PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY (1923-1929)

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Martin Heidegger's work centers on the task of retrieving the traditional problem of ontology, metaphysics, and first philosophy: the problem of Being. There has been a tendency in the scholarship to take Heidegger's formulation and solution to the problem together as a whole. In contrast, I propose to differentiate between the two, and to engage Heidegger's formulation of the problem as such, which takes shape as phenomenological ontology in the second half of the 1920s.

I claim that the *subject matter* of phenomenological ontology, the problem of Being, is in fact the unitary articulation of four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being, and the truth-character of Being. My analysis shows that these four problems are Heidegger's problematization (following Brentano) of the four main senses of Being, traditionally associated with Aristotle and Aristotelianism: the difference between the incidental and the in itself; the articulation of being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; Being in the sense of the categories; and Being in the sense of truth. Concerning its *method*, I claim that phenomenological ontology reformulates the problem of Being in three moments: reduction, construction, and destruction. My analysis shows that, with these three moments, Heidegger problematizes (following Husserl) the movement of ascent and descent traditionally associated with Plato and Platonism.

Although Heidegger never makes it fully explicit, the problem of the phenomenologically reductive, constructive, and destructive unitary whole of the four basic problems of Being is in fact his problematization of a (the) perennial *locus philosophiae*—the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent.

Moreover, I claim that phenomenological ontology has a transcendental-architectonic character, in a Kantian sense. The problem of Being is formulated in three differentiated moments: the reductive *fundamental ontology* asks and answers the question of the sense of Dasein's Being; the constructive *transcendental science of Being* asks and answers the question of the sense of Being as such; and the destructive *groundwork of metaphysics* asks and answers the question of the (historical) whole [καθ'ὅλου] of the Being of entities. Heidegger considers that his own architectonic is the historical outcome of the ontotheological orientation of the problem since Antiquity (Aristotle's *Metaphysics*), during the Middle Ages (Suárez's *Disputationes*), and throughout Modernity (Kant's *Critiques.*)

Because my interest lies in the problem itself, my aim is to problematize Heidegger's ontotheological interpretation of the *locus philosophiae.* The first task in this direction is to clarify Heidegger's incomplete construction of a unitary phenomenological ontology during the mid-late 1920s. The present text begins this clarification by outlining the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being, and on

the basis of the indicated *locus*. The reconstruction is a clarification in that it exhibits the simplest moments of the inner structure of phenomenological ontology.

The dissertation is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I analyze the basic concepts of phenomenological ontology. I exhibit first the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1), and then the basic concepts of the science of Being (Chapter 2.) Through these first two chapters I show the correspondence between the concepts of fundamental ontology and the science of Being based on the projection of the former onto the latter. It is here that I argue that fundamental ontology and the science of Being are two stages in Heidegger's architectonic reformulation of the problem of Being. I also argue that each of these stages reflects the whole problem from its own standpoint.

In the second part, I begin the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being. I claim that the analytic of Dasein is to be understood as the reduction of Dasein. The reduction of Dasein is articulated in two distinct moments that I call 'ontological' and 'existential.' I first characterize the reduction of Dasein as a whole (Chapter 3) and then its first moment—the ontological reduction (Chapter 4.) The text ends with an Appendix where I clarify Heidegger's lexicon of Being. Here, I anticipate fundamental aspects of the existential reduction, and point toward the connection between Heidegger's and Husserl's accounts of the reduction.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Martin Heidegger

GA 2	*Sein und Zeit*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.
GA 3	*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
GA 9	*Wegmarken*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967.
GA 14	*Zur Sache des Denkens*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1969.
GA 18	*Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.
GA 20	*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.
GA 22	*Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993.
GA 23	*Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas v. Aquin bis Kant*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006.
GA 24	*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.
GA 26	*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
GA 49	*Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling: «Philosophische Untersuchungen iiber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhiingenden Gegenstiinde» (1809)*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
GA 58	*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993.
GA 61	*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die Phänomenologische Forschung*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985.
GA 62	*Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005.
GA 65	*Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Erignis)*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
SZ	*Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1976.

Edmund Husserl

LU I	*Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1968.
LU II/1	*Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, I*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1968.
LU II/2	*Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band, II*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1968.
Hua III/1	*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch*, ed. Karl Schumann. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
Hua VIII	*Erste Philosophie II (1923-24): Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. Den Haag: Nijhoff, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
Hua IX	*Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
Hua XVI	*Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
Hua XXXV	*Einleitung in die Philosophie: Vorlesungen 1922/23*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002.

INTRODUCTION – "THE BASIC EXPERIENCE OF ALL PHILOSOPHIZING"

> "The basic experience of all philosophizing is 'nothing but' the *transformation* of the same few simple questions."[1]

These words belong to a speech given by Heidegger on April 8, 1929, on the occasion of the celebration of Husserl's seventieth birthday. In his speech, Heidegger elaborates "the essential thing" for which Husserl's students owe Husserl thanks. This essential thing is Husserl's phenomenology, to the extent that it grants access to *the basic experience of all philosophizing*. Heidegger characterizes this experience as the transformation of the same few simple questions, a transformation that takes philosophy "back onto the hidden path of its authentic historical happening."

Which questions are these same few simple questions? And what exactly is hidden? Is it the historical happening of the many philosophical transformations of these questions? Or is it the historical happening of the one, same philosophy (*philosophia perennis*) within which these questions maintain themselves, and are always ready to be transformed?

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[1] Martin Heidegger, "Edmund Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag," *Akademische Mitteilungen*: Organ für die gesamten Interressen der Studentenschaft von der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg/Br., 4 Folge, 9. Semester, Nr. 14 (May 14, 1929): 46-47. This is Sheehan's translation in Edmund Husserl, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger* (1927-1931) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 475-7. Emphasis in original.

1. Being as the problem of philosophy

By the late 1920s, Heidegger thought that the *basic experience of all philosophizing* is the experience of Being as a problem. The philosophical expression of this experience is the *phenomenological* formulation of the *ontological* problem of Being. Since a problem is a whole of articulated questions, philosophy, or phenomenological ontology, is the elaboration of the different questions of Being and their articulation as the problem of Being.

The problem of Being, however, is not just a simple set of questions. It is a set of problems, each of which has questions of their own. Heidegger claims that there are four basic problems of Being: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being in their ways of Being, and the truth-character of Being. (GA 24: 25/19)[2]

A problem is always the problem *of something*. Problems *problematize something*. If the *whole* problem problematizes Being, what does each of the four basic problems problematize? My working hypothesis is that these four problems problematize the basic manners in which Being is meant, pointed out by Aristotle and traditionally associated with Aristotelianism.[3] The ontological difference problematizes the difference between the incidental and the in itself; the basic articulation of Being problematizes the articulation of

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[2] I quote Heidegger's works referring first to the pagination of the German edition, followed by a slash and the corresponding pages in the English translation indicated in the Bibliography. In the case of GA 24: 28/29; 28 is the page of the Gesamtausgabe volume, and 29 the page of the English translation. I commonly modify the translations.
[3] See Arist. Met. VI.2.1026a33.

being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; the possible modifications of Being in their ways of Being problematizes Being in the sense of the categories; and the truth-character of Being problematizes Being in the sense of truth.

The four basic manners in which we talk about Being (senses of Being) constitute the *what* of the problem; *what* the problem problematizes. Now, problems also have a *how*. Problems *problematize* their contents in a determinate manner. Heidegger claims that the problem problematizes in the manner of three acts: reduction, construction, and destruction. (GA 24: 28/29ff.) The concepts of reduction, construction, and destruction are intimately connected to Husserl's phenomenology, but not exclusively. My second working hypothesis is that with reduction, construction and destruction, Heidegger problematizes the movements of ascent and descent characterized by Plato and traditionally associated with Platonism.[4]

Heidegger interprets philosophy as the formulation of the four problems of Being by means of reduction, construction, and destruction. What Heidegger's problem problematizes is *the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent*. Yet the correspondence remains implicit and hidden, these landmarks of Platonism and Aristotelianism circumscribe Heidegger's *locus philosophiae*. This *locus* is where the 'basic experience of all philosophizing' takes place; the soil from where philosophy arises and against which it weighs its possibilities and its own end.[5]

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[4] See Plat. Rep. 7.515e.
[5] Heidegger extensively discusses the two moments of the *locus philosophiae*. However, he is never clear regarding the exact role that this *locus* plays in his formulation of the problem. He clearly indicates his focus is on the unity of the many senses of Being in the 1960s in his letter to Richardson and in "My Way to Phenomenology". See William J. Richardson, S.J., *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham, 2003), x; and see GA 14: 91/74ff. Heidegger reduces the many senses to four following Brentano. See Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg: Herder, 1862), 1-6. See GA 22: 46/36. Heidegger thematizes the ascent and descent as a feature of metaphysical thinking more clearly after the 1920s. See GA 9: 203/153; GA 65: 423/335.

Heidegger barely clarifies his concept of philosophy—the concept of *phenomenological ontology*. This would have entailed a clarification of the sense of the *locus philosophiae,* of the *what* (the four ontological problems) and *how* (the three phenomenological acts) of philosophy. Nonetheless, *what* and *how* are constantly operative as a whole. Taken at once, as a whole, they reflect the *architectonic* of phenomenological ontology. My third working hypothesis is that Heidegger holds an 'architectonic perspective' and that phenomenological ontology should be thought as the transcendental groundwork of a system, in a Kantian sense.

Phenomenological ontology has an 'inner' architectonic for each of the four problems of Being, and an 'outer' architectonic that articulates the four problems as a whole. The formulation of each of the four problems reflects the rest of the problems from its individual standpoint, and by means of the three acts of reduction, construction, and destruction—the problems and acts, in turn, are not univocal. Reduction, construction, and destruction also articulate the 'outer' architectonic of the formulation of the four problems as the unitary whole of the problem of Being.[6]

Therefore, phenomenological ontology is not to be taken only as a *concept*, but also as an *idea*, in the sense of "the [unity of the] end [of philosophy] and the form of the whole

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[6] The systematic conception is also a traditional locus of philosophy—the ascent and descent may trace outer and inner circles, hermeneutical or otherwise. "Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle coming to closure within itself, but in each of its parts the philosophical idea exists in a particular determinacy or element. The individual circle, simply because it is in itself a totality, also breaks through the boundary of its element and founds a further sphere. The whole thus presents itself as a circle of circles each of which is a necessary moment, so that the system of its distinctive elements makes up the idea in its entirety, which appears equally in each one of them." G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik.* Werke, Bd. VIII (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986), §15. English translation: *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: Science of Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

that is congruent with it." (KrV A 832/ B 860)[7] Phenomenological ontology, like Kant's transcendental philosophy, does not posit its own principles, but discloses them from a finite starting-point. Just like Kant's critical project, phenomenological ontology "is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself." Moreover, both the critical project and phenomenological ontology "catalogue… the *entire preliminary sketch of a whole system*." (KrV B XXII-XXIII, my emphasis) The orientation toward a complete unitary whole of philosophy in its historical occurrence organizes phenomenological ontology *architectonically*.

The whole of phenomenological ontology begins reductively in the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*, which formulates the problem of the ontological difference. It follows the construction of the science of Being projected in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* which formulates the problems of the basic structures and ways of Being. Starting in 1928, Heidegger focuses on the third moment of phenomenological ontology: the destruction of the groundwork of metaphysics, which formulates the problem of the truth of Being. This threefold architectonic order of fundamental ontology, science of Being, and groundwork of metaphysics is analogous (not identical) to Kant's organization of the three critiques. However, Heidegger does not treat the third moment (the perspective of the whole of the first two) as Kant does with the *Critique of the Power of Judgment.* The third moment of phenomenological destruction must be in fact understood as involving a positive appropriation of Kant's dialectic. A second analogy can be traced: the

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[7] I follow Kant's distinction between 'concept' and 'idea.' See KrV A 312/B 369ff. Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften* Bd. III-IV (Berlin: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900ff.). English translation: *Critique of Pure Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 395ff.

phenomenological destruction is to the reduction and construction what the transcendental dialectic is to the transcendental analytic of concepts and of principles.[8]

2. The formulation of the problem of Being in phenomenological ontology

Heidegger's formulation of the problem of Being between 1926 and up to at least 1929 is to be characterized as *phenomenological ontology*.[9] Heidegger's formulation or problematization is considered to be *phenomenological* concerning its *how* because he problematizes in the manner of phenomenological reduction, construction, and destruction, which constitute "the treatment which the 'things themselves' [of the problem of Being] require." (SZ 27/49)[10] Concerning the *what* of the problem, Heidegger's formulation is to be characterized as *ontology* because Heidegger intends to problematize Being (understood as the Being of the entities as such.)

During the 1920s, Heidegger understands the problem of Being *ontotheologically*, including his own formulation of the problem, although he does not make it fully explicit and does not initially use the term.[11] He accounts for the continuity of the twofold orientation of ontotheology between Aristotle and Kant, and he situates his own

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[8] See Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (GA 3: 243/170f; 275/194).
[9] Although it was published in the Spring of 1927, I associate *Being and Time* with year 1926 because Heidegger sent the two parts of the manuscript to the printer this year, on April 1 and November 1. See the chronology of the path to the publication of this book in Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 477ff.
[10] And "the more genuinely a methodological conception is worked out… all the more primordially is it rooted in the way we come to terms with the things themselves." (SZ 27/49)
[11] He may have appropriated the term 'ontotheology' from Kant during the late 1920s. Cf. KrV A632/ B660. He uses the term for the first time in 1930. See François Jaran, "L'onto-théologie dans l'œuvre de Martin Heidegger. Récit d'une confrontation avec la pensée Occidentale", *Philosophie* 91 (2006): 62.

formulation within this continuity, as a reformulation of the same. From 1926 and through 1929, Heidegger progressively makes explicit that he has been thus far thematizing the constitution of the problem of Being as first addressing the problem of Being (of entities) *qua* Being (of entities) so as to provide what is necessary in order to formulate the problem of the regionality of Being.[12]

Heidegger understands the basic constitution of the formulation of the problem of Being through three pathmarks: the Aristotelian understanding of first philosophy as the formulation of the question 'what is Being?', and its twofold orientation as a question concerning Being as Being (entities as entities) and the theological question, concerning the region of Being from where all the regions can be articulated; the medieval (Suarezian) distinction between *Metaphysica generalis* (or ontology) and *Metaphysica specialis,* being the former *prior* to the latter[13]; and the modern (Kantian or post-Cartesian) grounding of metaphysics that characterizes the tradition of transcendental philosophy up to Husserl. Heidegger understands his own formulation as providing the originary ground of the transcendental grounding of ontology, and because of this, as guided by and oriented toward first philosophy or metaphysics as a whole. Now, the ontotheological constitution of first philosophy is explicitly presented as a (part of the) problem in 1929, *within,*

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[12] See SZ 8/28; GA 3: 6/3ff.; GA 26: 202/158.

[13] To be clear, Suárez makes the distinction in his *Disputationes*—it is the distinction that arranges the work—but Heidegger takes the terms 'metaphysica generalis' and 'metaphysica specialis' from the Wolffian school. "The first and primordial part of this work is constituted by… the exposition of the proper and adequate essential reason or concept of the object of metaphysics [entity as entity], and [the exposition of] its properties and causes. In the second part we propose the most important division [of the object of metaphysics, of the entity as entity]" Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* Volume I (Madrid: Gredos, 1960-1966), introduction to Disputatio II, 359.

through, and as a result of the formulation of the problem of Being as phenomenological ontology.[14]

Heidegger's expression 'Being in general' expresses the non-problematized understanding of the ontotheological constitution of phenomenological ontology. This expression, 'Being in general', characterizes the *what* of the problem of Being as a simple undifferentiated whole explicitly since 1926. Now, the question of Being in general *ultimately* means the question of *the* (historical) *whole of the Being of the entities*. 'Whole' is not said here of Being or of entities, but of the differentiation and articulation between Being and entities. The question of Being in general comes down to the question of the historical possibilities of differentiation and articulation between entities and Being in its historical occurrence. In order to answer the question of the whole of the Being of entities, the question of *Being as such* must first be formulated and solved. In turn, to answer the latter we must first formulate *the question of the sense of the Being of Dasein,* that is, the question of the sense of the Being of the entity who differentiates and articulates entities and Being.

Therefore, phenomenological ontology formulates the problem of Being as the problem of Being in general in three moments, by means of the articulation of the following three problems in the following order: the problem of the Being of Dasein, formulated and solved in the published part of *Being and Time* in 1926*;* the problem of Being as such, sketched out and only partially worked out in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* of

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[14] The double direction of the ontotheological constitution appears in paragraph §32 of the lecture course of the Winter Semester *Plato's* Sophist of 1924-25. See GA 19: 221/153ff. Then again in the summer of 1926 in *The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy.* See GA 22: 178/159; and the next semester 1926-27, *History of Philosophy. From Thomas Aquinas to Kant.* See GA 23: 1ff; 16ff. Heidegger comes back to it in 1927 but in the context of one of the four problems of Being. See GA 24: 112/80. In 1929, it is finally included *as a part of the problem* formulated by the destruction of the groundwork of metaphysics.

1927; and the problem of the Being of entities as a whole, sketched out in 1929 in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, and anticipated in the lecture course of 1928 *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. The threefold architectonic articulation of phenomenological ontology is anticipated in paragraphs 5 and 6 of *Being and Time,* though Heidegger progressively changes this characterization so as to distinguish the three moments. These three moments are *fundamental ontology,* the *science of Being,* and the *groundwork of metaphysics.* I will briefly outline them, indicating how they enact the order of the four basic problems of Being by means of the basic methodological determinations (phenomenological acts.) The *locus* of the four senses of Being and the ascent and descent should be kept in mind.

The phenomenological-ontological formulation of the problem of Being in general begins in *fundamental ontology*, through the question of the sense of Dasein's Being. Fundamental ontology works out the question of Being in general as the *reduction* of the Being of the entity that understands (differentiates and articulates) the Being of entities. From the architectonic perspective, fundamental ontology elaborates the first problem, the *ontological difference—Da*-sein as the 'there' of the difference. Fundamental ontology is worked out in Divisions One and Two of the Part One of *Being and Time.*

Fundamental ontology is followed by the science of Being. The science of Being formulates the question of Being in general as the question of Being as such, which is the question of the sense of the understanding (differentiation and articulation) of Being as such. The science of Being *constructs* the concept of Being as such. From the architectonic perspective, the science of Being is meant to elaborate two of the four problems: *the basic articulation of Being*, and *the possible modifications of Being in their ways of Being.*

Heidegger originally projected to formulate the question of Being as such in division three of part one of *Being and Time,* as a continuation of fundamental ontology itself. In *Basic Problems* the architectonic plan becomes more nuanced, though it remains commensurable and congruent with *Being and Time*.

The science of Being is followed by the groundwork of metaphysics, which is "the problem of the inner possibility [*innere Möglichkeit*] of the understanding of Being, from out of which *all explicit questions concerning Being* should be able to grow." (GA 3: 232/162) The groundwork of metaphysics formulates the question of Being in general as the question of the whole of the Being of entities, which is the question of the possibility of the unity between fundamental ontology and the science of Being. The groundwork of metaphysics *destructs* the historical ontological constructions that serve as a point of departure for today's formulation of the problem of Being. The destruction is done with a view to disclose the experience from where these ontological constructions arise. From the architectonic perspective, the groundwork of metaphysics formulates the basic problem of the *truth of Being,* which takes up the other three problems at once. Heidegger formulates this problem in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and other texts of the late 1920s and early 1930s.

It is important to point out how Heidegger ordered the texts at the beginning of *Pathmarks*. They were crafted precisely in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and they *mark* the *path* of the positive appropriation of the transcendental dialectic in phenomenological destruction. The order of these texts offers an extrinsic confirmation of my working hypotheses. Heidegger first addresses the onto-theological constitution; then the four

problems of Being; and finally engages Plato regarding the ascent and the descent, and Aristotle regarding the four basic senses of Being.

3. Aim, method, and outline of this project

Because I am ultimately interested in the problem of Being, I aim to problematize Heidegger's ontotheological characterization of the *locus philosophiae*. The first task in this direction is to clarify Heidegger's incomplete construction of a unitary phenomenological ontology during the mid-late 1920s. The present text begins this clarification by outlining a reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being, and on the basis of the *locus*. Understanding fundamental ontology from the science of Being, in the context of the architectonic I propose, exhibits fundamental ontology for what was projected to be.

My reconstruction has a formal character. Heidegger's solutions to the problem are bracketed, neither engaged or dismissed. This way, his *formulation* of the problem, the *form* by which he works out the problem, comes to the fore. Since I propose a unitary interpretation, this work primarily engages with Heidegger's texts.

My reconstruction aims to contribute to the collective effort of engaging the same problems that Heidegger engaged, while also accounting for Heidegger's formulation of these problems. My ultimate interest is to problematize the ontotheological characterization of the *locus philosophiae.* This means: to take Heidegger's characterization to its *limits* (to problematize it) so as to access that *from which* Heidegger

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characterized the *locus* as ontotheological. In this sense, I identify my work as an effort to

"mark the limits" of the characterization so as to access "that *from and within which*"

wonder awakens philosophy. [15]

As it has been shown, for Heidegger, "the question of being converges with that

of… *truth*" and both Heidegger I and II are preoccupied with the same problem of

overcoming metaphysics "by endeavoring to think the sense of Being-as-*truth*."[16] Truth is

first taken as "the original issue or basic problem, and then, finally, as the origin which

grants philosophical thought as such."[17] Building upon this, I add that convergence on truth

is the convergence of *the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent.*[18] Truth comes

last and grants access to the rest of the senses of Being at once in a unitary manner.[19] This

Einheit des Seins (or *Einheit der Analogie*) has been sought within one of the senses

alone—in the categorial sense of Being or in the basic ways of Being, as the unity of finite

and infinite entity, or of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, etc.[20] My claim is that the final unity

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[15] John Sallis, *Delimitations. Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics.* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), ix-xi. And Sallis, "… A wonder that one could never aspire to surpass," in *The Path of Archaic Thinking. Unfolding the work of John Sallis,* ed. Kenneth Maly (Albany: SUNY, 1995), 257-59.

[16] Richardson, op. cit., 623; Daniel Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 385ff.

[17] Sallis, "The Origins of Heidegger's Thought", in *Delimitations. Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 97.

[18] Though Heidegger "did not always make [what he meant by '*Sein*'] clear to the rest of us", the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent is not only what he meant as the problem of Being, but also what he thought our tradition has always meant when the problem has been formulated. Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger. A Paradigm Shift* (Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 3.

[19] The "truth of the possible" is a case of the unity of the senses. See Richard Kearney, *Poetics of Modernity. Toward a Hermeneutic Imagination* (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), 45. See also Kearney, *Poétique du Possible. Phénoménologie Herméneutique de la Figuration.* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1984), 117-132.

[20] See Friedrich-Wilhelm Von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins* 1 (Krankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 42ff. See Kisiel, op. cit., 227ff. See Franco Volpi, *Heidegger e Aristotele* (Roma: Laterza, 2010), *passim*; Walter Brogan, *Aristotle and Heidegger. The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany: SUNY, 2005), 1-21; Josh Michael Hayes, "Deconstructing Dasein: Heidegger's earliest interpretations of Aristotle's *De Anima*", *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 61, No. 2 (2007): 263-293; Michael Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle. Philosophy as Praxis* (London: Bloomsbury, 2008), 117; Sean Kirkland, "Heidegger and Greek Philosophy", in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger,* ed. François Raffoul Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 77-86.

is not to be found in one of the four senses, but in the movement of ascent and descent by which the four senses occur.[21] At the same time, each of the senses reflects the rest, though truth does this in the most complete, articulated manner. Therefore, attention to the problem of Being in the sense of truth is in fact attention to the unity of problems of the ontological difference, basic articulation of Being, modifications, and ways of Being. Unity of Being is unity of the senses in which Being is meant.

The unity of Being, understood as the ascending-descending unity of the senses in which Being is meant (the *locus philosophiae*), is far from being an oddity in the history of philosophy, and it has not been disregarded or forgotten by our traditions. We can recognize this if we consider the movement of ascent and descent alone. Heidegger's phenomenological ontology enacts this traditional movement *à la* Husserl, as reduction, construction, and destruction. This is why "on the way of reduction and construction, accompanied by the critically functioning destruction, there is disclosed step by step, in *Being and Time* the Being of the being that I myself am."[22]

In this work, though I focus on Heidegger, I consider *Husserl and Heidegger together* on the basis of the *locus philosophiae*. They both attempt to access and account for 'the basic experience of all philosophizing.' And their understandings of this

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[21] Though accounts of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato and Platonism do not connect such interpretation with Aristotle's four senses of Being, they tend to regard the problem of ascent and descent. See for instance Laszlo Versényi, *Heidegger, Being, and Truth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 74ff.; Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Plato (1976)", in *Heidegger's Ways* (Albany: SUNY, 1994), 81-95; Jean-François Courtine, *Heidegger et la phénoménologie* (Paris: Vrin, 1990), 129ff.; John Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger. The Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 320; Drew Hyland, *Questioning Platonism* (Albany: SUNY, 2004), 53ff; and Gregory Fried, "Back to the Cave: A Platonic Rejoinder to Heidegger", in *Heidegger and the Greeks,* ed. Drew Hyland and John Manoussakis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 157-76.
[22] Von Herrmann, *Hermeneutik und Reflexion. Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 152. English translation: Von Herrmann, *Hermeneutics and Reflection* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 133.

experience, while not the same, are commensurable. "Non-partisan" phenomenological work is thus necessary.[23] However, this 'commensurability' is not visible by confronting the 'solutions' to the problems they address—e.g. reflection v. hermeneutics; consciousness v. Dasein; etc. In contrast, I propose to focus on the ways in which Husserl and Heidegger formulate the problems, so as to begin to access *what* and *how* they problematize, and from where they do so.

I consider *the whole of transcendental philosophy* in the same relation. "Husserl and Heidegger share an orientation toward a common philosophical problem—the phenomenon of meaning."[24] They are both oriented toward sense or meaning because they share an orientation toward the problem of truth. They both recognize truth as one of the basic senses of Being (LU II/2: §39, 122/263f.) (GA 20: 71/53f.) This also calls for a reconsideration of Brentano's work. Brentano precedes the phenomenological tradition not only as a psychologist but also as Aristotelian scholar, 'scholastic' philosopher, and metaphysician.[25]

Upon what soil/*locus* is Husserl's *Ideas I* constructed? The book starts tracing "the most radical of all distinctions of Being" ('ontological difference'), which is the differentiation of the transcendentally reduced consciousness. (Hua III/1: 141/136) It continues with the basic structures and modifications of pure, absolute, transcendental consciousness. And it ends with the problem of truth, which returns to the beginning, now in terms of reason and reality. The very structure of the work shows the ascending-

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[23] See Burt Hopkins, *Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), 1-9.

[24] Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. Paths toward transcendental phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 5.

[25] Brentano's approach to metaphysics "underpins much of his later work." Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 27ff.

descending unity of the four senses of Being.[26] This is the ground of the "structural isomorphism" between the 'transcendental phenomenologies' of Husserl and Heidegger.[27] Transcendental phenomenology is certainly *first philosophy* [*Erste Philosophie*] in this sense. [28] And this does not only affect transcendental phenomenology, but Kant and the transcendental tradition as a whole.[29] In fact, it is only since Descartes that the 'prominent tone of philosophy' seems to start 'forgetting' the *locus philosophiae*.

This text is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I analyze the basic concepts of phenomenological ontology. I exhibit first the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1), and then the basic concepts of the science of Being (Chapter 2.) The correspondence between the concepts of fundamental ontology and the science of Being is exhibited on the basis of the interpretation I have offered. Fundamental ontology and the science of Being are two stages in the re-formulation of the traditional problem of Being, and each of these stages reflects the whole problem from their own individual standpoint.

In the second part, I begin the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being. I claim that the analytic of Dasein is to be understood as the *reduction* of Dasein. The reduction of Dasein has two moments—ontological and

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[26] Alhough Husserl focuses on Being in the sense of truth, the "scope" of his philosophy is not limited to one or two senses of Being. Cf. Robert Sokolowski, "How Aristotle and Husserl Differ on First Philosophy", in *Life, Subjectivity, & Art,* ed. Roland Breeur and Ullrich Melle (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 21ff. Cf. Sokolowski, "The Relation of Phenomenology and Thomistic Metaphysics to Religion", *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 67, No. 3 (2014): 603-626.

[27] Cf. Jitendra Nath Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), 160.

[28] I claim this is the *locus* from where transcendental (phenomenological) philosophy can be understood as a characterization of first philosophy; having this *locus* Greek birth and (contingently forgotten) Latin upbringing. Cf. Moran, "Heidegger's Transcendental Phenomenology in the light of Husserl's Project of First Philosophy", in *Transcendental Heidegger,* ed. Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 140ff.

[29] "The profound affinity Heidegger finds between the critical philosophy… and his own fundamental ontology" is, I claim, the post-Suarezian 'ontotheological' understanding of first philosophy. Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kantian Turn", in *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 45, No. 2 (1991): 331.

existential. I first characterize the reduction of Dasein as a whole (Chapter 3) and then its first moment: the ontological reduction (Chapter 4.) I anticipate basic aspects of the existential reduction in an Appendix.

PART ONE – BASIC CONCEPTS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

CHAPTER 1 – BASIC CONCEPTS OF FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

In this chapter, I identify and articulate the basic concepts of fundamental ontology with a view to reconstructing fundamental ontology on the basis of the science of Being. The basic concepts characterize the *what* and the *how* of the fundamental-ontological formulation of the problem of Being. The *what* and the *how* are articulated as a unity of coincidence.

4. Entities, Being, sense

According to Heidegger in *Being and Time,* the fundamental task of philosophy is to repeat [*wiederholen*] the question of Being [*Seinsfrage.*] This question, he claims, "is not just any question. It is the one which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation." (SZ 2/19) To repeat this subsided question does not mean to reiterate it in order to argue against a response, or to make a case for a new, alternative answer. If this was the case, then the task would not be to repeat the question but to answer it again, maintaining the question as it was. To repeat the question is to reformulate it.[30]

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[30] "The question of the sense of Being must be formulated [*gestellt, Fragestellung.*]" (SZ 5/24)

I aim to clarify here Heidegger's formulation of the question of Being in *Being and Time*. In clarifying or analyzing a question, its main components must be distinguished and gathered back together under a structured unity. The basic components of the question are the contents of the question. However, the way in which the basic components determine each other is given by how they are arranged according to the structure of the question, as well as the manner in which the question is to be formulated and answer (the method.) Heidegger characterizes the question of Being as the question of the Being *of entities*. (SZ 6/26) And he characterizes the question of the Being of entities as the question of the *sense* of the Being of entities. (SZ 1/19) Thus, the basic components of the question's content are 'Being,' 'entities,' and 'sense.'

The question of Being is not a simple, single unity. It entails a series of articulated questions; that is, it is a problem. The articulation of the questions entailed by the question of Being constitute the problem of Being [*Seinsproblem, Problem des Seins.*] In the late 1920's, Heidegger considers that the problem of Being ultimately aims to formulate and solve the question of *the sense of Being of entities in general* [*überhaupt.*] (SZ 37/61)[31] This is the problem's fundamental question but it cannot be formulated directly, and must be preceded by a different question that opens up the problem in the direction of the fundamental question.

This first question through which the question of Being begins to be re-formulated is the question of the sense of the Being of a preeminent entity—Dasein. Thus, the basic components of this first question specify the components of the fundamental question. The

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[31] Similarly, at the beginning of the lecture course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: "the fundamental question of the whole science of Being [is] *the question of the sense of Being in general* [*überhaupt.*]" (GA 24: 16/29)

components of the fundamental question are *entity, Being,* and *sense.* The components of the first question are 'the *entity* Dasein', 'Dasein's *Being*', and 'the *sense* of Dasein's Being.' In *Being and Time,* Heidegger only formulates and answers the question of the sense of Dasein's Being. Considering the basic components of the question, we can anticipate here the answer as follows: the sense of the Being of the entity Dasein is where the difference between the entity Dasein and its articulated Being maintains itself. This is the emptiest, most formal account of the main thesis of *Being and Time.*

What about the fundamental question of the *Seinsproblem*—the question of the sense of Being in general [*überhaupt*]? How is the sense of Being in general to be treated differently than the sense of the Being of Dasein? Heidegger did not clarify the sense of '*überhaupt*' in *Being and Time*. Though not made explicit, a sense of 'Being *überhaupt'* guides Heidegger's questions from the beginning. Confirmation of the guiding and determinative character of the '*überhaupt*' can be found in the Hüttenexemplar of *Being and Time.* Right in the passage where he introduces the expression for the first time, Heidegger writes in the margin: "Being—not a genus, not Being for the entities in general; the überhaupt = καθόλου = *Being of entities* taken as a whole; the sense of the difference." (GA 2: 50)[32] This means that the question of Being in general is the basic, fundamental question of the whole problem of Being. 'In general' means 'all the different moments by which entities and Being are differentiated, constituting the whole problem of Being.' The sense of the difference answers the question and solves the problem because it gives the

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[32] In 1929, Being in general is 'constitution of the Being of entities', the general question of ontology. "Kant's laying of the ground for metaphysics starts with *Metaphysica Generalis* and thus becomes the question of the possibility of ontology in general. This poses the question concerning the essence of the constitution of the Being of beings, i.e., concerning Being in general." (GA 3: 202/141)

complete determination of the difference between entities and Being; the different moments taken as a whole.

To put it simply, the question of Being is not just one simple question, but an articulated set of questions; that is, a problem—the problem of Being. As a problem, it has a basic, simple, guiding question that is worked out through each of the different questions constituting the problem. The basic, fundamental question is the question of the sense of Being in general. And the different questions constituting the problem work out the basic question by articulating the sense of 'in general.' The basic question of Being in general must be first worked out as the question of the sense of Dasein's Being, which is just the beginning of the formulation of the problem.[33]

In *Being and Time*, the sense of the problem of Being as a whole remains obscure due to the incomplete presentation of the sense and articulation of its basic components. However, Heidegger characterizes the problem as a unity from the point of view of the disciplines that formulate it: phenomenology and ontology. Heidegger commonly characterizes the first question of the problem (the question of the sense of Dasein's Being) by virtue of its object or subject matter or *what* as 'fundamental ontology', because 'phenomenology' "signifies primarily a *methodological conception* […] which does not characterize the *what* of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter [*das sachhaltige Was der Gegenstände*] but rather the *how* of that research." (SZ 27/50) However, the formulation of the problem depends upon both its *what* and its *how*. As Heidegger states, "ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical

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[33] "We shall point to temporality as the sense of that entity which we call 'Dasein'… In thus Interpreting Dasein as temporality, however, we shall not give the answer to our leading question as to the sense of Being in general. But the ground will have been prepared for obtaining such an answer." (SZ 17/38)

disciplines among others. These terms *characterize philosophy itself* with regard to its object [*Gegenstand*] and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology [*universale phänomenologische Ontologie.*]" (SZ 38/62)

'Philosophy itself' is ontology regarding its *what*, and phenomenology regarding its *how*. Consequently, the introduction to *Being and Time,* which is precisely dedicated to the "Exposition of the Question of the Sense of Being," is divided into two parts, a division that corresponds with the distinction between the *what* and the *how*. The first part of the introduction focuses on the subject matter or object of fundamental ontology as it is structured as a question. The second part is dedicated to the method required by the object or the manner in which the question must be formulated and solved. Therefore, the first part of the introduction constitutes an ontological introduction, the second part a phenomenological one. [34]

5. The ontological introduction to fundamental ontology. Three basic presuppositions about the problem of Being

The first part of the Introduction to *Being and Time* presents the *what* (subject matter) of the problem of Being. It is entitled 'The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being', and it is divided into four paragraphs.

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[34] This is certainly not how *Being and Time* begins. The way in which the reader (Dasein) of *Being and Time* engages the question of Being has been depicted by Sallis as carrying out the movement enacted by the Stranger in the passage of Plato's *Sophist* that in fact opens up the text. Cf. Sallis, *Delimitations Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 98ff. See also Jacques Derrida, *La question de l'Être et l'Histoire. Cours de l'ENS-Ulm 1964-1965* (Paris: Galilée, 2013), 30ff.

This ontological introduction presents both the problem of Being and the question of the sense of Dasein's Being as the first question of the problem. It identifies the fundamental contents of the problem of Being in general (entities, Being, sense), it projects them upon the structural moments of any question, and it finally determines Dasein as the entity to whom, and in regards to which, the first question must be asked. Heidegger claims that this analysis clarifies the "function [*Funktion*], aims [*Absichten*], and motives [*Motive*]" of the question. (SZ 8/29) The *function* of the question of the sense of Dasein's Being is that it begins to work out the question of the sense of Being in general. The *aim* of the question is to give access to the question of Being as such, and the aim of solving the problem as a whole is presented as the groundwork of all regions of entities. The *motive* is that Dasein is in a Being-relation to Being—Being is a *question* for Dasein, and anything ontical (concerning the entity) of Dasein is also ontological (concerning Being.)

Therefore, the ontological introduction does not merely introduce the contents of the subject matter of the question of Dasein's Being, but also the "characteristics of the question of Being, […] its distinctive features." (SZ 8/28-29) The *question itself* is part of the *what,* because the what is understood as a set of questions. The expression 'question of Being' is left undifferentiated because the focus is first the problem of Being taken as a whole. This introduction makes a case for the *necessity* of reformulating the question of Being, sketches its *structure,* and shows the *priority* that Dasein has in regards to the question. I will show how Heidegger presents the necessity of the question here. In the next section I will show the structure of the question and the priority of Dasein.

Heidegger opens up *Being and Time* by presenting the *what* of the question of Being as it is presupposed in our tradition. The question of Being belongs in philosophy ever

since Plato and up to Hegel, though it "has today been forgotten." (SZ 2/21) The question is forgotten in the sense that it is no longer asked, and the reason why it is not asked is because the problem of Being is ultimately not considered a problem.

Heidegger identifies three prejudices through which Being has been traditionally characterized. These conceptions of Being pervade the history of philosophy and explain how the problem of Being has been regarded. First, Being is understood as the most universal concept. Second, Being is understood as an indefinable concept. Third, Being is understood as a self-evident concept. The prejudices, turned into unquestionable dogmas, provoke "a lack of a definite answer and even […] a satisfactory formulation of the question itself." (SZ 9/29) This leads to the necessity of a reformulation. I will show, although Heidegger does not develop it, how the three prejudices at the same time presuppose the basic experience of Being as a problem and facilitate the forgetfulness of the problem of Being.

The three common prejudices are not free-floating conceptions. They spring from *presuppositions* constituting a common preunderstanding of the problem of Being. It is because there is a common preunderstanding that the problem of Being is at all intelligible, both pre-philosophically and philosophically. Thus, this preunderstanding, the presuppositions from where the common conceptions arise, *is* philosophy itself, in its historical occurrence. We are all situated in this preunderstanding that makes possible the intelligibility of these prejudiced conceptions. Now, the presuppositions constituting the preunderstanding are such that they do not only make possible the intelligibility of the prejudices but *also* their character *as prejudices*. The presuppositions that, within the preunderstanding, allow Heidegger to see the prejudice as prejudice, are positive

components of his own reformulation. In fact, I will show that these presuppositions are linked to what Heidegger takes to be the four the basic problems of Being. This link shows why Heidegger's work is a *re*-formulation of the problem, not a creation *ex nihilo.* The inevitable point of departure of the reformulation is the traditional preunderstanding where the common prejudices also belong.

Heidegger identifies three prejudices, seemingly in a rhapsodic manner: that Being is the most universal concept, that Being is indefinable, and that Being is self-evident. The prejudice that Being is the most universal concept entails that *the problem is solved*. Now, this 'answer' to the question of Being—that Being is simply the most universal concept— does not solve the problem of Being. Clarification of such 'universality' is needed, since Being's universality cannot be the one of the *genus.* Being 'transcends' any genus. "The term 'Being' does not define that realm of entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated [*artikuliert*] conceptually according to genus and species." (SZ 3/22) The history of philosophy has not provided a clear solution for Being's universality, so it is still a problem. Heidegger mentions the insufficient answers provided by Aristotle, Thomist and Scotist schools, and Hegel. The presupposition that Being is 'universal' in character must be kept in view nevertheless. Being has to be somehow universal because any entity whatsoever *is.* It is universal because it is the Being of *any* and *all* entities. But this universality is not the one of the genus. Only entities can be taken in the universality of a genus. Being is the Being of any and all entities without being itself a genus. It must be clarified how Being differs from entities by transcending them. The problem is not solved.

That the problem of Being is unsolved does not necessarily entail that it has a solution. The problem can in fact be thought as *unsolvable*. This possibility is grounded on

the prejudice that Being is *indefinable,* its sense cannot be retrieved. If Being cannot be defined, then the problem it constitutes cannot be solved. Now, the impossibility to obtain a definition does not affect the possibility for a solution to the problem of Being. Being cannot be defined because 'definition' is understood as articulation under relations of genus and specific difference. Only entities are subjected to genus-species articulations, thus only entities have proper definitions. Being is not an entity. Being cannot be articulated the way entities are articulated. But this does not mean that Being cannot be articulated at all. Being can be taken as a unity and also as structured by a manifold of ways of Being. 'Indefinability' from genus and specific difference does not mean that Being is meaningless or senseless, that it cannot be accessed or understood through an articulation. Being has an articulation of its own, and it determines entities in different ways. The presupposition that Being is undefinable grounds the prejudice that Being is meaningless. What does follow from the presupposition is that Being is indefinable as an entity. But Begin is not an entity, therefore Being's articulation must be different from the one of genus and specific difference. This presupposition must be kept in view. Being is not an entity. Being is *nothing but* the Being *of* any and all entities, that which determines entities *as* entities, entities as such. The problem of Being is not unsolvable. Certainly, Being cannot be defined or articulated as an entity. The sense of the *articulation of Being* and of the *ways of Being* needs clarification.

The last prejudice is that Being is self-evident. If Being is self-evident, then there is nothing questionable about it, and *the problem of Being is not a problem.* This prejudiced conception can be reconstructed as follows. If Being is self-evident, it means it is accessible, intelligible, visible. If Being is visible, then it needs not to be sought, it raises

no question, and constitutes no problem. This kind of visibility or *truth* is self-sufficient—what is self-evident is true in itself and because of itself. Thus, what is self-evident does not need anything else to take responsibility for its own sense and reality, it depends upon nothing else. Only what is *not* self-evident constitutes a problem: the problem of bringing it to evidence, to prove it, to demonstrate it. If Being is self-evident, then it actually does not constitute a problem. Now, the prejudice that Being is self-evident springs from a presupposition that must be kept in view. The presupposition is that, in any relatedness with entities or understanding of entities (cognizing, comporting, etc.), Being is already present as what determines entities as entities; as what makes entities relatable, or as that thanks to which they are understood. In this sense, we always take Being for granted. Being is always pre-understood in any understanding of entities. Or to put it in the language of evidence: any entity's evidence (visibility, intelligibility, truth) depends on its Being; it depends on the fact that this entity *is* and it *is* this or that. Being is nothing but the Being of any and all entities, in the *sense* of that *in relation to which* entities are entities themselves (given and accessible.) But this ubiquitous familiarity of Being does not mean that Being *itself* is intelligible. It 'gives' intelligibility, but it is actually itself not understood. In fact, Being constitutes "a priori an enigma." (SZ 23/4) Being is to be understood, its *sense* and *truth* are to be disclosed. Therefore, Being is not unproblematic. Being constitutes a problem that needs to be formulated and solved.

These are the three prejudices about Being identified by Heidegger: universality, indefinability, and self-evidence. The three prejudices entail positions that ultimately hindered the formulation of the problem of Being—they take the problem to be already solved, unsolvable, or not a problem in the first place. The prejudices presuppose that Being

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differs from entities in that it transcends from them; Being is not articulated as an entity, but it has an articulation of its own; and Being is in a relation to truth. What is presupposed in the prejudices are genuine problems, of which the prejudices are misleading solutions. Thus, the presuppositions behind the prejudices give the content of the question and what is questionable therein. Three basic components or elements constitute the content of the problem: entities, Being, and sense. What makes these elements questionable is that Being is nothing but the Being of any and all entities, in the sense of that in relation to which entities are entities themselves.

I have shown that the three prejudices are based on presuppositions that are not to be disregarded in a reformulation of the question of Being—and that Heidegger hides but does not disregard. In fact, these three presuppositions do constitute the point of departure of Heidegger's reformulation of the fundamental question of philosophy. The presuppositions stand on something about Being that is questionable, problematic. They reveal the manifold ways in which the basic components of the question of Being (entities, Being, sense) can be presented. Being is nothing but the Being of any, each, and all entities; that in relation to which entities are entities. Considering the presuppositions constituting our preunderstanding of the problem, the claim entails that: Being is *different from* entities (it transcends) though it is always *of* entities; Being is articulated on its own, and entities can be articulated under different ways of Being; Being determines the truth of entities and it has its own truth and sense. In Chapter 2, I will show how these presuppositions correspond with the four basic phenomenological-ontological problems of Being, and with the four ways in which we can regard Being.

6. The act of questioning and the basic components of the problem of Being

Heidegger dedicates the second paragraph of the ontological introduction of *Being and Time* to disclosing the moments that structure the act of asking questions in general. He also explains how these structural moments articulate the problem of Being. Questions are constituted by three structural moments: that which is asked about [*das Gefragte*], that which is interrogated or to whom/which the question is directed [*das Befragte*], and that which is to be found out by the asking [*das Erfragte.*] When we ask, enquire, or formulate a question, we ask someone/something about something so as to find something out.

The basic components of the content of the problem of Being (entities, Being, sense) must now be projected upon the structural moments of the question. The question of Being is a question *about* Being—Being is the *Gefragte*. This question is *directed to* entities—entities are the *Berfragte.* And it *aims to obtain* the sense of Being—sense is the *Erfragte.* Since the question of philosophy is the question of Being, it raises no doubts that Being itself is what is called into question, the *about which* [*Gefragte*] of the question of Being.[35] Now, if the question is centered around Being, why does the question aim to obtain the *sense* of Being and not Being itself? Also, why do we need to interrogate *entities* about Being, and not Being itself?

Heidegger understands questioning as seeking. If we ask about Being, it is because we do not have sufficient access to it. Why would we seek something that is here already fully present or available? Being is sought because it is not entirely visible, not sufficiently

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[35] "What is asked as such [*das Gefragte als solches*] is for the most part what, without hesitation, we mean by 'question'." (GA 17: 73/55) See also GA 20: §16

accessible to our view. At the same time, we know something about what we are looking for; we know enough that we are able to seek it. Thus, Being is already somehow partially or vaguely pre-seen and pre-understood. We understand something about Being in advance, in the sense that Being is somehow already here for us to ask about it. This is what the first paragraph of the ontological introduction has shown.

It has been preunderstood from the beginning that Being is nothing but the Being *of* entities. Being is *of* entities, it belongs to them. "Being means the Being of entities [*Sein besagts Sein von Seiendem.*]" (SZ 6/26) Being is something we can ask about because, in the first place, there are entities that *are* and that *are this* or *that*. It is our relation to entities (and to ourselves, as entities) that *motivates* and gives origin to the question of Being. What counts *as* an entity? What is that which is already accessible for us? According to Heidegger, entities are "everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything toward which we comport ourselves in any way, is entity; what we are is entity, and so is how we are [*was und wie.*]" (SZ 6-7/26) We know that Being is nothing but the Being of entities because entities are *what is*. Yet entities are not themselves Being. We have constant access to entities that *are,* and that *are this* or *that*, but not to Being. Entities are, in this sense, what the question can count on as a point of departure. We are always already in a certain relation with entities, we constantly deal with entities. We ourselves are an entity among others. The problem of Being starts with entities in the sense that it is from and through of our relation to entities that Being is an issue and a question. It is from entities and through entities that we can access Being.

Therefore, when asking *about* Being [*Gefragte*] we *interrogate* entities [*Befragte*] because Being is nothing but the Being *of* entities, and entities are always already

accessible in their Being, always closer to us than their Being. The question of Being is possible inasmuch as entities are accessible to us and let us interrogate them and access their Being. The question of accessibility to Being (the 'understanding' of Being) stands for the relation and difference between the always already accessible entity in its Being (where entity and Being are confused) and our search of the entity's not-yet-properly-accessed Being. We already understand entities in their Being, and what we seek to understand is Being as different from, though always in relation to entities. To access Being is to differentiate Being from entity.

It is clear why we must *interrogate* or ask entities when we *ask about* Being. However, in asking this question, why do we aim to obtain the *sense* of Being (and not Being itself) as the answer [*Erfragte*]? How are these two moments of the question—what is asked about and what is to be obtained—structurally distinct? I will show that what is to be obtained as an answer to a question [*Erfragte*] is what we interrogate [*Befragte*] and what we ask about [*Gefragte*] taken as a unitary whole. In order to work this out in detail, I must refer to a lecture course taught by Heidegger a couple of years before the publication of *Being and Time*.

In the course of the Winter Semester of 1923-1924, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, Heidegger interpreted Husserl's conception of the critical aspect of phenomenological philosophy as 'clarification of problems' [*Klärung der Probleme.*] Phenomenology clarifies the basic problems of philosophy.[36] Since "a problem

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[36] "Thus, if the idea of a philosophy as a rigorous science of the problems designated and all others that are essentially akin to them is not to remain powerless, we must have in view clear possibilities of realizing it; through clarification of the problems." Edmund Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", *Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur* I (3) (1910/11): 289-341, 297/256. Also: "The *critique* [of naturalism] is carried out in the manner of *clarifying the problems.* Problems are *taken up* and, with that, a specific *decision* is also made *about what is asked* [*Entscheidung für das Gefragte*] […]" (GA 17: 72-

is a question developed and explicitly posited in a specific manner," the clarification of the structural moments of a question would clarify the nature of any problem. (GA 17: 73/53) Heidegger distinguishes here *four* moments constituting the structure of the act of asking questions, in contrast to the *three* moments distinguished in 1926, in *Being and Time*.

What is interrogated [*Befragte*] and what the question is about [*Gefragte*] are identified as structural moments both in 1923 and 1926. In 1923, however, Heidegger does not mention the *Erfragte*. Instead, he presents two other moments: *the regard upon which of the question,* and *the actual or proper claim of the answer*. I claim that these two moments, presented in 1923, are simplified and taken as a whole in 1926. What is to be obtained in the answer of a question can be understood as the unity between the actual claim of the answer and the regard upon which of the question.

The *proper claim of the answer* is what the answer requests and expects from the question. The claim partially contains what is obtained as the answer to the question. However, the claim is not the answer *as* answer, but the answer as already present in the question. Heidegger characterizes the actual claim of the answer as the *how* of the question.[37] The *how* of the question is the question's *tendency* [*Antworttendenz*] toward an answer. This is commensurable with the 1926 account of the *Erfragte*. In 1926, the *Erfragte* is understood as "what is actually or properly *intended* [*das eigentlich Intendierte.*]" (SZ 5/24) The question is therefore determined on the basis of this tendency toward the intended answer, "on the basis of how the answer is *meant* [*gemeint*], sought [*angestrebt*], and laid claim to [*beansprucht.*]" (GA 17: 75/55) The actual claim of the answer is the

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73/52-53) Also, for the discussion regarding the basic problems of phenomenology as stemming from present-day's facts of the matter [*Tatsbestände*], see GA 17: 42/32.

[37] "*Das Wie des Fragens* selbst, *d. h. Der eigentliche Anspruch der Antwort.*" (GA 17: 73/54)

Erfragte understood as the pretension of the answer that guides the question toward the answer.[38]

How exactly is the actual claim of the answer, the tendency toward the intended answer, present in the question itself? This is given by the fourth moment distinguished in 1923: the regard upon which of the question. In asking a question, we *interrogate* something or someone [*Befragte*] *about* something [*Gefragte.*] Now, the relation between what is interrogated and what is asked can be taken as a unitary whole. This is possible if we consider the *regard upon which* [*die Hinsicht woraufhin*] of the question.[39] The interrogated is interrogated in regards to something. This something (the regard) is a moment of the interrogated. Now, it is *through* and *upon* this regard that the question *asks about something* [*Gefragte.*] Thus, the regard of the question [*Fragehinsicht*] mediates between what is interrogated and what is asked about. Through the regard, the question "articulates [*artikulieren*] the interrogated" and "constructs or shapes [*ausbilden*] what is asked about as such." (GA 17: 74/54) Both the articulation of the interrogated and the construction of what is asked about happen *in relation to each other.* The question *articulates* the interrogated within what is asked about through the regard; and the question *forms* what is asked about by exhibiting what is interrogated upon the regard. The regard, moving from the interrogated to what is asked about and back, is finally also addressed by the answer to the question. In interrogating something we take it 'as something.' The regard

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[38] Heidegger distinguishes two possibilities of the proper claim: the claim can be the acquisition of answers as objectively valid propositions; the answer can also claim to "bring… a specific basic relation to the entity interrogated." (GA 17: 55/76) The first possibility orients the answer to what is asked about as separated from what is interrogated; the second possibility orients the answer to the unity between what is asked about and what is interrogated.

[39] "In a question we distinguish… the regard in which it is asked, upon which the interrogated is interrogated—what is asked in regard to it [*Die Hinsicht, in der gefragt wird, woraufhin das Befragte befragt ist,–was an ihm gefragt ist.*]" (GA 17: 73/54)

of the question is this 'as something', "what is meant [*vermeinen*] in looking upon something [*hinsehen auf*], the content in looking upon something [*Hinsehensgehalt.*]" (GA 17: 75/54-55)[40]

What is to be obtained in the answer [*Erfragte*] can be understood as the unity of the regard upon which of the question and the claim of the answer. The regard upon which shows the different moments of the relation between what is interrogated and what is asked about; whereas the claim shows these moments as a whole.

Let's illustrate the actual claim of the answer and the regard upon which of the question with a non-philosophical, mundane example. In the question 'How big is your house?', the *Gefragte* is the house's size and the *Befragte* is the house itself. This means that the question is *about* the house's size and we interrogate and look for an answer in the house itself, by inspecting or interrogating the house itself. What is actually expected as an answer to this question? What is the claim of the answer? Maybe the answer claims a judgement regarding the function of the house's size, concerning how spacious the house is for living, an answer of the kind: 'My house is big enough to host a large family.' It is also possible that the expected answer is rather a comparison: 'My house is smaller than the average house in the area.' Or perhaps a quantitative answer is to be obtained instead, like the number of rooms, or the size in square footage. The *sense* of 'the size of a house' involves all these possible answers and more. Let the house's size be taken *as square footage.* In this case, the claim of the answer is a quantity measuring the size. The question asks the house about the house's size. But, *in what regard*? Regarding the square footage. Square footage is one of the regards through which a house can present itself as having a

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[40] When Heidegger uses '*Hinsehen auf*' later in *Being and Time*, he means: looking up, looking through, and looking upon. I show this in Chapter 4 'Ontological Reduction.'

size, and one of the manners in which the size can be exhibited in a concrete house—i.e. moving from the interrogated entity to what is asked about (Being) and back to the entity. The question interrogates the concrete house itself in its size, regarding the house's amount of square footage. So, to answer the question 'How big is your house?' in this regard is to interrogate and *look through* the house itself, not *looking upon* qualitative aspects of its inhabitable space, or for the number of rooms, but measuring the house's floor with a view to quantify the floor's surface. The house's size is pre-understood here *as* the measurable surface of the house's floor; i.e. as the house floor plan from where the size's measurement can be obtained.

The claim of the answer and the regard upon which of the question of 1923 are presented in 1926 simply as *Erfragte*. The virtue of the 1923 account is that it allows us to better see the coincidence between the basic components of the problem of Being and the structural moments of a question in general. In terms of the basic components of the problem of Being, sense corresponds with what is to be obtained by the answer. Now, just like the answer belongs, with the question proper, in the whole act of questioning, sense is not only restricted to the answer as such, but rather guides the questioning from the start. Sense, as the regard upon which, moves from the interrogated entity to what is asked about, which is the entity's Being, and back to the interrogated entity. In sense, the interrogated entity and its Being remain different and articulated in such difference. What I have just stated about the structure of the act of questioning coincides with what I have shown about the components of the problem of Being. We interrogate entities about Being with a view to obtain the sense of the Being of entities. Sense is that upon which the difference between entity and Being maintains itself, and becomes accessible.

The structure of questioning belongs in the *what* of fundamental ontology in that it shows the articulation of the three basic components. According to Heidegger, Being is presented in our philosophical tradition, as well as in our everyday, commonsensical understanding both as something problematic or unproblematic. However, fundamental ontology, begins precisely if and when we understand Being as a problem—i.e. fundamental ontology is the first stage in the formulation of the problem of Being, not what antecedes the formulation. Inasmuch as Being is understood as something that can be taken as a problem, and thus as a series of questions, the structure of such questioning belongs the *what* of Being that presents itself. Being is preunderstood as a problem and a question. Although the question itself is, in this sense, part of the *what,* it can also be regarded as *how.* Questions are to be treated phenomenologically. The manner of questioning is phenomenological in character.

7. The question of Being in general and the question of the Being of Dasein

Upon the presentation of the three structural moments of any act of questioning in general, Heidegger proceeds to explicitly exhibit how they instantiate in the concrete question that serves as a starting point in the formulation of the problem of Being. He first shows how the components of the problem of Being, which I have made already explicit, fulfill the *Gefragte,* the *Befragte,* and the *Erfragte* of the question.

> "The question about the sense of Being is to be formulated. We must therefore discuss it with an eye to these structural items…. In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which determines entities as entities, that upon which entities are already understood…. The Being of entities 'is' not

itself an entity…. In so far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and "Being" means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated…. If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated…, then any treatment of it… requires us to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its sense is to be understood." (SZ 6-7/25-26)

I have shown that the contents or components of the question (entities, Being, and sense), are present in the traditional prejudices concerning Being. I have also show that the presuppositions behind these prejudices articulate the preunderstanding (Heidegger's hermeneutical situation) of the relation between entities, Being, and sense. The articulation of the components coincides with the articulation of the structural moments of the act of questioning.

Since Being is sought by questioning or interrogating entities, entities constitute the starting point of the question, as well as what secures that the answer puts an end to the question. However, "there are many things which we designate as 'entity', and we do so in various senses." (SZ 6/26) What sense of entity is interrogated in the problem of Being? In what regard are entities taken in the formulation of the question of Being?

The question of Being cannot take entities upon any other regard than *as entities.* This is because the question is about Being, and the aspect of Being that can be anticipated by the question is that it is different and determining of entities as entities. Thus, in asking about Being, we must interrogate entities *as entities,* entities *as such.* It must be noted that, when Heidegger provides cases or examples of what counts as an entity, recognizing the multiplicity of senses in which those entities are to be considered entities, he is in fact already providing possible answers to the question of Being. Moreover, with this he is already providing the form of any possible answer. Heidegger claims that an entity is: "everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything toward which we

comport ourselves in any way, is entity; what we are is entity, and so is how we are." (SZ 6-7/26) Right after this enumeration of what counts as entities, Heidegger anticipates a series of possible solutions [*Erfragte*] to the question of Being. This is because, in determining what counts as entity, the Being of entities (taken in different regards or senses) is accentuated and begins to stand out. "Being lies in the fact that [*Sein liegt im*] something is [*Dass-sein*], and in its Being as it is [*So-sein*]; in Reality [*Realität*]; in presence-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*]; in subsistence [*Bestand*]; in validity [*Geltung*]; in Dasein; in the 'there is' [*es gibt.*]" (SZ 7/26) This "vague, average understanding of Being" is also present in the presuppositions grounding the traditional prejudices about Being that I have clarified.

Given these considerations, it must be decided which entity is to be interrogated for the first question of Being to be made concrete, with a view to formulate the question of Being in general. I have anticipated that this first concrete question is the question of the sense of Dasein's Being. I will show here how Heidegger demonstrates that this is the case.

An entity must be selected to first access Being in its sense. This entity must let itself be taken *as entity* so as to *fulfill* the most basic, formal, empty characterization of the differential relation between entities and Being: that Being is always *of* entities, and that Being determines entities as entities, or entities as such. The interrogated entity must be Dasein because Dasein is the entity for which it is impossible not to be taken 'as such.' Dasein *is* this reflectedness, this as-suchness. Dasein is the paradigmatic entity as such. Thus, Dasein has the most preeminent relation to Being, when Being is taken as that which determines entities as entities. Different from any other entity, Being is an issue for Dasein. Dasein understands and determines its own Being, it takes itself *as such*. Moreover, Dasein

understands the Being of any other entities *as entities*. Because Dasein decides its Being, any comportment of Dasein constitutes a moment of its Being, which in turn entails the fact that it is [*Das-sein*] this or that way [*So-sein; Seinsweisen*] in a way that cannot be dilucidated if we ask *what* Dasein is [*Was-sein.*] In other words, Dasein exists, thus it projects its own possibilities of Being and wins or loses itself in deciding upon them. Being is "that which determines entities and entities and that upon which entities are already understood." (SZ 6/35) Since Dasein owns the determination of its own Being and understands its Being and the Being of any other entities, the problem of Being must begin with the question of the sense of Dasein's Being. Dasein's understanding and interpretation of its own Being shall provide the conditions of the possibility of the understanding of Being in general. Fundamental ontology is the transcendental discipline that formulates and solves the question of the Being of Dasein with a view to work out the question of Being in general.

8. The phenomenological introduction to fundamental ontology

I have shown that the ontological introduction characterizes the subject matter of philosophy as the problem of Being, and Being itself as the Being of any, each, and all entities, in the sense of that on the basis of which entities are entities. Heidegger states in paragraph seven of *Being and Time* that, although what I call the ontological introduction depicts the "object which serves as the theme of our investigation [*Gegenstandes der*

Untersuchung] (the Being of entities, or the sense of Being in general), it seems that *we have also delineated the method to be employed*." (SZ 27/49)

Paragraph seven belongs in the second half of the introduction, dedicated to "The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. Method and Design of our Investigation." I claim that this part (paragraphs 5 to 8) can be taken to be the 'phenomenological introduction' to *Being and Time*. The phenomenological introduction is dedicated to the *how* of philosophy, in contrast to the ontological one, dedicated to the *what* of philosophy. From the point of view of the subject matter or 'what', philosophy is ontology, which begins as fundamental ontology. From the point of view of the method or 'how', philosophy is phenomenology. Phenomenology is the method of ontology because it satisfies "the objective necessities of definite questions and the kind of treatment which the 'things themselves' [of ontology] require." (SZ 27/49) Therefore, the basic components of the question of Being, which I have clarified in their articulation from the point of view of ontology, are now to be exhibited and demonstrated as moments of the phenomenological method.

Since the subject matter of the question of Being is phenomenological in character, the unity between the *what* and the *how* is to be clarified through a characterization of phenomenology. The phenomenon of phenomenology is the Being of entities. Thus, the subject matter of ontology is to be exhibited and demonstrated through the phenomenological method. The phenomenological method shows itself reflectively as phenomenon. This showing itself of the method is also the phenomenon of phenomenology; phenomenology taken as phenomenon. In this sense, the phenomenon of phenomenology shows the coincidence between the *what* and the *how* of the question of

Being. The method of phenomenology is exhibited phenomenologically so as to demonstrate that the phenomenon of phenomenology is the Being of entities.

Heidegger clarifies the method of phenomenology by exhibiting first the formal conceptual components of the expression 'phenomenology' ('phenomenon' and 'logos'), and then by demonstrating them through the unitary conception of phenomenology as the method of ontology.[41] Since the characterization is reflective (it is a phenomenological characterization of phenomenology), the order in which it is worked out coincides with the order of phenomenological ontology itself.

The clarification of the sense of 'phenomenon' consists of the articulation between the ordinary [*vulgären*], formal, and deformalized-phenomenological conceptions of phenomenon. The articulating movement that formalizes the ordinary conception and deformalizes it into the phenomenological conception is traditionally characterized as an ascending. It must be noted that the movement of deformalization is not a descending proper, but either a looking back from above, or a repetition of the ascending, by which the manifold of moments characterizing the phenomenon is articulated and integrated in a unity. I anticipate here that the movement through which the phenomenon shows itself phenomenologically coincides with the movement that moves from entity to Being; the access to the Being of the entity by which Being is differentiated from the entity and articulated as such.

The exhibition of the ordinary conception of phenomenon is preceded by the etymology of the word 'phenomenon', which first projects the formal conception that is to

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[41] "We shall set forth the preliminary conception of phenomenology by characterizing what one has in mind in the term's two components, 'phenomenon' and 'logos', and by establishing the meaning of the name in which these are *put together* [*zusammengesetzen.*]" (SZ 28/ 50) On Heidegger's method of formal indication, see Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 242ff.; 436ff.

be obtained from the ordinary one. Through and after the conceptual analysis of the etymology, Heidegger exhibits the object of the concept of phenomenon (concrete, given phenomena) by appealing to common, ordinary experience. The ordinary conception of phenomenon consists of the various determinations commonly presupposed in in our preunderstanding of the concept of phenomena. Heidegger refers to the "entities which are accessible through the empirical intuition in Kant's sense" as a concrete instance of this vague, commonsensical conception of phenomenon. (SZ 31/54) Phenomena ordinarily show themselves as: what is manifest [*Offenbare*], what is visible [*Sichtbare*], the self-showing [*Sichzeigende*] in itself, the self-showing as something which in itself is not or semblance, the appearance [*Erscheinung*] as what announces itself not showing itself, the appearance as that which does the announcing, or the appearance as something that emerges or emanates from what is never manifest (mere appearance.) All these determinations characterize any phenomenon, and "cannot be disentangled unless the concept of the phenomenon is understood from the beginning as that which shows itself in itself [*das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende.*]" (SZ 31/54) Phenomenon is formally that which shows itself in itself. Because we understand phenomenon formally in advance, we can distinguish and connect the senses of 'phenomenon', 'semblance', or 'appearance.' All these senses mean, formally, a showing itself in itself.

In the formal conception, claims Heidegger, "we leave indefinite which entities we consider as 'phenomena', and leave it open whether what shows itself is an entity or rather some characteristic which an entity may have in its Being." (SZ 31/54) The formal conception grasps the unity of an entity in its Being, but does not yet differentiate Being from entity or articulates Being as such. The formal conception of phenomenon is the

simple, empty unity in which any determination of any phenomenon belongs. Thus, the simplicity of the formal conception does not *structure* these different senses or determinations. The formal conception must be deformalized so it can be shown how these determinations hang together [*Zusammenhangen*] in a still empty, but articulated (structurally fulfilled) unity.

The deformalization of the formal conception of phenomenon leads to the phenomenological conception. Heidegger depicts phenomena phenomenologically as that "*which already shows itself in the appearance* [*Erscheinung*] *as prior* to the 'phenomenon' as ordinarily understood… [and] can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought thematically to show itself." (SZ 31/55)[42] Appearing is the indicating from something that does not show itself, through [*durch*] something that shows itself. However not initially self-showing, the self-announcing [*Sich-melden*] of the appearance shows itself in itself. "Appearance means a referential relation [*verweisen; Verweisungsbezug*] in entities themselves such that what does the referring (the announcing) can fulfill its possible function only if it shows itself in itself—only if it is a phenomenon." (SZ 31/54) The phenomenological conception of phenomenon indicates how we encounter entities in the manner of differentiating and articulating their Being. We first encounter the self-showing of the entity, which has been assigned a priori by its Being, that in turn announces itself through such entity. The process by which the Being of the entity is made manifest is the self-showing of its prior self-announcing. Being finally "stands out in full relief."

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[42] Heidegger notes that, if the ordinary conception of phenomenon corresponds to Kant's empirical intuitions, the phenomenological conception corresponds to the forms of intuition. I would rather argue that the phenomenological conception of phenomena would correspond not with the forms as such (which must coincide with the original unity of apperception) but with the pure intuitions of these forms—the pure intuition of space and time as forms of intuition.

(SZ 27/49) The co-dependency of self-showing and self-announcing coincides with the relation between entity and Being. The self-announcing of Being is prior to the self-showing of the entity and makes it possible— "the self-showing belongs essentially to the 'wherein' [*Worin*] in which something announces itself." (SZ 30/53) At the same time, "appearing is possible only on the basis of a self-showing" in that Being is always of entities. Being is only accessible from and through entities. (SZ 29/53)[43]

The phenomenon of phenomenology is the entity's Being as we access it from the entity in which it announces itself. What shows itself is the differentiation and an articulation of the entity's Being. Now, phenomenology is the *science* or *account* (*logos*) of phenomena. The phenomenological phenomenon is the relation between entity and Being, while *logos* is what leads toward and gives the *sense* of the Being of the entity; the 'account' of the entity's Being. It does so by moving from Being to entity, guided by the sense that provides an account of the entity in its Being.

Heidegger clarifies the sense of 'logos' by exhibiting it [*aufweisen*], like he does with the sense of 'phenomenon.' '*Logos*' means 'reason', 'judgment', 'concept', 'definition', 'ground', 'relation' [*Verhältnis,* and *Beziehung*], etc. And it also means the modes of judgment of 'assertion', 'accepting', or 'denying.' The formal conception of logos, however, is 'discourse' [*Rede*], for the other senses or characterizations can be understood as moments of discourse. "But how can 'discourse' be so susceptible to modification that *logos* can signify all the things we have listed?" (SZ 32/55) The answer to this question is to be found in the deformalized conception of *logos*, that understands

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[43] The phenomenological conception of phenomenon also articulates the moment of semblance [*das Schein*], which is a self-showing of something as something which in itself is not. Semblance can be a modality either of the self-showing of the entity, or of the self-announcing of Being.

discourse as *apophansis.* Discourse as *apophansis* is a letting something be seen, where the 'something' that becomes visible is what the discourse is about [*wovon.*] In discourse, "what is said is drawn from that about which what is said is said [*was geredet ist, aus dem, worüber geredet wird, geschöpft sein*]" so it becomes accessible for others. (SZ 32/56) Thus, discourse as *apohansis* is a letting something be seen from itself by *exhibiting* it [*aufweisenden Sehenlassens.*] Now, as apophansis, discourse also has the structural form of a *synthesis,* so it is a "letting something be seen in its togetherness [*Beisammen*] with something," letting something be seen *as something,* demonstrating it [*ausweisen.*] (SZ 33/56)

Sense lets something be seen (the entity's Being) by directly exhibiting [*aufweisen*] and directly demonstrating [*ausweisen*] it. (SZ 35/59)[44] Heidegger does not explain this here, but it is crucial to clarify it. What is exhibited and demonstrated 'synthetically' by sense is not just the entity and its Being, but the referential relation [*verweisen*] between Being and entity, that is, their difference and articulation. Discourse (sense) *doubles* the unity of Being and entity (in their referring) by means of the 'as structure.' Now, the sense that *exhibits* the referring between Being and entity *is not the same* as the sense that *demonstrates* it. I have claimed that 'phenomenon' in the expression 'phenomenology' stands for what is traditionally described as an ascending from entity to Being. '*Logos*', in turn, stands for the descending back to the entity, which is granted by sense. Now, the ascending has a descending of its own, and thus a *logos.* This descending of the ascending takes place as the deformalization by which the Being of the entity coincides with the entity and gains structural integrity. This descending within the ascending marks the presence of

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[44] *Auf-* and *aus-weisen* (the latter being the giveness of what is *meant* in a preeminent mode) are employed in their phenomenological sense. Cf. Hua XXXV, 288; Hua VIII, 242.

logos in the initial access (understanding) of the phenomenon. Any phenomenon is always already taken *as something*. Now, what matters is that the completion of the differentiation between entity and Being, that takes place in the self-showing of the self-announcing, remains *empty*, only fulfilled 'in structure.' The sense of 'logos' in the expression 'phenomenology' expresses the descending proper, from Being back to entity. In this movement, the unity that is to be found is not an empty structure, but the integral, concrete entity that fulfills the empty structure. The *logos* of the descending proper requires the entity to present itself in the flesh, so that it fulfills the structure with content. The descending proper also has an ascending of its own, since only the entity can complete the self-showing of the self-announcing of its Being, and it does so by looking up to Being; remembering Being. The completion of the self-showing of the self-announcing is done in sense. Sense *demonstrates* [*ausweisen*] the 'synthesis' of Being and entity. The complete differentiation between Being and entity and articulation of Being can only be accessed as sense.

This is what Heidegger means when he claims that "phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities"; i.e. the *logos* of *phenomena*. (SZ 37/61) He considers this conception of phenomenology is '*preliminary*' [*Vorbegriff.*][45] A *developed* (constructed) conception of phenomenology is provided in 1927, in the lecture course on *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. In this lecture course, the moments of the phenomenological method are disclosed as stages—reduction, construction, destruction.

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[45] Preliminary, formal whole of how and what—phenomenology as ontology, phenomenological ontology. See Sallis, "The Origins of Heidegger's Thought", in *Delimitations. Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 86-97.

The basic concepts of fundamental ontology—entity (Dasein), Being, sense; along with the moments of questioning and the moments of phenomenology—show the formal articulation of the formulation of the problem of Being in its starting-point. Being is nothing but the Being of entities; that which determines entities as entities, and upon which entities can be understood. To formulate the question of Being entails: 1) interrogating entities as entities about their Being; 2) regarding the difference between entities and Being and the articulation and modifications of Being; 3) in order to obtain the sense of Being, where the difference, articulation, and modifications maintain themselves and can be regarded at once. Entities are interrogated regarding their self-showing as an announcing of Being, which appears first as such, in their difference with the entity, and then through the self-showing of the entity, so as the whole phenomenon can be accounted as something. These fundamental-ontological concepts are repeated and rearticulated in the context of the science of Being, as I will show in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2 – BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE SCIENCE OF BEING

In this chapter, I identify and articulate the basic concepts of the science of Being. The basic concepts characterize the *what* and the *how* of the problem of Being *as such*, as it is formulated by the science of Being. The *what* and *how* of the science of Being are shown as that upon which the *what* and the *how* of fundamental ontology are projected— the formulation of the problem of Dasein's Being is projected upon the formulation of the problem of Being as such; thus, the latter discloses the former, shows the former for *what* and for *how* it was. The *locus philosophiae* is presented as the inner possibility of the beginning of phenomenological ontology in fundamental ontology.

9. "Time and Being" and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. From fundamental ontology to the science of Being

The first moment of the question of Being in general is the fundamental-ontological question of the sense of Dasein's Being, which is formulated and answered in the published part of *Being and Time.* Fundamental ontology gives way to a different question, which does not ask about the Being of one entity, but rather about *Being as such* [*das Sein als solches.*] This second question "aims at the objectification of Being as such… through which the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed." (GA 24: 398/281;

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458/459) The direction taken from fundamental ontology, however, prevents us from formulating this second question about Being as such in the vacuum. "Being and its distinction from entities can be fixed only if we get a proper hold on *the understanding of Being as such* [*das Verständnis von Sein als solches*.]" (GA 24: 322/227)[46] The question of Being as such has an ontical ground in Dasein's understanding of Being; and Dasein's understanding of Being is a moment of the response to the question of the Being of Dasein. Thus, the question of Being in general articulates the problem of Being by first formulating the question of the sense of Dasein's Being, and then the question of the sense of the understanding of Being as such. Heidegger projected the elaboration of this question as the task of Division Three of Part One of *Being and Time,* which was written but never prepared for publication. Nevertheless, Heidegger dedicated the lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* to this question, the question of Being as such.[47]

What is published under the title '*Basic Problems of Phenomenology*' in volume 24 of the *Gesamtausgabe* is Von Herrmann's collation of several sources of Heidegger's lecture course of the summer semester of 1927: Heidegger's original manuscript and marginalia, the typewritten copy by Fritz Heidegger, and notes taken by Simon Moser, who attended Heidegger's course as a student. Heidegger himself revised, modified, and finally approved Von Herrmann's collation and edition of the text.[48] That Heidegger decided this

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[46] "In existentiell understanding… there is present an understanding which, as projection, not only understands entities in their Being but, since Being itself is understood, has also in some way projected Being as such." (GA 24: 392/280)

[47] Since Division Three of Part One was never published as such, the tendency is to consider it unwritten. In contrast, I claim *Basic Problems* of 1927 must be seriously taken as this division. Cf. Lee Braver, ed., *Division III of Heidegger's* Being and Time. *The Unanswered Question of Being* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015), 1-18.

[48] Von Herrmann, "Nachwort des Herausgebers", in Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,* ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 471 ff. (GA 24: 471ff.) See also Daniel Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Last Word", in *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 41, No. 3 (March, 1988): 589-606; and Theodore Kisiel, "Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe: An International Scandal of Scholarship", in

would be the first text prepared for the *Gesamtausgabe* in 1975 speaks to the importance of the content of this lecture course.

The content of *Basic Problems* corresponds with the content projected for "Time and Being." Heidegger indicated this at least four times: in his copy of *Being and Time* (the *Hüttenexemplar*); in the manuscript of *Basic Problems* itself; in the personal copy of the first edition of "On the essence of ground" in 1929; and in the lecture course of 1943 at Freiburg, entitled *Die Metaphysik des deutchen Idelalismus.* Heidegger mentions the lecture course a fifth time in a handwritten list of all his lecture courses and seminars. The link between "Time and Being" and *Basic Problems* is also made explicit in the correspondence between Heidegger and Jaspers from the spring of 1926 to the summer of 1927. Particularly important is the letter written on October 4, 1926. Heidegger confesses there that, after having sent the manuscript to the publisher, he has been immersed in re-elaborating and developing what is left of the first half, which makes the project longer than expected.[49] What is left of the first half of *Being and Time* is Division Three of Part One, 'Time and Being.'

Von Herrmann points out that the re-elaboration entails changes that do not affect the structure of *Being and Time*.[50] My interpretation does not challenge what is essential in Von Herrmann's claim but develops how the re-elaboration might affect not the structure as such, but the understanding of it. In the project of *Being and Time,* a 'twofold task' is

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Philosophy today, Vol. 39, No. 1, (1995): 3-15. The fact that Heidegger extensively revised and modified the 1927 materials (no longer available) in 1975 opens up the possibility that the published text reflects Heidegger's late understanding of his earlier trajectory. If this was the case, it would not invalidate my position; it would rather support it.

[49] Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, *Briefwechsel 1920-1963* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990), 67. See also Kisiel, *Genesis*, 480-488.

[50] See Von Herrmann, "Being and Time *and* The Basic Problems of Phenomenology," in *Reading Heidegger. Commemorations,* ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 118ff.

distinguished: the task of formulating the question of Being and the task of the destruction of the history of ontology. "Time and Being" is presented as the third step (Division Three) of the first task, in a continuous whole of Part One along with the analytic of Dasein (Division One) and its repetition (Division Two.) Thus, the question of Being as such is just vaguely understood, and not developed *within* fundamental ontology. Heidegger claims there that "Interpreting [*Interpretieren*] Being as such includes working out the Temporality [*Temporalität*] of Being" and it is a "fundamental ontological task". Moreover, it is through the completion of this task that "the question of the sense of Being will first be concretely answered." (SZ 19/40) I suggest that in *Basic Problems* and onwards, the whole of Part One is now taken as formulating and solving two different, independent questions. The analytic of Dasein (Division One) and its repetition (Division Two) deal with the question of Dasein's Being, "Time and Being" or *Basic Problems* (Division Three) deals with the question of Being as such.

In 1943, Heidegger indicated that, while visiting Jaspers during the first days of 1927, he reconsidered once again the parts of *Being and Time* that had not yet been printed. Jaspers helped him realized that Division Three of Part One "Time and Being" would not be understood. However, it is to be noted that Jaspers had already read the first two divisions, which they discussed during their time together in Heidelberg. Heidegger does not simply think that "Time and Being" will not be understood. He does so *based on* his discussion with Jaspers that concerned the whole work.[51] When Heidegger reconsiders once again the edition at the beginning of 1927, what is at stake is not only "Time and

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[51] "Out of our friendly but lively disputes over the galleys of *Being and Time*, it became clear to me that the elaboration of the most important Division (I, 3) drafted up to that point had to be incomprehensible." (GA 49: 39ff.) Cf. Kisiel, op. cit*.,* 486.

Being," as an isolated part of the project of *Being and Time.* Heidegger has in mind the relation of the three parts of Division One as a whole. The reconsideration of this relation affects the understanding of the project of phenomenological ontology as a whole—the elaboration of the problem of Being as the problem of the sense of Being in general.

Basic Problems is not understood as having the same task as the analytic of Dasein; i.e., the formulation and answer to the question of the Being of Dasein. *Basic Problems* does not elaborate fundamental ontology, but rather the 'science of Being', which has the task of formulating and answering to the question of Being as such. According to Heidegger's architectonic conception of phenomenological ontology, the problem of Being is formulated by means of the articulation of the different moments or stages of the question of Being in general. There are three basic moments of the whole of phenomenological ontology. They correspond to the three moments of the phenomenological method that I will present and discuss in section 11—reduction, construction, destruction. Fundamental ontology constitutes the reduction, and the science of Being the construction. The unity of fundamental ontology and the science of Being is taken up in the destruction of the history of ontology, which will achieve full form by 1929 as the groundwork of metaphysics. In 1927, it is clear for Heidegger that the question of Being as such must be worked out in its own right, independent from fundamental ontology, though understood as grounded upon fundamental ontology. "The Interpretation of Dasein as temporality is the goal of fundamental ontology; then it must be *motivated* solely by the problem of Being as such." (GA 3: 239/168)[52]

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[52] Already in 1928, Heidegger explicitly distinguishes the three main moments of phenomenological ontology as I have sketched out. See GA 26: 199/157.

The science of Being's main question is the question of Being as such, which must be formulated as the question of the sense of the understanding of Being as such. The science of Being is "the theoretical conceptual Interpretation of the *structure* and *possibilities* of Being." (GA 24: 15/11)

10. The ontological introduction to the science of Being. The four basic problems of Being

Analogously to fundamental ontology, the science of Being can be characterized through its *what* and through its *how*. Since the science of Being is the Interpretation of the 'possibilities and structure of Being as such', the *what* is the '*structured possibilities*,' and the *how* is the '*structuring.*' Heidegger introduces the *what* of the science of Being in paragraph 4 of *Basic Problems,* in what we can consider the ontological introduction to the science of Being.

According to Heidegger, the *what* (structured possibilities) of the science of Being are the four basic problems of Being—the ontological difference; the basic articulation of Being; the possible modifications of Being in their ways of Being and the unity of Being's variety; and the truth-character of Being. These are in fact the 'possibilities of Being' that constitute the whole of Being as such. In the science of Being, these possibilities are problems, which means that these possibilities are to be exhibited in their possibility, that is, as such. Heidegger provides the following formal characterization of the four basic problems.

First, it must be noted that the theme of inquiry of the science of Being is Being itself, as such. But Being is always the Being *of* entities, it *belongs* to entities. At the same time, Being is what *determines* entities as entities. Thus, the difference between Being and entities is the first problem of the science of Being. This is the problem of the *ontological difference.*[53] The Kantian thesis stating that Being is not a real predicate is a solution to the problem of the ontological difference.

Second, every entity "is *something;* it has its *what* and as such has a determined possible manner of Being [*es hat sein Was und hat als dieses eine bestimmte mögliche Art zu sein.*]" (GA 24: 23/18) As determined by Being, any entity *is* [*quod est*] in the manner of *what it is* [*quid est.*] Thus, the second problem of Being is the articulation of Being in its basic structures—the belonging-together of whatness and way of Being. The medieval or scholastic thesis that to each entity there belong *essentia* and *existentia* is a solution to the problem of the basic articulation of Being.[54]

Third, every entity "has a way of Being [*Seinsweise*]" but such way of Being does not necessarily have the same 'character of Being' [*Seinscharakter*] in every entity. The third problem of Being is "the problem of the possible modifications [*Modifikationen des Seins*] and the unity of Being's manifoldness [*Viellfältigkeit.*]" (GA 24: 24/18) The Modern thesis stating that there are two basic ways of Being are the Being of Nature (*res extensa*) and the Being of Mind (*res cogitans*) is a solution to this third problem.

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[53] Heidegger connects here transcendence to the ascending and descending. "We are surmounting entities in order to reach Being. Once having made the ascent we shall not again descend to an entity, which, say, might lie like another world behind the familiar entities." (GA 24: 23/17)

[54] In the destruction, Heidegger shows the connection of the thesis to Aristotle's concepts of act and potency—though he does not explicitly disclose the *locus philosophiae.* See John Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas. An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988), 211ff; Oliva Blanchette, "Suárez and the Latent Essentialism of Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology", *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 44, No. 1 (1990): 3-19.

Fourth, every entity that we can have any relation to and any comportment toward, "can be addressed by saying 'it is' this and so, regardless of its specific manner of Being [*Seinsart.*]" (GA 24: 24/18) This is because the Being of the entity is *understood* or *disclosed* [*erschließen*] in its truth (sense); that is, differentiated and articulated in a *what* and a manner of Being, and interpreted in its modifications. The fourth problem is the problem of the truth-character of Being. The thesis that the sense of Being is the copula is a solution to this problem.

Heidegger does not only provide a formal account of the problems. He asks: "How shall we select and circumscribe the individual problems?" (GA 24: 2/2) Of course they should not be selected accidentally, rhapsodically. "We shall allow ourselves to be led to them by a more general or preparatory discussion of the concept of scientific philosophy in general. We shall conduct this discussion in tacit assessment [*stillschweigenden Anmessung*] of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from antiquity to Hegel." (GA 24: 4/3) Heidegger selects four paradigmatic theses about Being by which the '*basic tendencies*' of Western philosophy are made concrete. They determine possibilities of Being. The first is Kant's thesis: Being is not a real predicate. The second is a thesis that Heidegger associates with scholastic, medieval ontology, but that comes back to Aristotle, namely: Being is constituted by *essentia* and *existentia.* The third thesis is associated with modern philosophy: the basic ways of Being are nature and mind. Finally, the fourth thesis is that Being is the Being of the copula—a thesis that belongs in "logic in the broadest sense." (GA 24: 10/15)

The problem lies of course in this '*tacit assessment,*' which, yet never made explicit, conducts the consideration of the whole of philosophy by assessing the four basic

problems of Being—the theses of Being are just solutions to these problems. I have been referring to this tacit assessment as the *locus philosophiae*.[55] The four theses are solutions to the four basic problems. Heidegger's four basic problems of Being problematize the four senses of Being presented by Aristotle in *Metaphysics*. The ontological difference problematizes the difference between incidental and in itself; the basic articulation of Being problematizes the articulation of being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; the possible modifications of Being in their ways of Being problematizes Being in the sense of the categories; and the truth-character of Being problematizes Being in the sense of truth.[56] Here I simply indicate the connection between the four problems and the four senses. This connection will be shown *in concreto* throughout the reconstruction of phenomenological ontology.[57]

From an architectonic perspective, it must be noted how the basic problems present themselves already within the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time.* As I have shown in Chapter 1*,* Heidegger seems to identify three basic prejudices about Being that, although "rooted in ancient ontology" seem to be rhapsodically gathered: Being is universal, Being is indefinable, and Being is self-evident. (SZ 3/22) These three prejudices entail three presuppositions. The first presupposition is that Being is universal, though not 'general'; it differs from entities in that it transcends them. This presupposition is grounded in the ontological difference. Second, Being is not articulated as an entity (genus/species) but it has an articulation of its own. This presupposition is grounded in two problems: the

[55] See my Introduction, section 2.

[56] Heidegger follows Brentano's reduction of the many senses to four. See Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (Freiburg: Herder, 1862), 1-6.

[57] What has been shown, however, already proves that the ontological difference (as well as any other basic problem of Being) can be conceptually grasped at these stages of the formulation of the problem of Being. See Loy Vail, *Heidegger and Ontological Difference* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 188ff.

articulation of Being and the modifications of Being. Finally, the third presupposition is that Being is in a relation to truth, which is grounded in the problem of the truth-character of Being. The prejudices about Being are *systematically* articulated, *not rhapsodically* gathered. My claim is that the systematicity of phenomenological ontology is disclosed in the science of Being.

The four basic problems are the possibilities of Being, that is, the *what* of the science of Being. But these possibilities are structured in a certain manner (*how.*) The *how* of the scientific *structuring* of the possibilities gives "the entire stock of basic problems of phenomenology in their *systematic order* and their *foundation.*" (GA 24: 20/16) The *how* of the question of Being as such—as formulated by the science of Being—is clarified in the *phenomenological* introduction to *Basic Problems of Phenomenology.*

11. The phenomenological introduction to the science of Being. Reduction, construction, destruction

The *how* of the science of Being coincides with the *how* of fundamental ontology. Both disciplines access their subject-matter *phenomenologically.* There is however a difference between the two that must be noted upfront. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes the discipline formulating the problem of Being as 'ontology'—fundamental ontology. In contrast, in *Basic Problems,* the science of Being is primarily characterized as 'phenomenology.' The four problems of Being are in fact presented in the lecture course as 'basic problems *of phenomenology*.' "Phenomenology must develop its concept out of

what it takes as its theme and how it investigates its object." (GA 24 :1/1) In *Basic Problems,* 'phenomenology' does not only name the *how* or method, but the *how* and the *what* of a discipline as a whole. This priority of the methodological dimension of the science of Being is grounded in its architectonic role within the whole of phenomenological ontology. What must be called "a 'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense… is the *Being* of entities." (SZ 35/59) 'Logos', in turn, can be understood as 'science.' Since the science of Being access *Being as such,* and it does so *scientifically,* the expression 'science of Being' is the 'logos' of the 'phenomenon.'

Since Heidegger characterizes the formulation of the question of Being as such as the *science* of Being, the manner of access (*how*) to Being as such is accordingly thematized as *a knowing*. The knowledge by which we access Being as such is *a priori* knowledge. The *a priori* stands for what is prior to the entity, earlier to the entity. The earlier [*das Früher*] antecedes the entity's self-showing; that is, it makes the entity's manifestation possible. Being as such is the a priori of the entity—that which determines the entity as entity, characterizing *how* and *what* the entity *is* and, in the case of Dasein, characterizing *who* this entity is. This *earlier* or *prior* is not what we *first* encounter—it is an earlier in itself, but not for us. What is first for us is the entity in its Being, where the sense of its Being is undifferentiated from the entity. It is by differentiating Being from the entity through sense that we progressively gain access to the *a priori*. The *a priori* is the furthest from us, that which we encounter last.

Phenomenology, or the science of Being, is the access to the *a priori*. "The *basic parts* of *a priori knowledge* constitute what we call *phenomenology. Phenomenology* is the name for the method of ontology… the concept of a method." (GA 24: 27/20) '*Basic parts*'

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translates Heidegger's '*Grundstücke.*' '*Stück*' can be translated as 'part', 'component', 'piece.' Husserl uses '*Stück*' to refer to the independent part of a whole.[58] The basic parts of the phenomenological method are independent to each other in their outer relation thus, they can be taken as steps or stages structuring the order in which the science of Being proceeds. The phenomenological method "is nothing but the sequence of the steps involved in the approach to Being as such and the elaboration of its structures." (GA 24: 456/328) The basic parts, stages, or steps of phenomenology that elaborate the structures of Being as such are *reduction, construction,* and *destruction*.

The science of Being is "the theoretical conceptual Interpretation of the structure and possibilities of Being." (GA 24: 15/11) The *what* of the science of Being is the *possibilities of Being,* which present themselves as four problems. The *how* of the science of Being, the procedures of reduction, construction, and destruction consist of the *structuring* of the four possibilities or problems. Thus, reduction, construction and destruction formulate or structure the four problems of Being in their "*systematic order* and *foundation.*" (GA 24: 20/16)

We first encounter entities in their Being in a way in which the relation between entity and Being is indifferent. It is by means of a *reduction* that we differentiate the Being of an entity from the entity.[59] The reducing is a differentiating. The subject-matter of the science of Being are the possibilities of Being as such. But Being is always the Being of entities. Entities are what we first and foremost encounter—and uncover [*entdecken*] in their Being out of their hiddenness [*Verborgenheit.*] We only access Being through entities. Therefore, the manner of access of the science of Being is first *ontical* in that it starts in a

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[58] See LU II/I 266/28ff.
[59] For earlier critical accounts of the reduction, see GA 58: 249-254/188-192; and GA 20: 148-157/108-114.

relation to entities, and moves to the consideration of Being as such. We must first *approach* [*zugehen*] the entity whose Being is to be distinguished or reduced. The distinguishing of the reduction is achieved when it has "*led away from that entity and led back to the Being of that entity.*" (GA 24: 28-29/21)[60] The *leading away* [*wegführen*] and *back* [*zurückführen*] is a projecting of the Being of the entity that discloses [*erschlissen*] the Being as such. By means of the *phenomenological reduction,* Being is differentiated from the entity in a projection.

The achievement of the differentiation of Being calls for thematization of the connection between what has been differentiated (Being) and that from where it was differentiated (entities.) To fully access Being, the difference must be *articulated* on the basis of what made it possible. The reduction or difference is articulated by means of a *construction.* The construction *moves toward* Being, *carrying* the entity [*sichhinbringen*] from where the Being was reduced. From the perspective of the reduction, the entity is taken as *access* to Being. From the perspective of the construction, the entity is taken as *determined* by Being. This second movement is also a projection. The *carrying* or *bringing-toward* the entity is a *leading-toward* [*hinführen*] that has a *guidance* or direction [*die Leitung.*] The guidance is given by the *sense* of the entity's Being. (GA 24: 29/21) The sense of Being grants full access to the entity in its Being by maintaining, in their own articulation, the difference between Being and entity. The entity is first taken out of its hiddenness, uncovered in its Being; then the Being of the entity is disclosed; and finally the articulation of Being (and entity) is unveiled [*enthüllen*] by its sense. The

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[60] Heidegger's emphasis.

phenomenological construction brings back together Being and entity by exposing the horizon (sense) *upon which* the difference maintains itself.

The reduction differentiates Being from entity, and the construction articulates (gathers) this difference in terms of the sense of Being. The result of the reduction-construction is an Interpreted understanding of the sense of the entity's Being, where the difference-articulation of entity-Being-sense is fully and concretely displayed. Now, it is possible (and necessary) to come back to that which comes *before the beginning* of the reduction to investigate *its own conditions* of appearance. This is the task of the third part of the phenomenological method—the *destruction.* The construction undergoes a destruction by first identifying the *basic ontological or philosophical concepts* that it (reductive construction) is forced to use. These concepts are to be taken as the beginning or *way out* [*Ausgang*] of the current construction and also as the *outcome* [*Ausgang*] of the prior reductive construction that made entities in their Being accessible [*zugänglich*] for the current reductive construction. These *basic concepts of philosophy* must be critically *deconstructed* [*Abbau*] down to their phenomenological sources in a movement of *regression* [*Rückgang*] throughout the historical tradition that *constructed* them. (GA 24: 28-31/21-22)[61]

Reduction, construction, and destruction formulate the four basic problems of Being in their "systematic order and foundation." (GA 24: 20/16) The reduction first elaborates the ontological difference and projects the articulation of Being. The

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[61] See also Dermot Moran, "The Destruction of the Destruction: Heidegger's Versions of the History of Philosophy", in *Martin Heidegger. Politics, Art, and Technology,* ed. Karsten Harries and Christoph Jamme (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1994), 175-196. And Dermot Moran, "Destruction (Destruktion, Zerstörung) and Deconstruction (Abbau)," in *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon,* ed. Mark Wrathall (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 223-226.

construction structures the articulation of Being, its modifications and ways of Being guided by the sense or truth of Being. Finally, the destruction takes the reduction and construction as the whole of the truth of Being and formulates the problem of its originary possibility. Reduction, construction, and destruction articulate the inner structure of the science of Being, and also of fundamental ontology. They articulate the three main moments of phenomenological ontology, too.

12. Phenomenological ontology, the concept of philosophy, and the idea of philosophy

Fundamental ontology, the science of Being, and the groundwork of metaphysics are the three moments constituting the whole of phenomenological ontology. As a destruction, the groundwork of metaphysics must take the reduction (fundamental ontology) and the construction (science of Being) as a whole, so it can regress to the originary experiences from where the possibilities of Being appear as the four problems of Being in the history of philosophy.[62] The Greek Interpretation of Being as time is the Interpretation of an understanding of Being. I claim that, for Heidegger, this originary understanding of Being that can be Interpreted in terms of time, is the articulation of the *locus philosophiae*. According to its *concept,* philosophy is the problematization of the

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[62] The history of philosophy is one of the contents of the concept of philosophy. "Because destruction belongs to construction, philosophical cognition is essentially at the same time, in a certain sense, historical cognition. 'History of philosophy,' as it is called, belongs to the concept of philosophy as science, to the concept of phenomenological investigation. The history of philosophy is not an arbitrary appendage to the business of teaching philosophy, which provides an occasion for picking up some convenient and easy theme for passing an examination or even for just looking around to see how things were in earlier times. Knowledge of the history of philosophy is intrinsically unitary on its own account, and the specific mode of historical cognition in philosophy differs in its object from all other scientific knowledge of history." (GA 24: 31/23)

understanding of Being. The problem of the origin of the history of the understanding of Being constitutes the *idea of philosophy.* The idea becomes manifest in the task of the phenomenological destruction of the complete (historical) determination of the concept, and encounters the *other* of philosophy. According to its idea, philosophy is the *dialectical* problematization of what lies 'outside' of the whole of the Being of entities, unfolded in history. This is Heidegger's positive appropriation of Kant's transcendental dialectic, which characterizes Heidegger's work at least between 1928 and 1930.

In consequence, a *reconstruction* of fundamental ontology upon the science of Being is meant to clarify Heidegger's project of a phenomenological ontology as a whole, including the perspective from where a destruction of the history of the groundwork of metaphysics can be exhibited. This means that phenomenological ontology is taken both as the concept and as the idea of philosophy. A reconstruction of fundamental ontology in terms of the science of Being would give the concept of philosophy. Reconstruction of the phenomenological destruction that begins in 1928 would provide the idea of philosophy. To reconstruct fundamental ontology in terms of the science of Being means to interpret fundamental ontology as the science of the Being of Dasein. The reconstruction must project fundamental ontology upon the four problems of Being (ontological difference, articulation of Being, modifications of Being in their ways of Being, and the truth-character of Being) and the three phenomenological steps (reduction, construction, destruction.) What is characteristic of this conception of reconstruction is that it is guided by what constitutes, I claim, the inner possibility of phenomenological ontology—the *locus philosophiae,* the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent.

My architectonic perspective clarifies the articulation of the moments constituting phenomenological ontology. That the science of Being is the construction of what is reduced in fundamental ontology explains why in *Basic Problems* Heidegger gives priority to the methodological conception. Heidegger calls the four problems of Being 'basic problems *of* phenomenology,' an expression that gives title to the lecture course itself. In paragraph 5, Heidegger claims that two tasks are required to work out [*durchführen*] ontology: the first one concerns the object; the second concerns the method. The first task is to show that ontology has an ontical foundation and that such foundation must be secured at the very beginning of ontological investigation. Being is always the Being of entities, therefore ontology must start ontically, from and through an entity. Ontology—or the science of Being—cannot "be established in a purely ontological manner." (GA 24: 26/19) This is why the formulation of the problem of Being starts as fundamental ontology, formulating and answering the question of the sense of Being of the entity Dasein. The second task (the science of Being) *reflects the phenomenological manner of access* of fundamental ontology. The object or subject matter of the science of Being is ontically given by fundamental ontology as Dasein's *understanding of Being as such*. Properly speaking, Being as such can only be accessed as Dasein's understanding of Being as such. The science of Being is the 'logos' of such understanding. Dasein's understanding of Being as such is the *a priori* of fundamental ontology, for only because it understands Being as such can Dasein understand its own Being. Thus, the science of Being is the phenomenology of the *a priori* of fundamental ontology—it seeks the (sense) of the Being of Dasein's understanding of Being as such; that is, *Zeitlichkeit* as *Temporalität*.

Heidegger only gave one explicit account of the structure of the three moments of phenomenological ontology—fundamental ontology, the science of Being, and the groundwork of metaphysics. This account is given from the standpoint of fundamental ontology, and it can be found in the lecture course dedicated to Leibniz in 1928. Phenomenological ontology "includes: 1) a grounding that exhibits the intrinsic possibility of the question of Being as the basic problem of metaphysics—the interpretation of Dasein as temporality; 2) an explication of the basic problems contained in the question of Being—the temporal exposition of the problem of Being; 3) the development of the self-understanding of this problematic, its task and limits—the overturning [der *Umschlag.*]" (GA 26: 195/154) This threefold structure of phenomenological ontology, though veiled, is operative in 1929, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

In Part Two, I initiate the reconstruction of fundamental ontology in terms of the science of Being, which is the projection of fundamental ontology upon the four problems of Being and the three stages of the phenomenological method, ultimately understood in terms of the *locus philosophiae*.[63] Division One of *Being and Time,* the Analytic of Dasein, constitutes the *reduction* of the Being of Dasein, which results in care and its structures. The analytic or reduction problematizes the ontological difference in Dasein (the ontico-ontological differentiation), showing that Dasein is the entity where the difference takes place—it is the entity that understands Being.[64] The analytic or reduction also

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[63] Von Herrmann considers that it is possible to reconstruct *Being and Time* in terms of reduction, construction, and destruction. My reconstruction does not coincide with his, as it will be clear in what is to come. Cf. Von Herrmann, *Hermeneutik und Reflexion,* op. cit., 152ff. The ground of the disagreement is twofold. Von Herrmann does not take into consideration that Heidegger's four problems of Being problematize Aristotle's four basic senses of Being. Also, his focus on the differences between Husserl and Heidegger obstacles the view of what I consider to be structural correspondences between the two.

[64] I agree with Sallis when he claims that, in *Being and Time,* "Heidegger's intention is not merely to identify or determine being in its differentiation from beings… Heidegger's problematic is not structured by two terms and the difference between them but rather by three terms [the third term being the horizon of *Sinn*]

problematizes the articulation of the Being of Dasein, showing that it is not constituted by

a *what* but only by *how* and *who.* The *how* of Dasein's Being are manners of Being,

possibilities for Dasein to be.

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bound together by the possibility of understanding." Sallis, "Cosmic Time", in *Elemental Discourses. The Collected Writings of John Sallis*, Volume II/4 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 145. I add that, from the architectonic standpoint, fundamental ontology formulates the problem of the ontological difference in relation to the science of Being, where the problem of the basic articulation of Being as such is formulated, and can regard the results of fundamental ontology as a whole in its possibility.

PART TWO – THE REDUCTION OF DASEIN

CHAPTER 3 – REDUCTION AS A WHOLE

In this chapter, I interpret the Analytic of Dasein as the reduction of Dasein. This interpretation shows that fundamental ontology formulates the first two problems of Being of the science of Being—the ontological difference and the articulation of Being—in the context of the question of the sense of Dasein's Being. I propose a formal analysis of the mereological structure of the reduction. Through this analysis I exhibit that the reduction of Dasein is constituted by two moments—ontological and existential. The ontological reduction enacts the ontico-ontological differentiation between the entity Dasein and its Being. The existential reduction articulates the Being of Dasein as existence. I argue that this distinction between ontological and existential reductions is grounded on the ontical and ontological distinctiveness of Dasein. A detailed analysis of this grounding relation shows the complex articulation between the two moments of the reduction of Dasein. This articulation has an architectonic value in that it proves the systematicity of phenomenological ontology. The articulation of ontological and existential reductions discloses that the relation between the first two basic problems of Being is such that the ontological difference is doubled in the articulation of Being. Finally, I show that the mode of access to Dasein and its Being is also a moment of the reduction, and that it is grounded on the ontico-ontological distinctiveness of Dasein.

13. The Analytic of Dasein as reduction

What Heidegger calls 'preparatory analytic' in *Being and Time* corresponds to what he identifies as 'reduction' in *Basic Problems*. The first moment of the analytic of Dasein *is* the reduction of Dasein's Being. To show this correspondence, I will first characterize the 'analysis' performed in the analytic of Dasein. Then, I will show that analyzing is an act of understanding. Finally, I will prove that the act of the analytic understanding is a reduction.[65]

To be clear, the reduction leads to the *Being* of Dasein, not to its *sense.* This means that the reduction is performed, strictly speaking, within the 'preparatory' analytic, which "brings out the Being of this entity [Dasein] without Interpreting its sense." (SZ 17/38) The 'repetition' of the analytic is no longer a *reduction* but rather a *construction.*[66] As shown, the *reduction* is a movement away from entity and toward Being. In turn, the *construction* is a movement that brings entity and Being 'back together' guided by the sense of Being. The *construction* of the 'concept of Dasein's Being' takes place in Division Two of Part One of *Being and Time,* and Heidegger refers to it as a repetition of the preparatory analytic.

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[65] For an account of Heidegger's concept of reduction as one of his main adaptations of Husserl's phenomenology, see Dahlstrom, "The Early Heidegger's Phenomenology", in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology,* edited by Dan Zahavi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 216ff. For a comparative account of the Husserlian and Heideggerian concepts of the reduction in the context of an analysis of their approaches to the method of philosophy, see Crowell, *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 72-77. See Sheehan, "Phenomenology Rediviva", in *Philosophy today,* Vol. 60, No. 1 (2016): 223-235. See Hans-Helmuth Gander, "Phänomenologie im Übergang. Zu Heideggers Ausenandersetzung mit Husserl", in *Heidegger un die Anfänge seines Denkens,* Heidegger-Jahrbuch 1, ed. Alfred Denker et.al. (Freiburg: Alber, 2004), 294-306.

[66] See for instance Sallis, "World, Finitude, and Temporality in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger", in *Philosophy today,* Vol. 9, No. 1 (1965): 40-51.

The Analytic of Dasein encompasses two different and coordinated senses of 'analysis', a *reductive* and a *constructive* one.

Heidegger's characterization of the reductive beginning of fundamental ontology as Analytic is directly connected with Kant's concept of a Transcendental Analytic, which is an essential stage of the critique of pure reason in its different uses (motivations, interests, ends.) Kant famously states that "the proud name of an *ontology*… must give way to the more modest one of a mere *analytic* of the pure understanding." (KrV A 245/ B 303) Analogously, Heidegger claims that "fundamental ontology… must be sought in the *existential analytic* of Dasein" (SZ 13/34), and that "the *ontological analytic* of Dasein in general is what makes up fundamental ontology." (SZ 14/35) In a more solemn and conclusive way, Heidegger states that "philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure as an *analytic* of existence." (SZ 38/62; 436/487) In the *Basic Problems,* Heidegger insists in this crucial association, now characterizing the analytic also as 'discipline', a concept which also has Kantian pedigree: "Ontology has for its fundamental *discipline* [*Fundamentaldiszipline*] the analytic of Dasein." (GA 24: 26/19) In 1926-27*,* this connection to Kant is merely pointed out by Heidegger in *Being and Time*.[67] He would later work it out in a phenomenological destruction of the Transcendental Analytic in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.*[68]

Kant uses 'analytic', 'analysis', and their cognates in different ways, and so does Heidegger. In a basic, formal sense, which is valid for both Kant's deductions and Heidegger's reductions, to analyze [ἀνα-λύω*, (re-)solvere*] is to *unbind*, to *release*, to

[67] See also SZ 4/23; 23/45; 37/62; 220/262
[68] See GA 3: 41-42/29; 245-246/172; 279/196; et al.

untangle, and to (*re-*)*solve*.[69] This basic sense of analysis coincides with Heidegger's reduction, although it is certainly not the only sense of analysis. In fact, Heidegger's concept of construction (and Kant's concept of schematism) coincides with another sense of analysis closer to progressing, compounding, and determining. Now, Heidegger's concept of reduction can be understood as the basic mode of analysis. An act of analysis *unbinds* and *releases* in the sense of distinguishing; *untangles* in the sense of regressing to the simple; and *resolves* by maintaining a unity of agreement of analysandum and analysans. Heidegger considers that this mode of analysis is 'preparatory.'

In the analytic of Dasein, the Being of Dasein is *differentiated, articulated,* or *understood* [*unterscheiden, artikulieren, verstehen.*] In the Introduction of *Being and Time,* Heidegger claims that the "Analytic [of Dasein] has the character… of understanding" (SZ 12/33) and later shows how understanding is an act of differentiating and articulating or gathering. [70] It is in *Basic Problems* where Heidegger connects reduction with differentiating and understanding. The reduction is the first stage and structure "of ontological-transcendental *differentiating.*" (GA 24: 27/20) And "phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of an entity […] to the *understanding* [*verstehen*] *of the Being* of this entity (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed.)" (GA 24: 29/21)

The analysis of Dasein's Being is simply the understanding of the Being of Dasein. Dasein's understanding of its own Being entails a structured way of differentiating and

[69] See entries for ἀνα-λύω and rĕ-solvo in LSJ and L&S respectively. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Sir Henry Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940); Charlton T. Lewis, and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879). See also Patrick Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* (Albany: SUNY, 1997), 1-27.
[70] See SZ 148/188ff.

articulating Dasein's ways of Being. In general, to understand is to uncover, to see how an entity *differentiates* itself from, and *relates* to, other entities and to itself, which always involves a relation toward Being. However, Being is always pre-understood in our understanding of entities. To properly and explicitly *understand* the entity's Being, we must exhibit the *differentiation* between Being and the entity, which at the same time means to exhibit its relation or *articulation*.

No matter how numerous and diverse the ways of Being of Dasein, they are not dispersed items, or broken-up pieces that show themselves as concretely independent from each other. Dasein's ways of Being are not extrinsic elements added to Dasein either. The ways in which Dasein exists *constitute* the simple unitary Being of Dasein. This means that the *understanding* of the Being of Dasein, just like the basic sense of analysis, does not compromise the unity of coincidence of what is understood—namely, Dasein and its Being. In analyzing Dasein, the unity of the *analysandum,* of *what undergoes the analysis* (the entity Dasein in its Being), remains intact. In its preparatory stage, the *analytic understanding* is not a destruction nor a construction. The unity of the Being of the entity is just a projection of the unity of the entity in its Being. "What is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon—in other words, to hold its positive phenomenal content secure." (SZ 132/170)

Dasein's understanding can be *ontic* and *ontological. Ontic understanding* uncovers [*entdecken*] entities. This understanding understands the entity in its Being but it does not explicitly *differentiate* entity and Being. Since the entity is understood in its Being, the ontic understanding already pre-understands Being. Indeed, Being is always pre-understood as that which makes possible that an entity appears as itself. Ontic

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understanding is undifferentiated understanding of the entity in its Being. In turn, *ontological understanding*, which develops into *interpretation* [*auslegen*], understands Being explicitly, as *differentiated* from the entity and as *articulated.* Ontological understanding-interpretation *discloses Being* [*erschlissen.*] The particular acts of differentiation and articulation of understanding are *analytic* in character when the understanding understands *Being* (not yet sense.) This is why Dasein's ontic-ontological understanding performs the task of the preparatory analytic, obtaining the Being of Dasein: because to understand is first to analyze, that is, to unbind, release, untangle and resolve the Being of Dasein.[71] This the task of the analytic of Dasein in its starting-point: "How are we, to set our *sights* toward this entity, Dasein, both as something accessible to us and as something to be *understood* and *interpreted*?" (SZ 15/36)

14. The basic moments of the reduction: accessing [*zu-gehen*], leading away [*weg-führen*], leading back [*zurück-führen*]

I have provided a basic and general characterization of the act of analysis as an act of distinguishing, simplifying, and articulating in a way in which the unity or agreement between the analysans and analysandum is maintained. Then I have shown that the analytic of Dasein consists in the act of understanding the Being of Dasein. The analytic-

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[71] Cf. SZ 13/33; 15/35; 21/43; 58/85; 72/102; 182/227; 201/247; 213/156ff.; 240/284; 312/370; 375/427; et al. It must be noted that Dasein's ontic understanding of itself is always already—pre-ontological. And this is not in the sense that to any ontic self-understanding of Dasein there is a pre-understanding. Rather, it means that the difference between ontic and ontological in Dasein is not commensurable with this difference as it happens in other entities. Any *ontical* understanding that Dasein has of itself is a *pre-ontological* understanding of its Being.

understanding is carried out by a structure of differentiation and articulation that has the basic character of an analysis. Now I will show how the basic moments of the reduction better show the agreement between analysis of Being and understanding of Being, confirming the inner connections between understanding, reduction, and analysis; that is, the reductive character of Heidegger's provisional analytic of Dasein.

In the *Basic Problems* of 1927, Heidegger distinguishes without accentuating, three different determinations that define the *reduction*. "Ontological investigation always *accesses* at first and necessarily some entity, but then, in a precise way, it is *led away from that entity and led back to the Being of that entity*." (GA 24: 28-29/21)[72] The moments are distinguished by means of spatial-kinetical determinations of two kinds of movements: accessing (approaching), leading-*away*, and leading-*back* (withdrawing.) The *accessing* [*zugehen*] locates the entity in its Being.[73] The leading-away [*wegführen*] moves away from the entity, and it does so in benefit of a leading-back [*zurückführen*] to the Being of the entity. Where the leading-away determines the movement from its starting-point, the leading-back determines it in regards its destination.

I have presented the understanding of Being, or ontological understanding, as the analytic act of explicitly differentiating and articulating the Being of Dasein. This description, although it served to show the analytic character of understanding, is still undeveloped. The understanding differentiates in two essential manners. These two manners determine the inner structure of the Analytic of Dasein and the twofold character

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[72] Heidegger's text emphasizes the leading away from the entity and back to its Being. In my quote, I add emphasis to the act of *accessing* [*zugehen*] to show its involvement as a moment and its character of whole.
[73] I translate '*auf jmdn. zugehen*' as 'to access' rather than 'to approach', and I nominalize it with the present participle 'accessing' to show its relation to (and to keep it distinct from) 'access', which is how '*Zugang*' has been usually translated into English.

of the reduction. To understand the Being of Dasein is to differentiate Being from Dasein. But to understand the Being of Dasein is also to differentiate Being within itself in an act that emphasizes its different constitutive moments (manners of Being) while articulating them under a new simple unity which constitutes the structured Being. Thus, the understanding of Being *differentiates* Being from the entity Dasein and *differentiates* and *articulates* (structurally) the manners of Being of Dasein's Being.

The definition of the reduction indeed accounts for this inner-diversity of understanding. As I will show, the reduction as the *leading-away* from the entity describes the act of understanding by which Being is *differentiated away* from the entity. The reduction as the *leading-back* to Being describes the act of understanding by which the Being is itself *differentiated-articulated back* to its simplest unity. This distinction between the leading-away and leading-back is not accidental. It confirms the continuity between *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems* of 1927. The leading-away of the reduction enacts the ontological difference, whereas the leading-back obtains the articulation of Being. Fundamental ontology formulates these problems of the science of Being respectively as the ontico-ontological differentiation of Dasein and its Being, and as the existential articulation of Dasein's Being. This projection of fundamental ontology onto the science of Being illuminates the formulation of the problem of Being.

Do the different moments of the reductive sense of 'analysis' (*unbinding, releasing, untangling, resolving*) apply univocally to the understanding that *differentiates away* Being and to the understanding that *differentiates-articulates back* Being?

15. The structure of the reduction: leading away as *ontological reduction* and leading back as *existential reduction*

As shown, the preparatory analytic of Dasein is a reduction, thus a clarification of the reduction will at the same time clarify the analytic. The reduction is an *accessing* that *leads away* from the entity and *leads back* to the entity's Being. How exactly do the moments of the reduction—accessing, leading-away, leading-back—structure the whole of the reduction?

Heidegger characterizes the reduction as a whole as the *access* to entity and Being, precisely in alignment with the thesis that reduction is the first stage of the science of Being— "ontological investigation always *accesses…* some entity… and the Being of that entity." (GA 24: 28-29/21) The *accessing* has an *ontic* character, because what it accesses is "at first and necessarily some entity." However, the *accessing* has an *ontological* character too, for it ultimately accesses the Being of the entity. Since the reduction is the act that moves from the entity to its Being, it can be stated that 'accessing' characterizes the whole of the reduction from its beginning and through its end, and shows its ontico-ontological order of proceeding. To get to Being, one must begin with the entity. The more accessed the Being, the more reduced the Being from the entity, and the more differentiated Being from entity.

If the reduction is an *accessing* [*zugehen*], then it is a movement. And one can characterize a movement by inspecting how it is directed or guided [*führen.*] The *leading-away* [*weg-führen*] and *leading-back* [*zurück-führen*] characterize how the movement is directed. Thus, the two moments of *leading-away* and *leading-back* can be understood as

belonging to the whole of *accessing*. To reduce is to access (the Being of an entity), and to access is to withdraw by leading away (from the entity) and leading back (to Being.) *Leading-away* and *leading-back* are moments of the whole of accessing in that they refer to two aspects of the same movement; the movement from entity toward Being. 'Away' and 'back' both characterize the *leading*, but 'away' involves the entity, whereas 'back' is relative to Being. Thinking the reduction as a movement, the 'away-from' characterizes the movement from the standpoint of its starting-point, whereas 'back' does it from the standpoint of its destination. Leading-away and leading-back do not present themselves as asymmetrically dependent on each other, but rather as equiprimordial moments of the whole of the reduction.

The distinction between *leading-away* and *leading-back* is not trivial. It corresponds to the two fundamental sets of determinations of the Analytic of Dasein: ontico-ontological, and existential-existentiell. These two sets of determinations organize the course of the analytic of Dasein. They characterize the reduction, which moves toward their ontological and existential determinations. The leading-away leads to the ontological, and the leading-back leads to the existential. Accordingly, the reduction of Dasein's Being is structured in two fundamental moments: an *ontological reduction* and an *existential reduction*.

The ontological and existential reductions are the two basic ways in which the Being of Dasein is reduced or accessed. They are not two separate reductions, but the two aspects or moments of the same reduction of Dasein's Being. The two moments concretely concur in the disclosive understanding of the Being of Dasein, but considered analytically, they undergo independent variations. The Being of Dasein is fully reduced only by the

concrete occurrence of the ontological and existential reductions. However, taken in their mutual independence, they can be *abstracted* as two different reductions. Abstracting the two moments from the whole is crucial to fully disclose the structure of fundamental ontology. This means that the moments must be treated in their independence, as wholes themselves.

The preparatory analytic of Dasein is to be understood as a reduction, and the reduction is to be understood both as ontological and existential in character. What is the ground of the difference between the ontological and the existential reductions? How do they articulate the basic ontico-ontological and existentiell-existential determinations of the analytic? Crucial passages at the beginning of *Being and Time* provide answers to these questions, aligning with the textual evidence already supplied, and allowing for a further analysis of the analytic as a reduction from both an ontological and an existential perspective.

16. Ontico-ontological differentiation [*Unterschied*] and ontological difference [*Differenz*]

The reduction is the first stage and structure of *ontological-transcendental differentiation* [*unterscheiden*] pointed out in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. The reduction or preparatory analytic ends when the *Being* of Dasein is *differentiated*. Put simply, the reduction is the *differentiation* between the entity Dasein and its Being. The

reduction of Dasein's Being is the fundamental-ontological instance of the *ontological difference.*

The ontological difference [*die ontologische Differenz*] constitutes one of the basic problems of the science of Being. The term 'ontological difference' does not *exclusively* refer to the difference between the *entity* Dasein and the *Being* of the entity Dasein. Rather, it refers to the difference between entity and Being as such. The differentiation between Dasein and its Being is a distinctive, fundamental instance of the ontological difference. This explains why Heidegger uses the term 'ontological difference' for the first time in the second part of the *Basic Problems* in 1927, in the context of the transition or passage [*Überleitung*] toward the science of Being.[74]

That Heidegger did not use the term 'ontological difference' until the phenomenon was clarified *as* a basic problem of the science of Being does not mean that the phenomenon was absent from Heidegger's inquiry. Contrary to this, the ontological difference is constantly kept in view from the beginning of the project of fundamental ontology.

In the context of fundamental ontology, the ontological difference is at work in the distinction between the *entity* Dasein and the *Being* of the entity Dasein. Though Heidegger keeps these considerations implicit, he indirectly thematizes them when discussing the distinction between the *ontical*, the *ontological* and the *ontico-ontological.* Moreover, the second basic problem of Being—the articulation of Being—is also at work in *Being and Time.* Analogously to the ontological difference, the articulation of Being first appears as the articulation of the Being of Dasein. The articulation of Being first appears as the distinction between existentiell and existential, and also between the authentic and

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[74] See GA 24: 20/15

inauthentic. The articulation of Being constitutes the second problem of the first reductive stage of fundamental ontology (a differentiating, in this case, interior to the Being of Dasein.) With the ontological reduction of Dasein, we first access the ontological difference as a problem; and with the existential reduction, we first access the articulation of Being as a problem.

I will refer to the difference between the entity Dasein and the Being of Dasein as the *ontico-ontological differentiation* [*die ontisch-ontologische Unterschied.*] This way I can stress its difference from the 'ontological difference.' [75] The ontico-ontological distinction points out to the phenomenon of the ontological difference, but it does so in the context of the reduction of Dasein's Being, that is, prior to ontology as the science of Being.

If the reduction as a whole exhibits the ontological difference under the figure of the ontico-ontological differentiation, and the reduction is twofold, then the ontico-ontological differentiation must also be twofold, or be repeated, self-differentiated. This twofold character of the ontico-ontological differentiation mirrors the twofold character of the understanding—the understanding differentiates, and it also differentiates (in a different sense) and articulates. How does the ontico-ontological differentiation account for the difference between ontological and existential reductions?

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[75] It is the difference betweenn '*Unterschied'* (for the difference between the entity Dasein and its Being) and '*Differenz'* (for the ontological difference as such.) As I will show, in *Being and Time* Heidegger also uses '*Auszeichnung*'—the ontical and ontological *distinctiveness*, or *distinctive character* of Dasein.

17. The twofold character of the reduction as grounded on the ontical and the ontological *distinctiveness* [*Auszeichnung*] of Dasein

The difference between the ontological and existential reductions is not only to be grasped in terms of the *formal moments of reduction in general,* that is, as the difference between *leading-away* and *leading-back.* It must also be grasped in relation to the *contents* of both reductions. The content of the reduction is the differentiation between Dasein and its Being. The *ontico-ontological differentiation* must account for both moments of the reduction.[76]

Heidegger implicitly exhibits the twofold character of the ontico-ontological differentiation when arguing, in the Introduction to *Being and Time,* for the *ontical* and *ontological priority* [*Vorrang*], and *distinctive character* [*Auszeichnung*] of Dasein. Dasein is *ontically* prior and distinctive from other entities. And Dasein's Being is *ontologically* prior and distinctive from the Being of any other entities. *Distinction* and *differentiation* do not overlap. The *distinctiveness* is said of each of the two relata (the entity Dasein and its Being) of the *differentiation*. The *ontical distinctiveness* distinguishes the entity Dasein from other entities; it is a difference said of entities. The *ontological distinctiveness* distinguishes the Being of Dasein from the Being of other entities; it is a difference said of Being.

The priority, or distinctiveness of Dasein and its Being appears in the context of the discussion of the priority of the question of Being. The question of Being is prior to any

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[76] For the association between the reduction and the ontico-ontological differentiation, see also See Jean-François Courtine, "L'idée de la phénoménologie et la problématique de la réduction", in *Phénoménologie et métaphysique,* ed Jean-Luc Marion and Guy Planty-Bonjour (Paris: PUF, 1984).

other question, inquiry, and science.[77] However, Being is always the Being of an entity, and the question of Being must first be expressed as the question of the Being of an entity. Dasein is the entity who has priority. The question of the Being of the entity Dasein is prior to the question of the Being of any other entity.[78] And *this priority springs from the distinctiveness of Dasein* itself. Dasein is *prior* in that it grants access to Being in general. Fundamental ontology must *begin with* Dasein. But Dasein's priority is double—*ontical and ontological*—just like the priority of the question of Being. The priority of Dasein shows itself through the *distinctiveness* [*Auszeichnung*] of Dasein. 'Distinctive here means 'eminent' or 'prominent,' as what stands out from the rest. Dasein is *distinctive* among any other entities (*ontically distinctive* or *prior*); and the Being of Dasein is *distinctive* among the Being of other entities (*ontologically distinctive* or *prior.*)

18. Ontical distinctiveness and ontological reduction

"Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities…" Dasein is *ontically distinctive* and *prior* to any other entity in that "in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it [*in seinem Sein* um *dieses Sein selbst* geht.]" (SZ 12/32)

That Being is an issue for Dasein [*es geht um…*] means, more simply that, different from other entities, Dasein has something to do with Being, Dasein has a *relationship to Being* [*Verhältnis zu Sein.*] Dasein is the only entity that, in *relating* to entities (itself included), it *relates to the entities' Being.* The entity Dasein *is* fundamentally this *relating*

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[77] See SZ §3; "Ontological priority of the question of Being."
[78] See SZ §4; "Ontical priority of the question of Being."

itself, that constantly always directs itself toward entities in their Being. When Dasein handles entities, when it talks about them, manipulates them, enjoys them… in all and any relations to entities, Dasein takes them as being, and as being this or that; Dasein *relates to their Being*. Dasein differs from other entities in this *ontological relatedness.* In Heidegger's words: "Dasein is *ontically distinctive* [or distinctive among entities] in that *it is ontological.*" (SZ 12/32)

Dasein's relationship to Being [*Verhältnis zu Sein*] "is itself *of Being,*" it is a Being-relationship to Being [*Seinsverhältnis zu Sein.*] (SZ 12/32) This means that any ontical determination of Dasein (any way in which the relating that Dasein is happens) remits to its ontological character. Anything that Dasein is and does belongs to its Being. Thus, nothing in Dasein is just ontical, but always ontological. What is ontical in Dasein is just what is not yet taken ontologically in Dasein. In other words, ontical determinations of Dasein are just *pre-ontological*.

But, if any and all ontical determination associated with Dasein, if anything that happens to Dasein, or is relatable to Dasein in any sense, immediately *belongs to Dasein's Being...* does this not affect precisely the traditional distinction between *what is according to what happens* (or what is *incidentally*) and *what is according to itself*? This traditional distinction is, according to Aristotle, one of the main senses of Being, or even the first and originary sense—"τὸ ὂν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτό." (Met. 5.1017a) Anything that happens to Dasein can be taken according to itself, reflected back to the entity's Being. Dasein is the relating toward entities in their Being because it *relates to itself* in that manner. But in reflecting upon itself, it encounters an *ontically distinctive* relation between entity and Being—for anything ontical of Dasein is ontological, precisely

because any instance of the relating does it in a way that it lets the difference between entity and Being happen. Dasein is the entity for whom it is impossible not to be taken 'as such.' *Nothing ontical in Dasein is incidental*. Nothing is unbonded, everything that happens to, or is done by Dasein belongs to itself, in its Being. Dasein *is* this reflectedness [καθ᾽αὐτό]; the paradigmatic *entity as entity, entity as such*. Thus, Dasein has the most preeminent relation to Being as what determines entities *as entities*. Dasein's ontical distinctiveness provides a ground *upon which* the Aristotelian distinction can take place, and *under which* what is distinguished in this distinction come together.

Dasein's *relationship* to Being, in which the *ontical distinctiveness* of Dasein lies, can be characterized as *understanding*. Dasein relates to entities (including itself) by understanding them in their Being—in any handling, talk, manipulation, enjoyment… there is an understanding of Being. Understanding is the act of differentiating (and gathering) proper to the reduction. To understand Being is to reduce Being from entity. Consequently, to understand is to *let* the ontological difference between entity and Being happen, including, in an eminent or prominent (prior) manner, the differentiation between Dasein and its Being. In Dasein's relations to entities it is always present an understanding of Being, a simple differentiation that distributes between Being and entity, although the understanding can be more or less accomplished, vague, average, or even veiled, hidden, or forgotten.

Dasein is ontically distinct in that Dasein is the only entity that relates *to Being, that understands Being, that differentiates Being from entity*. This *relatedness* can be thematized through *their relata* (worldly entity-Dasein's self) or *as such*. The *ontological reduction* reduces this *relatedness* that characterizes the *ontical distinctiveness* of Dasein.

The *ontological reduction* is the reduction that *leads* this *relation away* from their relata toward the *relatedness of the relation as such.* The *ontological reduction* moves from the relation to Being as an ontical (always pre-ontological) affair [*Verhältnis zum Sein*] to the *Being-relation* to *Being* [*Seinsverhältnis zum Sein.*]

19. Ontological distinctiveness and existential reduction

Dasein's ontical distinctiveness (priority), which makes it unique among other entities, immediately points toward its Being, for it means that anything that Dasein is belongs to its Being. Dasein's ontical distinctiveness means that Dasein's entity can never be regarded just ontically, merely as an entity or as Being. No matter how or who Dasein *is* (what it does), whatever it is, it always remits to Being—to the Being of other entities and to its own Being. This *remission* or *Being-relationship* characterizes the *entity Dasein ontically* as *being ontological.* Because of this, Dasein's ontological distinctiveness and Dasein's ontical distinctiveness are intimately connected. Different from the ontical distinctiveness, the *ontological distinctiveness* of Dasein is what makes Dasein's Being distinctive among any other entity's Being. It is important to note, however, that we are remitted to the ontological distinctiveness by means of the ontical distinctiveness; by means of the fact that Being is an *issue* for the entity Dasein (it relates to Being); by means of Dasein's ontical Being-ontological.

Dasein is *ontologically distinctive* (and thus *prior*) in that Dasein's Being is Dasein's own *existence.* "Dasein is 'ontological' in virtue of being determined by its own

existence" [*Dasein ist auf dem Grunde seiner Existenzbestimmtheit an im selbst "ontologisch."*] (SZ 13/34) This means that the Being of Dasein *is* the way in which the entity Dasein exists, the way in which Dasein *ontically is*. To be clear, Dasein's Being-relationship with Being [*Seinsverhältnis zu Sein*] characterizes Dasein as an entity. Thus, the ontical distinctiveness shows *that Being is always an issue* for the entity Dasein… In contrast, the *ontological distinctiveness*, *existence,* characterizes Being itself. Different from the ontical, the ontological distinctiveness *characterizes the issue* that Dasein's Being is for Dasein—the issue of existing. The ontological distinctiveness grounds the *existential reduction* of Dasein's Being.

The connection between ontical and ontological distinctiveness must be fully clarified. These determinations ground the twofold character of the reduction, exposing in a definitive manner why phenomenological ontology finds its starting point in fundamental ontology. The ontical and ontological distinctiveness are *different* from each other in that, in characterizing the same ontico-ontological differentiation between Dasein and its Being; the ontical distinctiveness takes the standpoint of the entity, while the ontological distinctiveness takes the standpoint of Being. Now, the difference between entity and Being does not take place in Dasein as it does for the rest of entities. This is precisely what makes Dasein ontically distinctive and prior. Dasein's ontical dissolution of the differentiation between the entity Dasein and its Being is repeated or reflected ontologically. Dasein's Being is its existence. It does not 'have an essence' from where we can distribute its possibilities and actualizations. Whatever Dasein is and does belongs in its Being and is up to Dasein. Since existence characterizes Dasein's Being it also characterizes the Being-

relation that Dasein has with Being. In other words: the ontological distinctiveness remits back to the ontical distinctiveness, by inscribing it within Being, making it interior to itself.

'Existence' is "the Being itself toward which Dasein can *comport* itself in *one way or another*, and *always* does *comport* itself somehow." (SZ 12/32) The *relationship* [*Verhältnis*] is ontologically a *comportment* [*Verhalten.*] Dasein's Being or existence is a manifold of comportments ("one way or another"), so it involves a *differentiation.* The comportments, however, are constant ("always")*,* so an *articulation* of the diversity is possible. The existential reduction differentiates and articulates the Being of Dasein as existence.

The existential reduction does differentiate Being from entity but not in the manner of the ontological reduction. Rather it reinscribes or repeats such differentiation as a differentiation-articulation within Being. This is because the ontological reduction in fact 'includes' the ontical in the sense of the pre-ontological. Because the ontical determinations of Dasein are always pre-ontological, the existential reduction operates throughout the entire ontological reduction, and not with its results. In other words, the existential reduction takes place both ontically-pre-ontologically and ontologically. Dasein comports toward its own Being *both through the relata of the relationship and in itself;* both reflectively and unreflectively. The existential reduction operates *within Dasein's Being*, that is, it starts the articulation of Dasein's Being.

Dasein's *comportment* to its own Being, in which the *existence* of Dasein lays, can also be characterized as *understanding.* Dasein comports toward its own Being by understanding itself. As I have shown, to understand is to reduce, in the sense of differentiating and articulating Being. In differentiating its own Being, Dasein understands

a manifold of *possible manners of Being* [*Seinsarten*]; possible manners for Dasein to be this or that. "Dasein *always* understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself… Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold [*Egreifen*] or by neglecting [*Versäumen*] [decides to be itself or not itself.]" (SZ 12/33) It is relevant to underline the difference between '*always*' [*immer*] and the '*particular*' [*jeweilig.*] Dasein's *existential reduction* accesses or understands Being by differentiating and articulating the fundamental manners of Being, the existential comportments of which any Dasein is *always* capable. But the manners in which Dasein always is do not suffice to articulate the whole of Dasein's Being. The particular Dasein always decides or determines its existence by taking hold of it or by neglecting itself, which is described in an *existential construction* in Division Two of Part One of *Being and Time*.

The existential reduction differentiates, within Dasein's Being, the possibilities or manners of Being [*Seinsarten*] through which *any* Dasein *always* exists from this or that possibility. Thus, the existential reduction is the differentiation and articulation of the fundamental, primordial possibilities that are *always possible* for *any* Dasein. In accessing what is always possible for any Dasein, the existential reduction thematizes Dasein's possibilities *as possibilities*. The expression 'possibilities as possibilities' refers to possibilities taken only in the form of the possible. The expression refers to *the* possibilities which *are themselves the empty form or structure of the possible* for other possibilities. These formal or empty possibilities are fully *structurally* differentiated and articulated. The existential reduction moves from entity to Being, and accesses these 'existential structures', *existentialia,* the *existential* manners of Being of Dasein that articulate the structure of its Being [*Seinsstruktur.*]

The existential reduction obtains the structural, formal possibilities by which any Dasein always exists. But existence is not only the formal possibilities by which Dasein "always comports itself" toward its own Being. Existence is determined by existing, Dasein in each case is mine, it "decides its existence" by owning or disowning itself, encountering itself (making itself present to itself) or losing itself. The possibilities by which the particular Dasein decides to be or not to be itself are possibilities as owned or disowned; they are not existential, empty undifferentiated manners of Being, but rather *existentiell modes of Being* [*Seinsmodi*], fulfilling modifications through which *each* Dasein exists as one's own. This is no longer a task for the reductive analytic, but for the *constructive analytic*. The construction, after reductively projecting Being from entity, now projects entity toward its Being; that is, it brings back entity to Being (guided by sense.) The *constructive modification* is the mode by which *each* particular Dasein 'fulfills' (or not) itself, deciding its own possibilities, determining its *own* existence from the empty possibilities that all Daseine always already have.

Within *Dasein's Being,* the *extistential reduction* differentiates and articulates the manners of Being of *any* Dasein, and not the modes of Being that are possible for *each* Dasein. In this sense, the existential reduction repeats the traditional distinction between *energeia, dunamis,* and *entelecheia*; between *what is at-work* (act), *what is in potency,* and *what is at-work-staying-itself-to-its-fullness* (entelechy.) This traditional distinction is also an ontological one, and according to Aristotle, one of the main ways in which we can refer to that which is—"τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ" (Met. 6.1026a); "ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ μὲν δυνάμει ῥητὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων." (Met. 5.1017b) Dasein's

ontological distinctiveness provides the articulation through which these ways of Being [*Seinsweisen*] stay distinct but *also* come together.

The existential reduction moves *back* to 'what' (or rather to 'whom') any Dasein always already could be, and *away* from this or that possibility that this or that Dasein happens to be. Only in reference or in contrast to what is *existentially reduced* can then *any particular* Dasein come back to itself or flee from itself; find or forget itself; win or lose itself; be itself or not be itself; own its Being or disown it. The existential reduction distributes the ontico-ontological differentiation from the side of Being, and indeed, begins to *articulates the Being of Dasein.*

Dasein is ontologically distinctive in that Dasein's Being is its own existence, that is: all Daseine understands their own Being through possibilities. The *existential reduction* is executed both ontically-pre-ontologically and ontologically, coordinated but independently form the ontological reduction, as they are two moments of the same whole of the reduction. The Being of Dasein is only disclosed if both of the *two moments of the reduction*—ontological and existential—are fully accomplished. For the reductions to be accomplished, Dasein must ask the question of its own Being. A questioning which does not ultimately seek an answer to the question 'who am I?' but rather seeks to disclose *how* and *why* this question is possible in the first place.

20. The reductive self-distinguishing of the ontico-ontological differentiation as the articulation of Being

The aim of the reductions in the Analytic of Dasein is to disclose or understand Dasein's Being. The explicit reason why Heidegger argues for the ontical and ontological distinctiveness of Dasein is to show why the question of Being in general must begin, as a fundamental ontology, with the question of Dasein's Being. What Heidegger describes in those passages is crucial to understanding the whole of the preparatory analytic as reduction—and also as construction. The ontological and existential reductions are the two moments of the *differentiation of Dasein's Being* (the *ontico-ontological differentiation.*) Thus, the ontical and ontological distinctiveness are meant to show how the ontico-ontological differentiation *differentiates itself on the side of the entity, and on the side of Being.* This self-differentiation grounds the twofold character of the reduction. In terms of the science of Being, this means that the ontological difference and the articulation of Being are themselves moments of a whole.

I have shown how the *ontical* distinctiveness remits Dasein toward its Being. Dasein is ontically, as an entity, a *relation to Being.* Now, Dasein's *ontological* distinctiveness articulates Dasein's Being by pointing back to the entity, to the comportments that constitute Dasein's existence. Ontical and ontological distinctiveness [*Auszeichnungen*] differentiate the ontico-ontological differentiations [*Unterscheidungen.*] Due to the ontical distinctiveness, the ontological reduction exhibits the *reflective* character of the ontico-ontological differentiation, from Dasein to Being. Due to the ontological distinction, the existential reduction exhibits the *asymmetry* between empty manners of

Being and fulfilling modes of Being. Ontical distinctiveness means that Dasein remits to Being [*Seinsverhältnis*]; ontological distinctiveness means that the existence of Dasein remits to Dasein's comportments [*Existenzbestimmtheit, Verhalten.*]

The mutual remission of ontical and ontological distinctiveness provokes a doubling or self-distinguishing of the ontico-ontological differentiation. First, according to the ontical distinctiveness, Dasein does not relate to other entities and to itself ontically, but always ontologically. This means that anything ontical in Dasein is pre-ontological. When Dasein understands itself through its relating to other entities (wordly entities, self), it pre-ontologically understands its Being. Then, the reflective segregation of the ontical side of the ontico-ontological differentiation is 'transposed' to the ontological distinctiveness of Dasein's Being. The ontological distinctiveness, in turn, discloses the asymmetry of the ontico-ontological differentiation within Being—articulating the Being of Dasein by segregating the possibilities that can structure any possibility. The ontico-ontological differentiation between Dasein and its Being *doubles itself* into the articulation of the Being of Dasein.

The doubling of the ontico-ontological differentiation is expressed in the twofold character of the reduction. By means of the *ontological* reduction Dasein leads itself *away* from itself as entity. But any determination of the entity Dasein is ontological; that is, Dasein's ontical distinctiveness is that it is ontological. By means of the existential reduction Dasein leads itself *back* to its Being. But the Being of Dasein is its existence, its comportments. From the point of view of Dasein's Being, Dasein's Being is not distinct from Dasein's ontical affairs and comportments. The existential reduction opens up the articulation of the Being of Dasein, securing the possibility, within Dasein's Being itself,

of a return to the entity Dasein itself from its own Being. The full articulation of the Being of Dasein *is* the articulation (fixation) of the ontico-ontological differentiation by means of the sense of its Being. However, this is no longer a matter of reduction, but of construction—in the *sense* of the Being of Dasein, the ontico-ontological differentiation is fixated.

So how exactly is Dasein's Being differentiated from Dasein (ontological reduction), and how is the Being of Dasein articulated (existential reduction)? I have shown that the two reductions are connected to the formal moments (*away* and *back*) of the whole of the phenomenological method of reduction. From the ontological standpoint, I have shown that the two reductions are connected with the ontical and ontological distinctiveness of Dasein and its Being, with the ontico-ontological differentiation, and ultimately with the ontological difference and the articulation of Being as such, understood as problems of the science of Being.

The ontical distinctiveness of Dasein—that Dasein always relates to entities in their Being—makes possible the ontological reduction, which moves away from the ontical-pre-ontological relata of the relation (worldly entities, self) back to the *center of the relation as such* (ontological.) The ontological reduction moves away from yonder and here, and back there [*Da.*] In this sense, the ontical distinctiveness of Dasein grounds the ontological reduction of the ontico-ontological differentiation of Dasein and its Being (ontological difference.) In contrast, the ontological distinctiveness re-inscribes the differentiation within Being, which in turn refers back to the entity in its existential articulation. The ontological distinctiveness—the fact that Dasein's Being is determined by its existence—makes possible the existential reduction by differentiating and articulating existential

manners of Being [*Seinsarten*] back to the structure of Being [*Seinsstruktur*] so that it can be constructively fulfilled by existentiell modifications. In this sense, the ontological distinctiveness grounds the existential reduction of the structure of Dasein's existence*;* the reductive moment of the articulation of Being. *The difference between ontical and ontological distinctiveness grounds the difference between ontological and existential reductions*.

21. Average everydayness as the manner of access [*Zugangsart*] of the analytic-reduction

The ontological reduction distinguishes between ontical-pre-ontological and ontological, that is, it performs the ontico-ontological differentiation between Dasein and its Being. The existential reduction, in turn, distinguishes between existentiell and existential, that is, reductively articulates the existential. These two basic formal theses say something about the content of the reductions, about their *what*. But what about the *how* of the reductions? In what sense are they a leading-*away* and a leading-*back*?

The reduction is characterized by Heidegger as the access or accessing [*zugehen, Zugang*] that first encounters an entity (Dasein) but then is led *away* from it, *back* to its Being. "Thus, an analytic [or reduction] of Dasein must remain our first requirement in the question of Being. But in that case the problem of obtaining and securing the manner of access [*Zugangsart*]… becomes even a more burning one. To put it negatively, we have no right to resort to *dogmatic constructions* [*konstruktiv-dogmatisch*] and to apply just any

idea of Being to this entity." (SZ 16/37) Fundamental ontology must first lay out the differentiation between entity and Being, and not *construct* onto the given concept of such Being. Phenomenological construction*,* as the second stage of phenomenological ontology, can only take place on the basis of what is reduced in the reduction. The reduction is first, and the first task within the reduction is to obtain and secure the access to the entity and its Being. "How are we… to set ourselves toward this entity, Dasein, something accessible [*zugänglich*] to us?" (SZ 15/36)

According to Heidegger, "we must choose such a manner of access that this entity can show itself *in* itself and *from* itself. And this means… in its *average everydayness* [*durchschnittliche Altäglichkeit.*]" (SZ 16/37) Heidegger presents the concept of 'average everydayness' for the first time in paragraph 5*,* which constitutes the first part of the second or phenomenological introduction, and subsequently starts with a discussion on the point of departure and manner of access.

In paragraph 5, *average everydayness* is defined as the manner [*Art*] in which Dasein is *initially* or *closest* to itself [*zunächst*] and *for the most part* [*zumeist.*] Average everydayness is the manner in which Dasein presents itself to begin with, or initially, and regularly, in most cases, or most times. Heidegger's initial explanation of how the concepts of 'closest' and 'for the most part' determine average everydayness is vague, and unclear until the construction of the Being of Dasein obtains the "ontological-existential sense" of average everydayness. In paragraph 71, after completing the Interpretation of the Being of Dasein as temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*], Heidegger offers a brief note on these two concepts. *'Closest'* "signifies the way [*Weise*] in which Dasein is 'manifest' or 'open' in the with-one-another of publicness [*im Miteinander der Öffentlichkeit* 'offenbar' ist."] 'For the most

part,' in turn, "signifies the way [*Weise*] in which Dasein shows itself for Everyone [*Jedermann*], not always, but 'as a rule' [*in der Regel.*]" (SZ 371/422)

I take *closest* and *for the most part* to constitute the two ways or moments [*Weisen*] constituting *average everydayness,* which in turn is a manner of Being [*Seinsart*] of Dasein, particularly, the manner of access [*Zugangsart*] proper to the reduction-analytic that Dasein performs on itself. As I will show in the next chapter, 'closest' or 'initially' characterizes the ontological reduction, the accessing that leads away; whereas 'for the most part' characterizes the existential reduction, the accessing that leads back.

*

In this chapter, I have reconstructed the Analytic of Dasein as the reduction of Dasein in a projection of fundamental ontology upon the science of Being. First, I have exhibited the coincidence between analytic and reduction through the relation between Dasein's *understanding* and the *ontico-ontological differentiation*—i.e., the difference between the entity Dasein and its Being, which is the fundamental instance of the ontological difference. Then I have analyzed the whole of the reduction into the moments of *leading-away* and *leading-back*. Taken independently (*analytically, in abstracto*), these two moments constitute *two reductions*. The leading-away corresponds to an *ontological reduction,* and the leading-back to an *existential reduction*. The ontological reduction unfolds the ontico-ontological differentiation between the entity Dasein and its Being. The existential reduction discloses the first of the two moments of the articulation of the Being of Dasein (the existentiality of existence.)

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I have shown that ontico-ontological differentiation and the articulation of the Being of Dasein are the fundamental-ontological instances of the first two main problems of the science of Being: ontological difference and basic articulation of Being. Now, the whole of the reduction *is not* the conjunction or addition of the ontological and the existential reductions. The two reductions are moments of a whole; aspects that vary independently from each other, but that present themselves concretely *as one*. The ground of the distinction between the two reductions is implicitly provided by Heidegger when elaborating the difference between the *ontical* and *ontological distinctiveness* of Dasein: the ontical distinctiveness points to the ontological reduction; the ontological distinctiveness points to the existential reduction. The discussion concerning the *reflective* and *asymmetric* character of the ontico-ontological distinctiveness of Dasein have shown that the ontico-ontological differentiation between Dasein and its Being distinguishes itself into (or unfolds as) the articulation of the Being of Dasein; the latter repeats, develops the former by reinscribing the distinction within Being itself. The existential reduction opens up the articulation of Dasein's Being, which would be completed (fulfilled) in the stage of (authentic) *construction*.

Confirmation that the analysis is a reduction will be progressively given while showing how the two reductions distribute basic distinctions in fundamental ontology: the ontological reduction distinguishes the *ontological* from the *ontical and pre-ontological*; the existential reduction distinguishes the *existential* from the *existentiell*. The two reductions are also consistent with Heidegger's description of the manner of access [*Zugangsart*] of the Analytic—average everydayness. *Average everydayness*, which is the whole of the starting-point of the analytic-reduction, has a 'spatial' moment and a

'temporal' moment: what is *closest* and what is *for the most part*. I show that the

ontological reduction, or leading-away, is the movement that starts from what is closest

and ends in what is *farthest*—i.e., the Being of Dasein as such. I also show that the

existential reduction, or leading-back, aims to move from what is for the most part to what

always is—i.e., the structure of Dasein's existence. In Chapter 4, I interpret the Analytic

of Dasein as the *ontological* reduction.

CHAPTER 4 – ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION

In this chapter, I reconstruct the *ontological reduction* in the Analytic of Dasein, as it provides access to the Being of Dasein by disclosing its *ontico-ontological differentiation*. The reconstruction depends upon the interpretation of the analytic as reduction and the ontico-ontological differentiation as the ontological difference. First I offer a synopsis of the role of the ontological reduction in Division One of Part One of *Being and Time.* I exhibit then the basic components (*what*) of the ontological reduction—ontical-preontological and ontological Being of Dasein—and its differentiating (*how*) as a leading away that centers Dasein in its *there* and maintains a unity of coincidence between entity and Being. This leads to a clarification of the manner of access and starting-point of the ontological reduction. The ontological reduction must be interpreted as an act of understanding, when understanding is understood as sight [*Sicht.*] The consideration of ontic understanding as sight shows the pre-ontological dimension of the reduction in circumspection [*Um-sicht*] and consideratedness [*Rück-sicht.*] The main part of this chapter is the reconstruction of the ontological reduction in terms of the three moments of sight—preview [*Vor-blick*], viewpoint [*Hin-blick*], and perspectival view [*Durch-blick*]— that help organize the basic gesture of the ontological reduction as the movement from pre-ontological to ontological; that is, the movement from Being-in-the-world to Being-in; and from Being-in to care (within the horizon of disclosedness.) Finally, the accomplishment of the ontological reduction is exhibited as the transparency [*Durchsichtigkeit*] through

which Dasein sights its own ontological Being in a unity of coincidence with its pre-ontological Being.

22. Preliminary synopsis of the ontological reduction of Dasein's Being

Dasein is Being-in-the-world. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein shows itself as a *unitary* phenomenon. However, at the same time, Being-in-the-world involves a variety of ways of Being. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein also shows itself as an entity which, proximally and for the most part, understands itself as absorbed, yonder in the world, and lost here, in an already given and publicly accessible understanding of itself as the They. These ways of Being of Dasein's Being-in-the-world do not allow Dasein to encounter itself so as to be able to own itself from itself. The standpoint of Being-in, the 'inhood' of Being-in-the-world, however, gives Dasein the opportunity to 'center' its understanding back to itself, and understand the whole of itself by means of a *new unity*.

What characterizes Dasein as a Being-in is that Dasein is its 'there.' This 'there' is where both the 'yonder' of the world and the 'here' of the They take place at once. Thanks to this centering, Dasein discloses itself from its 'there' *as such* which, at the same time, is the *unity* of here and yonder. From the 'there'*,* Dasein encounters itself as thrown in the world having already a mood, looking ahead, understanding, projecting possibilities, and expressing itself in discourse. However, proximally and for the most part, Dasein encounters itself from the 'there', *not as such*, but as the falling unity of yonder and here. In this everyday 'there', Dasein shows itself to itself as falling into the world and the They.

In falling, Dasein misses the opportunity to project its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, inevitably losing itself.

Yet, Dasein is capable of understanding itself as a *more primordial unity,* which is *one* also in relation to the previous two approaches—the unity of the 'there' as such, and the 'there' as here and yonder. Dasein is capable of this unity, thanks to angst. In angst, Dasein is disclosed to itself as the fleeing from itself in which it loses itself. In angst, Dasein is anxious *in the face* of its factical having been thrown as Being-in-the-world, and anxious *about* its Being-in-the-world as its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being. That *in the face of which* Dasein is anxious, and that *about which* Dasein is anxious *coincide.* Angst discloses the *primordial unity* of Dasein's Being and Dasein shows and encounters itself from itself as care. Dasein is the entity that cares, going ahead of itself, having been already in a world, and presenting itself to itself alongside entities within the world.

It is not by chance that the determinations of Dasein's Being I have just presented—Being-in-the-world, Being-in, the 'there', disclosedness, care—are *unities*. The progression of primordial unitary accounts of Dasein's Being is the result of the *ontological reduction*.

23. Basic elements of the ontological reduction: difference and unity of pre-ontological and ontological Being of Dasein

The Being of Dasein is care. In Division One of Part One of *Being and Time,* however, the reader is confronted with an overwhelming array of phenomena standing for Dasein's Being. Almost all the things that are said in this part of the book belong to Dasein's Being. Dasein *is* Being-in-the-world; Dasein *is* its 'there'; Dasein *is* care; Dasein *is* ahead-of-itself-already-in as Being-alongside; Dasein *is* disclosedness.

Of course, care comes up by the end of the reduction, around the concluding passages of the Analytic. Moreover, care appears as that which provides the *emptiest unity* of all determinations of Dasein's Being. Within fundamental ontology, Dasein's Being as such is care. We must clarify that "the unity of the Being of Dasein is care." In order to *clarify* this, it must be shown how, in a precise and unequivocal manner, each and all the ontological determinations of the Being of Dasein are *transparently seen* [*Durchsichtigkeit*]; that is, fully *understood at a glance in its unity* in care. Transparency is the ideal of clarity. To 'clarify', in this sense, is nothing but performing the ontological reduction itself—grasping the Being of an entity at once in its unity.

What Dasein in fact encounters, normally and immediately, is entities (in their Being.) Thus, to secure that the Being of the entity Dasein shows itself *from* and *in* itself, in the manner in which it does so, one must start from the entity. Dasein must be accessed *ontically*. This manner of access from entity to Being is what Heidegger calls 'reduction.' As indicated, to reduce is to distinguish and articulate the Being of an entity. I have called

'ontological reduction' the aspect of the reduction that firstly differentiates the Being of Dasein from the entity Dasein.

The ontological reduction presupposes that Dasein is not just an entity that occurs among other entities. Dasein *is not* in the way in which any other entities *are*. Dasein is *ontically distinctive* from any other entity. Being is an issue for the entity Dasein. In contrast to other entities, the entity Dasein relates toward Being. In relating to entities, including itself, the entity Dasein relates to them in their Being. This means that Dasein is the entity where the ontological difference between entity and Being happens, where this difference takes place. Dasein is always already enacting the ontological difference in relation to any entity that it relates to, and in relation to itself in a primordial manner.

Dasein is ontically distinctive not only in that it *makes* the ontological difference in general *and* as such, but paradigmatically Dasein makes the difference in itself. This depicts the relation between fundamental ontology and the science of Being—it is because Dasein differentiates its own Being that it can formulate the problem of the ontological difference as such on the basis of its own understanding (differentiation) of Being as such. Dasein differentiates its own Being. Dasein ontologically reduces itself. Now, the ontico-ontological differentiation or ontological reduction does not happen in a simple stroke. The reduction differentiates *while* disclosing its own unity. *Proximally,* Dasein performs the ontological difference in a *vague* and *obscure* manner. Only when the difference has been projected upon its own *farthest* limits can Dasein distinctly and clearly (transparently) *see* Being. Dasein's ontological reduction of itself (the Analytic of Dasein) constitutes Dasein's full and thematic performance of the ontico-ontological differentiation upon itself. By means of the ontological reduction, Dasein moves from understanding itself

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ontically to understanding itself ontologically. The complete result of the reduction is in fact the reference to the 'reductive sense' of the Being of Dasein, which is disclosedness. I will clarify this by the end of the chapter.

Because of the ontical distinctiveness of Dasein—by which Dasein relates to Being and differentiates it—any ontical determination of Dasein is ontological in character. Any ontical comportment of Dasein is a relation to Being. Ontically, Dasein is ontological. This is why all ontical determinations of Dasein are in fact also *'pre-ontological.'* The ontical distinctiveness of Dasein highlights the nature of the difference that the ontological reduction of Dasein must exhibit, moving from the pre-ontological to the ontological. At the same time, the ontical distinctiveness also shows that the ontological reduction of Dasein keeps the *unitary* ontological character of Dasein and its Being. The ontological Being of Dasein grasps the multiplicity of the pre-ontological at a glance, as a unity. Now, since the pre-ontological *is ontological,* a further unity must grasp the more primordial unity of pre-ontological and ontological—the unity of disclosedness.

In sum, the basic gesture of the ontological reduction is the differentiation of the Being of Dasein that maintains Dasein and its Being together. The ontological reduction of Dasein's Being is a differentiation that concerns itself with the unity of the entity Dasein, the unity of its Being, and the unity of coincidence of Dasein and its Being—the pre-ontological and the ontological. To distinguish Dasein and its Being is to distinguish the unity of the ontological throughout the manifold of the pre-ontological, and to disclose the unity of the ontological and pre-ontological through the manifold of the ontological.

Being-in-the-world is care. This means that Dasein in its Being is "a *unitary phenomenon* [*einheitliches Phänomen*] … [It] cannot be broken up into contents which

maybe pieced together." (SZ 53/78) The ontological reduction must be guarded "against any disruption or fragmentation of the *unitary phenomenon."* (SZ 131/169) To ontologically reduce Dasein's Being is nothing but *to see* the *whole unity* of Dasein's multiple projected determinations of Being *throughout* [*hindurch*] this manifold itself.

If the ontical and the ontological must coincide, how do they differ? Dasein is understood ontologically when its Being is taken *as such, from itself.* Dasein is taken ontically or pre-ontologically when its Being is encountered as something else, from somewhere else. However, since the 'somewhere else' and 'something else' are still ontological in a preliminary sense, and they cannot compromise the unity of the phenomenon, it follows that what I call the ontological reduction *discloses* the ontological *in and throughout* the pre-ontological.

As stated, the reduction ultimately maintains the unity of *coincidence* between the ontological and pre-ontological Being of Dasein; the difference and unity between the Being that Dasein already always was and will be, and the Being that Dasein tends to be for the most part. This makes the reduction different from the *construction*. The phenomenological construction involves a gathering together, on the one hand, of the unity of the Being that Dasein tends to be and already always was and, on the other hand, of the Being that it can and will become. The Analytic of Dasein does not access Dasein as a 'regional' or dogmatic construction—it does not take Dasein *as* animal, man, person, soul, consciousness, etc. This would obstruct the project of fundamental ontology. As Heidegger puts it, the Being of Dasein "is not to be reached by building up [*zusammenbauen*] out of the elements… under a construction map [*Bauplans.*]" (SZ 182/226) In phenomenological ontology, the construction operates upon the results of the reduction. "To put it negatively,

we have no right to resort to dogmatic constructions [*Konstruktion*] and to apply just any idea of Being and actuality to this entity [Dasein.]" (SZ 16/37) What then is the reductive manner of access Dasein that differentiates the Being from the entity and, at the same time, maintains the co-incidental unity between the two?

24. Manner of access of the ontological reduction: being-closest, everydayness, and primordiality

I have shown that *to reduce* Dasein is *to access* Dasein's Being. I have also shown that, consequently, the *manner* of such accessing [*Zugangsart*] is crucial in determining how the reduction reduces—it is a moment of the mereological constitution of reduction. I have also shown that the manner of access to Dasein's Being is *average everydayness,* and that average everydayness has two moments: *being closest* or *proximally,* and *being for the most part.* The two moments of the reduction (ontological and existential) are structurally associated with the two moments of the manner of access. I will show here how the ontological reduction accesses Dasein's Being by moving *away* from what is *closest,* in its everydayness, toward what is *primordial* [*ursprünglich.*]

Initially, proximally [*zunächst*], Dasein *encounters itself ontically*, as an entity, yonder and here, alongside other entities. And "ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us—even that which is closest [*das nächste*]: we are it… In spite of this, or *rather for just this reason,* it [Dasein] *is ontologically that which is farthest*." (SZ 15/36)[79]

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[79] My emphasis.

Consequently, the ontological reduction is a leading-*away from* the initial and closest *manner of Being* of Dasein; i.e. the manner of Being of average everydayness. The ontological reduction moves away from the *closest* ontical, toward the *farthest* or ontological. What is farthest to the entity Dasein is primordial [*ursprünglich*] to the Being of Dasein. What is primordial is first, not in the sense of the initial point of departure or access, but in the sense of that which Dasein always already was from the beginning and until the end, but is only to be found at its farthest end or limit. What Dasein always already was from the beginning and until its end accounts for what Dasein tends to be.

Nevertheless, Dasein does not only encounters itself initially and proximally as an entity. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is always ontological. In relating to entities, Dasein always relates to Being. Dasein *is itself this relation* toward Being, and must be understood as such. This means that Dasein initially encounters itself *through the relata of the relation that it itself is.* Through this initial access, Dasein encounters Dasein's closest pre-ontological Being-in-the-world. "Dasein is thus interpreted *pre-ontologically* in the way it lies *closest*." (SZ 15/36) The *relata* of the relation are the *world* in which Dasein is, and *Dasein's self* (with Others) as the They. Initially, Dasein understands itself by means of its absorption in the world and in the experience of losing itself in the They. Even when later clarifying the 'there' [*Da*] that Dasein ontologically is, *falling* (into the world of the They) is the unitary phenomenon which lies ontically closest to Dasein.[80]

The ontological reduction operates by first grasping the initial unity of Dasein as the 'Being-relation' that Being-in-the-world is. Then the ontological reduction aims to 'center' Dasein's orientation toward itself, moving *away* from the *relata,* and back to the

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[80] For the characterization of what lies closest to Dasein as Dasein's pre-ontological Being, see also SZ 15/37; 59/85; 65/93; 88/121; 130/168; 167/210; et al.

relation itself. It is to be noted that, by moving away from the relata and back to the relation itself (the *centering*), the relata are not lost. Rather, they are taken *at once,* from a unique standpoint*,* in a simple glance, in their belonging to the whole relation, from the *center in between.* The ontological reduction first consists of disclosing the primordiality of the relation over the relata. The whole relation is more primordial than the relata because it is what makes possible for the relata to be relata of such relation. The relata, which 'take place' yonder in the world and here with the They, are taken now in the 'there' of the relation. This means, also, that they are taken *at once, as a unity,* i.e. as the one relation that Dasein always already is. Because Dasein is primordially the relation as such, it is only through the reduction that Dasein shows its Being *from itself.* Thus, in the ontological reduction Dasein takes itself at once, sees itself as a unity, and shows itself to itself from itself.

'Primordiality' [*ursprünglich*] characterizes the ending-point of the ontological reduction. What is primordial is no longer to be reduced; i.e. the irreducible. Care (as disclosedness) is the *primordial Being* of Dasein, that is, the final result of the ontological reduction; what lies farthest away.[81] "The ontological Interpretation of Dasein as care… lies far from what is accessible to the pre-ontological understanding of Being." (SZ 182/227) Care is primordial because it is the *unity* of the manifold determinations (pre-ontological and ontological) of the whole of Dasein's Being. Given these determinations "there is woven together in them a *primordial* context which makes up the wholeness of the structural whole. In the *unity*… of Dasein's Being, this Being becomes something

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[81] "That which is last in the order of the way things are connected in their foundations ontologically-existentially, is regarded ontically and factically as that which is first and closest to us." (SZ 225/268)

which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically." (SZ 191/235-6) When ontological reduction progresses, it takes a manifold as a whole, or a whole in its unity.[82]

Since the reduction's outcome is a unity, and the analysis of Dasein does not break Dasein into pieces, nor bring anything 'from outside' of Dasein to determine its Being (as in a dogmatic construction), the *farthest, primordial,* and *ontological* must maintain a coincidence with the *closest, pre-ontological* Being of Dasein. The entity Dasein and its Being are not two different phenomena. And the reduction in its *ontological moment* (ontological difference) shows that Dasein is an entity (*one* entity) as such from its own Being.

25. Understanding as sight [*Sicht*] and transparency [*Durchsichtigkeit*]

I have shown how the ontological reduction differentiates, while keeping together, the Being of Dasein and the entity Dasein; the ontical-pre-ontological and the ontological. Furthermore, I have also shown that the manner of access of the ontological reduction is characterized as a movement of seeking what is primordial, from what is initially closest to what is farthest away. Now I will show how the ontological reduction is an act of Dasein's attuned understanding. To understand the Being of Dasein is to ontologically reduce it.

The ontological reduction is an act of Dasein's *understanding* [*Verstehen.*] More precisely, it is an act of Dasein's *sight* [*Sicht.*] Understanding amounts to [*ausmachen*]

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[82] For the ontological as the movement toward primordiality, where primordiality is understood as wholeness and unity, see also SZ 41/65; 180/225; 192/236.

sight. It is by means of sighting (or understanding) that Dasein uncovers entities, and discloses entities in their Being. Consequently, the distinction and coincidence between Dasein and Dasein's Being—the ontological reduction—is itself something *sighted, understood.* Dasein *sights* Being, which means Dasein sights the Being of the entity; the Being's differentiation from the entity. "Sight is directed upon Being *as such*." (SZ 146/186)[83]

To be clear, these two phenomena of the Being of Dasein's understanding—that the understanding sights when ontologically reducing, and that the understanding understands itself as sight—iterate what I claim to be the starting-point of Heidegger's fundamental ontology in its projection onto the science of Being. Dasein *is itself this ontological reducing,* it *is* the entity that ontologically reduces, the entity where the ontological difference takes place.

Now, Dasein's *sight* has a *projective* character.[84] As stated, Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *relates* to Being. This *relation* [*Verhältnis*] is to be taken generally as a *projection of possibilities.* For instance, in relating to an entity, taken in the manner of Being of present-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*], Dasein projects possibilities of the entity's Being as "still outstanding not yet present-at-hand," in the sense of what is in potency, not yet actual in or for the entity. (SZ 144/182) "As a modal category of present-at-hand, possibility signifies negatively what is *not yet* actual and what is *not at any time* necessary." (SZ 143/183) Nevertheless, this account of 'possibility' and Dasein's projection of

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[83] "From the beginning onwards, the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily toward 'seeing' as a way of access to entities *and to Being.* To keep the connection with this tradition, we may formalize "sight" and "seeing" enough to obtain therewith a universal term for characterizing any access to entities or to Being, as access in general." (SZ 147/187)
[84] See SZ 146/186.

possibilities in relating to entities in their Being is merely restricted to Dasein's relation to entities in the manner of present-at-hand. How different is the projection of possibilities of understanding's sight when characterizing Dasein's own Being, when reflectively coming back to itself? Or more simply: How are Dasein's possibilities of Being different from the possibilities of any entity in the manner of present-at-hand?

The *projective* character of the understanding already shows the explicit connection between the articulation of Dasein's Being (existential reduction) and the ontico-ontological differentiation of its Being (ontological reduction.) The entity Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it relates to Being. But Dasein is ontologically distinctive in that its Being is its existence. This means that Dasein's relation [*Verhältnis*] toward Being, when directed back [*zurückfahren*] (reduced!) to its own Being, characterizes Dasein in terms of the comportments [*Verhalten*] that make up its existence. Dasein comports itself by projecting its *own possibilities.* "Dasein is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility." (SZ 143/183) The Being-possible [*Möglichsein*] of Dasein's *existential possibilities* must be "sharply distinguished both from empty logical possibility and from the contingency of something present-at-hand." (SZ 143/183) The Being-possible [*Möglichsein*] of Dasein's projected possibilities—that is, possibility [*Möglichkeit*] taken as an *existentiale*—is Dasein's potentiality-for-Being [*Seinkönnen.*] Dasein is, in every case, *what it can be*: its possibilities *as possibilities*. Dasein shows that it is its possibilities *as* possibilities—its potentiality-for-Being—precisely in understanding. This is why, according to Heidegger, "when we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 'understanding something' with the signification of 'being able to manage something'… 'being capable of doing something' [*etwas können.*]" (SZ 143/183)

Therefore, existentially, Dasein has a relation with the *possible as possible. It projects possibilities upon possibilities*. "As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understood itself in terms of its possibilities. Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects—that is to say, possibilities." (SZ 145/185) Dasein understands (sights) itself in projecting possibilities, and the upon which [*woraufhin*] of such projection remains a possibility itself. Regarding the full existential-existentiell articulation of Dasein's Being, by which possibilities are to be owned or disowned (in Dasein's individuation), Dasein understands itself as "the possibility of Being-free *for* its *ownmost* potentiality-for-Being." (SZ 144/183) Dasein's possibilities to be are not actualized or enacted, as an entity taken in the manner of present-at-hand. Rather, Dasein can own or disown its possibilities.[85]

Dasein's understanding *as* sight *is* Dasein's projection of possibilities *as* its potentiality-for-Being. Dasein reduces its own Being (existence) as its own possibilities, by *understanding* these possibilities in their Being-possible [*Möglichsein*], by *sighting* them as potentiality-for-Being. Or to put it in Heidegger's own words, "understanding is the Being of such potentiality-for-Being." (SZ 144/183)

Dasein's sight is responsible for the ontological reduction of Dasein's Being, which is to be understood as the projection that is potentiality-for-Being. The final result of the ontological reduction is care. In care, Dasein sights *the unity and structure* (or articulation) of the whole of its potentiality-for-Being. The ontological reduction is responsible for *the sight of such unity*. In turn, the *existential reduction, pre-sights* [*vor-sichten*] by *pre-having*

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[85] Phenomenological construction shows how Dasein owns and disowns itself.

[*vor-haben*] and *pre-conceiving* [*vor-greifen*] the *structure as structure,* that is, the *articulation of Being*.

Care is the *unity* of the wholeness of the structural whole of Dasein's Being. When Dasein's sight sights the unity of the whole of Dasein's Being, this sight is characterized by *transparency* [*Durchsichtigkeit.*] Heidegger defines 'transparency' as the "understandingly achieved grasping [*verstehendes Ergreifen*] of the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world *throughout all* [*hindurch*] the essential moments of such state [*wesenhaften Verfassungmomente.*]" (SZ 146/187)

Sighting with transparency is *sighting throughout* [*hin-durch*] *the structural moments toward a unity*. This is the formal characterization of the act of the understanding's sight, and the simplest and emptiest depiction of the ontological reduction as an act of understanding. The ontological reduction is the act by which Dasein sights transparently its own Being at one glance, throughout the manifold determinations of such Being.

While this definition describes understanding's sight and the ontological reduction in general, it is particularly clear for the last stage of the ontological reduction that obtains the Being of Dasein—care. But understanding's sight is at work in what Dasein encounters closest, initially and for the most part, even when understanding itself is not yet understood from itself. How so?

26. Pre-ontological sight: circumspection [*Um-sicht*] and consideratedness [*Rück-sicht*]

Closest and for the most part, Dasein finds itself absorbed by its concern, in its environment [*Umwelt*], dealing [*Umgang*] with entities in the manner of ready-to-hand within-the-world [*innerweltlich.*] In Dasein's relation to entities ready-to-hand within-the-world, understanding's sight presents itself as circumspection [*Um-sicht.*] And in Dasein's relation to other Daseine, understanding's sight presents itself as considerateness [*Rück-sicht.*] Dasein "*is* this sight equiprimordially in each of those [two] basic ways of its Being…: as the circumspection of concern, as the considerateness of solicitude." (SZ 146/186) The role of circumspection and considerateness is crucial for the first stage of the ontological reduction (the pre-ontological reduction), because it ultimately allows us to reduce Dasein, by *centering* it in its 'there.'

In dealing with entities ready-to-hand, Dasein's understanding shows itself as *circumspection*. Circumspection is the projection of possibilities of entities in the manner of Being of ready-to-hand. Such projection projects a structure of assignment [*Verweisung*]—whose moments are involvement, in-which, with-which, toward-which, and in-order-to. [86] This means that "understanding can devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world." (SZ 146/186) This is Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of itself. This understanding understands the relation to Being [*Verhältnis*] that Dasein is

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[86] "The 'in-order-to' [*Umzu*] prescribes a 'toward-which' [*Dazu*] as a possible 'alongside-which' [*Wobei*] for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement with something has—an involvement which is *with*-something [*Womit.*]" (SZ 86/119) See also SZ 69/98 ff.

from the standpoint of the relata of such relation—the inner-worldly entities along with which Dasein is. However, not primordial, the pre-ontological understanding belongs in Dasein's Being and characterizes it. "Dasein, in so far as it is, has always submitted [*anweisen*] itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this submission [*Anweisung*] belongs to its Being." (SZ 87/121)

Now, Dasein is not limited to understanding itself from the world. Dasein can understand itself *from* itself, ontologically, which involves taking the submission [*an-weisen*] as assignment [*ver-weisen*], or rather as self-assignment [*sich-ver-weisen.*] Dasein must sight that the totality of involvements refers back to Dasein, or rather, that it is Dasein that assigns itself to it. "Dasein always assigns itself from a 'for-the-sake-of-which' to the 'with-which' of an involvement." (SZ 86/119) This is how Dasein encounters (comports toward) the ready-to-hand in relation to its own potentiality-for-Being; by letting the ready-to-hand be involved in assigning itself to it, for the sake of itself. The ontological reduction shows that any totality of involvements is structured toward a *for-the-sake-of-which* [*Worumwillen*], to which the aforementioned coordinated, structured relations always refer.

In conclusion, understanding can devote itself to the world and understand Dasein from therein. "Or else, understanding throws itself primarily into the 'for-the-sake-of-which'; that is, Dasein exists as itself." (SZ 146/186) In disclosing itself as the for-the-sake-of-which of the manifold of assignments, that is, as self-assigning, Dasein sights throughout [*hindurch*] the manifold moments of the worldhood of the world toward the unity that it itself is. This unity of Dasein is the 'there' of Dasein. The first stage of the

ontological reduction is to move from submission to the world, to the self-assigning of the for-the-sake-of-which in the 'there' of Dasein.

Though not thematically, Dasein first encounters its 'there' with the discovery of the for-the-sake-of-which in the worldhood of the world. In fact, *two* 'theres' are thus disclosed—Dasein's there and the world's there. This act, which Heidegger only clarifies when analyzing understanding (and particularly, understanding's sight) is crucial to show how the first stage of the ontological reduction orients the analysis of Being-in-the-world from the worldhood of the world (chapter 3), through Being-with (chapter 4), toward Being-in (chapter 5.) As I have stated, understanding is a manner of disclosedness that performs the ontological reduction (one of the manners in which disclosedness discloses.) "In existing, Dasein is its 'there'… its *Being-there* is Being-in. In the 'for-the-sake-of-which' existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called 'understanding'." (SZ 143/182) Until the reduction reaches Being-in *as such,* we remain in the pre-ontological Being of Dasein, by which Dasein is not yet centered in its 'there.' Understanding, however, uncovers, discloses, performs the reduction from the very beginning.

The analysis of the worldhood of the world shows that Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part as "fascinated [*benommen*] with the world… thus, absorbed [*aufgehen*] in the world." (SZ 113/149) Once Dasein has disclosed the worldhood of the world, and the irreducibility of the for-the-sake-of, it confirms that it itself is not the world, nor an entity within-the-world, Dasein understands itself and other Daseine (Others) as entities *in*-the-world. "In Dasein's Being, the context of assignments of significance [*Verweisungzusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit*] is *tied up* [*festgemacht*] with its ownmost

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Being—a Being which essentially can have no involvement [*Bewandtnis*], but which is rather that Being *for the sake of which* Dasein itself is as it is." (SZ 123/160) It is crucial to note that Dasein can be absorbed in its world but it never gets confused with it. Heidegger indicates in these passages—and he develops it later through the Analytic—that the disclosure of the 'there' of Dasein happens first *along with* the disclosure of the 'there' of the world (worldhood.) The 'there' is double: of Dasein and of the world.

In encountering itself as the for-the-sake-of-which that is never involved but always self-assigns itself, Dasein can now ask the questions concerning other Daseine (Others) in-the-world (and not within-the-world); concerning Dasein's Being-with Others; and concerning Dasein's own *self* (the who of Dasein.) According to Heidegger, because Dasein is not *within-the-world,* Dasein's Being-with is not characterized by concern, but rather by solicitude.[87] Consequently, regarding understanding's sight [*Sicht*], "just as *circumspection* [*Umsicht*] belongs to concern [*Besorgnis*], solicitude [*Fürsorge*] is guided by *considerateness* [*Rück-sicht*] and *forbearance* [*Nach-sicht.*]" (SZ 123/159) Understanding's sight as *considerateness* (and *forbearance*) is at work throughout the analysis of Being-with. And just as circumspection showed the irreducibility of Dasein in the for-the-sake-of-which, so does considerateness regarding Others. "As Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others." (SZ 123/160)

I am reconstructing here the pre-ontological reduction of Dasein's Being. Formally, the pre-ontological reduction is to be understood as the leading away from the relata and back to the relation or relating that Dasein itself is (a relation toward Being.) Spatially, the reduction is the disclosure of the disclosedness of the *there* [*Da*] of Da-sein. The

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[87] See SZ 121/157 ff.

disclosedness of the *there* discloses both the *yonder* [*Dort*] and the *here* [*Hier*], but also it discloses itself as disclosure [*das Erschliessen*], as the clearing [*die Lichtung*.][88] In the analysis of worldhood, the ontological reduction to the for-the-sake-of-which has shown that Dasein self-assigns itself to the world of its concern *yonder* [*Dort.*] Now, the question is how Dasein sights or understands it*self* (and Others) in such assignment, how it comes from the *yonder* of the world back to its own *here* [*Hier.*] This is the question of the *who* of Dasein, and of how Dasein is itself with Others, in *regarding* Others, in *being considerate of* Others.

"Even when Dasein explicitly addresses itself as 'I here', this locative personal indication… is to be understood as Being-in in terms of the 'yonder' of the world that is ready-to-hand—the 'yonder' that is dwelling place of Dasein as concern." (SZ 119/155) But why the 'here' of Dasein (its who) is to be understood in terms of the 'yonder'? Precisely because Dasein is Being-with, which, as I will show, proximally and for the most part relies on the 'They.' Daseine rely on the fact that the They has already disclosed the 'there' of the world—the worldhood of the world as significance—or rather, that the They has given an orientation to such totality of assignments. Heidegger is not particularly clear or explicit in describing how Dasein moves between its yonder and its here when understanding itself pre-ontologically. The moving from one to the other becomes transparent when it is understood as the pre-ontological stage of the ontological reduction.

Heidegger answers the question of the 'who' of Dasein in an empty, formal manner in paragraph 4 of *Being and Time* and in connection with Dasein's ontological distinctiveness. That Dasein's Being is its existence means that Dasein is in each case I

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[88] See SZ 133/171.

myself. Dasein's Being is mine, and not Others'.[89] However, the Others are "rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among one is too." (SZ 118/154) Thus, the everyday manner of Dasein's Being-with is precisely in a way that makes it impossible for Dasein to encounter itself *from* itself. Contrary to this, everyday Being-with 'subjects' Dasein to the Others. Dasein, "as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in *subjection* [*Botmäßigkeit*] to Others. It itself *is* not; its Being has been taken away by the Others." (SZ 126/164)

These Others, to which Dasein's everyday Being-with-one-another is subjected to, are not themselves distinct or definite, but the impersonal 'They' [*das Man.*] As I have anticipated before, the 'They' provides everyday Dasein with an already always available referential context of significance. Such context of significance makes up the worldhood of the world about which everyday Dasein is concerned. This means that proximally and for the most part, "when entities are encountered, Dasein's world frees them for a totality of involvements with which the 'They' is familiar." (SZ 129/167) Everything that seems familiar to any Dasein belongs in the publicness [*die Offentlichkeit*], which is the unitary whole of the different moments of the 'They'—distantiality, averagednness, and levelling down of all possibilities of Being. It must be noted that, even though Dasein is *self-assigned* as the for-the-sake-of-which of a structure of assignment, Dasein first and for the most part encounters itself taken away by the world, *fascinated* and *absorbed* in structures of involvement that are *dominated* (uncovered and maintained) by the They. Dasein first and foremost encounters itself *not from itself,* but *alienated*.

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[89] See SZ 114/150.

Though oriented toward the ontological reduction, understanding's sight understands the pre-ontological Being of Dasein. In the pre-ontological stage of the ontological reduction, sight as circumspection first discloses the irreducibility of the for-the-sake-of-which that always refers back to Dasein and by which Dasein self-assigns itself to the world. Sight as considerateness first discloses that Dasein is for the sake of Others equiprimordially with being for the sake of itself. Everyday Dasein encounters itself always in terms of the world, whose worldhood (significance) is determined by the 'They', by which Dasein remains undifferentiated from Others. "From the manner of Being which belongs to the 'They'… everyday Dasein draws its *pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being*." (SZ 130/168)

Now, the circumspection of concern and the considerateness of solicitude are just the manners of Being [*Seinsarten*] of the manifold ways [*Weisen*] of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. However, Dasein's Being-in-the-world is itself a unitary account of the Being of Dasein, whose unity is disclosed in the 'there' of Being-in as such. Only in a new unitary account of itself can Dasein sight itself from itself. How does Dasein reduce its pre-ontological Being-in-the-world to its ontological disclosedness, throughout the 'there' of Being-in? And how does Dasein consequently reduce its 'there' to Care?

27. Sight's threefold vista: preview [*Vor-blick*], viewpoint [*Hin-blick*], and perspectival view [*Durch-blick*]

Dasein's understanding amounts [*ausmachen*] to sight when performing the ontological reduction. Despite its structural relevance, Heidegger only devotes one page to sight in *Being and Time*.[90] The language of seeing [*sehen*], sighting [*sichten*], and viewing [*blicken*] is not especially common through *Being and Time,* but it comes to the fore in all the passages that are crucial for the reconstruction of the ontological reduction.[91] Though not abundant, the textual evidence is sufficient to show that my interpretation is consistent; it just unfolds what Heidegger had merely sketched.

Among the cognates of *sight* [*Sicht*], the concepts constructed with '*Blick*' are especially relevant for the ontological reduction of Dasein. '*Blick*' can be translated as 'glimpse', 'glance', or 'peek.' It refers to the sudden, instantaneous sight of something, to the first, immediate encounter 'on the face of it.' What is intended by *blicken,* in turn, is the closest self-showing of the phenomenon, as it is first and immediately visible, when it shows itself *prima facie* [*auf den ersten Blick.*] I will use the English 'view' to translate '*Blick*' just because it allows me to better translate the family of concepts involving '*Blick.*'

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[90] See SZ 146-7/186-7. It could even seem that Heidegger employs 'sight' [*sicht*] merely "to keep the connection with this [the philosophical] tradition… [and to] deprive pure intuition [*Anschauen*] of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology." (SZ 147/187)

[91] Heidegger sometimes employs "coming/bringing to view/sight" [*In den Blick bringen / kommen; Im Blick behalten*], as well as becoming "visible" [*sichtbar*] in a technical, deliberate way, though he leaves them underdeveloped. For instance, "In order that we may turn our view [*Blick*] explicitly upon this [the question of the sense of Being] in the light of what we have gained" (SZ 183/227); or "The pre-ontological characterization of man's essence expressed in this fable [*cura*], has brought to view in advance the manner of Being [*sonach im vorhinein die Seinsart in den Blick genommen*] which dominates his *temporal sojourn in the world,* and does so through and through." (SZ 199/243)

I take *view* to be the first, simple, immediate, instantaneous *sight* of something. Three concepts constructed with '*blick*' are essential to the ontological reduction: *preview* [*Vor-blick*], *viewpoint* [*Hin-blick*], and *perspectival view* [*Durch-blick.*] As I have already pointed out, although Heidegger barely employs them, and never fleshes them out, these three concepts appear in passages that characterize the whole of the Analytic of Dasein as ontological reduction. We can emptily foresee how *preview, viewpoint,* and *perspectival view* can constitute the different moments in the view of something. Whatever we view, we first *preview* it as a simple, unitary whole. Then, we come to see that the preview was already guided by a *viewpoint,* by one of the multiple moments structuring the preview of the whole phenomenon. Finally, we are capable of viewing, from the viewpoint *through* the multiplicity of moments of the whole, and toward a new unitary whole that grasps the previous views in a *perspectival view.*

The same family of concepts can be expressed employing the Latin *specie*: *prospect*, *aspect-respect*, and *perspective*. In these constructions, '*species*' translates '*eidos*' as 'look,' 'view,' 'sight,' etc. A *prospect* [*prō-speciō, Vorblick*] is the pre-view, which provides various *aspects* [*ad-speciō*, looking to or toward.] One of these *aspects* is the *re-spect* [*re-speciō*] through which we can see the whole. '*Re-speciō*' means to look back upon (to regard.) Thus, the *respect* is a second look, a look that secures and fixes. The German '*Hin-blick*' expresses a view *toward* (Hin-)*,* but also a respect or regard (*im Hinblick auf, die Hinsicht*.) The Latin expressions have the advantage here of distinguishing between *a-spect* and *re-spect,* which *Hinblick* conflates*.* Coming back to our threefold structure, it is in relation to the *aspect* that is *respected* or regarded that we can trace the *perspective* [the look-through, *Durchblick.*]

The concept of *preview* [*Vorblick*] refers to the first and earliest view of something. Since '*Blick*' already involves the sense of 'first sight', a *pre-view* or *Vor-blick* stands for the earliest possible view, the view that precedes any other. It is not by coincidence that Heidegger employs '*preview*' to name the act by which we first access the closest ontical, pre-ontological, whole of Dasein's Being, i.e. *Being-in-the-world*. '*Preview*' does not only name the act, but also its content: Being-in-the-world is the *preview* of Dasein's Being. That Dasein is in a world is what we always already pre-view of Dasein. With the preview of Being-in-the-world we first grasp Dasein in its Being, and we do so by grasping at the same time the unity of Being-in-the-world and its three basic constitutive moments.

In paragraph 28, Heidegger states that Being-in-the-world is the *preview* of the Being of Dasein. This is the first paragraph of Chapter V, dedicated to Being-in as such. Being-in is the third, basic equiprimordial moment [*Grundmoment*] of the basic state [*Grundverfassung*] Being-in-the-world and, at the same time, a 'bearing structural moment' that provides access to Dasein's most primordial Being. It is thus significant for the ontological reduction that Heidegger employs the concept of *preview* right when he is explicitly showing the link between Being-in-the-world and Being-in. "The anticipation [*Vorwegnahme*] of this bearing structural moment [Being-in] arose from the aim, from the beginning, to frame [*einkreisen*] the analysis of the individual moments in a persistent *preview* [*durchhaltenden Vorblick*] on the structural whole [*Strukturganze*] and to prevent any disruption and splitting of the unitary phenomenon." (SZ 131/169)[92] Dasein *previews* itself as a simple, straightforward whole in the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. The

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[92] What allows us to preview the phenomenon as a simple whole is the formal indication 'Being-in-the-world.' The 'formal' character of the indication guides the view in the direction of the viewpoint [*Hinblick*] of Being-in because the moments of worldhood, who, and Being-in are ready to be differentiated and articulated (analyzed, *reduced*) as parts of the expression itself.

preview is persistent; that is, the simple unity of Being-in-the-world is always 'kept in view.' This shows that the ontological reduction is a 'leading away' (from the entity, toward its Being) that does not split the phenomenon, nor is subjected to dogmatic constructions. In other words, the constantly present pre-view of the simple whole Being-in-the-world *maintains in advance* the unity of the manifold of the worldhood of the world, the who of Dasein, and Being-in. Dasein's *preview* of itself as a *simple whole* coincides with its view as the three moments; that is, as a *structural whole* [*Strukturganze.*]

In fact, Heidegger explicitly claims in paragraph 61 that the *preview* constitutes the access to the basic state [*Grundverfassung*] of *any* entity whatsoever, not only to the basic state of the Being of the entity Dasein. "Any genuine method is based on previewing [*Vorblick*] in an appropriate way the basic state of the object to be disclosed, or of the domain within which the object lies." (SZ 303/350)[93]

Heidegger characterizes the access to Dasein's basic state [*Grundverfassung*] of Being as *preview* only one more time, in paragraph 39. Here he notes again that the *preview* is crucial in maintaining the coincidence between simple and structural whole. "Being-in-the-world… has been elucidated phenomenally as a whole and also in its constitutive moments… the *preview* [*Vorblick*] which we gave to the whole of this phenomenon [Being-in-the-world] in the beginning has now lost the emptiness of our first general sketch of it." (SZ 180/225) Of course, it is precisely in paragraph 39, where the phenomenon Being-in-the-world self-shows and is viewed in its full structural manifold. The sense of

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[93] This speaks for how Heidegger understood in 1926 the role of the ontological reduction *beyond* fundamental ontology and in the context of the groundwork of metaphysics. However, the problem of the groundwork of metaphysics is not restricted to the world-problem. It problematizes the ontotheological character of the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent. Cf. Crowell, "The Middle Heidegger's Phenomenological Metaphysics", in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology*, ed. Dan Zahavi, 235ff. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

preview is only clarified in these three passages, but they provide a sufficient account of its role in the ontological reduction.

It is also in paragraph 39 where Heidegger insists that it is by means of *a view different from the preview* that we grasp the manifold structures of Dasein's simple whole in a unified manner. "To be sure, the constitution of the structural whole and its everyday manner of Being, is phenomenally so manifold [*Vielfältigkeit*] that it can easily obstruct our *viewing the whole* as such phenomenologically in a way which is *unified* [*einheitlichen phänomenologischen Blick.*]" (SZ 181/225) The view that grasps the unity of the structural manifold, however, *is not the preview*, for the preview views the *whole* but not yet the *wholeness* [*Ganzheit*] of such whole, nor its *unity*. What kind of view, different from the preview, grants access to the wholeness of the whole, and eventually to the unity of such wholeness? What gives the wholeness of the whole in the first place?

Heidegger is even less explicit concerning this moment of the reductive sight: the *view* of the wholeness of the whole. It is clear that Being-in-the-world is the first, closest, straightforward, simple (unstructured) *whole* of Dasein's Being. However, Being-in-the-world also shows itself as a *structural whole.* For this to happen, the manifold of the basic moments of Being-in-the-world must become visible; that is, when Being-in-the-world is viewed as worldhood, who, and Being-in. Heidegger opens paragraph 12 by pointing out this 'double view' of whole and moments. "Being-in-the-world… stands for a *unitary* phenomenon… [and] must be *seen* [*sehen*] *as a whole*… [However, Being-in-the-world] may be *looked at* in three ways [worldhood, who, Being-in.]" (SZ 53/78) The two views (or double view) is first the *preview,* which views the simple whole, and *a second view*.

The second view is the viewpoint which runs the entire structural manifold of the moments of such whole.

How does this *second view* show that the three moments 'complete' the whole? What if we are *not seeing* other moments, for they are still enclosed? From where is it clearly visible that these are *all* the moments constituting Being-in-the-world? The *wholeness* of the whole *clarifies* these questions. 'Wholeness' is that which gives the whole its character of being a whole; what makes a simple whole 'structurally whole.' 'Wholeness' here has a reductive, empty meaning—it stands for the structural completeness of the moments of a whole. The *wholeness* of the whole Being-in-the-world is that which shows that worldhood, who, and Being-in *are the whole.* It is a point of view from where we can see that worldhood, who, and Being-in *are all the moments* of Being-in-the-world. The *viewpoint* of the wholeness of the whole shows that Being-in-the-world is constituted by these three moments—no more, no less. The *second view* is the *viewpoint* [*Hinblick.*]

It is to be noted that the 'reductive' *wholeness* of the whole is not accessed from a viewpoint that transcends the whole itself. This means that the wholeness of the whole must be accessed *through* one of the moments of the whole.[94] Being-in is the *viewpoint* [*Hinblick*] from where the wholeness of the whole shows itself and can be viewed. Therefore, Being-in has the remarkable capacity to show itself *both* as a moment of Being-in-the-world *and also* as its wholeness. As wholeness, Being-in shows that worldhood, who, and itself (Being-in) are every and all the moments of Being-in-the-world. How so?

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[94] It must always be kept in mind that this is valid for the reduction. Reduction and construction differ in the ways of giveness and fulfillment of the whole phenomenon, in the character of the wholeness of the whole, and in the character of the unity of such whole.

The wholeness is accessible *from the viewpoint* of Being-in, as the 'there' of Dasein. It its crucial to insist that it is *one of the moments of the whole* that provides the *point of access* (the *point of view*) to the whole in its wholeness. In the self-reduction that Dasein performs over itself, the fixation of the viewpoint must be understood as a *centering*. From this privileged, *centered viewpoint*, Dasein can *see itself from itself.* This is crucial because Dasein is the entity that, as entity (ontically), *is a relation* toward Being. The way in which this relation shows at first is always from the relata, and not from the relation itself. The establishment of the *viewpoint* that shows the wholeness*,* is the centering from the relata back to the relation. I have argued for this when showing that the ontological reduction of Dasein is first a *centering* away from the 'yonder' (world) and from the 'here' (who-They) and back to the 'there' (Being-in.)

Being-in is one moment of the whole, but also the point of access and *disclosure* of all the moments; the 'common' center of the two other moments. In Being-in as such (the *Da* of Dasein), Being-in-the-world is viewed *in its wholeness, as a structural whole*. This means that Being-in *accounts for* both world and the who of Dasein. Being-in is *the point from where* the manifold is seen at once and as completing what the *preview* held in view as a simple unity. Dasein *is in* a world*.* This is why it can be said that Being-in is the *viewpoint* from which the whole shows itself and can be viewed as a 'whole' whole; that is, in its *wholeness*.

It is only once, in paragraph 28, that Heidegger explicitly claims that Being-in gives access to the *wholeness* of the whole. "By considering this [Being-in] more penetratingly we shall… get a new and surer phenomenological view [*Blick*] of the structural wholeness [*Strukturganzheit*] of Being-in-the-world." (SZ 131/169) This passage shows that the *view*

of Being-in is the view of the structural wholeness. But this does not yet prove that this *view* is a *viewpoint.* There is again only one passage where Being-in, as a *view*, is to be characterized as *viewpoint.*

However, Being-in is not only the point from where the wholeness of the whole is visible. Being-in is also an equiprimordial moment of the structure of Being-in-the-world, as it belongs and can be viewed in such *preview*. It is in paragraph 12, within a passage I have already discussed, where Heidegger characterizes all three equiprimordial moments of Being-in-the-world as *regards* or *viewpoints.* "The phenomenal datum which our expression ['Being-in-the-world'] indicates is one which may, in fact, be viewed in regard to *three viewpoints* [*dreifache Hinblicknehmen.*]" (SZ 53/78) Nevertheless, these three disclosed *viewpoints* (or 'three regards') do not have the same status. One of them, Being-in, is at the same time *viewed* or *disclosed* within the simple whole and *disclosive* of the other two as completing the structure of the simple whole. Being-in constitutes the *ontological viewpoint;* the viewpoint by which Dasein's Being makes itself visible.

Being-in is not only a view of Dasein among others, but the *viewpoint,* the 'regard' or *that regarding which* [*Hinblick* (auf)] the whole of Being-in-the-world is viewed in its wholeness.[95] Through Being-in, Dasein encounters itself from itself, as disclosed in its disclosedness. The *disclosedness* of the 'there' of Da-sein is first encountered as the *viewpoint* from where the wholeness of the whole is viewed 'with a view' to project its *unity* (care.) This is why Heidegger first sketches out [*verzeichnen*] Being-in-the-world "in terms of an orientation toward Being-in as such." (SZ 52/78) The analysis or reduction of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is oriented from the outset by the *viewpoint* of Being-in; the

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[95] The expression "*Im Hinblick (Hinsicht) auf*" is commonly used and can be translated as "in regard to" or "with a view to."

'there' of Da-sein; Dasein's disclosive disclosure, and its disclosedness. To be clear, the wholeness is viewed, through Being-in, as the 'there' (of Da-sein), which is the center of 'here' and 'yonder.' The preview was already oriented *by* and *toward* a viewpoint; a viewpoint that had made possible the preview in the first place.

The viewpoint of Being-in does not only show the wholeness of the simple whole. As new viewpoint of the whole, Being-in is a structural whole that regards the entity in its Being *from itself alone*. This is why the viewpoint is accessed 'with a view to' seeing the most primordial, furthest *unity* of the phenomenon; the ontologically reduced Being of Dasein (care.)

In paragraph 39, after having viewed the basic moments of the 'there'—namely, the existential constitution of Da-sein (§§29-34) and its everyday Being as falling in the world of the They (§§35-38—Heidegger states that now we can hold more securely a *unified view* of the Being of Dasein, and he asks the following question: "How is the *wholeness* of that structural whole which we have pointed out to be defined in an existential-ontological manner?" (SZ 181/225) [96]

Note that Heidegger asks how the wholeness of the structural whole is to be seen in an *existential-ontological manner*. My claim is that the *existential* and the *ontological manners* can and must be distinguished. The ontological reduction shows the wholeness of the structural whole in an ontological manner, and this means *per se,* καθ'αὐτό, from itself [*von sich*], and in accordance with itself. In the case of the entity Dasein, the ontological reduction shows a differentiated-but-coincidental, structurally complete, new simple unity—care. Thus, in accordance with the basic gesture of the ontological reduction, the

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[96] 'Basic moments' of the 'there' are in fact to be thematized as 'basic manners of Being' [*Grundarten.*]

ontological most primordial manner to take the wholeness of the structural whole is *as a new simple unity*. This new simple unity (care) puts every other determination of Being *in perspective*. The wholeness is already shown through the *viewpoint* of Being-in (as the 'there', the disclosedness of Dasein) but not in a primordial unitary manner. Only through this *viewpoint,* however, are we able to bring to view the perspective of the unity of Dasein's Being.

The ontological *viewpoint* at the same time *shows* the wholeness of the previewed simple whole, and allows us to project the *perspective* that grasps all determinations of Being *at once* in a new unity. This is implied in the second part of a passage of paragraph 28 that I have already discussed. Heidegger there claims that, by considering the phenomenon of Being-in more thoroughly, "we shall *not only* get a new and surer phenomenological view [*Blick*; *Hin-blick*] of the structural wholeness [*Strukturganzheit*] of Being-in-the-world, *but shall also pave the way* [*Weg*] *to grasping the primordial Being of Dasein itself—namely, care.*" (SZ 131/169) Care is the primordial unity of the Being of Dasein, to be accessed *through* a new kind of view, different from the view of the whole and the view of its wholeness.

To access care is to get to a *single perspectival view* [*Durch-blick*] of all determinations of Dasein's Being 'under' a new unity. Viewing Dasein *as* care is *putting* the difference between Dasein and its Being *in perspective. Through* or *by way of* [*durch*] care, we see the articulated whole of Dasein at once.

Here it is fruitful to look at how we commonly understand a view in perspective. A perspectival view is the projection of a given point upon the line of the horizon. In order to view a thing in perspective, the thing must *already be in our view,* as *previewed,* right in

the closest, immediate forefront of our own plane. To set up the perspective we must take a *point* (of view) *included* in the previewed forefront. Now, a *point* (of view) may disclose some aspects of the thing but also enclose others. We seek the viewpoint that makes the entire thing visible; the view that gives the whole of the thing and its different aspects all at once from itself. The perspective as such is a projection of this *viewpoint* upon [*woraufhin*] the furthest 'vanishing point' in the horizon. The vanishing point truly turns the viewpoint into a complete perspective. When the thing is seen projected upon the furthest point in the horizon, the thing is seen *anew,* in a *primordial* way. By looking at the thing in perspective, now we view what was invisible for us before—what the thing already was and what it could be, taken to the fullest extent of its possibilities. In tracing the perspective, from the 'closest' forefront, via the 'centered' viewpoint, to the 'furthest' vanishing point of the horizon, the thing shows itself from itself in its entirety. To put in perspective is to lead what is *closest* away to its *furthest* limit. Care is given in a *perspectival view,* and the vanishing point in the horizon is truth as disclosedness.

In paragraph 39, Heidegger confirms this characterization. He states that the most primordial unitary Being of Dasein (care) is accessed in a *perspectival view* [*Durchblick*]*, upon which* all determinations of Dasein's Being are 'ontologically supported.' "The Being of Dasein, upon which [*woraufhin*] the structural whole as such is *ontologically supported* [*trägt*] becomes accessible [*Zugänglich*] to us when we *put our view in perspective,* all the way *through* this whole [*in einem vollen* Durchblick durch *dieses Ganzen*] to a single primordially [*ursprünglich*] unitary [*einheitliches*] phenomenon." (SZ 181/226) The most primordial *unity* of the Being of Dasein, care, is accessed from a *perspectival view* [*Durchblick.*]

This is the only passage where Heidegger characterizes the view of care, and that he associates this kind of view with a *Durchblick. 'Durchblick',* along with its verbal form *'durchblicken'* can also be translated as 'being cleared' or 'being in the know.' More literally, the verb stands for 'showing through' and 'looking through'*,* which both involve the structure of a view that *traverses,* that *runs through,* tracing a perspective.[97] In English, 'through' is also employed in a temporal sense, similar to 'during.' 'Through' can refer to the entire duration of something, the whole 'temporal extension' of it. Since in this passage Heidegger employs '*Durchblick'* along with '*durch',* and given the inner structural connection of this term with '*Vor-blick'* and '*Hin-blick',* it is appropriate to stress the sense of perspectival view, the kind of view that exposes *the entire thing in one stroke*, a stroke that runs *through* each and all of its components. This is exactly what the view of care consists of, what care shows and let us see.

It must also be noted that, in this passage of paragraph 39, Heidegger refers to a 'whole' and to its 'wholeness.' In paragraph 39, the Analytic of Dasein (the reduction) is at a different moment than in paragraph 28. The *whole* that Heidegger talks about in paragraph 39 is not the one of 28, i.e. Being-in-the-world; and the *wholeness* is not the disclosure of Being-in as here-there-yonder. Paragraph 39 plays a parallel role to paragraph 28, however. These two paragraphs open up their corresponding chapters V and VI, and exhibit their basic gestures. In paragraph 39, the inquiry has already fully transitioned from the view of Being-in as the *viewpoint* of the whole Being-in-the-world, to the view of the 'there' as *a structural whole itself*. In paragraph 28, the 'there' is just that which shows the *wholeness* of the Being-in-the-world in Being-in. The 'there' of Being-in is at the same

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[97] For other iterations of '*durchblicken',* see SZ 177/221; 219/262.

time the view of the wholeness of Being-in-the-world, and the simple whole of Dasein's Being taken 'ontologically' from itself. The 'there' is thus crucial for the ontological reduction of Dasein; it is the wholeness of the *pre-ontological* whole of Dasein's Being, *and* the *ontological* whole of Dasein's Being. The there is the center where Dasein can be present to itself from itself, away from its constant projective absorption in the world and subjection to the They. The there is the place of the ontico-ontological differentiation.

Through chapter V, the whole 'there' is disclosed in its existential constitution, on the one hand, and in its everydayness on the other. These two moments are themselves wholes, constituted by a manifold of moments. Thus, the *wholeness* of the whole that the 'there' of Da-sein is must account for the completeness of all these structures, with a view to their *primordial unity*. Heidegger wonders: "can we succeed in grasping this structural whole… in its *wholeness*? Can Dasein's Being be brought out in such a *unitary manner* that in terms of it the essential equiprimordiality of the structures we have pointed out… will become intelligible?" (SZ 181/226) The *unity* makes the *wholeness* possible, but unity and wholeness are distinct. Care is the unity of a wholeness but… what wholeness? What is the wholeness of the whole of the 'there' of Da-sein?

The wholeness of the 'there' of Dasein is disclosed by the basic state of mind [*Grundbefindlichkeit*] of angst, which "provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping [*fassung*] the primordial Being of the wholeness of Dasein [*der ursprünglichen Seinsganzheit des Daseins.*] (SZ 182/227) This phenomenal basis is the wholeness itself, whose unity is care. Heidegger exhibits the wholeness disclosed in angst in paragraph 41: "the entire phenomenon of angst shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are *existentiality*, *facticity*, and

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Being-fallen." Now, the cohesion, or hanging-together [*der Zusammenhang*] of these three characteristics "makes up [*ausmachen*] that *wholeness* [*Ganzheit*] of the structural whole that we are seeking." (SZ 191/235) The three moments disclosed in angst, existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen—*hang together*. The hanging-together of these three moments must be thought of as *the convergence of the different lines of a perspective in the vanishing point of the horizon*. The lines *cohere* in the horizon. But how so? How exactly does this 'hanging-together' of existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen make itself visible?

Existentiality characterizes the Being of Dasein in that Dasein's Being is an issue for Dasein itself, which means that Dasein projects its own Being toward its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. In this projection, Dasein is always beyond itself, *ahead of itself*. *Facticity* characterizes Dasein's Being in that Dasein is always already in a world; it has been always already thrown, delivered over itself. Thus, Dasein is *ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in(the-world.)* Now, Dasein is not just an undifferentiated thrown projection. Rather, it is always *fallen;* it is always absorbed in the world of its concern, *alongside* entities ready-to-hand within the world.[98]

"The formal existential *wholeness* [*Ganzheit*] of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in(the-world) as Being-alongside." (SZ 192/237) Therefore, the wholeness of the structural whole of Dasein is this 'ahead-of-itself…' Note that the wholeness is here the hanging-together [*Zusammenhang*] of existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen. The hanging-together has the "as" structure, that is, it is interpreted understanding.[99]

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[98] See SZ 191-2/236-7.
[99] See SZ 149/189.

Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in *as* Being-alongside constitutes the *wholeness* of the whole of the 'there.' The interpretive 'as' constitutes the wholeness of the whole by showing that the three fundamental ontological characteristics—existentiality, facticity, Being-fallen—are *all* of the moments of the whole 'there' of Dasein's Being. The 'cohesiveness' has the form of an interpretation. Heidegger provides again the 'ontological-reductive' criterion for wholeness—that the moments are not synthetic pieces. These moments belong together "not as pieces belong to something composite [*nicht als Stücke zu einem Kompositum*], one of which might sometimes be missing." (SZ 191/235) The view of the wholeness of the whole shows how the moments cohere and guarantees that the whole *is whole*, entire, complete.

The wholeness already implicitly present in the three fundamental ontological characteristics (existentiality, facticity, Being-fallen) becomes explicitly understood under the hanging-together of the *two terms* of the interpretation ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in… and Being-alongside. The 'as-structure' of interpretation shows formally, or emptily [*formale Ganzheit*], the coincidence between the existential constitution of the 'there' (existentiality and facticity) and its 'everydayness' (fallenness)—i.e. that the former presents itself mostly as the later. Thus, the interpretation provides the *viewpoint* where the whole of the 'there' of Da-sein is kept visible *as whole,* namely, *in its wholeness*. That factical existence is *disclosed as* Being-fallen in the experience of angst shows the *coincidence* between the two moments of the 'there'—its existential constitution and its everyday manner of Being. Now, Being-fallen is the unity of the pre-ontological Being of Dasein. This means that the inner-coincidence of the ontological moments of the Being of

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Dasein is a doubling of the coincidence between the ontological and pre-ontological Being of Dasein.

The coincidence of the terms of the interpretation provides the emptiest characterization of the manifold determinations of Dasein's Being. Thus, the hanging-together of such coincidence (the wholeness of the whole) provides the *viewpoint* by which we can now 'run through' all determinations of Dasein's Being and *view them in perspective,* all at once, in their unity of coincidence. This unity of coincidence is care, a unity we access thanks to the *perspectival view* [*Durchblick.*]

Care is *the primordial unity of the wholeness of the whole*. In other words, care is *the Being of the wholeness* of the structural whole. Heidegger announces this coincidence between *Being* and *unity* in numerous occasions, reminding that "our aim is to proceed toward the Being of the wholeness of the structural whole [*zum Sein der Ganzheit des Strukturganzen*]… [or, in other words] to grasp the wholeness of this structural whole ontologically." (SZ 191/235)[100] The unity [*Einheit*] of the wholeness is the Being of the wholeness [*Seinsganzheit.*] That Being *is* unity shows how the *ontologically reductive sight*, by means of the threefold view (*preview, viewpoint, perspectival view*) *differentiates* between the entity and its Being while maintaining their ontico-ontological *coincidence*.

The threefold vista—preview, viewpoint, perspectival view—constitute the moments of the ontological reduction of Dasein, by which Dasein accesses its whole Being, the wholeness of its whole, and the unity of the wholeness of its whole. Dasein, *as* Being-in-the-world, is constantly *pre-viewed*, in that it occupies the forefront of our own closest plane. Dasein is always *previewed* in the manner in which it is closest and for the most

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[100] For more textual evidence, see SZ 182/227; 184/229; 191/235-6; et al.

part. But our *preview* of Being-in-the-world is already oriented by a *viewpoint*. In fact, when looking at Dasein's whole we always look to an aspect of it that *anchors our view*. It is possible, however, that our *point of view* does not block or limit our view, but rather facilitates the vision of the whole. This *viewpoint* that has already always shown the whole thing in the *preview,* is able to do so by being 'centered'. The *centered viewpoint* of Dasein is Being-in. Now, in focusing on the viewpoint of Being-in *as such,* we disclose the view of the 'there' of Dasein, which not only allows us to see the whole of Being-in-the-world *through* its moments, but it also *shows itself from itself as a new whole.* The view of the whole 'there' must now be anchored by a new viewpoint. This viewpoint is *factically given* by the state of mind of angst, which discloses the concrete mode by which the whole is given in its wholeness. The *viewpoint* is *structured* in its hanging-together by an interpreted understanding (structured by a coincidental 'as.') But this structured *viewpoint* was already anchored somewhere else, 'behind' all the moments already viewed in the original preview and through the first viewpoint. This 'behind' is of course the vanishing point of the horizon that allows the *perspective* to take place. In viewing care as the Being of Dasein, we trace the perspective toward the horizon upon which Dasein projects its Being. This horizon is disclosedness, which is the 'reductive sense' of care and the manner in which the *there* of Dasein was interpreted from the start. Disclosedness is the reductive sense or truth of Dasein. Its role must be reconstructed after the analysis of the existential reduction, when the two moments of the reduction can be gathered back together and exhibited again as a whole.

The ontological reduction is performed by the understanding's sight [*Sicht*] taken *as* view [*Blick.*] Only from the *perspective* projected toward the vanishing point of

disclosedness can the structural multiplicity of the wholeness of the whole of Dasein's Being be *viewed through* the unity of care.

28. Transparency [*Durchsichtigkeit*] and the ontico-ontological unity of coincidence of Dasein and its Being

As I have already pointed out, Heidegger explicitly characterizes the sight [*Sicht*] of the ontological reduction of Dasein as *transparency.* Since sight is that to which understanding amounts, to understand the Being of Dasein is for it to become transparent to our view. "Understanding has been elucidated, and at the same time the methodological transparency of the understanding-interpreting procedure of the Interpretation of Being [*Durchsichtigkeit des verstehend-auslegenden Verfahrens der Seinsinterpretation*], has been guaranteed." (SZ 230/273)

Transparency is the kind of sight that "relates to existence primarily and on the whole." (SZ 146/186) This is the sight by which Dasein understands itself ontologically, or more precisely, the sight by which "understandingly grasps [*ein verstehendes Ergreifen*] the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-world *throughout all* [*hin-durch*] the essential moments of its [Dasein's] state of Being [durch *seine wesenhaften Verfassungmomente hin-durch.*]" (SZ 146/187)[101] 'Transparency' translates the German *'Durch-sichtig-keit'*. Since this is Dasein looking at itself, this means that the ontological reduction makes Dasein transparent to itself. '*Transparentia*' [*trans-pāreō*] does not only express the sight

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[101] Heidegger emphasizes '*durch*' and *'hindurch',* along with *'Durchsigtigkeit'* in these passages.

but also that which is sighted in the sight, the 'being-visible' of what is sighted, its presencing or 'ap-pearing' [*ad-pāreō;* presencing-toward.] *'Dia-phanous'* [διαφανής] points to a showing-through, which is a possibility of self-showing, by which what is sighted allows itself to be sighted. Transparency is the sight by which Dasein fully presents itself *to* itself, *through* and *toward* itself. The *phenomenon* of Dasein amounts to a *reductive* self-showing that finds no obstacle, and shines in the open, in full clarity.

It is not accidental that Heidegger emphasizes his words when claiming that transparency is the sight that grasps the "full disclosedness" of Dasein "*thoughout all"* its moments. '*Hindurch*' combines the gestures of projecting a *perspective* [*Durch-blick*] by anchoring a *viewpoint* [*Hin-blick.*] Also, 'transparency' or '*Durchsichtigkeit'* involves the sense of 'clear', 'sighted' and the 'visible' of *'sichtig';* and also the sense of 'searching', 'reviewing', and 'running-through' of '*Durchsicht.'*

Heidegger's characterization of Dasein's sight of its own Being as transparency is consistent with my account of the three moments of view—preview, viewpoint, and perspectival view. In fact, transparency takes the threefold structure of view at once, in its full accomplishment. The sense of transparency involves a view with depth, where the vision grasps both the forefront and the background's horizon, and all the elements in between. This vision is clear, free from opaqueness and obfuscation.

The concept of transparency also solves a potential difficulty. Pre-philosophically, we tend to understand that viewpoints and perspectives cannot provide a view of the whole, because they are numerous, even infinite. This is also a philosophical thesis—a phenomenological one. In perceiving, particularly in seeing something, we grasp an aspect (point) or perspective of it, that is, an *adumbration* or *profile* [*Abschattung*] that discloses

what is perceived only *partially*.[102] The fundamental-ontological transparency of Dasein is *analogous* to the absolute character of pure consciousness in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.[103]

> "Between the senses of consciousness and reality, a veritable abyss yawns. In the latter there is a merely contingent and relative being, presenting profiles of itself and never affording itself absolutely; in the former there is a necessary and absolute being, a being that in principle cannot be given through profiles and appearances." (Hua III/1: 93/90)

This *abyss,* Husserl thinks, is "the most radical of all distinctions of being—being as *consciousness* and being as "transcendent" being, "*announcing*" itself in consciousness." (Hua III/1: 141/136) But this 'most radical of all distinctions of being' cannot be fully understood if the sense of 'being' is not clear, and has not even been sought by an act of questioning.[104]

Different from transcendental phenomenology, in the *ontologically-reductive* sight of Dasein's Being we can and need to go through the one 'adumbration' that also discloses the entity from itself.[105] This 'adumbration' is the aspect or moment that shows the wholeness of the always-already-previewed whole of the entity. Pre-ontologically, this special adumbration is the *viewpoint* [*Hinblick*] of Being-in, which is an adumbration, but

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[102] See *Ideen I* §§41-44 (Hua III/1: 83-95/71-80).

[103] See *Ideen I* §§47ff.

[104] Heidegger's 'development' "of the ontological dimension of intentionality" as conceived by Husserl must be understood in terms of the ontological difference—and of Aristotle's difference between incidental and in itself (*locus.*) See Moran, "Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality", in *Inquiry,* Vol. 43, No. 1 (2000): 40.

[105] The comparison between transcendental and eidetic reductions and ontological and existential reductions must be traced on this basis. Heidegger thinks it is not possible to enact the transcendental reduction without dogmatically presupposing a pre-understanding of Being; the preunderstanding that leads us to interpret intentionality as consciousness. In light of this, in fundamental ontology, existential and ontological reductions are equiprimordial moments of the same reduction. In terms of the science of Being, this means that the ontological difference cannot be a possibility of Being without its orientation toward an articulation of Being in its basic structures. This is crucial for the ontotheological characterization of the formulation of the problem of Being.

at the same time it also shows all the possible adumbrations of the whole Being-in-the-world; the wholeness of the whole. In the *there* of Dasein, world and the Self coincide as the 'here' and 'yonder' relative to the 'there.' This coming together of the parts in their 'coincidence' is given by the *viewpoint* that secures transparency. This viewpoint does not obfuscate any part of the whole, but rather provides a point of access from where their co-incidental unity becomes clear. The same happens with the interpretation of the existential constitution of the *there as* its everyday manner of Being, in which it normally presents itself. That 'ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in' is *viewed as* 'Being-alongside', shows the articulation, the wholeness of the whole *there*. This view does not *enclose* or *miss* any part, and in fact shows itself as a unity through the *perspective* of care and upon the horizon of disclosedness.[106]

Transparency discloses the role of coincidence in the ontological reduction. It also clarifies why and how the wholeness of the whole fulfills its unity. In paragraph 41, when care is finally presented as the Being of Dasein, Heidegger claims that "this Being ['ahead-of… *as* Being-alongside'] fulfills the meaning of the title 'care' [*Dieses Sein erfüllt die Bedeutung des Titels* Sorge.]" (SZ 192/237)[107] Of course, this 'fulfillment' is not the one of coming to the presence of the entity, and encountering it face to face, in the flesh. Rather, it is the 'presencing' of Being. This is why this is a 'formal' fulfillment. It happens between a structurally-manifold wholeness of the whole Being and its unity. Such fulfilment is

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[106] The reducing-centering view is a disclosing. The manner in which the horizon of disclosedness grasps the ontological reduction as a whole will be treated in relation to the ontological *construction*; from the constructive perspective, the roles of world and space in the ontological reduction of Dasein become manifest.
[107] "Since our aim is to grasp the wholeness of this structural whole, we must first ask whether the phenomenon of angst and that which is disclosed in it, can give us the whole of Dasein… and whether they can do so in such a manner that if we view searchingly at this wholeness, our view of it will be filled in by what has been given us [*der suchende Blick auf die Ganzheit an dieser Gegebenheit erfüllen kann?*]" (SZ 191/235) For the phenomenological sense of the fulfillment of coincidence, see GA 20: 65/48ff.

grounded in the coincidence of the moments of the whole. To formally fulfill is to bring to coincidence under a unity. The unity (the Being) of care is the empty *coincidence* between the everyday falling of Dasein and its factical-existential constitution. It iterates the pre-ontological coincidence of yonder and here in the there. Yet this coincidence, in Dasein, is the coincidence of what has been differentiated in the ontological reduction. It is the coincidence between the ontical-pre-ontological and the ontological. It is the coincidence between entity and its reduced Being. Dasein *coincides* with its own Being in caring.[108]

29. Conclusion

In this text, I have outlined the reconstruction of fundamental ontology on the basis of the science of Being, and in the context of the threefold architectonic structure of phenomenological ontology. Reconstructing here means *carrying out* the formulation and answer to the question of the sense of Dasein's Being from its *way out*, as projected upon the formulation and answer to the question of Being as such, which determines its *outcome*. To carry out the construction of concepts in its way out and outcome is, I claim, one of the moments constituting the phenomenological destruction—the reconstruction before the deconstruction [*Abbau.*][109] This carrying-out provides the concept of phenomenological ontology.

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[108] For a reconsideration problematization of the coincidence of the pre-ontological and ontological (in connection with the structure of the act of questioning) from the standpoint acquired after the phenomenological destruction of the late 1920s, see Sallis, *Echoes. After Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 15ff. See also Jacques Derrida, *Marges de la philosophie* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 149.

[109] Cf. Part Two of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.* In the Kant book, I claim, Heidegger performs a phenomenological destruction. The parts of the book enact the different moments of the destruction,

The central thesis guides the reconstruction as the inner possibility of Heidegger's construction. My thesis is that the originary experience (problem) that gives rise to Heidegger's reductive recursion of entities in fundamental ontology is the *locus philosophiae;* that is, the unity of the four basic senses of Being in an ascent and a descent. The main aim of the project beyond the reconstruction of the concept of phenomenological ontology is the problematization of the ontotheological characterization of the problem of Being disclosed by Heidegger's idea of phenomenological ontology. This is to be addressed thematically by itself, beyond the limits of Heidegger's philosophy.

The present work only begins to formulate the reconstruction of the concept of phenomenological ontology. In Part One, I have clarified the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1) and of the science of Being (Chapter 2), as Heidegger presents them in *Being and Time,* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* respectively. These are basic concepts of the *what* and the *how* of phenomenological ontology. I have shown that the three prejudices about Being presented at the beginning of *Being and Time,* along with the formal characterization of the basic elements (entities, Being, sense) of the problem, are structured by the four basic problems of Being presented in *Basic Problems.* Moreover, I have indicated how they all ultimately rely on the four basic senses of Being. I have also exhibited how the structural moments of the question of Being, along with the clarification of the concept of the phenomenological method in *Being and Time* are structured by the three acts of reduction, construction, and destruction presented in *Basic Problems*, and fulfilled by the four basic problems of Being.

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analogously as I have shown here in Chapters 3 and 4, where the different moments of the reduction are enacted in the Analytic of Dasein: accessing, leading away, and leading back.

In Part Two, I project the reconstruction of Division One of Part One of *Being and Time;* that is, the reconstruction of the analytic of Dasein as the first moment of fundamental ontology. My claim is that the Analytic of Dasein constitutes the reduction of Dasein's Being, and as formulating two basic problems of Being (ontological difference and articulation of Being) in the context of the whole of fundamental ontology—however, within itself, the reduction formulates the four basic problems, and it stands as an independent whole. In Chapter 3, I analyzed the reduction of Dasein as a whole. I show that the reduction is grounded in the ontico-ontological distinctiveness of Dasein. Dasein is distinctive in the manner in which it self-differentiates its preontological and ontological Being, and in the manner in which it articulates its Being as existence. The distinctiveness of Dasein also involves that it is the entity where the ontological difference and the articulation of Being happen *as such*—Dasein's relatedness to Being is an understanding, a disclosing of Being. This second dimension of the distinctiveness of Dasein characterizes the entirety of fundamental ontology, and not only the reduction. It characterizes fundamental ontology as the ontical access to the science of Being and, architectonically— taking phenomenological ontology as a whole—as the reductive formulation of the ontological difference.

In Chapter 4, I offer a detailed reconstruction of the ontological reduction of Dasein. The ontological reduction is one of the two moments constituting the reduction of Dasein— the other being the existential reduction. It consists of the differentiation of the ontological difference in Dasein (called 'ontico-ontological differentiation') that articulates the ontical-preontological and ontological Being of Dasein in their structural unity of coincidence. The act of the ontological reduction is performed by Dasein's understanding understood as

sight, which in turn has a threefold constitution—preview, viewpoint, and perspectival view. Being-in-the-world is ontologically reduced in Being-in as the disclosedness of care. This chapter ends with an appendix that anticipates basic aspects of the existential reduction, along with a clarification of Heidegger's basic lexicon of Being on the basis of the principles of the reconstruction.

Beyond the text, the project will continue with the reconstruction of the existential reduction of Dasein, which articulates Dasein's existential Being. The act of the existential reduction is performed by Dasein's interpretative understanding, which also has a threefold constitution—fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. Afterwards, the project will show how the reconstruction accounts for the link between the reduction of Dasein, Husserl's concept of reduction, and Kant's concept of deduction. Part Three will reconstruct the construction of the Being of Dasein by means of its sense. Part Four will reconstruct the destruction of Dasein's reductive construction. The destruction of Dasein provides a beginning for the science of Being by integrating the experience of time that the beginning of fundamental ontology in everydayness had neglected.

APPENDIX – THE LEXICON OF BEING

In this appendix, I clarify some of the components of Heidegger's lexicon of Being, as they become fixed in the Analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time.* I show the correspondence between the three moments of the fore-structure by which Dasein's understanding develops into interpretation (fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception) and the three moments of the articulation of Being (constitution of Being, manners of Being, structures of Being.) When Dasein understands its own existence, the fore-structure constitutes the *how* of such understanding, and the articulation of the Being of Dasein constitutes the *what.* This understanding performs the *existential reduction of Dasein.* Heidegger's existential reduction is structurally analogous to Husserl's eidetic reduction. This appendix anticipates the reconstruction of the existential reduction of Dasein.

In the last edition of his landmark work on the history of phenomenology, entitled *The Phenomenological Movement,* Herbert Spiegelberg singled out Heidegger's work as *obscure*. This would become a customary critique against Heidegger. What is not customary about Spiegelberg's critical note, however, is that he *did* identify the source of Heidegger's obscurity. He indicates that "a fuller understanding of the significance of Heidegger's wonder of Being also presupposes a clear grasp of two related conceptions, that of the 'ontological difference' and that of 'mode of being'."[110] And with 'mode of

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[110] Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 348.

being' he makes clear that he is translating the German *Seinsart.* Now, the ontological difference is a central issue that receives explicit, thematic treatment after 1927. But what about this other concept, the concept of *Seinsart*? Spiegelberg concludes that "the clarification of the concept of mode of being would be crucial both for an understanding and for the ultimate justification of Heidegger's enterprise."[111]

Heidegger never discussed the concept of *Seinsart,* at least not explicitly. The concept first appears in the 1920s, in connection to the phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle. It progressively becomes more frequent through the mid 1920s. In *Being and Time,* the concept of *Seinsart* is employed more than 200 times, which showcases its relevance to the lexicon of Being.

It must be noted that Heidegger uses three different words whose meaning might seem close enough to even take them as synonyms. These three words are '*Seinsart,*' '*Seinsmodus,*' and '*Seinsweise.*' The three terms have been normally conflated in the scholarship. But they are distinct, even though their meanings are intimately connected. I translate '*Seinsart*' as 'manner of Being', '*Seinsmodus*' as 'mode of Being,' and '*Seinsweise*' as 'way of Being.'[112] *Seinsarten* are the *manners* of Being as they are differentiated in the *reductive* projection of an entity's Being, and particularly of Dasein's Being in the preparatory analytic in *Being and Time. Seinsmodi* are the *modes* through which the entity is modified or determined by its Being to appear in a *constructive* projection. *Seinsweisen* can be taken in two different senses: way of Being is how entities

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[111] Spiegelberg, 350.
[112] There is no consensus among English translators. The distinction between 'Seinsart,' 'Seinsweise,' and 'Seinsmodus' is commonly lost in translation. These terms have been translated as 'kind of Being', 'form of Being', 'mode of Being', 'way of Being', and 'manner of Being'. Some translations do not even keep a consistent choice throughout the same text. Although the meanings of these three terms are connected, and Heidegger seems at times to use them interchangeably, their distinction is crucial, and becomes clear when considering phenomenological ontology as a whole.

present themselves when their relation to Being is not differentiated (*Seinsarten* and *Seinsmodi* are both *Seinsweisen*); ways of Being are also said of Being as such, and in this sense, they point out to the ways in which Being grounds regions of entities.[113]

It must also be noted that, even though 'manner of Being' can be considered one of the most eminent concepts in the lexicon of Being, it is structurally connected with other concepts that need clarification. The lexicon of Being should be approached architectonically, in its structural connections. Manner of Being belongs in a triad of concepts, along with *state of Being* [*Seinsverfassung*] and *structure of Being* [*Seinsstruktur.*]

State, manners and structure of Being are, for the most part, said of Dasein's Being in *Being and Time*. They are the three moments that bring about the articulation of the Being of Dasein. That which is articulated, properly speaking, is the structure of Being. Now, the structure is structured or articulated through the manners of Being which are first distinguished from within the state of Being. This means that the articulation of Being is itself the inner connection between state, manners, and structure of Being. As Heidegger puts it by the end of paragraph 42 of *Being and Time*: "The whole of Dasein's state itself

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[113] The concepts of manners, modes, and ways of Being (normally undifferentiated and taken as one) have undergone a very diverse array of interpretations and appropriations. Some philosophers in the French phenomenological tradition have employed the concepts after Heidegger. See Éttiene Souriau, *Les differents modes d'existence* (Paris: PUF, 1946), *passim;* Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et infini* (Paris: Hachette, 1961), 46, 157; Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 323, 333, 339, et al. More recently, and in the context of the Anglo-American dominant way of doing philosophy, Kris McDaniel has appropriated Heidegger's notion of kinds or modes of Being to defend a form of ontological pluralism in the context of metaontological discussions. See Kris McDaniel, "Ways of Being", in *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology,* ed. David Chalmers et. al., 290-319 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Denis McManus has discussed the 'Being and Time Problem' as the tension between the unity of the concept of Being and the manifold of ways of Being. See Denis McManus, "Ontological Pluralism and the Being and Time Project", *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2013): 651-673. Bo Mou has recently addressed the problem of the ways of Being in Heidegger in comparison with Daoism. See Bo Mou, "On Daoist Approach to the Issue of Being in Engaging Quinean and Heideggerian Approaches", in *Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy,* ed. Bo Mou and Richard Tieszen, 289-320 (Boston: Brill, 2013).

[*Verfassung*] is not simple in its unity, but shows a *structural* articulation [*strukturale Gliederung*], which is expressed in the existential concept of care." (SZ 200/244)

Since state, manners and structure of Being bring about the articulation of Dasein's Being, they must also be related to Dasein's understanding and interpretation of Being, because these are the comportments through which Dasein discloses its own Being, as well as the Being of other entities. This relation between the articulation of Being and understanding of Being becomes clear in the transition from Division One to Division Two of *Being and Time*—that is, at the point in which the investigation arrives to Dasein's *Being,* which is also the point in which the investigation departs toward the *sense* of Dasein's Being.

My exposition here will be in fact restricted to the first moment of the articulation of Dasein's Being—the existentiality of existence, thus Division One of Part One. My aim is to make explicit the connection between the articulation of Being and the fore-structure of understanding, with a view to clarify some aspects of these three basic concepts of the lexicon of Being of fundamental ontology in connection to the reduction. I will just refer to paragraphs 45, and 32 of *Being and Time.* Paragraph 45 shows the correspondence between the three moments of the articulation of Being and the three moments of the fore-structure of understanding. Paragraph 32 points out, in an indirect manner, some mereological determinations of the three concepts of state, manners, and structure of Being.

The relation between the articulation of Dasein's Being and Dasein's understanding and interpretation of Being becomes clear in paragraph 45. Paragraph 45 opens Division Two, and Heidegger dedicates it to elucidate the outcome of the preparatory analytic of Dasein, and to sketch out the task that is left for fundamental ontology. The outcome of the

preparatory analytic in Division One is Dasein's Being, and what is to be obtained in Division Two is the *sense* of Dasein's Being. Thus, it is precisely at this point that Heidegger must highlight the relation between the articulation of Dasein's Being and Dasein's understanding and interpretation of Being. This relation is the following: state of Being, manner of Being, and structure of Being are that which is understood by respectively, the fore-having [*Vorhaben*], fore-sight [*Vorsicht*] and fore-conception [*Vorgriff*] of understanding.

Fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception are the three moments of the fore-structure of Dasein's understanding. And the fore-structure, as Heidegger puts it, shows how Dasein's understanding appropriates understandingly that which has been understood. Interpretation interprets that which the understanding has already understood, that is, that which the understanding has structured under the fore-structure.

Heidegger notes that "in ontological interpretation, an entity is to be laid bare with regard to its own *state of Being* [*Seinsverfassung*]… and thus to bring it into the scope of our *fore-having*." (SZ 232/275) A state of Being is what the understanding *possesses* first when understanding something. The subsequent 'steps' of understanding, as Heidegger puts it, must *conform* [*anmessen*] with the state of Being brought to the scope of our fore-having. The Being of the entity is already understood in its state of Being. The steps that follow the fore-having must *conform* to it but these steps also "need to be *guided* [*führen*] by whatever fore-sight is possible as to the *manner of Being of the entity*." (SZ 232/ 275) Manner of Being is the correlate of the act of fore-sight, and thus belongs in the state of Being while guiding the movement of the understanding toward interpretation. And finally, Heidegger indicates: "our fore-having and our fore-sight will then give us at the same time

a sketch [*vorzeichnen*] of that way of conceiving (fore-conception) to the level of which all structures of Being [*Seinsstrukturen*] are to be raised." (SZ 232/275) To sum: what is *possessed* by the fore-having is a state of Being; what is *seen* by the fore-sight are manners of Being; and what is *conceived* in fore-conception are structures of Being.

These are the only passages where the three moments of the articulation of Being are taken thematically as a whole and in their connection to Dasein's understanding and interpretation. This, however, not only was operative throughout the preparatory analytic of Division One but it is characterized by Heidegger at the beginning of Division Two as its main outcome. Still, Heidegger dedicates only a brief paragraph to these issues, and does not provide any characterization of the three moments of the articulation of Being. It is clear that these moments constitute what is understood through the understanding's fore-structure. Therefore, the determinations of the fore-structure should further clarify these three moments of state, manners, and structure of Being.

Heidegger discloses the fore-structure of Dasein's understanding in paragraph 32 through a description of Dasein's everyday understanding of the world and of entities ready to hand. The fore-structure articulates what is understood by the understanding so as to make it interpretable. The understanding first encounters the entity as having it in advance, as fore-having it. Heidegger notes that first "The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements." (SZ 111/145) What is relevant here is that the understanding first has in advance a totality, a whole. The whole is not grasped [*erfassen*] here, says Heidegger, explicitly, thematically, laid out [in the sense of *aus-legen.*] In fore-having the whole of the entity in its Being is presented at a glance, in one stroke. The wholeness of this whole, that is, that which makes the whole a whole, is that it is a simple

unity, with no distinct parts, with no inner-articulation. Since the state of Being is that which the understanding understands in the act of fore-having, the state of Being of an entity is the Being of such entity given as a simple, unitary whole.

We know from paragraph 45 that the understanding must always *conform* or be measured against this simple whole possessed in advanced. But what moves the understanding toward its completion is fore-sight. This fore-sight "takes the first cut out of what has been taken in our fore-having. (SZ 150/191) 'To take the first cut' [*anschneiden*] is to take the cut that starts the partition of something, the cut that opens something up and shows its parts. In fore-sight, the whole of fore-having is now understood as 'divisible', and thus as involving a manifold. For-sight is the act of cutting up the whole that state of Being is, the act of disclosing the phenomenal manifold involved in the state of Being. Since manners of Being are what the understanding understands in the act of fore-sight, manners of Being are the Being of an entity given as the phenomenal manifold distinguishing the moments within the state of Being's simple whole.

Now, what is seen in the fore-sight does not *distinguish moments* within the whole of state of Being arbitrarily, without direction or guidance. As an act of fore-sight, understanding understands "under the guidance [again, *führen*] of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted." (SZ 150/191) There is an intimate link here between *Hin-sicht* and *Hin-blick*. The fore-sight sees from a point of view. And what is understood is to be interpreted in regard to such viewpoint. This viewpoint articulates or structures the understanding. This means that the fore-sight is already guided by a fore-conception. "Anything understood… toward we set our sights 'foresightedly', becomes *conceivable* [*begreiflich*] or susceptible to conceptualization

through the interpretation… which has already decided for a definite way of conceiving it [*eine bestimmte Begrifflichkeit*]… grounded in something we *fore-conceive* [*Vor-griff*]" (SZ 150/191) The *orientation* of the viewpoint from where we can see something in *fore-sight* has been established by a *fore-conception.* Since the structure of Being is that which the understanding understands in the act of fore-conception, the structure of Being of an entity is the Being of such entity given as whole, now structured or articulated through the moments distinguished in fore-sight.

The analysis of these passages in paragraphs 45 and 32 of *Being and Time* has shown the following. State of Being [*Seinsverfassung*], manners of Being [*Seinsarten*], and structure of Being [*Seinsstruktur*] constitute the formal moments by which Being presents itself. Now, Being is projected by, and accessible through, the understanding of Dasein that develops into interpretation. Dasein understands Being by means of the three acts of the the fore-structure. In consequence, the fore-structure of Dasein's understanding discloses, respectively, each of the moments of the articulation of Being. Fore-having possesses the state of Being, fore-sight sees the manners of Being, and fore-conception conceives the structure of Being. Both the understanding and what is understood are mereologically determined. In possessing the state of Being, fore-having discloses a simple, unitary whole. In turn, the act of fore-sight discloses the diversity of constitutive moments of whole that the state of Being is. The constitutive moments of Being are manners of Being. Finally, the diversity of manners of Being are structurally guided by the fore-conception. This is why the fore-conception conceives the structure of Being. When disclosed in its structure, Being presents itself as a unitary whole that is no longer simple. The structure of Being presents the whole diversity of manners of Being as gathered back together in an articulated unity.

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When Dasein's understanding understands by fore-having, fore-sighting, and fore-conceiving, it *reduces* the Being of an entity; that is, it differentiates and articulates the Being of an entity. Now, since the entity that is eminently understood and interpreted by Dasein is Dasein itself, it follows the fore-structure and the articulation of Being are the *how* and *what* of the reduction of Dasein. More specifically, they are the *how* and *what* of what I call the *existential reduction* of Dasein.[114]

In the lecture course of 1925, *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time,* Heidegger had already sketched out the existential reduction as the articulation of Being through the acts of the fore-structure of understanding.[115] In this lecture course, it becomes visible that Heidegger's conception of the existential reduction of Dasein is inspired by Husserl's account of categorial intuition in the sixth Logical Investigation, a theory that describes how we encounter categorial elements in experience, in the context of a general theory of truth. There Heidegger presents Husserl's account of categorial intuition. He focuses on describing the mereological structure of categorial acts, that is, the relation between founding and founded acts in both acts of synthesis and ideations.

What Heidegger does not make fully explicit is Husserl's account of the structure of categorial acts as founded upon a founding act in the paragraph §48 of the

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[114] See Chapter 3.

[115] Although implicitly, this is already indicated in 1925, in the lecture course *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time.* In paragraph 18: "Dasein is to be laid out in its *Grundverfassung* […] The first aim of this analysis is therefore not so much a fully realized apprehension of all specific structures. Its first aim is rather to lay out the basic constitution of this entity as a whole. This does not require the unbroken fullness of the structures included in this totality along with the adequate and full research horizon which accompanies these structures in their entirety." (GA 20: 204/152) And in paragraph 31: "Care is the *Seinstruktur* of Dasein… The innermost structure of Dasein's caring about its being can be conceived formally as Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself. But we must understand this in the context of the structures which have hitherto already been exhibited." (GA 20: 406-408/293-294) See also GA 20: 413-415/299-300.

aforementioned Chapter 6.[116] More importantly, Heidegger does not associate his account of the fore-structure of understanding to the structure of categorial constitution. Heidegger's existential reduction is inspired by Husserl's eidetic reduction. [117]

According to Husserl, the first structural moment of categorial constitution is the founding act of apprehension of the object in a simple "straightforward fashion." (LU II/2, 152/286) Husserl provides an account of simple intention, in its paradigmatic case of direct in-person sense-perception, in paragraph §47. There he states that the intentional object of these acts is given as "a complete, unified thing" and its corresponding intentional act is also "always a homogeneous unity, which gives the object 'presence' in a simple, immediate way." (LU II/2, 148/284) The unity of the act of perception and of the perceived object does not "arise through *our synthetic activity*." The lack of synthetic activity grounds its immediacy, simplicity, and founding-character. This unity, in sum, "comes into being as a *straightforward* unity, *as an immediate fusion of part-intentions, without the addition*

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[116] In his reconstruction of Husserl's categorial intuition, Dieter Lohmar states that this threefold structure applies to *all* categorial acts. Dieter Lohmar, "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition," in *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology,* ed. D. Zahavi and F. Stjernfelt, 129ff. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002). I add that the threefold structure applies to all synthetic acts, and only to a kind of ideation. The first and second moments build upon each other and are preserved in the third. This means that the founding moment is co-intended. Thus, the originally perceived object is also co-intended, which is incompatible with ideative abstractions. Ideative abstractions do not need the threefold structure per se. However, since ideative abstractions are *normally* multilayered and based on synthetic acts of parts/whole relations, like the ones that are performed in eidetic variation, the threefold structure is at work in these kinds of eidetic acts, too. "Ideational Abstraction [is the act] where no such non-independent moment [non-independent moments of the perceived object or percept], but its Idea, its Universal is brought to consciousness and achieves *actual giveness*." A manifold of acts of abstractions "one of the same kind" are repeated and "we become aware of the identity of the universal through the repeated performance of such acts upon a basis of several individual intuitions, and we plainly do so in an overreaching act of identification which brings all such single acts of abstraction into one synthesis." (LU II/2, 162/292) See Sokolowski, "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition", *Philosophical Topics* 12, Supplement (1981): 127-141. See Richard Cobb-Stevens, "Being and Categorial Intuition", *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 44, No. 1 (1990): 43-66.

[117] Heidegger provides a brief account of this dimension of Husserl's theory. "In the simple perception of an entity, the perceived entity itself is first there simply [in 'onefold' as it were] without complication […] the real parts and moments included in it do not stand out in relief. But inasmuch as they are present […] they can also be brought out explicitly […] in new and special acts of explication. […] The explicating acts constitute an original unity of acts which, as an overarching unity, brings the new objectivity, more precisely, the entity in this new objectivity, to giveness." (GA 20, 87/64)

of new part-intentions." (LU II/2 148/284) This is the founding moment. It can take place independently, which makes it founding.[118] That the object of straight-forward intention is simple and homogeneous does not mean that it has no parts, "the parts which constitute it are indeed in it, but are not made our explicit objects in the straightforward act." (LU II/2, 152/286) They are 'fused', undifferentiated. These fused parts become explicit as parts in the second moment.

The second moment of categorial constitution is founded or dependent upon the first, and it is the one in which categoriality is firstly given, precisely in making explicit the differences and connections self-contained and fused in the simple, straight-forward object. "The same object [that was intended in straight-forward perception] can be grasped by us in explicative fashion: acts of articulation can put its parts 'into relief', relational acts bring the relieved parts into relation, whether to one another or to the whole." (LU II/2, 152-153/286) It is worth noticing that the 'explicative' acts have two modalities: articulation and relation. In articulating acts, that which was simple, with no parts, is now encountered in the multiplicity of parts it already contained without yet being manifest. In relating acts, the different parts show their mutual inner connections, and their connection to the whole. The parts are brought back together in a new unity. These parts are first articulated or differentiated from the first object. Only by this second moment do the first-differentiated-then-related "members [of the first moment] assume the character of 'parts' (or of 'wholes.')" (LU II/2, 153/286)

The explicative acts, which differentiate and relate, structure a new unity that *repeats* but *coincides* with the first unity. Thus, thanks to the third moment, the final unity

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[118] See LU II/1, 228-230/5-6; 261-264/25-26.

of the categorial object is obtained. "The articulating acts and, taken in retrospect, the act we call straightforward, are not merely experienced one after another: *overreaching unities of act are* rather always present, in which, *as new objects,* the *relationships of the parts* become constituted." (LU II/2, 153/286-287)

A simple whole first presents itself—the fore-having of a *Seinsverfassung*. Within the simple whole, a diversity of moments becomes manifest—the fore-sight of *Seinsarten*. Finally, this diversity is gathered under the unity of a structured whole—the fore-conception of the *Seinsstrukturen*. The manner in which Dasein reduces an entity's Being (and especially its own Being) is analogous to the manner in which the categorial is reduced from an object given directly in perception. There is nothing accidental in this structural correspondence between Husserl and Heidegger. From Heidegger's perspective, the structure of the existential reduction is more originary, and would ground the structure of categorial acts. What is reduced in categorial constitution is the Being of entities taken in the derivative way of Being of present-at-hand—Being articulated as *essentia* and *existentia*.

— μὰ τὸν κύνα.

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