

The Twilight of Indirect, Senatorial Elections: Emerging Popular Legitimacy on the Eve of Reform, 1890-1913

Author: Thomas J. Goodman

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THE TWILIGHT OF INDIRECT, SENATORIAL ELECTIONS: EMERGING POPULAR LEGITIMACY ON THE EVE OF REFORM, 1890 - 1913

Thomas J. Goodman

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The Twilight of Indirect, Senatorial Elections: Emerging Popular Legitimacy on the Eve of Reform, 1890-1913

Thomas J. Goodman

Advisor: Marc Landy, Ph.D.

Prior to the passage of the 17th Amendment, senators were selected by state legislators, a measure designed to remove them from fluctuations of popular whim. By 1913, reformers, having assailed members of the Senate as insular to the changing needs of their constituents, pressed for fundamental, structural reform, including direct popular elections. But few works have assessed the nature of senatorial campaigns under the indirect regime.

I research contemporaneous newspaper coverage and personal correspondences of individual senators to better glean their levels of sensitivity to re-election pressures — a significant qualitative contribution to the discourse. And I measure the extent to which a state's political conditions influenced the tendency for senators to engage in public appeals for popular support. Senatorial elections were *already* pseudo-democratic before 1913, experiencing an emergent element of popular legitimacy as public sentiment meaningfully informed the process and conduits for public accountability were expanding.

In stark contrast to prevailing perceptions, senators *were* keenly sensitive to electoral pressures. By cultivating popular support, they regularly tried to bolster their positions vis-a-vis powerful party leaders, state legislators, and pivotal decision-makers. But the strategy was risky as well, for a poor showing in the November elections invited intra-party challenges. Ultimately, my dissertation tells a story of how parties adapted to changing conditions to remain politically viable and survive in a new age, granting concessions to the electorate which were designed to promote greater popular participation whilst maintaining overall control over the process.

The crusade for reforming the senatorial selection method was conducted on behalf of reformers who sought to redress perceived inequalities and dysfunction in the system. Debates over the balance between democratic self-government and the importance of whom Jonathan Rauch term “the middlemen” continue to percolate, coloring the dispute within the Democratic Party over the role of superdelegates and efforts to abolish the Electoral College. And my research explores the intersection of democratic reforms and racialized politics with the adoption of the invidious “white primary” in South Carolina and the factors which gave rise to the race-baiting, populist demagogue Benjamin Tillman — the precursor to modern-day populists and illiberal democracies.

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CHAPTER 1: Background, Literature Review, and Theory

On January 3, 1911, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge arrived at Boston's Symphony Hall to deliver what was anticipated to be the most consequential address of his long, storied career. Speaking to the massive crowd, he declaimed, "I have valued the high position given me in the Senate ... but I prize them most because they give to Massachusetts the place which is her due in the councils of the nation." Lodge was defending his record in the Senate against a chorus of charges that he had misrepresented the interests of the people of Massachusetts. Approaching the climax of the oration, the senior senator presented himself as a willing public official in the service of his state, concluding, "I have given my all; no man can give more ... Others may easily serve her better than I in those days yet to be, but of this I am sure: that no one can ever serve her with a greater love or deeper loyalty."¹

Nor was Lodge alone. Describing the Payne-Aldrich Tariff as a product of "greed and avarice" on the part of "financial powers," Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge repeatedly touted his fierce opposition to the much-maligned and deeply divisive measure, proclaiming, "This bill I fought ... I fought them in the name of honesty."² At other rallies, he beseeched his listeners to "support him and to stand up for purity in public life."³ And at a rally in South Carolina, the state's senior senator, Matthew Calbraith Butler, boasted, "\$200,000 for Charleston Harbor ... the first appropriation for Winyah Bay ... a survey of the rivers of the state ... half a million for the dry docks at Port Royal ... [and] I helped make the Agricultural Department what it is."⁴

¹ *The Boston Globe*, January 4, 1911, p 4.

² *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p 5.

³ *The Huntington Herald*, October 21, 1910, p 4.

⁴ *The Pickens Sentinel*, June 28, 1894, p 4.

Such stark public defenses by senators of their service in the United States Senate occurred *prior* to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment stipulating direct election of its members — a time when senators were perceived to be insular to political responsiveness, out of touch with constituents, and out of step with the times. These seemingly unconventional appearances belie the notion that incumbents were insensitive to the demands of electoral politics. To the contrary, my dissertation demonstrates that public sentiment and diligent campaigning were widespread features of senatorial elections. The process was *already* pseudo-democratic in nature, comprising a degree of popular accountability and input, and represented one of the *more* democratized aspects of the Senate at that time.

The Seventeenth Amendment providing for direct election of United States Senators represented the culmination of Progressive efforts to reform government and the first significant structural change enacted by constitutional amendment of the Twentieth Century. Progressive reformers argued for direct elections on a democratic basis, so to increase the accountability of senators and the participation of voters.⁵ By circumventing state legislatures, the Seventeenth Amendment was intended to increase the responsiveness of senators, and, as one scholar explains, “It has been somewhat summarily adjudged a closed case.”⁶ However, its effects have been less clearly understood, especially on the nature of their campaigns. Although the direct election amendment did have wide-reaching implications for federalism and the strength of political parties, it is less clear if senators were necessarily rendered more responsive and sensitive to the pressures of electoral politics.

⁵ William H. Riker, “The Senate and American Federalism,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1955), 468, accessed January 30, 2019 URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951814>.

⁶ C.H. Hoebeke, *The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 18-19.

The extent to which indirect elections were democratic, with senators sensitive to electoral pressure, has been disputed. Initial analyses of the issue suggested that campaigns and public canvassing were widespread, but these studies were neither systematic nor in-depth.⁷ The consensus view has been that public campaigns existed, but did little to assure their chances of re-election, with candidates making perfunctory public appearances of little import or consequence. Instead, the most critical aspect of their re-election occurred behind the scenes and within the halls of their state legislatures, through insider politicking amongst party officials and state representatives.⁸

Instead of challenging the prevailing understanding that influence within statehouses was crucial, I supplement it by illustrating the importance of public campaigns as a useful tool for senators to secure re-election. Ignoring the growing necessity of cultivating popular support risked inviting serious challenges to an incumbent's re-election prospects and undermining support amongst relevant party figures. For the sake of simplicity, these practices shall constitute my *theory of indirect elections*. To bolster my argument, I investigate the manner whereby senators solicited support from party members *and* voters to further their electoral successes. To precisely gauge the pervasiveness of these activities, I have devised a research design — the details of which I discuss below.

Across the universe of cases, a growing tension materialized between the enduring *party control* over a state's politics and the emergent *voter control*, as manifest by public sentiment and popular support. On the surface, states with little overall competition (party control) should wit-

⁷ William H. Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism."

⁸ Wendy J. Schiller and Charles Stewart, *Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seventeenth Amendment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 199-201.

ness perfunctory, meaningless campaigns, since authority rested predominantly with parties and state legislatures. Instead, politicking amongst party leaders, officials, and legislators were essential for re-election. Conversely, we expect more competitive states (voter control) to experience vibrant elections, widespread public campaigns, and sophisticated methods of channeling popular support, since the *greater* threat to a senator's reelection was the likelihood of the opposition party seizing control of the legislature. My hypothesis tests whether any causal relationship existed between the degree to which a state's elections were *popular* and the need for public campaigns.

Along the spectrum of states — from the most popular to the least popular — the evidence actually reveals that public campaigns for popular support were commonplace *and* relevant. And while these meaningful exercises varied in intensity by state, they were critical for securing another term in office. Furthermore, personal letters from senators themselves betray an uneasy sense of vulnerability to the possibilities of defeat and evince a deep-seated sensitivity to the demands of electoral politics.

My *theory of indirect elections* stipulating that senators *did* widely pursue public campaigns as a means of attaining re-election attests to a broader concept at play — party adaptability. To explain these unexpected and under-appreciated practices, I offer a partisan model telling a story of how parties have to adapt to changing conditions so to survive in a new age, and remain politically viable. American parties regularly adjust to changing times, embrace the prevailing *zeitgeist*, and, in so doing, enjoy remarkable longevity. Increasingly popular senatorial elections represented a measured response by parties to the pervasive discontent toward the Sen-

ate, capitalized upon by Progressive reformers, muckraking journalists, and political opportunists.

At the turn of the Twentieth Century, political parties were exceedingly relevant entities, and senators had numerous incentives to serve them. Parties controlled the apparatuses of state governments, with many states dominated by a single party for years.⁹ Together with senators, parties also provided important patronage jobs and doled out vital spoils which satiated key voters and interest groups. And finally, while state representatives were not themselves legislative careerists serving for long periods in their legislatures, they were “political careerists,” loyal, devoted party members who provided support for a senator’s career, both within or without the legislature.¹⁰ Therefore, party organizations were enormously important, especially in uni-party systems.

However, as conditions ripened and sentiment solidified in favor of Progressive objectives — controlling economic conglomerates, ridding government of special interests and influence, and engendering a more participatory polity — reformers aimed to weaken the power of state governments and political parties, proposing such measures as the initiative, referendum, nomination primary, and direct election of senators. To counter these democratizing trends, party leaders sought to co-opt many open-ended practices by offering concessions to reformers, whilst maintaining control over the essential machinery.¹¹ Thus, senatorial elections gradually began

⁹ Wendy J. Schiller and Charles Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 51.

¹⁰ Sean Gailmard and Jeffery A. Jenkins, “Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Apr., 2009), 327, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548121>.

¹¹ Eric Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform*, (1952; Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001), 76; James Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 19-21.

taking the form of a more direct process, incorporating a modicum of popular input and public accountability. These included implementing limited primaries, introducing state convention endorsements of incumbent senators, and advertising the candidacy of the principal contenders for office, among others. Granted, these transformations were not uniform across all states, but they were significant on the trajectory of senatorial elections, shifting it in a more democratic direction.

On the individual choice level, an implication of party adaptability is the concept of independent political support. As these elections grew increasingly democratic, senators quickly discovered the benefits of “bringing the demos” into their coalition. Instead of exclusively relying on the support of party insiders, incumbents cultivated support from voters during elections, thereby providing an independent political base separate from state parties. Under the indirect regime, incumbent senators campaigned for electoral support amongst voters to impress upon crucial party officials the popularity of their candidacy and the sensibility of endorsing their reelection. These relationships could be confrontational at times, whereby incumbents would marshal their vast popular support to corral state legislators and party actors to bandwagon with their candidacy. Other times, they were more symbiotic, where the entire party prospered due to the strong standing of the senator. These variations depended upon state conditions, political circumstances, party strength, and the reputations of individual senators themselves.

At times, senators relied upon popular support to deter would-be challengers from arising, and assure continued security in office. If a factional, intra-party struggle did arise, senators could point to their strong performance in the recent elections as testament of their electoral value, political fortitude, and popular backing. Subject to frequent elections as they were, state leg-

islators were at risk for ignoring the “choice of the people” in settling the question of the senatorship.¹² However, the strategy of appealing to the public was inherently double-edged for senators, as well. Failure of a strong performance in the recent elections greatly weaken their political standing, giving party leaders, state legislators, and partisan opponents greater bargaining leverage with which to exert. Therefore, senators had an incentive for a solid electoral showing.

To restate, my *theory of indirect elections* bolsters the concept of party adaptability, for any measures intended to bolster a senator’s popular support attests more broadly to the changing nature of parties, and their adaptability to the democratizing trends of the day. In so doing, windows of opportunity emerge for senators to seize upon, namely by cultivating political support independent from the party machinery. Evidence buttressing such behavior — whether symbiotically or confrontational — demonstrates the value of popular, electoral support to the senatorial selection process.

1.1. Background

The Seventeenth Amendment altered the way that members of the United States Senate were elected, thereafter stipulating direct, popular vote. Prior to 1913, senators were selected by their respective state legislatures. The framers desired an upper house more stable and deliberative than its counterpart. These qualities permit a much-desired check on the impulses of the more-populous lower chamber, as well as on the perceived injustices rampant in the states. Assuring stability and deliberation necessitated senators be insular to the vicissitudes of popular whim, nor subject to sudden, dramatic, and frequent convulsions of electoral fortunes. To that

¹² *Buffalo Evening News*, December 27, 1904, p 9.

end, the framers agreed to six-year terms — far lengthier than any offices that had existed at the time —and staggered elections, wherein only one-third of the Senate be elected at any given time.¹³

Although Madison viewed state legislatures as the worst offenders at the time, a grave threat to individual liberties and just laws, he nonetheless agreed to permit them the power of senatorial selection. The Constitution was itself forged out of compromises and this agreement was little different. Having establishing a Senate with two members who could vote individually — as opposed to a single, state unit — enjoy six-year terms, and be free of recall by their state legislatures, Madison conceded the method of selection to the states as a practical, political calculation so to assuage the deep-seated concerns of smaller states and nervy skeptics of an overly-nationalist government.¹⁴ It was further believed that these bodies would possess at least a modicum of wisdom to choose the most talented, natural elite throughout the country. Thus, in certain respects, state legislative selection remained Madisonian in principle for it served as a filtration device on the immediate sentiment of the masses.

The early years of senatorial elections seemed to conform to the framers' expectations, as the “natural aristocracy” selected members of the Senate, with nary any popular dimension. Beginning in the 1830s, however, general election public canvassing gradually became common practice among senatorial contenders,¹⁵ the most notable example in 1858, when Democratic Senator Stephen A. Douglas spared with his Republican challenger, Abraham Lincoln, in seven

¹³ Charles Stewart III, “Responsiveness in the Upper Chamber: The Constitution and the Institutional Development of the Senate,” in *The Constitution and American Political Development: An Institution Perspective*, ed. Peter F. Nardulli, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

¹⁴ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 25-27.

¹⁵ William H. Riker, “The Senate and American Federalism.”

public debates throughout the state of Illinois. Although Lincoln came up short in his senatorial bid, the events enhanced his national standing.

Despite these concessions to democracy, the Senate continued to be viewed as an illegitimate body, especially by Progressives and other reformers. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, a growing number of Americans had grown disenchanted with their government, and the Senate represented the epitome of their frustrations: dysfunctional, highly partisan, and laden with corruption and bribery. Senators were seen as overly cozy with corporate and industrial interests, often dispensing vast amounts of money raised from shady business interests on the purchasing of state legislators, thereby assuring their own re-election. Parties were viewed as complicit in the entire sordid affair. Additionally, state legislatures often deadlocked over the choice of senator, leading to lengthy vacancies and divisive sparring. The sentiments of discontent were expressed, albeit sensationally, in a series of articles by David Graham Phillips, "The Treason of the Senate," in 1906.¹⁶

In an effort to curb excessive political corruption, end the extensive legislative squabbling, and cure the pervasive constitutional dysfunction that was believed to afflict the polity, Progressive reformers advocated direct election of senators. Argued on a democratic basis, it was a means increasing the participation of the voters in electing their representatives, thereby enhancing the the public accountability and responsiveness of officeholders.¹⁷ Furthermore, it

¹⁶ David Graham Phillips, "The Treason of the Senate," accessed January 30, 2019, URL: http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/resources/documents/ch24_02.htm.

¹⁷ Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism," 468.

served a dual purpose of weakening party intermediaries as well, and rendering senators less dependent on party organizations.¹⁸

1.2 *The Literature*

The literature addressing the *nature* of senatorial campaigns and the role of public sentiment under the indirect method has been largely limited, although not wholly neglected. For the most part, researchers have analyzed the implications of direct elections on federalism [Riker, 1955; Rossum, 2001], democratization [Hoebeke, 1995], legislative careers and behavior [Schiller, 2006; Romero, 2007; MacKenzie, 2014], ideological responsiveness [Bernhard and Sala, 2006], and institutional, electoral responsiveness [Stewart, 1992; Gailmard and Jenkins, 2009; Rogers, 2012].

The earliest treatment given to indirect senatorial elections was by William H. Riker in 1955. Riker argues that popular appeals for mass support amongst senatorial candidates was “a fairly regular feature” of campaigns prior to 1913.¹⁹ Beginning in the mid-19th Century, candidates engaged in public canvassing to seek the support of voters. By courting the public electors of state legislators rather than state representatives themselves, senators reversed the dependency dynamic that had hitherto existed. Grappling with the changing nature of Senate campaigns and its implications for American federalism, Riker contends that when “senators depended less on state legislatures ... [the] national government depended less on local government.”²⁰ Such de-

¹⁸ James Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 21.

¹⁹ Riker, “The Senate and American Federalism,” 467.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 463.

velopments were important, for, according to Riker, “the main peripheralizing feature of American federalism” had been the state legislature’s power to select members to the Senate.²¹ This feature remained the only way by which the states could substantively influence national policy, having been shorn of the power to recall its representatives at the Constitutional Convention in 1787.

While Riker’s analysis of the federalism issue is accurate, his characterization of pervasive public canvassing during the indirect period has been criticized. Some researchers, such as Schiller and Stewart, contend that Riker’s “reasoning is overly generous.” He “overinterprets” sparse, relatively uncommon practices, and broadly generalizes from these examples. For instance, Riker uses the Lincoln-Douglas convention nominations in 1858 to exemplify the extent to which popular senatorial elections were common, yet Schiller and Stewart maintain these practices were not only unique to Illinois, but unused for decades thereafter.²² Implicit in this critique is that Riker’s research is not sufficiently systematic to test and compare such activities across a spectrum of diverse, varied states so as to have greater confidence in the validity of the findings. A rigorous research design should be devised properly placing these democratic practices into historical context and glean a better understanding of the period. To that end, I have crafted a systematic research design, which will be discussed below.

Additionally, one can fault Riker for his lack of in-depth historical detail. Often, his evidence is anecdotal and unsatisfactory, at times leading to spurious conclusions. For example, he attributes popular senatorial elections to general political excitement amongst the voters, and de-

²¹ Ibid., 469.

²² Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 106.

termines that a dearth of excitement in Massachusetts explains why “elections reverted wholly to the legislature.” Republican officials “were wholly blind to any defect in the characters of Senator Hoar and Lodge.”²³ However, my findings affirmatively rebut these assertions. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge extensively engaged in statewide popular campaigning for his 1898, 1904, and 1910 re-election, and regularly evinced political acuity to the growing role of public sentiment and popular support in those efforts. And while the state was strongly in the grip of Republican control, such hegemony was illusory. In 1910, Lodge confronted a divided Republican Party, mirroring the national fissures that had emerged between Progressive insurgents and conservatives, and, although he won re-election that year, it was not without intensive efforts at shoring up support, both through public appeals *and* legislative politicking.²⁴

More recently other researchers have analyzed the impact of the Seventeenth Amendment on the development of American federalism. Ralph Rossum notes that the issue was largely neglected in the arguments during the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.²⁵ “Federalism [was] never defined or even expressly mentioned in the Constitution,” he argues. As such its support rested exclusively on structure. Once the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, that structure was “fundamentally altered.” Ultimately, Rossum’s conclusions generally align with Riker, namely that direct senatorial elections weakened the ability for states to redress their growing power imbalance with the federal government, leading to an increasingly larger chasm,

²³ Riker, “The Senate and American Federalism,” 466.

²⁴ *The New York Times*, August 16, 1910, p 2; *The Boston Post*, September 13, 1910, p 1-2; *The Washington Post*, September 18, 1910, p 1; *The Boston Post*, October 26, 1910, p 2; November 2, 1910, p 8; *The Boston Post*, November 4, 1910, p 16.

²⁵ Ralph A. Rossum, *Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of Constitutional Democracy*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 219.

and unalterably weakening federalism, writ large.²⁶ Such an expansion of governmental authority invariably led to the passage of measures that Rossum considers harmful to the states as state units.²⁷

Other scholars have assessed the Seventeenth Amendment within the broader context of democratization. C.H. Hoebeke explains, “The direct election of U.S. Senators has engendered very little commentary in the historiography of either the Constitution or of the Progressive Era. It has been somewhat summarily adjudged a closed case.” Commentary has generally accepted that the Seventeenth Amendment achieved what its proponents had sought to remedy. “Senators ... were too out of touch with popular needs and had to be rendered more responsive.”²⁸

Challenging these prevailing assumptions, Hoebeke observes that senators *were* originally insulated from popular democracy at the outset, but argues that they gradually grew ever more sensitive to electoral politics, and, by the turn of the Twentieth Century, were fully enmeshed by these democratizing trends. In proposing the Seventeenth Amendment, Progressives simply “offered more democracy to cure the evils of democracy” that had manifest over the previous century. Not surprisingly, the reform “exacerbated the problems they were intended to solve,” notably the undue influence of money and special interests. Hoebeke concludes that the Seventeenth Amendment accentuated existing democratic trends, thereby rendering the upper house “more responsive [and] less deliberative,”²⁹ and representing the *culmination* of a democratizing Senate, rather than its commencement.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁸ C.H. Hoebeke, *The Road to Mass Democracy*, 18-19.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 190-193.

While Hoebeke's diligent tracing of the emergent democratization of the Senate is compelling, he does not fully capture the minutiae of senatorial campaigns and elections, leaving unanswered several important thematic questions. Precisely how *democratic* were these elections? In what ways can we characterize them as *responsive*? What techniques and methods did senators utilize to effectively cultivate popular support? How did they capitalize upon these novel avenues of political support? And finally, what roles did the parties play, and how did they adapt to these changing conditions?

Several studies seek to understand how electoral necessities shaped legislative careers and behavior. Wendy Schiller has explored how senators utilized legislative activities to craft a "personal portfolio of accomplishments" that could be used to enhance their reelection prospects. In order to cultivate strong ties with party regulars, as well as with their own constituents, senators would "ensure their performance in office was sufficiently strong" so as to ward off the possibility of an intra-party threat. To that end, incumbents would pursue a panoply of options available, including "roll call voting, patronage, committee assignments, bill and amendment sponsorship, and the presentation of petitions."³⁰ Schiller concludes that the Seventeenth Amendment had the effect of weakening state party organizations, rendering senators less dependent on key party figures and interests, and "remov[ing] one of the main sources of leverage that state party leaders held over U.S. Senators."³¹

In his study of the Senate, Scott MacKenzie examines the professionalization of senators, concluding that the Seventeenth Amendment favored "office-based professional politicians,"

³⁰ Schiller, "Building Careers and Courting Constituents: U.S. Senate Representation 1889–1924," *Studies in American Political Development*, 20, (Fall 2006), 187–188, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X06000095>.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 196–197.

with voters viewing them as “a breath of fresh air compared with the wealthy and, in some instances, corrupt candidates selected by the legislatures.” Furthermore, MacKenzie finds that these changes affected the legislative activities of senators, specifically committee assignments.³² In the wake of the Seventeenth Amendment, opportunities to serve on committees were broadened to include amateur legislators, as well as careerists. MacKenzie speculates that these committee assignments were useful for senators’ constituent and re-election objectives.”³³

And Francine Sanders Romero investigates whether direct elections had the effect of engendering support for Progressive reforms in the Senate. By analyzing roll-call votes from 1905 to 1921, the height of the Progressive era, she determines that the Seventeenth Amendment had little effect on efforts to enact reform legislation.³⁴ “The Senate was conducive to reform *throughout* the era,” she explains, pre- and post-Amendment.³⁵ Moreover, roll-call voting for reform measures mirrored those in the House, the supposedly more responsive and democratic body.³⁶

Responsiveness has been an important source of attention for scholars of the indirect regime. The work of Bernhard and Sala actually straddles two thematic issues: reelection and legislative behavior, assessing decisions to run for re-election and the ideological development of

³² Scott A. MacKenzie, “From Political Pathways to Legislative Folkways: Electoral Reform, Professionalization, and Representation in the U.S. Senate,” *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (December 2014), 755, accessed April 29, 2018, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24371948>.

³³ *Ibid.*, 752-753.

³⁴ Francine Sanders Romero, “The Impact of Direct Election on Reform Votes in the U.S. Senate,” *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2007), 820-821, accessed April 29, 2018, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42956223>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 824.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 826.

congressional voting trends. Their data shows that, prior to 1913, senators more often looked to state legislatures as a bellwether of their re-election prospects. If their party controlled a majority then they “were a good bet both to seek and win reelection.” However, after direct elections were implemented, party support in the state legislatures were less predictive, and senators were more likely to stand for reelection, regardless of the partisan makeup. This was especially true for incumbents confronted by a hostile legislature.³⁷ Additionally, Bernhard and Sala shed light on senators’ ideological voting records. With incumbents less dependent on party factions for support, they gradually began to moderate their voting records so as to remain competitive amongst voters. Although their data suggests both parties moved toward the median, the strongest trends were among Republican officeholders. Bernhard and Sala argue that these changes attest to meaningful effects rendered by the Seventeenth Amendment. “Senators,” they contend, “became more accountable to citizen demand.”³⁸

Building upon the notion of accountability, Gailmard and Jenkins apply a principal-agent framework to the dynamics of institutional responsiveness and legislative behavior. They provide hard data to support the generally-accepted wisdom that the Seventeenth Amendment renders senators more responsive to the interests of the voters. By assessing roll-call votes, they determined that after direct elections, senators’ voting patterns more closely aligned with the Republican vote shares in their respective states, as opposed to the Republican seat shares in their state legislatures. Thus, “senators became substantially less responsive to the policy interests of the state legislature.” Additionally, they find that senators exercised more discretion in the wake

³⁷ William Bernhard and Brian R. Sala, “The Remaking of an American Senate: The 17th Amendment and Ideological Responsiveness,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May., 2006), 347, accessed April 29, 2018, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00411.x>.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 354-356.

of the Seventeenth Amendment, with state legislatures unable to serve as a monitoring mechanism to police individual senator's legislative behavior. In other words, "political principals ... had less explanatory power" after 1914.³⁹

By contrast, Steven Rogers argues that the Seventeenth Amendment "had little impact" on the electoral responsiveness of Senate elections. By utilizing a counterfactual experiment wherein the state legislatures still selected senators after 1914, he analyzes the majority parties in each state, and determines whether they would have selected a senator of the same partisan persuasion as those who were eventually elected by the direct method. His evidence suggests that electoral responsiveness *did* increase, as a whole, but this is mostly inflated by the solid Democratic South. Excluding the region, "there is little evidence that direct elections are more electorally responsive than indirect elections." As such, Rogers contends that "regional considerations are critical when evaluating the electoral effects" of direct elections.⁴⁰

More broadly, responsiveness of the Senate as the whole has been equally as important for scholars. Charles Stewart has assessed changes incurred by the institution in the wake of direct, popular elections, revealing particularly astonishing data on the development of average chamber service and partisan swings. After the Seventeenth Amendment, a general convergence of tenure rates between the upper and lower chambers has emerged, although senators continue to serve slightly longer than their counterparts.⁴¹ Furthermore, Stewart analyzed partisan swings,

³⁹ Gailmard and Jenkins, "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate," 331-332, 334.

⁴⁰ Steven Rogers, "The Responsiveness of Direct and Indirect Elections," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (November 2012), 510, 522, accessed April 29, 2018, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41719850>.

⁴¹ Stewart, "Responsiveness in the Upper Chamber," 73-74.

discovering that the Seventeenth Amendment increased the frequency of changes in partisan control in the Senate. “In any given election, the Senate is now slightly more likely to change partisan control than the House is,” concludes Stewart.⁴²

Stewart argues that the Senate has become “as ‘democratic’” as the House, attributing this development to the Seventeenth Amendment, statewide constituencies — whose media is more difficult to dominate and which provides quality challengers — and six-year terms — which ironically may make senators more vulnerable since they are removed from consistent campaigning for upwards of three election cycles. The only structural feature which stabilizes the body is the staggered nature of its elections, otherwise, the Senate would be an even more volatile branch.⁴³

The most systematic, comprehensive treatment of indirect elections has been Schiller and Stewart’s *Indirect Democracy*. The pair collect an impressive amount of data pertaining to senatorial careers, parties, and state legislative activities. The facets of their research include how Senate seats represented the apex of an ambitious politician’s career;⁴⁴ how the party controlled the mechanisms of nomination, either through primaries, conventions, or caucus meetings; and the manner wherein state representatives settled upon a senatorial candidate. Ultimately, they determine that the Seventeenth Amendment did not fundamentally resolve the issues associated with the Senate during that time, including undue influence of money, longevity of entrenched incumbents, and the institution’s persistently high unfavorable ratings. “The direct power to elect senators has not appreciably increased the Senate’s responsiveness or efficiency,” they con-

⁴² Ibid., 76-77.

⁴³ Ibid., 79-81.

⁴⁴ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 79-80.

tend. However, *de facto* popular elections did *not* exist prior to 1913. Instead, state legislatures still retained the means of selection, even amongst states adopting the Oregon Plan, which bound representatives to support the popular-chosen candidate. True politicking occurred during the critical legislative selection period, amongst party officials and state legislators.⁴⁵ Although Schiller and Stewart devote a chapter to party nominations, they do not exhaustively examine public campaigning for popular support in any appreciable detail, especially as these activities pertain to re-election strategies, nor do they explore the role of public sentiment in the process.

As with most of the forays into the period of indirect regime, Schiller and Stewart rely heavily on quantitative data, presenting select case studies to exemplify particular concepts. Few other studies have delved into the intricacies of senatorial elections by utilizing qualitative, in-depth case study analysis. Much of the literature is dominated by quantitative, large-N studies. And the few qualitative works that do exist fail to *systematically* address the nature of re-election campaigns, the role of public sentiment and popular support, and the degree to which senators were sensitive to these demands.

By contrast, my dissertation demonstrates that public campaigns for electoral support *were* an important component of the senatorial selection process, exploring the novel and creative ways that incumbent senators cultivated popular support for re-election. My theory explains why these practices were widely available, frequently utilized tools in a senator's arsenal of campaign methods. In addressing these concepts, I closely examine the intricacies and nature of senatorial campaigns, how intensively in effort and extensively in scale they were waged, and whether senators effectively strengthened their electoral position as a result of catering to voters

⁴⁵ Ibid., 199-201.

rather than party officials and legislators. My unique qualitative contribution to the research takes the form of personal letters, official correspondences, and autobiographies by senators themselves. Such findings permit us to better grasp how sensitive they were to the increasingly democratizing pressures and electoral demands of their day. By investigating the details of senatorial elections, my dissertation better illustrates why senators pursued active public campaigning, canvassing, and electioneering at a time when parties and insiders seemingly controlled the selection process.

1.3 Theory-Building

My *theory of indirect elections* postulates that senators extensively engaged in public campaigns for popular support as a relevant tool for securing re-election, despite the widespread reliance upon state legislatures in rendering the ultimate decision. To better define what I mean by “public campaigns,” I borrow from David Mayhew’s *Electoral Connection*. In essence, we expect senators to engage in *advertising*, *credit-claiming*, and *position-taking*. Advertising comprises the dissemination of one’s candidacy, emphasizing unique personal qualities and raising awareness of their name brand. Credit-claiming entails the promotion of favorable accomplishments which demonstrate the competence and ability of the officeholder. Position-taking denotes staking out stances on salient political issues so to demonstrate the compatibility between the incumbent’s judgment and the interests of constituents.⁴⁶ These activities take many forms, including utilizing newspapers by publishing letters and granting interviews, conducting direct, personal canvassing; and enlisting political surrogates to stump on their behalf.

⁴⁶ David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974), 49; 52; 61.

These practices were not pursued uniformly across all states. We may anticipate that states with little overall competition — scoring high on partisan control and re-election rate — would witness *perfunctory* campaigns, since authority rested less in the hands of the voter than with parties and state legislatures. The primary threat to a senator's career emerged from within the party caucuses, not from the possibility of the opposition gaining control of the state legislature. Politicking amongst party regulars and state legislators would be considered essential for re-election. Party-based appeals for support would take precedence over the individual candidates. Conversely, we may expect more competitive states — scoring low on partisan control and re-election rates -- would experience vibrant senatorial elections and widespread public campaigns, since the greater threat to one's reelection was presented by the real likelihood of the opposition party seizing control of the legislature, and thereby, wiping out the incumbent's majority. The credentials of the individual contenders would be emphasized over those of the parties, thereby personalizing the process and contributing to entrepreneurial campaigns. My hypothesis test whether any causal relationship existed between the nature of a state's senatorial elections — popular/non-popular — and the necessity to engage in public campaigns.

If the evidence were to show that public campaigns were pursued minimally and did not meaningfully influence the selection of a senator across the spectrum of states *even* among exceptionally-popular elections, where few barrier points existed between the ballot box and the legislature's selection, then my theory would be falsified. If the findings largely conform to the hypothesis, then my theory would be *partially* supported, demonstrating that senators engaged in electioneering and public appeals in popular states, but were mostly circumscribed in less popular or non-popular conditions, where many barrier points existed between the voters and the se-

lection of a senator. However, if the evidence were to demonstrate that popular, public appeals prevailed across *all* states, serving a consequential role in the determination of a senator, then my theory has merit.

Why, then, did senators appeal to voters when the reins of power were controlled by state machines, especially in cases where numerous barrier points diluted the public sentiment and curtailed popular support? I posit two plausible, interrelated explanations. The first is *party adaptability*, namely, that political parties will adapt to changing conditions and circumstances to remain politically viable. After the decline and fall of the Federalist party, American parties learned to adjust to changing times, embrace the prevailing *zeitgeist*, and, in so doing, enjoy remarkable longevity. In 1896, a passionate core of Democrats co-opted the increasing populist sentiments of westerners and farmers when William Jennings Bryan launched his moral crusade against the gold standard. Similarly, after the strong showing of the independent candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992, both parties committed themselves to fiscal responsibility and discipline, eventually leading to balanced budgets and the first surpluses in thirty years.⁴⁷

The major political parties at the turn of the 20th Century were not immobile, shapeless lumps of granite. By contrast, they understood that to survive in an increasingly democratic age, governed by a fervor for direct primaries and accountability for officeholders, they had to adopt certain practices and procedures, permitting a modicum of popular electoral input in government, especially the selection of senators. Often the face of their state parties and the vanguard of their

⁴⁷ Kristina Nwazota, "Third Parties in the U.S. Political Process," *PBS NewsHour*, July 26, 2004, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/politics-july-dec04-third_parties; Shigeo Hirano, "Third Parties, Elections, and Roll-Call Votes: The Populist Party and the Late Nineteenth-Century U.S. Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40263450>.

state's politics, senators began appealing to voters in state elections, in an effort to foster greater legitimacy for the political process, a tenuous legitimacy which was routinely subject to assault. In the process, popular senatorial campaigns emerged, representing a response to the pervasive discontent with key governing institutions at the time, fueled and capitalized upon by Progressive reformers and muckraking journalists. The New York senatorial campaign of 1910 proves illustrative of these dynamics.

By 1910, Senator Chauncey Depew's reputation had been tarnished by allegations, at times extravagant, of shady business dealings and undue influence from financial and corporate interests. While he still commanded respect, his candidacy posed a dilemma for the Republican party. As the *Star Gazette* implored Republicans, "Party harmony is desirable, but not at such a price."⁴⁸ It was widely believed he could not win re-election on his own merits, but that the fortunes of the party could be improved if they were to draft someone of higher stature, perhaps in the personage of Theodore Roosevelt.⁴⁹ The Republicans never had to make that decision, as they were routed by the Democrats in the November election.⁵⁰ Although Depew was eventually nominated by the party caucus in the state legislature in January, party leaders conceded it was mere honorific for the retiring Depew. The irony was that Depew would not have been renominated had the Republicans retained the majority.⁵¹ Thus, far from insularity to changing circumstances, parties willfully adapted. Depew's failure to win re-election, both by a vote of the peo-

⁴⁸ *The Star Gazette*, February 1, 1910, p 6.

⁴⁹ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 27, 1910, p 3.

⁵⁰ *Buffalo Courier*, November 9, 1910, p 1.

⁵¹ *The Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 1910, p 2.

ple and the choice of the party, demonstrates that even in the boss-controlled Empire State, the perception of public accountability mattered a great deal.

The second explanation is the concept of *independent political support*, which closely hews to party adaptability. Senators and their parties often shared a symbiotic relationship. The latter relied upon the former for federal patronage and monies for state projects. The former relied upon the latter for political support, mobilization, and job security. In many respects, senators owed their positions to the parties by dint of their duty and service to the state machinery. Such over-reliance on parties meant senators were restricted from straying very far from party orthodoxy and regularly towed the party line.⁵² As senatorial elections democratized, however, senators soon understood that cultivating support from voters provided valuable leverage upon which to rely when cajoling state officials and legislators into supporting their re-election. Thus, in essence, incumbents could go over the heads of party leaders by appealing directly to voters, “bringing the demos into [their] coalition,” and letting the people decide the matter, en masse, so to speak.⁵³ If an intra-party struggle arose or a factional challenge developed, senators could point to their strong performance in the recent elections as proof of their continued value and import. After the November elections of 1904, as Governor Odell of New York was considering organizing a challenge to remove Depew from his Senate seat, Depew and his syndicate, including the influential editor of the *Buffalo Evening News*, repeatedly publicized the senator’s breadth of support amongst the people of the state - “unanimous,” as the paper colorfully de-

⁵² Gailmard and Jenkins, “Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate.”

⁵³ I borrow the concept from Josiah Ober’s treatment of the Athenian Revolution of 508 BCE in *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 160-162.

scribed it.⁵⁴ The Depew camp even went so far as to organize mass meetings throughout the state to pressure state legislators into supporting the junior senator.⁵⁵ These activities were not irrelevant to the eventual decision by the legislature to retain Depew in the Senate. State legislators themselves were subject to annual elections, and failure to heed the actions of the people risked defeat in the next round of elections.⁵⁶

By its nature, such a strategy was double-edged. While senators strengthened their positions vis-a-vis party officials and legislators with a strong showing in the recent elections, failure to perform well greatly undermined their political standing, thereby giving party leaders greater bargaining leverage with which to exert. The relatively poor performance by Henry Cabot Lodge and the Republicans in the 1910 elections in Massachusetts certainly emboldened gleeful Democrats and disaffected, insurgent Republicans to coordinate to deny Lodge another term in the Senate. Several detractors interpreted the unimpressive election results as evidence of the dismal state of Lodge's own personal popularity and an outright rejection of the incumbent senator.⁵⁷ The pressures for a good result were readily apparent.

1.4 Broader Themes

My research offers broader implications for structural, democratic reforms. To recount, Progressive reformers were most displeased with a Senate they viewed as dysfunctional, corrupt,

⁵⁴ *Buffalo Evening News*, November 26, 1904, p 14; December 27, 1904, p 1.

⁵⁵ *The Press and Sun Bulletin*, December 24, 1904, p 1.

⁵⁶ *Buffalo Evening News*, December 27, 1904, p 9.

⁵⁷ *The Boston Globe*, November 10, 1910, p 12; November 11, 1910, p 10; *Worcester Gazette*, republished in *The Boston Globe*, November 12, 1910, p 10.

beholden to special, moneyed interests, unresponsive to the interests of their constituents, and insular to the changing world around them. To redress these problems, they targeted the *means* of senatorial selection, proposing direct popular elections as a replacement for state legislative authority. They defended the amendment on democratic grounds, namely that it would enhance the accountability of senators and increase the participation of the electorate. In short, the remedy for an “undemocratic” institution was to facilitate greater democracy. My dissertation demonstrates that senators were neither insular to the demands of public campaigning nor aloof to the interests of their constituents. By contrast, the trajectory of selecting senators had tended toward greater public accountability and popular input.

To be clear, I do not *understate* the impact of the Seventeenth Amendment. Prior to 1913, state legislatures served as the final arbiter in deciding senators. Once that power had been removed, senatorial elections became truly direct, and popular decisions. The reform rendered the Senate and its members more ideologically responsive to the electorate, heightening existing democratic trends.⁵⁸ But by targeting the *most* democratic aspect of the Senate at that time, Progressives were less successful addressing the underlying problems with the chamber, specifically money, special interests, and pervasive dysfunction. As Schiller and Stewart conclude, reformers failed to improve the Senate’s efficiency on these counts.⁵⁹ Therefore, a more wholesale solution should have encompassed regulating campaign contributions, finance, and spending, as well as reforming the body’s procedural rules. Furthermore, it is worth considering whether the reduction of senatorial terms or the elimination of staggered elections might have been more effective,

⁵⁸ See Charles Stewart III, (1992); William Bernhard and Brian R. Sala, (2006); and Sean Gailmard and Jeffery A. Jenkins, (2009).

⁵⁹ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 199-201.

far-reaching remedies. These were the features which Madison most believed protected the Senate from the ephemeral currents of popular whim, rather than the selection method exclusively.

While the Seventeenth Amendment furthered a more direct, popular election of senators, the reform resulted in three unanticipated, but enormously significant side effects. First, the height of the Progressive age and its many successes engendered a fierce backlash in both parties, resulting in an extended period of conservative rule. Second, the amendment itself altered the prevailing federal-state arrangement, diminishing the authority of the state governments in their capacity to influence the makeup of federal officeholders.⁶⁰ Third, it curtailed the parties in their capacity to control the political dynamics of their states, as candidates grew more individualistic and independent of the party apparatus.⁶¹ Granted, these developments were objectives of Progressive reformers, but, as Rossum laments, little mention of the implications for federalism were actually discussed during the debates over ratifying the Seventeenth Amendment.⁶² And consequently, very little was understood or appreciated as to their far-reaching and undue effects.

In many respects, the crusade for reforming the senatorial selection method — the centerpiece of a litany of major proposals — was conducted on behalf of well-meaning reformers who sought to redress perceived inequalities and dysfunction in the system through extensive political mobilization to enact their program for democratic reforms, which have fundamentally reshaped the constitutional and political framework of the United States. These debates over the balance between democratic self-government and the importance of what Jonathan Rauch terms

⁶⁰ See William H. Riker, (1955); and Ralph A. Rossum, (2001).

⁶¹ Gaillard and Jenkins, “Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate,” 331-334.

⁶² Ralph A. Rossum, *Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of Constitutional Democracy*, 219.

“the middlemen,” have percolated to present day, colorizing the dispute within the Democratic Party over the future role of superdelegates, as well as efforts to abolish the Electoral College.

For over a century, party conventions were tasked with nominating presidential candidates. Although the conventions represented a more democratic, and open alternative to the congressional caucuses that had preceded it, they regularly remained controlled by party figures. The process was run by “powerful state party leaders [who] controlled the selection of delegates and dominated the ‘smoke-filled rooms.’”⁶³ The dawn of the Progressive age brought forth calls for systematic change. Assailing the method as insufficiently undemocratic, reformers sought to implement direct primaries for state and federal offices.⁶⁴ Wisconsin enacted the first direct primary in 1904 under the leadership of “Fighting Bob” La Follette.⁶⁵ Thereafter, while primaries gradually transformed presidential campaigns into popular tests of a candidate’s electoral strengths, they were by no means solely determinative of the outcome. Until 1968, these popular exercises often persuaded party leaders of the caliber and ability of aspiring contenders. Once these pivotal endorsements were secured, the convention would nominate a candidate.⁶⁶

After 1968, a second wave of reforms exploded, fueled in part by the perceived undemocratic nature of Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s nomination, which had been attained without partaking in a single primary contest. To remedy those shortcomings, Democrats launched the McGovern-Fraser Commission, which introduced a method of selection pegged exclusively to

⁶³ Daniel DiSalvo, *Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-2010*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 61.

⁶⁴ James Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development*, 21.

⁶⁵ Allen Fraser Lovejoy, *La Follette and the Establishment of the Direct Primary in Wisconsin, 1890-1904*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941).

⁶⁶ John Geer, “Rules Governing Presidential Primaries,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Nov., 1986), 1007, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2131010>.

primaries.⁶⁷ However, after the abysmal failure of George McGovern's 1972 presidential bid and the political difficulties surrounding Jimmy Carter's presidency, Democrats recognized several insufficiencies in the process, among them the lack of support from important traditional voting blocs, such as labor unions, and pivotal party figures. In response, they introduced superdelegates in 1984, allowing a scintilla of direction from party officials in ultimately settling upon a nominee.⁶⁸ Superdelegates were critical in ensuring the nominations of Walter Mondale that year and Barack Obama in 2008.⁶⁹ At the outset of the 2016 campaign, they overwhelmingly supported Hillary Clinton. Although their lopsided support may have deterred other Democrats from challenging Clinton, superdelegates were not singularly decisive in Clinton's victory over Bernie Sanders, for she won 55 percent of the primary vote as well.⁷⁰ Yet, some Democratic activists, upset over the perceived stacking of the deck against Sanders, pressed for reducing or outright eliminating the strength of superdelegates in future nominating contests.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1972*, (1973; New York: HaperCollins, 2010), 21-28.

⁶⁸ "Who are the Democratic superdelegates and where did they come from?" *The Guardian*, April 19, 2016, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/apr/19/democratic-party-superdelegates-history-rules-changes>.

⁶⁹ Zachary Roth, "Supredelegates Don't Determine the Democratic Nominee," *NBC News*, June 7, 2016, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/superdelegates-don-t-determine-democratic-nominee-n587386>.

⁷⁰ Nate Silver, "Was The Democratic Primary A Close Call Or A Landslide?," *FiveThirtyEight*, June 27, 2016, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/was-the-democratic-primary-a-close-call-or-a-landslide/>.

⁷¹ Adam Levy, "DNC Changes Superdelegates Rules in Presidential Nomination Process," *CNN*, August 25, 2018, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/25/politics/democrats-superdelegates-voting-changes/index.html>.

By the same token, many Americans are generally disaffected with the Electoral College,⁷² and argue the body has unfairly inflated the influence of underrepresented, smaller, rural states, while deflating the importance of larger, more populous states. Such an arrangement has had the effect of electing presidents who have not won the popular vote, thereby obstructing the will of the people.⁷³ Yet before ditching the Electoral College in favor of direct, popular vote, reformers should understand the implications of such a move. For one, while the Electoral College has selected two candidates in the last twenty years who lost the popular vote, it has a better track record throughout history of selecting the popular vote winner, only failing in 1876 and 1888 — excluding the jumbled election of 1824. Second, a pure popular vote could have the effect of increasing the costs of campaigning, requiring candidates to travel to large states and advertise in expensive television markets. Increased costs would increase the value of contributors - often smaller cadre of wealthy donors. And finally, it would have the effect of exacerbating political polarization, as candidates would seek to drive up turnout among their base, while sacrificing moderate, swing voters who have traditionally determined elections. Each of these side-effects would run counter to the desires of reformers. Instead, alternatives should be considered that retain the present system, but implement alterations which alleviate its worst aspects, such as proportionally allocating electors based on the state's popular vote percentage earned by each contender.

⁷² Grace Sparks, "Americans would prefer picking the president with the popular vote, but there's a catch," CNN, July 20, 2018, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/20/politics/popular-vote-poll/index.html>.

⁷³ "A National Popular Vote for President," *Fairvote*, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: https://www.fairvote.org/national_popular_vote.

As with Progressives at the turn of the previous century, democratic reformers targeting structural entities ought to first accurately diagnose the source of the problem, prescribe a precise remedy, and grasp the intended impact of the reform, as well as its potential side effects. As with any medical treatment, a holistic approach to understanding the entire body politic should be better appreciated.

Another salient issue raised by the research is *party cover*. Primarily due to the durability of strong parties, persistence of factional contestation, and importance of legislative haggling under the indirect regime, elements of a *parliamentary democracy* manifested. State legislative nominees were often publicly committed to supporting the re-election of incumbents and senators diligently worked toward ensuring district conventions nominated legislative partisans, who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent's re-election in the forthcoming legislative session. Publicly pledged legislators rendered the system more directly accountable to voters, but also ensured rigid party discipline.

Parliamentary democracies provide *party cover* to its officeholders and candidates, a dynamic appraised by David Mayhew and Anthony King. In short, in parliamentary systems, ambitious politicians are nominated by the party proper, not directly by voters through primaries; their expenses are footed by party committees, rather than perennially fundraising on their own behalf; and finally, their political career depends exclusively upon party discipline and loyalty; whereas in the American system, outsiders regularly attain positions of high status. Under the indirect regime, party cover constituted what Jonathan Rauch terms "the middlemen," those essential political functionaries who ensured the system operated smoothly, filtrated fluctuations in popular opinion, and served the broad interests of the parties. As party cover has been shorn of

American elections, candidates have grown increasingly more independent of the parties, fueling assaults on the middlemen by populist-driven “outsiders.”⁷⁴

Another relevant theme is the interplay between national politics and local conditions. Strong parties and party discipline tended to invite the *nationalization effect*. Most evidently, senators eagerly nationalized their contests to benefit from a favorable political climate. These efforts were seamless and most lucrative during presidential elections, where senators could easily peg their candidacy to the coattails of the president and transform all down-ballot legislative races into a referendum on the race. But incumbent senators could similarly capitalize upon positive national conditions during midterm election years, as well. More perilously, during economic downturns or politically problematic periods for the party, senators were especially vulnerable to the negative currents of public sentiment. And despite great exertions to decouple their partisan identification or national factors from the race, they were often subject to immensely powerful wave elections. Yet local circumstances often defined the contours of these races, as factional disputes, personal rivalries, party leaders, burning state issues, and nomination methods animated senators, party officials, and voters alike. Thus, nationalized referenda were refracted through the prism of unique state conditions.

A final salient feature is the intersection of democratic reforms and racialized politics, namely the enactment of the invidious “white primary.” Although primaries were introduced by many states as an inclusive measure — opening up participation to more citizens — Southern states passed primaries precisely to exclude African-Americans from participating in their polity.

⁷⁴ Jonathan Rauch, “How American Politics Went Insane,” *The Atlantic*, (July/August 2016), accessed May 21, 2020, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/how-american-politics-went-insane/485570/>.

The South Carolina case study investigates the passage of the white primary and the manner that senatorial campaigns routinely whipped up overtly-racist appeals. Furthermore, it assesses the factors that contributed to the rise of the race-baiting, populist demagogue Benjamin Tillman, who railed against an out-of-touch establishment, impure government, and non-whites in a flamboyant fashion to improve the lot of economically-depressed farmers — in many respects, the precursor to modern-day populists and the rise of *illiberal democracies* across the world.

CHAPTER 2: Hypothesis, Research Design, and Methods

2.1 Hypothesis

To investigate the veracity of my theories, I have devised a hypothesis for senatorial campaigning allowing me to test whether the nature of a state's senatorial selection process — popular or non-popular — determined incumbent senators' levels of insularity or sensitivity to electoral politics and, if the latter, drove them to engage in electioneering and canvassing.

My independent variable — the nature of a state's senatorial selection process — can be subdivided into three observable indicators or elemental facets which I have dubbed “barrier points,” structural barriers that existed between the public sentiment as manifest by the general election results, and the eventual selection of a senator by the state legislature the following January. The *greater* the barrier points, the less popular the process, whilst the *fewer* the barrier points, the more popular the election. These barrier points are general election *competitiveness*, *candidate recognition*, and *legislative deference*.

In essence, *competitiveness* refers to whether general elections within a state were truly contested, measuring the degree to which one party held a dominant advantage such to deny any potential challenges to its hegemony from the opposition party, or whether both political parties viably competed for electoral support. Strong, uni-party systems did not experience truly competitive nor meaningfully popular elections, thereby dampening enthusiasm and depressing turnout for voters of the minority party. Furthermore, structural arrangements, such as extensive state legislative gerrymandering, impeded a faithful translation of the popular vote into political influence, entrenching the power of majority parties. By contrast, competitive states where both

parties routinely exchanged control would reasonably be considered to witness more popularly-based general elections.

To gauge the competitiveness of general elections, partisan control is quantified by the number of senatorial elections wherein one party emerged victorious as a percentage of the absolute number of these elections from 1890 to 1913. I have coded states witnessing over 75 percent Republican or Democratic control as *strong* (75-99 percent) and *solid* (100 percent) party states. States below the 75 percent threshold of partisan control are coded as *competitive*, swing states. Ten states — roughly 21 percent of the country — were swing states with neither party dominant for an appreciable length of time.⁷⁵

Additionally, general election competitiveness will further be captured by senatorial re-election rate. The re-election or retention rate refers to the number of instances wherein an incumbent senator successfully secured re-election as a percentage of the absolute number of senatorial elections within that state for the relevant period. While re-election rates comprise an aspect of overall general election competitiveness, they are not a standalone independent variable for they loosely intercorrelate with partisan control — the greater the party control, the higher the re-election rates of senators.⁷⁶ Strong and solid party states generally witnessed safer, more entrenched incumbents, and vice-versa. However, there were notable exceptions to the rule, which will be addressed below. States with greater than 65 percent re-election rates are coded as *high* or high-entrenchment states; between 35 percent and 65 percent rates as *average* or mid-dling; and below 35 percent rates as *low*, or high-turnover states.

⁷⁵ See Appendix A, Column B, “Party Control.”

⁷⁶ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 55.

Measuring re-election rates appears seemingly intuitive, but in actuality, they are more complicated and nuanced. Were we to employ the strictest standard — instances where an announced incumbent outright *lost* re-election — then we find fully 28 states (58 percent) enjoyed high retention rates, while only seven states (15 percent) witnessed low rates.⁷⁷ Such a metric, however, overlooks scenarios where the incumbent, sensing the mood of the electorate, opted to retire in advance. Anticipating a poor showing by their party in the upcoming elections, senators could pursue retirement as a face-saving measure. Other times, these decisions could have been made *after* their party lost seats in the general election, but *prior* to the legislative selection in January. Therefore, a more permissive standard counts any incumbent senators who simply failed to serve a second term, regardless of the reasons. Furthermore, I am confining my research to *elected* senators who were denied a second term, thereby excluding appointees, placeholders, special elections, resignations, and untimely deaths. Including these factors creates an overly-generous standard. Thus, the revised rubric represents a reasonable compromise between the two extremes, taking into account only *elected* senators who lost renomination, lost re-election, or retired before serving a second term. Applying this broader definition modestly depresses the re-election rate uniformly across all states. Only 18 states (38 percent) are now classified as highly entrenched, while fully ten (21 percent) are considered high turnover states.⁷⁸

Coupled together, partisan control and re-election rate offer a quantifiable measure of a given state's general election competitiveness — or their *competitiveness index*, upon which I will explicate further below. States ranking high on both counts are identified as strongly parti-

⁷⁷ See Appendix A, Column D, "Re-election A - Strictest standard."

⁷⁸ See Appendix A, Column F, "Re-election rate C - Median Rule."

san, highly entrenched, and *less competitive*, while those ranking lower are classified as high turnover, *highly competitive* swing states.

The second independent variable is *candidate recognition*, or how extensively observers recognized the identities of a party's prospective candidate for the Senate *prior* to the November election. Candidate recognition can be qualitatively assessed by contemporary newspaper coverage of election-related events. If the elections were individualistic and entrepreneurial, centering upon a single candidate, their unique qualities and legislative record, then the process would be considered *more* popular, as the voters understood the contest as a clash of personalities when rendering their decision. By contrast, if the elections weighed more heavily toward party-based appeals, touting the accomplishments of the party, while obscuring, diminishing, and deemphasizing the individuality of the incumbent senator, then the process would be considered *less* popular. Voters would be less certain as to the identities of the respective candidates themselves, eventually casting their ballot for one of the two political parties instead.

The extent of candidate recognition within each state is not readily quantifiable, for it does not lend itself to precise calculations. The variable can only materially be determined by an in-depth examination of each case. Therefore, the full universe of cases (all 48 states) has not been coded according to this variable. However, a scale for candidate recognition has been applied to the four states under consideration for my research, about which I further extrapolate below.

The third and final independent variable is *legislative deference*, or how faithfully state legislatures ratified the choice of the people when deciding upon the senatorial question. Did legislators perceive the general election results as a popular referendum on the incumbent senator

or any publicly-declared, widely-known challengers from the opposing party, or did they exercise their own judgment by selecting a candidate who had not hitherto publicly canvassed for support? Legislative deference examines whether it was commonplace for legislatures to confirm the leading candidate of the party that secured the most votes in the general election, or whether, in light of these results, they reconsidered their options. In cases where state legislatures were *more deferential* to democratic majorities, upholding the widely-understood, public contender for the office, the state would be considered *more* popular in their method. In instances where state legislatures exercised *greater autonomy*, selecting a contender who had not pursued a public campaign and, thereby, outright ignoring the results of the previous election, the state would be considered *less* popular in their selection process.

Once again, legislative deference appears logical at first sight, but there is more nuance than meets the eye when measuring the construct. At one extreme, one could argue that *every* state legislature prior to 1913 exercised the final, ultimate decision on the senatorial question, and therefore, legislative deference would be functionally meaningless as a construct. However, we could correctly rebut that legislatures *did* in fact eventually settle on a contender that was well-known prior to the November elections, and conducted a public campaign for popular support, at least according to the cases investigated, therefore supporting the notion of legislative deference. Adding a further wrinkle to the matter, state legislators frequently reconsidered whom to support for the Senate, even when they ultimately settled on the leading, public candidate of majority party, generally considered the “choice of the people.” Whether they were threatening to consider alternatives as a means of extracting concessions from the incumbent without any

real intention of abandoning them at the fated hour is difficult to discern, however. Thus, measuring legislative deference must take into account all of these caveats.

Instances where the emergent victor in the November election was widely favored for the seat, generally understood to be the winner, and eventually selected by the legislature without any complications are coded as *highly deferential*. Cases where the legislature *did* consider several options as a mere formality, but summarily approved the candidate chosen by the popular elections are coded as *middling*. Cases where the legislature outright selected its own candidate who had not competed in a public campaign prior to the election, or where the body settled upon the leading choice only *after* extensive wrangling and bargaining between legislators, party officials, and incumbent senators, are coded as *low* on the deferential scale. I delve further into greater quantifiable detail below when I explain the case selection process.


My dependent variable is the *insularity* or *sensitivity* of incumbent senators to the pressures and expectations of electoral politics. To best capture the insularity-sensitivity construct, I have scrutinized senatorial re-election campaigns, writ large, including electioneering and canvassing. Borrowing from David Mayhew's *Electoral Connection*, incumbents pursued three fundamental objectives in their re-election bids: *advertising* their candidacy, *position-taking* on pressing issues of the day, and *credit-claiming* of favorable accomplishments. And to achieve these goals, senators specifically utilized three methods of electioneering: *newspapers*, *public appearances*, and *political surrogates*.

Admittedly, campaign activities themselves remain difficult to quantify, and, therefore, I must rely on a holistic assessment predicated on a qualitative measure for each case. Yet, certain objective measures *can* be adopted providing a more rigorous, robust metric. For each senatorial

election campaign, I examine levels of *intensity* — when did incumbent senators begin to evince a sense of vulnerability to colleagues, friends, and close associates, if ever? How did these sentiments translate into the nature of the campaigns? How early did senators commence their public campaigns for re-election? How frequently did they personally appear at campaign events and rallies? How often did they pen letters to influential newspapers? How many high-level political surrogates did they enlist? Complementing levels of intensity, I also examine how *extensively* the campaigns were waged, as well. How far did senators travel during their campaigns? Where did they visit, and whom were their audiences?

My hypothesis stipulates a causal relationship between the nature of senatorial elections — *popular* or *non-popular*, as measured by the number of barrier points between voters and the state legislature's selection of a senator — and the insularity or sensitivity of incumbent senators to electoral pressures, as indicated by the scale and magnitude of their public campaigns. Thus, under more *popular* systems, senators should correctly recognize greater voter control — authority resting with citizens — and undertake extensive public campaigning so to cultivate popular support and generate turnout for their candidacy. Conversely, under *non-popular* conditions, incumbents should recognize the preponderance of party control over the process, rather than voters, and canvass amongst state leaders, influential figures, party officials, and state legislators, accordingly. Public campaigning amongst the masses should be non-existent, infrequent, or largely constricted. See **Figure 2.1** visualizing the causal links of my hypothesis.

Figure 2.1 Causal Links of Hypothesis



The hypothesis can be falsified in two directions. If states with *fewer* barrier points (*popular*) witnessed *low* levels of active campaigning, thereby suggesting that senators were actually more insular to electoral necessities even under the most popular of conditions, then my theory would be significantly weakened. In place of direct appeals to the masses, widespread engage-

ment of voters, and cultivation of popular support, senatorial elections would have taken a less democratic form, namely that of elite party competition and jockeying. The parties themselves likely would not have demonstrated any meaningful efforts at adapting to the rising tide of democratization, and senators would have been closely tied to their parties.

If states with *more* barrier points (*non-popular*) witnessed *high* levels of intensive/extensive campaigning by senators and these incumbents betrayed a sense of sensitivity to public sentiment and voter preferences, despite the prevalence of strongly partisan, highly entrenched conditions, then my theory would be strengthened. These findings would suggest that public appeals for popular support were more widespread and consequential than has henceforth been appreciated. Furthermore, they demonstrate that parties *were* gradually granting concessions to democratic reformers by incorporating an element of popular input in the senatorial selection method. Additionally, senators would rely increasingly on public opinion and popular legitimacy in their campaigns, contentiously corralling state legislators and party officials into supporting their candidacy, or symbiotically marshaling their popularity with voters to strengthen the fortunes of the ticket down ballot.

How will we know whether a campaign was relevant and integral, to the animating question of the senatorship, or merely a formality entitling perfunctory appearances by the senator on behalf of their party? In revealing the innermost thoughts and intimate sentiments of my subjects, private letters and official correspondences affirmatively address how vulnerable they felt toward an upcoming election, how sensitive they were to public sentiment and the necessities of campaigning, or how confidently they believed they would secure re-election. I discuss how these novel primary sources uniquely contribute to my research below, but, suffice it to say, the

materials provide invaluable insight into the perceptions and perspectives of senators themselves on the importance of their campaign efforts. Additionally, I assess the post-election period (November to January), as well, to determine whether a senator's conduct during the campaign enhanced their political support or adversely affected their standing amongst party officials. If evidence validated public campaigns as a primary reason for the legislature's support, then my theory would be further strengthened.

Were we to discover that public campaigning for the people's vote was extensive where it was *most* expected — in the easy test cases of *popular* states — *and* where it was *least* expected — in the hard test cases of *non-popular* states — then we can confidently conclude that an emerging element of popular legitimacy undergirded the indirect selection regime, gradually generating a “mixed system” of sorts between party control and voter input, and attesting to the notion of *party adaptability*. If parties began nominating senatorial candidates early in the calendar prior to the November election, especially via a primary, encouraged state conventions to endorse senators for another term, supported disseminating their candidacies across the state, and pressed legislators to recognize the role of public sentiment, then the idea that parties *were* ceding greater authority to voters in an effort to satiate dissatisfied reformers and the broader democratizing trends would be suggestive.

If parties were granting concessions to democratization, then the role of popular support should provide a new avenue for senators to explore and a novel cudgel with which to wield against party officials and state legislators. Did the centrality of a senator's campaign unmistakably contribute to the electoral fortunes of their party? Did senators, operatives, and observers highlight the incumbent's electoral strength as evidence of their popularity and value, and if so,

did this translate into coercive authority to secure the backing of state legislators and other pivotal party figures? Conversely, did political opponents take advantage of relatively poor showings by incumbents to bolster their efforts at denying the senator another term in office?

Whether a senator's enormous popularity buttressed the party's positions, or whether an incumbent's compromised candidacy served as an albatross instead, then the evidence would suggest that popular support *was* emerging as an independent base of political support.

2.2 Case Selection

To maximize the external validity and generalizability of my theory, I have selected states representative of the country from 1890 to 1913 — that twenty-year period constituting the “eve of reform” before the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. Initially, I drew upon data from Schiller and Stewart's *Indirect Democracy* to better visualize the universe of all possible cases. However, as their focus begins much earlier — from 1871 — I conducted further research into the political circumstances of each state for the relevant time frame (1890-1913).

Several factors relevant to my case selection must first be addressed. One variable is the so-called “Oregon Plan.” By 1912, twelve states adopted the Oregon Plan, an arrangement whereby state representatives were formally bound to support the popularly-elected candidate for selection to the Senate. In theory, these were de facto direct elections, yet, as Schiller and Stewart maintain, they were not sufficiently direct so to circumvent state legislatures.⁷⁹ And these plans varied by state. In Colorado, state legislators actually held two votes: one for the *individual* who won the popular vote, the second for the majority *party*, as a means of preventing in-

⁷⁹ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 39-41.

stances wherein the two might diverge. In practice, however, the Oregon Plan continued to peg state parties to the selection of their senatorial candidate. States adopting the Oregon Plan were Oregon (1904), Nebraska (1909), Nevada (1909), Minnesota (1909), Ohio (1910), Wisconsin (1910), California (1910), Montana (1910), New Jersey (1910), Kansas (1910), Colorado (1911), and Arizona (1912).⁸⁰ Most of these states only enacted their versions of the Oregon Plan quite late in the indirect period. As such, there are few cases available under the regime to permit a rigorous comparative study. And since they did not achieve their stated purpose, the Oregon Plan is not a particularly important variable for my case selection.

There are, however, two limiting factors that winnow the field of available cases from which to study. The first factor is the recency of a state's admission to the Union. A subset of states only joined the union after 1890: Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907), Arizona (1912), and New Mexico (1912).⁸¹ These states had witnessed far fewer elections than their counterparts, and, as such, their smaller sample sizes distort valid coding. For example, Arizona is coded as solidly Democratic, but this was due to Democratic victories in their only two elections ever held under the indirect method. Additionally, re-election rates are less relevant for the entire subset as well, since there were fewer re-election contests generally than in other states. Indeed, they are not even applicable for Arizona and New Mexico as their first senatorial re-election contests occurred *following* the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.

⁸⁰ *The American Year Book, A Record of Events and Progress*, (New York; D. Appleton & Co., 1910-1912), Vol. 1, 1910, 140; Vol. 2, 1911, 179; Vol. 3, 1912, 59, accessed January 30, 2019, via HATHI TRUST Digital Library.

⁸¹ "States by Order of Entry Into the Union," *InfoPlease*, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.infoplease.com/history-and-government/us-history/states-order-entry-union>.

The second factor is a geographic limitation, namely the West. I will not be selecting any Western states for my analysis. The region was mostly comprised of newly-formed states, with ten having joined the Union from 1889 to 1912. Only California and Oregon predated the Civil War.⁸² Added to that, they were sparsely populated. According to the 1900 census, seven of the ten least-populated states were in the West, and California ranked 21st, at 1.4 million people - half the size of Massachusetts.⁸³ Granted, their politics were fascinating for the era, displaying a penchant for Populist sympathies. In the 1892 presidential election, James Weaver carried Colorado, Kansas, Idaho, and Nevada.⁸⁴ Six Populist senators were elected, several of whom hailing from the West: two from Kansas, and one apiece from North Carolina, South Dakota, Idaho, and Nebraska.⁸⁵ Further, they were readily amenable to reforms, such as the Oregon Plan, which was quite prevalent in the West. Indeed, a sample of newspaper coverage during the 1902 elections in California and Colorado reveal high levels of public campaigning and canvassing.⁸⁶ Thus, the activities that I am researching seemed to be as prevalent, if not more so, in the West, and, as such, the region offers a weaker test for my theory, which postulates sensitivities to electoral pressures and public campaigns, even in strongly-partisan, highly-entrenched states.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ "Population of States and Counties of the United States: 1790-1990," *Bureau of the Census*, March 1996, 3, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/PopulationofStatesandCountiesoftheUnitedStates1790-1990.pdf>.

⁸⁴ "1892 Presidential General Election Results," *US Election Atlas*, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1892&f=0>.

⁸⁵ "Senators Representing Third or Minor Parties," *The United States Senate*, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/senators_thirdParties.htm.

⁸⁶ *The Los Angeles Sunday Times*, October 19, 1902; *The Weekly Gazette*, Colorado Springs, October 30, 1902; October 23, 1902.

In order to maximize the internal validity of my theory, I have selected cases which vary accordingly by each independent variable. My first and arguably most important independent variable is general election *competitiveness*. The competitiveness index is comprised of two sub variables: *party control* and *re-election rate*. As stated above, party control is determined by the number of senatorial elections wherein one party was victorious, as a percentage of the total number of elections in a given state. This approach yields figures along a spectrum from 50 percent to 100 percent. To create an absolute partisan score on a 0 to 100 scale, I have redistributed the numbers so that each percentage point after 50 be represented by increments of two, i.e. 50 = 0, 51 = 2, 52 = 4, and so forth, until reaching 100.⁸⁷

To recap, most states (38) were strong or solid uni-party states, where a single party dominated 75 percent of elections or more. Only ten states — roughly 20 percent of the country — were truly swing states, where neither party achieved an extended period of dominance. Overall, the South was solidly Democratic. New England and the Midwest were dominated by the Republicans. The Mid Atlantic and parts of the Midwest were generally more contentious. The newly-added states of the West divided between Republican-dominated states and swing states.

As far as re-election rates, the metric defining re-election rate as the frequency wherein an incumbent senator did not serve a second term will be applied. The retention rate includes senators who outright lost renomination or re-election, *as well as* retirees who demurred before they actually lost their seat. Granted, this may be too permissive a standard, but it makes allowances for the possibility that senators used this route as a means of saving face. Applying this

⁸⁷ See Appendix A, Column C, "Absolute Partisan Score."

broadier definition, however, only modestly depresses the re-election rate relative to the stricter alternative.

Qualitative differences existed in the various ways that senators secured (or failed to secure) re-election. The first was renomination, which was assured by party caucus support. Prior to primaries, these caucuses consisted of formal and informal party gatherings and conventions, but between 1888 and 1910, direct primaries proliferated, rendering the public support a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for gaining the nomination.⁸⁸ The convention then had to ratify that selection. Failure to win renomination, either via primary or party caucus, ended careers, such as that of Matthew C. Butler (D-SC) in 1894.

The second means was by gaining numerical majorities in the state legislature. General elections not only decided which political party attained a majority, but, more importantly for uni-party states, which factions were strongest in the general assembly. Senators had to ensure that election produced the most favorable results for their party *and* their factions. Successful re-elections were attained via this route by Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA) in 1898, 1904, and 1910, Charles W. Fairbanks (R-IN) in 1902, and Chauncey M. Depew (R-NY) in 1904. However, senators were ousted from office when their party simply failed to win a majority, outright, as was the case with David Turpie (D-IN) in 1898, Albert Beveridge (R-IN) in 1910, and Depew in 1910.

The third means was when one's nomination or backing by a party caucus *failed* to settle a political dispute or provide a consensus candidate due to the deeply fractious nature of the state's politics. These developments were more prevalent in the South, where primaries coupled

⁸⁸ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 111-113.

with strong parties produced such conditions, but they were by no means limited to that region. Wade Hampton's (D-SC) fate was sealed when Benjamin Tillman was nominated for governor in 1890. Despite enjoying the support of the reigning Bourbon Democrats, he eventually lost when the Tillmanites won control over the state legislature.


Partisan control is loosely correlated with re-election rates.⁸⁹ Generally, the greater the party control, the higher the re-election rates, and vice-versa, but notable exceptions emerged. Most states at the time — seventeen states (35 percent) — were considered strong or solid partisan states, witnessing *high* rates of re-election, such as Virginia (D) or Pennsylvania (R). Six were Democratic, while eleven were Republican. Following that cohort, sixteen states — fully a third of the country — were strongly or solidly partisan, with *average* re-election rates. These included Florida (D) and California (R). Only a handful of states, more precisely five (10 percent) were strongly partisan with *low* re-election rates. These included Kentucky (D) and Oregon (R). Of the ten swing states, fully half experienced *low* re-election rates, including New Jersey and Delaware. Four more fell under the average re-election rating. Unusually, Nevada is the only swing state with high re-election rates. The state first witnessed internecine warfare between Republicans and Silver Republicans, several of whom bolted the party only to rejoin later, before the assertion of ascendant Democratic strength at the turn of the Twentieth Century. Despite the unique three-party dynamic that prevailed, most incumbents successfully defended their respective seats. See **Table 2.1** and **Figure 2.2** for a taxonomy of all cases.

⁸⁹ Schiller and Stewart, *Indirect Democracy*, 55.

Table 2.1: Universe of Cases, 1890-1913, Reassessed Re-Election Rate

	Solid Democratic (100%)	Strong Democratic (75%-99%)	Swing State (50%-75%)	Strong Republican (75%-99%)	Solid Republican (100%)
High Re-Election Rate (65%-100%)	Oklahoma Virginia Alabama Arkansas Tennessee Arizona		Nevada	Maine	Vermont Iowa Minnesota Michigan Massachusetts Pennsylvania Connecticut Wyoming Rhode Island New Mexico
Average Re-Election Rate (35%-65%)	Georgia Florida Mississippi Texas South Carolina Louisiana	Missouri Maryland	North Carolina West Virginia Indiana Colorado	New Hampshire California North Dakota Illinois Idaho South Dakota Utah Wisconsin	
Low Re-Election Rate (0-35%)		Kentucky	Delaware New Jersey New York Kansas Montana	Ohio Oregon Washington Nebraska	

Figure 2.2: Universe of Cases, 1890-1913



SOURCE: *The Tribune Almanac and Political Register*, 1891 - 1913

In order to craft a general election competitiveness index from these two measures, I have relied upon the quantifiable data devised for each metric. Every state was given a score from 0 to 100 for both absolute partisan control and re-election rates. By adding these two scores together and then dividing in half, we can arrive at a reasonable figure for each state's competitiveness. Those states ranking high on the spectrum (over 50) are coded as strongly partisan and highly entrenched — in other words, largely *uncompetitive*. Those lower on the spectrum (below 50) would be weak partisan states with high turnover — very *competitive*.⁹⁰

My remaining variables, or “barrier points,” are *candidate recognition* and *legislative deference*. Implicitly, one may reason that these latter two variables are nothing more than a factor of the state's partisan control, i.e. strong, solid party states would witness party-focused elections and greater authority in the legislatures. While such patterns were undeniably present, there were notable exceptions which demonstrate the important distinctions between the variables, delineations about which I will explicate. To restate, the measure for *candidate recognition* spans a spectrum — from individualistic, entrepreneurial elections (more popular) to party-based elections (less popular), while *legislative deference* spans from deferential (more popular) to autonomous (less popular). The scores for *candidate recognition* and *legislative deference* are the product of my considered judgment based on the evidentiary record available, and I have offered my most faithful interpretation of the data.

My case studies are Indiana, South Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts. First and most evidently, these cases offer geographic diversity, with one state apiece from New England, the Mid Atlantic, the Midwest, and the Deep South. Second, most of these states were quite rel-

⁹⁰ See Appendix A, Column G, “Competitiveness Index.”

evant at the turn of the last century, representing major population centers and/or ranking in the top third of the country, such as New York, the most populous state, Massachusetts (ranked 7th), or Indiana (ranked 8th).⁹¹ But most importantly, they offer variability in their respective degrees of general election *competitiveness*, *candidate recognition*, and *legislative deference*.

Indiana scores 31 on the competitiveness index, indicating very competitive conditions. It was a swing state with average re-election rates at around 50 percent, or turnover every other election. With weak partisan attachments, its elections were notable for widespread knowledge of each party's respective senatorial candidate during the autumn season. Additionally, the campaigns often stressed individual candidate appeal and their achievements, while deemphasizing partisan labels and parties in general. Such practices were vigorously adopted by Senator Albert Beveridge in his 1910 re-election contest.⁹² Thus, for candidate recognition, Indiana ranks as highly individualistic. Regarding legislative deference, the legislative sessions tended to be mere formalities, ratifying the election of the people.⁹³ Therefore, they rank as deferential. Overall, Indiana qualifies as *exceptionally popular*, (0/3 barrier points), with strong voter control over the senatorial selection process.

South Carolina scores 75 on the competitiveness index, indicating moderately competitive conditions. It was a solid Democratic state with fairly average re-election rates. The two cases from the Palmetto State examine the effects of the indirect primary in 1892. As a result of the reform, the state's prevailing factional disputes were transformed into highly personalized

⁹¹ "Population of States and Counties of the United States: 1790-1990," *Bureau of the Census*.

⁹² *Muncie Evening Press*, February 14, 1910, p 4; *The Indianapolis Star*, October 2, 1910, p 37; *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p5.

⁹³ *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 22, 1903, p 2; *The Columbus Republican*, January 29, 1903, p 1.

contests. Candidate recognition was more individualistic, widely-understood by the masses as referendums on the candidates and their respective factions.⁹⁴ As far as legislative deference, the majority party in the assembly exercised a degree of autonomy *prior* to the primary, but thereafter, they willingly conformed to the results of the primary.⁹⁵ As such, they were modestly deferential. Due to these considerations, South Carolina is classified as a *moderately popular* state (1/3 barrier points), with a mix of voter influence and party factions.

New York scores 26 on the competitiveness index, indicative of its status as a fiercely-contested battleground. Although New York was a swing state with anemic re-election rates, the political parties themselves were powerful, well-organized, and influential. As such, the state's elections focused on the accomplishments of the national and state parties at the expense of particular candidates. However, the out-sized persona of Senator Chauncey Depew (1899-1911) infused his campaign with an element of personality and individuality.⁹⁶ Therefore, New York receives a middling score for candidate recognition — a blend of individual *and* party-based appeals. As far as legislative deference, the parties exercised great authority in the Empire State when settling upon the choice of a senator, notwithstanding the vote of the people.⁹⁷ Therefore,

⁹⁴ *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, May 28, 1890, p4; Admittedly, the 1890 senatorial contest ultimately resulted in the selection of John Irby to the Senate. Irby had not been known as a candidate until the legislature deliberated on the matter. However, the general election was very clearly a contest between incumbent Senator Wade Hampton, III, and the populist rebellion of Benjamin Tillman and his forces. The overwhelming victory of Tillman in the November elections presaged the defeat of Hampton and the selection of either Tillman himself or a close lieutenant, in this case, Irby.

The Watchman and Southron, August 15, 1894, p 7; *The Intelligencer*, September 12, 1894, p 2.

⁹⁵ *Keowee Courier*, December 4, 1890, p 2; *Abbeville Press and Banner*, December 17, 1890, p 4; *The Gaffney Ledger*, December 14, 1894, p1;

⁹⁶ *Buffalo Evening News*, September 29, 1904, p 2.

⁹⁷ *Buffalo Courier*, November 18, 1904, p 7; *Buffalo Enquirer*, November 18, 1904, p 9; *The New York Tribune*, November 10, 1910, p 2.

it is ranked as autonomous. Overall, New York would be considered to have had *moderately non-popular* senatorial elections (2/3 barrier points), with an admixture of parties and voters entering into the electoral calculus.

The final case is Massachusetts. The Bay State scores 93 on the competitiveness index, indicating very uncompetitive conditions. It was a solid Republican state with sky-high re-election rates. The elections took the form of party-based appeals and legislative district campaigning and — with the partial exception of 1910 — Senate candidate identities were not widely disseminated.⁹⁸ Thus, it ranks modestly low on candidate recognition. And finally, for legislative deference, the parties exercised tremendous influence and autonomy during the selection process. Granted, they frequently rubber-stamped the general election vote, but they remained relevant during the process.⁹⁹ Taken together, Massachusetts ranks as *exceptionally non-popular* (3/3 barrier points), an exclusivist, party-controlled process. See **Table 2.2** for the scores of each case.

⁹⁸ *The Boston Globe*, November 8, 1898, p 1; *Fitchburg Sentinel*, September 20, 1904, p 8.

⁹⁹ *The Boston Globe*, November 30, 1910, p 5; *The Boston Globe*, December 22, 1910, p 2.

Table 2.2 Scores for Each Case

State	Competitiveness Index	Candidate Recognition	Legislative Deference	Nature of Elections
Indiana	31	Highly Individualistic	Deferential	Exceptionally popular (voter control)
South Carolina	75	Individualistic, personalized factions	Modestly Deferential	Moderately popular (voters + party factions)
New York	26	Middling (elements of party and candidate)	Autonomous	Moderately non-popular (parties + voters)
Massachusetts	93	Party-based legislative system	Autonomous	Exceptionally, non-popular (exclusivist party control)

2.3 Scope and Methods

Four factors define the scope of my research. First, the time frame under investigation. I have focused on the period from 1890 to 1913 — the “eve of reform.” Calls for broad reform were greatest during this time, as were criticisms of the Senate as insufficiently democratic, unduly insular to popular demands, and beholden to corrupt special interests.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, it would be especially pertinent to better glean the methods of electoral campaigning during these particularly fraught times, when the perception of the Senate and its members had hit an unenviable nadir. The second factor relates to the nature of the subjects themselves. I have limited my re-

¹⁰⁰ *Congressional Record*, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, 1103, 2179-2180, & 2496, accessed January 30, 2019, URL: <https://archive.org/details/congressionalrec46eunit>.

search to elected incumbents seeking re-election, be they first-term or multi-term senators.

Much criticism was levied at members of the Senate and their lack of accountability and responsiveness, and I am interested in the ways they responded to these charges. The third factor pertains to the types of elections. I am predominantly, although not exclusively, covering non-presidential, off-year elections. Presidential elections generally witness greater interest, enthusiasm, attention, and turnout, and as such, we can expect senators to engage in campaign appearances on behalf of their national ticket, barring some deep misgivings for their nominee. Whether public appeals obtained during off-year elections, with less attention and lower turnout, remains questionable. Having said that, I utilize two cases from the 1904 presidential election for a valid comparative analysis between the two types of elections.

Finally, I primarily, although not solely, focus on *general election* campaigning in the autumn of the election year. However, I have not entirely precluded primary election campaigns or legislative wrangling during the selection period from my investigation. The former is especially relevant for understanding southern states, where primaries, party caucuses, and conventions witnessed the fiercest contestation. Meanwhile, the latter provides helpful insight for two reasons: first, evidence may emerge attesting to the how incumbents secured backing by state legislators, and whether campaign activities contributed to their support. Second, public appearances, speeches, and canvasses may have even continued during the legislative selection period, after the general election.

I have relied heavily upon contemporary newspapers for coverage of their state's political activities, with an emphasis on local and state papers. Oftentimes, statewide political events went underreported by larger, national papers. Filling that void, many local and state newspapers

served a valuable purpose in educating and informing the public of the issues of the day and the competing campaigns, publishing campaign speeches, itineraries of candidate appearances, important summits between relevant political actors, and letters and interviews from viable contenders. Their scrupulous efforts have helped to amass an impressive archive of the dynamics and trends of these elections for future scholars. Furthermore, the era witnessed exceptionally partisan periodicals, which often trumpeted their parties, while savaging opponents. And while these newspapers held a firm political bent and were given to hyperbole, their opinions remain useful for better understanding the full spectrum of political viewpoints in the state at that time.

To supplement these sources, I have also scoured a slew of archives, accessing the personal effects of senators themselves, including personal letters, official correspondences, diaries, scrapbooks, speeches, and even autobiographies. These first-hand primary documents delve more deeply into the mindsets of my subjects, revealing their private thoughts, desires, and concerns. Taken together, these materials offer a better sense of a senator's political security, whether they truly felt secure or evinced a certain degree of sensitivity, acuity, and even vulnerability to the pressures of electoral politics. These materials go beyond the public persona projected by the campaign, and delve deeply into the private realm, uncovering their most candid opinions, expressions and judgments. As a result, we can better surmise how these sentiments influenced their behavior as it pertained to their re-election efforts.

2.4 Overview of Cases

Senatorial elections were already *pseudo-democratic*, exhibiting elements of popular input, accountability, and responsiveness, values which many a Progressive reformer sought to

achieve with the Seventeenth Amendment. Overall, my hypothesis was largely confirmed, with one important caveat. Across the spectrum of cases, senators sensitive to electoral pressures pursued aggressive public campaigns for re-election. As anticipated by my theory, these campaigns took many different forms and varied in intensity, however, even in the hardest test — Massachusetts — personal letters of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge clearly reveal that the long-time senator never truly felt politically secure in any election, no matter the strength of the Republican party. And these revelations partially explain why he never lost re-election. As Anthony King insightfully explains when discussing Congress fully a century later, successful re-election rates do not necessarily connote a sense of safety for incumbents.¹⁰¹ Additionally, the cases support the interrelated concepts of party adaptability and independent power bases. As the process for selecting senators became more popularized, senators sought to capitalize upon these democratic developments by cultivating independent bases of support with voters, buttressing their political position vis-a-vis party officials and leveraging their popularity to corral obdurate state legislators into supporting their re-election. The following chapters detail how these dynamics obtained and differed from state-to-state.

Under the indirect regime, senators were selected by a majority of the state legislature. While states differed on the technical rules governing the procedure, each chamber would regularly assemble separately to decide the matter. In the event a candidate failed to secure the required majority threshold in either house, the full legislature would convene in a joint sitting to resume the balloting. Only once a majority of both houses agreed, a candidate would officially be selected as senator.

¹⁰¹ Anthony King, "Running Scared," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 279, No. 1, (January, 1997).

The first case study is Indiana. The Hoosier State was a fiercely-contested battleground state, with neither party fully dominating the scene. Indiana had used the legislative party caucus to formally nominate senatorial candidates, but increasingly applied a district convention system, which nominated state legislative candidates publicly pledged to a senatorial contender *prior* to November, thereby rendering the election a referendum on the Senate race. I examine three different elections by three distinct senators: David Turpie's (D) loss in 1898; Charles W. Fairbanks' (R) win in 1902; and Albert Beveridge's (R) loss in 1910. Each case witnessed extensive personal campaigning by each senator.

In 1902, Republican party officials and legislative nominees eagerly pegged their fortunes to the immense popularity of Senator Charles Fairbanks. The incumbent was greeted with enormous enthusiasm and large crowds, akin to a presidential campaign.¹⁰² After the November elections, several observers contended the party's good fortunes were primarily the result of the senator's strong showing among voters. In his absence, Republicans might have fared much worse.¹⁰³ Suffice it to say, Fairbanks elicited little opposition during the legislative selection session.¹⁰⁴ While this was partly due to the exceptionally popular nature of elections in the state — voters exercised enormous influence over the process, with parties less relevant — the senator's electoral strength stifled any opposition from manifesting and deterred potential dissenters before they could organize.

In 1910, Albert Beveridge sought to cultivate popular support among moderate voters in an attempt to decouple his fate from the party and establish an independent power base. Bev-

¹⁰² *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 28, 1902.

¹⁰³ *The Republic*, November 5, 1902, p 1.

¹⁰⁴ ¹⁰⁴ *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 22, 1903, p 2; *The Columbus Republican*, January 29, 1903, p 1.

eridge's Progressive crusade began when the "insurgent Republican" voted against the unpopular Payne-Aldrich Tariff earlier that year — an act of apostasy to party orthodoxy. The senator strenuously campaigned against the tariff during his re-election campaign, making the issue the centerpiece of the campaign.¹⁰⁵ In addition, he avidly de-emphasized partisan labels, appealing to independent voters and even Democrats.¹⁰⁶ Characterizing his Democratic opponent, John W. Kern, as nothing more than a party stooge, supporters contrasted Beveridge's strong independent spirit, sound judgment, and willingness to buck his party when necessary.¹⁰⁷ Beveridge's entire campaign apparatus was impressive for its sophistication, utilizing a bevy of techniques to muster as much public support as possible, including disseminating his convention address to Republican and Democratic voters alike, dispersing his biography to various newspapers, and utilizing his likeness in friendly periodicals.¹⁰⁸ Unquestionably, Beveridge's objective was to distance himself from the unpopular party organization and the Republican Congress, but he ultimately fell short, having alienated his own base from turning out to support him.

The second case is South Carolina, a solid Democratic state with only average re-election rates. Amongst all solid Democratic states, South Carolina enjoyed one of the *lowest* re-election rates, for the uni-party state was characterized by intense factionalized feuding. Prior to 1892, the state utilized a county convention system to indirectly nominate senatorial candidates — an admixture of party and popular support — which emphasized local, democratic grassroots orga-

¹⁰⁵ *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p 5.

¹⁰⁶ *Muncie Evening Press*, February 14, 1910, p 4; *The Indianapolis Star*, October 2, 1910, p 37; *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p5.

¹⁰⁷ *Princeton Daily Clarion*, May 3, 1910, p 2.

¹⁰⁸ *Palladium-Item*, July 8, 1910, p 9; *The Indianapolis News*, September 5, 1910, p 3; Albert Beveridge Letter to John F. Hayes, July 21, 1910, *Library of Congress*, "Albert Beveridge Collection."

nizing and electioneering, before migrating to the indirect primary — which encouraged *highly-personalized* factional disputes and popular pandering. Furthermore, a Populist uprising in the 1890s threatened the political status quo.

In 1890, Senator Wade Hampton, III (D) lost his seat, while Senator Matthew C. Butler (D) suffered the same fate four years later. Both had vociferously opposed the rise of Benjamin Tillman, the avidly-racist, demagogic leader of a simmering agrarian rebellion against the landed gentry class, which had ruled the state government for much of its history. When Tillman was nominated as candidate for governor in 1890, Hampton opted against campaigning for the party during the general election, eventually losing when the Tillmanites seized control of the legislature through superior local organization and fierce passionate exertions.¹⁰⁹ After the implementation of the indirect primary in 1892, the state's factional politics devolved into highly personalized contests for power. In 1894, Tillman defeated Butler in the August primary after a heated clash of personalities topped off by an extensive series of widely-anticipated public debates between the two contenders.¹¹⁰ After his defeat, Butler bolted from the party, attempting a desperate, short-lived independent bid to deny Tillman the seat, but these efforts were futile, and ultimately fizzled out with nary any support for the cause.¹¹¹ These cases illustrate the fractious nature of South Carolina's politics, as well as the growing importance of the white electorate in deciding the matter of the senatorship.

¹⁰⁹ *The Keowee Courier*, October 23, 1890, p 2.

¹¹⁰ *The Laurens Advertiser*, May 15, 1894, p 1.

¹¹¹ *The Times and Democrat*, September 5, 1894, p 6.

The third case study is New York, a swing state with an ever-so-slight Republican lean. It suffered abysmally low re-election rates — approximately 25 percent.¹¹² The Empire State relied exclusively on the legislative party caucus to nominate senatorial candidates. These bodies were heavily influenced by the assent of party leaders. While incumbent senators and pretenders to the throne conducted their canvass for crucial party support months in advance, this exclusivist arrangement generally obscured the importance of the senatorial contest during the election, instead witnessing extensive legislative wrangling *post*-election.

I have investigated Chauncey Depew's two re-election campaigns — his successful election in 1904 — a presidential year — and his defeat six years later. Parties were quite relevant in Albany, so much so, that after Depew successfully barnstormed the state to deliver a favorable result to Theodore Roosevelt's presidential campaign and fortunes of countless state Republicans, several party officials conspired to eject Depew from his seat. Their leader, Governor Benjamin Odell, had signaled their displeasure with Depew stemming from his close ties with Boss Platt, Depew's colleague in the Senate and Odell's chief adversary for control over the state party apparatus.¹¹³ Odell publicly assuaged Platt and Depew that he remained supportive of the latter's re-election to the Senate, but privately had been recruiting a candidate with widespread appeal to field as a challenger, or, failing that, vie for the position himself.¹¹⁴ Odell eventually came to an agreement with Platt, gaining recognition as state party leader and defusing much of the opposition in the state legislature to Depew's re-election, but not before Depew had scrupulously orga-

¹¹² See Appendix A.

¹¹³ *Buffalo Courier*, November 18, 1904, p 7; *Buffalo Morning Express*, November 18, 1904, p 7.

¹¹⁴ *The New York Times*, November 12, 1904, p 2; November 21, 1904, p 1; November 27, 1904, p 2, *The New York Tribune*, December 7, 1904, p 3.

nized his syndicate of lieutenants in the field to publicize the breadth of Depew's popular support throughout New York. The influential editor of *The Buffalo Evening News* ran near-daily testimonials from ordinary citizens and party members attesting to the depth of their affection for the venerable senator and the strength of his electoral standing.¹¹⁵ By demonstrating Depew's popular electoral support — independent from the party — these activities were intended to cajole state officials into backing the senator's selection, for failing to adhere to the dictate of the people may spell disaster for the party with key voting blocs.¹¹⁶

By 1910, Depew's public image and reputation had been inexorably tarnished by revelations of improper, unsavory business dealings. The once-vaunted statesman was savaged by Philip's "Treason of the Senate," a sensationalized account of undue influence in the Senate. With the party woefully demoralized due to the tremendously difficult national conditions and fielding a weakened, unpopular contender for re-election to the Senate, Republicans were roundly punished by voters. Democrats ended their long exile from government by successfully capitalizing upon the failures of the reigning Republicans generally, as well as the foibles of their senior senator, whose immense wealth, political connections, and shady business dealings seemed woefully outdated for the times, a relic of a bygone era. Depew's defeat attested to the expanding notions of electoral accountability for compromised officeholders who violated the public trust.

Rounding out the cases is Massachusetts, a rock-ribbed Republican state with sky-high re-election rates. As with New York, the Bay State relied on the legislative party caucus to nom-

¹¹⁵ *Buffalo Evening News*, November 26, 1904, p 14; December 27, 1904, p 1.

¹¹⁶ *Buffalo Evening News*, December 27, 1904, p 9.

inate senatorial candidates. Incumbent senators canvassed for crucial party support months in advance, but extensive legislative wrangling ensued *post*-election. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge epitomized the state's traditionally stable dynamics, serving from 1893 until his death in 1924. His conservative, traditionalist views, including opposition to direct senatorial elections and women's suffrage, typified sentiment in the state.

I analyze the senator's successful re-election campaigns in 1898, 1904, and 1910. Although the senator comfortably won most of those elections, it was not without effort on his part. Through elite learning, the senator routinely pressed the party to adopt state convention platforms clearly endorsing his candidacy for re-election. By 1910, Lodge was confronted by an existential threat: a two-front war for political survival. The long-dominant Republican Party had fractured over the protective tariff. Lodge became an easy target for brewing opposition to the tariff and general discontent with the economy.¹¹⁷ Insurgent Republicans launched an effort to displace the senator from his seat, spearheaded by Congressman Butler Ames.¹¹⁸ Sensing blood, Democrats sought to benefit from the intra-party divisions, and even considered subtly partnering with insurgent Republicans.¹¹⁹ After the general election, newly-elected Governor Eugene Foss, a Democrat, embarked upon a statewide tour to cultivate opposition to Lodge and ensure his defeat.¹²⁰ Lodge's relatively poor showing in the November elections bolstered the audacity of his detractors, inviting these challenges to continue unabated.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ *The Boston Globe*, May 23, 1910, p 1; *Fitchburg Sentinel*, July 12, 1910, p 4.

¹¹⁸ *The Boston Globe*, September 6, 1910, p 11.

¹¹⁹ *The Boston Globe*, June 4, 1910, p 3.

¹²⁰ *The Boston Globe*, November 21, 1910, p 1.

¹²¹ *The Boston Globe*, November 10, 1910, p 12; November 11, 1910, p 10; *Worcester Gazette*, republished in *The Boston Globe*, November 12, 1910, p 10.

To counter these headwinds, Lodge undertook intensive campaigning to shore up support and ward off the multi-front challenges to his Senate career.¹²² These efforts culminated with his historic, unprecedented address in January 1910 at Boston's Symphony Hall to an audience that included members of the legislature, party officials, *and* the public as well. The embattled senator decided to go public, recognizing the gambit as a concession to the increasingly democratized process and the need to manage public relations. The 1910 election was exemplary of the potential for general election competition and electoral sensitivity in one of the *most* partisan, and highly-entrenched states in the country. And while the parties continued to wield tremendous authority in the state, popular legitimacy gradually became crucial to closing the deal.

The political conditions for a state's senatorial election process — as defined by the number of barrier points between popular sentiment and the selection of senator — influenced the degree to which senators turned to personalized campaigning and public appeals. General election *competitiveness*, *candidate recognition*, and *legislative deference* determined the nature and intensity of campaigns. States falling under the popular end of the spectrum, such as Indiana and South Carolina, witnessed greater individualized, entrepreneurial contenders, and personalized campaigns, whilst states closer to the exclusivist, non-popular model, such as Massachusetts, experienced party-based appeals and legislative-district machinations. And although party officials were consequential in the senatorial selection process, public campaigns and popular support gradually emerged as essential elements to securing re-election, attesting to the desire by parties

¹²² *The New York Times*, August 16, 1910, p 2; *The Boston Post*, September 13, 1910, p 1-2; *The Washington Post*, September 18, 1910, p 1; *The Boston Post*, October 26, 1910, p 2; November 2, 1910, p 8; *The Boston Post*, November 4, 1910, p 16; *The New York Times*, December 2, 1910, p 4; *The New York Times*, December 13, 1910, p 22.

to adapt to these democratizing tendencies so to maintain their legitimacy with voters and remain viable political in the near-term.

Sensitivity to these electoral pressures drove many a senator to take necessary precautions when confronting intra-party challengers or negotiating with party figures. To advertise their candidacy, take positions on pressing issues, and claim credit for favorable services, incumbents utilized newspapers, personal appearances, and political surrogates, all in an effort to drum up popular support for the ticket and bolster their own position within the party. Oftentimes, these activities served as valuable tools to corral state legislators into supporting their re-election, or convince party officials of their senatorial timber. In that sense, a faithful respect for the will of the people became their clarion call.

CHAPTER 3: Senatorial Campaigns in Indiana

Exceptionally Popular Elections - Entrepreneurial Campaigns and Voter Control

Exceptionally popular conditions for senatorial elections prevailed in Indiana at the turn of the Twentieth Century. Although party officials, unity and backing were important, voters wielded tremendous influence over the process. As such, it presents the easiest case for my *theory of indirect elections*, which stipulates that weakly-partisan, high-turnover swing states would experience widespread public campaigns and individualized appeals by entrepreneurial senatorial candidates, emphasizing their own pedigree over mere party labels. The theory is fully supported by Indiana. Popular elements of campaigning dominated the general election, attesting to the preponderance of power in the hands of the people and the sensitivity of incumbents to cultivating public support in their quest toward achieving re-election.

Senator David Turpie placed great emphasis on the statewide canvass for electoral support, pursuing a rigorous, but limited campaign during his unsuccessful bid for re-election in 1898. In 1902, Senator Charles W. Fairbanks' favorable image and effective public campaigning were instrumental to Republican successes that November, bolstering his position within the party and enhancing his re-election prospects. And in 1910, Senator Albert Beveridge personally managed an aggressive re-election campaign — an insurgency effort against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and his own Republican Party, more generally, stressing his candidacy and political independence at the expense of party labels. Although unsuccessful, Beveridge utilized novel methods of electioneering, advertising, and speech-making to solicit popular support among ordinary voters. These cases collectively demonstrate the emerging importance of greater public account-

ability of senators, wider popular input in the selection process, higher visibility of incumbents, and overall responsiveness by the parties to the democratizing trends afoot.

3.1 Background

At the turn of the Twentieth Century, Indiana was experiencing immense transformation. Typical of the country at large, industrialization was fundamentally reshaping economic life. Prior to the Civil War, the Hoosier State's economy was predominantly agricultural, based upon many modestly-sized, family-owned farms.¹²³ Its nascent industries were limited to small factories, such as flour and grist mills, and local shops, such as blacksmiths.¹²⁴ After the Civil War, the landscape dramatically changed with the completion of the Madison & Indianapolis and New Albany & Salem Railroads. Suddenly, the state was interconnected by a dense web of rail lines, with Indianapolis the nexus in the network. By rendering accessible much of the state, the railroads contributed to tremendous industrial and commercial development throughout Indiana. Notably, the northern and central sections of the state benefitted most from the growth of the rails as the southern region's "hilly terrain made it more difficult and expensive to lay track."¹²⁵

The resultant changes witnessed Indiana emerge as a manufacturing hub. The state was a leading producer of glass, iron, steel, and agricultural and machine parts, and its factories turned out "electrical machinery, railroad cars, and [eventually] automobiles." By the end of the Nineteenth Century, many regions were transformed, as well. Natural gas fueled an economic boom

¹²³ James H. Madison and Lee Ann Sandweiss, "The Age of Industry Comes to Indiana," in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society Press, 2014), 125, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://indianahistory.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoosiers-and-the-American-Story-ch-05.pdf>.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 119-121.

in the eastern-central region of the state, turning Anderson, Kokomo, and Marion into major industrial towns.¹²⁶ In the Calumet Region of the northwest, factories and oil refineries cropped up along Lake Michigan at the hand of Standard Oil and Inland Steel. And U.S. Steel launched its “largest state-of-the-art steel works and company town” in the area, christening it Gary after Chairman Elbert Gary.¹²⁷

Large conglomerations reigned supreme. “By 1919 Indiana’s 302 largest manufacturing companies - which together represented only 4 percent of the total number of manufactur[ers] ... employed 58 percent of the state’s workers and produced 72 percent of its total value of manufactured goods.”¹²⁸ What few agricultural industries remained were co-opted by modern mechanization, dependent upon factory-produced parts and materials. These practices were largely confined to the northern and central regions at the expense of southern Indiana, whose land was not conducive to farming.¹²⁹ As many Indianans migrated to large factories and plants, they were forced to contend with unsafe working conditions, long hours, and meager wages. To redress their grievances, many workers joined labor unions. As these organizations grew in strength, many unions, especially coal miners and railroad workers, organized mass strikes.¹³⁰ However,

¹²⁶ Ibid., 127.

¹²⁷ Madison and Sandweiss, “Immigrants, Cars, Cities, and a New Indian,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 158, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://indianahistory.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoosiers-and-the-American-Story-ch-06.pdf>.

¹²⁸ Madison and Sandweiss, “The Age of Industry Comes to Indiana,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 115.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 123.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 132, 134-135.

despite their growth, the state remained hostile to unions and their methods for years thereafter.¹³¹

As a result of the railroad and manufacturing boom, Indiana experienced rapid and wide-reaching urbanization. The pastoral farmlands and small towns gave way to large cities and urban centers. Indianapolis emerged as the hub of transportation and commerce, cementing its premier position in the state.¹³² Terre Haute and South Bend also benefitted from their newfound positions of importance in the extensive rail system,¹³³ while Gary, considered the “City of the Century,” attracted thousands of workers to its state of the art steel mills.¹³⁴ Employment opportunities in these cities led to significant rural flight, as many young families departed their farms for the perks of city life. Underscoring the sheer magnitude of urban growth, a majority of Hoosiers were living in cities by 1920.¹³⁵

The burgeoning industries and jobs lured many immigrants to Indiana. The earliest immigrants were Germans fleeing political turmoil in the wake of their failed revolution for a liberal democracy in 1848. Many Irish Catholics soon followed, finding work at mills and factories. By the end of the Nineteenth Century, newer immigrants from southern and eastern Europe settled the state, including Italians, Greeks, Poles, and Russian Jews. Despite the massive influx of

¹³¹ Madison and Sandweiss, “Immigrants, Cars, Cities, and a New Indian,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 155.

¹³² Madison and Sandweiss, “The Age of Industry Comes to Indiana,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 121.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹³⁴ Madison and Sandweiss, “Immigrants, Cars, Cities, and a New Indian,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 159.

¹³⁵ Madison and Sandweiss, “The Age of Industry Comes to Indiana,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 125.

foreign-born immigrants, their numbers were far more modest in Indiana than other states at the time, accounting for approximately 10 percent of the population.¹³⁶

The waves of immigration elicited social and political backlash by Americans who treated their newfound neighbors as aliens, unable to assimilate into society. These attitudes were especially pronounced in Indiana, where Hoosiers were exceedingly homogenous. By 1920, 95 percent of its population was American-born, of whom 97 percent were white and three-quarters Protestant.¹³⁷ As such, many Hoosiers were sternly resistant to cultural, linguistic, and religious differences.

Politically, Indiana was a dynamic state. Traditionally, the state enjoyed an exceedingly vibrant democratic tradition, as public canvassing and widespread popular participation were common features. The Hoosier state regularly witnessed high voter turnout rates during the period — averaging 91% between 1860 and 1900.¹³⁸ Such engagement was also the reflection of Indiana's intense political competitiveness. Republican and Democratic strength were roughly evenly-matched throughout the state. Republicans performed well in the central regions and the north, especially among manufacturing centers such as Gary and Indianapolis.¹³⁹ Democrats were concentrated in the south along the Ohio River, which was less economically and commercially developed, and a smattering of counties in the central and northern regions, including Fort

¹³⁶ Madison and Sandweiss, "Immigrants, Cars, Cities, and a New Indian," in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 142-147.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 141-142.

¹³⁸ Madison and Sandweiss, "Progressive Era Politics and Reform," in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 167, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://indianahistory.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoosiers-and-the-American-Story-ch-07.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 2011, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://www.nhgis.org/>.

Wayne and occasionally Terre Haute.¹⁴⁰ As a result, the state was a major battleground during presidential elections. Attesting to Indiana's importance in national elections, ambitious Hoosiers were often selected for their party's ticket. Between 1860 and 1920, no fewer than seven candidates had been nominated on nine occasions for higher office — excluding renomination contests.¹⁴¹

As the Progressive age dawned, ever-more democratic notions of self-government, public accountability, and popular participation resonated with many Hoosiers. The Progressive element constituted a major cornerstone to the state's politics. While Indiana was not appreciably unique as far as its democratic traditions relative to other states in the Midwest, West and South influenced by the Populist and Progressive movements, the state was distinct from the party-dominated, exclusivist systems common in the East — New York, Massachusetts Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island and so forth.

Indiana's senatorial selection process was exceptionally popular in nature, with few barriers diluting the voters' input at the ballot box in November from the ultimate selection of a senator the following January. The first barrier point variable is *general election competitiveness*. Competitive general elections permit parties to freely compete and participate in the state's politics, allowing ordinary Hoosiers to more directly influence their elections. In addition to presidential contests, Indiana's senatorial elections were fiercely competitive, as well. The state earned a score of 31 on the competitiveness index, indicating *very competitive* conditions and a vibrant two-party system. At the time, Indiana was a swing state with re-election rates hovering


¹⁴⁰ Ibid.; Madison and Sandweiss, "Progressive Era Politics and Reform," in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 168.

¹⁴¹ CQ Press, *National Party Conventions, 1831-2004*, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 291-293.


around 50 percent. In the early 1890s, Democrats David Turpie and Daniel Voorhees occupied the state's two Senate seats. After 1896, however, Republicans gradually made inroads. First, Voorhees was ousted by Charles Fairbanks, while Turpie was bested by Albert J. Beveridge two years later. Republicans consolidated their strength when Fairbanks and Beveridge secured re-election in 1902 and 1904, respectively. However, the Republican advantage began to ebb by decade's end. Fairbank's successor, James Hemenway, was defeated for re-election in 1908 by Benjamin F. Shively. And Beveridge went down fighting to John W. Kern in 1910. Until 1916, Democrats dominated the state thereafter.¹⁴² See **Figures 3.1** and **3.2** for a visualization of the partisan composition of each chamber of the Indiana state legislature from 1892 to 1910.

Figure 3.1

**Composition of the Indiana House of Representatives,
1892 - 1910**

**Figure 3.2**

**Composition of the Indiana Senate,
1892 - 1910**



SOURCE: Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary: 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007), 61.

¹⁴² "List of United States Senators from Indiana," *Ballotpedia*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_United_States_Senators_from_Indiana.

The second barrier point variable is *candidate recognition*. Indiana's elections were notable for the widespread knowledge of each party's respective senatorial contender during the fall campaign. At times, the campaigns accentuated the appeal of individual candidates — their character and record — often at the expense of partisan labels, and parties more generally. The purest non-partisan, entrepreneurial model was undertaken by Senator Albert Beveridge in his failed bid for a third term in 1910.¹⁴³ However, even when campaigns emphasized party discipline and partisan support, candidate personalities remained paramount to the election itself. The centrality of Senator Charles Fairbanks to the 1902 legislative elections was credited with securing comfortable Republican majorities.¹⁴⁴ Thus, Indiana ranks as *highly individualistic* on candidate recognition, which allowed voters the opportunity to render their collective judgment upon the candidates directly, rather than pegging the electoral fortunes of the incumbent senator exclusively to the performance of the party.

The third barrier point variable is *legislative deference*. The official selection by the state legislature tended to be formalities, merely ratifying the results of the preceding general election.¹⁴⁵ In essence, the party supported a publicly-declared aspirant, whose candidature was widely advertised and whose support rested upon popular legitimacy. It was less common for unknown quantities to discreetly maneuver within the annals of the party without any semblance of public support. Therefore, Indiana ranks as *highly deferential* to the publicly-known, leading

¹⁴³ *Muncie Evening Press*, February 14, 1910, p 4; *The Indianapolis Star*, October 2, 1910, p 37; *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p5.

¹⁴⁴ *The Republic*, November 5, 1902, p 1.

¹⁴⁵ *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 22, 1903, p 2; *The Columbus Republican*, January 29, 1903, p 1.

candidate of the majority party in the legislature. Resultantly, the state qualifies as *exceptionally popular* in its senatorial selection process (0/3 barriers).

In the Hoosier State — as in every state under the indirect regime — senators were selected by a majority of the state legislature. While states differed on the technical rules governing the procedure, each chamber would regularly assemble separately to decide the matter. In the event a candidate failed to secure the required majority threshold in either house, the full legislature would convene in a joint sitting to resume the balloting. Only once a majority of both houses agreed, a candidate would officially be selected as senator.

Formally nominating senatorial contenders varied widely across states. Initially, Indiana operated along lines similar to other, more traditional, party-controlled states. Legislative party caucuses nominated senatorial contenders. But these caucuses *were* influenced somewhat by a modicum of popular legitimacy. The most successful aspirants had conducted a public campaign serving the party (Beveridge, 1898; Fairbanks, 1902). Concurrently, legislative district conventions played a crucial role, as well. At the district-level, conventions gathered to nominate state senators and state representatives, wherein they were pledged to an incumbent senator's re-election, in the style of a *parliamentary democracy*. If an ambitious figure had their sights on the United States Senate, they courted favorable state legislative candidates and worked toward their nominations by the party.

But party officials exerted a morsel of control over these democratic proceedings, as well. For a senator to effectively command a broad spectrum of support from among a panoply of state legislators, they were expected to wield a fair degree of power and authority over the state party apparatus. As district primaries and conventions grew increasingly more relevant, however, such

insider support counted for less. In 1907, Indiana adopted primaries in districts with over 36,000 people to determine delegates to the district conventions for the express purpose of nominating a senatorial candidate, in essence, elevating the statute of the party faithful over the legislative caucus.¹⁴⁶ Eventually, these district conventions selected delegates to the state convention, which would collectively hand down the party's official decision on a senatorial nominee, often rubber-stamping the decision of the lower-tiered gatherings. The process was not unique to Indiana. Populist and Progressive-influenced states in the West, Midwest, and South incorporated similar procedures, but they stood in stark contrast to the party-dominated states of the East.

In exceptionally popular states with few barriers, the preponderance of influence in deciding the senatorship rested with voters, who explicitly passed judgment on a candidate by supporting that contender's party in the state legislative races. By contrast, the role of party figures was more circumscribed. Accordingly, these states should witness intensive and widespread public campaigning on behalf of incumbent senators for popular support. Further, senatorial aspirants should prioritize disseminating their own identity and candidacy, turning to individualized appeals for support over a party-based framework, thereby permitting ordinary Hoosiers a popular check on their records and electoral future. To that end, we expect vigorous advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking by senators through such various methods as newspapers, personal appearances, and political surrogates.

The evidence in Indiana conforms to these expectations. Incumbent senators routinely pursued intensive public campaigning in their quests for re-election and regularly framed these elections as referenda on their own records, extolling their service, and enumerating laudable ac-

¹⁴⁶ Wendy J. Schiller and Charles Stewart, *Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seventeenth Amendment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p 112.

complishments. Their personalities were crucial to achieving a favorable electoral result for the party in November, thereby assuring another term in the Senate. Despite the relative modicum of independence these senators seemingly enjoyed from their party, intra-party disaffection and an unfavorable political climate — the *nationalization effect* — could easily spell trouble for their re-election bids, notwithstanding the personal effort undertaken to counteract those headwinds. With the hypothesis affirmed for Indiana, my *theory of indirect elections* — attesting to the critical importance of popular elements in campaigns under the indirect regime — is strengthened.

Since candidate identities were so crucial to Indiana's legislative elections, I analyze three different senators to adequately gauge their distinctive personalities and varying campaign styles, which arguably had a larger impact on the methods adopted than environmental conditions. Throughout the following cases, I can better compare and contrast each senator's divergent approaches to confronting similar challenges of re-election.

Elected to the Indiana State House of Representatives in 1852, David B. Turpie commenced his long political career. Although he served only a brief stint in the state legislature — opting to sit as a judge on various lower level courts — he returned to the State House of Representatives in 1859 for another term. In 1863, Turpie was selected to fill the remainder of the term of U.S. Senator Jesse Bright, who had been expelled for supporting the Confederacy. For yet a third time, Turpie entered the State House of Representatives in the 1870s, capping his career in the lower chamber as Speaker from 1874 to 1875. In 1878 and 1881, he was chosen for a three-man commission tasked with revising Indiana's laws. In 1887, Turpie was formally selected by the Democratic state legislature to serve in the United States Senate, defeating Benjamin

Harrison for the position.¹⁴⁷ The legitimacy of Turpie's election was challenged by detractors, who claimed a Republican legislator was unduly removed from his seat and replaced by a Democrat so to facilitate Turpie's elevation to the Senate. However, the Senate dismissed the charges of electoral misconduct, declaring it beyond the constitutional purview of the body.¹⁴⁸ Turpie was re-elected in 1893, before losing his bid for a third term in 1898 to Republican Albert Beveridge. Turpie's final election campaign in 1898 comprises the chapter's first qualitative case study.

Charles Warren Fairbanks belonged to upper echelon of the business community as a wealthy financier and legal expert for railroad companies and partial owner of the *Indianapolis News*, a powerful position from which he could influence the political discourse of the state.¹⁴⁹ Fairbanks first vied for public, elective office in 1893, when he unsuccessfully challenged incumbent David Turpie for the U.S. Senate. He was more successful three years later when he ousted Daniel Voorhess. Fairbanks was handily re-elected in 1902. In 1904, Republicans nominated the Hoosier Republican as Theodore Roosevelt's running mate, attaining the vice presidency that November. After serving as vice president for a single term, Fairbanks once again ran for that office as the running mate to Charles Evans Hughes in 1916.¹⁵⁰ Fairbanks was generally considered a conservative traditionalist. Republican party regulars viewed the Hoosier senator as

¹⁴⁷ "David Turpie," "Biographical Directory of the United States Congress," *U.S. Congress*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=T000432>.

¹⁴⁸ "The Election Case of David Turpie of Indiana (1888)," *United States Senate*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/076David_Turpie.htm.

¹⁴⁹ "Charles W. Fairbanks," *University of Virginia: Miller Center*, accessed May 21, 2020, URL: <https://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/essays/fairbanks-1901-vicepresident>.

¹⁵⁰ "Charles Warren Fairbanks," "Biographical Directory of the United States Congress," *U.S. Congress*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000003>.

a necessary ideological counterweight to Theodore Roosevelt's more progressive — and erratic — inclinations. For Fairbanks was not only more conservative, but staid and dour, “known by his detractors as ‘the Indiana Icicle’” for his “cool and reserved” demeanor.¹⁵¹ Despite the characterization, Fairbanks was greeted by rapturous receptions at his campaign rallies. The senator's highly successful bid for re-election in 1902 comprises the chapter's second case study.

Albert Jeremiah Beveridge was elected Indiana's junior senator in 1898, ousting incumbent Democrat David Turpie. He was handily re-elected six years later (1904), but lost his bid for a third term to John W. Kern in 1910. After his loss, he bolted from the Republican Party to join the Progressives, serving as chairman of the Progressive Convention in 1912, and running for governor on the Progressive ticket that same year, ultimately falling short. Thereafter, he twice sought a return to the Senate — first in 1914 as a Progressive, and again in 1922 as a Republican, losing the latter election to Samuel M. Ralston, a Klan-backed Democrat.¹⁵² Described as “charming and gregarious,” Beveridge held many a Progressive position, advocating for greater governmental regulatory power over economic and business activities and a durable social safety net for hard pressed Americans. Furthermore, he strenuously supported projecting American power and the acquisition of overseas territories.¹⁵³ Beveridge's unsuccessful re-election campaign in 1910 and the factors behind the loss — where the incumbent's strenuous efforts

¹⁵¹ Madison and Sandweiss, “Progressive Era Politics and Reform,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 184.

¹⁵² “Albert Jeremiah Beveridge,” “Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,” *U.S. Congress*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=b000429>.

¹⁵³ Madison and Sandweiss, “Progressive Era Politics and Reform,” in *Hoosiers and the American Story*, 184.

to distance himself from the party were undone by the nationalization of the race — comprises the chapter's third qualitative case study.

3.2 1898 - Turpie Hampered by Intra-Party Divisions, Free Silver, and War Fervor

Reflecting in his memoirs on the practice of soliciting popular support from constituents, David Turpie described the experience as providing “the public canvasser ... a certain intimacy with his audiences.” According to Turpie, “This acquaintance is casual but constant, transient yet continuous, wholly impersonal but not without interest,” explaining that the “impression which [the canvasser] forms of his audiences” is often “more distinct and well defined” than that which they form of him. He is fully exposed to their unique “manners ... costume [and] even ... colloquial intercourse.” Turpie placed great value on the art of public canvassing, recognizing its deep-rooted tradition amongst civically-active Hoosiers. “These traditions of our ancient worthies of the [s]tump have not yet ceased; they are handed down from one generation to another,” he wrote.¹⁵⁴

Despite Turpie's commitment to public canvassing, he was undone by an inability to wage as extensive and vigorous a battle during his 1898 bid for re-election, given the great importance of cultivating popular support in the state. Furthermore, deep intra-party divisions over his candidacy — as evidenced by the innumerable efforts to replace him — meant the Democratic base was not wholly unified behind Turpie as he led the march to the battlefield during the general election. Additionally, Republicans were capitalizing politically over free silver, for which Turpie had been an ardent advocate, and the newly-acquired territories of the recently-

¹⁵⁴ David Turpie, *Sketches of My Own Times* (1903), 307-308, in *David Turpie papers*, Indiana State Library.

concluded Spanish-American War, a pressing issue on which the incumbent failed to offer a clear and forceful position. The patriotic fervor that had swelled across the country proved immensely difficult for the hapless senator to counter, ultimately felling any hope for another term in office.

First elected to the Senate in 1887, Turpie was easily re-elected six years later by a unified state legislature during a period of Democratic dominance. Aside from a brief two-year stint, between 1882 and 1894, Democrats controlled the lower house — often claiming upwards of two-thirds to three-quarters of that body — and continuously held power in the State Senate, regularly by double-digit margins.¹⁵⁵ Despite the Democratic advantage in the legislature, Indiana lived up to its swing-state status in gubernatorial and presidential elections. In 1884, they elected a Democrat for governor, Isaac P. Gray, before elevating Republican Alvin Peterson Hovey to the office in 1888. By 1892, the state once more elected a Democrat, Claude Matthews.¹⁵⁶ These results were mirrored in its presidential vote, as well. In 1884, Indiana favored Grover Cleveland by 1.3 percentage points. Although the state supported Republican favorite son Benjamin Harrison for president in 1888, the result was decided by a difference of just four-tenths of one percentage point. And only four years later, Indiana promptly voted the unpopular Harrison out of office, opting instead to re-elect former president Cleveland to a second, non-consecutive term.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary: 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007), 61.

¹⁵⁶ “Governor of Indiana,” *Ballotpedia*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: https://ballotpedia.org/Governor_of_Indiana..

¹⁵⁷ Dave Leip, “Indiana Election Results,” in *Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?fips=18&f=0&off=99>.

Worryingly for Turpie, shortly after his second term commenced, Indiana began to tread increasingly more Republican. In 1894, Republicans were swept to power in a blowout, wave election, claiming a decisive advantage in the legislature. In its lower house, they held an astounding 82 seats of 100 in total, while in the upper house, they numbered 32 senators of 50 in total. Although those impressive margins continued in the Senate through 1896, the House grew more competitive. Republicans still held the majority with 52 seats, but Democrats clawed back to 39. And a new political group emerged, the Populists, who influenced policymaking with their small but pivotal cadre of nine legislators.¹⁵⁸ That year, Hoosiers elected Republican James A. Mount to the governor's office and backed Republican Governor William McKinley of neighboring Ohio over Democrat-Populist William Jennings Bryan for president by three points.¹⁵⁹ With the state and its legislature firmly Republican, longtime Democratic senator Daniel Voorhees, who had served in the Senate since 1877, was defeated for re-election, and thereafter replaced by Charles W. Fairbanks.

3.2.1 *Intra-Party Discontent*

These daunting political developments were the reality facing Senator David Turpie as his election to a third term approached. To remain viable, it was incumbent that the senator ensure his party remain united behind his candidacy for another spell in the Senate. However, all hope of party unity was dashed early in the calendar year. Partly fueled by the massive Republican successes and partly due to the senator himself (about which I discuss below), many Democ-

¹⁵⁸ Dubin, *Party Affiliations*, 61.

¹⁵⁹ "Governor of Indiana," *Ballotpedia*; Leip, "Indiana Elections Results," in *Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*.

rats were disenchanted with Turpie. At the outset, four camps emerged within the Democratic fold vying for the party's senatorial nomination: Senator Turpie, whose incumbency status immeasurably aided in his renomination battle due to his record of service and network of connections; former governor Claude Matthews, who — while he was was deeply interested in running — was not held in high esteem by pivotal party leaders; John W. Kern, city solicitor for Indianapolis; and Benjamin Shively. Shively's candidacy had actually been trumpeted by supporters of Indianapolis Mayor Thomas Taggart, who himself was angling for a gubernatorial bid in two years hence. Taggart was seeking to remove a major hurdle to these plans by submitting Shively for consideration for the Senate instead. Evidently, Shively *was* amenable to striking an agreement with the cunning Taggart. And his potential candidacy was broadly palatable to a number of party figures.¹⁶⁰ On March 3, however, former governor Matthews officially announced his candidature to succeed Turpie in the event the Democrats successfully regain the legislature in November.¹⁶¹ On the whole, the former governor was making the most aggressive push of any candidate, diligently overseeing the nomination of friendly, supportive legislative district candidates.¹⁶²

The emergence of intra-party challengers attests to the widespread discontent amongst Democrats with Turpie. According to *The Republic*, “Senator Turpie is not a popular leader, nor has he been a popular [s]enator.” Democrats were eager to nominate “one of their more popular leaders,” including the aforementioned contenders, “or some man more in touch with the

¹⁶⁰ *Fort Wayne News*, February 15, 1898, p 4; *The South Bend Tribune*, March 4, 1898, p 6.

¹⁶¹ *Daily News Democrat*, March 3, 1898, p 2.

¹⁶² *South Bend Tribune*, March 4, 1898, p 6.

party.”¹⁶³ The unfavorable sentiment toward Turpie stemmed from the belief that “the senator ha[d] passed the stage of usefulness.”¹⁶⁴ *The Evansville Tribune* described Turpie as “an old fossil ... who has outlived his usefulness.”¹⁶⁵ And *The Fort Wayne News* acknowledged these negative feelings were “becoming more and more patent to everybody.”¹⁶⁶ It is difficult to discern whether the hostile sentiment was driven by issues or personality. From the evidentiary record, it appears issues were less important than personality and the prevailing belief among many a Democrat that Turpie was unpopular, ill-suited for the times, and, possibly, unable to mount a strong, credible challenge in the general election campaign. Even supporters of Turpie focused on the incumbent’s popularity levels rather than positions on issues. Contrary to the prevailing narrative, *The South Bend Times* argued, “Democratic sentiment throughout the state seems to run in favor of the re-election of David Turpie.”¹⁶⁷ Given Indiana’s exceptionally popular senatorial elections, broadly popular personalities were a paramount consideration for Democratic Party officials *and* voters.

On June 22, the Democrats gathered at their state convention in Indianapolis. The assemblage presented a prime opportunity for Turpie and former governor Matthews, considered “the two leading” contenders in the race, to “mix with the representatives of the party...and do some effective political work.”¹⁶⁸ While the state convention was democratic in nature, shoring

¹⁶³ *The Republic*, March 24, 1898, p 2.

¹⁶⁴ *Fort Wayne News*, February 15, 1898, p 4.

¹⁶⁵ *The Republic*, May 14, 1898, p 2.

¹⁶⁶ *Fort Wayne News*, February 15, 1898, p 4.

¹⁶⁷ *Fort Wayne News*, January 11, 1898, p 2.

¹⁶⁸ *The Richmond Item*, June 21, 1898, p 5.

up insider, party support remained crucial to securing the party's senatorial nomination. Party and popular support were both equally necessary and roughly at parity. When the 1,528 delegates congregated at Tomlinson Hall, they named Turpie as permanent chairman, undoubtedly fueled by his incumbency status and vast network of political connections. From this position, the senator actively shaped the platform, which the party would duly adopt, thereby placing his imprimatur on the convention. Throughout the proceedings, the gathering operated in an orderly, businesslike manner, "determined to do its work quickly."¹⁶⁹

The convention "reaffirm[ed] and emphasize[d]" the Chicago platform of 1896 — the Populist Agenda — declaring, "We are in favor of the free silver at the existing ratio of 16 to 1."¹⁷⁰ In effect, by approving the 1896 platform wholesale, the Democrats rendered the issue of free silver and bimetallism as *the* animating issue of the campaign, as it had been two years earlier. Complicating the situation, by the time the convention met, the U.S.S. *Maine* was sunk and the resultant Spanish-American War had begun. Unlike his assertive stance on the currency, Turpie sought to straddle the issue of the war and the question of territorial expansion. The two-term senator extolled President McKinley's execution of the war, "prais[ing] the vigor with which [it was] ... being carried on."¹⁷¹ And the gathering adopted a resolution which did not explicitly oppose the acquisition of foreign territories. According to *The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, "The convention of the Indiana Democrats ... fail[ed] to follow either Mr. Bryan or Mr. Cleveland in a declaration against 'imperialism.'"¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ *Fort Wayne Daily News*, June 22, 1898, p 1.

¹⁷⁰ *The Richmond Item*, June 23, 1898, p 4.

¹⁷¹ *Fort Wayne Daily News*, June 22, 1898, p 1.

¹⁷² *Fort Wayne Daily Journal Gazette*, June 30, 1898, p 6.

In addressing the delegates, Turpie explained, “Concerning ... our military acquisitions ... they may well be remitted to the future ... There we may leave them in the full confidence that the American democracy will deal with them in due season, and in such manner as shall best subserve the national interest and best comport with the national honor.”¹⁷³ In other words, instead of staking out a clear position, it was better to buck pass responsibility down the road to the considered judgment of the American people. Turpie was likely seeking to skirt the issue and avoid opposing outright an increasingly popular position amongst many Americans for the sake of assuaging anti-imperialist Democrats.

We may surmise that the party endorsed free silver with the expectation that it would rouse laborers, workers, and farmers to the Democratic fold and attract support from Silverite Populists. However, the issue actually alienated the party from scores of Gold Democrats, businessmen, and moderate voters, who may have considered backing the Democrats otherwise. Additionally, the equivocated stance on territorial expansion, which was likely done to appear inoffensive and patriotic, backfired as well, proving untenable for Turpie and other Democrats to clearly defend and enthusiastically rally behind.

Although the state convention was expected to demur on offering its collective endorsement for a senatorial nominee, “refrain[ing] from any expression” on the contest,¹⁷⁴ it did ultimately, “Indorse the record of ... David Turpie,” praising “his sturdy devotion to the interests of the people ... advocacy of great reforms, and ... warm espousal of the cause of Cuban independence,” thereby earning him “the confidence [of the] Indiana democracy.”¹⁷⁵ The convention’s

¹⁷³ *Hamilton County Democrat*, June 24, 1898, p 3.

¹⁷⁴ *The Richmond Item*, June 21, 1898, p 5.

¹⁷⁵ *Hamilton County Democrat*, June 24, 1898, p 3.

lukewarm recognition of Senator Turpie's record of service to the party and the state represented a modicum of party backing *and* popular sentiment, as the convention nominating process comprised both elements. But short of a full-throated endorsement of his senatorial aspirations, Turpie was shorn of strong party unity. The statement was intended to bolster party harmony by telegraphing to undecided, disaffected Democratic officials, legislators, *and* voters to put aside their reservations and come home to the party.

At the same time, many district conventions instructed their legislative candidates to back Turpie, as well. He earned the support of the joint convention of Cass and Pulaski counties, Whitley and Huntington counties, Fulton County, White County, and LaPorte County.¹⁷⁶ These endorsements represented a popular means whereby senatorial elections were conducted. By publicly tying the legislative candidates to the senator, voters could more directly hold their senator to account and render a verdict on their electoral fate — allowing the party faithful to voice their preferences. Further, these instructions permitted senators to maximize the potential strength of their bloc in the next legislature, ensuring that those Democrats elected in November were Turpie partisans, in the style of a *parliamentary democracy*.

The conventions' endorsements were critical in buttressing Turpie's position within the party. But any chance amongst hostile Democrats of denying the incumbent senator renomination were dashed when former governor Claude Matthews, his chief rival, unexpectedly died on August 28. In writing his obituary, *The Connersville News* described him as Turpie's "most formidable opponent for a seat in the United States Senate."¹⁷⁷ Matthews was by far the most ac-

¹⁷⁶ *Logansport Reporter*, May 7, 1898, p 8; *Marshall County Independent*, June 10, 1898, p 4; *Jasper Weekly Courier*, June 17, 1898, p 2; *The Indianapolis News*, June 25, 1898, p 1; *Logansport Pharos-Tribune*, August 22, 1898, p 3.

¹⁷⁷ *The Indianapolis News*, August 31, 1898, p 2.

tive, aggressive candidate vying for the Democratic senatorial nomination. His untimely death at the age of 52 effectively eliminated most organized opposition to Turpie's renomination, however unwittingly. By October, *The Marshall County Independent* could claim, "No opposition to Senator Turpie's re-election has developed in [D]emocratic quarters."¹⁷⁸

3.2.2 *Political Headwinds and Republican Challengers*

While Turpie's position within his party markedly improved, his fortunes in the upcoming general election inexorably slid. Conditions in Indiana were becoming increasingly adverse for the Democrats. Having been soundly defeated on the issue of free silver in the previous two elections (1894 and 1896), and, with patriotic fervor approaching altitudinous levels, the party was in a precarious position and their ambiguous stance on territorial possessions did little to strengthen their cause. However, a Republican victory was far from assured. By the summer of 1898, the looming legislative elections were generally considered a toss-up as partisan newspapers of both stripes confidently boasted their respective party's chances of success.¹⁷⁹ In this environment, throughout the winter and spring, a slew of Republican senatorial aspirants emerged as potential challengers to Turpie, including U.S. Congressman Henry U. Johnson of Richmond, Colonel Robert S. Robertson of Fort Wayne, former U.S. congressman, J. Frank Hanly, and General Lew Wallace, who, interestingly, had authored *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ*.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ *Marshall County Independent*, October 21, 1898, p 4.

¹⁷⁹ *The Brookville Democrat*, May 26, 1898, p 4; *The Hancock Democrat*, August 4, 1898, p 4; *The Richmond Item*, September 14, 1898, p 4; *The Republic*, October 3, 1898, p 1.

¹⁸⁰ *Fort Wayne News*, March 11, 1898, p 8; *Marshall County Independent*, February 25, 1898, p 7; *The Bremen Enquirer*, July 29, 1898, p 4; *The Indianapolis News*, January 28, 1898, p 2.

At the outset, Wallace appeared to be the frontrunner in the race. The Republican Sound Money club of South Bend “vigorously applaud[ed]” the general “as the club’s candidate,”¹⁸¹ declaring, “There is no one who would bring more honor to the state, more usefulness and more capacity to bear than Wallace.”¹⁸² In February, Wallace attended a reception for Republicans of the Ninth District at the Opera House in Noblesville, where he gave an address on “The Future of the Republican Party,” defending it as the only party whose leaders “fulfill every promise.”¹⁸³ In response to his strong, captivating performance, the Ninth District subsequently endorsed Wallace for the Senate.¹⁸⁴ Clearly, Wallace’s campaign for the senatorial nod took place on the public stage. While he benefitted from the crucial support of some party insiders, the general committed to nurturing popular support by enthusiastically rousing throngs of Republican voters the state over.

Wallace’s strong, commanding position made his rash decision to withdraw from the race even more surprising. On April 18, General Wallace announced he “has formally withdrawn from the race for United States senator,” choosing instead to serve in the armed forces on behalf of “Cuban independence.” While he “consider[ed] it a great honor to represent Indiana in the senate,” the general was driven more by “the duty of every American” during wartime to serve his country, “until the peril which threatens the nation has passed.”¹⁸⁵ In responding to requests

¹⁸¹ *The Indianapolis News*, January 28, 1898, p 2.

¹⁸² *South Bend Tribune*, January 19, 1898, p 5.

¹⁸³ *Hamilton County Ledger*, February 4, 1898, p 1.

¹⁸⁴ *The Indianapolis News*, February 2, 1898, p 3.

¹⁸⁵ *Fort Wayne Daily News*, April 18, 1898, p 8.

for a follow-up statement, Wallace remained firm, insisting, “I prefer being a soldier for the country in time of war than to being a United States senator in time of peace.”¹⁸⁶

Wallace’s withdrawal left a void in the Republican senatorial nomination contest. Several names jostled for support, among them Governor James Mount, Frank Hanly, Judge Robert S. Taylor and Albert J. Beveridge.¹⁸⁷ Throughout the summer, Judge Taylor undertook a very public campaign for popular *and* party support.¹⁸⁸ The most notable aspect of Taylor’s public campaign occurred during the fall season, when he published a series of open letters to Senator Turpie on the question of free silver. By September, it appeared the senatorial contest had come down to the two leading contenders. Taylor skillfully sought to exploit the situation by distinguishing between their respective positions on the currency. In the letters, Taylor excoriated the incumbent and his party for their support of free silver. A bimetallic currency, with silver coined at the ratio of 16 to 1, was “a position untenable.” According to the letter, “The platform of Mr. Turpie’s party would mean a silver standard, and a general overturning of all values, and the driving out of circulation of gold.”¹⁸⁹ A week later, Taylor published his second letter “in which he clearly prove[d] that the nation must stand by the gold standard or abandon it.”¹⁹⁰

Distributed to Republican newspapers across the state, Taylor’s letters were generally well-received.¹⁹¹ *The Terre Haute Express* raved, Taylor “is always fair in the statement of a

¹⁸⁶ *Fort Wayne Daily News*, April 20, 1898, p 4.

¹⁸⁷ *The Fort Wayne Weekly Journal*, September 1, 1898, p 10.

¹⁸⁸ *The Fort Wayne Daily News*, July 18, 1898, p 3; *Huntington Weekly Herald*, August 19, 1898, p 4; *Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, August 15, 1898, p 24.

¹⁸⁹ *The Waterloo Press*, September 8, 1898, p 4.

¹⁹⁰ *The Waterloo Press*, September 15, 1898, p 4.

¹⁹¹ *South Bend Tribune*, September 8, 1898, p 4.

proposition, and clear, courageous and convincing in argument.”¹⁹² For his part, Turpie decided against responding to the series of letters fearing it would unnecessarily “accentuate the public interest in the letters,”¹⁹³ failing to recognize that their widespread coverage by the press had already piqued the public’s interest in the discussion. His unwillingness to satisfactorily rebut the charges risked letting Taylor define the terms of debate, mischaracterize the issues, and misrepresent the senator’s positions before voters.

The series of open letters are highly significant for two reasons. First, they reflect the individualistic, personality-driven nature of the campaigns. Taylor was explicitly addressing Senator Turpie as the leader of his party as well as the Democratic senatorial nominee for re-election, suggesting that Hoosiers *were* fully aware of the leading candidates’ identities and understood the implications of upcoming legislative elections on the senatorial matter. Second, the letters were published in newspapers and conducted in an open forum, attesting to the importance of *public* appeals for popular support. In certain respects, they represented an unsuccessful attempt by Taylor to engage the leading senatorial candidates in a debate on the pressing issues of the day through the use of newspapers, the most accessible means of communication and information. Broadly, these activities exhibit the expansive control by voters on the senatorial selection process.

Turpie’s failure to engage Taylor ceded the ground to his political opponents. Several Republican newspapers continued hammering away at the Democrats on the issue of the silver currency. *The Richmond Item* explained, “The only issue before the people of Indiana this fall is

¹⁹² *Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, September 9, 1898, p 4.

¹⁹³ *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, September 17, 1898, p 4.

found in the financial planks adopted by the two parties.” The paper argued, “On this same issue in 1896 the people of the Hoosier state gave a majority ... against the Turpie repudiationists. The majority should be a great deal larger this year.”¹⁹⁴ *The Republic* echoed these sentiments, “As the Indiana Republicans have twice badly trounced the Democrats on that issue, they are ready to do it again. This time the defeat ... will doubtless be effectual and lasting,” and blamed Turpie and former governor Matthews for recklessly “succumbing to the cry” of free silver.¹⁹⁵

Free silver was becoming an increasingly unsustainable position to defend for Democrats. Any expectation of mobilizing masses of dormant voters to support the party was readily dispelled. Compounding their woes, Populist state leaders announced in September that, while their roughly twenty candidates who were placed on various Democratic legislative tickets would support the Democratic senatorial candidate in the legislature’s selection session in January, they would *not* join to nominate Senator Turpie in the preceding caucus meeting.¹⁹⁶ While not precisely fatal to Turpie’s renomination prospects — since the senator had essentially coalesced Democratic support behind him — the statement was neither a rousing endorsement of Turpie’s populist credentials, thereby undercutting his general election message. Further, his renomination could be jeopardized were a last-minute, intra-party challenger to emerge as a spoiler. These developments speak to the precariousness of incumbency for any senator, especially after two terms. Although incumbency status afforded certain advantages, namely in securing party backing through the dense network of political connections accrued, the complicated nature of

¹⁹⁴ *The Richmond Item*, September 14, 1898, p 4.

¹⁹⁵ *The Republic*, October 3, 1898, p 1.

¹⁹⁶ *The Richmond Item*, September 23, 1898, p 5.

Turpie's voting record failed to sufficiently satisfy Populists or disaffected Democrats, driving much of the intra-party disharmony.

While Judge Robert Taylor had been considered the leading Republican senatorial candidate, another eligible contender, Albert J. Beveridge, was making his own public campaign for support, as well. The promising, 36-year-old lawyer, who made a name for himself as counsel in several notable Supreme Court tax cases, was touted as "a man of extraordinary achievements in political oratory ... rank[ing] with the first orators of America."¹⁹⁷ *The Rushville Republican* described him as "one of the most brilliant young orators in Indiana."¹⁹⁸ At the height of the fall campaign, he appeared at innumerable rallies throughout the state on behalf of the Republican ticket, opening the campaign in Indianapolis on September 17, where his speech "was heard with pleasure and profit."¹⁹⁹ Toward the end of the campaign, his appearance in Rushville was considered "the best speech of the campaign," having "present[ed] his arguments in a keen, incisive manner, and never los[ing] the close attention of his audience."²⁰⁰

Beveridge's speeches routinely focused on the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of foreign territories, striking overtones of patriotism. In Columbus, Beveridge said it was "not a time for politics but that it was a time for patriotism," imploring his listeners, "Will we be partisan or patriotic? Will we stand by our country in the election ... or will we ... vote against our country?" Beveridge mercilessly tore into Turpie and other Democrats for opposing the suffrage

¹⁹⁷ *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, September 9, 1898, p 4.

¹⁹⁸ *The Rushville Republican*, October 21, 1898, p 6.

¹⁹⁹ *The Indianapolis News*, September 16, 1898, p 8; *The Tribune*, September 17, 1898, p 2; *The South Bend Tribune*, September 19, 1898, p 1; *Muncie Daily Herald*, October 20, 1898, p 1; *The Rushville Republican*, October 21, 1898, p 6; *The Republic*, October 27, 1898, p 2.

²⁰⁰ *The Rushville Republican*, October 28, 1898, p 3.

of Civil War veterans at the Soldier's Home in Marion. "At this very hour," Beveridge exclaimed, "these political crocodiles who pretend a concern they do not feel for the boys in blue today are trying to rob two thousand of the soldiers of 1861 of their suffrages." He went on to charge, "No man but him whose heart is rotten with partisanship, whose conscience is putrid with hatred for the men who saved this nation, could ever conceive a scheme so treasonable in intent."²⁰¹ Beveridge's public campaigns were widespread, well-received, and highly successful, attesting to the premium in cultivating popular, electoral support in the Hoosier state. His appearances were intended to demonstrate to party regulars *and* ordinary voters his credentials as a loyal Republican asset and they were consequential in elevating the promising, budding politico to the United States Senate.

3.2.3 *Mobilizing Democrats through Popular Campaigns*

To counter the Republican efforts and mobilize Democratic turnout, Senator Turpie embarked upon a statewide public campaign for popular support — absolutely critical given the exceptionally popular conditions of the state and the immense degree to which voters wielded control over the process. In Indiana, these democratic practices had been routine and common, but they were growing in import by the 1890s, pressuring parties to make material concessions. Parties responded by finding methods of rendering senators ever-more visible, responsive, and accountable. In 1898, such means were adopted to a limited extent. During the summer, state Democratic leaders agreed to allow Turpie and former governor Claude Matthews spearhead the fall

²⁰¹ *The Columbus Republican*, November 3, 1898, p 6.

campaign “as the principal speakers.”²⁰² But with the latter’s untimely death in August, that responsibility fell primarily to the vulnerable incumbent, who held a personal stake in the outcome of the forthcoming legislative elections. Reflective of Indiana’s competitive nature, the party chairman announced their campaign would be waged “in every county” and that “every interest [be] looked after” in each congressional district.²⁰³ It was vitally important for Hoosier Democrats and Senator Turpie that as many districts be won as possible, and, to that end, they arranged for a vigorous, statewide campaign to turn out supportive voters to the polls.

Turpie commenced the public campaign in Evansville on September 2, in the First Congressional District, joined by Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado, a prominent silver Republican who had bolted his party over the currency issue and who, eventually, would join the Democrats.²⁰⁴ By appearing alongside Teller, Turpie signaled to populist-minded Hoosiers his commitment to the silver cause. The senator then appeared in Rochester on September 24, and in Plymouth on September 28, where he was touted by a newspaper advertisement as “one of the ablest exponents of the Democratic party ... Every voter should arrange to hear him.”²⁰⁵ On October 5, he addressed “a large audience at the opera house” in Bremen, before speaking in Hammond the following day.²⁰⁶ On October 7, he spoke at the Huntington Opera House, and on the afternoon of October 8, he campaigned in Peru.²⁰⁷ Interestingly, Turpie was slated to speak in

²⁰² *The Indianapolis News*, August 11, 1898, p 8.

²⁰³ *The Indianapolis News*, September 6, 1898, p 7.

²⁰⁴ *The Elwood Daily Record*, August 3, 1898, p 4.

²⁰⁵ *The Argos Reflector*, September 22, 1898, p 5; *Marshall County Independent*, September 23, 1898, p 1.

²⁰⁶ *The Bremen Enquirer*, October 7, 1898, p 8; *Daily News Democrat*, October 7, 1898, p 5.

²⁰⁷ *Daily News Democrat*, September 26, 1898, p 4; *Logansport Pharos Tribune*, October 5, 1898, p 20.

Elkhart on the night of October 10, but evidently, due to “a misunderstanding” of some sort, he missed the appearance. Officials maintained the event would be rescheduled.²⁰⁸ Turpie continued stumping the state from Decatur to Rushville. On October 14, he appeared at Rushville, and two days later, presented his party’s case at the Columbus Court House.²⁰⁹ On October 26, he delivered the keynote address at a rally at the court house in Terre Haute, returning to Evansville on October 28.²¹⁰ Additionally, Turpie’s memoirs explicitly named engagements in La Porte, Portland, Vevay, Boonville, and Madison.²¹¹ By November, Turpie began winding down the campaign. On November 2, he spoke in Nashville on “important issues ... pending from a Democratic standpoint.”²¹² The following day, he appeared at the Grand Army Hall in Richmond before a mixed crowd of Democrats and Republicans.²¹³ Finally, Turpie culminated the canvass in Decatur on November 5.²¹⁴

Turpie officially commenced the campaign operation on September 2, which was typical of senatorial and legislative elections of the time. By mid-September, his appearances ramped up to several a week, and, by early October, he was headlining political rallies on a near-daily-to-daily basis. An approximate count of the evidentiary record available reveals that Turpie’s stumping tour amounted to twenty public appearances, although this figure likely represents a conservative estimate considering the number of rallies which were not covered by reporters or

²⁰⁸ *The Bremen Enquirer*, October 14, 1898, p 4.

²⁰⁹ *Palladium-Item*, October 14, 1898, p1; *The Republic*, October 14, 1898, p 4.

²¹⁰ *Logansport Pharos Tribune*, October 27, 1898, p 18.

²¹¹ Turpie, *Sketches of My Own Times*, 307.

²¹² *The Indianapolis News*, October 26, 1898, p 2.

²¹³ *The Richmond Item*, November 3, 1898, p 5.

²¹⁴ Turpie, *Sketches of My Own Times*, 307.

uncovered by my research.²¹⁵ Additionally, Turpie's campaign was truly a statewide effort. Democratic leaders expressed their desires to pursue a vigorous, aggressive push in every county. Senator Turpie ultimately criss-crossed the entirety of Indiana — from Lake Michigan to the Ohio River, and from the Illinois border to the Ohio state line, appearing in 36 of Indiana's 92 counties,²¹⁶ and campaigning in at least eight of thirteen congressional districts.²¹⁷

The intensity of the campaign attests to the competitive nature of elections in Indiana, where Republicans and Democrats held a realistic chance of winning a majority in the legislature and thereby the opportunity to select a United States senator, as well as the value Turpie placed upon popular campaigns in his pursuit for re-election to the Senate. In an interview to *The Marshall County Independent* during the third week of his canvass, the senator was encouraged, "I have never seen democracy in better shape than it is this year," expressing confidence in his campaign's ability to generate enthusiasm among Democrats and other sympathetic Hoosiers to back the party and, by extension, support his re-election, "My meetings have all been spirited and enthusiastic and the attendance has always been large, in some cases amounting to overflow." Resultantly, Turpie was bullish on obtaining a favorable result in the November elec-

²¹⁵ That figure is derived from the following sources: newspaper coverage of 14 events (13 appearances, and one no-show at Elkhart which was presumably rescheduled), plus the six locations Turpie named in his memoirs.

²¹⁶ Turpie, *Sketches of My Own Times*, 307. Available newspaper coverage supports 12 counties: Vanderburgh, Fulton, Marshall, Lake, Huntington, Miami, Elkhart, Rush, Bartholomew, Vigo, Brown, and Wayne. In addition, Turpie's memoirs explicitly name six more: Decatur in Adams County, which was his last stop, La Porte in LaPorte County, Portland in Jay County, Vevay in Switzerland County, Boonville in Warrick County, and Madison in Jefferson County. He tallies 36 counties in total, which is the figure I have adopted.

²¹⁷ "Guide: Apportionment: Reapportionment in Indiana," *Indiana University: Bloomington*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://libraries.indiana.edu/guide-apportionmentreapportionment-indiana>. Newspaper coverage attests to appearances in seven congressional districts: the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth. Turpie's memoirs supplement that figure with one additional district, the Eighth.

tion, “From observation I have made, I haven’t a particular doubt that we will carry the state ticket, secure a majority on joint ballot in the state legislature and materially increase our delegation in [C]ongress.”²¹⁸

Admittedly, Turpie may have been overstating the positive effects of his public campaigns for the sake of the party, coming as it did mere weeks before Election Day. However, even his *post hoc* appraisal emphasized the importance of public canvassing. In his memoirs, *Sketches of My Own Times*, Turpie acknowledged his inability to pursue as extensive and robust a campaign as possible was partly responsible for his ultimate defeat. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Indiana senator was consumed by numerous foreign policy matters confronting the nation, especially given the aftermath of the recent war. “Our committee,” he wrote, “had held meetings three times a week and sometimes had daily sessions. The attendance was close and exacting and with the other more public duties of the Senate, taxed even the physical powers quite heavily.” Turpie “returned from Washington ... somewhat worn by the labors of the session.” As a result, “My participation in the home canvass was ... somewhat limited. I had not the strength to make the extensive tours of twenty or thirty years before.” But he recognized that his engagements were “well distributed in the [s]tate,” reflecting the statewide nature of the campaign discussed above.²¹⁹

In his campaign speeches, Turpie emphasized his positions on pressing national issues of the day, including the currency, the Dingley Tariff, the Spanish-American War and the country’s newfound territorial acquisitions. On the currency question, Turpie steadfastly supported “the

²¹⁸ *Marshall County Independent*, October 21, 1898, p 4.

²¹⁹ Turpie, *Sketches of My Own Times*, 306–307.

free and unlimited coinage of silver,” promising “peace and prosperity” upon its adoption.²²⁰ Further, the senator skewered Republicans as blatant hypocrites on the issue.²²¹ On the Dingley Tariff, Turpie again came out swinging. Opposing the Dingley Tariff of 1897, which placed exorbitantly high tariff rates on many products, the senator argued that its promise to cover “all governmental expenses ... failed,” leaving instead “an actual deficit.”²²² Rather, Turpie contended, “The Dingley bill ... was accumulating a big revenue for the treasuries of the big trusts,” before declaring, “I do not think that hereafter any political party in this country will draft a tariff bill on the line of prohibitory protection.”²²³

To redress the budgetary shortfall, Congress considered two revenue raising options: a stamp tax or bonds. Turpie opposed the former on the grounds that they were essentially regressive in nature and he staunchly opposed the latter since they would force “people [to] buy interest bearing bonds.” Instead, Turpie proposed treasury bonds, which worked satisfactorily well during the Mexican War. Turpie argued that \$150 million of greenbacks “could have paid all the expenses of the war.” He explained, “If [they] had been added to the circulating medium, the farmers’ products would have come up, wages would have increased and industry would have been stimulated.” Additionally, Turpie tendered other revenue-raising methods which he believed were more democratic, including an inheritance tax on “all property failing heir” to family

²²⁰ *Logansport Pharos Tribune*, October 27, 1898, p 18.

²²¹ *The Richmond Item*, November 5, 1898, p 5.

²²² *Marshall County Independent*, September 30, 1898, p 1.

²²³ *The Richmond Item*, November 5, 1898, p 5.

members, and a tax on large corporations, such as the sugar trust, sleeping car monopolies, and Standard Oil.²²⁴

Regarding the Spanish-American War and management of the territories, Turpie defended a more nuanced, and at times, strained position. On the whole, he viewed the recent conflict as a necessary and legitimate response to “the many outrages that were perpetrated against the American people” by Spain.²²⁵ For Turpie, Spain had mismanaged its administration of Cuba, failing to adhere to its promise to provide good government. He explained, “The United States protested against ... the inhumanity with which Spain treated the Cubans.” Therefore, the forceful reaction to the explosion of the *Maine* was merited.

However, Turpie disagreed with the manner in which the McKinley Administration was administering the newly-acquired territories. On Cuba, the senator advocated for independence, “bitterly attack[ing] the administration for not having recognized the freedom and independence of the Cuban people.” Turpie alleged that economic considerations, such as the “heavy holdings of Cuban bonds,” were dictating policy toward the island.²²⁶ The remaining lands ceded to the United States, including Puerto Rico, the Ladrones, and the Philippines, “should be made American colonies” rather than territories, and, under no circumstances, returned to Spain.²²⁷

In addition to Turpie’s extensive position-taking on important issues, the personality of the leading senatorial candidate(s) was an integral element in the campaigns — another critical element characterizing greater public accountability and direct input by voters. Democrats sought to por-

²²⁴ *Marshall County Independent*, September 30, 1898, p 1; *The Richmond Item*, November 5, 1898, p 5.

²²⁵ *The Richmond Item*, November 5, 1898, p 5.

²²⁶ *Logansport Pharos Tribune*, October 27, 1898, p 18.

²²⁷ *The Richmond Item*, November 5, 1898, p 5; *Marshall County Independent*, October 7, 1898, p 4.

tray Turpie as a learned, venerable statesman, fighting on behalf of the common man. Newspapers cast his extended record of service as virtuous and commendable. *The Daily News Democrat* contended, “His long experience in public matters mak[es] him able to discuss all public questions with clearness and reliability.”²²⁸ Posters advertising Turpie’s personal campaign appearances described the candidate in glowing terms, “The Honorable David Turpie, Sage of the United States Senate, the Soldiers’ Friend, the People’s Benefactor, the Star of Cuba’s Hope for Liberty ... Champion of the Free and Unlimited Coinage of Both Silver and Gold ... and Indiana’s Greatest Living Statesman.”²²⁹

While Republicans agreed that Turpie was the face of the state Democratic Party and their nominee for re-election to the Senate, they proffered their own, less flattering nicknames for the embattled senator.²³⁰ *The Terre Haute Express* dubbed Turpie “the Wily Senator,” accusing him of engaging in “the arts of the low demagogue” by “deliberately misrepresent[ing] the position of his opponents and misquot[ing] the provisions of a monetary bill.”²³¹ *The Indianapolis Journal* described Turpie as “a Forgetful Senator” for “know[ing] so little now about the financial question.”²³²

The Seymour Republican opted for a more familial moniker, “Your Uncle David has been trodding the crooked paths of his party long enough to know that he has a job on his hands.”²³³

²²⁸ *Daily News Democrat*, September 26, 1898, p 4.

²²⁹ *The Indianapolis News*, October 26 1898, p 2.

²³⁰ *The Richmond Item*, October 18, 1898, p 4. “Senator Turpie, the recognized leader of Indiana Democracy, and their avowed candidate for Senator in case his party wins.”

²³¹ *The Richmond Item*, November 3, 1898, p 4.

²³² *The Richmond Item*, October 12, 1898, p 4.

²³³ *The Republic*, June 22, 1898, p 2.

The epithet clearly intended to portray Turpie as an amoral political boss, whose long career could only have been made possible by unscrupulous behavior with party bigwigs. More gravely, *The Richmond Item* lambasted Turpie's patriotism over the recent conflict.²³⁴ These examples attest to the widespread recognition by voters and observers alike of the leading candidates' identities — especially that of the incumbent senator — and the understanding that his political fate was intricately tied to the outcome of the looming legislative elections, evidencing the direct, popular nature of the process.

3.2.4 *Legislative Deference to General Election Results*

The results of the 1898 midterm elections were a stalemate, producing no clear, decisive victor. Although the Republicans remained in control of both houses of Congress, Democrats made tremendous gains in the U.S. House of Representatives, picking up 37 seats, mostly at the expense of Republicans — who lost 19 seats — and Populists, who saw their numbers reduced by 75 percent.²³⁵ Conversely, the Senate witnessed Republicans increase their ranks by nine members, for a total of 53 senators, while Democrats lost eight seats for a total of just 26 senators.²³⁶

In Indiana, by contrast, Republicans consolidated their gains from the previous four years. Notably, not one of the thirteen congressional districts changed parties. This outcome actually benefited Republicans, who were defending nine of those seats. Democrats contested four

²³⁴ *The Richmond Item*, October 31, 1898, p 4.

²³⁵ "Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present," U.S. House of Representatives, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/>.

²³⁶ "Party Division," U.S. Senate, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm.

Republican-held districts, hoping that a populist-driven wave might flip them, but ultimately to no avail.²³⁷ Statewide, voters supported the Republican ticket by a 15,000 to 20,000 plurality, a strong performance for the party.²³⁸ Their electoral strength translated into political strength in the legislature. In the lower house, Republicans netted eight seats for a total of sixty — an advantage of twenty over the Democrats. In the upper house, Republicans maintained an edge of eight state senators, despite the loss of four seats.²³⁹ Taken together, Republicans enjoyed a joint majority of twenty-eight. These results assured that a Republican would succeed David Turpie to the United States Senate.

The election returns were humbling for Turpie, but not altogether unexpected. *The South Bend Tribune* attributed the poor performance to depressed Democratic turnout, “a stay-at-home vote.”²⁴⁰ If accurate, the assertion suggests that an enthusiasm gap emerged, likely the manifestation of lingering intra-party disenchantment with Turpie and his stewardship of the party, sentiment which the senator failed to effectively counteract through his public stumping tour. Despite his best efforts to rouse laborers, farmers, Populists, and other favorably-inclined voters to the Democratic fold, Turpie was unable to contend with ebbing enthusiasm and waning interest among the base.

For its part, the state legislature largely deferred to the popular sentiment of the November election results. With padded majorities, Republican legislators could confidently nominate a successor to Senator Turpie in caucus, *a la* a parliamentary-styled democracy. However,

²³⁷ *The Indianapolis News*, November 10, 1898, p 1.

²³⁸ *The Richmond Item*, November 9, 1898, p 1.

²³⁹ Dubin, *Party Affiliations*, 61.

²⁴⁰ *South Bend Tribune*, November 10, 1898, p 1.

choosing an alternative would prove difficult since there was no single candidate around which to coalesce. Throughout the general election and legislative selection period, a bevy of ambitious, aspiring men contended for the Republican senatorial nomination, jostling for elite and popular support to buttress their positions. The official candidates were Judge Robert S. Taylor, an eminent jurist and legal thinker, Congressman George W. Steele, former congressman and gubernatorial nominee Frank B. Posey, former congressman J. Frank Hanly, Assistant Postmaster General Perry S. Heath, and Albert J. Beveridge.²⁴¹

Beveridge had stumped the state on behalf of the Republican ticket, dazzling audiences with his eloquent oratory and winning over listeners with his incisive arguments. According to *The Richmond Item*, “During this year’s campaign he easily took the lead, and the demand for his presence was something unprecedented.”²⁴² Where Turpie failed to spark much enthusiasm among Democrats, Beveridge succeeded, exciting scores of Republican voters. These efforts were not lost amongst party figures and legislative members. But Beveridge was not the only candidate to take to the stump. Other leading senatorial contenders delivered campaign addresses during the general election as well, including Frank Posey and Robert Taylor, orations which were well received by the Republican faithful.²⁴³ As is evident, even under the indirect regime — when the state legislature exercised the final judgment — senatorial aspirants in Indiana conducted their campaigns in a public manner, recognizing the growing import of popular, democratic legitimacy.

²⁴¹ *The Indianapolis News*, November 9, 1898, p 2; *The Richmond Item*, December 7, 1898, p 6.

²⁴² *The Richmond Item*, December 7, 1898, p 6.

²⁴³ *The Indianapolis News*, November 4, 1898, p 9.

Due to the fractious, splintered nature of the race, the state legislature was tasked with settling the question, thereby exercising a degree of autonomy in the selection process. *The Richmond Item* considered the contest “all in the air ... It is a fair fight with an open field and the field seems likely to remain open until the thing is over.” Since each candidate enjoyed a roughly equal smattering of support by their respective localities and home districts, *The Item* stressed that legislators’ second choices would determine the victor.²⁴⁴ By late December, it was believed Hanly held the advantage, with Taylor and Beveridge gaining momentum.²⁴⁵ Many holdouts who had yet to pledge their support were “waiting for the ‘band wagon’ ... until they could see the probable winner.”²⁴⁶ In the meantime, Hanly, the frontrunner, was making the most expensive pitch “and seem[ed] to have plenty more to spend.” By January 4, even Posey was displaying signs of strength.²⁴⁷

On January 6, the trajectory of the race shifted dramatically toward Beveridge. Two heretofore undecided legislators announced their support for the young orator. Francis Roots of Connersville declared, “I feel that there is a sentiment that the young men should have an opportunity to shoulder the responsibilities of state and develop their natural abilities, which will make them of great service to their constituents. These qualities, I think Mr. Beveridge possesses in a marked degree.” Jesse Stevens of Wayne County asserted, “When in our county [Beveridge] made a very favorable impression, and I feel that a large number of voters will indorse my action ... I believe that the young man ought to have a show.” Clearly, these legislators were impressed

²⁴⁴ *The Richmond Item*, December 7, 1898, p 6.

²⁴⁵ *South Bend Tribune*, December 27, 1898, p 1.

²⁴⁶ *Logansport Pharos Tribune*, December 28, 1898, p 18.

²⁴⁷ *The Logansport Pharos Tribune*, January 4, 1899, p 20.

by Beveridge's youthful disposition and his remarkable public campaign throughout the state, reflecting an element of popular legitimacy in their decisions. Their endorsements reinvigorated the Beveridge forces and opened the floodgates for his nomination. After the announcements, the Beveridge camp "became unusually aggressive," going on to organize with leading businessmen and influential groups to pressure state representatives for support.²⁴⁸

On the morning of January 10, Republican state lawmakers assembled in the lower chamber of the state legislature to nominate their senatorial candidate. With such a crowded field, their decision was eagerly anticipated by many Hoosiers. Shortly before nine o'clock, the voting commenced. Hanly took an early sizable lead. On the first ballot, he led with 31 votes, just 14 shy of the nomination threshold of 45. No other candidate surpassed 20 votes. Beveridge came in second at 19 votes, followed by Taylor at 16, Posey at 12, and Steele at 11. In many respects, the fault lines in the race were between the frontrunner Hanly, considered the traditionalist, conservative insider, and the remaining four challengers, whom all viewed themselves as outsider reformers. These fissures became pivotal as the balloting continued.

On the eighth ballot, Hanly's support increased to 34 votes, Beveridge dropped to 20, and Taylor rounded out third with 15. The ninth ballot confirmed these trends, with Hanly reaching 37 and Beveridge stalling at 20. By then, Taylor's forces determined that their candidate held little chance of the nomination and recognized that his continued presence on the ballot presented the real possibility of a Hanly victory. Thus, his supporters agreed to throw half of their strength behind Beveridge on the next ballot, and then the entirety of their votes to the young lawyer on the subsequent ballot. On the eleventh ballot, Hanly remained in the lead with 36 votes, but

²⁴⁸ *The Muncie Morning News*, January 6, 1899, p 4.


Beveridge's stock had risen to 28, attracting six of Taylor's former supporters. Encouraged by the movement, the remaining Taylorites delivered their votes for Beveridge on the twelfth ballot. Joining them were the holdout Steele supporters and three from the Posey camp. As a result, the twelfth ballot revealed Hanly remaining with 35 votes, Beveridge reaching 49, and Posey just 6. In a dramatic last-minute development, Beveridge had reached the necessary threshold for nomination. According to one of the "older men ... it had been the most exciting contest for a nomination for a [s]enator ever witnessed in Indiana."²⁴⁹ See **Figure 3.3** graphing the results of each ballot. By contrast, the Democratic caucus unanimously backed Turpie, a mere formality given the party expected to remain in the minority in the upcoming session.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ *The Indianapolis News*, January 11, 1899, p 1.

²⁵⁰ *Marshall County Independent*, January 13, 1899, p 4.

Figure 3.3


Republican Caucus Vote for Senatorial Nomination, January 1899

SOURCE: *The Indianapolis News*, January 11, 1899, p 1.

On January 17, 1899, Albert Beveridge was formally selected by the legislature as Indiana's next United States Senator. In the State House of Representatives, he won 59 votes to David Turpie's 37 votes. Four representatives were not present due to illnesses. In the Senate, Beveridge secured 28 votes, Turpie 19, and Alonzo G. Buckhart, the Populist, carried only one vote. Two senators were unable to participate in the proceedings.²⁵¹ See **Figure 3.4** for a chart of the final vote breakdown.

²⁵¹ *The Indianapolis News*, January 17, 1899, p 2.

By eventually selecting Albert Beveridge for the Senate, the state legislature essentially choose a candidate whose name and identity were well-known, whose reputation was well-received, and who, as the second youngest of the candidates, best represented the future of the Republican Party. By selecting a known quantity through a reasonably open process, party figures acknowledged the growing importance of popular legitimacy and public sentiment undergirding the selection of a senator — the rising tide of democratization. If Beveridge made the greatest impression on the party (insider officials and voters alike) and, was even partly responsible for their spectacular victory, then his elevation to the Senate represented a suitable reward for his efforts.

Figure 3.4**Vote of the Indiana State Legislature for Senator, January 1899**

SOURCE: *The Indianapolis News*, January 17, 1899, p 2.

3.2.5 Analysis

The 1898 case study supports my *theory of indirect elections*, and testifies to the vibrant democratic practices characterizing Indiana during that time. Senator David Turpie's extensive, vigorous canvassing demonstrates the importance of cultivating popular support through public campaigns under exceptionally popular conditions — as anticipated by the hypothesis. Faced with widespread intra-party discontent, Turpie was motivated to unify the party behind his can-

didature and mobilize turnout for the general election — hence his decision to commit the Democratic Party to the 1896 populist platform, most notably free silver, which had twice been rejected by Indiana voters. Despite the electoral losses incurred by the Democrats, Turpie never considered distancing himself from party principles or party identification. He remained firmly dedicated to his party. Where he did stray — namely with regard to the Spanish-American War and the newly-acquired territories — his nuanced, at times ambiguous position did not appreciably help the party grapple with the patriotic delirium gripping the country.

Due to Indiana's exceptionally popular senatorial elections, the element of personality infused the process to a great extent. Democratic disenchantment with Turpie was partly fueled by the perception that the longtime senator had passed his prime and, owing to his unpopularity amongst voters, would be unable to effectively mount a general election offensive against an invigorated Republican Party. Further, the election presented a clear referendum on the incumbent. Both camps placed Turpie's record front and center in their campaigns, allowing voters the opportunity to directly pass judgment on the senator. In so doing, both parties advanced the notion of public accountability — a concession to the democratizing trends manifesting across the nation. While the election did not represent a true choice between two candidates — since a number of Republicans were vying to replace Turpie — several Republican contenders, such as Albert Beveridge, *were* undertaking public campaigns of their own, ostensibly on behalf of the ticket, but realistically to advance their senatorial prospects. Therefore, voters understood the election was between Turpie and an alternative Republican, whom likely was well-known and public.

Although Hoosiers were aware of the centrality of Turpie's political fate in the legislative elections, it appears a mix of personality and policy issues influenced their decision. In voting for the Republican ticket, they were expressing their support for the gold standard and the McKinley Administration's handling of the recently-concluded Spanish-American War. While Turpie's strained reputation and long career did not help his cause, his association with free silver and inability to articulate a coherent stance on the war were likely more responsible for his defeat.

Ultimately, Turpie's effort at attaining a third term in the Senate failed due to lingering Democratic discontent with his candidacy and an emerging enthusiasm gap, strong political headwinds on the currency issue and the war, and the limited, constricted nature of the campaigning itself, which Turpie admitted afterwards was insufficient at stemming the tide against him, thereby assuring a Republican successor. Eventually, the legislature selected Albert Beveridge to replace Turpie. Beveridge had mounted a public campaign for insider *and* popular support. Although the legislators exercised a degree of autonomy in settling the question, due to the fractious nature of the race, they deferred to the candidate with a strong popular base, who had made the greatest impression, held the most promise for the future of the party, and, ergo, could legitimately lay claim to the seat.

3.3 1902 - Fairbanks' Constituency Services and Personal Popularity Score Impressive Victories

The 1902 Indiana senatorial contest demonstrates the singular role of the candidate to the election results. The re-election bid of Senator Charles Fairbanks featured prominently in the

campaign that year. His widespread popularity was a boon to many a Republican office seeker, who eagerly tied their electoral fortunes to his candidature. Further, Fairbanks had skillfully utilized constituency services through the extension of rural mail delivery routes as a material incentive for political support amongst voters. These efforts were widely reported by the Republican press, whose editors attributed sole credit to the senator. While many a sympathetic newspaper went about advertising and credit-claiming on behalf of the senator, Fairbanks rose above personal entreaties in his public speeches, instead addressing state and national issues and articulating Republican Party principles and ideals.

Ultimately, the centrality of Fairbanks' candidacy, his immense popularity, and the intensive public campaign for popular support all contributed to a stupendous Republican victory in the November election. These highly successful activities bolstered Fairbanks' position within his party against any potential disaffection, easily securing a second term in the Senate. When the state legislature convened to render its decision, the body essentially deferred to the public sentiment expressed by the outcome of the recent elections, choosing the popular incumbent who was primarily responsible for the party's majorities. Consciously or not, taken together, these developments represented another concession by parties toward advancing the notion of more responsive, directly accountable, and highly visible incumbents, as well as a more democratic, popular process by which to select senators.

Charles Warren Fairbanks belonged to upper echelon of the business community as a wealthy financier and legal expert for railroad companies and partial owner of the *Indianapolis News*, a powerful position from which he could influence the political discourse of the state. Fairbanks was first elected to the United States Senate in 1896, propelled to the august body by a

decisive Republican victory amidst a captivating presidential election. Fairbanks had defeated longtime incumbent Daniel Voorhees, who was promptly retired from office. In the 1898 elections, Hoosier Republicans escaped the traditional midterm punishment, largely unscathed. The party expanded their ranks in the legislature, culminating in the ousting of Democrat David Turpie from the Senate. For the first time since 1875, Republicans had laid claim to both Indiana Senate seats.²⁵² Two years later, the party swept the state. In the presidential election, President William McKinley prevailed over William Jennings Bryan by four percentage points — sizable for a battleground state — while in the gubernatorial contest, Republican Winfield T. Durbin was elected. At the state level, Republicans gained one seat in the lower house and four in the upper chamber. Although historically, Indiana had been a swing state, Republicans were consolidating their gains, crafting a durable, long-term electoral advantage over the rival Democrats.

3.3.1 *Political Conditions and General Election Competitiveness*

These were the favorable political realities before Fairbanks as he embarked upon his bid for a second term in 1902. Recent inroads by Republicans augured well for the party and, by extension, the senator's electoral fate. However, given the competitive nature of elections in the state, challenging headwinds could produce a wild swing to the Democrats, undoing fully a decade of progress. The tension between economic and political tailwinds and the uncertainty of the Indiana electorate fueled the dynamics of the 1902 elections.

Improving economic conditions and the strengthened position of Republicans in the state contributed to a sense of confidence over the party's fortunes. Speaking with several political

²⁵² "List of United States Senators from Indiana," *Ballotpedia*.

supporters in April, Fairbanks declared, “The Republicans of Indiana have every reason to feel confident of the result in November,” attributing his sense of confidence to the “enthusiastic gatherings ... we have all witnessed,” and his belief “that the Republican party in Indiana has grown stronger.” An attendee retorted, conceding that, while prices were indeed high, “The situation is not as bad as it was a few years ago when everything was cheap, but the people had no money with which to buy.”²⁵³

By September, the situation remained unchanged, reinforcing Fairbanks’ optimism. In an interview with *The Kansas City Journal*, the senator recognized “Republican prospects [as] generally very favorable,” explaining “the condition of business throughout the country is gratifying.” Resultantly, “The ... party must have the credit of successfully administering the business affairs of the country in such a way as to give confidence to enterprise.” The senator also praised the labor situation, contending, “It is gratifying to know that labor is so generally employed throughout the country and that wages are ... so well maintained. The more prosperous the laboring man the greater the prosperity the country will enjoy.”²⁵⁴

Privately, Fairbanks continued to evince assuredness over the party’s prospects in the upcoming election. In June, he conveyed to Robert Mansfield his conviction that “the political conditions are quite satisfactory.” Although he acknowledged a “desperate effort” by Democrats to compete for control of the legislature, the senator concluded, “I think we shall triumph.”²⁵⁵ Fairbanks repeatedly expressed similar sentiment in his correspondence throughout the year. Until the eve of the election, he was “look[ing] forward to the result ... with utmost

²⁵³ *The Star Press*, April 25, 1902, p 7.

²⁵⁴ *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 4, 1902, p 4.

²⁵⁵ Fairbanks to Robert Mansfield, June 7, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

confidence.”²⁵⁶ And the collective optimism of Republicans over the outcome was echoed by many newspapers, as well, especially those favorable to the senator.²⁵⁷

For their part, the Democrats had committed themselves to a serious effort at regaining control of the legislature. Although battered by successive defeats, they were given a fighting chance of scoring their first political victory in a decade. Indiana’s highly competitive general elections meant neither party could be entirely certain of the outcome, raising the possibility of an upset. Over the summer, *The Republic* reported that “both parties in Indianapolis are preparing to plunge into the work of the campaign with their usual energy.” While the Democrats were “planning two or three big meetings,” on the whole, “it [was] not to be a speaking campaign.”²⁵⁸ We can speculate the party likely concluded the futility of publicly competing with the immense popularity of the incumbent senator, instead, opting to conduct an aggressive campaign beneath the surface through partisan newspapers and precinct canvassing. I discuss the Democratic campaign in greater detail below.

The generally favorable trend in political and economic conditions for Republicans coupled with the widespread sense of confidence were contributing to deep-seated anxieties among a number of supporters over perceived complacency, which was magnified by the highly competitive and unpredictable nature of Indiana’s elections. These concerns were articulated by one J. L. C. McAdams in a lengthy letter to Senator Fairbanks. McAdams complained, “Our party feels that there is no danger about the result. This is the only thing that causes any doubt to arise in

²⁵⁶ Fairbanks to Charles Magoon, November 3, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁵⁷ *The Republic*, July 25, 1902, p 4; *The Republic*, October 3, 1902, p 1; *The Richmond Item*, October 21, 1902, p 2; *The Richmond Item*, November 3, 1902, p 1.

²⁵⁸ *The Republic*, July 8, 1902, p 1.

my mind.” He went on to bemoan, “Over-confidence is always dangerous —extremely so. The best way to avoid danger is to fortify against it,” highlighting the “herculean effort” by Democrats of competing in marginal districts to win control of the legislature. “Frankly,” he conceded, “I am apprehensive that we might lose the legislature in the last days of the campaign on account of the feeling of safety on our part and the stupendous work being done by the [D]emocrats.”²⁵⁹

Fairbanks *was* attentive to the problems of complacency, which occasionally manifested in his correspondence. In one letter, he described “[t]he outlook in the state [as] very excellent, never in fact was it better,” before acknowledging, “Our only danger is as a rule over-confidence.”²⁶⁰ And he recognized the threat emanating from the Democrats’ aggressive attempts to recapture control of the legislature. Writing to Robert Mansfield, the senator observed, “The [D]emocrats are making a desperate effort to get together. They have eliminated some of their old issues and have promulgated new ones which they think will have a unifying effect upon the party.”²⁶¹ To Frank Roby, he wrote, “The efforts of the [D]emocrats will be to carry the legislature. I think they will subordinate all other things to this end.”²⁶² And in a letter to Dr. Charles Copeland, Fairbanks linked the twin threats of complacency and intensive Democratic efforts together, writing, “The Democratic [P]arty is relying largely upon the apathy of the Republicans and are determined to make the most of it. It behooves us to be upon our guard.”²⁶³ These observations attest to Fairbanks’ acuity over the threats arising from complacency amongst

²⁵⁹ J.L.C. McAdams to Fairbanks, October 10, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁶⁰ Fairbanks to L.W. Walker, July 24, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁶¹ Fairbanks to Robert Mansfield, June 7, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁶² Fairbanks to Frank Roby, June 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁶³ Fairbanks to Dr. Charles Copeland, August 19, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

Republicans and the active low-key campaign by the Democrats. They suggest the senator was keenly sensitive to economic and political conditions, the trend of public sentiment, and the need to cultivate popular support through a sustained mobilization operation — adaptations to the growing importance of popular legitimacy and democratization.

3.3.2 *Forging Party Unity*

Favorable economic and political conditions were not sufficient to ensure Republican successes at the polls in November. Fairbanks understood that the party could not rest on their laurels and coast to victory, especially given the aggressive pitch undertaken by the Democrats. Therefore, to counteract these efforts and achieve a favorable electoral result for the party and, by extension, Fairbanks' own re-election, the incumbent senator set about achieving three major objectives: promoting *party unity*, providing *material incentives* to voters for political support, and *mobilizing turnout*. These aims were pursued through a multi-pronged strategy over many months.

The first phase of the strategy involved forging party unity. While the Republicans were in an advantageous position on the whole, internal factions were rife. A majority in the legislature would be insufficient for the senator's electoral prospects if the party caucus did not constitute Fairbanks partisans. Albert Beveridge's election four years earlier represented a political victory for outside reformers — the high-water mark for the nascent progressive wing — much to the chagrin of the more traditional, conservative element, personified by Senator Fairbanks. The ensuing period witnessed low-level sparring between the two forces for control over the state party machinery. But with an election looming on the horizon, Fairbanks could ill afford to

permit these differences to fester unabatedly, lest he lose his vaunted position in the Senate — as had befallen David Turpie in 1898. Therefore, throughout the winter and spring, Fairbanks embarked upon a dual strategy of public reassurances of unity, whilst privately outflanking the Beveridge forces on influential committees and other bodies.

The ideal of party unity was a widely-shared aspiration for many Hoosier Republicans. In an impassioned letter, Terre Haute lawyer J. A. Mathews exclaimed, “Friendship to Beveridge must not be construed as disloyalty to Fairbanks. If it is, then we want to find it out right now ... You will find there are many stalwart young Republicans in Indiana who are like us.”²⁶⁴ Thus, for Fairbanks, it was imperative to publicly commit himself to party unity. By appearing to rise above the din of factional politics, the senator could more effectively craft an image as a statesman, thereby preserving his reputation and popularity. Writing to V. K. Officer, Fairbanks stressed, “I venture the wish that everything will be done to promote party harmony and to avoid any more factional disturbances.” In place of hostility, Fairbanks “want[ed] to be friendly with all Republicans and ... see them friends with each other.”²⁶⁵

Publicly, Fairbanks’ appearances during the winter and spring, coupled with coverage by Republican newspapers, conveyed an image of party harmony, minimizing any internal differences and dissensions. At an annual Republican gathering on January 1, considered the “preliminary to the opening of the campaign” and described as the “love feast,” Fairbanks declared, “We meet under such agreeable circumstances, and when the prospects for continued Republican ascendancy are so promising.” He went on, “An important campaign lies immediately before us. I

²⁶⁴ J.A. Mathews to Fairbanks, January 24, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁶⁵ Fairbanks to V. K. Officer, February 25, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

have never seen the party in this great state more eager for the contest, or more confident of the result.” And the senator closed his speech by observing, “We meet with no trace of factional disturbance ... With the party harmonious and united throughout the state, this is indeed a happy augury. It forecasts certain Republican victory.” Notably, Fairbanks was joined at the event by his junior colleague, Albert Beveridge, who delivered his own remarks upon the conclusion of Fairbanks’ speech.²⁶⁶

Later that month, *The Indianapolis Journal* took many Democratic newspapers to task for “continuing puerile attempts to make it appear that the Indiana senators are hostile to each other.” The Republican periodical emphasized, “Every ardent friend of Mr. Beveridge ... may favor the re-election of Mr. Fairbanks, and thereby remain ... the staunchest supporters of the junior senator ... There is no conflict between the two senators ... there is no conflict between their friends.”²⁶⁷ When the matter of selecting a temporary chairman for the state convention emerged, potential discord between the two Republicans was again downplayed. Once more, *The Indianapolis Journal* maintained, “Attach no importance to the sensational stories that there is conflict between [them].” According to the paper, neither senator was “desirous of the honor” nor did they “wish to interfere ... with the [s]tate [c]ommittee.”²⁶⁸ And at the state convention in April, where Fairbanks sat on the influential committee to draft the party’s platform, *The Republic* insisted “The relations between the two senators are perfectly cordial and friendly,” lauding how “each paid the other a very high compliment in [their] speech[es] before the convention.”²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ *The Tribune*, January 1, 1902, p 1.

²⁶⁷ *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 18, 1902, p 4.

²⁶⁸ *The Indianapolis Journal*, March 9, 1902, p 4.

²⁶⁹ *The Republic*, April 25, 1902, p 4.

Privately, however, Fairbanks and his forces were committed to outflanking the Beveridge men in their long-running confrontation for control over the party apparatus. Fairbanks benefitted from his status as the senior senator — greatly expanding his network of connections, doling out political patronage, and building the party machinery in his own image — and he was highly successful in those efforts. In January, *The Fort Wayne Sentinel* reported, “In the election of [R]epublican committeemen in the ... districts yesterday Senator Fairbanks won signal victories in almost every district and the effort of Senator Beveridge to gain control of the state organization has failed.” Evidently, Beveridge succeeded “in only one or two districts at the most.”²⁷⁰ These results were encouraging for the Fairbanks camp. J. Barhaus of Hartford City apprised the senior senator of the factional infighting and its stakes for the forthcoming decision over the senatorship, writing, “There seems to be an effort made to build up and strengthen the Beveridge [*sic*] element [in Randolph County]. This will not do. If that element should control the next [l]egislature when you are a candidate for re-election to the [S]enate, we can not foresee nor even conjecture the wrong that may be done.” He urged Fairbanks “to be alert in the selection of members of the [l]egislature in order that the other faction may not control the next [t]wo [l]egislatures.”²⁷¹ And in reporting on the situation in Orange County, James Goodrich expressed his “alarm” that “Beveridge’s friends ... are determined to not only nominate Rogers [a Beveridge-friendly candidate] but to seat the delegates of the bolting convention ... if it becomes necessary in Roger’s [*sic*] interests.” He bemoaned, “It will create a breach among the Republicans in that county that will not be healed within the next ten years.”²⁷²

²⁷⁰ *The Fort Wayne Sentinel*, January 16, 1902, p 1.

²⁷¹ J. Barhaus to Fairbanks, March 7, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁷² James Goodrich to Fairbanks, April 9, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

Notwithstanding these discouraging incidents, the Fairbanks camp continued to enjoy impressive successes over Beveridge. By March, *The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette* declared, “The Fairbanks wing is still the dominant element of the [R]epublican [P]arty in Indiana.” Describing his control over the party machinery as a “lead pipe cinch,” the paper argued, “Fairbanks may and will round up the votes.”²⁷³ Once the state convention was gaveled into order in April, Fairbanks’ victory was thorough and complete. According to *The Elwood Daily Record*, “Senator Beveridge, with a full slate of candidates ... had to smile as he saw his favorites go down in defeat before Fairbank’s [*sic*] candidates.” “The greatest humiliation of all” followed when the vanquished was forced to “clasp the hands” of the victor and evince a cheery demeanor.²⁷⁴ By July, Fairbanks was assured of the support of his party. *The Indianapolis Journal* could boast, “The party is united on him.” The senator could count on “the entire confidence and unanimous support ... from his party in Indiana.”²⁷⁵ Admittedly, *The Journal* was biased in its promotion of party unity, but its claim was not necessarily unfounded. By that point, Fairbanks and his supporters had been wholly effective in dominating the state party apparatus. The senator achieved the necessary degree of *party backing* to assure his renomination and a sufficient degree of *party harmony* for a strong general election performance, having averted the catastrophic consequences of lingering, intra-party disaffection.

3.3.3 *Material Incentives for Political Support through Constituency Services*

²⁷³ *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, March 4, 1902, p 5.

²⁷⁴ *The Elwood Daily Record*, April 25, 1902, 1.

²⁷⁵ *The Indianapolis Journal*, July 25, 1902, p 4.

The second prong of Fairbanks' strategy was to win over apathetic Hoosiers by providing a material incentive to support the Republican Party. These inducements emanated from the senator's constituency services, taking the form of infrastructural guarantees. From his pivotal position as chairman of the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, Fairbanks effectually implemented and extended rural mail route services.²⁷⁶ Early on, many Republicans recognized the link between the establishment of rural mail delivery and popular support for the party. Debriefing Fairbanks on the situation in Whitley County, Elmer Leonard noted, "It has been suggested ... to me ... that it would be a most excellent plan to have established in [this] [c]ounty, a complete county rural service," explaining, "We feel confident that if we can get these routes in Whitley ... it will greatly assist us in carrying that county this fall, and insure the election of a State Senator."²⁷⁷ Wallace W. Williamson, publisher of *The Columbia City Mail*, concurred, claiming, "The results of the November elections 1900 ... show conclusively that Whitley county made an excellent showing and was the only county in the district that helped Mr. Hanna [the Republican congressional candidate] materially on the account of the establishment of rural free delivery." He further called for the realization of "complete rural mail service" in the county, urging Fairbanks to "use [his] best endeavors to secure the service."²⁷⁸

Reporting from Jackson County, David Green lamented, "On account of the remaining long pending [r]ural [f]ree [d]elivery running out from this place, there is considerable discontentment and I am afraid if they are not viewed out and recommended before the election there will be serious results," warning, "We are liable to lose votes as the people in the west part of the

²⁷⁶ *The Indianapolis News*, February 11, 1902, p 4.

²⁷⁷ Elmer Leonard to Fairbanks, May 21, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁷⁸ Wallace W. Williamson to Fairbanks, May 21, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

[c]ounty begin to feel they have actually been slighted.”²⁷⁹ Similarly, for Clark County, E.L. Dorsey suggested “prompt action in this matter [as it] will very materially aid us in the coming election.” Dorsey believed Democratic infighting would hamper their turnout operations, enabling Republicans to exploit the opportunity.²⁸⁰

Senator Fairbanks *was* cognizant of the political benefits of delivering postal routes to his constituents, as well. In July, he wrote, “I trust that everything will be harmonious and that this service may redound to the credit of the Republican [P]arty, which is primarily responsible for its establishment.”²⁸¹ And in September, he underscored, “Our legislative tickets are suffering in certain localities, unless we see that they are not longer neglected.”²⁸² To that end, the senator prioritized providing these routes to under-served, reachable districts and counties, especially those promising vast political dividends in November. In Waterloo, Fairbanks informed H. C. Willis that special agent Dice “will be in [the] district shortly” to consult with Republicans “with a view to securing liberal extensions in your county rural service.”²⁸³ And in Noble County, he “directed [Dice]” to visit party figures “and secure the benefit of [their] suggestions.” Writing to L. W. Welker, Fairbanks described the special agent as “obliging and willing to do everything he can to carry out your wishes to the fullest possible extent.”²⁸⁴

²⁷⁹ David Green to Fairbanks, October 10, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁸⁰ E.L. Dorsey to Fairbanks, October 11, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁸¹ Fairbanks to L.W. Welker, July 7, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁸² Fairbanks to F.M. Campbell, September 29, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁸³ Fairbanks to H.C. Willis, June 18, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

²⁸⁴ Fairbanks to L.W. Welker, July 7, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

Most critically, Fairbanks contacted A. W. Machen, General Superintendent for Rural Free Delivery in Washington, to facilitate the establishment of postal roads in Whitley and Lawrence Counties. At the outset, he explained, “I would be especially benefitted by ... this service,” before continuing, “One of the counties is Whitley, in the 12th [d]istrict ... I would be glad to have Mr. Dice put in a full county service ... The other county is Lawrence in the 2nd [c]ongressional [d]istrict, where there has been some delay.” The senator reiterated, “It would be of incalculable benefit to me this year.”²⁸⁵ It is especially noteworthy that Fairbanks explicitly linked the approval of these services to their political significance by identifying the congressional districts within which the affected counties resided. Furthermore, he repeatedly acknowledged their implications for his own political prospects, as well. His pleas for prioritizing these counties confirm the central role of rural postal routes during the general election and, more broadly, exemplify the intersection of congressional constituency services and the cultivation of popular support. Fairbanks astutely understood that these tools afforded the means to engender a favorable reputation with constituents and nurture electoral support for his candidature — crucial given the exceptionally popular, voter-controlled conditions of the state and the emerging value of popular legitimacy to the senatorial selection process.

3.3.4 *Widespread Candidate Recognition*

Before discussing the third prong of the strategy — the coordinated public campaign to mobilize turnout and win doubtful districts — it is first necessary to explore the extent to which candidate recognition obtained during the election, namely, how widely Fairbanks’ candidacy

²⁸⁵ Fairbanks to A.W. Machen, August 9, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

was reported, whether it was well known to the public, and how his re-election bid factored into each party's respective campaigns. Given Indiana's exceptionally popular conditions, the caliber of the candidates was instrumental in choosing a senator, contributing to an element of visibility and direct, public accountability.

Fairbanks enjoyed high favorability ratings. The senator was broadly popular among Hoosiers, and enormously so among the party faithful. By 1902, Fairbanks was even considered presidential timber — a leading candidate among the traditional, conservative wing of Republican Party, possibly to challenge Theodore Roosevelt for the nomination in 1904. Many newspapers testified to the depth of this affection. *The Sheridan News* claimed, “The absence of opposition to Senator Fairbanks ... is a proof incontrovertible that the people of Indiana feel that the state ... is fortunate in having at her command the services of a distinguished statesman who has served them ... so well,” going on to state, “His retention ... is a pleasure as well as a duty.”²⁸⁶ Describing the sentiment of most Republicans, *The Richmond Item* declared, “Senator Fairbanks ... has given the ticket an other [*sic*] element of strength.”²⁸⁷ *The Indianapolis Journal* explained how “the immense popularity of Senator Fairbanks” was contributing favorably to the strength of down-ballot races. “The political situation in [Orange] [C]ounty never before appeared better.”²⁸⁸ And Frank B. Posey, a leading Republican official from Evansville, characterized “the return of Senator Fairbanks ... [as] a great incentive to Republicans.”²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ *The Sheridan News*, August 1, 1902, p 4.

²⁸⁷ *The Richmond Item*, October 21, 1902, p 2.

²⁸⁸ *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 28, 1902, p 2.

²⁸⁹ *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 31, 1902, p 2.

With a widely popular incumbent at their disposal, Republicans enthusiastically embraced riding the senator's coattails, a strategy which necessitated publicizing Fairbanks' candidature as extensively as possible. Throughout the year, friendly partisan newspapers repeatedly acknowledged the centrality of the senior senator's re-election in the upcoming legislative contests. *The Republic* reported in May that Fairbanks would be tasked with opening the fall campaign, stating, "The leaders say this is his year in Indiana, as the legislature ... will elect a United States senator for [another] term."²⁹⁰ Party leaders were even factoring Fairbanks' re-election into their scheduling plans. "The fact that Senator Fairbanks is a candidate for re-election will be taken into consideration by the speakers' bureau," noted *The Indianapolis News*.²⁹¹

Additionally, periodicals explicitly framed the election as a referendum on the incumbent senator — a method which continued rendering the selection process far more directly accountable by voters. *The Richmond Item* beseeched its readers "to get busy and roll up their usual majority," before explaining, "The success of the ticket [is] important this year because of the fact the next legislator has to choose a successor to Senator Fairbanks, and it is eminently desirable that he succeed himself." The paper boldly predicted that Republican successes would represent the death knell to Bryanism, permanently.²⁹² Other periodicals pegged local and districtwide Republican strength to the senator's re-election. *The Republic* boasted, "The [R]epublican [P]arty will carry Bartholomew [C]ounty this fall; it will elect the [R]epublican state ticket; it will elect the next legislature; it will elect Senator Fairbanks to succeed himself."²⁹³ Mayor

²⁹⁰ *The Republic*, May 17, 1902, p 1.

²⁹¹ *The Indianapolis News*, August 15, 1902, p 3.

²⁹² *The Richmond Item*, August 25, 1902, p 4.

²⁹³ *The Republic*, June 21, 1902, p 4.

Charles Bookwalter of Indianapolis predicted, “Marion [C]ounty ... will send a solid delegation to the [l]egislature this winter to vote for the return of Charles W. Fairbanks.”²⁹⁴ And toward the end of the campaign, *The Republic* emphasized, “To [re-elect Fairbanks] is to give special attention to the election of their legislative candidates, and to see that the full [R]epublican vote is out on [E]lection [D]ay.”²⁹⁵

By contrast, the Democrats were reticent to openly conduct a public campaign for mass support. The leading Democratic senatorial aspirant was Thomas Taggart, former mayor of Indianapolis. His chief rival for the nomination was former congressman Benjamin Shively. Through his financial means and political connections, Taggart had effectually outmaneuvered Shively to emerge as the frontrunner.²⁹⁶ As early as July, the former mayor’s desire to succeed Fairbanks in the Senate was publicly known and generally acknowledged by the press.²⁹⁷ Just days before the election, *The Republic* exclaimed, “If the [D]emocrats should carry the legislature, Tom Taggart will be a candidate for United States senator.”²⁹⁸

Despite the visible nature of his candidacy, Taggart did not embark upon any meaningful public campaigns to extensively advertise his name or convey his positions on important state and national issues — in keeping with the party’s decision to manage a low-key campaign. Instead, Taggart had committed to privately canvassing legislative candidates for their support. According to *The Richmond Item*, Taggart was “setting up the pins for the Democratic legislators

²⁹⁴ *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 7, 1902, p 2.

²⁹⁵ *The Republic*, October 17, 1902, p 4.

²⁹⁶ *The Republic*, November 1, 1902, p 4.

²⁹⁷ *The Richmond Item*, July 23, 1902, p 1.

²⁹⁸ *The Republic*, November 1, 1902, p 4.

in the close districts ... He has picked out the men whom he thinks can make the strongest fights.” In return, he offered “spiritual encouragement” as well as “more substantial means of meeting the enemy,” — an obvious reference to Taggart’s wealth. *The Item* maintained that these activities were “not generally known,” so we cannot determine how extensively it was conducted.²⁹⁹ Taggart’s machinations supplemented the more concerted action by the Democratic Party organization to mobilize turnout and shore up support in crucial districts.

Since the Democratic camp, including their senatorial candidate, were not publicly canvassing for support, they focused their energies on Senator Fairbanks. As a result, they were as committed to framing the election as a referendum on the popular senator as were the Republicans — jointly contributing to greater direct accountability of the senator, public input by the voters, and democratization of the selection process. However, a split emerged in the party over a proper strategy to deal with the venerated incumbent. Some Democrats did not believe Fairbanks could be bested. A former senator from Seymour, Joseph Shea, offered an exceedingly bullish prognostication over the summer that Democrats would sweep nationwide races and make inroads in Indiana. Although he expected “the lower house in the Indiana [l]egislature [to be] Democratic, [h]e [did] not insist that Senator Fairbanks will be defeated.”³⁰⁰ Even the most optimistic of scenarios could not countenance a Fairbanks defeat.

Sensing inevitability and invincibility in the Republican candidate’s prospects, some Democratic legislators sought to localize the election by decoupling individual, down-ballot races from the senator’s electoral fortunes. In a revealing letter, J. L. C. McAdams informed Fair-

²⁹⁹ *The Richmond Item*, July 23, 1902, p 1.

³⁰⁰ *The Indianapolis Journal*, August 7, 1902, p 10.

banks, “Then [*sic*] [D]emocratic candidate for representative in this county is winning over some [R]epublican friends by stating that there is absolutely no danger whatever to you ... The [D]emocratic candidate is doing this personally.”³⁰¹ *The Indianapolis Journal* raised the issue, as well, contending, “It is frequently the case that voters are induced by personal appeals or friendliness to Democratic candidates for the [l]egislature to vote for them. Too often personal dislike or prejudice leads Republicans to vote for Democratic candidates.” *The Journal* urged readers to resist localizing the races and focus on the national importance of the vote.³⁰²

The Republican effort to emphasize Fairbanks’ popularity, his record of service, and the accomplishments of the Republican Party in achieving favorable economic conditions constituted the *nationalization effect* — the transforming of all down ballot races into a referendum on the national environment. As the incumbent party, Republicans clearly understood the advantageous position they enjoyed and effectively pursued ways to capitalize upon their edge. Confronted by these headwinds, Democrats sought to decouple the candidacy of Fairbanks — and other national factors — from state legislative races, essentially localizing these contests so, instead, voters could weigh municipal and county issues and take into account the caliber of the candidates themselves -- wherein Democrats believed they held a better chance of success.

In many respects, Republicans were urging their voters to support the ticket *a la* a parliamentary system, whereby the leader of the party would be returned to office — albeit in an indirect manner — so long as the majority of seats in the legislature are claimed by the party. Ideally for the senator, the lion’s share of those Republicans *should* comprise Fairbanks loyalists.

³⁰¹ J.L.C. McAdams to Fairbanks, October 10, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁰² *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 28, 1902, p 4.

Thus, the importance of parties in the electoral equation. By contrast, Democrats were insisting that Hoosiers vote on an individual basis for the quality of the local candidates — resisting the temptation to consider the fate of Senator Fairbanks.

Dismayed by the apparent lack of fight demonstrated by party leaders, other Democratic officials wanted to confront Fairbanks head-on, attempting to tarnish his image and reputation outright. *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette* accused Fairbanks of “voting away the people’s money as subsidies to trusts and combines,” and pleaded with Hoosiers to “vote for an anti-subsidy senator.”³⁰³ In a lengthier indictment, *The Journal Gazette* lambasted Fairbanks as “not a man of the people.” Instead, “he is a defender and advocate of the trusts, as his record in the [S]enate proves.” The periodical characterized Fairbanks as “a trust-made millionaire, a trust-owned statesman, and a trust-controlled politician.” By contrast, it declared, “The [D]emocratic candidates ... will vote for a man who represents popular government and popular right.”³⁰⁴ *The Daily News Democrat* concurred, exclaiming, “Mr. Fairbanks had not made a record in the [S]enate of which the people of Indiana can be proud.”³⁰⁵

The Hancock Democrat excoriated Fairbanks and Beveridge as “two tools of Wall [S]treet,” highlighting the election as an opportunity for Democrats to “vote for the people’s interest; for men who will represent the people instead of misrepresenting them.”³⁰⁶ And on the eve of the election, *The Daily News Democrat* succinctly framed the election as an indirect means of passing judgment on Senator Fairbanks and his record. “Don’t loose [*sic*] sight of the

³⁰³ *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, October 2, 1902, p 5.

³⁰⁴ *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, October 20, 1902, p 4.

³⁰⁵ *The Daily News Democrat*, October 20, 1902, p 2.

³⁰⁶ *The Hancock Democrat*, October 23, 1902, p 4.

fact that ... you are voting for the next United States senator to succeed Charles Fairbanks.” It predicted that a Republican victory would portend “more trusts, fewer jobs, higher prices on all the commodities of life ... [and] the creating of more labor crushers.”³⁰⁷ The Democrats had centered their campaign as a referendum on Senator Fairbanks, as well, but without offering a clear-cut alternative, other than vague promises of a better future.

Democrats had taken Fairbanks to task on shipping subsidies, the tariff, and other votes that they considered overly-cozy with business and financial interests, who, they claimed, filled the coffers of the party’s campaign fund.³⁰⁸ But how accurate was the portrayal? As noted, Fairbanks was a business mogul, having served as a legal expert and financier for railroad companies and claiming partial ownership over the *Indianapolis News* — “three-quarters interest” — and the *Indianapolis Journal* — “four-fifths of the capital stock.” According to Donald Ritchie, the Hoosier Republican’s “ownership of these papers became public knowledge only after the reading of his will.”³⁰⁹ But evidently, rival newspapers *did* level these charges against the senator during his tenure in office.³¹⁰

Concurrent service in public office and the corporate world was not uncommon. Senator Chauncey Depew (NY) was chairman of New York Central Railroad Company, among others; John Kean (NJ) was president of Elizabeth Water and Gas Companies; Nathan B. Scott (WV) was president of Central Glass Company; and Nelson Aldrich (RI) owned the Rhode Island

³⁰⁷ *The Daily News Democrat*, November 3, 1902, p 2.

³⁰⁸ *The Brookville Democrat*, September 18, 1902, p 4.

³⁰⁹ Donald A. Ritchie, “David Barry and the Loyalty of the Senate,” in *Press Gallery*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 182, accessed June 4, 2020, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvk12rkc.13>.

³¹⁰ *The Richmond Item*, April 29, 1902, p 4. *The Item* had bemoaned the biased, unfair coverage of the recent state convention by *The Indianapolis News*, and its pro-Fairbanks, anti-Beveridge bent.

Company, an amalgamation of various streetcar railway corporations. Lower-tiered offices, such as county councils, were populated by “good, practical business men,”³¹¹ as well as state legislators. One prospective nominee for the legislature — and eventual victor — James Gray, secretary and treasurer of the Evansville Grain Company, informed Fairbanks of his intention to support the incumbent for another term upon assuming office.³¹²

Industrialists, financiers, corporate magnates, and business tycoons exercised an outsized influence on political parties and the Senate, especially those states dominated by strong party systems in the East. Indiana was no different. These figures promoted their preferred policies to elected officials. *The Indianapolis Journal* reported in January that Fairbanks “received a number of strong letters from business men in the beet-sugar growing section of northern Indiana advocating continuance of the present tariff on raw sugar.”³¹³ And they directly communicated with the senior senator, offering political advice and coordinating strategy.

T.H. Jones, president of the T.H. Jones Company, Commission Merchants and Cotton Factors, cautioned Fairbanks to steer clear of a destructive political fight in Arkansas;³¹⁴ Walter W. Bonner, cashier of the Third National Bank — which had recently been selected as a government depository — debriefed Fairbanks on troubles in Decatur County, writing, “[The] [c]ounty will need some attention.”³¹⁵ T.R. McFerson, of McFerson & Foster, manufacturers of Poplar and Cottonwood Box Shooks, bemoaning the weakness of the legislative ticket in Evansville,

³¹¹ *The Republic*, November 3, 1902, p 4.

³¹² James P. Gray to Fairbanks, March 17, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³¹³ *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 4, 1902, p 1.

³¹⁴ T.H. Jones to Fairbanks, January 18, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³¹⁵ Walter Bonner to Fairbanks, May 13, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

assured the senator, “I will do all I can for it as you are interested. Will swap any thing to get votes;”³¹⁶ and Alvin Higgins, of the Terre Haute Carriage & Buggy Company, informed one Mr. J. A. Matthews, “I have made up my mind to take an active hand in the campaign from now on; not as a candidate for any office under the sun: but simply to be in the game.”³¹⁷ The portrayal of Fairbanks by the Democrats as a “trust-owned statesman” is largely accurate, considering the senator was a staunch defender of the tariff, the gold standard and other policies which the railroad, oil, sugar, steel, and other industries feverishly backed.

3.3.5 *Coordinated Public Campaign for Popular Support - Newspapers*

The third prong of Fairbanks’ strategy was a public campaign for popular support. Given the preponderance of voter-control over the selection process, cultivating popular support was absolutely critical to securing re-election. Further, the increasing significance of popular legitimacy demanded that incumbents take to the hustings and appeal to ordinary Hoosiers. Fairbanks pursued an aggressive public campaign for several principal reasons. First, he wanted to avoid complacency among supporters by mobilizing Republican voters, thereby delivering marginal districts to the party and shoring up comfortable legislative majorities. Second, the senator sought to bolster his position among Republicans and ward off any potential intra-party challenges. A strong performance in November would quell any potential disaffection from manifesting.

³¹⁶ T.R. McFerson to Fairbanks, April 17, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³¹⁷ Alvin Higgins to J.A. Matthews, January 24, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

The public campaign was constituted by the coordinated, concerted effort of partisan periodicals, the party apparatus, and Fairbanks, himself. The operation comprised two aspects: the first involved advertising and credit claiming on behalf of Fairbanks and his candidature by friendly, supportive newspapers. Since the senator remained a valuable commodity for the party, many a periodical pervasively touted his character and accomplishments, including the ever-important rural mail delivery routes. The second aspect took the form of in-person, public appearances by the senator, as well as important political surrogates. Permitting the press to praise his personal credentials allowed Fairbanks to deliver orations on Republican principles and address the salient issues of the day.

The first aspect of the public campaign centered upon the *advertising* and *credit-claiming* on behalf of Charles Fairbanks conducted exclusively by Republican-friendly newspapers. The coverage took two forms: advertising the senator's biography, endorsing his candidacy, and praising his character; *and* touting his record, lauding his accomplishments, and meting credit for constituency services. As to the former (advertising), these periodicals regularly stressed Fairbanks' stature and talents as a senator. *The Republic* declared, "Senator Fairbanks ... has attained a prominence in national affairs seldom achieved by an American statesman," before describing him as "faithful and untiring" as a "representative of the state."³¹⁸ *The Gas Belt Labor News* fawned, "[Fairbanks] [has given] the best thought and energy he possessed to the affairs of the nation,." The paper praised his "large, well disciplined brain" and "cool deliberation," before concluding, "Fairbanks has done more for the individual citizen and community than any senator

³¹⁸ *The Republic*, July 14, 1902, p 4.

Indiana has ever had.”³¹⁹ And *The Sheridan News* opined, “[Fairbanks] has demonstrated unusual ability and attained commanding influence,” saluting “his conservatism, his unswerving purpose to do what is right for the ... people, his single object the welfare of the great multitude which he has always at heart.”³²⁰

Regarding the latter (credit-claiming), supportive newspapers repeatedly emphasized the accomplishments of the Republican Party and the constituency services undertaken by Senator Fairbanks. One prevalent theme was the improving economy. Given the favorable economic conditions, Republicans were especially eager to trumpet these developments. Newspapers credited the party with the strong economic growth and general prosperity. *The Republic* boasted, “The county has ... attained a prosperity unexampled in the world’s history ... Senator Fairbanks has been not a passive spectator, but a potent factor.”³²¹ *The Indianapolis Journal* contended, “The present prosperity had its birth with the inauguration of President McKinley and the Senate in which Mr. Fairbanks first took his seat.” *The Journal* went even further, adeptly tying present economic conditions to Republican policies, in particular the Dingley Tariff. The paper asserted, “Confidence in industrial circles followed, and an era of unparalleled industrial activity set in ... Indiana has become the second glass-producing [s]tate ... [and] the farmer [is given] a degree of prosperity he had never known.”³²²

More specific to Fairbanks himself, a number of periodicals credited the senator for the implementation of rural postal delivery routes — the highly popular service which Republicans

³¹⁹ *The Fairmount News*, September 9, 1902, p 4.

³²⁰ *The Sheridan News*, October 31, 1902, p 2.

³²¹ *The Republic*, October 20, 1902, p 6.

³²² *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 14, 1902, p 4.

believed would improve their electoral position with voters in critical districts and counties. Throughout the year, these endorsements repeatedly and persistently trumpeted the newly-expanded services, and identified Fairbanks as the public official solely responsible for their provision. *The Kendallville Standard* noted, “Senator Fairbanks is winning high favor with the farming community by his earnest and energetic work in promoting rural mail delivery,” to which *The Columbia City Mail* replied, highlighting a slew of new routes inaugurated in Whitley County.³²³

As we have seen, Republican newspapers did not hesitate to position Fairbanks at the center of the push to establish new postal roads. *The Republic* emphasized that innumerable delays then plaguing the process would soon abate. “Senator Fairbanks has brought this matter to the attention of the department since his return from Indiana,” the paper declared, “The senator has been promised that the pending petitions will be taken up and disposed of without unnecessary delay.”³²⁴ *The Tribune* noted, “Senator Fairbanks has taken great interest in the project,” explaining that Lawrence County had lacked a single postal road and its people were growing “very anxious.” Accordingly, the senator “has requested ... liberal extensions of the delivery in [the county].”³²⁵ *The Columbia City Mail* was even more emphatic, proclaiming, “[These routes] stand like so many monuments to the goodness, ability and untiring conscientious efforts of Senator Fairbanks.”³²⁶

³²³ *The Indianapolis News*, February 11, 1902, p 4; *The Star Press*, March 2, 1902, p 1; *Steuben Republican*, March 5, 1902, p 5; *The Indianapolis Journal*, April 17, 1902, p1; *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, August 23, 1902, p 4; *Jackson County Banner*, October 22, 1902, p 2.

³²⁴ *The Republic*, April 29, 1902, p 8.

³²⁵ *The Tribune*, August 15, 1902, p 1.

³²⁶ *The Indianapolis News*, February 11, 1902, p 4.

3.3.6 *Coordinated Public Campaign for Popular Support - Personal Appearances*

The second aspect of the campaign comprised public appearances by Fairbanks himself and important political surrogates. These rallies were intended to energize voters, rousing them from the slumbers of complacency. Many Republicans recognized the electoral advantage of having their illustrious senator tour the state. J. L. C. McAdams wrote, “I feel that a speech by you would change matters and arouse party men to a sense of danger,” before suggesting, “Better results will be obtained if you arrange to have the meeting [in Jay County] just a few days prior to the election,” strategically utilizing the popular senator for maximum political benefit.³²⁷ Several days earlier, McAdams pleaded with Fairbanks, “The peculiar situation warrants me in stating that a speech by you in [Portland] would be productive of good results.”³²⁸ Fairbanks understood his prime position in the forthcoming election and the value of public campaigning, readily lending himself to aiding down-ballot Republicans. Writing to A. L. Brick of South Bend, the senator said, “I observe what you say with reference to my speaking in your district ... If it can be arranged so, I will be glad to have it done. I feel very much interest in your election and whatever I can do, you know will be done for you with the utmost pleasure.”³²⁹

The campaign tour was a highly-publicized affair — widely reported by the press — with Fairbanks headlining its major rallies. *The Republic* reported that Fairbanks would “bear the brunt of the speaking ... as this is regarded as his year in Indiana.”³³⁰ *The Indianapolis News* noted that Indiana’s senior senator “proposes to participate actively in the [s]tate campaign this

³²⁷ J.L.C. McAdams to Fairbanks, October 10, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³²⁸ J.L.C. McAdams to Fairbanks, October 8, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³²⁹ Fairbanks to A.L. Brick, September 5, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³³⁰ *The Republic*, June 23, 1902, p 1.

year,” spending “most of his vacation in [the state].”³³¹ And *The Tribune* described the upcoming stumping tour as “a more elaborate speaking campaign than has ever before been required for an off year,” with Fairbanks “devoted to Indiana.”³³²

The incumbent’s public campaign was intensive in effort and extensive in scale. In terms of frequency, Fairbanks delivered roughly two speeches daily. Writing to Victor Rosewater, editor of Omaha’s *The Bee*, the senator revealed, “We are just entering our campaign. I make two speeches to-morrow [September 20] and for the most of the rest of the campaign, the same number. We shall have a hard fight, but shall win without doubt.”³³³ And *The Indianapolis News* reiterated that Fairbanks was slated to deliver two speeches per day following the opening week.³³⁴ The evidentiary record supports the claim. The senator opened the campaign in Anderson on September 20, and, on multiple instances, headlined two rallies on a given day, often held in separate municipalities.³³⁵

The campaign was extensive, as well. The tour — which *The Indianapolis Journal* faithfully covered — spanned at least 35 towns and cities, comprising 32 counties, and all but one of Indiana’s thirteen congressional districts.³³⁶ Fairbanks barnstormed the state, appearing in Evansville, Rockport, Kent, Madison, and Vevay — all located in southern Indiana along the Ohio River; Terre Haute and Clinton in the west on the Wabash River; South Bend and Val-

³³¹ *The Indianapolis News*, July 3, 1902, p 8.

³³² *The Tribune*, August 12, 1902, p 1.

³³³ Fairbanks to Victor Rosewater, September 19, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³³⁴ *The Indianapolis News*, September 13, 1902, p 3.

³³⁵ *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 20, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 27, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 17, 1902, p 4; *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 21, 1902, p 1.

³³⁶ “Guide: Apportionment: Reapportionment in Indiana,” *Indiana University: Bloomington*. I could not verify the 12th congressional district.

paraiso, outside Gary, in the north; Wayne County in the east; Indianapolis at the nexus, and numerous other localities in between, such as LaFayette, Greensburg, and Kokomo, where he closed the campaign.³³⁷ The intensity in effort attests to the competitiveness of Indiana's general elections, the seriousness of Fairbanks' commitment to public campaigns, and the rising stature of popular legitimacy undergirding the senatorial selection process.

In his orations, Fairbanks propounded Republican principles and highlighted his positions on contemporary issues. With friendly, supportive periodicals managing the advertising and credit-claiming dimension of the operation, the senator could afford to rise above personal entreaties and wax poetic over party ideals. Characterizing Republicans as "the party of progress," Fairbanks proclaimed, "It stands for those principles which are the very life of advance. It holds out to you hope and opportunity. It has widened the theater of your action." Fairbanks continued, "The destiny of the republic is what we make it ... The Republican [P]arty ... has served the country wisely and patriotically," before declaring, "Let the young men of Indiana ... aid in carrying our country forward in the way of peace, honor and prosperity, and to the highest and best destiny."³³⁸

Aspirational eloquence aside, much of the senator's addresses centered upon itemizations of the party's stances on national issues. In discussing the currency question, Fairbanks blasted free silver as "a monetary policy which would create commercial embarrassment and untold

³³⁷ *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 30, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal* October 27, 1902, p 8; *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 28, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 23, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 28, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 5, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, November 1, 1902, p 1; *The Richmond Item*, September 25, 1902, p 1; *The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, November 3, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 27, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 21, 1902, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, November 4, 1902, p 1.

³³⁸ *The Fort Wayne Daily News*, September 22, 1902, p 7.

ruin.” Fairbanks reassured voters, “So long as the [R]epublican [P]arty is in power there need be no concern as to the maintenance of the gold standard.” On trade, the senator affirmed his allegiance to protective tariffs, but remained amenable to revision when necessitated by the interests of the nation, explaining, “When the time for revision comes it must be done by the friends of a protective tariff and not by its enemies.”³³⁹ And on trusts, Fairbanks argued that the word was used improperly “to all large combinations of capital” regardless of whether they were “beneficial or injurious.” The senator went on to link trusts with the tariff, contending that most of the large trusts tended to “deal in commodities which are on the free list.” Accordingly, “The overthrow of the protective policy would not, in the opinion of the ... party, work the destruction of trusts, but would destroy enterprise and bring embarrassment to industry.”³⁴⁰ According to Fairbanks, the monetary and trade policies enacted by Republicans had a markedly positive impact on the economic life of the nation.³⁴¹

Crucially, Fairbanks explicated upon rural mail routes, implicitly touting his own achievement in extending the service throughout Indiana by praising the party for its commitment. He described the service as “one of the most beneficent developments of Republican administration.” Fairbanks enumerated “704 rural routes in operation ...[over] 14,080 square miles ... serv[ing] ... a total population of 353,000,” and ambitiously promised, “We shall go forward until the service is extended so that the mails will be delivered daily at the home of every farmer in Indiana.” It is noteworthy that the senator publicly credited the party for the expansion of the popular rural route service. Since Fairbanks was so instrumental in the provision of these roads

³³⁹ *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 21, 1902, p 1.

³⁴⁰ *The Republic*, September 30, 1902, p 6.

³⁴¹ *The Republic*, September 30, 1902, p 5.

and, with newspapers concomitantly advertising his strenuous efforts to secure them, the senator's emphasis of the issue represented a subtle, yet significant example of personal credit-claiming — essential for senators in raising their profile with constituents and nurturing positive connections with voters.³⁴²

One of the prime motivations for Fairbanks' public campaigns was to mobilize turnout and strengthen his position within the party. Achieving these objectives required that the incumbent couple his personal popularity with down-ballot candidates, thereby tying together their electoral fortunes and bolstering his own standing among party regulars and legislative nominees — the *nationalization effect*. The senator desired to translate his vast popular standing among Hoosiers into electoral support for Republicans at the polls — thereby enlarging the majority in the legislature and, more importantly, the pool of Fairbanks partisans in the party caucus — ergo quashing any potential for intra-party disaffection to organize into a coherent challenge to his reelection bid. During the campaign tour, Fairbanks extolled the virtues and caliber of numerous Republican office-seekers in each county and district. When he arrived at Terre Haute on September 27, he “paid a high compliment to the Republican candidate of Vigo [C]ounty,” before praising the congressional nominee, E.C. Holliday, as “conscientious high minded and capable.” He went on to sing the praises of a bevy of additional nominees, as well.³⁴³ As Fairbanks concluded the canvass, his closing pitch to voters was essentially to maintain the status quo and avoid disrupting the fruitful conditions which had materialized. Whether Hoosiers wanted to

³⁴² *The Fort Wayne Daily News*, September 22, 1902, p 7.

³⁴³ *The Indianapolis Journal*, September 28, 1902, p 1.

gamble on an uncertain future offered by the Democrats or continue with the favorable economic environment as proven by the Republicans must be “answer[ed] ... at the ballot box.”³⁴⁴

To supplement Fairbanks’ personal appearances, the campaign hosted important political surrogates to headline rallies, as well. Through *credit-claiming* and *position-taking*, these surrogates heaped additional praise onto the party, and Senator Fairbanks. The two biggest Republican figures of the day were President Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Mark Hanna of Ohio. After managing McKinley’s successful 1896 and 1900 presidential campaigns, Mark Hanna had been elected to the United States Senate. Fairbanks was pivotal enlisting their support and managing their visits to achieve maximum political effect.

President Theodore Roosevelt was slated to visit Indiana on his Midwest tour that fall. In July, Terre Haute attorney A.M. Higgins broached the idea to Senator Fairbanks of having the president appear in his city. “While the president’s visit would be of a purely non-partizan character ... it will be of unusual benefit to us to have a [R]epublican president meet the people face to face and especially as it will be in the campaign.” He requested the senator “to intercede for this city in that respect.”³⁴⁵ Higgins recognized the immense power which the image of the presidency commanded, where even non-political events would redound to the benefit of the occupant’s party. Fairbanks promised he would “bring the matter to [Roosevelt’s] attention at once and see if it cannot be arranged that the stop may be made.”³⁴⁶ As Roosevelt’s arrival neared, the senator entertained further requests for the president to appear in their districts.³⁴⁷

³⁴⁴ *The Indianapolis Journal*, November 2, 1902, p 1.

³⁴⁵ A.M. Higgins to Fairbanks, July 10, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁴⁶ Fairbanks to A.M. Higgins, July 12, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁴⁷ Fairbanks to A.L. Brick, September 5, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

In the early morning hours of September 23, President Roosevelt arrived in Logansport. By late morning, Roosevelt's trip culminated in Indianapolis, where he was received by the state's two senators.³⁴⁸ At Tomlinson Hall, the colonel appeared before veterans of the Spanish-American War. Roosevelt "spoke extemporaneously, talking to the people with a freedom devoid of formal expressions of any kind." The president mostly adhered to recounting the Spanish-American War, the importance of a strong navy, and "a discussion of good citizenship." Roosevelt's second appearance was held at the Columbia Club, where he delivered a brief speech to the throngs of people who had crowded Monument Place.³⁴⁹ Ultimately, Roosevelt's speaking engagements were to be limited. Although the trip to Indiana was largely a success, it was cut short due to an infection requiring immediate surgery.

Senator Mark Hanna had become an immensely popular figure among the party faithful. Any number of campaign appearances by the Ohio Republican promised to generate enthusiasm for the state ticket. On May 22, State Committee Chairman James Goodrich wrote to Fairbanks, "I should like very much to see Senator Hanna make some speeches in Indiana at some time during the campaign, perhaps during the month of October." The chairman requested Fairbanks to "talk the matter over with Senator Hanna and see what can be done about it," before deferring to his judgment, "If you think it advisable to do so, I can write a letter direct to him, but would not want to do this unless you thought it best."³⁵⁰ Several weeks later, Meredith Nicholson, president of the Contemporary Club, submitted a similar appeal. "[We] would very much like to have

³⁴⁸ *Princeton Daily Clarion*, September 23, 1902, p 1.

³⁴⁹ *Indianapolis Journal*, September 24, 1902, p 1.

³⁵⁰ James Goodrich to Fairbanks, May 22, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

Senator Hannah speak ... in October,” describing the Ohioan as “a great card for us to have,” and concluding, “We shall be very grateful to you for this favor.”³⁵¹

Fairbanks was receptive to inviting Hanna to speak in Indiana, recognizing the utility of his colleague’s gravitas in stirring up enthusiasm for the Republican ticket — and his own re-election. He assured Judge Frank S. Roby that he would “see that Mr. Hanna delivers a speech in Portland as you suggest.”³⁵² On July 10, Fairbanks extended his invitation to Senator Hanna, enclosing the telegram from Chairman Goodrich and the State Committee. “I hope you can give us a few speeches after the President has been here,” Fairbanks suggested. “It would be better that your meeting should come after that.” The Hoosier Republican was likely strategizing to maximize the impact of Hanna’s visit on the electorate.

On July 25, Hanna replied to another Fairbanks letter with a degree of caution, “I would be only too glad to visit Indiana for one or two meetings in the [f]all if it is possible,” he began, “but it seems that the matter got into the newspapers, and if I accepted all the invitations I am receiving from your state, I would not be able to devote much time to Ohio.” Therefore, he asked to “let the matter rest on uncertainty until I can decide.”³⁵³ A close Fairbanks friend, Frederick Landis, confirmed that Hanna would be constrained. “It is not going to be possible for [him] to give very much time to this state,” Landis lamented.³⁵⁴

Six weeks later, on September 9, Fairbanks delivered a follow-up request to Hanna, treating the matter delicately, while emphasizing the high regard felt for the Ohioan by many

³⁵¹ Meredith Nicholson to Fairbanks, June 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁵² Fairbanks to Frank S. Roby, June 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁵³ Mark Hanna to Fairbanks, July 25, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁵⁴ Frederick Landis to Fairbanks, August 13, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

Hoosiers. Fairbanks began, "I trust you have not entirely forgotten our great desire to have you visit the state during the campaign," before reiterating, "You can not appreciate the wish of our people to have you come." Then, he shifted to a more deferential tone, "Suit your own convenience. We will accommodate ourselves to you ... I will see that proper arrangements are made for you," before reassuring Hanna, "If you can not make more than one speech, we will be satisfied with that. Do the best you can for us. We shall be perfectly content with whatever you shall feel is best for yourself and your own health."³⁵⁵ Evidently, Fairbanks' gambit worked. On September 11, Hanna replied, "I will be very glad ... to make a speech in Indiana this [f]all ... I will see if it cannot be arranged so that I can go to Indiana for one meeting in October." He explained that the "demands upon me" in Ohio were so great that he could not "leave for a longer time than one day."³⁵⁶ Thereafter, it was agreed that Hanna would appear at Evansville, Indianapolis, and South Bend on his visit in late October.³⁵⁷

Hanna's upcoming visit to Indiana was hailed as a major feat for Hoosier Republicans. *The Washington Post* reported, "After considerable effort, the Republican State committee has secured the Senator for two days." It explained that Hanna's appearance "has been planned to rally the labor vote to the Republican ticket." According to *The Post*, "The enthusiasm over Senator Hanna ... appears to have taken a wonderful hold upon the members of organized labor, especially the miners. The greatest demand for his services as a speaker comes from the mining districts of the state."³⁵⁸ Given the competitive conditions in Indiana, the parties were ever eager

³⁵⁵ Fairbanks to Mark Hanna, September 9, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁵⁶ Mark Hanna to Fairbanks, September 11, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁵⁷ Fairbanks to M.D. Woodford, October 5, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁵⁸ *The Washington Post*, October 13, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IHS.

to find ways of broadening their appeal and widening their electoral coalitions. Hoosier Republicans sincerely hoped that Hanna's visit would effectually shore up support amongst laborers, miners, and other manual workers.

On October 23, the long-awaited visit by Senator Hanna commenced in Evansville, where he spoke for a brief period on economic and industrial matters, pleading with voters to "let well enough alone."³⁵⁹ The visitor's addresses were described as "heart-to-heart talks to the people." Throughout his speeches, Hanna burnished the character and reputation of his colleague. In Hartford City, the Ohioan lauded the "unrivalled prosperity," and urged the attendees, "You should feel it your patriotic duty to send to Congress ... the men who will execute your will. Send Fairbanks and Beveridge back to the Senate by all means." And at Bunker Hill, Hanna extolled the senior senator's "eminent abilities and loyal patriotism," proclaiming, "No man in the Senate ... is respected more highly ... has any wider influence nor ... has exerted more of that influence in the support of the McKinley administration and all through his public life than has Senator Fairbanks ... You should be proud of him and in sending him back to the United States Senate."³⁶⁰

3.3.6 *Republican Landslide and Legislative Deference*

Republicans scored a smashing victory in the 1902 midterm elections. The outcome — which saw them consolidate their gains from the previous election — confirmed their status as the majority party. In the U.S. House of Representatives, the party gained thirteen seats to claim

³⁵⁹ *The Fort Wayne Daily News*, October 23, 1902, p 8.

³⁶⁰ *The Indianapolis Journal*, October 25, 1902, p 2.

200 seats, whilst the Democrats lost ten seats — from 161 to 151.³⁶¹ In the U.S. Senate, Republicans netted three seats for a total of 56 members. Although the Democrats increased their ranks by six, their gains generally came at the expense of Populists and Silver Republicans. Ultimately, they only mustered 32 members in total.³⁶² These results were replicated in Indiana. Republicans remained firmly in control of the lower house — gaining five seats for a 66-to-34 advantage. In the upper chamber, they claimed two additional seats for a total of 35. Democrats were left with a paltry 15 state senators, which represented their second-worst showing in the Indiana State Senate since before the Civil War.³⁶³

Observers credited the great Republican successes to the centrality of Fairbanks's candidature during the election and the senator's intensive public campaigning efforts. *The Republic* determined, "Throughout the state the Republican legislative ticket led the local candidates. This was, of course, due to the strength of ... Senator Fairbanks, whose re-election depended upon the result, and whose strong campaign added much to the chances of Republican victory." The periodical even quoted Democrats who conceded, "The result would have been much more favorable to [their] party had Senator Fairbanks' re-election to the ... [S]enate not been so prominent an issue in the campaign."³⁶⁴

Congratulatory letters and telegrams flooded Fairbanks' office, echoing the same theme. "The result ... is grand ... to which ... you contributed far more than any one else," said C. E.

³⁶¹ "Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present," U.S. House of Representatives.

³⁶² "Party Division," U.S. Senate.

³⁶³ Dubin, *Party Affiliations*, 61.

³⁶⁴ *The Republic*, November 5, 1902, p1.

Cowgill.³⁶⁵ Some well-wishers identified Fairbanks' popularity as critical to the election. Will David wrote, "Our [s]enior [s]enator was worth many thousands of votes to the Republican [P]arty."³⁶⁶ Others touted the campaign itself. Jesse Overstreet praised Fairbanks' "personal work and the very efficient management of the campaign."³⁶⁷ Will Whittaker extolled the senator's "splendid assistance and personal work" he had given.³⁶⁸ Congressman James Watson described "the gratifying results" and his appreciation for "the assistance which you gave me by your public addresses in my [d]istrict."³⁶⁹ T. R. McFerson explained to the senator the impact of his speech on voters in Evansville, which persuaded Democrats to support the ticket.³⁷⁰ And Eugene Bundy summed it up succinctly, "Your candidacy for re-election was a tower of strength to the ticket."³⁷¹

The Republican Party's stupendous success in 1902 represented a popular mandate for Senator Charles Fairbanks. Owing to the centrality of his candidacy, immense popularity, and diligent, vigorous public campaigning, the senator was primarily responsible for the Republican victory — a clear-cut example of direct, public accountability. In essence, the party owed their fortunes to the venerable incumbent. The sweeping results virtually assured Fairbanks of his re-election by the state legislature. As *The New York Evening Post* declared, "The result insures ... the re-election of Senator Fairbanks, and is considered by enthusiastic friends to strengthen the

³⁶⁵ C.E. Cowgill to Fairbanks, November 5, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁶⁶ Will David to Fairbanks, November 5, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁶⁷ Jesse Overstreet to Fairbanks, November 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁶⁸ Will Whitaker to Fairbanks, November 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁶⁹ James Eli Watson to Fairbanks, November 8, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁷⁰ T.R. McFerson to Fairbanks, November 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁷¹ Eugene Bundy to Fairbanks, November 9, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

presidential boom of the latter.”³⁷² O.H. Montgomery, lawyer from Seymour, agreed, “The large majority ... makes your return to the Senate incontestable.”³⁷³ Even the senator himself recognized the decision as a *fait accompli*, writing to Eugene G. Hay, “I am pleased to say that there is no opposition to my re-election.”³⁷⁴

The large Republican majorities in the legislature meant that any potential insurgencies would likely not materialize. Fairbanks’ strong public standing and strenuous work on behalf of Republican candidates bolstered his position within the party and effectively warded off rumblings of discontent. On January 21, 1903, both houses of the legislature convened in a joint session to canvass their votes cast for United States senator. Fairbanks — who had been unanimously nominated by the Republican caucus — collected 66 votes in the State House and 35 votes in the State Senate, winning “every Republican member” present. Although Thomas Taggart had actively courted candidates for support, he failed in his bid for the Democratic nomination, losing to former congressman Benjamin F. Shively of South Bend.³⁷⁵ Shively received 31 votes in the State House and 13 votes in the State Senate. Three Democratic legislators were not present.³⁷⁶ See **Figure 3.5** charting the final vote breakdown. The unanimity in Republican support for Fairbanks was a recognition of the senator’s service to the party and state. Ultimately, the state legislature acted in accordance with a parliamentary-styled democracy, as the majority

³⁷² *The New York Evening Post*, November 8, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IHS.

³⁷³ O.H. Montgomery to Fairbanks, November 7, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.

³⁷⁴ Fairbanks to Eugene G. Hay, November 6, 1902, *Fairbanks papers*, IU.


³⁷⁵ Complete figures of the Democratic caucus vote are scarce.

³⁷⁶ *The Indianapolis News*, January 7, 1903, p 4; *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 13, 1903, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 21, 1903, p 1; *The Indianapolis Journal*, January 22, 1903, p 2; *The Fort Wayne Weekly Journal Gazette*, January 22, 1903, p 7.

party rewarded their leader with another term in office. Further, the body deferred to the “will of the people” as manifested by the results of the general election, by choosing a popular incumbent whose re-election was at the center of the campaign and whose service was critical to the outcome. Public sentiment and popular legitimacy were essential elements to the senatorial selection process.

Figure 3.5

Vote of the Indiana State Legislature for Senator, January 1903



SOURCE: *The Fort Wayne Weekly Journal Gazette*, January 22, 1903, p 7

3.3.8 *Analysis*

The 1902 case study demonstrates the import of public campaigns in Indiana, which were a critical feature of the state's elections. Under the exceptionally popular conditions, popular legitimacy mattered a great deal in settling the question of the senatorship, even if the incumbent evinced a measure of confidence in ultimate victory. Senator Fairbanks repeatedly expressed his assuredness that Republicans would prevail in the election, and his perceptions aligned closely with the political and economic realities which predominated. But the senator was not driven into a sense of complacency or overconfidence. Rather, Fairbanks endeavored to undertake a vigorous, intensive, and widespread statewide stumping tour to cultivate electoral support amongst voters.

Further, the 1902 election attests to how pervasively the element of personality infused the selection process. Fairbanks' candidature for re-election, personal popularity, and public campaigns factored greatly in the general election and contributed to the massive Republican victory. Enjoying the fruits of prosperity, Hoosiers were likely in a status-quo mood, eager to reward the incumbent party for its aptitude, competence, and achievements. But we cannot ignore that Fairbanks' candidacy enhanced the magnitude of the final result, especially given that legislative candidates ran ahead of county-level tickets. The voters understood that the election represented a referendum on Senator Fairbanks — his character, record, and service — and they resoundingly approved. Alas, there was not an equally vibrant Democratic campaign advertising their leading senatorial candidate's positions due to the uncharacteristically low-key operation which they pursued. Although Thomas Taggart had been a public aspirant for the Senate, he was

not engaging in any public campaigns, in the traditional sense of the term. Ultimately, he fell short in his nomination by the Democratic caucus, anyway.

Additionally, Fairbanks skillfully utilized *constituency services* to offer material incentives for popular, political support. As chairman of the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, the senator was instrumental in facilitating the implementation and extension of rural postal delivery routes, which had a beneficial effect on Republican support in the affected counties. His efforts were widely reported by the network of friendly Republican newspapers, who publicized their enlargement and credited the work to Senator Fairbanks. Indeed, much of Fairbanks' credit-claiming and advertising were conducted by party periodicals and important political surrogates, such as Mark Hanna. By allowing newspapers and surrogates to praise his character and service, Fairbanks rose above personal aggrandizement in his public campaign addresses to deliver orations on Republican principles, achievements, and positions. However, he was not wholly averse to highlighting the accomplishments on the issue of rural route services, implicitly claiming credit for their expansion, as well.

Finally, following the election, Fairbanks was duly rewarded by those legislative candidates who had benefited from his diligent efforts in managing the campaign operation. Mobilizing turnout, energizing voters, and increasing Republican ranks had the concomitant effect of bolstering his position and strengthening his grip over the party. The state legislature's decision to select Fairbanks to another six-year term was merely a formality, ratifying the decision of the voters to support a popular incumbent in a campaign which was extensively advertised and widely publicized.

The elements of public campaigns, personality, constituency services, and down-ticket parliamentary style support constituted adaptations by the parties to the burgeoning sense of popular legitimacy and represented their responsiveness to the democratizing trends afoot, collectively contributing to greater public accountability of incumbent senators, wider popular input in the selection process, and ever-more visible public officials.

3.4 1910 - Beveridge's Insurgent Campaign Fails to Stem Democratic Tide

The themes illustrated by the 1898 and 1902 senatorial elections — public accountability, visibility, and responsiveness — were pronounced to an even greater degree in 1910. Once more, the personalities of the leading contenders were critical, often taking precedence over the issues. In fact, the senatorial candidacies *were* the overriding issue of the campaign. Unlike the previous two elections — which represented referenda on the incumbent senators — the 1910 election presented a clear choice between two publicly-nominated aspirants dueling for the support of ordinary Hoosiers: Senator Albert Beveridge (R) and John W. Kern (D). The personality-driven nature of the contest served to foster greater visibility and public accountability of the incumbent senator, and, to a lesser extent, the pretender to the throne.

Furthermore, vigorous public campaigns for popular support remained crucial to securing victory and these canvasses were conducted with great fanfare. In his quest for re-election, Beveridge undertook an aggressive, hands-on operation: managing his campaign, personally strategizing over his outreach, and pursuing novel means of self-promotion to a degree hitherto unseen. These campaigns reflected the increasingly wider popular input in the senatorial selection process.

Additionally, Beveridge greatly diverged from his predecessors in his approach to party fidelity. Whereas in the previous cases, popular support afforded senators a modicum of autonomy from their party labels, they still operated within the confines of the traditional model of inter-party competition — bolstering party unity and mobilizing party loyalists to join forces in waging the battle against the opposing party at the height of the general election. However, Beveridge turned that formula on its head, instead launching an all-out war against traditionalists and party loyalists of both stripes. Perceiving limited electoral appeal by adhering to party fidelity, the senator repeatedly emphasized his independence from Republicans in an effort to resonate with independent-minded voters — responding to the increasingly nebulous notions of partisan identification and party affiliation.

Ultimately, Beveridge was unsuccessful stemming the tide against him. Democratic enthusiasm was too strong to overcome and antipathy toward Republicans and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff too great. Despite his greatest exertions to the counteract it, the senator was undone by the *nationalization effect* — whereby his contest was translated into a referendum on the national environment and the deeply unpopular Republican brand. Further, Beveridge's insurgency campaign overestimated his ability to attract traditional conservatives to the fold, whom were more than pleased to see the paragon of the progressives go down to defeat. The state legislature subsequently selected John W. Kern to succeed Beveridge, deferring to the publicly-nominated candidate of the majority party in the November results.

3.4.1 *Adverse Political Conditions*

Albert Jeremiah Beveridge was first elected to the Senate in 1898, besting an expansive field of Republican contenders and ousting the incumbent Democrat David Turpie. Thereupon, he was handily re-elected in 1904, riding the coattails of the popular president, Theodore Roosevelt, and again benefiting from a favorable climate. Yet, as the senior senator prepared to mount his bid for a third term, ominous storm clouds were gathering overhead. The political environment had grown ever-more adverse for the long governing Republican Party and these headwinds were threatening Beveridge's chances of winning re-election.

At the state level, much of the trouble stemmed from an unforced error. In 1905, Governor Frank Hanly assumed office. Hanly, an ardent prohibitionist, had consistently advocated for a temperance law in the state. By 1908, the Republican legislature finally enacted a county local liquor option, which effectually discontinued the sale of alcohol in 70 of its 92 counties.³⁷⁷ In their attempts to have the cumbersome law repealed, many brewers were driven away from the Republican Party, as Democrats successfully capitalized on their displeasure.³⁷⁸ The 1908 elections produced a sensational victory for Democrats, ending their long years in the political wilderness. Their candidate, Thomas R. Marshall, was elected governor over Republican James E. Watson, and they captured the lower house of the state legislature, as well.³⁷⁹ Although Re-

³⁷⁷ Dan Carden, "J. Frank Hanly," *NWI Times*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: https://www.nwitimes.com/news/special-section/history/famous-hoosiers/j-frank-hanly/image_79f762bc-e682-5411-a971-72a0dce662db.html; *The Encyclopedia of Indiana*, eds. David J. Bodenhamer and Robert G. Barrows, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1327, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <http://ulib.i-upuidigital.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/EOI>.

³⁷⁸ Albert Beveridge to J. Frank Hanly, April 15, 1910; Beveridge to Mark Sullivan, September 13, 1910; *Albert Beveridge papers*, Library of Congress.

³⁷⁹ Justin Clark, "The Crusader: J. Frank Hanly and the Election of 1916," *Hoosier State Chronicles*, September 14, 2016, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <https://blog.newspapers.library.in.gov/tag/progressive-party/>.

publicans maintained a four-seat edge in the State Senate, Democrats commanded a twenty-seat advantage in the State House.³⁸⁰ The margin was large enough to elect Democrat Benjamin F. Shively to the United States Senate, thereby denying appointee James A. Hemenway — who had succeeded Charles Fairbanks upon the latter's elevation to the vice presidency in 1905 — a full term to that body.

The stock of national Republicans was fairing no better. In 1909, William Howard Taft was inaugurated president, succeeding Theodore Roosevelt. Although highly intelligent, capable, and judicious, Taft was unable to live up to the great expectations set by his animated, gregarious predecessor. His relations with the press were cool and his approach to governing was more circumspect and reserved. As such, major legislative accomplishments went largely unnoticed, as he ceded the public discourse to political detractors who could pounce on an issue and characterize the debate on their terms. Such was the fate that had befallen the notorious Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1910.³⁸¹

Difficult economic conditions and higher prices were already contributing to a “spirit of vague discontent.”³⁸² However, much of the public's ire soon centered upon the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Although the bill actually lowered rates and duties on certain products and freed a number of others, it failed to go as far as many advocates for downward revision had desired.³⁸³ As

³⁸⁰ Dubin, *Party Affiliations*, 61.

³⁸¹ Doris Kearns Goodwin, *The Bully Pulpit: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and the Golden Age of Journalism*, (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2013), 574-575; 585-589.

³⁸² John Arthur Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), 273.

³⁸³ *Ibid*, 267-268.

such, it was a widely unpopular measure. A poll of “1,500 ... leading men” in Indiana found 74% were opposed to the tariff, while only 13% approved.³⁸⁴

Another consideration for Beveridge was the fact that his re-election coincided with the upcoming midterm election. Historically, midterm elections punish incumbent parties. But Hoosier Republicans *had* escaped largely unscathed in the two preceding midterms. In 1898 and 1902, mitigating factors, such as the patriotic fervor over the Spanish-American War (1898), the popularity of President Roosevelt (1902), and strong economy (both) served to counteract these trends. By 1910, sentiment had shifted squarely against the Republicans and the looming congressional elections were appearing grim.

3.4.2 *Fractious Partisan Fault Lines*

Beveridge’s decision to deemphasize partisan labels was rooted in the brewing intra-party civil war between conservative traditionalists and progressive reformers. During the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, progressive Republicans grew critical of their party’s overly-protective attitude toward business, specifically large corporations and conglomerations, at the expense of working Americans. In response, they argued for increasing governmental regulatory powers to redress the innumerable social and economic ails plaguing the nation, advocating for regulating and dismantling trusts and monopolies, creating safe, workable conditions for laborers, safeguarding maximum hours and minimum wages, and banning child labor, among others. And while they remained protectionists in principle, they stridently opposed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff

³⁸⁴ *Palladium-Item*, June 6, 1910, p 1.

as an unfair, regressive tax favoring businesses and trusts. The issue quickly became the rallying cry for progressive Republicans.

Albert Beveridge enlisted as a loyal foot soldier in the progressive crusade for reform. Due to the challenging, outright hostile climate for Republicans and the toxicity of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the senator astutely discerned that party fidelity promised limited appeal to the electorate. Therefore, he committed political heresy by voting against the administration and his own party on the unpopular measure. The Hoosier Republican anticipated backlash from the party, but believed his stance on the tariff would neutralize the hot-button issue in the upcoming election. Several "Republican leaders" were reported to "not agree with Senator Beveridge on the tariff question" and were "inclined to keep up the agitation."³⁸⁵ Former chairman Charles S. Hernly vocalized his reservations over Beveridge's decision. According to *The Hancock Democrat*, Hernly expressed his belief "that Senator Beveridge will not have the united support of the Republicans of Indiana ... because of his attitude ... over the tariff bill." Hernly lamented, "The trouble of the whole situation is that we haven't a Republican [P]arty any more ... There is no such thing as a united party," before predicting that Beveridge would go down to defeat due to the fissures that had emerged over protectionism.³⁸⁶ Notwithstanding the intensity of Republican bitterness over Beveridge's audacity to oppose the administration, many of the senator's ardent followers remained confident that Taft would withhold exacting a punishment for the infraction — namely by curtailing Beveridge's authority on the all-important matter of patronage. Much to

³⁸⁵ *The Richmond Item*, January 12, 1910, p 1.

³⁸⁶ *The Hancock Democrat*, January 27, 1910, p 6.

their relief, the two Republicans “[came] to an understanding ... that the president [was] not going to hold it against [the senator].”³⁸⁷

Despite Taft’s reasonably lenient response, Beveridge continued to stress his opposition to the tariff *and* also began touting his personal independence from Republicans, more generally, hoping to broaden his appeal and captivate a larger pool of voters. In his private correspondence, Beveridge regularly deemphasized traditional partisan labels. In March, the senator conveyed to E. L. McClain the considered conclusion of *Saturday Evening Post* writer Sam Blythe, “If it were an ordinary campaign ... along the old party methods ... the Republicans would be overwhelmingly defeated.”³⁸⁸ To Senator Joseph Dixon of Montana, Beveridge observed, “The truth is that party lines all over the country have pretty well disappeared ... There is no real issue now between the parties.” Resultantly, Beveridge confidently boasted, “We are going to get the entire independent vote and a great many Democratic votes as well.”³⁸⁹ Beveridge repeated his assertion to Frank Munsey of *Munsey’s Magazine*, writing, “Party lines have practically disappeared,” and to Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York, he elaborated, “This is an uprising of a people ... The old-time politicians ... are trying to crack the party whip over the shoulders of men they have listed on their books for years, but without avail.”³⁹⁰

Publicly, Beveridge touted the importance of appealing to independent voters, as well. At a banquet at the Columbia Club in Indianapolis, the senator insisted, “This very spirit of inde-

³⁸⁷ *The Times*, January 10, 1910, p 4.

³⁸⁸ Beveridge to E.L. McClain, March 14, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

³⁸⁹ Beveridge to Joseph Dixon, July 16, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

³⁹⁰ Beveridge to Frank Munsey, September 26, 1910; Beveridge to Hamilton Fish, September 26, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC

pendence will turn out to be one of the great elements of our strength. Certainly the independent spirit does exist ... The independent voter ... is with us in this campaign.”³⁹¹ And newspapers such as *The Richmond Item* lauded Beveridge’s “convictions” and “fearless[ness] [in] resist[ing] the domination of Aldrich and his machine in the [S]enate,” declaring, “Beveridge is quite secure of the votes of all our citizens who are independent of party.”³⁹² These gestures intended to advertise to the public the senator’s willingness to buck his party for the good of the people, and more generally, the outmoded nature of traditional party identities.

Furthermore, not only did Beveridge distance himself from the party, but he outright spurned any effort to reconcile with conservative Republicans and promote party unity, fearing that doing so would cede the moral high ground in his political crusade. Writing to E. M. Lee, the senior senator maintained, “The common voter is going to be almighty independent this fall ... But if we higgie-piggie, if we resort to half way measures, we are lost.” Beveridge determined, “The standpatters are not going to vote against us — there won’t be many standpatters among the voters ... by the time I close the campaign on [E]lection [D]ay.”³⁹³ He immediately denounced any attempts to “patch up differences” with the conservative faction. To Charles Remy, he bemoaned that reconciliation would reduce the campaign to “a thing of ‘shreds and patches,’” explaining, “We will lose the great moral hold we have upon the people without regard to party; the common voter will say that I am more anxious to win than I am to be right.”³⁹⁴ And he explicated further to Harry Bennett, “We will not win by the ‘getting together’ process ...

³⁹¹ *The Indianapolis Star*, February 4, 1910, p 1.

³⁹² *The Richmond Item*, April 5, 1910, p 4.

³⁹³ Beveridge to E.M. Lee, July 21, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

³⁹⁴ Beveridge to Charles Remy, July 20, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

For every vote that the ‘harmony’ plan secures to us, we will lose many an independent vote and many a Democratic vote.”³⁹⁵ Beveridge’s reformist zeal lead him to calculate a greater political benefit in alienating traditionalist voters than in accommodating them.

Entering into the electoral calculus was the *nationalization effect*. Due to the deeply unpopular Republican brand, Beveridge recognized that a national contest would advantage the Democrats and redound to his political detriment. Thus, the senator was desperately trying to prevent his race from becoming a referendum on the national environment — minimizing party labels, decoupling his candidacy from the party, and emphasizing his independence and sound judgment. Further, by placing himself at the center of the campaign, the senator rendered his candidature more visible to Hoosiers and provided a direct channel by which voters could hold him accountable. But these channels were complicated, somewhat, by the senator’s insistence on tarnishing the name of the Republican Party, whose ticket voters would need to support in order to return Beveridge to the Senate.

Beveridge’s non-partisan strategy elicited mixed reaction from the Republican press. *The Indianapolis Star* was in agreement, inquiring, “Is a platform demanded in the name of party loyalty which means certain party defeat?”³⁹⁶ Other newspapers were more despondent. *The Fort Wayne Daily News* pleaded with conservatives, “The cordial support of all [R]epublicans is just exactly what Senator Beveridge needs this year ... He cannot win as an independent or factions ... The [R]epublicans of Indiana cannot afford to quarrel this year.”³⁹⁷ And in a separate editorial, *The News* determined, “To count upon the independent vote or upon [D]emocratic sup-

³⁹⁵ Beveridge to Harry Bennett, July 20, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

³⁹⁶ *The Indianapolis Star*, March 30, 1910, p 10.

³⁹⁷ *The Fort Wayne Daily News*, March 3, 1910, p 6.

port of Senator Beveridge is to lose. There is no independent vote of proportions worth considering in Indiana and the [D]emocrats can be relied upon to support their own ticket.” The paper described “thousands of [conservative Republicans] who have been assailed,” proclaiming, “These men must be taken into account and ... common sense would dictate the extension to them of the olive branch rather than the whack of the war club over their devoted heads.”³⁹⁸ And *The Times* of Munster beseeched its readers to rise above immaterial factional differences and embrace being “a [R]epublican [R]epublican.”³⁹⁹

3.4.3 *State Convention*

As Republicans gathered in Indianapolis for their state convention in April, they were tasked with drafting their party’s platform. The platform, coupled with Senator Beveridge’s much-anticipated keynote address, would lay the groundwork for the upcoming campaign. To undergird his political crusade, Beveridge had pressed the delegates to adopt a platform of progressive principals and positions. The senator feared that pressure by Taft and so-called “stand-patters” would result in an endorsement of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. To his relief, the convention conveniently ignored the issue — a victory for the insurgents. “The platform makes declaration for a protective tariff, but only so much ... as ‘covers the difference between the cost of production here and abroad.’” And on the ever-divisive issue of the county local liquor law, the delegates once more turned a blind eye, instead opting to make Beveridge the primary issue of the election, about which I further explicate below.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁸ *The Fort Wayne Daily News*, March 11, 1910, p 8.

³⁹⁹ *The Times*, February 24, 1910, p 4.

⁴⁰⁰ *The Weekly Sentinel*, April 6, 1910, p 1.

On April 5, Beveridge fired the opening salvo of the campaign. At the outset, the senator wasted little time framing the debate as transcending party labels. “The coming battle,” he argued, “is not so much between political parties as much as between the rights of the people and the powers of pillage.”⁴⁰¹ Addressing the tariff, Beveridge artfully skirted mentioning the Payne-Aldrich measure by name, but his remarks were no less forthright. “The Republicans of Indiana are for a protective tariff which covers the difference in the cost of production here and abroad,” Beveridge thundered, “Less than that is unjust to American laborers; more than that is unjust to American consumers.” The senator went on to proclaim, “Injustice is the only foe that protection needs to fear. It was to reduce the Dingley tariff to meet changed conditions and secure justice that we undertook its revision.”

Beveridge further expounded upon the tariff commission. Having long supported the entity, the senator bemoaned its inability to effectively enforce anything meaningful, charging, “We asked for power, they gave us parley.” Beveridge also touched upon regulating unwieldy trusts, such as the railroads, banning child labor — vowing, “It must and shall be stopped,” — and conserving natural resources.⁴⁰² Concluding his battle cry, Beveridge implored voters to support his moral crusade for righteousness. “The supreme question before the voters of Indiana this fall is whether or not Indiana will stand for the new order of things, or continue the old methods which politicians of both parties have used ... for their own ends and the people’s undoing.” He glowingly predicted, “Americans will stand for justice and against privilege.”⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ *The Star Press*, April 6, 1910, p 5.

⁴⁰² *The Indianapolis News*, April 5, 1910, p 11; *The Star Press*, April 6, 1910, p 5.

⁴⁰³ *The Indianapolis News*, April 5, 1910, p 11.

Beveridge was eminently pleased with his reception at the gathering, writing to Samuel Blythe, “Greatest convention in numbers and enthusiasm in history of state,” describing how the delegates “went wild with enthusiasm when I attacked the tariff bill.”⁴⁰⁴ And to longtime friend and comrade-in-arms, Gifford Pinchot, Beveridge proudly boasted the frenzied reception to his speech. When he assailed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, “the great audience jumped to their chairs, waved hats and handkerchiefs and ... ‘made the walls of Tomlinson Hall tremble.’”⁴⁰⁵

Disenchantment with the address largely emanated from the old wing of the party, comprising the more traditional, conservative members. They criticized Beveridge’s speech for lacking any semblance of Republican adulation. According to *The Fort Wayne Sentinel*, “There was little of the waving of the flag and not enough laudation of the G.O.P. to come up to the approbation of the average party man.” Evidently, “some of the old warhorses” considered the oration “the rankest sort of political heresy.” Interestingly, one dissenter was quoted as saying “It was an excellent [D]emocratic speech ... and I fully expect to see the [D]emocrats make use of it as a campaign document.”⁴⁰⁶

Beveridge’s widely-covered appearance at the state convention illustrates the growing visibility of senators and their central role in the state elections. The incumbent’s decision to adopt a wholly Progressive platform attests to the senator’s responsiveness to the fluctuating notions partisan identification and party affiliation, for Beveridge sincerely believed voters of all stripes were desiring a progressive fighter — a position which would transcend party divisions and appeal to all Hoosiers.

⁴⁰⁴ Beveridge to Samuel G. Blythe, April 5, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁰⁵ Beveridge to Gifford Pinchot, April 21, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁰⁶ *The Fort Wayne Sentinel*, April 6, 1910, p 1.

But the episode also demonstrates the continued necessity of *party backing*. Beveridge had fashioned the Republican state apparatus in his likeness since he became the senior senator in 1905 — appointing reform-minded Republicans to political, patronage, and public offices, ironic, given the major cause of Progressivism was “clean government.” Thus, the party, so to speak, was behind Beveridge, but the senator *had* alienated many influential party figures who were out of office, such as former vice president Fairbanks and his traditionalist partisans. Conservative party members and voters enjoyed virtually no representation in the state party. Beveridge’s progressive campaign effectually alienated a significant bloc of Republicans and exacerbated fissures in the party for the foreseeable future.

3.4.4 *Senatorial Candidate Recognition*

Partly resulting from Beveridge’s strategy distancing his re-election bid from traditional party labels, an element of personality predominated the campaign. In place of straight-ticket party-based appeals, entrepreneurial contenders sparred individually for voter support in their quest for the senatorship. Thus, it became crucial that parties nominate broadly popular candidates with mass appeal to the electorate. In fact, the candidacies of the dueling senatorial aspirants became *the* driving focus of the 1910 campaign.

Beveridge was the Republicans’ choice to succeed himself in the Senate. Through a multi-step process, the party effectually nominated the incumbent for a third term. In Indiana, legislative district conventions played a crucial role choosing senatorial nominees. At the district-level, conventions nominated state senators and state representatives, wherein they pledged themselves to the incumbent senator’s re-election bid. Furthermore, the body selected delegates

to the state convention — usually held in the spring — which would collectively hand down the party’s official decision. Party officials exerted a modicum of influence over these proceedings, as well. But by 1910, district primaries — which were adopted in 1907 for municipalities with over 36,000 people — were growing increasingly more relevant to the equation.⁴⁰⁷

On January 31, statewide primaries determining delegates to the party district conventions yielded an impressive victory for Beveridge. “There was no opposition in any quarter to ... Beveridge, and he will control the new state central committee,” reported *The Daily Republican*.⁴⁰⁸ When the district conventions convened in early February, all thirteen unanimously adopted “strong and enthusiastic endorsements of Senator Beveridge.”⁴⁰⁹

Throughout the spring, county conventions convened, readily endorsing their senior senator for another term. The first convention, held in Rush County, was the most anticipated for party regulars as they were uncertain how Republicans would juggle the dicey issue of the tariff with Beveridge’s unorthodox opposition. On March 18, Rush County Republicans expressed their support for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, while endorsing Beveridge for re-election — patently ignoring the chasm between their senator and the unpopular measure.⁴¹⁰ Other conventions followed suit.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ Wendy J. Schiller and Charles Stewart, *Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seventeenth Amendment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p 112.

⁴⁰⁸ *The Daily Republican*, January 31, 1910, p 3.

⁴⁰⁹ *Princeton Daily Clarion*, February 2, 1910, p 2.

⁴¹⁰ *Palladium-Item*, March 18, 1910, p 3.

⁴¹¹ *The Huntington Herald*, March 23, 1910, p 6; *The Indianapolis News*, April 14, 1910, p 1; *The Call-Leader*, May 14, 1910, p 1.

Although conservative Republicans continued to express deep skepticism over Beveridge, the state party and its local affiliates roundly backed the senator as their party's nominee. The bifurcated nature of the Republican Party can be explained by the fact that Beveridge had not only been the state's senior senator, but, since 1909, its sole Republican. Ergo, he had readily strengthened his hold over the party machinery, leaving an indelible imprimatur on the body's apparatus and reshaping the organization in his image. But conservatives, comprising large swaths of the party, remained underrepresented within official Republican channels, namely, the many state party offices and federal positions which had been allotted to Beveridge partisans.⁴¹² The resentment of the so-called "old guard" toward — and disaffection with — Beveridge, their chief foe, had festered for years, eventually boiling over during the general election. Hence, the episodes of seeming party unity occasionally disrupted by flare-ups of discontent.

Having been overwhelmingly nominated by the Republicans, Beveridge continued to pursue a strategy of minimizing partisan labels. As we have seen, the party's standing was dismal. Americans, including Hoosiers, had grown weary of the long-reigning Republicans and were agitating for change. A Democratic enthusiasm gap was emerging, threatening to develop into a full-scale tidal wave. And with Indiana's fiercely-competitive elections, the state promised to be the apex of the battle. Beveridge's personal popularity had remained strong throughout the period and his brand was even more popular than that of his party's.⁴¹³ Therefore, it was imperative the senator harness his popularity toward winning re-election. To that end, Beveridge strove

⁴¹² *The Indianapolis News*, April 18, 1910, p 16.

⁴¹³ *Muncie Evening Press*, February 14, 1910, p 4; *Steuben Republican*, February 16, 1910, p 4.

to render his candidacy as *the* overriding issue of the campaign, drowning out the divisive tariff and other issues which might exacerbate partisan feelings among voters.

Throughout his correspondence, Beveridge repeatedly urged his supporters to adopt his candidature as the primary consideration for Hoosiers in the upcoming election. After the district conventions endorsed his re-election, Beveridge boasted to Charles Coffin, “Every district in the [s]tate passed resolutions declaring themselves for my re-election to the Senate; and in addition, that my re-election was the chief and over-shadowing issue of the campaign.”⁴¹⁴ In April, he wrote his political lieutenant Harry Bennett, “The policy of the Republican newspapers throughout the [s]tate should be to continue increasingly as they began in January to make *the* issue in the campaign my re-election to the Senate.”⁴¹⁵ And in July, the senator beseeched John Hayes in an extended letter, “Incessantly, subtly and yet openly my reelection should be made the one thing the people will talk about,” lambasting conservative editorials for highlighting issues other than his candidacy. Beveridge went on, “I note with some concern that Frank Corwin speaks of the conduct of the *News* as tending to dim what he thinks is the winning issue, my reelection to the Senate.”⁴¹⁶

Many Republican periodicals placated the senator by trumpeting his candidacy above all. *The Palladium Item* proclaimed, “The real issue of this fall’s campaign is Beveridge and not the tariff ... The people are going to make Beveridge the issue of the coming campaign.” *The Fort Wayne Daily News* described the senator as “the principal issue” of the election. *The Richmond Item* asserted, “In the minds of the Republican leaders about the only card they have to play is

⁴¹⁴ Beveridge to Charles Coffin, February 7, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴¹⁵ Beveridge to Harry Bennett, April 30, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴¹⁶ Beveridge to John Hayes, July 25, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

Senator Beveridge and his record on the tariff question,” and, in a separate article several months later, reiterated, “The main issue will be Senator Beveridge and his progressive policies.”⁴¹⁷ *The Huntington Herald* summarized a piece by Samuel Blythe in *The Saturday Evening Post*, which, in effect, declared, “The result of the present campaign will hinge on the question: Shall Beveridge be returned? He will be the issue ... The personality, the accomplishments, the record of the senator will determine the question of regaining the legislature from the Democrats and carrying the state.”⁴¹⁸

Emboldened by their successful gains in 1908, Democrats were feeling bullish over their chances of expanding control over the state legislature and selecting another Democrat to serve alongside Benjamin Shively in the Senate. Although Thomas Marshall had become governor, he did not displace the dogged Thomas Taggart as the undisputed leader of the state party. The former Indianapolis mayor remained formidable and evidently was overseeing the party’s legislative campaign.⁴¹⁹ However, Taggart’s potential candidacy for the Senate concerned a number of Democratic officials. As party boss, Taggart commanded an unsavory reputation, engendering “widespread distrust” across the state. According to *The Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*, “If there is a possibility of his being a candidate many good [D]emocrats may remain away from the polls or may vote for the [R]epublicans for the legislature ... As long as Taggart remains a possibility, there is danger of a [R]epublican legislature at the very time when prospects are exceedingly ripe

⁴¹⁷ *Palladium-Item*, February 2, 1910, p 4; *Muncie Evening Press*, March 10, 1910, p 4; *The Richmond Item*, March 19, 1910, p 10; *The Richmond Item*, June 2, 1910, p 1.

⁴¹⁸ *The Huntington Herald*, March 31, 1910, p 6.


⁴¹⁹ *The Star Press*, January 26, 1910, p 1.

for [D]emocratic success.” The periodical implored Taggart to step aside for the sake of the party.⁴²⁰

Ultimately, on April 29, the state Democratic convention formally nominated John W. Kern as the party’s senatorial nominee. On the first ballot, Kern received 303 votes to Taggart’s 228, whilst the remaining delegates supported a smattering of other contenders. Having likely already approved Kern’s nomination and sensing the momentum in the room, Taggart threw his Marion County supporters entirely behind Kern on the second ballot, and, after his dismal showing of just 14 votes, promptly withdrew from the race. On the third ballot, the party boss gleefully announced, “The old Taggart machine is in the scrap pile today,” before casting the delegation’s vote for Kern, who accumulated 772 votes. Thereafter, the outstanding aspirants dropped out and Kern received the backing of the convention by acclamation.⁴²¹ See **Figure 3.6** graphing the results of each ballot.

⁴²⁰ *Daily News Democrat*, March 24, 1910, p 4.

⁴²¹ *Brazil Daily Times*, April 29, 1910, p 1; *The Tribune*, April 29, 1910, p 3.

Figure 3.6**Democratic Convention Vote for Senatorial Nomination, April 1910****SOURCE: *The Tribune*, April 29, 1910, p 3.**

Although Kern served in the State Senate for a brief stint, his career was unremarkable, having largely been an also-ran, first, as a minor contender in 1898 for the Democratic nomination, only to be outdone by incumbent Senator Turpie and his chief challenger, former governor Claude Matthews; then, as the Democrats' unsuccessful candidate for governor in 1900 and again in 1904. More recently, he had been William Jennings Bryan's running mate in the 1908

presidential election, another example of a Hoosier standing for national office.⁴²² Although Kern was nominated for the Senate because he was generally agreeable to a majority of Democrats, he lacked the gravitas possessed by his opponent.

Recognizing the defects of Kern's candidacy, Republicans were gleeful. *The Alexandria Times-Tribune* reported, "The Democrats had added greatly to Senator Beveridge's chances of re-election by selecting ... John W. Kern ... It was the general expression of the card-writers that Mr. Kern would not prove a strong candidate for the United States Senate."⁴²³ And *The Republic* asserted, "Kern's selection adds no element of strength to the [D]emocratic prospects. Senator Beveridge ought to feel considerable elation over the trend of political events in Indiana."⁴²⁴

Beveridge was delighted with the nomination of Kern, writing to Harry Bennett, "Nothing better for us possibly could have happened than the results of the Democratic Convention." Contrasting his independence and willingness to buck his own party, Beveridge described his Democratic opponent as "intensely partisan and an old time politician."⁴²⁵ To Charles Sefrit, the senator further explained, "Mr. Kern is a nice man and I like him; but of all the partisan partisans I have ever known, John is about the most unreasonable," going on to question Kern's fortitude against partisan pressures, "Imagine him insurging against a majority of the Democratic senators at the last tariff session! Imagine him insurging against anything!"⁴²⁶ And in a letter to John Stoll, he criticized Kern's denunciation of free silver before quickly towing the party line and

⁴²² "John Worth Kern," *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=K000132>.

⁴²³ *The Alexandria Times-Tribune*, June 7, 1910, p 1.

⁴²⁴ *The Republic*, April 29, 1910, p 4.

⁴²⁵ Beveridge to Harry Bennett, April 30, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴²⁶ Beveridge to Charles Sefrit, May 4, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

reversing himself. “I know perfectly well what would happen to him in the Senate with the Democratic [P]arty there controlled ... by the men that you know.”⁴²⁷ Since Beveridge’s greatest asset was his independence, he was encouraged by the candidacy of John Kern, whose overtly-partisan nature provided a stark contrast for his campaign’s strategy of appealing to independent voters.

With publicly-declared candidates as the overarching issue of the campaign, senatorial candidate recognition was widespread. The election presented a clear choice between two individuals vying for the Senate and established a much more direct linkage between voters and their candidates — bolstering popular input in the selection process. Hoosiers understood the implications of their vote and their preferences were readily discernible.

Furthermore, the contest represented the quintessential example of a *parliamentary democracy*. Actively courting Hoosiers for electoral support, the leaders of the competing political parties campaigned in legislative districts for their favored nominees in an effort to secure an overall majority in the forthcoming legislature. While Kern’s campaign abided most faithfully to this model, emphasizing party discipline and nationalizing the contours of the race, Beveridge upended the formula, strenuously striving to blur the partisan fault lines which separated the parties and resisting the *nationalization effect* so voters could freely support his candidacy independent of the party labels.

⁴²⁷ Beveridge to John Stoll, September 25, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

3.4.5 *Sophisticated and Novel Campaign Tactics: Operations and Consultations*

Senator Beveridge undertook an active personal involvement managing his aggressive re-election campaign. Given the exceptional preponderance of voter control in the state, popular support remained absolutely critical for success. Beveridge's campaign operations reflected the pivotal role of popular legitimacy *and* further augmented notions of widespread, direct public input in the senatorial selection process. To cultivate their electoral support, the senator was chiefly interested in three principal objectives: *advertising* his brand — namely his progressive candidacy for re-election and independent nature — *claiming credit* for favorable accomplishments, and *taking positions* on pressing matters — primarily the tariff. To that end, Beveridge relied upon an arsenal of novel tactics available at his disposal.

At the outset, the senator's chief political lieutenants held regular campaign meetings — in essence, “war rooms” — to coordinate strategy and consolidate operations. In March, Beveridge wrote friend and adjutant John Hayes, “The time has come to do team work. One of our weaknesses is that each fellow is trying to do things on his own hook.” Recounting the intensive and frequent gatherings that summarized his first successful bid for the Senate in 1898, the senator explained, “We knew exactly what we were doing and everybody worked together.” Thus, he urged Hayes to schedule “a meeting of our fellows at least three times a week from now on until the [s]tate [c]onvention.”⁴²⁸

At the same time, Beveridge solicited feedback from aides regarding his critical convention address, where he intended to draw the battle lines in his upcoming progressive crusade. Therefore, it was important the speech be carefully considered. On March 20, the senator wrote

⁴²⁸ Beveridge to John Hayes, March 10, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

Judge Albert Anderson of Indianapolis requesting his objective opinion on the speech's "general scope, purpose and swing."⁴²⁹ Beveridge forwarded an advance copy of his convention address to Harry Bennett, as well, who he instructed to discuss with his core group of confidants, affectionately dubbed "the boys."⁴³⁰ Bennett's feedback was largely positive, believing the speech was "all right." He wrote the senator, "It is very much out of the ordinary and will not ... appeal to that class of Republicans who are looking for an old fashioned party fight, but, under the circumstances, I think it is the right sort of speech for you to make."⁴³¹ John Hayes was even more effusive in his praise, declaring, "On the whole I think the speech is superb. It has got the right swing to it; and you are absolutely right in making it a daring and startling speech."⁴³²

3.4.6 *Sophisticated and Novel Campaign Tactics: Pamphlets*

The Beveridge campaign distributed pamphlets in the hopes of educating voters of the senator's candidacy, character, independent-minded attitude, positions on salient issues, and record of accomplishments. To that end, they printed biographies, autographed photos, reproductions of the convention address, and circulars explaining the senator's congressional labor record. In one of his many extensive letters to John Hayes, Beveridge wrote, "I shall dictate ... a brief and interesting biography ... Get it up in a very attractive pamphlet and circulate it among the voters — especially among those who are going to be our speakers."⁴³³ And in a further let-

⁴²⁹ Beveridge to Albert Anderson, March 20, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴³⁰ Beveridge to Harry Bennett, March 20, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴³¹ Harry Bennett to Beveridge, March 24, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴³² John Hayes to Beveridge, March 24, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴³³ Beveridge to John Hayes, July 21, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

ter, the senator reiterated, “A condensed biography ... should not only be reproduced in all of our papers ... but it should be printed in an attractive pamphlet form with a reproduction of my photograph ... and sent broadcast into every home.”⁴³⁴

Supplementing Beveridge’s biography were autographed photos delivered to pivotal Republican voters in Lake County — another means of advertising the senator’s brand name, raising the visibility of his candidacy, and mobilizing voters to join his crusade. *The Times* of Munster reported that the photographs were “large” and “a vast improvement over the campaign lithograph.” The paper considered Beveridge’s “personal appeal” as “very clever campaigning.”⁴³⁵ Reproductions of Beveridge’s convention address were similarly dispersed throughout the state. At the senator’s own personal expense, copies were allocated to Republicans and Democrats, a testament to the intensity of the campaign and the sustained, continuous effort to surmount partisan divisions. In fact, by July, approximately 50,000 pamphlets had already been printed, with thousands more expected.⁴³⁶

To earn the support of laborers and unions — a crucial voting bloc in the election — the campaign produced “Beveridge’s Labor Record.” Penned by Theodore Perry of the Indianapolis Typographical Union and eight other leading labor figures, the fifteen-page booklet espoused the senator’s laudable positions on “such matters as child labor, the eight-hour day, the various life-protecting measures, and [workers’] compensation.” In tandem with the Republican state com-

⁴³⁴ Beveridge to John Hayes, July 25, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴³⁵ *The Times*, September 21, 1910, p5.

⁴³⁶ *Palladium-Item*, July 8, 1910, p9; *The Indianapolis News*, July 7, 1910, p 4.

mittee, supportive labor leaders determined to distribute the pamphlet to “labor union centers” throughout Indiana.⁴³⁷

3.4.7 *Sophisticated and Novel Campaign Tactics: Newspapers*

Beveridge actively engaged Republican periodicals in his re-election effort, personally directing editors to publish items, such as editorials or interviews, which would aid the campaign. By advertising the senator’s brand name rather than his party affiliation and meting out credit for well-received ideas, such as the tariff commission, these newspapers burnished Beveridge’s independent, entrepreneurial nature, strengthening his appeal to voters of all political stripes. An oft-mentioned suggestion pushed by Beveridge was the placement of the senator’s photograph atop editorials in friendly, partisan newspapers. In July, he urged John Hayes, “Why not get out a very good cut of me and have it run at the head of the editorial columns of all of our Republican country newspapers which head their state ticket with my name for senator?”⁴³⁸ Beveridge clearly intended to directly couple the electoral fortunes of down-ballot legislative nominees to his candidacy for re-election to the Senate — in essence, furthering the senator’s public accountability, widening popular input in the decision, and emphasizing the parliamentary-style nature of the indirect regime. Several days later, the senator repeated his request to Hayes, writing, “Run my name at the head of the editorial columns containing the [s]tate ticket, as the Republican candidate for United States Senator.”⁴³⁹

⁴³⁷ *The Indianapolis News*, September 5, 1910, p 3; *The Times*, September 9, 1910, p 1.

⁴³⁸ Beveridge to John Hayes, July 21, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴³⁹ Beveridge to John Hayes, July 25, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

Additionally, Beveridge implored the party apparatus via Republican periodicals to publicize his laudable position on the tariff commission, granting him the necessary credit for the body's adoption. In the wake of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the idea of a tariff commission grew increasingly popular. However, Beveridge was incensed, claiming he favored its creation long before it was in vogue, in stark contrast to political opponents who had since changed their tune. In an uncharacteristically short, but curt letter to Hayes, the senator wrote, "Please push the idea by every means in your power, editorials in the *Star* and everything else, that I originated the tariff commission idea and fought for it when it had no friends, and kept on fighting for it until it won out." Beveridge continued, "I honestly deserve every bit of the credit for this and it should be driven home to the people of Indiana."

Furthermore, the senator beseeched newspapers to publish favorable interviews from prominent Progressive champions, including the influential editor, William Allen White. White expressed support for Beveridge, having praised the Hoosier's progressive credentials. Astutely sensing immense political dividends from White's endorsement, the senator repeatedly pressed Hayes to widely disseminate the interview throughout Indiana. In May, he wrote, "White's interview should be reproduced by every Republican and independent paper in the [s]tate that will print it. You must remember that White is not only a very great writer ... but also a very able practical politician," explaining, "He gave this interview out ... for the purpose of being most effective with the voters. It has a ring to it, because White spoke with the force of faith and conviction."⁴⁴⁰ Several weeks later, Beveridge described White's interview as "the best thing that

⁴⁴⁰ Beveridge to John Hayes, May 25, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

has been done for us since the [s]tate convention.”⁴⁴¹ And in a lengthy letter in July, the senator further explicated the impact of these interviews on the minds of voters, declaring, “The public mind should be prepared by ... interviews like William Allen White’s ... In short, it should be made very clear to the people that the battle is raging around me personally; that I stand for them and that in voting and working for me they vote and work for themselves,”⁴⁴² once more attempting to forge a direct connection between the interests of Hoosiers, his candidacy for re-election, and the all-consuming progressive crusade.

3.4.8 *Aggressive Public Campaign for Popular Support - Personal Appearances*

The most prominent aspect of Beveridge’s re-election was his public campaign for popular support. By all measures, the canvass was intensive in effort and extensive in scale. Beveridge opened the campaign on September 27 at Tomlinson Hall in Indianapolis, fearing any earlier would “create a very bad impression” that he was deeply anxious and uncertain over his electoral fate, a sentiment he hoped to avoid.⁴⁴³ The senator also sought to strategically cultivate the enthusiasm of voters, believing an earlier commencement would lead to diminishing returns throughout the course of the campaign.⁴⁴⁴ Newspapers reported that Beveridge intended to stump the state “day and night,” describing the campaign as the “busiest in years.”⁴⁴⁵ Even Beveridge himself discussed holding at least two rallies daily in his letters, writing to E.M. Lee, “Big

⁴⁴¹ Beveridge to John Hayes, June 7, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁴² Beveridge to John Hayes, July 25, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁴³ *Palladium-Item*, September 28, 1910, p 1; Beveridge to Samuel Blythe, July 23, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁴⁴ Beveridge to Mark Sullivan, September 5, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁴⁵ *The Republic*, April 11, 1910, p 2.

rallies held in the daytime where all the farmers can attend, and then go on to the various cities at night and this repeated,” an efficient means of reaching as many voters as possible.⁴⁴⁶ Indeed, the evidentiary record supports these claims. Throughout the fall campaign, Beveridge partook in *multiple* rallies on a frequent, near-daily basis — a herculean effort of intense proportions.⁴⁴⁷

Beveridge’s senatorial canvass was extensive in scale, as well. According to the press, the senator was slated to visit *every* county in the state. The Huntington Herald described the upcoming campaign as a “strenuous” effort “in each of the ninety-two counties in the Hoosier commonwealth.”⁴⁴⁸ Newspaper coverage confirms appearances in at least fifty-one localities, spanning forty counties and all thirteen congressional districts.⁴⁴⁹

Beveridge’s campaign addresses were defined by four overarching themes: the diminishing significance of *partisan labels*, the framing of the *progressive crusade* as a struggle between the people and the powerful, *major issues* of the campaign, and Beveridge’s own *candidacy for re-election* to the Senate.

The senator keenly sought to deemphasize partisan identifications and party affiliations in an effort to broaden his appeal, especially to independent and Democratic voters. In Columbus, Beveridge “urged all voters ... to lay aside all party prejudices and vote for men who would cure

⁴⁴⁶ Beveridge to E.M. Lee, August 1, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁴⁷ *Palladium-Item*, October 5, 1910, p 1; *Palladium-Item*, October 6, 1910, p 1; *Palladium-Item*, October 12, 1910, p 1; *The Indianapolis News*, October 20, 1910, p 4; *The Huntington Herald*, October 21, 1910, p 4; *The Star Press*, October 21, 1910, p 5; *The Star Press*, October 22, 1910, p 5; *The Weekly Sentinel*, October 26, 1910, p 2; *The Indianapolis Star*, October 30, 1910, p 26; *The Times*, November 1, 1910, p 1; *The Indianapolis News*, November 3, 1910, p 3.

⁴⁴⁸ *The Indianapolis Star*, April 12, 1910, p 2; *The Huntington Herald*, June 30, 1910, p 6.

⁴⁴⁹ Counties include: Lake, Porter, St Joseph, Elkhart, Steuben, Noble, Dekalb, Kosciusko, Whitley, Allen, Fulton, Wabach, White, Cass, Grant, Howard, Huntington, Blackford, Fountain, Parke, Clay, Marion County, Madison, Tipton, Delaware, Randolph, Wayne County, Fayette, Rush, Owen, Franklin, Ripley, Bartholomew, Monroe, Sullivan, Washington, Floyd, Clark, Vanderburgh, and Gibson.

the nation's political ills.”⁴⁵⁰ In Indianapolis, he proclaimed, “Vote for your own party ... vote for the other party if you believe that it is best for your family and country ... Not as partisans, but as citizens let us take counsel of one another for our common good.”⁴⁵¹ And at the climax of the campaign, the progressive fighter blasted both parties for their complicity in perpetuating the prevailing troubles, asserting, “I found that the parties must be made to serve the people, instead of the people to serve the parties.”⁴⁵²

Beveridge persistently framed the progressive crusade as a battle between the helpless many and the powerful few, as personified by party bosses and economic conglomerations. On October 3, in Columbus, Beveridge unveiled his new slogan: the many versus the bosses, explaining, “It is the home, the wife, the mother against the bosses.”⁴⁵³ In Huntington, the senator argued on behalf of reforming government, promising “the crooked things had to be straightened [and] the people accorded a voice.”⁴⁵⁴ By mid-October, Beveridge amped up his rhetoric, decrying the reign of a malevolent invisible government. In Jeffersonville, he exclaimed, “The overthrow of the invisible government of mighty interests that the visible government of the people may endure is the issue of this campaign. And it is this invisible government against which we war.”⁴⁵⁵ In Patricksburg, the incumbent continued to develop this theme, contending, “The boss representatives of the interests which are seeking to control legislation on behalf of the money

⁴⁵⁰ *The Indianapolis Star*, October 2, 1910, p 37.

⁴⁵¹ *The Indianapolis News*, October 11, 1910, p 6.

⁴⁵² *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p 5.

⁴⁵³ *The Indianapolis News*, October 3, 1910, p 2.

⁴⁵⁴ *Palladium-Item*, October 8, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁵⁵ *The Indianapolis News*, October 10, 1910, p 2.

powers and against the welfare of the people must be put out of power.”⁴⁵⁶ And at the close of the campaign, Beveridge impressed upon voters the stakes of the forthcoming election, positing that the outcome will determine either “the elimination of the progressive Republican movement or the death knell of the invisible government, composed of the special interests.” That pivotal choice rested with Hoosiers.⁴⁵⁷ Due to his strong support in the district primaries — and subsequent district and state conventions — and personal popularity amongst ordinary Hoosiers, Beveridge could legitimately claim a popular mandate against “the powerful,” but only partially. The senator *still* retained the backing of the party — *his* party — and, while these influential party figures were no longer reactionary traditionalists — the political stripes of the oft-derided “bosses” — they were Beveridge partisans, instead.

Within the progressive crusade, Beveridge highlighted several defining issues, staking out positions on these pressing policy matters. Describing the Payne-Aldrich Tariff as a product of “greed and avarice” on the part of “financial powers,” the senator explained his fierce opposition to the measure, proclaiming, “This bill I fought ... With seven other Republicans and several Democrats I fought them in the name of honesty.”⁴⁵⁸ He advocated his longtime support for a tariff commission, declaring, “A tariff commission would have made all this battling, all this confusion, unnecessary and these wrongs impossible.”⁴⁵⁹ Beveridge maintained, “Our tariff must be just and wise, must protect the prosperity of all American industries and prevent extortion by any industry, must care for the wages of American workingman and not unnecessarily increase the

⁴⁵⁶ *The Indianapolis News*, October 24, 1910, p 2.

⁴⁵⁷ *The Indianapolis News*, November 7, 1910, p 8.

⁴⁵⁸ *Evansville Press*, October 27, 1910, p 5.

⁴⁵⁹ *Palladium-Item*, September 28, 1910, p 8.

workingman's cost of living."⁴⁶⁰ Assailing the "sweat shops" of child labor, the senator delivered an impassioned plea for its abolition, promising, "No prosperity based upon the blood of little children is worth having. Any foundation based on human blood is bound to fail in the end ... As long as I live ... I will fight it with all my strength."⁴⁶¹ And furthermore, Beveridge outlined his support for an income tax amendment and the passage of an inheritance tax.⁴⁶²

Finally, the Hoosier Republican directly presented his candidature to voters, offering an opportunity to pass judgment on his record of service and to decide whether he should be returned to the Senate for another term — a clear-cut example of public accountability. At Monticello, "he frankly told the audience if they did not approve of his position during the last session of [C]ongress not to vote for a man who would vote for him in the next legislature."⁴⁶³ At Columbia City, he addressed a crowd on "why he should be returned to the [S]enate ... and ... appealed to the public to stay with him this fall."⁴⁶⁴ And at a Fort Wayne rally in late October, he told "of his record in the [S]enate, and call[ed] upon voters to support him and to stand up for purity in public life."⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁰ *The Indianapolis News*, October 10, 1910, p 2.

⁴⁶¹ *Angola Herald*, October 12, 1910, p 1; *The Indianapolis News*, October 3, 1910, p 2.

⁴⁶² *The Star Press*, October 28, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁶³ *Palladium-Item*, October 5, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁶⁴ *The Fort Wayne Journal Gazette*, October 6, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁶⁵ *The Huntington Herald*, October 21, 1910, p 4.

3.4.9 *Aggressive Public Campaign for Popular Support - Political Surrogates*

Public appearances by important political surrogates complemented Beveridge's personal stumping tour. These figures served to pitch the rationale for the senator's re-election to Hoosier voters. Beveridge meticulously managed the invitations, scheduling, and even the substance of the addresses, to varying degrees. Due to the simmering fissures within the Republican Party, few figures were in any position to truly unite the party. The only leader broadly palatable to Republicans of all stripes remained the aging warhorse, former president Theodore Roosevelt.

Upon leaving the White House, Roosevelt undertook an extended stay in Africa, where he ceded the spotlight to his successor, William Howard Taft. As political conditions worsened for the administration and the party, the former president did not flinch, opting to remain silent on all matters until he had returned to the United States. In the summer of 1910, Roosevelt finally arrived, disembarking in New York Harbor to throngs of ecstatic Americans. His long-anticipated return marked his re-entry into the political scene, as well. Hoping to assuage both sides of the intra-party dispute, however, Roosevelt did not stake out especially strong positions on the pressing issues of the day. While he espoused many progressive causes, he paid lip service to Taft and softly supported the much-maligned Payne-Aldrich Tariff. The colonel's generally neutral approach translated into an ideologically-balanced campaign, appearing at rallies for progressive insurgent Albert Beveridge and conservative traditionalist Henry Cabot Lodge.⁴⁶⁶

For Beveridge, Theodore Roosevelt represented the fulcrum of the progressive crusade, the general at the forefront of the ever-consuming struggle for reform, and the senator viewed himself as the loyal lieutenant on behalf of the right. On April 21, Beveridge tactfully wrote the

⁴⁶⁶ Goodwin, *The Bully Pulpit*, 647-650.

former president, requesting assistance in the form of three speeches. The senator insisted victory was virtually assured, but explained, “If you will come to my aid our majority will be simply overwhelming, and the credit of it will go to you.” Beveridge went on to describe themselves as brethren of the same order, writing, “The fight is for the great cause which you have led and still are leading and always will lead, and to which you and those of us who stand with you are giving our lives ... I am willing to sacrifice everything to the great historic movement.”⁴⁶⁷

Additionally, Beveridge enlisted other like-minded progressive Republican senators to assist his re-election in the fall campaign. Over the summer, he contacted Joseph L. Bristow of Kansas. Describing Indiana as “the bloody angle ... of this great national fight” akin to the Battle of Shiloh, Beveridge explained, “The forces of pillage have determined to crush me in Indiana ... They seem to think that in that way they can best put a stop to the whole progressive movement,” whereupon he beseeched his colleague, “What I want you to do is to write me by return mail how much time you will give me and when.” Beveridge was determined to secure as much time as possible, admitting, “I want absolutely every minute of your time you can give me. Four weeks is better than two weeks; two weeks better than one.”⁴⁶⁸ Similar invitations were furnished to Senators Moses E. Clapp of Minnesota, Joseph M. Dixon of Montana, Norris Brown of Nebraska, Jonathan P. Dolliver and Albert Cummins of Iowa, William Borah of Idaho, and Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁷ Beveridge to Theodore Roosevelt, April 21, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁶⁸ Beveridge to Joseph Bristow, July 14, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁶⁹ Beveridge to Moses Clapp, July 14, 1910; Beveridge to Joseph Dixon, July 16, 1910; Beveridge to Norris Brown, July 16, 1910; Beveridge to Jonathan Dolliver, August 9, 1910; Beveridge to Albert Cummins, September 15, 1910; Beveridge to William Borah, September 15, 1910; Beveridge to Robert La Follette, September 14, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

The Hoosier Republican personally managed scheduling these appearances, as well. To maximize the effectiveness of the rallies in maintaining intensity and generating a continuous spate of voter enthusiasm for the ticket, Beveridge selected the most propitious dates for each surrogate. Recognizing that Roosevelt's appearance in October would likely witness a surge of interest from the press and ordinary voters, the senator urged his colleagues schedule their appearances around the former president's visit.

Writing to Senator Dolliver, Beveridge recommended, "I want you to enter the [s]tate about the 15th of October — two days after Roosevelt touches off his fourteen inch gun, and I want you to stay right by me until the day of the election. The other boys are coming to my aid at various times, but I want you at this particular time."⁴⁷⁰ To Senator Bristow, Beveridge explicated, "Roosevelt will make his great speech ... I would like to have our strongest men jump into the fray immediately afterwards and stay with me until election day," requesting the final two weeks of the campaign from the Kansan.⁴⁷¹ And he reiterated to Senator Borah, "After Col. Roosevelt arrives here our boys must pour into the state following his departure so that the campaign will increase instead of recede in enthusiasm."⁴⁷²

Further, Beveridge had a hand in dictating the content of the addresses, ensuring that they adequately framed the campaign in terms consistent with his message, and sufficiently touted the candidate's character, record, and abilities. Describing himself as "a modest man," Beveridge suggested to Albert Cummins, "Tell the people about a certain friend of yours in this [s]tate being the noblest two-legged creature now walking upon this sordid earth; about his having the

⁴⁷⁰ Beveridge to Jonathan Dolliver, August 9, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁷¹ Beveridge to Joseph Bristow, August 9, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁷² Beveridge to William Borah, September 27, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

most elemental intellect, the most dauntless heart, the cleanest, whitest, purest and snow like soul.” Beveridge proceeded to boil down the campaign to its singular issue, writing, “The issue in this [s]tate really is coming down to the question of whether I should be returned to the Senate or not. That is about the size of it.”⁴⁷³

On October 13, Roosevelt’s train traversed the Illinois boundary into Indiana, commencing his stumping tour of the state. He was greeted by “crowds of varying degrees of enthusiasm,” comprising Hoosiers eager to see the former president. *The Star Press* described the atmosphere as ecstatic and characterized Roosevelt as “a veteran of many wars to whom the rattle of the drums is music still” marching into battle.⁴⁷⁴ The party decided Roosevelt would appear in eleven cities, accompanied on each leg by his protege, Albert Beveridge.⁴⁷⁵

Roosevelt’s mission was to present the case for Beveridge, touting the senator’s diligent service to the progressive cause and imploring voters to return him to the Senate. At Muncie, “the Chief” pleaded with Hoosiers, “We ask the decent, plain citizens of Indiana to support Senator Beveridge because he has served his party best by making it serve the state.” Defending the senator’s stance on the tariff, Roosevelt declared at Crawfordsville that Beveridge was ahead of lawmakers in Washington, “but [they] will catch up,” he assured his listeners.⁴⁷⁶ At another rally, Roosevelt stressed the caliber of Beveridge’s mettle, describing the senator as “a game fighter for the right ... the man who stood fearlessly for the right when it needed nerve to stand for the right,” and he attested to his friend’s “honesty, courage and good, sound, common sense.” At

⁴⁷³ Beveridge to Albert Cummins, September 16, 1910, *Beveridge papers*, LOC.

⁴⁷⁴ *The Star Press*, October 14, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁷⁵ *Richmond Item*, October 13, 1910, p 1; *Princeton Daily Clarion*, October 13, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁷⁶ *The Star Press*, October 14, 1910, p 1.

Covington, the colonel praised Beveridge as “embod[ying] all that we stand for in our struggle for honest government,” and, at another appearance, he emphasized the righteousness of the cause, proclaiming, “Senator Beveridge was always desirous of finding out what the popular need was ... and .. he was then ready to fight to a finish” to meet those needs.⁴⁷⁷

Similar appeals on behalf of Beveridge’s re-election were conducted by other progressive figures, as well, notably Senators Joseph Bristow of Kansas and Albert Cummins of Iowa, former Interior Secretary James Garfield, and former chief of the Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, who had had a very public spat with the administration and was now publicly allying with Beveridge and the insurgents.⁴⁷⁸

3.4.10 *The Opposition*

The Democrats pursued an equally vigorous statewide campaign for popular support. In contrast to their low-key canvass of 1902 — where they unsuccessfully tried to co-opt the issue of Senator Charles Fairbanks’ re-election by ignoring his candidacy altogether — their publicly-nominated senatorial aspirant led the assault against the Republicans and Senator Albert Beveridge, repeatedly tying the incumbent to the reputation of his unpopular party — in essence, trying intensively to *nationalize* the contest. John W. Kern, the Democratic nominee for Senate, mounted a spirited defense of his party’s proposals, deriding Republican misrule and prodding Beveridge on his alleged independence. At a rally in Marion, he promised veterans, “If I do not do more in two years for you than Senator Beveridge has done in twelve years, I will resign,”

⁴⁷⁷ *Princeton Daily Clarion*, October 13, 1910, p 1; *The Indianapolis Star*, October 14, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁷⁸ *The Richmond Item*, October 10, 1910, p 1; *The Richmond Item*, November 4, 1910, p 1; *Palladium-Item*, October 19, 1910, p 1; *The Indianapolis Star*, October 24, 1910, p 13.

before rebuking the Republicans, “The government has not kept its contract with you men who saved it.” Kern also attacked Beveridge for opposing the income tax and supporting ship subsidies.⁴⁷⁹

Another criticism Kern hurled against his opponent was the charge that the incumbent senator was essentially protectionist-lite. While Beveridge may have opposed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, the senator remained a devotee of protectionism, more generally, and ergo, would not offer much needed relief from exorbitantly high tariff rates when in office. Kern mercilessly derided the senator on this issue, arguing, “Beveridge stands for this protection, this tariff that has transferred the earnings of the multitude of working men to the pockets of the favored few. He stands for this system and upholds it as righteous.” For Kern, the difference between Republican progressives and conservatives was one of degree. The Democrat offered a blistering denunciation peppered with folksy humor, proclaiming, “Senator Aldrich stands for grand larceny; Senator Beveridge stands for petit larceny and John W. Kern stands for no larceny at all if he knows it.”⁴⁸⁰

Throughout his stumping tour, Kern was accompanied by Governor Thomas Marshall and Senator Benjamin Shively. The trio were favorites among the Democratic faithful, skillful in their arguments and electric in their presentations. According to *The Jackson County Banner*, “[This] combination ... is a formidable one and that it is getting in telling blows.”⁴⁸¹ Additionally, William Jennings Bryan appeared in Indiana in late October to promote the candidacy of John Kern and assist in the coordinated offensive against the Republican ticket. At the Coliseum in

⁴⁷⁹ *Jackson County Banner*, October 12, 1910, p 4.

⁴⁸⁰ *The Indianapolis News*, October 17, 1910, p 3.

⁴⁸¹ *Jackson County Banner*, October 12, 1910, p 4.

Richmond, “he denounced Theodore Roosevelt and Albert J. Beveridge,” suggesting that they had proven themselves “incompetents” and proclaiming, “whatever Beveridge has done Kern could have done.” Bryan bemoaned any Democrat supporting Beveridge, “if that Democrat desires progressive legislation,” explaining that Kern, not Beveridge, was the “pioneer” in supporting progressive causes and represented the true reformer in the race.

In his remarks, Bryan also extolled the character of John Kern, describing the Democrat as honest, respectful, and scrupulous. “And then he has the courage,” Bryan insisted, “and my friends, his heart is right. His heart is in sympathy with the people; he shares their aspirations, he understands their wants, and he is one of them.”⁴⁸² Ultimately, the Democrats centered their campaign in stark opposition to Republicanism, writ large, and all of its associates, including the vulnerable, embattled senator. By assailing Beveridge’s candidacy for the Senate and promoting Kern’s prospects, the party presented a clear choice to voters on settling the matter of the senatorship — fostering wider popular participation in the process.

3.4.11 *Democratic Wave and Legislative Deference*

The 1910 midterm elections produced a sweeping Democratic tidal wave, routing the Republicans. In the U.S. House of Representatives, the Democrats gained 58 seats to claim 230, whilst the decimated Republicans were left with 162 seats — their lowest figure in that body since 1895.⁴⁸³ In the U.S. Senate, Republicans maintained overall control with 52 senators, but that represented a loss of eight seats, while the Democrats claimed 44 seats.⁴⁸⁴ In Indiana, Re-

⁴⁸² *The Richmond Item*, October 21, 1910, p 2.

⁴⁸³ “Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present,” U.S. House of Representatives.

⁴⁸⁴ “Party Division,” U.S. Senate.

publican damage was even more pronounced. The Democratic margin of victory was between 12,000 and 14,000 votes, which saw them maintain their 60-to-40 seat edge in the House, while finally seizing control of the State Senate by a 30-to-20 seat advantage. For the first time in fifteen years, the party enjoyed full control of the state legislature.⁴⁸⁵ With Democrats so dominant on the joint ballot, Beveridge conceded defeat on the afternoon of November 9.⁴⁸⁶

Shortly after his defeat, Beveridge penned a remarkably insightful analysis of the reasons behind his loss. While the senator maintained he was not disconsolate over the outcome, he admitted to feeling hard done by a good many factors beyond his control. First, he pointed to former governor Hanly's county local option law (passed in 1908). The political repercussions of the statute continued to reverberate in 1910. German communities, brewers, and liquor interests, who ordinarily would have supported Beveridge, voted Democratic explicitly to repeal the law. Second, the senator bemoaned the influence of outside money, writing, "We were confronted with the biggest campaign fund any of us ever saw in this [s]tate." Third, he readily recognized the poisonous, toxic environment for his party, fueled by the "resentment" toward the tariff bill. Ultimately, Beveridge concluded he would have won re-election, hypothetically, if a direct, popular vote regime had been adopted instead, explaining, "The Democrats frankly say that if the people could have voted upon the question of the senatorship directly our majority would have been considerably over a hundred thousand. And I guess there is no doubt about that."⁴⁸⁷

Beveridge's contention that direct elections would have facilitated his re-election should not be dismissed lightly. There may be some validity to the claim. The seasoned incumbent en-

⁴⁸⁵ Dubin, *Party Affiliations*, 61.

⁴⁸⁶ *Muncie Evening Press*, November 9, 1910, p 1.

⁴⁸⁷ Beveridge to Franklin McVeagh, November 18, 1910, *Albert Beveridge papers*, Indiana State Library.

joyed sky-high favorability ratings, largely due to his courageous stance on the tariff and willingness to buck his party in the face of the unpopular measure. Furthermore, the nature of the indirect regime meant state legislative districts — oftentimes gerrymandered — did not proportionally represent the statewide popular vote in allocating seats in the legislature. Parties could conceivably win more votes, but fall short of a majority in state assemblies.⁴⁸⁸

Nonetheless, there is little certainty direct elections would have witnessed Beveridge re-elected in 1910.⁴⁸⁹ Antipathy toward Republicans was immense and their support had ebbed to its lowest level in over a decade, driven by widespread opposition to the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Meanwhile, Democratic enthusiasm was gradually building, climaxing with their high-water mark in the midterm elections. While independent and Democratic Hoosiers approved of their senator's stance of the tariff, they likely concluded that overall Democratic control of the Senate offered a more suitable alternative on tariff policy, namely in reducing rates.

Beveridge's strategy had been flawed from the outset. During the campaign, the senator appealed to independent and Democratic *voters*, but relied almost exclusively on Republican *legislators* to back his re-election in the state legislature in the upcoming session. He never seriously entertained coaxing Democratic legislators to defect on his behalf. Thus, Beveridge was asking Democratic voters to support Republican legislators primarily to ensure his return to the Sen-

⁴⁸⁸ See Abraham Lincoln and the 1858 Illinois senatorial election.

⁴⁸⁹ Direct elections have not insulated popular incumbents from defeat, either. They have been defeated under the direct election regime as well. See Lincoln Chafee, 2006 Rhode Island senate election. Chafee's approval rating was 62% on Election Day, and he was the only Republican to oppose the Iraq War, the driving issue in that year's congressional races. Yet, while his position may have bolstered his approval amongst constituents, it did not neutralize the issue entirely from the contest. Voters approved of his stance on the war, but concluded that Democratic control over the issue was more suitable. For information on his approval rating, see Brendan Nyhan, accessed August 11, 2019, URL: https://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2006/11/lincoln_chafees.html.


ate. Ultimately, the embattled senator under-appreciated the deep-seated party fealty of Hoosiers Democrats to their own party.

Added to the mix were those conservative, traditionalist Republicans, whom Beveridge persistently assailed and alienated. The senator may have overestimated their support in the general election, incorrectly surmising that they had no viable option but to remain faithful to the Republican ticket. Beveridge failed to anticipate the possibility that these Hoosiers may abstain from voting. Given the senator's unwillingness to bridge the intra-party divide, conservative Republicans may have decided to sacrifice a Senate seat if it meant the defeat of their longtime Progressive nemesis.

The following January, John W. Kern and Albert Beveridge were officially nominated by their respective party caucuses in the state legislature, deferring to the choice rendered by their parties the previous spring — confirming the increasingly wider popular participation in the selection process. On January 18, Kern was duly elected to the Senate, earning 60 votes in the State House and 30 votes the State Senate, while Albert Beveridge received 40 votes in the State House and 20 votes in the State Senate.⁴⁹⁰ The selection was decided by a purely partisan vote, with no defections.⁴⁹¹ See **Figure 3.7** charting the final vote breakdown.

⁴⁹⁰ *The Indianapolis Star*, January 18, 1911, p 1.

⁴⁹¹ *The Tribune*, January 18, 1911, p 4.

Figure 3.7**Vote of the Indiana State Legislature for Senator, January 1911**

SOURCE: *The Indianapolis Star*, January 18, 1911, p 1

Kern's elevation to the Senate was the clearest example of legislative deference. The body selected an aspirant whose candidacy was publicly-known, widely advertised, and offered voters an alternative to the incumbent senator, Albert Beveridge. And while Kern's individual merits may have partly accounted for his party's successes in November, he was largely the benefactor of the immense antipathy toward Republicans and renewed Democratic strength, more generally — the nationalization of the contest.

3.4.12 *Analysis*

The defining element of the 1910 Indiana case study was the choice afforded to voters in deciding the senatorship. The candidacies of the dueling senatorial aspirants were central to the election. Beveridge was insistent the campaign revolve around his record, character, and willingness to buck his party in the face of great political headwinds — in essence, a referendum on himself, heavily resisting efforts to nationalize the contest. The Democratic nominee, John W. Kern, was also publicly-known, undertaking an extensive public campaign for popular support, and he eagerly sought to peg the popular incumbent to the unpopular brand of his party — the nationalization effect. As the contenders led the charge into battle, their unique personalities dominated the campaign to a considerable degree, presenting an opportunity for Hoosiers to render a verdict on the performance of their senator — public accountability — and directly select an alternative if they disapproved of the incumbent, reflecting the widespread popular input in the process.

Additionally, Beveridge seized personal command of his operations, adopting an aggressive, hands-on approach managing strategy and tactics. The senator oversaw campaign messaging, consulted with advisors on his speeches, saturated the press with intensive advertising of his candidacy, conducted a strenuous, intensive public campaign for popular support, and enlisted important political surrogates, strategizing their schedules for maximum effectiveness and suggesting ideas for their addresses. The heavy reliance on popular support dictated the assumption of ever-more sophisticated methods for cultivating a favorable relationship with ordinary Hoosiers. Ultimately, the voters decided, rendering their decision at the ballot box. When the state legislature convened, they abided by the result, elevating John Kern to the Senate. Kern's

selection represented the clearest example of the legislature's deference to the general election outcome, specifically, and the value of popular campaigns, more generally. The decision attests to the recognition by parties of the growing significance of popular legitimacy and their willingness to adopt certain practices and procedures that bolstered widespread popular participation in the selection process.

Could the 1910 Indiana senatorial election be characterized as a *de facto* direct election? Both candidates had been publicly-nominated by the spring, and their candidacies were widely advertised. Further, they conducted vigorous public campaigns for popular legitimacy. Indeed, the election itself was driven by the senatorial contest and voters clearly understood the November poll as a choice between two dueling aspirants.

Ultimately, we *cannot* conclude the contest represented a *de facto* direct election. The indirect system of selection emphasized party discipline and rested upon party unity. Hypothetically, Beveridge might not have won re-election under direct, popular election, but he was partially correct when he laid blame to other mitigating factors in the race that accounted for his loss. Despite his insurgency and repeated efforts to distance himself from the Republicans, the senator *was* ultimately a casualty of the party's unpopularity and poor standing among Hoosiers — and Americans at large — a victim of the *nationalization effect*. Therefore, even under the most exceptionally popular conditions prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, parties still mattered a great deal for senators. Strong party backing *and* party unity remained critical for success. Intra-party fissures and persistent squabbling boded ominously for an incumbent's prospects. Nonetheless, senatorial candidates were *not* anonymous backroom contenders, surreptitiously securing insider support exclusively amongst powerful party leaders and pivotal officials on their

trek for a Senate seat. While party support was a necessary condition for victory, it was not sufficient. Recognizing the importance of popular legitimacy, senators conducted their campaigns in a public manner and cultivated electoral support among the people. Therefore, the 1910 Indiana senatorial election can more precisely be characterized as the most *popularly-based selection process* of the indirect era.

3.5 Conclusions

Indiana's senatorial elections demonstrate the emerging popular legitimacy crucial for an incumbent's re-election. My theory anticipates a high premium placed on cultivating the support of voters. Under the Hoosier state's exceptionally popular conditions, few barrier points existed between the November ballot box and the state legislature's selection of a senator. First, the state's general elections were *very* competitive — both parties commanded relatively equal shares of the populace and a sizable independent bloc pivoted between them. The unpredictable nature of the electorate meant an upset always remained a distinct possibility. As such, no senator could rest on their laurels and coast to re-election. Even when assured of victory, incumbents regularly undertook all necessary precautions to strengthen their ranks and mobilize voter turnout. These developments reflect the increasingly widespread popular participation in the senatorial selection process and the willingness of the parties to accept these democratizing trends.

Second, candidate recognition was widely reported and incredibly pervasive. The senatorial contest drove the narrative of the general election and the candidacies were central to the campaigns. As such, entrepreneurial contenders appealed individually for support, rather than

relying exclusively on partisan identification and party affiliation. Further, personalities took precedence over issues as the caliber of the candidates greatly factored into the electoral calculus of voters — enhancing the visibility of senators. Ultimately, the voters internalized the election as a means of passing judgment on the senatorial race — either as a referendum on the incumbent’s performance or as a clear choice between dueling senatorial aspirants — thereby bolstering direct, public accountability of the office.

Finally, legislative deference was high. When the field of aspirants was fractious, comprising multiple candidates, the state legislature exercised greater autonomy rendering a decision. But even then, the body deferred to a popularly-elected, publicly-named candidate whose intentions for the Senate were widely advertised during the general election — a pattern which repeated and intensified in subsequent years.

With few barrier points, the preponderance of power lay in the hands of the voter, and therefore, public campaigns were a common feature of Indiana’s senatorial elections. Increasingly, senators pursued ever-more rigorous and intensive campaigns, enlisting themselves and important political surrogates to publicize their brand and burnish their credentials, and utilizing a bevy of novel methods to garner public support, generate enthusiasm, and mobilize turnout. Even more effectively, senators offered material incentives to constituents for political support through directed services — as exemplified by the rural route mail delivery system — and strategically publicized these services. Further, supportive partisan periodicals played a prominent role advertising the senator’s candidacy, character, record, and legislative achievements, working in tandem with the incumbent’s messaging strategy.

Although popular legitimacy afforded a degree of autonomy to senators vis-a-vis political parties, party support was crucial, as well. In many respects, elements of a parliamentary-styled democracy obtained. State legislative nominees were publicly committed to supporting the re-election of incumbents. Senators had diligently worked toward ensuring supportive legislative candidates — partisans — were nominated by their district conventions. Thereafter, they campaigned in their respective districts to maximize visibility and mobilize turnout. To an extent, these dynamics were the result of the *nationalization* effect — the transforming of all down-ballot state races into a referendum on national conditions. The strong party system under the indirect regime tended to foster these dynamics, as senators eagerly nationalized their race and state legislative contests, as well, thereby assuring party discipline.

When senators marshaled their personal popularity with Hoosiers to strengthen their grip over the party and forge party unity, such as Charles Fairbanks, they concurrently bolstered their standing among voters *and* party figures, thereby enhancing their re-election prospects. Fairbanks had effectively nationalized the contest, coupling his candidacy with the fortunes of Republican legislative nominees. In return, the Republicans caucus duly returned Fairbanks to another term in office.

By contrast, when faced with antagonistic intra-party factions and bereft of any semblance of unity, other incumbents struggled to gain traction, such as David Turpie, who ran a traditional Democratic campaign, or Albert Beveridge. The latter's unconventional insurgency campaign complicated certain aspects of the parliamentary-styled system in place. In parliamentary systems, parties take precedence over personality, however, Beveridge — in fiercely resisting the *nationalization effect* — elevated his candidacy above partisan identification and party

affiliations, desperately trying to render his election a direct vote rather than through the indirect, party-based method.

Parliamentary democracies provide “party cover” to its officeholders and candidates, a dynamic appraised by David Mayhew and Anthony King. In short, in parliamentary systems, ambitious politicians are nominated by the party proper, not directly by voters through primaries; their expenses are footed by party committees, rather than perennially fundraising on their own behalf; and finally, their political career depends exclusively upon party discipline and loyalty; whereas in the American system, outsiders regularly attain positions of high status.⁴⁹² Under the indirect regime, party cover constituted what Jonathan Rauch terms “the middlemen,” those essential political functionaries who ensured the system operated smoothly, filtrated fluctuations in popular opinion, and served the broad interests of the parties. As party cover has been shorn of American elections, candidates have grown increasingly more independent of the parties, fueling assaults on the middlemen by populist-driven “outsiders.”⁴⁹³

These developments pose implications for governing, as well. Party cover encouraged the “division of labor” model of representation — a representative system whereby legislators exercised their considered judgment concerning the national interest, freed from electoral consequences and the constraints of popular whim. By contrast, greater individualism has fostered an

⁴⁹² David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

⁴⁹³ Jonathan Rauch, “How American Politics Went Insane,” *The Atlantic*, (July/August 2016), accessed May 21, 2020, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/how-american-politics-went-insane/485570/>.

“agency” model, whereby officeholders strive to placate the interests of constituents and voters— at all costs — always with a view toward securing re-election.⁴⁹⁴

Anticipating these trends, Albert Beveridge undertook a full-throated crusade against the party system through an entrepreneurial campaign that heavily emphasized his own credentials and candidacy independent of the party brand. But Beveridge was premature for parties remained critically important to victory. Although Fairbanks similarly elevated his personality and accomplishments, he did so within the prism of the partisan system as a faithful Republican. By contrast, Beveridge alienated a fair share of conservative Republicans and failed to appreciate the continued loyalty of Democratic voters to their party. The strong party system commanded the fealty of its voters and tended to produce nationalized, wave elections, ultimately downing Beveridge’s candidacy in 1910.

The indirect regime rested on party discipline and partisan loyalty. During the selection process, defections from state legislators were expected to be minimal. In many states, instances wherein a bloc of disaffected members bolted from their party to join forces with the opposition in an effort to deny the incumbent re-election were relatively rare. So great was party fealty that insurgency movements generally supported figures from their own ranks, rather than an aspirant from the opposing party. Indiana was no exception, as attested by the persistence of party-line voting in each selection vote. When the Democratic incumbent was deeply unpopular, as with Turpie, few Democrats defected. When the Republican incumbent was broadly popular, such as Fairbanks, few Democrats defected. And when the incumbent expressly campaigned on dissembling partisan labels, as with Beveridge, party-line voting asserted itself once more.

⁴⁹⁴ Anthony King, “Running Scared,” *The Atlantic* (January 1997), accessed May 23, 2020, URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/01/running-scared/376754/>.

As an increasingly more democratic age took hold, popular legitimacy, growing in import, began to matter greatly to senators, especially as they confronted the challenges of re-election. But even in the weakly-partisan, high-turnover, and fiercely competitive state of Indiana, unified party support remained essential as well — a continued vestige of the prevailing system of indirect senatorial elections.

CHAPTER 4: Senatorial Campaigns in South Carolina

Moderately Popular Elections - Personalized, Factional Contestation amid Populist Agitation

Senatorial campaigns in South Carolina demonstrate the potency of the vast, omnipotent democratizing currents of the period. Even before adopting the indirect primary — when the Palmetto State relied upon the convention system — its senatorial contests were defined by emerging elements of popular support, public legitimacy, and accountability. Offering disaffected voters a channel with which to express their frustrations, elections represented a referendum on the incumbent senator.

But recognizing the increasing calls for greater popular participation in the state's politics, the Democratic Party promptly adopted an indirect primary in 1892 — exemplifying *party adaptability* to these trends. The indirect primary further contributed to widespread statewide canvasses and vigorous public appeals for electoral support. The effect of the primary was to present a truly binary choice before the people, whereby voters can more directly convey their preference for the Senate. Thus, the state witnessed some of the most highly-popular senatorial elections under the indirect regime.

South Carolina's elections were *moderately popular* affairs, characterized by vibrant, energetic campaigns. Traditionally, the state was dominated by an exclusive cadre of conservative, Bourbon landed elites that had governed since before the Civil War. With the exception of a brief interlude during Reconstruction, the Democratic Party achieved a virtual monopoly over all levers of power. Given the prevalence of a single-party system, political disputes and electoral competition occurred exclusively within the Democratic fold, leading to factional feuding among

its many power blocs jostling for authority. With no single group commanding a majority of support, senatorial aspirants were expected to secure the backing of multiple factions. But the enactment of the indirect primary in 1892 rendered the system more transparent and democratic, at least as it pertained to white citizens. Thereafter, public sentiment and popular legitimacy gradually emerged as foundational elements to the election of public officials. Resultantly, the state's politics devolved into highly-*personalized* factional infighting, as the maneuverings of senatorial candidates grew ever-more visible.

My theory of indirect elections stipulates that senators seeking re-election under *moderately popular* conditions should undertake active, public campaigns for popular support, with the result at the ballot box definitive of the final selection. Yet, a sizable degree of insider politicking and bloc support should remain critical for success. The theory is confirmed by South Carolina. In 1890, Senator Wade Hampton III lost his bid for a third term due to his pursuit of a low-key, passive re-election effort. Hampton largely abstained from public appearances and adhered faithfully to his unpopular stances on the animating issues of the day. Four years later, learning the lessons from his vanquished colleague, Senator Matthew C. Butler opted for a more engaged, vigorous re-election campaign — fundraising, stumping the state early, and adjusting his positions on salient issues to broaden his appeal to the electorate. However, Butler failed as well, primarily due to the inability to rally his base around his candidacy and offer the requisite levels of support necessary for victory.

Both senators were casualties to an uprising constituting economically-depressed farmers and laborers, whose rebellion was personified by the race-baiting, populist demagogue Benjamin Tillman. The hostile takeover of the party by disgruntled Populists had been effected due to the

reliance on the convention system to nominate public officials. Although this system represented a hybrid of party control and popular support, the most consequential politicking occurred at the local level. Therefore, the superior organizational prowess — coupled with fierce enthusiasm and passion — of the Populists at the various county conventions across the state ultimately earned the faction total control over the government. As the last of the remaining Bourbons in power, the joint defeats of Hampton and Butler ushered in the reign of Tillman and a more ominous era for South Carolina.

4.1 *Background*

During the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, South Carolina was jolted by a series of seismic shifts and political realignments. In 1860, its legislature was the first to formally secede from the United States; just eight years later, the state was readmitted to the Union; in 1877, the Bourbons were restored to power, marking the end of Reconstruction; and in 1890, an agrarian uprising ousted the ruling Bourbons. Throughout this tumultuous period, the Palmetto State adopted no fewer than four constitutions (1861, 1865, 1868, and 1895).⁴⁹⁵ Its elections gradually became more transparent and democratic. Meanwhile, African-Americans, representing a majority of the population (60%), witnessed their fortunes rise to unimaginable heights and fall to dispiriting lows.

⁴⁹⁵ Cole Blease Graham, Jr., “Constitutions,” *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, University of South Carolina, Institute for Southern Studies, April 15, 2016, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <http://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/constitutions/>.

4.1.1 Reconstruction, 1868-1877

The 1868 constitution was a landmark achievement, heralding the era of Reconstruction and political parity between the races. In addition to safeguarding the hard-won rights of African-Americans, it devolved greater authority to local governments, abolishing centrally-administered districts with autonomously-managed counties, which exercised authority over budgets and taxes. Once the stubborn barriers to participation had been removed, blacks “began to flex their political muscles within the Republican Party,” winning election to offices in ever greater numbers. Representation in the General Assembly rose to 61 percent in 1872, and by 1876, 52 percent of all state and federal contests since 1867 had been won by an African-American, an impressive achievement.⁴⁹⁶

Newly-empowered African-Americans pressed for two overarching issues: public education and civil equality. The legislature increased funding for schools and expanded educational opportunities for budding students. According to Walter Edgar, “the establishment of a universal, publicly funded system of education was one of the major successes of [the period].” In many respects, education was an outgrowth of the push for civil equality. Providing education for Carolinians meant broadening access to all citizens, regardless of race. And while many black children benefited from the investment, so too did white children who had never before attended school.⁴⁹⁷ In 1893, the legislature enacted a statute which “opened ... all public accommodations” to everyone. Although the law lacked much in the way of effective enforcement mechanisms, blacks did achieve limited successes. These efforts represented a major step for-

⁴⁹⁶ Walter Edgar, *South Carolina: A History*, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 386-388.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 389-391.

ward in their advancement toward full societal inclusion.⁴⁹⁸ Never before had opportunities been as plentiful nor the future as promising for black Carolinians as during the height of Reconstruction.

Most whites were appalled, unsettled, and dismayed by the meteoric rise in the fortunes of blacks in the state. They had never accepted the legitimacy of the new constitution. For them, the present government was an exclusivist regime propped by the barrel of a gun, solely representing blacks and the interests of Northern Republicans. To deny their approbation, white Carolinians embarked upon a strategy of resistance, systematically retreating from public affairs and participation in the polity. They boycotted elections and public accommodations which had been integrated.⁴⁹⁹

Fueling the flames of racial discontent, the Republican administration in Columbia overreached on several fronts. Wielding the cudgel for the first time, the government was not averse to unsavory electoral tactics, such as gerrymandering white voters and defrauding elections. And to pay for their generous spending, they imposed higher taxes on white landowners, which, coupled with local taxes, proved burdensome and exorbitant. White property owners resented what they viewed as redistributive policies by the radical regime.

Additionally, widespread corruption was endemic to the system, as graft and bribery plagued the government. "Corruption was the Achilles' heel of the Republican Party and Reconstruction" in the state. In 1872, Republican lawmakers launched an effort to impeach Governor Robert K. Scott, but evidently, Scott literally bought his exoneration and survived the affair. Sys-

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., 393.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid., 386-394.

temic corruption, chronic financial mismanagement, and bonded indebtedness compromised the moral high ground of the Reconstruction administration, allowing disaffected whites to successfully capitalize on their excesses. Furthermore, these ails limited the effectiveness of state-financed entities, such as the militia and the public education system.⁵⁰⁰

Ultimately, the Reconstruction government was undone by economic distress and societal unrest. The Depression of 1873 hit farmers particularly hard. Largely agrarian in nature, South Carolina was devastated. According to Edgar, the depression “eradicated what little economic recovery ... had been.” Savings were wiped out and interest rates reached altitudinous levels.⁵⁰¹ These economic woes were compounded by rising social violence. White paramilitary groups, manifesting as the Ku Klux Klan, terrorized blacks and Republican officials, challenging the authority of the administration to maintain order, assure security, and provide for the common defense of its citizens. Increasingly, the government was forced to rely on the assent of decision makers in Washington to buttress Columbia with additional federal troops. But the foundations of the system had been shaken and the entire structure teetered on the verge of collapse.

4.1.2 *The Bourbon Restoration, 1877-1890*

In 1876, Wade Hampton led the Bourbons back to power. Hampton had been a highly revered figure in South Carolina politics. A member of the planter class, he was elected to the State House of Representatives in 1852 and the State Senate in 1858, before rising to the position of lieutenant general for the Confederate Army during the Civil War, where he commanded

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., 394-396.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., 396-397.

“Hampton’s Legion.”⁵⁰² Hampton epitomized the conservative Bourbons — distinguished, genteel, and honorable — and he appealed to many white Democrats as their best hope of regaining control over the state. During his gubernatorial bid in 1876, the general crafted a diverse coalition of voters. Among white Democrats, he could count on a wellspring of affection and deep-seated loyalties. One supporter maintained, “I would die for General Hampton.”⁵⁰³ Anticipating Hampton’s election, another described “the sudden flash of a new day of sunshine and brightness and hope.”⁵⁰⁴ Recognizing the limited appeal of exclusively catering to whites, Hampton courted black Carolinians as well. A moderate, paternalist on the race issue, the general fervently believed blacks should be afforded equal treatment and that their hard-won political protections be safeguarded. Throughout the campaign, Hampton unabashedly defended his position in an effort to broaden his support. “I shall be the governor of the whole people,” he repeatedly declared, vowing to protect the privileges and immunities of white and black citizens alike.⁵⁰⁵

Although the election was marred by charges and countercharges of fraud, Hampton eked out a narrow 2,000 vote margin, emerging victorious over his opponent, Governor Daniel Henry Chamberlain.⁵⁰⁶ By that point, the general had “effectively controlled the state,” and his hand was further strengthened once federal troops were withdrawn following a similarly contentious

⁵⁰² “Wade Hampton” in *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, U.S Congress, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=H000141>.

⁵⁰³ Walter Brian Cisco, *Wade Hampton: Confederate Warrior, Conservative Statesman*, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), 232.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 224.

⁵⁰⁵ Robert K. Ackerman, *Wade Hampton, III*, (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 175.

⁵⁰⁶ Cisco, 246-247.

presidential election.⁵⁰⁷ Hampton's victory signaled the restoration of the Bourbons — the elite, planter class which had governed South Carolina since before the Civil War. Unlike in other Southern states, these conservatives did not belong to a younger, vibrant generation of new leaders. Rather, they exclusively comprised the more seasoned and experienced cohort of South Carolina's statesmen. Grounded in "present expediency," the Bourbons offered the steady hand of their leadership to address the myriad challenges confronting the state, fashioning themselves as dedicated, responsible public officials, yet they lacked a cohesive, unifying vision for the future and failed to adequately anticipate the social and economic troubles which would ensue.⁵⁰⁸

The Bourbons were amenable to limited commercial development, establishing a railroad commission and enacting an incorporation law. They understood that businesses and manufacturing industries played an important role in the state. But they resisted "surrendering control ... to commercial interests."⁵⁰⁹ Instead, they favored preserving South Carolina's agrarian character. As the vanguard of the agricultural economy, the landed gentry were firmly dedicated to the centrality of farming and cash crops.

On the most salient issue of the day — the political equality of the races — the Bourbons adopted a paternalistic approach.⁵¹⁰ When Hampton became governor, he strived to mend the divisive wounds of the Civil War and Reconstruction in ways that advanced the interests of all citizens. He appointed blacks and Republicans to positions of patronage, continued the heavy investments in public education, honored legitimate debts accrued (while controversially oppos-

⁵⁰⁷ Edgar, 407.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 407-408.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 411.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 411.

ing mass repudiation), and established a commission to examine instances of fraud under the previous government.⁵¹¹ Overall, Hampton was committed to achieving racial harmony, expanding educational opportunities, and securing financial stability. These efforts won him plaudits among many black Carolinians as well as their allies in the North.⁵¹²

Hampton was roundly re-elected governor in 1878 with no Republican opposition. As affirmation of his race policies, he received 30,000 more African-American votes than in his first bid for governor.⁵¹³ Capitalizing on his rising stock, the governor traveled the country as a spokesman for the South, eager to bridge the lingering sectional differences. Addressing gatherings in the North, Hampton explained that the Bourbon restoration represented a sea change in his region for “civilization, for home rule, for good government, for life itself.” He insisted the ruling class possessed superior wisdom and intelligence, and therefore, were better suited for governing the state. And the governor steadfastly assured his listeners that the South would remain committed to the political equality and constitutional protections of black citizens.⁵¹⁴

In the weeks following his re-election, Hampton was duly selected by the state legislature to succeed John Patterson in the United States Senate. The decision reflected widespread appreciation for Hampton’s record of service to the state, as well as his growing national profile. *The Daily Register* lauded the overwhelming vote of confidence as “recognition of those great qualities ... which have made the name of Hampton synonymous with truth, justice and integrity

⁵¹¹ Ackerman, 205-212.

⁵¹² Ibid., 209.

⁵¹³ Cisco, 281.

⁵¹⁴ Ackerman, 213.

throughout the country.”⁵¹⁵ Others were more circumspect, fearing that the governor’s elevation to the Senate would undo the great strides that had been made in managing race relations, and protecting the weak and impoverished.⁵¹⁶

Indeed, many of these concerns proved justified. With Wade Hampton’s election to the Senate, his influence and power began to gradually, but inexorably recede. Removed from the daily affairs of the state and unable to oversee its politics, he exercised ever-less authority in subsequent years.⁵¹⁷ Without Hampton’s strong, commanding presence, the ruling Bourbons lost a highly revered figurehead able to command the affection of white Democrats and the trust of blacks, resulting in their own demise from power.

4.1.3 *The Agrarian Rebellion, 1880s - 1890s.*

Throughout the 1880s, disaffection amongst poorer, white farmers toward the Bourbon regime materialized, fueled by a brewing resentment toward the government’s policies on race and class. Many whites detested the landed elite’s paternalistic approach to black Carolinians. Appalled by the rampant excesses of the Reconstruction era and subscribing to the assumption that blacks could never be assimilated into society, they advocated for curtailing the rights of African-Americans — the majority of the population — and denying black participation in the polity. In 1882, the Eight Box Law was passed, which, while not a strict literacy test, utilized a separate, distinct ballot box for each state office — in essence requiring of the voter the ability to read. Furthermore, the law set strict standards for registration. As a result of the statute, “tens of

⁵¹⁵ Cisco, 282-285.

⁵¹⁶ Cisco, 283.

⁵¹⁷ Ackerman, 237.

thousands” of blacks were disenfranchised. At the same time, the legislature redrew the state’s congressional districts, gerrymandering the boundaries so to dilute the strength of black voters. Additionally, racial violence and lynchings grew at an alarming rate, driving many black citizens from politics.⁵¹⁸

These efforts culminated with the adoption of the party primary in 1892.⁵¹⁹ Since the parties were private entities, they were not governed by the citizenship provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, through the use of the invidious “white primary,” parties were legally entitled to deny blacks from partaking in their nomination contests. The primary served another purpose: wresting control from the governing Bourbon class. By replacing the machinations of local and county conventions with white voters, the primary democratized elections in the state, thereafter rendering public officials subject to more direct, popular approval. I address the impact of the primary on the state’s senatorial elections below.

The revolt against the Bourbons was also driven by their bumbling management of the economy. Due to their lack of innovation and imagination, “the state’s economy was a shambles.” The per capita wealth was far below the national average, earnings and wages were paltry, and, partly due to the overproduction of cotton, crop prices were sharply down.⁵²⁰ The reigning Bourbons were tone-deaf and aloof to the vast agricultural woes besetting the state’s farmers, failing to acknowledge their pain and hardship. In reports to the legislature, leading of-

⁵¹⁸ Edgar, 414-417.

⁵¹⁹ Ackerman, 264.

⁵²⁰ Edgar, 427-428.

ficials routinely described the “happy and prosperous” conditions prevailing throughout the Palmetto State.⁵²¹

The struggling farmers found their voice in one Benjamin Ryan Tillman. Tillman burst onto the political scene with his infamous address to the Grange and Agricultural and Mechanical Association annual meeting at Bennettsville in 1885. At the outing, the aspiring Tillman introduced himself to his fellow Carolinians, laying the groundwork for higher office down the road. In what would become typical Tillman fashion, he railed against the Bourbon regime as outmoded and woefully out of touch with the common people. By contrast, Tillman spoke to the economic plight of ordinary farmers, promising meaningful relief instead of platitudes of prosperity. In the interests of the the economically-depressed farmer, he advocated for a technical school to develop and hone agricultural practices. And Tillman unnecessarily inflamed racial tensions, assuring his white listeners that blacks ought to permanently be stripped of their citizenship, while explicitly encouraging the use of intimidation and violence to attain these objectives.⁵²²

Tillman represented the antithesis to the Bourbons. Where Hampton and his cadre were moderate paternalists on race, Tillman was a *bona fide* racist. Where the conservatives were elite planters, Tillman spoke on behalf of the forgotten farmer — the poorer, economically-depressed yeoman. And where the Bourbons were dignified and respectable, the flamboyant Tillman’s inflammatory rhetoric was bombastic, outrageous, and often disrespectful of mores, conventions, and norms. In 1890, the populist leader announced he would seek the governor’s office, formal-

⁵²¹ Ibid., 429.

⁵²² Cisco, 301; Edgar, 432-433; Ackerman, 255.

ly commencing his political career and posing an existential challenge to the Bourbons and their idyllic vision for South Carolina.

4.1.4 *Political Conditions*

In the Palmetto State—as in every state under the indirect regime — senators were selected by a majority of the state legislature. While states differed on the technical rules governing the procedure, each chamber regularly assembled separately to decide the matter. In the event a candidate failed to secure the required majority threshold in either house, the full legislature would convene in a joint sitting to resume the balloting. Only once a majority of both houses agreed, a candidate would officially be selected as senator.

Formally nominating senatorial contenders varied widely across states. In South Carolina, legislative party caucuses officially nominated senatorial contenders, but these bodies were *greatly* influenced by popular support expressed through the convention system. Local and county conventions assembled to nominate delegates to the state convention — delegates belonging to a particular faction. These gatherings represented an admixture of party control and popular support. At the state convention, the delegates nominated a slate of state legislative nominees publicly pledged to backing the senatorial choice of their faction at the forthcoming session, in the style of a *parliamentary democracy*. Voters generally understood that an incumbent's faction would return the senator to office, barring any unforeseen complications. If an ambitious outsider had set their sights on the United States Senate, they courted favorable state legislative candidates and worked toward the nomination of factional allies.

The state adopted an indirect primary in 1892 — altering an important link in the chain. The reform replaced the authority of county conventions to select state convention delegates with an August primary — a purely popular element — whose white Democrats henceforth voted for state convention delegates committed to nominating the senatorial candidate of their choosing at the upcoming gathering. Thereafter, the state convention formally nominated state legislative candidates pledged to a senatorial contender.

Political conditions prevailing in South Carolina at the turn of the Twentieth Century were *moderately popular*, meaning that party backing *and* popular support were crucial to any elected officials, senatorial contenders included. But, as the choice of the voters was decisive, campaigns exhibited a slight tendency toward popular sentiment and public transparency over surreptitious, insider politicking.

Since Reconstruction, the Democratic Party enjoyed complete hegemony over the state's politics. Once black Carolinians began abandoning the Republicans in favor of Wade Hampton's entreaties in the 1870s, the party of Lincoln collapsed, and, by the time those voters were disenfranchised a decade later, the party had been effectively hollowed out. Thereafter, the state legislature was dominated by Democrats, and every appointee to the United States Senate reflected this power differential. Therefore, general elections in the Palmetto State were neither fully free — as it denied black voter participation — nor fully fair — as it prevented a true, competitive, two-party system from emerging. These *non-competitive conditions* represented a *barrier point* to direct, popular senatorial elections, since South Carolina's voters could never faithfully express their preferences from among a choice of parties at the ballot box.⁵²³

⁵²³ Nor were they necessarily *all* Democrats.

Due to the prevalence of the uni-party system, political disputes and electoral competition occurred entirely within the Democratic sphere, devolving into intense feuding among multitudinous factions. With no single group commanding a majority of support, senators and their challengers were expected to secure the backing of multiple factions, a difficult task even amongst incumbents. As a result, re-election rates hovered around 50%, reflective of widespread senatorial casualties during the period.

Before the indirect primary, county conventions wielded the authority to nominate candidates. These decisions were rendered only after spirited, public appearances by the leading contenders. Despite the public nature of the campaigns, *senatorial candidate recognition* was itself rather limited and circumscribed. The issue was secondary, at best, to campaigns and voters, and the identities of the premier contenders were neither widely known nor disseminated until after the general election. If anything, the 1890 election represented a quasi-referendum on the incumbent, Wade Hampton.

But recognizing the increasing calls for greater popular participation in the state's politics, the Democratic Party promptly adopted an indirect primary in 1892, which exemplified the party's willingness to adapt to the democratizing currents of the period, whilst still maintaining a modicum of control over the machinery. Once the primary was enacted, the choice of a senator grew in import, occupying a central role in the state's elections. The identities of the candidates were extensively covered, presenting a binary choice to the voters. These dynamics percolated outward to the rest of the campaign, individualizing the process and elevating *personality* over policy. Furthermore, the primary ensured that factional bargaining would occur in a more transparent and open manner, with highly-anticipated debates featuring the main contenders for of-

fice. Thus, widespread *candidate recognition* was common, indicative of rather popular senatorial elections.

Finally, the legislature regularly acted as the final arbiter on the senatorship, especially given the rampant number of factions jockeying for leverage. Insider politicking, bargaining, and compromise were essential for success. But the implementation of the primary largely settled the question long before the legislature was even elected. As such, legislators tended to defer to the decision of the voters in the summer primary. In 1894, after Tillman handily defeated Butler in the nomination contest, the legislature elevated Tillman to the Senate. With high *legislative deference*, the state's senatorial elections leaned more popular than non-popular. As a result, South Carolina witnessed only one *barrier point* filtrating popular participation in the senatorial selection process, thereby exhibiting *moderately popular* conditions.

Under moderately popular conditions, we expect vigorous, public campaigning on behalf of the principal candidates. Recognizing the important role exercised by voters, senators ought to cultivate their support and cater to their interests — perhaps even adjusting their stances on salient policies to better comport with the views of the electorate. Further, we should anticipate individualized, entrepreneurial appeals for support. Unlike other strong party states, such as Massachusetts — where party-based, partisan appeals took priority — South Carolina should witness senatorial contenders emphasizing their *own* personal credentials largely as a result of the primary.

The case studies conform to my hypothesis, presenting a tale of two campaign strategies. Wade Hampton's re-election bid in 1890 — prior to the primary — serves as a cautionary tale. Hampton hoped to rise above the toxic taint of politics and behave in a statesman-like manner,

resting on the laurels of the Bourbon landed gentry. In the face of strenuous opposition to his positions on race and the currency, he remained stubbornly committed to his principles. As such, Hampton pursued a defensive campaign of passive politicking, buttressing his fortifications and only reacting to developments when necessary. But the revered general was undone by the concerted, organized, and passionate efforts of Tillman and his Populist supporters, who successfully seized control of the state party apparatus in their march to victory.

By contrast, Matthew C. Butler's re-election bid in 1894 was distinctively different. Butler felt no compunction sinking to Tillman's level. He was all too eager for a fight, engaging in hand-to-hand combat with his adversary and muddying his uniform in the heat of a good old-fashioned political battle. The senator undertook an offensive campaign of active electioneering, fundraising and appearing at public rallies exceedingly early in the calendar year to pre-empt the fate that had befallen Hampton. Butler additionally shifted his positions on pressing issues in an effort broaden his appeal to a wider pool of voters, namely Tillmanites and other Populists. But the gambit backfired, instead driving away conservatives and blacks from supporting his candidature and sealing his untimely defeat. In essence, these elections explore the intricacies of highly-personalized factional politicking prevalent within many Southern states at the time and driven by an emerging element of popular legitimacy and public support.

4.2 1890 - Hampton's Defensive Campaign of Passive Politicking

The 1890 case study illustrates the foibles of pursuing a complacent, passive campaign in the face of brewing Populist agitation. Hampton opted to remain statesman-like, betting that his loyal service to the state during the war and thereafter had earned him enough affection so to withstand these challenges. And the senator remained stubbornly committed to his principles on the divisive, animating issues of the currency and race.

Although the 1890 election predated the primary, the convention system in place encouraged localist, democratic electioneering. Thus, a wide degree of popular participation in the state's elections already existed— even as it pertained to the question of the senatorship, which factored less significantly in the race, but still mattered to South Carolinians. And while the election represented only a quasi-referendum on Hampton — due to the indirect nature of the dynamics — an element of public accountability emerged, as open channels permitted voters to hold Hampton and the Bourbons responsible for their misrule.

Hampton's defeat— as well as the hostile takeover of the party by disgruntled Populists — were largely attributed to the structure of the regime. The Populists' superior organizational prowess — coupled with their fierce enthusiasm and intensive passion — at the various county conventions across the state ultimately earned the faction total control over the reins of government.

As 1890 dawned, Wade Hampton was capping off a twelve-year stint in the Senate, having been ceremoniously elevated to the position in 1878 as a reward for his faithful service to the Democratic Party, and re-elected in 1884 with nary a hint of opposition. Consequentially, the

forthcoming state elections were expected to determine the composition of the legislature, wherein his electoral fate would once more be decided. The old general was witnessing his beloved state change before his eyes in rapid and unexpected ways. Black Carolinians, who comprised approximately 60% of the population, were increasingly isolated from society, government, and politics, following a concerted, systematic effort by whites to disenfranchise, gerrymander, and intimidate black voters.

Having never fully recovered from the war, the state's economy continued to stagger, jolted by a severe depression in the 1870s, and several powerful aftershocks. Anguished, distressed farmers, with few means to provide for themselves or maintain their farms, channeled their discontent into political action. Mobilizing their fellow yeomen, they organized the Farmers' Alliance, forerunner to the People's "Populist" Party. The Populists directly challenged the authority of the stand-pat, insular, and unimaginative cadre of the landed gentry, to which Hampton belonged.

4.2.1 *Springtime Factional Tensions*

During the spring season, Democratic disaffection with Wade Hampton grew ever-more apparent, attested by the prevalence of fierce factional feuding.⁵²⁴ Given the fractious condition of the state's politics, the incumbent senator needed the backing of multiple factions to be renominated — and effectually re-elected — by the party. Hampton enjoyed the support of conserva-

⁵²⁴ Factional discontent with Hampton should not be construed as an entirely novel phenomenon, *per se*. With South Carolina politics so fragmented, such infighting was natural, and indeed, the agrarian element had always been antithetical to Hampton and the Bourbons, especially among more racist whites. But their influence over the process was growing, wielding greater power than before, and enjoying new conduits with which to affect politics.

tive Bourbon Democrats — ostensibly his base — having relied upon them over the years in his successful gubernatorial and senatorial bids. But the agrarian Populist movement remained staunchly opposed to Hampton and his elite cadre of Southern gentlemen. By 1890, they had been growing in import, especially once the animated Benjamin Tillman had taken on the mantle of leadership.

The Sumter Watchman and Southron typified the burgeoning antipathy toward the incumbent, assailing his continued trauancies from the Senate. “Our much honored senior senator still loves the hunt better than his duties,” the paper declared, decrying, “Hampton ‘is out of reach’ ... and absent from his seat.” The editor even questioned Hampton’s ties to the state, asserting, “He does not live in South Carolina, and is a South Carolinian only ‘by courtesy.’”⁵²⁵ Visceral hyperbole aside, there was a grain of truth to the charges. Admittedly, Hampton found the humdrum monotony of Senate procedure unappealing and regularly took leave, traveling to other parts of the country to the detriment of his obligations.⁵²⁶ In a letter to colleague Matthew C. Butler, Hampton expressed his partiality for hunting over senatorial responsibilities, “There is much more fun in doing that, than in listening to dry speeches.”⁵²⁷

Despite the rising tide of agrarian disaffection toward the ruling Bourbons, Hampton did not undertake extraordinary, proactive steps to stave off the threat. In many respects, the general failed to appreciate the severity of the Populist challenge to the reigning elite until it was too late to effect much of an impact. During the early months, Hampton was more preoccupied by a pa-

⁵²⁵ *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, January 1, 1890, p 4.

⁵²⁶ Ackerman, 240; Cisco, 295.

⁵²⁷ Wade Hampton to Matthew C. Butler, November 16, 1889, *Matthew Butler papers*, The South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

tronage row involving a Columbia postmaster. In November 1889, Postmaster General John Wanamaker removed Postmaster Gibbes from his position, several months before the expiry of his tenure. Evidently, Wanamaker had privately assured Hampton that Gibbes would retain his post until the conclusion of his term in February, and the senior senator would be consulted regarding a replacement.⁵²⁸ Hampton was furious, excoriating his behavior as “disrespectful,” and demanding “his man [be] defeated.” He implored Butler, “Tell Cameron that I shall expect him to help in defeating my [Post Master] for it should do as much for him.”⁵²⁹

However, the negative attention of the revelations — contrary to the spirit of the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883 and the trend in public opinion toward greater transparency — forced Hampton into damage control. In December, the senator penned a letter to the editors explaining the entire situation as a series of misconstrued falsehoods. The contention that he “asserted [his] right to nominate the postmaster” and request the “retention of the incumbent” was not true. “I did neither of these things,” he maintained. In essence, Hampton argued that he had offered the nomination of one Mr. Eugene Gary to the Columbia office after President Harrison had taken office, but was informed by the Postmaster General that Gibbes would retain his position until the following year, whereupon Hampton conveyed to Gibbes that he should expect job security until the termination of his appointment. When Gibbes was unexpectedly removed, Hampton “felt naturally and properly indignant at the manner in which I had been treated ... because I had been made the medium of communicating to Mr. Gibbes a falsehood and I was thus placed in a false position.” Hampton distanced himself from the Columbia postal position, “I

⁵²⁸ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, November 13, 1889, p 4.

⁵²⁹ Wade Hampton to Matthew C. Butler, November 16, 1889, *Butler papers*, USC.

have no possible interest in the post office ... I had no candidate for the place, nor have I interfered in the matter in the slightest degree.” Instead, the senator’s only stake was to see “a good post master there, for that is a matter of importance to my fellow citizens.”⁵³⁰

As Hampton dabbled in the heated politics of patronage, the agrarian rebellion was gaining steam. In January, Captain George W. Shell, chairman of the Farmers’ Association of South Carolina, issued the “Shell Manifesto,” urging like-minded Democrats to assemble in Columbia on March 27 to consider much needed political reforms and economic measures.⁵³¹ On the appointed date, delegates from thirty-four counties convened at the Farmers’ Convention, wherein they nominated Benjamin Tillman for governor by acclamation and adopted a platform reflecting their strongly-held Populist principles. The gathering emphasized “the necessity of Anglo-Saxon unity,” as a race-baiting means of solidifying white support; advocated for direct primaries for “all nominations for office in the party other than state officers,” and the reapportionment of Democratic convention representation; supported the abolition of the Board of Agriculture, whilst ceding “everything pertaining to agriculture or mechanics” to the purview of Clemson Agricultural College; demanded separate, but equal schools for blacks and whites; advanced the idea of a popularly-elected, effective Railroad Commission; implored fiscal discipline of state expenditures, and called forth a new constitutional convention to settle the state’s persistent economic and political challenges. Finally, the delegates beseeched their candidates to exhaustively “canvass the state ... so that the people can ... act intelligently and render their verdict at the primary election.”⁵³² In essence, the convention issued a call to arms targeting municipal and

⁵³⁰ *The Watchman and Southron*, January 1, 1890, p 6.

⁵³¹ *Keowee Courier*, January 30, 1890, p 2.

⁵³² Ackerman, 261; *Yorkville Enquirer*, April 2, 1890, p 2.

county politics in an effort to mobilize the support of hard-pressed, white farmers — a testament to the widely popular and democratic nature of the convention system in place, which emphasized strong organizational prowess at the local level.

By that point, momentum had shifted squarely in favor of Tillman and the Populists. Surveying the scene in Brewington, one observer characterized an “entirely one-sided” affair, “Every man that I have talked to is true blue for Tillman and reform.” He lambasted the reigning Bourbons, “whose only fitness for office is a long line of distinguished ancestors” and who have excelled at attending sumptuous dinners and lavish outings rather than serving their constituents.⁵³³ A conservative farmer from Brunson’s Cross Roads described widespread enthusiasm for Tillman’s candidacy, and, while he noted Hampton was at the “zenith of his glory ... his political doom [would be] fixed” were he to oppose “Pitchfork Ben” for governor.⁵³⁴ And the editor of *The Manning Times* reported, “I am sure [Tillman] is gaining ground every day,” before turning his attention to the fate of Wade Hampton. Recognizing “all the honors” due to the revered statesman, the editor remained adamant that any effort to undermine Tillman’s rise “would be beneath [Hampton’s] dignity,” sully his reputation. He warned, “We would surely show him that we farmers know a little something about the workings of politics.”⁵³⁵ Similarly, *The Times and Democrat* proclaimed, “The people can be trusted,” before cautioning, “We would regret very much to see Senator Hampton mixed up in the present campaign.”⁵³⁶ Once

⁵³³ *The Manning Times*, May 14, 1890, p 3.

⁵³⁴ *The Manning Times*, May 14, 1890, p 2.

⁵³⁵ *The Manning Times*, May 21, 1890, p 3.

⁵³⁶ *The Times and Democrat*, May 21, 1890, p 4.

again, the Populist press resorted to class-based entreaties to mobilize popular support for Tillman and cultivate resentment toward the conservatives.

Although Hampton began devoting a trifle more attention to the home front, splitting his time between South Carolina and Washington,⁵³⁷ the senator largely resorted to half-measures to confront the rising tide of Tillman, tepidly considering another gubernatorial bid and equivocating on whether to assemble an advance meeting among regular Democrats to plot a cohesive campaign strategy.⁵³⁸ But these faint attempts were futile. Penning an insightful expose on the political situation gripping the state, an outside observer remarked, “The anti-Tillman people have no organization of their own except in Richland County. The Tillman people ... are compactly organized in every county,” maintaining, “if the anti-Tillman people had organized several months ago, and had met every charge and every argument in every county, and had then put on the stump their strongest men, they might have succeeded.” Alas for the Bourbons, he concluded, “It is barely possible they might [succeed] now, if immediate organization were effected.” The writer portrayed the agitators as driven by “the fierce frenzy of a religious war,” dogged in the pursuit of their rights. Indeed, “no man ... can stem the tide — not even Wade Hampton.”⁵³⁹ Having taken advantage of the convention system, which relied upon superior organizational abilities at the local and county level, the Populists were sweeping the state. Caught entirely off guard, the Bourbons had failed to pre-empt the Populist agitation from metastasizing.

Speculation soon abounded that Hampton would be replaced following the results of the forthcoming state election. *The Abbeville Press and Banner* anticipated a Tillman victory

⁵³⁷ Ackerman, 263.

⁵³⁸ *Keowee Courier*, May 15, 1890, p 2; *The Times and Democrat*, May 21, 1890, p 4.

⁵³⁹ *The Intelligencer*, July 10, 1890, p 1.

“would bring about a revolution of political sentiment and a breaking up of old lines of policy.” Ergo, Senator Hampton would quickly discover sizable opposition brewing to his retention.⁵⁴⁰ Several periodicals suggested Tillman himself as the most eligible contender, in a complicated reshuffle which would witness the lieutenant gubernatorial nominee, Colonel Eugene B. Gary, elevated to the governor’s office, whilst State Lecturer William Jasper Talbert of Edgefield would pursue Tillman’s vacated seat in Congress.⁵⁴¹ By August, *The Intelligencer* revealed a new potential arrangement agreed upon by the Alliance: George D. Tillman, brother of the aspiring governor, for the incumbent’s place in the Senate.⁵⁴² For the hapless Hampton, Tillman’s nomination constituted the greatest challenge to the reigning Bourbons and the gravest threat to his re-election.

4.2.2 *Summer Nomination Contest*

In the heat of the summer, the statewide nomination contests were in full swing. County conventions selected delegates for the state convention in August, who collectively settled the matter of nominating officials for state offices. But these conventions were essentially *pro forma* gatherings, as the consequential political jostling occurred at the local level. While the delegates were not extensively pledged to backing a particular senatorial contender, the voters widely understood that the nomination and election of conservative state legislators would foster a receptive caucus for Hampton’s retention. By contrast, the nomination and election of a majority of

⁵⁴⁰ *The Abbeville Press And Banner*, May 28, 1890, p 4.

⁵⁴¹ *The Times and Democrat*, July 30, 1890, p 4; *The Abbeville Press And Banner*, June 11, 1890, p 4.

⁵⁴² *The Intelligencer*, August 7, 1890, p 2.

Populist legislators would oust the incumbent from office and ensure that a Tillman-backed challenger be chosen, instead.

Given the emphasis on local, popular politics, contenders for higher office were expected to extensively canvass the state before the public to discuss the pressing issues of the day and vie for the support of municipal and county organizations. As the face of the Populists and avowed candidate for governor, Benjamin Tillman eagerly embraced these outings as an “opportunity to appeal to the masses.” Appearing alongside Tillman, Senator Wade Hampton advocated for the regular Democratic slate, including their own gubernatorial candidate, General John Bratton.⁵⁴³ Countering the Populist challenge to the Bourbons, defeating their reviled leader, and denying the Alliance a foothold in the state government became Hampton’s *cause celebre*, and he determined to achieve these objectives by valiantly attending the public appearances *qua* proto debates to shore up support for the reigning conservatives and ameliorate the persistent factional infighting.

In late June, the highly-anticipated confrontation between the state’s political heavyweights commenced in earnest. The two principals jointly appeared at a lively episode in Columbia on June 24. Shortly after ten o’clock, the speakers arrived at a stand erected at a fair grounds one mile from the State House. Hampton and Tillman were accompanied by other candidates, including General Bratton and Colonel Gary. Hampton kicked off the proceedings, addressing the adoring crowds before him. As the throngs of adulation persisted for several minutes, the aged, esteemed senator was “brought [to] tears.” When he finally spoke, Hampton strove to rise above the din of politics by emphasizing non-political, unifying themes, and de-

⁵⁴³ Ackerman, 262.

scribing himself and his colleagues as high-minded statesmen concerned only with the welfare of South Carolina. At the outset, Hampton impressed upon his listeners the value of duty, his unceasing fidelity to the people of South Carolina and his commitment to “serve his state in every emergency,” including the “grave situation” at hand.⁵⁴⁴

After imploring the spectators to treat each participant with dignity and respect, the senator maintained he would “discuss measures, principles and policy, not men,” resisting the lurid temptations to sink to personal epithets. Hampton immediately warned the deep, “bitter,” internecine factional divisions would tear the party asunder and invite the possibility of a Republican victory. “It is useless to say that we are all Democrats when we do anything that may divide the ... party,” he thundered. The senator expressed his support for direct primaries, but insisted the convention system could “be conducted in a perfectly proper and straightforward manner,” and then assailed the foundations of direct democracy by arguing that widespread dissatisfaction with government and its many public officials stemmed from “the people themselves [who] do not take interest enough ... to do their proper share of the work.” No political reforms could ever cure an indolent, trigger-happy society.⁵⁴⁵

Following General Bratton, Tillman took to the stand. The outing represented the first time the Populist leader publicly addressed an audience in Richland County, the den of anti-Tillman sentiment. As he spoke, he was frequently interrupted by the taunts, insults, mock laughter, and groans of the hostile crowd. Tillman advocated for devolving greater power back to the people, through re-apportionment and placing delegate elections under review, and he treated

⁵⁴⁴ *The Times and Democrat*, July 2, 1890, p 5.

⁵⁴⁵ *The Watchman and Southron*, July 2, 1890, p 1.

Hampton's contention that no aristocracy or oligarchy existed in the state "in a derisive manner." Tillman described the "wrongs [of] the farmers suffered at the hands of the politicians," and warned the "flood ... in the up-country [would] sweep everything before it." At this point, Judge Haskell interrupted Tillman to inquire whether he had served in the Civil War. Tillman retorted he was too young, to which Haskell reminded his adversary he was all of seventeen, ripe enough for enlistment. Burned by Haskell's unnecessary interjection, Tillman explained he had injured his eye — unrelated to battle — and "was an invalid ... paralyzed in bed," wherein he summoned General Ellison Capers to vouch for his family's name. Capers proclaimed Jim Tillman, the candidate's father, "the oriflamme of my regiment," which promptly shut down Haskell's charge.⁵⁴⁶

The roles were reversed in Aiken several days later. A hotbed of agrarian agitation, Hampton was "howled down" after likening Tillman to former senator William Mahone of Virginia, a member of a similarly-populist Readjuster Party who ultimately caucused with the Republicans. The crowd blared, "We are not Mahonites, neither will we ever be," before chanting the name of their savior. Several in the audience blurted, "General, we followed you through Virginia in '61, but we are following Tillman in '90." The gibe connoted a generational dimension to the angst against the reigning Bourbons, in addition to a class-based disconnect. By contrast, Tillman was carried to the stage "on the shoulders of his followers" and given a rapturous reception.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁶ *The Times and Democrat*, July 2, 1890, p 5; *Yorkville Enquirer*, June 25, 1890, p 2.

⁵⁴⁷ Ackerman, 263; *The Manning Times*, July 16, 1890, p 2.

Throughout the summer, Hampton engaged in limited public appearances alongside his nemesis Benjamin Tillman, primarily to convince voters of the merits of the conservatives. These activities were intended to bolster support for General Bratton's candidacy for governor and the ruling Bourbons more broadly. While these appearances may have had an incidental effect on his own re-election for another term in the Senate, they were geared predominantly toward the more immediate elections at hand, and therefore, did not represent an extraordinary step in the senatorial selection process. In fact, the question of the senatorship hung very much in the background in 1890, as the gubernatorial election occupied the prime position in the campaign. But voters understood that backing conservative candidates would return Hampton to the Senate, while a Populist wave would wash the venerable incumbent out of office. Therefore, an emergent, but indirect element of *public accountability* manifested in the equation.

A key component of Hampton's statesman strategy required remaining faithful to his principles. Resisting the urge to pander to audiences and shift his stances on controversial matters so to broaden his electoral appeal and increase support for the ticket, Hampton endeavored to speak boldly and frankly from the courage of his convictions, even if it meant alienating large swaths of voters from backing the conservatives. The animating issue of the day — the currency — had dogged Hampton for months. Poorer farmers were agitating for free silver as a means of alleviating their economic plight. Anxious over the soundness of the dollar, Hampton stubbornly refused to countenance any relief in the form of a silver currency. In July 1890, the Senate passed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, which authorized the Treasury Department to issue federal notes for the purchase of silver bullion, promising to “add to the legal-tender circulating

medium ... sixty to seventy millions of dollars” per year.⁵⁴⁸ The bill itself was a far cry from the unlimited coinage of silver which many Populists and their congressional supporters had championed, yet Hampton adamantly opposed even this modest nod toward a bimetallic monetary system.⁵⁴⁹ In his public appearances, Hampton uttered little about the currency issue. The senator recognized “a great depression in money,” expressing how deeply he “sympathized with the farmers,” but he quickly minimized the ability of state institutions to effect meaningful change. “But what laws can be passed by a legislature, or how can a governor ... help the farmers? ... How he can help the people is beyond my comprehension.”⁵⁵⁰

Another contentious class-based issue was the Subtreasury Plan. A popular Populist program, the plan “required the federal government to construct warehouses ... in counties that marketed crops with an annual value of \$500,000.” If they desired, farmers could “receive negotiable federal notes for up to 80 percent of the value of the crops.” These notes would be repaid at a one percent annual interest rate.⁵⁵¹ Hampton considered the “scheme” to be unsound, as well as unconstitutional.⁵⁵²

On the issue of race, Hampton maintained his paternalistic approach toward the civil protections afforded to African-Americans, but he was not immune to the increasingly torrid political climate confronting black Carolinians. In a speech to the Senate on January 30, Hampton

⁵⁴⁸ *Congressional Record*, 51st Congress, 1st session, vol 21, pt. 8, p 7088 - 7109, July 10, 1890, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1890-pt8-v21/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1890-pt8-v21-2-1.pdf>.

⁵⁴⁹ Ackerman, 261.

⁵⁵⁰ *The Watchman and Southron*, July 2, 1890, p 1.

⁵⁵¹ James L. Hunt, “Subtreasury Plan,” *NC Pedia*, State Library of North Carolina, 2006, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://ncpedia.org/subtreasury-plan>.

⁵⁵² *The Watchman and Southron*, July 2, 1890, p 1.

advocated for the emigration of Negroes from the South. In making his pitch, the senator defended “the political rights of our colored fellow citizens,” including the most essential right to “choose his home.” Yet he recognized their continued presence as “the sole disturbing cause preventing ... the hopes of our fathers ... [in] establish[ing] ‘a more perfect union’ between the states.” Therefore, in the senator’s view, the most propitious course of action mandated that the “races ... be permanently separated, leaving each to work out its own destiny.”

Hampton sought to counter any suggestion that his proposal arose from deep-seated antipathy toward black citizens, reminding his listeners of his long record striving to advance their interests. “I have been a true friend,” he declared, insisting, “My voice was the first in either [region] which advocated the policy of conferring on him ... the right of suffrage.” Characterizing blacks as behaving “admirably,” the senator warned against forcible deportations, which were “unlawful ... impolitic, unjust, and cruel” in nature. Furthermore, he did not want to “see them leave the country empty-handed.” Instead, they ought to be aided in their migration. “Something is due to these people, if only on the grounds of kindness and benevolence ... [and] gratitude for services rendered.” Hampton proclaimed, “I would cheerfully do all in my power to secure the enduring welfare of all of them.”⁵⁵³

In *The July Arena*, Hampton published a more blistering explanation for his position, describing the initial grant of suffrage to blacks as unconstitutional, misguided, and the “greatest wrong ever inflicted on a free people,” for the recently-freed slaves were unsuitable to “discharge any of the duties of manhood,” and therefore, unable to govern themselves. “But we must meet the fact that the negro ... is a citizen and a voter,” the senator conceded. The revocation of their

⁵⁵³ Wade Hampton Speech on Negro Emigration, *Hampton family papers*, The South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina.

constitutional protections is “impracticable.” As such, the “next best thing” stipulated their consensual deportation. Hampton suggested that many an African-American “expressed a wish to try this experiment,” and they ought to be handsomely assisted by the government. “Let us help them to establish a nationality for themselves, when they can show to the world that the lessons they have learned here have borne good fruit,” he exclaimed.⁵⁵⁴ Although Hampton maintained respect and civility toward African-Americans, even he was forced to comport his stance on the divisive racial issues, somewhat, with the rapidly-shifting attitudes of white Carolinians.

The professed paternalism toward African-Americans which Hampton shared with his fellow Bourbons was clearly infused by a stringent strain of white supremacy and racism. While conservatives tried rationalizing this worldview, insisting they were as vested in the best interests of black Carolinians as much as whites, their position was always informed by the belief that only “concerned white folk” — former slave owners who had reared their servants in the antebellum years — were better positioned to continue guiding the servile hand of the weak and infirm Negro. In 1876, that *weltanschauung* had extended to including blacks in the affairs of state politics — participation in elections, access to educational opportunities, patronage appointments, and so forth. But, by 1890, even the allegedly more “moderate” position on race in the South devolved into an ugly, subverted notion of racial, political, economic, and cultural segregation, a permanent split best achieved by voluntary self-deportations.

Hampton’s steadfast positions, especially on economic relief for depressed farmers, did little to endear himself to a restive populace stirring for change. His opposition to the silver currency and subtreasury plan fed into Tillman’s portrayal of the conservatives as an insular, out-of-

⁵⁵⁴ *The Manning Times*, July 16, 1890, p 4.

touch, elitist clique, dedicated more to preserving their own power than assisting the forgotten farmer. As the August convention neared, the gathering — packed as it would be by pro-Tillman delegates — promised to deliver a major triumph for their movement’s namesake. In a desperate eleventh hour attempt to avert disaster, the Democratic Executive Committee, one of the last remaining anti-Tillman political organs, demanded that the forthcoming convention authorize a second state convention in September instead, whose members be selected by primaries, thereby circumventing the countless Tillmanite-dominated county conventions. When the convention convened in August, the delegates brazenly opted to ignore these orders, instead, stipulating that the new September convention continue to be chosen by county conventions. Additionally, they assembled a friendlier executive committee, and arrogated a new constitution, which called for the introduction of primaries in 1892.⁵⁵⁵

At the September convention, the Democrats officially nominated Benjamin Tillman for governor by a vote of 269 to 40, with delegates from Charleston, Beaufort, Georgetown, and Richland Counties opposing. In his acceptance speech, Tillman pronounced his triumph as a “victory for the people in attaining the right ... to govern themselves.” Untainted as he was by petty politics and corrupt officials, only he represented the people’s vehicle to good government, economic relief, and white supremacy. Complementing Tillman’s selection, Colonel E. B. Gary was nominated for lieutenant governor by acclamation. Additionally, the gathering adopted wholesale a Populist platform reflecting the principles of the Shell Manifesto, including the free, unlimited coinage of silver, income tax, segregated school districts, a strong Railroad Commission, a new constitutional convention, and the maintenance of white supremacy as the “bulwark

⁵⁵⁵ Ackerman, 263-264; *Yorkville Enquirer*, August 20, 1890, p 1.

of our civilization.” The platform further denounced the McKinley Tariff “as unjust,” the Lodge Force Bill — which intended to enforce free and fair elections, notably in the South — “as iniquitous,” and advocated for abolishing national banks.⁵⁵⁶ The Populists had clearly benefitted from the convention system in place, which placed a premium on local organizational prowess — their great strength. The movement’s diligent work climaxed with the nomination of their faction’s candidates for higher office and the adoption of Populist principles into the platform. The capture of the party by Populist reformers virtually assured that the Tillmanites would control the forthcoming state legislature as well, an ominous portent for Senator Hampton’s re-election prospects. But these developments signaled widespread popular participation in the states’s elections and even, if indirectly, the senatorial selection process.

4.2.3 *Fall General Election Passivity*

Ordinarily, general elections in South Carolina were immaterial. Under the uni-party regime, Republicans held little chance of effecting an upset. Democratic nominations rendered over the summer by the convention system (followed by primaries in 1892) effectually decided the ultimate victor in the November elections. Furthermore, while marginal legislative seats may have been contested, control for the state legislature was never seriously in doubt. But in the 1890 election, an added wrinkle threatened to complicate matters.

Tillman’s nomination precipitated a split in the party, as regulars, led by Alexander Cheves Haskell, bolted from the party in protest. Self-styled as the “straight-out Democrats,” these sycophants were determined to undermine Tillman’s tightening grip over the party appara-

⁵⁵⁶ *The Newberry Herald and News*, September 18, 1890, p 1.

tus.⁵⁵⁷ A hardened Civil War veteran, Colonel Haskell was wounded four times, sustaining irreparable damage to his left eye. But he bravely soldiered on until the conclusion of the conflict. A loyal political lieutenant to Wade Hampton, Haskell was instrumental in effectuating the general's election in 1876 and the Bourbon restoration, more broadly. As a reward for his faithful services, he was appointed associate justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1877.⁵⁵⁸ Haskell viewed Tillman with scorn and contempt. Fearing his election would reap undue harm to the state, he utilized every opportunity possible to deny the demagogue elevation to the governor's mansion.

At their convention in October, the straight-outs nominated Haskell for governor and W.D. Johnson for lieutenant governor, thereby placing dueling Democratic tickets before the people of South Carolina.⁵⁵⁹ With little time to spare — a mere three weeks until the election — Haskell acted expeditiously to shore up support for his candidacy, issuing entreaties to members of the great silent resistance — recalcitrant holdouts who remained unalterably opposed to Tillman, even at this late stage. However, limited in their electoral appeal, the straight-outs failed to generate much enthusiasm for their cause. A pervasive sentiment among many Democrats in the state, especially those conservatives whom Haskell targeted, led them to deem as apostasy opposing the party's nominees.

Even Wade Hampton, whose fortunes were most directly impacted by the political developments underway, issued a statement disavowing Haskell's independent bid. On October 23,

⁵⁵⁷ Ackerman, 263-264.

⁵⁵⁸ Rod Andrew, Jr., "Alexander Cheves Haskell," *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, University of South Carolina Institute for Southern Studies, April 15, 2016, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <http://www.sckenyclopedia.org/sce/entries/haskell-alexander-cheves/>.

⁵⁵⁹ Ackerman, 264.

Hampton penned a letter declaring his “support [for] the ticket nominated by the convention in September.” But his endorsement was paired with an important qualification. The senator made clear he was not validating “the grave charges which have been made against the Democratic Party of the state.” In justifying his support for the “September ticket,” Hampton explained, “It was nominated by the Democratic convention, and ... the other ticket lacks that endorsement.” Further, the incumbent — clearly ill at ease — expressed his profound “regret ... that this latter ticket has been brought out,” before attesting to the “greatest respect for the gentlemen composing it,” including an extended treatment of Colonel Haskell’s admirable deeds comprising his distinguished record of service.⁵⁶⁰

At the height of the campaign, Hampton embarked upon a strategy of passivity. The State Executive Committee, coupled with the various County Executive Committees, invited the venerable statesman to deliver speeches “at the proposed mass meetings.” Having returned to his home in Millwood, Hampton was fully “expected to comply” with the request.⁵⁶¹ However, the senator had other plans. Perhaps driven by his principled objection to the Populist agenda, coupled with a personal aversion to Tillman, Hampton opted against campaigning in the general election for any Democratic candidates. Through his friend, John W. R. Pope, the editor of *The Columbia Register*, the incumbent explained, “He would not speak at the meetings advertised to be held ... as in his judgment, these would only prolong the existing excitement, intensifying the bitter feeling now unfortunately prevailing, and tend to widen the breach in the ... party.”⁵⁶² On the surface, Hampton, who had long bemoaned the bitter factional infighting destroying the par-

⁵⁶⁰ *Yorkville Enquirer*, October 29, 1890, p 2.

⁵⁶¹ *The Times and Democrat*, October 22, 1890, p 8; *Keowee Courier*, October 16, 1890, p 4.

⁵⁶² *Yorkville Enquirer*, October 22, 1890, p 2.

ty, portrayed his decision as an effort to avoid exacerbating those tensions further. But we may surmise his deeper motive was to deny the Tillmanites his stamp of legitimacy and approval.

Hampton had approached his own re-election in a blasé, detached, almost apathetic manner. In a letter published in September, the senator denied having “entertained the slightest idea of entering upon a contest for re-election to the Senate” after a potential compromise conference between both factions emerged. Hampton maintained that his re-election remained “in the hands of the people of South Carolina, and they must settle it without any advice or suggestion from myself. I have never asked for an office, and I certainly shall not do so now.”⁵⁶³ Therefore, Hampton never sought to shore up popular support for the party and its slate of state legislative nominees with the expectation that he would be rewarded with re-election — critical given the highly-popular, widespread input by voters in the contests. And while many of those prospective legislators were Populists — a faction antithetical to the senator — Hampton never deigned to corral undecided legislators into supporting his candidature nor endear himself to those critical figures in opposition.

The Tillmanites interpreted Hampton’s refusal to campaign as a “slap in the face,” whose consequences would redound to the senator’s detriment in due course. *The Keowee Courier* lamented, “This is humiliating ... and it comes in bad grace.”⁵⁶⁴ And Hampton’s letter of neutrality, which offered only qualified support for the Democratic ticket nominated by the September convention, evidently “excited great dissatisfaction among Captain Tillman’s friends,” further damaging the senator’s standing with the Populists.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ *Yorkville Enquirer*, September 10, 1890, p 2.

⁵⁶⁴ *Keowee Courier*, October 23, 1890, p 2.

⁵⁶⁵ *The Watchman and Southron*, October 29, 1890, p 2.

4.2.4 *The Legislature Decides*

At the national level, the November elections produced a Democratic tsunami. Fueled by the widespread discontent with the McKinley Tariff, Democrats reclaimed the U.S. House of Representatives with 238 members, which relegated the Republicans to a mere 86 members.⁵⁶⁶ In the U.S. Senate, Democratic gains were more modest. Together with the Populists, they gained four Republican seats, but remained in the minority.⁵⁶⁷ In the Palmetto State, Populists scored a decisive victory. Benjamin Tillman was handily elected governor with 59,159 votes, representing nearly 80% of voters. A.C. Haskell's protest bid performed dismally, earning a paltry 14,828 votes.⁵⁶⁸

Unsurprisingly, the state legislature remained firmly in Democratic hands, although Republicans made ever-so slight incremental gains. In the General Assembly, Democrats enjoyed a lopsided advantage of 115 members to the Republicans' nine, which itself represented a post-Reconstruction high-water mark for the opposition. In the upper chamber, Democrats numbered 33 senators in total and commanded a 29-seat advantage over the Republicans. Incidentally, the forthcoming legislature would be the final assembly to witness any Republicans in the Senate

⁵⁶⁶ "Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present," United States House of Representatives, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/>.

⁵⁶⁷ "Party Division," United States Senate, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm>.

⁵⁶⁸ Cisco, 303.

until 1966.⁵⁶⁹ More pertinently, the Tillmanite-Farmers' Alliance wing of the Democratic Party secured comfortable majorities in both chambers.⁵⁷⁰

The lack of any official records or hard evidence precludes quantifiable estimates of the factional breakdown in the legislature. However, we may surmise that as many as four factions operated under the umbrella of the Democratic majority. The first bloc was the Farmers' Alliance, representing the poorer, economically-depressed farmers, and advocating for major new initiatives and programs to improve their lives. They were desperately in search for a strong, commanding figure to lead them to the promised land. The second faction was the Tillmanites. Borrowing from Richard Fenno's metaphor, this bloc constituted the smallest concentric circle, but what they lacked in magnitude, they compensated in passion. These people comprised Tillman's most devoted supporters, personally dedicated to the man through thick and thin, and committed to getting him nominated and subsequently elected. This ring existed within the larger Farmers' Alliance ring. Therefore, while most Tillmanites belonged to the Alliance, many members of the Alliance were not necessarily Tillmanites. Together, this grouping formed the People's Party, or Populists.


The third bloc represented moderate conservatives, those Bourbons, driven by self-preservation, who were willing to compromise on important issues and cede some ground to the Populists. As the election results attest and Walter Edgar contends, many Democrats who belonged to this group voted for Tillman, as well. The final faction composed the hard-line, obdurate conservatives, unwilling to compromise with the Populists on any measure, and endeavoring

⁵⁶⁹ Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2007), 170-171.

⁵⁷⁰ Cisco, 303; *Keowee Courier*, November 6, 1890, p 2; *The Newberry Herald and News*, November 20, 1890, p 2.

to prevent Tillman from gaining a foothold within government. They mostly backed Haskell in the gubernatorial election. **Figure 4.1** graphs the factional breakdown of the Democratic caucus.

Figure 4.1 - Factional Breakdown of the Democratic Caucus, 1890



With the Populists wielding complete power over the state, Wade Hampton's days as senator were numbered. Following the election, speculation mounted that Hampton would be denied another term, with prominent Tillman supporters citing the incumbent's unforgivable actions during the campaign as a pretext for replacement. One official denounced "Senator Hampton's letter [which] was far from being the letter he should have written." Characterizing the statement as "a Haskell letter except [for] that single sentence [endorsing the 'September ticket']," the source deplored how "it ended with the statement that he could not advise the people of South Carolina how to vote." Livid at Hampton's unwillingness to fulfill "his duty" on behalf of the "integrity of the Democratic Party," the official concluded, "There is no little re-

sentment among the Tillmanites at his letter, and I think it very probably that there will be opposition to his re-election.”⁵⁷¹ Unquestionably, the Tillmanites had been angling to eject Hampton from office for months. His actions during the late campaign merely provided a convenient excuse to do so.

The Times and Democrat agreed. While the editors expressed their desire to “see [Hampton] succeed himself,” they did “not think he acted altogether proper in the election.”⁵⁷² Other periodicals, such as *The Newberry Herald and News*, remained committed to the general, intimating their “regret to see the people of South Carolina turn their backs on Wade Hampton now.”⁵⁷³ And although *The Abbeville Press and Banner* objected to the notion that Hampton was “entitled” to his seat, they favored his re-election on the grounds of “gratitude” and “honor ... for past services.”⁵⁷⁴ Meanwhile, a flabbergasted *Charleston World* exclaimed that the merits of Hampton’s actions were inconsequential and irrelevant, for most people had already formed hardened positions on his retention. Rather, the paper implored the legislature to exercise its selection authority in a deliberative manner. “See what available [senatorial] timber you have for the place, and then select the best piece.” But it cautioned, “above all, be careful.”⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷¹ *The Times and Democrat*, November 19, 1890, p 1.

⁵⁷² *The Times and Democrat*, November 26, 1890, p 4.

⁵⁷³ *The Newberry Herald and News*, November 20, 1890, p 2.

⁵⁷⁴ *The Abbeville Press And Banner*, December 3, 1890, p 4.

⁵⁷⁵ *Keowee Courier*, November 27, 1890, p 2.

With the race to succeed Wade Hampton heating up, a bevy of avowed and potential candidates emerged, offering a wide selection to the ascendant Tillmanites.⁵⁷⁶ But as the days progressed, the field winnowed to two contenders: Colonel M. L. Donaldson and John Laurens Manning Irby. Irby had a checkered past. “An habitual drunk and accused murderer,”⁵⁷⁷ Irby was first elected to the state House of Representatives in 1886, before being elevated to the position of speaker in 1890. During that time, he served as Tillman’s loyal, hard-working lieutenant, persuading him to pursue the governorship and nominating him for that office at the convention. During the campaign, Irby chaired the important State Executive Committee. With Tillman governor-elect, Irby was primed for the Senate seat.⁵⁷⁸

On December 9, the legislature assembled to decide the question of the senatorship. Seven candidates were officially nominated, among them Irby, Donaldson, and Hampton. The contours of the voting were set at the first ballot. In the General Assembly, Irby took a commanding lead of 50 votes, Donaldson received 33, whilst Hampton rounded out third with 31. In the Senate, Donaldson received fifteen votes, Hampton received fourteen votes, and Irby received just five votes. With no candidate attaining the necessary majorities in each chamber, a joint sitting convened the following day. The second ballot produced another sizable lead for Irby, who secured 63 votes — still short of the 78-vote threshold for selection. Over subsequent roll calls,


⁵⁷⁶ *The Manning Times*, December 3, 1890, p 1; *The Newberry Herald and News*, November 27, 1890, p 2.

Such possibilities included Colonel Ellison Keitt, Congressman John James Hemphill of the Fifth District, and Judge William Henry Wallace of Union, South Carolina. The latter two were considered compromise candidates in case of a deadlock.

⁵⁷⁷ Edgar, 439.

⁵⁷⁸ Michael Robert Mounter, “John Laurens Manning Irby,” *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, University of South Carolina, Institute for Southern Studies, June 8, 2016, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <http://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/irby-john-laurens-manning/>.

Irby continued inching higher toward the majority, whilst Donaldson and Hampton plateaued. After some late-hour wrangling, the Donaldson supporters threw their weight behind the frontrunner on the fifth ballot, whereby Irby collected a whopping 105 votes, formally elevating the contender to the Senate. Wade Hampton's final curtain call saw him place second with 43 votes.⁵⁷⁹ **Figure 4.2** charts the sequence of joint ballots taken by the legislature in choosing a senator.



SOURCE: *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of South Carolina. General Assembly. House of Representatives*, (Columbia: James J. Woodrow, 1891), 221-223, 245, 247, 249

⁵⁷⁹ *Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of South Carolina. General Assembly. House of Representatives*, (Columbia: James J. Woodrow, 1891), 221-223, 245, 247, 249, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: https://books.google.com/books?id=cCINAAAAAYAAJ&dq=m.l.+donaldson+south+carolina&source=gbs_navlinks_s.

Hampton felt justly aggrieved by the whole process. Shortly after the legislature's decision, he wrote to former senator and secretary of state Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware, dejectedly informing his friend, "My constituents have ... relegated me to private life. I accept the change willingly but it would have been more decent in them to have allowed me to make it voluntarily." The senator excoriated the entire band of Tillmanites, characterizing them as "unscrupulous demagogues," who, interested only with advancing their own political fortunes, have invariably led "our people ... astray." Hampton bewailed, "The man who takes my place [Irby] has been tried for murder and though acquitted is very generally believed to have been guilty. The governor's proudest boast is that he took part in the Hamburg massacre," the cold-blooded killing of African-American militiamen during a vigilante riot in 1876, "and his brother George Tillman served his time in jail for a brutal and cowardly murder! Of course men like them realize that I am not a proper representative of their principles or their character, and they naturally chose one who is." Even more painfully for Hampton, the long-revered figure lost his fondness for his own people, revealing, "I have no pride in representing the South Carolina of the present day. I was once proud of representing the state, but then the state itself was proud of its honorable ... old traditions."⁵⁸⁰

Penning a letter to his colleague, Senator Matthew Butler, Hampton excoriated the manner in which Tillman and his supporters had conducted the campaign. "The Alliance friends hav[e] 'shelved' me ... Base methods were used to defeat me. The ordinary methods of Tillman and his followers: misrepresentations, distraction, and lying." But Hampton remained proud of

⁵⁸⁰ Wade Hampton to Thomas F. Bayard, December 12, 1890, *Thomas Bayard papers*, Library of Congress.

the nature of his campaign, “I prefer defeat at their hands rather than to have been successful by sacrificing my independence and self respect.”⁵⁸¹ The outgoing senator reiterated his attitude in a follow-up letter to Bayard, writing that he was neither surprised nor pained by the election results, since “it was brought about by a base conspiracy and by shameful methods.”⁵⁸² More difficult for the general was the “hurt” he felt when “the old soldiers turned against me, for I did not expect that at their hands.”⁵⁸³

As the close of Hampton’s career drew nearer, the senator was gratified by the expressions of “sincere regret at my defeat” on behalf of fellow senators, and sentiment arising “from all quarters of the country generally deploring what they call the ‘disgrace of the state.’”⁵⁸⁴ Despite the increasingly untenable conditions back home, Hampton’s ultimate consolation was the widespread affirmation and validation of his upstanding, honorable record of service by intimate friends and professional colleagues.

4.2.5 *Analysis*

As the evidence demonstrates, South Carolina’s 1890 senatorial election, occurring prior to the enactment of the primary, was generally more *non-popular* in nature. Under the state’s uni-party system, general elections were immaterial and uncompetitive. Candidate recognition was modest, at best. Few of the senatorial aspirants even conducted visible, public campaigns, and, while Wade Hampton attended limited appearances, the implications of the forthcoming

⁵⁸¹ Hampton to Matthew Butler, December 13, 1890, *Butler papers*, USC.

⁵⁸² Hampton to Thomas F. Bayard, December 24, 1890, *Bayard papers*, LOC.

⁵⁸³ Hampton to Matthew Butler, December 13, 1890, *Butler papers*, USC.

⁵⁸⁴ Hampton to Barker, January 29, 1891, *Hampton family papers*, USC.

election for his electoral fate were not widely emphasized. As such, the legislature exercised tremendous autonomy settling the question, necessitating insider politicking, power broker bargaining, and legislative wrangling.

But elements of popular legitimacy and a vibrant democracy *were* materializing, especially with the rise of the Farmers' Alliance and their political vehicle, the People's Party. The case study attests to the widespread *popular participation* in the state's politics, and, indirectly, in the senatorial selection process. The electrifying issues of the currency, relief for depressed yeomen, and race relations engaged masses of citizens, rousing formerly forgotten farmers into action. The convention system — which had placed a premium on the decisions of county conventions — encouraged local, democratic electioneering. The outsider Populists took full advantage of the structure through their superior grassroots organizing efforts, fierce enthusiasm, and intensive passion. They targeted municipal and county level politics, outmaneuvering their conservative opponents at every turn. By the time the Bourbons recognized the growing threat to their power, it was too late to stem the rising tide.⁵⁸⁵ Further, the extensive state canvass conducted by the candidates served as *proto-debates*, which would mature more fully in subsequent years following the adoption of the primary. These engagements provided voters first-hand observations of the candidates, their mettle, and their stances on the pressing issues of the day, unfiltered by the biases of the press.

Additionally, although the election presented only a *quasi-referendum* on Wade Hampton — his candidacy was neither widely advertised nor directly pegged to individual legislators, and

⁵⁸⁵ Although reformers assailed the convention system as undemocratic, designed to preserve the existing power structure of the state, the Populists demonstrated, through diligent, superior organization, concerted coordination, and sheer fortune, they could seize control of the party apparatus and state government before the first primary was ever held.

the Senate contest had not been the premier issue for voters — an emerging element of *public accountability* had manifest in the equation. South Carolinians recognized that nominating conservative state legislative contenders would return Hampton to the Senate for another term. Backing Populist nominees would replace the incumbent with a Tillmanite. Therefore, voters held an indirect means of holding Hampton to account for the misrule of the Bourbons.

As with his fellow conservatives, Hampton failed to properly anticipate the concerted, organized, and impassioned effort by the Populists and their leader, Benjamin Tillman, to sweep the state, overwhelm the reigning Bourbons, secure the party nomination — and, in effect, the general election — and claim a Senate seat, at that. Hampton had pursued a defensive campaign of passivity, adhering strictly to his principles, even when unpopular, refusing to clash personally with Tillman, attending only limited public appearances, and opting out of the fall election campaign completely. By that point, the senator seemed resigned to defeat. The final ignominy occurred when the state legislature officially selected John Irby to replace the revered general in the Senate.

Logically, the question that arises is whether Hampton could have salvaged his seat, in any way. While his actions did himself no favors, admittedly, it would have been exceedingly difficult for the senator to hold on, even had he tried more forcefully. A series of increasingly unlikely hypotheticals emerge. At the outset, Hampton, a man of solid convictions and principle, would never have countenanced surrendering his independence and sacrificing his pride to the reviled Tillman. But suppose he had made concessions on the currency and adopted more inflammable rhetoric on race, would the Tillmanites have agreed? In that scenario, it seems more likely the Populists would have still objected, citing the senator's poor track record on farmers'

issues. Indeed, the president of the Farmers' Alliance predicated his opposition to Hampton on the misalignment between the senator's record and the interests of the Alliance.⁵⁸⁶ Furthermore, had Hampton managed to secure another term, Tillman's brash style, unceasing defense of the farmers, and rabid race-baiting was very much in vogue. By 1890, the prevailing mood among white Carolinians was itself the oxygen which fueled Tillman's rise, and Hampton would have encountered great difficulty managing under these starkly changed circumstances.

For all the rhetoric, it is worth examining whether the 1890 uprising was itself a revolution. Although many observers at the time — conservative and reformer alike — viewed the developments as a full-scale takeover of the Democratic Party by the Populists, Walter Edgar takes exception to the characterization, arguing, "[Tillman] did not bring any new white voters to the polls in the poorer counties. There was no groundswell of debtors and poor whites backing the Reform ticket." Instead, "the white minority ... voted ... Democratic ... to forestall any possibility of allowing blacks to decide." Edgar minimizes the extent to which the results signaled a victory for poor whites in a broader class struggle, contending, "Tillman [won] with the assistance of some members of the elite and a goodly portion of the state's upper middle class."⁵⁸⁷

While Edgar offers compelling information regarding the coalitions and behavior of South Carolina voters, he understates the significance of the 1890 election. Most clearly, the election represented a changing of the guard for the state as a new generation of younger leaders asserted themselves, figured who were reared in the years *after* the idyllic, antebellum period, during the upheaval and tumult of Reconstruction and the 1873 Depression. Their values dif-

⁵⁸⁶ *Keowee Courier*, December 4, 1890, p 2.

⁵⁸⁷ Edgar, 437.

ferred markedly from their conservative forerunners. As a result, the state's political direction shifted seismically. With the aristocracy defanged, South Carolina drifted into an *illiberal democracy*. As poorer farmers were brought into the fray, the government responded, enacting many a Populist program designed to assist the depressed yeomen in their economic plight, policies which would never have been implemented during the Bourbon Age. Furthermore, Tillman's election augured a darker period for race relations, giving official state sanction to Jim Crow segregation, intimidation, lynchings, and other forms of violence. Black Carolinians, who comprised sixty percent of the state, witnessed their constitutional protections stripped and the rule of law undermined — all in the name of “the people.” Conditions grew increasingly untenable, such that many eventually migrated to the North after World War I in search of a better life.

4.3 1894 - Butler's Offensive Campaign of Active Electioneering

By 1892, the indirect primary replaced the convention system in nominating candidates for statewide office. The reform represented the party's earnest effort to signal meaningful concessions to the Populists and their calls for greater democratic self-government — evidencing *party adaptability*. Henceforth, voters selected state convention delegates committed to nominating legislative candidates pledged to a specific senatorial contender.⁵⁸⁸ The slate of highly-visible nominees directly pegged to a senatorial candidate recall certain elements of a *parliamentary*

⁵⁸⁸ Samuel J. Martin, *Southern Hero: Matthew Calbraith Butler, Confederate General, Hampton Red Shirt, and U.S. Senator*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 278; *Republican Leader*, August 30, 1894, p 1.

In many respects, the indirect nominating procedure mirrors the current process of selecting a president. In a series of primaries, voters directly choose delegates committed to nominating a presidential candidate at the party's national convention. In the general election, the electorate is presented with each party's official nominee and render their choice accordingly, but they technically are voting for a slate of electors pledged to one candidate, who then formally elect a president in December.

democracy — whereby the pool of an aspirant's partisans are maximized across the state's various legislative districts. See **Figure 4.3** for a visualization of the multi-step senatorial selection process.

This singular reform fundamentally transformed the state's politics, including its senatorial selection process, to a more *moderately popular* regime. Although general elections remained uncompetitive, the senatorial election became *the* primary issue before voters — on par with the gubernatorial election. Candidate recognition and civic attentiveness to the race grew more widespread. As a result, the state legislature lost a modicum of its autonomy, ultimately deferring to the results of the August primary when deciding upon a senator. Thus, *popular participation* in the process burgeoned as conduits expanded for a more direct *public accountability* of incumbent senators.

Learning from the missteps of Wade Hampton's defeat, Senator Matthew C. Butler embarked upon an offensive campaign of active politicking and his strategy could not have been more different. Where Hampton was reactive — complacently waiting until it was too late to effect much of an impact — Butler was proactive, eagerly preparing for months and even years beforehand. Where Hampton appeared only in limited public engagement, Butler threw himself into the ring, going toe-to-toe with Tillman in a series of publicized debates. Where Hampton refused to engage in personalities, adhering faithfully to his convictions and principles, Butler freely hurled personal insults and readily shifted positions on important issues to broaden his appeal to a wider electorate. Where Hampton painfully, but respectably, accepted the results of the convention's nomination, issuing a firm statement disallowing Haskell's extra-partisan candidacy, Butler refused to honor the results of the Democratic primary, bolting from the party and

launching an independent bid. Ultimately, hard done by a split in the conservative vote and the inability to attract support from reformers, Butler lost his seat to Benjamin Tillman.

Figure 4.3 - Multi-Step Senatorial Selection Process in South Carolina, 1894



4.3.1 *Background*

Tillman's record as governor was decidedly mixed. Per the Populist platform, he raised corporate taxes, brokered new agreements with the phosphate industry, and reapportioned the General Assembly, which witnessed the hardscrabble region of the upcountry gain four seats at the expense of the low country. But Tillman was less successful enacting meaningful railroad reform, addressing the perennial concerns of poorer farmers over prohibitive lien laws, and managing the state's finances. Emboldened by his re-election in 1892, Tillman embarked upon a more ambitious administration. The governor established a new railroad commission, equipped with the necessary powers to effectively regulate rates, placed maximum hour limits on textile industry workers, refinanced the state debt, and reduced fiscal spending. However, the most controversial and contentious issue was the Dispensary.⁵⁸⁹

Prohibitionist sentiment had been increasing throughout South Carolina for decades. By 1891, approximately 78 communities had banned the sale and manufacture of alcoholic beverages. Responding to the passage of a statewide, popular referendum the following year, Tillman and the Assembly prohibited all private suppliers of liquor. In its stead, they instituted the Dispensary system, which provided "the only legal source of alcohol." Overseen by the Dispensary Board, which included the governor, the state-run cartel determined whether to approve requests by counties to supply their communities with the state's own favored dispenser. The statute granted wide latitude to authorities to rigorously enforce the measure no matter the cost to the privacy concerns of its citizens or the lives of ordinary Carolinians. These overbearing, dracon-

⁵⁸⁹ Edgar, 439-441.

ian tactics led to flagrant violations of the law and violent tussles with police.⁵⁹⁰ The Dispensary threatened to alienate many natural allies of Tillman, including a sizable portion of Alliance members. Therefore, it remained imperative for the governor to unify the Reformers before any fissures deepened beyond repair.

De- spite the controversy, Tillman set his eyes on higher office. Eager to consolidate the impressive gains achieved over the previous four years and strengthen his grasp over the party apparatus and, by extension, the state government, the governor divined a providential plan envisioning his elevation to the Senate. The forthcoming elections presented the prime opportunity for Tillman to advance his political career beyond South Carolina.

The one obstacle to Tillman's ambitions, however, manifested in the personage of Matthew Calbraith Butler, who had hitherto occupied the coveted Senate seat in question. Butler's entry into politics in 1860 was interrupted by the outbreak of the Civil War, where he served under General Wade Hampton in "Hampton's Legion." The young Carolinian saw combat in the battles of Bull Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Brandy Station, where he gave his right foot. After a brief convalescence, he returned to battle, eventually attaining the rank of major general. Following the war, Butler resumed his political career when he was elected to the state House of Representatives in 1866. As he had during the conflict, the tenacious Butler rose through the ranks, again under the tutelage of Wade Hampton. After Hampton's election as governor in 1876, Butler was chosen by the General Assembly to serve in the United States Senate, where- upon he was re-elected in 1882 and 1888.⁵⁹¹ Described as more active and diligent in his official

⁵⁹⁰ Edgar, 441-443.

⁵⁹¹ "Matthew Calbraith Butler," *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, U.S. Congress, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/MemberDetails?memIndex=b001184>.

duties than his colleague, Butler delivered many important services for the state, including the clearance of Charleston Harbor.⁵⁹²

As 1894 approached, Butler was confronted by a vastly changed political landscape in South Carolina, which boded ominously for his re-election prospects. The Bourbon aristocrats had been all but ejected from office, save for himself. The reviled, but popular Tillman was virtually in control of the entire Democratic Party, having restructured it around his leadership. Tillmanites wielded authority over the machinery of the state, as well. And the prevailing attitudes amongst Carolinians had shifted toward Populist assumptions about the powers of government and the alleged perfidious nature of financial corporations, elites of all stripes — political, social, and economic — and blacks. To counter these developments, the pugnacious Butler was keen to prove his mettle as a fighter.

4.3.2 *Scramble for Factional Support*

Given the fractious nature of the state's politics, Butler needed to command sufficient backing from enough factions constituting majority support, but the political scene had grown ever-more nebulous. By 1894, the intra-party factions jostling for power splintered even further. The Populists, now dubbed the "Reformers," were torn over the leadership of the party. While Tillman's most passionate devotees were eager to support the governor for the highly-coveted Senate seat, other members were less enthusiastic. These divisions were fueled, in part, by a prolonged dispute over a suitable gubernatorial candidate, and by the emergence of an "anti-Tillman

⁵⁹² Ackerman, 253; Martin, 226-227.

dispensary” element — a grouping of Reformers who disapproved of the imperious liquor regime, its heavy-handed enforcement, and the widespread violence in its wake.⁵⁹³

For Tillman, it remained imperative that he promptly consolidate the support of the Reformers — his base. Trivializing the schisms as nothing more than an elaborate ploy by Butler to “creat[e] dissensions in ours ranks,” Tillman loyalists fervently went about “whipping into line” the incessant “wavering and doubting” amongst Reformers.⁵⁹⁴ But Tillman’s reply to the Alliance demands, where he derided state ownership of the railroads “on the grounds of wisdom and practicability,” and pronounced his “unalterable opposition” to the subtreasury plan as “paternalism run made,” akin to the despised national banking system, was wholly unsatisfactory to the faction.⁵⁹⁵ Unconvinced by Tillman’s tepid response, the Alliance threatened to field a third party candidate for the Senate, a potentially calamitous blow to the governor’s prospects for higher office.⁵⁹⁶

Sensing an opening, Butler sought to capitalize upon Tillman’s troubles. Concluding that the conservative factions could only offer limited electoral support for his re-election, the senior senator began visibly courting the backing of Reformers, instead. To broaden his appeal, Butler recalibrated his position on the pressing matter of the currency. The enactment of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, stipulating “the purchase of 4.5 million ounces of silver every month by the treasury,” witnessed the depletion of the nation’s gold reserves. As the Depression of 1893 deepened, the federal government feared it would be forced to adopt a silver currency,

⁵⁹³ *The Newberry Herald and News*, January 17, 1894, p 2; *The Intelligencer*, January 31, 1894, p 2.

⁵⁹⁴ *The Newberry Herald and News*, March 14, 1894, p 2.

⁵⁹⁵ *The Times and Democrat*, June 6, 1894, p 1.

⁵⁹⁶ *The Pickens Sentinel*, June 7, 1894, p 2.

thereby devaluing the dollar and risking further economic instability. As such, President Cleveland, a gold bug, implored the Congress to repeal the Silver Act and restore the United States to sound fiscal footing. Abandoning his longtime opposition to silver, Butler opposed the repeal, demanding that it be “accompanied by a proposition to continue the coinage of silver ... making it a permanent part of ... financial policy.” The senator used the occasion to more broadly assail the “selfish and sordid ... owners and holders of large investments, as well as the “bankers ... [who] had loaned the money of their depositors far beyond the bounds and limits of prudence.” Paraphrasing Andrew Jackson, Butler excoriated banks for their undue economic and political influence upon the liberties of a free people.⁵⁹⁷

Similarly, for race relations, Butler emphasized his commitment to white rule. Although he had long held unenlightened prejudices toward blacks for years, the senator shared the Bourbon responsibility of protecting the civil rights of former slaves. At the height of Reconstruction, Butler even appealed to the support of black voters during local elections in his hometown of Edgefield.⁵⁹⁸ But the mood of the South Carolina electorate had shifted considerably by the 1890s, as whites were relentlessly striving to relegate blacks to a permanent status of political and social inferiority. Responding to these sentiments, Butler offered his Negro Emigration Bill, designed to facilitate the migration of blacks from the South to found their own settlements in other regions or countries.⁵⁹⁹ Furthermore, the senator penned a letter to *The Greenville Enterprise* in late 1893, firmly proclaiming, “I have struggled for white supremacy and shall continue to struggle for its permanency. Whatever I am I owe to the white people.” Decrying rumors

⁵⁹⁷ Martin, 271-273.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 128, 169, 177.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 258-261.

which suggested one faction may yet seek “the negro vote,” Butler bemoaned, “The degradation of the ballot, the demoralization of the white people ... would be something too terrible to contemplate.”⁶⁰⁰

Butler’s strategy coaxing the backing of Reformers reached its zenith in the summer, when the incumbent issued his detailed response to the demands of the Alliance. Two issues aside, the senator virtually endorsed the bulk of the Populist program. As with Tillman, Butler opposed the public acquisition of railroads and utilities, which he considered “impolitic and unwise,” for they would increase the indebtedness of the state and saddle “present and future generations” with enormous expenditures. Additionally, he objected to the subtreasury plan, insisting it be “abandoned” on practicable and constitutional grounds. But the senator favored the free and unlimited coinage of silver and gold, the implementation of an income tax, the creation of postal savings banks, and the Alliance’s policy toward public lands, which deemed any acreage “held by railroads ... in excess of their actual need” or by aliens be “reclaimed” by the state.⁶⁰¹

The Tillmanite press bewailed Butler’s ploy as disingenuous. *The Manning Times* charged, “Butler waited until Tillman spoke and then said, ‘me too.’ Governor Tillman’s utterances have the sound of the patriot, while Butler’s has the sound of the pap-riot.”⁶⁰² *The Dispatch News* inquired “whether Butler is apeing [*sic*] Tillman, or Tillman is trying to step in Butler’s tracks?”⁶⁰³ And *The People’s Journal* explained, “[Butler’s] letter will not be satisfactory or

⁶⁰⁰ *Edgefield Advertiser*, December 7, 1893, p 1.

⁶⁰¹ *The Intelligencer*, May 23, 1894, p 2.

⁶⁰² *The Manning Times*, May 23, 1894, p 2.

⁶⁰³ *The Dispatch-News*, May 30, 1894, p 2.

productive of much support to him in his senatorial race.”⁶⁰⁴ The Farmers’ Alliance was despondent by the prospects of “the only avowed [senatorial] candidates ... neither ... in full accord with [their] demands.” “Both of them gag at the same two of our demands,” the Alliance protested.⁶⁰⁵

Butler’s gambit to endear himself to the Reformers served only to alienate his own base. Having relied upon the senator to safeguard certain core principles of the old guard, conservatives were outraged by his decision to oppose the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act.⁶⁰⁶ Their disaffection intensified further during the course of the campaign, as the incumbent kowtowed to the vilified Tillmanites and their Populist agenda. Reportedly, “several of the conservative papers are speaking in a disapproving way” of the once conservative incumbent.⁶⁰⁷ Accordingly, *The Laurens Advertiser* suggested, “Senator Butler is less popular with the conservatives than with the Reformers.”⁶⁰⁸ And *The Aiken Recorder* declared, “While he has lost the sympathy of many ... conservatives, he has not gained the vote of a Tillmanite” going on to predict his imminent “retire[ment] into obscurity.”⁶⁰⁹ Having strived to expand his appeal to numerous factions, Butler was soon bereft of strong backing by *any* faction. As he prepared to face the primary voters over the summer, the senator found himself in a precarious electoral position.

⁶⁰⁴ *The People’s Journal*, May 24, 1894, p 2.

⁶⁰⁵ *The Times and Democrat*, June 6, 1894, p 1.

⁶⁰⁶ Martin, 274.

⁶⁰⁷ *The Laurens Advertiser*, February 20, 1894, p 2.

⁶⁰⁸ *The Laurens Advertiser*, February 27, 1894, p 2.

⁶⁰⁹ *The Watchman and Southron*, June 13, 1894, p 8.

4.3.3 *The Primary Nomination Battle*

As a result of the primary in nominating aspirants for public office, the senatorial contest became central to the state's elections, emerging as *the* premier issue before the electorate. Senatorial candidate recognition grew more widespread, visible, and widely-advertised. As early as 1890 — in the days following Wade Hampton's defeat — Governor-elect Tillman signaled his intentions to challenge Senator Butler, the last remaining vestige of the Bourbon regime.⁶¹⁰ During the election year itself, periodicals routinely reported the implications of the looming primary in determining the next member of the United States Senate and publicized the principal figures in the race. The summer primary presented a stark choice to voters — back the incumbent, Matthew Butler, for another six year term, or eject him from office by supporting Benjamin Tillman in his stead. *The Correspondence News and Courier* remarked, “Everybody understands that the contest will be between Senator Butler and Governor Tillman ... When the fight is really made it will be between these two men.”⁶¹¹ *The Washington Post* quoted one Colonel Ben Perry of Edgefield, who asserted, “The primaries next August ... will determine whether Senator Butler will succeed himself or whether his successor will be Governor Tillman.”⁶¹² With voters wielding such immense authority over the decision, *popular participation* in the process bourgeoned and notions of a more direct *public accountability* — holding incumbent senators to account for their record — greatly expanded.

⁶¹⁰ *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, December 17, 1890, p 4.

⁶¹¹ *The Intelligencer*, January 10, 1894, p 2.

⁶¹² *Edgefield Advertiser*, January 25, 1894, p 1.

The Columbia Register described the upcoming campaign as “the hottest the state has ever experienced,” with Butler “resorting to every means to secure his election.”⁶¹³ And *The News and Courier* predicted “a bitter personal struggle” between the candidates, “for Senator Butler is anxious to retain his seat ... and Governor Tillman has been bending all of his political and personal energies” to defeat Butler. Characterizing the face-off as a “battle royal,” the newspaper rated the election as toss-up. “Both sides appear to be about equally confident of victory,” and insiders were hard pressed “to pick a winner” so early in the process.⁶¹⁴

Apprehensive over his electoral fate, Butler proactively launched an aggressive campaign for re-election. Strapped for cash, the senator solicited financial contributions to fund his efforts, well over a year before the first votes were cast. Writing to Senator Arthur Poe Gorman of Maryland, national leader of the Bourbon Democrats, Butler requested “to borrow ... five thousand dollars ... for six or twelve months ... to aid me in my fight in [South Carolina].” The general outlined his plan to solicit influential periodicals to support his cause, revealing, “I have had overtures made by several newspapers that could be wielded with great effect if I could get a controlling interest in them.” Furthermore, Butler betrayed a keen sensitivity to the political situation as far as it pertained to his own fortunes, pronouncing, “There are three senatorial elections to take place in the state the latter part of July, and I want to take a hand in them, as they will be in the next legislature. ... There is more involved than my election, although it might naturally be assumed, I am more interested than anybody else, as I certainly am.” However, Butler maintained his defeat would present larger repercussions in the struggle against the Populist

⁶¹³ *Edgefield Advertiser*, March 28, 1894, p 1.

⁶¹⁴ *The Laurens Advertiser*, May 15, 1894, p 1.

challenge nationwide, providing, as it would, “a great deal of encouragement to the same class in other states.”⁶¹⁵

Since the primaries were essentially cut-and-dried popular elections, the campaigns developed such practices as *advertising*, *position-taking*, and *credit-claiming*. Butler’s innumerable campaign appearances and debate performances were geared toward achieving those primary objectives. Underscoring his eagerness to proactively cultivate support among voters — especially Reformers — Butler launched his campaign in February, rather early in the calendar year. The senator symbolically selected Bennettsville as the site of the opening — where Tillman thundered onto the political stage in 1885, whipping up Populist fervor. In his address, the born-again Butler “reviewed his official acts” and emphasized his support for a silver coinage, saying “nothing that any Reformer could object to.”⁶¹⁶

More provocatively, the senator promptly traveled to Darlington in the wake of the town’s infamous riots, granting an interview to the press.⁶¹⁷ In March, a tussle ensued between dispensary enforcement agents and two youths at the local train station. The disruption escalated into a gunfight, resulting in three deaths — including that of a police officer — and countless injuries. Tillman did not hesitate to react. The governor treated Darlington as a war zone, declaring “a state of rebellion” in the affected counties, “seize[ing] control of [its] telegraph lines ... and call[ing] out the militia.”⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁵ Matthew C. Butler to Arthur Poe Gorman, June 19, 1893, *Butler papers*, USC.

⁶¹⁶ *Edgefield Advertiser*, February 7, 1894, p 3; *The Laurens Advertiser*, February 13, 1894, p 1; *The Times and Democrat*, February 14, 1894, p 4.

⁶¹⁷ *The Manning Times*, April 11, 1894, p 2.

⁶¹⁸ Edgar, 441-443.

Sensing a political advantage, Butler pounced. Describing Darlington as “a peaceable, law abiding community,” the senator questioned “why this reinforcement of armed men should be sent ... I cannot understand, and I think the authorities will have difficulty in explaining.” As a result of reckless decisions, “two unoffending citizens were slain.” Instead of traveling to Darlington and Florence to reassure the affected communities, he charged Tillman with having “issued a proclamation denouncing the good people of these two counties as insurgents and insurrectionists.” The senator assailed the “harsh, violent and ill advised manner” by which the Dispensary Law had been enforced, violating the constitutions of the United States and South Carolina. More broadly, he lambasted the governor’s “fire-alarm pyrotechnic style of government” for “having a bad effect upon the material and social interests of the state,” and urged him to “leave to each community the right to govern itself.”⁶¹⁹ By harping on the unnecessary bloodshed at Darlington, Butler hoped to strike Tillman at his most vulnerable — the Dispensary Law — arguing that, for all his bluster, the governor cared but very little for ordinary South Carolinians.

Complementing his public campaign for popular support, the senator also undertook a diligent canvass of party officials. In March, *The Atlanta Constitution* reported that Butler was “making considerable headway” with a number of congressmen, forging important “political alliances” in his favor.⁶²⁰ And according to *The Augusta Journal*, Butler was gaining scores of supporters at the Meriwether Township - Edgefield County Democratic Club, although Tillman ultimately emerged victorious in that battle.⁶²¹

⁶¹⁹ *The Times and Democrat*, May 2, 1894, p 3.

⁶²⁰ *Yorkville Enquirer*, March 28, 1894, p 2.

⁶²¹ *The Laurens Advertiser*, May 8, 1894, p 1; *Yorkville Enquirer*, May 9, 1894, p 2.

On June 18, the long-awaited series of debates between Governor Tillman and Senator Butler commenced in Rock Hill. Much like a prizefight, the aspirants emerged from their corners, cheered by throngs of supporters, to engage in a contest of endurance and skill. Tillman addressed the spectators first. Although the crowd modestly favored Butler, they gave the governor a respectful hearing. Tillman began by offering an olive branch to his opponents, bemoaning the accusations of his “bitter tongue,” deriding the persistent “abuse by the newspapers,” and insisting he was on “friendly” grounds with his neighbor from Edgefield, the senior senator. Tillman firmly maintained his record as governor, “I am ready to defend every act of my administration.” Distancing himself from the term “office seeker,” he contrasted his recent election to office with Butler, who “has been in the Senate eighteen years.” Prefacing his discussion of national issues, the governor admitted he would only offer “a bird’s eye view of them,” for he could not cover each matter sufficiently in depth given the time constraints. Thereupon, Tillman delved into the cotton crop, national bank notes, and the “fraudulent demonetization of silver.” Before closing, the governor quipped, “What relief can I offer? ... When I get to the Senate I can’t be bought, or bribed or bulldozed. I can go up on a mountain and gather a great many big rocks and hurl them at everybody that comes along.”

After Tillman completed his remarks, the senator was beckoned to the platform by cries of “Butler.” After the audience quieted down, the pugnacious Butler wasted little time aggressively tearing into his adversary and systematically rebuking every claim. Posing a query to Tillman, Butler asked whether he would “agree to have a separate ballot box ... in which the people ... in the primary ... may register their choice for senator, without the interference or [*sic*] rings and caucuses ... Will he do that?” Butler countered the characterization that he was noth-

ing, but an ambitious, craven office seeker. “The Senate doesn’t belong to me; I didn’t ask to go there,” explaining that a firm sense of duty drove him to accept the position on behalf of many grateful Democrats for his services to the party during the Bourbon Restoration. Mocking Tillman’s rock-hurling metaphor, Butler retorted, “What could he accomplish in the Senate making such a veritable spectacle of himself?” The senator discussed at-length the silver currency, declaring his advocacy of silver monetization and the creation of “silver leagues” across the county, and addressed recent problems over Civil War pensions, which Butler maintained he was diligently attempting to resolve in the Senate.

Butler closed his soliloquy with an entreaty to poorer farmers:

I know the farmers are poor. I understand that the governor promised when elected that he would help [them]. Are they better off? ... Taxes have been increased. I shall stand side by side with my people in their struggle. I challenge Governor Tillman to point to an instance where I have not done my duty ... I have not learned to steal or accept bribes. I can’t be captured by gold or free passes. It may be a little vain, but I believe I am the man to bring the people together.

Tillman briefly responded, rebutting the senator’s insinuations, whereupon Butler continued to press the governor on the presence of an illicit ring controlling the party apparatus and the nomination process.⁶²²

⁶²² *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, June 20, 1894, p 4.

Over the next two months, in the depths of the stifling Southern summer — often exposed to the glaring Carolina sun or occasionally drenched by driving rain — Butler and Tillman sparred in approximately 31 municipalities, including Yorkville, Sumter, Aiken, Hampton, Columbia, Laurens, Spartanburg, and Anderson, culminating in Abbeville on August 8.⁶²³ But the feistiest exchange occurred in Edgefield on July 19, where tempers flared. Pent up with resentment and anger at the unremitting assaults on his character by the Tillmanites, Butler lost his composure. Recounting his participation in the infamous Hamburg Massacre — where a posse of white vigilantes attacked a cadre of black National Guardsmen, killing a handful in the melee⁶²⁴ — H. H. Townes inquired as to whether the senator's house was scorched by black citizens in retaliation for his role in the incident, to which Butler replied in the affirmative. Joe Atkinson, a staunch Tillman supporter standing on the stage alongside Butler, prodded the senator, "Yes, but you denied it in Washington." Butler "turned like a panther, and quick as lightning" yelled, "That is a lie - an infernal lie," repeating himself several times. Disorder ensued. "Men began to surge toward the stand," whilst others reached for their pistols. But before the chaos degenerated into an outright riot, Butler and Tillman managed to coax the excitable spectators back into place, thereby averting a wider conflagration.⁶²⁵

As illustrated above, Butler's campaign was designed to *advertise* his candidacy, *take positions* on pressing issues, and *claim credit* for important services delivered to the people of South Carolina. Butler consciously advertised himself as a duty-bound public servant, committed to serving the interests of the people and actively fighting on their behalf, distancing himself

⁶²³ *Yorkville Enquirer*, June 27, 1894, p 2; *The Watchman and Southron*, July 4, 1894, p 6.

⁶²⁴ Edgar, 403.

⁶²⁵ *The Intelligencer*, July 25, 1894, p 2.

from the image of a seasoned insider, excessively eager for a fourth term in the Senate. Bolstering his populist brand, Butler categorically took *favorable* positions on programs and policies salient to many a Reformer, especially the free and unlimited coinage of silver, which he oft touted at campaign appearances. And his reply to the Alliance Demands represented the most thorough attempt at publicizing these positions. Finally, the senator regularly claimed credit for federal monies channeled toward the state. At York, Butler boasted, “\$200,000 for Charleston Harbor ... the first appropriation for Winyah Bay ... a survey of the rivers of the state ... half a million for the dry docks at Port Royal ... [and] I helped make the Agricultural Department what it is.”⁶²⁶ Therefore, while Butler disassociated himself from his long career in the Senate, he repeatedly emphasized its many perks.

4.3.4 *General Election Insurgency*

As the August 30 primary approached, Butler grew increasingly nervous. His appeals for the support of farmers and Reformers had fallen flat. Momentum decisively shifted toward his adversary, who had more effectively consolidated the Populist wing behind his candidacy. Innumerable county conventions were endorsing Tillman outright, including the senator’s own Edgefield.⁶²⁷ In a move of desperation, Butler withdrew from the primary at the eleventh hour, declaring he would not abide by its results. The general insisted the indirect nature of the process — whereupon voters nominated legislators pledged to a senatorial contender — intrinsically favored Tillman and his henchman. Having repeatedly requested a primary whereby Car-

⁶²⁶ *The Pickens Sentinel*, June 28, 1894, p 4.

⁶²⁷ Martin, 283.

olinians could *directly* select their nominee for the Senate, Butler intended to break the alleged “ring” that exercised its stranglehold over the party. With his wishes roundly rejected, the senator felt no compunction to respect the “sham” election.

Butler had been building his case for months. During the debates, he confronted Tillman over the issue, challenging the governor outright to support a direct primary for the senatorial contest, but Tillman repeatedly rebuffed his charges, declaring that, while he favored popular elections of senators, he believed parties were best left to determine their own means of nominations.⁶²⁸ Just weeks before his decision, Butler granted an interview to *The News and Courier*, where he described the Tillmanites as “the most unscrupulous ring that ever dominated the politics of any country.” The senator charged, “Satan could not have hit upon a more effectual method to usurp the rights of the people and turn them over ... to a handful of selfish, corrupt, ringsters.”⁶²⁹

The senator’s strategy specifically sought to contest the Democratic primary in Richland, Charleston, Georgetown, Sumter, Beaufort, and Edgefield — the six counties where Butler believed his slate held the greatest opportunity for support, thereby relying on regular party channels. Reformers residing in these areas would have no choice but to support the legitimate Democratic nominees. But in the remaining thirty counties, where no favorable slates had been fielded, the senator called for independent candidates pledged to his re-election in the general election — an explicitly extra-partisan course.⁶³⁰ The plan relied upon disaffected conservatives to forego participation in the primary and back an independent ticket instead.

⁶²⁸ *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, June 20, 1894, p 4.

⁶²⁹ *The Laurens Advertiser*, August 21, 1894, p 1.

⁶³⁰ *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, August 29, 1894, p 5.

Butler's decision sent political shockwaves across the state. The sight of a longtime, respected incumbent senator refusing to abide by the results of a primary contest wherein he had invested bags of time and money deeply unsettled the Democrats of South Carolina. Scathing editorials indicted Butler for apostasy. *The Abbeville Press and Banner* lamented, "Every South Carolinian looks back with a shudder to the bitterness and hatred engendered by the Haskellite movement in 1890," gloomily forecasting "probable bloodshed and countless troubles of all kinds" ahead.⁶³¹ *The Dispatch News* characterized Butler's decision as a betrayal to the faithful who "rallied to his assistance ... and defended him with their lives," whose only effect would be "to solidify the Reformers" against him.⁶³² By contrast, while the *The Yorkville Enquirer* conceded the senator's chances "appear to be very slim," the editor insisted it was Butler's "perfect right to run as an independent, if he sees fit."⁶³³

Unsurprisingly, the results of the primary produced a Tillman tidal wave, deluging every county, save Charleston, Richland, and Sumter, where the anti-Tillman element held their ground.⁶³⁴ While Butler was certainly going to lose the primary election, his decision to bolt from the party did his candidacy no favors, likely contributing to Tillman's overwhelming, lopsided margin of victory. In their capacity as voters, South Carolinians held the incumbent senator responsible for his conservative, Bourbon associations and heretic, extra-partisan actions — evidencing the enlarging notions of a more direct *public accountability*. Instead, the electorate was attracted to Tillman's brash style, unconventionality, and reformist credentials. Butler re-

⁶³¹ *The Abbeville Press and Banner*, August 29, 1894, p 5.

⁶³² *The Dispatch-News*, August 29, 1894, p 2.

⁶³³ *Yorkville Enquirer*, August 29, 1894, p 2.

⁶³⁴ *Vicksburg Evening Post*, August 30, 1894, p 1.

mained defiant, proclaiming, “Something must be done to relieve the Democratic Party of ... selfish and unprincipled demagogues and ringmasters,” who have effectively “drawn [the party] away from [its] true faith.”⁶³⁵

Butler’s general election tactics emphasized coordination and organization at the expense of public campaigning for popular support. Gathering in Columbia on September 1, Butler and his team of adjutants — numbering upwards of forty men — hashed out a plan forward. They elected a chairman and secretary, and agreed to convene their own convention to nominate an independent ticket, including a gubernatorial nominee.⁶³⁶ For Butler, it soon became evident that his ability to channel the widespread discontent amongst conservatives into an anti-Tillman crusade would likely flounder. The senator had spent the entire campaign shamelessly recalibrating his positions in a futile effort to attract greater support amongst Reformers, thereby alienating those crucial conservatives upon whom he now relied. Many old guard Democrats detested Butler only a trifle less than they despised Tillman. Therefore, penning an open letter to the newspapers, the old general sought to decouple his candidacy from the broader movement in denying Tillman elevation to the Senate, writing, “[My] candidacy ... may be entirely eliminated from any movement looking to the reorganization of the ... party ... and the restoration of decent government.” Lacerating the misrule and betrayal of the “ringsters,” who have resorted to “slandorous” charges, Butler exclaimed, “It is not a question of the rule of the majority, but of the ring ... There is no such thing as political freedom in [the state], and I stand ready to aid in reclaiming it, at any and every cost.”⁶³⁷

⁶³⁵ *The Laurens Advertiser*, September 4, 1894, p 1.

⁶³⁶ *The Times and Democrat*, September 5, 1894, p 6.

⁶³⁷ *Yorkville Enquirer*, September 12, 1894, p 2.

The senator continued to embrace the power of the pen to counter other distortions and misrepresentations concerning his motives and behavior. Sounding similar notes, he repeated to *The Columbia Register*, “I am not after re-election to the United States Senate, but ... the corrupt ring now disgracing the politics of the state,” accusing nefarious ringsters of “destroy[ing] ‘white supremacy’ [and] sever[ing] the relations of the white people.” Butler maintained, “‘White supremacy’ is a very precious thing ... and I would lament the day when it is lost,” before reiterating, “I am not after the United States Senate, but the ring and its villainies and that I am in for the war.”⁶³⁸ And in a lengthy broadside to *The News and Courier* recounting the campaign and justifying his decision to bolt from the party, the senator remarked, “I went into the canvass for a purpose ... I accomplished that purpose ... If anybody had chosen to reorganize the Democratic Party ... they were at liberty to do so ... I do not see why I should be held responsible for their failure to do so,” before restating in no uncertain terms, “I discharged my duty as I saw it; never aspired to be a leader and do not now ... The ‘struggle’ was not and is not ‘hopeless’ if every man will do his duty, and stop finding fault with me.”⁶³⁹

Ultimately, the anti-Tillman movement decided to forego its threat of extra-partisan contestation, opting to challenge the Reformers exclusively within the channels of the Democratic Party — a more politically palatable option for most Carolinians. Congregating in Columbia mere days before the state convention, the grouping passed resolutions urging their fellow Democrats to “declare [their] true and loyal allegiance ... to the principles ... of the national ... party, and ... repudiate and rescind the action of the state convention of 1892,” which adopted the

⁶³⁸ *Edgefield Advertiser*, September 19, 1894, p 1.

⁶³⁹ *The Newberry Herald and News*, September 19, 1894, p 1.

Populist program. While the rump summit omitted formal nominations, they implored the delegates to oppose any member for state office “who acknowledges allegiance ... to the principles of the Populist party.”⁶⁴⁰

Despite their pleas, when the Democratic Party gathered at their convention on September 19, they adopted an “omnibus” plank — wedding elements of the more conservative, Cleveland-friendly Chicago platform of 1892 with features suitable to the Farmers’ Alliance, known as the “Ocala demands.” The platform endorsed the free and unlimited coinage of silver, backed the Dispensary Law, and advocated for a constitutional convention to draft a new system of government for the state based upon the principles of popular, democratic governance and white supremacy. Furthermore, the gathering nominated *bona fide* Reformers John Gary Evans for governor and Washington Hodges Timmerman for lieutenant governor.⁶⁴¹

Several days later, the “true” Democrats — conservative holdouts — reassembled in Columbia to finally settle the question of proffering a competing platform and an alternative slate of contenders for public office. While the delegates expressed their delight with the state convention for accommodating *certain* tenets of the Chicago convention, they excoriated the party’s partial adoption of the Populist platform. After an acrimonious and contentious overnight session occurring behind closed doors, the fatigued delegates failed to agree to fielding their own slate of nominees. “This convention desires to avoid doing anything likely to cause increased strife among our people,” instead passing hollow resolutions pledging fealty to the principles of the national Democratic party and urging like-minded citizens to join their efforts against the

⁶⁴⁰ *The Times and Democrat*, September 19, 1894, p 1.

⁶⁴¹ *The Newberry Herald and News*, September 26, 1894, p 1; *The Laurens Advertiser*, September 25, 1894, p 1.

foolhardy measures emanating from the reform-dominated state convention.⁶⁴² The dearth of any meaningful leadership, a cohesive framework, and legions of local candidates able to advance the cause to the countless districts, counties, towns, and hamlets seriously undermined the efficacy of the anti-Tillman movement at that critical hour.

After all the strenuous exertions, Butler was described “as near broken hearted as a brave man can be.” With “no organization backing him,” any hope of disrupting Tillman’s coronation was virtually snuffed out.⁶⁴³ Upon analyzing the races in each legislative district, *The Times and Democrat* projected a gloomy forecast for Butler: a Tillmanite majority of 29 in the Senate and 102 in the House — although the periodical cautioned that scores of new members rendered it almost “impossible to speculate as to what strength Senator Butler will be able to develop.”⁶⁴⁴ By that point, the haggard incumbent essentially conceded defeat in the electoral arena, undertaking no further campaign activity throughout the remainder of the general election.

4.3.5 *The Legislature Defers*

Nationally, the midterm elections of 1894 witnessed a dramatic Republican landslide. Although the once-popular Grover Cleveland had been returned to office to a second, non-consecutive term in 1892, the onset of a major economic depression, the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, the unpopularity of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, and persistent labor travails shook the nation to its core. Republicans seized control of the House of Representatives, with

⁶⁴² *The Laurens Advertiser*, October 2, 1894, p 1.

⁶⁴³ *The Dispatch-News*, October 3, 1894, p 1.

⁶⁴⁴ *The Times and Democrat*, October 3, 1894, p 1.

254 members, while the Democratic share collapsed to 93 representatives.⁶⁴⁵ In the Senate, the party net four seats to reclaim the majority.⁶⁴⁶

In South Carolina, John Gary Evans, the official Democratic nominee, trounced his chief opponent, Dr. Sampson Pope, an “original Reformer” who had parted company with the Populists over Tillman and the Dispensary Law. Evans collected 39,247 votes (69%) to Pope’s 17,298 votes (31%). More contentiously, the referendum calling forth a new constitutional convention narrowly passed, 31,402 votes (51.5%) to 29,523 (48.5%).⁶⁴⁷ In the lower house of the General Assembly, Democrats maintained 104 seats. Independent Democrats accounted for a disappointing 17 seats, while Republicans claimed a mere three seats (the only three Republican members of the General Assembly). In the upper chamber, Democrats held 29 seats, while the Independent Democrats accrued 7 seats.⁶⁴⁸

During the legislative selection process, the General Assembly largely deferred to the results of the August primary. With voters overwhelmingly favoring Tillman-backed delegates, who had faithfully nominated Tillman-pledged legislative candidates at the state convention in September, legislators had no incentive to disobey. Political pressures coupled with public sentiment militated against party disloyalty. At high noon on December 12, members congregated in their respective chambers to conduct the business of formally choosing the state’s senator. Each faction placed into nomination their agreed-upon contender and legislators voted on the

⁶⁴⁵ “Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present,” United States House of Representatives.

⁶⁴⁶ “Party Division,” United States Senate.

⁶⁴⁷ *The Watchman and Southron*, November 28, 1894, p 2.


⁶⁴⁸ Dubin, 171.

pending question. Thereafter, the Assembly convened a joint session to tabulate the results. At the outset, Benjamin Ryan Tillman amassed an astounding 131 votes — the support of every Reformer present — easily surpassing the 78-vote threshold necessary for a majority, and officially elevating the governor to the United States Senate. Senator Matthew Calbraith Butler collected twenty-one votes — the support of those independent conservatives present. Rounding out the ballot, George Washington Murray, African-American congressman representing the 7th District, received two votes, while William Demosthenes Crum, African-American chair of the Charleston County Republican Party, received a single vote.⁶⁴⁹ **Figure 4.4** charts the joint vote of the legislature on the matter of the senatorship.

⁶⁴⁹ Bernard E. Powers, Jr., “William Demosthenes Crum,” *South Carolina Encyclopedia*, University of South Carolina, Institute for Southern Studies, April 15, 2016, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <http://www.scencyclopedia.org/sce/entries/crum-william-demosthenes/>; South Carolina. General Assembly. Senate. (18421870). *Journal of the Senate of the State of South Carolina*, Columbia, S.C.: The Senate, accessed January 15, 2020, URL: <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nyp.33433010016784&view=1up&seq=236>; *The Gaffney Ledger*, December 14, 1894, p 1.

Figure 4.4

Vote of the South Carolina State Legislature for Senator, December 1894

SOURCE: *The Gaffney Ledger*, December 14, 1894, p 1

Refusing to concede defeat, the tenacious Butler resorted to one final scheme to deny Tillman’s ascension — pursuing a legal challenge. Still seething over the perceived ring operating within South Carolina’s politics, the senator filed a lawsuit with the State Supreme Court over the constitutionality of the Registration Laws. Butler sought an injunction “restraining [the] Comptroller General from issuing his warrant” to the registration supervisors, alleging the law

“deprives voters of their rights.”⁶⁵⁰ The Court eventually dismissed the suit the following July.⁶⁵¹

On December 2, 1895, Tillman sauntered down the aisle of the Senate, escorted by Senator James Zachariah George from Mississippi, to take the oath of office as South Carolina’s duly-elected senator. Tillman was sworn in by Vice President Adlai Stevenson, “without a murmur of objection,” thereby closing the chapter on a turbulent, highly-dramatic, and seemingly interminable election.⁶⁵²

4.3.6 *Analysis*

The indirect primary — which itself attested to the Democratic Party’s adaptability to the democratizing currents afoot and its concessions in satiating the Populists’ demands — transformed the state’s politics, including its senatorial selection process, to a more *moderately popular* regime. Although general elections remained uncompetitive and immaterial, the senatorial election increased in importance, matching other state races in coverage. Candidate recognition and civic attentiveness to the contest grew more widespread and widely disseminated. Butler and Tillman were frequently framed as the two sole contenders for the Senate, presenting a binary choice to the populace. As such, amongst the white electorate, at least, *popular participation* on the question of the senatorship burgeoned and conduits for a more direct *public accountability* of incumbent senators expanded, permitting South Carolinians wider latitude in rendering their collective judgment on the performance of the officeholder and holding them responsible for an unenviable record. Finally, the General Assembly ceded a modicum of autonomy on the matter,

⁶⁵⁰ *The Dispatch-News*, November 28, 1894, p 2.

⁶⁵¹ *The Watchman and Southron*, July 10, 1895, p 6.

⁶⁵² *The Watchman and Southron*, December 4, 1895, p 6.

essentially deferring to the results of the August primary — a highly-popular element — as state legislators were indirectly pledged to supporting Tillman.

To a remarkable degree, Senator Matthew Butler evinced a measure of vulnerability over his own re-election prospects and an acute sensitivity to the means of securing another term in the Senate. Determined to avoid the fate of his colleague Wade Hampton — a casualty of the Populist uprising of 1890 — Butler embarked upon an offensive campaign of active politicking. Laying the groundwork for his campaign early, Butler proactively prepared for months beforehand, raising funds for his campaign's operations and targeting pivotal legislative districts. In an effort to broaden his appeal to disenchanted Reformers, the senator readily recalibrated his positions on salient issues, especially the currency, so to better comport with the views of most voters. Furthermore, Butler utilized three tried-and-true tactics of campaigning — *advertising*, carefully cultivating an image of a fighter on behalf of the hard-pressed farmers of the state; *position-taking*, staking out favorable stances on issues; and *credit-claiming*, the boasting of federal monies and services directed to the state on his behalf. Butler pursued these tactics by way of a highly-visible campaign — penning letters to periodicals, granting interviews to the press, barnstorming the state, and participating in an extensive series of public debates with his adversary, Benjamin Tillman. Fiercely driven by the burning desire to secure re-election, the equally-powerful determination to deny Tillman a seat in the Senate, and outright distaste for the governor, Butler was not above hurling epithets, engaging in personalities, and most critically, refusing to honor the results of the democratic process.

Under the most propitious circumstances, Butler may have had a slim chance of surviving. Certainly, his strategy appealing to Reformers was politically savvy, given that the Populists

were in the ascendancy and likely represented his only route to re-election. Counterfactually, we may surmise that had the senator not firmly turned against the Alliance during the course of the *post*-primary period and instead continued to cultivate their backing by channeling their simmering discontent with the authoritarian tendencies of the governor and the excesses of the Dispensary Law, Butler *may* have performed marginally better in the general election. Incidentally, Dr. Sampson Pope, an “original Reformer,” campaigned on such a platform for governor and scored approximately a third of the vote in November.

A secondary, but less viable pathway to a fourth term ran through conservative Democrats. In his quest to broaden his electoral support, Butler alienated his own base — the foundations of the anti-Tillman movement. Had he committed himself earlier and more consistently to the Chicago platform — which upheld the more moderate, business-friendly principles of the national party, instead of the Populist pretenders — he may have rallied enough conservative holdouts during the general election for a stronger showing. But the senator’s decision to pander to Reformers, before bolting from the primary only to seek the support of conservatives was the height of hypocrisy, inconsistency, and foolishness. Ultimately, Butler was defeated by the combination of conservative apathy toward his candidacy and his systematic failure to skillfully court disaffected Reformers.

4.4 Conclusions

South Carolina’s senatorial elections during the early 1890s attest to the unique challenges of intra-party factional contestation. With the prevalence of a uni-party system, political disputes and electoral competition occurred exclusively within the Democratic Party, as few al-

ternative conduits were available to channel such conflict. As a result, factional infighting was ubiquitous and countless power blocs jostled for authority. With no single group commanding a majority of support — popular *or* party — senatorial aspirants were expected to secure the backing of multiple factions, cobbling together a coalition to achieve a working majority. Notably, Senator Matthew Butler failed spectacularly striving to attract the support of “soft” Reformers whilst placating his conservative base, whereas Benjamin Tillman succeeded (in both elections) in solidifying his bickering base of Populist-Reformers, while dividing the voting strength of the opposition.

The strong party system operating under the indirect regime tended to foster the *nationalization effect* — the transforming of down-ballot state races into a referendum on national conditions — as senators eagerly nationalized their race and state legislative contests, as well, thereby assuring party discipline. But these dynamics were more limited and circumscribed in South Carolina. While South Carolinians were influenced by national developments — the economic depression(s), the Silver Purchase Act and the debate over the currency, tariff policy, the Subtreasury Plan — the state’s uni-party system insulated the electorate from fluctuations in national partisan trends. The strong Democratic performance in 1890 had little net effect on their standing in the state, and, conversely, the party’s abysmal showing in 1894 had virtually no effect on the strength of the state ticket, either. Ironically, Palmetto State Republicans actually performed stronger in 1890 and worse in 1894. Therefore, the *nationalization effect* did not meaningfully manifest in the state, nor did emerge, presumably, in any other Southern uni-party regime.

Further, while the Populists belonged to a broader national movement among disaffected laborers and farmers across the South and Midwest — and Matthew Butler, viewing his re-elec-

tion against Tillman as a bulwark against the wider movement across the region, feared a *domino effect* would ensue in the event of his own defeat — the Farmers' Alliance responded more immediately to the peculiar, unique local conditions prevailing in South Carolina — the plight of the farmers, the agrarian economy, the aloof Bourbon gentry which had ruled the state for decades, and the race problem, which had arisen from the experience with Reconstruction. These factors created the conditions for distressed farmers to organize under the umbrella of the People's Party, but only once the brash Benjamin Tillman had stormed onto the scene did the movement finally have an attractive leader to spearhead the hostile takeover of the party and the state government.

Elements of a *parliamentary democracy* manifested under the indirect regime, primarily due to the durability of strong parties. After the primary was adopted, state legislative nominees became publicly and directly committed to supporting the election of a senatorial contender. Due the uni-party system and prevalence of factional contestation, these dynamics operated differently than in other states. The pivotal battles occurred during the nomination contests, and the objective for an aspiring senator or an incumbent desiring re-election was to ensure that a majority of prospective legislators across the state be nominated by *their* faction. Failing that, they would have to cobble together a majority, attracting “soft” members from across the factional divide. Under the convention system in 1890, the Populists gained large majorities in the state legislature — winning support from moderate conservatives, as well. Although their nominations effectually ousted Wade Hampton from office, they were not directly pegged to backing a particular senatorial contender. Under the primary system in 1894, Tillman secured an overwhelming majority in the August primary — maximizing the support of his base of Reformers,

while capitalizing upon the dissension amongst the conservative opposition. These legislative nominees *were* directly pledged to elevating Tillman to the Senate.

Parliamentary democracies tend to provide “party cover” to its officeholders and candidates, a dynamic appraised by David Mayhew and Anthony King. In short, in parliamentary systems, ambitious politicians are nominated by the party proper, not directly by voters through primaries; their expenses are footed by party committees, rather than perennially fundraising on their own behalf; and finally, their political career depends exclusively upon party discipline and loyalty; whereas in the American system, outsiders regularly attain positions of high status.⁶⁵³ Under the indirect regime, party cover constituted what Jonathan Rauch terms “the middlemen,” those essential political functionaries who ensured the system operated smoothly, filtrated fluctuations in popular opinion, and served the broad interests of the parties. As party cover has been shorn of American elections, candidates have grown increasingly more independent of the parties, fueling assaults on the middlemen by populist-driven “outsiders.”⁶⁵⁴

While certain parliamentary dynamics obtained in the state — the pegging of legislative nominees to the selection of a senator — the lack of free and fair elections and dueling political parties, the adoption of the indirect primary, and the subsequent personalization of the state’s factional infighting greatly weakened *party cover*. Matthew Butler was forced to fundraise on his own. Although he had asked the nationwide leader of the conservative Bourbons, Senator Arthur Gorman, for much-needed funds, he remained in desperate need of money to finance his re-election campaign. With party nominations determined exclusively by voters, Butler had to comport

⁶⁵³ David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

⁶⁵⁴ Jonathan Rauch, “How American Politics Went Insane,” *The Atlantic*, (July/August 2016).

with prevailing public sentiment to outfox Tillman — a strategy that ultimately failed. And finally, career advancement occurred outside the party channels, as anti-establishment outsiders, such as Tillman, emerged victorious, completing the hostile takeover of the state and molding the party apparatus around his personage.

The two case studies provide a useful comparative to assess the impact of the indirect primary on the process of selecting a senator, as well as the state's politics, more broadly. Due to the uni-party system in place, general elections were largely immaterial, with greater emphasis placed on the highly-consequential nomination contests. Therefore, it is not surprising that Southern Populists specifically targeted reforming the nominating process so to render office-holders more *visible*, *transparent*, and *publicly accountable*. Coupled with the drive to deny black citizens their hard-won right to vote, these inclinations explain why many Southern states — with South Carolina at the forefront — were the earliest to adopt some form of a primary.

The primary raised the importance of senatorial elections in South Carolina. Prior to 1892, the matter had been a secondary concern for many voters, incidental to the gubernatorial and state legislative elections. The election represented a quasi-referendum, at best, on the career of Senator Wade Hampton — whose fortunes were tied exclusively to the strength of the Tillman movement and individual performances of legislative candidates. By 1894, the contest had increased in salience — on par with other state races — and presented a meaningful choice before voters on the question of the senatorship. Newspapers widely covered the contenders as they sparred in public debates and vigorously appealed for popular support. And the press routinely explained the implications of the primary vote on the senatorial selection process. As a result,

candidate recognition was widespread, *popular participation* had enlarged, and conduits for a more direct *public accountability* of incumbent senators expanded.

Additionally, the state's *moderately popular* elections demonstrate the emerging popular legitimacy bolstering many a senatorial contest at that time. Glaring exceptions aside — single-party hegemony and racial isolation — the state enjoyed a robust, vibrant democracy, even before the primary. With the advent of the reform, office-seekers pursued elaborate, ambitious, and extensive public campaigns for popular support, while periodicals engaged in impassioned exchanges and informative dialogue. Although the primary itself was indirect in nature and party officials remained critical to the final result, the voters of South Carolina exercised a far greater influence over the selection of a senator than in many other states. Senators Hampton and Butler were decisively rejected by a white electorate thirsty for bold, new ideas, and fresh leadership at the helm.

These sentiments found expression through the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party. As a movement, Populist successes were not limited to South Carolina. In neighboring North Carolina, Marion Butler — no relation to Matthew — spearheaded a Populist-Republican fusion ticket at the state level, catapulting into power in 1894 and culminating with Butler's own elevation to the United States Senate. But many Populists successfully seized control over their respective parties and governments under the old rules of nominations and elections — a regime they vociferously assailed as undemocratic.

The convention system represented the collective judgment of the party's delegates from across the state, but, given that the consequential jostling occurred at the county level, the regime encouraged intensive local, democratic activities. While an organized cabal of party officials

could conceivably lock down the backing of a particular county convention, they would be deluged by a broad, popular uprising of ordinary residents. The Populists successfully effected a hostile takeover of the South Carolina Democratic Party in 1890 by capitalizing upon the structure of the system. Through superior , grassroots organization, skillful coordination, fierce, passionate exertions, and fortuitous circumstances, the Populists outmaneuvered and outflanked the long-reigning conservatives. The enactment of the primary further emphasized these democratizing trends, personalizing the state's politics and rendering the senatorial elections ever-more responsive to voters.

Finally, these developments illustrate the flexibility of political parties and their need to adapt to changing conditions so to remain relevant and viable institutions. As disillusioned, depressed farmers charged that the party mechanisms were insufficiently democratic, unrepresentative, and insular to their plight, the Democratic Party adopted the indirect primary as a concession to reformers. And its adoption was not merely a reflection of the Populist takeover, for Senator Hampton had favored the primary. Even old-guard conservatives, willing to countenance new measures of satiating the pent-up agitation of the period, supported these popular, democratic changes, as well.

Incidentally, although primaries are generally assumed to have weakened parties, the indirect primary in South Carolina and other Southern states *may* have strengthened the grip of the Democratic Party in three important ways. First, the primary partially mollified distressed white farmers, curtailing their brewing hostility against the party. By demonstrating its willingness to respond to calls for reform and address the characterization of the party as insular, undemocratic,

and aloof, the Democrats may have regained a scintilla of party fealty from white farmers in the state.

Second, by shifting the initial phase of the nomination process to the voters, the white electorate had an even greater incentive to participate, thereby fostering more widespread civic attentiveness. Third, by restricting blacks from voting, parties could essentially select their own members, acting as gatekeepers and denying “undesirables.” Indeed, in the years immediately following the introduction of the primary in 1892, the strength of the vestigial Republican Party — which had already been meager — collapsed. But further research is required to substantiate these suppositions.

CHAPTER 5: Senatorial Campaigns in New York:

Moderately Non-Popular Elections - Intra-Party Feuding and Public Accountability

Senatorial elections in New York were modestly non-popular affairs. My *theory of indirect elections* stipulates that moderately non-popular elections should see senatorial candidates pursue limited public campaigns within a party framework. While a semblance of popular sentiment may inform the process, party leaders ought to render the ultimate decision. The theory is generally confirmed by New York. Overall, senators were selected by an exclusivist, insider process. Powerful party bosses and their machines, which had dominated the state's politics for decades, dictated the nomination of candidates, managed the operation of campaigns, controlled fiscal services, doled out patronage, and determined the ever-galvanizing matter of the senatorship.

At the same time, an emerging element of popular legitimacy began to take root, exercising a subtle influence on the legislature's otherwise highly-autonomous selection of a senator. Due to the evenly-matched nature of the political parties and their relatively rigid positions, New York was a fiercely competitive swing state during presidential, gubernatorial, and legislative elections, with vibrant public campaigns and a modest degree of senatorial candidate recognition. In 1904, Senator Chauncey Depew embarked upon a widespread statewide stumping tour. Desirous of securing re-election to a second term, the vaunted incumbent diligently cultivated popular support on behalf of the Republican ticket, thereby delivering impressive gains for the party and bolstering his position among legislators and party officials — a beneficiary of a nationalized contest, reflecting well on the Republican Party.

Although Depew represented the public face of the Republicans, the senator found himself caught in the midst of a bitter, internecine intra-party factional struggle between the Empire State's kingmakers: his colleague, Thomas C. Platt and Governor Benjamin Odell. During the legislative selection period, Depew leveraged the positive electoral outcome and his own favorable standing among New Yorkers against both camps, thereby affording his candidacy an air of popular legitimacy, and developing a base of political support separate from the party. Through syndicates and supportive newspapers, these sentiments were widely advertised across the state, pressuring party officials to eventually coalesce around his candidature. In tandem with a politically-savvy deal with Odell, the marshaling of popular support helped Depew successfully secure another term in office.

By 1910, Depew's reputation had been inexorably damaged by revelations of improper business dealings and undue financial influence. With the party woefully demoralized due to the tremendously adverse national conditions — the *nationalization effect* — and fielding a weakened, unpopular contender for re-election to the Senate, Republicans were roundly punished by voters. Democrats ended their long exile from government by successfully capitalizing upon the failures of the reigning Republicans generally, as well as the foibles of their senior senator, whose immense wealth, political connections and shady business dealings seemed woefully outdated for the times — a relic of a bygone era. These cases illustrate the increasing significance of popular legitimacy undergirding the senatorial selection process. Although power rested primarily with party figures, public sentiment began dictating the boundaries of the party's decision. Furthermore, they emphasize the growing importance of accountability — parties *and* voters holding incumbent senators to account. In adapting to these democratizing trends, political par-

ties proved responsive, quickly recognizing the delimits demanded by popular input in the process and accountability of public officials.

5.1 *Background*

As the Twentieth Century dawned, New York occupied a pivotal position in the United States. Wealthy residents, whose opulent mansions lined the wide avenues of Manhattan, comprised the nation's social elite class. Their lavish gatherings were oft-reported by the press for a public awed by their riches, as were their more beneficent activities supporting universities and symphonies through monetary contributions.⁶⁵⁵ Additionally, the state had long been a center of art, contributing important innovations in literature and painting to the collective culture that was emerging, publishing affordable, popular novels, and staging electrifying performances in its many theaters.⁶⁵⁶ By 1900, New York boasted innumerable opera houses, dance halls, "Vaudeville houses, penny arcades, ... [and] nickelodeons," while nurturing the budding motion picture industry — cementing its status as the hub of entertainment.⁶⁵⁷

At the same time, the state was a major driver of the national economy. Small pockets of major industrial centers dotted the landscape, dominated the market, and led the country in manufacturing. New York had long relied upon an intricate canal system, most notably the Erie Canal, to receive vital materials and deliver goods and products. In the decades following the Civil War, railroads replaced steamships as the premier mode of transportation for passengers

⁶⁵⁵ Paula Baker, "Making Sense of Mass Society," in *The Empire State: A History of New York*, ed. Milton M. Klein, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 477-478.

⁶⁵⁶ I. Ray Gunn, "New York at the Crossroads of Culture," in *The Empire State*, 346-368.

⁶⁵⁷ Baker, "Making Sense of Mass Society," and "'Progress' and Politics," in *The Empire State*, 469-470, 480-481.

and freight. Together with innovations in mechanization and the broader industrialization underway, the state's manufacturing prowess increased appreciably. Steel mills clustered in Buffalo and along Lake Erie. New York City provided the lion's share of clothing, jewelry, and silverware. Troy was a key producer of collars, whilst Gloversville and Johnstown specialized in leather gloves. And the state's forests accounted for "21 percent of the country's wood pulp and paper." Agriculturally, New York farms were the leading source of dairy products, and farmers were competitive in potatoes, apples, small fruit, and a smattering of other items.⁶⁵⁸ Furthermore, Manhattan served as the focal point of finance and capital, attracting banking institutions, wealthy tycoons, and market speculators to the burgeoning metropolis.

The colossal industrial and commercial growth, however, was blighted by upheaval among farmers and laborers arising from distinct, unique challenges. New York farmers had faced hardships which their Midwestern counterparts did not experience, primarily due to the relatively hilly terrain, poor soil quality for cattle feed, and the diverse, heterogenous nature of the land.⁶⁵⁹ Compounding their woes, the depression of the 1870s jolted the agrarian economy, sending many a farmer deep into debt. As they found themselves increasingly vulnerable to economic shocks, scores of farmers gravitated toward such movements as the Grange, which espoused far-reaching reforms, including the reassessment of property taxes and state regulation of the railroads to relieve the plight of rural Americans. At their height in 1876, some 362 chapters enlisted approximately 17,000 members.⁶⁶⁰ Although farmers in New York continued to experience difficulties throughout the 1880s and 1890s, they failed to coalesce around the emergent

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid, 480.

⁶⁵⁹ Baker, "New York during the Civil War and Reconstruction," in *The Empire State*, 447-448.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid, 448-449.

Populist Party to the same degree as their Midwestern and Southern brethren. The rigid two-party system deterred many third parties from taking root. Additionally, the “lack of common experiences, difficulties in communication, and diversified agriculture” undermined any semblance of effective collective action.⁶⁶¹

Laborers confronted their own array of adversity. Many industrial workers were forced to contend with unsafe conditions, long hours, meager wages, and little collective recognition by their employers. Railroad workers, who formed some of the earliest unions, waged a decades-long struggle for improved conditions and higher pay, resulting in frequent strikes and violent confrontations with local militias. In 1877, a major railroad strike erupted in Martinsburg, West Virginia, reverberating through many municipalities along the Erie Railroad, including Buffalo and Hornellsville.⁶⁶² In search of commonality with their fellow laborers, workers of all stripes began joining the Knights of Labor, which “combined the appeals of unionism with fraternalism.” Throughout the 1880s, their ranks burgeoned considerably, laying claim to 415 assemblies comprising 68,000 members in New York City alone by 1886. As with other reform groups, the Knights advocated for “the eight-hour day, an end to convict and contract labor, and the creation of a bureau of labor statistics,” and they readily sponsored strikes across the country. Although their numbers dwindled after 1886 due to fractious internal politics and diminishing public support, the strength of their movement attests to the strong sentiment among laborers for a more active government to regulate the excesses of business and industry, and redress the many grievances of ordinary workers.⁶⁶³

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶⁶² Baker, “Making Sense of Mass Society,” in *The Empire State*, 453-454.

⁶⁶³ Ibid., 458-459.

Additionally, exceptionally high rates of immigration were fundamentally transforming New York's demographics and labor force. By 1900, one-quarter of the state was foreign-born, with much of the immigrant population disproportionately concentrating in New York City, Yonkers, and Buffalo. Political instability, a dearth of economic opportunity, and religious persecution had driven many families from Italy, Russia, and Eastern Europe in search of a better life. Manhattan's Lower East Side served as a mosaic for the rapidly changing makeup of society, "Jewish in the formerly German neighborhoods west of the Bowery, Italians in the old Irish settlements east of the Bowery," residing in overcrowded and often unsanitary conditions. Although the arrival of these "newer" Americans drove the overall growth of the state's population — expanding by 40% in the final three decades of the Nineteenth Century — and supported an ever-growing labor force of skilled and unskilled workers, their alien customs elicited considerable backlash among long-established Americans, especially German and Irish communities, who, ironically, had endured similar treatment during previous waves of immigration.⁶⁶⁴ Simultaneously, the state witnessed an upsurge in its African-American population. Desirous of extricating themselves from the bleak circumstances that had arisen in the South, many blacks, "the first generation born in freedom," began migrating to the North, especially New York. Manhattan attracted the greatest proportion of black Americans in the state (nearly two-thirds).⁶⁶⁵

The continued plight of rural farmers, disproportionate influx of immigration to urban centers, expansion of employment opportunities, and ever-industrializing economy fueled an exponential boom in the population of cities. In 1900, a majority (56%) of New Yorkers resided in

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid., 461-464.

⁶⁶⁵ Baker, "'Progress' and Politics" in *The Empire State*, 508-509.

cities over 100,000 inhabitants, while only 27% remained in rural locales.⁶⁶⁶ As these urban populations mushroomed, many municipalities enlarged their limits. Technological innovations in communication and transportation afforded unique opportunities for cities to expand in size beyond their traditional cores. Exemplary of such growth, the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island joined Manhattan to form Greater New York City in 1898.

In the face of tremendous societal, industrial, and commercial changes, the Empire State's politics continued to be dictated by powerful party bosses and their influential machines. In the decades following the Civil War, the issue of civil service reform animated the electorate, sewing deep internal fissures *within* both political parties. The Republicans were long controlled by Senator Roscoe Conkling and his Stalwart faction, which favored patronage and vehemently opposed any efforts at reform. However, the elevation of James Garfield to the presidency in 1881 signaled a sea change in the political currents, as the Half Breeds — the faction supportive of reforms and antagonistic to the Stalwarts — gained control over national and state Republican politics, effectively ousting Conkling from power. In protest, Conkling dramatically resigned from his seat in the Senate. He was joined by his younger colleague and protege, Senator Thomas C. Platt. Although forced into exile, Platt strategically plotted to return to power and restore his lost glory. By 1888, his aspirations were realized when he eventually emerged as the undisputed leader of the state Republican apparatus, a position he would hold until 1901. The “Easy Boss,” the monicker Platt gained for “his deft handling of patronage,” even succeeded in returning to the Senate in 1897, capping his pilgrimage for redemption.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁶ Baker, “Making Sense of Mass Society,” in *The Empire State*, 461.

⁶⁶⁷ Baker, “‘Progress’ and Politics” in *The Empire State*, 483-484.

The Democrats were confronted by similar headwinds. Calls for honest government, openness, and transparency were splitting the party into rival factions, whose intractable infighting needlessly damaged the party's electoral strength in general elections. Grover Cleveland's candidacy for governor in 1882 and subsequently for president in 1884 attracted the support of reform-minded Democrats *and* Republicans, the latter of whom were derisively termed "mugwumps" for their apostasy in bolting from their party. Cleveland's elections represented the high-water mark for Democratic reformers in the state. Their influence began to wane precipitously, thereafter. By the late 1880s, Cleveland's chief adversary, Governor David Bennett Hill, diligently labored to dominate the state party organization, forging a "working alliance among the ... major local powers." Despite Hill's uncanny ability to achieve a semblance of control, other Democratic leaders were routinely hampered in their efforts to impose party regularity upon the state. Most prominently, the party favored a policy of devolution, granting powers to smaller, local organizations and thereby dispersing authority to down-ballot candidates and party workers. Indeed, New York City itself was controlled for decades by the oft-maligned Tammany Hall. Although the infamous "Boss Tweed" had been overthrown in the early 1870s, powerful, ambitious figures arose to fill the vacuum that had emerged with his departure, such as Richard Crocker, who consolidated his grip over the ring in 1886 and ruled until he stepped down in 1902. In many respects, Tammany rivaled state leaders in its strength and influence, and were often out of league with national and state Democrats, complicating their efforts to maintain the necessary discipline and order expected of political parties.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid., 484-485.

Throughout the Nineteenth Century, the Republican and Democratic Parties commanded legions of loyal, sympathetic followers. Competition engendered “intense partisanship” amongst voters. As Paula Baker describes:

Most men stuck by the major parties, even when they were dissatisfied with their party’s performance. The major parties held men’s imaginations ... Party affiliation connected men with a tradition, made them not cogs in a machine but personifications of the attributes of manhood: loyalty, steadfastness, and the ability to work for the good of an organization bigger than any individual ... The pageantry of political campaigns reinforced partisanship.⁶⁶⁹

Deep-seated fidelity for the parties contributed to a rigid, inflexible two-party system, snuffing out the potential for third parties to effectively compete statewide. Furthermore, the strength of the parties were relatively equal, garnering comparable shares of the state’s electorate. Democratic voting strength concentrated in New York City, where the many immigrant communities formed the bedrock of the party. Outside of New York City, Democrats performed well in Seneca, Hamilton, Schoharie, and Albany counties. Republicans dominated elsewhere, including most of the state’s rural counties, as well as Suffolk, Erie, and Monroe counties.⁶⁷⁰ Due to the rigid, evenly-matched nature of the political parties, New York was a fiercely competitive state, and, with the largest population in the country, the most valuable electoral prize during presiden-

⁶⁶⁹ Baker, “Making Sense of Mass Society,” in *The Empire State*, 455.

⁶⁷⁰ U.S. Presidential Election Results by County, (1880-1896), Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 2011.

tial elections. As a testament to the state's political eminence, between 1864 and 1920, no fewer than thirteen New Yorkers were nominated on fifteen occasions for higher office — excluding renominations of incumbents and third parties.⁶⁷¹

New York's senatorial elections were moderately non-popular affairs. While the preponderance of power rested with party elites, a modicum of public sentiment and popular support influenced the process. In examining all possible barrier points that filtrated popular sentiment from the selection of a senator, the Empire State witnessed approximately 1.5 barrier points. First, the state scored just 26 on the competitiveness index, the rubric measuring the partisan control of the state legislature and the senatorial retention rate. New York's relatively low figure indicated *very competitive* senatorial elections (zero barrier points). Free and fair general elections, where *both* parties reasonably expect to win and freely compete for widespread support allow the electorate to exercise greater direct input on the outcome. Uni-party regimes deter opposition voters from expressing their preferences.

Second, senatorial candidate recognition was *middling* — neither widely-known nor fully dissembled (half a barrier point). During state legislative elections, incumbent senators conducted appeals on behalf of the state ticket and legislative nominees — within a partisan framework. Although their own candidacy may have featured prominently in the campaigns, their re-election bid was neither central to the election (as in Indiana) nor exclusively subsumed by parties (as in Massachusetts). Instead, the dynamics in the state engendered a unique hybrid. Therefore, *middling* candidate recognition represents a *mixed* regime, where elements of popular support and legitimacy interacted with features of a non-popular, exclusivist, party-dominated system. Final-

⁶⁷¹ *National Party Conventions, 1831-2004*, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 291-293.

ly, the state legislature wielded *tremendous autonomy* in their selection of a senator (one barrier point). Senators engaged in insider politicking with influential party leaders to secure another term in the Senate. The results of the November election were not determinative of the final decision by the legislature, but public sentiment *did* impact the outcome, to varying degrees, and delimited party officials within certain boundaries. Additionally, evolving notions of public accountability — holding incumbent officials responsible for transgressing the public trust through disreputable behavior or unsavory actions — further forced parties to confront the electoral consequences of protecting insular senators who violated these emerging standards of conduct.

In the Empire State — as in every state under the indirect regime — senators were selected by a majority of the state legislature. While states differed on the technical rules governing the procedure, each chamber would regularly assemble separately to decide the matter. In the event a candidate failed to secure the required majority threshold in either house, the full legislature would convene in a joint sitting to resume the balloting. Only once a majority of both houses agreed, a candidate would officially be selected as senator.

Formally nominating senatorial contenders varied widely across states. New York relied almost exclusively on the legislative party caucus. The body generally nominated senatorial contenders *after* the November elections, but party leaders had agreed upon the decision beforehand. Increasingly, however, these caucuses *were* influenced somewhat by a modicum of popular legitimacy. Concurrently, legislative district conventions played a sizable role, as well. At the district-level, conventions gathered to nominate state senators and state representatives, wherein they were pledged to an incumbent senator's re-election — in the style of a *parliamentary democracy*. If an ambitious figure had their sights on the United States Senate, they courted fa-

avorable state legislative candidates and worked toward their nominations by the party. But party officials exerted a morsel of control over these democratic proceedings, as well. For a senator to effectively command a broad spectrum of support from among a panoply of state legislators, they were expected to wield a fair degree of power and authority within the state party apparatus.

I cover the re-election campaigns of Senator Chauncey Depew during the first decade of the Twentieth Century. The era was a politically pivotal period for New York, and the nation at-large. Progressives were assailing the traditional party system as archaic and corrupt, offering an alternative predicated upon greater participation of the people in their politics, and a cleaner, efficient, more responsive government. By holding constant the identity of the candidate, I can better assess the effects of the changing political environment, delving into the ways Depew responded to these broad shifts in the nation and the unique electoral challenges arising from the altered circumstances of varied election years. As such, I can contrast the varying degrees to which Depew evinced measures of assuredness or vulnerability, and whether those sentiments dictated contrasting courses of action with regard to crafting a viable campaign strategy.

Chauncey Mitchell Depew's elevation to the Senate capped a prominent and prestigious career as an orator, industrialist, and budding politico. After practicing law for several years, the ambitious Depew entered New York politics, first as a legislator in the New York Assembly in 1861, then as Secretary of State in 1864. Although appointed by Andrew Johnson as Minister to Japan, Depew declined, opting instead to serve the New York and Harlem Railroad in a legal capacity. In 1873, he commenced an eight-year stint as Judge Advocate of the New York National Guard. In the wake of the 1881 special elections precipitated by the "Senatorial Suicides" of

Conkling and Platt, Depew submitted his candidacy for consideration, but the legislature ultimately selected Warner Miller and Elbridge Lapham.

In 1885, Depew became president of the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, before rising to the position of Chairman of its Board of Directors in 1898. The business magnate sought a return to public life in 1888 when he pursued the Republican nomination for the highest office in the land. Undaunted, Depew was more successful contesting the senatorship in 1898, when the Republican legislature ousted incumbent Edward Murphy. While serving in the Senate, Depew retained his many business positions, straddling the boundary between the corporate world and the political sphere. Re-elected in 1904, the senator failed to earn a third term in 1910.⁶⁷² Depew's two re-election contests comprise the case studies for the New York chapter. See **Figures 5.1** and **5.2** visualizing the partisan composition of each chamber of the New York state legislature from 1898 to 1910 — covering Depew's senatorial career.

⁶⁷² "Chauncey Mitchell Depew," *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, U.S. Congress, accessed October 31, 2019, URL: <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=d000264>; "Chauncey Mitchell Depew," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed October 31, 2019, URL: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chauncey-Mitchell-Depew>.

Figure 5.1





Figure 5.2



SOURCE: Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures, A Year By Year Summary, 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2007), 134-137.

Indiana Senator Albert Beveridge described his New York colleague's "magnetism of geniality," coupling an "engaging personality" with "a strange aggressiveness of good nature in his whole manner." Beveridge expressed great fondness for Depew's oratorical capabilities, pronouncing him "a master of rhetoric" and "a thoroughly good debater on the floor of the Senate," concluding, "In the distinction and vigor of his addresses in the greatest legislative body in the world he has maintained and illustrated the oratorical traditions of that high forum."⁶⁷³ Such was his esteem that the senator was regularly called upon to deliver nominating speeches at many a Republican convention. And in New York, Depew represented the public face of the Republican Party, enthusiastically stumping the state on behalf of the ticket during the election season. Furthermore, Depew was a reliable conservative vote for his party in the Senate. An ardent protectionist, the senator vigorously defended the unpopular, controversial Payne-Aldrich Tariff in 1910. As a fervent believer of projecting American power overseas, Depew heartily supported establishing a democratic, free trading outpost in the Philippines and constructing the isthmian canal through Panama. Depew's strong pro-business attitudes and influential positions within the business community fueled the perception amongst detractors that the senator was exceedingly cozy with financial interests. These characterizations were only compounded by revelations of unsavory practices midway through his second term.

5.2 1904 - Depew Marshals Popular Support to Confront Feuding Factions

New York's 1904 senatorial contest demonstrates the ever-increasing significance of popular legitimacy to the exclusivist, party-controlled process, as public sentiment, popular support,

⁶⁷³ Albert Beveridge on Chauncey Depew, *Albert Beveridge papers*, Library of Congress.

and greater voter participation influenced the decision. Facing a seemingly interminable intra-party factional feud between Governor Benjamin Odell and Senator Thomas Platt, Depew pursued an admixture of *insider politicking* and *public sentiment* to cajole party officials into supporting his re-election. The senator's strategy comprised traditional bargaining with party officials, employing patronage and political favors; *quid pro quo* offerings for campaign services rendered during the campaign; and the marshaling of popular support. Due to the state's highly-competitive general elections, Depew could rely upon the breadth of affection amongst New Yorkers in cultivating an independent political base, therein strengthening his bargaining position with party leaders.

The state's fiercely competitive nature also witnessed pervasive robust public campaigns. Anxious to assure his retention in the Senate, Depew rigorously stumped the state, ostensibly on behalf of the party ticket, mobilizing voter turnout in an effort to strengthen the ranks of Republicans in the legislature, thereby assuring a majority in the forthcoming legislative session, as well as individual down-ticket candidates supportive of his own re-election bid — akin to a *parliamentary-styled system*, where the senator diligently sought the nomination and election of Depew partisans to the state legislature. The senator framed the election within a partisan prism. Given the broad popularity of President Theodore Roosevelt and the favorable political climate for Republicans, Depew patently pegged his own candidacy to the coattails of the president, thereby *nationalizing* all state races, including down-ballot legislative contests, into a referendum on the incumbent president and the recovering economy.

Despite the emphasis on this partisan framework, Depew's candidature occupied a prominent position in the campaign, as well. Newspapers widely advertised his re-election, lauded his

character, exalted his record of service, and went to great lengths to ensure voters clearly understood that the senator's electoral fortunes were on the line at the ballot box — enlarging the input of New Yorkers in the process.

Ultimately, the senatorship was decided by Odell, his approval of Depew, and his control over the state organization — by party officials and insider bargaining. But an element of popular legitimacy undoubtedly *influenced* the decision, delimiting officials to respect certain boundaries and representing a modest, yet significant shift toward greater popular participation in the senatorial selection process. In adapting to these developments — consciously or not — parties further legitimized these increasing notions of direct democratic self-government.

5.2.1 *Political Conditions*

Nationally, heady political conditions were developing for Republicans. In 1901, Theodore Roosevelt had unexpectedly assumed the presidency upon the assassination of William McKinley. The benefits of having a New Yorker in the White House immediately became apparent to Senator Depew. “As senator from his own state, I was in constant consultation with [Roosevelt] while he was urging legislation necessary to secure the concession for the construction of the [Panama] Canal,” reflected Depew in his memoirs.⁶⁷⁴ The senator had been a longtime champion of Roosevelt, dating back to 1898, when Depew joined State Party Chairman Benjamin Odell to convince Boss Platt to offer Roosevelt the Republican nomination for governor. Once Roosevelt ascended to the presidency, Depew continued offering unceasing support.⁶⁷⁵ By

⁶⁷⁴ Chauncey M. Depew, *My Memories of Eighty Years*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), 173.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 160-162, 167-174.

contrast, his senior colleague, Thomas C. Platt, never warmed to the Rough Rider. Whereas Depew admired Roosevelt's outsized personality, amiable nature, vigorous lifestyle, voracious reading regimen, and sense of culture, Platt viewed Roosevelt as a rabble-rouser, threatening to upend the established order of political parties and the stability of organizational politics.⁶⁷⁶ Platt had actually been instrumental getting Roosevelt nominated for the vice presidency as a short-sighted means of neutering the influence of his adversary.

By 1904, Roosevelt was seeking a popular mandate for another term in office. The economy was witnessing tremendous growth, having recovered from the doldrums of the 1890s. Employment opportunities were plentiful and Americans were largely satiated. Gone were the rampant cries for free silver, as the improving economy had deflated much of the populist passions that had defined the previous two presidential elections. Furthermore, Roosevelt was broadly popular among Americans. As the presidential campaign approached, these favorable conditions boded well for his election and for Republicans nationwide. When the National Convention convened in Chicago that June, Depew captured the pervasive sense of confidence among many of its delegates. A seasoned conventioneer, having attended nearly every gathering since Lincoln's renomination in 1864, the junior senator informed the president, "[The delegates'] enthusiasm and unanimity for you was from a conviction that you ... met their ideals of a President ... for the country's needs and the belief that you were far and away the strongest possible nomination for the party." Depew reported, "At the close of the third day, they had be-

⁶⁷⁶ Ibid.

come acquainted and compared conditions in their several states. From this came a belief, stronger than in any previous convention, except 1900, of the certainty of success.”⁶⁷⁷

Roosevelt’s popularity was an electoral boon for Republicans and an immeasurably beneficial tailwind for Depew’s own re-election. As he embarked upon a second term in the Senate, Depew could count on Roosevelt’s “most cordial and hearty support.”⁶⁷⁸ And in the fall campaign, the junior senator deftly tacked his bid for re-election to Roosevelt’s coattails, dutifully working to deliver the pivotal state for the president — thereby *nationalizing* the contest as a way of benefitting from the advantageous political position afforded by the president, the party, and the strengthening economy.

5.2.2 *Intra-Party Factional Feud*

Despite the rosy, upbeat conditions for Republicans, a lingering, intra-party factional dispute at the state level was casting a pall on Depew’s senatorial aspirations. Under the indirect regime, party *backing* and *unity* — the harmonization of all competing factions — mattered greatly to senators seeking re-election. In New York, where powerful party leaders dictated much of the state’s politics, the resolution of outstanding intra-party quarrels, especially as they pertained to Depew’s electoral fortunes, remained absolutely paramount for the junior senator. Furthermore, these powerful figures essentially determined senatorial nominations, as well — another important consideration factoring into Depew’s calculus.

⁶⁷⁷ Depew to Theodore Roosevelt, June 25, 1904, *Chauncey Depew papers*, George Washington University.

⁶⁷⁸ Depew, *My Memories*, 172-173.

Governor Benjamin Odell, the nominal leader of the state party, was eager to consolidate his grip over the party apparatus. Although Odell succeeded in displacing Senator Platt as organization head, the ousted Platt still commanded a degree of loyalty among a cadre from within the party machinery, presenting a challenge to the governor's power play. As such, Odell was intent on purging the party of Platt partisans. Since the governor's primary objective was to strengthen his authority over the state organization, the question of the senatorship mattered less to Odell than to Platt, who held strong preferences on the issue. Odell immediately recognized the bargaining leverage offered by the upcoming senatorial contest. As the election approached, the governor fired warning signals to the other side, implicitly threatening to replace Depew with an Odell-backed alternative lest he secure further concessions from Platt in their struggle for control over the party.

Throughout the winter and spring, Odell strategically remained noncommittal on the senatorial issue, repeatedly demurring on expressly endorsing Depew for another term. In February, *The New York Tribune* quoted several Odell aides as saying their governor had "given no thought" on the matter.⁶⁷⁹ The next month, *The New York Times* attested, "Odell positively did not give Senator Depew any assurances that he would favor his candidacy," merely denying he was "actively working against [the senator]."⁶⁸⁰ And following a crucial Platt-Odell conference on the eve of the Republican Convention in June, where Platt resignedly concluded that a pledge would "not be forthcoming," Odell affirmed only "that he had not given any pledges to anyone else."⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁹ *The New York Tribune*, February 28, 1904, p1.

⁶⁸⁰ *The New York Times*, March 22, 1904, p 3.

⁶⁸¹ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, June 10, 1904, p 6.

Odell's statements were not entirely forthright, for it was widely reported that he was grooming former governor Frank S. Black to succeed Depew. As early as January, Odell had been weighing potential challengers to the incumbent senator, and, by February, Black's name had emerged as a distinct possibility.⁶⁸² In April, *The Buffalo Enquirer* described Black as "Odell's friend," and predicted he would receive the senatorial nomination. *The Enquirer* explained, "It is now known to be the Odell programme for Chauncey to go back to railroading while Black goes to Washington to help make the nation's laws."⁶⁸³

Such bold predictions did not adequately capture Odell's intentions. Whether the governor truly wanted Black representing New York in the United States Senate is unclear. Several periodicals speculated Odell was simply using Black as a pawn to advance his own candidacy for the august body. *The Buffalo Enquirer* contended, "As conditions are taking shape it looks as if the Governor might be compelled himself to go to the Senate" if Odell opted against proffering Black.⁶⁸⁴ *The Buffalo Times* reported that Odell's intentions had been known to "local politicians ... some time ago," quoting one party insider who remarked, "Odell ... will start after Depew's place himself without delay."⁶⁸⁵ And *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle* noted that "Odell's friends believe [the Senate seat] is due to him," attempting instead to offer Black for the governorship.⁶⁸⁶

Odell's theatrics had the anticipated effect of rattling an already apprehensive and overwrought incumbent senator as he mulled the political realities of re-election. Whether the face

⁶⁸² *Star-Gazette*, January 13, 1904, p 4; *Buffalo Courier*, February 18, 1904, p 4.

⁶⁸³ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, April 11, 1904, p 11.

⁶⁸⁴ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, June 10, 1904, p 6.

⁶⁸⁵ *The Buffalo Times*, June 12, 1904, p 26.

⁶⁸⁶ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, July 8, 1904, p 18.

was Black or Odell, the challenge posed an existential, material threat to Depew's public career. *The Buffalo Times* described the senator as "worried by the reports" of Black's "strong [candidacy]," and "disturbed" by the announcement.⁶⁸⁷ *The Rochester Post-Express* found "great uneasiness among Senator Depew's friends" over Odell's entry into the race, with the senator himself "deeply concerned on the subject."⁶⁸⁸ And *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle* restated the high stakes of the contest, declaring, "Depew is fighting for his political life."⁶⁸⁹

In the wider confrontation between Odell and Platt, Depew firmly belonged to Platt's faction. He could never have attained his seat without the express consent of the aging senator, and, in 1904, Platt once again endorsed Depew's candidacy. While Depew was loath to countenance transgressing Platt, he could neither assail Odell outright lest he risk rupturing the party asunder at a critical moment in his re-election. Therefore, it remained imperative that Depew bridge the chasm between the feuding factions, especially so given the competitive nature of elections in New York and the likelihood that lingering intra-party discontent might invite the Democrats to seize control of the legislature. Therefore, Depew embarked upon a tried-and-true tactic of bolstering harmony: appealing for party unity and publicly praising Odell, whilst downplaying the significance of any threat to his seat. The critical importance of party leaders in the electoral equation demanded that Depew focus his attention on resolving the simmering tensions among the heavyweights.

⁶⁸⁷ *The Buffalo Times*, February 25, 1904, p 7; February 26, 1904, p 4.

⁶⁸⁸ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, March 24, 1904, p 4.

⁶⁸⁹ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, March 19, 1904, p 1.

5.2.3 *Bolstering Party Unity*

The arrival of spring signaled renewed energy, vigor, and tempo for Chauncey Depew's re-election efforts as his campaign kickstarted into high gear. The New York senator, more combative than conciliatory, firmly expressed his willingness to "make a fight for his seat" and "call a showdown at the earliest possible moment" with Odell, eager to peg the governor down on his evasive antics over the pressing issue of the senatorship.⁶⁹⁰ Despite the confrontational tone, Depew balanced his rhetoric with an impassioned plea for party harmony. Recognizing the perilous prospects that would ensue in lieu of full party backing, the chastened incumbent appealed to the feuding factions to rise above their intractable quarrel. Ever the optimist, Depew remained bullish over the potential for a detente. Following a promising meeting with President Roosevelt in March, Depew, never one to shy away from the press, delivered a lengthy report on the state of Republican politics in New York, declaring:

The President ... said that the one thing to be considered was the success of the ... party, rather than the fortunes of certain leaders ... As a result of that conference I am convinced that Republican success in New York is assured ... Senator Platt ... and Governor Odell ... will work shoulder to shoulder in the cause in which both have jointly labored for so many years.

Depew boldly predicted, "The friction existing between the partisans of these two leaders will rapidly pass away, so that by the time the campaign is on it will be the old and solid Republican

⁶⁹⁰ *Star-Gazette*, February 25 1904, p 4; *Buffalo Evening News*, February 26, 1904, p 5.

Party,” warning that the aforementioned divisions would assuredly deliver “disastrous” results in the general election.⁶⁹¹ The junior senator’s statement was clearly intended to cajole Platt and Odell to set aside their mutual distaste and personal differences on behalf of party, president, and — left unspoken but implicit — Depew’s own electoral fate.

Encouragingly for Depew, mere weeks later, Senator Platt and Governor Odell arrived in New York City for a summit. Following their two-hour encounter, the party announced that Depew would serve as temporary chairman of the upcoming convention to draft a platform and select delegates on behalf of Roosevelt’s candidacy. While Odell withheld the specifics of their meeting, the governor maintained in no uncertain terms that the two leaders “were working in harmony.”⁶⁹² At the state nominating convention in April, Depew continued his delicate dance for party unity, proclaiming the certainty of the president’s election and praising Odell’s record. “We will enter cheerfully with our state ticket upon the fall campaign, confident of an approval of the able administration of Governor Odell,” the senator exclaimed. The remark, evidently “an interpolated paragraph not in the set speech,” received the greatest response yet amongst the delegates and was “the most loudly-applauded portion of ... Depew’s address.”⁶⁹³ Despite the gesture of reconciliation, Odell partisans remained unconvinced of Depew’s sincerity. *The Buffalo Enquirer* opined, “Depew’s heart was out of his speech ... He knows that Odell has ... Black groomed and waiting for the [seat].” Describing the senator’s address as merely “perfunctory,”

⁶⁹¹ *Democrat and Chronicle*, March 25, 1904, p 1.

⁶⁹² *The Buffalo Times*, April 9, 1904, p 6.

⁶⁹³ *The Buffalo Commercial*, April 12, 1904, p 1-2.

the editorial bemoaned Depew's lackluster performance. "There was a hoar frost in the air and some of it stood out on the mutton chop whiskers of Senator Depew," the periodical jibed.⁶⁹⁴

Over the course of the long summer months, the embattled incumbent refused even to publicly acknowledge the presence of an intra-party challenge to his re-election, endeavoring to shift the focus away from his vulnerability and defuse the simmering tension with Odell and Black. *The Buffalo Evening News* quoted Depew, who asserted, "I am a candidate ... and so far as I know no one is against me. I have heard of no opposition from any source." Thereupon, he explained that Odell provided assurances he would not be machinating against the senator's candidacy.⁶⁹⁵ Reinforcing the narrative, Senator Platt contended, "I have never heard Governor Odell express any opposition to Senator Depew ... I don't believe he's opposed to [him]. I believe [he] will be re-elected, and I am for him."⁶⁹⁶

While Depew publicly minimized the emerging threat to his re-election, the New York senator discreetly coaxed subordinates and operatives to outmaneuver party rivals in the innumerable factional struggles defining local, county races. Describing "the perfect harmony [that] prevailed" in Cortland County in March, Postmaster Andrew S. Brown surmised "much encouragement for the work of the coming campaign," before confidently assuring Depew, "The delegates selected are solid *Platt-Dunn* citizens upon whom we may depend."⁶⁹⁷ It is unclear whether similarly auspicious gatherings were repeated throughout the state and if Depew's management of these local showdowns was a widespread, systematic effort. Nonetheless, the letter

⁶⁹⁴ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, April 13, 1904, p 8.

⁶⁹⁵ *Buffalo Evening News*, June 9, 1904, p 17.

⁶⁹⁶ *The New York Times*, June 13, 1904, p 7.

⁶⁹⁷ A.S. Brown to Depew, March 26, 1904, *Chauncey Depew papers*, Yale University.

itself is exemplary of the senator's sensitivity and political acuity to the gathering storm clouds overhead. Collectively, these activities attest to the critical importance of insider politicking in forging party unity and securing re-nomination, as Depew exclusively curried favor with party bigwigs Platt and Odell, valiantly striving to smooth over their deep differences.

5.2.4 *Public Campaigns for Popular Support*

As the summer slowly transitioned to fall, Depew's troubles compounded. The long-standing intra-party factional feud remained far from settled, and, complicating the situation, the state's legislative elections were looming ahead. Given New York's fiercely competitive nature, voters played a direct, central role in determining which party controlled the legislature and the size of the majority. Democrats held a real, distinct possibility of regaining control, rendering moot the entire dispute over the senatorial nomination. Thus, immediate popular support for the Republican ticket was crucial.

To steady the ship, Depew embarked upon a vigorous public campaign for popular support, which served the dual purposes of delivering strong Republican majorities whilst bolstering party unity. By tirelessly mobilizing voters to support the party en masse, aiding in the election of prospective legislators, and directly linking their individual electoral fortunes to his own candidacy, Depew could reasonably expect the party to reward his diligent services and back him for another term in the Senate.

Friendly newspapers implored the party to publicly endorse Depew and expressly peg the senator's candidature to their platform, telegraphing to voters the party's unified backing of the venerable incumbent. After extolling Depew's devotion to the Republican cause, *The Buffalo*

Evening News demanded, “The re-election of Senator Depew ... should be among the conspicuous pledges of the next Republican State platform.”⁶⁹⁸ At the tactical level, the senator personally recruited state legislative contenders supportive of his bid for a second term — Depew partisans. *The New York Times* described the incumbent as “using every influence at his command” toward that end, bringing in “many of the men on the ticket to enter a district fight.”⁶⁹⁹ Certain elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* obtained in New York. Given the nature of the system, competitive elections, strong parties, and factional struggles, senators relied heavily on down-ballot partisans who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent’s re-election in the forthcoming legislative session. These activities served to join Depew’s candidacy with a slate of legislative district nominees, bolstering his chances of a receptive caucus in the State Assembly, while also widening popular, direct participation in the selection process itself.

Further, Depew undertook a spirited public campaign on behalf of the party ticket. In late summer, the junior senator was reported to attend several county fairs before embarking upon “a speaking tour of pretty much the whole state,” and, with his re-election on the line, intended to “devote practically all his time to the New York campaign.”⁷⁰⁰ The State Committee ambitiously proposed sending the senator to canvass every county in the state of New York.⁷⁰¹ Clearly, Depew took seriously the consequences of the upcoming legislative elections to his political career and recognized the necessity of publicly appealing to voters for electoral support.

⁶⁹⁸ *Buffalo Evening News*, March 25, 1904, p 18.

⁶⁹⁹ *The New York Times*, March 29, 1904, p 5.

⁷⁰⁰ *The New York Times*, August 21, 1904, p 5.

⁷⁰¹ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, September 16, 1904, p 11.

Senator Depew's statewide canvass was exceptionally extensive in scale. The available evidence attests to appearances in at least 28 separate towns and cities over 24 counties, spanning large swaths of the state.⁷⁰² Accounting for rallies which were underreported or where coverage has been lost, we may surmise that Depew's tour was even more widespread. Impressively, the senator boasted that he had "broken all records," achieving the feat of speaking "in every county [and] ... averag[ing] 300 miles of travel."⁷⁰³ While Depew may have been exaggerating for the purposes of strengthening his reputation with party officials, we should not dismiss the claim outright. The Republican State Committee aimed to have their venerable incumbent appear in every county over the summer. Depew was exclusively confining his canvass to New York. And although the evidentiary record supports approximately one-third of the state's counties, we have already established the count may be incomplete. Accordingly, Depew's claim could be accepted as mostly accurate.

Furthermore, the stumping tour was intensive in effort. Depew opened the campaign in Lyons on September 16 and brought it to a close at a Black Baptist Church in New York City on November 8. By the senator's own count, over the course of the period, he delivered four speeches, daily. Instances abound where Depew traversed numerous municipalities on a given day — as when he visited Buffalo and Warsaw to headline Republican rallies on October 15 —

⁷⁰² Allegany, Broome, Canandaigua, Cattaraugus, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Chenango, Cortland, Dutchess, Erie, Genessee, Jefferson, Kings, Monroe, New York, Niagara, Ontario, Orleans, Oswego, Saratoga Springs, Schenectady, Wayne, Westchester, and Wyoming county.

⁷⁰³ *Buffalo Evening News*, November 7, 1904, p 19.

or when he attended four or five major rallies in New York City on a single night when the campaign neared its denouement.⁷⁰⁴

As the presidential election loomed large over the election, Depew devoted considerable attention to the top of the national ticket. The contest was a distinctly New York affair, with both party's nominees hailing from the Empire State. Having enjoyed a front row seat to the state's politics for some years, Senator Depew was intimately familiar with Theodore Roosevelt and Judge Alton B. Parker, his Democratic opponent. Throughout the statewide canvass, the senator continually praised the caliber of the president's personality, character, and mettle, and lauded his admirable achievements. In Harlem, Depew exalted Roosevelt as "the best-equipped man in the country," whose only real fault is his exceptionally blunt nature, explaining, "We have come to know he means what he says." The senator further extolled the president as "a man of action," as exemplified by Roosevelt's assertiveness in Panama.⁷⁰⁵ In Buffalo, Depew commended the chief executive's valuable experience in administration and hailed the growth in Roosevelt's "ability, experience, efficiency, and wisdom," throughout his term.⁷⁰⁶

By contrast, the New York senator characterized Parker as an empty suit, ill-fitted for the office of the presidency. Whereas Roosevelt's career could span volumes, Depew asked, "What is there of Parker? A speech, a letter and a telegram."⁷⁰⁷ The senator chided the judge for his "judicial habit," having been "accustomed to the silence and seclusion of his study, where he

⁷⁰⁴ *Buffalo Evening News*, August 24, 1904, p 4; *The Buffalo Commercial* November 8, 1904, p 2; *Buffalo Evening News*, November 7, 1904, p 19; *Buffalo Evening News*, October 15, 1904, p 11; *Buffalo Evening News*, October 15, 1904, p 4; *Buffalo Evening News*, October 28, 1904, p 7; *The New York Times*, October 28, 1904, p 9.

⁷⁰⁵ *The New York Times*, September 29, 1904, p 5.

⁷⁰⁶ *Buffalo Morning Express and Illustrated Buffalo Express*, October 5, 1904, p 3.

⁷⁰⁷ *Buffalo Evening News*, October 28, 1904, p 7.

evolves ponderous opinions.”⁷⁰⁸ Resultantly, he lacked boldness and decisiveness, and was given to “hesitancy, the qualifications of positions, the caution in statement and transparent doubt.” Even on the great issue of the currency, Depew skewered Parker for his eleventh hour conversion to the gold standard, only after the standard had successfully delivered prosperity and stability to all Americans.⁷⁰⁹

Aside from presidential personalities, Depew preached party orthodoxy on the pressing issues of the day — defending the protective tariff, gold standard, labor laws, the burrowing of the Panama Canal, and the administration’s deft management of the Philippines. A champion of protectionism, the senator commended the tariff for the strong economy and widespread prosperity, exclaiming, “Every time it has been interrupted there has been a depression or panic.” Depew credited protectionist policies for spurring industrial growth and increasing American exports by the millions.⁷¹⁰ With the Democrats intent on capitalizing on labor discontent, the incumbent was keen to co-opt the issue and address the interests of workers. At a rally in Attica, Depew skillfully coupled his defense of the tariff to safeguards for laborers, declaring, “Labor unions can bring about uniform wages in different lines of industries ... in our country,” but other major trading powers could “flood our markets” with low-wage products. Therefore, “a protective tariff protects the American workingmen from this unfair competition.”⁷¹¹ And on the currency question, the senator maintained confidence in the gold standard, affirming its “value

⁷⁰⁸ *The New York Times*, September 29, 1904, p 5.

⁷⁰⁹ *Buffalo Morning Express and Illustrated Buffalo Express*, October 5, 1904, p 3.

⁷¹⁰ *Poughkeepsie Eagle-News*, October 1, 1904, p 5.

⁷¹¹ *The Buffalo Commercial*, October 15, 1904, p 2.

... [as] the basis of our home production and our entrance upon foreign markets.” He bemoaned the continued hostility exhibited by Democrats to a foundational pillar of market stability.⁷¹²

Depew devoted his campaign orations to the highly successful foreign policies of the Roosevelt Administration, as well, namely the construction of the isthmian canal in Central America and the retention of the Philippine territories. Praising the president’s decisiveness over Panama, Depew boasted, “Within three weeks [of Panamanian independence] ... the United States negotiated a new treaty, and the Panama Canal was assured.”⁷¹³ In the Pacific, the senator urged patience and vigilance over the difficulties arising over the newly-acquired islands. “[The Filipinos] would inaugurate an empire if the protection of the American government were withdrawn,” Depew warned. Further, the New York senator framed the issue in commercial terms, declaiming the necessity for “foreign outlets,” without which they would “produce an industrial congestion.”⁷¹⁴ By assiduously lauding the accomplishments of the Republican Party and offering a promise for a better future, Depew grounded his appeals for electoral support within a partisan framework. Furthermore, by *nationalizing* the contest so all down-ballot races reflected the advantageous position of Roosevelt and the Republicans, the senator pegged his candidacy to the coattails of the president and the party.

As Depew toured the state delivering impassioned pleas for support on behalf of the Republican ticket, articulating the major accomplishments and positions of the party, newspapers focused on promoting the credentials of the incumbent senator, advertising the Depew brand, and rallying to his cause. To a great extent, Depew’s outsized personality influenced the campaign.

⁷¹² *Poughkeepsie Eagle-News*, October 1, 1904, p 5.

⁷¹³ *Poughkeepsie Eagle-News*, October 1, 1904, p 8.

⁷¹⁴ *Democrat and Chronicle*, October 22, 1904, p 2.

The editors of *The Poughkeepsie Eagle* described the senator as “one of the most brilliant and most influential,” possessing exceptional “oratorical ability,” and whose record of service faithfully supporting the agenda of the Roosevelt Administration had “placed him in the front rank among the practical men of the Senate.” Thus, Depew’s re-election “ought to exclude any other from serious consideration.”⁷¹⁵ The ever-effusive *Buffalo Evening News* — the primary organ for Depew partisans — extolled “the amazing force of mind and the physical vigor of Dr. Depew,” who, through his unceasing energy, had proven to be “the most active ... and the most effective” Republican canvasser throughout the state. “The main thing,” the periodical implored, “is to give him the unanimous support of his party in the legislature next winter for the Senatorship.”⁷¹⁶

Depew’s detractors similarly framed the upcoming legislative elections as a referendum on the sitting senator. His chief nemesis, *The Buffalo Times*, oft reported underwhelming turnout at many a Depew rally, an ominous sign of voter apathy toward the junior senator. Just weeks before the vote, the editors beseeched Republicans to carefully consider the selection of a senator in January with the “good of the party and the state in mind,” asserting, “Most of them know which is the better man. A little questioning here and there might do no harm.”⁷¹⁷ Others were critical of the apparent impropriety raised by Depew serving as president of a major railroad corporation while simultaneously holding a seat in the Senate. *The Hartford Courant* sardonically proclaimed, “Depew is Vanderbilt... If [he] has ever made such a request” to excuse himself from voting on legislation affecting his personal interests and fortunes, “we have failed to notice

⁷¹⁵ *Buffalo Evening News*, April 4, 1904, p 14.

⁷¹⁶ *Buffalo Evening News*, September 29, 1904, p 2.

⁷¹⁷ *The Buffalo Times*, October 14, 1904, p 2.

it in that vivacious sheet, the ‘Congressional Record.’”⁷¹⁸ These efforts personalizing the contest increased the visibility of the incumbent senator to the electorate and provided ordinary New Yorkers a more direct conduit through which to support Depew or hold the senator to account, thereby bolstering popular participation in the process and public accountability of the office.

The Democratic broadside alleging Depew as a corporate shill demands further attention. Depew had been president of innumerable companies, most prominently New York Central and Hudson River Railroad, sitting on the corporate boards of many businesses whilst serving in the Senate. These practices were not especially uncommon for the era. Charles Fairbanks (IN) partially owned the *Indianapolis News* and the *Indianapolis Journal*. John Kean (NJ) was president of Elizabeth Water and Gas Companies. Nathan B. Scott (WV) was president of Central Glass Company. And Nelson Aldrich (RI) owned the Rhode Island Company, an amalgamation of various streetcar railway corporations. But what distinguished Depew from many — although certainly not all — of his illustrious colleagues was that the New Yorker’s business propositions were publicly known. “His ties with the railroad industry had never been secret,” explains Donald A. Ritchie.⁷¹⁹

Depew enjoyed a close relationship with captains of industry and other important industrialists. At the height of the 1904 election, Depew communicated with numerous company presidents and high ranking officers — ranging from innocuous political advice and hearty congratulations to offers of service in the campaign. In October, Charles A. Moore, of Manning, Maxwell, and Moore: Railway and Machinists’ Tools and Supplies, praised Depew’s “yeoman service

⁷¹⁸ *The Wall Street Journal*, April 27, 1904, p 2.

⁷¹⁹ Donald A. Ritchie, “David Barry and the Loyalty of the Senate,” in *Press Gallery*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 188, accessed June 4, 2020, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvk12rk.13>.

in this campaign of politics,” expressing his optimism that the result would indeed be favorable, “[T]hings are beginning to look brighter and we are now working hard, and I think we will get what we want, with the help of you and other eloquent and loyal Republicans.”⁷²⁰ Henry Russell of a Flour and Feed company in Albany, extolled Depew’s strong standing in the state, “[N]othing can withstand the tide in your favor.”⁷²¹

Immediately following the election, G.T. Rogers, president of the Binghamton Railroad Company, conveyed his “great pleasure” at the prospect of the senator’s near-certain return to office, but extended his hand in service, “[I]f there is any place where I can be of any use whatsoever, as errand boy, or otherwise, I am yours to command.”⁷²² And Mr. Bertron, of Bertron, Storrs, and Griscom Bankers, similarly offered his hearty congratulations to Depew, before advising him on a stock option. “I think the thing to do with the SURETY COMPANY Stock is to sit tight for the present. If the old management had continued we certainly would not have been ‘in it.’”⁷²³

Finally, while in office, Depew heartily supported policies and programs near and dear to the heart of many business interests, including the gold standard and the tariff. Thus, the Democratic portrayal of Depew was largely accurate.

⁷²⁰ Charles A. Moore to Depew, October 18, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷²¹ Henry Russell to Depew, December 17, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷²² G.T. Rogers to Depew, November 24, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷²³ Bertron to Depew, November 11, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

5.2.5 *Disorganized Democratic Opposition*

After twelve years in the political wilderness, Democrats were eager to return to power. Buoyed by the selection of a New Yorker atop the presidential ticket and hoping to capitalize on the persistent intra-party squabbling among Republicans, many party officials felt confident of their prospects making inroads in the legislature and, quite possibly, even replacing the divisive Depew with one of their own. But their efforts were plagued by their own share of unremitting factional infighting, seriously handicapping any possibility of carrying the state. The party was torn between an organization nominally tasked with state affairs and a bevy of local, municipal party machines, the largest being Tammany Hall. By the spring of 1904, Senator Patrick McCarren, leader of the Brooklyn Democrats, was desirous of succeeding Depew in the Senate as his party's nominee. Alas, for McCarren, his stridently anti-Tammany stance undercut any hope for the senatorship, and he was eventually undone by fierce partisan infighting.⁷²⁴ During the summer, a compromise was forged between Boss Charles F. Murphy and McCarren to allow Tammany to select the state chairman while ceding its influence in Brooklyn to McCarren. With both camps "extremely anxious to carry [the] state," they committed to "a harmonious campaign" in upcoming elections.⁷²⁵

At the Saratoga Convention in September, the party reluctantly nominated D-Cady Herrick for governor at the prodding of presidential nominee, Judge Alton Parker.⁷²⁶ However, they failed to effectively spearhead a concerted senatorial campaign to oust the incumbent Republi-

⁷²⁴ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, March 3, 1904, p 2.

⁷²⁵ *The Evening World*, August 15, 1904, p 3.

⁷²⁶ While newspapers reported his name as "D. Cady Herrick," his unique first name was actually hyphenated as D-Cady.

can. No single individual won the confidence of the party's multitudinous factions. In July, McCarren advanced the name of Bourke Cockran, "the Democratic Demosthenes" known for his extraordinary oratory as the party's choice for Senate.⁷²⁷ Instead, Parker entrusted William F. Sheehan, longtime aide and advisor, for the position, and, by early August, Sheehan's prospects were firm enough to be regarded "as absolutely certain" in the event of a Democratic legislature.⁷²⁸ However, other well-known and powerful contenders loomed large, with former senator David B. Hill entertaining the notion of returning to the upper chamber, whilst McCarren continued to harbor similar ambitions.⁷²⁹ Resultantly, the Democrats committed their immediate attention and available resources to the presidential and gubernatorial races, sacrificing their enterprise for a seat in the Senate and the many legislative district seats required for a majority. For his part, Senator Depew benefitted from the strategy, as he was neither directly implicated nor outright assailed by the Democratic speakers in the fall campaign.

5.2.6 *Corralling the Legislature Amid Republican Successes*

The Republicans achieved a sensational victory of landslide proportions in the 1904 elections, routing the Democrats and cementing their status as the majority party nationwide for the foreseeable future. Much of their success was driven by the widespread economic prosperity and the personal popularity of President Roosevelt, whose return to the White House produced strong coattail effects down ballot — the *nationalization effect*. In the presidential race, the Rough Rider handily trounced his Democratic counterpart Judge Parker by a lopsided margin — 56% to

⁷²⁷ *Democrat and Chronicle*, July 17, 1904, p 2.

⁷²⁸ *The New York Tribune*, August 7, 1904, p 1.

⁷²⁹ *Times Union*, August 25, 1904, p 4.

38%.⁷³⁰ The results were more pronounced in the Electoral College, where Roosevelt carried every state outside the South, accruing 336 electoral votes to Parker's 140.⁷³¹ In the Congress, Republicans expanded their ranks, picking up 44 seats in the House of Representatives to claim a total of 251, which represented a 116-seat advantage over the Democrats, while gaining one seat in the Senate for an advantage of twenty-four.⁷³² At the state level, Republican Frank W. Higgins handily defeated his opponent, D-Cady Herrick, by a two-to-one margin, amounting to a plurality of nearly 75,000 votes — representing a 31.5% difference in an electorate of approximately 238,000 voters⁷³³ The stupendous results saw Republicans secure comfortable majorities in the state legislature, as well. In the Assembly, their strength increased to 104 seats, with Democrats relegated to a meager 46 seats, while in the Senate, their margins improved to twenty-two-seat advantage over the Democrats, for a total of 36 seats — a feat neither party had hitherto accomplished in the history of the Empire State.⁷³⁴

The consolidation of Republican control over the state legislature boded well for Depew, ensuring the party would retain the Senate seat in January and, thereby, rendering the caucus's formal nomination of a candidate most critical. Many a well wisher interpreted the results as an encouraging, promising sign for the senator's re-election. Congressman Charles W. Gillet of New York described "sentiment in this section [as] decidedly in [Depew's] favor, in fact, there is

⁷³⁰ *Presidential Elections, 1789-2004*, (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 138.

⁷³¹ *Ibid.*, 223.

⁷³² "Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present," US House of Representatives. "Party Division," United States Senate.

⁷³³ *The New York Times*, November 10, 1904, p 2.

⁷³⁴ Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures, A Year By Year Summary, 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2007), 134-137.

no sentiment for any other person.” Gillet hoped the party would “respond to the wishes of our own people.”⁷³⁵ C.V.C. Van Deuzer congratulated Depew for the “magnificent result ... which you did so much to secure,” expressing his “satisfaction of having you continue to represent the state in the U.S. Senate.”⁷³⁶ David A. Rowe shared these expectations, cautiously declaring, “Here’s hoping that the junior senator from New York will [succeed himself].”⁷³⁷

In the Empire State, however, where party bosses exercised enormous influence on the state’s politics and legislators enjoyed tremendous autonomy in the senatorial decision, Depew’s re-election was anything but certain. Therefore, the senator needed to court pivotal party figures and legislators to assure a favorable result in the upcoming caucus vote determining the party’s official nominee. Endeavoring to lock down crucial support among many a state legislator, Depew pursued three primary tactics: traditional, insider politicking, *quid pro quo* offerings for campaign services rendered, and the channeling of public sentiment and popular support.

The first tactic was traditional insider politicking, which involved pressuring and cajoling party actors into supporting the senator’s candidature for re-election — a pure party-based method of attaining support. Recognizing the preponderance of power in the hands of Republican leaders and their legions of supporters, Depew engaged in the old fashioned game of party politics — negotiating and bargaining with key officials and legislators. Following the election, the incumbent collaborated with important political lieutenants in the field, carefully overseeing the operation. Writing to E.H. Butler, editor of *The Buffalo Evenings News*, the senator informed the staunch Depew operative, “I have just received a letter from Senator Davis which practically

⁷³⁵ Charles W. Gillet to Depew, November 5, 1904, *Depew papers*, GWU.

⁷³⁶ C.V.C. Van Deuzer to Depew, November 9, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷³⁷ David A. Rowe to Depew, November 9, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

pledges his support.”⁷³⁸ J. W. Dunwell reported to the junior senator, “I had a talk with Hon. A.P. Smith, our Member of the Assembly, and advised him to telegraph you at once that he would support you in case of your candidacy for United States Senator. [He] is an honest man and once having taken a position I have the greatest confidence that he would not fail.”⁷³⁹

With Erie County Republicans threatening obstacles to Depew’s return to the Senate, the incumbent reached out to Judge John R. Hazel in Buffalo, informing his friend “that Erie County is undecided on the subject of United States Senator,” before *immediately* reminding his reader, “It gave me great pleasure to support you with all my ability for judge, and I may now tell a little incident connected with that appointment,” going on to detail his influence in securing the coveted position for Hazel. Depew concluded, “If in your judgment I have performed sufficiently creditable service in the Senate to be re-elected, I would greatly appreciate any expression of that kind or of your personal interest to your Erie County friends.”⁷⁴⁰ The judge was receptive to Depew’s pleas, expressing his “loyalty and steadfast support” on account of the pivotal actions by both New York senators in assuring his elevation to the bench. “You may rely upon me doing all in my power to further your re-election to the United States Senate,” he pledged.⁷⁴¹

The second tactic was *quid pro quo* offerings for campaign services render, which entailed convincing party officials and state legislators to reward Depew’s diligent, strenuous feat assisting the party during the general election — a marriage of party-based and popular elements. As early as October, when the senator joined Platt and Odell for a critical summit to obtain a

⁷³⁸ Depew to E.H. Butler, November 23, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷³⁹ J.W. Dunwell to Depew, November 12, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴⁰ Depew to John R. Hazel, November 28, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴¹ John R. Hazel to Depew, November November 29, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

commitment of support from the governor, “Depew reminded [Odell] that for weeks and weeks he had been going about the state making speeches for the ticket and doing his utmost in its behalf ... He believed a re-election to be no more than his due.”⁷⁴² After the election, sympathizers echoed these sentiments and expectations. Richard H. Clarke lauded the “active part” Depew had “taken in the recent presidential campaign, and the good results flowing therefrom.” “I think you are entitled to the gratitude of all good Republicans,” Clarke asserted, “I also think that your re-election to the Senate is due to you in consideration of all that you have done.”⁷⁴³ A representative from the banking establishment Betron, Storries, and Griscom declared, “Certainly no one in the Republican Party in this state did more for the success encountered than you and I earnestly hope that your reward will be equally as great.”⁷⁴⁴ And John C. Davis debriefed Depew on the election of “a complete Republican delegation” in his region. “Each of the gentlemen named promised me that he would support you first, last and all the time in case of their election.”⁷⁴⁵

The third tactic involved the marshaling of public sentiment and popular legitimacy to compel party leaders into backing Depew’s candidacy — a purely popular method. The senator astutely understood that a firm pledge of support from Governor Odell would likely never materialize. Thus, passively waiting for an endorsement seemed foolhardy and wasteful. The governor had two options before him: endorse Black, thereby sinking any chances of Depew’s remaining in the Senate, or remain neutral. The latter held the most promise for Depew, for he repeatedly informed aides and supporters that Odell would “try and ascertain the trend of Republican

⁷⁴² *Press and Sun Bulletin*, October 19, 1904, p 1.

⁷⁴³ Richard H. Clarke to Depew, November 10, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴⁴ Mr. Betron to Depew, November 11, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴⁵ John C. Davis to Depew, November 10, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

sentiment, without attempting to direct it.”⁷⁴⁶ More specifically, Odell was eager to “see as many people of influence who are leaders in various counties as possible, and to hear from them their frank expression of preferences, coupled ... with the expression of loyalty to [his] state organization.”⁷⁴⁷

“Republican sentiment,” freed from the stifling confines of factional commitments, invariably represented a modicum of public opinion. With a respectable reputation, strong personal favorability, and frequent, well-received canvasses, Depew could count on a wellspring of popular support amongst New Yorkers and state Republican officials. As Editor A. O. Bunnell attested, “Depew’s return ought to be absolutely certain ... Public sentiment is undeniably overwhelmingly in his favor.”⁷⁴⁸ Even Odell himself “recognize[d] ... an almost universal feeling in [Depew’s] behalf in the state, among the people and in the press,” according to the senator’s own account of their meeting.⁷⁴⁹ Therefore, it remained imperative that Depew and his operatives tap into these widespread, positive attitudes among New Yorkers, thereby grounding his candidacy on firm foundation of popular legitimacy, independent from the dominant party bosses and closed-door politicking that had characterized the state’s politics for years. In early December, the senator directed friendly newspapers to conduct “educational work ... [for] representatives in the Legislature [so they] could ascertain easily ... the sentiment of their constituents.”⁷⁵⁰ Enlist-

⁷⁴⁶ Depew to William Barnes, December 2, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴⁷ Depew to Timothy L. Woodruff, December 9, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴⁸ A.O. Bunnell to unspecified, December 1, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁴⁹ Depew to Timothy L. Woodruff, December 9, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁵⁰ Depew to M.R. Sackett, December 12, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

ing a syndicate of editors to support the beleaguered incumbent, A. O. Bunnell implored his colleagues:

The least that we ... can do for our generous friend now, is to give prompt and simultaneous expression of public sentiment in his favor, buttressed as it is by his splendid talent and great capacity to serve the Empire State, which is conceded by men of all parties. It is also suggested that you personally or by your letter, urge your Senator and Assemblyman to support Senator Depew.⁷⁵¹

The post-election newspaper enterprise illustrating the depth of affection among New Yorkers and Republican members for their junior senator commenced in earnest. Led by *The Buffalo Evening News*, a syndicate of supportive periodicals went about reporting favorable attitudes and publishing testimonials among ordinary citizens, industrialists, and pivotal political figures. Proclaiming the “unanimous desire” for Depew’s return to the Senate, the editors of *The News* contended, “Popular sentiment in this state in favor of ... Depew is remarkable alike for its volume and its earnestness.” The emerging threat to the senator’s re-election had “rall[ied] to his support the overwhelming sentiment of his party.”⁷⁵² Throughout December, the newspaper ramped up its reporting. “Depew is the people’s choice for a second term,” one headline declared, as “prominent Republican leaders and business men speak out.”⁷⁵³ Capturing the immense support for Depew throughout Western New York counties, *The News* further publicized a

⁷⁵¹ A.O. Bunnell to unspecified, December 1, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁵² *Buffalo Evening News*, November 26, 1904, p 14.

⁷⁵³ *Buffalo Evening News*, December 12, 1904, p 1.

bevy of testimonials describing the senator as the “right man” for the position, possessed of great ability, and solidly standing “with the people.”⁷⁵⁴ And in Wyoming County, the periodical highlighted “leading ... merchants, editors, [and] bankers” of both parties urging Depew’s re-election.⁷⁵⁵

Other papers trumpeted the claims of *The Buffalo Evening News*. *The Buffalo Enquirer* praised Depew’s record as “honorable and unassailable,” before warning, “There is good reason to believe that should public opinion be disregarded ... natural resentment for the high-handed methods employed to further selfish interests is quite likely to find emphatic expression, and that at the polls the voters will voice their disapproval.”⁷⁵⁶ In other words, if traditional politicking among party officials and high-level maneuvering between factional blocs decided the looming question of the senatorship at the expense of an able, respectable, and enormously popular incumbent, then the Republican party would reap grave electoral consequences for willfully ignoring public opinion. *The Watertown Standard* concurred, pronouncing, “Senator Depew is the choice of 90 percent of the people of this state ... Is the will of the people ... to be frustrated who grossly misinterpret the almost universal sentiment throughout [New York]?”⁷⁵⁷ Describing Depew as “backed by the people,” *The Buffalo Enquirer* wryly inquired, “Are the people to be betrayed” by Black and Odell?⁷⁵⁸ And *The Buffalo Courier* reprinted a story testifying to the strong

⁷⁵⁴ *Buffalo Evening News*, December 13, 1904, p 33.

⁷⁵⁵ *The Buffalo Sunday Morning News*, December 18, 1904, p 9.

⁷⁵⁶ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, December 19, 1904, p 2.

⁷⁵⁷ *The Buffalo Times*, December 25, 1904, p 20.

⁷⁵⁸ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, December 27, 1904, p 2.

support for the junior senator among “influential Republicans” of Amsterdam, where all but two had committed themselves to Depew.⁷⁵⁹

Echoing the claims of widespread, popular sentiment, direct appeals were made to important political officials on behalf of Depew. One Mr. Webster contacted Governor-elect Frank Higgins, proclaiming “the sentiment of nine-tenths of the railroad men” favored Depew’s return to the Senate. “If Depew is turned down,” Webster counseled, “it will create an issue [for] the Republican Party ... [and] it will antagonize the railroad element, not only of the state, but of the entire country,” going on to explain the intimate relationship the junior senator enjoyed with the workers, “Depew was always ready to take his car and go 500 miles to speak at the opening day of their conventions, and there isn’t a railroad man in the United States that does not know him.”⁷⁶⁰

Furthermore, the Depew camp planned ever-more demonstrable activities for the new year to pressure party figures and legislators to endorse the incumbent for another term. With the intention of illustrating the “popular demand” for the senator, they proposed “Depew meetings in almost every election district ... to flood the Legislature with a storm of protests such as has never before been presented to that body on a pending question,” as well as enlisting the support of chambers of commerce throughout the Empire State to pass resolutions imploring Depew’s re-election.⁷⁶¹

The novel methods which Depew’s operatives utilized to effectively marshal popular support so to compel party officials into backing the senator’s re-election attest to the increasing

⁷⁵⁹ *Buffalo Courier*, December 28, 1904, p 1.

⁷⁶⁰ Mr. Webster to Frank Higgins, December 16, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁶¹ *Press and Sun Bulletin*, December 24, 1904, p 1.

importance of the *vox populi*. While not decisive, public sentiment was setting the boundaries around which the discussion took place, and placing limits on the flexibility of pivotal party officials and leaders, especially Odell, on the matter of the senatorship. Given that Depew, the public face of the Republican Party, commanded broad popular support, his candidacy was grounded in popular legitimacy, and therefore, by rejecting Depew, party leaders risked violating the trust of the voters — critical for the party in the highly competitive state.

On December 29, at the much-anticipated and decisive summit with Odell and other party leaders within the posh Fifth Avenue Hotel, Depew agreed to recognize Odell's control over the state organization, signaling to other holdouts within the party similar expressions of deference. In return, Odell finally committed to remaining neutral in the senatorial contest, quashing any chances of backing Black as a challenger and yielding to the widespread public sentiment and popular support for the venerated senator.⁷⁶² Several weeks prior, Depew had sensed the political situation was improving, reporting that Odell repeatedly insisted “that the state organization ... controls the situation, and [would] not permit an election to be had where that is not recognized by the state and country.” The governor was eager for a majority of legislators to “follow his wishes regardless of their preferences.” In short, Odell simply wanted full control over the process and the party. As far as his own personal standing with the governor, Depew assuringly revealed, “I am sure [Odell] is entirely satisfied with my ... attitude to himself and to the organization, and equally certain that he expects to bring about a happy solution ... very soon.”⁷⁶³

⁷⁶² *The Buffalo Commercial*, December 30, 1904, p 8.

⁷⁶³ Depew to Timothy L. Woodruff, December 9, 1904, *Depew papers*, YU.


When the meeting finally adjourned, Depew emerged to speak with reporters, “fairly beaming” and donning a large smile. “The optimist wins as he always does and I am it,” the senator exclaimed, before praising Governor Odell for having “brought harmony out of the situation.” “I am very grateful to him,” he declared.⁷⁶⁴ When Odell was interviewed by the press, the governor explained, “I have tried all along to get the preference of the party,” recognizing, “The sentiment for Senator Depew was very great throughout [New York].” Upon being asked whether he had fully appreciated the strength of Depew’s popularity and affection, Odell replied, “I have been working on this matter since election,” revealing the consequential role of public sentiment on the senatorial selection decision and the influence of the newspapers in publicizing these favorable attitudes. Upon being informed of Depew’s characterization of Odell as “his fairy godmother” responsible for “bringing about ... the settlement of this situation,” the flattered governor responded, “Well ... that is indeed very kind of him.”⁷⁶⁵

On January 18, 1905, Chauncey Depew’s long quest for re-election was formally realized when the state legislature announced his selection to a second term in the United States Senate. Having been unanimously renominated by his caucus, Depew went on to earn 100 votes in the State Assembly to 44 for Smith M. Weed, the Democratic nominee. In the State Senate, the incumbent secured 36 votes to Weed’s 13.⁷⁶⁶ **Figure 5.3** charts the state legislature’s final vote on this matter.

⁷⁶⁴ *The Buffalo Times*, December 29, 1904, p 1.

⁷⁶⁵ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, December 29, 1904, p 1.

⁷⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, January 18, 1905, p 2.

Figure 5.3**Vote of the New York State Legislature for Senator, January 1905****SOURCE: *The New York Times*, January 18, 1905, p 2**

5.2.7 Analysis

The New York senatorial election of 1904 exemplifies the vast preponderance of power wielded by party bosses and the prevalence of factional politics. Chauncey Depew was caught within the internecine intra-party struggle between Governor Benjamin Odell and his quest for complete control over the state organization and the waning authority of the aging Senator Thomas C. Platt. Ostensibly a Platt man, Depew eagerly sought to conciliate the feuding power blocs, especially the Odell machine, going to great lengths praising the governor, recognizing his

wide-reaching dominance over the state's politics, and forging a tenuous truce — attesting to the importance of currying favor with pivotal party figures and powerful leaders in securing the senatorial nomination and earning re-election.

With his re-election on the line, Depew undertook a widespread, vigorous public campaign to mobilize popular support on behalf of the party ticket. By helping to achieve large Republican majorities in the legislature, Depew could reasonably expect to be duly rewarded by the party with another term in the Senate. In the process, he readily lent his services to state legislative nominees who had pledged their support to the senator's re-election in January, thereby enlarging the potential pool of Depew partisans in the legislative party caucus. In certain respects, elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* manifested. Senators relied heavily on down-ballot partisans devoted to their cause, who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent's re-election in the forthcoming legislative session. These activities joined Depew's candidacy with a slate of legislative district nominees, bolstering his chances of a receptive caucus in the State Assembly, while also widening popular, direct participation in the selection process itself. Alas, the analogy suffers from one important caveat: the opposition Democrats failed to adopt an equally vigorous enterprise for the Senate seat, sacrificing their prospects of carrying a majority. As such, no visible, publicly-known senatorial aspirants contended for party backing or popular support during the general election.

The legislative elections were not a direct referendum on Depew. The senator framed the campaign within a traditional partisan framework, lauding the strength and character of President Theodore Roosevelt and advocating on behalf of the accomplishments, achievements, and promises of the Republican Party, writ large. Given the broad popularity of Roosevelt and the

advantageous position of the Republican Party, Depew earnestly pegged his candidature to the coattails of the president and *nationalized*, to a large extent, all down-ballot legislative races in the state, as well.

But the election was neither a wholly *indirect* affair. Supportive newspapers regularly touted the record of Senator Depew, striving to elevate his candidacy and profile, as well as the stakes of the election on his future, above the clamor of the presidential campaign and the cacophony of the persistent factional infighting. Infusing this element of personality and offering New Yorkers the opportunity to render their judgment on the incumbent helped in forging a more direct, popular input in the selection process and widening the participation of the electorate.

Despite the *middling/mixed* nature of the senatorial race, Depew solicited the cooperation of friendly periodicals to disseminate the breadth and depth of popular support favoring his return to the Senate. After the November election — as Odell signaled his desire to glean public sentiment on the issue — a syndicate of newspapers diligently went to work marshaling the widespread affection among New York Republicans for Depew. These activities illustrate the necessity of adopting novel techniques to secure re-election — a trend which continued to ever-greater lengths in subsequent elections.

Were these newspapers merely manufacturing popular support to appear that Depew commanded a larger mandate than it seemed? While the supposition cannot be entirely dismissed, we may surmise that the senator enjoyed a degree of tangible support amongst the people. And while the election returns were not the most accurate measure, given that the outcome largely turned on President Roosevelt's performance, Depew — as the public face of the party — probably enjoyed high favorability ratings, as well. But, notwithstanding these considerations,

the very fact that Depew partisans engineered popular support to strengthen the senator's standing with party leaders demonstrates the increasing value of popular legitimacy in the selection of a senator.

Depew effectively cultivated a durable relationship with ordinary New Yorkers, developing a political base independent from an over-reliance on party bosses and insider politicking. By "bringing in the *demos*" the senator could more persuasively corral Odell and others into supporting his re-election, lest they break with public opinion and risk further rupturing the delicate fault lines of the party. Ultimately, the senatorship was decided by Odell — his control over the state organization and approval of Depew factoring into the calculus — but an element of popular legitimacy undoubtedly *influenced* the decision, representing a modest, yet significant shift toward greater popular participation in the process. Public sentiment set the boundaries of the discussion and placed limits on party leaders in selecting a suitable senator. By respecting the prevailing sentiment and backing the widely-popular Depew, the party granted legitimacy to voters, exhibiting adaptations to the democratizing currents of the period.

5.3 1910 - Damaged Depew Decisively Downed in Political Shipwreck

Chauncey M. Depew's singular victory in 1904 represented the high-water mark for the junior senator's long, distinguished career. Having effectively navigated the delicate and troublesome waters of New York politics, mastering high-level politicking whilst commanding widespread popular support, Depew returned to his vaunted, highly-coveted position in the Senate. By that point, the senator could reasonably have expected his great victory to presage another equally-successful stint as senator. However, his second term proved to be far less auspicious

and much more problematic, posing intractable challenges for the the party and his own career. Ultimately, Depew failed to secure a third term due to pervasive party disharmony arising from newfound weaknesses of the his own stature, coupled with an ever-hostile climate for national Republicans — a casualty of the *nationalization effect*, whereby the contest reflected the unfavorable national dynamics harming the party. Taken together, these factors conspired to produce a Democratic tidal wave at the polls. With Depew’s lack of party backing and rejection by voters, the election exemplifies a clear-cut case of public accountability — holding incumbent senators responsible for violating the public’s trust — and the party’s willingness to adapt to evolving standards of ethics and maturing notions of self-government.

By mid-decade, demands for greater transparency and publicity were growing. Many reformers targeted the overly-cozy and seemingly pernicious relationship between the business sphere and government, honing in on fiscal contributions and special favors. Responding to these pressures, the New York legislature opened an investigation into various insurance industries, “their political dealings,” and undue financial influence over public officials. Beginning in 1905, the chief counsel for the committee, Charles Evans Hughes, “uncovered corrupt business practices of long standing ... and the purchase of political influence” through donations to both parties. Chauncey Depew found himself engulfed by the controversy. A successful industrialist himself, Depew concurrently served on corporate boards as well as in the Senate, straddling the boundary between the economic and political worlds and exemplifying the oft-perceived comity between them. The investigation brought to light Depew’s “\$20,000 annual retainer from Equitable ... where he was a director.”⁷⁶⁷ These allegations severely damaged the senator’s carefully-

⁷⁶⁷ James S. Simon, *FDR and Chief Justice Hughes: The President, the Supreme Court, and the Epic Battle Over the New Deal*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 35.

crafted, public reputation as an honorable, respectable, high-minded statesman. Nor was Depew alone. His colleague Senator Platt and former governor Odell were similarly discredited, tarnished by their unseemly, improper connections to financial corporations.

Immediately, the state prohibited contributions by corporate entities to parties and imposed greater regulations on lobbying. Driven by his passion for reforming government, Charles Evans Hughes used his newfound fame as a springboard to the governorship in 1906. Upon assuming office, Hughes continued to advance reform-minded policies. To divest politics from administration, he established public commissions to regulate utilities. Eventually, the governor was armed with the authority to launch inquiries into the management of any state agency. After much prodding by Hughes, the legislature enacted a worker's compensation bill in 1910, setting a precedent for the nation to follow. And throughout his tenure, the governor tirelessly and repeatedly advocated for direct primary nominations to replace backroom dealings and corrupt conventions.⁷⁶⁸ Amidst the zealotry for transparency and reform, Depew privately blamed Hughes' "assaults without intermission" on party fealty for exacerbating the combustible fissures within the party.⁷⁶⁹

While the insurance scandal presented a tangible pox on the house of Depew, his reputation was greatly scarred by the subsequent narrative framed by investigative journalists, who saturated the newspapers with sensationalist accounts of unsavory business practices. In March 1906, David Graham Phillips began publishing "The Treason of the Senate," a multipart series in *Cosmopolitan* detailing the alleged web of corruption, bribery, and undue influence between cor-

⁷⁶⁸ Baker, "'Progress' and Politics," in *The Empire State*, 494-495.

⁷⁶⁹ Depew to E.H. Butler, November 9, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

porate owners and the powerful senators who controlled the country. In the periodical's first episode, Phillips thundered, "Treason is a strong word, but not too strong to characterize the situation in which the Senate is the eager, resourceful, and indefatigable agent of interests as hostile to the American people as any invading army could be."⁷⁷⁰ By no means unbiased or objective, the magazine was the organ of media mogul William Randolph Hearst, who had recently wafted into the waters of New York politics as a congressman and was angling for higher office — harboring presidential ambitions.⁷⁷¹ But it did stir the imaginations of Americans, rousing their basest fears, validating their deepest suspicions, and brewing their scalding resentment against the so-called "elite class."

Phillips had long been aligned against Depew harkening back to his days at *The New York World*.⁷⁷² In his latest publication, he decried the New York senator as the "sly courtier agent [of the Vanderbilts] with the greasy conscience and the greasy tongue and the greasy backbone and the greasy hinges of the knees," exclusively beholden to the railroad interests.⁷⁷³

Many press reporters were appalled by the allegations, while Theodore Roosevelt was incensed, dismissing the "lurid sensationalists" behind them. For one, their claims were largely baseless or exaggerated. Even more importantly, the president continued to rely upon the cooperation of Depew and those belonging to the conservative element in the party to enact his agen-

⁷⁷⁰ David Graham Phillips, "The Treason of the Senate," *Cosmopolitan*, (February, 1906), as quoted by The United States Senate, "Treason of the Senate," U.S. Senate History, accessed June 5, 2020, URL: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Treason_of_the_Senate.htm.

⁷⁷¹ Ritchie, "David Barry and the Loyalty of the Senate," in *Press Gallery*, 188.

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ Phillips, "The Treason of the Senate," *Cosmopolitan*, XL, 496, (March, 1906), as quoted by James R. McGovern, "David Graham Phillips and the Virility Impulse of Progressives," in *The New England Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (September, 1966), 341-342, accessed June 5, 2020, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/363960>.

da. He could ill afford to alienate their support.⁷⁷⁴ But Depew's public image was irredeemably damaged. Long considered the "elderly, long-winded, and peripheral solon," — a sage, venerable man of wisdom and wit — the senator was now chastised as a corporate stooge, backed by the monied interests and acting at the behest of the wealthy and powerful.

Nationally, the political environment was growing increasingly untenable for the Republicans, especially vulnerable incumbents, like Senator Depew, who had already witnessed their standing greatly weakened and compromised. With the broadly popular and artful Theodore Roosevelt retiring from the scene, his hand-picked successor, William Howard Taft, assumed the presidency. Taft lacked many of Roosevelt's important talents and failed to live up to the heightened expectations placed upon him in the wake of his predecessor's abrupt exit from political life. The new president possessed none of Roosevelt's outsized, gregarious personality nor was he especially effective in his dealings with the press. While the Rough Rider was bold, assertive, often willing to publicly defend his positions from the bully pulpit of his office, Taft was more judicious, introspective, and analytical, deferring instead to subordinates and the media to interpret his policies on their own merits. Most critically, where Roosevelt skillfully managed the antagonistic factions within the party, Taft was ill-equipped to satiate both sides of the looming civil war. Therefore, when Congress adopted Taft's policy programs in the summer of 1910, many detractors and "insurgents" immediately seized upon the unjustness and short-sidedness of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, arguing that the tariff revision signaled the undue and excessive influence of corporate interests.

⁷⁷⁴ Ritchie, "David Barry and the Loyalty of the Senate," in *Press Gallery*, 188.

With sharp divisions engendered by the deep unpopularity of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and the party under assault for their traditional advocacy of high protective tariff rates — especially by insurgent Republicans — the issue lost the electoral efficacy it had commanded in previous years. New York Republicans steered clear of defending the measure during the fall campaign, fearing they would incur the wrath of voters by aligning themselves too closely with Taft and the protectionists. These actions only served to further compound the re-election prospects of Senator Chauncey Depew. An ardent protectionist himself, Depew was incensed by the party's strategy of appealing to independents and Democrats by abandoning the orthodoxy of Republican principles. "I have seen scores of churches go down and their congregations scatter where the minister thought he had something different, fresher, better than the old ... doctrines ... in which the congregation had been brought up," the senator complained after the election.⁷⁷⁵ These discouraging political trends threatened to *nationalize* scores of state races — overtaking local issues and individual personalities — a bleak prospect from the perspective of New York Republicans. With the toxicity of the party brand, the vacuum created by state Republicans, and his own compromise candidacy, Depew faced a Herculean, uphill battle for a third term in the Senate.

5.3.1 *Party Disharmony*

As Depew prepared to mount his quest for re-election in 1910, his candidacy was plagued by widespread party disharmony. Many Republicans had soured on the senator, having grown disenchanted in the wake of the Equitable Life Assurance revelations. With transparency and

⁷⁷⁵ Depew to E.H. Butler, November 9, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

reform the prevailing *zeitgeist*, Depew's immense wealth and business connections seemed woefully outdated for the times — a relic of a bygone era. Nervy Republicans were greatly dispirited by the prospect of their outmoded senator occupying a prominent position in the upcoming campaign. *The Star Gazette* described Depew's candidature as "a fearful handicap" to state legislative tickets, explaining, "The people have not forgotten the insurance scandals and the miserable part played in them by Depew."⁷⁷⁶ *The Post Standard* concluded that the senator's nomination "would be political suicide," for "he is recognized as the representative ... of the greatest combinations of capital."⁷⁷⁷ *The Buffalo Enquirer* bemoaned "the ills of the old system" as manifested in the Empire State, where Depew, a "director of sixty-three corporations," could "be returned without the party or the people having any direct chance to get at him."⁷⁷⁸ And the editors of *The New York Press* urged its readers to "sternly rebuke" Depew's "proposal to misrepresent his state for another term," imploring Republicans to nominate "some citizen whose qualifications ... will strengthen the party's cause at the polls."⁷⁷⁹

By 1910, senatorial nominations were still primarily decided by party officials and the legislative caucus. As such, it remained critically important that Depew court invaluable support from key party figures in his quest for renomination, which the senator and his followers *do* vigorously undertake. But the process was informed, to a degree, by district conventions — democratic proceedings, in nature, which represented an admixture of popular support and organizational prowess. These gatherings nominated state legislative candidates for office, who would

⁷⁷⁶ *Star Gazette*, February 1, 1910, p 6.

⁷⁷⁷ *The Post Standard*, February 3, 1910, p 4.

⁷⁷⁸ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, February 10, 1910, p 4.

⁷⁷⁹ *Press and Sun Bulletin*, March 12, 1910, p 6.

occasionally be pledged to the election of a senatorial candidate. Ideally, the incumbent needed to maximize the ranks of Depew partisans in the upcoming Republican caucus by diligently working toward their nominations at these various conventions all across the state. However, unlike in 1904, where Depew largely succeeded at these efforts, it is unclear how actively the senator committed to these fundamental prerequisites of victory.

Accordingly, conservative Republicans and Depew partisans were eager to rehabilitate the senior senator's public image. Throughout the winter months, supportive editors reframed the narrative, illustrating an idealized portrait of party harmony predicated on the overwhelmingly positive sentiment favoring the venerable Depew. *The Buffalo Sunday Morning News* declared his re-election "has met with great favor in all parts of the country ... from far and near," expressing their "appreciation of his lifelong services and his ardent defense of soundest policies and measures."⁷⁸⁰ *The Buffalo News* routinely echoed these claims, publishing such headlines as "Depew Sentiment Fast Forming in Favor of Return: Re-election is Part of Harmony Plan in Republican Politics."⁷⁸¹ And *The New York Tribune* reported "no effective candidate in the field against Mr. Depew," praising the senator for "having rendered more effective service ... in the last three years than at any time before in his career," and describing the high esteem held for the incumbent by his colleagues.⁷⁸²

Faced with a seemingly unbridgeable chasm, Senator Depew actively spearheaded efforts to stabilize the situation, steady the ship, and lay the foundations for his re-election bid. In early February, he hosted members of the influential New York Editorial Association at a reception in

⁷⁸⁰ *Buffalo Sunday Morning News*, January 9, 1910, p 1.

⁷⁸¹ *Buffalo Evening News*, January 29, 1910, p 4.

⁷⁸² *The New York Tribune*, January 26, 1910, p 4.

Washington, where they met the president and a cadre of Republican state legislators — necessary to consolidate crucial party backing, as well as enlisting the influential powers of the press in his campaign operations.⁷⁸³ Depew's intentions were not lost on *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, whose editor questioned the classification of the gathering as a mere “meet and greet,” instead surmising, “Wonder if that’s all he wants? Let’s see, Senator Depew’s term expires on March 4, 1911, doesn’t it? Wonder if he’s a candidate for re-election?”⁷⁸⁴

Following the reception, Depew was keen to survey the political landscape, especially as it pertained to the upcoming senatorial contest. From the senator’s vantage point, the outlook was encouraging. J.R. Joslyn contended that Depew’s candidacy was “in very healthy condition,” observing the generally favorable attitudes among most of the periodicals, with the notable exception of *The Syracuse Post Standard* and its editor W.E. Gardner.⁷⁸⁵ Depew himself even characterized the commencement of his campaign as having gone “remarkably well.” He was heartened by the “friendly” disposition of most Republican newspapers, and described “the comments” of the opposition papers as “not nearly as hostile as one might suppose.”

However, Depew remained slightly bemused by the persistent ire emanating from *The Syracuse Post Standard* and *The Boston Globe*, suggesting his operative, E. H. Butler, editor of *The Buffalo News*, contact the respective owners personally to effect a meaningful shift in sentiment — again, trying to manage the political narrative through the influence of newspapers.⁷⁸⁶ Butler dutifully responded, “I feel more assured every hour of your re-election,” confirming he

⁷⁸³ *Buffalo Evening News*, February 4, 1910, p 21.

⁷⁸⁴ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, February 5, 1910, p 9.

⁷⁸⁵ J.R. Joslyn to Depew, February 11, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁸⁶ Depew to E.H Butler, February 19, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

would reach out to W. E. Gardner and Colonel Taylor — editor of *The Boston Globe* — to try to “bring about a little change,” before cautioning, “It might not come suddenly, but it would come.” Butler was convinced the press owed Depew at least a modicum of respect and deference, insisting, “I don’t think for a minute [they] should treat you unkindly, because you treated a kinsman of its editor with great kindness.”⁷⁸⁷

Although Depew’s diagnosis may have been overly optimistic, he earnestly utilized creative and aggressive measures to bolster *party unity* and improve his standing among voters. Early in the year, Depew distributed reproductions of his Senate speeches to “all enrolled Republicans” throughout the state, at his own personal expense.⁷⁸⁸ Eventually, these operations evolved, enlarging in size — 150,000 copies solely for an acclaimed address of prosperity and economic matters — and expanding in reach to ever more “surprised constituents” residing in the Empire State, as well as readers nationwide. These activities were soon financed by the incumbent’s franking privilege, a practice which elicited criticism from several periodicals. *The Buffalo Courier* snidely remarked, “If ... Depew fails ... it will not be because of his neglect ... to dump tons of his speeches upon the heavily burdened people” of New York, while *The Buffalo Commercial* was outraged, insisting, “When men of the standing of [the] senator use the pocket book of Uncle Sam to advertise himself free, is it any wonder that the littler fellows lower down look anxiously around for a chance to gratify their hunger for the spoils of graft?”⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁷ E.H. Butler to Depew, February 24, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁸⁸ *The Sun*, January 2, 1910, p 35.

⁷⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, February 22, 1910, p 8; *Buffalo Courier*, March 14, 1910, p 6; *The Buffalo Commercial*, June 14, 1910, p 13.

These activities evidence the value of maintaining a positive public image. Depew recognized the necessity to saturate the state rehabilitating his damaged reputation. And by targeting Republicans — both voters and officials — the senator hoped to lock down their critical support and bolster party harmony, ideally by mobilizing all disaffected party members to rally to the cause under the banner of his candidacy once again. But alas, it remains uncertain how fully the senator committed to the ever-important district conventions, which played a sizable role in the senatorial nomination process.

5.3.2 *Rumors of Retirement*

Despite his best efforts to counteract the great forces arrayed against him, Depew's compromised candidacy and weakened political standing remained an albatross for Republicans, failing to instill confidence in the rank-and-file of the party faithful. During the spring, newspapers began circulating rumors of the senator's impending retirement, presumably disseminated by Republicans anxious to replace the incumbent for a stronger, more palatable alternative. The plan reported by the press called for Depew resigning from the Senate *before* the next legislative session in January so to permit the present Republican-controlled legislature the opportunity to select a suitable successor.⁷⁹⁰ Describing Depew's "connection with insurance complications [as] a rather embarrassing handicap in contested elections," *The Buffalo Commercial* maintained the senator "earned the right" to depart from public life on his own terms.⁷⁹¹ And *The Buffalo*

⁷⁹⁰ *Democrat and Chronicle*, April 21, 1910, p 11.

⁷⁹¹ *The Buffalo Commercial*, April 21, 1910, p 10.

Times, intent on nudging Depew from office, argued voluntary retirement “the safest kind of bet,” warning, “he will shortly find himself outside the breastworks.”⁷⁹²

Firmly dispelling any notions of a premature exit from the political scene, Depew remained adamant that he would not be retiring in the face of adversity nor permitting the party to select a replacement as a means of saving face. Privately, the senator attributed the story to a resourceful reporter with a penchant for “inventing possibilities” and “a talent for developing salable news” by adding “a spice to this narrative.” Furthermore, Depew incisively exposed the fallacy of the alleged plan, explaining that the present legislature could *only* appoint a placeholder until the next session in January, whereupon the new legislature — whose composition would be determined at the next election — would still decide a successor. There was no escaping such an eventuality.⁷⁹³

Describing the rumor as “the premier joke of 1910,” Depew publicly reiterated to the press, “I have never considered resigning ... I am still able to do a day’s work ... I am still in fair health as you see.” Notably, the senator was far more evasive committing himself to the pursuit of a third term. “I have never considered ... standing for re-election,” Depew proclaimed, “My term runs till March 1911 and that is as far ahead as there is any need for me to look ... If the next legislature is Republican, the question will bear consideration, if it is Democratic ... it ceases to be interesting.”⁷⁹⁴ While Depew did not outright declare he would step aside in the event of a Republican majority, the two-term incumbent left the door ajar to that possibility, apparently signaling to party officials his approval for the caucus to consider other viable candidates for the

⁷⁹² *The Buffalo Times*, April 22, 1910, p 2.

⁷⁹³ Depew to J.R. Joslyn, April 22, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁷⁹⁴ *Buffalo Evening News*, April 21, 1910, p 19.

seat. If true, the senator may have recognized he held little chance of securing another term, even if Republicans claimed a majority, and endeavored to neutralize the issue of *his* candidacy from the forthcoming election as a means of motivating voters to support the party ticket. But since he never explicitly removed himself from contention, per se, Depew remained the *only* avowed Republican candidate for Senate, pending the emergence of a strong alternative capable of commanding a consensus of party support.

Depew's announcement did little to quell the brewing fervor against his candidacy. The editors of *The Press and Sun Bulletin* lambasted the senator for "sadly lacking in tact," cautioning that Republican support for his re-election bid would prove to be "the last straw that broke the camel's back [and] all that is wanting to complete their public discomfiture."⁷⁹⁵ Even more brazenly, pivotal party officials openly considered other potential senatorial contenders. In late April, "a consensus of opinion" emerged to resolve the political impasse by offering the seat to former president Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt's triumphant return from overseas was imminent — due to arrive within weeks — and his nomination for the Senate promised to be a boon for the party. "It is predicted here that the Republican[s] ... would easily retain ... the legislature and ... the Roosevelt personality ... would bring success to the entire state ticket," reported *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*.⁷⁹⁶ The Rough Rider's reputation was such that even the endangered Depew expressed his willingness to "gladly withdraw if Roosevelt wants the place."⁷⁹⁷ The Roosevelt boom, however, did not enjoy an especially long shelf life. By early May, Colonel Roo-

⁷⁹⁵ *Press and Sun Bulletin*, April 22, 1910, p 6.

⁷⁹⁶ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, April 27, 1910, p 3.

⁷⁹⁷ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, June 9, 1910, p 3.

sevelt made clear in no uncertain terms he held little desire for further elective public office in the sunset years of his retirement, including a coveted seat in the United States Senate.⁷⁹⁸

Undeterred by Roosevelt's firm decision to demur, many a Republican entertained supporting the candidature of James Wolcott Wadsworth, speaker of the New York State Assembly. Wadsworth was the darling of the so-called "old crowd," conservative stalwarts who considered the speaker "their best asset" in the looming senatorial contest. However, his youth — barely 33 years of age — and antagonism to Governor Hughes and Colonel Roosevelt precluded his candidacy from gaining much traction beyond his immediate base of support with the business-friendly, traditionalist faction.⁷⁹⁹ Despite these headwinds, John A. Merritt, Customs Collector for the Port of Niagara, undertook an informal canvass to broaden Wadsworth's appeal. At a summer picnic in Lockport, he uttered that the young, aspiring Republican could be "eligible" for elevation to the Senate were he to retire from the Assembly. However, Merritt's rather weak efforts failed to gin up additional support.⁸⁰⁰ Characterizing Wadsworth as "a bright young man," *The Watertown Times* decried that he was "entirely out of touch with public sentiment," and beseeched its readers to retain Senator Depew instead, who "has proved a most worthy representative."⁸⁰¹

By late August, Wadsworth himself expressed an interest pursuing "Depew's toga," but declined to officially decide until the adjournment of the State Convention the following month,

⁷⁹⁸ *Star Gazette*, May 2, 1910, p 1.

⁷⁹⁹ *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, June 9, 1910, p 3.

⁸⁰⁰ *Buffalo Courier*, August 7, 1910, p 41.

⁸⁰¹ *The Post Star*, August 15, 1910, p 8.

further handicapping his prospects for higher office.⁸⁰² On September 29, Wadsworth publicly declared he would not pursue re-election, thereby stepping down from his eminent position in the Assembly. Left unaddressed was the outstanding question of the senatorship.⁸⁰³ Thereafter, while the Speaker loyally stumped the state on behalf of the party ticket at the height of the campaign season, he was never presented as an avowed candidate for the Senate. Many Republicans concluded that Wadsworth lacked senatorial timber.⁸⁰⁴ Thus, while Depew encountered stiff resistance, struggling to lock down critical party backing and bolster party unity around his candidacy — essential prerequisites heading into the general election — Republican officials wrestled with finding a suitable alternative with whom to place their fullest confidence, as potential senatorial aspirants floundered to impress party figures, as well.

5.3.3. *The Fall Campaign - Mobilizing Disaffected Republicans*

As the summer drew to a close, Republicans failed to coalesce around a singular senatorial candidate. Emblematic of the uncertainty over the upcoming question, State Senator George A. Davis declared his support for Depew if the latter were a contender, but retorted, “I don’t know that he is a candidate ... If there are no other candidates I would vote for him ... If they were high-class candidates.”⁸⁰⁵ Plagued by an internecine intra-party conflict and mustering few foot soldiers on his behalf, Depew opted to pursue a modest public campaign for popular sup-

⁸⁰² *The Buffalo Times*, August 22, 1910, p 1.

⁸⁰³ *Buffalo Evening News*, September 29, 1910, p 34.

⁸⁰⁴ *The Buffalo Times*, October 9, 1910, p 33; *The Buffalo Evening News*, October 18, 1910, p 8; *The Post Standard*, October 21, 1910, p14; *The Buffalo Commercial*, October 31, 1910, p 10.

⁸⁰⁵ *The Buffalo Times*, September 16, 1910, p 4.

port, “tak[ing] an active part in the discussion of the issues now before ... Republicans.”⁸⁰⁶ The campaign presented an opportunity for the endangered incumbent to mobilize disenchanted Republicans to support the party ticket — governor, state legislative nominees, members of Congress, and President Taft — with their votes of confidence. Voters directly determined which party controlled the legislature and the magnitude of the majority. And while many elements within the party remained unalterably opposed to Depew, a strong performance in November promised to allay their fears and deep-seated concerns over Depew’s candidacy, potentially convincing skeptical legislators to support his re-election bid and sweep the senior senator back into office. In effect, Depew would once again forge a political base independent from party leaders through a strong popular showing — a repeat of the 1904 campaign. But given Depew’s tarnished image, damaged reputation, and unpopularity with New Yorkers, the task proved insurmountable.

As he prepared to mount his bid for a third term, Depew grew increasingly bullish, confident that the party could at long last snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Nationally, he sensed a sudden “change for the better.” President Taft and congressional leaders agreed to enact many of the president’s programs, decisively crushing the insurgent holdouts and snapping a dispiriting drought of legislative activity. Virtually overnight, Taft shed the image of equivocation and ineptitude, instead earning high marks for his assertiveness. Depew hailed the moment as a turning point, “enliven[ing] the situation” and “promot[ing] the gayety of millions.”⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰⁶ *New York Tribune*, August 25, 1910, p 6.

⁸⁰⁷ Depew to Elihu Root, June 23, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

At the state level, Republicans were struggling to gain much traction. In mid-September, J.R. Joslyn assured Depew, “I do not have much doubt yet ... about carrying the legislature,” yet he warned, “If we are going on to have fights and T.R. is going to travel about here, telling everybody that he has got the men opposed to him licked to a frazzle ... the prospect certainly is not very brilliant in that direction.” Joslyn was hopeful that “better moods” would prevail once “the preliminary skirmishing [was] over.”⁸⁰⁸ Within weeks, the party was rejuvenated by their gathering at the Saratoga Convention. On September 27, Colonel Roosevelt delivered a rousing address, sounding the “battle cry” against dishonesty and corruption, and touting many of Hughes’ political reforms, including the direct primary, as a necessary antidote to the systematic maladies afflicting the nation.⁸⁰⁹ Thereafter, the party nominated Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Attorney, for governor.⁸¹⁰ When the proceedings adjourned, Depew attributed to the convention a renewed sense of “enthusiasm” among many “thousands of men who were feeling dissatisfied.”⁸¹¹ Certainly, Depew’s optimistic observation should be accepted with a grain of caution given that he publicly delivered the statement to the press and likely reflected standard boilerplate fodder for the newspapers to print. But his remarks possess a kernel of import to them, as well. Disaffection among voters is equally as much psychological as it is material and Depew’s optimistic statements were clearly intended to disseminate an aura of positivity and confidence so to gin up the necessary enthusiasm among Republicans.

⁸⁰⁸ J.R. Joslyn to Depew, September 14, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

⁸⁰⁹ *New York Tribune*, September 28, 1910, p 3.

⁸¹⁰ *Buffalo Evening News*, September 29, 1910, p 50.

⁸¹¹ *The New York Tribune*, October 1, 1910, p 4.

Alas, the intensity and extent of Depew's statewide stumping tour remains indeterminate. Owing to underreporting and/or lack of available reliable sources, the evidentiary record for that year's general election is scarce, thereby precluding a conclusive determination over the nature of the canvass. But we can deduce that the senator played at least a *modest* role as the public face of the campaign — headlining fewer events and featuring less prominently in the rallies than in 1904. If true, then Depew *may* have been trying to minimize the publicity of his re-election and neutralize the issue of his candidacy from the forthcoming election as a means of motivating voters — especially Republicans — to turnout and support the party ticket.

Accompanying Colonel Roosevelt, Depew's first official address was delivered at the Clermont Avenue Rink in Brooklyn on October 20, rather late in the calendar year.⁸¹² On the same day, it was announced that Depew would “make several speeches” in the upcoming days and weeks to help the party close the deal, including a number of further high-profile appearances in Brooklyn.⁸¹³ Thereafter, the incumbent visited White Plains, Queens (where he was joined by gubernatorial candidate Stimson) and New York University in Manhattan.⁸¹⁴

In his addresses, Depew did not shy away from vigorously defending the tried-and-true orthodoxy of Republican policies, programs, and accomplishments. Despite a president whose reputation had greatly suffered in contrast to his predecessor, Depew lauded Taft as a man of principle, “The only president in my time ... who believes that a platform is a thing to be lived

⁸¹² *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, October 20, 1910, p 3.

⁸¹³ *The Buffalo Commercial*, October 20, 1910, p 2; *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, October 28, 1910, p 4.

⁸¹⁴ *The New York Times*, October 28, 1910, p 5; *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, November 1, 1910, p 2; *The New-York Tribune*, November 5, 1910, p 2.

up to — a thing to stand on, not just to get in on.”⁸¹⁵ Nor was Taft *merely* a scrupulous leader. In fact, his administration was storied with notable achievements, the most “since Washington’s time,” boasted Depew, eliciting wild enthusiasm from his audience.⁸¹⁶ Notwithstanding the toxicity of the Republican brand — which drove such men as Albert Beveridge to rail against his party — Depew remained faithful to his political home, proclaiming, “Progress has been the characteristic of the ... party since it came into power with Abraham Lincoln.” Far from widespread misrepresentations of Republicans as hostile to reforms, “Progressive policies of the party have not lagged behind public opinion but have led public sentiment.” And confronted by the deep antipathy among many Americans toward the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Depew assailed the unfair mischaracterizations of the measure as increasing duties on innumerable necessities of life. By contrast, the senator vociferously argued that many essential products actually witnessed a *downward* revision in their rates, to the incalculable benefit of manufacturers, laborers, and workers.⁸¹⁷ Although the aging senator, long past his prime, had grown frail, Depew continued to captivate audiences with his spellbinding oratory.

Depew’s candidacy for a third term in the Senate was not prominently featured in the newspapers, as well — again, attempting to minimize the publicity of his re-election and neutralize the issue of his candidacy from the election. During the winter and spring, with rumors of the senator’s impending retirement rife, a flurry of editorials erupted assessing the political scene, with some backing Depew and others urging him to throw in the towel. After that period, mentions of his re-election bid ground to a halt. Aside from a thorough treatment of Depew’s “bril-

⁸¹⁵ *The New York Tribune*, October 28, 1910, p 2.

⁸¹⁶ *The New York Times*, October 28, 1910, p 5.

⁸¹⁷ *The Buffalo Sunday Morning News*, October 23, 1910, p 3.

liant achievement[s]” in “his busiest and most successful” term by the ever-faithful *Buffalo Evening News*, few periodicals deigned to even advertise his candidacy.⁸¹⁸

By contrast, the Democratic camp was most eager to focus their spotlight and center their attacks on Depew’s endless foibles. Chastened by their long years in the political wilderness, the party sought to capitalize on the general feelings of discontent among New Yorkers toward their senior senator and the persistent intra-party disaffection plaguing his candidacy. Throughout the summer, buoyant Democrats agreed to seriously contest control of the state legislature. According to *The Buffalo Times*, “The situation throughout [the Empire State] was never brighter for the Democratic Party,” with the state organization already nominating strong contenders for a slew of competitive districts just in the Buffalo area alone.⁸¹⁹ To that end, the opposition also concluded that Depew could prove a powerful motivator for *Democratic* voters. William H. Ryan, chairman of the party’s Speaker’s Bureau, proclaimed at the campaign’s commencement, “At this time, when Chauncey M. Depew is certain to be the Republican candidate for re-election ... The thought of six years more of Depew ought to make the next legislature Democratic beyond any doubt.”⁸²⁰ And *The Troy Press*, commenting upon Judge Alton Parker’s interest in the campaign, suggested that his elevation to the Senate in place of the sullied Chauncey Depew “of insurance ill fame” would be welcomed by Democrats and even “reputable Republicans.”⁸²¹ Collectively, these considerations fed into the enlarging notions of public accountability — giving voters the opportunity to hold incumbents to account for unsavory and disreputable behavior.

⁸¹⁸ *Buffalo Evening News*, August 2, 1910, p 50.

⁸¹⁹ *The Buffalo Times*, August 21, 1910, p 25.

⁸²⁰ *The Buffalo Enquirer*, October 19, 1910, p 7.

⁸²¹ *The Post Standard*, October 26, 1910, p 4.

Despite the serious efforts undertaken by the Democrats in their quest for control of the state legislature — and, by extension, the selection of a United States Senator — the party did not publicly nominate a leading contender for the office to spearhead their senatorial campaign. They shared a general sense of optimism that they would capture the State Senate, and while confident of gaining seats in the Assembly, they “had little hopes of carrying the [body].” Ergo, “There was almost no talk ... regarding a Democratic candidate for the ... Senate.”⁸²² Nonetheless, visible Democratic figures, such as former Judge Alton Parker, were diligently stumping the state on behalf of the party ticket, and regularly touted as senatorial timber by party members and the press.

5.3.4 *Democratic Landslide*

At the ballot box, Americans delivered a searing indictment of the Republican Party. The long-developing Democratic wave, fueled by an enthusiasm edge and widespread discontent with the reigning party, crested into a landslide of monumental proportions. The party gained 58 seats in the House of Representatives for a total of 230 seats, recapturing control of the chamber for the first time in fifteen years. Republican strength dipped to 162 seats. And although the Republicans maintained their majority in the United States Senate, fully eight seats were ceded to the Democrats, who closed the margin to an eight-seat difference.⁸²³ In the Empire State, the damage to Republicans was even more pronounced. Their gubernatorial nominee, Henry Stimson, was trounced by John Alden Dix, who went on to become the 38th governor of the state.

⁸²² *The New York Tribune*, November 10, 1910, p 2.

⁸²³ “Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present,” US House of Representatives; “Party Division,” United States Senate.

Further, the party's majorities in the state legislature were eviscerated. Democrats nearly doubled their ranks in the State Senate to claim a 29-to-21 member advantage over the Republicans, whilst in the State Assembly, they netted 31 seats for a comfortable 87-to-63 vote margin over their opponents.⁸²⁴ These decisive results assured that a Democrat would succeed Chauncey M. Depew in the Senate, retiring the longtime incumbent from public office.

Voters that November were largely driven by their disapproval of the much-maligned Payne-Aldrich Tariff and rampant dissatisfaction with the governing Republican Party, as personified by President Taft and congressional leadership. On the surface, the enactment of these measures appear fairly innocuous. But had the Payne-Aldrich Tariff been passed several years earlier, it likely would *not* have aroused such deep hostility and antipathy. The measure's passage — coming as it did at the height of calls for significant downward revision in tariff rates, greater transparency and openness in government, and the liberation of the political system from the undue influence exercised by powerful corporations and financial conglomerations — flew in the face of the changing conditions and the evolving *zeitgeist*. Americans expressed their brewing frustrations at these tone deaf decisions by ousting the Republicans, wholesale, from power, wholesale. These dynamics illustrate the *nationalization effect*. The rigid party system that prevailed under the indirect regime tended to nationalize state contests — transforming all down-ballot races, from governor to state legislative seats, into a referendum on the national environment. By that measure, Republicans were at a distinct political disadvantage in 1910, and their inability to decouple state elections from the difficult national climate witnessed many a Republican go down to defeat.

⁸²⁴ Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures*, 137.

Additionally, the persistent fissures amongst New York Republicans between conservative stalwarts and reformers over the proper direction forward for the party seriously hampered their efforts to maintain harmony, present a united front, and offer a coherent message to voters in the general election. Nor could they agree upon a viable senatorial replacement for Depew, either. As a result, Democrats effectively capitalized on the openings exposed by these intra-party weaknesses.

Depew's re-election bid represented a minor consideration for voters in 1910. The senator's compromised reputation and uninspiring candidacy did little to assist the party, down ballot. However, the nature of the campaign represented only a quasi-referendum, of sorts, on the sitting senator. Depew's candidacy was *not* widely advertised, even though newspapers regularly assessed his viability as a contender and passed judgment on his record. And while the senator faithfully canvassed popular support for the ticket, the senatorial question itself was not an overarching issue for New Yorkers. Voters understood that supporting the Republican ticket *might* return Depew to another term, but the party had withheld their backing from the senator and, having failed to coalesce around his candidacy, the prospect of a Republican replacement was considerable. Furthermore, voters clearly grasped that supporting the Democratic ticket *would* certainly oust the senator from his perch. But given that the Democrats failed to agree upon a challenger, as well, voters were in the dark as to a proper alternative.

Under the indirect regime, elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* certainly obtained, given the rigid party system and durable party cover, but the 1910 New York election presented several complications. Most patently, the senatorial contenders of the respective parties had not been determined. Their candidacies were neither highly visible nor widely advertised.

Legislative caucuses still formally nominated candidates for the Senate. Voters could still support a particular party in their own districts to determine which camp controlled the legislature, but beyond that, the range of possibilities regarding the identity of Depew's successor was great. Incidentally, while state contests, including down-ballot legislative seats, *were* nationalized, it appears the parties essentially detached the senatorial question from the electoral calculus. Notwithstanding these caveats, however, Depew's lack of party backing and ultimate rejection by voters attest to the evolving notions of public accountability, wherein incumbent senators are held responsible by the party *and* voters for transgressions of the public trust, unsavory behavior, and disreputable actions.

After the election, Depew penned an insightful analysis of the party's defeat. He admitted having met "life-long Republicans" during his canvass who planned to support the Democrats "never having done so before." Such dispirited meetings were fueled by Governor Hughes' "continued assaults" on party loyalties, which, Depew contended, were long the foundations of the party's electoral viability, maintaining, "I believe in the strength of party fealty based upon party principles." The senator bemoaned "the insurgents in Congress, with an exaggeration and imagination I have never seen equaled" similarly lobbing destructive attacks on the party. And the incumbent lamented the party's unwillingness to offer a spirited defense of their accomplishments, muttering, "No appeal was made to party loyalty, or party principles, or the necessity of sustaining the national administration, for fear it might alienate a large body of Democratic voters who might be offended [by] Republicanism."⁸²⁵ Publicly, Depew was sanguine, revealing to reporters, "There is no bitterness in defeat for me. I have enjoyed the sweet taste of political

⁸²⁵ Depew to E.H. Butler, November 9, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

... life, and retire with no regrets. It has been a pleasure ... I have striven to represent the people of the state, and retire with a clean conscience.”⁸²⁶

3.5.5 *The Legislature Decides*

As the estimable Chauncey Depew prepared to step aside from his eminent position in the Senate, forced to retire in the wake of the Democrats’ sudden capture of the state legislature, one final matter remained unresolved: the party’s choice for a proper senatorial nominee. Having been relegated to minority status, the lingering question surrounding the Republican senatorial nomination effectively reached an anti-climax. The party’s considered decision held little chance of winning selection by the Democratic-controlled legislature. Therefore, when Republican legislators and party officials assembled in their caucus, they bestowed the honor of their formal nomination on Depew, recognizing the incumbent as their official candidate for the United States Senate. Although the nomination was merely perfunctory, their decision reflected widespread respect for Depew’s storied career and a reward for his faithful service to the party.⁸²⁷ A humble, grateful Depew expressed his deep “appreciation of [their] cordiality and kindness” in “granting [him] the complimentary nomination for Senator,” pronouncing, “It would mean infinitely more to me than anybody else, and would be most satisfactory as the closing chapter of fifty-four years of public life.”⁸²⁸

For their part, the Democrats failed to coalesce around a suitable senatorial nominee of their own. With “little hopes of carrying the Assembly” prior to the election, they deigned to ig-

⁸²⁶ *The Buffalo Evening News*, December 9, 1910, p 12.

⁸²⁷ *The Wall Street Journal*, November 12, 1910, p 2.

⁸²⁸ Depew to Josiah T. Newcomb, December 30, 1910, *Depew papers*, YU.

nore the contentious issue, fearing it would unnecessarily divide the party at a critical moment in the campaign. When they eventually recaptured the legislature, they were at a loss for finding a worthy replacement to Chauncey Depew. The name of former judge and presidential candidate Alton Parker emerged as a potential consensus choice, palatable to the supporters of former Senator David Hill, while agreeable to the rest of the party. Parker had devoted himself to the Democratic ticket in the recent campaign, earning the praise of *The New York Tribune*, which declared, “There was no more tireless speaker for the Democrats than ex-Judge Parker. He covered the state from end to end.” The periodical speculated that “the senatorship might be his reward” in the event of a Democratic majority, once again attesting to the pertinence of loyal service to the party through the use of visible, public campaigns for popular support. The only Democratic official who remained unconvinced was Parker himself, who authoritatively removed his candidacy from contention immediately following the election, insisting, “I would not accept the place if it were offered to me, even if I were elected to it.”⁸²⁹

Backed by Tammany Hall and its influential leader Charles Murphy, former Lieutenant Governor William Sheehan entered the fray, procuring the support of most of the Democratic legislative caucus.⁸³⁰ However, a small, but pivotal cadre of anti-Tammany insurgents, led by an aspiring, young, newly-elected member from Dutchess County, Franklin D. Roosevelt, threatened to deadlock the vote.⁸³¹ When the first joint ballot was held on January 17, Sheehan secured all

⁸²⁹ *New York Tribune*, November 10, 1910, p 2.

⁸³⁰ *Buffalo Evening News*, January 12, 1911, p 15.

⁸³¹ *Buffalo Enquirer*, January 14, 1911, p 1. At the twilight of Depew’s long and illustrious career, with the legislature hopelessly embroiled in an intractable, contentious struggle to decide upon a successor, a new generation of Democratic leaders was emerging in New York politics, asserting themselves for the first time. Not only was Franklin Roosevelt leading his motley crew of insurgents, but Alfred E. Smith had just assumed the role of the State Assembly Majority Leader, whilst Robert F. Wagner had taken the mantle of leadership in the State Senate.

of 91 votes — eight shy of the threshold for selection — as the Democratic holdouts scattered their votes for other candidates.⁸³² As the weeks went by, a continuous series of ballots ensued, producing no discernible difference in the result. Sheehan remained short. Although home district pressures were growing on the insurgents, they remained steadfast and obdurate in the face of these demands.⁸³³

March 16 marked the fiftieth ballot, once again with little movement in the dicey political drama. By the fifty-first ballot, even the powerful Charles Murphy was forced to mull a compromise. Although he maintained that Sheehan would firmly remain the party's choice for Senate, Murphy considered an alternative modestly more acceptable to the insurgents.⁸³⁴ Mere weeks later on April 1, at long last, Murphy, Stetson, and the rest of the Democrats agreed upon New York Supreme Court Justice James A. O'Gorman. **Figure 5.4** graphs the Democratic caucus vote, nominating Gorman. Thereafter, O'Gorman promptly collected 112 votes to Chauncey Depew's 80 votes, officially choosing a new senator and signaling an end to the seemingly interminable saga.⁸³⁵ **Figure 5.5** charts the final vote of the legislature on the matter.

⁸³² *Buffalo Evening News*, January 17, 1911, p 1.


⁸³³ *Buffalo Evening News*, January 30, 1911, p 6.

⁸³⁴ *Buffalo Evening News*, March 16, 1911, p 12.

⁸³⁵ *Press and Sun Bulletin*, April 1, 1911, p 1; *Democrat and Chronicle*, April 1, 1911, p 1.

Figure 5.4


Democratic Caucus Nomination Vote, April 1911



SOURCE: *Democrat and Chronicle*. April 1, 1911, p 1

Figure 5.5

Vote of the New York State Legislature for Senator, April 1911



SOURCE: *Democrat and Chronicle*, April 1, 1911, p 1

5.3.6 Analysis

The New York senatorial election of 1910 demonstrates the increasing importance of *public accountability*. While progressive reformers assailed the dominance of powerful parties and bemoaned the indirect regime for seeming to protect incumbents laced with graft and woefully insular to common sentiment, the political system actually held senators to account for disreputable behavior and unsavory actions which transgressed the public trust. Depew's weakened, compromised standing in the eyes of New Yorkers was more than a personal inconvenience for the sitting senator — his tarnished reputation and negative public image presented an electoral liability for the state Republican Party, especially given the evolving notions of transparency, openness, and reform. Weighed down by national and state setbacks, many Republicans desperately searched for a potential alternative to boost the ticket, even considering former president Theodore Roosevelt no less, but these efforts ultimately proved futile. Depew remained the only avowed candidate in the contest albeit with little vote of confidence from party figures. In holding the senior senator responsible for his improper business and political dealings, the party, responsive to the prevailing *zeitgeist* of greater democratic self-government, exhibited the necessary adaptations to remain viable, while still maintaining control over the process.

Additionally, the 1910 case attests to the absolute necessity for senators to accrue party *backing* and bolster internal *harmony* amongst the disparate factions and power groups. Parties were the essential drivers of all political activity, especially for electoral competition. Lacking the dedicated commitment of one's party boded inauspiciously for incumbents desiring another term in office. Especially in the Empire State, where legislative caucuses determined their par-

ty's nominee, often dictated by party leaders beforehand. But these decisions were also informed by public sentiment, which had moved strongly against the senator, and district conventions. Depew struggled mightily to achieve a united front among Republicans in his bid for re-election and these fissures ultimately sank his candidacy.

Nor was the practice of holding incumbents accountable relegated to party officials. In their capacity as voters at the ballot box, constituents were free to pass judgment on the performance of the incumbent, as well, namely by denying the party the proper majority in the state legislature necessary for their re-selection. The 1910 case does *not* offer the purest example of referendum. All state races, including down-ballot legislative seats, were *nationalized* to a large extent as national concerns predominated on the minds of voters. The senatorial contest to replace Depew had been decoupled from the electoral calculus.

But while Depew's candidacy was effectually minimized, his re-election bid had not been *entirely* removed from the equation. Newspapers reported on the matter throughout the year, albeit slowing to a more incremental pace at the height of the general election. Even so, the long-time incumbent was stumping the state to advertise the party's accomplishments, publishing his own brandname in the process. And while there was no public Democratic alternative to offer New Yorkers a true choice, voters recognized that punishing Depew required ousting the Republicans from power, and they were aware of the implications of the outcome on the looming matter of the senatorship. Thus, we can conclude that New Yorkers *did* utilize their ballots to punish Depew for his improper behavior, even if the issue was less salient.

Finally, while elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* manifested under the indirect regime — district-based canvassing, strong parties, public leaders — those dynamics were

much less pronounced in the 1910 New York election. Depew had essentially been shorn of party cover. Lacking critical party backing, his candidature was neither widely advertised nor highly visible. And without a clear Democratic or Republican contender for the Senate, both camps were bereft of a strong leader to spearhead the legislative campaign.

5.4 *Conclusions*

New York's senatorial elections illustrate the unique hybrid of strong parties and influential voters operating under modestly non-popular conditions. The preponderance of power rested with parties — encompassing an array of pivotal political leaders and their legions of devotees. But given the rough parity between the premier parties of the period, a coherent, stable two-party system developed, sustaining fiercely competitive general elections. As such, the dueling parties conducted colorful, robust, and vibrant campaigns, intent to make inroads in the electorate, fortify their gains, and weaken the standing of their adversaries.

For potentially vulnerable incumbent senators eyeing another term in office, public campaigns presented a prime opportunity to bolster their credentials with party figures. Chauncey Depew regularly utilized his oratorical skills vigorously stumping the state on behalf of the ticket — framing the election within a partisan prism. By mobilizing the party faithful, en masse, and persuading independents and uncommitted voters to support Republican candidates, Depew was responsible for helping the party achieve stupendous electoral successes over the years.

But these faithful, unceasing services to the party were not entirely selfless acts. With their own re-election on the line, incumbents were determined to witness their party's ranks in the legislature safely assured. Even more importantly, senators remained ever vigilant to intra-

party challenges, factional feuds, and party disharmony upsetting their calculus. Spirited public campaigns alleviating these threats from manifesting, firstly, by signaling to party bigwigs an expected reward in return for the loyal services rendered to the party in the recent campaign, and secondly, by supporting legislative nominees favorable to the senator's own candidacy so to increase the pool of loyal partisans in the next party caucus.

While the November election returns may have been instructive, they did not decide the matter of the senatorship. Rather, the senatorial question was settled by insider politicking, factional bargaining, and legislative buyouts, without which incumbents would be naive to expect to prevail. Legislative caucuses — strongly informed by party leaders — largely nominated senatorial contenders after the elections and, given the persistence of party discipline, the majority caucus all but determined the next senator.

But public sentiment *did* influence the process in a subtle, yet significant way, bounding party officials to respect the popularly legitimate option conferred by the voters and placing constraints on the flexibility of party leaders in settling the matter. In 1904, Depew turned to sympathetic editors to publish the widespread affection and breadth of popular support he enjoyed amongst ordinary New Yorkers and pivotal political and economic figures. These pressures cajoled reluctant, uncertain legislators to yield to public opinion and duly support the incumbent. Accordingly, by forging a base of political support independent from the party infrastructure, *popular legitimacy* emerged as a valuable tool in the arsenal of senators to lock down critical high-level backing. And while Depew's fate was only sealed by the mutually-beneficial deal with Governor Odell, the *vox populi* nudged the governor to accede.

By 1910, Senator Depew's subpar favorability ratings arising from the insurance revelations and other embarrassments fatally tarnished his reputation and damaged his public image, inflicting an irreparable rupture in the ranks of Republicans and leading to massive hemorrhaging of crucial party support throughout the year. Party officials heeded the strong public sentiment that had turned against Depew, withholding their considered backing of the incumbent for another term. In November, the voters of New York held the Republican Party to account for widely unpopular policies, while ousting the longtime incumbent from the Senate. Chauncey Depew's compromised candidacy was decisively downed in the political shipwreck that followed, and the legislature responded by selecting a fresh successor.

In so doing, these developments advanced the evolving notions of *public accountability* — holding officeholders responsible for transgressing the public trust. Parties recognized the intrinsic electoral risk and political liability of protecting insular, out-of-touch incumbents who committed unsavory practices and behaved disreputably. Therefore, to remain viable, they responded to the democratizing currents of the day, adapting to calls for broader, more direct popular input in politics and greater transparency in government, while still maintaining meaningful control over the political process.

The indirect regime rested on party discipline and partisan loyalty. During the selection process, defections from state legislators were expected to be minimal. In many states, instances wherein a bloc of disaffected members bolted from their party to join forces with the opposition in an effort to deny the incumbent re-election were relatively rare. So great was party fealty that insurgency movements generally supported figures from their own ranks, rather than an aspirant from the opposing party. New York was no exception, as attested by the persistence of party-line

voting in each selection vote, despite the prevalence of intra-party fissures. In 1904, the ever-popular Depew commanded unanimous support from the Republican caucus. But his strong standing did not attract any Democratic legislators.

In 1910, Republicans renominated Depew, despite his tarnished public image. Given the party had been relegated to minority status, their senatorial nomination represented a mere formality. Had they achieved a majority in the legislature, the caucus might have considered the matter differently, but that scenario remains an open question. The real drama emanated from the Democrats. The simmering feud between Democratic bosses and anti-Tammany reformers precluded a consensus candidate from emerging quickly. But conservative Republicans never considered joining conservative Democrats to form a majority favoring a traditionalist aspirant. Nor did the progressive elements within the parties ever coordinate on the matter as well. The final vote electing O’Gorman fell along strictly party lines — with several notable holdouts.

The strong party system under the indirect regime also fostered the *nationalization effect* — the transforming of all down-ballot state races into a referendum on national conditions — and the tendency to produce wave elections. The Republican Party’s result in the 1904 elections, comfortably holding the governor’s office, enlarging their majorities in the state legislature, and electing Roosevelt to the presidency, were impressive, especially so given the divided, competitive nature of the New York electorate. These gains were largely driven by the broad popularity of the president and the strengthening economic conditions — factors with which all Republicans were willing to identify and ever eager to emphasize, including the venerable Depew — and the incumbent senator benefitted immensely from these trends.

By 1910, the political climate had shifted dramatically against the party — an unpopular president, divisive policy measures, and a brewing intra-party civil war. Many voters expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction of the country by voting Republicans out of office. Thus, statewide contests were nationalized to a large degree. In New York, the Democrats claimed the governorship, both houses of the legislature, and, with it, a complimentary seat in the Senate. A casualty of these dynamics, Depew was promptly retired after the election.

Elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* manifested under the indirect regime, primarily due to the durability of strong parties. State legislative nominees were publicly committed to supporting the re-election of incumbents. Senators had diligently worked toward ensuring district conventions nominated state legislative partisans, who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent's re-election in the forthcoming legislative session. Thereafter, incumbents vigorously campaigned in the respective districts to maximize visibility and mobilize turnout

In 1904, Depew personally recruited strong contenders for various legislative seats and campaigned tirelessly on their behalf — ostensibly for the party ticket — especially in those pivotal districts. These activities served to join the senator's candidature with the slate of legislative district nominees, bolstering his chances of a receptive caucus in the State Assembly. By contrast, the Democrats failed to settle on a suitable alternative to Depew, all but giving up on recapturing control of the legislature. In that respect, the election was not a faithful reproduction of a parliamentary-styled system.

In 1910, these dynamics were even more compromised. Most patently, the senatorial contenders of the respective parties had not been determined. Lacking critical party backing,

Depew's candidature was neither highly visible nor widely advertised. Without a clear Democratic or Republican contender for the Senate, both camps were bereft of a strong leader to spearhead the legislative campaign. Despite these major caveats, down-ballot state races remained a referendum on national politics, producing a Democratic wave of historic proportions.

Parliamentary democracies provide “party cover” to its officeholders and candidates, a dynamic appraised by David Mayhew and Anthony King. In short, in parliamentary systems, ambitious politicians are nominated by the party proper, not directly by voters through primaries; their expenses are footed by party committees, rather than perennially fundraising on their own behalf; and finally, their political career depends exclusively upon party discipline and loyalty; whereas in the American system, outsiders regularly attain positions of high status.⁸³⁶ Under the indirect regime, party cover constituted what Jonathan Rauch terms “the middlemen,” those essential political functionaries who ensured the system operated smoothly, filtrated fluctuations in popular opinion, and served the broad interests of the parties. As party cover has been shorn of American elections, candidates have grown increasingly more independent of the parties, fueling assaults on the middlemen by populist-driven “outsiders.”⁸³⁷

These developments pose implications for governing, as well. Party cover encouraged the “division of labor” model of representation — a representative system whereby legislators exercised their considered judgment concerning the national interest, freed from electoral consequences and the constraints of popular whim. By contrast, greater individualism has fostered an

⁸³⁶ David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

⁸³⁷ Jonathan Rauch, “How American Politics Went Insane,” *The Atlantic*, (July/August 2016).

“agency” model, whereby officeholders strive to placate the interests of constituents and voters— at all costs — always with a view toward securing re-election.⁸³⁸

In 1904, the widely respected and revered Depew enjoyed strong party cover. Party officials and leaders — including Odell, at the end — roundly backed the senator’s re-election. And down-ballot legislative nominees were publicly committed to his candidacy, as well. Thus, they shared a mutually-beneficial, symbiotic relationship. By 1910, as Depew’s tarnished reputation served as an electoral albatross on the party, the incumbent had lost much of that valuable party cover — key decision makers were distancing themselves from the senator, while legislative nominees had not been wholly dedicated to his re-election. Thus, the relationship deteriorated into a parasitic one.

⁸³⁸ Anthony King, “Running Scared,” *The Atlantic* (January 1997).

CHAPTER 6: Senatorial Campaigns in Massachusetts

Exceptionally Non-Popular Elections - Exclusivist, Party Control

Massachusetts experienced exceptionally non-popular senatorial elections. The state's general elections were decidedly uncompetitive with Republicans strongly dominating its politics. The identify of leading senatorial contenders were largely dissembled — neither widely disseminated nor publicly known during the fall campaign. And the state legislature exercised tremendous autonomy deciding the senatorial question. The preponderance of power rested with *party leaders* rather than voters, an exclusivist, party-controlled regime. Therefore, the state presents the hardest case for my theory of indirect elections, whose hypothesis stipulates that strongly-partisan, highly-entrenched states witness legislative-district canvassing and relatively limited public campaigns. Senators were expected to engage in high-level politicking amongst party officials and district-by-district canvassing to curry favor with state legislators, an elite-driven process of securing re-election. Public support should account for little. Ergo popular campaigning should be non-existent, circumscribed, or functionally limited. This expectation is partially upheld by Massachusetts. During typical election years (1898 and 1904), Senator Henry Cabot Lodge pursued these traditional methods in his quests for re-election.

However, emerging elements of popular legitimacy and public campaigning gradually infused the process of electing a senator. Senator Lodge was keenly aware of the drift of public sentiment throughout his career, routinely tapping into these trends during re-election bids. An underwhelming performance by his party in the legislative elections augured poorly for a smooth re-election. Thus, Lodge turned to public campaigns to mobilize voters, strengthen the Republi-

can ranks, and in so doing, gain crucial support from state legislators and bolster his position within the party.

Furthermore, through elite learning, the senator also adopted practices, such as state convention endorsements, to more directly link his candidacy with the fortunes of the party and render his re-election more publicly evident to Republican voters. Therefore, public campaigning emerged where the hypothesis does not anticipate, partially falsifying the hypothesis, but strengthening the theory that popular campaigning was more significant to senatorial elections under the indirect regime than previously understood or appreciated. Broadly speaking, these popular developments attest to a degree of party adaptability in its recognition of — and concession to — increasingly democratized practices of selecting a senator, gradually taking into account public sentiment and popular legitimacy.

6.1 *Background*

Senatorial elections in Massachusetts were exceptionally non-popular affairs, with party figures exercising their discretion in selecting the most agreeable candidate. A number of barrier points served to filter the popular vote of the November general election from the ultimate selection of senator the following January. First, as a solidly Republican state with sky-high re-election rates, the Bay State scored 93 on the competitiveness index, indicating *very uncompetitive* conditions. Second, elections regularly took the form of party-based appeals and legislative-district canvassing, as Senate candidate identities were not widely disseminated,⁸³⁹ therefore ranking modestly low on *candidate recognition*. Third, the legislature enjoyed tremendous *autonomy*

⁸³⁹ *The Boston Globe*, November 8, 1898, p 1; *Fitchburg Sentinel*, September 20, 1904, p 8.

during the selection process, as high-level politicking and partisan jousting definitively determined the winner.⁸⁴⁰ Popular support seemingly counted for little.

In Massachusetts — as in every state under the indirect regime — senators were selected by a majority of the state legislature. While states differed on the technical rules governing the procedure, each chamber would regularly assemble separately to decide the matter. In the event a candidate failed to secure the required majority threshold in either house, the full legislature would convene in a joint sitting to resume the balloting. Only once a majority of both houses agreed, a candidate would officially be selected as senator.

Formally nominating senatorial contenders varied widely across states. In Massachusetts, a fusion of insider, party caucuses *and* legislative district conventions prevailed. Party caucuses comprised pivotal party officials, including leaders in the state legislature (speaker, majority leaders), governors, lieutenant governors, state committee chairs and committee members, and powerful patronage positions. At the district-level, conventions gathered to nominate state senators and state representatives, wherein they would be pledged to an incumbent senator's re-election bid. If an ambitious figure had their sights on the United States Senate, they would seek the nomination of favorable state legislative nominees. But party officials generally exerted enormous influence over these proceedings, as well. And for a senator to effectively secure a broad spectrum of support from among a panoply of state legislators, they would have to wield a fair degree of power and authority over the state party apparatus.

During the late nineteenth century, Massachusetts was undergoing rapid and immense socio-economic developments, epitomizing the broader changes to the country as a whole. The

⁸⁴⁰ *The Boston Globe*, November 30, 1910, p 5; *The Boston Globe*, December 22, 1910, p 2.

pre-Civil War agricultural economy had given way to manufacturing, as farmlands were replaced by factories. In Holyoke, textile mills and paper industries dotted the landscape, whereas Lynn, Brockton, and Haverhill were noted “shoe-making centers.” Urbanization had accompanied the state’s immense industrialization. By 1890, Massachusetts officially became a “Commonwealth of Cities,” with 28 cities comprising 61.3% of the population. Boston alone boasted over 448,000 residents.⁸⁴¹ The growth of cities was fueled by technological innovations as well as rural flight and immigration.

Immigration wrought expansive changes to society, while posing difficult political challenges for the state. In the 1840s, Massachusetts witnessed a wave of Irish immigrants which elicited nativist backlash and tensions over religious issues. By the end of the century, however, immigrants were predominantly Italian and Jewish, fleeing from the oppressively harsh conditions of southern and eastern Europe. The arrival of these “new immigrants” triggered societal divisions and upheaval. Tensions ran deep not only with native-born Americans, but also with older Irish immigrants, who had by that point felt sufficiently assimilated to American society and more akin to their fellow countrymen. These differences came to a head in major urban centers, such as Boston, where fully 34% of the population was foreign-born by 1885. Immigrants bore the brunt of the criticism during economic downturns, where they were blamed for taking jobs from those considered more “worthy” of work.⁸⁴² Politically, many new immigrants, like their Irish predecessors, gravitated toward the Democratic Party, providing reinforcements and fresh support for the moribund party. Nevertheless, Democrats, who could occasionally claim


⁸⁴¹ David Wendell Dotson, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Political Biography, 1887-1901*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1980, 1-5.

⁸⁴² *Ibid*, 8-9.

the state's governorship, were massively outnumbered by their Republican opponents. "Control of the legislature by the Republicans was absolute," and the possibility of Democrats ever gaining a majority was "unthinkable."⁸⁴³ See **Figures 6.1** and **6.2** for a visualization of the partisan composition of each chamber of the Massachusetts state legislature from 1892 to 1910 — covering Lodge's four elections by that body.

Figure 6.1


**Composition of the Massachusetts House of Representatives,
1892 - 1910**



⁸⁴³ John Arthur Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), 132.

Figure 6.2

**Composition of the Massachusetts Senate,
1892 - 1910**



SOURCE: Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year By Year Summary, 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007), 93-94.

By the 1890s, the “Old Guard” founding generation of the Republican Party in Massachusetts, personified by such giants as Charles Sumner, had been slowly passing from the scene. The retirement of Senator Henry L. Dawes in 1893 and death of George Frisbee Hoar in 1904 signaled the changing of the guard, as they were replaced by a younger generation of spirited Republicans, reared in the years following the Civil War, among them Roger Wolcott, George D. Robinson, John Long, and Henry Cabot Lodge.⁸⁴⁴

⁸⁴⁴ Dotson, 13-14; 101.

Henry Cabot Lodge assumed the senatorship in 1893, a position which he held until his death in 1924. Prior to the Senate, Lodge served a brief stint in the state legislature before winning four elections to the U.S. House representing the Sixth Congressional District of Massachusetts, which then included his own Nahant, Lynn, Chelsea, Revere, and several wards of Boston, among others.

The senator had descended from a long line of nobility. For generations, the Cabots and the Lodges represented the premier families in Massachusetts high society and politics. One of the earliest senators from the state, George Cabot was a major Federalist bigwig and close ally of Alexander Hamilton. And Henry Cabot's grandfather, Giles Lodge, was a wealthy, influential English merchant.

Prior to his entry into politics, Henry Cabot Lodge pursued a career as an author and scholar, publishing several biographies, including works on Hamilton and Washington, lecturing at his alma mater Harvard, and serving as assistant editor of the *North American Review*, which had featured book reviews and scientific and literary discussions. The budding politico's first foray into politics began as a liberal Republican reformer in the 1870s, at the height of the corruption allegations rocking the Grant Administration and numerous city rings. Animated by the desire to purify government, Lodge committed himself to the issue of civil service reform, locking arms with such brethren as author and historian Charles Francis Adams, Treasury Secretary Benjamin Bristow, and the German revolutionary Carl Schurz. Eventually, he parted company with his fellow reformers after his stock began to rise in Massachusetts Republican politics. As Lodge was confronted by the realities of practical politics, he was forced to temper his idealistic,

grandiose visions with the necessities of partisan contestation, party discipline, and career advancement.

While serving in Congress, Lodge took many a strident position, most prominently as an ardent advocate for high tariffs and the system of protectionism, erstwhile vehemently opposing free silver, which he believed would reap financial instability if adopted. Lodge also sought restrictions on the large influx of immigration, favoring a literacy test to attract only the most desirable elements from other countries. Additionally, the senator believed in the power of the federal government to redress the plight of African-Americans in the South. In 1890, he drafted the Lodge Force Bill giving the federal government the necessary tools to enforce fair and equal voting protections across the country. The bill ultimately failed to pass the Senate. Furthermore, Lodge vigorously promoted a powerful American presence in the Western Hemisphere, supporting a strong naval capability, the annexation of Hawaii, and the acquisition of Cuba and the Philippines. Finally, the traditionalist remained steadfastly opposed to direct democratic procedures on the grounds that they violated the representative nature of the Constitution, arguing against the initiative, referendum, and popular election of Senators.⁸⁴⁵

Despite these positions, Lodge was *not* a staunch conservative nor an adversary of progressive legislation. The senator accepted the role of the government in regulating the worst excesses reaped by the Industrial Revolution for he feared inaction would result in labor revolts and widespread societal unrest. Therefore, he generally supported Theodore Roosevelt's modestly progressive policies as president. But he opposed completely displacing private industries with

⁸⁴⁵ Garraty, 228; 287-291.

the state, opting instead to work with business and management, rather than abolish them.⁸⁴⁶ As such, Lodge trended within the median of the average Republican legislator — a soft conservative — wholly ensconced in neither wing of the party — Stalwart nor Progressive. Lodge was more a faithful party man than a fierce ideologue.

I examine Lodge's first three senatorial re-election campaigns in 1898, 1904, and 1910. By keeping constant the candidate, we can better isolate the personality of the senator from his environment, thereby permitting a more rigorous assessment of the impact of fluctuating political circumstances on the incumbent's sensitivity to electoral politics. Were we to discover that Lodge exhibited varying levels of sensitivity — as manifest by gradations in the levels of campaigning across these cases — then we can more confidently conclude that these considerations *were* influenced by the ever-changing fortunes of the party and his re-election prospects, rather than contrasting styles and personalities of individual candidates themselves.

Under exceptionally non-popular conditions, Massachusetts presents a hard case for my theory of indirect elections. With no fewer than three material barrier points filtrating the popular vote in the selection of senator, my hypothesis stipulates that public appeals for popular support on the behalf of the senator's re-election be non-existent or functionally limited. However, the theory is partially upheld and partially invalidated. The 1898 and 1904 senatorial elections conform to the theory's expectations, proceeding as legislative-district canvasses, with an incumbent evincing an overall sense of political security. These cases represent "ordinary" elections under the indirect regime. However, a growing modicum of sensitivity to public opinion

⁸⁴⁶ Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography*; Dotson, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Political Biography*; William Lawrence, *Henry Cabot Lodge, A Biographical Sketch*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925).

and anxiety over the outcome do manifest, driving Lodge to undertake widespread public campaigns across the state.

By contrast, the hypothesis is invalidated by the 1910 case study, where Lodge locked horns with intra-party Republican dissenters and an invigorated Democratic opposition, seeking to nurture a strong base of popular support so to mitigate these challenges. Thus, public campaigns emerged as an important tool to which Lodge turned when confronted by an existential threat to his political career, *despite* the preponderance of the influence resting with party officials. Lodge pursued public campaigning to achieve three objectives: *advertising* his candidacy, *credit-claiming*, and *position-taking* via newspapers, personal appearances, and political surrogates.

Incumbency presents another critical dimension of these elections. Lodge's incumbency status afforded certain advantages when seeking re-election in a favorable political climate. In 1898 and 1904, the senator successfully cleared the field of potential intra-party Republican challengers, relying upon his record of service to the party and network of influential connections. By contrast, incumbency could prove an albatross as well. When public sentiment was brewing against the reigning Republicans — as in 1910 — Lodge's position *invited* an intra-party challenge in the face of Butler Ames, while galvanizing the Democrats to rally against the senator personally and his candidature for re-election.

This chapter tells the story of how Henry Cabot Lodge mastered the art of political survival throughout a turbulent period in American history, eking out a narrow victory against all odds in the face of opponents who desperately sought to dislodge the vaunted incumbent from his seat.

6.2 1898 - *Lodge Sails to Victory*

The 1898 senatorial election illustrates how Massachusetts was largely a party-controlled system. Lodge relied predominantly on securing the support of party officials and pivotal state legislators in his re-election canvass. But the case presents an early example of nascent acuity to the trend of public opinion, especially as it pertained to free silver and Spanish-American war fervor — the two animating issues of the campaign. While limited, such sensitivity drove Lodge to directly link his candidacy to the party and render his re-election more publicly visible. Through elite learning, the incumbent senator pressed for a state convention endorsement that would bolster his position in the party whilst simultaneously strengthening his appeal to voters.

Upon taking his seat in the U.S. Senate in 1893, Henry Cabot Lodge anticipated a considerably lengthy tenure in office. With the state legislature dominated as it was by Republicans, “Lodge could be reasonably sure of re-election every six years for a long time.” By contrast, while serving in the Massachusetts legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives, Lodge was consumed by state issues and electoral politics on a near-constant basis. State legislative elections coupled with the all-important governorship were contested annually, ensuring little to no respite from campaign considerations. Once Lodge graduated to become junior senator, he could expect “freedom from the petty friction of public life,” as his friend Elihu B. Hayes wrote.⁸⁴⁷

Ironically, elevation to the Senate actually had the opposite effect, welding Lodge to state affairs and party politics ever more closely. As Dotson explains, “His new stature meant that he was frequently called upon to lend his prestige to a particular political move or to adjudicate in-

⁸⁴⁷ Garraty, 132.

tra-party disputes.”⁸⁴⁸ Additionally, his position as junior senator meant he was responsible for dispensing patronage for key governmental offices and positions. While Lodge had been a fervent advocate of civil service reform since the days of his youth, he operated more traditionally within the prevailing spoils system by rewarding political supporters and punishing adversaries. As he saw it, until wholesale reform could be effected, it was only sensible to marshal the existing system to favor one’s own political ends. Nonetheless, “[he] found the task unpleasant, time consuming and dangerous.”⁸⁴⁹ Indeed, as Garraty describes, “In times of partisan strife even the ‘scholar in politics’ must plunge into local squabbles and . . . sacrifice large principles to small prejudices for the sake of votes.”⁸⁵⁰

6.2.1 *Free Silver and War Mobilize Republicans*

As 1898 dawned, Lodge expressed apprehension over the looming congressional elections. Historically, midterm elections penalize the party in power and, with Republicans firmly ensconced in both chambers of Congress as well as the presidency, they could expect to suffer similar fortunes. Included among the eleven Republican Senate seats contested that year was Lodge’s seat. Although Lodge’s close political associate George Lyman had assured the senator that they would win the legislature “hands down,” and that few had even “heard a suspicion of any scheme” against him, Lodge remained uneasy.⁸⁵¹ In his reply to Lyman, he wrote, “I look

⁸⁴⁸ Dotson, 169.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid, 247.

⁸⁵⁰ Garraty, 241.

⁸⁵¹ George Lyman to Lodge, January 7, 1898, *Henry Cabot Lodge Papers*, microfilm edition, 183 reels (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society), reel 11.

forward with anxiety to the congressional elections next autumn, but I think the silver fight we have been having in the Senate will help us in Massachusetts.”⁸⁵² Lodge was referring to the issue of free silver.

Although Republicans had scored major victories in the 1896 presidential election on sound money and the gold standard, bimetallism had galvanized many poorer, indebted farmers in the Midwest and West to support the Democratic nominee, William Jennings Bryan, providing a foothold for the party outside of its traditional southern base. While Bryan had been bested by McKinley, Lodge feared the long-term threat of Bryanism to the stability of the economy and constitutional government.⁸⁵³ As such, he was quite nervous over labor turmoils in his own state which might strengthen the appeal of dangerous and ill-advised measures, such as free silver. He bemoaned the recent cotton mills strike, writing “They are going to cost us many votes ... Discontent is what makes votes for free silver, and these strikes and reduction in wages bring discontents.” He implored another confidant to “do something in Boston to get the mill owners [to settle for the sake of] sound money and national credits.”⁸⁵⁴

The remedy to the pervasive rage for free silver and Bryanism more generally was civic education and appeals to reason over passion, a very Madisonian approach. Lodge frequently exalted the central role that facts and enlightenment can play in shaping the minds of the electorate, especially low-information voters, and molding public opinion. “There is a great deal of education to be accomplished,”⁸⁵⁵ he exclaimed, before urging the distribution of “circulars and

⁸⁵² Lodge to George Lyman, January 29, 1898, *Lodge Papers*, MHS, reel 146.

⁸⁵³ Garraty, 173-174.

⁸⁵⁴ Lodge to Henry Higginson, January 31, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 146.

⁸⁵⁵ Lodge to Henry Higginson, January 31, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 146.

pamphlets [articulating] the need of standing by sound money and opposing free silver.”⁸⁵⁶ In addition, he recommended holding “non-political sound money meetings in all the towns and cities” of Massachusetts. And time was at a premium, with the senator explaining, “Now is the time to begin, six months before the political campaign is on.”⁸⁵⁷

The explosion of the U.S.S. *Maine* in February rattled the political scene. Initially, President McKinley was reticent to pursue war against Spain, holding out for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. However, his position became increasingly untenable in the face of growing resolve and clamor by many Americans for a forceful response. Lodge was especially concerned that McKinley’s stance would split the party asunder, warning, “I fear ... he will take such a ground that Congress will break away from him ... With the parties split in two, we shall be defeated at the polls, and your humble servant among others will go down in the wreck.”⁸⁵⁸

These exchanges demonstrating Lodge’s keen sensitivity to the fluctuations of public sentiment — who placed great emphasis on its political repercussions despite repeated assurances by confidants of strong party backing for his candidacy — attest to the importance of an emergent, but limited element of popular input in the senatorial selection process. However, despite the preponderance of evidence attesting to Lodge’s acute sense of anxiety regarding the congressional elections and his own re-election, these reservations did not translate into any meaningful public campaigning, beyond the ordinary. It is likely that preoccupation with the Spanish-American War overtook any time and attention which Lodge could have devoted to early, visible activities geared toward securing another term. Even so, the non-popular conditions of the state

⁸⁵⁶ Lodge to Charles, January 31, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 146.

⁸⁵⁷ Lodge to Henry Higginson, January 31, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 146.

⁸⁵⁸ Lodge to William, April 4, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 147.

meant that enormous authority rested with party figures, and cultivating support amongst those political actors remained Lodge's primary objective and greatest concern.

6.2.2 *Dearth of Quality Challengers*

Given the strong, party-controlled nature of Massachusetts, it was essential that the field be cleared of intra-party Republican challengers. Once the Spanish-American War concluded and the treaty with Spain was ratified, Lodge grew increasingly confident of his re-election prospects. During the spring and early summer, he noted a conspicuous dearth of opposition against him. In assessing the motives of one Republican congressman, Lodge deduced, "I do not think our friend Barrett has any intention of running against anybody, certainly not against me."⁸⁵⁹ Taking stock of the political situation more generally within his party, Lodge declared, "I do not hear of any large opposition anywhere ... [nor] any organized opposition even now, and I am sanguine enough that ... there will not be any."⁸⁶⁰ In another letter, he reiterated similar sentiment, "I do not hear ... of the slightest opposition to my return to the Senate ... but of course there is always an uncertainty about these matters."⁸⁶¹ The reason for Lodge's renewed confidence may be due, in part, to "the trend of public opinion throughout the country" regarding the conclusion of the war and the recently-acquired territories of Cuba and the Philippines. It had appeared that the Republicans were reaping tremendous political dividends from the conflict. In Lodge's words, "Public opinion can be summed up in one phrase: where the flag has gone up

⁸⁵⁹ Lodge to George Lyman, May 11, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 147-148.

⁸⁶⁰ Lodge to Wright, May 27, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 150.

⁸⁶¹ Lodge to Fellows, July 5, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 150.

it ought never come down.” Meanwhile, the Democrats were deeply divided over the issue and their vacillating positions were seen to be running “counter to the public feeling.”⁸⁶²

The lack of any organized opposition should not conceal the possibility that alternative candidates may have been considered. Evidently, feelers were put out on behalf of Governor Roger Wolcott. According to *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, “There are plenty of men who would like to see the governor a strong candidate against Senator Lodge.” In response, a spate of stories alleging Wolcott’s unpopularity as governor were published, which the *Sentinel* speculated were attributed to Lodge’s men.⁸⁶³ Whether the Wolcott candidacy was a serious, genuine threat to Lodge is unclear. The two men were close political allies and shared similar attitudes. Therefore, Wolcott had little incentive to challenge the junior senator. Further, it did not appear that the Wolcott boom ever amounted to much in the way of popular support, notwithstanding the negative stories which were published. Whatever the severity of the threat, Lodge’s supporters would reasonably be expected to forcefully squelch any potential challengers from gathering momentum at this early stage.

6.2.3 *State Convention Endorsement and Platform*

During the summer, with little threat of an intra-party dispute hampering his renomination, Lodge next turned to securing ever-crucial Republican support, given that party officials largely decided matters in the state. With the annual state convention looming in the fall, Lodge wanted the delegates to publicly affirm their commitment to supporting his re-election through a

⁸⁶² Lodge to George Lyman, June 22, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 149-150.

⁸⁶³ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, July 7, 1898, p 1.

resolution, representing an attempt to directly link his candidature with the party and render his re-election more publicly visible. However, the senator was considerably nervy about soliciting such an endorsement. In a strictly confidential letter to George Lyman, Lodge first broached the issue by declaring outright, “I should like very much, as I am up for reelection, to have a word of endorsement at the State Convention.” He then proceeded to explain his grounds for making the request, writing, “I have been engaged in some pretty stiff fights since I have been in the Senate, and I should like to know that my party represented in convention was behind me.” Then, almost lawyer-like, Lodge entered into as evidence resolutions from a recent Minnesota convention supporting the re-election of Senator Davis. “I do not mean to suggest this as a model ... but merely to show you that other Republican Conventions are doing this thing for their Senators.” Finally, Lodge revealed his reticence to raise the issue in the first place, conceding, “I am afraid you may think me very vain and presumptuous to speak about these resolutions at the State Convention in regard to myself,” before deferring to the wisdom and judgment of his close friend. In a follow-up letter, Lodge explained that he “hate[d] to say anything about his personal interests when men are dying for the flag down in Cuba.”⁸⁶⁴

Lyman was exasperated by the timid, diffident nature of Lodge’s request. Describing it as “meek as Moses,” Lyman went on to disabuse Lodge of any notion of vanity or presumption. “Don’t you recognize that your fight is our fight? ... You are the fellow I would fight for. The State convention ... will give any endorsement we ... want it to ... You will get an unsolicited ovation at that convention.” Lyman went on to dissect a proper timeline for rolling out the endorsement. He said that the biggest question concerned “the advisability and wisdom of the

⁸⁶⁴ Lodge to George Lyman, July 1, 1898; July 7, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 149-150.

time, not so far as it effects [*sic*] the convention, but so far as it may effect [*sic*] outsiders, and that is a matter that no one is better able to judge than yourself.”⁸⁶⁵

We can conclude several relevant and insightful points from this exchange. First, through elite learning, incumbents were acutely aware of novel methods to ensure their re-elections were secured in the safest possible way. Lodge looked to the Minnesota convention as precedent for buttressing party support in his own quest for a second term. Second, Lodge’s incumbency status afforded the senator immeasurable benefits, first by clearing the field of quality challengers, and second, by accruing the backing of the party at the state convention. And third, it would appear that parties were adapting to ever-changing societal and political conditions by incorporating firm, public endorsements of their respective candidates for Senate. Although Lodge’s convention endorsement in Massachusetts was done to shore up critical party support across legislative districts — elements of an exclusivist, party-controlled regime — this modest shift toward candidate recognition effected a movement in a more popular direction, for it disseminated to ordinary voters the identity of the party’s senatorial contender.

For Lodge, a more pressing matter arose over the platform. With negotiations over the Treaty of Paris ongoing, Lodge wanted the party to support the administration’s handling of the war. An ardent expansionist, the senator did not want the sitting to be hijacked by anti-imperialist adversaries, but at the same time, he feared alienating opponents to annexation, including his widely-respected colleague, George F. Hoar. Ultimately, Lodge successfully steered clear of needlessly divisive resolutions. At the state party convention in Worcester on October 6, the delegates agreed to a “harmless avowal of confidence in the national administration’s conduct of the

⁸⁶⁵ George Lyman to Lodge, July 5, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 11.

war and the peace,”⁸⁶⁶ and disavowed any notion of returning any hard-won territory back to Spain.⁸⁶⁷ Thus, the party supported Lodge’s position, but left the door ajar to annexation.

Lodge’s address to the convention was the highlight of the gathering. Attendance had been dismal, partly due to inclement weather as well as the foregone conclusion of the nominations.⁸⁶⁸ Indeed, many delegates took leave before the convention adjourned. Several were described as “wearied” during the proceedings. However, when Senator Lodge took to the rostrum, he delivered “one of the best speeches” in recent Massachusetts history. He defended the accomplishments of the Republican Party, especially at the national level, and devoted considerable attention to foreign affairs. Lodge’s “unusual force and animation ... roused [the delegates] to the highest pitch of enthusiasm.”⁸⁶⁹ Lodge immediately recognized the positive impact of his address. In a letter the next day to longtime friend Theodore Roosevelt, who himself was running for governor of New York, Lodge reflected upon the previous day’s events, declaring, “The speech appeared to be a success and there was no doubt of the splendid reception that the Convention gave me. There has been no appearance of any opposition to me anywhere, but the tone of the Convention yesterday settled the thing if any settlement was needed.”⁸⁷⁰

⁸⁶⁶ Garraty, 199-200.

⁸⁶⁷ Dotson, 324-325.

⁸⁶⁸ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, October 6, 1898, p 6.

⁸⁶⁹ *The Boston Globe*, October 7, 1898, p 1, 4.

⁸⁷⁰ Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, October 7, 1898, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Volume I*, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 353.

6.2.4 Legislative District Canvassing

After the state convention, Lodge shifted focus to the work of campaigning. Typically, senatorial elections during this time were waged across competitive state legislative districts, especially those considered favorable to the party or doubtful. With the Republicans firmly entrenched in the legislature, Lodge's task was to ensure that losses were kept to a minimum and that the vast majority of those seats be retained. To that end, he embarked upon a statewide speaking tour, stumping on behalf of Republican legislative nominees and other congressional candidates. One week before polling day, Lodge visited key wards across Boston alongside Massachusetts House Speaker John L. Bates from East Boston and Congressman Samuel J. Barrows. He campaigned for Congressman William S. Knox of the Fifth District at a rally in Lawrence; for Benjamin C. Dean at a Brookline rally, and for Ernest W. Roberts in Lynn.⁸⁷¹

Additionally, individual senatorial district conventions often convened to name committee members, nominate a candidate for the state Senate, and then instruct that candidate to support Henry Cabot Lodge upon being elected.⁸⁷² Such methods more directly tied the political fortunes of state legislative candidates to Lodge's selection as senator. Furthermore, these activities emphasized the elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* which had manifest at the time. Given the strong, durable party system in place, senators relied heavily on down-ballot partisans who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent's reelection in the forthcoming legislative session. District conventions represented an admixture of popular support — the "party faithful" — and insider party backing, but they were largely con-

⁸⁷¹ *North Adams Transcript*, October 31, 1898, p 4; *The Boston Globe*, November 1, 1898, p 1; November 3, 1898, p 2; November 4, 1898, p 5; November 8, 1898, p 3.

⁸⁷² *The Boston Globe*, October 7, 1898, p 5.

trolled by the latter and rested upon the organizational prowess of Lodge's syndicate of supporters.

Due to the nature of the conditions, the public campaigns took the form of party-based, partisan appeals. Lodge framed the election as a referendum on the record of the Republican Party at the state and national levels, and, more specifically, on the administration's conduct of the Spanish-American War and its handling of the territories. Lodge repeatedly urged his attendees to support the administration by voting for the Republican Party. At one event, he asserted, "If we give a victory to [our] political opponent we say not only to the United States, but ... to the world ... that the people of the United States repudiated the war, repudiated its result and repudiated the man who has led victoriously through war and is now leading us back to peace, William McKinley."⁸⁷³ At the Chickasawbut Club, Lodge touched upon the threat of free silver, but stressed, "A [D]emocratic congressional victory will be regarded abroad as a vote of lack of confidence in the administration."⁸⁷⁴

At the Annual Republican Dinner, Lodge warned, "Every vote today against the [R]epublican party is ... a vote for free silver ... [and] a vote to reopen the tariff question." He went on to defend the newly-acquired territories, arguing that they align with traditional American values and policies. At the end of his oration, he once again linked the election with defense of the administration, declaring, "I appeal .. to every voter in Massachusetts, who believes in sustaining the administration, who is an American first and before everything — I appeal to him to sustain the American President ... William McKinley."⁸⁷⁵ And in an open letter to the newspa-

⁸⁷³ *The Boston Globe*, October 9, 1898, p 30.

⁸⁷⁴ *The Boston Globe*, October 13, 1898, p 7.

⁸⁷⁵ *The Boston Globe*, October 27, 1898, p 4.

pers, as published by *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, Lodge made clear in no uncertain terms that “a vote ... for a Democratic congressman ... and the election of the Democratic [H]ouse will be an encouragement to Spain and would help her commissioners against the representatives of the United States ... Every Massachusetts district ought to send to [C]ongress a man about whose support of the president there can be neither cavil nor question.”⁸⁷⁶

Party-based appeals, and to a lesser extent legislative-district canvasses, are non-popular in nature since they do not engender a direct connection between the popular election vote for the state legislature and the selection of a senator. Framed as a referendum on administration policy, the campaigns blurred the distinction between Senator Lodge as an individual candidate and the Republican Party as a whole. As a result, the state ranked low on *candidate recognition*, since Lodge’s candidacy was not itself front-and-center in the public campaigns waged during the fall election season. Therefore, the voters could not reasonably expect to exercise scrutiny or accountability over the record of their freshman senator. Whatever his faults or missteps, Lodge would sail safely to re-election, as his ship was firmly anchored to the rising tide of patriotism following the Spanish-American War and its successful management by the McKinley Administration.

Lodge’s campaign appearances were fairly limited in their extent, attesting to the circumscribed role they exerted in the selection process at that time. After the State Convention address on October 6 at Worcester, he addressed several distinguished associations, including the Middlesex Club on October 8, the Chickatawbut Club on October 12, and the Republican Editorial Association of Massachusetts the next day, before darting off to New York City to speak on be-

⁸⁷⁶ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, October 19, 1898, p 7.

half of his friend, Theodore Roosevelt, candidate for governor. Upon his return to Massachusetts, Lodge appeared at the annual dinner of the Republican Club of Massachusetts at the Boston Music Hall on October 26. From there, he toured Dorchester, Lawrence, Cambridge, Brookline, Lowell, Haverhill, and finally Lynn during the closing week of the campaign.⁸⁷⁷

As the loyal opposition, Bay State Democrats were in an unenviable position. Rattled by the patriotic fervor of the recent war, they struggled to effectively spearhead any effort at reclaiming the state legislature. After their highly promising, charismatic, and broadly palatable contender, Samuel Roads, Jr., declined consideration for governor — which *The Fitchburg Sentinel* gleefully observed, “It is wonderfully hard to find any Democrat ... who will accept” — the party eventually agreed to nominate former Lawrence mayor Alexander B. Bruce as its standard bearer.⁸⁷⁸

At the state convention in Worcester, the Democrats adopted a wholly Populist platform, insisting upon a bimetallic currency, advocating for public ownership of railroads and utilities, excoriating “American imperialism,” and demanding the freedom and independence of the Cuban people.⁸⁷⁹ An editorial in *The North Adams Transcript* bemoaned how Democrats were woefully out of step with the people. “‘Next year,’ the Boston Democrats answer, when asked when once more a fight is to be made to capture the state.”⁸⁸⁰ By dint of their seemingly radical platform, the party risked remaining a perennial minority in the commonwealth.

⁸⁷⁷ *The Boston Globe*, October 9, 1898, p 21; October 13, 1898, p 7; October 14, 1898, p 4; November 1, 1898, p 1; November 3, 1898, p 2; November 4, 1898, p 5; November 5, 1898, p 5; November 6, 1898, p6; November 8, 1898, p 3.

⁸⁷⁸ *The Boston Globe*, October 2, 1898, p 9; *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, October 1, 1898, p 4; *The Boston Globe*, October 4, 1898, p1.

⁸⁷⁹ *The Boston Globe*, October 5, 1898, p 4.

⁸⁸⁰ *The North Adams Transcript*, October 8, 1898, p 7.

At the height of the fall campaign, Bruce lambasted the mismanagement of the Spanish-American War, seeking political capital by tarnishing one of the strongest issues for the reigning Republicans. “Better it were if Alger had erred, even if we had lost some millions of dollars, if he had saved many a poor boy from an untimely grave,” he remarked in Haverhill.⁸⁸¹ The incumbent party’s other claim — the strengthening economy — was summarily dismissed by E. J. Slattery, nominee for lieutenant governor, as “false and misleading.” Citing persistent troubles in Lawrence, Lowell, and Fall River, he questioned the availability of employment opportunities and alleged growth in wages which the Republicans had been trumpeting.⁸⁸²

Despite the Democratic charges, by October, Lodge had begun to sense a shift in public opinion and, ergo, the political fortunes of Republicans, crediting the party’s nationwide effort at mobilizing voters. In a letter to Cushman Davis, the senator admitted, “Three weeks ago I did not think we could save the House.” For Lodge, the greatest danger had been the “apathy with which we have had to struggle here,” namely the inability to motivate Republican voters to turn out. However, in the interim, “matters have greatly improved.” In particular, Lodge attributed the improvement to “[t]he President’s speeches in the West [and] the gradual awakening of the business interests” to the “great disaster” of a free silver House. These issues have “roused up the Republican and conservative voters of ’96 ... If the Republican vote comes out we are all right.”⁸⁸³ Despite the renewed optimism, Lodge was far from confident about the results. On the

⁸⁸¹ *Fall River Globe*, October 20, 1898, p 2.

⁸⁸² *Fall River Globe*, October 31, 1898, p 1.

⁸⁸³ Lodge to Cushman Davis, October 31, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 12.

eve of the vote, he wrote to William Draper, “Everybody is interested in the elections, which seems to me very doubtful, and about which I have felt a great deal of anxiety.”⁸⁸⁴

The November election produced “no landslide” for either party. The Republicans “escaped” the traditional midterm punishment, holding both houses of Congress. Although they lost an appreciable number of seats in the House of Representatives, they actually gained several in the Senate. In Massachusetts, the Democrats out-performed the previous gubernatorial contest by 30% and made modest inroads in the lower house, increasing their proportion from a quarter to a third of the seats. However, Republicans maintained their firm grip on the state. Lodge interpreted the election results as an endorsement of the policy of expansion, a connection he diligently sought to emphasize during the recent campaign.⁸⁸⁵ Even more importantly for the senator, the results meant that his political future was safe. With control of the legislature in Republican hands, *The Boston Globe* could proclaim, “Lodge counts among the assured facts ... his calling and reelection to the national [S]enate.”⁸⁸⁶ Clearly, the results of the state legislative election were indicative of an incumbent’s political strength in the forthcoming legislature, to varying degrees. Even Lodge could claim as early as November 11, “There is no apparent opposition to me in any quarter, except among a few mugwumps who have no vote in the Legislature.”⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁸⁴ Lodge to William Draper, November 7, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 12.

⁸⁸⁵ Dotson, 326; Lodge to Henry White, November 11, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 13.

⁸⁸⁶ *The Boston Globe*, November 9, 1898, p 6; *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, November 10, 1898, p 8.

⁸⁸⁷ Lodge to Henry White, November 11, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 13.

6.2.5 *Legislative Haggling*

Despite the strong Republican performance in the state legislative elections, Lodge's re-election, while likely, was not a foregone conclusion. At that time, state legislatures exercised tremendous autonomy in deciding upon the senatorship, especially in Massachusetts, where non-popular conditions prevailed. Specifically, legislative party caucuses and state party organizations wielded the final authority on the question. Having been instructed to back Lodge by their district conventions, the elections of innumerable state legislators were predicated upon supporting the junior senator. As such, they were electorally responsible to follow these instructions, lest they reap political consequences from their constituents in the next election.

Electoral incentives aside, incumbent senators pursued other means of obtaining the support of legislative members. Presumably, they could count on patronage and political favors to curry favor with obdurate representatives. Although Lodge detested the arduous task of managing patronage, he utilized the system to advance his own political interests. Additionally, senators could offer to direct federal monies for projects in pivotal districts, as well. Such promises presented a win-win for both sides: bolstering the support for senators among state legislators, while strengthening the political standing of the state representatives back home.

After the November election, Lodge intensified his canvass of Republican members of the legislature. A close friend and staunch supporter, Jerry J. McCarthy, served as his lieutenant in the field, "look[ing] after Lodge's interests in the legislature."⁸⁸⁸ A member of that body himself, McCarthy expressed to Lodge in October that it would be a "special pleasure to be given the

⁸⁸⁸ Dotson, 325-326.

opportunity to vote for you for the second time an honor that seldom comes to one man.”⁸⁸⁹ He quickly went to work gauging the sentiment of legislators toward Lodge’s candidature and carefully securing their support for his re-election.

In an insightful letter on December 5, McCarthy assured Lodge, “I don’t think you will have any opposition but it is well to be on the look out and have a sure knowledge of things.” He proceeded to name several legislators who had agreed to support Lodge’s return to the Senate, including State Senator George E. Smith, but went on to impress upon Lodge the varied political aspirations and desires of several lawmakers. For example, Smith was vying to become President of the Senate, and, according to McCarthy, “If ... elected President, he will be [able] to vote for you for the U.S. Senate.” Additionally, “Lowell of Boston is talked about here to take the place of Judge Wilson. [He] is a good man.” And “Bates will of course be Speaker ... and would like to be Lieutenant Governor with the ticket Crane and Bates in 1900. Bates was very popular this year as Speaker.”⁸⁹⁰ Whether McCarthy was merely apprising Lodge of the state of the political scene within the legislature itself, or subtly intimating that legislative support for his re-election was predicated upon promises of favorable action to advance their careers is unclear. It would be entirely feasible for McCarthy to provide information pertaining to the wrangling over offices and positions if he saw his role as a neutral observer, tasked with delivering the minutiae of the political scene. However, given the manner in which the letter was structured — with favors interwoven amongst pledges of support — and his own role as a Lodge partisan, there is

⁸⁸⁹ J.J. McCarthy to Lodge, October 12, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 12.

⁸⁹⁰ J.J. McCarthy to Lodge, December 5, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 12.

every reason to suspect that McCarthy was suggesting the myriad ways Lodge could buttress his political standing among legislators and other pivotal politicians.

To complicate matters, McCarthy was not working *pro bono*. As he was shoring up support for Lodge's candidacy, he went about obtaining signatures for a petition to be appointed Surveyor of the Port of Boston, an incredibly powerful patronage position in the state. According to Dotson, McCarthy had a "reputation among some Republicans of being a 'boodle' politician," and was known for entering into "questionable arrangements." Lodge was forced to "[keep] him on a short leash."⁸⁹¹ The appearance of overtly rewarding McCarthy for his canvass, or to be seen advising or managing him was to be avoided, lest Lodge be tainted as a corrupt, machine politician. In a letter to Lyman, Lodge acknowledged McCarthy's "extraordinary support" which he recognized would be difficult to ignore. He explained that McCarthy solicited his advice on the petition, but "replied advising him not to." He went on to complain, "It will not do for him, a member of the Legislature and a supporter of mine, to come on here as a candidate for the Surveyorship before I am elected. It might give rise to talk which might just as well be avoided, and might be used to put us both in a false position." He then urged Lyman "to make it clear to McCarthy that ... he ought not to come here under any circumstance before the end of January."⁸⁹² Thus, Lodge found himself in a delicate balancing act between satisfying McCarthy and his grand ambitions, while tampering down any conspicuous communication and coordination between them.


⁸⁹¹ Dotson, 326.

⁸⁹² Lodge to George Lyman, December 6, 1898, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 150-151.

Despite Senator Lodge's precarious situation, he undoubtedly benefited from McCarthy's diligent canvass of Republican state legislators. On January 10, 1899, the Republican caucus unanimously nominated Lodge for a second term. One week later, both houses of the state legislature voted separately to ratify that decision. In the upper house, Lodge racked up 159 votes. Alexander Bruce of Lawrence received sixty-five, while Winfield P. Porter of Newburyport received two. The State Senate awarded twenty-one votes to Lodge and just seven to Bruce.⁸⁹³ See **Figure 6.3** for a chart of the final vote breakdown.

Figure 6.3

Vote of the Massachusetts State Legislature for Senator, January 1899



SOURCE: *The Boston Globe*, January 19, 1899, p 1; January 17, 1899, p 3.

⁸⁹³ *The Boston Globe*, January 19, 1899, p 1; January 17, 1899, p 3.

6.2.6 *Analysis*

The 1898-99 selection process represented a typical senatorial election under the indirect regime in the Bay State. With exceptionally non-popular conditions, Republicans dominated the state and senators easily secured re-election. Campaigning was conducted within legislative districts and appealed to party support, often dissembling the identity and record of the leading senatorial candidate. Further, a strongly autonomous legislature comprised of its own self-interested members rendered the final verdict on the senatorship.

Despite the exclusivist, elite-driven nature of senatorial elections in Massachusetts, there were ever-so-subtle, yet significant shifts toward a more popularly-oriented process. Structurally, the party adopted novel methods of buttressing the political support for their incumbent senator, first by urging the state convention to pass a resolution endorsing Senator Lodge's re-election bid — made at the behest of Lodge himself — and second by coupling district convention legislative nominations to Lodge's candidature. Even more revelatory, strong party support did not materially assuage the senator's anxieties over the forthcoming elections. By contrast, Lodge's calculus was regularly informed by the trajectory of public sentiment and the electoral fortunes of the Republican Party.

6.3 *1904 - Riding Roosevelt's Coattails to a Third Term*

The 1904 senatorial case study demonstrates the symbiotic relationship that emerged between the incumbent senator and party figures. Under the party-controlled system, party officials and state legislators exercised the greatest authority, but public campaigns for popular support steadily increased in import. With the presidential contest adding an additional dimension to the

election, Lodge was expected to rally Republican voters to the polls and deliver the state for Roosevelt, as well as strong majorities in the state legislature. By faithfully serving the party, Lodge could reasonably expect to be rewarded with re-election by grateful legislators and party figures, who owed their success to the diligent senator.

As 1904 dawned, the political scene had changed markedly. Having long been concluded, the Spanish-American War receded into history, although a bloody insurrection continued plaguing the administration of the Philippines; William Jennings Bryan and the specter of free silver were again handily defeated in another presidential contest; and more tragically, Theodore Roosevelt had ascended to the presidency upon the assassination of William McKinley. With Roosevelt at the helm, Lodge soon occupied a central position within the affairs of government. As member of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee and longtime friend and confidant of the president — whose consul Roosevelt valued — the Massachusetts senator exercised an outsized influence on the policy and politics of the period.⁸⁹⁴

Lodge's pursuit of a third term was occurring alongside the presidential campaign, where Roosevelt was effectively running for a second term. The junior senator was keenly aware that his electoral fortunes were greatly dependent on Roosevelt's performance in the looming election. Although Massachusetts was never seriously in doubt, any difficulties, challenges, or opposition to the president and his policies would redound to the detriment of Lodge, who had so faithfully represented and supported the administration on most matters. These complications could prove an albatross threatening the senator's political survival.

⁸⁹⁴ Garraty, 224-225.

6.3.1 *Attentiveness to Public Sentiment*

In the strong, party-controlled state of Massachusetts, Lodge's route to re-election passed through powerful Republican figures, demanding their careful courting by the incumbent. But public sentiment continued to grow as an important facet of the electoral calculus, directly impacting the fate of the party at the polls and indirectly affecting Lodge's own re-election, for his political fortunes were tied to the performance of the party. Therefore, public opinion could not be ignored.

Once more, Lodge and his associates attuned themselves to the pulse of the nation. Roosevelt had been broadly popular among the American public and that sentiment was widely recognized by contemporaries. In January, former governor Winthrop Murray Crane wrote to Lodge, "The sentiment favorable to President Roosevelt is gaining rapidly, notwithstanding what the newspapers are saying, and I have not the slightest doubt but that everything will come out all right."⁸⁹⁵ Similarly, Lodge echoed these observations several months later, assuring George Meyer, "The President will be nominated by acclamation. The outlook throughout the country is very good and I think that we shall win handsomely."⁸⁹⁶ Admittedly, assessing popular sentiment does not directly translate into hard corroborative evidence suggesting that senators were using such information solely to advance their career via re-election. Public officials and lawmakers with no stake in the outcome had plenty of reasons for tracking public opinion, most immediately for their party to score a victory in the upcoming presidential election. But for senators such as Henry Cabot Lodge, who were in the midst of their own bids for re-election, these trends took on

⁸⁹⁵ Winthrop Murray Crane to Lodge, January 21, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁸⁹⁶ Lodge to George Meyer, March 2, 1904, *George von Lengerke Meyer papers*, Massachusetts Historical Society.

an added sense of urgency and relevance. Thus, given the stakes for the forthcoming state elections on his electoral prospects, it was incumbent upon Lodge to capitalize upon these favorable conditions for Republicans — *nationalizing* the contours of his contest.

Despite the general favorability to Roosevelt, several latent problems were simmering beneath the surface, each with the potential to disrupt the harmony and confidence of the party. As expected, Lodge was acutely sensitive to these troubles, wasted little time addressing them, and expended great effort toward allaying them. One issue was the pending Supreme Court decision on the Northern Securities Company. Northern Securities was a railroad corporation created by the merger of Great Northern Railway and Northern Pacific Railway. Their consolidation was vigorously challenged by President Roosevelt's Justice Department as a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the suit was brought to the Supreme Court for adjudication. In a frantic letter to Lodge, Henry Higginson complained that the decision "upsets everything and discourages everybody and is very injurious to the [R]epublican party." Evidently, "people know that if the decision ... comes against the railroad, the New Haven, the Pennsylvania, the New York Central and all the great properties will be ripped up, - not by the government but by somebody else." Politically, "this anxiety and worry are working very much against the success of the [R]epublican party and giving the [D]emocrats much comfort."⁸⁹⁷ Lodge was more sanguine over the decision. Viewing the government's role as justified, Lodge assured Higginson that the decision would not lead to the uprooting of other railroad companies as there would be no authority upon which to pursue such a course. "The government has no idea of anything of the sort." As far as its repercussions for the election, Lodge lambasted Democratic mismanagement

⁸⁹⁷ Henry Higginson to Lodge, March 7, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

during the economic depression of the 1890s before concluding, “I do not think the Republican Party is going to be beaten, certainly, it will not be beaten on the Northern Securities decision.”⁸⁹⁸

More importantly for Lodge were issues involving labor unrest and potential economic woes. In the spring, he explicated at length to Theodore Roosevelt on the problems afflicting his state:

There is only one thing that troubles me and that is the reduction of force and labor going on on the railroads, in the Mass. cotton mills, in every industry. This is our only danger ... But it is the only peril which is real. As it is we can win all right but if the business conditions should not improve or should get worse we must be prepared to make the most earnest and vigorous fight possible. The organization and National Committee ought to understand the situation and be ready early.⁸⁹⁹

Several weeks later, Lodge reiterated his concerns over business, labor, and the economy. “The real danger of the campaign,” Lodge wrote to George Meyer, “is the fact that business is dull and men are being laid off on the railroads and in the factories. The crops do not look very promising ... If the crops improve labor will return to the normal employment by the autumn and all will be well.”⁹⁰⁰ By June, Lodge’s assessment of the situation had markedly improved to cautious optimism. In a letter to Henry White, he observed, “The crops are improving and the de-

⁸⁹⁸ Lodge to Henry Higginson, March 9, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁸⁹⁹ Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, May 27, 1904, *Selections, Volume II*, 79-80.

⁹⁰⁰ Lodge to George Meyer, June 13, 1904, *Meyer papers*, MHS.

cline in the employment of labor, at one time threatening, has stopped. I think that industries will renew their normal activity after the summer is over.”⁹⁰¹ However, lingering troubles arising over the cotton mill strike continued to complicate matters. In late July, he debriefed Roosevelt, “The Democrats ... are going to make a desperate effort in New England ... With this cotton-mill strike on our hands we cannot afford to let any points go.” Lodge beseeched the president, “I am very anxious that you should come.”⁹⁰²

While Lodge’s attentiveness to the electoral ramifications of labor and economic issues is compelling, more noteworthy is how these concerns were translated into public campaigning. The senator explicitly urged making “the most earnest and vigorous fight possible.” And to that end, he requested greater organizational prowess on behalf of the party machinery and personal engagement by the president to confront the challenges. Granted, these considerations directly pertained to the presidential contest and the party’s broader performance in the upcoming elections, but it cannot be overstated, these activities undoubtedly benefited Lodge’s quest for a third term.

6.3.2 *Reciprocity and Internal Republican Divisions*

Party harmony was vital for Republican successes and Lodge’s own re-election. Party harmony denotes achieving the unity of all disputing factions, partially by satisfying or suppressing internal divisions. The biggest issue confronting Lodge and the Massachusetts Republican Party centered upon trade reciprocity with Canada. In an era of high tariffs and protectionism,

⁹⁰¹ Lodge to Harry White, June 25, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹⁰² Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 29, 1904, *Selections, Volume II*, 93.

reciprocity agreements implicated the mutual lowering of duties between two countries on specified goods and products. The United States had unsuccessfully pursued a reciprocity treaty with Newfoundland in 1902, and, by 1904, public sentiment was growing in favor of freer trade with Canada. The raw materials offered by America's northern neighbor was "so obviously to the advantage of New England industry" that the issue found widespread support across the region. However, as Garraty explains, "The Massachusetts fishing interests ... feared northern competition, and looked with dark suspicion on those raw materials found in the chill waters of the Grand Banks."⁹⁰³ Although they represented an ever-diminishing fraction of the Massachusetts economy, they still exerted great political influence on the state. And Senator Lodge was committed to protecting their economic interests.

The divisions within the Republican Party over reciprocity were personified by one Eugene N. Foss. Foss was a businessman who supported lower tariff rates with Canada. Disenchanted with continually high tariffs on imported goods and displeased with the seemingly heavy-handed ways state Republicans sought to shut down the debate, Foss undertook to make the issue the *casus belli* in his crusade against the party. In many respects, Foss was co-opting the reciprocity issue to advance his own political career, angling to become a delegate to the national convention and revamp the party's platform at the state convention.⁹⁰⁴ Whatever his motives, his efforts were threatening to disrupt party unity at a critical time during the election season, as convention delegates were being chosen to offer their unanimous backing to Roosevelt and nominate the president for another term.

⁹⁰³ Garraty, 234-235.

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid, 239.

Lodge and his political allies recognized the pitfalls and challenges posed by Foss and the thorny issue of reciprocity. In a series of letters, they mulled several available options to defuse the situation. Lieutenant Governor Curtis Guild wrote, “Our party is being hurt materially ... by its supposed hostility to all reciprocity and any extension of our markets abroad.” He considered such a position to be a “false conception of the party’s attitude.” Guild’s solution was for “[a] square statement of what reciprocity really is, and that the Republican party is for it and not against it.” Clarity on the matter would help to undercut the opposition, which was “growing more rapidly than is appreciated.” Guild went on to suggest that the party vigorously distinguish the principle of reciprocity, which entailed the lowering of duties while protecting American industries, from the more injurious free trade, which many people had been conflating. However, “remaining silent ... [would permit] our enemies ... to misrepresent the party and advance the cause of free trade behind the mask of reciprocity.”⁹⁰⁵

Guild continued to press Lodge for an assertive response. By early March, the situation appeared to have grown even more dire. Guild lamented, “The public is woefully ignorant. They are being told daily that our export trade is endangered ... that you and Roosevelt are opposing all expansion of trade and all revision of the tariff.” He went on to plead, “Something ... is needed now and quickly and in this [s]tate by Associated Press and from you. You stand for the Administration here and no statement as to [its] attitude is regarded as authoritative unless it comes from you.”⁹⁰⁶

⁹⁰⁵ Curtis Guild to Lodge, February 26, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹⁰⁶ Curtis Guild to Lodge, March 4, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

Although Lodge shared a modicum of Guild's concern, he remained more grounded and sanguine over the matter, preferring instead to manage a long-term strategy over impulsively responding to short-term provocations. "Don't get stampeded over this Foss talk which is chiefly in the newspapers," Lodge implored Guild, for he was confident Foss would lose his race for delegate-at-large from Boston. More importantly, "Everybody is for reciprocity in the true sense," he declared. While Lodge found Guild's suggestion for a public statement to be an "admirable thing," he was "very doubtful" over "plung[ing] into the controversy without any apparent reason" so early in the campaign. Instead, Lodge recommended they decide upon interviews on reciprocity after further consultation and to reply to Foss in due time.⁹⁰⁷ In a follow-up letter, he maintained, "I assure you I have no desire to be beaten for the Senate, or to get involved in a contest for my seat. However, there will be time enough for that when it assumes more definite shape." In the meantime, the senator was not going to grow overly alarmed with newspaper publications attesting to the perceived strength of the Foss movement.⁹⁰⁸

Lodge's correspondence with Guild reveals that the junior senator was acutely aware of the political challenges posed by Foss and reciprocity, but he disagreed with the lieutenant governor over the means of addressing them. Opting for a more strategic, long-term approach does not necessarily mean that Lodge was *insensitive* to the pressures of campaigning. By contrast, they demonstrate a deft, skillful understanding of the effectiveness of a well-calibrated public campaign to diffuse the issue and foster party harmony.

⁹⁰⁷ Lodge to Curtis Guild, March 5, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹⁰⁸ Lodge to Curtis Guild, March 10, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

In his letters with Winthrop Murray Crane, Lodge was more candid about the political situation. “I agree with you that there is no great political strength to the Foss movement, but he is making a pretty active campaign in the newspapers and he is also trying to organize as generally as he can throughout the [s]tate.” Lodge assured Crane that his people were working hard to defeat Foss in Lynn and Salem, but was less confident about Lowell, Lawrence, Worcester County, and Fitchburg. He urged Crane to deploy his own associates to look after the situation in those locales. Finally, Lodge admitted that he could not estimate how many delegates Foss would secure, “but it would be a very unfortunate thing just as we are entering on the campaign if he should affect a division or get elected. I think matters require a great deal of careful looking after.”⁹⁰⁹ Clearly, Lodge *was* anxious over the potential for party disunity and disharmony at such a critical juncture in the campaign.

Crane replied, “I do not believe that Foss can possibly get 200 votes in the Convention. He will be on the wane from now on, in my judgment.” Nonetheless, Crane explained, “Everything possible is being done to counteract their work ... We ought, and I shall, do everything that I can to bring about the proper result.”⁹¹⁰ Despite the reassurances, Lodge continued to exhibit apprehension over Foss, writing, “Foss is putting up a pretty extensive fight ... I feel a little anxious for fear he should make a raid in Holyoke.”⁹¹¹ And in a follow-up letter, he references receipt of a report on the situation, which was “all good but I think much work still remains to be done.”⁹¹²

⁹⁰⁹ Lodge to Winthrop Murray Crane, March 12, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹¹⁰ Winthrop Murray Crane, March 21, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹¹¹ Lodge to Winthrop Murray Crane, March 24, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹¹² Lodge to Winthrop Murray Crane, March 26, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

6.3.3 *Council of War and Public Campaigning*

Lodge marshaled his concerns into actively organizing the necessary *party backing* to settle the political dispute and bolster party unity. On March 18, he assembled what *The Boston Post* described as a “council of war,” taking “command of his army of supporters” against “the legions enrolled under the reciprocity banner of Eugene N. Foss.” Evidently, Lodge was determined to launch a relentless counter-attack on the Foss movement for the next several weeks, climaxing at the state convention in mid-April. Lodge arrived at Republican headquarters in Boston to consult with Colonel E.C. Benton of Belmont, who was challenging Foss directly for the position as delegate-at-large from Boston; Eben S. Draper, former chairman and high-ranking party official; Colonel Reynolds; and Major Talbot, the chairman of the state Republican Party. In grappling with Foss’ demand for a reciprocity plank and election as delegate, the conference agreed to “fight it out on every proposition because to yield on any single point would eventually mean an attack on the party leadership.”⁹¹³

By the time the state convention met in Tremont Temple on April 15, Lodge could confidently rely upon crucial party support to confront Foss and avert a crisis. However, Lodge’s presence was necessary for sealing the deal. When the convention opened, Foss proposed his plank, urging “the United States [to] take immediate steps to secure closer and more advantageous trade relations with Canada, and that reciprocal relations beneficial to both countries” be permitted. After a warm reception, Foss was then followed by Senator Lodge, who wasted little time energetically scouring the proposal. According to *The Boston Post*:

⁹¹³ *The Boston Post*, March 19, 1904, p 12.

When he made reference to Mr. Foss' resolution as a reflection upon President Roosevelt, the Senator used biting and vitriolic words, and when he referred to the insinuation that the Massachusetts delegation was allowing Ohio and Pennsylvania to manipulate the trade conditions of the country, the Senator waxed warm and said that if the people of Massachusetts were not satisfied they had the remedy.

By contrast, Lodge argued, "The Republicans of Massachusetts have long been committed to the principles of reciprocity," so long as those terms were favorable and provided free foreign markets to products not produced domestically. He lambasted "reciprocity with Canada" as "a mere phrase," without any terms or understanding of concessions. "No trade can be a good trade unless both parties are benefited thereby."⁹¹⁴

Once again, Lodge's performance at the convention carried the day. The reciprocity plank was defeated, as was Foss, and Lodge's stock markedly increased, receiving generally positive reviews for his address.⁹¹⁵ According to *The Boston Globe*, "Republicans ... said that the junior senator had never been more effective than he was during his 50-minute speech." They "responded with earnestness and wild enthusiasm" to Lodge's "appeal for an expression ... of loyalty to the President, marred by 'no discordant note.'"⁹¹⁶ Lodge's personal efforts were instrumental in staving off the challenge of Foss and the reciprocity movement. Although the issue

⁹¹⁴ *The Boston Post*, April 16, 1904, p 1.

⁹¹⁵ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, April 16, 1904, p 7; J.T. Wilson to Lodge, April 16, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹¹⁶ *The Boston Globe*, April 16, 1904, p 1.

would continue to simmer for the remainder of the year, Republicans successfully averted a potentially explosive affair over it, due in no small measure to Lodge's concerted response. His attentiveness, political acumen, strategic planning, and personal appearance before the convention helped to contain the threat and contribute to strong party unity in the fall campaign.

Although many of these aforementioned issues (i.e. labor disputes, economic troubles, reciprocity, party divisions) may have contributed to unfavorable conditions and a difficult environment for Lodge's re-election, most immediately pertinent to his senatorial bid was the nature of his opponent. While he diligently worked to nullify the reciprocity danger, Lodge was consumed by the inauspicious possibility of a quality challenger announcing for the senator's seat. At the start of the year, *The Boston Post* reported that Lodge was favored for re-election with nary a hint of opposition. His strong standing was primarily due to solid backing among party bigwigs — absolutely essential for a senator under the party-controlled system that prevailed in Massachusetts. Furthermore, the senator's incumbency afforded him certain advantages, as well, namely a favorable record of service to party and president, and an extensive network of influential contacts. Governor Bates declared he would “cordially support” the junior senator. Bates' support was crucial, for a triumvirate of power brokers had effectively emerged within the state, comprising himself, Lodge, and former governor Winthrop Murray Crane, a Lodge ally.⁹¹⁷

However, Lodge did evince a degree of apprehensiveness over the matter. In March, *the Globe* claimed that Lodge “was showing marked signs of nervousness [pertaining to] the opposition he may expect to meet,” suggesting, “Mr. Lodge is well aware that he has many opponents in his own party who would be glad to see him replaced in the [S]enate by a [R]epublican who

⁹¹⁷ *The Boston Post*, January 3, 1904, p 1.

would be more in sympathy with the general sentiment of Massachusetts on leading issues.”⁹¹⁸

While we cannot say with certainty to what or whom Lodge’s anxiety would be attributed, we may surmise it centered on former governor John Long, who represented a sizable threat to the senator’s security.

On March 20, after earlier noncommittal statements regarding his intentions, Long announced he would not be in contention to oppose Lodge for the Senate, thereby clearing the field of quality candidates who could mount a credible challenge. According to *the Globe*, Long likely “surveyed the field and wisely decided that the senator was so strongly intrenched that it would be impossible to defeat him.” And although “anti-Lodge sentiment” had been evident, it was “strongly fettered and absolutely disorganized.”⁹¹⁹ Without a leader available to mobilize the reservoir of discontent, such sentiments remained severely constricted politically. Therefore, it was critical for Lodge that he favorably courted key political figures in the state so to clear the field of possible intra-party challenges from manifesting.

As a result of Long’s announcement coupled with the convention address, Lodge began to evince a gradual onset of confidence and self-assurance over his re-election prospects. By August son-in-law Augustus Gardner boasted, “I am absolutely convinced that your election is assured beyond peradventure of a doubt,” before recommending Currier’s Card Catalogue, a panoply of forecasts for the composition of the next legislature.⁹²⁰ And the senator himself assured his friend C.S. Mellen, “I do not feel any personal anxiety as to the outcome,” despite the

⁹¹⁸ *The Boston Globe*, March 16, 1904, p 4.

⁹¹⁹ *The Boston Globe*, March 20, 1904, p 16.

⁹²⁰ Augustus Gardner to Lodge, August 13, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

fact that “Mr. Whitney,” industrialist and president of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, “under cover of reciprocity is using [it] to try to take votes away from me in the [l]egislature.”⁹²¹

Despite the general sense of confidence, Lodge remained characteristically vigilant vis-a-vis his electoral position. To avoid any complacency, he laid the groundwork for an intensive public campaign, devoting his fall schedule to appearances exclusively within Massachusetts. This was likely an attempt to ensure that President Roosevelt enjoy a strong showing in the state. But with his own re-election riding on the result, several newspapers suggested Lodge may have been pursuing these activities to demonstrate the mettle of his candidature to an audience of party officials *and* voters, an acknowledgment of the continuing relevance of party backing and the increasingly important role of public sentiment in the selection process. *The Fitchburg Sentinel* stated the decision meant Lodge “want[ed] to be sure that his fences are all up.”⁹²² Another article surmised it was “imperative that he make sure that this legislature is all right for him,” which “doubtless ... explains the urgent need for him to remain here.”⁹²³ An editorial in *The Globe* was more biting, arguing that Lodge’s statewide campaign plan revealed his attentiveness to the “political conditions in this commonwealth,” wherein “a vast majority of voters” support Canadian reciprocity if given a vote, and that Lodge — who had “cast his lot with the national [R]epublican machine” — would work aggressively to make “specious pleas” to squelch dissent and avert losing his seat.⁹²⁴ By contrast, an editorial in *The Fitchburg Sentinel* contended that Lodge was

⁹²¹ Lodge to C.S. Mellen, August 15, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹²² *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, July 20, 1904, p 4.

⁹²³ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, August 11, 1904, p 4.

⁹²⁴ *The Boston Globe*, July 19, 1904, p 9.

“over-anxious” and “worrying himself needlessly,” since “there [was] not in sight any combination which proposes to defeat him.”⁹²⁵

During the fall, Lodge embarked upon a widespread stumping tour of the commonwealth. The senator launched the opening of the campaign at a dinner of the North Dorchester Republican Club in Nahant on August 8, before appearing at the Republican ratification meeting in Boston later that month. On September 22, he visited the Essex Agricultural Society in Peabody, and attended the Newton Club several days later. October marked the apex of the campaign, with rallies scheduled on a near-daily basis. From October 11 to November 6, Lodge visited Melrose, Symphony Hall in Boston, Mechanics Hall in Worcester, Amesbury, Quincy, East Somerville, Cambridge, Gloucester, Swampscott, Brockton, Brookline, Leominster, and finally Lawrence.⁹²⁶

Lodge’s campaign rallies were more numerous and intensive than six years earlier. In 1898, Lodge attended several gatherings in early-to-mid October, before spending a short spell in New York to support his friend Theodore Roosevelt in the gubernatorial election. He devoted a single week in the final stages of the election to vigorous, in-state public campaigning, and even these appearances were limited to only a handful of rallies. In 1904, by contrast, Lodge opened the campaign in August, before pursuing rigorous, near-daily public rallies throughout the fall season. We can glean that the uptick in rallies was the result of the looming presidential election, which required greater commitment and energy on behalf of party officials. However, as several newspapers accurately suggested, Lodge’s own re-election fortunes not only coincided with the

⁹²⁵ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, August 15, 1904, p 4.

⁹²⁶ *The Boston Globe*, August 7, 1904, p 1; *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, August 29, 1904, p 4; *The Boston Globe*, September 22, 1904, p 14; September 27, 1904, p 14; October 11, 1904, p 3; October 12, 1904, p 4; October 18, 1904, p 1; October 21, 1904, p 11; October 22, 1904, p 5; October 23, 1904, p 10; October 25, 1904, p 11; October 28, 1904, p 5; October 29, 1904, p 8; November 1, 1904, p 4; November 4, 1904, p 11; November 5, 1904, p 11; November 6, 1904, p 2.

presidential election, but were directly tied to the performance of the party and the president. Therefore, a strong showing for the Republicans was absolutely paramount for Lodge.

As in 1898, Lodge's public campaigning took the form of partisan appeals across key legislative districts, given the party-controlled nature of the state. The senator was closely observing the status of individual state legislators at least as early as August, even enlisting the assistance of lieutenants in the field to "look after ... district[s]" on his behalf. It was important that Lodge succeed in increasing Republican turnout across the state, not only on behalf of the president, but also for legislative candidates integral to his own re-election. Delivering strong Republican majorities in the legislature was essential, but equally necessary was ensuring these members were supportive of Lodge. Once again, these dynamics recall the elements of a *parliamentary-styled system* which obtained — strong party system (albeit without a viable opposition party), district-based competition, and party cover, whereby state races (from Lodge to all state legislative seats) were politically, electorally, and fiscally backed by the party apparatus.

Lodge's speeches generally focused more on national issues, such as reciprocity and the tariff, rather than state and local affairs.⁹²⁷ Typical of how he framed the issue, Lodge explained to the Newton Club:

I am personally in favor of reciprocity when it brings compensation to the United States for any concession we make and does not injure American labor, industry or agriculture.

⁹²⁷ *The Boston Globe*, June 12, 1904, p 6; June 29, 1904, p 14; September 22, 1904, p 14; September 26, 1904, p 14.

But because I favor reciprocity under these conditions I do not promise to support any scheme of legislation or any treaty that any one chooses to label reciprocity.⁹²⁸

Such was his standard response to the topic. Additionally, Lodge regularly defended the Roosevelt Administration, especially as it pertained to naval and defense expenditures, and its management of the Philippines.⁹²⁹

The ongoing presidential campaign infused an element of personality to Lodge's addresses. Throughout his statewide stumping tour, Lodge contrasted the caliber of President Theodore Roosevelt with Judge Alton Parker of New York, the Democratic nominee. In Worcester, the senator chided Parker for making statements on the Philippines which were "almost wholly untrue," urging the Democrat to become more familiar on the policies of the nation before speaking upon them.⁹³⁰ In Amesbury, he contended that Parker was out of step with his own party — namely William Jennings Bryan — and that the Democrats were hopelessly divided. Meanwhile, Theodore Roosevelt could proudly boast the united support of his party.⁹³¹ And in Brookline, Lodge asserted that Parker "has helped us more since he began to talk than by his silence." Parker had leveled unsavory assertions against cabinet secretary and party chair George Cortelyou without "a thread of evidence to support his charges." The president "will go into the office unpledged, unbound and tied to no man or combination. He can't be bound."⁹³²

⁹²⁸ *The Boston Globe*, September 26, 1904, p 14.

⁹²⁹ *The Boston Globe*, October 11, 1904, p 3; October 12, 1904, p 4; October 28, 1904, p 5.

⁹³⁰ *The Boston Globe*, October 18, 1904, p 1.

⁹³¹ *The Boston Globe*, October 21, 1904, p 11.

⁹³² *The Boston Globe*, November 4, 1904, p 11.

For Massachusetts Democrats, the presidential election was a non-issue. Delivering the state's electoral votes to Alton Parker remained beyond the realm of reality and nobody seriously entertained the possibility of an upset. More practically, the party committed itself to building upon the gains they had accrued in the State House of Representatives — having increased their ranks from a nadir of 58 in 1900 to 84 in 1903 — and offering a suitable Democratic contender for the governor's office.⁹³³

At their convention in Brockton, the Democrats nominated William L. Douglas as their gubernatorial candidate and John C. Crosby for lieutenant governor.⁹³⁴ Leading party figures lacerated years of Republican misrule, seeking to capitalize upon the simmering discontent with the twin issues of reciprocity and tariffs. Congressman John Thayer pilloried the Republican's fanciful position on trade reciprocity as “weak enough and meaningless enough to fall to pieces when it is presented to Congress.” Douglas himself castigated the exceptionally high tariff burden on the Bay State, charging that “protected trusts [have] deprived [the state] of the cheap raw materials to which she is fairly entitled ... She is unwilling to further sacrifice her industries upon the altar of protection.” Furthermore, the party's standard bearer maintained that these deleterious conditions explain why droves of “enterprising citizens are now agitating for reciprocity with Canada.”⁹³⁵

In an unconventional move, Douglas jettisoned traditional campaign speechmaking, as party leaders believed his acceptance speech represented the strongest, most articulate defense of

⁹³³ Michael J. Dubin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year By Year Summary, 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2007), 93.

⁹³⁴ *The Boston Globe*, October 13, 1904, p 1.

⁹³⁵ *The Boston Globe*, October 13, 1904, p 4.

his candidacy and Democratic policies, and, as such, would “be distributed as a campaign document,” accordingly. In lieu of major rallies, the gubernatorial nominee turned to retail politics. At least in Plymouth County, Douglas arranged an automobile tour to allow him to “meet the voters ... face to face ... and give [them] an opportunity to see the candidate at close range.”⁹³⁶

The Democratic operation failed to materially affect the trajectory of public sentiment. By the close of the campaign, Lodge’s political position remained secure, if not strengthened, by the senator’s strenuous efforts at public campaigning and internal politicking. A number of revealing letters explicitly pegged the strength of the ticket to Lodge’s endeavors. Mr. Chandler of New Hampshire praised Lodge’s “industry,” and predicted the senator’s “re-election in January without opposition” as affording an opportune moment to “enjoy full and lasting satisfaction.”⁹³⁷ John W. Weeks thanked Lodge for his address to the Newton Club “and the distinctly favorable impression it made on [his] listeners.” Weeks was sure that Lodge’s speech “influenced them.” “In two or three cases about which I personally know the men have entirely changed their ideas of [reciprocity].” Indeed, “all of the active members of the Club with whom I have talked have expressed their appreciation of your willingness to deliver such an address at a time when you need your strength and voice for other purposes.”⁹³⁸

These plaudits even translated into crucial support in the legislature for Lodge’s own re-election. Joseph Walker declared, “I really believe the party owes you a debt of gratitude for the broad and yet conservative stand which, through your leadership, it has taken on the reciprocity matter. You have held the party together at a critical moment.” Walker assured Lodge that these

⁹³⁶ *Fall River Globe*, October 15, 1904, p 1.

⁹³⁷ Chandler to Lodge, October 22, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹³⁸ John W. Weeks to Lodge, September 27, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

sentiments were shared “with hundreds of other good [R]epublicans,” before offering his unwavering backing, “I need not tell you that you will have my hearty support as a member of the legislature.”⁹³⁹

The November election produced a sensational victory for Roosevelt and his party across the board. Described as the “greatest landslide in political history” at that time, Roosevelt walloped Parker, winning over 2.5 million more votes and achieving a 56.4% to 37.6% popular vote victory.⁹⁴⁰ In the Electoral College, Roosevelt secured 336 votes from every state in the North, Midwest, and West, whilst Parker solidly held the Democratic South, amounting to only 140 votes.

The results in Massachusetts closely aligned with the national vote, with Roosevelt claiming 57.9% of support to Parker’s 37.2%. The only consolation for the Democrats was the upset election of William L. Douglas to the governors’s office, besting incumbent governor John L. Bates. But Douglas’ victory represented a solitary island amidst a vast Republican sea, for he failed to carry many other Democrats into office. In the state legislature, Republicans actually netted 15 seats in the House of Representatives, to give them a total of 170 members to the Democrat’s 69 members. And in the Senate, Republicans gained three seats for a total of 34 senators, while the Democrats claimed only six seats.⁹⁴¹ Thus, the *nationalization effect* obtained — favorable national conditions for Republicans assured the party a strong performance at the ballot box.

⁹³⁹ Joseph Walker to Lodge, October 7, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.

⁹⁴⁰ *The Boston Globe*, November 9, 1904, morning edition, p 1.

⁹⁴¹ *The Boston Globe*, November 9, 1904, evening edition, p 1; Dubin, *Party Affiliations*, 93.

6.3.4 *Legislative Deference and Party Harmony*

The overwhelming Republican victory was interpreted as indicative of Lodge's selection by the legislature to a third term — often regarded as a *fait accompli*. George Meyer, in a post-election letter, confidently declared, "You will again be elected Senator from Massachusetts. I am going to congratulate you in advance." Meyer asserted, "There may be a few mugwumps or imperialists jealous of your success ... but the party as a whole and even many [D]emocrats are proud" of an upstanding and honorable figure to represent the state in the Senate.⁹⁴² Lodge shared Meyer's confidence over his prospects. In a letter to President Roosevelt, he exclaimed, "The Legislature is safely Republican. There is no opposition to me or to Crane," his newly-appointed colleague.⁹⁴³ And replying to his friend Meyer, Lodge wrote, "Our victory in the country was something stupendous ... I do not apprehend that there will be the slightest ripple of opposition to either Crane or myself when the Legislature meets."⁹⁴⁴

These early assurances so immediately following the election suggest that party officials and state legislators may have been moving in a more "deferential" direction, measuring their support for Lodge by the magnitude of the recent electoral victory and the senator's diligent service to the party. In effect, they were ceding the decision to the outcome of the November election, especially if the incumbent contributed to the stupendous victory *and* was perceived by party figures as instrumental in that result.

The historically strong showing by the Republican ticket in 1904 and the party's absolute control over the legislature may have given Lodge insurance against any intra-party divisions.

⁹⁴² George Meyer to Lodge, December 14, 1904, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reel 21.


⁹⁴³ Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, November 9, 1904, *Selections, Volume II*, 109.

⁹⁴⁴ Lodge to George Meyer, December 27, 1904, *Meyer papers*, MHS.

With the margins between the parties so wide, potential defections or revolts within the Republican fold would not be cause for trepidation, lest they cascaded into a tidal wave. But the success of the party in the recent elections likely bolstered party harmony and diminished the threat of any defections in the first place. When the state legislature decided the question of the senatorship the following January, Lodge was handily re-elected, securing every single Republican vote on record.⁹⁴⁵ See **Figure 6.4** for a chart of the final vote breakdown.

Figure 6.4

Vote of the Massachusetts State Legislature for Senator, January 1905



SOURCE: *Fall River Globe*, January 18, 1905, p 6

⁹⁴⁵ *The Boston Globe*, January 18, 1905, p 2.

6.3.5 *Analysis*

The 1904 senatorial election illuminates the interplay between high-level politicking and democratic, public campaigning — novel features under exceptionally non-popular conditions. In Massachusetts, party figures held a firm grip on the selection process. Political actors were essential in Lodge's re-election, first, by clearing the field of potential challengers, then in providing crucial party support during the fall campaign, culminating in the senator's renomination by the party caucus and eventually re-election by the legislature.

Despite the preponderance of power with pivotal party figures, an emerging degree of sensitivity to prevailing public sentiment and popular opinion obtained. Lodge was continually aware of the pulse of the state and nation-at-large, especially as they pertained to Roosevelt's re-election prospects, the status of Republicans, and party harmony. Nor were concerns limited to public sentiment. They extended to material issues as well, notably labor troubles, economic woes, and the greatest challenge — reciprocity. Lodge's efforts — privately amongst party officials and publicly amongst voters — were critical in preventing discord and disharmony. Having committed himself to the electoral fortunes of president and party, the senator was duly rewarded with re-election by appreciative party leaders and state legislators, especially those who owed their victories to Lodge's diligent efforts.

The presence of a presidential contest had several effects on the nature of the senatorial election. For one, it rendered public campaign rallies more numerous than in 1898. Furthermore, the personalities of the leading contenders regularly infused the campaign, often co-opting local and state issues. But as in 1898, national issues were just as widely discussed. While we may conclude Lodge's appearances were undertaken with the intention of assuring the best pos-

sible result for Roosevelt, the presidential contest was never the senator's *sole* motivation for he recognized his own re-election riding on the president's coattails. Thus, Lodge's re-election — as well as the bevy of state contests and legislative seats — were all *nationalized*, reflecting the broad popularity of President Roosevelt and the improving economic prospects for the country.

While Lodge campaigned up-ballot for the president and down-ballot for state legislative races, these public appearances were geared to bolster his political position within the party. The strong showing for the Republicans in the state legislature may have stifled any potential for intra-party defections. Lodge's strenuous work was rewarded by an unanimous show of support from his party the following January. Therefore, while party backing was instrumental for securing re-election, Lodge's prospects were bolstered by strong popular support as manifest by the outcome of the November election and achieved through the pursuit of vigorous public campaigns.

6.4 1910 - Lodge's Two-Front Battle for Political Survival

The 1910 case study demonstrates how amply public sentiment and popular legitimacy mattered to the senatorial selection process, as the non-popular conditions of Massachusetts began to ebb and fray. The solidly Republican state elected a Democratic governor and witnessed historically close margins in the state legislature, attesting to renewed political competitiveness. Lodge pursued far more intensive legislative-district canvassing to assure that supportive Republicans be nominated by their district conventions and ultimately elected to the legislature. While Lodge generally waged party-based appeals for support throughout the state (see 1898 and 1904), his adversaries centered their campaigns entirely in contradistinction to the senior senator,

personalizing the contest to a degree hitherto unseen. And the relatively close result in the legislature granted the body far greater autonomy in its decision on the senatorship, as each individual member's judgment and consideration became of paramount importance. But the selection process itself was infused with elements of popular legitimacy to a greater scale, as the political principals embarked on cultivating popular support to strengthen their respective causes.

If 1904 presented the most fortuitous circumstances possible for Lodge's re-election, 1910 offered the most adverse. The ever-popular Theodore Roosevelt had demurred on seeking a third term in 1908, and accordingly, his hand-picked successor William Howard Taft was handily elected. While able, capable, and intelligent, Taft possessed none of his predecessor's magnetic personality nor public relations acumen. As a result, major policies and significant legislative accomplishments were often delegated to lower-echelon officials or deposited to the press to cover. Lacking a vigorous defense of the administration, the ground was ceded to political opponents. Furthermore, a brewing schism between an emergent Progressive wing of the Republican Party and the regular "Old Guard" traditionalists was threatening to erupt into a full-fledged civil war. Roosevelt had deftly navigated between the two camps, managing an uneasy, but steady alliance to hold until he left office. Once more, Taft lacked Roosevelt's skill at satiating these increasingly antagonistic factions and striking a tough compromise between them.

By 1910, the Republican Party had ruptured. Tough economic conditions and higher prices were contributing to a "spirit of vague discontent."⁹⁴⁶ Much of the public's ire had centered upon the unpopular Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Although the bill actually lowered rates and duties on certain products and freed a number of others, it failed to go as far as many advocates for

⁹⁴⁶ Garraty, 273.

downward revision desired.⁹⁴⁷ The issue became the rallying cry for Progressive Republicans, as they assailed the tariff as unfairly favoring businesses and trusts at the expense of ordinary Americans, workers, and laborers, lambasting their party for protecting economic elites.⁹⁴⁸

The bleak, even “catastrophic” conditions nationally were mirrored in Massachusetts.⁹⁴⁹ In the traditionally Republican state, pervasive discontent had festered before finally boiling over. Many within the party had been seeking a more liberal approach to tariffs, first through a reciprocity agreement with Canada, and then by wholesale downward revision on other tariffs, yet neither of these were achieved. Henry Cabot Lodge, the ardent protectionist, represented the face of the Old Guard Republicans, and naturally, the outlet for much of this ire. He had skillfully defeated reciprocity in 1904 and strongly backed the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. While it paid political dividend in the short-term, it helped sow disaffection in the longer term.

With his seat up for re-election in 1910, a group of insurgent Republicans capitalizing upon public discontent hoped to deny the senior senator another term. They found their voice in one Butler Ames, a congressman representing Lowell. For the first time in his senatorial career, Lodge was confronted with a material threat to his position from within the party. Although Ames remained a long-shot with little chance of actually winning, his candidacy was significant in a state alleged to be dominated by Lodge loyalists. The insurgency typified the larger socioeconomic travails affecting Bay Staters and presented the possibility that a deadlocked legislature might ultimately rest on the votes of the small cadre of rebels.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid, 267-268.

⁹⁴⁸ In another chapter, I cover at length the insurgent campaign of Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana that same year, as he railed against his own party's tariff as he bid for re-election.

⁹⁴⁹ Ibid, 273.

Sensing blood, Democrats were uncharacteristically bullish of scoring major upsets throughout the commonwealth. Eugene N. Foss — the very Republican businessman whom Lodge had ignominiously shown the door in 1904 — had since bolted from the party and become a Democrat, winning his new party's nomination for governor and centering his entire campaign against the personality of Lodge himself and the unpopular tariff measure. Thus, Lodge was faced with a two-front battle for political survival — one from within his own party and the other from a rejuvenated Democratic Party. To persevere, he would need to make all the stops, check all the boxes, and do everything feasible to win, including widespread, vigorous public campaigns for popular support, if necessary.

6.4.1 *Political Conditions and Headwinds*

Traditionally, Massachusetts had been safely Republican, especially control of the legislature. The party's impressive margins in 1904 epitomized its stranglehold over the state. But by the end of the decade, that monopoly was threatened as Republican strength began to wane. In 1909, Eben S. Draper was elected governor by a paltry 8,000 votes.⁹⁵⁰ The Republican advantage in the State Senate slipped to 31 seats, and their ranks dropped to 167 in the House — the lowest figure since 1903.⁹⁵¹ Although the party went on to perform poorly in the 1910 state elections, a pervasive sense of gloom and foreboding was readily apparent for months prior to the outcome, indicative of the most competitive general election in recent memory.

⁹⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁵¹ Michael J. Dublin, *Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year By Year Summary, 1796-2006*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2007), 93-94.

Senator Lodge astutely detected these worrisome trends, attesting to the competitive nature of the forthcoming election and his personal sensitivity to fluctuating political conditions, driven by the public's ire with the ruling Republican Party. These exchanges illustrate the extent to which the state's senior senator anxiously traced the ebb and flow of public sentiment, especially as it pertained to the performance of the party in November and his own re-election bid.

Initially, Lodge was exclusively preoccupied with national affairs. In January, he revealed to Governor Eben Draper, "I feel a great of anxiety about the congressional elections next year. We shall have ... a hard struggle to carry the House," yet Lodge was slightly more optimistic about his own state, declaring, "I think we shall do pretty well with our congressmen in Massachusetts, but we ought to strengthen ourselves in every possible way and I am especially anxious that you should have a big majority."⁹⁵² By early March, Lodge recognized "discontent which will affect the campaign of the [p]arty in the [s]tate," but he minimized its impact on local and state races, asserting "I think it extremely unlikely ... that the Republican control of the Legislature will be seriously affected ... The difficulties we have to meet as a [p]arty are very serious and I shall do everything I can to promote the success of the [g]overnor."⁹⁵³ Evidently, while Lodge was cognizant of widespread, pervasive discontent brewing amongst the people, he failed to fully appreciate its depth.

The major inflection point occurred in late March, during the special election to fill the vacant seat of the fourteenth congressional district. The race was contested by Republican William Buchanan and Democrat Eugene N. Foss, who was marking his return to politics with

⁹⁵² Lodge to Eben S. Draper, January 4, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

⁹⁵³ Lodge to William Wood, March 2, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

gusto. Although considered a safe Republican seat, Foss scored a major upset, sending shockwaves throughout the state and the country. The result served as a wakeup call to complacent Republicans, especially Lodge, who were unnerved by the suddenness of the defeat and the magnitude of the public's disenchantment, anger, and frustration expressed toward the reigning party.⁹⁵⁴

Mere days following the special election, Lodge sent an alarmist letter to former president Roosevelt, debriefing him on the recent developments and confiding his greatest worries over its implications. He began by describing the situation as "moving very fast ... and pretty badly." The "strongest Republican district in [the state] [and which] never went Democratic in its history" suddenly and unexpectedly was "lost ... by 5,600," a swing of nearly 20,000 votes. Lodge attributed the party's defeat to a weak candidate, but also more broadly "general unrest which rose chiefly from high prices ... Starting with high prices people are in a dissatisfied mood with everything and the party in power suffers." Lodge went on to bemoan the Taft Administration as well, decrying, "It is going down hill all the time." For Lodge, the implications of the loss were enormous and severe. He explained:

After that election ... we may say broadly that no Massachusetts district can be counted as perfectly safe ... There is no prospect of carrying the House as we now stand. I believe we shall carry the Massachusetts Legislature and if we carry it by anything like the normal majority I think I shall be returned without any reasonable doubt, but if our

⁹⁵⁴ *The Boston Globe*, March 20, 1910, p 1; March 27, 1910, p 48.

majority is cut way down, they may get in a position where, with Foss' money and some Democratic deal, they may send a Democrat or, what is worse, a man like Foss in my place ... The situation at the present time is very bad.

Importantly, Lodge's solution was to remain firmly committed to the Taft presidency and the Republicans. "The only course I can pursue is to give a cordial support to the Administration and to the party. I see no reason to do otherwise and it is the best course to pursue."⁹⁵⁵ The unfavorable, dispiriting national conditions for Republicans, exacerbated by the *nationalization effect*, threatened the party's ranks in the legislature in the forthcoming election.

Following the Foss upset, Lodge and his associates increasingly evinced deep-seated anxiety over the political conditions within the state. In April, Governor Draper wrote, "There is a general feeling of unrest everywhere ... Here in Massachusetts this feeling of opposition ... exists strongly and is bound to play an important part in the fall ... This feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction is ... in our [s]tate as well as everywhere else."⁹⁵⁶ Lodge agreed that "we have a hard fight ahead of us," but believed "things are looking better at home" and was encouraged by the party's reaction to the setback.⁹⁵⁷

By the summer, Lodge continued acknowledging the public's dissatisfaction, but regularly maintained an air of confidence that the eventual result would be favorable to the party. In a letter to Louis Southard, he conceded, "A certain spirit of discontent does exist," but qualified

⁹⁵⁵ Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 25, 1910, *Theodore Roosevelt Collection*, George Gottlieb Archives, Boston University Collection.

⁹⁵⁶ Eben S. Draper to Lodge, April 20, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

⁹⁵⁷ Lodge to Eben S. Draper, April 22, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

“that things are looking better all the time and ... we shall win this [f]all.”⁹⁵⁸ And writing to R. L. O’Brien of *The Transcript*, Lodge detailed several countervailing forces at play confronting the Republican Party. First, he explained that the recent improvement in the party’s fortunes were attributed to “successful passage of so many good measures recommended by the Administration.” Clearly, Lodge wanted to emphasize that Republicans were effectively legislating to meet the challenge. But the intractable political conditions were being fueled by factors “over which we have no control,” thereby decoupling responsibility for the situation from the party itself. “The outlook for the crops is not good. Business ... is dull, largely owing to the fear of a Democratic victory ... All depression and dullness in business work against the party in power ... Then the ceaseless attacks of certain Western Senators undoubtedly stir up hostile feelings here.”⁹⁵⁹

If these factors were responsible for the strong headwinds against the Republican Party, they were also working against Lodge’s own re-election, to which the senator was particularly alert. In a journal entry in late March following the Foss election, Lodge reflected on a meeting with a confidant, writing, “Christy says he don’t see how the Senator can lose, but says that the Senator ought to make the fight of his life.”⁹⁶⁰ The following month, he stressed to Governor Draper, “The principle [*sic*] battle will be to elect our [s]tate ticket and our [c]ongressmen but we ought not to take the Legislature for granted. Not only is a Senator to be elected — in which I take some interest — but [they] will redistrict the [s]tate [c]ongressionally.” To that end, “We

⁹⁵⁸ Lodge to Louis Southard, July 13, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 32.

⁹⁵⁹ Lodge to R.L. O’Brien, July 27, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 31.

⁹⁶⁰ Journal Entry, March 28, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-33.

have got a very hard fight before us and we must leave no stone unturned.”⁹⁶¹ He echoed such sentiment a few weeks later in a letter to L.D. Apsley, “We have a hard fight ahead of us ... The next [l]egislature not only elects a Senator, in which I naturally have a large personal interest, but will probably redistrict.”⁹⁶² And mere weeks before polling day, Lodge admitted to Silas Reed the stakes of the upcoming vote, “I am exceedingly [worried] that we should have any contest which endangers a seat in the Senate but I hardly know what can be done. I only hope that it will not result in the election of a Democrat.”⁹⁶³ As these correspondences demonstrate, Lodge closely followed the trajectory of public sentiment and popular opinion, especially as it pertained to the performance of the party in the forthcoming state elections and his own bid for re-election, and they attest to the far greater role occupied by popular legitimacy in the hitherto non-popular state.

6.4.2 *Intra-Party Challengers*

The presence of a quality challenger to oppose Lodge was another important variable factoring into the senator’s electoral calculus. Whereas in 1898 and 1904, Lodge’s incumbency status, affording the senator strong party backing from leading figures, effectively cleared the field of potential intra-party challengers, by 1910, Lodge was less fortunate. With the groundswell of sentiment simmering against the party, Lodge’s incumbency proved a liability. A cadre of disgruntled Republicans resentful of the senator’s perceived heavy-handed management of the party were encouraged by the rising tide of public discontent and disaffection with the Republicans.

⁹⁶¹ Lodge to Eben S. Draper, April 15, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

⁹⁶² Lodge to L.D. Apsley, May 4, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

⁹⁶³ Lodge to Silas Reed, October 7, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 31.

Responding to the changing political and economic conditions, they found their voice in Congressman Butler Ames of Lowell who boldly defied the party leadership by launching a bid to dislodge the incumbent senator from his seat. Ames had been flirting with a run for months. On January 27, a telegram was reprinted in the newspapers declaring Ames' candidature. That very day, the congressmen held small luncheons with select state legislators to "become better acquainted with them" — a clear attempt to win pivotal party backing for his long-shot candidacy. The legislators "showed a lively interest in what he had to say in outlining his opposition to the senior senator." Further, it appears that Ames promised "substantial support" — potentially of a monetary nature — to legislative candidates, should they support his bid.⁹⁶⁴

Throughout this period, Ames was testing the waters to gauge whether his candidacy would engender a favorable reception by party bigwigs — an "invisible primary" if you will. During the period, the congressman was "receiving daily encouragement in his fight for Senator Lode's seat."⁹⁶⁵ By the spring, he was feeling "cheerful and confident" of defeating Lodge.⁹⁶⁶ Taking stock of the political situation in Massachusetts, Ames declared, "Everything looks good to me," predicting Lodge would fail to "defeat the will of the people."⁹⁶⁷ According to *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, Ames' candidature held the potential to "develop more strength than some people suppose ... [due to the] considerable opposition" to Lodge's "domination of the state machine."⁹⁶⁸ On June 26, the invisible primary became more visible as Ames formally announced

⁹⁶⁴ *The Boston Globe*, January 28, 1910, p 8.

⁹⁶⁵ *The Boston Globe*, March 1, 1910, p 9.

⁹⁶⁶ *The Boston Globe*, April 26, 1910, p 8.

⁹⁶⁷ *The Boston Globe*, May 27, 1910, p 3.

⁹⁶⁸ *The Fitchburg Sentinel*, February 11, 1910, p 8.

his intention to run for Senate. In a public statement, the campaign decried “Boss Lodge and his political machine,” and vowed to end undue protection for “large railroad, banking and manufacturing interests.”⁹⁶⁹

Initially, Lodge downplayed the threat posed by Ames. When Ames began meeting state legislators to feel out support for his candidacy, Lodge’s friends “shrug[ged] their shoulders.” Describing the senator’s position as unassailable, they contended, “Mr. Ames would have a difficult time defeating Senator Lodge.” And when Lodge himself was asked directly about the upstart congressman, he “smile[d] sardonically.”⁹⁷⁰ Although Lodge was keeping a close watch over the situation, it does not appear the senator believed Ames’ challenge amounted to a much. While occasional mentions of Butler Ames and the machinations by his camp litter his correspondences, relatively few explicitly reference Ames’ strength itself. Writing to his adjutant William Wood in early February, Lodge reported, “I notice that ‘The Eagle’ regards Mr. Ames’ chances of election as very slight ... and adds ... ‘comparatively few of the voters would want to see it succeed.’”⁹⁷¹ Perhaps Lodge was sizing up Ames, but the record is scarce as far as direct references to the challenger’s political standing.

Eugene Foss’ special election upset may have jolted Lodge to take Ames’ candidacy more seriously. In the first test of the popular sentiment that year, voters turned hard against Lodge. Like Ames, Foss represented the manifestation of the public’s disillusionment and anger brewing against the Republicans over the high cost of living and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Ames wished to tap into the public’s discontent with the economic situation, as well. Shocked by the depth of

⁹⁶⁹ *The Boston Globe*, June 27, 1910, p 1.

⁹⁷⁰ *The Boston Globe*, January 30, 1910, p 40.

⁹⁷¹ Lodge to William Wood, February 4, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

the disaffection, Lodge and company grew increasingly nervy over another upset. According to *The Boston Globe*, “The senator’s followers on Beacon Hill began to sit up and take notice [of Ames]. They are now wondering what may happen next fall [and] “inquir[ing] more minutely into the ... movement.”⁹⁷² Following the election, Lodge’s mentions of Ames increased proportionally. Although he continued to view the congressman’s appeal as limited and his chances infinitesimally small, he devoted more time and attention to the insurgent campaign. In a journal entry from March 29, Lodge wrote that Christy says “Foss and Ames can and will furnish all the money that can be used.”⁹⁷³

On April 15, Lodge informed a Mr. Curtis of Ames’ efforts, observing, “I see that Ames is again on the ground in Boston, but ... I do not think he is making the slightest headway.”⁹⁷⁴ Writing to William Wood in early May, Lodge explained, “I am not sanguine about anything but I think I am quite right about the Ames movement ... Ames has no strength.”⁹⁷⁵ In late June, the senator declared to John Palfrey, “I cannot find that Butler Ames has any support,” and while he was “aware of the existence [of] a progressive element” in the party, he maintained that these adherents were not translating into support for Ames.⁹⁷⁶ In another letter, Lodge explained that Ames was not a true insurgent since he voted for the very tariff measure against which the insurgents were railing. Lodge deduced, “I do not think that I am in serious danger.”⁹⁷⁷ And when

⁹⁷² *The Boston Globe*, March 27, 1910, p 48.

⁹⁷³ Journal Entry, March 29, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-33.

⁹⁷⁴ Lodge to Mr. Curtis, April 15, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

⁹⁷⁵ Lodge to William Wood, May 2, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁷⁶ Lodge to John Palfrey, June 30, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 31.

⁹⁷⁷ Lodge to Charles Grosvenor, July 11, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 30.

Ames launched his attack on the so-called Lodge machine, the incumbent opted against responding, contending, “I do not think that it will do him any good or me any harm.”⁹⁷⁸ Lodge was growing increasingly bullish, but he continued to closely monitor the activities of the congressman’s upstart campaign. Judging from his letters, we may surmise that Lodge was genuinely concerned over the potential for an upset, or merely trying to assuage political loyalists over the matter entirely. Whatever the motivation, it is clear that Ames’ campaign henceforth occupied a more central focus for Lodge’s electoral calculations.

Throughout the summer, Lodge maintained that Ames did not pose much of a threat, but insisted that a thorough public campaign was necessary to “take every precaution” to meet the challenge.⁹⁷⁹ The senator launched a two-pronged strategy to winning re-election: legislative district canvassing — backing among party officials and critical state legislative candidates — *and* public campaigns for popular support, both equally sufficient for victory. The former was necessary to shut out the intra-party challenge from Ames. The latter was integral for party mobilization, which served two purposes: bolstering Lodge’s position within the party — thereby weakening Ames even further — and improving the party’s position against the Democrats in the November general election — thereby minimizing the political strength which the opposition may enjoy in the next legislature.

⁹⁷⁸ Lodge to Ashton Hemphill, July 2, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 30.

⁹⁷⁹ Lodge to Thaddeus Sharretts, July 28, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 32; Lodge to Samuel Winslow, August 18, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33; Lodge to Fred Shattuck, August 20, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 32; Lodge to William S. Greene, August 20, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 30.

6.4.3 *Legislative District Canvassing*

The gravity of Butler Ames' intra-party challenge — magnified by the Foss special election upset — drove Lodge to oversee a vociferous canvassing of legislative districts, in essence, obtaining support amongst critical state legislators, thereby maximizing the pool of favorable electors in the legislature. In 1910, the incumbent senator was involved to a far greater extent than in previous years locking down candidates supportive of his re-election. At the outset, Lodge focused on securing nominations by district conventions of individuals who were dually supportive of his bid *and* strong candidates for the party in the November election. By directly affixing party nominees to Lodge's re-election, these contenders would stamp out the Ames threat, withstand the looming Democratic wave, and back the senator in the legislature upon assuming their seats. For Lodge, the first step was to ensure their nominations.

Throughout the campaign, Lodge closely coordinated with his adjutants — predominantly William Wood, Arthur Alger, and J. Otis Wardwell — who were delegated immense responsibilities to manage district canvassing on behalf of their superior. As early as March, Lodge informed Wood that he expected to receive “a complete list of the men who will come back to the [l]egislature next year who are for me,” before revealing, “a very careful canvass ... has not thus far revealed anyone who is opposed to me except [several] in the Lowell district.”⁹⁸⁰ The critical task was identifying marginal seats where the greatest effort must be expended. Lodge explained as much to Wardwell, writing, “I am now going to sort out the vote in the ... districts and sort out those where new men are to come and to which attention must be given and also all where the

⁹⁸⁰ Lodge to William Wood, March 2, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

majority is narrow and where a special effort must be made to win.”⁹⁸¹ In a follow-up letter, Lodge explicated, “Everything must be done to run the best men and carry every doubtful district.” He instructed Wardwell to review his list and determine “which [districts] need to be looked after and ... which we can give our attention as soon as possible.”⁹⁸² Continuing their correspondence, the pair analyzed soft supporters — candidates who would likely support Lodge but required a gentle nudge⁹⁸³ — as well as nominations of his strongest supporters.⁹⁸⁴

Additionally, Lodge was eager to solicit information from loyalists. Arthur Alger routinely provided invaluable details and advice pertaining to dicey district politics.⁹⁸⁵ James Arkison offered useful data on sentiment in southern Massachusetts, including New Bedford, Taunton, and Attleboro.⁹⁸⁶ And Samuel Winslow was recruited to manage Lodge’s campaign in Worcester County, districts about which the senator confessed he knew little.⁹⁸⁷ Perhaps the most insightful material was a list provided by Walter Carter specifying insurgent Republicans who were “faithfully” inclined to back the senator’s re-election bid.⁹⁸⁸ Securing the support of these legislators was an obvious boon for Lodge, for they were a natural constituency for Butler Ames, and it quickly became clear the congressman was unable to win natural political brethren. Lodge even

⁹⁸¹ Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, April 8, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁸² Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, April 26, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁸³ Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, May 4, 1910; May 5, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁸⁴ J. Otis Wardwell to Lodge, August 23, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁸⁵ Lodge to Arthur Alger, April 9, 1910; July 11, 1910, August 27, 1910, September 3, 1910, September 16, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

⁹⁸⁶ James Arkison to Lodge, August 15, 1910; Lodge to James Arkison, August 17, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

⁹⁸⁷ Lodge to Samuel Winslow, August 18, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁸⁸ Walter Carter to Lodge, May 10, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

recognized the “insurgent feeling” was lacking “strong leadership,” and its force had been blunted by the overwhelming support he was commanding.⁹⁸⁹

The massive effort at legislative district canvassing relied upon friendly, supportive delegates attending the state convention to nominate pro-Lodge candidates.. Lodge repeatedly stressed the need to stack the deck at the gathering. In letters to Alger, he wrote, “Whatever happens we want to be very careful that the delegates to that convention are friends of mine,” adding, “The important thing is to control the Convention so that whoever is elected will be all right,” meaning they would “vote for me as again [*sic*] Ames.”⁹⁹⁰ Favorable nominees represented the convention’s collective endorsement of the sitting senator’s re-election. Further, these activities illustrate elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy*. The strong party system demanded that senators rely on partisans. Therefore, a premium was placed on enlarging the pool of Lodge loyalists in the forthcoming legislative caucus, which retained the authority to formally nominate senatorial contenders and effectually select senators. And all these state contests enjoyed party cover — the financial, political, and electoral backing of the party apparatus.

Another means of directly tying his candidacy to the party and rendering it more highly visible to the public involved outright convention endorsements. Lodge was adamant that the party adopt a resolution at the state convention explicitly supporting his bid for another term, writing to Charles Washburn, “It becomes a matter of some importance to me to have a line or two of direct approval for me personally so that it would be understood that the Convention gives me and my service their endorsement.” Lodge justified the request on the grounds that it had

⁹⁸⁹ Lodge to Silas Reed, September 18, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 31.

⁹⁹⁰ Lodge to Arthur Alger, August 27, 1910; August 31, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

“been done for the past twenty years for each of the Senators ... up for re-election.”⁹⁹¹ Additionally, it was also necessary that legislative district conventions express their approval of Lodge and instruct their nominees to support him. As he explained to Alger regarding one district, “If we could have a resolution in my favor in the Senatorial Convention it would be a good thing, although it would not be worthwhile to try to force it unless we were perfectly sure that it would carry.”⁹⁹² By coupling Senator Lodge’s performance to the electoral fortunes of state legislative candidates, Lodge strengthened his position within the party vis-a-vis Butler Ames, while also infusing a more popular element to the senatorial selection process, publicizing his campaign and explicitly tying his election to the fortunes of individual party members.

Lodge’s diligence was rewarded with an impressive result at the district-level primaries and caucuses in late September — an admixture of strong party backing and the Republican faithful. According to *The Boston Globe*, Congressman Butler Ames scored only one senator and four representatives, whilst Senator Lodge secured seven senators and 48 representatives.⁹⁹³ The decisive result effectively ended Ames’ chances of defeating Lodge with the support of Republicans. The mood amongst Lodge and his associates was buoyant. Charles Gardner expressed his congratulations to the senator, adding, “You must feel considerable satisfaction.”⁹⁹⁴ Describing Ames’ result as “a sorry showing,” George Meyer attributed it to “the thorough and able manner in which you managed your campaign ... It will be a satisfaction to you to know that in doing so

⁹⁹¹ Lodge to Charles Washburn, September 14, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁹² Lodge to Arthur Alger, September 29, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

⁹⁹³ *The Boston Globe*, September 28, 1910, p 1.

⁹⁹⁴ Charles Gardner to Lodge, September 29, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 30.

you have helped the party, and particularly the administration.”⁹⁹⁵ Lodge expressed similar sentiment to William Wood, declaring, “Although Mr. Ames has spent a great deal of money ... his campaign has been a complete failure.”⁹⁹⁶

Upon the gathering of the Republicans at their state convention in early October, Lodge’s son-in-law Augustus P. Gardner boasted, “Ames’s candidacy still continues as a feeble joke ... You have no more political trouble to fear.”⁹⁹⁷ Gardner was only partially correct. While Lodge had substantially buttressed his standing amongst Republicans, thereby shutting out the intra-party challenge to his re-election, political troubles were brewing, especially in the form of the Democratic opposition. Lodge expressed concern that Ames might support independent and Democratic candidates to oppose him.⁹⁹⁸ Further, the specter of Eugene Foss loomed large over the proceedings. Lodge feared Foss was gearing up to run as a stalking horse senatorial challenger, seeking to deadlock the legislature’s vote before throwing his hat into the ring as the Democrat’s choice for Senate.⁹⁹⁹

6.4.4 *Taking to the Stump: Public Campaigning*

The second prong of Lodge’s re-election strategy involved public campaigning. Once favorable Republicans were nominated, it became necessary to carry them over the finish line.

⁹⁹⁵ George Meyer to Lodge, September 30, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 31.

⁹⁹⁶ Lodge to William Wood, September 29, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

⁹⁹⁷ Augustus Gardner to Lodge, October 8, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 30.

⁹⁹⁸ Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, February 10, 1910; October 1, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33; Lodge to Arthur Alger, October 1, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

⁹⁹⁹ Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 25, 1910, *Theodore Roosevelt Collection*, BU; Lodge to George Meyer, November 24, 1910, *Meyer papers*, MHS.

To that end, Lodge partook in numerous public rallies and personal appearances to mobilize the Republican faithful, increase turnout, and defeat the Democrats, much as he had done in 1898 and 1904. But unlike in previous election years, the once-solid Republican unity had fractured, while the Democrats were riding high on enthusiasm and momentum. Therefore, properly cultivating popular support through public campaigns grew in import.

Once again, Lodge's campaigning took the form of party-based appeals, defending the Taft Administration and Republican policies, including the reviled Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Despite Lodge's adherence to parties, his opponents centered their campaigns against the personage of the senator, himself. Butler Ames and Eugene Foss — now the Democratic gubernatorial candidate — emphasized their personal and political antagonism to the incumbent senator. The renewed scrutiny on Lodge personalized the contest to a degree hitherto lacking in previous state elections.

Throughout the campaign, Butler Ames framed his election as a battle against Lodge's impenetrable organization and his undue favoritism toward wealthy elites, tycoons, businesses, and trusts. When he formally announced his candidacy in June, Ames railed against "Boss Lodge and his political machine," which had "crush[ed] all political ambitions, endeavors or opinions not sanctioned by Mr. Lodge" through patronage and corporate donations. Lodge's "orders have ... advance[d] the selfish financial schemes of the large railroads, banking and manufacturing interests he serves in the hall of [C]ongress as well as in the Massachusetts legislature."¹⁰⁰⁰ In an interview with *The Boston Globe*, Ames reiterated his desire to defeat "'Boss' Lodge ... [and] smash the [R]epublican state organization into smithereens." Ames explained

¹⁰⁰⁰ *The Boston Globe*, June 27, 1910, p 1.

that he “prefer[ed] to do his own thinking and that the ... machine hasn’t any use for a man in public life who will not take orders from that body ... from Mr. Lodge.” At that point, he “began to lose caste with the leaders.”¹⁰⁰¹ In the first public speech of his campaign in Haverhill, Ames directed his crusade “against Senator Henry Cabot Lodge ... It is a fight against the man who ... has acted as dictator and boss of the party councils; who has been and is responsible ... for the methods, abuses and practices of his machine.” Ames went on to argue, “His only support ... is the machine ... and the large corporate interests for whom he has rendered improper service.”¹⁰⁰²

Additionally, Ames routinely raised the issue of popular legitimacy to weaken Lodge’s authority with voters. The congressman pitted Lodge and his forces as “working hard to defeat the will of the people.”¹⁰⁰³ In his first major campaign speech, Ames explained:

I am fighting a political battle for you this fall. I hope that when this fight is over, it will be possible for any man ... to take an independent stand of any political question without fear of the heel of the machine ... It is the protest of the unprotected individual voter against a party organization that has been so lacking in a sense of right and wrong ... It is the protest of the voter against a machine that has ... determined the candidates and political fortunes of every man in public life.

¹⁰⁰¹ *The Boston Globe*, August 21, 1910, p 45.

¹⁰⁰² *The Boston Globe*, September 6, 1910, p 11.

¹⁰⁰³ *The Boston Globe*, May 27, 1910, p 3.

Ames exclaimed that Lodge was not “a public servant,” instead, “he has used every influence at his command to prevent the people from having a chance to vote for him or his successor.”¹⁰⁰⁴

Similarly, Eugene Foss primarily rested the Democratic argument on enmity for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff and avowed opposition to Senator Lodge. When asked whether the tariff was the major issue, Foss replied “Yes, but the party itself is becoming an issue.” Many Republicans were “not in conflict with the principles of the founders, but rather the methods of the leaders ... [They] are dissatisfied with their leaders and especially with Senator Lodge.”¹⁰⁰⁵ In the fall, Foss repeatedly framed the election as a referendum on Lodge’s performance in the Senate. At one rally, he proclaimed, “There is no progressive movement in the [R]epublican party ... You must rebuke Lodge and Draper and their machine, and the only way it can be done is as I have done, by joining the [D]emocratic party.”¹⁰⁰⁶ At another rally, he urged voters to support the entire [D]emocratic ticket “for I will need them on Beacon [H]ill this winter to defeat Henry Cabot Lodge. We will beat him at his own game, and show him that he was correct when he stated that if Massachusetts went Democratic this fall ‘the jig was up’ for the [R]epublican party.”¹⁰⁰⁷ And most notably, Foss and Lodge shared a public spat over generous contributions to their respective campaigns over the years.¹⁰⁰⁸

In response to these charges made by his opponents, Lodge was compelled to intensify his public relations campaign and persuade discontented constituents to back the Republican Par-

¹⁰⁰⁴ *The Boston Globe*, September 6, 1910, p 11.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *The Boston Globe*, May 23, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *The Boston Globe*, October 27, 1910, p 4.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *The Boston Globe*, November 6, 1910, p 6.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *The Boston Globe*, October 24, 1910, p 1.

ty — hugely significant methods to cultivate popular support and a recognition of the increasing importance of the public sentiment. Seeking to address the widespread discontent with the tariff, Lodge undertook three electoral activities: *advertising* to heighten awareness of the party brand; *credit-claiming* to demonstrate favorable output by the party; and *position-taking*, so to convey the party's stances on the pressing issues of the day. Although Lodge presented these arguments within a party-based framework, he coupled his personal stake to the overall operation. The senator predominantly pursued these activities through three means: newspapers, personal appearances, and political surrogates.

Newspapers offer an effective means of enhancing the image of a candidate or party, especially by countering false claims or misperceptions. Lodge utilized newspapers regularly during the campaign, writing letters for publications and granting interviews to periodicals. Over the summer, the senator penned a letter to *The Boston Post* trying to bridge the chasm between so-called insurgent and Old Guard Republicans — the distinction between Butler Ames and himself. Many insurgents had contended that the senator was opposed to party harmony, but Lodge sought to counteract that characterization. By contrast, he claimed to favor party unity, going to great lengths to minimize the differences that had divided both camps. Bemoaning the “classification of [the party],” Lodge described himself as “simply a Republican.”¹⁰⁰⁹

That same week, Lodge was interviewed by *The Post* where he defended the actions, policies, and programs of Republicans in Congress. Recognizing the tariff was the most pressing issue, he explained the measure had fallen victim to widespread misconceptions amidst popular “agitation.” Protectionism was not responsible for the high costs of living, but rather, served the

¹⁰⁰⁹ *The Boston Post*, August 19, 1910, p 8.

economic interests of the commonwealth. Due to the diversity of manufacturing industries, Lodge argued, “There is no State in the Union to which a reasonable and intelligent management of the tariff is more important than Massachusetts.”¹⁰¹⁰

Personally taking to the stump to deliver campaign messages was a useful tool to rouse dormant elements of the party and persuade undecided voters to support the Republican ticket. Lodge and his associates placed much faith in the effectiveness of a well-calibrated public campaign. After addressing the Norfolk Club in July, Governor Draper praised Lodge for giving “the most effective speech on the tariff that I have heard you or anybody else make for Massachusetts consumption.” He hailed Lodge’s insistence that key manufacturing duties were actually reduced by Republicans, and how the senator broached “the question of the wage rate ... most excellent[ly].” Draper concluded, “I believe this speech before an audience of voters would have a great effect. It is easily understood and is unanswerable.”¹⁰¹¹

Evidently inferring political strength from high campaign rally turnout, Lodge was even attentive to relative audience sizes between Eugene Foss’ appearances and Republican events. “We had the audiences counted everywhere [Foss] spoke.” Lodge observed, “On the Cape, he had a perfect frost ... He had 35 at Barnstable, 15 at [unspecified] ... I also hear from the Western part of the [s]tate that his trip there has been a failure.” Lodge unfavorably contrasted Foss’ turnout with impressive Republican rallies, “I have never seen such meetings as I saw at Holyoke and Northampton ... All the newspapers up there said it was the greatest Republican rally ever held in the [c]ity. We had over fifteen hundred people in that big hall ... The same report comes

¹⁰¹⁰ *The Boston Post*, August 21, 1910, p 28.

¹⁰¹¹ Eben S. Draper to Lodge, July 18, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

from Springfield.” Lodge believed that support for Foss among Republicans was “checked by the Faneuil Hall performances ... By next week we shall be in better shape than ever and this will do us good.”¹⁰¹²

Considered “one of the best exponents of Republican doctrine,”¹⁰¹³ Lodge undertook an extensive schedule of party rallies and appearances. On June 28, he opened his campaign at a rally in Somerville, before attending a party unity event with Governor Draper at the Brighton Republican Club on July 9. He addressed the Norfolk Club a week later, the Swedish-American Club on August 10, and the Plymouth Club on August 16. Lodge appeared at an Essex County newspaper outing on August 20, held an event for the governor at Nahant a week later, attended the Essex County Club on August 30, and then the Malden Republican City Committee the following day.¹⁰¹⁴ In September, Lodge visited the Dorchester Club, a banquet at Bass Point, Quincy, the Franco-American Club in Shrewsbury, Roxbury, and finally Dorchester.¹⁰¹⁵ Throughout October and early November, Lodge campaigned in Lawrence, Wakefield, Somerset, Holyoke, Northampton, Revere, Worcester, Melrose, Clinton, and finally Tremont Temple and Faneuil Hall in Boston.¹⁰¹⁶

¹⁰¹² Lodge to Robert Southworth, October 28, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 32.

¹⁰¹³ *The Boston Globe*, August 14, 1910, p 50.

¹⁰¹⁴ *The Boston Globe*, June 29, 1910, p 4; July 10, 1910, p 1; July 17, 1910, p 2; August 11, 1910, p 9; August 16, 1910, p 1; August 21, 1910, p 9; August 28, 1910, p12; August 31, 1910, p 9; September 1, 1910, p 5.

¹⁰¹⁵ *The Boston Globe*, September 2, 1910, p 8; September 9, 1910, p 8; September 11, 1910, p 5; September 16, 1910, p 9; September 22, 1910, p 9; September 27, 1910, p 9.

¹⁰¹⁶ *The Boston Globe*, October 4, 1910, p 8; October 7, 1910, p 5; October 14, 1910, p 8; October 23, 1910, p 10; October 25, 1910, p 13; October 26, 1910, p 5; October 27, 1910, p 13; October 30, 1910, p 8; November 1, 1910, p 9; November 2, 1910, p 6; November 4, 1910, p 4; November 6, 1910, p 11; November 7, 1910, p 2.

Opening the campaign on June 28 was exceptionally early, even by Lodge's standards. Most campaigns began between late August and early October. From June 28 to August 31, Lodge attended nine major events — more numerous than during the same period in 1904, belying any notion of a long, quiet summer. And his fall campaign schedule was even busier. From September 1 to November 7, Lodge partook in near-daily public appearances, which increased to daily rallies by the last weeks of the campaign. In a letter to Henry P. Dowse on October 6, Lodge explained that he was consumed with making “four speeches a week from now until election,”¹⁰¹⁷ an estimate which might have been on the lower end of the scale, as he delivered far more weekly speeches as polling day neared. These intensive efforts at public campaigning attest to Lodge's sense of vulnerability to the political conditions afflicting the state and to the potential for a Democratic wave that might sweep out a whole host of Republican lawmakers from the legislature and endanger his re-election prospects. Throughout the campaign, Lodge repeatedly emphasized, “The only danger ... is our losing the Legislature,” which was unlikely, “or finding ourselves with a very narrow margin,” which was more likely to occur.¹⁰¹⁸ Thus, it was critical that Republicans “keep [the Democratic] gain down and make it as small as possible.”¹⁰¹⁹

Lodge's campaign speeches once more took the form of party-based appeals, defending the Taft Administration, Congress, and the Republican Party. At one appearance, he warned that a Democratic Congress would precipitate a business depression.¹⁰²⁰ At another event, he lauded the achievements of the Republican Party, declaring it the true progressive party, despite the deep

¹⁰¹⁷ Lodge to Henry P. Dowse, October 6, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

¹⁰¹⁸ Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, April 26, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 33.

¹⁰¹⁹ Lodge to Eben S. Draper, May 30, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

¹⁰²⁰ *The Boston Globe*, July 10, 1910, p 1.

internal rifts that had ruptured.¹⁰²¹ In addition, he campaigned on behalf of Governor Draper, whom he described as “the most manly, most upright and most public-spirited governors the state has ever had,”¹⁰²² and raised state issues, as well.¹⁰²³

However, the primary issue he defended was the tariff. In Quincy, Lodge noted many of the measure's under-appreciated benefits, “No doubt there are defects in the present tariff bill ... If we had not passed this tariff bill, there would not be today in the country a customs court; there would not be a maximum and minimum clause; there would not be a tariff board to settle the tariff issues in a scientific manner.”¹⁰²⁴ Further, he frequently challenged the misperception that the measure was responsible for the high cost of living. In Brockton, Lodge argued, “The present tariff bill took the duty off oil; yet the price of oil has advanced. We took the duty off hides; yet the price went up higher than ever ... The cost of living has increased in European countries where there is no American tariff.” Instead, Lodge warned, a reduction of tariff rates would “cheapen wages.” He went on to declare, “If the tariff is too high let us make a reduction that will not affect wages.”¹⁰²⁵ And at another event, he attributed the influx of gold into circulation for inflating the prices of many products.¹⁰²⁶

Sensing momentum and enthusiasm shifting in their direction, Massachusetts Democrats were cautiously optimistic of a strong performance in November. After an acrimonious, con-

¹⁰²¹ *The Boston Globe*, September 1, 1910, p 5.

¹⁰²² *Ibid.*

¹⁰²³ *The Boston Globe*, November 4, 1910, p 4.

¹⁰²⁴ *The Boston Globe*, September 11, 1910, p 5.

¹⁰²⁵ *The Boston Globe*, November 1, 1910, p 9.

¹⁰²⁶ *The Boston Globe*, September 22, 1910, p 9.

tentious convention, they nominated the controversial congressman, Eugene Foss, to head the ticket for governor. “We shall win,” the newly-minted nominee thundered.¹⁰²⁷

Having prodded Republicans for years from the back benches, Foss was now in the driver’s seat to assail the party headlong and dictate the issues of the election. And from the opening of the campaign, he made clear the tariff was the singular topic before voters, “For eight years I tried within the ranks of the Republican Party to bring about better conditions,” he explained, “But when [they] passed the Payne-Aldrich bill ... I saw that it was useless to hope for relief from intolerable business conditions through the Republican Party whose leaders had deliberately broken faith with the people, and ... increased tremendously the burdens of which the people complained.” Foss offered himself as the remedy, “I stand upon my record as a builder up of New England industries, as a believer in New England ... I have advocated tariff revision downward, free raw material and reciprocity. I advocate them now.”¹⁰²⁸

Throughout the campaign, Foss unleashed his invective against Republican policies. He described the tariff commission established by the recent measures as “a bogus commission,” with no effective power to gather data and provide useful tariff information.¹⁰²⁹ And he characterized the party’s reciprocity proposal as “a fake reciprocity,” suggesting Republicans were not serious about mutually lowering rates with Canada. “I fight in the open,” Foss clamored, “I will force [my opponents] out into the open and ask them to make good their insinuations.”¹⁰³⁰

¹⁰²⁷ *The Boston Globe*, October 20, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰²⁸ *The Boston Globe*, October 23, 1910, p 17.

¹⁰²⁹ *The Boston Globe*, October 23, 1910, p 17.

¹⁰³⁰ *The Boston Globe*, October 29, 1910, p 3.

The Democratic standard-bearer reserved his sharpest charges for the state's senior senator. Foss began his tirade by indicting Lodge and his son-in law, Congressman Augustus Gardner, for "us[ing] money with so lavish a hand that the Democratic Party has been unable to find a man who would dare to run against ... Gardner."¹⁰³¹ He contended that Republicans had been "concealing the real expenditures ... by dividing them" amongst various organizations, and he repeated the assertion that Lodge authorized large sums of money to defeat opponents when serving as chair of the Republican state committee.¹⁰³² Additionally, Foss delivered a seething critique of Lodge's record in office, assailing the introduction of his Force Bill and excoriating his opposition to the Newfoundland Treaty, among others.¹⁰³³

Lodge promptly returned the favor, attacking Foss in more direct terms and personalizing the contest for the remainder of the campaign. After defending himself from the charge that his campaign expenditures were overly lavish, the senator responded, "Last year Mr. Foss confessed in his sworn return to the expenditure of a sum of money for his election as lieutenant governor which far exceeded all the money I have ever spent in politics during my whole public life." Lodge went on to assail Foss for trying to "buy the [R]epublican party and fail[ing]. He has just tried to buy the [D]emocratic party and has failed in that, although by devious methods he has received the nomination ... I do not believe the state is for sale."¹⁰³⁴ In subsequent rallies, Lodge attacked Foss' labor record as an industrialist.¹⁰³⁵

¹⁰³¹ *Fall River Globe*, October 21, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰³² *Fall River Daily Evening News*, October 24, 1910, p 6.

¹⁰³³ *The Boston Globe*, October 29, 1910, p 2.

¹⁰³⁴ *The Boston Globe*, October 23, 1910, p 10.

¹⁰³⁵ *The Boston Globe*, November 6, 1910, p 11.

Lodge's electoral fate was coupled with the fortunes of the Republican Party. While this was partly the result of his opponents framing the election as a referendum on the incumbent, Lodge self-consciously committed to attaching his candidacy to the party, as well. Among supporters, the senator was considered the face of the Republicans and the vanguard of the party in Massachusetts.¹⁰³⁶ Therefore, Lodge interwove his reputation with the party's brand. And when he defended the party, he was defending himself. An instructive example occurred when Lodge claimed credit for the tariff bill and the hard work and industry he had put into its formulation, "I spent many weary months at work on this bill, and it was the best bill that could be made under the then existing conditions and methods."¹⁰³⁷ His statement was a subtle, yet significant attempt at interjecting his own personal role within a broader defense of the tariff, thereby rendering his record ever-so-slightly more directly accountable to the public.

The third means of electioneering was the enlistment of political surrogates. These endorsements manifested as public appearances and newspaper publications. The most notable surrogate was former president Theodore Roosevelt — close friend and emerging leader of the nascent Progressive movement. Senator Lodge was instrumental snagging Roosevelt to appear at a major campaign rally in Massachusetts.

On October 21, 1910, Roosevelt was received with great fanfare at the Boston Arena. The former president defended the tariff, urged party harmony, and attacked the Democrats as insincere in many of their proposals. When speaking of Lodge, the Rough Rider exclaimed, "I feel it would be not only a calamity to Massachusetts but a calamity to the nation if he were not

¹⁰³⁶ *The Boston Globe*, August 15, 1910, p 50.

¹⁰³⁷ *The Boston Globe*, September 11, 1910, p 5.

returned.” Roosevelt proclaimed, “Mr. Lodge has stood for progressive legislation,” trumpeting Lodge’s favorable record on labor and commitment to protecting railroad workers from dangerous conditions. And the former president praised the senator’s admirable foreign policy positions, including his support for a strong navy, construction of the Panama Canal, and good government in the Philippines. Roosevelt concluded with a rhetorical flourish, pleading with voters to re-elect Lodge, “I ask that Massachusetts be true to its great traditions ... and send back to the [S]enate ... that statesman ... who has himself been true to the mighty traditions of Massachusetts’ past, that senator who has upheld the honor of his state by upholding the honor and the interest of the nation - Senator Henry Cabot Lodge.”¹⁰³⁸

Roosevelt’s address was a significant for several important reasons. First, the former president defended the long-time senator’s record and service to Massachusetts in glowing terms, representing a direct endorsement of Lodge’s candidature for re-election by a major, outsized political personage. Second, as a beloved figure of the Progressive wing of the party, Roosevelt’s support bolstered Lodge’s progressive credentials -- however tenuous -- while defusing the momentum behind the insurgency of Butler Ames. Roosevelt touted Lodge as the true progressive fighter. Finally, as a broadly popular leader among many Americans, Roosevelt could offer a more spirited, robust defense of the party to mainstream voters. His appearance was geared to dampen Democratic enthusiasm and attract as many voters to the Republican fold as possible.

At the height of the campaign, the embattled senator reached out to important politicians from other states to speak on behalf of the party. A fascinating letter to Old Guard Republican

¹⁰³⁸ *The Boston Globe*, October 22, 1910, p 5.

Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island reveals how Lodge strategically calibrated these campaign events. Lodge writes, “A speech from you on the cotton schedule will be of the greatest possible value to us. Our conditions have improved somewhat but we have a very hard fight.” Evidently, Lodge believed Aldrich’s deep knowledge of tariff duties would appeal to voters undecided over the issue. Further, he beseeched Aldrich to urge “Governor [Aram J.] Pothier [of Rhode Island] to make two speeches for us, one at New Bedford and one at Holyoke. They would have a very good effect on our French vote, which we are very anxious to hold as they are now wholly Republican. This is a matter of great importance to us.”¹⁰³⁹ Pothier was of French-Canadian extraction and clearly offered some assistance to Republicans in mobilizing the French vote throughout the commonwealth.

6.4.5 *Greater Legislative Autonomy Infused by Growing Elements of Popular Legitimacy*

On Election Day, the Republicans were humbled by a “Democratic tidal wave.” Democrats decisively recaptured the Congress, netting 58 seats to claim 230 in total. Eugene Foss triumphed over Governor Eben Draper by a margin of over 33,000 votes.¹⁰⁴⁰ And while Republicans maintained their hold over the state legislature, Democrats made impressive gains, winning 41 in the House for a total of 112 seats and capturing five Senate seats for a total of twelve senators.¹⁰⁴¹ With their ranks whittled down to a mere 127 in the House and 26 in the State Senate, Republicans enjoyed a majority of only seven votes in both chambers and a joint majority of fourteen. These results evidence how the Massachusetts contests were all successfully *national-*

¹⁰³⁹ Lodge to Senator Nelson Aldrich, October 11, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

¹⁰⁴⁰ *The Boston Globe*, November 9, 1910, morning and evening editions, p 1.

¹⁰⁴¹ Dublin, *Party Affiliations*, 94.

ized by the Democrats, so that state Republicans would be punished for the missteps of the Taft Administration and the Congress. Lodge's worst fears were realized. Although the Democrats were prevented from securing an overall majority, the closeness of the margins meant a small cadre of insurgent Republicans could wreak havoc with his selection. The ensuing weeks were Lodge's most vulnerable during his entire senatorial career.

The closeness of the margins granted the state legislature greater autonomy and wider latitude settling upon a senator. The judgment of every individual member became *more* important as each one was consequential to the final decision. There was little room for error. As such, it was absolutely imperative for Lodge that not a single Republican defect and abandon the party. The anxious Lodge made clear to his operatives, "With only 28 on joint ballot as it stands today, it is necessary to take every precaution and I felt sure that you would give me a helping hand."¹⁰⁴² To another supporter, he wrote, "Apart from my personal fortunes, it is very important ... that the Republican party should stand together unitedly, elect their own Speaker, their own President of the Senate and their own Senator ... Anything that you can do in that direction will be of highest benefit to me and ... to the party."¹⁰⁴³ Admittedly, Lodge may have been feigning selflessness when he urged party unity *notwithstanding* his own personal stake in the contest. He understood that no other Republican candidate could possibly command as much support as he enjoyed — even if short of a majority — and therefore, he could afford to take the high road in his rhetoric with other legislators and party officials.

¹⁰⁴² Lodge to Dana Malone, November 9, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 31. Lodge was using the margin of difference between Republicans and Democrats, not the margin for an outright majority, which was approximately fourteen.

¹⁰⁴³ Lodge to William Flanders, November 13, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

Despite autonomy given to legislators, elements of public opinion, sentiment, and pressure permeated the politics of the decision, rendering the legislative selection process modestly more popular. Newly-emboldened by the Democratic wave and his resounding election as governor, Eugene Foss embarked upon an unconventional and unprecedented statewide tour of Massachusetts with the stated intent of denying Lodge another term to the Senate. By then, Colonel William Gaston, former gubernatorial nominee and bigwig in Democratic state politics, announced his intention to challenge Lodge as his party's candidate on November 20.¹⁰⁴⁴

However, Foss' campaign was exclusively predicated upon opposing Lodge, not affirmatively supporting Gaston. On December 1, Foss commenced his assault at Provincetown, declaring, "This is the opening gun in the campaign of the people for the popular election of United States senators ... This first battle ... is against the present incumbent, Henry Cabot Lodge ... This is the people's fight, and there is no question as to the result. The people will win." Foss interpreted the Republican's poor showing in the recent election as popular judgment upon Lodge and tangible evidence of the senator's weakened political support. "You know that the vote in November ... was the verdict of the people against not only Gov. Draper but Senator Lodge," he contended, continuing, "If Senator Lodge were truly a representative Massachusetts man, he would have withdrawn after this overwhelming vote of censure, but he has chosen to defy the will of the people by standing for re-election."

Foss further developed this theme that Lodge was anathema to the people of the state, claiming the senior senator was "working in silence and secrecy [assisted by] his self-constituted political machine ... which has dominated [the state] politically for years." The governor-elect

¹⁰⁴⁴ *The Boston Globe*, November 21, 1910, p 2.

assailed Lodge's record as serving "privileged interests" in supporting high tariffs and duties, which have harmed businesses, industries, and consumers. "Senator Lodge's great ability working against the people's interests makes his influence more harmful than otherwise ... We criticize 'Lodgeism' and the wrong it means to the people."¹⁰⁴⁵

Foss carried on his public campaign along the Cape, visiting Chatham, Yarmouthport, and numerable other towns, before concluding in Wareham on December 3.¹⁰⁴⁶ And on December 29, Foss appeared at Faneuil Hall in Boston to whip up frenzied opposition to Lodge.¹⁰⁴⁷ The governor-elect was met with generally favorable crowds and his rallies were well attended, as the Cape and Boston proper were hubs of pro-Foss, anti-Lodge sentiment. However, his actions were uniformly panned by many observers as undignified and unbecoming of a governor-elect. *The Lawrence Telegram* lamented, "It hasn't taken ... Foss very long ... before he tries to play the role of dictator or boss."¹⁰⁴⁸ Another editorial from *The Telegram* declared, "[Lodge] really shines in comparison to such a mere money collector and opportunist politician as is Foss." *The Milford Daily News* contended, "That ... Foss should dare to dictate to the legislature is a crime that no self-centered member will overlook." *The Lowell Courier Citizen* urged Foss to "cease from bothering about so many things that can't be done and stud[y] up a little more constitutional law." *The Taunton Gazette* wrote, "Many of the members [of the legislature] are rather inclined to laugh at the idea of Mr. Foss shouting to the people what the legislature must or must not

¹⁰⁴⁵ *The Boston Globe*, December 2, 1910, p 1, 4.

¹⁰⁴⁶ *The Boston Globe*, December 2, 1910, p1; December 3, 1910, p 1; December 4, 1910, p 7.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *The Boston Globe*, December 29, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰⁴⁸ *The Boston Globe*, November 24, 1910, p 10.

do.”¹⁰⁴⁹ And *The Waltham Free Press Tribune* bemoaned Foss for “setting out to violently antagonize a majority of the members of the legislature.”¹⁰⁵⁰

In the face of Foss’ public onslaught, Lodge opted to personally remain silent, devoting his immediate attention to meeting Republican legislators and shoring up support among the caucus.¹⁰⁵¹ In the meantime, recognizing the importance of favorable public relations, Lodge deployed his legions of supporters to “address meetings at various places in the interest of [his] candidacy.”¹⁰⁵² Additionally, Lodge and his adjutants utilized other methods of advertising to counter the governor-elect’s negative narrative. Shadowing Foss during his stumping tour, the senator’s supporters distributed flyers devised by Norman White of Brookline, an ardent Lodge ally. One poster beseeched Foss, “Tell the citizens of Massachusetts” of his deep financial and business ties, before insisting, “When you have done this, then tell the truth about Senator Lodge.”¹⁰⁵³ Another poster, entitled “Truth About Lodge,” defended the incumbent’s record of service by enumerating his varied achievements on labor and other Progressive programs and his stated foreign policy positions. And it made clear in no uncertain terms, “He is NOT A DIRECTOR IN ANY CORPORATION - good, bad, or indifferent.”¹⁰⁵⁴ These posters were present “all along [Foss’] route.” Evidently, the pro-Lodge circulars “completely offset the [anti-Foss] litera-

¹⁰⁴⁹ *The Boston Globe*, November 30, 1910, p 12.

¹⁰⁵⁰ *The Boston Globe*, November 24, 1910, p 10.

¹⁰⁵¹ *The Boston Globe*, November 21, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰⁵² *The Boston Globe*, November 28, 1910, p 10.

¹⁰⁵³ Anti-Foss Poster, 1910, *Meyer papers*, MHS.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Pro-Lodge Poster, 1910, *Meyer papers*, MHS.

ture.”¹⁰⁵⁵ Lodge was informed by a Mr. Clark that the circulars “had a great deal of effect in distracting attention from what Foss had to say.”¹⁰⁵⁶

Complementing these activities, Lodge devised means of pressuring state legislators via external support, which manifest as top-down high-level endorsements and bottom-up grassroots petitions. Lodge insistently implored important political figures and businessmen to publish letters of recommendation so to convey to legislators the breadth of his political support. Writing to Charles Francis Adams, Lodge said, “I think a public letter from you would be of great assistance to me at this time ... Your Representative, Mr. Stone of Sudbury, I know and he is friendly and favorable to me, but I have no doubt that a personal letter from you would strengthen and encourage him.”¹⁰⁵⁷ He explained to Fred Atkinson, “It will be a very good thing to have some of our business people speak out, through letters to the newspapers and in other ways.”¹⁰⁵⁸ Similarly, he requested from Henry Higginson “a letter from you in [*sic*] my behalf [which] could not fail to help me.”¹⁰⁵⁹ More substantively, Lodge wanted credit for supporting the creation of a tariff board as senator. He urged L. D. Apsley to “write a letter to the papers ... pointing out that I voted for the tariff board in 1909 ... that I voted at the last session ... for [its] appropriation,” — an example of *advertising*, *position-taking*, and *credit-claiming* all in one — as

¹⁰⁵⁵ *The Boston Globe*, December 3, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Clark to Lodge, December 5, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Lodge to Charles Francis Adams, November 26, 1910, *Charles Francis Adams papers*, (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society), reel 42.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Lodge to Fred Atkinson, November 26, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Lodge to Henry Higginson, November 26, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 30.

well as other relevant material which could be used to “dispose very handsomely of Mr. Foss’ falsehoods.”¹⁰⁶⁰

Further, Lodge’s associates collected petitions in pivotal legislative districts to demonstrate the depth of popular support he enjoyed in those areas, thereby pressuring legislators to conform with public sentiment.¹⁰⁶¹ Lodge informed William Ahearne that petitions in Lynn have been started, “both for and against me. If you can do anything to promote those in my favor I shall of course be very glad,” before directing him to a Ralph Bauer to manage the ground game.¹⁰⁶² Ahearne replied, “Ex. Senator Salter called on me a few days’ [sic] ago and left about twenty-five with me. I have already put out fourteen and will collect them Saturday.”¹⁰⁶³

But Lodge’s greatest assistance was provided by the reviled Eugene Foss, himself. The governor-elect badly miscalculated the reaction to his stumping tour. Instead of rallying opinion against Lodge, the campaign actually helped unify the schism between Republicans. *The Hingham Journal* suggested, “Lodge will probably be re-elected ... and ... he can give a large share of the credit to Gov-elect Foss.”¹⁰⁶⁴ *The Cambridge Journal* explained, “There may be many [R]epublicans who sincerely believed ... that Senator Lodge should be retired ... From the source of the more recent attacks upon him, and the spectacle Foss had made of himself, [they] have come around to the feeling that he must not be defeated now at any rate.” *The Springfield Union* urged the re-election of Lodge, “if for no other reason than to teach an executive to keep

¹⁰⁶⁰ Lodge to L.D. Apsley, December 24, 1910, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

¹⁰⁶¹ John Cole to Lodge, undated letter, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27, 29.

¹⁰⁶² Lodge to William Ahearne, January 10, 1911, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

¹⁰⁶³ William Ahearne to Lodge, January 13, 1911, *Lodge papers*, MHS, reels 27-28.

¹⁰⁶⁴ *The Boston Globe*, December 15, 1910, p 10.

on his own ground and have due respect for the legislative department.” Even *The Falmouth Register* concluded “The Cape tour ... a failure of a unique experiment.”¹⁰⁶⁵

The strengthening of the Republican ranks redounded to the detriment of Democratic hopes of unseating Lodge. Colonel William Gaston withdrew his bid after just one month, judging that “Gov-elect Foss had destroyed whatever chances [his party] had to elect a successor to Senator Lodge by his ‘state-wide’ campaign advocating the election of a ‘progressive [R]epublican.’”¹⁰⁶⁶

With Gaston out of the running, Lodge received the endorsement of a longtime Democratic industrialist, Henry Whitney. Whitney had favored Canadian reciprocity and opposed Lodge politically for many years. However, citing the absence of a suitable alternative, the influential businessman threw his weight behind Lodge on January 2. According to his letter to the press, Whitney wrote, “I would have been glad to see Col Gaston elected to this position, but since he has seen fit to withdraw ... my judgment is that Senator Lodge should be chosen.” Whitney went on to praise Lodge’s “ability, his position and influence in the [S]enate,” which would “best conserve the interests of the state.” The move came as a shock to the Foss camp. “To say that [they] were surprised is putting it mildly,” jived *The Globe*. Representing the continued consolidation of high-level political support around the longtime senator’s candidature, Whitney’s endorsement significantly strengthened Lodge’s hand and went a long way toward assuring his reelection.¹⁰⁶⁷

¹⁰⁶⁵ *The Boston Globe*, December 20, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰⁶⁶ *The Boston Globe*, December 20, 1910, p 1.

¹⁰⁶⁷ *The Boston Globe*, January 3, 1911, p 1.

Although Lodge resisted making public appearances on his own behalf during the selection period (November to January), he agreed to speak at Symphony Hall in Boston a fortnight prior to the legislature's decision. Primarily directed toward state legislators and party figures, the address represented a prime opportunity to present the senator's case for re-election, state his record of service in the Senate, and clear his name of all the misperceptions, distortions, and purposeful misrepresentations. The decision to take the fight to a highly-visible public venue attested to the growing relevance of molding mass opinion and securing popular legitimacy.

On January 3, 1911, Lodge arrived at Symphony Hall, appearing before a crowd of 4,000 observers who had packed the halls of the venue. Billed as an event of great "political and historical importance," many attendees were not even Republicans, but ordinary citizens "anxious to hear Senator Lodge." At 8 o'clock, Lodge was greeted with a five-minute ovation as he "made his dramatic appearance, unattended and alone." As he began to speak, "his voice was trembling, and he was ... a little nervous."

At the outset, Lodge recognized the novelty of the moment, admitting, "I come with unfeigned reluctance, for ... I have never yet learned to speak in favor of my own election." The senior senator recognized that he had "been accused of silence, so far as my own personal fortunes are concerned," but he had always "discussed every public question of national import." But given the extraordinary, extenuating circumstances and widespread distortions, the incumbent was forced to break with precedent. "I intend ... to confute these misrepresentations and in simple justice ... to recall what I have said and done during my service as senator and to restate my oft-expressed opinions upon the public questions of the day." Lodge proceeded to detail his positions the pressing issues of his long career, including civil service reform, immigration, rail-

road regulation and rebates, naval expansion, overseeing governance of the Philippines, and another spirited defense of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Furthermore, the senator touted his support for a corporation tax and reciprocity with Canada — although conceded the technical difficulties in agreeing to favorable terms.¹⁰⁶⁸ As Lodge concluded the address, the senator proclaimed his devotion to serving his beloved Massachusetts:

I have valued the high position given me in the Senate ... but I prize them most because they give to Massachusetts the place which is her due in the councils of the nation I have given my all; no man can give more ... Others may easily serve her better than I in those days yet to be, but of this I am sure: that no one can ever serve her with a greater love or deeper loyalty.”¹⁰⁶⁹

Although Lodge’s speech was given to state legislators and party leaders, it was not conducted secretly behind closed doors, but rather in a public venue widely reported to the populace. The nature of the address epitomized the increasing importance of popular legitimacy in the senatorial selection process. When the legislature finally convened days later, Lodge failed to carry an outright majority in each chamber. As such, the legislators were obligated to meet in a joint session, wherein Lodge ultimately prevailed by a narrow six-vote majority to be re-elected to the Senate for a fourth term.¹⁰⁷⁰ See **Figure 6.5** for a chart of the initial vote breakdown and **Figure 6.6** for the final joint ballot conducted by the legislature.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *The Boston Globe*, January 4, 1911, p 6.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *The Boston Globe*, January 4, 1911, p 4.

¹⁰⁷⁰ *The Boston Globe*, January 18, 1911, p 1.

Figure 6.5

Initial Vote of the Massachusetts State Legislature for Senator, January 1911



SOURCE: *Fall River Globe*, January 18, 1911, p 6

Figure 6.6

Final Joint Vote of the Massachusetts State Legislature for Senator, January 1911

SOURCE: *The Boston Globe*, January 19, 1911, p 1

Analysis

The preceding case studies offer satisfactory evidence to several important questions regarding senatorial elections in Massachusetts. First, was popular campaigning a necessary component for a successful re-election? Clearly, public campaigns were a necessary component for buttressing a senator's electoral position. Over the years, Lodge undertook increasingly more vigorous, intensive, and widespread public campaigns for popular support. These trends culminated in 1910, with the launch of the campaign as early as June and daily appearances throughout October and early November. These public events tended to cluster in and around large population centers, namely Boston and its outlying regions, Worcester, Lawrence, Lowell, and Brockton.

Public campaigning served the immediate objective of mobilizing turnout and protecting marginal legislative seats. In so doing, a senator bolstered their position within the party, earning *bona fides* with district nominees for their diligent work, and thereby potentially averting intra-party discontent. Additionally, the campaigns helped persuade voters to support Republicans over Democrats. While this concern traditionally mattered less in Republican-dominant Massachusetts, it emerged as a major consideration in 1910.

Second, did the voters render judgment on Senator Lodge when they entered the polling place to cast their ballots? Although the citizenry was aware that Democrats and insurgent Republicans had been framing the election as a referendum on Lodge himself, it does not appear they were opposing the senator due to his personalized, individual traits. Despite the widespread perception that Lodge was a corrupt, machine politician — upon which Foss and Ames repeated-

ly capitalized — those aspects do not seem to have factored into the election calculus as much as the more salient economic issues gripping the state and the nation, at that time. Voters were passing judgment on the Republican Party, broadly, and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, specifically. The contests was effectively *nationalized* as a conduit by which to channel their frustration and ire with the missteps and mistakes of the Taft Administration and Congress.

Lodge represented the public face of the Republicans, faithfully defending the unpopular tariff and readily associated with the public's ire for the reigning party. As such, the senator incurred the condemnation of voters, as they punished the party with its worst showing in decades. Whether a more progressive Republican amenable to the insurgency would have performed better is questionable. While the scenario may have satiated rebellious Republicans, it likely would have alienated conservative, protectionist Republicans, furthering the rift between both camps. And awhile they may have been able to successfully co-opt the divisive issue of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, it is uncertain whether that would have been sufficient to withstand the strong Democratic wave.

Third, was the legislative selection period a case of legislative *deference* or *autonomy*? On the spectrum, it appears the 1910-1911 senatorial selection process ranks closer to autonomy. With the relatively close outcome in the November elections, each member's judgment was critical to the eventual selection. The vulnerable Lodge could ill afford any defections or abstentions. With the role of the legislature elevated, however, many popular elements infused the decision. Foss embarked on a stumping tour to gin up anti-Lodge sentiment and pressure lawmakers, while Lodge countered with circulars and flyers to educate the populace; letters from notable politicians and businessmen (top-down support) coupled with district petitions (grassroots,

bottom-up support) to demonstrate the breadth of his following; and eventually, Lodge's own public defense of his long record of service to Massachusetts. Lodge could have handled the persistent intra-party discord in the back rooms, privately wrangling with party officials and leading figures to gain pledges of support. But the embattled senator opted to go public, equally a recognition of the necessity for public relations outreach and a concession to the increasingly democratizing process. The 1910 senatorial election was exemplary of the potential for competitiveness and sensitivity in one of the nation's most partisan, highly-entrenched states. Although the parties still wielded tremendous authority, popular electoral support gradually became crucial to closing the deal.

The indirect regime rested on party discipline and partisan loyalty. Defections from state legislators were expected to be minimal. In many states, instances wherein a bloc of disaffected members bolted from their party to join forces with the opposition in an effort to deny the incumbent re-election were relatively rare. So great was party fealty that insurgency movements generally supported figures from their own ranks, rather than an aspirant from the opposing party. Massachusetts was no exception. Although Eugene Foss made entreaties to disaffected Republicans to combine with the minority Democrats and oppose Senator Lodge, ultimately, these efforts fell short. Democrats supported their own candidate, Sherman L. Whipple, while insurgent Republicans supported Butler Ames, or a smattering of other Republican candidates. Strong party fidelity precluded cross-party support.

The strong party system under the indirect regime also fostered the *nationalization effect* — the transforming of all down-ballot state races into a referendum on national conditions — and the tendency to produce wave elections. The Republican Party's result in the 1904 elections,

electing Roosevelt to the presidency and enlarging their majorities in the state legislature, was largely driven by the broad popularity of the president and the strengthening economic conditions — factors with which all Republicans were willing to identify and ever eager to emphasize, including Lodge — who himself was buoyed to another term in office. By 1910, the political situation had grown tenuous for Republicans given the unpopularity of President Taft, the deep fissures caused by the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, and the general sense of discontent. Resultantly, voters punished Bay State Republicans at the polls in November.

Elements of a *parliamentary-styled democracy* manifested under the indirect regime, primarily due to the durability of strong parties. State legislative nominees were publicly committed to supporting the re-election of the incumbent. Senators diligently worked toward ensuring district conventions nominated state legislative partisans, who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent's re-election in the forthcoming legislative session. Thereafter, incumbents vigorously campaigned in the respective districts to maximize visibility and mobilize turnout. Lodge faithfully undertook these canvasses in all three election years, leaving no stone unturned in his quest for party support.

The system prevailing in the Bay State was largely dominated by party officials and leading political figures. Unquestionably, party backing *and* party harmony — partially afforded by the senator's incumbency — were integral to Lodge's smooth re-elections, as the 1898 and 1904 case studies illustrate. Problematically, in 1910, the senator could count on continued party backing, but party unity was seriously disrupted by reciprocity, the tariff, and the Butler Ames challenge. Lodge's incumbency status seemingly posed a liability, but the senator continued

benefitting politically from his position as his efforts were greatly assisted by a solid, professional canvassing operation of state legislators to support his candidature.

Despite the strong, party-dominated nature of the state, popular legitimacy increasingly factored into the equation. Lodge conducted limited appeals for popular support. Through newspapers, personal appearances, and political surrogates, the senator sought to advertise party and candidacy, take positions on pressing issues, and claim credit for important accomplishments. Through elite learning, the incumbent recognized how best to couple his candidacy to the party and render his re-election bid more publicly visible, namely through the use of state and district convention endorsements. Similarly, the public nature of his Symphony Hall address rendered the senatorial selection process even more transparent and open than before. These practices represented critical concessions to the democratizing tendencies afoot, with parties and senators responding to seismic shifts in attitudes by accommodating the increasing importance of public sentiment and popular legitimacy.

CHAPTER 7: Broader Themes - Implications for Structural Democratic Reforms

On the eve of its reform, the indirect method of senatorial selection exhibited emerging elements of popular legitimacy, as public sentiment influenced the process to a degree hitherto scarcely appreciated. Keenly sensitive to the electoral pressures of the day, senators took to the hustings to buttress their positions within the party, and, in so doing, bolster their own prospects for re-election. My *theory of indirect elections* anticipated that these levels of sensitivity — a senator's sense of vulnerability/confidence in their electoral fate — would vary according to the nature of the state's political conditions.

7.1 Theory of Indirect Elections and Recapitulation of Case Studies

In cases operating on the “popular” end of the spectrum — competitive general elections, widespread candidate name recognition, and state legislative deference to the electoral results — vibrant campaigns were the norm. Senatorial aspirants undertook extensive and vigorous public canvasses to cultivate popular support on behalf of their party and, more critically, their candidacy. In the *exceptionally popular* state of Indiana or the *modestly popular* South Carolina, senatorial contenders occupied a primary, central role in the forthcoming elections, and more broadly, they represented a major force in their state's politics. Having pegged their fortunes to the popularity of Charles Fairbanks, Hoosier Republicans enjoyed stupendous successes at the polls that year, thereafter rewarding the incumbent with a second term in office. By contrast, Fairbanks' counterpart, Albert Beveridge, failed to leverage his personal popularity to compensate for his party's flailing numbers primarily due to the senator's determined assault on the party over the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, thereby alienating his base from turning out in sufficient numbers. And

Matthew C. Butler charted a tenacious, but tenuous course to retain his seat, adjusting positions in an effort to broaden his electoral appeal and rebrand himself as a Populist-light Bourbon; but the senator too fell short, having alienated his core cadre of conservative Carolinians in the process. While Indiana was a fiercely competitive battleground state with a truly two-party system and South Carolina a uni-party regime with an entrenched Democratic hegemony, the parties mattered far less than the *personalities* of the candidates. The face of the contenders dominated the campaigns and the course of the elections. But when an especially animating national issue mobilized voters to express their frustrations, party-line voting reasserted itself in consequential ways. See Beveridge, 1910.

As conditions grew less popular and more exclusivist — non-competitive general elections, constricted name recognition, and state legislative autonomy — insider politicking, bargaining, and hard-nosed negotiating were more prevalent as party leaders and officials — the so-called *middlemen* — exercised greater clout and influence over the process. In non-popular states such as New York or Massachusetts, parties controlled the proceedings and dominated the campaigns. The power struggle between Governor Benjamin Odell and Senator Thomas C. Platt defined the contours of the contest and colored the course of the election, forcing Chauncey Depew into a delicate dance between the competing power brokers. And Henry Cabot Lodge regularly relied upon his loyal Republican organization to return him to office. Emphasizing the importance of the political parties, these campaigns generally resorted to partisan appeals for electoral support, as individual senators rode the coattails of their party. Their candidacies were often secondary to other more visible races in the state.

Despite the preponderance of power in the hands of parties, popular legitimacy and public support were growing in import. Depew enlisted a syndicate of favorable periodicals to publish his breadth of support amongst ordinary and influential New Yorkers. And even in the *exceptionally non-popular* Massachusetts, Lodge evinced a nifty sensitivity to the trend of public sentiment, routinely organizing public campaigns on behalf of the party and diligently canvassing state legislative districts in an effort to back viable candidates pledged to his re-election. Few senators could ignore the all-encompassing thrust of democratization, which was increasingly rendering their offices more *accountable* to voters and transforming the nature of senatorial elections into a more *public and popular* process.

7.2 Campaign Techniques

These democratizing trends raised the importance of appealing to voters and cultivating popular support. Novel techniques emerged offering senators the promise of more effectively communicating with the masses. Borrowing from David Mayhew's *Electoral Connection*, incumbents pursued three fundamental objectives in their bids for re-election, early, prototypical examples of what would eventually be termed *advertising* (disseminating their candidacy), *position-taking* (staking out stances on pressing issues of the day), and *credit-claiming*, (highlighting favorable accomplishments). To achieve these goals, senators often utilized three methods of electioneering: newspapers, public appearances, and political surrogates. These activities were most common and better developed amongst more popular states. Butler routinely praised his commitment to delivering federal monies to support infrastructure projects in South Carolina. Fairbanks regularly touted his responsibility in enlarging access to rural mail delivery routes

throughout Indiana. And fashioning himself as a Progressive crusader on the side of ordinary Hoosiers, Beveridge repeatedly emphasized his firm opposition to the much-maligned Payne-Aldrich Tariff.

Under less popular conditions, these activities were more limited, circumscribed, and indirect, yet they remained useful tools for senators in the arsenals of their campaigns. Depew's outsized personality and highly-regarded talents as an orator were self-evident on the campaign trail, advertising his candidacy and senatorial timber to eager spectators. Further, the senator often reminded audiences of his devout loyalty serving the party on the stump and in the Senate. Even Henry Cabot Lodge eventually took to reviewing his long record of service and distinguished career representing Massachusetts in his climactic — and public — Symphony Hall address.

The thrust of democracy also reshaped state political dynamics and existing power arrangements. As voters grew in import, senators discovered independent bases of political support in their quests for re-election. Gradually, popular legitimacy emerged as a cudgel with which to leverage against recalcitrant insider power brokers and state legislators. Confronted by the internecine Odell-Platt factional feud, Depew marshaled his popularity with New Yorkers to impress upon party officials the depth of his electoral support *and* its immeasurable benefit to the party. Charles Fairbanks conducted a similar operation, sans the fierce intra-party squabbling that characterized New York.

7.3 *Party Adaptability*

How parties responded to these changes attest more broadly to *party adaptability*. Political parties strategically and haphazardly adapt to changing conditions and recognize the evolving *zeitgeist* to remain electorally viable, competitive, and relevant. While influential officials — leaders and machines — may initially resist any rumblings of discontent, forcefully extirpating these impulses root and branch, they must ultimately reconcile themselves to fluctuations in sentiment, often choosing to co-opt novel movements in ways that preserve the existing power differential. Confronted by the rising tide of democracy as manifested by calls for greater democratic self-government — enlarging the authority of the electorate to meaningfully check public officials, hold them accountable to higher standards of service, and render those offices more responsive to the interests of ordinary Americans — the parties made necessary concessions.

One subtle, yet important shift toward more *directly accountable* senators was the convention endorsement. Through elite learning, incumbent senators imitated practices from other states in their quests toward re-election. Recognizing the immense benefit of a state convention endorsement, whereby senators could visibly couple their personal prospects to the fortunes of the party, Lodge, at first, hesitatingly inquired (1898), and then, adamantly demanded (1910), that the Republican party state convention endorse his record of service and candidacy for re-election — partially explaining his perfect record of electoral success. State convention endorsements were a prized commodity as they generally reflected party harmony and internal unity. In the run up to state conventions, county and district conventions issued their own endorsements, measuring the breadth, viability and strength of a senatorial contender's electoral support.

Failure to demonstrate broad competitiveness and strong party unity often doomed incumbents. See David Turpie, 1898.

Another major concession by the parties was the adoption of the indirect primary — notably in South Carolina. In a nod to the democratizing tendencies of the period, the primary infused a popular element to the complex process of nominating a senatorial candidate, replacing one link — the county conventions — in an intricate chain of steps. Admittedly, the primary was only implemented *after* Populist reformers seized power in their state, but conservative Bourbons came to favor the reform, as well. And while Butler may have unhelpfully opposed the particulars of the 1894 senatorial preference poll — the fact he was losing — he supported the *principle* of the primary, namely greater power to the people. And Butler willingly stumped the state to appeal to voters of all stripes and consistently argued on behalf of letting the electorate more directly determine their own representatives in office. The primary may have strengthened the legitimacy of the Democratic Party in the South, allowing it to mollify disenchanted farmers, and, in their role as gatekeepers, exclude African-Americans from the state's politics, altogether. Other states followed South Carolina by introducing their own versions of a primary election, measures which emphatically increased the role of voters, public sentiment, and popular support in the selection of a senator.

A final concession, developing more organically than deliberately, was the presumption of widespread public campaigns for popular support. These expectations varied across the cases — routine and fundamental in more popular states; circumscribed and limited in non-popular states. In South Carolina, where state campaigns were especially vibrant, senatorial contenders were required to widely canvass every county and partake in a series of debates with their com-

petitors. Similarly, dueling candidates in Indiana exhaustively criss-crossed the state to cultivate electoral support for their Senate bids. Under less popular conditions, campaigning was limited to supporting the party slate, with senatorial contenders less directly implicated in their appeals. But public campaigns remained important to generate enthusiasm and turnout among the party faithful and produce a positive result for the party ticket, lest an incumbent weaken their standing and induce an intra-party insurgency — a fate which befell Lodge in 1910 as he desperately tried fending off the challenge of Republican Congressman Butler Ames.

7.4 *Endurance of Party Support*

Despite the significant democratizing trends, the importance of whom Jonathan Rauch term the *middlemen* remained a critical part of the process and ensured the system operated smoothly. During the indirect period, parties wielded significant influence as attested by the general lack of true independent senators and the need to ensure the combination of party backing (support of influential actors and officials) *and* party harmony (unity of all disputing factions). A modern-day Icarus, Beveridge over-relied on popular support at the expense of party harmony, straying too far from party orthodoxy and jeopardizing his seat in the general election. More effectively, Chauncey Depew struck the proper balance between public sentiment and party support, for his fate was ultimately decided after a constructive summit with Governor Benjamin Odell.

Primarily due to the durability of strong parties, persistence of factional contestation, and importance of legislative haggling under the indirect regime, elements of a *parliamentary democracy* manifested. State legislative nominees were publicly committed to supporting the re-

election of incumbents. Senators diligently worked toward ensuring district conventions nominated legislative partisans, who could carry the district for the party in November *and* support the incumbent's re-election in the forthcoming legislative session. Thereafter, incumbents vigorously campaigned in the respective districts to maximize visibility and mobilize turnout. Publicly pledged legislators rendered the system more *directly accountable* to voters, but also ensured rigid party discipline.

Parliamentary democracies provide “party cover” to its officeholders and candidates, a dynamic appraised by David Mayhew and Anthony King. In short, in parliamentary systems, ambitious politicians are nominated by the party proper, not directly by voters through primaries; their expenses are footed by party committees, rather than perennially fundraising on their own behalf; and finally, their political career depends exclusively upon party discipline and loyalty; whereas in the American system, outsiders regularly attain positions of high status.¹⁰⁷¹ Under the indirect regime, party cover constituted what Jonathan Rauch terms “the middlemen,” those essential political functionaries who ensured the system operated smoothly, filtrated fluctuations in popular opinion, and served the broad interests of the parties.¹⁰⁷²

Lodge and Fairbanks enjoyed very strong party cover in their re-election contests, collecting critical convention endorsements and the public backing of legislative nominees. While Depew could claim party cover in his 1904 re-election — primarily due to his popularity and record of service to New York Republicans — he had been all but shorn of party cover by 1910, after his reputation had been damaged and his public image irrevocably tarnished. Although he

¹⁰⁷¹ David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

¹⁰⁷² Jonathan Rauch, “How American Politics Went Insane,” *The Atlantic*, (July/August 2016).

was eventually nominated by the caucus, the party had not publicized his candidacy nor encouraged the senator to undertake an extensive statewide stumping tour to promote it. And party cover had been greatly weakened in South Carolina after the indirect primary was adopted in 1892. Matthew Butler was forced to fundraise on his own accord, begging the leader of the national Bourbons for much-needed funds to finance his campaign. With the party nomination determined exclusively by voters, Butler had to comport with prevailing public sentiment to outfox Tillman — a strategy that ultimately failed. And finally, career advancement occurred outside the party channels, as anti-establishment outsiders, such as Tillman, emerged victorious, completing the hostile takeover of the state and molding the party apparatus around his personage.

Given the strength of parties, nominations were enormously critical to the landscape. The ability to lock down the backing of the party was a major factor to a senator's electoral success. Formally nominating senatorial contenders varied widely across states and they indelibly shaped the state's politics. South Carolina utilized a county convention system prior to 1892 — an admixture of party and popular support — which emphasized local, democratic grassroots organizing and electioneering, before migrating to the indirect primary — which encouraged *highly-personalized* factional disputes and popular pandering. Early on, Indiana had used the legislative party caucus, but increasingly applied a district convention system to nominate state legislative candidates publicly pledged to a senatorial contender, all prior to November, thereby rendering the election a referendum on the Senate race. New York and Massachusetts relied exclusively on the legislative party caucus, which were heavily influenced by the assent of party leaders. While incumbent senators and pretenders to the throne conducted their canvass for crucial party support

months in advance, this exclusivist arrangement generally obscured the importance of the senatorial contest during the election, instead witnessing extensive legislative wrangling *post*-election.

But party support alone was an insufficient component for victory. Successful re-elections demanded party harmony, as well, and, while incumbent may have ostensibly been backed by the party as its senatorial nominee, intra-party disunity torpedoed their candidacies. See Turpie, 1898, Beveridge, 1910, and Depew, 1910. Therefore, a premium was placed on coaxing intra-party challengers and mending the factional divide in effective, meaningful ways.

In many respects, the system of choosing a senator resembled the mixed system of presidential nominations. From 1912 to 1968, candidates competed in a series of limited primaries to demonstrate their presidential mettle and persuade party officials of their electoral *bona fides* with voters, yet party leaders exercised the final decision in selecting a nominee. Primary results informed their considerations, but they were by no means exclusive. In 1960, Senator John F. Kennedy successfully convinced skeptical Democratic figures that his Catholic faith would not present an albatross to the fortunes of the party in November, as it had to Alfred Smith's bid in 1928, only after convincingly winning the West Virginia primary — a state considered prime terrain for anti-Catholic sentiment.

Under the indirect regime, incumbent senators campaigned for electoral support amongst voters to impress upon crucial party officials the popularity of their candidacy and the sensibility of endorsing their re-election. These relationships could be confrontational at times, whereby incumbents marshaled their vast popular support to corral state legislators and party actors to bandwagon with their candidacy. See Depew, 1904. Other times, they were more symbiotic, where the entire party apparatus prospered due to the strong standing of the senator. See Fair-

banks, 1902. These variations depended upon state conditions, political circumstances, party strength, and the reputation of individual senators themselves.

But the district-based structure of the regime inhibited a faithful translation of the popular vote into legislative strength. In 1858, Abraham Lincoln collected more votes, but lost the election due to the allocation of seats in the legislature.¹⁰⁷³ In 1910, Albert Beveridge contended that he would have been re-elected under a direct method of election.¹⁰⁷⁴ As with the Electoral College or the Iowa Democratic Caucuses, the system punished candidates who failed to win a broad coalition of support. Candidates who ran up exceedingly large tallies, but in *fewer* districts, may emerge as the popular vote winner, yet fall short of the necessary majority of legislators/electors/delegates to be elected. Therefore, a contender had to command broad support across *more* districts, rather than witnessing their backing concentrated in *fewer* districts.

7.5 *National and State Issues*

Senatorial campaigns were shaped by a blend of national and state conditions. As United States Senators, we would expect national issues to resonate among voters in rendering their decision. Strong parties and party discipline tended to invite the *nationalization effect*. Most evidently, senators nationalized their contests to benefit from a favorable political climate. These efforts were seamless and most lucrative during presidential elections, where senators could easily peg their candidacy to the coattails of the president and transform all down-ballot legislative races into a referendum on the race. In 1904, Depew and Lodge were assisted immeasurably by

¹⁰⁷³ "Lincoln and Douglas race to the Senate," *Abraham Lincoln Historical Society*, accessed February 20, 2020, URL: <http://www.abraham-lincoln-history.org/lincoln-and-douglas-race-to-the-senate/>.

¹⁰⁷⁴ It is unclear whether Beveridge was suggesting he *did* win more votes in the final tally, as in Lincoln's case, or whether the contention was speculative at best.

the massive Republican landslide which returned Theodore Roosevelt to the White House — in effect riding the popular president's coattails. But senators could similarly capitalize upon positive national conditions during midterm election years, as well. See Fairbanks 1902. More perilously, during economic downturns or politically problematic periods for the party, senators were especially vulnerable to the negative currents of public sentiment. And despite great exertions to decouple these factors from their contest, they were often subject to immensely powerful wave elections. Beveridge and Depew were casualties of the 1910 Democratic wave, whilst Lodge witnessed his electoral standing seriously eroded in ostensibly safe Massachusetts. Most glaringly, the uni-party system of South Carolina insulated the state from fluctuations in national partisan trends. Neither party was materially impacted in the state by their nationwide performance. The *nationalization effect* did not meaningfully manifest in the Palmetto State, nor did emerge, presumably, in any other Southern uni-party regime.

Notwithstanding these nationalizing impulses, the combination of the *state* legislative selection method and strong *state* parties — coupled with their specific means of nominations — national policies and sentiment were often refracted through the prism of unique state circumstances — factional disputes, local issues, pivotal figures — thereby shaping the outcome of these elections in intricate ways. While the Populist uprising had a cross-regional dimension, its success in South Carolina was only possible due to the state's hard-hit, economically-depressed farmers, an out-of-touch establishment class, the race problem that had arisen from the experience of Reconstruction, and the artful manipulation of their demagogic leader, Benjamin Tillman.

Although Theodore Roosevelt's election and calls for Republican harmony colored the 1904 contests, the issue was distorted by the Platt-Odell power struggle — emerging as a chess piece with which to wield against political opponents in the Empire State. In 1910, the shift in the national atmosphere toward greater transparency and accountability was setting reformers alight across the country, but Depew's compromised candidacy was *immediately* the result of Governor Charles Evans Hughes reformist crusade, the investigations which revealed the senator's unsavory business dealings, and the over-saturation of the press by enterprising journalists covering the matter.

Canadian trade reciprocity and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff were major national issues at the turn of the Twentieth Century, but the specific ways they negatively resonated with economic interests in Massachusetts, coupled with the skillful manner by which Eugene Foss capitalized on such discontent to assail Henry Cabot Lodge and his entire state organization, represented the gravest threat to the incumbent's electoral fate. And it was only due to the harm which the tariff afflicted on Indiana's sizable manufacturing sectors and the state's large segment of independent voters that Beveridge determined upon a battle against his own party over the issue.

7.6 Drive Toward the Seventeenth Amendment

The adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment — replacing state legislatures with direct, popular elections — represented the culmination of a long process of democratization. As the evidence illustrates, many states were *already* moving toward greater democratic deliberation and wider popular participation in selecting their senators. Several states even enacted so-called “Oregon Plans,” mandating that state legislators choose the candidate who received the most

votes in the recent election. Arguably, by 1913, the selection process was the *most* democratic aspect of the Senate.

Yet the method became identified with the growing Populist and Progressive movements as the centerpiece in their arsenal of reforms — the ready-made option intended to redress the rampant political dysfunction of the age by restructuring the Constitution. As Riker contends, reformers advocated for the Seventeenth Amendment on a democratic basis,¹⁰⁷⁵ arguing for a more responsive Senate. But their sustained fixation with removing the authority of state legislature to elect senators overstated the significance of the method, itself.

Over a century earlier, the framers of the Constitution designed an upper house which would serve as an institutional check on the rash impulses of the lower house. However, in Madison's own estimation, the means of choosing members of the United States Senate was not *the* key feature in achieving that body's deliberative purpose. Instead, the chamber's smaller size, longer terms, staggered nature of elections, and higher qualifications for members were much more essential in achieving the desired stability and deliberation. In *Federalist* #62, Madison writes, "Appointment ... by the state legislatures ... is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems."¹⁰⁷⁶ While the indirect method may be better suited to selecting members of superior wisdom and caliber, the tool was a necessary concession to federalism, permitting state govern-

¹⁰⁷⁵ William H. Riker, "The Senate and American Federalism," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1955), 468, accessed February 20, 2020, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951814>.

¹⁰⁷⁶ "Federalist #62," in *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Isaac Kramnick (London: Penguin Group, 1987), 364-365.

ments in their capacity as individual units to exercise meaningful influence on the composition of federal government officeholders. In certain respects, state legislative selection remained Madisonian in principle for it served as a filtration device on the immediate sentiment of the masses; but it was never *exclusively* intended to insulate senators from electoral pressures, per se, nor was it the *only* means whereby senators would be protected from such demands.

Then why reform the method of senatorial selection? We may surmise reformers were more likely targeting the iron triangle of undue influence — state legislatures, political parties, and the so-called “moneyed” interests — wealthy tycoons, industrialists, financiers, and large conglomerates. The state legislative selection process represented the fulcrum of these unsavory institutions. Such sentiment was widely expressed during the debates over the Seventeenth Amendment. Senator Joseph Bristow (R-KS) lambasted “the insatiable greed of modern times for commercial and financial power” dominating state legislatures.¹⁰⁷⁷ The increasing regularity of these dispiriting episodes and the depth of their entrenchment drove reformers to pass an amendment circumventing the gatekeepers and weakening party control over the entire process. Additionally, rampant partisanship and heated accusations of corruption produced deadlocks in many state assemblies, often resulting in extended vacancies and undermining the legitimacy of the Senate itself. Senator William Borah (R-ID) insisted the process was proving to be a burden on state legislatures, deploring the pervasive deadlocks and widespread bribery hampering an honorable selection of senators.¹⁰⁷⁸

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Congressional Record*, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, 2179-2180, accessed February 20, 2020, URL: <https://archive.org/details/congressionalrec46eunit>.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 1104-1105.

7.7 Consequences

The first consequence of Progressive reforms was the fierce conservative backlash which they engendered. The Seventeenth Amendment stipulating direct, popular election of senators was passed by Congress on May 13, 1912 and ratified with much fanfare on April 8, 1913.¹⁰⁷⁹ Heralding a flurry of major Progressive reforms, its adoption represented the high-water mark for the movement. The Sixteenth Amendment enacting a federal income tax was ratified in 1913 and eventually the Nineteenth Amendment granted women suffrage in 1920. And under the tutelage of President Woodrow Wilson, significant legislative achievements furthered the Progressive cause, including the Federal Reserve Act establishing a central banking system, the Federal Trade Commission regulating business conglomerations, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act legalizing peaceful labor strikes, and the reduction of prohibitive tariff rates. Concurrently, these successes signaled the twilight of the Progressive Age as well, for once the valve released the pent-up steam which was building for a decade, momentum suddenly stalled. A political movement's gravest challenge is often when victorious, for once it has accomplished its objectives and sated its appetite, it loses its *raison d'être* for attracting sustained support. Additionally, the outbreak of the Great War stifled any further oxygen for Progressive causes.

By that point, a backlash developed against Progressivism, presaging the onset of a more conservative political environment which would persist until the 1930s, when economic catastrophe would demand renewed national attention to redress the untenable ails plaguing the country. The brief hiccup of the 1920s — crudely termed the nation's "return to normalcy" — actually marked an overreaction to a false, idealized conception of a pre-Progressive America.

¹⁰⁷⁹ "17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Direct Election of U.S. Senators," *OurDocuments.gov*, accessed February 20, 2020, URL: <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=58>.

Throughout the decade, conservatives adopted a neo-isolationist foreign policy, as a sharp rebuke to Wilson's neoliberal institutional *weltanschauung*, but unlike earlier, ostensibly "neutral" behavior by the United States, their policies willfully ignored a growing threat to American national security. Additionally, conservative judges aggressively challenged the constitutionality of regulatory legislation, pursuing a far more vigorous defense of the "liberty of contract" than even Chief Justice William Taft countenanced as reasonable. See *Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D.C.* (1923). And Republicans sharply curtailed the influx of immigration by enacting quotas limiting nationalities to two percent of their 1890 population.

In the short-term, conservative politicians benefitted from these favorable political circumstances. Ironically, staunch *opponents* of the direct, popular election of senators continued to be re-elected to the Senate. For years prior to the reform, Bay State Democrats were certain that Henry Cabot Lodge lacked broad popular support, and, once subjected to a direct vote of the people, presumably would be sent packing. Yet Lodge proved his doubters wrong, eking out tight victories against Boston Mayor John Fitzgerald (grandfather of the 35th president) in 1916, and against Colonel William Gaston in 1922. Meanwhile, advocates for the direct election, such as Indiana Democrat John W. Kern — who defeated Beveridge in 1910 and went on to serve as Democratic leader in the Senate during the Wilson presidency — lost re-election in 1916 to Harry S. New. And Albert Beveridge, who staked his career on his Progressive insurgency and support for such causes as the direct popular election, failed in his attempt to return to the Senate in 1922. While he bested incumbent Harry New in the Republican primary, he lost to a Klan-backed Democrat, Samuel M. Ralston.

A second consequence has been on the nature of American federalism. Ralph Rossum observes that the issue was largely neglected in the arguments over the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.¹⁰⁸⁰ “Federalism [was] never defined or even expressly mentioned in the Constitution,” he argues. Its maintenance has relied exclusively on structure. Once the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, that structure was “fundamentally altered.” Rossum contends the reform irrevocably weakened the ability for states to redress their growing power imbalance with the federal government, leading to an increasingly larger chasm, and unalterably weakening federalism, writ large. “Federalism,” he writes, “no longer constitutes a viable constitutional restraint on Congress from trenching on what was once considered ‘the inviolable and residuary sovereignty of the states.’”¹⁰⁸¹ Such an expansion of governmental authority invariably led to the passage of measures that Rossum considers harmful to the states as units.¹⁰⁸²

A third consequence has been the weakening of the political parties. The Progressives’ other major target have similarly witnessed their influence significantly curtailed. Wendy Schiller concludes that the Seventeenth Amendment had the effect of weakening state party organizations, rendering senators less dependent on key party figures and interests, and “remov[ing] one of the main sources of leverage that state party leaders had over U.S. Senators.”¹⁰⁸³ Further research is in order to determine the implications of weaker state parties on the nature of candidates and senatorial campaigns under the direct, popular regime.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ralph A. Rossum, *Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of Constitutional Democracy*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 219.

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁰⁸² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰⁸³ Wendy Schiller, “Building Careers and Courting Constituents: U.S. Senate Representation 1889–1924,” *Studies in American Political Development*, 20, (Fall 2006), 196–197, accessed February 21, 2020, URL: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X06000095>.

Yet for all the bluster surrounding the impetus for reform, primarily the expectation that direct popular elections would materially democratize the institution of the Senate, at long last opening up the secluded chamber to the people and subjecting its members to greater transparency, publicity, and accountability, the Seventeenth Amendment failed dismally. Schiller and Stewart argue the reform did not resolve the animating issues associated with the Senate during the period, namely the toxic role of money and undue influence exercised by the financial interests, the formidability of entrenched incumbents, and the body's generally high unfavorable ratings. "The direct power to elect senators has not appreciably increased the Senate's responsiveness or efficiency," they contend.¹⁰⁸⁴

In lieu of pursuing structural change to the method of selecting Senators, Progressive reformers could have considered more modest alternative remedies. If they were concerned about the outsized role of the industrialists and corporations, they should have addressed the role of money in politics more seriously. The issue was certainly in vogue. Albert Beveridge repeatedly assailed the influence of "dark money" during his 1910 campaign and the need to dilute its deleterious effects on the polity. Once in the majority in Congress, they could have enacted legislation regulating fundraising, spending, and transparency.

Furthermore, the Progressives could have targeted the stranglehold of special interests over state legislatures in other, more effective and skillful ways. A principal precept of Progressivism was its advocacy of a strong, national government as a means of curtailing the authority of state legislatures, but reformers could equally have organized at the county and district levels instead. As demonstrated in South Carolina in 1890 — even before the implementation of the

¹⁰⁸⁴ Wendy J. Schiller and Charles Stewart, *Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seventeenth Amendment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 199-201.

indirect primary — the state's Populists outmaneuvered their Bourbon opponents in the state government through superior local grassroots organization and fierce enthusiasm and passion. Through open, public forums within each locality, committed reformers could have organically pressured state legislators from below to respond to the growing calls for meaningful, effective legislation.

If critics *were* angling for revolutionary proposals and truly desired transforming the elitist Senate into a more popular and responsive chamber akin to the House of Representatives, then they should have targeted senatorial tenure — shortening the length of its members' terms anywhere from two to four years — or discontinued the staggered nature of their selection, thereby authorizing a single election to determine the composition of the entire body at the same time — as in a *parliamentary democracy*. Unlike the direct election measure — which merely represented the culmination of a gradual process of democratization — these changes would have had a much more significant effect on the development and trajectory of the United States Senate.

7.8 Broader Themes

The debate regarding the validity of structural democratic reforms has percolated throughout American history and remains a salient, contentious issue today. In short, are reforms of this nature necessary when the government has allegedly grown listless and inactive before the American people? Is more democracy the answer?

In response to the 1968 Democratic Convention — where Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey secured his party's nomination on the first ballot having not competed in a single

presidential preference primary — anti-war Democrats disenchanted with the system pressed for fundamental reforms, thereafter implementing a primary-centric process to determine the party's nominee and shifting the power differential from party officials to voters. If the mixed regime of presidential nominations resembled the indirect system of senatorial selection, then the blossoming of the primaries echoed the switch to direct, popular elections for members of the Senate.

The abandonment of the convention system precipitated several problematic issues which have stubbornly persisted for decades. First, conventions — as with the indirect regime — assured broad, consensus candidates. Divisive, factional candidates with a high floor, but low ceiling of fierce-devoted supporters were filtrated from contention, unable to expand or diversify their coalition. Most problematically, their potential nomination posed grave electoral consequences for the party in the forthcoming general election, thereby incentivizing party leaders to forge a broadly-popular, politically-palatable contender. In a crowded field under the primary system, candidates routinely win the early states with little more than a quarter or a third of the vote.¹⁰⁸⁵ When these leading candidates eventually begin amassing outright majorities in state primaries, it is less a sign of the assent of party voters as a lack of suitable options available, as other viable candidates, struggling to keep up with the frontrunner's delegate lead, media atten-

¹⁰⁸⁵ Since 1972, the average winning percentage in Iowa has been 37.6%, while the average winning percentage in New Hampshire has been 41%. Excluding uncontested contests, such as the 1992 Iowa Democratic caucuses.

"Iowa Caucuses: Caucus History," The Des Moines Register, accessed February 20, 2020, URL: <https://data.desmoinesregister.com/iowa-caucus/history/#1972/dem>; "Iowa Caucus Results 2020," The New York Times, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/04/us/elections/results-iowa-caucus.html>; Dan Barrick and Rebecca Lavoie, "From Portsmouth to Pittsburg, Mapping 40 Years of the N.H. Presidential Primary," New Hampshire Public Radio, January 12, 2016, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.nhpr.org/post/portsmouth-pittsburg-mapping-40-years-nh-presidential-primary#stream/0>; "New Hampshire 2020 Primary: Live Results," The New York Times, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/02/11/us/elections/results-new-hampshire-primary-election.html>.

tion, organization, and resources, drop out of contention. The primary nominating process is less a system of consensus than of dysfunction. See **Table 7.1** for the percentages of all winning candidates in Iowa and New Hampshire.

Table 7.1 Winning Percentages of Iowa Caucuses and New Hampshire Primary, 1972 - 2020

Year	Iowa		New Hampshire			
1972 D	Muskie	35.5%	Muskie	46%		
1976 R			Ford	50%		
1976 D	Carter	27.6%	Carter	29%		
1980 D	Carter	59.1%	Carter	49%		
1980 R	Bush	31.6%	Reagan	50%		
1984 D	Mondale	48.9%	Hart	37%		
1988 D	Gephardt	31.3%	Dukakis	36%		
1988 R	Dole	37.4%	Bush	38%		
1992 R			Bush	53%		
1992 D			Tsongas	33%		
1996 R	Dole	26.3%	Buchanan	27%		
2000 R	Bush	41%	McCain	49%		
2000 D	Gore	63.4%	Gore	50%		
2004 D	Kerry	37.1%	Kerry	38%		
2008 D	Obama	37.6%	Clinton	39%		
2008 R	Huckabee	34.4%	McCain	37%		
2012 R	Santorum	24.6%	Romney	39%		
2016 D	Clinton	49.9%	Sanders	60.4%		
2016 R	Cruz	27.6%	Trump	35.3%		
2020 D	Buttigieg	26.2%	Sanders	25.7%		

SOURCE: "Iowa Caucuses: Caucus History," *The Des Moines Register*,

<https://data.desmoinesregister.com/iowa-caucus/history/index.php#2016/gop>.

"Mapping 40 Years of the N.H. Presidential Primary," NHPR

<https://www.nhpr.org/post/portsmouth-pittsburg-mapping-40-years-nh-presidential-primary#stream/0>.

Additionally, primaries only attract exceptionally small slithers of registered voters, let alone the population at-large. In 2016, the eventual nominees — Hillary Clinton and Donald

Trump — were only chosen by 14 percent of eligible voters and nine percent of Americans.¹⁰⁸⁶

We can only speculate as to the reasons for low turnout, but asking citizens to partake in multiple elections in a given year (presidential primary, state primary, general election) may be diminishing the value they place on the exercise of their franchise.

If absolute party control can be subject to abuse, then unchecked voter control can similarly be misused and abused. With party cover having been shorn of American elections, candidates have grown increasingly more independent of the parties, fueling assaults on the middlemen by populist-driven “outsiders.”¹⁰⁸⁷ And the introduction of primaries has had a serious impact on Congress, as well. As Anthony King amply demonstrates, American *hyper-democracy* and the lack of party cover— with the primary at the forefront — has eroded the willingness of members of Congress to find common ground, and fostered an “agency model” of governing, whereby officeholders strive to placate the interests of constituents and voters— at all costs — always with a view toward securing re-election. Compromise has become a toxic term. Ideological purity tests and institutional rigidity reward obdurate, recalcitrant members who resist negotiating with political opponents. Instead of enacting meaningfully effective policies, Congress passes superficial measures designed to satiate voters.¹⁰⁸⁸

The Senate, long the institution of compromise and mediation, has been especially hard hit by these developments. Senators must balance their responsibilities to their office against appeasing party primary voters. In 2016, Senator Richard Shelby, the chairman of the Senate

¹⁰⁸⁶ Alicia Parlapiano and Adam Pearce, “Only 9% of America Chose Trump and Clinton as the Nominees,” *The New York Times*, August 1, 2016, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/01/us/elections/nine-percent-of-america-selected-trump-and-clinton.html>.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Rauch, “How American Politics Went Insane.”

¹⁰⁸⁸ Anthony King, “Running Scared,” *The Atlantic* (January 1997).

Banking Committee, opted to “halt his committee’s work until later in March,” for, as he explained, “I have a primary, you know.”¹⁰⁸⁹ Shelby’s fears were not unfounded. Between 1996 and 2012, seven Senators lost their primaries, although two avoided outright rejection from office. Historically, more senatorial primary defeats occurred in spurts in earlier periods, such as the late 1940s, late 1960s, and late 1970s, yet these seven defeats represented another uptick in recent years.¹⁰⁹⁰ And the repercussions for senators are not limited to this modest cadre of casualties. The *threat* of a primary challenge has had a general deterrent effect on the psyche of *all* members, driving countless incumbents to “voluntary” retirement so to avoid a bloody, damaging primary fight, and whipping those who remain into line as they satiate their primary voter base.

Seeking to arrest the trend toward unilateral voter power and reclaim a modicum of party influence over the presidential selection process, Democrats introduced “superdelegates” in 1982. Recommended by the Hunt Commission Report, superdelegates comprised unpledged party officials who exercise discretion and judgment in the event of a contested convention or undesirable factional nominee. Collectively, these members accounted for approximately 15 to 20 percent of the party’s delegate totals. Superdelegates played a pivotal role determining the outcome of the 1984 nomination contest between Walter Mondale and Gary Hart, 2008 contest between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, and 2016 contest between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders. In no instance, however, did the superdelegates ever override the candidate with

¹⁰⁸⁹ Joshua Green, “Even the Senate Banking Chair Is Slamming Banks in Campaign Ads,” *Bloomberg Politics*, February 12, 2016, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-02-12/businessweek-wall-street>.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. Malbin, Andrew Rugg, and Raffaella Wakeman, “Vital Statistics on Congress: Chapter 2: Congressional Elections,” *Brookings Institute and the American Enterprise Institute*, July 2013, accessed February 20, 2020, URL: <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-mann-ornstein/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-2--Congressional-Elections.pdf?la=en>.

the most pledged delegates. In 2008, as Barack Obama began accruing a delegate lead over Hillary Clinton, the early superdelegate frontrunner, many party officials began bandwagoning in favor of the Illinois senator — following the electorate. Therefore, in certain respects, their calculations mirror those of Supreme Court justices — acting as a vital check on egregious transgressions by voters, but navigating within the bounds of politically legitimate behavior so as not to incur their unbridled wrath and undermine the standing of the institution itself.

In 2016, superdelegates unwittingly failed in their efforts to convince younger party activists of their neutrality and legitimacy. By overwhelmingly backing Hillary Clinton early in the nomination contest — 359 to 8 by November 2015, before a single primary vote was cast¹⁰⁹¹ — dissenters cried foul, claiming party officials were unfairly stacking the deck against challengers and deterring alternative candidates from emerging. In response, the party agreed to cede greater authority to voter control, reducing the number of superdelegates and denying them a first ballot vote at the convention, unless a presumptive nominee is “a foregone conclusion.” In the event no candidate receives a majority of pledged delegates on the first ballot, superdelegates are then permitted to wade into the fold and render their decision.¹⁰⁹²

The assault on mediating institutions are not limited to presidential nominations, but extend to general elections as well. In the wake of two popular vote losers assuming the presidency in as many decades, the Electoral College has fallen under renewed scrutiny. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted the National Popular Vote Initiative agreeing to reward

¹⁰⁹¹ Domenico Montanaro, “Clinton Has 45-to-1 ‘Superdelegate’ Advantage over Sanders,” *NPR*, November 13, 2015, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.npr.org/2015/11/13/455812702/clinton-has-45-to-1-superdelegate-advantage-over-sanders>.

¹⁰⁹² “Democratic Superdelegate Rule Changes for 2020,” *270 to Win*, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.270towin.com/content/superdelegate-rule-changes-for-the-2020-democratic-nomination>.

their electoral votes to the national popular vote victor.¹⁰⁹³ Their ire stems less from the Electoral College per se, than from the states' winner-take-all method of allocating electors whereby a candidate who carries a state by a single vote collects the entire slate of electors. See Florida, 2000. The push for popular election of presidents echoes the reformist movement favoring direct election of senators — ensuring a fairer, more faithful translation of the people's will and expanding the democratic foundations upon which our institutions rest. However, as with the Seventeenth Amendment, abolishing the Electoral College in favor of a pure majoritarian system would likely *not* result in the grand expectations set forth by its advocates.

A national popular vote regime elicits three problematic issues. First, implementing a national system of voting registration, balloting, and counting would be onerous, especially considering the deference states and municipalities have been afforded in such matters and the peculiarities of local conditions and circumstances. Agreeing upon a singular rule for the nation may prove elusive and more divisive. Second, the costs of national campaigning, advertising, and electioneering could precipitate ever-more expensive elections, overall — a trend which may displease many a reformer, especially in light of the renewed scrutiny on money in politics. Third, a national popular vote system has the potential to devolve into base-turnout elections, whereby candidates appeal to their core partisan supporters at the expense of moderate and swing voters across the country, resulting in further party polarization.

Before embracing such far-reaching reforms, we should consider modest alternatives which maintain the existing intermediary institutions while ensuring they operate more fairly and democratically. *Proportionally* allocating a state's electors based upon each candidate's popular

¹⁰⁹³ National Popular Vote, accessed February 29, 2020, URL: <https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/>.

vote percentages may render every state truly competitive, since voters of all stripes would feel incentivized to turn out, notwithstanding the partisan lean in their states. Since the system relies on electors and not pure votes, smaller states and swing voters remain important — although their roles are modestly diminished from the current winner-take-all regime. And finally, contenders will continue to vie for a broad-based coalition of support necessary for success. Thus, proportional allocation promises a fairer, more reasonable means of selecting the president, increases salient issues debated, and ensures a broad consensus for the victor, all the while safeguarding the existing institutional mechanisms that prevent unexpected and undesired consequences of a purely democratic solution.

7.9 *Further Research*

My dissertation raises several pertinent conceptual challenges and provides new avenues with which to explore the role of the Senate, nature of campaigns, behavior of senators, and their communication with constituents and voters. The district-based nature of the system rewarded candidates who commanded *broad* support amongst voters — accumulating backing from *many* legislative districts — rather than witnessing their backing concentrated in *fewer* districts. A contender who enjoyed unprecedented levels of turnout in a limited number of districts might ultimately emerge as the popular vote winner, but fail to claim a majority of legislators. Additional research should be conducted into this arrangement and the propensity for state legislatures to draw gerrymandered districts, thereby further distorting the faithful translation of popular support into legislative strength. These activities evidence the efforts by which political parties and incumbent senators undertook to fortify and entrench their positions in power by placing

structural hurdles before the opposition. And they raise questions about popular legitimacy, as well. A party that secured a majority in the legislature and selected a new senator could not always necessarily claim a popular mandate.

The role of the primary under the indirect regime should also be more closely examined. The primary in South Carolina — and other Southern states — *may* have strengthened the grip of the Democratic Party in three important ways. First, the measure might have helped regain a scintilla of party fealty among core supporters — poor, white farmers — who had grown disaffected with the system and disenchanted with politics under the Bourbon regime, serving as the pressure valve that alleviated their brewing hostility against the party. Second, in shifting the initial phase of the nomination process to the voters, white Carolinians may have had an even greater incentive to participate, thereby fostering greater civic attentiveness. Third, by restricting blacks from voting, parties essentially could select their own members by acting as gatekeepers and denying “undesirables.” In the years immediately following the introduction of the primary in 1892, the strength of the vestigial Republican Party — which had already been meager — collapsed.

Further research is required to substantiate this theory and determine whether the primary strengthened the Democratic Party’s grip over South Carolina and the ways the measure impacted other southern states where it was adopted. Another relevant dimension of the primary was its implementation in *non*-southern states where it was in use, particularly in the Midwest and the West. Did the primary render senatorial elections exceedingly more popular and democratic, further emphasizing candidate-centered, entrepreneurial features of campaigns at the expense of strong parties?

The preceding work largely limited itself to the period *prior* to the Seventeenth Amendment. But the immediate and long-term effects of the reform were not as closely scrutinized here. Presumably, the democratizing trends of the period were further heightened by direct, popular elections. To what extent did the nature of campaigns themselves change as a result of the reform? How common did candidate advertising, credit-claiming, and position-taking become afterwards. If so, how long after 1913 did they manifest? In what ways did advertising evolve, if any? Were personal canvasses more intensive and widespread? In short, just how much *more* “democratic” did these races become?

Relatedly, were parties irrevocably weakened in the wake of the Seventeenth Amendment? Certain studies have suggested as much,¹⁰⁹⁴ but additional research is necessary to specifically investigate the increasingly tenuous balance between parties, voters, and senators as it pertained to senatorial elections. During the indirect period, party control and voter control remained at parity — in tension, but in balance. With the adoption of direct, popular elections, party control was presumably weakened, while voter control grew to dominate the process. If so, what were its implications for legislative and electoral behavior? Did this change free moderate incumbents from the grips of their parties, allowing centrists to more forcefully assert themselves in successive years?

Finally, what was the effect of the Seventeenth Amendment on conservative southern states? While under the indirect regime these modestly popular states, i.e. South Carolina, exhibited exceptionally vibrant campaigns — more so than non-popular, exclusivist states, i.e. Massachusetts — it is unclear whether these states continued to operate in a similar fashion after the

¹⁰⁹⁴ Schiller, “Building Careers and Courting Constituents.”

Seventeenth Amendment. Did their elections continue moving on this trajectory toward greater openness, transparency, and widespread voter engagement, or did they revert to more staid affairs, with ostensibly safe, entrenched incumbents wielding great power and deterring contenders from mounting a primary challenge? Around the same time of the Seventeenth Amendment, Congress began dispersing its internal authority more widely to committees, whose chairs grew in import and influence. Many a southern member soon wielded these gavels, serving as consequential figures in the annals of legislative politics. Therefore, we may surmise these important positions may have insulated many members from traditional electoral politics calculations.

Further qualitative, in-depth case studies should be conducted to test the veracity of the aforementioned postulations and theories.

APPENDIX A: STATE DATA SCORES, 1890 - 1913

State	Party Control	Absolute Partisan Score	Re-election A - Strictest standard	Re-election rate B- Most Permissive	Re-election rate C - Median Rule	Competitiveness Index
Alabama	100% D	100	88%	90%	88%	94
Arizona	100% D	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Arkansas	100% D	100	71%	56%	71%	86
California	90% R	80	80%	50%	50%	65
Colorado	56% D	12	80%	50%	50%	31
Connecticut	100% R	100	86%	75%	75%	88
Delaware	63%R	26	33%	22%	29%	28
Florida	100% D	100	67%	60%	57%	79
Georgia	100% D	100	100%	56%	57%	79
Idaho	82%R	64	50%	38%	43%	54
Illinois	78% R	56	60%	33%	43%	50
Indiana	56% R	12	50%	44%	50%	31
Iowa	100%R	100	100%	88%	100%	100
Kansas	56% R	12	0%	0%	0%	6
Kentucky	80% D	60	40%	22%	22%	41
Louisiana	100% D	100	80%	55%	50%	75
Maine	78% R	56	86%	87%	75%	66
Maryland	82% D	64	50%	50%	40%	42
Massachusetts	100%R	100	100%	85%	85%	93
Michigan	100%R	100	86%	75%	86%	93
Minnesota	100%R	100	88%	78%	88%	94
Mississippi	100% D	100	75%	56%	57%	79
Missouri	88% D	76	83%	63%	63%	70
Montana	55%R	10	0%	0%	0%	5
Nebraska	78%R	56	0%	0%	0%	28
Nevada	44% R	0	100%	67%	75%	38
New Hampshire	88%R	76	71%	63.00%	63%	70
New Jersey	67% R	34	50%	40%	29%	32
New Mexico	100%R	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
New York	63% R	26	29%	25%	25%	26
North Carolina	67%D	34	63%	56%	63%	49
North Dakota	89%R	78	50%	40%	50%	64
Ohio	75% R	50	50%	33%	25%	38
Oklahoma	100% D	100	100%	100%	100%	100
Oregon	78% R	56	16%	11%	13%	35
Pennsylvania	100% R	100	88%	70%	78%	89
Rhode Island	100%R	100	80%	50%	67%	84
South Carolina	100% D	100	60%	44%	50%	75
South Dakota	75%R	50	43%	50%	43%	47
Tennessee	100% D	100	67%	50%	67%	84
Texas	100% D	100	100%	42%	50%	75
Utah	88%R	76	50%	33%	33%	55
Vermont	100%R	100	100%	80%	100%	100
Virginia	100% D	100	100%	90.00%	100%	100
Washington	88%R	76	17%	13.00%	13%	45
West Virginia	60% R	20	67%	44%	57%	39
Wisconsin	78%R	56	60%	30%	30%	43
Wyoming	100%R	100	75%	75%	75%	88