BOSTON COLLEGE

THE MYTH OF 'SOFT POWER COUNTERTERRORISM'

A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING DERADICALIZATION AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM PROGRAMS IN THE WEST

A SENIOR HONORS THESIS

SUBMITTED TO

THE HONORS PROGRAM

OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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APRIL, 2017

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction And Literature Review

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Background of Islamist-focused CVE and Deradicalization

Western Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism in Brief

Disengagement and Deradicalization Literature

Individual-level Deradicalization: Theory Review

Definitions: Extremism, Radicalism, and Terrorism

Following a high-profile terrorist attack in Nice, France, in which a French Muslim drove a truck through a crowded beach, the French government extended its State of Emergency once again. A newsletter that the French government sent to French citizens at the time noted that the State of Emergency "is an integral part of our fight on our own soil just as it is in Africa and the Levant."[1] The claim is representative of a general trend in Western states facing a phenomenon of homegrown Islamist terrorism: declaring States of Emergency, known in academic literature as "states of exception".

Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE, has come to dominate discourse for counter-terrorism academics, students and policymakers alike. The appeal is easy to see: they're programs that make people less likely to become violent, meaning that there won't be home-grown terrorism to combat in the first place. The implementation of community policing would mean that costs could be cut in intelligence and lives could be saved, just by informing Muslims that they are *not* terrorists. Yet the buck stops there. No one has defined CVE and how to best approach it, there have only been criticisms of those systems currently in place. The defense is far too general and unexamined to be evaluated in any consistent manner. Furthermore, CVE policies have not been in place for long enough for law enforcement and government agencies to understand the extent to which their policies may or may not work. Furthermore, much academic literature surrounding CVE considers the policies in the context of Muslim-State interactions, and the ability of a state to *integrate* or *assimilate* Muslim communities into the host society. The academic literature about connections between immigration and integration is

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[1] "Partagez et Diffusez". Gouvernement.fr, 21 July 2016

already sparse. Beyond studies of immigration, academic studies also lack a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between integration trends, integration-level responses, and CVE.

CVE incorporates a variety of strategies for, primarily, integration of mal-aligned minorities or at-risk youth groups and communities. Foremost among CVE strategies is cooperation between law enforcement and local leaders to foster a sense of appreciation for the government; after-school activities like soccer team to occupy youth's time and make them feel included, and programs to aid immigrants in finding housing or employment. Each component has some merit, but as a whole, CVE programs appear fairly ineffective, both to professionals and community members.[2] The ineffectiveness is particularly apparent in states such as France and the U.S., where a number of "Muslim extremists" conducted large-scale attacks in 2015 and 2016.

The problem is not only that they are ineffective (or effective, for that matter). The problem is that neither policymakers nor academics understand what does or does not work in CVE policies. There is little consensus as to which communities or groups are to be targeted, and even definitions for the word "extremism" has been through multiple iterations in the countries presented in this study. One area of concern is the extent to which CVE or de-radicalization efforts target communities that wouldn't otherwise be at risk, and which may ultimately feel marginalized or even demonized by the blatant presence of law enforcement in their community. Another area of concern in CVE is the disparate nature of authority and accountability. For example, many strategists for CVE programs suggest using the gang prevention techniques of the 1980s as a cookie-cutter solution to radicalize or violent communities. Yet those very gang prevention techniques began failing when law enforcement had been present for too long and its liaisons became wary of the long arm of the law. The same would happen in almost any other situation. Finally, and most concerning, is the tendency to equate CVE and de-radicalization programs with anti-Islamist extremism programs. This narrow-sightedness has led to policies that will be unable to address future, non-Islamist threats to homeland security.

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[2] Interviews conducted by author, April 2016.

CVE programs could be harmless enough, if they are just rhetoric with some small indicatives. What I fear, however, is that CVE is part of a soft-medium-hard power cycle, in which the discussion of "soft power," integration- and counter narrative-based counterterrorism efforts veils actual government action in the medium power range. The governments in this study have rarely resorted to hard power as a solution to integration programs, but often turn to what I've termed "medium power". Medium power is the utilization of the state's authority to restrict freedom of movement for particular groups of people. This restriction of freedom tends to be through law enforcement, including raids on homes, confiscations and excessive imprisonment. The state also restricts freedom through immigration control and profiling immigrants, and marginalizing a community from the state's general society. Medium power is dangerous in that it threatens civil liberties and the liberal nature of Western governance. Perhaps more worrisome, medium power use may result in *increased* radicalization, as communities ultimately must turn inward – without support from external society. This trend is unfortunately beginning among the American Muslim community, where there are reports of less trust in law enforcement and a greater sense of being targeted unfairly.

I will argue here that states typically resort to "medium power" during "States of Emergency", or their per-literature term, States of Exception. That is, when a state is presented with an internal threat, the best option is not to operationalize brute force and hard power against the internal threat, but rather to degrade it through medium power measures. Citizenry are less apt to criticize measures that seem, while perhaps unfair, at least not outrageous. These ideas will be considered in the following cases, which Asses the degree to which the U.K., France, and the U.S. have relied on medium power both historically and in the present.

In turn, the extent to which a state resorts to medium power can be used as a measure of the effectiveness of CVE, at least as far as government policymakers determine. An increase in law enforcement or immigration control may reflect a sense of emergency coming not only from specific events but also a public belief in a constantly present threat. CVE programs are intended to react against the perception that there is a constant threat, so it seems that a public perception of danger implies CVE have not adequately done their job.

Another challenge to policymakers around the Western world is the idea of deradicalization. For instance, on November 7, 1983, a bomb exploded in the U.S. Senate building, representing the height of terrorist activity by the "Weather Underground," a far-left terrorist movement active in the United States in the 1960s and 1980s. In 2002, Laura Whitehorn, an ex-member of the group, spoke to a filmmaker producing a documentary about her involvement with the group: "I still have hope...I do think people never stop waiting for the moment…" In a clip a minute earlier, one of Whitehorn's colleagues from the Weather Underground had noted, "I certainly would do it again." The Weather Underground ceased to exist in 1981.[3]

The documentary, also titled *Weather Underground*, involved extensive interviews with ex-members of the organization, many of whom now teach in universities -- the very locale in which they became radicalized in the 1960s. The final remarks of its interviewees leave feelings of empathy and unease. If they were willing to bomb the capitol of the United States in the 1980s, and they still feel that a revolution is imminent, couldn't they do it all again?

Given the drastic increase in security and counterterrorism measures within the FBI, CIA and State Department since the 1970s, it seems implausible that the Weather Underground or any like far-left domestic terrorism group could resurface in any kind of threatening way. The problem, however, is that the motivations behind terrorism have not ceased. Some members stated unabashedly that they still believe in the movement and stand by their actions. These ex-terrorists, while disengaged, are not deradicalized. Similarly, The significant difference between disengagement and deradicalization has remained largely unexamined in academic works.[4] Scholars have analyzed forces of radicalization in great depth, but have not attempted to formulate and assess deradicalization programs. Instead, scholars and policymakers alike have debated the

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[3] *The Weather Underground

,* Film, directed by Sam Green and Bill Siegel 2003)

[4] John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism*, 1. publ. ed. (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2009b). (cont. below)
Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Jul 1, 2006), 7-48. doi:10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137538.
Stephen Vertigans, The Sociology of Terrorism : Peoples, Places and Processes (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011).

extent to which the "securitization of immigration" has led to more or less terrorism, with scholars such as Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia arguing that heightened security in fact exacerbates the tensions underlying radicalization in contemporary America.[5] d'Appollonia provided scholars with a breakthrough analysis that demonstrated the conflation in the American and European psyches of immigrants and terrorists since the late eighteenth century.[6]

While d'Appollonia contributed significantly to the conversation surrounding state responses to terrorism, she did not adequately address the ways in which "new terrorism" had bred new counterterrorism; in fact, she noted "neither the United States nor European countries dramatically changed their policy options in the aftermath of 9/11."[7] She took issue with the claim that "the emergence of obscure, idiosyncratic millenarian movements, zealously nationalist religious groups, militant antigovernment, far-right paramilitary organizations, and a transnational network of religious extremists that seeks the restoration of theocratic rule over what was once a vast pan-Islamic empire arguably represents a different and potentially far more lethal threat than traditional terrorist adversaries," such as the Weather Underground.[8] The implied debate between these two camps has been largely ignored among academics, although numerous conceptions of "modern terror" abound, especially with regards to the changed nature of terrorist organizations' international outreach and expanded military capabilities. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas theorize that the increased lethality of "new terrorism" is "actually the product of terrorists' reasoned response to loosening constraints on their behavior caused by changes in funding sources."[9] Funding sources have evolved to enable terrorists or extremists to have access to funds from drug or oil trafficking, as well as international networks of financial support for groups. For example, the Tamil Tigers notably received significant funding from international donors. There is an assumption that the evolution of technology and globalizing forces has

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[5] Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear* (Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012) 4.

[6] ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Rev. and expanded ed. ed. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2006). Pp. 127

[9] *Terrorism Financing and State Responses : A Comparative Perspective *, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;query=Id:%22library/lcatalog/00141798%22.

created terrorism in an entirely unprecedented way. Such an assumption is inherently dangerous, because when regimes are presented with something they can't understand, the tendency is often to criminalize it.

Lorenzo Vidino suggests that the categorization of Muslims as a terrorist "other" is inherently bad for society and, moreover, represents bad counterterrorism policymaking. He notes, "on the one hand, the idea of establishing a police-led system that singles out individuals simply for expressing views that, according to very vague and subjective standards, could be considered extremist is at odds with the ideals of all Western democracies and could stigmatize the Muslim population."[10] Vidino's argument is compelling, yet he fails to fully demonstrate the extent to which a "police-led system" isn't only bad for Muslims: it is, rather, an ineffective and time-consuming approach to counterterrorism for future generations.

Without a proper understanding of the radicalization process and the ways in which CVE and Deradicalization programs may or may not be effective, governments have proven prone to taking drastic actions against individuals. The classic example in the United States, of course, is the passage of the an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act which enabled U.S. law enforcement officials to detain "any alien for forty-eight hours without charge and to extend detention for an additional period in the event of an 'emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.'"[11] Such a statement enabled an expansion of counter-terror measures that de-legitimized the U.S.'s moral stance in matters of criminal justice and human rights. The USA PATRIOT Act, of course, followed suit in the trend towards actions taken directly against individuals, consistent with state actions which Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia has labeled the "Immigration-Security Nexus."[12]

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[10] Lorenzo Vidino, "Countering Radicalization in America," in *Radicalization*, Vol. 4 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010), 411-429. http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo19413.
[11] 66 Fed. Reg. 48334-35 (Sept. 20, 2001), Amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(D), . (September 20, 2001).
[12] Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear* (Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012)1.

Background of Islamist-focused CVE and Deradicalization

Although the threat of Islamic extremism, especially from large, organized groups such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, has remained omni-present since the 1980s, governments did not begin to formulate pre-radicalization programs until the United Kingdom presented "Prevent", meaning "Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy" in 2003, in order to combat Al Qaeda-inspired rhetoric in the UK as part of CONTEST, the larger counterterrorism strategy. Although critics of "Prevent" abounded, policymakers in other states followed suit slowly, with the U.S. not addressing the topic until late 2010. Countries such as Denmark and Germany have advertised their respective CVE policies as largely successful in diminishing the number of foreign fighters leaving to fight for Syria. One noted that "the notion of 'countering violent extremism' is rarely defined let alone conceptualized or theorised within the literature...the focus in the literature on countering violent extremism is generally on strategies that aim to respond to, or prevent violence...rather than on understanding how 'countering violent extremism' is constituted and emerges in particular ways." While academics frequently use the term, it is significant to note that even Wikipedia doesn't include a page for "Countering Violent Extremism" - a search for the term re-directs to the mostly different term "counter-terrorism." Implicit in this is a conflation of two entirely separate topics. The conflation is   telling.

Another dilemma in the study of CVE programs is to what extent they have been a factor in preventing radicalization among populations, especially because it is nearly impossible to prove that someone was influenced to, for example, *not* travel to Syria to fight. Take for instance Denmark. Denmark heralded its CVE program as having decreased the number of Danish foreign fighters significantly. However, the Danish government's data may not concretely indicate a correlation to its CVE program. A number of other factors, such as a decrease in ISIS's need for Danish foreign fighters or ISIS's diminishing ability to pay its foreign fighters, may have been the primary influence in lowering the number of Danish foreign fighters in 2015. It is thus unclear whether programs implemented since the rises of Al Qaeda and ISIS have, in fact, worked to deter radicalization. CVE studies systematically lack an ability to demonstrate causation   from   the   correlative   studies.

An understanding of CVE also requires an assessment of its political expediency. CVE may be a means for government officials to formulate an answer to a problem perceived as not having an answer. If that is the case, it is imperative to present an argument for or against using CVE policies to diminish the threat posed to a state's security by radicalized non-state actors. Furthermore, CVE policies may unintentionally bolster nationalist movements heralded by far right parties in both the U.S. and abroad. In the ISIS-centered context of contemporary politics, CVE programs seem to target and single out Muslim communities by simply delegating de-radicalization or prevention tasks to the "Muslim communities," meaning usually, a single imam. The programs thereby separate Muslims from society, which may further potential causes of radicalization.

CVE policies are under-evaluated. CVE arose out of a desire to formulate *preventative* measures against radicalization and movement to extremist action. Yet "prevention" is in-and-of itself vague, and raises extensive questions as to how policymakers ought even begin to go about formulating preventative approaches. The Director of the U.S. Office for Community Partnerships, George Selim, defined CVE, as encompassing "a number of efforts, including prevention and intervention programming, as well as alternative dispositions which involves the possible development of disengagement programs in the post-crime context, both prior to trial and following conviction."[13] Director Selim's definition is appropriate for a general audience unfamiliar with CVE programs, but, alarmingly, Selim presented this rather unfocused definition to the U.S. Senate's Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs -- the very audience that would supposedly be regulating and, to an extent, formulating some kind of CVE programming measures.

Selim's presentation was part of a Senate hearing meant to enable the Committee to begin assessing CVE measures in place, in the hope that these CVE measures would prove to be remarkably effective. Unfortunately, the results of the oversight hearing were mixed, if not entirely unclear. The Committee heard testimony from representatives of the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of State, as well as

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[13] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Written Statement of George Selim, Director Office for Community Partnerships U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2016, .

two analysts. The representatives from each department affirmed that their respective efforts were making slow but steady gains against ISIS, but analysts contested this claim, as did senators.   Moreover, Twitter has been heralded for its suspension of well over 10,000 ISIS-related or -promoting accounts in the past two years, suggesting that the private sector may be more effective than government measures to counter extremist propaganda.[14] The French government blames social media and the private sector for not doing enough, but no government has addressed the relative harm it may cause.

Disengagement and Deradicalization

Peter R. Neumann's four-volume *Radicalization* is a comprehensive collection of essays discussing the development of deradicalization programs around the world. Neumann's approach is to underline the critical concepts towards deradicalization, whether in strategic or military terms. However, most of Neumann's selections for the volumes reflect a desire to understand the processes of radicalization. Neumann is thus guilty of encouraging a line of thinking in which understanding of radicalization in context is integral to formulating an approach to deradicalization. It is thus necessary, for this paper and other academic inquiries, to evaluate how important an understanding of the whole gamut of radicalization forces exist; it seems, based on USAID's approach, that paying such attention to radicalization prohibits an efficient system.

Notably, Anthony Richards provided a helpful essay titled "The Problem with 'Radicalization:' the remit of 'Prevent' and the need to refocus on terrorism in the UK."[15] Richard's argument centered around the idea that the UK has suffered from no "consistent notion of what is meant by 'radicalization'…while there have been significant successes in thwarting terrorist attacks since 7/7, the lack of clarity as to *who the radicalized are* and what Prevent is precisely supposed to address has given rise to a sense of strategic drift."[16] The fundamental problem in the 'Prevent' program, according to Richards, is that it does not consider deradicalization as a separate process from

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[14] Delshad Irani, "How Social Media is Preventing the ISIS Advance Online [Brand Equity]," *The Economic Times (Online)*Nov 3, 2016. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1835099191.
[15] ANTHONY RICHARDS, "The Problem with 'radicalization': The Remit of 'Prevent' and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK," *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (Jan, 2011), 143-152. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00964.x.
[16] ibid. pp 143.

disengagement, and expands surveillance of individuals who may be "vulnerable" to becoming radicalized based on an expansive set of potential causes of radicalization. The USAID report confirms this theory by demonstrating a vast array of potential causes. If CVE policies were to rely on radicalization theories, nearly all individuals in a society would be categorized as "vulnerable" to becoming radicalized. Therefore, there is a lack of a discussion as to how to narrow the definition of radicalization and "vulnerable" individuals.

Klejda Mulaj noted the distinct importance of DDR methods, as simple disengagement leaves the possibility for a return to violence or other forms of extreme political action. DDR refers to programs to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate.[17] The concept has been used specifically in the context of civil wars and insurgencies, but may be relevant to an ongoing discussion of counterterrorism.[18] The challenge, as Vertigans suggests, is that "civil wars appear to have a credibility in terms of justification and rationale that is rarely attributed to terrorist forms of political violence."[19] Yet CVE and deradicalization programs must consider the extent to which domestic "home-grown" extremist networks are a form of civil war.

It is also imperative to understand the role of formal state-led "integration" systems that offer a way to bring immigrants into a community. States generally lie somewhere along a spectrum, which is composed of Germany or France's strict assimilation policy on one end and British multiculturalism on the other. Assimilation, generally, refers to integration by total assumption of the "native" culture – understanding the native language with fluency, passing tests to assess levels of civic and historical understanding, and, sometimes, adoption of "Western"-style dress or values. The process is conducted on an individual's own will – immigrants are expected to learn and conform on their own. Multiculturalism, on the other end, refers to a system of integration by which the state takes a rather *laissez-faire* approach to integrating immigrants, preferring to allow ethnic groups to form communities that support themselves and usually maintain their home culture. There is less of a requirement to

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[17] Klejda Mulaj, *Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2009).
[18] Horgan, Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis
[19] Vertigans, The Sociology of Terrorism

adopt specific values or perceptions. Integration strategies will be referred to throughout this work, as most studies (at least, those governments tend to cite) suggest radicalization occurs when an individual feels disempowered and disconnected from their society due to a lack of integration and acceptance by the host community. States tend to deal with the problem of integration differently, but it is certainly connected to programs to deradicalize. Additionally, community-level-focused government initiatives usually emphasize the need to foster appreciation for the host culture and society – an initial step in attempting "integration." For instance, a 2011 report on the Prevent Strategy in the UK observed, "the dependence of successful Prevent work on developing a sense of belonging to this country and on a perception of the importance and legitimacy of integration."

Individual-level Deradicalization - Theory Review

There is significant literature theorizing about the potential roots of individual radicalization. The USAID analysis, while informative, focuses on radicalization agents in non-Western countries, and therefore is difficult to apply to individuals living in Western countries. USAID efforts in non-Western countries are directed towards preventing individuals from joining U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), and are therefore biased to focus on groups that would be more likely to carry out attacks in the U.S. Stephen Vertigans takes a comprehensive look at the academic literature surrounding the sociological explanations for radicalism. Most critically, Vertigans presents contemporary theories about the terrorist psyche and puts them into historical context. For example, Vertigans notes that the present association of terror and poverty has precedence in past waves of terrorism, in which relative deprivation; frustration-aggression, narcissism-aggression and blocked social mobility theories played a prominent role. He notes that even "in the fourth century BCE Aristotle blamed poverty for acts of political violence."[20]

The Sociology of Terrorism presents explanations for individual-level decisions to join terror groups, and then moves on to understanding the psychological and sociological underpinnings of groups engaged in terrorism. His perhaps most compelling

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[20] ibid.

argument is that the individual may desire to join a terror group because of integration into a "social habitus." Social habitus theory purports that terrorism may be more likely in societies where violence is an accepted norm within a given society. Governments play a role in the creation of this context through normalized and legitimized uses of violence such as war and utilization of the death penalty. Violence can also become engrained in a social habitus as part of a common history of protest or violence. For example, protest is highly normalized in France, making individuals more likely to pursue heightened forms of protest (e.g. terrorism) in their efforts to achieve regime reform or change.

Social habitus theory is supported by examples in which "engagement with broader social movements leaves more room for radicalization," such as the radicalization of the so-called "Hamburg cell" prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.[21]

Ultimately, Vertigans' historical examples demonstrate the similarities in contemporary terrorism. While Vertigans does not directly assess state policies towards various forms of terrorism in the past, the examples in his book share a similar narrative: incarceration as a response to terror. As he noted in a discussion of post-anarchist state actions, "anarchists in Germany and Russia were largely eradicated through persecution, imprisonment and execution".[22] Indeed, this is the crux of this paper's analysis of the soft vs. medium vs. hard power. Governments, both historically and in present time, respond far more often with medium and hard power than with soft power when faced with "existential" threats to national security.

Vertigans fails to adequately examine ways in which governments or societies may begin to address the problems of terrorist recruitment and deradicalization. His adherence to a sociological framework prevents him from suggesting any kind of forward movement; instead, he relies on past examples to demonstrate that contemporary society must face similar challenges from terrorism as it has since nation-states and violence have been possible. Several of Vertigans' examples provide the reader with an

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[21] Vertigans, The Sociology of Terrorism, p. 71
[22] Vertigants, The Sociology of Terrorism. p. 64

opportunity to glean insight, yet true insight will require examination of a much broader range of topics than Vertigans' approaches.

His analysis covers roles of the media, mosque and community building, bottom-up recruitment, and group dynamics. He briefly acknowledges the importance of some historical examples, such as the Italian policy of leniency in the 1980s. The program has more recently been used in the Colombian government's efforts to offer immunity to FARC rebels in Colombia. Both these examples suggest that the only way to overcome extremists and to aid in de-radicalization is to incorporate and welcome the extremist groups into their general society. An in-depth historical analysis across cases enables us to evaluate the extent to which a decreased acceptance of an extremist group within society is correlated to levels of extremist activity and/or radicalization rates. To measure such a relationship, this study will consider immigration levels compared to actual threat levels and integration or law enforcement reactions from the state.

Disengagement programs demonstrate the extent to which governments are willing to conduct integration efforts only with a proven and present threat. Aside from the sociological aspects investigated in Vertigans, Horgan dove into the psychological formation of extremists. John Horgan considers de-radicalization in the context of disengagement, for which, according to Horgan, "there is a critical need to identify and collect data that would inform and develop our knowledge on individual disengagement from terrorism."[23] Horgan presents an analysis of disengagement processes based in a separation of psychological disengagement and physical disengagement. He notes that this separation begs the question of different levels of de-radicalization among the two groups; it seems reasonable that terrorists who only left a violent extremist group because of physical pressure would not necessarily have removed their motivations to conduct violence[24].

While presenting a strong case for the difference between the two types of disengagement, his analysis of cases inadvertently draws attention to the lack of data supporting his claims of a legitimate disengagement process. His data comes primarily from interviews and statements made by self-proclaimed ex-terrorists, but there does not

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[23] John Horgan, "Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis," in *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, eds. Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009a). Pp. 28

[24] Ibid.

exist a real measure by which to assess the legitimacy of the individual's' separation from terrorism. For instance, he quotes an ex right-wing extremist as saying, "Prison was the best thing to ever happen to me."[25] The quote is difficult to legitimize considering its anecdotal nature, and underlines the inherent problem with deradicalization programs: there is not a means to legitimately and authoritatively say that someone has "deradicalized." While literature abounds about the defining characteristics of radicalization, there is little explanation of what a *deradicalized* individual would be.

Tore Bjorgo, on the other hand, turned to an assessment of deradicalization of right-wing extremist groups in order to assess the psychological processes involved in moving away from an ideology.[26] Bjorgo et al. evaluated disengagement programs in Sweden, Norway, and Germany to come to the conclusion that NGO disengagement groups appear to help more extremists than government groups, despite the larger amount of funds available for governmental programs. They suggest this anomaly may be due to NGOs' inability to conduct follow-up research tracking their clients. There is thus very little analysis of recidivism rates among disengaged far-right extremists in these countries, just as there is for the cases studied in this work.

Bjorgo et al. did, however, contribute an understanding of the early programs seeking "de-radicalization." They note that a "common trait is that these projects are *addressing the general life situation* of the clients rather than giving priority to changing racist and extremist attitudes, which has also been the approach of traditional programmes to reduce racist movements."[27] The importance the authors give to this idea of de-radicalization evidences their bias towards a "relative deprivation" theory of extremist radicalization, at least within the scope of their study (comprising Sweden, Norway and Germany).

The most prolifically written in topics of deradicalization are John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock are arguably the pioneers in research on the effectiveness of de-radicalization programs. Their analysis of Northern Ireland's,

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[25] Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism

[26] Tore Bjorgo, Jaap van Denselaar and Sara Grunenberg, "Exit from Right-Wing Extremist Groups: Lessons from Disengagement Programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany," in *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 1st ed. (Hoboken: Routledge Ltd, 2008).

[27] Bjorgo, van Denselaar and Grunenberg, Exit from Right-Wing Extremist Groups: Lessons from Disengagement Programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany pp. 150

Columbia's, Indonesia's, Yemen's, and Saudi Arabia's various approaches to institutionalized de-radicalization concluded that each state uses de-radicalization towards slightly different specific objectives is somewhat unsupported: their evidence equates territorial insurgencies with ideological terrorist groups, as well as equating states with secular agendas and states with Islamic agendas. Yet the diversity of factors in their examples is also a strength for Horgan and Braddock. By developing a framework to assess programs in a variety of contexts, Horgan and Braddock are able to propose a method that may help policymakers regardless of the state, constituency, or target. Saudi Arabia will be considered later in this work, as its historical efforts at CVE and deradicalization have targeted interpretations of Islam and Islamist terrorism more often than the other cases in this work (the U.S., U.K. and France).

With regards to radicalization in the United States, Lorenzo Vidino opened a conversation about how to evaluate current deradicalization[28]. He then proposed seven policy recommendations, which warrant listing here:

1. Policymakers should understand the radicalization process

2. Policymakers need to decide whether to target only violent radicalism or, more broadly, cognitive radicalism.

3. Policymakers should be aware of the deepening role of ideology in the radicalization of Western Muslims

4. An effective counter radicalization strategy must be prepared to intervene in ideological and theological matters

5. Counter radicalization programs should choose partners carefully

6. Policymakers and program managers should deliver appropriate messages to mitigate problems in implementation.

7. Policymakers need to devise metrics to empirically measure the results of their actions.

To an extent, most governments have followed Vidino's suggestions. Policymakers have begun refining methods and processes. However, the lack of consensus as regards definitions of terms like "extremism" and "radicalism" makes it extremely difficult for "community engagement" efforts to be applied in any sort of strategic way. Moreover,

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[28] Vidino, *Countering Radicalization in America*, 411-429

there has been little research into the *metrics* to measure the efficacy of CVE and de-radicalization programs. Indeed, most rely on the most basic metric: the low number of attacks perpetrated since a program's initial implementation. Such failed reasoning and logic should be unacceptable for policy standards.

These recommendations are helpful for formulating and assessing CVE programs as well. Throughout this work, a common theme will be the connections between deradicalization programming and CVE programming. Interagency cooperation is difficult to achieve within one sector, but it may be necessary to cooperate across agencies and across fields of research. It is imperative that CVE and Deradicalization programs be assessed so as to assure that they do not target Muslims in the West, and so that they can be adaptable for future versions of extremism, regardless of ideological foundations.

Defining Extremism, Radicalism and Terrorism

Various scholars have debated the validity of terrorism definitions, yet there is relative consensus about the terms "extremism" and "radicalism". This distinction is likely due to the way in which politicians have employed "terrorism" as a buzzword, intended to elicit emotional responses rather than a relaxed academic approach. Zartman and Faure claim, "the [Obama] administration currently tends to avoid the term "terrorist" and prefers "extremist." How synonymous the two terms are is a matter for a not-too-interesting debate...for the purposes of analyzing state decisions, the term "terrorism" must be accepted as meaning 'any movement termed 'terrorist' by the state,' since it is that designation that underlies the state's problem with engagement."[29] Zartman provides this analysis in order to discuss *modern* terrorism and extremism, but is slightly mistaken in his assumption that the terms can be used interchangeably.

For purposes of this study, *extremism* will refer to the belief in an ideology that advocates or sanctions the use of violence towards the expansion of that ideology's

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[29] Ira William Zartman, *Engaging Extremists*, 1. publ. ed. (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011).

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popularity. *Radicalization* refers to the process by which an individual adopts extremist beliefs and begins to condone violent action in the name of a particular ideology. *Terrorism* refers to a violent action committed by non-state actors against non-combatants in order to achieve a political goal or to stimulate widespread fear among a population.

Therefore, the two terms are separable as ideology-driven (extremism) and action-driven (terrorism). By this definition, all acts of "violent extremism" are also acts of terrorism (such as Islamist "lone wolves") but acts of terrorism may be only political in nature, and therefore not violent extremism (such as revolutionary terror groups seeking to overthrow a regime). Far-Right parties and far-Left parties advocating violence for political and ideological objectives are examples of extremists which are highly likely to transition into terrorist groups. There is therefore an important opportunity for lawmakers and counterterrorism task forces to stop a group from transitioning from an *extremist* movement into a *terrorist* movement.

"Countering violent extremism (CVE)" policies are intended to stop this process before it has begun, whereas "deradicalization" policies intend to transition a terrorist into an extremist and then from an extremist to a non-violent citizen. Deradicalization therefore encompasses CVE in theory and ambition. Deradicalization programs have been in place for much longer than CVE programs; thus, CVE programs are likely to incorporate deradicalization concepts. But from where do policies makers derive conceptions for how to deradicalize an individual? Peter R. Neumann is perhaps the leading authority with regards to deradicalization. His four-volume text *Radicalization* explores the various facets of radicalization as it was and is understood in both the historical and contemporary contexts. Neumann's work will be an important cornerstone for this study's conception of deradicalization.[30] From there, CVE policies are largely unexamined and un-evaluated.

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66 Fed. Reg. 48334-35 (Sept. 20, 2001), Amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(D).

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2. CASE ONE: THE UNITED KINGDOM

Chapter Outline

Historical Approach: Soft Counterterrorism Measures and Deradicalization of the IRA

      Deradicalization and Prevention Programs in Northern Ireland (1929-1995)

      Resources Provided to Irish Deradicalization Programs

Contemporary Approach: Multicultural Integration, Prevent, and Community Engagement through Channel

      The UK's Multicultural Integration Model

      CVE in the UK: The Prevent Framework (2005-2017)

      Law Enforcement and Immigration Control

      Community Engagement: Channel and its subsets

      Resources for Prevent Programs

      Prevent in an International Context

Deradicalization: Where does it fit in?

Conclusions

      The following case studies are presented in chronological order according to the debut of each state's efforts to officially "combat violent extremism." This analysis will thus begin with the United Kingdom, which many scholars herald as the preliminary community-integration programming effort related to contemporary Islamist terrorism. It is important to note, however, that many states had been involved in various forms of soft power counterterrorism and even anti-violence community engagement long before the creation of Prevent in the UK, and indeed, even long before September 11, 2001.

      The UK provides an interesting starting point because it has the most extensive history of domestic terror for these case studies. Furthermore, as Jacobson notes, "a more in-depth review reveals that while aspects of the USA PATRIOT Act are far-reaching, there are also respects in which other countries such as Britain...have enacted laws giving their prosecutors and law enforcement officials even greater power."[31] Britons have indeed struggled to reconcile various counterterrorism measures with human rights and

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[31] Michael Jacobson, The West at War; U.S. and European Counterterrorism Efforts, Post-September 11, Vol. 21 (Portland: Ringgold Inc, 2006) p.62.

constitutional obligations. For instance, the Law Lords found Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (2000), which required exemption from the European Convention for Human Rights, to be an unconstitutional abrogation of British citizens' rights. Parliament replaced Part IV with an act allowing for "control orders," which were also subjected to constitutional review and subsequently outlawed by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, enacted in December 2011.

Therefore it is exigent to analyze and assess not only the effectiveness of CVE and deradicalization legislation in the UK, but to address whether those programs violate civic or human rights of citizens and/or noncitizens and the extent to which the state may be found culpable for actions taken by law enforcement which stigmatize certain communities. There is no dispute that so-called Islamophobia is a societal phenomenon, yet there is significant ambiguity in the analysis of the role the state has played in allowing such a xenophobic phenomenon to take root in a country which advocates for "multicultural integration." In order to fully understand the context of CVE and deradicalization legislation in the UK, this chapter will consider the legacy of the IRA's domestic terror campaign and the counterterrorism measures enacted to combat it.

HISTORICAL APPROACH: Soft Counterterrorism Measures and Deradicalization of the IRA

The United Kingdom has experienced one of the longest ongoing terrorist and insurgent threats in modern state history. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) formed in 1919 in order to advocate for the reunification of Ireland and separation from UK rule. Despite ongoing internal splits, the IRA continued to exist and challenge British rule until 1998. The violent faction of the group, IRA-Provisional (PIRA), believed terrorism to be an integral component in their challenge of British rule, and consequently claimed responsibility for attacks that killed over 3,500 people between 1969 and 1998.[32] British reactions to the IRA and larger empire-wide nationalist campaigns were relatively consistent: outlaw opposition groups and incriminate group leaders. The policy persists

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[32] Kimberly Cowell-Meyers and Paul Arthur, *Irish Republican Army (IRA)*Encyclopædia Britannica Inc, 2016). https://www.britannica.com/topic/Irish-Republican-Army.

through today to some extent, as 60 former IRA militants remain imprisoned in specialized units in the UK.

Eamon Collins, a former militant who was allowed to leave prison as a provision of the Good Friday Agreement's Early Release Scheme, provided an interesting look at the psychology involved in becoming a member of the PIRA. His commentary is illuminating in the current context, as it examines the role of the greater public in terrorist campaigns, which mimics to some extent the ways in which "Islamophobia" and the rise of Far Right parties are seen to increase support for radical Islamist groups among Western Muslims. Collins noted "I believe that everyone in Ireland should be prepared to examine critically where they stood in relation to the war. It corrupted thousands of people by making them ambivalent towards violence…. they contributed to the continuation of the blood feast by quietly exulting in particular acts of violence, as they watched the television news from the safety of their living room."[33] Furthermore, the case Collins presented of the PIRA actions includes the transnational nature of terrorist campaigns, an aspect of modern terrorism that many analysts consider "new". Collins pointed to the Italian anarchist group the Red Brigades, noting "I believed the IRA could be turned into an organization which could take on the capitalist state and the agents of that state, as the Red Brigades had done in Italy."[34] The IRA therefore constituted a sort of transnational non-state group; sometimes conducting attacks abroad (albeit on British targets). Viewing the IRA's activity as in some way transnational makes the British government's interactions with and attempts to destabilize the IRA a particularly poignant example for comparison to the present-day CVE and deradicalization-focused preventative approach today, when transnational and external groups are considered the primary threat to national security.

Soft Power: De-radicalization and Prevention Programs in Northern Ireland (1929-1995)

Scholars and journalists have documented various similarities between the struggles that Northern Irish republicans faced during the Troubles and the contemporary

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[33] Eamon Collins and Mick McGovern, "Introduction
," in *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books, 1997), 1-29.
[34] Collins and McGovern, *Introduction
*, 1-29

obstacles facing the Muslim community throughout UK territory.[35] Several news stories in 2016 reported an increasing trend of British citizens -- even young children -- being required to participate in deradicalization programs.[36] There is talk in both the public media and in Parliament and the British Home Office of expanding the use of "mandatory deradicalisation" programs, which raises questions of liberty of action and freedom of thought. Mandating certain individuals to go through deradicalisation without their consent implies a certain authority of the state over individual minds. Corinne Purtill remarked that proposals to segregate Islamist extremists in prison bear a striking resemblance to programs (which have since been denounced as counter-effective) enacted in the 1970s that moved Irish terrorists to specialized prisons in Belfast, Long Kesh, Maze, and Maghaberry.[37] Purtill echoed the concerns of many radicalization scholars that "prison authorities tend to respond to security fears by creating a more restrictive environment, facilitating the creation of oppressive and minimalist regimes," and in turn the object of the restrictive measures creates a distinct target. In the historical case, the distinctive targets were Irish ex-paramilitaries. In the contemporary case, it is Muslims, especially young Arab men.[38]

Prison-specialization proposals differ only slightly from deradicalization programs in the latter half of the twentieth century, aimed at Irish paramilitaries. This is despite the fact that the fight against a domestic insurgency with a straightforward objective (the Troubles) was motivated in significantly different ways than present-day lone wolf Islamist or Far Right terrorism. As such, however, the similarities between the

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[35] Purtill, What Northern Ireland Teaches Us about Today's War on Terror

[36] Sima Kotecha, "More than 400 Children Under 10 Referred for 'Deradicalisation'," *BBC News*-01-21T06:08:04+00:00, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35360375. "Deradicalisation Programme Referrals on Rise." *BBC News*-10-08T09:31:45+01:00, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34469331. "EXCLUSIVE: UK Government to Introduce 'Mandatory Deradicalisation' Scheme," last modified 22 Jul, accessed Jan 13, 2017, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-government-introduce-mandatory-deradicalisation-scheme-746303354.

[37] "Anguish Haunts Northern Ireland's Retired Terrorists," last modified 15 Jul, accessed 8 Jan, 17, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/anguish-haunts-northern-irelands-retired-terrorists-n392326. "What Northern Ireland Teaches Us about Today's War on Terror," last modified 15 Jul, accessed Jan 13, 2017, http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-07-15/what-northern-ireland-teaches-us-about-todays-war-terror.

[38] UK government documents recommend this measure, as its research has shown that terrorists (both successful and thwarted) tend to be men under the age of 30 years old.

governmental responses to the Irish terrorist threat and contemporary threats provide a solid framework for a study of how current policies may have grown from the old.

The Good Friday Agreement marked a turning point in the so-called "Irish Troubles." The "Troubles" refer to the period between 1920 and 1998 in which Irish paramilitary groups conducted violent attacks in order to protest and fight against the British military presence in Northern Ireland. Irish-focused deradicalization programs fall into the category of DDR, or disarmament, disengagement, and reintegration. The Good Friday Agreement ensured both disarmament and demobilization, as the signatory terrorist groups were required to disarm immediately and cease terrorist activity. In exchange, prisoners from the groups were allowed shortened stays in prison, under the Agreement's Early Release Scheme. The Early Release constituted the "reintegration" component of the agreement, yet failed to truly create a framework in which ex-paramilitaries could truly re-integrate into society. Interviews conducted with ex-paramilitaries indicate a difficulty finding employment and acceptance by the greater UK society. This lack of integration represents a failure of the Agreement's effort at DDR, and has left a security gap for re-radicalization.

Community groups took on a role in the reintegration process. For instance, the group Tar Isteach offers counseling to former IRA combatants, even today.[39] The community-involvement has been heralded as an important element of the Prevent category of the UK's CONTEST strategy. Yet there is little governmental oversight, and these unsupervised community groups are the main bulwarks against re-radicalization. "Community engagement" programs have thus become a central means for ex-paramilitaries to reorganize and, in fact, re-radicalize. Neil Ferguson highlighted a problem in stating that "for many participants, they had actually become more radical through their time in the organization or especially whilst in prison rather than less."[40] Community groups have existed since before the Good Friday Agreement, meaning that they constituted and established procedure prior to any official government involvement. There is not sufficient data to consider whether such groups were more effective before or after governmental oversight. A comparison between heavily monitored community engagement deradicalization groups and those that operate more independently of the

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[39] Purtill, What Northern Ireland Teaches Us about Today's War on Terror
[40] Ferguson, Disengaging from Terrorism: A Northern Irish Experience

government may be a particularly helpful comparison considering the ambiguity surrounding current groups' effectiveness.

Soft Power: Resources Provided to Irish Deradicalization Programs

Resources for Irish terrorist deradicalization programs significantly decreased as Islamist terrorism rose and increasingly threatened UK territory and citizens. This trend started in prisons, where there remain at least 60 Irish ex-paramilitaries as of early 2017. Purtill observed that the "ability of the prison service to adequately staff such units and provide deradicalisation programmes is questionable.

> Over the last few years, staffing and resourcing difficulties have led to a rapid deterioration in safety and security within English and Welsh prisons. Meanwhile, over 1,000 prisoners are believed to be extremist or vulnerable to extremism – yet only 60 are engaged in specialised interventions addressing these issues. This raises concerns about the ability of the prison service to maintain order and control in such units and what those detained there will spend the majority of their time doing."[41]

Such an analysis confirms the theory that specialized prisons may in fact lead to further radicalization. Unfortunately, work with Irish ex-paramilitaries hadn't matured before British government officials began efforts to create legislation directed towards extremist Islamist groups. Some British government CVE and deradicalization policies and statutes do mention Far Right extremist groups, yet there have been limited efforts to "deradicalize" Far Right extremists and even fewer efforts to create "specialised prisons." A clear problem with British deradicalization is that it is too focused on Muslim extremism and therefore not focused enough on other forms – a critique which policymakers tend to ignore when faced with the political pressure to act on crises.

CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: Multicultural Integration, Prevent, and Community Engagement (Channel)

The 9/11 attacks on the United States created repercussions worldwide, especially within states allied to the United States that suddenly felt an increase in threat to their national security from external sources. The United Kingdom, accustomed to dealing with *internal* terrorism began efforts for a reformed counterterrorism strategy soon after

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[41] Referring to CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report for 2014, 2015). http://publicinformationonline.com/download/71706.

the attacks, and in 2003 released CONTEST, whose goal as stated in a 2011 report summary released by the Crown, was "to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence...This new strategy reflects the changing terrorist threat and incorporates new Government policies on counter-terrorism."[42] The stated aim of CONTEST suggests that the UK Government considers the contemporary terrorism threat to be completely unprecedented in UK terror and counterterror history, and that the threat of terrorism is such that people cannot "go about their lives freely and with confidence."[43] This last claim has been the subject of significant criticism, as scholars and Muslim community leaders alike have pointed to the myriad ways in which CONTEST has, in fact, prevented more British citizens from living "freely" than prior to the strategy's enactment.[44]

Prior to implementation of CONTEST, governmental efforts to prevent terrorism were fairly sparse. The British experience with the IRA cemented the idea that terrorism was the result of extreme political views by domestic groups, at least in the UK. Anthony Richards noted, "the broad remit of Prevent lay in being in denial about...the significance of internal factors as underpinning radicalization."[45] Parliament did enact a series of laws in the late 1990s and early 2000s directed at immigration control, which notably demonstrate the UK's ignorance (prior to 2005) of the potential for "home-grown," non-Irish terrorism on a large scale. The Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 was smaller in scope and purpose than the subsequent Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 and then the Asylum and Immigration Act of 2004. The 2002 Act instituted a nationality test, the passing of which would be requisite for gaining British nationality. Many commentators noted the test is overly difficult, somewhat reminiscent of Jim Crow voting

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[42] UK Parliament, *CONTEST the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (London: , 2011). http://publicinformationonline.com/download/23565.

[43] ibid.

[44] Dominic Casciani, "Analysis: The Prevent Strategy and its Problems," *BBC News*-08-26T16:27:39+01:00, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28939555. Jo Dillon and Severin Carrell, "War Against Terror: Court Challenge to UK Anti-Terror Laws," *The Independent*Jul 14, 2002. http://search.proquest.com/docview/312073397.

[45] ANTHONY RICHARDS, "The Problem with 'radicalization': The Remit of 'Prevent' and the Need to Refocus on Terrorism in the UK," *International Affairs* 87, no. 1 (Jan, 2011), 143-152. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00964.x. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00964.x/abstract.

prohibitions in the United States.[46]   That action, in addition to the later 2004 Act, reinforced a closed-border attitude towards permanent immigration in the early part of the 21st century. The Acts also increased control over asylum-seekers, mandating them in some cases to undergo programs to "adapt" to British culture. The programs conflict with Western liberal values, which would espouse freedom of though, and seem to contradict the UK's purported "multicultural" approach to immigration, which would enable those of different cultural backgrounds to nevertheless be a part of their society.

The 2011 report mentioned above, the first released government report regarding CONTEST, suggested two primary targets of needed counterterrorism efforts: Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) and radical Islamist terrorism coming from Al-Qaeda affiliates and, mainly, "terrorist groups based in Pakistan." Interestingly, the 2011 report suggested that tackling of NIRT should be done by the central UK government, despite efforts in 2002 and subsequent years to divert NIRT-related counterterrorism to MI5, in Ireland.[47] The 2002 effort is indicative of a trend that will be described throughout this chapter and each case study, in which counterterrorism policymakers shift focus to target specific groups, as opposed to formulating programs to combat terrorism in a more general way – the "medium power" approach.

CONTEST created four strategies in order to combat extremism (albeit without a clear-cut definition of the word "extremism"): Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. As the comparative case studies will demonstrate, a significant problem with this form of targeted counterterrorism is that it leaves a gap in which groups outside the program's target pool may conduct terrorist attacks or threaten the security of a state without the state being able to truly "Prevent" or "Prepare." This paper will assess the Prevent tenet, as analysts and foreign policymakers have most often looked at Prevent as the tenet most in need of reform and most vital to maintaining state security, indeed, to maintaining the integrity of many modern states.

Prevention of "homegrown" terrorism is a new concept, even within the CONTEST framework. Between 2003, the inception of CONTEST, and the July 5, 2005

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[46] Alan Travis and home affairs editor, "Being a Good Brit: A User's Guide," *The Guardian*-09-04, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2003/sep/04/asylum.politics.; Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear* (Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012).

[47] Liam Clarke, "MI5 to Get Irish Terrorists Role," *Sunday Times (London, England)*Jun 30, 2002.

London bombings, political rhetoric remained largely focused on the threat of externally-based terrorism, that is the "Pakistan-based groups" which targeted Western values and Western democracies.   However, the July 5 bombings demonstrated to the British population and British policymakers that domestic terrorism, the terrorism inflicted by so-called "Lone Wolves" represented a severe threat.   Analysts have yet to truly identify the causes of domestic radicalism; theories vacillate between socio-economic disparities and psychological problems.[48] In several European countries, a dominant theme has been the lack of integration of Muslim communities into the country's political and social fabric.   Integration techniques will be evaluated as a part of CVE and soft power policy considerations in each case study; however, it is important to note that integration efforts have never been seriously considered as the primary soft power approach. Indeed, there is a clearer tendency in developed countries to make efforts at deportation and mass detainment than integration -- in a return to a "medium power" approach.   Thus, to some ends, talk of "integration" in various forms is more political rhetoric and appeal than true policy objectives.

In the wake of the July 5, 2005 London Underground bombings, various Muslim organizations in the London area published communiqués which not only condemned the attack, but asserted a sense of cooperation between security services and the Muslim community.   For instance, the Muslim Council of Britain noted, "we must and will be united in common determination that terror cannot succeed. It is now the duty of all us Britons to be vigilant and actively support efforts to bring those responsible to justice…"[49] Likewise, the Muslim Association of Britain stated, "all communities, including the Muslims, must cooperate with the security agencies in order to prevent any further such attacks. We cannot rule out the possibility of a conspiracy to carry out more attacks in the future, whether near or distant...community leaders, clerics, journalists, academics, politicians and decision makers need to face up to the causes of radicalisation

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[48] "Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?"*Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses* (Washington: CQ Press, 2010), 34. doi:10.4135/9781483330822.n2.
http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781483330822.n2. USAID, *Understanding and Responding to Causes of Violent Extremism*, eds. Deborah M. Price and Joshua W. Morris (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011). Stephen Vertigans, *The Sociology of Terrorism : Peoples, Places and Processes* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011).
[49] Muslim Council of Britain. "Condemnation of London Bombings." *UK Newsquest Regional Press - this is Lancashire*14 Jul, 2005.

of the Muslim youth in the United Kingdom."[50] Yet between 2005 and 2016, the UK security services in fact increased the rift between them and Muslim communities, ostracizing many communities through mosque raids and heightened supervision.

Soft Power: The UK's Multicultural Integration Model

Discussion of integration as a means of preventing terrorism tends to contradict policy responses to terrorism, such as the three state responses promoted by David Lake, Robert Pape, Scott Atran and other terrorism experts.[51] Such experts suggest that terrorism is a rational approach to a perceived power dynamic in which the terrorist-employing group cannot defeat the state through non-violent or state-structured responses. Prevention and CVE policy, on the other hand, is predicated on an assumption that some part of homegrown terrorism may be motivated by isolation from the state's general community, revenge, psychological illness, or a by-product of socio-economic disadvantage. Indeed, the UK Parliament has stated that integration will be its primary focus in the prevention of extremism: "whereas Prevent is part of CONTEST, a counter-terrorism strategy, and deals with terrorism, the Government will address the challenge of extremism -- and extremist organisations in particular -- primarily through other means. They include: the Government's new approach to promoting integration, which DCLG is leading; other parts of the criminal justice system, notably legislation regarding religious and racial hatred; and debate and civic challenge."[52] Thus, policy took an impetus towards decentralization. The concern, moreover, is driven by a claim that "there is an association between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a society...which is cohesive and integrated…*Prevent* depends on a successful integration strategy."[53] As recently as 2016,

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[50] Musim Association of Britain. "Condemnation of London Bombings." *UK Newsquest Regional Press - this is Lancashire*14 Jul, 2005.

[51] Lake suggested that, in response to domestic terrorism, a state may either do nothing at all or minimally increase security, capture and eliminate the terrorists, or retaliate militarily. See David A. Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century," *Dialogue IO* 1, no. 1 (Jan 1, 2002), 15-29. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S777777770200002X. ROBERT A. PAPE, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (Aug 1, 2003), 343-361. doi:10.1017/S000305540300073X. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S000305540300073X. Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Mar 7, 2006), 127-147. doi:10.1162/016366006776026239. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v029/29.2atran.html.

[52] Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Prevent Strategy*

[53] ibid.

another Parliamentary policy command paper noted that there would be a sophisticated "review into how we can boost opportunity and integration in our most isolated communities."[54] It is therefore prudent to take a deeper look at how the UK approaches integration in relation to its efforts with Prevent, especially considering the frequent revisions to Prevent implying that it needs continual improvement.

Government officials and academics in the UK began to consider integration to be a key aspect of counter terrorism in 1998 after the signing of the Good Friday Accords. Integration strategies were initially considered a rehabilitative measure, and in counter-terrorism related more closely to 21st century deradicalization programs, as they sought to re-integrate members of the PIRA into British society with a more favorable and non-violent view of the radical's former enemy state. This perspective explains the reliance on specialized prisons and community rehabilitation groups.

Many scholars have observed the relatively closed-off nature of the assimilation model used in France when compared to the relatively open nature of the UK's multicultural approach. Yet, as CVE programs have made evident, the UK's approach is only multicultural so long as the multiple cultures adhere to "shared British values." It is those undefined "shared values" which pose such a significant problem for CVE program implementation, and perhaps a driving reason that the UK resorted to more "medium power" approaches. Prevent's strategy has seemed dependent on a common cultural understanding, which in many cases may ultimately lead to further radicalization of the targeted populations and communities. The state's actions in the absence of "shared values" is perhaps more telling than the grandiose conception of "multiculturalism." Indeed, state targeting of minorities and ghettoization leads one to question whether multiculturalism can exist on a society-wide level anywhere.

Soft Power: CVE in the UK: The "Prevent" Framework (2005-2016)

As is obvious by its name, Prevent is the CONTEST tenet devoted to the prevention of radicalization and attacks on British home soil. Prior to July 2005, Prevent aimed to obstruct British citizens from joining extremist groups abroad. The focus on groups abroad and the threat they pose to UK security is evident in the 2011 legislative report assessing each component of CONTEST. The report's authors suggested that

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[54] Great Britain. Home Office, Counter-Extremism Strategy / Home Office

> "preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism and also part of a terrorist narrative. Challenge may mean simply ensuring that extremist ideas are subject to open debate. But where people seek to enter this country from overseas to engage in activity in support of extremist as well as terrorist groups we will also use the Home Secretary's powers to exclude them."[55]

Thus, there is a general impression that extremism coming from groups abroad presents the greatest challenge to UK security. This is similar to with the USA's post-9/11 focus on foreign intervention and USAID work abroad, as will be discussed later.

More recently, however, Prevent has been used as the foundation of efforts to prevent homegrown radicalism and terrorism. As part of Prevent, the UK Parliament has organized significant amounts of research into radicalization (causes, drivers, and theories). A review of Prevent highlighted the

> "search for identity, meaning and community," radicalization as a "social process particularly prevalent in small groups" and, mainly, "an ideology that sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence; a network of influential propagandists for terrorism, in this country and elsewhere, making extensive use of the internet in particular; and by specific personal vulnerabilities and local factors which make the ideology seem both attractive and compelling" as the primary causes of radicalization, especially Al Qaeda and Islamist-related radicalism.[56]

The report also suggests that extremism is more likely among youth and those disaffected with the government and police force. Yet there has been little effort to repair the level of trust citizens have in the police force.

In order to tackle the identified radicalization tendencies and policing complexities, the Prevent framework incorporates elements of police work, community engagement, and international development work. The most tension exists between the first two areas of Prevent, with policymakers and government officials repeatedly asserting that community engagement is essential, like has been successful with both the IRA case and with gang prevention and disengagement.

While laudable in its scope of research and attempted policy solutions, Prevent, at least as presented in official reports, is full of contradictions. Foremost among these contradictions is the relationship between the state and law enforcement and communities: community-members are more likely to become radicalized when they

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[55] UK Parliament, CONTEST the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism
[56] Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Prevent Strategy* (London: British Crown,[2011]).

perceive a strong law enforcement presence in their community, yet increased policing and "strict monitoring" is the proposed solution for gaps and problems within Prevent. Parliamentary Command Papers and Reports indicate that policymakers are aware of this contradiction and have made various efforts to solve it, first in 2007 and subsequently in 2011 and 2015. For instance, the 2011 report has been used by various governmental agencies for its succinct definition of extremism: "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs [and] calls for the deaths of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas."[57] This definition is rather all encompassing, as it covers values, governmental obedience and loyalty, and military authority. The definition implies that "extremism," while not relating to a specific form of extreme belief, is rather a term to refer to antipathy towards the British state, even in "vocal opposition." Again, this aspect of Prevent raises serious concerns for the "values" of British legislation, and the extent to which free speech may increasingly fall by the wayside.

The most consistent complaint in each subsequent review of Prevent is succinctly stated in the 2011 review: "there have been allegations that previous *Prevent* programmes have been used to spy on communities…. *Prevent* must not be used as a means for covert spying on communities. Trust in *Prevent* must be improved."[58] Considering the broad scope of the "extremism" definition alone, it is no surprise that many British citizens fall into the category of "extremists," thereby warranting, from a legal perspective, supervision and surveillance. Allocation of resources and a comparison with the treatment of ex-PIRA militants shows that supervision and surveillance is considered a priority in the absence of public forms of soft power.

A 2015 Prevent review gave more emphasis to extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups, including groups like Blood and Honour which do not overtly conduct violent attacks but rather promote and advocate for violence towards minority groups. This may to some extent answer the critique earlier in this paper that Prevent, and UK de-radicalization programs more specifically are too narrow in scope and audience.

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[57] Quoted in "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice," ACI Information Group, last modified 22 Aug, http://scholar.aci.info/view/146482d05fe083b0168/156b6e2d451001073c3ff94.

[58] Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Prevent Strategy*

Moreover, the 'mandatory deradicalization' has been the implemented against solely the Muslim community, justifying the perception that the UK government is spying on Muslim communities.

Medium Power: Law Enforcement and Immigration Control

Authorities and policymakers have often highlighted Peter Clarke's 2014 investigation into the predominantly Muslim Birmingham community known as *Trojan Horse*. In that investigation, Clarke revealed that law enforcement had failed to respond to clear trends in radicalization. In particular, Clarke pointed to extremists occupying high-level posts in schools. The law enforcement therefore has stepped up it's monitoring of school administrators.

Immigration control has been another area on which media attention has focused as a reaction to increased risks from terrorists. The UK government began using immigration control in order to maintain a tighter grasp of the non-citizen population, having observed that most Islamist attacks (foiled and perpetrated) in London were committed by individuals with extensive familial links to foreign countries, and Pakistan in particular. The 2011 report noted that

> "The Government already uses immigration powers to protect the public from extremists...We will continue to use these powers when it is necessary and proportionate to do so. We will make it more explicit that the criteria for exclusion on the grounds of unacceptable behaviour include past or current extremist activity, either here or overseas. Those who intend to travel to the UK should be clear about our expectations...we will strengthen the 'good character' requirement in citizenship applications to include whether an individual has promoted extremist views, or acted in a way which undermines our values...We can already refuse to grant a visa to those whose presence in the UK is not conducive to the public good."[59]

Hidden in the above language is an effort to exclude from the UK not only those who may pose an overt security risk, but those who may disrupt the "public good" or may fail to live up to standards of "good character." Such exclusions are similar to France and the USA, but are difficult to compare to the earlier example for Great Britain, as the IRA constituted an entirely domestic threat. A slight similarity may be drawn between the

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[59] Great Britain. Home Office, *Counter-Extremism Strategy / Home Office* (London: British Crown, 2015).
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/summary/summary.w3p;query=Id:%22library/lcatalog/01133518%22.

Early Release Scheme's criteria, which required characteristics to be met in order for an ex-militant to qualify for early prison release. It is important to consider, however, that the effort to shut down immigration is in fact a central component of far-right parties, and is widely considered to have been a major factor in the 2015 UK "Brexit" referendum in which British citizens opted to leave the European Union. Immigrants have been portrayed by conservative politicians as vying for scare jobs and resources while decreasing overall national security; a fact which scholars such as d'Appollonia state is untrue. Yet large influxes of refugees coming out of the Syrian civil war and terrorist-related violence around the world has made immigrant populations, especially new groups which may not speak local languages, prevalent around Europe. The UK's exit from the European Union would enable it to cease abiding by EU agreements on refugee and migrant acceptance into the country; portending even more closed-off borders.

As such, the *Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales*, a 2011 policy document outlining the role of leaders in law enforcement working to prevent violent extremism and the radicalization leading to it, is illuminating. The policy statement suggests that Prevent is intended to be a risk-based approach, as opposed to the broad-based Islamophobic law enforcement system initially implemented in 2002 as a response to the increasing public demand for action against terrorism. Law enforcement officials, according to the policy, are "frontline staff who engage with the public" and

> "should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to be aware of what we mean by the term 'extremism and the relationship between extremism and terrorism.'"[60]

This well-intentioned effort to clarify extremism and terrorism have not been substantiated by open source investigation, but it is promising that such a goal has been established. However, it may be a misguided approach, as it has been shown that political suggestions of a link between terrorism and immigration actually increase radicalization by stigmatizing communities to the point that they feel completely excluded from a piece of their identity and thus must seek radical identities.[61] The policy furthermore emphasizes a decentralized power framework in which "local authorities"

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[60] Home Office, Secretary of State, *Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: For England and Wales* (London: British Crown,[2015]).
[61] Chebel Ariane d'Appollonia, *Frontiers of Fear*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

such as county councils spearhead efforts to regulate law enforcement and ensure it remains consistent with the Prevent ideals and the recommendations of experts in countering extremism and radicalization. As recently as August 2016, a report on Islamist extremism in prisons commented on the need to improve security service and law enforcement understanding of the definitions of radicalization and the causes leading to extremism, as well as greater coordination between police and central counter-extremism and counter-terrorism groups.[62]

Prison reform in order to prevent radicalization is an area of significant interest for UK policymakers. The very same report suggested a return to the system of "35specialized" prison units, used for Irish terrorists. The 2016 report suggests that containing known highly violent extremists – the report uses the term TACT (Terrorism Act) to represent those individuals imprisoned under the Terrorism Act of 2000 -- ought to be placed in contained units with specially trained police and deradicalization specialists. It is further justified, by the report, because "[Islamist] prisoners extend the threat of radicalisation beyond those arrested for terrorist offences.

> Other prisoners -- both Muslim and non-Muslim...are nevertheless vulnerable to radicalisation by Islamic Extremists. Statistics show an increasing and disproportionate representation of Muslims within the criminal justice system, which could chime with the radicalisers' message of the victimisation of Muslims."[63]

Unfortunately, the report does not consider whether the victimization of Muslims is justified. Rather, the proposed action is to expend resources in order to create more prisons and to, in fact, congregate Muslims -- extremist and non-extremist alike -- in separate prisons. Such action would negate the potential positive effects of prison-time, which in countries like Indonesia, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia have been proven to decrease radicalization.[64] Moreover, findings in other countries have suggested that prison radicalization occurs in the absence of an imam-and the specialized prisons don't provide any actions to improve that.

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[62] "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice."

[63] "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice."

[64] Tore Bjorgo, Jaap van Denselaar and Sara Grunenberg, "Exit from Right-Wing Extremist Groups: Lessons from Disengagement Programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany," in *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 1st ed. (Hoboken: Routledge Ltd, 2008).

Soft Power: Community Engagement: Channel and its subsets

The most widely-adopted aspect of Prevent internationally has been "Channel," an effort implemented by which police seek to work with "liberal Muslims" in order to engage potential extremists and prevent their radicalization. The "community engagement" aspects of Prevent are supposedly separate from law enforcement and intelligence components. Community engagement strategies comprise efforts to connect government authorities with leaders in civil society, including NGOs, community service organizations, and religious organizations. Since 2014, there has been a push in governmental policy to regulate positions of power in schools. Yet then-Home Secretary, now Prime Minister Theresa May noted in March 2016 that

> "The House debated the Second Reading of the Investigatory Powers Bill, which will ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to keep people safe in a digital age. Through our Prevent and intervention programmes, we are working to safeguard people at risk and to challenge the twisted narratives that support terrorism. That includes working with community groups to provide support to deliver counter-narrative campaigns. Our Channel programme works with vulnerable people and provides them with support to lead them away from radicalisation, and, as we announced as part of strategic defence and security review in November last year, this year we will be updating our counter-terrorism strategy, Contest."[65]

The efforts have evolved over the year, but presently focus 54% of resources and programs in "debates, discussions and forums" – activities linked to Western efforts to formulate an effective counter-narrative. Other activities that Prevent purports to advocate for are general educational activities, leadership and management activities, non-accredited training, arts and cultural activities, and sports and recreation. These strategies parallel programs in Saudi Arabia discussed earlier; however, the UK's programs have much more limited scope as a result of more limited resource allocation and limited legitimacy.

In terms of the deradicalization side, an upsurge in Syrian refugees beginning in 2014 has led to increased calls for deradicalization efforts. As of mid-2016, reports calculated that authorities have referred nearly 4,000 individuals to Channel. An article in *The Guardian* noted that this number averages to about 11 people per day, "nearly triple

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[65] Gabrielle Garton Grimwood and Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons.,
*Radicalisation in Prisons in England and Wales * (London: House of Commons Library,[2016]).

the figure of the previous year [2015]."[66]   The National Police Chiefs Council's figures list that 293 of those referrals were Muslim, outnumbering the next most populated religious group, "not known" by over 100 people.   In an age breakdown, the majority of those referred were between the ages of 15 and 19, far younger than the target age range suggested by investigative reports that the UK Parliament commissioned.

Within the prison setting, there is a suggestion that prison imams have failed to prevent radicalization of prisoners, due to the "intimidation" posed to imams by "charismatic [Islamist Extremist] prisoners acting as self-styled 'emirs' and exerting a controlling and radicalising influence on the wider Muslim prison population."[67] Such claims demonstrate ignorance on the part of investigators to the nature of Islam or the ways in which Imams may be able to influence prison radicalization. Indeed, the 2016 UK prison report noted that,

> "While most chaplains were dedicated members of staff and did good and useful work, there is also evidence of a weak understanding and effective approach to IE. There is for example a...lack of management control over access to extremist literature and materials. The review further noted that Deobandism being the 'default' version of Islam in prisons could be problematic if non-Deobandi chaplains and prisoners felt marginalised...vetting and clearance arrangements for chaplains should be strengthened."[68]

Such a move lends credence to those in the Muslim and wider UK communities which point to the ways in which UK government is attempting to control Islam and Muslims, giving, in fact, more fodder to the fire of radicalization. It is, in fact, the polar opposite of "community engagement CVE" and contrary to ideals expressed by the 2011 and 2015 Prevent summaries. For example, the prison report recommends the following in order to clamp down on radicalization:

1. "An independent advisor on counter-terrorism in prisons, accountable to the Secretary of State and responsible for an over-arching counter-extremism strategy."

2. Ensuring that "senior post-holders responsible for the strategy have sufficient and credible operational experience."

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[66] Josh Halliday, "Almost 4,000 People Referred to UK Deradicalisation Scheme Last Year," *The Guardian*-03-20, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/20/almost-4000-people-were-referred-to-uk-deradicalisation-scheme-channel-last-year.

[67] "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice."

[68] "Summary of the Main Findings of the Review of Islamist Extremism in Prisons, Probation and Youth Justice."

3. Creation of a "new security category for TACT and Islamic Extremist prisoners, to be managed by the central government."

4. Creation of specialized prison units for the "small subset of extremists within this group who present a particular and enduring risk to national security through subversive behaviour, beliefs and activities."

5. Systematic records of "the promotion of extremist beliefs and threats of violence to staff".

6. Providing "suitable training for staff, with particular emphasis on distinguishing religious from cultural traditions."

7. Tightening the "vetting of prison chaplains to assess association with organisations linked to extremism."

8. "Tackling the availability and source of extremist literature."

9. Giving greater focus to the "safe management of Friday prayers, with sanctions imposed for abuse or misuse of all acts of worship."

10. Reviewing "procedures under 'Rule 39,' to ensure confidential privilege in legal correspondence is not being abused."

11. Improving the "capacity for responding swiftly to serious violent incidents, with regular exercising of this capability and improved coordination with the police, who should be given primacy in handling serious prison incidents."

These 11 recommendations make it clear that efforts to reform prison systems in order to combat "radicalization' are directed solely towards Muslims within the prisons, and are hardly related to the formulation of a counter-narrative or promotion of British values. For instance, with regards to the first suggestion about a specialization, as of mid-2016, this simple task had not been implemented, and in fact, further reports suggested a strategy specifically for prisons would be needed. There has also been some progress in the training of prison officers, and "senior post-holders," as the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and the Prison Officers' Association (POA) have implemented some more expansive officer training programs. Yet the extent to which "senior post-holders" are well informed about radicalization remains to be seen -- there have been few comments by senior post-holders (aside from former Prime Minister

David Cameron and current Prime Minister Theresa May) indicating an understanding of prison radicalization reports.

The emphasis on Islamist radicalization alone may be misguided, in that it responds to a deeply engrained prioritization of imprisonment for Muslims and minority communities in the UK. It also leaves a security gap in which other forms of radicalization may go unnoticed, unreported, and unresolved. For instance, the NOMS Offender Equalities Annual Report, in 2015, noted that 14.4% of the British prison populations are Muslim, whereas the general population represents only 7.7% of those imprisoned.[69] The figure above denotes the increasing numbers of Muslims in British prisons.[70]

Muslim Prisoners as Percentage of Total in England in Wales*

	2002	2005	2014	2016

Soft Power: Resources provided to Prevent programs

The budget for Prevent as an entire program has been consistently between £40-45 million annually, although individual communities shoulder most costs, and the funding from the Prevent budget is allocated through grants to high-need or high-performing regions in a competitive grant process. Table 2.1 shows a selection of grant-receiving regions, and demonstrates the extent to which resources have gone from a somewhat equitable distribution to a rather skewed one. The skew reflects the trend of programs becoming more and more focused on high-visibility locations, and urbanized areas, rather than instituting a durable training program for CVE on a continuing basis. The data points to Parliament's tendency towards immediate effects and the general dismissal of any genuine CVE programs; even going so far as to defund the College of

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[69] Ministry of Justice. "Summary of the main findings of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation, and youth justice." Gov.uk, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice/summary-of-the-main-findings-of-the-review-of-islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice
[70] Author-generated graph. Data from
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04334/SN04334.pdf

Police from receiving Prevent grants. The implication is that Parliament does not value putting resources into training the police on a large scale to deal with new forms of radicalization.

The actual "prevention of violent extremism" takes place much more frequently on the small scale, with local authorities and law enforcement mechanisms. There are

Figure 2.2 2016 and 2017 Prevent Grant Amounts

even 43,000 directly employed prison staff members working to prevent prison radicalization. Despite concerns that these employees are not properly directed or trained in the prevention of radicalization, it is still notable that resources for prisons are allocated from local communities.

Notably, whereas the UK budget allocates up to £45 million annually to Prevent, the budget to reinforce borders and the closing of migration has been consistently around £130 million. Thus, even within the budget there is a significant emphasis placed on the importance of immigration control rather than truly relying on soft power efforts. The effectiveness of CVE programs thus can't truly be measured, as the government itself has prevented an environment in which to test out reliance on soft-power measures alone, but rather provide a framework from which to see that medium power plays a hidden role.

Prevent in an International Context

The 2011 report on Prevent suggested as component 1.29, "Our objectives will be to...work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address." This effort is consistent with the nature of Saudi Arabia's CVE and

deradicalization programs, which were developed from the start in order to deal with homegrown terrorist threats.

The UK has increased its efforts to work with France in counterterrorism, especially with regards to military intervention and prevention of radicalization. A 2016 bilateral counterterrorism summit of the two states concluded that "our two countries aim at intensifying their fight against radicalization, particularly online: by building the capability of civil society to develop positive, counter and alternative messages targeted to those vulnerable to extremist and radicalising influences; by promoting the sharing of best practice between counter and de-radicalisation experts…"[71] While the promotion of best practice sharing and efforts to coordinate with civil society groups seems promising, it is overshadowed by the remaining five pages of the document, which outlined increased security and anti-immigration measures, emphasizing a reliance on medium and even hard power instead of soft, integration-based approaches, and with no acknowledgment of any current "expert" knowledge of best practices for working with civil society or countering online radicalization messaging. Nor is there any evidence that any additional resources will be devoted to the effort; indeed, the clear turn to greater hard power indicates that if additional resources were to be available, they would be almost entirely directed towards increased law enforcement.

Deradicalization: An element of Prevent or an underfunded side-project?

Frank Gardner, the BBC's security correspondent, noted in 2015 that, out of the four aspects of CONTEST, Prevent "is the most controversial and arguably the least successful. It's stated aim is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Yet in the 12 years since its inception, the number of UK suspects coming to the attention of the police and security service has ballooned into the thousands."[72] Gardner, and many analysts like him, fined Prevent to be so unsuccessful because there has been little to no discernable decrease in radicalization. "Soft power," in general, is intended to prevent terrorist actions by affecting the "hearts and minds" of potential terrorists and marginalized communities, in order to make communities more resilient in the face of

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[71] UK and France, "UK France Summit Conclusions" 3 Mar 2016).
[72] Frank Gardner, "Prevent Strategy: Is it Failing to Stop Radicalisation?" *BBC News*-03-06T04:26:25+00:00, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31756755.

challenges and less likely to turn to or condone violence. Yet any sort of "hearts and minds" approach would need to entail a serious effort by the government to ameliorate the public perception of the State-Muslim community dynamic, which the UK has been largely unsuccessful in doing.

Indeed, the UK Prevent efforts have been lackluster even in the basic sphere of Internet security and prison deradicalization. Deradicalization programs, such as *Mosaic*, take a distinctive approach of introducing ex-foreign fighters to help de-radicalize those who are at high-risk to become radicalized and perpetrate attacks. Local deradicalization efforts try to work within communities and with mosques to address lapses in education or instruction. While there are many such programs in the UK, there is an unfortunate lack of funding or publicity given them by the government. Furthermore, people who have worked in British deradicalization non-profits suggest that the programs have little lasting effect, and seem to be increasingly distrusted by the leaders of the British Muslim communities in which Mosaic and the like work.[73]

Decreasing CVE, Increasing Law Enforcement

The UK has grappled with re-integration of Irish radicals for decades, and its multicultural approach sounds like a perfect way to allow integration without forced assimilation of new immigrants. Both facts suggest that the UK ought to be fully prepared to deal with emerging threats to homeland security coming from radicalization, and that integration measures in place should be entirely sufficient. Yet such is not the case.

It is telling that many of those who work in deradicalization programs in the UK don't see them as separate from CVE. They consider deradicalization to be an aspect of community outreach, whereas leaders in the British Muslim community have noted a distinct rise in distrust associated with the imposition of "mandatory" deradicalization programs. There is, in fact, evidence demonstrating that the British Muslim community ought not expect the UK government to approach security as softly as Prevent initially made it appear. Critics of Prevent have for considerable time dismissed it because it unfairly (and likely, unwisely) targets Islam in the UK while espousing multiculturalism

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[73] Interview conducted by author; January 2017.

as a tenet of British identity. In response to critiques, Parliament and the Home Office have released various reports suggesting guidelines for improving the credibility and efficacy of Prevent. At the same time, however, Parliament has been allocating increasing funds to immigration control and law enforcement – the crux of medium power filling the gap of soft power's slow implementation

The main criteria for considering Prevent effective would be an increase in local community trusting of the government and law enforcement authorities. Even in the case of the IRA, however, former militants do not have an enhanced view of law enforcement. Some have moved on in their lives and are more integrated into society, but many face difficulty finding employment and social inclusion, despite the minimal governmental efforts to reach out to former militant communities. Recent legislative actions have sadly proven an observation made by an astute journalist in 2002 that,

> "Under the guise of 'anti-terrorism measures', this government will legislate to introduce the European arrest warrant into Britain. It is expected to take effect on January 1, 2004. Under its provisions any British subject or, for that matter anyone on British soil, can be extradited to any country in the European Union for any one of 32 listed offences including racism and xenophobia"(September 2002).[74]

It is exigent that Parliament and policymakers in general consider the implications that British Prevent policy has moved backwards in the twelve years of its existence, and that counterterrorism measures in general have been in keeping with the worst of alarmist scholars.

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[74] "Trials Ahead for British Justice." *Sunday Times* Sep 29, 2002.
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3. CASE TWO: FRANCE

Chapter Outline

Introduction

Historical Approach: Integration and Exclusion as Preventative Measures

      Law Enforcement Efforts for Italians, Polish and Spanish

            Threat levels and government responses

      Historical Law Enforcement Efforts targeting North Africans

            Integration's Limited Success for North African Communities

Contemporary Approach: Assimilate, Propagate, Educate

      Official CVE Framework and Government Action

      Law Enforcement and Immigration Control Measures

            Threat levels and governmental responses

      Community Engagement Programs

      Resources provided to CVE and deradicalization programs

French Policy in the International Context

Conclusions

Introduction

Of the case studies examined in this work, France has perhaps the most notorious legacy in terms of integration and immigrant-focused counterterrorism. The Algerian War for Independence in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as various other colonial independence or anti-French revolts habituated many French to the idea of violence as a tool to oppose oppression. Yet the French always considered such violence to be a tool used by the immigrant or religious minority *other*. There is a perception, even in France today, that the legacy of the French Revolution has made the French state inherently non-violent, in that violent attacks must by nature be caused by external intervention.

It is this sort of perception that led the French government to legislate under the famed principle of *laïcité* since the 19th century. *Laïcité* has no direct translation in English but refers to a very strict form of secularism in which the state directs a separation between Church and State.

French revolutionaries fighting in 1789 against the then-King objected both a lack of egalitarianism in society and the powerful influence of the Catholic Church. The anti-Monarch France that emerged in 1800 retained that anticlerical sentiment. Far down the road, in the latter half of the 20th century, following the brutal Algerian War, the French *laïcité* took on the role of creating a systematic "inequality" between secular *français de souches* (white, native French) and immigrant or religious minorities.[75] Violent campaigns by pro-Algerian and pro-Palestinian terrorists in the 1990s in France exacerbated the assumption that violence resulted from a Huntingtonian "Clash of Civilizations" and that Arab-Muslims were the largest threat to national security. Arabs, who began appearing in large numbers as refugees or migrant workers from former French colonies in North Africa, tended to live clustered together, reinforcing the idea that they were not able to assimilate and become true French citizens. In fact, many of these bidonvilles were forced upon immigrants who had no other housing options. Tensions between *francais de souces* and Muslim and immigrant communities continued increasing into the early and mid-2000s as a response to government crackdowns (the Headscarf Affairs of 1989, 1994 and 2004) and a contemporaneious rise in immigrant community identities, seen in the *beurs* marches and *banlieu* riots in 2005.

French marginalization of immigrant, especially Muslim, communities has been well documented in academic works, popular literature and film, and in music, especially *raï* music.[76] For those who identify as *français de souches,* the exclusion of Muslim communities from general French society is due in large part to a Muslim unwillingness to integrate into French society and to renounce divisive practices. Indeed, one interviewee noted that "France has always been a multicultural country, we've always had to take in foreigners...but they've always been resentful of the French and they aren't true French citizens."[77] This sentiment, while extreme, is representative of many of the older French citizens, and is commonly considered to stem from a strict understanding of *laïcité* as integral to French identity.[78] Those, whom Kenan Malik refers to as "multiculturalism's critics," who suggest, "Europe has allowed excessive immigration without demanding enough integration -- a mismatch that has eroded social

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75 Jaques Mandelbaum, "Le Film Qui Répond À Claude Guéant," Le MondeFeb 14, 2012.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/921319665.
76 Raï music is a genre of French music which originated in Algeria, and has evolved into a major source of "homeland" music around which immigrant communities in France can rally.
77 Emily Murphy, Interview with Brigitte Bachelot, April 25, 2016.
78 Data compiled from a series of interviews conducted in Aix-en-Provence, France (2016).

cohesion, undermined national identities, and degraded public trust", echo it.[79] Growth of this sentiment seems contemporary to a rise in the popularity of nationalist parties, but it is certainly rooted in a deep historical bias.

The French conception of *laïcité,* especially as it relates to Muslim communities, became significantly more defined between 1995 and 2005. In those 10 years were three "headscarf affairs," in which female students at public French schools fought against being forbidden from wearing the *hijab,* the Islamic head-covering which Muslim women around the world wear as a part of their personal faith and belief. The Stasi Commission, which first convened in 1998 in response to the first headscarf affair, found that *laïcité* encompassed three "indispensable values": freedom of thought, equality, and the total neutrality of public powers.[80] The effect of such a ruling was a total exclusion of religion, particularly Islam and Islamic religious practice, from the public sphere.

There is a tendency in today's journalism and parlance to equate the aggressive secularism of *laïcité* to a secular French identity that does not incorporate religious people. Colette Beaune suggested that French nationality developed over the years from Charlemagne's consolidation of France in 800 to the French Revolution, and then subsequently re-defined itself with each regime. She defined the development of French national identity in terms of territory, ethnicity, language, religion and culture. Even many French philosophers of old have figured into the foundation of French identity; of note is Montesquieu's belief that popular sovereignty would only work if a system of common virtues and identities were in place.

The French state ascribes to the assimilationist model of integration. Each citizen is expected to know the French language, have some appreciation for French history and culture, and participate in civic life. The "Citizenship and Equality Law" of December 22, 2016 demonstrates this effort. The effect of the law, as stated in the beginning of its documentation, is that "the Government reinforced its action for bringing all French together around the values of

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79 Kenan Malik, "The Failure of Multiculturalism: Community Versus Society in Europe," Foreign Affairs, Mar 1, 2015, 21. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:ho-us&rft_dat=xri:ho:sup_ref:3606947171:3606947171::TG:6:6.
80 Extraits du rapport de la Commission STASI sur la laïcité. (Sep 1, 2004), 107-136. http://pyramides.revues.org/381.

the Republic…"[81] The law consists of three main subject areas: increasing citizenship engagement, especially among younger French citizens and in schools, measures to create equal access to housing in order to diminish territorial segregation and prioritizing societal integration and a sociopolitical mix, and finally an effort to create new rights in order to benefit all citizens and reinforce "true equality."

The assimilationist model, however, presumes a lack of equality. Implicit in the "need to assimilate" is the notion that one is distinctly *not* French if one does not fit the very specific cultural, racial, and linguistic benchmarks of French identity. Under public education laws such as the Debré Law of 1959 enforce the narrow conception of French-ness. Scholars see this as the root of radicalization among French Muslims; as one Palestinian woman living in Marseille noted, "Islam becomes an identity marker because of social categorization."[82] With integration schemes and *laïcité*, Muslims or even non-religious Arabs and other minority groups may find themselves seeking an identity, and in some cases that identity marker has been radicalized in order to combat the radical segregation with which the individuals find themselves placed.

The French state abides by this theory of radicalization to some extent. Assimilation programs are intended to make citizens feel included in society by making minorities feel they can speak perfect French or look like French people. The emphasis on *laïcité*, however, indicates that the anti-clericalism that undergirded the French revolution remains a force in French governance, and the implementation of CVE reflects this turn against religious peoples. It therefore seems like less of an attempt to assimilate those with different views into a distinct society, and more an attempt to continuously and aggressively remove religion from, not only the public sphere, but also the state and society itself.

Beyond this, the selective implementation of *laïcité* in the Headscarf Affairs and laws such as Debré seem to target Islamic community and practice while making exceptions for Christianity and Judaism. French press in recent years has covered significant debates surrounding the public financing of religious institutions. It is a contentious issue because the French Parliament has effectively financed Church construction through back channels for decades, while it remains adamantly opposed any public funds being used for mosque construction. The unwillingness of French policymakers to support mosque building has been a

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81 INSERT LOI EGALITE ET CITOYENNETE HERE
82 Interview conducted by author, April 2016

major reason behind the lack of large mosques around France. There are, at the time of this writing, only four mosques of normal size in France (meaning a mosque which can hold most of the Muslim community in the region and includes a minaret tower).

HISTORICAL APPROACH: Integration and Exclusion as Preventative Measures

Figure 2.1. Immigrant Nationalities in France, 1931 and 1990[83]

	1931		**1990 (59% non-European)**
Italians	808,000 (30.4% of foreign population on French soil)	Portuguese	504, 000
Polish	507, 000	Algerians	473, 000
Spanish	351, 900	Moroccans	396, 500
Belgians	253, 700	Italians	222, 900
North-Africans	102, 000	Spanish	190, 000
Swiss	98, 500	Tunisians	135, 500
Russians	71, 900	Turks	146, 700

There is much work to be done in incorporating the analysis of immigration and terrorist attack correlation in Western countries. The media's tendency to focus on immigrants as terrorists, and to see the subsequent reactions of the state, likely reinforce in immigrants' minds that their communities are more inclined towards terrorist action. Figure 1 shows the utility of this study's focus on the early twentieth century as a comparison to now; as small communities seemed to grow out of similar trends in ethnic immigration.

The total North Africans arriving in 1990 almost equaled the number of Italians migrating into France in 1931, and both groups faced similar levels of distrust in French society. The French government responded to both with some integration measures, but primarily through law enforcement. Indeed, in both cases there seems to have been only a cursory

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83 Lequin, Yves. Histoire Des Étrangers Et De L'Immigration En France. Paris: Larousse, 1992.

attention paid to assimilating the groups – many of the Italian immigrants in 1931 would later return to Italy.[84]

Integration efforts for immigrant groups were extremely minimal; indeed, an immigration advocacy group, the Luttins Collective, noted that

> "People who dared defend immigrants were scarce. Elites, however, recommended several times that the French state recognize the huge role immigrants played in French manual labor, and the necessity of conserving this labor force. Also note that it was not until the victory of the Popular Front in 1936 that immigrants were given any sort of legal status." [85]

To some extent, we may call this "integration." The first step in integrating a community is to acknowledge their worth and legitimacy as role-players in one's society. However, the classification of Italian immigrants with low-level manual laborers would be ingrained in the French psyche. Lequin noted that this was association led to an assumption that the Italians were dirty and criminal (a sentiment likewise found in U.S. perceptions of Italians and Irish).

The Italian government made some efforts to assist its citizens living abroad in their integration to their host society, especially through sending priests and church-related support to Italians in France. In France, unfortunately, the oversight of the Italian government was perceived as yet another cause for alarm vis-à-vis the incoming immigrants.

> "More generally, French opinion came to doubt the possibility of assimilating foreigners as had been done in schools, language, religious practice, the onset of the nineteenth century. Immigrants were too numerous, to diverse and, moreover, unlike the Belgians and the first Italians, they tended to hold onto their national identity and to assume their practices. Unfortunately, they were aided in the conservation of their culture by their home governments.
> "In 1922, an auxiliary bishop from Paris, Mgr. Chantal, was charged with a mission to lead the Italians [in religious matters]. But the Opera Ferreri, which, since its founding, had by 1927 created libraries, organized reunions, pilgrimages, and brought together 20,000 Italians to protest at Sacre-Coeur with songs, banners and fervor in front of the nonce and ambassador."[86]

Medium Power: Law Enforcement Efforts for European Immigrants
Immigration Levels and Potential Causes for Immigrant Radicalization

Lequin describes the high concentration of Italian immigrants as an "onslaught". He notes that: "between 1851 and 1866, the number of Italian immigrants doubled in Marseille...the

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84 Gabaccia, Donna R. Militants and Migrants. New Brunswick u.a: Rutgers Univ. Pr, 1988.
85 "Histoire de l'immigration en France." Collectif des LutTins, 2015).
http://www.preavis.org/formation-mr/Luttins/brochure_immigration_1-0.a5.pdf
86 Yves Lequin, Histoire Des Étrangers Et De L'Immigration En France (Paris: Larousse, 1992). P.348

Italians, in more and more broken ranks, continued to come back to France, pushed by the crisis of 1920-1921, then by the onslaught of fascism, defeated militants -- a minority -- mixed with job-seekers...among them, a third were women"[87]. Other data sources suggest that large numbers of Germans and Belgians also moved into France in large numbers. By 1923, they lived primarily in ghettoized suburbs around major cities, a common theme in Western nations.[88] Immigrant communities both seek out living in close proximity to their shared ethnic group and are pushed to do so by housing agents, affordability, and pressure from the wider community. There may be some evidence for correlation between ghettoization and radicalization, although scholars have yet to come to a consensus.[89]

Italians formed a large part, in both the U.S. and France, of the unionized, manual labor force. Often, leaders of strikes and protests were Italians or second-generation Italian immigrants. Strikes often erupted into violence, leading to the demonizing of Italian unions like "the Marseillaise Vipers."[90] It is important to note, however, that while the Italians were marginalized and imprisoned in large numbers, North African immigrants fared far worse, often being completely excluded from the workforce or political action. The exclusion of North Africans, according to Lequin, was "first of all the doing of the public powers themselves," not French society. This perhaps foreshadowed the present-day exclusion of North African immigrants in France, which persisted throughout the twentieth century and increased drastically after Algerian independence.

Gérard Noiriel, in a piece titled "Inter-war politicization of migration: The influence of the Communist Party", connected the draconian measures which the French government took against immigrants to both economic conditions and the emergence of a transnational, violent Communist movement. He noted that, "throughout the 1920s, the PCF (Parti Communiste Français) was the only political party to attempt to address the demands of the immigrant proletariat. In September 1921, the first Congress of the Communist Federation of Italian Sections gathered at Nugent-sur-Marne. The same year, the PCF organized the first Sacred

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87 Lequin, Histoire Des Étrangers Et De L'Immigration En France p.285.
88 Lequin, Histoire Des Étrangers Et De L'Immigration En France.
89 "Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?"Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses (Washington: CQ Press, 2010), 34. doi:10.4135/9781483330822.n2. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781483330822.n2.
90 Yves Lequin, Histoire Des Étrangers Et De L'Immigration En France (Paris: Larousse, 1992) p. 342.

Congress on the Colonial Question at Marseille."[91] There was thus a created affiliation between communists and immigrants; meaning immigrants became associated in the public sphere with communist violence. Anarchists and communists tended to use violence because their groups were economically disadvantaged, which may have incentivized some newly immigrated individuals to support their causes.

While communist and anarchist terror thus did constitute a threat to the stability of the government, the ethnic side of the immigration-terrorism nexus bore a closer resemblance to modern-day racial tensions. In 1925, a homeless Kabyle (a Berber, from the Maghreb) assassinated two women in broad daylight and wounded two others, leading to a general fear of Arab immigrants. The incident sparked pre-existent racial and ethnic tensions brought about by the low status of Arabs in the French workforce, which had solidified as French immigration policy allowed them in solely for manual labor jobs. Pulling migrants from less developed countries was a common tactic for European states in their efforts to rebuild infrastructure following the devastation of World War I.

Levels of terror and government responses

French anti-terrorism views in the early part of the 20th century were informed by the events of the Paris Commune in 1871. The brutal reign of French communists and the effort to combat them left Parisians and French communities wary of plots to overthrow the French state. Between 1867 and 1900, moreover, a large number of violent marches, strikes, and protests erupted between immigrant communities and native French citizens. For example, in 1899 a large group of native French citizens sought to lynch all "Florentines" from prisons in their community.[92] Rhetoric surrounding the Italians in the last few decades of the nineteenth century characterized Italians as brutes: "thin, pruney bandits," "enraged with fanaticism," and "lacking dignity" are just a few examples of the general public's perception of Italians. It is easy to see, then, why the state was able to turn the Italian community into a violent enemy.

Blevis et al. noted that "The creation of a police unit specifically for immigrants from North Africa, in Paris then in numerous other cities around France beginning in 1925, gave the state additional means of putting in place the same repressive politics against militant Algerians...the repressive crackdown against the militants of the CGT was accompanied by

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91 Blévis et al., 1931, Les Étrangers Au Temps De L'Exposition Coloniale p.81.
92 Yves Lequin, p.339.

draconian measures of expulsion and repatriation."[93] This aggressive law enforcement may be seen as a side effect of assimilation's exclusive approach; but more likely is representative of the tendency toward medium power use as the main way to deal with perceived existential threat immigrants posed to the state and citizens' well being.

A fair argument against the significance of this "medium power" example is that the state had not developed "soft power" as a concept for dealing with complex issues of national security. Lawmakers would turn to medium and even hard military power as the sole options for addressing these forms of threats, as the go-to. Sending states also posed a challenge for even small-scale efforts to "integrate": many Italians sought to return home in a few years. The Vatican and Italian government supported programs to keep Italian-language instruction and Italian culture present even across borders. Notably, immigration policy centered around labor alone – family reunification was not a primary reason for migration, but rather the reason that most labor migrants in this early period ultimately returned to their home country.

Medium Power: Historical Law Enforcement Efforts targeting North Africans

A variety of state actions promoted a particular segregation of the North African and Muslim communities, which were thus subjected to what Lequin terms a "double exclusion: that due to the existence of particular, separate institutions and that of public opinion which perceived them as infectious and cunning."

> "The ultimate setting aside of North Africans was primarily enacted by the public powers themselves.... the spirit of "indigenous affairs', strongly colored by paternalism, and which was particularly present in the Marseille region and in Paris, where the government constructed a mosque, and opened halls and even a franco-Muslim hospital in Bobigny. Thus the North Africans won a double exclusion: that due to the existence of particular [segregated] institutions and that of the public opinion which saw them as spreading infection and spying or snitching."[94]

The Vichy regime took a particularly strong tack against North African immigrant communities. A series of laws passed throughout the early 1930s restrained the ability of migrants to receive French identity cards, making it almost impossible without French nationality or a physical contract for work, and nearly ending family reunion as a policy (it

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93 Laure Blévis et al., ed., 1931, *Les Étrangers Au Temps De L'Exposition Coloniale* (Paris: Gallimard, 2008). 80-83.
94 Yves Lequin. p. 350

would be later implemented). Such laws spurred law enforcement to further target North Africans and solidified a segregated society.

Soft Power: Integration's Limited Success for North African Communities

Lequin considers the poor housing conditions into which immigrants were forced to be a major factor in the failure of integration during the latter half of the twentieth century. While Polish and Italian immigrants had been able to find shelter through work, the waves of North African immigrants were greeted with diminishing housing availability and employment opportunity. Even the promise of the HLM (low-rent housing) wasn't sufficient to diminish the ghettoization of immigrant communities, although they were no longer perpetually homeless communities ("*bidonvilles*"). The housing opportunity situation became worse after the Algerian War, as *pieds noirs*[95] and Algerian refugees migrated in large numbers back to Southern France. The *harkis*, in particular, suffered a great deal from the neglect of the French state towards their communities.

Downtown Marseille, a French city on the southern Mediterranean border, exemplifies this trend. A series of streets in the *Belsunce* and *Le Panier* neighborhoods are de facto segregated along lines of national origin: sub-Saharan Africans on one street, North Africans on the next, Armenians the next, and so on. Recent French legislation has aimed to improve access to housing across neighborhoods and streets, but the effects will be long-term. Moreover, the lack of a mosque in Marseille means that each community of Muslims must further segregate into small prayer groups, who meet in obsolete "prayer spaces" in basements or the first level of buildings.

The feeling of exclusion and derogation felt by many in immigrant communities in France are expressed in immigrant literature and art. For example, books such as *Kiffe Kiffe Tomorrow,* a novel written by Faïza Guène in 2006 and based in her real experience and *Le Gone du Chaâba*, a similar novel written by Azouz Begag in 1986 depict the harrowing daily lives of children growing up in the *bidonvilles* and *banlieus* (shantytowns and suburbs) of French cities. Their stories indicate on the one hand that integration of immigrant communities, even Armenian families who've lived in France for almost a century, have utterly failed. The popularity of the

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95 French citizens who had moved to Algeria or been born in Algeria as part of France's colonizing mission.

books, on the other hand, bears credence to a growing willingness among the public to discuss segregation in France.

CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: Assimilate, Propagate, Educate

There is a plethora of scholarship; both in France and externally, which seeks to understand why French-speaking countries tend to have a higher rate of Islamist-related radicals and extremists than non-French speaking countries, and why France in particular has had such a problem fixing its relationship with its domestic Muslim community. France today houses the largest Muslim community in Europe (especially in Marseille, Lyon and Paris, and in the suburbs of those cities) and has struggled since the Algerian War of Independence to deal with labor and liberty-related migration from North Africa. Most scholars suggest that these large communities of, by now, second- and third-generation immigrants have been cut off from mainstream French society and the political process due to the exclusive "assimilationist" model of integration.

The parallel worlds of "native" French and "immigrant" communities has led to what Olivier Roy termed "France's Oedipal Islamist Complex."[96] The term refers to the fact that certain immigrants or even "native" French feel so excluded from society that they will be radicalized in search of an identity no matter what the identity or the radicalization. In other words, jihadists will continue in France whether or not it is about Islam or the Middle East. According to Roy, second-generation immigrants "choose Islam because it's the only thing on the market of radical rebellion. Joining the Islamic State offers the certainty of terrorizing." This idea affirms Masarwa's comment that, in fact, radicalization is embedded in failed integration efforts. It legitimizes soft power attempts to formulate a counter-narrative to Islamist and other forms of radical propaganda. The governmental response, however, has been to turn away from integration and to rely increasingly on targeted efforts against Islam, Muslim communities, and criminalization.

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96 Olivier Roy, "France's Oedipal Islamist Complex," Foreign Policy (7 Jan, 2016).
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/07/frances-oedipal-islamist-complex-charlie-hebdo-islamic-state-isis/.

Soft Power: Official CVE Framework and Governmental Actions

Muslim communities in France are linked to the French state through the Grand Mosqueé de Paris (Paris Grand Mosque, GMP) and the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of Muslim Community, CFCM). Imams are allocated to mosques and prayer spaces around France by the GMP, which aids in the distribution of imams, and coordinates requests made to Algeria for trained imams to work in France. The process can take several years: an imam at the al Arrahama mosque in Istres, France noted that the Istres community requested a mosque in 1987 but wasn't able to build one until 2001, and even then it took until 2007 to complete and inaugurate the mosque building.[97] Furthermore, the mosque building is prohibited from having a minaret, the tall tower that normally sits next to a mosque in order to broadcast the call the prayer. There is thus distance from official government control of mosques and, moreover, a lack of willingness to invest in the Muslim community in France.

It has been much more difficult for French policymakers to refine the scope of deradicalization than those in Britain combatting the I.R.A. As noted in the first chapter of this work, theories abound as to the best way to engage in deradicalization efforts, and examples range from gangs to far-right parties. French deradicalization has emphasized threats posed by radical Islamist extremism far more than any other sector. It can be broken down into two main categories of efforts: online deradicalization and prison deradicalization. There is significant literature surmising the best ways to approach radicalization in prisons from examples around the world, but France has pursued the topic more than most European countries.

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls announced in early January 2015, following the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks. It is a directed effort by the French government to implement online deradicalization programs. The announcement reflected a trend in worldwide radical Islamist attacks coming from homegrown terrorists being radicalized online. The programs seek to "diminish the ideological pull that violent radicalizing propaganda exerts."[98] Details in the programs make it clear that the "counter-narrative" to be offered through state-sponsored agencies will be directly against Islamic jihadist and radical propaganda. The French state

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[97] Interview conducted by author,

98 Tual, Martin Untersinger et Morgane, "Contre La Propagande Djihadiste En Ligne, Le Gouvernement Se Tourne Vers Le Secteur Privé," Le Monde.Fr-05-09T19:22:41+02:00, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/05/09/contre-la-propagande-djihadiste-en-ligne-le-gouvernement-se-tourne-vers-le-secteur-prive_4916283_4408996.html.

furthermore sought to implicate web companies such as Facebook and Google and to encourage the companies, at least in France, to monitor and eliminate accounts or web pages promoting violent extremism. The extent to which such actions may be an infringement of freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in the French constitution, was not addressed in the government's gentle push for online private-sector censorship.

Medium Power: Law Enforcement and Immigration Control
Immigration Levels and Other Security Fears

Despite anti-immigration sentiment in Western countries, the levels of immigration in France have actually increased in the decade or so after 9/11. It is relevant to note that French anti-immigration policies before 9/11 tended to be particularly harsh; Martin Schain commented that, "the changes in American law have not gone as far as British and French laws had gone even before September 11, 2001."[99] Considering the legacies of terrorism across Europe considered in this and the previous chapter, it makes sense that the UK and France would have a more developed approach to counterterrorism. Schain documented an *increase* in Middle Eastern/Arab immigration into France between 2001 and 2008. In recent years, these numbers have increased even more drastically as France (similarly to other European and Western nations) accepted thousands of refugees fleeing Bosnia, Kashmir, the Syrian War, and similar conflicts.

Interestingly, data analysis suggests that community marginalization would be far greater in France than in the United States. This is consistent with general scholarship regarding the assimilationist model. In 2002, for instance, a study by Pew Research Center found 67.4% of Americans considered "immigration from the third world" to be "good," compared to only 43% of French citizens.[100] Another study, however, demonstrated that between the years 1984 and 2004, French citizens have consistently considered law and order, unemployment, and social inequality as greater concerns in voting than immigration.[101]

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99 Martin Schain, "Immigration Policy and Reactions to Terrorsim After September 11
," in Immigration, Integration, and Security, eds. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008) p.128.
100Schain, Immigration Policy and Reactions to Terrorsim After September 11, 11-129.
101 "This is Why the Paris Attacks have Gotten More News Coverage than Other Terrorist Attacks," WP Company LLC d/b/a The Washington Post, last modified Nov 16,

As noted in Heisbourg and Marret, terrorism poses a wide variety of threats even outside the immigrant community. Most significant is the potential for transnational recruitment networks and the possibilities that "their territory was and is used as an external base from which it is possible to manage widespread operations, Muslim communities living in Europe become stigmatized in spite of themselves by terrorist groups, and some Islamist militants organize in cellular structures, and undetected, are likely to conduct attacks on French/European soil."[102] Those fears have led to a variety of governmental responses, as seen above. Yet an honest and deeper look at the nature of law enforcement is required in order to best assess whether the French state has relied more heavily on soft power (CVE), hard power (imprisonment, surveillance, and deportation) or a combination (immigration control).

Figure 1 French Government's Advisory for "Reacting During a Terrorist Attack"

Levels of terror and government responses

The November 2015 Paris attacks and March 2016 Brussels attacks demonstrated the ability of terrorists to hide from arrest simply by escaping to other European countries. Numerous scholars have highlighted the complexities of French immigration policies, especially as pertains to the assimilationist method by which France deals with immigrants once living on French soil.[103] Figure 1 above is an image distributed in early 2016, in an effort to more

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http://search.proquest.com/docview/1733384944.; Schain, Immigration Policy and Reactions to Terrorsim After September 11, p.128.
102 Heisbourg and Marret, 86.
103 Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj, "The Challenge to Integration in France," in University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 283-299. http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00388753/en/.; Jonathan

outwardly address the insecurity of the French state. The poster suggests that, in the event of a terrorist attack, one must first "escape", and if that is not possible, "barricade yourself in and hide" – fairly straightforward suggestions. Yet by distributing this poster, the government implies that terrorist attacks are such a significant threat that they warrant explicit instructions and procedures – reinforcing the need for a security state as well as the amplified military and police presence in French cities.

France differs from other countries in its assimilationist policy and adherence to strict *laïcite,* but it also differs from the United States in that it is part of the European Union, wherein European citizens are free to travel between European countries without visas and with ease. The terrorist fear in France is exacerbated by its commitment to the European Union -- a fact that far-right leaders such as Front National leader Marine Le Pen have used to gain popularity among the French electorate. Such a trend can be seen across Europe, but France came under fire about it because of Abdul Karim. Yet, as stated by Pierre Vimont in a recent interview, "on the other hand, not all terrorists are coming back from Syria. Certainly, some radicalized within our borders. The problem is thus also much larger than the Schengen agreement."[104] Vimont's vague statement is indicative of a lack of understanding of the radicalization process and the minds of radicals themselves.

In summer 2016, France suffered from several smaller-scale, yet still terrorist in nature, attacks by French citizens motivated primarily by radical Islamist ideology. The situation so deteriorated that French security forces had to admit that they are not strong enough to combat the terrorist threat and detect radicalization, especially among potentially marginalized communities, which tend to be wary of French security forces. This reinforced the failure of soft power, leading to a need for something stronger. And thus we see, once again, a state's automatic turn to medium power.

Efforts to incorporate French-trained imams into mosques and Islamic centers and prisons have so far seen minimal results. While the most prominent terrorist attacks of this year

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Laurence, "Muslims and the State in Western Europe," in Immigration, Integration, and Security, eds. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008), 229-253.; Geoffrey Cameron, "Integration of Muslims into Western Liberal Countries," The Review of Faith & International Affairs 13, no. 1 (2015), 83-87.; Doris Ben-Simon, "Ashkenazi and Sephardi Immigration into France," Wiener Library Bulletin 31, no. 47 (1979), 131-134.
104 Mareschal, «Désormais, Le Lien Entre Terrorisme Et Immigration Est Présent Dans Les Esprits».

have been of the Arab ethnic minority, which indeed has predominated immigration into France, French authorities do not report detailed information about thwarted or far-right, nationalist attacks. France's recent history has seen far more anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks than ISIS-related attacks. The under-reporting of these attacks, however, indicates that the French state, and indeed scholars, may not consider the attacks to be terrorist attacks.[105]

The association seems to have held more water in the early twentieth century waves of anarchist terrorism. Immigrant communities organizing through labor groups such as unions spurred assassinations and stabbings clearly meant to convey fear to the general population in large part. Government repression against immigrant communities in both the United States and France during the 1920s and 1930s also seems to have effectively led to a ceasing of terrorist violence. It would be beneficial to continue this analysis by studying media releases and testimonies from immigrants during that time period.

Figure 2.1 Direction de la Surveillance du
Figure 2. 1 Trends in Surveillance Use for Counterterrorism

Law enforcement in France has tended rely on arrests and surveillance related to "affairs of Islamist extremism." Data shows a sharp increase in number of arrests, even during a period of relative stability in French Muslim community, as demonstrated in Figure 2.1.[106] House arrests and raids were implemented as a central aspect of the State of Emergency as well. These measures keep the discriminatory nature of surveillance and law enforcement somewhat hidden from public view, as do quietly passed legislative measures providing funding for prison building. The role of technology in surveillance efforts – and the online deradicalization conversation more generally – is a question deserving of future study and analysis, although it is

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105 Schor, *Français Et Immigrés En Temps De Crise (1930-1980)*, 1-25.
106 Data for Figure 2.1 from François Heisbourg and Jean-Luc Marret, *Le Terrorisme En France Aujourd'Hui* (Sainte-Marguerite-sur-Mer: Éd. des Équateurs, 2006).

out of the scope of this project

On the other hand, modern-day terrorism seems less correlated to immigration waves. Far more terrorists are "home-grown", "self-radicalized," or "lone wolves." While receiving inspiration from abroad, they do not necessarily need to have direct contact with immigrants. Moreover, Arab and Middle Eastern ethnic minorities in the United States are marginalized in much the same that Italian and German immigrants in the 1920s were; indicating that the state might be more of a cause for attempt at revenge than the target of an ideology propagandizing by the deed. In late twentieth century scholarship, the term "integration" referred to a political, and not a cultural intermingling. The consolidation of the European Union, and even a more-integrated Western European Union, served to "integrate" marginalized communities by easing their ability to move between borders and to structurally equalize access to employment opportunities. The ability to migrate and even travel informally meant that communities came more frequently into contact with other cultures. In other words, the political integration of different states proceeded and in fact leads to a cultural integration.

A similar approach in contemporary politics would mean a close cooperation between France and North Africa. A deep colonial history brings the two regions together naturally, yet at the same time has left a residue of resentment. There is little effort at French integration with Middle Eastern and North African states, indeed, there has only been outward military aggression.

The French state has relied extensively on its power to suppress freedom for those suspected of being a threat to French security or safety. As of July 2016, French law enforcement had placed 268 persons under surveillance and suspicion following travel plans, and had detained 169 people, with 99 on warrants. The goal, according to French policy during the State of Emergency, was to place people under surveillance or in detention in order to then assess their level of "dangerosity" and their "degree of radicalization."[107] Of course, the system doesn't always work, as in the case of Adel Kermiche, the young man who killed a priest in Seine-Maritime in July 2016. Authorities placed Kermiche under review after he twice attempted to travel to Syria to wage jihad. Evidently, assessments of his "degree of radicalization" found him

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107 Cécile Bouanchaud, "Quel Suivi Judiciaire Pour Les Candidats Du Djihad?" Le Monde28 Jul, 2016. http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/07/28/quel-suivi-judiciaire-pour-les-candidats-au-djihad_4975585_1653578.html.

to be a low-level threat, and he was released from surveillance. The revelation that he'd been intentionally removed from the law enforcement watch list left many French feeling bitter and led to a drop in respect for law enforcement in France. Similar situations have occurred in the United States and elsewhere in Europe. Scholars suggest the lack of faith in law enforcement is a factor in the rise of far-right parties across the Western world that advocates a strict adherence to principles of security over principles of liberty.

Law enforcement has also engaged in shutting down mosques and regulating the flow of money for building mosques. Notably, the French government has strayed away from allowing mosque construction: Marseille, which houses between 25,650 to 342,000 Muslims, still lacks any formal mosque.[108] In fact, there are only three to four large-scale, single-purpose mosques in all of France. Most Muslims organize in small community centers which operate as localized neighborhood mosques -- a problem for French surveillance operations, as it has become increasingly difficult to find and track local, small-scale imams. Moreover, as of August 2016, French authorities had shut down around twenty, although reports suggest that "of the 2,500 mosques and prayer halls in France, about 120...are considered to be preaching Salafism, a strict Sunni interpretation of Islam."[109]

The problem may, in part, relate to the French state's avoidance of assisting religious leaders in cultivating their religious community. For instance, Algerian imams requested for a mosque to be built in Istres, France, in 1987. It took until 2001 for the Grand Mosquée de Paris to authorize the building and obtain a building permit from the French state. After subsequent attacks with weapons such as Molotov cocktails, the *Masjid al Arrahama* was finally completed in 2007.[110]

Soft Power: Community Engagement Programs

Since implementation of the State of Emergency, some community engagement programs have fallen by the leeway. The Law of Equality and Citizenship, which the French Parliament

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108 Based on population estimates and a range of 30-40% Muslims in Marseille. French law prohibits collection of statistics on religious preferences. "Marseille : La Population Ne Décolle Plus," , accessed Jan 27, 2017, http://www.laprovence.com/article/edition-marseille/3742335/la-population-ne-decolle-plus.html.
109 "French Foundation to Administer and Build Mosques," , accessed Jan 27, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/french-foundation-administer-build-mosques-160801133029106.html.
110 Information provided in interview (Istres, France: 21 March 2016).

passed on 2 January 2017, attempted to resolve some lapses in community engagement.   In particular, the law emphasized the necessity of youth civic engagement and a countrywide sociopolitical intermingling.   Two of the three sponsors of the law: Ericka Bareigts and Patrick Kanner, belong to the Socialist Party in France, which has suffered a severe loss of popularity in France under the administration of French President Francois Hollande. Implications are that progressive legislation such as the Law on Equality and Citizenship is not likely to be renewed or furthered after the 2017 French elections in Spring 2017.

More ingrained in French political structure for CVE is MIVILUDES, the Interministerial Mission for Vigilance and the Fight against Sectarian Drift.[111]   MIVILUDES is fairly well recognized and supported among scholars and the French population.   However, there is some uncertainty with the direction MIVILUDES ought to take considering the record number of radicalized individuals committing attacks between 2015 and 2017.   Community integration efforts now span beyond the scope of MIVILUDES, to include efforts at housing integration, language instruction, and public education reform. MIVILUDES more targeted works with families of radicalized individuals in order to pair the radicalized individuals with post-deradicalization advocates.   Their mission is thus to promote discussion and a branching of open-mindedness.

French academics have generally commended the community-engagement theories for the homeland, whereas French governing bodies have tended to work with international aid programs, such as *Médecins sans frontiers*. Dounia Bouzar is a prolific writer in topics of Muslim integration in France, and she has often suggested that integration on the level of social workers is the best approach. The Prevention Center against Radical Islamic Sects (Centre de Prévention contre les Dérives Sectaires liées à l'Islam, CPDSI) is founded on her method of countering radicalization through one-on-one and neighborhood-wide social work efforts.

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111 In French, "La Mission interministerielle de de Vigilance et de Lutte contre les Derives Sectaires." "Sectarian Drift" refers to very strict interpretations, more colloquial a translation perhaps would be "radical ideologies." See "La MIVILUDES Explication," last modified -04-27, accessed Jan 27, 2017, http://www.agoravox.fr/actualites/politique/article/la-miviludes-explication-134905.

Mourad Benchellali is another name that often comes up in discussions of deradicalization. Benchallali has taken it upon himself to present at schools and to work with NGOs to prevent youths from subscribing to radical ideals.[112] More and more ambitious French individuals have taken up Benchellali's example, to the point that such social deradicalization social workers are portrayed in contemporary French film.

Soft Power: Resources provided to CVE and deradicalization programs

Aïnoha Pascaul and Raphael Kempf noted that attempts to curb liberties were a way of making up for budget shortfalls. The state of emergency implemented after the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks cost the state of France both in terms of budgeting, resource allocation, and maintenance of civil liberties. Pascual and Kempf suggest that "thanks to the State of Emergency, we don't need to abide by legal/justice principles in order to take counterterror measures...we can talk about taking someone's liberty even if the Constitutional Council doesn't validate that interpretation."[113] Their argument is consistent with the trend towards medium power as a lower-cost method of countering extremism. The cost is significantly lower politically and socially than soft power, and less costly than employing hard military force against its own population or the home countries of perceived threatening communities. Notably, in the wake of 2015 attacks the Hollande Administration did call for an expanded military campaign against ISIS on the ground in Syria, suggesting that the heightened level of emergency warranted greater power enforcement than medium efforts.

French policy has put some resources into anti-discrimination efforts as a soft-power approach to decreasing the likelihood of social or economic estrangement. French government formulated anti-discrimination laws in 1972, 1993 and 2003, before issuing even more extensive measures in 2016. Legislation has provided some funding for anti-discrimination public-awareness campaigns and litigation against offending employers. It is grounded in the fairly rational assumption that those with housing and employment will not go to the effort to commit terrorist attacks against the French government or French citizens. However, funding has been limited and the public awareness campaigns led to only very moderate changes in patterns of employment.

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[112] http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/03/07/apres-guantanamo-le-combat-de-mourad-benchellali-pour-faire-entendre-ses-mots_4877821_3224.html#meter_toaster
113

On a localized level, the "Four Sisters" have been working since the late twentieth century to prevent discrimination against minorities in the workplace and public sphere. These are the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (LDH, founded in 1898), Ligue Internationale contre le racisme et l'antisemitisme (LICRA, founded in 1928), Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'Amitie entre les Peuples (founded 1949), and most recently, SOS Racisme (founded 1984). 1972, 1993, 2003 = anti-discrimination laws

French policy in international context

France, as a member of the EU, grappled with controlling large refugee flows from the Syrian Civil War. Shantytowns popped up along the Northern French coast, as refugees seeking to cross the English Channel became stuck in less-welcoming France. In mid- to late-2016, law enforcement authorities began forcefully removing refugees from these camps and leaving thousands homeless.

The French and Medium Power

In assessing the French approach to CVE and deradicalization, this chapter has considered France's legacy of integration struggles and radicalism. Historically, labor movements (composed primarily of migrant workers) challenged the state in the most organized form. Immigrant communities consistently lived clustered in small suburban regions around major French cities, with little access to French public goods. Integration efforts were also minimal, and in fact, *laïcité* was used, especially in the late twentieth century, as a means to systematically remove non-French religious and cultural identities from French soil and the social sphere. Contemporary legislation has focused on the threats posed by radical Islamist terrorism, but soft power efforts have continued to be somewhat lackluster. MIVILUDES and similar localized efforts to deradicalize have had a moderate effect at decreasing levels of radicalization, but state-level policies have operated on incentivizing non-discrimination and online counter-narrative campaigns, while channeling most resources towards medium power use, such as increased law enforcement through raids, arrests, and deportations. Political rhetoric has villainized immigrant populations, especially as attacks continue to occur.

If CVE were effective in the French case, there would be significantly less controversy over anti-discrimination legislation and integration actions. The State of Emergency implemented in France during 2015 and 2016 proved that there was little to no respect for the Muslim communities in France, and demonstrated the extent to which immigrants living in French cities, especially Paris or Marseille, would be subject to violations of human and civil rights. Foreigners or recent immigrants conduct many attacks on French citizens, and so France's targeting of immigrants as the source of the security dilemma is perhaps more warranted in France than in the UK or U.S.

But France does not prove the immigration-security nexus; rather, it confirms that the CVE-immigration nexus is ineffective. The reliance on integrative measures and efforts to assimilate immigrants to a certain ideal has led to a massive stigmatization and demonization of immigrant communities. The turn from soft to medium power largely reflects desperation on the part of French policymakers; CVE and deradicalization, despite the immeasurability of their success, are seen as failures each time an attack occurs. The de-legitimization of soft power efforts at integration portends a future of increasingly tight security measures and decreasing attempts to assimilate in any multicultural way.

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4. CASE THREE: THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Historical Case: 1920s Anarchist Scare, post-WWII Communist scare (Red Scares 1 and 2)

       Exclusionary integration model

       Immigration controls and law enforcement

       Education through unions

Recent History Case: Community-engagement approach to gangs, 1970-present

Contemporary Case: The transition from post-9/11 hard power to post-2010 soft power

       Melting pot approach to integration

       Review of CVE programs, policy aims, departmental general strategies

       Law enforcement and immigration controls

       Community engagement

       Resources provided to programs

Conclusion: Considerations for incoming administration with respect to preventing the growth of violent extremism

HISTORICAL APPROACH: The Red Scares, Nativism And Americanization Programs

Soft Power: Assimilationist/Exclusion Model

> "There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."
>
>   - James Madison, *Federalist 10*[114]

The 1920s and 1930s, considered to be the "Roaring Twenties" and Great Depression, respectively, represent distinct economic situations in American history. Both are relevant for our understanding today, as many scholars have drawn parallels between the integration of Italian and Jewish refugees during these decades and the modern phenomenon of Syrian refugees.

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114 James Madison. "Federalist 10." *The Federalist Papers.*
"MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)," , accessed Feb 4, 2017,
https://casetext.com/case/meyer-v-state-of-nebraska.

Indeed, the inter-war period (roughly 1920 – 1945) of American history is a prime example of the USA's limited multiculturalism. Nationalist sentiment, reacting to foreign wars led to the creation of formal "Americanization" programs. Peter Roberts defined "Americanization" as "the molding and shaping of the ideas of foreign-born men as to what America stands for, the training of the foreign-born in the *modus operandi* of democratic institutions as found in these United States, the informing of these men as to the history of the country and the founders of the Republic…"[115] The presence of intentional American state effort is conspicuously missing from Roberts' statement, notably because Roberts referred throughout his 1920 book to Americanization as a spontaneous process undertaken by individual businesses. In point of fact, Americanization efforts were primarily a localized effort, although some state governments enforced Americanization requirements on employers. City councils were often responsible for oversight and implementation, usually through lower-level agencies. This has come to be known in academic and policymaking circles as "community engagement".

Despite the seeming inclusiveness of the small-scale Americanization model, some analysts held strong opposition to the programs on the basis of their threat to the concept of democracy. In 1919, amid actions to foster "Americanization" programs, Carol Aronovici wrote, "the Americanization movement which has sprung into being not from any desire to develop democracy at home, but rather as an effort for national integration that would strengthen our hands in our effort to safeguard democracy abroad, is pregnant with dangers that threaten the very ideals upon which the United States built its foundation…"[116] At base, however, the programs seem innocent enough: they typically encompassed city- or state-run English language courses, public lectures and entertainment, and public group recreational activities.

The problems Aronovici observed are strikingly similar to contemporary criticisms of law enforcement and CVE: "sectionalism...race or class prejudice, and, above all...the stifling effects of a rigidity of thought that is the enemy of all progress and fair play. Instead of beholding a vision of a new national life, a new interpretation of our social and economic order consistent with the rate of the march of the times, I am haunted by the old ghost of patriotism."[117]

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[115] Aronovici, *Americanization* p. 5
[116] Peter Roberts, *The Problem of Americanization* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1920) p.28. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t0wp9w84f.; Carol Aronovici, *Americanization* (St. Paul: Keller Publishing Co., 1919) p.5.
[117] Aronovici, Americanization

The similarities between Aronovici's commentary and contemporary discussions of CVE is striking, and warrants a deeper analysis of how community-based programs may target immigrant communities.[118] It would be helpful to see how such programs might have interacted with law enforcement, to test whether discriminating "Americanization" programs and targeted CVE programs could lead to similar ostracizing of certain groups, and to what extent the State can have a role in preventing that phenomenon.   Policies directed at preventing ostracizing groups rest on the assumption that the United States is, in fact, stronger and a better democracy when supported by a diversity of socio-ethnic groups, and when as many people as possible are able to participate in democratic institutions. The 2016 election, however, demonstrated that the US population and Administration might not consider inclusion of minorities to be as important as in the past.

Soft Power: Americanization Programs

"Americanization programs" refers to a series of measures implemented in the first few decades of the twentieth century. States created (sometimes mandatory) English-language and American history learning programs, mandated education for immigrant children and established informal forms of civic engagement with the wider non-immigrant community. Boston, New York and Chicago initiated the Americanization efforts at a smaller community level, but large states became known for the extent and comprehensiveness of their statewide regulations and grants.   For example, the California Commission of Immigration and Housing's authority encompassed a large range of purposes, including developing English-language programs and integrating immigrants into predominantly non-immigrant housing communities.   Advocates, such as Americanization proponent Florence Keller, promoted federally consolidated programs in order to best prepare newly-immigrated families to work and live in American culture; however, as Kathleen Arnold notes, "in the end, rivalry between the Bureau of Naturalization and Bureau of Education helped foil hopes for a centralized federal Americanization system."[119] The onset of World War I also significantly halted public support for moderate Americanization programs. The perceived emergency and threat coming from Asian and Southern European or

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[118] For example, see Jeremy Shapiro "Countering Violent Extremism: the quixotic quest for a rational policy on terrorism." *Order from Chaos,* Brookings Institution; 16 February 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/02/16/countering-violent-extremism-the-quixotic-quest-for-a-rational-policy-on-terrorism/

[119] Arnold, Kathleen. *Anti-Immigration in the United States: A Historical Encyclopedia*. Denver: Greenwood Publishing, 2011. P. 12-13

German immigrants pushed support towards groups like the American Legion, which encouraged "100% Americanization" programs in which immigrants were told to disregard any previous linguistic or cultural norms.[120]

For many scholars of American politics and constitutionalism, the concept "100% American" seems self-contradictory. It makes little sense that a country composed of immigrants and from disparate cultural and religious backgrounds would have blended into such a homogeneous population that "American" could even become an ethnicity. Indeed, James Madison noted in *Federalist 10* that a large population is essential to the correct functioning of the American republic, as the diversity of interests would prevent any single interest from oppressing minorities.[121] The Supreme Court supported Madison's defense of U.S. diversity in the 1923 case *Meyer v. Nebraska*. The case took issue with a Nebraska law which

> "Said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals; and 'that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. It also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled."[122]

The Supreme Court ultimately ruled such a piece of legislation unconstitutional via the due process clause, which inherently guaranteed all citizens the right to choose their language and education. The precedent in approaching CVE evaluation, then, should be the same legalistic terms used to evaluate a very similar set of programs, aimed at improving the level of "American" among immigrant populations.

Studies of the 1920s Americanization programs suggest that they were successful in causing more students to stay in school increased some English-language abilities and ultimately led to a slight increase in likelihood of later employment for immigrants. However, there has been no conclusive study which found an increase in integration of immigrant communities; in fact, one study noted that "the nation as a whole was moving away from using foreign languages

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[120] Arnold 2011

[121] The extent to which the modern-day American system is or is not a republic is outside the purview of this analysis.

[122] Meyer v. Nebraska

voluntarily."[123] As such, the programs at best accelerated the adoption of English as a more natural language of discourse in the first half of the twentieth century. Studies indicate there may have been a connection between Americanization programs and integration, but that specific measures such as English-language programs and child labor/schooling laws did not directly influence that movement. School enrollment increased among foreign-born and native-born groups, but the increased enrollment did not correlate with an increase in English fluency or literacy among foreign-born groups. It is thus likely that school did not adequately replace the native influence within living communities, and the soft attempt at Americanization or integration failed, insofar as communities and families did not replace their native cultures with American culture.

Soft Power: The Near-Miss: Gang Deradicalization Programs

Measures in major cities to de-radicalize gang members in the latter half of the twentieth century reveal another shortfall of community-based de-radicalization efforts. Gang deradicalization had the potential to work, but ultimately failed. Gangs, groups of youths using criminal activity to generate revenue and power, largely recruited unemployed or otherwise disenfranchised community-members. Once involved with the gangs, as suggested by Bjorn's work, it was extremely difficult for members to de-radicalize and leave the gang. Members and their families were bound to the gang, usually until the member found alternate employment and measures to ensure his/her safety.

Law enforcement officials utilized community intervention techniques to help members leave gangs and diminish the recruitment appeal. In so doing, states and local government hoped to greatly reduce the threat gangs posed to the wider community as a result of their violence and economic delinquency. Usually, "community intervention" involved law enforcement working with housing leaders in gang-ridden areas in order to promote a sense of trust for law enforcement officers within the community. Officials also worked to provide alternative employment and safety guarantees in order to expedite gang members leaving and de-radicalizing from the group. In particular, work to provide paths to employment led to modest success in decreasing gang activity in large cities.

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[123] Adriana Lleras-Muney and Allison Shertzer, "Did the Americanization Movement Succeed?" *American Economic Journal* 7, no. 3 (2015), 258-290. http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=83454475X.

Yet such efforts had little resilience in the face of an economic downturn, which ultimately led to cooperation between the housing/community leaders and gang leaders, in conspiring against law enforcement or at least blatantly ignoring law enforcement efforts.[124] Thus, the community intervention tactics used were not successful in truly de-radicalizing or even preventing further radicalization -- it seems that economic stability was the only factor able to really influence gang membership and gang activity in a community. There is a lesson to be learned about the economic factor in anti-extremism efforts. It is highly likely; furthermore, that employment offers one of the best paths to CVE-type inclusion measures.

Medium Power: Immigration And Law Enforcement

Contemporary journalists struggle with the question of defining "emergency." Schmitt and Agamben formulated the idea of "State of Exception" to counterbalance anarchist thought and tendencies, and there is some evidence to support that the United States became a State of Exception in response to anarchists and communists themselves. During the early twentieth century, the "First Red Scare" referred to, as noted by a former Communist Murray Levin, "a nationwide anti-radical hysteria provoked by a mounting fear and anxiety that a Bolshevik revolution in America was imminent -- a revolution that would change...the American way of Life".[125] Indeed, U.S. Governmental policies during the "First Red Scare" indicate a deep level of societal fear. Both the Immigration Act of 1917 and the Anarchist Act were used in numerous cases of state assaults against citizens' bodies and liberties, culminating in the Palmer Raids in 1919 and 1920.[126] The Palmer Raids represent a pretty direct parallel to present-day counterterrorism interrogation and detention strategies, which often capture innocent individuals in drawn-out and violent episodes of detention.[127] This tendency towards targeted law enforcement is central to what I've termed the use of medium power.

There appears to be a direct connection between a widespread sense of impending doom for "the American way of life" and a governmental response that focuses on controlling the liberty of those individuals considered to pose a grave threat to "the American way of life."

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[124] C. Ronald Huff, *Gangs in America*, 2. ed. ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif. [u.a.]: Sage, 1996).

[125] Levin 1971, 29

[126] Chacon, Jennifer M. "The Security Myth: Punishing Immigrants in the Name of National Security." In *Immigration, Integration and Security*, ed. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich, 145-163. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008.

[127] Biswas and Zahi 2011

Indeed, President Woodrow Wilson pushed Congress to authorize the Sedition Act of 1918 in order to surveil and deport immigrants in the United States during the Red Scare of 1918-1920. By 1920, rhetoric had evolved into active aggression against anarchists and promoted "vigorous enforcement of the law."[128] In December of 1920, the U.S. Senate considered legislation to further constrict immigration and naturalization laws. The defense of naturalization laws, in particular, supports the hypothesis of this work that states respond to states of emergency with restrictions to immigration and overt suspicion of minority or immigrant groups. Despite the mass deportations under the Immigration and Anarchist Acts, and mass surveillance authorized by President Wilson, another "Red Scare" emerged in the wake of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War.

Historians have come to consider McCarthyism a period of broad infringements on civil liberties. Most potently, the period was characterized by broad, baseless accusations and detentions of suspected "communists" throughout the 1930s through the 1950s. Detention without cause constitutes a serious breach of Western liberal practice, but more significantly, likely led communities to feel marginalized, leading, potentially to radicalized groupings. It also conforms to patterns in British and French experience of infringing political rights in order to preserve an aura of safety.

The U.S. Government's responses to crisis during World War II perhaps legitimized and cemented repressive politics of fear. War is arguably one of the most threatening of emergency situations, and the World Wars served to justify strong military leadership and decision-making abilities. Yet it is during this period that President Franklin D. Roosevelt committed one of the worst acts of human rights violations within the United States -- the internment of Japanese-Americans. Many US citizens consider that Presidential action to be a severe infringement on liberty and life. Again, the period correlated to an increase in nationalist propaganda and rhetoric, as well as a general "rally around the flag" attitude among the American population. Such indirect support for a state controlling bodies is alarming, but may provide valuable insights to the current American political scene.

The era of "McCarthyism" lasted much longer than the initial "Red Scare." Perhaps the influence of the Second World War played a role in heightening tensions, but the onset of the Cold War is most often considered the cause of increased polarization among American society.

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[128] "Immigration." New York Times, 03 Dec 1920. Timesmachine.nytimes.com

Cold War tensions pitted society against communist or anarchist groups. At the heart of Cold War political theory was, in fact, that Soviet, communist and anarchist influences threatened the American "way of life".

President Roosevelt grasped power and used it to combat an economic "state of emergency" in a way that no other President had attempted previously. The New Deal marked a momentous change in the role of the President in the U.S. government: it would thereafter become a position of immense power and influence in the government and society beyond, just as Schmitt and Agamben advocated should happen in a "state of exception." The 1930s marked a significant expansion of the considerations of "state of emergency" -- being that it now included economic emergency -- and vested the President with the role of doing whatever may be necessary to resolve the crisis, with the full support of the American people.

The New Deal set a precedent that was followed throughout WWII, especially in the wake of Pearl Harbor, when President Roosevelt authorized the internment of Japanese-Americans in a way that violated the individual's' rights to freedom. Having stomached such a reckless use of Presidential prerogative, it is no wonder the American people could so easily stand behind the era of the Second Red Scare and government-enforced McCarthyism. Even dictionary definitions highlight the unjust nature of McCarthy-era detainments and deportations: the online source Dictionary.com defines it as "the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, especially of pro-Communist activity, in many instances unsupported by proof or based on slight, doubtful, or irrelevant evidence" (Dictionary.com). Both Red Scares demonstrate the reach of the U.S. law enforcement and governmental agencies to literally control the movement of individual bodies, even via extra-legal methods and with dubious legitimacy. Newspaper sources demonstrate the effectiveness of the government's use of "emergency" to garner popular support -- even tacit support by the media is demonstrated in the sheer amount of attention paid to the topic.

Contemporary American politics have been characterized by the state's focus on the "terrorist other" -- the "terrorist" body. Implicit in such an interest is a need to define that constitutes a terrorist and what actions make someone a terrorist rather than a criminal. Law enforcement has tended to target the Muslim community in America as the most likely terrorists, much as the state of emergency in France presently and unfairly targets all Muslims. The most significant acts of U.S. state repression of individual Muslim bodies have been made possible

through the USA PATRIOT Act, the employment of extraordinary rendition, and the acts of torture carried out at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, among other high-security detention facilities. The state's ability to take away one's liberty and freedom is certainly a fundamental right of governments and law enforcement, yet it seems that in today's "perpetual" emergency state, the American populace perpetually falls prey to the Schmittian concept of a warranted liberty- and freedom-encroaching tyrant.

Rhetorical Analysis: Times Of Terrorism-Related "Emergency"

Between 1918 and 1920, federal and state law enforcement agencies targeted suspected "reds" in a dramatic way: through raids, warrantless arrests, and mass deportations. The New York Times reported on January 21, 1920, that "truck loads of alleged Reds from lodging houses, pool halls, cafes and soft, drink saloons, haunts of Russian Radicals, were delivered at the Government detention station last night in a carefully planned raid against suspected communists and anarchists in Seattle" (Anonymous 1919e, 15). This quotation is only one of numerous Times articles from 1919 alone that highlighted the U.S. law enforcement's aggressive pursuit to detain and deport suspected "Reds." Deportation and detainment, of course, are hallmarks of state limitation and control of bodies. Restricting freedom of movement, for non-criminal causes, seems to rub against the very essence of American democracy.

An analysis of New York Times articles in the 1918-1920 period provides helpful insights about the nature of American society's views towards the U.S. Government's appropriation of bodies during the period. Notably, many articles report abuses of individual liberty and freedom without passing a particular judgment. Indeed, if one takes the news reporting to be a reflection of general American societal attitudes, it is evident that support for the government's policies was high, even though said policies infringed on basic rights and liberties guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, such as the right to habeas corpus. It is also relevant to note the significant parallels between the selected quotations below and contemporary political rhetoric.

The quotations selected in Table 1 show the gradual violation of bodily rights by the government. In early 1919, there was evidently a general unease and desire for increased security, yet mostly vague, broad calls for "increased security" and "war on anarchy". By June 5, 1919, however, the Times reported that law enforcement officials had created a list of at least ten thousand "radicals" to be investigated. The sheer amount of resources dedicated to the

investigations of these alleged "radicals" demonstrates the extent to which the "war on anarchy" represented a state of emergency/exception.   The link between the threat of anarchists and the government's "right" to conduct covert surveillance of anyone demonstrates the extent to which the American public was willing to support drastic, liberty-infringing liberties and the right to privacy of one's body and space.

Tables 1-6 are divided into six tables comparing rhetoric across the three case studies by thematic categories, in order to demonstrate the similarities between the three selected periods of state repression leading to mass detainment and deportation.   While each time period corresponds to different levels of press formality, the nature of articles from the time period, and the sheer availability of such similar quotations, strongly demonstrates the consistency across the cases.   The references to terrorist bodies and the characterizations thereof are particularly interesting, as the casual manner in which they are discussed shows to some extent the level of complacency among the American population towards assaults on "terrorist" bodies.

Table 1 considers how terrorists are described, and how the community is expected to interact with suspected terrorists. During the First Red Scare, reporters referred to terrorist acts as "bomb outrages," encouraging community members to be "extra vigilant". During both the Second Red Scare and modern era, descriptions of the terrorist "other" imply that their values are inherently anathema to cherished American liberal values.   In all three cases, non-state community actors constitute a significant force against terrorists, who are clearly stigmatized as being outside of the norm of society.

Table 2 further shows the extent to which rhetoric in each period suggested the "terrorist" must be fought with actual physical force. Physical force is so supported that many newspapers and politicians referred to a literal "war" between, essentially, the forces of good and the forces of evil. Historians and political scientists often point to Lyndon B. Johnson's declaration of a War on Poverty as the starting point for political uses of abstract wars among American presidents. Yet, as shown in Table 2, references to war and physically attacking even just suspected terrorists are common in the history of the American approach to counterterrorism. In 1919, The New York Times had no qualms about discussing a "war on anarchy" and a "hunt for anarchists" as being prominent and, to an extent, laudable approaches to anarchist violence. The theme carried into the hunt for communists during the Second Red Scare, when community members were invited to join the "propaganda war" and "crusade" in order to "round up"

communists, as McCarthy did. The awkward wording of "crusade" and the characterization of the terrorist as being an "enemy combatant", of course, have characterized the contemporary era.

Table 3 portrays anyone with even the least potential for terrorist sympathizers as a subversive bent on bodily harm. In 1919, anti-communists argued that anarchists sought "a reign of terror by bomb explosions." In 1954, communists' access to weapons could supposedly decide whether "the sons of American mothers may live or die." An Islamophobic 2014 book even alleges that true Muslims must be willing to martyr themselves (i.e. sacrificing their bodies) to kill infidels and fulfill God's wishes. These quotations suggest a link between the bodies of the "good" and the bodies of the terrorists, in that the "good" are likely to be very physically and legitimately attacked. The state, therefore, would likely need to attack the terrorists individually in order to truly combat the threat posed by terrorists. Table 3's quotations would provide, as seen earlier in this paper, the foundation for state repressive actions.

The USA PATRIOT Act received significant criticism for the authority it gave to the NSA to monitor electronic communications between American citizens (and noncitizens) without the traditional warrant approach to criminal investigations. It also expanded the restrictive nature of US immigration laws. Jennifer Chacon noted that, "changes in immigration enforcement [since 9/11] have increased racial and ethnic profiling in newly expanded immigration efforts and flooded an overburdened administrative and judicial system with detainees… (Chacon 2008,157)." As Table 4 demonstrates, the use of surveillance, and even of making "lists" of suspected terrorists, is, once again, consistent with past uses of US state power to restrict individual's' liberty to move and retain power over their body. Mass surveillance is a direct watching of the individual body, in a way that infringes the private space and private sphere. In many ways, electronic surveillance may actually be less intrusive than the typical, historical means of mass surveillance, as quotations from the Red Scares suggest citizens report suspicious neighbors to police in order to "index" terrorists, and even suggest detaining citizens in "disagreeable labor camps" in order to best monitor those with the potential to become terrorists.

Table 5 considers the rhetoric used by the media in each of the three cases with regards to deportation, but it is especially enlightening to look at the selected quotation from 1919. This quotation highlights the connection between deportation (forcing movement of a body and the home/private sphere) and torture. In a period before Guantanamo functioned as a detention

center, individuals described as being deported "as anarchists and revolutionists" had "blackened eyes and lacerated scalps as souvenirs of the new attitude of aggressiveness which has been assumed by the Federal agents… ("Quick Deportation for the Reds" 1919c)." In the latter two cases, on the other hand, efforts were directed less at deportation of those in the country, but rather the prevention of immigration. The prevention of immigration is perhaps a hazy topic for this paper, as it concerns the state's regulation of a non-citizen's freedom of movement. However, the cases are still indicative of the ways in which a state reacts to insecurity by aggressively acting against bodies, whether through refusing asylum or scalping. Additionally, it is significant to note the significance of "raids" in all three cases, wherein Federal agents are seen as having some state power-derived right to enter into private domains.

Table 6 describes the way Americans deported or proposed to deport three generations of immigrants who represented real or imagined threats to the United States, denying those immigrants freedom of movement. Politicians in 1920 sought "the protection of the country from the revolutionaries and radicals eager to descend upon it," often an excuse to detain them and house them in subhuman conditions. In 1954, American officials referred to undocumented immigrants as "subversive aliens," dehumanizing them so that the civil-rights violations of Operation Wetback seemed less inhumane. The upcoming Trump administration will "ensure that other countries take their people back when we order them deported." In all three eras, administrations have denied immigrants control over their own bodies, ostensibly as a way to further secure the state. Such detentions and deportations seem almost automatic to the perceived constant "state of emergency."

The transition from post-9/11 hard power to soft power

Soft Power: Melting pot approach to integration

While the UK and France have had long ethnic and cultural histories involving prioritization of societal homogeneity, the US is founded, in principle, on the concept of a "melting pot." Yet a detailed understanding of US policies indicates that, in fact, the "melting pot" approach has been degraded in favor of securitized homogeneity in the past few centuries. Indeed, the US has acted as a "melting pot" in much the same way that French scholars view

French society -- as a mix of cultures and ethnicities by necessity, but a gradually homogeneous group by intentional socio-political effort.

The "melting pot" became exclusionary starting early on in US history. The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, signed by President John Adams permitted

> "That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United Slates, within such time as shall be expressed in such order, which order shall be served on such alien by delivering him a copy thereof, or leaving the same at his usual abode, and returned to the office of the Secretary of State, by the marshal or other person to whom the same shall be directed...
> ...All natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of...hostile nation or governments [as proclaimed by the President]...who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien enemies. And the President of the United States shall be and is hereby authorized...to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, towards the aliens…. the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those, who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, shall refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which shall be found necessary in the premises and for the public safety…."

The U.S. Supreme Court later struck down the act as unconstitutional. But the language in the Act would not go away; in fact, as will be shown in data tables later in this chapter, the behaviors suggested in the Alien and Sedition Act were natural tendencies of law enforcement and government officials – even the President. It speaks to the automatic association, dating back to 1798 and before, of outsider (Alien) individuals and national insecurity or emergency.

The (perceived) intrinsic connection between immigration and national security continued throughout American history in various forms, including nationalist groups and movements like the "Know-Nothing" Party of the twentieth century. The concept of "melting pot" persevered as well, as various immigration waves were brought into US fabric, although usually after a few decades of socio-political struggle for equality. The distinction between ethnic groups broadened as globalization expanded the types of groups and peoples coming into the United States.

For instance, US policymakers in the early years of the European refugee crisis (1938-1941) turned to increasing restriction as they rode "an undercurrent of anti-refugee feeling,

emphasized their propositions that aliens caused unemployment and that the most effective solution would be to stop further immigration and deport as many noncitizens as possible."[129] Even by then, such responses had been normalized from previous immigration and refugee waves. The 1920s and 1930s, especially, saw a variety of efforts to close down on immigration.

The significance of immigration closure for an analysis of "melting pot" integration is that, especially in the 1920s during the First Red Scare and the post-WWII Second Red Scare, immigration policies targeted specific immigrant ethnicities. A "melting pot" approach to integration would imply that the response to a perceived migrant threat ought to be to bring communities together in different ways -- what in contemporary parlance is CVE. Immigration policies, therefore, suggest a helpful framework for evaluating the effectiveness of community-based approaches, which, when existing prior to immigration restriction, may have failed.

It is relevant to note that many studies indicate Muslims in the U.S. are better integrated and even better assimilated than that elsewhere. Chebel d'Appollonia remarks "such a belief partly explains why the radicalization of young US Muslims has for many years been perceived as less alarming than the situation in Europe, even after 9/11. While focusing on border controls to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the country and applying tight surveillance on Muslim foreign nationals, American policymakers tended to dismiss the very possibility of second- or third- generation immigrants joining jihadist ranks."[130]

Both Americanization programs and Gang de-radicalization programs are informative examples for contemporary policymakers seeking to implement CVE and deradicalization programs. Americanization programs that mandated compulsory education until age 16 were the most successful of all Americanization measures put into place. While intended to integrate communities, Americanization programs in fact created deeper dissonance between immigrant communities and law enforcement by making immigrant communities the subject of surveillance and enforcement -- truancy officers being some of the most visible law enforcement for children and child protective services taking a strong role in parental and adult lives. Programs meant to unite gang-community leaders with law enforcement in order to establish safer cities also fell short in their aims. Gang membership did alter slightly with law enforcement efforts to aid community leaders in finding employment for youths, but without the economic incentive to

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[129] Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia. *Frontiers of Fear.*
[130] ibid.

integrate into society, community leaders returned to reliance on gang leaders and members for financial stability, encouraging gang activity.

Furthermore, both time periods coincide with greater police and law enforcement activity in general. Another example is the internment of Japanese-Americans in camps during WWII is an example of the extreme measures to which the government was willing to go in an effort to combat extremism. Fortunately, there are few indications that the mass internment led to any kind of extended, long-term radicalization or extremist tendencies among the Japanese-American population, although some long-term psychological effects have been documented.[131]

CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: CVE

Contemporary CVE programs mimic the Americanization programs of the early twentieth century to some extent. Progress in small-scale integration and CVE efforts has been slow, but some private businesses and organizations have taken it upon themselves to develop cooperation with their local Islamic communities in order to prevent extremism on a small scale, much as private firms took it upon themselves in the 1920s to teach English and American values. One example of business endeavors is a 2004 Northeastern University developed a "Promising Practices Guide" for their "Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative."[132] Northeastern University's Initiative stated a variety of measures intended to support minority group working at the University and to foster open discussions about diversity and acceptance. Private groups such as the NGO *Cure Violence* have likewise incorporated small-scale CVE efforts -- Cure Violence has been working "since 2000…[to apply] a mix of interventions, including providing safe spaces for youth, getting out of communities to detect potential flare-ups of violence, and training local actors on conflict prevention to reduce shootings in Chicago's most dangerous neighborhood by 67 percent and in Baltimore by 56 percent."[133] The policies' continued implementation connotes success at creating more integrated communities in the workplace, and provides hope that a broader effort may be based on the

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[131]"Psychological Effects of Camp," last modified 27 May, http://encyclopedia.densho.org/Psychological_effects_of_camp/.
[132] Deborah A. Ramirez, Sasha Cohen O'Connell and Rabia Zafar, Developing Partnerships between Law Enforcement and American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Communities: A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary (Boston: Northeastern University School of Law,[2004]).
[133]Shannon N. Green, "Terrorism has been Democratized, so Too must Counterterrorism," *Boston Globe*Sep 19, 2016. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1820590315.

approach. The local, decentralized nature of the small programs resembles NGO-level CVE and deradicalization groups in the UK and France as well.

In the US, however, it took until 2011 for the national government to officially enact a counter-radicalization and countering violent extremism policy. An analysis report by the Congressional Report Service broke the initial CVE program down into three components: *community engagement, building government and law enforcement expertise, and countering violent extremist propaganda.*[134] The analysis also considers grassroots efforts as integral to the strategy, although regards the lack of a lead agency as adding some complexity. Since the 2012 report, CVE strategies expanded across departments, whereas CVE initially was confined to a subset of the Department of Homeland Security.   It is important to note the similarity between the tenets of community engagement, building expertise, and challenging propaganda and the tenets detailed in earlier chapters about Prevent. Both projects employ a wide range of literature in order to explain the ideal forms of CVE. The negatives are similar as well: both projects also refrain from defining in clear terms "extremism" or "community engagement," and leave significant room for interpretation as to the role of law enforcement. Furthermore, both countries these tenets in practice rarely receive significant attention from practitioners. Perhaps the state-level approach is too far-removed from the law enforcement agents and community members responsible for implementing the ideals.

For all departments, the foremost challenge to effective implementation of CVE programs is choosing appropriate community partners and establishing both legitimacy and trustworthiness of law enforcement or government representatives. A study notes that "the Administration's CVE strategy depends on federal agencies cooperating with local groups to expand engagement efforts and to foster preventative programming to 'build resilience against violent extremist radicalization." [135]   The emphasis on small-scale, community-led efforts to counter extremism, known in academic circles as the "community-based approach" to integration and CVE, has been utilized around the world for decades.   In the United States, CVE partnerships are regulated by the Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other smaller

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[134] Bjelopera, Jerome P. "Countering Violent Extremism in the United States." *Congressional Research Service,* 2012.

[135] Jerome P. Bjelopera, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,[2012]).

government entities. They work with US attorneys under the leadership of the US Attorney General. At the time of CVE implementation, the Obama Administration's Attorney General Eric Holder expressed a genuine belief in the ability of CVE to transform counter-extremism in the US. The Trump Administration, which took office on January 20, 2017, has largely claimed it intends to "undo" the program as defined.

Each above department has published speeches and communiqués seeking to explain the nature and extent of CVE policies in the United States. Sarah Sewall, the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, notably has been integral to the effort to educate the general American public (or at least, academic community) about CVE's importance and role in modern-day counterterrorism. For instance, she explained that

> "'Hard' approaches to counterterrorism remained critical for protecting us from immediate threats, they were ill-equipped at preventing new ones from emerging. That called for a broader approach, one that not only took the fight to violent extremists around the world, but prevented people from taking up violent extremism in the first place. That is the rationale for CVE."[136]

In general, the Obama Administration stressed the importance of identifying at-risk communities and working to decrease societal factors that would or had tended to increase risks of radicalization.   The compilation of Administrative reports and speeches suggests that economic disparity and a lack of employment opportunity are the most prevalent causes of radicalization. Such a statement seems wise in light of the findings earlier in this chapter that gang violence only decreased with an improvement in economic situation. Integration of violent anarchists, then gangs, only ceased with employment opportunities, especially within communities. Environmental terrorists in the late twentieth and early 21st century also have tended to cease perpetrating attacks when employment became available to them.   It is not, of course, a catchall approach – many analysts have been confounded by the number of well integrated, economically stable Westerners have joined the radical Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. But it is certainly significant to note.

There has been little follow-up in government reports regarding the effectiveness of CVE policies. In 2016, Justin Siberell noted several areas of CVE implementation that would require greater cooperation, efforts, and resources -- many of them similar if not exactly the same to recommendations in the 2012 report:

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[136]Sarah Sewall, Countering Violent Extremism: How Human Rights and Good Governance Help Prevent Terrorism (Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc,[2016]).

As part of our overall strategy, we also believe that we must increase our focus on preventing the spread of violent extremism in the first place – to stop the radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization of people, especially young people, to engage in terrorist activities. Secretary Kerry has directed the Bureau to play the lead role in enhancing and coordinating the Department's work on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The Department has renamed the Bureau and increased personnel resources to support this mission. We appreciate the support of Congress for this effort. In this role, we will be working very closely with USAID and the newly established interagency Global Engagement Center (GEC) to promote a more strategic, integrated, and ultimately accountable approach to CVE. In collaboration with the GEC, the Department has requested additional resources for CVE programming in Fiscal Year 2017 – including as part of CTPF – to expand partnerships with government, non-governmental, local communities, and civil society actors who can help counter violent extremist messaging and narratives and they recruitment and mobilization that they drive.

In addition, we obligated more than $20 million in fiscal year 2014 funding for programs to help partner nations address FTF threat.

Siberell's comments make it starkly evident that Islamist-targeting CVE policies have made little progress in the half-decade since their initial implementation. It is thus also evident that CVE has not been the priority of policymakers, even in Departments specializing in countering extremism and radicalization. The negligence of policymakers to reform CVE is another probable data point suggesting that the emphasis on medium power measures immigration controls and law enforcement increases as interest in soft power measures decrease.

Hard Power: Islamophobia in the US and Policy Implications

Leaders in both Muslim communities and the American political fabric have voiced serious concerns over rising Islamophobia. Their concerns run parallel to an illusion held by members of state and national legislatures that Muslims pose a significant threat to the safety of Americans everywhere. Texas came under fire in early 2017 for an inflammatory survey that sought to quantify the level of Islamist extremism in Texas.[137] NGOs, such as Texas Impact and CAIR (the Council on American-Islamic Relations) expressed their opposition to such measures and solidarity with local mosques and Muslim families.

Contemporary American politics have been characterized by the state's focus on the "terrorist other". Implicit in such an interest is a need to define that constitutes a terrorist and what actions make someone a terrorist, rather than a criminal. Law enforcement has tended to

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[137]"Texas Muslims Voice Concerns After Inflammatory Survey and Forum," last modified 26 Jan, accessed Feb 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/texas-muslim-community.html.

target the Muslim community in America as the most likely terrorists, much as the state of emergency in France targeted Muslims. The most significant acts of US state repression have been made possible through the USA PATRIOT Act, the use of extraordinary rendition, and the acts of torture carried out at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, among other high-security detention facilities. The state's ability to take away one's liberty and freedom is certainly a fundamental right of governments and law enforcement, yet it seems that in today's perpetual emergency state, the American populace continues to fall prey to the Schmittian concept of a warranted liberty- and freedom-encroaching tyrant.

Medium Power: Immigration and Law Enforcement

Law enforcement which targets the Muslim community poses a major obstacle for establishing effective "community engagement" techniques. In the 1920s and 30s case, community engagement took place within the employer-employee dichotomy, meaning if not trust then at least legitimacy was guaranteed. In the late twentieth century and early 21st century anti-gang community efforts, a decrease in gang membership only occurred in communities with a good rapport between government representatives/police and gang leadership. In comparison, Muslim communities in the US tend to be highly skeptical of the governmental arm. Tom Malinowski noted, "seeing as how they had fled terrorism, I asked them if a scary terrorist moved into their neighborhood, would they call the police? They laughed, and one man replied: 'Of course not. If we did that, either the police would arrest us again to get a bribe, or, if they arrested the terrorist, someone would bribe him out, and then he'd come to kill us."[138] Malinowski suggests that the only way to address the credibility problems is to respect rights of citizens -- which implicates the immigration-security nexus and the ways in which that contradicts liberal democratic views.

Hard Power vs. Medium Power and the Islamist Threat

The U.S. Government has acknowledged the legitimacy of taking actions against individual liberties and freedom of body in contemporary times as well. In 1994, Jamie S. Gorelick, at the time the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, noted, "the President has inherent

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[138]Tom Malinowski, *Narrowing the Trust Gap: A Rights-Based Approach for CVE* (Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc,[2016]).

authority to conduct warrantless physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes and that the President may, as has been done, delegate this authority to the Attorney General". The remainder of Gorelick's speech suggested he did not condone the authority; he nonetheless did not actively fight against it, a trend which subsequent policymakers have continued since.

The American government has received significant blowback for its use of torture on noncitizen bodies held at Guantanamo Bay Detention Center. The U.S. Government, under the Bush administration, considered those held at Guantanamo to be unlawful combatants, and therefore not subject to international law regarding POW treatment. Certainly, the use of torture at Guantanamo is a reprehensible use of state power. Yet far less attention has been paid in the media to the U.S. Government's use of "extraordinary rendition," which persisted throughout the past several presidential administrations[139].

Extraordinary rendition poses a complex issue for the relationship between the U.S. state's assertion of power and the bodies of citizens, yet it is ultimately an issue that directly parallels those of the Red Scares. In early December 2014, the U.S. Senate released a report in which it admitted to having wrongfully detained twenty-six American citizens in other countries. The Central Intelligence Agency captured detainees considered to potentially have intelligence valuable to the War on Terror, and sent them to third countries where domestic laws such as the Fourth and Eighth Amendments would not apply, where the CIA could use "enhanced interrogation techniques" (a euphemism for torture) on them (Ackerman 2016). One of the twenty-six wrongfully detained detailed being forced to stand for sixty hours, being subjected to constant loud music, and being "shackled alone in freezing-cold cells in Afghanistan" (Shane 2014).

The CIA even resorted to sexual abuse, more often than not employed by the worst of Africa and Asia's dictatorships, to obtain information from detainees. CIA officers photographed blindfolded, naked detainees. The Intelligence Community retained the photos to use as leverage against former detainees who might pursue legal or political recourse against them (Ackerman 2016). In other words, the CIA accepted and acknowledged -- at least internally and secretly -- that its actions likely violated detainees' rights under American and international law. Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union has launched a lawsuit on behalf of former detainees against former CIA contractors alleged to have masterminded "enhanced interrogation techniques,"

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[139] Savage 2014; Eddington 2015

raising the possibility that the CIA might have negated the negligible intelligence benefits of its torture program by opening a Pandora's box of legal complications and dilemmas (ACLU 2016). Moreover, the country's citizens and politicians must investigate and reflect on the American government's preparation of fail-safes in order to violate its own laws. The CIA not only violated the rule of law but also sought to mitigate potential fallout with methods that were themselves illegal.

It is important to acknowledge the direct power the CIA therefore has over even American citizens' bodies, but more relevant to this paper is the notion that this extent of torture and form of extraordinary rendition is the direct result of the War on Terror, which many see as a perpetual state of emergency, lasting from the attacks of 9/11 into the present day. The beginning of the War on Terror, of course, was the U.S. Government's passing of the Patriot Act. While the Patriot Act did not specifically condone torture, the enabling of heightened surveillance demonstrated the extent to which American government figures were willing to pursue intrusions into the private sphere of individuals.

In the same context, the U.S. government authorized the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ostensibly to remove Saddam Hussein from power and dismantle weapons of mass destruction. The invasion of Iraq and American military efforts to create stability in a land of "emergency" led to one of the most abhorrent examples of torture in American history: the torture (often against innocent or low-level criminals) conducted at Abu Ghraib (Sontag 2004). While U.S. Administrations never supported nor encouraged the human rights violations at Abu Ghraib, it remains an important data point in this analysis of the acceptance of torture during times of perceived threat or emergency. The power of the state, acted upon detainees' bodies in this way, demonstrates the link between state power and individual repression in such contexts. Sontag suggests that the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib by American military personnel demonstrates a blatant disregard for the humanity of the detainees. It is perhaps an aspect of the "state of emergency"/"state of exception" that the state dehumanizes the "other" in order to preserve a sense of stability in a world in which the state has lost its legitimacy or power to control external forces and protect its citizens and its "way of life." It is a theme repeated by various scholars, including Nussbaum, who argues that a "politics of disgust" drives the creation of "other" groups by states (Nussbaum 2010). Even if the state did not directly condone or order the torture at Abu Ghraib, its overall dehumanization of the "enemy" allowed the soldiers

guarding   the   prison   to   justify   their   actions   to   themselves.

It is also interesting to consider the extent to which international condemnation has failed to elicit a genuine response from American policymakers and administration officials. In several instances throughout American history, the U.S. Government has condoned the use of torture or ostracizing of minority groups in other states. Yet in many of the most extreme cases of the state's use of torture and surveillance on individuals, pressure from the international community has been fairly subdued, at least as far as the American media is concerned; for example, revelations of NSA spying on EU and UN leaders has had little effect on US standing in Europe or the international community. The findings of this paper suggest that tacitly-supportive reporting about U.S. government attacks on individual freedom reinforces the "rally around the flag" effect by heightening the perception among the American population that we are, in fact, in a perpetual state of emergency.

Soft Power: Recent Developments in U.S. Programs

In January 2016, the U.S. State Department transformed its Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications into the "revamped" Global Engagement Center. The Department of Homeland Security likewise established an Office of Community Partnerships, ostensibly in order to use CVE-based "community engagement" in order to combat extremist tendencies in smaller communities.

Scholars began to consider the role of interagency cooperation more seriously when the 9/11 Commission published the *9/11 Commission Report.* Many have pointed to conflicting views and personalities within the different intelligence and security agencies in the U.S. Government as having created the intelligence lapse that failed to realize the immediacy and breadth of bin Laden's plans to attack the United States[140]. Senator Rob Portman recently commented during a Senate hearing on "ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization & Recruitment on the Internet & Social Media," that previous efforts to address this threat have struggled to overcome "bureaucratic hurdles, unclear authorities, and a lack of interagency communication and unity effort[141]." He was perhaps alluding here to the role of interagency

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[140] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower*, 1. ed. ed. (New York: Knopf, 2006).
[141] Committee on Homeland Security, Opening Statement of Chairman Rob Portman, HEARING OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS "ISIS ONLINE: COUNTERING

cooperation on the domestic level, which, has not significantly improved since the publication of the *9/11 Commission Report.*

The trick, as noted in a report by USAID about USAID's international CVE and community outreach programs, published in 2011, is to formulate evaluative measures and CVE policies which "walk the fine line between recognizing the importance of culture, and not exaggerating it."[142] The U.S. government rarely compares its efforts or even alludes to those of USAID. The USAID report is perhaps the best tool for establishing ways and measures by which to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of CVE programs. The wide scope of the document enables a reader to gain a deep appreciation for the basis of USAID's CVE efforts, which are primarily utilized in African states in which USAID creates partnerships. Ultimately, the analysis finds that one of the most important bases for CVE is knowledge of the causes of radicalization. The document comprehensively discusses every cause of radicalization that can be found in radicalization scholarship worldwide. USAID breaks the causes of radicalization up into social or individual causes, political causes, and economic causes.

While USAID's *Guides* provide a useful starting point for an analysis of CVE programs, it is very tailored to a bureaucratic need to define all elements, and create an evaluative framework that is far more expansive in its reach than practical[143].

In the wake of the May 2016 attacks at Brussels Airport, Belgium, the U.S. Dept. of State released a communiqué to its email listserv describing its efforts to counter violent extremism.[144] The document outlined the State Department's work with USAID, whose CVE policies, as discussed above, have been developing and evolving for several years. The State Department's communiqué suggests that the Department is "helping to build a network to connect subnational and civil society leaders to counter violent extremism in all forms." This definition refers to the State Department's efforts abroad -- which points again to the struggles of interagency and intra-governmental coordination and information sharing.

TERRORIST RADICALIZATION & RECRUITMENT ON THE INTERNET & SOCIAL MEDIA" JULY 6, 2016, 2016, .

[142] USAID, *Understanding and Responding to Causes of Violent Extremism*, eds. Deborah M. Price and Joshua W. Morris (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011).

[143] USAID, Understanding and Responding to Causes of Violent Extremism

[144] Justin Siberell, Counterterrorism: Assessing the State Department's Efforts to Counter Violent ExtremismU.S. Dept. of State,[2016]).

Trends in U.S. CVE

Commentators in the wake of 9/11 have surmised that the massive expansion of the U.S. security apparatus and intelligence services are a component of what will henceforth be a perpetual state of emergency. France has voted to renew its official state of emergency multiple times since attacks around Paris on November 13, 2015, shocked the country. The U.S. has not conducted any such formal process, yet the renewal of security funding and attention to military efforts, both internal and external, point to the possibility that this is the case. The ACLU quoted Mike German, a former FBI agent, as stating, "It raises fundamental questions about whether a domestic intelligence agency can protect civil liberties if they feel they have a right to collect broad personal information about people they don't even suspect of wrongdoing" (ACLU 2016). This question should be at the core of policy debates in both academic and journalistic circles, yet there seems to be a lack of interest in the concerns raised by German and this paper.

The rise of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States suggests that the American people accept the claim that modern America is under a constant and never-ending threat, as his campaign was predicated on nationalistic, racist sentiments suggesting a return to white, male-supremacist America. This paper has shown that similar sentiments prompted severe restrictions on individual liberty and enabled an attack from the government against the American body and privacy of individuals' homes. There is thusly a desperate need for attention and consideration of the infringement of rights by the government during times of perceived (even if ill-founded perception) emergency.

Moreover, this analysis of current US policy as compared to previous integration and soft-power efforts suggests that soft power rarely works 'enough'. That is, integration efforts tend to precede a shift to medium, and then, sometimes, hard power. In present time, this cycle has resulted in drastic escalations of hard and medium power policies. The Trump Administration sought an "immigration ban" in the early months of its tenure in the US Presidency, and similarly exclusionary policies are expected to continue. This trend is alarming, as it implies and increases in insecurity as the US Administration moves progressively away from the integration model that has been more or less effective in mitigating radicalism. The old integration model allowed assimilation to happen somewhat more naturally than at present, and the turn away from that model portends an integration approach similar to that of France. The

French continue to struggle with radicalism among their disaffected populations because of a lack of integrative acceptance, and a lack of state-enforced CVE policies. No matter the governmental system, CVE cannot be effective without being accompanied by efforts to accept and integrate immigrants and/or minorities.

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5. CONCLUSION

Terrorism is neither a new phenomenon nor one that is likely to end anytime in the foreseeable future. The motivations behind terrorist actions are varied across time and individual attacks, making the efforts to stop radical ideologies before they manifest violently seem futile. Attempts to formulate a solution to the topic of countering extremism, however, emerge in the wake of nearly every attack. For instance, in late March 2017 a radicalized Islamist attacked the London Parliament building and nearby bridge. While the attack did not result in mass casualties – five dead and 40 injured – it is notable for the commentary given to it. Prime Minister Theresa May reported that the suspect had been under investigation for "violent extremism" and that intelligence had deemed him not a theat. News reports abound surmising how the attacker could have been radicalized, how it could have happened so quickly, and how family, community members, and law enforcement could have failed to predict and prevent the attack. Despite the rarity of successful terrorist actions, in the wake of death or political turmoil the phenomenon of extremism takes on a superior role to all other policy discussions. British Parliamentarian Michael Torrance noted the level of acceptance among Parliament that an attack was inevitable, stating "looking at it in context, up and until the late '70s, it was a frequent target of I.R.A. attacks."[145]

Soft Power: Community-Level Integration and Deradicalization

This paper has considered the relationships between immigration, integration, CVE and deradicalization. Scholars have expounded on the interconnectedness of immigration and threats to national security, which most people consider to be a much stronger correlation than studies suggest it is in reality. The perception that security is diminished with increased immigration led to legislation seeking to close immigration or to mandate heightened supervision of immigrant communities since the beginning of modern states.

CVE being as it is an extremely recent policy development; I considered historical techniques for integration as a relatively similar approach. Integration programs share many components with CVE: assessing the needs of communities and providing housing, employment and language aid and services. Similarly, deradicalization endeavors use community partners

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[145] Bilfesky, Dan; Castle, Stephen; Rao, Phrashant S. "We Are Not Afraid,' Theresa May Proclaims After U.K. Parliament Attack." *New York Times*, 23 March 2017.

and peers to cultivate a sense of communion and understanding among the radicalized and non-radicalized parts of a community, so as to pull the radicalized members away from a sense that violent action would be necessary.

Deradicalization began prominently in the UK, as policymakers and community leaders struggled to reincorporate ex-Irish militants into mainstream society, and even politics and governance. The British thus had an incentive to develop soft strategies to gain respect among the ex-militant community for British government, in order to obtain a minimum level of security. Yet evidence suggests that, despite some small programs which assist in employment for ex-radicals, British law enforcement placed much more emphasis on re-allocating those still in prison and formulating new offenses in order to continue to target, in a *medium* way, the Irish.

The British experience also demonstrates the ways in which contemporary CVE have gone awry. While rightly taking credit for Prevent's new conception of counterterrorism prevention as being at an ideological level, Parliament has also failed to reform Prevent adequately, and has, again, focused much more attention on building up law enforcement than on developing any kind of sustainable, long-term, adaptable strategy for countering extremist narratives. Furthermore, politics and public opinion have proven to be highly significant to the story of Prevent. For instance, the Liberal Democrats party received huge support for their plan, announced in October 2016, to de-fund several elements of the Prevent Strategy. Anti-immigration public sentiment in the UK is likely to cause much political discussion regarding community integration and multiculturalism in the UK in the coming years.

France has developed CVE policies to an even lesser extent, as it has more directly dealt with the political tensions between a Socialist party in power and the far-right Front National. Relatively frequent terrorist attacks, usually motivated by Islamist extremism, furthered the sense among the French population that immigrants, especially Arab refugees, represent a distinct threat to French identity. Indeed, France's adherence to *laïcité* has prevented Parliament from taking significant action to work with France's Muslim communities. Despite some formal structures for state-Islam relations, notably the Grand Mosque of Paris and the Union of Islamic Organizations in France, there remains a problematic lack of formal mosques or recognition. A series of political crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s resulted in the banning of "religious symbols" from public schools, meaning that French Muslims receive a message from the government that their religious practices are not considered "French" enough. Furthermore, law

enforcement has targeted French Muslims. In the wake of recent terror attacks, Parliament approved plans for building more prisons across France, and the State of Emergency included provisions for extra-judicial raids in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods.

The US provided an interesting case study, as its history of Red Scares exemplified the cyclical nature of the immigration-security nexus. The tables provided in the Appendix demonstrate the high correlation between political rhetoric at various times of "emergency" in the United States. The analysis of the Italian anarchist integration is helpful for a study of contemporary CVE, as Italians in the United States are now largely integrated, and have conducted few, if any, present-day terror attacks. The success of Italian and Communist integration seems to have occurred largely after the widespread persecution of the First Red Scare, WWII, and the McCarthy era, indicating that medium power measures of increased law enforcement and immigration controls do not actually decrease extremism in any meaningful way.

Current US policies towards CVE are informed from both international examples and a history of CVE work through government agencies like USAID. In spite of the plethora of scholarship suggesting that CVE ought to be non-discriminatory, and run from members of the community themselves (as opposed to external state agents whose job is to 'work with the community'), US policy has not evolved. In fact, recent Senate Hearings demonstrate that improvement measures have simply involved delegating CVE work to different agencies, as opposed to improving and altering CVE policy within any particular department. The departmental drift of CVE policy is likely a signifier of CVE's downfall in the US; it is well known that competition between US government departments stagnates most attempts to enact coherent policy.

In the France and US cases, the states also went so far as to toe the line between medium and hard power. In France, increased threat levels from Islamist-related terrorism led President Hollande to call for drastically increased military involvement in the Syrian civil war. In the US, the terror caused by 9/11 led the government to swiftly pass USA PATRIOT Act, which abridged human rights domestically and internationally and created a culture in which military action to respond to terrorism became normalized. These cases of hard power are alarming, but receive significant more attention than increased use of medium power. The role of politics and maneuvering around constantly shifting public opinion complicates the ability of governments to utilize and implement further soft power. Political responses to anti-immigration fear have

tended to be the most visible measures. Therefore, this study has emphasized the hidden – and dangerous – role of medium power in state responses to security threats. There is a need for further scholarship in all three cases on the way in which intra-state political tensions between conservative and liberal factions affects legislation surrounding soft power.

Medium Power: Emergency Policy

The conclusion from the above case studies is that states react to nation-wide existential emergency (or, at least, the appearance thereof) in similar patterns. There is a tendency to acknowledge the superior and longer-lasting nature of soft power: improving integration of new communities, providing assistance in housing and employment, and the like. However, the "urgency" of threats such as unforeseen terrorist attacks makes states far more likely to utilize medium power as a way to avoid hard power costs while still taking direct action against groups which appear as a distinct threat.

State policymakers have emphasized the importance of academic research into causes of radicalization and the motivations for acts of terror on Western soil. There is a disconnect, however, between calls for action and the response to academic inquiry. France, for example, has held many conferences and sought advice from academics on multiple occasions. Yet the results of most academic inquiries reflect similar statements: policymakers need to create programs to increase integration among minority and marginalized communities, foster economic opportunity for newcomers to the society, and aid newcomers in language instruction. None of these suggestions would entail high monetary costs, yet policymakers haven't paid much attention. A recent conference held in Paris on February 10, 2017 titled "Scientific Council for Analysis of Violent Religious Radicalization in France" sought to "analyze the phenomenon of violent religious radicalization in France, analyze the consequences of these phenomena on French society and define the means to protect the population."[146] Yet multiple pieces of French legislation (just like UK and US) have claimed to address these concerns. It is

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[146] "Un Conseil Scientifique Pour Analyser La Radicalisation Religieuse Violente." . Accessed Mar 24, 2017. http://www.gouvernement.fr/argumentaire/un-conseil-scientifique-pour-analyser-la-radicalisation-religieuse-violente.

thus evident that policymakers have not given credence to their stated goals: this is likely due to the inherent understanding that CVE, integration and other soft power techniques are intended to be rhetorically powerful rather than practically useful. Instead, states continue to rely on medium power.

The findings of this study have important implications for policymakers across the Western world. Policymakers ought to stop seeking the "causes of radicalization" and the best ways to implement CVE; rather, government bodies should consider the extent to which medium power may interfere with the policy aims of CVE programs already in place. More quantitative research is necessary to establish the extent to which imprisonment numbers and abnormally high rates of incidents with law enforcement or immigration controls are correlated with levels of emergency. The tables in the Appendix are a starting point for considering the ways in which political rhetoric may condone medium power more than soft power.

6. Appendix

TABLE 1:

Descriptions of Terrorists and Community Reactions

First Red Scare Quotations (1919-1930)	Second Red Scare Quotations (1948-1958)	Contemporary Era Quotations (2001 - 2016)
January 6, 1919 -- "Since the anarchist bomb outrages in Philadelphia the New York police have been taking precautionary measures to prevent violence here….all members of the uniform force are to be extra vigilant in guarding public buildings...to keep the 'Red' leaders and their activities under close watch. ("Police Watch the Reds", 1919)"	May 9, 1949 -- "The Communists dismissed from the University of Washington were secret, covert members of the party, masquerading as honest liberals and free men." (Allen, "Communists as Teachers," 1949)	August 24, 2011 -- "The Islamic world view divides the world into the House of War and the House of Islam. A state of war, not peace, perpetually exists between Islam and unbelievers." (Gawthrop 2011) "The Professor Watchlist...says its mission is to educate students about "true free market values." Charlie Kirk, its founder and executive director, wrote in a blog post that "it's no secret that some of America's college professors are totally out of line" and that it was time to expose them (Mele 2016)."

TABLE 2:

References to Establishing a "War on [anarchism, communism, 'terror']"

First Red Scare Quotations (1919-1930)	Second Red Scare Quotations (1948-1958)	Contemporary Era Quotations (2001 - 2016)
June 5, 1919 -- "officials throughout the country [were] rapidly being spread today in the **most determined war on anarchy** the	*September 13, 1950 --* "Admiral William F. Halsey Jr. today called on every citizen to **join the crusade** for freedom as	*September 21, 2001 --* "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it **does not end there**. It will not end until every terrorist

Federal Government has ever undertaken…"

"There will be no interference with him in his conduct of **the hunt for anarchists**"

"Two of the best detectives of the bomb squad of the New York City pllice, who are familiar with the ways of anarchists, particularly the **Italian anarchists** of the metropolitan district…"

"All statements and literature that are in any way un-American should be forwarded to Police Headquarters, **giving names and addresses of persons**…"

(Special to The New York Times 1919, 1)

a fighter in the **propaganda war with communism**...there was another kind of war, a 'war of words and ideas,' in which every American citizen should play a part...Premier Stalin's 'big lie' he asserted, is repeated by Russian delegates who contend in the United Nations that the United States is **out to conquer the world.**" ("Crusade by All Urged," 1950)

group of global reach has been f**ound, stopped and defeated**. Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber - a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. **They hate** our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other." (Bush 2001)

TABLE 3:

References to Constant High-Level Terrorist Threat, i.e. "reign of terror"

First Red Scare Quotations (1919-1930)	Second Red Scare Quotations (1948-1958)	Contemporary Era Quotations (2001 - 2016)
July 3, 1919 -- "the anarchists intend to create a reign of terror by bomb explosions...the plans have not been divulged, but it is known that many suspected persons have been under surveillance and that they will be arrested on the least suspicious move." (Anonymous1919a) "Precautions Nation-Wide"; Anonymous 1919b)	*March 2, 1954 --* "He then read it, declaring exposure of Communists working on secret weapons might determine whether 'the sons of American mothers may live or die.'" ("McCarthy, Dirksen Suggest Labor Camps for Army Reds; CAMPS' SUGGESTED FOR REDS IN ARMY Witnesses at McCarthy Hearing", 1954).	*August 21, 2014 --* "To be wholly consistent with the tenets of Islam and to express one's unconditional faith in it, a Muslim must be willing to die to advance the spread of Islam, and be deemed a "martyr" for it or a self-sacrificing "warrior." (Cline 2014)

TABLE 4:

Making lists of terrorists, mass surveillance, and mass detainment

First Red Scare Quotations (1919-1930)	Second Red Scare Quotations (1948-1958)	Contemporary Era Quotations (2001 - 2016)
June 5, 1919 -- "In the **search** to find "those who exploded the bombs in eight cities of America last Monday…" "10,000 radicals **indexed**…**every one of them will come in for a searching examination** as to where he has been and what he has been doing for the past three months." District Attorney Swann: "It would be well if [the list of suspected individuals] were enlarged so as to i**nclude not only those who have committed crimes but potential criminals of all kinds**." (Anonymous19 19b, 1) "Question Radicals Here", Anonymous 1919c, 1) *January 21, 1920 --* "**truck load**s of alleged Reds from lodging houses, pool halls, cafes and soft, drink saloons, haunts of Russian Radicals, were **delivered at the Government detention station** last night in a carefully planned raid against suspected	*March 2, 1954 --* "Senators Joseph K. McCarthy and Everett M. Dirkseen suggested today **'disagreeable' labor camps** for armed services personnel who were Communists or who invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about Communist associations." "Senator Dirksen…said Secretary Stevens would be asked to produce figures on **how many persons** there might be in the Army, both as enlisted men and officers, who had admitted present or past Communist membership or who had refused to answer such questions on their loyalty forms." "The junior Senator from Wisconsin has declared political war….Senator Watkins also said the Eisenhower Administration had reason to be proud of its record 'in **ferreting out Communists and jailing the guilty**.'" ("McCarthy, Dirksen Suggest Labor Camps for Army Reds; CAMPS' SUGGESTED FOR REDS IN ARMY	*November 17, 2016 --* "Look, the president needs to protect America first, and if that means having people that are not protected under our Constitution **have some sort of registry** so we can understand, until we can i**dentify the true threat** and where it's coming from, I support it." (Carl Higbie, Trump supporter and former Navy SEAL)

communists and anarchists in Seattle...only three American citizens were caught in the dragnet…" ("27 Seattle Reds Held";(Anonymous1920 a, 17)

Witnesses at McCarthy Hearing", 1954).

December 8, 1954 --

"It listed eight items, including conviction of fifty Communist party leaders and indictment of forty-nine; addition of sixty-two organizations to the Justice Department's official list of subversive organizations that now total 255; indictment of one person for treason; conviction of two for espionage and ten for making false statements to the Government

TABLE 5:

References to Deportation Efforts

First Red Scare Quotations (1919-1930)	Second Red Scare Quotations (1948-1958)	Contemporary Era Quotations (2001 - 2016)
November 9, 1919 -- "an effort will be made to **deport them as anarchists and revolutionists**...most of them had blackened eyes and lacerated scalps as **souvenirs of the new attitude of aggressiveness** which has been assumed by the Federal agents against Reds and suspected Reds. Twelve of the men who were **roughly handled and later released said they were soldiers**….The thirty-five alleged Reds who were sent to Ellis Island	*October 24, 1954 --* "The McCarran-Walter Immigration Act...**refuse to admit Communists as temporary visitors to the United States**. What American civil servant would not feel 'shyness about using his discretionary powers to waive the legal admissibility of a Communist?" ("Granting Visas to Communists, 1954).	*November 16, 2016 --* "Anybody that's brought into this country from the migration is going to be out. We're not gonna do it. We're gonna have a country again, we're gonna have borders, we're gonna have a country again, right now we don't have a country." (Trump, in ABC News 2015)

from this city last night were joined there by thirty of the same type who had been arrested in the northern district of New Jersey in **raids** directed by Federal Agent Frank P. Stone of Newark, The entire sixty-five will be taken before a Federal Commissioner on Monday...a lawyer representing some of the arrested men, said he would attempt to free them all through habeas corpus proceedings..they will probably be held in this country for some time, even if the court's order their deportation." (Anonymous1919c, 3) "Quick Deportation for Raided Reds" ; 1919d, 3)

TABLE 6[147]:

References to Increased Deportation and Efforts to Stop Immigration

First Red Scare Quotations (1919-1930)	Second Red Scare Quotations (1948-1958)	Contemporary Era Quotations (2001 -2016)
November 22, 1919 -- "An investigation is also being carried on by the agents of the Department of Justice into the circumstances which make it possible for hundreds of Reds who have been **ordered deported to remain in this country and to keep**	*December 8, 1954 --* "...deportation of 129 alien subversive	*C. 2016 --* "5. Immediately terminate President Obama's two illegal executive amnesties. All immigration laws will be enforced - we will

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[147] Citations for Tables 1-6: (Trump ; Cline 2014; Bush 2001; Gawthrop 2011; Savage 2009; Bilefsky 2014, A13; Savage 2014; Shane 2014; Anonymous1919c, 1; Anonymous1919d, 3; Anonymous1920b, 1; Special to The New York Times 1919, 1; Anonymous1919e, 15; Anonymous1919b; Anonymous1919a, 8; Anonymous1920a, 17; DAVID E SANGER and MAGGIE HABERMAN 2016; Arango 2015)

up their propaganda for the **destruction of the American Government**...Chairman Johnson said that the committee intended to undertake a broad survey of the immigration problem, with a view to **legislation** which would **permit entrance to this country only of men with the making of good citizens.**" (Anonymous1919d, 15) "Red Plot to Kill Officials Bared" ; Anonymous 1919e, 15)

December 3, 1920 -- "Besides amendments to the Naturalization Reorganization and Immigration bills and the Japanese question, it will consider immigration in general...Mr. Johnson, Chairman of the committee, favors a resolution to **suspend all immigration temporarily** and to secure time for careful deliberation on a general and permanent law."

"The **protection** of the country from the revolutionaries and radicals eager to descend upon it is one essential object of a general immigration law. It has sometimes appeared as if the immigration authorities were not too eager to **keep out these undesirables.** It is true that it is difficult to ascertain the opinions of the immigrants here, and that, except in the case of notorious Reds, the detection of the undesirables must be provided for on the other side. Elaborate systems for this purpose are being devised, but the best of them will be impotent if the representatives of this Government abroad and at home are tenderer to the suspected would-be settler among us than to the rights of American citizens and the safeguarding of our form of government from its most dangerous enemies...what is needed is vigorous enforcement of the law." (Anonymous1920b, 1) "Immigration"; Anonymous 1920b, 1)

s; orders for 410 to be deported; orders for **de-naturalization of forty-nine and the barring of 172 subversive aliens**…"("M'Carthy Breaks with Eisenhower; Rues 1952 Support", 1954)."

triple the number of ICE agents. Anyone who enters the U.S. illegally is subject to deportation. T**hat is what it means to have laws and to have a country**.

"7. Ensure that other countries take their people back when **we order them deported.**"

(Trump 2016)

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      1919c. http://search.proquest.com/docview/100372096.

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