understand the detrimental effects of residential isolation. Their fears were largely confirmed in an article by sociologists Chamboredon and Lemaire (1970), who argued that the spatial proximity of residents living in the *grands ensembles* and their degree of isolation had encouraged social segregation. Rather than the desired "populist utopia," Chamboredon and Lemaire found that urban planning had instead led to isolation, social polarization, and exclusion.

Public discourse surrounding residential isolation and social exclusion prompted an increased focus on race and ethnicity, both among the public and within scholarly research. It also highlighted the relative absence of reliable statistics on the number of immigrants in France. Although planners and policy makers were aware of the growing social isolation of the country's immigrant populations, the absence of census data recording racial and ethnic background made it difficult to examine their precise degree

of exclusion. Instead, research was normative, framing social segregation as a problem and suggesting local integration as the solution.

3.5 The "Problem of the Quartiers" and Urban Policy in the 1980s

The link between segregation and integration would reappear in public discourse shortly after François Mitterrand assumed the presidency in May 1981. France was rocked by riots in the outskirts of Lyon, first that summer, and again in 1983. Public concern regarding the "problem of the *quartiers*" arose, wherein the spatial concentration of ethnic minorities was increasingly linked to social disadvantage.[5] President of the National Commission for the Social Development of the Quartiers (*Commission nationale de développement social des quartiers*) Hubert Dubedout was tasked with offering a solution. In response, Dubedout published a report titled "Together, Remaking the City" (*Ensemble, refaire la ville*). Recalling the public's reaction to the riots, he wrote:

> "The media were broadcasting to a surprised and concerned nation the image of ghettos where people and families, rejected by the rest of the city and society, lived in a uniform, deteriorated and soulless environment. [...] The public found out about such neighborhoods as 'les Minguettes' in the city of Vénissieux, those of northern Marseilles, the slums of Roubaix, the 'Haut du Lièvre' housing project in Nancy, the 'cité des 4000' in La Courneuve" (Dubedout, 1983).[6]

Rising residential isolation was seen as the result of residential strategies prompting certain social groups, notably the well-off native French, to relocate (Simon, 2002). According to this logic, the concentration of "disqualified" populations was the primary cause of their "social decline" (Paugam, 1995). Yet, unlike the market-based economic

[5] While *quartiers* can refer to any type of neighborhood, the term is often used in pejorative way to refer to poor neighborhoods in inner cities and the *banlieues*.

[6] A *cité* is a housing project or estate.

regeneration that was proposed in England to solve similar issues, Mitterrand's government looked to housing reform to promote social cohesion and solidarity (Goodchild & Gorrichon, 1993). This strategy ushered in the first of several initiatives addressing social exclusion and residential isolation (Tissot, 2007).

Local social development policies emerged under an urban social policy known as the Urban Policy (*Politique de la* ville) developed by Dubedout in 1980. These policies addressed the socio-spatial divisions and clustering of disadvantaged populations in the *banlieues* (Pinçon & Pinçon-Charlot, 1989). The *Politique de la ville* offered spatial solutions to social problems and sought to reduce isolation and regenerate deprived neighborhoods to engender social cohesion.

First, the report proposed the Quartier Social Development Program *(Développement social des quartiers*, DSQ), which was tasked with developing targeted intervention programs for *quartiers en difficultés* (problem neighborhoods). Second, to supplement the proposed initiatives by the DSQ, Mitterrand devolved housing policy to communes in the first decentralization laws of 1982, and again in 1983.

Decentralization was a notable departure from the centralized housing policies of the previous decades. The Department of Planning and City Planning (*Direction de l'aménagement et de l'urbanisme*, DAU) was stripped of its usual responsibilities, including the "rehabilitation" of the *quartiers*. The emphasis shifted to diversifying land use and addressing the needs of excluded minorities.

Policymakers viewed the lawlessness of the riots as the outcome of rampant unemployment in the isolated *banlieues*. Rather than arguing for employment as a means to integration, however, they concluded that integration should be a pre-requisite for

employment (Simon, 2002). A local employment policy was thus instituted to encourage the link between social integration and professional qualifications.

The program also designated neighborhoods according to different tiers, including "problem neighborhoods" (*quartiers en difficulté*), "at-risk neighborhoods" (*quartiers à risque*), and "sensitive areas" (*zones sensibles*). However, several studies have since highlighted the issues surrounding the state's designations (Champion et al., 1995; Tabard, 1993). Most notably, state designations often failed to correspond to real levels of deprivation. As Tabard (1993) notes, "although the neighbourhoods targeted by the Urban Policy do not rank very high in the socio-spatial hierarchy their situation is nevertheless not the worst, neither within their own city, nor as compared to other cities" (p. 16). A dynamic emerged wherein certain neighborhoods were institutionally recognized as deprived, and accordingly were assigned to government programs aimed at remedying their perceived deprivation. At the same time, other neighborhoods were ignored, creating categorized distinctions between "recognized" and "unrecognized" areas that further entrenched divisions.

As part of a broader effort to categorize spatial exclusion, additional designations were instituted, including the Priority Education Zone (*Zone d'Education Prioritaire*, ZEP), which addressed educational disparities within France, notably for children with immigrant parents. Other initiatives included the Municipal Councils for the Prevention of Delinquency (*Conseils communaux de prévention de la délinquance*, CCPD), and the local taskforces for the social integration of disadvantaged young people (*missions locales pour l'insertion des jeunes en difficulté*). The overlap between local devolution and spatial solutions to social problems thus became evident. The state's emphasis on the

link between disadvantage and place – whether it be schools or cities – reinforced its role in structuring space and using neighborhoods as the primary avenues to integration.

Although urban policy was framed as an alternative to the centralized urban planning of the previous decades, as Donzelot and Estèbe (1994) note, the state continued to position itself as an organizer (*état-animateur*). The DSQ, for example, sought to prevent the division of public and local community action, including schooling, housing, and healthcare (Simon 2002). Tensions between the government's attempts to prevent local divisions while also granting increased power to the communes would prove increasingly contentious.

Along with the "problem of the *quartiers*," France also faced class-based gentrification. Tabard and Chenu (1993) show that between 1982 and 1990 urban spaces became increasingly delineated by socio-professional status. These spatial shifts were due to two simultaneous processes. First, the clustering of middle-class families in areas of similar socio-professional status and the eviction of lower-class families. Second, the grouping of blue-collar workers together and the expansion of the service sector.

Patterns of residential mobility according to socio-professional class left immigrant families in precarious positions, as they were over-represented in low-skilled jobs and left in the most deprived areas (Guillon, 1996). Simon (1995) notes that by the early 1990s immigrants made up 28.5 percent of the working-class population in Paris's Bellville neighborhood but represented 65 percent of unskilled workers and 45 percent of the unemployed populations. Along Belleville's streets with the highest concentration of immigrants, the latter made up 40 percent of the population, 81 percent of unskilled workers, and 71 percent of the unemployed population. Their spatial concentration was

overlaid with economic deprivation. According to the 1990 census, over 75 percent of Turkish, North African and African households made less than the French median income (INSEE, 1997).

Housing soon became segmented along ethnic lines. Immigrants tended to cluster according to national origin: Portuguese and Spanish in detached homes; Turks, Algerians and Moroccans in public housing; Southeast Asians in newer apartments, and Africans in the inner cities, older apartment buildings or detached homes bought using owner-occupation programs (Simon, 2002).[7] These settlement patterns were overlaid with socio-economic status, as Turks, Moroccans and Algerians were more likely to be represented in working-class neighborhoods, while others, including the Portuguese and Spanish, lived in middle-class neighborhoods (Simon, 1995).

3.6 Segregation, Isolation and the "Right to the City" (1990-2000)

Fears grew surrounding the segmentation of housing along ethnic lines and the resulting spatial exclusion reappeared nearly a decade after the 1981 riots. Social unrest erupted in the *banlieues* of Lyon and Paris in 1990 and 1991, primarily among youths of immigrant origin. Reflecting on the riots, Geindre (1993) observes:

> "In some neighbourhoods, the laws of the republic are increasingly losing hold…Just as in the United States and in Great Britain, those who live in disfavored neighborhoods have begun to search for an identity as members of an ethnic community, and one may reasonably see this trend as a potential threat to the non-religious principles and values of the French republic" (p.10).

[7] Poiret (1996) finds that developers would frequently partner with African community leaders to offload hard-to-sell plots of land. In doing so, African households that faced difficulties finding rental units bought homes in areas with high concentrations of their co-ethnics or co-nationalists.

In making these claims, Geindre points to the detrimental impact of spatial isolation on republican values. He also suggests that identification with an ethnic community must necessarily be linked to a form of religious identification.

To what degree were fears surrounding growing segregation supported by evidence? The empirical analyses displayed in Table 3.2 use restricted access INSEE census data over two census periods between 1982 and 1990 to analyze changes in segregation levels. Calculations are computed using individual files that contain information regarding the nationality and locality of individuals in each census block (approximately 500 inhabitants per block). Access was given for about 25 percent of census tracts across France's largest cities. Due to restrictions in census data availability, it is not possible to gather data on individual ethnic groups. Therefore, I use "non-European immigrant" as an identifier, which includes foreigners and naturalized immigrants. Following Verdugo and Toma (2018), I use metro areas as the local unit of analysis. I fix the boundaries of metro areas across time using their measurement in the 1999 census.

As with the English case, I use the dissimilarity and isolation indices. Here, I compute dissimilarity indices between non-European immigrants and native populations (around 2,500 inhabitants), using data collected at the IRIS level.[8] The two right-hand columns show the spatial isolation of non-European immigrants. They account for the percentage of non-European immigrants living in a tract and measure the degree to which

[8] The index is calculated as follows: $D = \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left| \frac{w_i}{W_T} - \frac{m_i}{M_T} \right|$. Where W_T and M_T are native and non-European foreigners in a district, and w_i and m_i are the non-European foreigners and native populations in IRIS i, respectively.

non-European immigrants live only among themselves and estimate the potential for inter-ethnic mixing within neighborhoods.[9]

Table 3.2. Segregation and Isolation Across Largest French Metropolitan Areas, 1982 and 1990

Commune	Segregation		Isolation	
	1982	1990	1982	1990
Paris	31	30	13	15
Lyon	31	33	10.2	12.5
Marseille	35	33	16.3	15.3
Nice	21	22	7.9	8.5
Lille	42	42	10.2	11.8
Toulouse	31	32	7.7	9.8
Bordeaux	37	35	5.0	5.9
Nantes	43	45	3.9	6.2
Toulon	36	37	13.0	12.0
Douai	40	39	6.2	6.2
Strasbourg	32	35	8.6	12.9
Grenoble	31	32	10.0	10.8
Rouen	36	39	5.3	8.1
Montpellier	28	28	9.1	11.6
Nancy	36	40	6.5	8.0
Weighted average non-European immigrant households	33	33	11.5	13.0

Notes: Only metro areas with more than 500 immigrants are included in the calculation. A household is coded as non-European if the head of the household is a non-European immigrant. Segregation indices compare the distribution of non-European immigrant households to those of other households (natives and non-European immigrants).
Sources: Calculations based on the 1982 and 1990 censuses, INSEE.

[9] The index is calculated as follows: $F_{fw} = \sum(\frac{n_{if}}{N_f})(\frac{n_{iw}}{n_i})$. Where n_{if} is the number of non-European foreigners in the IRIS, $n_{iw}$is the number of natives in the tract, $N_f$is the number of non-European foreigners in the city or town, and $n_i$is the total population in the tract.

Both indices reveal the full extent of segregation and isolation across French cities over the eight-year period. Within the largest metropolitan areas – rocked by the riots a decade before and again in the early 1990s – there were few signs of residential integration. In the four cities that experienced a decline in segregation, the decrease was two percentage points or less, two cities remained the same, and in nine cities segregation increased by up to four points. Although several cities experienced a decline (Paris, Marseille, Bordeaux, and Douai) the overall trend was an increase in segregation across France's largest cities.

As Table 3.2 indicates, levels of isolation decreased as well. In fact, isolation only increased in one city, Marseille, and remained stable in Douai. The remaining thirteen cities experienced a decrease in isolation, indicating that the likelihood of a minority group interacting with a majority group in fact increased between 1982 and 1990, albeit by a small percentage.

Increases in segregation, and only a slight decrease in isolation, led to persistent fears surrounding the "ghetto." As Simon (2002, p. 64) notes:

> "This vague concept now play[ed] a central role in the symbolic management of social conflicts and underscore[d] two strategic issues: 1) the recognition of ethnic diversity and of its impact both on social organisation and national symbolic representations; 2) the management of the territorialisation of social inequality, in other words the attempt to control a system whereby populations are confined to specific areas according to their socio-economic status or, which is even worse in a French perspective, to their position in the hierarchy of ethnic origins."

Growing segregation, coupled with riots, resulted in the Besson Law (*Loi Besson*) in May 1990, which introduced the "right to housing." The law opened social housing to populations in precarious situations, many of them minorities and immigrants, with the goal of ensuring "social balances." Like the earlier tolerance threshold for HLMS, POPS

was a decidedly arbitrary measure of balance based on the average social characteristics of a population (Bacqué & Berrat, 1995).

The Besson Law foreshadowed a series of initiatives that encouraged urban integration. In 1991, the government enacted the Urban Development Act (*La loi d'orientation pour la ville*, LOV), initially known as the "anti-ghetto law." The Urban Development Act's goal was to "fight exclusion by refusing to accept a two-tiered society" (Geindre, 1993). It resulted in a set of "Guidelines for the City," which asserted that each individual had a "right to the city," including housing, security, transportation, and social facilities, with the goal of fighting residential exclusion. The law opposed homogeneous neighborhoods, with the assumption that diversity was necessary for social cohesion.

Several years later, the government introduced the *Loi d'orientation du 29 juillet 1998 relative à la lutte contre les exclusions*, known as the law against exclusion, which states: "diversity is primarily a human balance which is necessary for the occupation of the city by all its inhabitants, without identification with some stigmatized zone in which they would have the feeling of being under house arrest" (Loi N° 98-657 Du 29 Juillet 1998 d'orientation Relative à La Lutte Contre Les Exclusions, 1998). Its housing component redefined social housing's mission to ensure "respect for social diversity" (Ibid).

A new type of housing policy, known as social mixing (*mixité sociale*) emerged under President François Mitterrand, which aimed to prevent the communitarianism found in the earlier *bidonvilles* (Blanc-Chaléard, 2006). The Mitterrand government also argued that it would combat social segregation, particularly in HLM housing. Resting on

ideals of social justice and equality, the concept of social mixing was framed in opposition to segregation, which went opposed the republican ideal of civic equality (Bacqué, 2003). Social mixing policies were articulated along two dimensions: territorial and individual. The former dimension framed social mixing as an effort to combat spatial segregation and poverty in peripheral urban spaces; the latter would supposedly allow households to escape a culture of poverty, benefit from the advantages of a good neighborhood, learn from those who were "better integrated" (Bacqué & Fol, 2018).

However, the strategy of social mixing remained highly contested. Scholars in the Chicago School noted that the relative residential isolation of certain neighborhoods could lead to their integration (Genestier, 1995). Others argued that dispersing the urban poor and minority populations would lead to reduced social resources, such as social capital, that were facilitated by social proximity (de Souza Briggs, 2005).

In addition to the implementation of social mixing policies, a series of six national debate emerged in March 1999 titled "Living, getting around…Living in the City," which brought together residents, experts, and government officials. The debates concluded by agreeing that three types of fractures needed to be addressed: generational divides, geographic divides, and social divides.

Policy responses developed in two directions. The first considered the primary issue to be social housing access, and proposed solutions to meet the demand of the most vulnerable populations. Advocates called on specialized associations to produce and manage additional social housing, while HLM organizations were asked to welcome households in precarious situations more broadly, and a series of measures aimed at

clarifying the operation of allocation methods and restoring consistency to prefectural contingents were put in place.

The second response, diagnosing a "ghettoization" of the social housing sector, aimed to improve the economic conditions of the *banlieue* and pushed for schemes to incentivize middle-class settlement in poor areas. To do this, communes were tasked with improving local green space and broader urban transformation. At times, this required demolishing and rebuilding housing stock, and communes often imposed settlement limits on the disadvantaged and minority populations.

In December 2000 the Solidarity and Urban Renewal Act (*La loi solidarité et renouvellement urbain*, known as *Loi SRU*) was introduced, which addressed five domains: the right to the city, social mixing, transportation, social housing landlords, and civil law. Its goals included the goal of "greater solidarity" and the reinforcement of "democracy and decentralization" (Loi N° 2000-1208 Du 13 Décembre 2000 Relative à La Solidarité et Au Renouvellement Urbains, 2000). The law would profoundly alter the right to housing and urban living in France. Passed under the government of Lionel Jospin, the most well-known article 55 required larger communes (more than 1,5000 residents in Ile-de-France and 3,500 in other regions) to make 20 percent of their housing stock devoted to social housing.[10]

[10] The law was implemented with mixed outcomes. In 2008, of the 730 communes that had less than 30 percent social housing stock at the time of the law's passing, 330 did not realize their goal. Less than a decade later, a 2014-2016 report showed that the cumulative catch-up objectives assigned to the municipalities subject to the SRU system were exceeded to reach 188,587 housing units (i.e., 106 percent of the cumulative objectives). However, of the 1,152 municipalities subjected to the requirement, 649 failed to reach the level of production set by the law (*Bilan Triennal SRU 2014-2016*, 2016).

Despite a variety of initiatives aimed at increasing diversity and preventing segregation, social diversity policies raised significant contradictions. Municipalities and social housing managers were frequently caught in the contradiction of social mixing, which required communes to welcome the most disadvantaged households while also maintaining a degree of social and economic diversity.

3.7 Housing Policy and the Rise of "Immigrant Enclaves" (2000-2011)

Discussions surrounding social isolation in the *banlieues* reappeared in October 2005, when France was rocked by riots on the outskirts of Paris (*Émeutes de 2005 dans les banlieues Françaises*). The unrest began in Clichy-sous-Bois, when police investigated a break-in and a group of youths scattered to avoid questioning. Two died from electrocution after hiding in an electrical substation. Their deaths ignited national anger surrounding youth unemployment, policing, and supposed lawlessness in the *banlieues*, igniting tension surrounding the spatial and economic displacement of minority youths. "People are joining together to say we've had enough," said one protester. "We live in ghettos. Everyone lives in fear" (Sachs, 2005). The riots lasted for three weeks and spread to other French cities, leading President Jacques Chirac to declare a state of emergency.

The 2005 riots were a turning point in the discussion of minority integration. Links were increasingly drawn between the religious origins of inhabitants in the *banlieues* and their social isolation. "Islam is seen as the biggest challenge to the country's secular model in the past 100 years," a BBC report proclaimed in the wake of the riots. The report described the discontent and alienation experienced by many French Muslims in the suburbs of French cities. However, the editorial also questioned whether

such alarm was justified, citing that France's "Muslim ghettos" were not hotbeds of separatism and that "the suburbs are full of people desperate to integrate into the wider society" (Ibid). Nevertheless, the riots would cement distinctions in the public's mind between the religious identification of many of the rioters living in the *banlieues* and the White, majority population living in larger towns and cities, reinforcing fears of growing segregation and isolation.

Table 3.3. Segregation and Isolation Across Largest French Metropolitan Areas, 1999 and 2012

Commune	Segregation		Isolation		Adjusted Isolation Index *eta^2*	
	1999	2012	1999	2012	1982	2012
Paris	32	33	18.8	25.4	5.4	7.9
Lyon	35	36	15.4	19.3	4.2	8.2
Marseille	36	40	17.1	20.5	9.3	9.1
Nice	26	33	10.2	14.6	2.3	3.9
Lille	43	41	14.1	17.2	6.0	8.7
Toulouse	32	30	14.0	15.8	3.9	9.0
Bordeaux	36	35	8.2	11.2	2.5	4.5
Nantes	41	38	8.2	12.4	2.4	5.4
Toulon	36	45	11.0	12.8	8.5	6.5

Douai	36	33	5.8	6.1	3.4	2.8
Strasbourg	39	35	17.5	21.3	3.8	9.8
Grenoble	34	33	13.6	15.9	4.2	7.2
Rouen	37	35	10.5	15.3	2.7	6.5
Montpellier	27	30	15.3	20.1	3.3	7.7
Nancy	37	35	8.7	12.6	3.3	5.1
Weighted average non-European immigrant households	34	34	16.0	20.7	5.3	9.3

Notes: Columns 1-4 show the segregation and isolation indices of European and non-European immigrants across French metro areas with at least 500 immigrants. The last two columns show the adjusted isolation index. Households are included as non-European if the head of the household is a non-European immigrant.
Sources: 1982, 1999, and 2012 censuses, INSEE.

Table 3.3 investigates whether these fears were supported by empirical evidence. To do so, I compare segregation and isolation levels between 1999 and 2012. To factor the growth of non-European immigrants into consideration, the last two columns show the *eta^2* indices in 1982 and 2012 that adjust the isolation index by considering the proportion of non-European households in the metro areas. Adjusted isolations varied from 3 percent to 10 percent in 2012 and increased by four points between 1982 and 2012.

Table 3.4. Distribution of Census Tracts and non-European Immigrant Households by the Share of Immigrant Households in the Population

Share of Immigrants in the Population Tract	00-01	02-05	06-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	>30
A. Distribution of Census Tracts								
1982	9.9	24.7	25.8	18.6	10.8	5.2	2.5	2.5
1990	9.2	26.2	26.2	18.2	10.1	5.2	2.4	2.6
1999	7.2	28.7	27.3	16.0	9.0	4.7	2.8	4.2
2012	4.7	29.8	26.1	14.6	8.8	4.9	3.3	7.9
B. Distribution of Non-European Immigrant Households Across Census Tracts	00-01	02-05	06-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	26-30	>30
1982	0.2	4.9	15.4	23.2	21.1	14.3	9.1	11.7
1990	0.2	5.2	15.9	22.3	20.3	14.2	8.4	13.3
1999	0.2	5.6	15.2	18.9	16.9	12.7	9.6	21.0
2012	0.1	4.8	13.1	15.2	14.3	11.0	9.1	32.5

Note: Panel A shows groups census tracts according to the percentage of immigrants in the tract. Panel B shows the distribution of non-European immigrants across the census tracts.
Source: Verdugo and Toma (2018).

Contrary to England, which witnessed a slight reduction in segregation levels between 2001 and 2011, segregation in France increased, although there remains substantial variation across metropolitan areas. In 2012, segregation indices for Paris and Nice were 33, but in Marseille they were much higher (40) and grew four percentage points in just over ten years. Segregation decreased in cities such as Rouen and Douai but rose in other cities, including Toulon and Montpellier.

Table 3.5. The Distribution of Households by the Size of the Housing Projects in 2012

	Percentage of Public Housing in the Census Tract in 2012			
	0-5%	5-16%	16-37%	>37%
A. Distribution of Households Living in Public Housing by Project Size				
All households	4.4	19.5	29.8	47.2
Immigrant households	2.2	12.1	24.7	61.0
Non-European immigrant households				
France	1.9	10.8	23.7	63.5
Paris	1.3	7.1	21.5	70.1
Lyon	1.7	13.2	29.3	55.8
Marseille	2.4	10.9	21.0	65.8
B. Construction Period of Public Housing by Project Size				
Share constructed before 1975	30.0	37.1	50.1	68.1
Share constructed before 1981	41.4	53.1	67.2	84.8

Source: 2012 French census, INSEE.

Despite an increase in segregation, Table 3.3 indicates that isolation decreased across the majority of cities. For example, in 1999 there was an 18.8% percent chance that a non-

European immigrant living in Paris would interact with a French native. In 2012, the likelihood rose to 25.4 percent.

Verdugo and Toma (2018) present evidence that increased segregation may be related to the rise of "immigrant enclaves," (Logan et al., 2002; Wilson & Portes, 1980) understood as tracts that contained more than 30 percent immigrant households. As shown in Table 3.4, there have been substantial changes in the number of census tracts with sizable immigrant-origin populations since 1982.

The authors show that by 2012 non-European immigrants made up at least one percent of the majority of census tracts, and that the number of immigrant enclaves tripled. These changes are closely related to the presence of housing projects. Within immigrant enclaves, the median proportion of residents in public housing was 15 percent in 2012, more than double in 1982 (Table 3.5).

Social Mixing and Non-Differentiation: Current Trends in French Housing Policy

The increase in segregation and isolation, as well as growing fears of "immigrant enclaves," led to a continued reliance on targeted programs to address spatial inequalities. By the end of the 2000s, however, tensions between the republican ideal of non-differentiation and the reality of targeted programs began to appear. Devolution to communes for planning entailed local public action plans that targeted specific communities. For example, ZEP programs were justified as being necessary to address educational disparities between natives and children of immigrants (Lorcerie, 1995). Others suggested that social mixing policies and urban programs addressing exclusion violated the republican principle of non-differentiation according to ethnic origin. Simon

(2002) notes that while this may be the case, they are "tolerated" in cities with sizable Muslim populations (p.65).

Social mixing and other urban policies such as ZEP programs propose spatial solutions to social problems. In this way, the state's current use of urban policy to mitigate inequalities reflects its approach to managing its citizenry in the post-war period. While targeted programs may mitigate current social inequalities, they do little to address the root of these problems. As Table 3.3 shows, segregation and isolation levels remain relatively high across France, contributing to inequality and structuring Muslims' social integration outcomes.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter provided a historical overview of space-making processes across France. It showed how the state adopted a centralized role in housing construction in the post-war period and highlighted its use of housing policy to regulate its citizenry. In this way, planning and housing construction took on decidedly social qualities.

While the state focused on shaping a civic-minded native population, it faced a growing housing crisis for its guest workers. The state's patchwork solution is best characterized by its reliance on the *bidonvilles*, or shanty towns, to house guest workers. Beginning in the 1950s, however, the state razed the *bidonvilles* in favor of other housing solutions. *Bidonvilles* were presented as communitarian spaces that encouraged the primacy of ethnic and national belonging. The subsequent development of housing organizations such as the Sonacotra illustrated the state's reliance on housing as a social tool that was used to prevent communitarianism and integrate ethnically diverse populations.

When the guest worker program ended in 1974, immigrants and their families settled in the *grands ensembles* and HLMs, and the native French moved into individual homes. In this way, housing became segmented along ethnic lines. By the end of the 20th century, growing spatial polarization led to fears surrounding social exclusion that would shape the state's response for the coming decades. These fears were compounded by the terror attacks on 9/11, which highlighted patterns of social exclusion and led to minority categorization along religious lines. While social mixing policies partly address entrenched patterns of spatial exclusion, I have shown that minorities continue to live in relatively high levels of segregation and isolation across France.

4 CHAPTER FOUR

Muslim Inclusion, Segregation, and Descriptive Representation in England

In 2005, former Labour politician Trevor Phillips argued that England was "sleepwalking" into segregation.[1] His controversial statement was echoed by Lord Ousley, who admitted "[segregation's] not new - it's been around for a while. It may be getting worse." Both Phillips and Lord Ousley expressed fears that segregation was rising, and that it would lead to social exclusion. More recently, politicians have begun to worry about segregation's political implications. Former Minister for Constitutional Affairs Harriet Harman noted: "We don't want to get into a situation like America - but if you look at the figures, we are already looking like America...In London, poor, young and black people don't register to vote." Implicit in her comments is the assumption that segregation dampens political participation. If segregation is associated with reduced voter engagement, what are its effects on Muslim representation?

This chapter investigates the impact of segregation on the descriptive representation of Muslims across England. I suggest that we first need to investigate the conditions under which Muslims are included as local candidates. I analyze 20th century party inclusion strategies and demonstrate how the Labour Party's use of the block vote in the post-war period has been adapted to include Muslims in the wake of declining party-union linkages. In doing so, I demonstrate the ways in which Muslim inclusion has been shaped by non-programmatic inclusion strategies, including patronage and

[1] Phillips made these comments in the wake of the 7/7 bombings in London and implied that religious and ethnic divides would ultimately lead to further violence. In March 2020 he was suspended from the Labour Party following accusations of Islamophobia.

clientelism, which capitalize on the dense concentration of Muslim populations in highly segregated cities.

Next, I propose that segregation carries important implications for Muslims' descriptive representation. Using spatial models of English cities, I demonstrate how segregation interacts with population demographics to shape local representation outcomes for Muslims. Contrary to the prevailing literature, I show that there is a non-linear relationship between the size of a Muslim population in a given district and its political representation outcomes. Segregation level conditions the effect of Muslim population size and increases the likelihood that Muslims will be elected to local office. However, its effect is reduced in districts with sizable Muslim populations. I propose the concept of a population threshold, in which election to local office depends not only on the proportion of Muslims in a given district, but its level of segregation. I provide evidence for my findings drawing on over 33,000 candidate observations across more than 11,000 ward-level elections between 2010 and 2021. Results are aggregated at the local authority level to produce an original dataset of 431 district-level election outcomes.

This chapter contributes to the literature on the electoral geography of political representation. First, it shows how the geography of co-ethnicity matters for candidate inclusion and representation outcomes. Second, it casts doubt on the expected linear relationship between an ethnic group's size and its electoral power. Third, it shows how segregation has facilitated the use of non-programmatic political strategies. By demonstrating the conditioning effect of segregation, the findings call for a reevaluation of the relationship between group size and representation outcomes.

4.1 Labour-Union Linkages and Patronage Politics

Current Muslim representation outcomes are rooted in the Labour Party's inclusion strategies throughout the 20th century, as well as its period of crisis beginning in the early 2000s. In the ten-year period between 2011 and 2021 several shocks to the party system resulted in both local and national electoral realignments. At the local level, this ten-year period has been marked by rapid Labour Party losses in formerly industrial cities, along with Conservative gains and the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

This section situates the Labour Party's current electoral concerns within a broader framework of party decline. It traces the breakdown of party-union linkages from the 1970s until the early 1990s. In particular, it focuses on the party's internal structure, with an emphasis on the block vote, to understand how Labour's current use of patronage politics is rooted in an internal party apparatus that was constructed in the early 20th century to facilitate party-union linkages.

Labour's electoral dilemmas are illustrative of a more protracted crisis. Since the 1980s, the party has worked to maintain control in formerly industrial cities that had powerful union presences. Labour-union linkages were previously facilitated by the party's internal structure, notably the block vote system, which required affiliated organizations to vote as single entities in party elections. The block vote system also involved an accepted form of patronage politics, whereby unions engaged in seat and vote buying. Although the block vote was a "seemingly blatant contrariety to democracy" (Quinn, 2002, p. 207) few studies have examined the system's non-programmatic politics and its implications for democratic practice within the Labour Party.

As this section argues, the block vote facilitated the emergence of a form of patronage politics that was antithetical to programmatic forms of political inclusion.

Labour's sustained use of the block vote established the party's strategy of patronage politics to gain votes, and its reliance on the system carried profound implications for group incorporation, first for unions, and later, for Muslims. While it was adept at including large groups, Labour struggled to include the voices of individual members, a weakness that would usher in a period of steep party decline in the 1980s. As Labour-union relations crumbled, however, Labour would harness this pre-existing internal structure to integrate a new electorate that was internally fragmented but united along religious lines.

4.1.1 The Labour Party, Clientelism and the Block Vote

Before the Labour-union crises emerged in the 1980s, Labour's priorities were firmly rooted in maintaining strong party-union linkages. Labour's symbiotic relationship with the unions can be traced to the party's founding when unions delivered critical electoral and financial support in exchange for sympathetic policies. Strong party-union linkages resulted in Labour victories in half of the General Elections between 1945 and 1974.

Labour-union relations were embedded in the party's internal structure, notably its use of the block vote. The system relied on an indirect federal structure (Duverger, 1964) in which individuals were only able to join through affiliated organizations, usually trade unions. The block vote created a cohesive voting structure that minimized dissenting voices and improved efficiency and the system required each union to deliver votes via delegates rather than individual members (Quinn, 2002). This meant that votes were often concentrated among a small number of wealthy unions that received more delegates, thereby skewing the power distribution in favor of large and profitable unions. The block vote amounted to a system of exchange in which groups (i.e., unions) received

decision-making power in exchange for financial contributions and patronage. In doing so, the block vote required each union's delegates to adopt a single opinion on a policy issue. This practice is consistent with the Labour Party's broader tactic of reducing multiple voices into one for the purpose of electoral capture, a tactic it would later employ with an ethnically diverse Muslim electorate.

Intra-union dynamics involving party leadership selection illustrated the degree to which patronage was involved in decision-making processes. During party leadership contests, unions had the power to nominate candidates under the block vote system. Candidates that lacked a union leader's patronage were often side-lined or forced to rally intermediate-level supporters (Quinn, 2004). By contrast, candidates favored by powerful unions and their leaders usually had their outcomes determined before the elections took place. In two notable elections, first in 1983 and then in 1992, intra-party patronage was a critical factor in determining leadership selection. First, in 1983, Neil Kinnock's campaign for Labour Party Leader was strengthened by the support of MPs who voted for Kinnock in the open ballot election because they feared losing their union patronage (Stark, 1996). Nearly a decade later in 1992, John Smith received over 90 percent of the votes in his bid to become Leader because MPs again feared losing their patronage (Quinn, 2004).

The block vote's ability to concentrate power within select groups also facilitated seat buying, in which unions sponsored candidates for local office and parliament in order to ensure union interest representation. Seat buying remained even after the Hastings Agreement was enacted in 1993 to regulate the practice, as the Labour Party

continued to deem it legal and "above board" in order to appease union interests ("The party and the trade unions," 1992).

As is evidenced by the above discussion, the Labour Party's internal structure was centered on the block vote. The system successfully linked financial contributions to decision-making power and ensured that unions maintained their influence by shaping the interests of affiliated organizations rather than individual members. Despite its significance for party operations, however, the block vote was never enshrined in the Labour Party's constitution. In this way, it operated as an informal institution, much like other forms of patronage. The public's displeasure with the system and its undemocratic elements would lead to a reckoning soon after Labour's loss to the Conservatives in the 1979 elections.

4.1.2 Crumbling Relations: Margaret Thatcher's Anti-Union Agenda and Internal Fragmentation

Party-union linkages, which were based on an understanding of mutual exchange, faced two distinct hurdles beginning in the late 1970s. These challenges would ultimately prompt a re-evaluation of party-union linkages in the early 1990s and would eventually cause Labour's shift towards a new electorate.

First, and perhaps most importantly, the Conservatives defeated Labour in the 1979 General Elections and took control of national labor policy. Labour's defeat was partly due to the party's ineffectual response to rising inflation in the late 1970s. James Callaghan's administration faced severe backlash from unions for rising inflation and unemployment and the party was unable to successfully respond to the crisis by the May elections. Unions were dissatisfied with Labour's performance and following the party's

defeat its relationship with the unions soured. In a town hall meeting in Manchester by the National and Local Government Officers' Association (NALGO) in 1982, the Union acknowledged that the majority of its members "must have voted Tory in the 1979 elections," foreshadowing a significant electoral realignment ("Town hall union casts political vote," 1982).

Thatcher's victory in 1979 signaled a turning point for British politics and ushered in an era of reduced union power as a result of two policies. First, the 1980 Employment Rights Act, which restricted the unions' abilities to strike. Second, Norman Tebbitt's Green Paper "Democracy in Trade Unions," which attacked the anti-democratic elements of union structure, namely the political activities of trade unions and the system of block voting. Manufacturing investment dropped by nearly one-third and Britain became a net importer of manufactured goods for the first time since the Industrial Revolution ("Today," Vol. 6, 1983).

In addition to the destruction caused by Thatcher's anti-union policies, public opinion dealt a serious blow to what remained of Labour-union linkages. The party was attacked for its lack of internal transparency, patronage, and financial reliance on the unions. In turn, Labor acknowledged that the unions had a "backward looking, cloth cap, overwhelmingly male, smoke-stack industry image" that damaged their public credibility (Revised Draft Report of the Trade Union Links Review Group, 1993).

In response to growing financial issues and public discontent, Labour formed the Trade Union Links Review Group in 1992, which re-evaluated the party's relationship with the unions. By this time, public anger had reached an all-time high. Labour was under fire for the union practice of seat buying, which had been standard practice since

the party's early days. A 1990 Gallup poll showed that 50 percent of respondents agreed with the statement: "The trade unions have too much say in the affairs of the Labour Party." In a later a draft report from the Trade Union Links Review Group in 1993, Labour conceded that "The financial strengths brought by the unions can be caricatured as 'buying voters' and as undemocratic sectional interest controlling the party." The party acknowledged that the debate surrounding vote buying "was not only an argument about the self-interest of the party but about 'democracy itself'" and recognized that it was a relationship "based on finance and privilege" ("The party and the trade unions," 1993). In response, former Labour MP Graham Allen stated that "no organization should be able to buy votes" and proposed reforms. However, while the reforms forbade vote buying at differentiated prices, they continued to sanction the practice.

As debates surrounding vote buying dominated party discourse, there was also increasing backlash against the block vote. Labour faced a dilemma regarding how to maintain union influence without further alienating the public. "Our aim should be to abolish the block vote but at the same time create a system that still maintains union influence…" it wrote in a 1992 memo, "Abolition of the Block Vote." In response, Labour instituted partial individual balloting, known as one member one vote (OMOV) under the leadership of John Smith in 1993. The new system aimed to limit the type of patronage that had developed between the party and its affiliated organizations, in which activists from affiliated organizations acted as collectors for members who failed to attend meetings. While Smith proposed a complete OMOV policy, the party only accepted a partial system. Under the new OMOV system, affiliated organizations, notably unions, could no longer use the block vote in the selection of parliamentary candidates.

The new system also allowed all due-paying members to vote in the party's leadership decisions. Thus, while union influence diminished under OMOV, the internal mechanisms that permitted the block vote remained. The block vote had yet to be completely dismantled and parts of the party's internal apparatus that allowed for group capture remained.[2]

4.1.3 Labour's Shift Towards a New Electorate and Muslim Inclusion

As the Labour-union relationship turned increasingly stale, proposals aimed at broadening "the cultural, social and occupational appeal of the party to wider sections of the population" emerged (Revised Draft Report of the Trade Union Links Review Group, 1993). An internal memo from the Trade Union Links Review Group illustrates the Labour Party's membership crisis and its shifting electoral strategy:

> "Labour needs a broader based membership which involves a growing section of party supporters…Above all, Labour will need a growing membership to win. Successful election campaigns increasingly require that a modern national communications strategy is allied to, and reinforced by, a long-term program of identifying the concerns of individual voters (especially those in key seats) – and then developing an ongoing dialogue with those voters, through personal contract, mail and the phone…This will become increasingly important as traditional political class, occupational and family loyalties breakdown. This form of communication relies on local knowledge and action, and therefore a strong membership base to make it work" (Labour Summary Position Paper, 1992).

The memo foreshadowed Labour's emerging mobilization strategy aimed at a broadening its electorate and was significant for two reasons. First, the memo acknowledged that traditional party-union links based on class and occupation were deteriorating, as

[2]A complete OMOV system would not be instituted until 2014 under former Labour leader Ed Miliband. Under the new system, all Labour members that were part of an electoral college, including MPs, unions, and MEPs, were allowed to vote for the party Leader and Deputy Leader.

illustrated by the financial and political decline of unions. Second, the memo recognized that "local knowledge" would become an important component of the party's electoral strategy. Labour's interest in developing networks became apparent as it worked to develop new "affinity relationships" with its Muslim electorate (Labour Summary Position Paper, 1992).

In the following years, crumbling party-union linkages forced Labour Party leaders to turn to a new electorate for political support. In close local authority elections, the delivery of large numbers of Muslim votes was increasingly appealing and the inclusion of Muslim candidates on local election ballots became an important electoral strategy. Labour began to rely on the dense geographic concentration of Muslim populations within certain local authorities to deliver votes. This strategy has been facilitated by relatively high levels of segregation across English cities.

4.2 Muslim Candidate Inclusion through Patronage

This section argues that we cannot fully understand the ways in which segregation has shaped Muslim representation without accounting for the persistence of non-programmatic politics. In many cases, Muslim inclusion has been rooted in ethnic-based patronage politics premised on co-opting clan elders for electoral gain. Kinship- and clan-based mobilization strategies are frequently used during campaigns, and it remains common for community leaders to ensure a block vote in exchange for various political favors. A particular form of ethnic-based patronage has developed known as *biraderi politicking*, named after the kinship networks these leaders control. As part of these networks, community elders promise to deliver votes in exchange for local positions. *Biraderi politicking* is common in England's most segregated cities, notably Birmingham

and Bradford (Akhtar & Peace, 2019), and is strengthened by the availability of highly concentrated ethnic communities. What explains the persistence of clientelist politics in advanced democracies? How can pre-existing social structures be adapted to electoral institutions for electoral gain?

This section argues that segregation has facilitated the emergence of an ethnic-based clientelism. The Labour Party has manipulated the political space by co-opting kinship networks and encouraging the emergence of politically salient ethnic identities. Here, electoral institutions, which are exogenous to the presence of Muslim communities, have strengthened and activated social structures that are sustained in the absence of state patronage. The party's internal apparatus, which was previously used to establish party-union linkages using the block vote system, has further facilitated co-optation.

Muslim inclusion through patronage merits discussion for several reasons. A growing body of research has found that ethnic identities are politically salient in elections across Western Europe (Dancygier, 2017). Beyond the persistence of ethnic politics, there is strong evidence that patronage is common practice in local elections involving the Muslim vote. In 2014 the Electoral Commission found that 94 percent of cities flagged for being at risk contained sizable Muslim populations (Electoral Commission Report, 2014).

4.2.1 Why Engage in Patronage? The Labour Party and Party-Union Linkages

The practice of patronage is widely acknowledged by Labour politicians. Former Labour politician Shahid Malik acknowledged that the Labour Party has allowed the "clans" to control British politics. "One of the things that has held back British Pakistanis and Kashmiris in this country," said Malik, "has been the clan mentality, how people support

and who people support" (Malik, 2013). A statement from the Metropolitan Police Authority seconds Malik's statement: "some practices that are seen as acceptable outside the UK have been adopted in respect of UK elections – for example, the head of an extended family instructing family members to vote for a particular party or candidate" (Metropolitan Police Authority, 2006). The co-optation of *biraderi* networks for electoral gain was confirmed in a 2019 interview conducted in Manchester. The interviewee, a Muslim female councilor, acknowledged the widespread use of *biraderi politicking*, but noted that the practice relied on the co-optation of male clan elders and therefore excluded women (Interview, 7/8/19).

Incentives to include Muslims as an electoral group through patronage are in part encouraged by England's plurality electoral system, which privileges dense group concentration. In plurality systems, candidates are directly elected to local office in single member districts (SMD) or multimember districts (MMD).[3] Cities or towns consist of sub-electoral units, in this case wards, and parties run different slates of candidates across each ward. As part of the plurality system, the first candidate(s) to obtain the majority of the vote is elected to office. As a result, elections tend to be highly personalistic and rooted in a particular geographic space (Ejdemyr et al., 2018; Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2008; Stratmann & Baur, 2002). Parties are therefore incentivized to capitalize on groups that are densely concentrated and who have the potential to deliver a sizable percentage of the vote.

The use of non-programmatic politics is particularly attractive in highly segregated areas. A growing body of scholarship suggests that the structural inequality

[3] The majority of English cities have SMDs, although some are MMDs, in which the top two or three candidates are elected.

created by segregation facilitates the emergence of clientelist politics, as inequality has been shown to create contexts that are vulnerable to electoral fraud (Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Stokes et al., 2013). Residentially segregated communities in England are therefore particularly vulnerable to the emergence of clientelist politics due to the structural disadvantages they experience. In this way, segregation strengthens kinship networks and leads to their co-optation for political gain.

4.2.2 The Rise of Patronage Politics in English Local Elections

The Labour Party would first locate a potential block vote within England's Muslim populations in the 1950s, when large numbers of guest workers arrived from Pakistan and later, Bangladesh. They imported the *biraderi* system to form community ties with newly arrived immigrants and to produce collective goods and services for themselves (Akhtar, 2013). A sizable number of immigrants arrived from the Mirpuri region of Pakistan, which made it relatively simple to replicate the kinship networks found in their home country. High levels of social capital found in *biraderi* networks prompted voluntary societies to emerge in the 1960s that provided much-needed welfare services, and *biraderi* leaders were often placed in leadership positions.

Although Labour began to activate *biraderi* networks for electoral gain as early as the 1960s, co-optation and patronage remained infrequent. Isolated instances of patronage were limited to a few cities with sizable Muslim populations, including Birmingham and Bradford. Patronage was largely dependent on the wills of local mayors and had yet to become a cohesive party strategy. As Labour-union linkages crumbled, however, Labour recognized that a block vote could potentially be delivered quite easily if *biraderi* networks were mobilized. Labour primarily used patronage in wards, rather than

parliamentary constituencies, which were more ethnically diverse and therefore less likely to be persuaded to vote for a member based on ethnic ties (Akhtar, 2013).

From the beginning, there was active participation within the Muslim community in perpetuating the system and clan elders often negotiated preferential treatment. In its early days, the *biraderi* system influenced the selection of White, non-Muslim candidates in local elections. Clan leaders would act as brokers between the party and negotiate for the election of White candidates to local office in exchange for political favors.

Labour's early use of clientelism was thus made possible because of the relatively high levels of segregation and subsequent social capital found in kinship networks, which were harnessed for electoral gain. Decisions to engage in patronage were dependent on the size of the Muslim community in a given district and the practice remained viable only as long as Muslims comprised a group that was large enough to deliver an ethnic block vote.

Labour's ability to co-opt these networks for electoral gain was the also due to its internal apparatus that was built to mobilize internally fragmented groups. The block vote had united opposing union voices behind delegates, who served as intermediaries and maintained considerable influence regarding candidate nominations. Although clan elders never held the same type of institutionalized weight as union deputies, Labour's process of *biraderi* co-optation was strikingly similar. Labour replaced union delegates with clan elders, who acted as brokers between their co-ethnics and the party.

Over the past two decades, Labour has become increasingly reliant on *biraderi* networks for electoral support. Today, clan leaders increasingly control and deliver voters in exchange for political favors, and in some cases, run for office themselves.

Voters are typically represented by a single clan leader, who develops a coordinated and dependent relationship with the party. Following candidate nomination elders engage in vote-buying strategies premised on the delivery of their clan's vote, a process Baston (2013) terms "manipulated clan politics" (p.10).

Interviews in local authorities with established *biraderi* networks suggest that the broker-client relationship can vary in its level of formality. Some votes are promised on the basis of friendship and clan loyalty. Others take place according to a more formal type of reciprocity, in which candidates make direct promises to voters. Sometimes, cash and other goods are offered in exchange for votes (Interview, 7/23/19). Additional research has shown that elected *biraderi* clan members are often called on to provide a wide range of services that extend outside of the bounds of councilor work (Hill et al., 2017). The system is strengthened by intra-network patronage, in which clan elders occasionally promise rewards to other clan members in exchange for political benefits (Interview, 7/24/19).

The impact of *biraderi politicking* on Muslim representation outcomes may be heightened in areas with high levels of inter-level competition. Several interviewees noted significant competition among *biraderi* networks outside of the political process and pointed out that some networks are higher in status than others (Interviews, July 2019). For example, land-owning *Rajputs* and *Jats* are at the top of the social order, while artisans such as *Mochi* are at the bottom. Competition creates increased co-ethnic voter mobilization as clan elders vie for political power. The political process is thus bolstered by increased voter mobilization and competition, which are typically features of robust

democracies. In this case, however, these mechanisms are indicative of non-programmatic political behavior.

The qualitative evidence presented above suggests that segregation can facilitate the use of non-programmatic politics. The following section uses quantitative evidence to gain a broader perspective on segregation's role in shaping Muslim representation across thousands of electoral contests between 2010 and 2021.

4.3 Data and Methods

In the following analyses, the outcome of interest is Muslim representation in local authorities. The dependent variable is measured as the percentage of Muslim candidates elected to a local council following an election; it ranges from zero to 20 percent. Ninety-four local authorities are included in the dataset. For the purposes of these analyses, identification as a Muslim is grounded in a sociological indicator of ethnoreligious origin rather than assumed personal piety. In order to identify a candidate's ethnic background, I rely on an onomastic approach, which involves hand coding their first and last names.

I first code each candidate running for district council in a given ward. Next, I code the outcome of each ward-level election before aggregating the results at the city level. The data cover over 33,000 candidate observations across more than 11,000 ward-level elections between 2010 and 2021, for a total of 431 local authority election outcomes. My sample includes election data from both urban and rural districts to obtain the most representative illustration of political representation.

I have theorized that the level of segregation should matter for Muslim representation outcomes. To operationalize segregation, I use the dissimilarity index, which serves as the standard segregation measure discussed in Chapter 2.

I also account for local demographic composition in order to understand how co-ethnic group size affects Muslim representation. If ethnicity influences voter behavior, then the size of the Muslim population should matter for the group's representation outcomes. I therefore include a Muslim population variable, which is measured as the percentage of Muslims in a given local authority using data from the 2011 census. To conduct the initial ward-level analysis analyzing the relationship between Muslim group size and likelihood of a Muslim being nominated for local office, I use the percentage of Muslims in a given ward.

I also include a number of control variables. According to competition theories of ethnicity, economic deprivation should bind Muslims together along ethnic lines (Barth, 1969; Nagel, 1994), leading to increased co-ethnic representatives to obtain scare resources. Economic deprivation is operationalized as the percentage of households in a given English district that are below the 60 percent median standard of living. The variable is measured using 2011 census data.

Given that Muslims are more likely to be elected in districts with a strong Labour presence (Dancygier, 2013, 2014; Purdam, 2001), I code the majority party in each district. I include a dummy variable to denote a Labour-dominated council to test whether it is Labour party dominance that influences Muslim representation.

I also test for the effects of electoral rules, which may influence the ability of Muslims to become elected to local office. A larger district magnitude may afford more opportunities for minority candidate election (Matland & Brown, 1992; Rule, 1987). I therefore include a district magnitude variable, calculated as the average of the number of councilors elected by district size, ranging from 1 to 3.

In addition to political configurations, demographic features may influence representation outcomes. Increased diversity could fragment groups along ethnic and racial lines (Trounstine, 2016) and stymie mobilization, decreasing Muslim representation. To measure ethnic fragmentation, I create a diversity variable based on the distribution of racial and ethnic groups in a given district using a diversity measure using the Herfindahl index.[4]

I also include a voter turnout variable, operationalized as the percentage of voter turnout in the given local election year. Although this variable is unable to capture voter turnout by ethnic category, it allows us to test whether Muslims are more likely to be elected in districts with high levels of voter turnout.

Finally, I control for urban and rural distinctions to test whether urban districts are more likely to display higher levels of Muslim representation. Scholarship has found increased levels of minority representation in urban areas as a result of sizable minority populations (Geddes, 1995). I operationalize the Urban variable using local authority population density data from the 2011 census, which allows for assessments of urbanity that are independent of district-type categorizations and captures sub-national urban and rural distinctions.

I begin by using logistic regression to investigate whether ward-level Muslim population size influences the likelihood of a Muslim being nominated for local office. The predictor variable % Muslim Population was tested a priori to verify that there was no violation of the assumption of linearity of the logit. Second, to analyze the relationship

[4] $H = \sum_{i=0}^{n} S_i^2$. This calculation includes three groups: White, Asian, and Black.

between the independent variables and the local authority-level election outcomes, a series of multiple linear regressions were conducted, which are appropriate when the dependent variable is continuous. The reported regression coefficients measure the relationships between the independent variables and percentage of Muslims elected to office in a given local authority.

Following the initial series of regressions, I use the J-N technique as a robustness test. I center the predictors before subtracting the mean from each predictor. This allows for an evaluation of the interaction's effects in the model relative to the other variables' means (Appendix B). I then construct a threshold model based on the interaction to further investigate the relationship between segregation and Muslim representation on local councils.

4.4 Results

I first analyze whether the likelihood of nominating a Muslim candidate to office is influenced by the size of the Muslim population in a given ward. The results of the logistic regression illustrated in Figure 3.1 indicate that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the proportion of the Muslim population in a given ward and the likelihood that a Muslim will be nominated for local office. The estimated odds ratio favored an increase of nearly 5 percent for the likelihood of nominating a Muslim candidate for every one unit increase in Muslim population percentage.



Figure 3.1. Muslim Nomination Given Population Percentage, Ward-Level

Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable measuring whether or not a Muslim is nominated as a candidate. Zero indicates no Muslim candidate nomination, 1 indicates Muslim candidate nomination. The fitted line shows the predicted probability of Muslim candidate nomination.

Table 4.1 presents the results of the OLS models estimating the representation of Muslims on local councils. For each model, the dependent variable is percentage of Muslims elected to office in a given local authority. In Model I, I establish the significance of the control variables before demographic variables are included. In Model II, I add the demographic variables % Muslim Population and Diversity prior to considering the spatial dynamics of population distributions. Model III includes the variable Segregation Level along with an interaction term between Segregation Level and % Muslim Population to test whether the effects are reduced when the relative group size of Muslims is larger.

The results shown in Model I indicate that several of the control variables, including Economic Deprivation, District Magnitude, Voter Turnout, and Labour, are significant predictors of Muslim representation. However, only Voter Turnout remains significant following the addition of % Muslim Population and Diversity in Model II, and after including Segregation Level and the interaction term in Model III. While voter turnout was expected to increase Muslim representation, the results show that it is decreases Muslim representation.[5]

Table 4.1. The Election of Muslims to Local Councils in English Local Authorities

Variables	Model I % Muslims Elected	Model II % Muslim Elected	Model III % Muslims Elected
Segregation Level			0.024**
			(0.00653)
% Muslim Population		0.338**	0.611**
		(0.0272)	(0.147)
Segregation Level x % Muslim Population			-0.393*
			(0.181)
Diversity		-0.009	-0.017
		(0.0110)	(0.0124)
Economic Deprivation	-0.001**	-0.001	0.004
	(0.00005)	(0.000004)	(0.000004)
District Magnitude	0.012**	0.003	0.001
	(0.00263)	(0.00202)	(0.00193)
Voter Turnout	-0.027*	-0.026**	-0.023**
	(0.00878)	(0.00653)	(0.00648)
Labour	0.0128**	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.00266)	(0.00205)	(0.00221)
Urban	0.007	-0.005	-0.007*
	(0.0000007)	(0.0000005)	(0.0000004)
Constant	-0.007	0.001	-0.002
	(0.00675)	(0.00456)	(0.00458)
Observations	431	431	431
R-squared	0.140	0.542	0.552

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

[5] I explore how voter turnout shapes Muslim representation in highly segregated districts in Appendix B.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

The results in Model II show that Muslim population size, measured as the percentage of Muslims in a given district, is a statistically significant and positive predictor of Muslim representation. It remains significant following the inclusion of the Segregation Level variable in Model III. This finding supports the electoral geography thesis, which suggests that Muslim population size will influence a group's political outcomes by increasing its representation levels. Despite the positive and significant effects of Segregation Level and % Muslim Population, the results in Model III show that the interaction term is negative and significant. As the Muslim population rises, increases in segregation level reduce the positive and significant impact of the main effects.[6]

The insignificance of the remaining control variables in Models II and III indicate that demographic and spatial indicators are more powerful determinants of Muslim representation outcomes than economic predictors, electoral rules, and the presence of a majority Labour council. The results displayed in Model III also indicate that segregation level has a positive and significant effect on the share of councilors who are Muslim in a local district.

Although the interaction term displayed in Model III is significant, it is possible that the model fails to reflect the majority of the dataset's values. The interaction may occur at the end of the dataset or represent a theoretical interaction in an area of the model where there are no datapoints. To establish the model's robustness, I use the J-N technique and restrict the generalization of the results to the sample data.

[6] Results remain consistent when using a fractional logit model (Appendix B).



Figure 3.2. Average Marginal Effects of Segregation Level on the Conditional Expectation of Muslims Elected, J-N Technique

Note: The dependent variable is the percentage of Muslims elected to office in a local authority. The solid line outlines the conditional effects of segregation level and percent Muslim population. The shaded areas cover the 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the results of the J-N technique by visualizing the effect of the moderator (Segregation Level) on the coefficient of the focal predictor (% Muslim Population). It indicates that the effect of segregation on the conditional expectation of the percentage of Muslims elected to local office diminishes as the Muslim population grows. The average marginal effects are non-zero for the majority of the dataset, except for local authorities with Muslim populations between 12 and 15 percent.

4.4.1 The Population Threshold

The findings displayed in Table 4.1 and the results of the J-N technique indicate a non-linear interaction between segregation level and a district's Muslim population size.[7] Table 4.2 shows the results of the threshold model given the interaction effect displayed in Table 4.1. When segregation levels remain constant, increases in the Muslim population raise the predicted percentage of Muslims elected to office in a given local authority. However, as Figure 3.3 illustrates, there is a marked change in the effect of segregation as the percentage of a district's Muslim population moves from five and 10 percent; increases in a district's segregation level now decrease the predicted percentage of Muslim councilors. The results indicate a population threshold, wherein the impact of segregation shifts in districts where the Muslim population is 6 percent and above, leading to reduced levels of Muslim representation (full results with threshold shown in Appendix B).

How can we interpret the finding that districts with Muslim populations of 6 percent and above will display reduced levels of Muslim representation as segregation levels rise? We know that Muslims are increasingly confined to a few segregated wards in districts with sizable co-ethnic populations and high segregation levels. In districts without a co-ethnic presence, Muslims have little chance of being elected. Districts with sizable Muslim populations and moderate levels of segregation thus exhibit higher representation levels; the population is spread out across several wards, increasing the number of electoral opportunities, and with it, the chance to become elected. As the level of segregation rises, however, Muslims are increasingly concentrated in a select number

[7] The non-linearity refers to the significantly negative Segregation Level x % Muslim Population term, which indicates that the negative slope of the representation line gets steeper as the Muslim population increases.

of wards, and, outside of these wards, have little chance of election. Conversely, when the segregation level is held constant, increases in a district's Muslim population leads to increased co-ethnic representation.

Table 4.2. Predicted Percentage of Muslims Elected to Office in a Local Authority, Threshold Model

	% Muslim Population	1	5	10	15	20	25	30
Segregation Level								
15		<1	2	4	7	10	13	15
30		<1	2	4	7	9	11	14
45		<1	2	4	6	8	10	13
60		<1	2	4	5	7	9	11
75		<1	2	3	5	7	8	10
90		<1	2	3	4	6	7	8

Note: The estimated percentages presented in the table derive from the interaction effect in Model III of Table 4.1. Segregation levels of zero and 100 are excluded given their unlikelihood.

The mean values of the sample's Muslim population size indicate that 50 percent of cases fall below the population threshold of 6 percent. Indeed, the results suggest that in half of the districts included in the sample, increases in segregation level will lead to reduced levels of Muslim representation.

The threshold of this interaction becomes important, from a comparative perspective, for Muslims running for office in FPTP systems. To illustrate the threshold's impact on representation outcomes at the local level, take the examples of the London

boroughs of Ealing and Brent described in Chapter 1, both of which have Muslim populations that fall above the threshold. In Ealing, where Muslims constitute 15 percent of the population



Figure 3.3. Predicted Muslim Representation Given Segregation Level and Muslim Population
Note: The solid lines trace the expected linear prediction at the minimum, maximum, and mean segregation levels. The dependent variable is the percentage of Muslims elected to office in a local authority.

and the segregation level is high (56.0), Muslims represented 10 percent of all candidates elected to office following the 2018 local elections. In nearby Brent, which contains nearly the same share of Muslims (16 percent) but where the segregation level is significantly lower (38.3), Muslims represented 20 percent of all candidates elected to local office in the same year.

While the electoral geography literature predicts that both boroughs would exhibit high levels of Muslim representation, the population threshold suggests otherwise. In Ealing, nearly 50 percent of the Muslim population is concentrated in five wards out of

23, whereas in Brent, 50 percent of the Muslim population is spread across nine wards out of twenty-one. Both cities displayed high levels of Muslim candidate nomination in those wards. However, high levels of segregation in Ealing decreased the overall electoral power of the co-ethnic vote. Conversely, as a result of the increased population dispersion in Brent, more Muslims were able to become elected to local office. Indeed, in 2018, Muslims were represented in 12 wards in Brent, but only six wards in Ealing. This local example illustrates the paradox of representation: Muslim populations benefit electorally from segregation only insofar as their numbers fall below the population threshold. After crossing the threshold, increases in segregation dampen Muslim representation.

4.5 Conclusion

The evidence presented throughout this chapter provides additional nuance to existing narratives of Labour Party co-optation. I have shown that current Muslim inclusion and representation outcomes should be understood within the broader framework of Labour's group inclusion strategies, notably the block vote. This chapter suggested that we cannot understand current Muslim representation outcomes without looking at the ways in which parties, particularly Labour, have used non-programmatic inclusion strategies, that harness the residential isolation experienced by Muslims living in segregated local authorities.

The quantitative analyses provided additional evidence regarding segregation's impact on Muslim representation. The significance of the population threshold clarifies the role of segregation for Muslim representation. While the electoral geography literature has looked to population size to theorize minority group outcomes, the results

show that the presence of a sizable minority population is an insufficient predictor of representation. Once segregation level is accounted for, a Muslim population's group size is no longer the sole arbiter of its representation outcomes. Rather, we must account for the spatial settlement patterns of Muslim populations to understand how population size shapes election to office. The non-linearities associated with the uneven distribution of groups across space are indicative of the greater complexities involved in explaining minority representation.

Taken together, the findings suggest that there are significant structural and economic inequalities in England that carry broader implications for Muslim incorporation. The following chapter will consider how segregation has shaped substantive outcomes, particularly as they relate to public spending and goods distribution in segregated local authorities.

5 CHAPTER FIVE

Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and Public Spending in England

The provision of public goods has emerged as a salient issue across England. While some local authorities spend more on public goods and have well-kept public amenities such as roads and public parks, others fail to provide adequate goods and services. Explaining under-provision is of particular importance in local authorities with sizable Muslim populations who suffer disproportionally from high levels of economic deprivation. Although research has shown that there is broad support for increased public spending among minorities (Boustan et al., 2013; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004), the prevailing scholarship has found that diversity stymies goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Baldwin & Huber, 2010), suggesting that districts with sizable Muslim populations should display reduced public goods outcomes.

This chapter re-examines the consensus that diversity hampers goods provision. I argue that segregation, rather than diversity, structures local public spending decisions. I find that segregation drives down overall public expenditures as well as spending across a variety of categories. Given that Muslims are more likely than White populations to live in conditions of segregation, distribution is also segregated along ethnic lines. I support my argument with evidence from an original dataset of public expenditure and demographic data across 94 English local authorities and nearly 2,000 district-level budgets between 2010 and 2019. To address possible endogeneity, I instrument for segregation using the number of waterways in a local authority.

While segregation hampers goods provision, I find that the presence of Muslims in local government exerts a powerful countervailing force. Using a difference-in-

difference design, I demonstrate how segregation encourages ethnic favoritism and the strategic targeting of local public goods. This chapter thus offers a territorial-based explanation for goods provision, which centers on the spatial settlement patterns of Muslims and their presence in local office. It demonstrates that the ability of Muslims to access the political arena structures broader spending and delivery decisions. In doing so, the results suggest that representation and public goods provision are deeply intertwined.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide an overview of segregation and public goods provision in England. Next, I turn to the analyses and results before discussing the implications of my findings. I conclude with a case study of goods provision in Bradford, to understand how patronage and ethnic favoritism interact with segregation to shape goods provision.

5.1 Public Goods and Local Representation in England

5.1.1 Local Authorities and Public Goods Decision-Making

Public goods distribution in England is characterized by a mixed-economy system, wherein multiple actors, including the state, local authorities, and associations, are responsible for service provision. Over the last several decades, local councils and voluntary associations began to assume increased authority over the allocation of public funds. The system remains highly decentralized, with local authorities retaining decision-making power for goods distribution. Local authorities are responsible for a variety of services, including children's social care, neighborhood services including libraries and waste collection, and some components of housing, transportation, and education. While most funding is received from council taxes (50 percent), the remaining funds are received from the central government and retained business rates.



Figure 4.1. Local Authority Spending on Individual Budgetary Categories, 2009-2010 and 2020-2021
Note: The top panel shows the 2009-2010 budgetary categories, the bottom panel shows the 2020-2021 budgetary categories.
Source: Department for Communities and Local Governments.

Thus, while local authorities maintain control over spending decisions, they also rely on central government subsidies to fund public goods distribution.

The importance of central government funds for local authority spending became increasingly apparent following the 2008 financial crisis. Reductions in central government grants meant that local authority spending fell considerably. Data collected from the Department of Communities and Local Governments shown in Figure 4.1 illustrates the proportion of local authority service spending by service categories between 2009 and 2010.

As shown in the top panel of Figure 4.1, spending on social care occupied the largest proportion of spending, followed by transportation (15 percent) and environment and refuse (10 percent). In the following decade, local authority spending power fell by 16 percent. These reductions are reflected in the 2019-2010 budgetary categories. While social care continued to occupy the largest proportion of spending, it fell by nine percentage points. Similar reductions across transportation (12 percent) and housing (5 percent) are also apparent.

The global financial crisis's impact on local authority spending was compounded by the 2011 Localism Act, which further limited spending by prohibiting local authorities from raising taxes by more than two percent each year. Metropolitan districts and London boroughs experienced particularly significant reductions in spending power. These areas also had higher levels of economic deprivation and sizable Muslim communities and were more likely to rely on central government grants to remedy deprivation.

5.1.2 Local Diversity and Resource Allocation

Cutbacks have complicated existing tensions over local spending decisions.

As the level of ethnic diversity has grown across the country, local authorities have struggled to manage service provision demands from various communities. When immigrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh arrived in the 1950s and 60s, high levels of geographic isolation meant that nearly all issues related to goods provision were shaped along ethnic, rather than pluralist, lines. High levels of segregation meant that Muslim and White voters were geographically divided within a given city and shared few common interests. When a library, school, or park was constructed in a ward with sizable Muslim communities, the White majority derived little, if any benefit (Dancygier, 2010). As a result, Muslims found few political allies outside of their co-ethnics when services such as council housing were threatened with cutbacks or elimination.

In local authorities with a strong Labour Party presence, relationships between the White, working-class voters and Muslim populations were particularly fraught. As detailed in Chapter 4, party-union linkages provided significant support for Labour in industrial cities. Resource allocation to Muslim populations challenged Labour-union relations and threatened to undermine local political consensus; Labour-union linkages thus dictated resource distribution at the local authority level for much of the 20th century. Labour's political interests relied on offering the least number of resources to Muslim communities, who held little electoral power, and as many resources as possible to White, working-class voters.

These preferential dynamics would shift as Labour-union linkages weakened and England's Muslim population grew. The presence of sizable Muslim districts, although undermining coalition-building, created the potential for a Muslim block vote. Crumbling relations between the Labour Party and the unions meant that party leaders increasingly

looked to the local Muslim population for political support, both as voters and potential representatives. In close local authority elections, the delivery of large numbers of Muslim votes proved increasingly appealing to White politicians. As detailed in Chapter 4, clan elders began to control and deliver voters in exchange for political favors.

In these cases, Muslims were represented at the ward-level by a clan elder, who both benefitted from, and contributed to, Labour party success. Clan elders wielded considerable power within their own communities, while maintaining a more tenuous position within the larger, overwhelmingly White, local council.[1] As a result, the resources Muslims received were usually less than those provided to White politicians and their constituencies. In the early days of the patronage relationship, on issues that had the potential to threaten White, working-class voters, Muslim clan elders were regularly outvoted (Interview, 7/2/2019).

In this way, segregation precipitated the emergence of neighborhood interests and led to political fragmentation within local authorities. Electoral divisions within local authorities led to competition along ethnic lines, with Muslims overwhelmingly supporting higher spending and increased goods and services. These debates took place within a fractured local political context in which Whites and Muslims were spatially divided, stymieing cooperation and encouraging division.

5.2 Data and Methods

This section considers the effect of segregation on public spending outcomes. The prevailing scholarship has argued that diverse places spend fewer public dollars on public

[1] Similar dynamics have been detailed in racially segregated areas in the US, where, in return for political support in racially segregated areas, White politicians granted black bosses such as Oscar DePriest in Chicago patronage in exchange for black support at the polls.

goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Hopkins, 2009). Despite a robust literature linking diversity and under-provision, the potential impact on public spending of the local spatial distributions of diverse populations remains largely undertheorized. I suggest that segregation, not just diversity, should matter for local goods provision. Given Muslim preferences for increased public spending, I expect that the presence of local Muslim councilors will exert a countervailing effect.

In order to test these hypotheses, I run a series of linear regressions using local public expenditure data collected from the Department for Communities and Local Governments for all local authorities included in my sample between 2010 and 2019. To assess overall spending on public goods, I analyze the effect of segregation on public expenditure per head. I then conduct additional analyses on specific budgetary categories, including highway and transport services, public health, environmental services, cultural services, children's services, and fire services.

To operationalize the main independent variable, segregation, I use the dissimilarity index, as in Chapter 4. In total, the dataset includes nearly 2,000 council budgets across 94 English local authorities.

To measure fragmentation along ethnic lines, I create a diversity variable based on the distribution of racial and ethnic groups in a given district using a diversity measure known as the Herfindahl index, described in Chapter 4. I also include the percentage of Whites, Blacks, and Asians in the overall population.

To test for the impact of Muslim representation, I include a Muslim councilors variable. In order to remain consistent across measurement categories, I operationalize the

variable as the percentage of Pakistani and Bangladeshi councilors on a given local council, which I coded using the onomastic approach described in the Introduction.

The following analyses also control for the population (logged), proportion of the population over age sixty-five, the proportion of the population with a college degree, and the percentage of households below 60 percent of the median income. The inclusion of these controls accounts for the demographic characteristics that may influence public spending. For example, I might expect cities with sizable older populations to spend less on government services, such as education. Another explanation for a negative relationship between segregation and spending might be the level of city wealth, or percentage of households below 60 percent of the median income. If it is true that segregated cities are more likely to be poor, then they may have less money to spend on public goods.

5.3 Results

I begin, in Table 5.1, by regressing public expenditure per head on segregation with the controls described above. In Model II I also include ten-year changes in ethnic group shares following Hopkins to determine whether or not changes in ethnic diversity could be the driving factors of public spending (Hopkins, 2009). The results from Table 3.1 provide strong evidence that segregation negatively affects public goods spending. The results remain significant when changing demographics are included in Model II.

Notably, diversity has no significant impact on public spending. This finding suggests that it is the spatial distribution of diverse groups, rather than diversity itself, that structures public spending decisions. Diversity remains an insignificant predictor of

public spending without the inclusion of the segregation variable (Appendix C), suggesting that it has little impact on public spending regardless of segregation level.

Table 5.1. Effect of Segregation on Local Authority Expenditures

Variables	Model I Public expenditure per head	Model II Public expenditure per head
Segregation	-1.599***	-1.641***
	(0.352)	(0.343)
Diversity	0.325	
	(1.999)	
% Black	-0.189	
	(3.578)	
% White	-2.773	
	(4.544)	
% Asian	-4.432	
	(3.588)	
% Δ diversity		0.477
		(3.889)
% Δ Black		0.022
		(0.044)
% Δ White		-0.005
		(0.099)
% Δ Asian		-0.030
		(0.050)
Muslim councilors	1.159*	1.413**
	(0.680)	(0.686)
Deprivation level	0.043***	0.000*
	(0.011)	(0.000)
% College degree	0.409	-1.369*
	(0.625)	(0.745)
% 65 +	0.586	1.144
	(1.213)	(1.312)
Population (logged)	0.489***	
	(0.063)	
Population Δ (logged)		0.422***
		(0.069)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.111	-2.711
	(4.692)	(8.414)

Observations	1786	1786
R-squared	0.541	0.511

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

As is evidenced by the panels in Figure 4.2, segregation's dampening effect extends to each individual category of public goods spending (see Appendix C for full regression). Segregation drives down spending for highway and transport services, public health, environmental services, cultural services, children's services, and fire services. The level of diversity continues to be an insignificant indicator of spending in each category (Appendix C).



Figure 4.2. Segregation and Public Goods Spending in English Local Authorities
Note: The above panels illustrate the predicted relationship between segregation level and per head spending on public goods. Gray shading represents 95% confidence intervals. Full regressions shown in Appendix C.

While segregation is negatively related to spending on public goods, increased Muslim representation is associated with higher levels of public spending, as the positive coefficient on Muslim councilors indicates. The positive and significant effect of the Muslim councilors variable may reflect the spending preferences of Muslims, who

generally support increased public spending. These preferences are reflected in the policy goals of local Muslim councilors who seek to satisfy citizen demand.

Given that Muslims are also more likely to live in highly segregated cities, which spend less on public goods, it is important to examine the countervailing effect of Muslim councilors. To do so, I estimate the model displayed in Model I of Table 5.1. I then predict the public expenditure per head at across a range of segregation levels.



Figure 4.3. Muslim Councilors and Public Goods Spending in English Local Authorities
Note: The above figure shows the effect of local council diversity on public goods spending at different levels of segregation.

Figure 4.3 illustrates how Muslim councilors affect public goods spending across a range of segregation levels. It displays the differences in predicted public goods spending at varying levels of segregation, as well as the confidence intervals surrounding these predictions. As Figure 4.3 illustrates, increases in Muslim councilors in areas with high

segregation levels lead to increased spending on public goods. While segregation continues to exert an overall dampening effect on public spending, the presence of Muslim councilors, particularly in highly segregated local authorities, leads to increased public spending.

5.4 Evidence of Causality

Although I have argued that segregation should dampen public spending, there may be factors that remain unaccounted for that affect both segregation and spending. Given that we cannot randomly assign segregation levels to ascertain their effects on local authority spending, I use an instrumental variable approach to establish causality.

I instrument for segregation using the number of waterways in a given local authority. My instrument is based on the topography of the 94 local authorities included in the dataset. It is operationalized as the number of inter- and intra-district waterways in each local authority, including large streams and rivers. Given that waterways divide local authorities into geographical subunits, I expect that areas with more rivers will be more highly segregated. Unlike other instruments of segregation such as railroads and highways (Ananat, 2011) which are often constructed to segregate a city (Bayor, 1996), waterways are exogenous to both the level of segregation and spending. This approach has been used in several studies on segregation, beginning with Hoxby (2000), who used waterways to instrument for government fragmentation in US metropolitan areas. My approach more closely follows Trounstine (2016, 2018), who uses waterways to instrument for segregation in her study of the effects of segregation on public goods inequality across US cities.

There are several reasons why waterways are likely linked to segregation levels. The presence of natural barriers makes it more likely for local politicians to construct man-made barriers based on natural boundaries. For example, the construction of separate housing units along waterways, which leads to the spatial exclusion of Muslims from White, majority neighborhoods. Further, the presence of waterways as natural boundaries might make it more difficult for Muslims to remain close to their neighborhoods if they decide to leave, thereby disincentivizing relocation and entrenching settlement patterns (Cutler & Glaeser, 1997).

In order to instrument for segregation, I gathered data on the number of waterways included in my sample from OS Open Rivers, an open water network that provides data on the locations of rivers, waterways, streams, and canals across the England. Using this data, I generated counts of waterways across each local authority. A regression relating a local authority's segregation level to the number of waterways yields a significant and positive correlation of .019 ($p<.001$) and an F-statistic of 90.30, suggesting that there is a strong relationship between the number of waterways and segregation levels across England.

In Table 5.2, I use the same dependent variables included in the original analyses – public spending per head and spending per head across individual sectors – and engage the number of waterways as an instrument for segregation. Waterways are likely correlated with other variables, most notably the size of the population, which is correlated with segregation level and number of waterways in a given local authority. I therefore include logged population as an instrument.

As is made evident by the results in Table 5.2, segregation (instrumented) continues to be highly correlated with decreased public spending at the local authority level, regardless of demographic characteristics and diversity levels. One notable difference is that the presence of Muslim councilors is no longer significant for public spending outcomes. However, the findings presented in Table 5.2 continue to reflect the results displayed in Table 5.1 and Figure 4.2. Following the inclusion of demographic characteristics, local authorities with greater segregation spend less on overall public expenditures and devote less monetary resources to highway and transport services, public health, environmental services, cultural services, children's services, and fire services.

5.5 Ethnic Favoritism and Segregation

Next, I use a difference-in-difference design to evaluate whether ethnic favoritism within local authorities increases as segregation rises. I examine 2,101 wards across 80 local authorities that were not ethnically matched with their councilor prior to 2011 based on the composition of local councils in 2010. In the 2012 and 2014 elections, 45 of these districts experienced a change in the ethnicity of their councilor, resulting in 1,001 of these wards being matched with their councilors and 1,100 remaining unmatched.

Table 5.2. Effect of Segregation on Local Authority Expenditures, Instrumental Approach

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Variables	Public expenditure per head	Highway and transport services	Children's social services	Public health	Cultural services	Environmental services	Fire services
Segregation instrumented	-0.019**	0.005	-0.002*	-0.001*	-0.000**	0.099*	0.022*
	(-0.005)	(-0.004)	(-0.001)	(-0.005)	(-0.002)	(-0.009)	(-0.004)
Population (logged), instrumented	0.418***	0.017***	0.075***	0.029***	0.001	0.005*	-0.013***
	(-0.065)	(-0.003)	(-0.008)	(-0.005)	(-0.002)	(-0.003)	(-0.002)
Diversity	1.379	0.133	0.445*	0.132	0.077	0.067	0.017
	(-2.002)	(-0.101)	(-0.256)	(-0.111)	(-0.061)	(-0.103)	(-0.065)
% Black	4.214	-0.343*	0.671	0.23	0.148	0.361**	-0.004
	(-3.525)	(-0.177)	(-0.447)	(-0.187)	(-0.105)	(-0.182)	(-0.113)
% White	3.499	-0.209	0.966*	0.307	0.288**	0.401*	-0.021
	(-4.399)	(-0.222)	(-0.56)	(-0.234)	(-0.132)	(-0.232)	(-0.142)
% Asian	1.022	-0.339*	0.124	0.04	0.19	0.199	-0.045
	(-3.405)	(-0.172)	(-0.435)	(-0.199)	(-0.102)	(-0.175)	(-0.11)
Muslim councilors	1.023	-0.063*	0.09	0.061	0.018	0.079**	-0.005
	(-0.99)	(-0.035)	(-0.089)	(-0.041)	(-0.021)	(-0.036)	(-0.023)
Deprivation level	0.042***	0.001	0.005***	0.003***	0.002***	0.003***	0.002***
	(-0.01)	(-0.001)	(-0.003)	(-0.005)	0.120)	(-0.001)	(0.223)
% College degree	0.940	-0.132***	-0.026	0.056	0.012	0.133***	0.069***
	(-0.644)	(-0.032)	(-0.081)	(-0.039)	(-0.019)	(-0.033)	(-0.021)
% 65 +	-0.845	0.011	-0.226	-0.080	-0.122***	-0.078	0.045
	(-1.232)	(-0.061)	(-0.154)	(-0.065)	(-0.036)	(-0.062)	(-0.039)
Constant	-8.839*	0.028	-1.860***	-0.679***	-0.292**	-0.483**	0.115
	(-4.517)	(-0.229)	(-0.575)	(-0.241)	(-0.136)	(-0.232)	(-0.146)
Observations	1786	1786	1786	1786	1786	1786	1786
R-squared	0.505	0.298	0.57	0.551	0.321	0.284	0.314

Thus, I observe two groups of wards. Group 1 were not matched with their councilor prior to 2011 or after 2011, whereas Group 2 wards were not matched with their councilor prior to 2011 but were matched in the second period. Group 2 wards therefore experienced a co-ethnic councilor switch.

The goal of the difference-in-difference approach is to estimate the effect of the co-ethnic councilor switch experienced by Group 2, using the time-trend of Group 1 as a counterfactual. This approach also allows me to hold constant any time-invariant ward characteristics that affect public spending, including levels of ethnic diversity. To estimate how segregation conditions ethnic favoritism, I use two approaches. First, I run a regression among three subsets of local authorities based on segregation level. I use terciles of the dissimilarity index, which I use to measure segregation, to group local authorities into low, medium, and high levels of segregation. I then interact the Match variable with the indicators for medium and high segregation. I also run a model that interacts Match with a continuous measure of segregation. I estimate linear probability models and cluster the standard error on wards to account for the data's panel structure. I repeat these analyses with the continuous indicator of co-ethnic councilor match, Match Proportion.

I estimate ethnic favoritism using the average capital programme funding in each ward across the included time periods. I geo-code capital programme projects by ward to evaluate the proportion of projects across wards and the amount directed at these projects. Using capital programme funding, rather than spending per head, allows me to estimate the resources that were directed at each ward, rather than the overall local authority.

Table 5.3. Segregation and Ethnic Favoritism in Capital Programme Spending

	I	II	III	IV	V
	Low	Medium	High	All	All
A. Match with local councilor: largest ethnic group in ward					
Match with local councilor	0.013 (0.06)	0.12 (0.03)	0.22* (0.06)	0.05 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)
Match*Medium Segregation				0.08 (0.04)	
Match*High Segregation				0.19** (0.08)	
Match*Continuous Segregation					0.17** (0.11)
B. Match with local councilor: proportion co-ethnic match					
Match	0.04 (0.03)	0.11 (0.04)	0.16** (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)	
Match*Medium				0.06 (0.09)	
Match*High				0.59* (0.10)	
Match*Continuous					0.98* (0.12)
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

No. Local Authorities	15	33	32	80	80
No. Wards	650	735	716	2101	2101

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

The regression results presented in Table 5.3 confirms that segregation leads to ethnic favoritism after adjusting for confounders. Running the regression across the three subsets of local authorities based on their levels of segregation indicates ethnic favoritism in local authorities with high levels of segregation. In highly segregated districts, wards that experienced an increase in co-ethnic representation were seven to 15 percent more likely to display an increase in capital programme spending. Finally, I also find consistent results when I interact Match with the continuous level of segregation. In short, I find robust evidence of ethnic favoritism, which is particularly pronounced in areas with high levels of segregation.

Panel B in Table 5.3 presents the results of analyses that use the proportion of a councilor's co-ethnics in the locality to estimate an ethnic match. I find that indicators of Match Proportion are also statistically significant and that the effect increases along with segregation, indicating a higher degree of ethnic favoritism in highly segregated districts. This pattern is confirmed when Match Proportion is interacted with two segregation dummies. The relationship between ethnic favoritism and segregation is further confirmed when Match Proportion is interacted with the continuous measure of segregation.

In sum, I find convincing evidence that the prevalence and salience of ethnic favoritism in local authorities increases as segregation rises. Coupled with the evidence suggesting a positive relationship between the presence of Muslim councilors and

increased public spending shown in Table 5.1, there is substantial empirical support for my hypotheses. Segregation decreases overall public goods provision while allowing Muslim councilors to target their co-ethnics with local public goods.

The evidence presented here demonstrates that the level of segregation in a given local authority plays an important role in determining access to public goods. Contrary to the prevailing expectation, segregation, rather than diversity, drives down overall public expenditure as well as spending across individual sectors. However, diversity in local government exerts a powerful and significant countervailing effect. Cities with greater levels of local government diversity spend more on public goods, suggesting that diversity in local government plays an important role in driving spending decisions. Muslim populations are more likely to support increased public spending and the positive impact of co-ethnic councilors points to the importance of descriptive representation for spending outcomes, particularly in areas with sizable Muslim populations.

5.6 Clientelism, Segregation and Public Goods Provision in Bradford

The previous section demonstrated that while segregation drives down public spending, the presence of Muslim councilors exerts a powerful countervailing effect. As the number of Muslim councilors increases in segregated cities, public spending rises. However, the findings also showed that Muslim councilors are likely to engage in strategic ethnic favoritism. This section demonstrates how the continued salience of ethnic kinship networks and electoral power of Muslim councilors has shifted the balance of political power in local authorities across England.

To do so, I investigate the impact of *biraderi* politics in Bradford, a formerly industrial city in West Yorkshire. Muslims living in Bradford experience high levels of

isolation (4.9) and segregation (75.5). Local decision-making processes are fragmented along ethnic lines, and the Labour Party has maintained a powerful presence in local politics since the mid-20th century. As in other English cities, the Labour Party has included Muslims in local distribution schemes through *biraderi* networks. The current *biraderi* system in Bradford is a form of patronage politics that also employs vote buying; elder members of the community receive jobs and political positions in exchange for delivering votes. It is an ethnically based form of patronage politics because participation in the system and receipt of political benefits is based on membership in a particular ethnic group. In this way, local political processes in Bradford reflect those found in other post-industrial cities across England. As this section shows, high levels of segregation prompted the Labour Party to co-opt clan elders for political gain, thereby shaping their incorporation into local politics along non-programmatic lines.

5.6.1 The Origins of Clientelism in Bradford

The current *biraderi* system in Bradford can be traced to the 1970s during Edward Lyons's tenure as MP of the Bradford West Constituency from 1974 to 1983. Lyons defeated John Wilkinson of the Conservative Party and became an MP at a time of intense political competition. Since 1905, local authority control had alternated between the Labour and Conservative parties. The postwar period witnessed the election of Arthur Tiley (Conservative, 1955-1966), followed by Norman Haseldine (Labour Cooperative, 1966-1970), then John Wilkinson (Conservative, 1970-1974) before Lyons's election in 1974.

Upon his arrival in local office, Lyons took note of the cultural salience of *biraderi* networks within the city's Muslim populations. High levels of social capital

prompted voluntary societies to emerge in the 1960s that provided much-needed welfare services, and *biraderi* leaders were often placed in leadership positions.

Although Bradford was still a White, working-class city in the 1970s, Labour recognized that a block vote could potentially be delivered quite easily if *biraderi* networks were mobilized. Anwar (1986) has provided several pieces of evidence to support this logic. First, high levels of co-ethnic concentration meant that *biraderi* networks could influence electoral outcomes, as a result of England's FPTP electoral system. Second, there was a broader political awareness that community organizations, and *biraderi* networks more specifically, were increasingly influential groups. Third, and most importantly, Muslims were able to mobilize these kinship networks to counter the anti-minority agenda that was commonly articulated by the Conservative Party.

The Labour Party's growing realization of the potential impact of an ethnic block vote, coupled with ongoing political competition with the Conservative Party, prompted its initial use of clientelist politics to secure votes. In the 1979 elections, the Labour Party made an active effort to target the city's ethnic minority population, creating an ethnic-based clientelist system that relied on the presence of Muslim groups united by *biraderi* networks. In response, Labour secured victory over the Conservatives. Labour's early use of clientelism was thus made possible because of the relative homogeneity within the city's Muslim population and subsequent high reserves of social capital; kinship networks are able to be replicated and harnessed by political parties.

5.6.2 Biraderi Politicking in Bradford: Galloway and the Respect Party

In recent years, the political inequality generated by the *biraderi* system has come under attack. Growing opposition to *biraderi* politics is best illustrated by Labour's 2012 by-

election defeat in the Bradford West constituency to George Galloway and the now-defunct Respect Party.

Bradford West had a long history of *biraderi politicking*, beginning with Labour party co-optation under Lyons in the 1970s. Indeed, a report on Bradford West noted that the constituency had been "marred by patronage, neglect, bad organisation and even electoral fraud" (Baston, 2013). In an interview with the BBC, Ratna Lachman, director of the campaign group Just West Yorkshire, argued that "in its initial genesis the system was set up so the Asian community got a fair deal, as time has gone on this positive context of the biradari has become corrupted and co-opted into politics" (Lachman, 2015).

Bradford's patronage scheme was initially composed of two components. First, clan elders received political benefits, such as positions in local office, in exchange for delivering votes. Second, in order to assure community compliance, clan elders offered both pork barrel benefits to groups of their co-ethnics or engaged in individual vote buying (Interview, 7/17/19).

The continued activation of *biraderi* networks in Bradford has prompted legal investigations. In 2014, Bradford was cited by the Electoral Commission for political fraud. Findings from the investigation found that a significant degree of voter fraud had occurred as a result of postal voting (Electoral Commission, 2014). In this way, the absence of the secret ballot in mail-in elections enables coercion and reinforces patronage and vote-buying schemes. The Commission's investigation found that women in Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities are particularly vulnerable to mail fraud and are more likely to have their registration forms filled in by another member of their

household (Electoral Commission, 2014). In this way, the use of postal voting to commit voter fraud marginalizes women by preventing them from taking part as autonomous actors in the political process. While none of my interviewees would admit to knowledge of this fraud, Akhtar & Peace (2019) have found that politicized *biraderi* networks frequently rely on postal voting to boost voter turnout.

Galloway ran on an anti-*biraderi* campaign platform that promised to do away with the system. Respect Party founder Salma Yaqoob (2008) noted the frustration with clan elders acting as "gatekeepers":

> "Politics in large parts of South Asian communities is overwhelmingly a male preserve, from candidates to campaigners … This grip is reinforced by the way in which members of tight family and clan networks are encouraged to vote as a bloc. In this way the male head of the household can often control dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of votes, which are used to exercise political leverage. This ultimately has quite a corrupting influence on politics because the determining factor in exercising such influence becomes less about political conviction and more about which candidate will be indebted to you" (p. 156)

Indeed, young Muslims and Muslim women were particularly disenchanted with the *biraderi* system. Galloway took note of their anger and worked hard to engage both groups. He sent bilingual campaigners door-to-door in an effort to speak with Muslim women. I spoke with one English-speaking married, Muslim woman, who told me that Galloway allowed her to articulate her concerns and feel included in the political process (Interview, 7/18/19).

Galloway also reached out to young Muslims. Scouring old Facebook posts in the months leading up to the 2012 election, I found a post from one young Muslim writing: "2 fingers up at the 'Mirpuri village politics' imported to the UK, particularly Bradford... where voting is about who you know, financial and personal gain for the candidate... long

live the youth that made this possible." Another post read, "I truly hope the people of Bradford appreciate what a great opprtunity [sic] this is to vote for someone who can & will make a difference - I hope that people will vote for the best candidate - GG, rather than relying on the baradri [sic] system to vote in another labour puppet who will sell favours to his relatives!" Social media thus provided a space for voters to demonstrate their frustration with the existing political process.

Despite running on an anti-*biraderi* platform, Galloway continued to use the system for political gain prior to the 2012 elections. Galloway's co-optation of *biraderi* networks was in fact an established practice. In 2005, when campaigning in the London constituency of Bethnal Green and Bow, Galloway traveled to the Sylhet region of Bangladesh. He sought to develop ties with local dignitaries and relatives of Bangladeshis living in London, who would then contact their relatives in London to vote for Galloway. Traveling to Bangladesh also allowed him to form relationships with local figures who carried political weight in the London borough of Tower Hamlets. This strategy was relatively successful; in the 2006 elections, Respect Party candidates won 12 seats as councilors, and Respect became the second largest party in the borough.

The Respect Party employed similar tactics in Birmingham prior to the 2006 elections. The late Chris Harman (2008) a former member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), wrote:

> "Salma Yaqoob had previously suggested that Helen Salmon [SWP] should be the candidate. But in the week prior to the selection meeting about 50 people were recruited to Respect in the ward (at a time when there were only about 70 paid-up Respect members in the whole of south Birmingham). An Asian Muslim recruitment consultant was put forward as an alternative candidate at the last minute, and he was selected by 30 votes to 20. The overall outcome of the argument in Birmingham was a complete change in the character of Respect's list of candidates in 2007 compared to the year

> before. There was now a slate made up of entirely men from South Asian backgrounds."

These anecdotes highlight the degree to which *biraderi politicking* was an entrenched political practice within the Respect and Labour parties. Galloway's outward disapproval for *biraderi politicking* during the 2012 campaign allowed his party to suggest an alternative political vision while continuing to use *biraderi* and community networks for votes. The strategy worked. General discontent with the *biraderi* system catapulted Galloway to victory. He beat out the favored Labour candidate Imran Hussain with 55 percent of the votes.

By the time I arrived in Bradford in 2019, the Respect Party lost its seats to the Labour Party and de-registered.[2] Yet, Galloway's initial victory remains significant several years after his defeat. Respect's victory demonstrated an increasing willingness among young Muslims and women to challenge the political status quo.

Galloway's success also highlighted the failure of mainstream parties to address discontent with the *biraderi* system, as well as their lack of political innovation. Such innovation would have been necessary to successfully oppose Galloway's grassroots campaign, which he termed "Bradford Spring." The decay of traditional party politics created space for the Respect Party to challenge the existing patronage system, while also deftly manipulating it to its advantage. In this way, *biraderi politicking* is both an embedded practice within mainstream politics as well as an anachronic political system that is a vestige of 20th century political machines.

[2] Although Galloway threatened to contest the results, he failed to launch a legal campaign and did not run in the 2017 elections. That same year, his former Respect Party colleague Salma Yaqoob stood as an Independent and came in third with nearly 14 percent of the votes.

Interviews conducted seven years after Galloway's election suggested that *biraderi politicking* remains a persistent feature of Bradford's local political institutions. The current distribution scheme used by Labour involves clan leaders elevating their supporters' demands for improved service provision in exchange for votes. Promises can take the form of small favors such as cash or vouchers, or can involve a degree of pork barrel politics, wherein co-ethnic councilors promise to divert funds to their constituencies to improve parks, fund daycare programs, or fix council housing (Interviews, July 2019).

While no councilor would admit to being a member of a *biraderi network* (identification is primarily based on last names), the time I spent in council meetings in Bradford, Tower Hamlets, and Birmingham demonstrated that Muslim councilors were very likely to bring up the topic of service provision in council meetings, regardless of clan affiliation. This was an issue their constituents cared about; among those attending meetings, Muslims often raised problems concerning service provision in their neighborhoods (Council meetings, 8/15 and 8/29, 2019). While we might assume that discussing service provision in council meetings is merely symbolic, the findings from the previous section suggest that the presence of Muslim councilors produces real and beneficial outcomes for their co-ethnics. In this way, ethnic favoritism has the capacity to remedy service provision issues for Muslims living with large numbers of their co-ethnics in highly segregated cities.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter showed how early trends in Muslim political representation were characterized by a high level of political isolation. Political fragmentation among White

and Muslim councilors reflected spatial settlement patterns across many English cities, where Muslims lived in segregated areas away from White majorities. These patterns entreat us to consider the relationship between diversity and segregation. Diversity is a prerequisite of segregation; segregation is therefore improbable without a minimal level of diversity. Rather than concluding that diversity is inconsequential for public goods provision, the importance of segregation for structuring spending contributes to our understanding of how diversity shapes goods provision.

The findings also point to the role of the neighborhood in structuring spending decisions. Given that council decision-making involves spatial distribution across wards, and that ethnic groups remain relatively separate from one another within local authorities, neighborhoods have become important local actors across England. The political role of the neighborhood is particularly notable in highly segregated local authorities, where neighborhood interests and ethnic divisions often overlap. Thus, segregation not only shapes divisions within local authorities but across city lines as well. As England becomes irncreasingly diverse, segregation and public goods will continue to structure inequality.

6 CHAPTER SIX

Muslim Inclusion, Segregation, and Descriptive Representation in France

The 11th arrondissement is a vibrant, yet discreet, section of Paris. Less touristy than other neighborhoods in the city, it encompasses the Place de la République, markets and parks along the Boulevard Richard-Lenoir, the Oberkampf nightlife district, and a residential section in the east. The neighborhood is also home to a large Muslim community, estimated at around 16 percent of the population. It has over ten mosques and prayer rooms and a variety of ethnic grocers and shops that serve its sizable Muslim population. Yet, Muslims remain nearly entirely absent on the municipal council that represents the arrondissement in the larger *conseil de Paris* (Paris Council). This pattern of under-representation has persisted for over a decade. Following the 2008 and 2014 elections, Muslims represented only 3 percent of the municipal council, and in 2020, no Muslims were elected to office following the second round of elections.

Meanwhile, in the 19th arrondissement, Muslims display significantly higher representation levels. Bordering the communes of Aubervilliers, Pantin, des Lilas, and Pré-Saint-Gervais, the 19th sits at the very north of Paris. Like the 11th, it is known as a vibrant and multicultural neighborhood and also contains a sizable Muslim population, estimated at 17 percent of the population. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Muslim representation is much higher. Muslims represented 8 percent of the municipal council after the 2008 elections. After the 2014 elections the number rose to 10 percent and in 2020 the number increased to 14 percent.

These divergent outcomes reflect broader puzzles surrounding the variation in Muslim representation across France. Why do some communes with sizable Muslim

populations display reduced levels of co-ethnic representation, while those with similar demographic characteristics display higher levels? I argue that divergent representation outcomes in communes with sizable Muslim populations can be explained by variation in segregation level. I support this argument using quantitative and qualitative evidence. To understand the factors that impact representation, I engage an original dataset that covers over 50,000 candidates across nearly 1,200 party lists in 104 of France's largest metropolitan areas for the 2008, 2014 and 2020 municipal elections. I find that, just as in England, there is a population threshold, above which increases in segregation level decrease Muslim representation outcomes.

Next, I draw on in-depth interviews to explore the factors that cause segregation to reduce Muslim representation. The findings reveal that segregation undermines Muslims' political visibility from local party institutions; Muslims living in segregated cities have few interactions with non-Muslim residents, and, more broadly, the local political arena. Their isolation creates an unwillingness on the part of Muslim residents to become engaged in local politics. At the same time, segregation creates a reluctance within local parties to include Muslims on ballots, which stymies their ability to become elected to municipal councils.

6.1 Segregation and the Changing Nature of Muslim Representation in France

Minority integration became a topic of intense political interest in the 1980s as a result of the *Beur* movement. In the summer of 1981, young Maghrebians (populations from North Africa) organized a series of demonstrations, sit-ins and hunger strikes to protest discrimination and harassment. The movement came to a head with the March Against Racism and for Equal Rights (*Marche contre le racisme et pour l'Égalité des Droits*) in

1983. The media labeled them the "Beur movement," where *Beur* was used as a slang term for second-generation Maghrebians.[1] The government responded to the *Beur* movement with a series of policies aimed at revitalizing the disadvantaged neighborhoods in which many *Beur* youths lived. These initiatives included increased economic benefits to disadvantaged areas, as well as tax incentives for companies to hire young Maghrebians.

The movement was particularly important for developing a framework that encouraged discussions about minority political integration. The *Beurs* were focused on deepening French citizenship; in doing so, they called for a growing recognition of religious and cultural diversity. In this way, the movement's political visibility led to a growing recognition that Maghrebians were under-represented on municipal councils. In response, associations developed that were active in local political arenas and focused on increasing minority representation in the 1989 municipal elections. France Plus, for example, launched an initiative to get Maghrebians on local ballots, which resulted in the election of nearly 100 Maghrebian candidates to office (Leveau, 2000).[2]

Despite a modest increase in representation following the elections, in the next municipal elections in 1995 only 4 percent of candidates were of immigrant origin, and most were Spanish or Portuguese (Oriol, 1998). In part, decreased candidacy was due to disillusionment among Maghrebian councilors, who were new to politics and frustrated at the lack of change once they entered office. Among those elected, accusations were made against political parties of solely choosing an *arabe de service* (token Arab) as a

[1] *Beur* comes from the inverse of the French word for Arab, *Arabe*.

[2] France Plus approached all parties except for the Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) and proposed nearly 500 Muslim candidates of North African origin. Nearly 300 were included on party lists, but only around 100 were elected.

candidate.

The decrease in Maghrebian candidates elected to local office in the 1990s reflected the decline of the *Beur* movement and coincided with the rise of the far-right Front National (FN) under Jean-Marie Le Pen. As Feldblum (1999) details, the FN's popularity united mainstream parties in opposition. Together, they pushed for the protection of republican national values, which called for non-differentiation in the political sphere. The emphasis on French civic engagement and republican principles weakened the salience of minority demands and their push for political inclusion.

6.1.1 Minorities and Evolving Party Inclusion Strategies

The importance of party inclusion for Muslim representation outcomes became increasingly clear by the early 2000s. While Muslim candidates in England were frequently included on ballots due to pressure from local co-ethnic organizations, party leaders and mayors in France were largely responsible for approaching potential Muslim candidates. Unlike in England, where Muslim candidates were backed by grassroots movements and often had experience as local activists, Muslim candidates in France had little political backing from their own communities.

The early 2000s witnessed an evolution in the discourse surrounding minority categorization in France. Minorities were no longer referred to by their ethnic origin (e.g., *Beur*), but as Muslims. As detailed in Chapter 3, this change was driven in part by 9/11 and a growing recognition of the religious dimensions of Maghrebian identity. This development overlapped with Jean-Marie Le Pen's unexpected success in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, which placed him in the second round against President Chirac. Chirac's overwhelming victory, in part due to the mobilization of

Muslims against Le Pen, led many to believe that parties would become increasingly willing to include Muslims as candidates in municipal, as well as national, elections.

Yet, change never arrived. Their continued exclusion from municipal office in the late 1990s and early 2000s was due, in part, to the hierarchical nature of municipal governments in France, which concentrates large significant power in the mayor's office and their circle of local elites. When Muslims were included as candidates, many were placed far down on the ballot, stymieing their ability to become elected and signaling that inclusion was largely symbolic. During regional elections in 2004, for example, the center-right *Union pour un mouvement populaire* (Union for a Popular Movement, UMP) promised to include candidates of immigrant-origin on their ballots. While more than 300 minority candidates were vetted, Bird (2005) notes that the party "bowed to local barons" (p. 436) who were responsible for candidate selection, and only six minority candidates were included, and none elected.

6.1.2 Muslims and Sub-Municipal Representation

The difficulties Muslims faced were also the result of government efforts to marginalize Muslims from the political arena through the development of neighborhood associations and *conseils de quartier* (neighborhoods councils) (Garbaye, 2005). Municipal councils found it relatively simple to devolve Muslim representation to the sub-municipal level because Muslims were more likely to live in neighborhoods with large numbers of their co-ethnics. In this way, neighborhood-level segregation at once isolated Muslims from the local political arena while facilitating their engagement at the neighborhood level.

Political incentives to relegate Muslim representation to the sub-municipal level reflect broader claims of a "social fracture" (*fracture sociale*) in France. The term

indicates the process by which the disadvantaged were territorially "abandoned" and removed from more advantaged groups through "disqualification" (Simon, 2002). Claims of a social fracture are at least partly supported by evidence. In a research report drawing on findings from the *Enquête Emploi* (employment survey), Maurin (2004) shows that the most elevated indicator of inequality between households was the proportion of foreign residents. Préteceille (2006) finds that in the early 2000s, immigrant segregation of North African origin was 150 times greater than the social segregation of workers. In this way, sub-municipal representation embodies the spatial processes of disqualification inherent in segregation.

While patterns of social exclusion persisted, political engagement and party incorporation tactics would shift in the wake of the 2005 riots in the *banlieues*. As Lichfield (2006) notes, the riots pushed Muslims to channel their collective frustration to advocate for greater political representation. They also incentivized political parties to adopt new inclusion strategies, which involved increasing the number of minority candidates fielded on the ballots for municipal elections in 2008 (Maxwell, 2012). Between 2008 and 2020, Muslim representation on local councils increased by nearly 7 percent. Despite overall increases in Muslim representation, there remain puzzling differences in candidacy and representation levels across communes with sizable Muslim populations. The following sections will explore the reasons for this variation.

6.2 Data and Methods

This section presents the data and methods used to analyze segregation's impact on Muslim representation. In France, elections are held at the municipal level and are carried out according to different electoral laws that vary based on population size. I restrict my

samples to communes over 1,000 inhabitants, where elections are held according to a semi-proportional two-round list system, to ensure consistency in electoral rules. In the following analyses, my dependent variable is the percentage of Muslims elected to municipal council. I collected data on municipal election outcomes in 104 municipalities for the 2008, 2014, and 2020 municipal elections. In order to account for smaller metropolitan areas that have sizable Muslim populations, I include sample forty-four cities in the *banlieues* of Paris and Lyon. In total, I coded over just over 1,200 party lists containing over 50,000 candidates.[3]

I account for a variety of potential influences to understand the factors that influence Muslim representation outcomes. To calculate the main independent variable, segregation, I use the dissimilarity index, as detailed in Chapter 2. I rely on restricted access data from the 2012 census in order to calculate segregation levels. As previously noted, France prohibits the collection of data on ethnic identity, aside from household member nationality and country of birth. National origin is therefore used as a proxy variable for ethnic categorization. As a result, it is possible that the number of Muslims is under-counted.[4]

According to electoral geography literature, the size of the Muslim population in each district should play an important role in determining the percentage of the elected Muslim representatives on each council. Given that French law prohibits the collection of

[3] I also conduct additional analyses to understand how segregation shapes the average percentage of Muslims included as candidates, as well as across the winning, second, and third lists (Appendix D).

[4] To account for this possibility, I multiply the foreign population by two, three, four, and five, as proxies for the actual number of Muslims living in an IRIS. I then compute projected dissimilarity indices based on these figures. The results remain consistent when projected dissimilarity indices are used.

data on the ethnic or religious origins of its population, I rely on population figures available for the countries of birth in each municipality.

I draw on census data from the 2012 census to measure economic deprivation levels. Economic deprivation is operationalized as the percentage of households in a given French commune that are below the 60 percent median standard of living.

To understand the degree to which the number of available seats might influence inclusion, I include a district magnitude variable. District magnitude ranges from 22 to 69 in my sample.

To assess whether the presence of other minority communities might stymie the ability of Muslim minorities to be elected once on the ballot, I create a diversity index based on the percentage of foreigners in each commune's population. I use this index to generate three levels of diversity – low, moderate, and high –based on the breakdown of national origin categories across municipalities from the 2012 census.

It is also possible that the number of Muslims on the *conseils de quartier* could stymie their chances of being nominated to municipal councils, given that municipalities have historically sought to relegate their representation to the sub-municipal level. I therefore include the percentage of Muslims in each commune's *conseils de quartier* and aggregate the total percentage at the communal level. Councilors were gathered by obtaining data from council websites and, when needed, contacting councils for additional details.

Finally, I include the population (logged) and control for the impact of urban-rural distinctions by including a given commune's population density.

I begin by conducting an OLS regression to understand the factors that influence Muslim nomination on a given party list, as well as the overall proportion of nominated Muslims. I then construct a threshold model based on the interaction to further investigate the relationship between segregation and Muslim representation on municipal councils.

6.3 Results

Table 6.1 presents the results of the OLS models estimating the nomination of Muslims to municipal councils. In Model I, I estimate the significance of the control variables and main independent variables on the average percentage of Muslims nominated across all lists. In Models II, III, and IV, I estimate their significance on the nomination of Muslims across the remaining party lists.[5]

Table 6.1 presents the results of the OLS models estimating the representation of Muslims on municipal councils. For each model, the dependent variable is the percentage of Muslims elected to office on a given municipal council. In Model I, I establish the significance of the control variables before demographic variables are included. In Model II, I add the demographic variables % Muslim Population and Diversity prior to accounting for Segregation Level. Model III includes the variable Segregation Level along with an interaction term between Segregation Level and % Muslim Population to test whether segregation level moderates the relationship between Muslim population size and Muslim representation outcomes.

Table 6.1. The Election of Muslims to Municipal Councils Across French Communes

	I	II	III
Variables	% Muslims	% Muslims	% Muslims Elected

[5] Regressions for nomination on lists four through seven are excluded due to the small number of observations.

	Elected	Elected	
Segregation			0.316
			(0.173)
% Muslim Population		0.557***	1.808**
		(0.150)	(0.631)
Segregation*% Muslim Population			-3.421*
			(1.729)
Conseils	-0.29*	-0.13	-0.11
	(8.920)	(9.263)	(9.182)
District Magnitude	0.000201	-0.00127	-0.00116
	(0.00110)	(0.00111)	(0.00110)
Economic Deprivation	0.684***	0.233*	0.221*
	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Urban	0.001***	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.002)	(0.0002)	(0.002)
Population (logged)	-0.0343*	-0.00719	0.000905
	(0.0149)	(0.0153)	(0.0147)
Left Party	0.0412*	0.0403*	0.0415*
	(0.179)	(0.0166)	(0.0167)
Two Rounds	-0.0334	0.00511	0.00653
	(0.0162)	(0.0158)	(0.0159)
Turnout	-0.0166	-0.00942	-0.00427
	(0.0471)	(0.0410)	(0.0407)
High Diversity		0.0643***	0.0625***
		(0.0189)	(0.0185)
Constant	0.320*	0.0432	-0.0928
	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.130)
Observations	336	336	336
R-squared	0.481	0.563	0.578

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses

The results displayed in Model III indicate that while Segregation Level is an insignificant predictor of Muslim representation outcomes on its own, it acts as a moderator, and the interaction is negative and significant. These findings are surprising, given that the prevailing scholarship assumes no significant relationship between the geographic distribution of minority groups and their election outcomes in list systems. The results displayed in Model III, however, cast doubt on this assumption. The spatial

distributions of majority and minority groups do, in fact, shape Muslim representation outcomes. As the Muslim population rises, increases in segregation reduce the positive impact of the main effects.

The Conseils variable is the only control whose significance changes following the inclusion of the demographic variables. In Model I, the percentage of Muslims on *conseils de quartiers* is a negative and significant predictor for determining the percentage of Muslims elected to municipal councils. However, it becomes insignificant following the inclusion of demographic and spatial variables.

Aside from the Conseils variable, the significance of the controls in Model I, and the significance of the demographic variables included in Model II, remain consistent Segregation Level is included. Economic Deprivation has a positive and significant effect on Muslim inclusion outcomes across all three models, indicating that communes with higher levels of poverty are more likely to displayed increased levels of Muslim representation. Similarly, when Diversity Level is included in Models II and III, it exerts a positive and significant influence on Muslim representation. Urban communes are also more likely to display increased levels of Muslim representation, consistent with the scholarly consensus that Muslims are more likely to display increased representation rates in urban, rather than rural, settings.

The findings displayed in Table 6.1 indicate a non-linear interaction between segregation level and a district's Muslim population size.[6] Table 6.2 shows the results of the threshold model given the interaction effect displayed in Appendix D. When

[6] The non-linearity refers to the significantly negative Segregation Level x % Muslim Population term, which indicates that the negative slope of the representation line gets steeper as the Muslim population increases.

segregation levels remain constant, increases in the Muslim population raise the predicted percentage of Muslims elected to office in a given commune.

However, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, there is a marked change in the effect of segregation as the percentage of a district's Muslim population moves from five and 10 percent; increases in a district's segregation level now decrease the predicted percentage of Muslim councilors. The results in Table 6.2 indicate a population threshold, like in England, wherein the impact of segregation shifts above a given Muslim population, leading to reduced levels of Muslim representation. Table 6.2 displays the population threshold for election given the interaction effect between Muslim population size and segregation levels.

The interaction reveals that increases in segregation at a given Muslim population above the threshold decrease the likelihood of Muslim election. The results in Table 6.2 indicate that between a Muslim population of five and 10 percent, the effect of segregation changes. Specifically, at 9 percent (full results with the complete threshold are shown in Appendix D.)

The mean values of the sample's Muslim population size show that 46 percent of the cases included in my sample fall below the population threshold of 9 percent (the mean is 7 percent). Indeed, the results suggest that in the majority of communes, increases in segregation will lead to reduced levels of Muslim representation.

Table 6.2. Predicted Percentage of Muslims Elected to Office in a Commune, Threshold Model

	% Muslim Population	1	5	10	15	20	25	30
Segregation Level								

10	2	8	16	24	30	41	50
20	4	9	16	22	29	36	42
30	6	10	15	20	25	30	35
40	9	11	15	18	21	24	27
50	11	12	14	16	17	19	21

Note: The threshold displayed is the result of the interaction effect displayed in Appendix D.

This variation becomes important, from a comparative perspective, for Muslim representation across France. Take the examples of Nîmes and Montpellier.

In Montpellier, where the level of segregation is relatively low (30) Muslims represented 10 percent of all nominated candidates on the winning list and 12 percent of the council following elections in 2014. In the 2020 elections, Muslims represented 17 percent of nominated candidates on the winning list and represented 21 percent of the council following of elections.



Figure 5.1. Predicted Muslim Representation Given Segregation Level and Muslim Population

Note: The solid lines trace the expected linear prediction at the minimum, maximum, and mean segregation levels. The dependent variable is the percentage of Muslims elected to office on a municipal council. Segregation levels represent the minimum, maximum, and mean levels.

In Nîmes, where the level of segregation is higher (45), Muslims represented only two percent of nominated candidates on the winning list, and none were elected in 2014. Here, the importance of list placement becomes critical. Among those few Muslims who were included on the list, they were placed at the bottom and failed to be elected to the municipal council after the election's second round. In the 2020 elections, Muslims represented 5 percent of candidates on the winning list, slightly more than in 2014. However, once again not all Muslim candidates were elected to the municipal council because 2 percent were placed on the bottom of the list, resulting in the election of 3 percent of Muslim candidates.

6.4 Qualitative Case Study: Segregation, Muslim Representation and Political (Dis)engagement

This section further tests the importance of segregation for Muslim representation. It illuminates the causal pathways that explain the under-representation of Muslims in communes that possess sizable Muslim populations and high levels of segregation. To do so, I draw on qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted in 2020, 2021, and 2022.

I begin by detailing the empirical strategy. Drawing on a most-similar systems comparison of municipalities that have similar Muslim populations above the population threshold, but differ in their levels of segregation, I elaborate on the causal mechanisms

and discuss how local circumstances condition Muslims representation. As detailed in Chapter 1, interviewees were recruited using a snowball sampling method. The task of reaching individuals and groups to interview proved to be one with a number of challenges. Given that the initial fieldwork was cut short due the Covid-19 pandemic, I relied on Zoom to conduct the majority of interviews. In total, I interviewed 22 respondents, including residents, Muslim and non-Muslim councilors, and party officials, all of whom were non-Muslim.

Finally, notwithstanding the sizable Muslim populations in the communes in which interviews were conducted, openly discussing categories of race, religion, and ethnicity, remains highly stigmatized. Many councilors and party officials were reluctant to talk about Muslim inclusion and representation. As one party official told me, "Officially, we don't select based on race, religion, or ethnicity. But we do select based on those who will be able to deliver the most votes and are the most capable candidates, as everyone does" (Interview, 5/27/20). For this reason, I resorted to recording the interviews by hand. I also pledged to protect the anonymity of my interviewees, which is why I do not use the proper names of any localities or individuals.

For my argument to be proven correct in the French context, I expect to find meaningful differences between communes that contain sizable Muslim populations but display differing levels of segregation. As the following section shows, discussions of segregation as a tool of political disengagement are much more prevalent in communes with low Muslim representation compared to demographically and economically similar communes where there are high levels of Muslim representation.

6.4.1. Under-representation in Highly Segregated Communes with Sizable Muslim Populations

The findings from the following interviews suggest that in communes that displayed low levels of Muslim representation, segregation was frequently referenced as a reason for political disengagement, both on the part of voters, as well as in the inclusion of Muslim candidates. In one highly segregated commune, a Muslim councilor pointed to the isolation that Muslims face as creating a hesitancy to engage with local politics:

> Muslim councilor: "When you only see people that share your background all the time, that becomes your community. In the stores they shop at they are only with others [like them], when they go outside, they see others [like them], but they don't see anyone else. They don't want to become engaged in something with others who aren't like them because they think they don't need [politics]" (Interview, 3/14/22).

A Muslim resident who has never run for local office shared similar sentiments:

> Muslim resident: "Why should I [engage]? It's just symbolic. Politics doesn't do anything for us, and they don't want us anyway" (Interview, 4/15/22).

A local Muslim figure, akin to a political organizer in the US context, spoke about the difficulties of creating engagement in residentially segregated areas.

> Organizer: "There's a perception that voting doesn't do anything. These are not the kinds of people that are going to go talk to their councilors [on their own]. The problem is not that there aren't people like them around – most people they interact are Muslim. They just don't care, and it's a challenge to make them understand why they should care, what's at stake. I don't even think they care if they're represented. They just don't care at all. It's very difficult [for people like me]" (Interview, 4/20/22).

Another, non-Muslim councilor on a municipal council in a *banlieue* outside of Paris speculated that their apathy was because of their isolation:

> Councilor: "They are not only isolated within [the city], but they can't get to other cities without taking several buses. These areas never vote. We can put up as many flyers as we want and they don't vote" (Interview, 4/1/22).

The respondents all displayed, or perceived, a degree of political apathy and disengagement among Muslim residents. In this way, their logic displays similar reasoning. Both the Muslim councilor and resident paint a picture of "us versus them." These sentiments suggests that segregation breeds social isolation, which creates a type of communitarianism that cuts off Muslims from political institutions.

When discussing their "community," the first two Muslim respondents focused on how politics does little to serve the interests of others like them. The Muslim resident also suggested that political institutions did not want Muslims to engage. Further, the Muslim councilor seems to be sympathetic towards those Muslims who have no interest in engaging with politics. At the same time, they distance themself from these residents in the way they speak about them (e.g., "they").

The political organizer displayed similar frustrations as the non-Muslim councilor. Both spoke not only of political apathy, but a general *unwillingness* to engage that was difficult to remedy, despite a variety of political strategies employed (e.g., organizing, flyers).

These sentiments were echoed by a non-Muslim party official:

> Socialist Party Official: "We want to include those who want to be included. If there are those who think that they have no obligation to others outside the people they see every day, then why would they want to participate, and why would we want to include them?" (Interview, 4/8/22).

Here, the party official describes a certain hesitancy to even include Muslims as candidates. The burden is placed on residents to show an openness to engage as political

participants before parties decide to include them. The interviewees also present participation as a type of civic duty, which is grounded in the recognition that they serve the community as a whole. This sentiment was shared by a non-Muslim councilor:

Non-Muslim Councilor: "There is a large Muslim community here…But they don't want to become involved. They don't vote and they don't run for office. They are of course isolated, which is something [the city] is trying to address."

SC: What steps has the city taken to address the isolation?

NMC: Well, you know, we try and hold events that are open to everyone…the mosque held open hours where people could come and learn [about Islam]…of course we want to discourage communitarianism" (Interview, 3/28/22).

The exchange with the non-Muslim councilor highlights sentiments shared by many non-Muslim councilors and residents: frustration with the perceived political apathy on the part of Muslim residents, coupled with vague and half-hearted attempts to discourage their isolation. At the same time, their apparent unwillingness to engage is driven by fears of *communautarisme* (communitarianism), which carries a pejorative connotation in the French context.

Taken together, segregation creates both an unwillingness among Muslims to engage as political participants, as well as a hesitancy among parties to include them as candidates, thereby preventing their ability to become elected. Particularly striking is the assumption across all of these conversations that Muslim under-representation is somehow linked to a lack of Muslim political engagement. Implicit in these assumptions is the belief that Muslims would be more likely to vote for parties that include their co-ethnics on the ballot. In this way, party strategies at inclusion are driven by anticipated co-ethnic voting behavior, which parties believe boost their results in communes with sizable Muslim populations.

6.4.2 Increased Representation in Communes with Low-Moderate Levels of Segregation and Sizable Muslim Populations

In communes with low and moderate levels of segregation, conversations about political engagement looked quite different. The political arena was frequently presented as open to everyone, rather than a select few:

> Non-Muslim councilor: "While the council has people from all backgrounds, that isn't what's important. Everyone is here to serve the city" (Interview, 4/12/22).

A Muslim councilor came to similar conclusion:

> Muslim councilor: "I don't see myself as someone representing Muslims or Algerians, but as someone that's here to improve the city for each person" (Interview, 4/13/22).

Here, the Muslim councilor viewed themself in a lens that transcended ethnic or religious categorization. This may suggest that low levels of segregation cause people to identify less with the ethnic or religious dimensions of their identities, and more with their "civic" French identities. The converse may be true as well: the more isolated Muslims are, the more likely they are to identify primarily as Muslims, thereby preventing the formation of "civic" identities that encourage political participation.

A party official on the Left echoed the previous interviewees' views on role of councilors:

> Party official: "There is a willingness here for people to want to engage, not just voting but becoming [council members]. This is a city with a great deal of social mixing. Council members want to serve everyone" (Interview, 3/21/22).

In each interview, respondents suggested that councilors were there to "serve" the city as a whole, rather than select groups of residents. There was significantly less emphasis

placed on ethnic or religious categorization. When these identity categories were mentioned, it was to emphasize their relative insignificance.

Further, the party official links the high level of "social mixing" with the desire of councilors to serve the city as whole. This rhetoric suggests that social mixing (the concept, rather than the policy) encourages candidates and councilors to view their city as a single entity, rather than a collection of groups fragmented along ethnic lines. Cohesion encourages them to approach their political duties to benefit the entire city. Notably, discussions of isolation and segregation were relatively absent in communes with high levels of Muslim representation. When the spatial dynamics of community membership were discussed, it was to reference the social mixing that encourages sentiments of togetherness not expressed in communes with high levels of segregation.

Across all the conversations I had, recurrent themes included a willingness or reluctance to engage, as well as the assumption that Muslim voting behavior would drive Muslim representation outcomes.[7] The results from the interviews suggest that segregation affects both engagement and inclusion, which both shape Muslim representation. First, segregation isolates Muslim communities and creates political disengagement, thereby stymieing their willingness to participate as potential candidates or even as voters. Second, segregation creates a hesitancy among party officials to include Muslims as candidates as a result of their perceived political apathy. Their reluctance to include Muslim candidates thus stymies their ability to become elected to municipal office.

[7] These discussions suggest that future research would benefit from additional quantitative analyses looking at individual voting behavior across French communes, to understand whether Muslim engagement does, in fact, influence co-ethnic representation.

By contrast, there was little mention of segregation or isolation in communes with high levels of representation. When ethnoreligious identity was mentioned, it was to affirm that it was an unimportant determinant of political behavior. Conversations about civic engagement were common, and both Muslim and non-Muslim interviewees indicated their desire to serve their communities. The absence of discussions surrounding segregation and isolation, even in communes that are empirically considered segregated, was particularly enlightening. This surprising finding suggests that in some cases, it is the *perception* of residential integration that influences engagement, rather than the actual level of segregation.

6.5 Conclusion

The findings in this chapter showed that as the Muslim population increases in a given commune, increasing levels of segregation dampen Muslim representation. Segregation thus impedes Muslim nomination and election to municipal councils in highly segregated communes. I support these findings from data collected across three election cycles between 2008 and 2020, which include 1,200 party lists and over 50,000 candidates. Like in England, I find that there is a population threshold, and in communes where the Muslim population is 9 percent or greater, increases in segregation level will decrease their representation outcomes.

Here, the role of parties in structing inclusion is particularly important. Drawing on qualitative evidence gathered during semi-structured interviews, I find that parties are less willing to include Muslims on their ballots in highly segregated communes with sizable Muslim populations. The qualitative analysis reveals how segregation is a central lens through which individuals and parties understand themselves, their localities, and

political motivations. It also illustrates how they render the segregation they experience politically salient. Living in conditions of segregation means that the daily lives of Muslims and White, majority populations are segmented: they shop at their own grocery stores, their children play at different parks, they eat at different restaurants. In short, the two populations are highly unlikely to interact with one another. Segregation creates reduced political visibility and causes parties to perceive Muslims as unengaged, thus excluding them from the ballot. Taken together, this chapter provided convincing evidence that segregation shapes Muslim representation outcomes across France.

7 CHAPTER SEVEN

Segregation, Muslim Representation, and Public Spending in France

Issues surrounding public spending and service provision in communes with sizable Muslim populations have preoccupied government decisionmakers since the early 2000s. In 2003, Social Affairs Minister Jean-Louis Borloo proposed a "Marshall Plan" for the *banlieues*, which included increased funding for public housing, employment training, and apprenticeship programs to solve the "*banlieue* problem." Three years later, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin pushed his government to address educational disparities and economic deprivation in the *banlieues*. In response, Villepin's government provided an additional 100 million euros to municipalities to fund civic associations tasked with improving services. At the heart of these proposals were fears that Muslims would fail to integrate if they lived in conditions of spatial exclusion and received inadequate services. Villepin's solution, which relied heavily on associations to remedy service provision problems, is indicative of a broader governmental reliance on associations to deliver public goods to Muslims.

Using generalized propensity score matching, I draw on spending data collected between 2014 and 2020 across 110 metropolitan areas, or 770 communal budgets, to explore how segregation shapes public spending across France. I find that segregation drives down overall public spending as well as across individual budgetary categories. I further show that the percentage of Muslim *adjoints*, rather than the demographic composition of a municipal council, positively influences overall public spending, particularly in highly segregated cities.

I demonstrate that while the ethnic composition of *adjoints* shapes overall public spending, few resources are devoted to Muslim communities. Instead, I show how municipal councils have devolved provision responsibilities to associations, thereby relegating Muslim service provision to the sub-municipal level. In this way, communes have been able to exert control over local Muslim communities by reconfiguring party networks and associations on a neighborhood basis. Using the cases of Lille and Marseille, I demonstrate that interactions with municipal associations are often mediated by clientelism and patronage.

The chapter begins by providing an overview of local public spending across France. I then use propensity score matching to examine the impact of segregation on public spending, before analyzing the impact of Muslim councilors on communal budgeting using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The final section examines the territorialization of associations and patronage politics across Lille and Marseille.

7.1 Public Spending and Service Provision in France

Three overlapping tiers of government are responsible for local public spending decisions in France. The lowest tier consists of around 36,600 municipalities, the middle tier consists of 96 departments (*départements*, similar to counties), and at the highest level are 22 regions. The current arrangement is the result of decentralization laws in 1982 and 1983, which devolved budgetary power to municipal governments. Beginning in March 1982, communes assumed responsibility for deciding how funds for urban infrastructure, parts of education, and economic, social, and health policies, should be spent.

The changes rendered France both a decentralized and unitary state (Seifert & Nieswand, 2014). The traditional French territorial administrative system, instituted

during the French Revolution and later, under Napoleon, is based on what Cole (2006) refers to as the "principle of uniformity," in which the centralized state exerts dominance over smaller administrative entities, including localities, parties, or interest groups. Following this principle, public spending decisions originated in the central government, were implemented at the communal level by state agencies, and were coordinated by a state representative.

Today, the state retains legislative power and delegates service provision to the three subnational administrative tiers, which assume different spending responsibilities, or *blocs de compétences*. In 2019, for example, regions contributed approximately 13 percent to local government expenditures, the communes contributed 55 percent and *départements* 32 percent (CLENCH, 2019). Regions make the broadest spending decisions, including how funds should be spent on economic development and regional cultural services. Departments manage budgets related to secondary education and departmental social services. Finally, communes are responsible for drafting the local budget. They decide where public funds are spent, including various local services such as planning, building and maintenance of primary schools, waste disposal, some welfare services and local social assistance and waste collection, as well as direct the agencies that carry out these functions (INSEE, 2019).

In many ways, the system of power sharing contradicts the common depiction of France as a heavily centralized state. Yet, in contrast with a federal system, the largest territorial bodies (regions) do not control the spending decisions of the departments or communes; they exist as a set of overlapping entities. In many cases, regions rely on the cooperation of the lower territorial bodies to implement their own policies.

7.2 Patterns of Decentralization: Planning and Spending Across Communes

The current relationship between the central government and lower levels of government reflects a broader evolution in the state's approach to managing local territory. As detailed in Chapter 3, the post-war period was defined by a heavily centralized, technocratic approach to territorial planning that focused on the construction of infrastructural projects, including bridges and highways. To accomplish this, the state provided funding to local territorial bodies and used field agencies connected to the central government to ensure funds were spent according to state plans.

Beginning in the late 1950s and 1960s, the central government's inability to manage all of its territorial projects became clear, and sub-national territorial units began to assume partial responsibility for planning projects. Regional administrative constituencies (*conférences administratives régionales*, CAR) were formed in 1955, and over a decade later, regional councils (*établissements publics régionaux*, EPR) were created in 1972. Both bodies were tasked with carrying out local planning. Beginning in 1986, CAR and EPR became directly elected bodies of sub-national government.

While political decentralization of CAR and EPR only began in 1986, administrative decentralization began two decades earlier. Regional prefectures were created in 1964 and represented a significant step in the regionalization of the state. Similar to the regional councils, prefectures were instituted to coordinate the spending activities of larger, departmental prefectures.

This process of territorialization, which Cole (2006) refers to as "steering at a distance," was further enshrined in the 2004 Decentralization Act. The legislation followed a December 2002 bill that designated responsibility for areas deemed

"technically and socially the most difficult" to lower levels of public administration (p.110). The bill was accompanied by the 2003 Constitutional Reform, which enshrined the principle of communal financial autonomy and placed the burden of generating financial revenue through local taxation on communal and regional authorities (Sueur, 2005).

Communal structures have adapted since the initial decentralization period and subsequent reforms. The power of local actors to shape spending decisions has thus broadened, and decisionmakers now include mayors, *adjoints*, municipal councilors, local economic and voluntary associations, and private-public partnerships (Gaudin, 1995; John & Cole, 1999). The power of the mayor and his inner circle is particularly pronounced. Mayors enjoy a six-year term and use a system known as *cumul de mandats*, in which they hold several positions across municipal government. This incentivizes the use of pork barrel politics, particularly for local development projects, and also makes them difficult to defeat (Bird, 2005).

Decentralization laws have thus resulted in two important outcomes. First, decentralization has increased the power of *adjoints*, who work with the mayor to draft the communal budget. Second, the concentration of power around the mayor and *adjoints* has made it relatively difficult for municipal councilors to exert influence on local decision-making processes. Only after the mayor and *adjoints* draft the budget are councilors able to vote on the proposed spending measures.

The fragmentation of territorial service provision often overlaps with two primary forms of spatial exclusion. First, communal-level isolation of the *banlieues* from major cities. Second, intra-communal segregation. Much of the scholarship on segregation and

public spending has looked to understand the former, wherein public spending in the *banlieues* is compared with spending in more central areas (Cartier et al., 2008; Tabard, 1993). Less discussion has been paid to the ways in which intra-communal segregation shapes provision. Given that segregation internal divisions and fragments resource distribution, we can expect that it exerts a detrimental effect on overall public spending.

As was shown in Chapter 5, the internal composition of councils in segregated cities – and the ability of Muslim councilors to target their co-ethnics with local public goods – shapes spending decisions in England. Yet decidedly less attention has been paid to how spatial exclusion and council composition in at-large systems shapes spending outcomes. Given that Muslims favor increased public spending, we can expect them to carry these preferences with them as municipal councilors. However, the at-large system removes geographic accountability to neighborhood constituencies, thus reducing the potential for Muslim councilors to redirect resources to their communities. Instead, I propose that we look at the demographic composition of *adjoints*, who participate in budgeting and decision-making, to understand how local budgets are shaped.

7.3 Data and Methods

In order to test the impact of segregation on public spending, I engage methods of propensity score matching that use GPS estimates and dose-response functioning, which are suitable for establishing causality when the treatment variable is continuous. Data for my outcome variable, public spending per capita, is gathered from the communal budget published by the Ministry of Economy and Finance's *comptes des collectivités* (communal accounts) for all communes included in my sample (n=110) between 2014 and 2020, for a total of 770 communal budgets.

To operationalize the main independent variable, segregation, I use the dissimilarity index, as in previous analyses. I also include several variables that might be correlated with the level of segregation.

First, to account for demographic explanations, I include a diversity variable. Given that I am unable to obtain the precise demographic characteristics of French cities, I operationalize diversity as high, medium, and low levels based on the percentage of foreigners living in a town or city according to the 2012 census, as in Chapter 6. I also include twelve-year changes between 1990 and 2012 in the population of White, French, to account for White flight, as well as the population (logged).

I also account for economic factors. I include the median house value, the percentage of the population above age 65, and the percentage of renters. Together, the inclusion of these controls accounts for the economic and demographic characteristics that may be correlated with living in a segregated city.

To assess the relationship between segregation and public spending I use propensity score matching. Much of the scholarship that engages propensity score matching involves binary treatment variables. Yet, in many observational studies, the treatment variable is continuous. In cases where there the expected treatment is non-binary, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest that covariates and the treatment variable can be modeled using a scalar approach (propensity score), and that matched groups can be made based on the propensity score. Here, I am interested in estimating the average treatment effect where the treatment (segregation) takes on a continuum of values.

Hirano and Imbens (2004) follow this logic and develop a generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology as part of a potential outcomes framework to estimate the dose

response function (average treatment effect) for a continuous treatment. Bia and Mattei (2007), for example, use the dose-response function to estimate the effect of economic aid to firms, while Berresaw et al. (2012) use GPS matching to analyze the effect of improved maize technologies on a variety of economic outcomes in rural Tanzania, including food security and food expenditures.

I use GPS matching because the nonrandom process that characterizes segregation makes simple comparisons across cities problematic. Indeed, the primary difficulty with making a causal inference using a simple regression is the lack of randomization of assignment to the "treatment" of living in a segregated city. In this way, segregation is not a random process. While I used an instrumental variable approach to establish causality between segregation level and public spending in England, the use of waterways in France to instrument for segregation is not comparable. GPS matching allows me to overcome the nonrandom assignment issue using an alternative approach.

The GPS matching method engages the following logic: given that the counterfactual is unavailable for observational data (i.e., it cannot be assigned as it would in an experimental design), one possible solution is to estimate the average treatment effect. The expected value of the "response" across two sets of equivalent groups allows me to compare the effect of the treatment and establish causality between the treatment effect and outcome. In this way, GPS matching is an extension of propensity score matching. It is understood as the conditional probability of receiving a level of treatment (segregation) given covariates.

This methodology relies on the uncounfoundedness assumption (assumption of selection on observables) wherein the treatment assignment mechanism is independent of

each potential outcome conditional on the covariate. The uncounfoundedness assumption allows me to adjust for differences in my covariates, thereby removing comparison biases in the treatment. Thus, estimating the GPS creates covariate balancing, and the DRF is then computed by estimating average outcomes across different treatment intervals and across different covariates.

After establishing the relationship between segregation and public spending, I examine the potential for Muslim councilors to influence spending decisions across different levels of segregation. I draw on original panel data that combines longitudinal fine-grained local-level data of election returns with geolocated public spending between 2014 and 2020. Leveraging changes in council representation, I estimate the casual effect of Muslim representation on public spending across different levels of segregation.

Following propensity score matching, I conduct an OLS regression to understand how Muslim representation shapes spending. If I want to analyze the ways in which Muslim representatives shape spending power, I need to account for both the ethnic composition of the municipal council as well as the *adjoints*. I thus conceptualize Muslim representation in two ways. First, as the percentage of Muslim councilors on a municipal council. This measure of representation accounts for the overall council composition and allows me to understand how Muslim inclusion on winning party lists shapes (or fails to shape) spending decisions. Second, as the percentage of Muslim *adjoints* on a municipal council. If *adjoints* are critical players in shaping public budgeting decisions, then it follows that Muslim *adjoints* would be able to positively influence spending decisions. I also include a number of control variables, including the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the population below 60 percent of the median

income, the percentage of the population that is estimated to be Muslim, and the level of ethnic fragmentation within the city, to account for additional factors that may influence public spending.

7.4 Results

7.4.1 Obtaining GPS Estimates

I first estimate the conditional distribution of Segregation given the covariates. Prior to matching, the distribution of Segregation is skewed, with a skewedness of -2.8 and a kurtosis of 8.2. I therefore transform the Segregation variable by taking its logarithims. The logarithims of Segregation have a skewedness of -.75 and a kurtosis of 2.4.

Next, I estimate the GPS, which is the conditional probability of receiving a particular level of treatment (segregation level) given the observed covariates. The variables included in the estimation of the GPS and the estimation results are shown in Table 7.1. Given that the treatment is non-binary, I follow Hirano and Imbens (2004) and divide segregation level into three intervals, segregation levels between zero and 30, 30 and 60, and 60-100. The GPS is computed for each interval. Next, I stratify observations into two groups according to the value of the GPS evaluated at the median treatment for each interval.

I then balance the distribution of the covariates among the treatment categories. The ability to interpret differences between matched treatment and control observations relies on my capacity to demonstrate that the matched pairs of treatment and controls are equivalent after conditioning on a series of covariates. According to a standard t-test, the balancing property is satisfied at a .01 level, indicating that the fit of the GPS is sufficient.

7.4.2 Matched Groups and Public Spending

Next, I examine the balance for each of the covariates by conducting a difference in means test. This test allows me to assess whether the mean in one treatment group is different from the mean in the other two combined. Given the three treatment interval groups, this results in three means differences and three standard errors.

Table 7.1. Balance of Covariates Given the GPS

Variable	Unadjusted			Adjusted		
	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
Renters	-0.8	1.3	-1.2	-0.5	0.6	-1.0
% population over 65	-1.2	0.7	0.5	-0.6	0.6	0.4
Diversity	-2.2	1.2	3.3	-1.8	0.8	2.4
12-year changes	-1.1	0.5	0.6	-0.7	0.7	-0.2
Population (logged)	-1.2	-0.3	2.0	-0.1	-0.2	0.3
Median house value	-0.6	2.0	-1.6	-0.1	-0.5	-1.0

In Table 7.1, I report the corresponding t-statistics before and after conditioning on the GPS. The results indicate that the covariate balance was improved by adjusting for the GPS. For instance, the first interval has five variables greater than 1.90 in absolute value without conditioning on the GPS. After accounting for the GPS, the number is reduced to one. Overall, the covariate imbalance reduced by 78.3 percent after adjustment.

I then estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome (spending) given segregation level and GPS. I regress the conditional expectation of the outcome (public spending) as a function of the observed treatment (segregation level) and GPS. While the

coefficients themselves hold no meaning in this model, they allow me to see whether all coefficients involving the generalized propensity score are equal to zero, which can be seen as a test of whether the covariates introduce bias into the model (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2. Parameter Estimates of Conditional Distribution of Segregation Level Given Covariates

Variable	Est.	SE
Intercept	0.25	0.04
Segregation level	-2.39	0.79
Segregation level-squared	7.63	2.60
Log(score)	-0.04	0.10
Log(score)-squared	0.07	0.07
Log(score) x segregation level	0.19	0.36

I can now obtain the average treatment effects for different values of the treatment (segregation level) using the DRF, which is the average conditional expectation of public spending given segregation level and estimated GPS. The dose response curve shown in the left panel of Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between the treatment (segregation level) and the outcome (public spending). It is the average treatment of moving from untreated (low segregation) to treated (high segregation). As Figure 6.1 indicates, once the segregation level reaches 30, there is a dramatic decrease in public spending as segregation level increases.[1] For each outcome, I also estimate the marginal treatment function (panel 2). The marginal effect of segregation shown in the panel on the right shows that that a 20 unit increase in segregation will on average decrease public spending per capita by about 2.5 points.

[1] The dose response functions are statistically significant for all values of treatments.



Figure 6.1. Dose Response and Treatment Effect Functions, Segregation Level

This trend holds across individual spending categories as well. As each panel in Figure 6.1 illustrates, increases in segregation decreased funding for highway and transport services, public health, environmental services, cultural services, children's services, and fire services. Taken together, these findings provide strong support for the claim that segregation dampens public goods provision.



Figure 6.2. Segregation Level and Spending on Individual Budgetary Categories

7.5 Muslim Councilors and Municipal Budgeting

The results from the previous section demonstrate that increases in segregation led to decreased public spending. In this section, I investigate the role of Muslim councilors in shaping public spending decisions according to level of segregation. Given that the mayor and their *adjoints* are responsible for drafting the yearly communal budget, I expect that the ethnic composition of the *adjoints* should influence public spending, rather than the percentage of Muslim councilors on the entire council. I expect their influence to be particularly pronounced in highly segregated cities.

Table 7.3. Muslim Representation and Public Spending Across French Communes

Variables	Model I Public Spending	Model II Public Spending
Segregation	-0.166*	-0.140
	(0.0839)	(0.0831)
Adjoint Representation		0.795*
		(5.794)
Muslim Representation	-0.0937	
	(0.0541)	
College Degree	0.0113***	0.00977***
	(0.00250)	(0.00279)
Party in Power	0.00493	0.00820
	(0.00588)	(0.00581)
Poverty Level	0.312**	0.238*
	(0.104)	(0.107)
Muslim Population	-0.0311	0.00655
	(0.111)	(0.113)
Fragmentation	-2.99e-06	-3.49e-06*
	(1.59e-06)	(1.59e-06)
Constant	0.00674	-0.00180
	(0.0507)	(0.0516)
Observations	212	212
R-squared	0.266	0.246

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

I first conduct an OLS regression analyses to establish the degree to which either the percentage of Muslim councilors or the percentage of *adjoints* shape public spending decisions. I begin, in Table 7.3, by regressing public spending with the controls described above. I include the percentage of Muslim councilors to test whether they have the ability to influence public spending decisions. In Model II, I include the percentage of Muslim *adjoints* as an independent variable to assess whether the demographic composition of *adjoints* influences public spending decisions.

The results in Table 7.3 provide strong evidence that, while the percentage of Muslim councilors has no significant effect on public budgeting outcomes, the percentage of Muslim *adjoints* positively and significantly impacts public spending. Moreover, the impact of segregation on public spending is negative and statistically significant, consistent with the findings from the propensity score matching.



Figure 6.3. Average Public Spending, 2020 Municipal Budget

To further examine the impact of *adjoint* demographic composition, I take the treatment intervals established in the previous section, which divided communes into low, moderate, and high levels of segregation, and then match them with their level of *adjoint* representation.[2] The results displayed in Figure 6.3 suggest that across all levels of segregation, high levels of Muslim *adjoints* representation led to an increase in average public spending.

In fact, the increase is steepest in highly segregated cities. As Figure 6.4 shows, highly segregated cities that experienced an increase in Muslim *adjoints* representation between 2014 and 2020 displayed a significant increase in public spending when compared to cities that either experienced no increase in Muslim *adjoints* representation or experienced a decrease.



[2] Low levels of *adjoints* representation are between zero and 2 percent, while high levels of Muslim representation are between 2 and 10 percent, which is the maximum percent of *adjoints* in my sample.

Figure 6.4 Change in Spending in Highly Segregated Communes Given Changes in Minority *Adjoints* Representation, 2014-2020

This finding is meaningful, given that segregation has been shown to decrease public spending. The results here indicate that while segregation may negatively impact goods provision, the presence of Muslim *adjoints* mitigates the negative effects of segregation on public spending through their increased decision-making power.

7.6 The Territorialization of Minority Service Provision

While the results from the previous section indicate that Muslim *adjoints* have the potential to shape communal budgeting decisions, financial resources are not necessarily targeted at their co-ethnics. As this section argues, their inability to redirect resources to their communities is reflected in historical processes of associationalism and territorialization.

Across France, minority population demands were historically dealt with through the *Fonds d'action sociale* (Social Action Fund, FAS), created in 1958. Established just after the founding of the Fifth Republic, the FAS funded social welfare programs for Algerians in the final years of French rule and was the primary funder of the Sonacotra. Central to the FAS was the state's intention to use welfare services to integrate Algerians through the improvement of their material conditions, while also shaping a population that was acquiescent to the French state (Lyons, 2009).

The FAS funded educational and cultural activities and was supplemented by charity organizations such as social centers (*centres sociaux*), the *Scouts de France*, and the *Foyers Léo Lagrange*. In the decades after its founding, it began to serve all immigrants and their descendants. Associations created a patchwork of service provision

outside of local government. They were, and in large part continue to be, the primary avenues through which Muslims obtain community-directed service provision.

In 2001, the FAS changed its name to the Action and Support Funds for Integration and the Fight Against Discrimination (*Fonds d'action et de soutien pour l'intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations*, FASILD). The transition from the FAS to FASILD reflected the state's growing recognition that immigration was not a passing phenomenon. Three years after FAS transitioned to FASILD, Philippe Séguin, president of the Court of Audit, spoke at a press conference in November 2004 on the reception of immigrants and immigrant integration:

> "It is true that the idea that immigrants were only a transient population has long prevailed. Therefore, much of the early efforts in the 1950s and 1960s were by no means aimed at addressing the problems of all immigrants. And if the FAS or Sonacotra were created during this period, it was exclusively for Algerian Muslims living in mainland France - and again, in the very particular context of the Algerian war."

Séguin's comments depart from those of Claudius Petit, former director of the Sonacotra, who argued decades earlier that immigration was an "artificial and traumatic phenomenon that will have to be ended sooner or later" (CAC 19870056, art. 7). The transition from FAS to FASILD reflected the evolution of governmental responses to immigration and integration, as well as the state's reliance on associations to distribute necessary goods and services to its growing Muslim populations. Only two years later, FASILD was transformed into the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity (*L'Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances*, Acsé)

in 2006, which worked to combat broader instances of discrimination separate from immigrant integration.[3]

The relegation of Muslim demands to the associational level reflected local patterns of service territorialization beginning in the 1970s. Municipal councils increasingly relied on associations to provide goods and services to their minority populations. Addressing service provision outside of local electoral institutions removed minority demands from local political institutions and confined provision to the extra-municipal level. This section explores how these political tactics created a system of associational neighborhood territorialization in two cities, Lille and Marseille, which limited the ability of dispersed Muslim communities to aggregate their demands.

7.6.1 Associations and Political Patronage in Lille and Marseille

In Lille, the subordination of associations serving minority service provision was entrenched in an established party machine that stymied Muslims' access to local office and prevented their influence on municipal councils. The Socialist party machine originated under mayor Pierre Mauroy (1973-2001) and was grounded in, and strengthened by, the local institutional context. Beginning in the 1970s, Mauroy was able to deftly control the local branch of the Socialist Party because of its penetration into local associational life. Typically, these associations represented the working-class consistencies that benefitted Socialist elections.

[3] Acsé was replaced by *Le commissariat général à l'Égalité des territoires* (CGET) in 2014, which was replaced by *L'Agence nationale de la cohésion des territoires* (ANCT) in 2020. Both agencies addressed demographic, economic, social, and environmental inequalities in service provision.

As decentralization laws were enacted in the early 1980s, the subordination of local associations extended to those that served minorities. Funds provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs were given to the city's municipal council, which sought to deter minority political involvement. Lille's municipal council distributed funds to associations that delivered social services (e.g., school care for children) and, at times, would fund activities of minority groups, such as the House of Africa and the French Caribbean (*Maison de l'Afrique et des Antilles*). The council maintained strict control over the distribution of funds to improve the welfare of minority populations and, in this way, shaped critical service provision outcomes.

This dynamic limited service delivery to minority groups and kept their demands out of local politics. Even when minorities were able to enter local politics, they were unable to shape spending decisions. Garbaye (2005) notes that "those ethnic minority individuals who did attempt to participate [were] either excluded or marginalized within the party" (p. 175). Their inability to exert influence over spending decisions was compounded by the lack of party institutionalization at the municipal level. While in England, minority councilors frequently used appeal procedures provided by the party's rule book to raise issues, this remained uncommon in the French local party system. As a result, ethnic minority councilors had few options to appeal or shape decision-making.

Mauroy benefitted from the decentralization laws in the 1980s by listening to leftist demands for local self-government and direct democracy, resulting in increased control over associations linked to the Socialist party machine. The actors responsible for the urban regeneration programs discussed in Chapter 3 also benefitted from a close relationship with the party. Decentralization laws further allowed Mauroy to favor

distribution to certain associations, thereby territorializing the allocation of funds at the neighborhood level and creating a dense network of friendly, co-opted associations that were in control of housing and development.

At the same time, local associations representing minority interests were frequently sidelined in decision-making processes. The associations *Texture* and *Les Craignos*, for example, pushed for increased minority representation on Lille's municipal council. While *Les Craignos* entered local politics after several leading members were elected in the 1980s, Mauroy later sidelined the representatives to seek Green and Communist support before the 1989 municipal elections. The leader of *Les Craignos* soon left his position on the council in protest.

In this way, the Lille party machine worked to prevent minority representation on municipal councils. Even when minorities were able to enter the political arena, their decision-making power was weakened in favor of Socialist Party alliances. Instead, Mauroy appeased minority interests through the provision of short-term subsidies, which relegated minority demands to local associations and prevented any veritable push for minority candidate nomination or representation. In 1989 and 1995, there were only two councilors of North African origin on Lille's municipal council. In contrast, minorities made up 14 percent of elected representatives in the neighborhood *conseils de quartier*.

Mauroy was replaced by fellow Socialist Party member Martine Aubry in 2001. While the party machine that began under Mauroy was largely dismantled, the subordination of associational life has persisted. The devolution of service provision to the sub-municipal level indicates the degree to which Muslims have been consistently

sidelined from institutional power. In this way, Lille's robust associational life is the product of political exclusion.

The presence of party machines and subordination of local associations is common across other French cities as well. In Marseille, the established political machine and the local, native elite worked to keep Muslims out of local office, relegating their authority to sub-municipal *conseils de quartiers* and neighborhood activist networks.

Marseille's method of goods distribution can be traced to the late-19th century, when Socialist Siméon Flaissières (1892-1902, 1919-31) was elected mayor. Like Lille's Socialist machine, Flaissières's government proved particularly interested in catering to the city's working-class population and worked to strengthen the city's social services. As described by Jean Viard (1995), "for the first time, the municipal authority, which traditionally took little interest in living conditions, and the voluntary sector associations dealing with mutual assistance, joined forces. This original merger forms the basis of the local socialist tradition" (p. 262). This period, known as municipal socialism, was characterized by distribution of individual and club goods. The latter included improved sewage systems, local transportation systems, and better schools. As Mattina (2016) notes, the government's involvement in distributing goods that were both "collective and individual" (p. 76) encouraged the emergence of elective representatives that served as intermediaries between institutions and residents.

The local political machine that emerged during the municipal socialism period paved the way for the emergence of Simon Sabiani, who served as First Deputy Mayor from 1929 until 1935. His influence shaped nearly all spheres of public life, and his

tenure was characterized by personalistic policies that privileged the city's Corsican and Italian-origin populations, although no institutionalized form of clientelism took root.

The rise of mayor Gaston Defferre (1944-1945, 1953-1986) in the postwar period, coupled with demographic changes in the 1950s, signaled the emergence of a veritable clientelist system that would remain relatively unaffected by institutional changes in the early period of Fourth Republic. Defferre came to power at a time of intense political competition. A member of the SFIO, Defferre faced an ongoing challenge from the French Community Party (*Parti communiste* français, PCF). His party had yet to establish a secure hold on Marseille's political scene. In order to establish a reliable voter base, Defferre needed to incentivize the city's working-class population to vote for the SFIO, rather than the PCF.

Large-scale immigration from France's former colonies in North Africa coincided with Defferre's rise. The influx of immigrants posed challenges to the city's public sector, and the population rose from 670,000 to 920,000 between 1950 and 1975 (Roncayolo, 1996). Demographic changes were paralleled by developments in private and public administration sectors, followed by an increase in jobs necessary to support urban growth (schools, hospitals, etc.). Between 1954 and 1975, 70,000 jobs were created, while the number of manual workers and shopkeepers dwindled (Mattina, 2016). Decisions regarding the allocation of resources – primarily housing and public sector employment – continued to be made by public authorities, notably Town Hall officials.

Faced with a growing number of immigrants and subsequent strain on the public sector, as well as political competition, Defferre turned to clientelist redistribution policy. A robust patronage system developed in which public sector jobs were distributed

through the mayor's office, creating a discretionary recruitment process that allowed Defferre to privilege certain social groups and individuals. By the mid-1960s, the mayor's office controlled nearly 50,000 jobs directly or indirectly, including municipal jobs, taxi businesses, semi-public companies (SEMs), and social housing administration (Sanmarco & Morel, 1985). During this time housing and public sector employment began to be favored in clientelist distribution schemes.

During the period of demographic change and public sector expansion, certain groups were privileged, mainly middle-class public sector employees, working-class populations, and children of old immigrant communities (Corsicans, Italians, Armenians, and Jews). The groups that benefited during this time period were those that formed the alliance and social block around Defferre in the 1960s. The alliance included certain working-class sectors (concentrated around the SFIO and the *Force ouvrière* Trade Union), a small section of public sector workers, and a middle class centered around the center-right and professional class. Workers linked to the PCF and North African immigrants were excluded from the SFIO power base and from clientelist redistribution.

Although immigrants were unable to participate in politics when they first arrived, by the 1970s many had obtained voting rights and represented a key voting population. Despite their potential electoral impact, the SFIO overlooked them in its emerging clientelist redistribution system. Critical to this exclusion was the ethnic composition of the city's immigrant population. Although immigrants were primarily from Francophone North Africa, communities were divided along country of origin and lacked cohesion, preventing the formation of cohesive networks. Instead, Defferre turned to trade unions,

which had robust social capital and internal structures that were conducive to creating a block vote.

Although Deffere's tenure as mayor ended in 1986, patronage remains a critical feature of Marseille's local political context. In particular, the municipal council has retained a history of co-opting local associations, including ones that represent minority interests, for political gain. The decentralization laws of 2003 and 2004 further incentivized co-optation because they allowed the council to gain increased control over the distribution of funds.

Higher ups in FASILD, for example, worried about increased council influence in determining how funds were spent. As a former FASILD deputy told me,

> "The new way of organizing [the relationship between FASILD and government] jeopardized the independence of management and administration [of FASILD] that had previously allowed us to push back against local influence and had allowed us to be a lever between the state, collectivities, and associations" (Interview, 3/21/22).

In particular, they worried about the politicization of FASILD when it became subjected to local influence. "Prioritizing elected officials risked subjecting [issues of integration and discrimination] to pressures related to electoral issues," one said (Interview, 3/21/22.)

Another former FASILD deputy worried about how the association's subjugation would be influenced by patronage politics:

> "Associations, which were important partners with FASILD, and which were understood as 'private organizations,' were not prioritized after these organizational changes. We worried they would be willing to engage in clientelism with local officials because some officials did not hesitate to paramunicipalize 'friendly associations' in so-called sensitive neighborhoods and get rid of 'undesirable associations" (Interview, 3/14/22).

The official highlighted the necessity of co-optation for many associations that sought funding. They also pointed to the municipal government's tendency to "paramunicipalize" associations, in which the council would use informal means, such as patronage and clientelism, to partly bring them under local government control.

In this way, local strategies of co-optation and territorialization reflect tactics used by the post-war government to create "legibility" of its populations through the territorialization of diverse populations. While in the post-war period, the state used urban planning and housing to create neighborhoods, here, municipalities territorialized associations at the neighborhood level to create and control intra-communal spaces.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the ways in which segregation shapes public spending. GPS matching and dose-response functions indicate that segregation drives down overall public spending, as well as across a variety of budgetary categories. While Muslim representation on the municipal council had no significant impact on council budgeting outcomes, the percentage of Muslim *adjoints* exerted a countervailing effect on the negative effect of segregation on spending. These findings suggest that Muslims have the potential to positively influence public spending decisions when they are put in positions that carry decision-making power.

At the same time, the findings indicate that the ability of *adjoints* to shape public spending is not indicative of their power to redistribute goods to their communities. In this way, their inability to engage in ethnic favoritism represents a triumph for the French state, which crafted an electoral system that privileges non-differentiation. Instead, community redistribution has been relegated to local associations. Both Lille and

Marseille are characterized by histories of strong political machines that favored the co-optation of working-class populations and trade unions, while excluding minorities from the local political arena. In both cases, associations were prioritized as the primary means of service delivery for minority populations, and municipal councils subordinated and territorialized local associations for political gain. Decentralization laws in the 1980s and 2000s gave further power to communes to control service provision and direct funding to prioritized (i.e., co-opted) associations.

In this way, goods provision has become territorialized at the extra-municipal, neighborhood level. Patronage politics have shaped the ability of Muslims to enter local office, as well as the relationship between associations and municipal councils. These dynamics have created an institutional context in which associational life, which is often associated with robust local democracy, is in fact the product of Muslims' exclusion from political office.

Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to understand the puzzling variation in Muslim representation across Europe. In doing so, it intervenes in a number of major debates in comparative politics. First, by examining the factors that influence Muslim representation, the findings deepen our understanding of the ways in which formal institutions, notably electoral rules, interact with informal institutions such as segregation to structure representation outcomes. Second, it also engages in a key topic in comparative politics regarding the party realignment and the erosion of traditional party alignments across advanced democracies. Finally, it adds to the distributive politics literature by analyzing the factors that structure goods provision outcomes. This concluding chapter elaborates on these contributions. First, I revisit the theoretical argument and the quantitative and qualitative evidence that I have provided to support it. I then discuss my theoretical contributions and identify areas for future research.

The Argument: Segregation and Muslim Representation in Western Europe

Chapter 1 presented the puzzle of variation in Muslim representation across Western Europe and engaged with competing explanations for these outcomes. I presented a theory of segregation to explain this variation. I then articulated the ways in which segregation creates representative and distributional tradeoffs for Muslim minorities in Western European cities and concluded by introducing my research design and case selection.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I analyzed space-making processes across England and France. I demonstrated how divergent approaches to the role of government in structuring the neighborhood influenced current spatial settlement patterns. I examined the origins of

segregationist housing policy and traced the growth of segregation across the two cases to understand its origins and processes of entrenchment. I found that in France, space-making was used as a process of legibility; it allowed for the French state to make sense of its increasingly diverse populations, and to manage the integration of their growing Muslim populations. In this way, the French state has continually adopted spatial approaches to mitigating inequality and encouraging Muslim integration while simultaneously fragmenting housing policy along minority and majority lines. In England, the state showed little interested in using housing as a process of legibility for much of the 20th century. Housing policy was segmented along class and tenure, rather than ethnic lines, and few policies promoted spatial solutions to perceived integration problems.

However, segmented housing policies across both countries led to high levels of segregation and isolation according to different spatial configurations. In France, housing policy led to high levels of isolation and segregation in the *banlieues* on the outskirts of French cities. In England, Muslims were isolated and segregated within the country's inner cities. The inability of both British and French governments to successfully address the institutional roots of segregation led to patterns of entrenchment across both countries. Today, Muslims live in relatively high levels of segregation and isolation in both France and England, although there is significant variation at the sub-national level.

Chapters 4 and 5 investigated how segregation shaped the descriptive and substantive outcomes of Muslims in England. In Chapter 4, I engaged an original dataset of more than 11,000 electoral contests across England between 2011 and 2021. I used regression analysis and threshold modeling to show how the level of segregation has a

non-linear effect on representation outcomes for Muslim populations in my sample. I introduced the concept of the population threshold, above which Muslims achieve greater rates of representation, but below which their representation is dampened. I found that in cities with high levels of segregation and sizable Muslim populations, Muslims were increasingly concentrated in a small number of wards, thereby diluting their overall electoral power. In cities with similarly large Muslim populations but reduced levels of segregation, Muslims were more dispersed across a given district, thereby increasing their overall electoral power.

In Chapter 5, I explored how segregation structured goods distribution across England. I compiled a geocoded dataset of over 2,000 public spending outcomes across 94 English local authorities between 2000 and 2019. I found that segregation decreased overall public spending, as well as across individual budgetary categories. However, the presence of Muslim councilors exerted a countervailing effect. Using a difference-in-difference design, I found that segregation increased the ability of Muslim councilors to engage in strategic ethnic favoritism, resulting in distribution along ethnic lines.

Chapters 6 and 7 analyzed how segregation shaped the descriptive and substantive outcomes of Muslims in France. In Chapter 6, I coded more than 50,000 candidates across nearly 1,200 party lists to explore how segregation structured Muslim representation outcomes. I used regression analysis and threshold modeling to demonstrate that, as in England, segregation has a non-linear effect on representation outcomes across my sample, thereby creating a similar population threshold. I found that the means through which segregation decreases Muslim representation in France differs slightly from the case of England. Segregation in French cities with large Muslim

populations leads to a decreased willingness on the part of Muslims to become engaged in the political arena. At the same time, their isolation reduces their political visibility and makes parties reluctant to include them as candidates, thereby reducing their representation outcomes.

In Chapter 7, I investigated how segregation shapes public spending across 104 metropolitan areas in France between 2014 and 2020. I found that, as in England, segregation dampens overall public spending. While the percentage of Muslim councilors has no significant countervailing effect, the percentage of Muslim *adjoints* positively influences spending decisions. *Adjoints* carry increased decision-making power and are responsible for drafting the communal budget, along with the mayor. In this way, they are able to shape overall public spending. However, I showed that the presence of adjoints has little influence on community distribution. Rather, the responsibility for Muslim service provision has been relegated to extra-municipal level through the strategic use of associations. In this way, Muslim service provision has been removed as a local political issue.

Theoretical Contributions and Areas of Future Research

Existing Accounts of Muslim Representation

Taken together, this dissertation adopts an innovative approach to analyzing representation by suggesting the importance of spatial settlement patterns for representation outcomes. It challenges existing approaches, which tend to solely on the role of formal institutions in structuring representation. This branch of scholarship suggests that France and England should display opposing Muslim representation outcomes given their differing institutional structures and integration approaches.

British multiculturalism is representative of an accommodating approach to ethnoreligious difference which allows for, and even welcomes, the participation of Muslims in the political arena. Conversely, French *laïcité* maintains a strict separation between church and state and prohibits expressions of religious identification in the public and political spheres. Its goal, along with the state's broader approach to integration, is to create civic French identities that guarantee equality regardless of ethnic, religious, or racial identification. In recent years, *laïcité* has been challenged as an anachronistic approach to managing difference that leaves little room for managing France's increasingly diverse population. In this way, France is often presented as a singularly xenophobic country that has alienated, rather than included, its Muslim populations.

Divergent approaches to managing difference are coupled with different histories of group political integration. Britain's Labour Party developed a symbiotic relationship with the unions that lasted for much of the 20th century. Labour-union linkages were indicative of Britain's willingness to integrate diverse populations as groups, rather than individuals. The Labour Party's internal apparatus included the unions through the block vote; it used this same structure to reach out to Muslim populations as a potential voting block as party-union relations crumbled.

Group inclusion and the salience of party-union relationships is decidedly less pronounced in French politics. The French Socialist Party never developed enduring party-union relationships, and unions failed to exert the same degree of political influence as they did in England. French political parties, particularly on the Left, thus lacked historical experience integrating large groups into their electoral system.

Finally, England and France have different electoral rules, which structure Muslims' inclusion as voters and candidates. In England's FPTP system, individual candidates run for office at the sub-district, ward level. The FPTP system has been shown to facilitate the election of minorities to local office given geographic ties to their co-ethnics. France's semi-proportional representation system involves closed party lists and at-large elections, thereby removing the geographic links between councilors and their constituents. The existing scholarship suggests that at-large elections dilute the power of the co-ethnic vote; this should stymie the ability of minorities to become elected to local office.

These institutional and historical accounts suggest that England is an "easier" and "most likely case" for Muslim representation, while France is a "difficult" and "less likely" case. However, in the last decade Muslim populations across both countries have increased their descriptive representation outcomes. There is thus little difference in proportional representation rates across both countries. At the same time, there remains significant sub-national variation in levels of descriptive and substantive representation.

These outcomes suggest the need to re-evaluate the existing scholarship to account for additional factors. I have argued that segregation is the key mechanism driving Muslim representation. This dissertation showed that, across two opposing institutional structures, segregation influences both descriptive and substantive outcomes. However, the findings suggest that we should not dismiss the importance of electoral rules for structuring Muslim representation. Electoral rules influence party inclusion strategies and provide the frameworks for Muslim participation in local political arenas. In this way, I add to the literature on electoral rules and group representation outcomes by

showing the ways in which formal and informal institutions interact to shape representation.

These findings suggest several interesting areas for further research. First, future research can uncover how these dynamics manifest at the national level. Muslim representation is, on average, much higher at the local level. Yet, given the interaction between Muslim population size and spatial settlement patterns, it is possible that similar dynamics are at work in electing Muslim representatives to national office. Here, qualitative research may be valuable for understanding how segregation shapes national-level outcomes, given the small number of cases.

Second, the results invite further investigation into the interaction between segregation levels and group size across other institutional contexts. Similar patterns may exist across other plurality systems, although the threshold will likely differ between countries and across periods of time. Segregation has the potential to shape minority representation in other electoral systems as well. As was shown in France, segregation allows minorities to leverage their residential isolation to push for increased co-ethnic candidates in majority systems. These patterns may hold in proportional representation systems that use mixed-member proportional voting or ranked-choice voting.

Third, future areas of research could explore how segregation shapes representation outcomes for other minority groups. While this dissertation focused on Muslim representation, it is possible that segregation could shape the representation outcomes for other ethnic and religious minorities. This research could also explore how these spatial dynamics structure minority representation in developing democracies,

where similar patterns of ethnic division have been shown to be political salient (e.g., Posner, 2005).

Implications for Muslim Representation and Party Systems

Implications for Muslim Political Incorporation

This dissertation has demonstrated the need to revisit the debate about how scholars conceptualize minority representation in advanced democracies. Policymakers often classify integration as either a success or failure, but the findings highlighted in this dissertation suggest that these outcomes are not necessarily binary. Rather, I have demonstrated that political integration is a complex phenomenon that can take multiple forms.

Indeed, the findings suggest that political inclusion through segregation may involve tradeoffs. This suggestion is not new. Both Maxwell (2012) and Dancygier (2017) have shown that there are tradeoffs and dilemmas associated with minority political integration, and that spatial settlement patterns can shape these outcomes. My research has added additional nuance to this scholarship by examining multiple dimensions of spatial exclusion and their effects on both descriptive and substantive outcomes.

I have also showed the ways in which chain migration has been accompanied by the replication of clan- and kin-based networks across European cities. In this way, the political inclusion of immigrant-origin populations across European cities have shown that ostensibly pre-modern behaviors can be transplanted onto modern electoral institutions. Ethnic politics has been shown to operate across Africa (Posner, 2005) and India (Chandra, 2007). My research has shown that these forms of politics are salient

across Western Europe as well, even if governments do not operate according to established patronage schemes.

In making these claims, I have added to this scholarship in two ways. First, I have shown that segregation has encouraged the social capital necessary to sustain these kinship networks. Second, I have demonstrated how ethnic social capital has encouraged political co-optation. These findings thus complicate the assumption that social capital inherent in kinship networks is necessarily a feature of robust democratic practice.

Implications for Western Europe's Party Systems

Why have parties decided to mobilize these networks? If we look at the history of parties in Europe and the US, parties have historically turned to the mobilization of other ethnoreligious minorities. In the US, for example, the co-optation of Irish Catholic immigrants or Jewish populations was a common electoral strategy in the early 20th century. These populations were rooted in their neighborhoods, had embedded and readily available social structures, and had community representatives that could, upon co-optation, deliver a block vote. The activation of ethnic networks serves a similar purpose and is facilitated by high levels of segregation across England and France.

The availability of easily mobilized groups within Europe's Muslim population sheds light on the weaker, and less organized networks, within the broader electorate. The weakening of traditional party ties is in part due to the decline of the working class and disintegration of party-union linkages, particularly in England.

The mid-20th century represented the height of the relationship between parties on the Left and working-class populations in England and France, although the Labour Party in England has been more representative of these populations than France's Socialist

Party. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, working-class populations across both countries were slowly replaced by employees and other middle-class sectors. The decline of the working class as an available electorate was exemplified by the breakdown of party-union linkages. In this way, parties on the Left experienced a decline in the mobilizing blocks previously available to them.

Chapter 4 showed how Labour's current patronage system can be traced to its use in maintaining party-union relations. It made a broader argument that Labour's internal apparatus was structured in a way that facilitated the inclusion of a large group through non-programmatic means. It is likely that an organized working class could well make the delivery of votes from Muslims less appealing and strategically viable. In this way, the existence of strong labor unions could potentially mitigate Muslim co-optation, while also potentially them from the local political arena. Indeed, a Muslim councilor expressed worry that the Labour Party was beginning to elevate class over ethnicity, and that Muslim candidates would be de-selected (Interview, 7/4/19). If this is the case, it is possible that party inclusion strategies may revert back to inclusion along class-based lines.

These findings carry important implications for Western Europe's party systems. Studies examining the political consequences of immigration in advanced democracies have proliferated in recent years. Much of this scholarship addresses the political behavior of White, majorities reacting to immigration (Dancygier, 2010, 2013; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). In the US context, this branch of literature has shown that diversity can change party systems by causing White voters to change their party preferences. For example, Democratic Party support for civil rights and African

American inclusion in the 1960s and Republican Party resistance led to significant electoral realignments.

While these accounts of party change are apt, additional research is needed into the ways in which minorities are incorporated into the political arena and their influence on party systems. I have added to this growing literature by showing how Muslim incorporation privileges ethnic identification and kinship over class-based alliances. Parties are largely responsible for these developments. In particular, parties on the Left have benefited from the block vote, which has prevented the development of programmatic linkages between parties, Muslims voters, and representatives. In this way, parties have relied on pre-existing ethnic ties and social structures and have put little work into building durable, cross-ethnic class-based alliances.

Implications for Goods Provision in Diverse Societies

This dissertation has also contributed to our understanding of goods provision in diverse advanced democracies. While extant literature has suggested that diversity structures goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999; Baldwin & Huber, 2010; Hopkins, 2009), this dissertation has shown that it is the ways in which diverse groups are structured in space, rather than diversity itself, that shapes goods provision outcomes in Western Europe.

Given that local government decisions often involve the spatial allocation of resources, neighborhoods have become important political actors. In highly segregated cities neighborhood interests are often overlaid with ethnoreligious divisions.

As segregation becomes further entrenched, we can expect competition for goods distribution to increasingly take place along ethnic lines. This is particularly likely in plurality electoral systems that are divided into sub-district constituencies.

If this is the case, elected officials will play important roles in structuring goods distribution. The existing scholarship has suggested that individuals have little power in shaping public goods decision-making in advanced democracies. However, I have showed that Muslims representatives are able influence public spending decisions as councilors and *adjoints*. In this way, the dissertation clarifies the importance of descriptive representation for substantive outcomes.

I have also shown that the abilities of Muslims to redistribute to their co-ethnics is largely contingent on the electoral systems in which they participate. In England, the FPTP system facilitates strategic ethnic favoritism. This benefits Muslim communities, who are more likely to suffer from economic deprivation. However, it raises larger questions about resource inequality. While strategic ethnic favoritism can mitigate local inequalities, it does not address the root of these inequities. Rather, I have shown that segregation is an entrenched informal institution that has created real and enduring resource inequality. In France, municipal councils have relegated Muslim service provision to the associational level. While this appears to depoliticize allocation, it also makes it increasingly difficult for Muslims to make resource inequality a political issue. In this way, there are significant obstacles to ensuring equitable public goods provision across both countries.

Conclusion

In seeking to understand the factors that influence representation I have answered several questions about the mechanisms underlying Muslims' political integration. My central argument is that segregation is the key mechanism through which Muslims gain access to local office and shape substantive outcomes as representatives. In this way, the findings

add additional nuance to the scholarship on minority representation, which has overwhelmingly focused on the role of formal institutional structures in shaping these outcomes.

The results also suggest that there are significant structural and economic inequalities across England and France that carry broader implications for Muslims' incorporation. Religious and ethnic-based discrimination remain common in both the housing sector and the labor market, preventing residential mobility and contributing to the entrenchment of settlement patterns. Although there have been commissions, ministries, and associations devoted to combat discrimination across both countries, the findings here suggest that these processes are complex and difficulty to dismantle.

As inequality worsens, segregation along economic lines is also likely to intensify (Bischoff & Reardon, 2013). This has become evident in processes of White flight and gentrification across European cities. Proposals that argue for increased investment into segregated areas could prove valuable for reducing economic deprivation and mitigating resource-based conflict between communities. Investment, coupled with broader institutional reform aimed at combating discriminatory housing policy, could further alleviate the social and economic strain posed by segregation in England and France.

What would a future of entrenched segregation mean for Muslims integration? First, we can expect political polarization to increase with segregation. In the United States, political segregation has been shown to overlap with patterns of race and class segregation (Trounstine, 2018). These patterns are due, in part, to correlations between race, class, and partisan affiliations. Segregation and isolation also affect who people

interact with on a regular basis, which shapes partisanship, ideologies, and vote choices (Enos, 2017; Klar, 2014; Nicholson, 2011; Sinclair, 2012)

Segregation also carries harmful social and economic repercussions. In the case of the United States, segregation has led to what Massey and Denton (1993) call an "underclass" of citizens. These institutionalized patterns are challenging to undo. As Pettigrew (1966) wrote, "residential segregation has proved to be the most resistant to change in all realms." Until patterns of segregation are addressed, it is difficult to envision political, social, and economic equality for Western Europe's Muslims.

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Appendix A

A.1 Coding Ethnoreligious Identity

Coding ethnoreligious identity is one of the biggest challenges in the data collection process. There is no existing dataset with English local candidate ethnicities that is publicly available. As a result, I rely on an onomastic approach that identifies individuals by their first and last names. I rely on coding by hand in order to ensure a greater degree of reliability than is afforded by name identification software.

The names of Muslim minorities are recognizable from the majority population given their recent migration background. However, it is possible that some individuals who are assimilated no longer have Muslim first or last names. In order to ensure valid coding outcomes, I consult secondary sources and, when available, newspaper articles and candidate websites. These sources frequently mention candidate ethnic and religious backgrounds, as well as countries of birth.

While a degree of error is unavoidable, hand-coding allows me to code a large sample that covers each region of England and spans years and election cycles. Other forms of sampling, such as sending questionnaires to local councils to gather the ethnoreligious identities of their councilors, would force me to restrict the dataset to a given point in time and only to elected officials, rather than candidates. It is also likely that questionnaires would return low response rates, which would further restrict the sample.

Appendix B

B.1. Measuring Segregation Using the Entropy Index

I run the OLS regression substituting the entropy index for the dissimilarity index to ensure that the relationship between segregation and Muslim representation remains robust when additional groups are included in the segregation measure. The entropy index allows for a measurement of segregation that includes several groups simultaneously. The entropy index for LSOA i is:

$$\boldsymbol{h_i = -\sum_{j-1}^{k} p_{ij} \ln (p_{ij})}$$

Where k is equal to the number of ethnic groups, p_{ij} is equal to the proportion of the population of the j^{th} ethnicity in LSOA i, n_{ij} is equal to the population of the j^{th} ethnicity in LSOA i, and n_i is the total population in LSOA i. As with the dissimilarity index, data are collected from the 2011 census. LSOA results are aggregated to produce a district-level entropy index.

The results in Table B.1 indicate that the results remain consistent with the findings in the main text following the substitution of the dissimilarity index for the entropy index. The findings suggest that even with the inclusion of additional ethnic groups into the segregation measure, there remains a positive and significant relationship between Entropy Index (Segregation Level) and the percentage of Muslims elected to local office. The interaction effect remains significant and negative, as does the voter turnout variable. Only the urban control variable is no longer significant. Overall, the results indicate that the dissimilarity index remains a robust predictor of Muslim representation.

Table B.1. The Election of Muslim Councilors to Office in English Local Authorities, Entropy Index

Variables	Model I % Muslims Elected
Entropy Index (Segregation Level)	0.0673**
	(0.0189)
% Muslim Population	0.366**
	(0.0559)
Entropy Index x % Muslim Population	-0.253*
	(0.125)
Diversity	-0.000669
	(0.0134)
Economic Deprivation	-0.0000002
	(0.000005)
District Magnitude	0.00260
	(0.00206)
Voter Turnout	-0.0254**
	(0.00651)
Labour	-0.00306
	(0.00233)
Urban	-0.00000009
	(0.0000007)
Constant	-0.00960*
	(0.00527)
Observations	431
R-squared	0.552

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

B.2. Robustness Test Using Fractional Logit Regression

Table B.2. The Election of Muslim Councilors to Office in English Local Authorities, Fractional Logit Model

Variables	Model I % Muslims Elected
Segregation Level	5.686**
	(0.583)
% Muslim Population	38.73**
	(4.587)
Segregation Level x % Muslim Population	-41.27**
	(5.170)
Diversity	-0.735
	(0.555)
Economic Deprivation	0.00127
	(0.00307)
District Magnitude	0.229*
	(0.105)
Voter Turnout	-1.552**
	(0.430)
Labour	-0.118
	(0.117)
Urban	-.000009
	(.000001)
Constant	-8.182**
	(0.546)
Observations	431

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

B.3. Threshold Modeling, England

Table B.3. Estimates of Muslims Elected to Office in a Local Authority, Threshold Model

	% Muslim Population	5	6	7	8	9	10
Segregation Level							
15		.015482	.021003	.026524	.032045	.037567	.043088
30		.016132	.021064	.025945	.030926	.035858	.040789
45		.016783	.021124	.025466	.029807	.034148	.038490
60		.017433	.021185	.024937	.028688	.032439	.036192
75		.018084	.021246	.024407	.027569	.030731	.033893
90		.018734	.021306	.023878	.026450	.029022	.031594

Notes: Results are displayed in decimal form and correspond to the predicted percentage of Muslims elected to local office. Results derive from the interaction effect in Model III of Table 4.1 and subsequent threshold model shown in Table 4.2. Segregation levels of zero and 100 are excluded given their unlikelihood.

B.4. Elections in Highly Segregated Districts

Table B.4. The Election of Muslim Councilors to office in English Local Authorities in Highly Segregated Districts

Variables	Model I % Muslims Elected	Model II % Muslims Elected
Segregation Level (High)	0.0260**	0.0122**
	(0.00778)	(0.00364)
Voter Turnout	0.000299	-0.0229**
	(0.0128)	(0.00932)
% Muslim Population	0.326**	0.319**
	(0.0256)	(0.0256)
Segregation Level (High) x Voter Turnout	-0.0511**	
	(0.0187)	
Diversity	-0.0112	0.0209
	(0.00915)	(0.0149)
Deprivation	0.000002	0.000003
	(0.00010)	(0.00002)
District Magnitude	0.00151	0.000557
	(0.00236)	(0.00240)
Labour	-0.00255	-0.00172
	(0.00231)	(0.00232)
Urban	-0.0000004*	-0.0000007
	(0.000004)	(0.000004)
Segregation Level (High) x Diversity		-0.0376**
		(0.0138)
Constant	-0.00392	0.00497
	(0.00785)	(0.00706)
Observations	431	431
R-squared	0.555	0.555

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Appendix C

C.1. Diversity and Public Spending

Table C.1. Effect of Diversity on Public Spending, Excluding Segregation Level

Variables	I Public expenditure per head
Diversity	1.788
	(2.007)
% Black	5.711*
	(3.443)
% White	5.703
	(4.277)
% Asian	2.596
	(3.339)
Muslim councilors	1.046
	(0.704)
Population (logged)	0.418***
	(0.062)
Economic deprivation	0.056***
	(0.010)
% College degree	0.822
	(0.640)
% 65 +	-1.154
	(1.206)
Region fixed effects	Yes
Constant	-11.172**
	(4.388)
Observations	1786
R-squared	0.497

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses

C.2. Segregation and Individual Spending Categories

Table C.2. Effect of Segregation Across Individual Spending Categories

Variables	I Highway and transport services	II Children's social services	III Public health	IV Cultural services	V Environmental services	IV Fire services
Segregation	-0.057***	-0.125***	-0.036*	-0.055***	-0.037**	-0.093***
	-0.018	-0.046	-0.02	-0.011	-0.019	-0.01
Diversity	0.084	0.382	0.119	0.041	0.024	-0.062
	-0.1	-0.256	-0.108	-0.058	-0.103	-0.057
% Black	-0.539***	0.393	0.168	-0.004	0.187	-0.326***
	-0.183	-0.466	-0.196	-0.106	-0.188	-0.103
% White	-0.485**	0.603	0.224	0.078	0.153	-0.476***
	-0.232	-0.59	-0.249	-0.134	-0.238	-0.131
% Asian	-0.575***	-0.238	-0.044	-0.068	-0.012	-0.433***
	-0.183	-0.467	-0.197	-0.106	-0.188	-0.103
Muslim councilors	-0.059*	0.101	0.064*	0.022	0.081**	0.002
	-0.035	-0.089	-0.037	-0.02	-0.036	-0.02
Economic deprivation	0	0.005***	0.003***	0.002***	0.003***	0.002***
	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0	-0.001	0
% College degree	-0.149***	-0.074	0.038	-0.007	0.126***	0.043**
	-0.032	-0.081	-0.034	-0.019	-0.033	-0.018
% 65 +	0.069	-0.127	-0.055	-0.069*	-0.03	0.142***
	-0.063	-0.16	-0.067	-0.036	-0.064	-0.035
Population (logged)	0.020***	0.080***	0.031***	0.003*	0.007**	-0.009***
	-0.003	-0.008	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.327	-1.438**	-0.587**	-0.063	-0.216	0.608***
	-0.24	-0.611	-0.258	-0.139	-0.247	-0.135

Observations	1786	1786	1786	1786	1786	1786
R-squared	0.324	0.576	0.552	0.375	0.293	0.485

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS analyses for the impact of segregation across individual spending categories displayed in Figure 4.2.

Appendix D

D.1. Segregation and Muslim Inclusion

Table D.1. The Nomination of Muslims to Party Lists in France

Variables	Model I % Nominated Average	Model II % Nominated Winning List	Model III % Nominated List 2	Model IV % Nominated List 3
Segregation	0.299*	0.181	0.126	0.274
	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.148)	(0.212)
% Muslim Population	2.137***	1.723**	1.353*	1.903*
	(0.531)	(0.532)	(0.590)	(0.903)
Segregation * % Muslim Population	-4.071**	-2.762*	-2.070	-2.793
	(1.425)	(1.396)	(1.498)	(2.460)
Conseils	-18.77**	-7.957	-22.97**	-15.75
	(7.050)	(10.28)	(8.637)	(8.066)
District Magnitude	-0.00106	-0.00175	0.000301	0.000865
	(0.000936)	(0.00112)	(0.00101)	(0.000996)
Economic Deprivation	0.255**	0.194	0.471**	0.214
	(0.0957)	(0.114)	(0.145)	(0.166)
Population Density	3.12e-06*	3.77e-06*	8.42e-07	6.99e-07
	(1.22e-06)	(1.75e-06)	(1.75e-06)	(2.35e-06)
Population (logged)	-0.0161	0.00247	-0.0340*	-0.0510**
	(0.0137)	(0.0151)	(0.0144)	(0.0171)
Party in Power	-0.0120*	-0.0229***	-0.00374	-0.0121
	(0.00483)	(0.00646)	(0.00699)	(0.00853)
High Diversity	0.0610***	0.0779***	0.0365	0.0655*
	(0.0145)	(0.0176)	(0.0205)	(0.0286)
Constant	0.141	0.0384	0.296*	0.435**
	(0.105)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.149)
Observations	216	213	209	155
R-squared	0.724	0.650	0.573	0.576

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses

D.2. Threshold Modeling, France

Table D.2. Estimates of Muslims Elected to Local Municipal Council, Threshold Model

	% Muslim Population	5	6	7	8	9	10
Isolation Level							
10		0.077	0.094	0.111	0.127	0.144	0.161
20		0.088	0.102	0.115	0.129	0.142	0.155
30		0.100	0.110	0.120	0.130	0.140	0.150
40		0.111	0.118	0.125	0.131	0.138	0.145
50		0.123	0.126	0.129	0.133	0.136	0.139

Note: Results are displayed in decimal form and correspond to the predicted percentage of Muslims elected to local office.