The Justice of the Cross in St. Thomas:
In Nobis, Sed Non Sine Nobis

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Abstract

This thesis focuses on St. Thomas Aquinas's understanding of the justice of the cross. In particular, it explores the following question: In what sense is the justice of the cross just? This interpretive task is pursued against the backdrop of Augustine's soteriology and Aquinas's appropriation of Anselm's theory of satisfaction and Aristotelian metaphysics.

It is argued that, for Aquinas, the justice of the cross is a reconciling and therefore restorative justice. St. Thomas demonstrates that Christ's offering of an amendment for our wrongdoing (restoration of due order) is not a matter of retributive justice but of fittingly asking and being given pardon (reconciliation of personal relationship). Aquinas conceives the justice of the cross in terms of Christ's satisfaction: a meritorious act of vicarious penance, which proceeds from supernatural charity, understood as friendship. By virtue of sharing in both the *ratio poenae* and *ratio caritatis*, Aquinas's notion of Christ's vicarious satisfaction provides a speculative underpinning to Augustine's claim that charity is the beginning and the end of justice. The just due which satisfaction upholds is measured against the rectitude/charity of the wills involved: God's immutable love for human beings, Christ's antecedent willingness to vicariously suffer for his friends, and the sinner's willingness to be conformed and assimilated to Christ in charity.

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Introduction

Christus liberavit nos a peccatis nostris praecipue per suam passionem, non solum efficienter et meritorie, sed etiam satisfactorie.

—St. Thomas Aquinas[1]

St. Paul taught that we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block and foolishness to those who follow, not the wisdom of God, but the wisdom of the world. While the wisdom of the world—and its caesars—place confidence in the power of the sword or gold, the wisdom of God trusts in the power of the cross. It is Christ crucified and risen who is the power and wisdom of God, and the good news of salvation. It is those who have the mind/meaning of Christ (*nous Christou*)—the *pneumatikoi* who receive the Spirit of God in freedom and love—who are truly wise and will inherit the reign of God.

In the Augustinian-Thomist tradition, Paul's distinction between the two types of wisdom and power is tacitly transposed to articulate two different contexts of justice or rightness of order: the justice of retribution and the justice of redemption. Namely, St. Augustine transposes the dialectic between the two kinds of wisdom/power from the biblical context into the context of late antiquity and patristic thought. In his *De Trinitate*, this dialectic is re-articulated as a soteriological motif "justice over power": contrary to the enticements of the devil who is a proud mediator of death, Christ—the humble mediator of life—manifests divine choice to restore the fallen order through subordinating divine judicial justice (justice in power) to the higher justice revealed on the cross (justice in humble love).[2] In Augustine's reading, charity is the beginning

[1] *Summa Theologiae* III.62.5c (hereafter *ST* in the footnotes and *Summa* in the main text). The English translation of Aquinas's works in this chapter closely follows the digital works of St. Thomas Aquinas available at https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/ (accessed on 1/12/2019); translation is lightly modified and other editions are consulted as needed. If available, the Latin text is quoted from ibid., otherwise from http://www.corpusthomisticum.org. In all citations of *ST,* the numbers indicate part, question, and article. In the footnotes of this thesis, Aquinas's name is omitted when quoting his works.

[2] In its basic form, this is expressed in Augustine's "non autem diabolus potentia dei sed iustitia superandus fuit"; see *trin.* 13.17 (CCL 50A: 404.1–2). See also *lib.* 3.10.31, *trin.* 4.12.15–13.18; 13.10.13–18.23; *Io. eu. tr.* 36.4.

and the end of justice, conceived as interiorly and exteriorly ordered love, *caritas ordinata et ordinans*, and as *uera pietas*.[3] As re-contextualized in Augustine's *De ciuitate Dei*—a theological reflection prompted by the historical experience of Alaric's sack of Rome—Augustine's re-articulation of Paul's dialectic focuses on the pride-power or *libido dominandi* over against Christ's humble love that restores the fallen order.[4]

St. Thomas takes over and develops St. Paul's and St. Augustine's line of thought that a fitting remedy to the problem of a dis-ordered love is a re-ordering and (re-)ordered love, not coercive power. Aquinas transposes Augustine's soteriological motif "justice/love over power" into the theoretical-metaphysical context of medieval Scholasticism. As for St. Augustine, so for St. Thomas, the justice of the cross is not the justice of the judge.[5] However, Aquinas does not explicitly specify how we should conceive the justice of the cross.[6] The work of piecing evidence together and relating St. Thomas's understanding of the justice of the cross to his overall systematic framework, and to his understanding of justice, still needs to be carried out.

The Latin text here follows *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* (CCL), quoted from *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense*, ed. Cornelius P. Mayer (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corporation, 2014), Electronic Edition. The English translation of Augustine's works has been consulted at *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century* (WSA), 4th release (New York: New City Press, 1990–2014), Parts I–III, vols. 1–41 (Charlottesville, Virginia, USA: InteLex Corporation, 2014), Electronic Edition.

[3] See St. Augustine, *trin.* 8.6–12; *nat. et gr.* 70.84; *ciu.* 19.13–21; *lib. arb.* 1.15; *doctr. chr.* 1.39–44.

[4] It is pride, for Augustine, that incites the members of the earthly city to seek dominion over others, by which they themselves get enslaved to the very lust for domination, *libido dominandi*. See *ciu.* 1 *praef.* (CCL 47: 1.20–22): "…de terrena ciuitate, quae cum dominari adpetit, etsi populi seruiant, ipsa ei dominandi libido dominatur, non est praetereundum silentio…" See also *ciu.* 1.30, 3.14, 14.15, 14.28. Furthermore, throughout *ciu.*, Augustine contrasts Roman *amor laudis humanae* with Christian *amor ueritatis,* and the parallel conflict between *cupiditas gloriae* and *dilectio iustitiae* (see *ciu.* 1.19, 5.14, 5.19, 5.20, 5.26, 17.4). Augustine develops this theme in the *Confessions*, showing that pride reduces the pursuit of excellence to the pursuit of prestige (*conf.* 1.28–29; 3.5).

[5] See, e.g., *ST* III.46.2 ad 3. This interpretation, further substantiated in the following pages, is indebted to Bernard J. F. Lonergan. He, among other things, develops St. Thomas's soteriology by making fully explicit two distinct contexts in which Christ's cross might be interpreted: the context of penal substitution and the context of vicarious satisfaction. These two contexts correspond to two basic scenarios of interpreting the justice of the cross as the justice of the divine judge (especially characteristic of some Calvinist Protestant theologies) or a kind of redemptive justice. See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *The Redemption*, ed. Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, and Jeremy D. Wilkins, trans. Michael G. Shields, Collected Works 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), esp. Thesis 16 of *De Verbo Incarnato* and Ch. 4 art. 25 of the *Supplement.*

[6] This is partly accounted for by the fact that his *opus magnum*, *Summa Theologiae*, remained unfinished.

In light of the foregoing, the basic *question* of this thesis is: How does St. Thomas Aquinas conceive the justice of the cross? In particular, in what sense is the justice of the cross just? Correspondingly, the main *aim* is to clarify how Augustine's "justice/love over power" motif is transposed into a theoretically differentiated context of St. Thomas' soteriology.[7] Pursuing this interpretive task of Aquinas's refinements and transformations includes taking heed of his appropriation of Aristotelian metaphysics, his theoretical distinction of natural and supernatural orders, and his integration of Anselm's theory of satisfaction elaborated in *Cur Deus homo* (1094–1098).[8]

The main *thesis* of this work is that, for Aquinas, the justice of the cross is a reconciling and therefore restorative justice. In particular, St. Thomas demonstrates that Christ's offering of an amendment for our wrongdoing (restoration of due order) is not a matter of retributive justice but of fittingly asking and being given pardon (reconciliation of personal relationship). Aquinas conceives the justice of the cross in terms of Christ's satisfaction: a meritorious act of vicarious penance, which proceeds from supernatural charity, understood as friendship. By virtue of sharing in both the *ratio poenae* and *ratio caritatis*, Aquinas's notion of Christ's vicarious satisfaction provides a speculative underpinning to Augustine's claim that charity is the beginning and the end of justice. The just due which satisfaction upholds is measured against the rectitude/charity of the wills involved: God's immutable love for human beings, Christ's antecedent willingness to vicariously suffer for his friends, and the sinner's willingness to be conformed and assimilated to Christ in charity.

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[7] With the main focus on St. Thomas's systematic thought, the instances where he develops the patristic line of thought in narrative terms here are omitted. To give one example of the latter, in *Super Iob*, cap. 40, Aquinas presents a rather exotic counterpart to Gregory of Nyssa's fishhook and Augustine's mousetrap images for Christ's victory over the devil by using the analogy with the elephant hunt.

[8] As we will see briefly, without collapsing punishment into satisfaction, Aquinas provides a nexus between the two, thus softening Anselm's disjunction *aut satisfactio aut poena*.

To further clarify my main contention, in comparison to Augustine, Aquinas's development can be summarized in five moves: (1) Appropriating the theorem of supernatural, Aquinas distinguishes (without separating) two entitatively disproportionate orders, the natural and absolutely supernatural. In light of this theorem, the nature of God absolutely exceeds the proportion of any finite nature, and supernatural charity is entitatively disproportionate to natural love. As an image of God, however, we are *capax dei*: we have an open-endedness, a natural desire for God, which Aquinas conceptualizes as an obediential (receptive) potency for supernatural elevation by grace, by which, in charity, we partake of God's own nature. (2) Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotelian metaphysics and of the theorem of supernatural yields a triplex (rather than duplex as in Augustine) division as regards ontology (being, non-being, privation of being) and human anthropology (nature, sin, grace). (3) Correspondingly, Aquinas integrates and develops Augustine's objective and subjective readings of redemption by taking up Anselm's notion of restorative justice while shifting from supererogation to supernatural charity as the principle of Christ's satisfaction. (4) Furthermore, *pace* Anselm's *necessitas*, Aquinas reclaims Augustine's (rather aesthetic) attribution of *convenientia* to the cross event, and situates it in relation to the difference between philosophical and theological *rationes.* (5) Aquinas's account, however, mutes Augustine's "justice over power" as "humility over pride" dialectic in favor of an internalized "good will over bad will" dialectic. This tends to obscure Augustine's (pre-critical) historical perspective where pride is conceived also as *libido dominandi*. The displacement of pride from the place of pride, nevertheless, allows for a broader understanding of the contrariety between power and the economy of salvation.

Attentive to the developments briefly outlined above, this thesis primarily focuses on the meaning of Christ's satisfaction in Aquinas and its implications for understanding the justice

and, thereby, the "why" of the cross. The main source for my inquiry is *Pars Tertia* of the *Summa Theologiae* (c. 1265–1274), the text St. Thomas wrote before his ultimate return to God.[9] Given the interconnectedness of Aquinas's treatises, there also are frequent references to other parts of the same work, especially to the treatises on evil, grace, and the virtues. Some other works are consulted as needed, especially the following: Aquinas's early commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (c.1252–1257); his *Summa contra Gentiles* (c.1259–1265); and his late unfinished summary of Christian doctrine, *Compendium Theologiae* (c.1265–1274). Since, as has been recently argued, St. Thomas understood himself primarily as *magister in sacra pagina*, some of his scriptural commentaries are also considered.[10]

The thesis proceeds in three major steps. First, I introduce the notion of satisfaction in Aquinas, especially, in its relation to Anselm's theory of satisfaction. Since Aquinas's soteriology cannot be sufficiently grasped without recourse to his teaching on the problem of evil, the second section takes up the latter theme. After grounding my argument in this way, the

[9] For the historical circumstances and the exact dating of Aquinas's works, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005); James A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works: With Corrigenda and Addenda* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983); Marie-Dominique Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas,* trans. A.M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964); cf. Jan. A Aertsen, "Aquinas's Philosophy in its Historical Setting," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas,* ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12–37. For a brief introduction to the *Summa*, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

[10] Already Étienne Gilson has proposed that "the entire theology of St. Thomas is a commentary on the Bible"; see *Les Tribulations de Sophie* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967), 47. On the recent turn to Aquinas's scriptural commentaries, see, for instance, Fergus Kerr's forward to *Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction*, by Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum, eds. (New York: T & T Clark International; 2004), ix–xi, at xi; Daniel A. Keating, "Justification, Sanctification and Divinization in Thomas Aquinas," ibid., 139–58, at 139; Thomas Prügl, "Thomas Aquinas as Interpreter of Scripture," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas,* ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph P. Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 386–415, at 386; Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen, "Towards a 'Biblical Thomism': Introduction," in *Reading Sacred Scripture with Thomas Aquinas: Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives* (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2015), vii–xvi, at vii. As Chenu has noted, even in his scriptural exegesis, however, Aquinas looks for reasons and spontaneously passes from the *expositio* to the *quaestio*: "the *magister in sacra pagina* begets the *magister in theologia*" (*Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 253). For the present undertaking, of greatest interest are Aquinas's *Lectura super Ioannem* (c.1270–1272) and his commentaries on the letters of St. Paul (dating very difficult to establish, possibly 1265–1273).

third section relates Aquinas's notion of Christ's satisfaction to his understanding of justice and charity. Finally, the concluding section reviews the development from Augustine to Aquinas.

1. The Significance of Satisfaction in Aquinas's Soteriology

Why should the Most High stoop to things so lowly, the Almighty do a thing with such toil?

—St. Anselm[11]

While contemporary commentators tend to agree that, together with the notion of merit, the concept of satisfaction plays a key role in Aquinas's soteriology,[12] there are divergent interpretations of what St. Thomas means by satisfaction. While those less familiar with Aquinas still easily opt for reading it in terms of a legalistic transaction,[13] contemporary Thomists emphasize that Christ's satisfaction is the manifestation of *bonitas divina*.[14] Their interpretations slightly vary, however, with respect to what, precisely, Christ's satisfaction accomplishes, and what Aquinas's account adds to our understanding of the cross event. In particular, while many commentators foreground that, according to Aquinas, Christ's satisfaction proceeds from charity, the significance of the "justice" aspect in Aquinas's account of satisfaction does not receive a uniform evaluation.[15] Likewise, the relationship between Aquinas's notion of Christ's

[11] Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, *Cur Deus Homo*, in *The Major Works,* ed. Brian Davies and G.R. Evans, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 274.

[12] Eleonore Stump, for instance, proposes: "Aquinas assigns a number of roles to Christ's passion and death; but they can all be subsumed under two general functions, namely, making satisfaction and meriting grace"; see "Atonement According to Aquinas," in Michael C. Rea, ed., *Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 267–93, at 270. Likewise, Romanus Cessario contends that, for Aquinas, the satisfaction of Christ is "the Archimedean point of the new dispensation"; see "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," in *Aquinas on Doctrine,* 117–37, at 126; cf. Cessario, *The Godly Image: Christ & Salvation in Catholic Thought from St. Anselm to Aquinas* (Petersham, MA: St. Bede's Publications, 1990), 158–59. Though Rik Van Nieuwenhove does not explicitly single out satisfaction, he indicates that understanding other soteriological notions in Aquinas, in particular, Christ's death as sacrifice and sacrament, "corroborates our understanding of satisfaction"; see "'Bearing the Marks of Christ's Passion': Aquinas's Soteriology," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 277–302, at 293.

[13] For example, according to Gerald O'Collins, Aquinas contributed to "a monstrous version of redemption: Christ as the penal substitute propitiating the divine anger"; see *Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 207.

[14] For instance, see Cessario, "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," 118.

[15] The role of charity is emphasized, *inter alia*, by Stump, Cessario, Van Nieuwenhove, and Keating (see works cited above). They concur that, for Aquinas, satisfaction goes beyond reparation. An explanation of how the *bonitas divina* and *iustitia divina* are related, however, is lacking. As far as I can judge, among contemporary commentators, Matthew Levering comes closest to something like an explanation when he suggests that "[divine] justice is rooted in God's goodness, by which the triune God … enables creatures to share in the Trinitarian life. It follows that a sharp contrast between a logic of gift/love and a logic of justice is mistaken"; see "Creation and

satisfaction and his understanding of charity as friendship remains largely unexplored or even downplayed.[16]

The lacunae outlined above, at least partly, can be reduced to the insufficient attention given to Aquinas's integration of Anselm's theory with Augustine's soteriology.[17] Furthermore, even the works which strongly insist that, for Aquinas, Christ's satisfaction is "the Archimedean point of the new dispensation,"[18] lack explicit textual verification. This first section, therefore, seeks to demonstrate that Aquinas makes satisfaction the heart of his explanatory account of the cross event, thus transposing Augustine's primarily symbolic-narrative apprehension of the justice of the cross into a post-Anselmian speculative context. Since Anselm's theory of satisfaction has often been gravely misinterpreted, to attain a correct judgment of Aquinas's development, we begin by considering Anselm's contribution to soteriology.[19]

Atonement," in *Locating Atonement: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics*, ed. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017), 43–70, at 59.

[16] Commentators on Aquinas's soteriology typically note that, for Aquinas, sacramental satisfaction (as in penance) aims at the restoration of our friendship with God (e.g., Cessario, "Christian Salvation," 132), without necessarily extending the analogy to Christ's satisfaction. Some, such as Nathan Lefler, altogether reject such a possibility: "In general, Thomas does not think of friendship in predominantly christological terms, any more than he tends to focus on Christ's character as friend of the Christian soul"; see *Theologizing Friendship: How Amicitia in the Thought of Aelred and Aquinas Inscribes the Scholastic Turn* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2014), 119. Lefler's downplaying the link between charity and Christ's satisfaction might be indicative of a truncated understanding of Aquinas's insistence on the coordination between the two divine missions of Incarnate Word and Holy Spirit.

[17] For instance, none of the chapters in a recent book on Aquinas's Augustinianism is dedicated solely to Aquinas's soteriology, albeit two essays engage some of his biblical Christology. See Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering, eds., *Aquinas the Augustinian* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007). This lack of attention perhaps is accounted for by the judgment, expressed by Marie-Dominic Chenu, that even if "outside of [the capital inherited from Augustine] is impossible to conceive a Saint Thomas," Augustine's influence on Aquinas's Christology is ultimately moderate (*Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 54 and 151).

[18] Cessario, "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," 126. In *The Godly Image*, Cessario gathers a large amount of relevant material but refrains from making an explicit argument.

[19] In Thesis 16 of *De Verbo Incarnato* Lonergan offers an in-depth analysis of Anselm's theory and its ramifications. The present discussion is indebted to Lonergan's penetrating insights. See Lonergan, *Redemption.*

1.1. Anselm's Notion of Satisfaction

Though the idea of vicarious suffering is present in the Bible,[20] and the notion of satisfaction in the context of sacramental penance was used in the church since at least the third century, it is through the influence of Anselm that the vicarious suffering of Christ came to be interpreted as vicarious *satisfaction* (etymologically, "to do enough," *satis facere*).[21] In particular, Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* objectifies Christ's passion and death in terms of satisfaction to deduce the *necessitas et ratio* of the Christ event.[22] Anselm finds the patristic "recapitulation," "ransom," and "love-demonstration" explanations wanting. In conversation with his imaginary interlocutor Boso, he argues that "pictures" such as of Adam-Christ typology do not really help understanding. Nor can he agree that God was required to deal with the devil in terms of justice before dealing with him in terms of power, for the devil is never outside the domain of divine power. Moreover, the Christ event cannot be explained just as a demonstration of God's love, for God's love could have been shown in many other ways.[23] Anselm might have proceeded to enumerate reasons why this was the more fitting way to demonstrate God's love.

However, without a theorem of supernatural, philosophical and theological reasoning are not distinguished, and instead his mind runs spontaneously to necessary reasons.

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[20] See, for instance, the Songs of the Suffering Servant in Is 42:1–4; 49:1–6; 50:4–7; 52:13–53:12; cf. Pt 2:20–25; Rom 4:25.

[21] The term "vicarious" itself, however, is not used by Anselm. The word is first applied to the satisfaction of Christ during the nineteenth century. See more in Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Redemption," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958–1964,* ed. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 6–28, here at 19–21.

[22] By "Christ event" here is meant that Anselm seeks the necessary reasons for both Incarnation and Christ's passion and death. See Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, in *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury*, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis, MN: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000), 295–389, esp. §1.1, at 300. Though Anselm's account aims at proving the necessity of Christ's passion, he occasionally also uses the term "fittingness" and conceives this necessity as a kind of a necessity of the end (see ibid., §2.5, 352; cf. §2.17, 380). Nevertheless, lacking a theoretical apparatus to explain how the immutability of God's will is compatible with the created contingency, Anselm ends up affirming the absolute necessity of Christ's satisfaction: "it was impossible for the world to be saved in any other way" (ibid., §1.10, 316).

[23] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §1.3–10, 302–315. Cf. Lonergan, *Redemption*, 107.

In search of these reasons, Anselm proposes that sin offends God's honor by taking away that which rightly belongs to God, namely, human obedience.[24] This refusal to give God God's due incurs debt, which must be paid because God's will cannot be frustrated. Anselm distinguishes two contexts in which the sinner is reintegrated into the God-willed order: voluntarily (by making satisfaction) or involuntarily (by undergoing punishment). "It is necessary either for the honor that has been removed to be repaid or else for punishment to result. Otherwise, either God would be not just to himself or else he would not have the power to do the one or the other—heinous things even to think."[25] For Anselm, restoring God's honor is equivalent to restoring the harmony of the universe, which demands that those who, under God's permissive will, try to avoid God's directive will, run beneath God's punitive will.[26] *Aut satisfactio aut poena*.[27]

The compensation that needs to be paid on the account of offense, furthermore, is always greater than just giving back what has been taken away. One also needs to make restitution by paying something more in a way satisfactory to the dishonored person.[28] Hence, a condign satisfaction for sin has to be supererogatory: one has to offer something that is more pleasing to God than the sin is hateful. Though liable to punishment, a mere human, however, cannot make a condign satisfaction. First, on account of God's dignity, the debt incurred even by the smallest of

[24] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, §1.11. In §1.15 Anselm clarifies that no one can honor or dishonor God as God is in Godself, but the creature appears to do this when s/he obeys or disobeys God.

[25] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §1.13, 322.

[26] See Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §1.15, 324; §1.14, 323. In conceiving sin as the disturbance of the beauty of order, Anselm is very Augustinian. Judging from his correspondence with his old master Lanfranc, Anselm extensively studied Augustine. According to G. R. Evans, Anselm's direct debt to Augustine is most evident in *Monologion*, but his atonement theory is also influenced by *trin.* 13; see "Anselm," in *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 23–24.

[27] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §1.15, 324.

[28] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §1.11, 319.

sins is infinite: it "surpasses everything that is less than God."[29] Second, the creature already owes everything to God, so no act of repentance could go beyond what is already due. Thus, of themselves, human beings have only one option: to undergo punishment, that is, death. But God would not be good or wise, Anselm contends, if God were to destroy humanity. Since only humans ought to make satisfaction and only God can make it, the solution is a God-man.[30] Being sinless, Christ does not have to pay the debt of honor for himself. However, in obedience to God, he chooses to make supererogatory and, *de facto*, superabundant[31] satisfaction for human sin by voluntarily surrendering himself to death.[32] The good will of the Son pleases the Father. So does the gift of his life, for "his life is more lovable than sins are detestable."[33] By the Father's good pleasure, the merits obtained by Christ are bestowed upon all of humanity.[34]

To sum up, Anselm conceives Christ's satisfaction to be necessary for our salvation (either Christ pays the debt or we perish in hell), vicarious (Christ suffers for us and for our sins, and on behalf of us), and voluntary (Christ suffers with perfect willingness). The principle of Christ's satisfaction, for Anselm, is supererogation: being sinless, Christ can merit our liberation from the debt of honor because he has something with which to repay; his death is not already owed. Though Anselm's account exhibits a certain ambiguity, the pivotal element in satisfaction

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[29] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §2.6, 353. See also ibid., §1.20, 338–39; §1.21, 340–41; §1.13, 322.

[30] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §2.6 and §2.18.

[31] The two terms can be distinguished as follows: Giving that which is not already owed to God makes Christ's satisfaction supererogatory. The gift having a value that not only repays the debt but exceeds it makes Christ's satisfaction superabundant: because Christ's life is that of a divine person, it is of supreme value, and much more objectively lovable than all sin is objectively heinous.

[32] "Christ willingly underwent death—not by obeying a command to give up his life but by obeying the command to keep justice. For he persevered so steadfastly in justice that he incurred death as a result" (Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §1.9, 312; cf. §§1.14; 2.14).

[33] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §2.14, 368.

[34] Anselm, *Cur Deus homo,* §2.18–20. Of note, similarly to Augustine, Anselm contends that, in his divinity, Christ "offered himself to himself (just as to the Father and the Holy Spirit) for his own honor" (§2.19, 386–87). Contrary to some modern allegations, there is no implicit placation-of-the angry Father or child-abuse scheme in Anselm.

is not the brute fact of Christ's death, but the rectitude of Christ's will, in virtue of which he freely makes the supererogatory gift of his life. Even if "it requires very nuanced interpretive efforts to determine what precisely St. Anselm thought,"[35] there is no doubt that, for Anselm, Christ does not undergo the punishment of an angry Father but offers satisfaction.

Anselm's disjunction between satisfaction and punishment means that Christ's death is not to be understood on the model of retribution. It is therefore not, strictly speaking, penal substitution but vicarious satisfaction. It is vicarious, because Christ does for us what we cannot do for ourselves; but it is not substitutionary, because his satisfaction does not replace what we can do to amend for sin. It is satisfaction, not retributive punishment, because it is a voluntarily undertaken compensation for an offense, rather than an involuntary infliction. Anselm's disjunction between satisfaction and punishment, however, ran counter to an older biblical and patristic tradition that applied the symbols of punishment to Christ's death. Nor was this tradition dislodged by Anselm's authority. It remained, therefore, for Aquinas to reinterpret the older tradition in light of Anselm's contribution.

1.2. From Anselm to Aquinas

As Bernard J. F. Lonergan notes, though "Anselm is not guilty of all the crimes attributed to him," his theory might contain a suggestion "that God wants suffering and death as a means of forgiveness of sin, when, in fact, in the redemption, God is taking issue with wickedness and transforming sin and its effect into the forgiveness of sin and recovery."[36] Aquinas's transposition of Anselm's theory makes a significant step toward the latter understanding of redemption by positing charity as the main principle of Christ's satisfaction, and by overcoming

[35] Lonergan, "Redemption," 8.

[36] Lonergan, "Redemption," 19.

Anselm's penchant for giving necessary reasons for supernatural mysteries.[37] An evaluative sketch of this shift is in place before we focus on Aquinas's contribution.

Aquinas refers to Anselm's notion of satisfaction as early as in his *Scriptum* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences.*[38] As we will see in a moment, he also integrates the substance of Anselm's theory of satisfaction into his explanatory account of the saving mysteries in the *Summa*. In both the *Scriptum* and the *Summa*, he concurs with Anselm in affirming that satisfaction offers a compensation for sin, which is an offense against God.[39] Likewise, Aquinas explains that condign satisfaction is made by "offering something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense."[40] In the *Scriptum*, Aquinas concurs with Anselm that, inasmuch as it denotes an equality of proportion, satisfaction formally is an act of justice.[41] The emphasis on commutative justice, as we will see, does not disappear but somewhat recedes into the background in the *Summa's* synthesis concerning Christ's satisfaction.[42]

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[37] As Lonergan points out, this deficiency can be reduced to the limitations of the developmental stage in which Anselm writes before the introduction of the theorem of supernatural, which did not allow for distinguishing between philosophy and theology, and each respective methods (*Redemption*, 109).

[38] See *Super Sent.*, lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, aa. 1–5. Here Aquinas considers: (1) what is satisfaction, (2) whether we can make satisfaction to God; (3) how we can make it; (4) by what means; (5) whether restitution is part of satisfaction. These five articles and the following question (d. 16) form the core of the discussion on penance and satisfaction in the *Supplement* of the *Summa* (qq. 1–15), compiled after St. Thomas's death probably by Fr. Reginald of Piperno (aka Fra Rainaldo da Piperno or Rainaldus Romanus). Whoever did the work, the writer of the *Supplement* imports passages from Aquinas's *Sentences* and attempts to accommodate them in the context of the *Summa* (as some commentators note, not always successfully). This poses a methodological problem: Aquinas's views in the *Summa* are not necessarily those expressed in the *Supplement*. Cessario, for instance, notes that in the *Sentences* Aquinas tends to interpret Christ's satisfaction in more juridical terms (*The Godly Image*, 60). Hence, we use the *Supplement* with precaution, relying on the ideas expressed there to the extent they coincide with the mature Aquinas's thought.

[39] See *ST* III.48.2; cf. *ST* III.85.3; *Suppl.* 12.2 and 13.1; *Super Sent.*, lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2. As Cessario notes, from the *Scriptum* to the *Summa*, the emphasis, however, shifts: the young Aquinas is closer to Anselm as he "stresses the fulfilment of divine justice in conjunction with the provisions of divine mercy" whereas in the *Summa*, inspired by John Damascene, he "allows the divine goodness to control his overall approach to the Incarnation" (Cessario, "Christian Salvation," 117–18; cf. *ST* I.5.4 ad 2). Remarkably, Aquinas's discussion of satisfaction directly refers to Anselm's *Cur Deus homo* in the *Scriptum*, but not in the *Summa.*

[40] *ST* III.48.2c; cf. *ST* III.90.2c.

[41] *ST Suppl.* 12.2c; *Super Sent.,* lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2.

[42] Unfortunately, Aquinas's experience in the chapel of St. Nicholas in Naples, after which he ceased his writing, stopped him from providing us with an update to his treatment of satisfaction. The *Summa* ends with the

Furthermore, in the *Summa*, Aquinas largely foregoes Anselm's "debt of honor" language, which is still present in the *Scriptum*.[43] In the *Summa*, he prefers thinking of satisfaction in terms of repentance and conversion rather than of feudal homage. Christ's passion is no longer conceived primarily as a necessary payment, but as a fitting means for reconciling us to God, which, to be sure, entails the restoration of due order. In a sense, Aquinas is able to take Anselm's distinction of the two contexts, voluntary and involuntary, more seriously than Anselm does himself. According to Aquinas, it is proper to the context of penal retribution to measure the compensation according to the severity of the offense; in the context of vicarious satisfaction, however, what matters is the love of the one seeking reconciliation: "when penalty is inflicted for sin, we weigh his iniquity who is punished; in satisfaction, however, when to placate the one offended, some other voluntarily assumes the penalty, we consider the charity and benevolence of him who makes satisfaction."[44]

It seems right to suggest, then, that inasmuch as the measure of Christ's satisfaction in Anselm's account is primarily determined in proportion to the gravity of the offense, rather than to the love of the one making satisfaction, Anselm did not completely escape the context of retributive justice. Furthermore, in light of the theorem of supernatural, Anselm's very principle of satisfaction calls for a major revision. As Charles Hefling has proposed, "Anselm tried to conceive what was super*natural* about Christ's saving work in terms of super*erogation*." Since "excess implies that what exceeds and what is exceeded share a common measure," Anselm's

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general discussion of the parts of penance. On Aquinas's prayer experience that all of his works (estimated as 101) is "chaff," see Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle and Margaret O'Rourke Boyle, "Chaff: Thomas Aquinas's Repudiation of His Opera Omnia," *New Literary History* 28, no. 2 (1997): 383–99.

[43] For instance, see *Super Sent*., lib. 4 d. 15 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 2 s. c. 1; 15 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 3 co.

[44] *Summa contra Gentiles* (*SCG* hereafter) IV.55.23: "dum poena pro peccato infligitur, pensatur eius qui punitur iniquitas: in satisfactione vero, dum quis, ad placandum eum quem offendit, voluntarie poenam assumit, satisfacientis caritas et benevolentia aestimatur."

idea that merit has its ground in supererogation, proves to be incoherent.[45] Aquinas makes up for these deficiencies by positing charity understood as friendship—instead of the necessary work of supererogation—as the principle of Christ's satisfaction.

1.3. Satisfaction: The Heart of Aquinas's Explanatory Account of the Cross

Satisfaction, as the brief outline of the development from Anselm to Aquinas above implies, becomes the heart of Aquinas's explanatory account of the cross. To support this by textual evidence, we now turn to the mature soteriology of Aquinas in the *Pars Tertia* of the *Summa*, which treats "of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race."[46] While, in the past, often misconstrued as an appendix to the rest of the *Summa*,[47] this last part arguably is the culmination of Aquinas's *opus magnum*, a reflection on faith and what pertains to faith in accordance with the *ordo disciplinae*. As brought to light by Marie-Dominic Chenu's retrieval of the implicit *exitus-reditus* schema of the *Summa*, Christology crowns this work because it is Christ who is the true mediator of our return to God.[48]

Satisfaction comes to the forefront right at the outset of *Pars Tertia*, viz., in Aquinas's discussion of the fittingness and the end of the Incarnation.[49] In the footsteps of Augustine, Aquinas contends that the Christ event was not absolutely necessary for our salvation but rather

[45] See Charles C. Hefling, "Lonergan's *Cur Deus Homo*: Revisiting the 'Law of the Cross,'" in *Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, SJ,* ed. John D. Dadosky (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2009), 145–166, here at 148 (emphasis original).

[46] *ST* III. *prol.* The first fifty-nine questions of *Pars Tertia* are directly dedicated to Christology and soteriology, i.e., Christ's person and life (qq. 1–45) and Christ's Paschal mystery (qq. 46–59). Note that qq. 1–26 are more conceptually oriented, whereas qq. 27–59 take up the historical sequence of Christ's life. The main object of the remaining qq. 60–90 is the sacraments, through which the saving grace merited by Christ's passion is communicated.

[47] In his *History of Dogma*, Adolf Harnack, for instance, thought that *Pars Tertia* has many questions but says little: "multa sed non multum" (quoted in Cessario, *The Godly Image*, 151).

[48] See Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 304–310.

[49] *ST* III.1.1–3. By the "Incarnation" here Aquinas means what we might call the "Christ event": the notion includes the event of Incarnation and the entire life of Christ which culminates in the Paschal mystery.

fitting, *conveniens*.[50] Its fittingness can be thought of as a relative necessity of the means whereby the end is attained more conveniently.[51] Aquinas lists ten reasons why the Incarnation was a suitable means for the restoration of the human race: five reasons with respect to the "furtherance in good" (*ad promotionem hominis in bono*) and five reasons with respect to our "withdrawal from evil" (*ad remotionem mali*).[52] The latter set presupposes that the reason for the Incarnation (in the world as it exists *de facto*) is the removal of sin and the restoration of God's image in the human being.[53] In this second set, Aquinas cumulatively foregrounds Augustine's "justice over power" motif.[54] The climactic fifth reason rearticulates Augustine's "justice over power" dynamic in the Anselmian terms of satisfaction:

> [God should become incarnate] in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man.[55]

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[50] *ST* III.1.2. Cf. Augustine, *trin.* 13.10.13; *ciu.* 11.2.

[51] *ST* III.1.2c: "A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey." Cf. *ST* II-II.58.3 ad 2: "Necessity is twofold. One arises from 'constraint,' and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a 'command,' or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing."

[52] See *ST* III.1.2c. With the focus on Christ's crucifixion, the argument for fittingness continues in *ST* III.46.4 where Aquinas contends that it was most fitting, *convenientissimum*, for Christ to suffer death on the cross. Aquinas first argues from the exemplary value of Christ's suffering and then brings up six other reasons which reiterate patristic allegoric typologies, e.g., the juxtaposition of the tree of knowledge and the "tree" of the cross.

[53] See *ST* III.1.3c. Though affirming that God could have become incarnate even if no sin was committed, Aquinas does not give into discussing some hypothetical possibilities but simply points out the biblical evidence: everywhere in Scripture "the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation" (*ST* III.1.3c). Sin, however, does not cause the Incarnation nor is the redemption its end in itself: for Aquinas, nothing else moves God's will as the end except God's own goodness, to which other things are ordained (cf. *ST* I.19.2).

[54] Aquinas's first reason in this set exposes the need to renounce the disembodied mediator of death in favor of the mediator of life who unites humankind to God by assuming human flesh, while the second reason develops this point by highlighting God's avowal of human dignity in the Incarnation. The third and the fourth reasons consider the fittingness of the Incarnation by explicating Augustine's "humility vs. pride" theme, whereas the fifth reason engages the "justice over power" motif directly, as explained above.

[55] *ST* III.1.2c: "Quinto, ad liberandum hominem a servitute. Quod quidem, ut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trin., fieri debuit sic ut Diabolus iustitia hominis Iesu Christi superaretur, quod factum est Christo satisfaciente pro

In a single sweep, as an implicit reference to Anselm's dilemma "the human should but only God could,"[56] Aquinas transposes Augustine's notion of the justice of the cross into the Anselmian context of satisfaction: the devil has been overcome by the satisfaction of Christ.

Throughout *Pars Tertia*, Aquinas links Augustine's "justice over power" motif with satisfaction in a number of other occasions.[57] For instance, in q. 46 a. 3, which discusses whether the cross event was a suitable means of redemption, Aquinas states: "it was fitting that through justice man should be delivered from the devil's bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the passion."[58] Another relevant occurrence is found in the sixth article of the same question, in which Aquinas argues that, on account of Christ's dignity, the perfection of his soul and body, his voluntariness, and the gravity of all sins, Christ's pain, both interior and exterior, was the very greatest, *dolor maximus*. In response to the objection that, from the infinite value of his divine person, the slightest pain would have sufficed, Aquinas replies:

> Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.[59]

In this passage, Aquinas clearly associates the justice of the cross with satisfaction, conceived in terms of a fully human suffering. As such, it has to be adequately manifested in one's en-fleshed

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nobis. Homo autem purus satisfacere non poterat pro toto humano genere; Deus autem satisfacere non debebat; unde oportebat Deum et hominem esse Iesum Christum."

[56] Cf. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, §2.18.

[57] This theme also shows up in Aquinas's scriptural commentaries, without being fully transposed into the theoretical context. For instance, see Aquinas's commentary on 2 Tim 1:10, where he explains the right of the devil by analogy with a thief and in the Augustinian vein affirms that Christ destroyed the devil's "right" by destroying death, that is, by satisfying for ours sins: "*Dicit ergo Christus, propter hoc, quod pro nobis passus est, destruxit mortem, id est, satisfecit Deo pro peccatis nostris*" (*Super II Tim*., cap. 1, l. 3). Correspondingly, Aquinas's Scripture commentaries but not so much the *Summa* calls upon the Augustinian juxtaposition of humility vs. pride. Cf. *Super Philip.*, cap. 2, l. 2; *Super Iob*, cap. 42.

[58] *ST* III.46.3 ad 3.

[59] *ST* III.46.6 ad 6: "Christus voluit genus humanum a peccatis liberare, non sola potestate, sed etiam iustitia. Et ideo non solum attendit quantam virtutem dolor eius haberet ex divinitate unita, sed etiam quantum dolor eius sufficeret secundum naturam humanam, ad tantam satisfactionem."

humanity.[60] This, as we will see later, resonates with Aquinas's notion of satisfaction as an exterior act of interior repentance.

Aquinas's treatise on Christ's passion (*ST* III.46–49) proceeds from discussing the various aspects of the fittingness and voluntariness of Christ's salvific suffering and death (qq. 46–47) to examining its effects (qq. 48–49), the latter comprising the main locus where Aquinas's explicit teaching on Christ's satisfaction in the *Summa* is found. He first considers the manner in which the salvific effect is brought about, *de modo efficiendi* (48.1–6), and then the effect in itself, *de ipso effectu* (49.1–6). Aquinas names five ways (*modi*) in which Christ's passion is effective, namely, by way of merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, redemption, and efficiency. The first four modes regard Christ in his humanity, whereas the last mode, efficiency, pertains to Christ as divine.[61]

The principle efficient cause of salvation, Aquinas affirms, is God.[62] By the grace of the hypostatic union, Christ in his humanity is the conjoined instrument of God, the mediator between God and humankind, and the high priest who intercedes by his perfect self-offering *in*

[60] Significantly, Aquinas is not siding with what became known as satipassionism, the theory of atonement which reasons that Christ has saved us not by "doing enough" (*satis facere*) but by "suffering enough" (*satis patior*). Such a reading would miss the point: Aquinas's main intention in *ST* III.46.6 ad 6 seems to be the defense of the full humanity of Christ. Satispassionism, as Lonergan has noted, almost by necessity goes together with mistaking vicarious satisfaction for penal substitution, as seen in early Protestants and some Catholic preachers and theologians, but it is entirely foreign to Aquinas. See more in Lonergan, *Redemption*, 93–105.

[61] This is congruent with Aquinas's exposition of Chalcedonian Christology. In virtue of the hypostatic union, the divine and human natures of Christ are predicated of the Person of the Word who is one subject operating in two distinct manners. See *ST* III.19.1; cf. *ST* III.1.1–3; III.17.1–2.

[62] *ST* III.48.6. Of note, in the *Compendium*, Aquinas provides the following qualification: "Christ's death is the cause of the remission of our sin: the efficient cause instrumentally, the exemplary cause sacramentally, and the meritorious cause. In like manner Christ's resurrection was the cause of our resurrection: the efficient cause instrumentally and the exemplary cause sacramentally. But it was not a meritorious cause, for Christ was no longer a wayfarer, and so was not in a position to merit; and also because the glory of the resurrection was the reward of His passion, as the Apostle declares in Philippians 2:9ff" (1.239). Aquinas's distinction between the different types of causality involved clarifies how to reconcile two claims, namely, that we are saved by Christ's death and justified through Christ's victory over death, his resurrection (cf. *ST* III.56.2; Rom 4:25). There are two efficient and exemplary causes, but only one meritorious cause, Christ's death, Aquinas proposes.

holocausto Christi ignis caritatis.[63] Aquinas considers Christ's total self-giving in his humanity under two aspects: with respect to his soul and with respect to his body.[64] On the part of Christ's human soul, Christ's passion works *per modum meriti*: by freely surrendering to the suffering and death on the cross *ex caritate et obedientia*, Christ merits salvation for all the members of his *persona mystica*.[65] On the part of Christ's body, his passion saves us by way of satisfaction, sacrifice, and redemption.[66] Furthermore, Aquinas correlates redemption with the forgiveness of fault (*culpa*), satisfaction with the liberation from the debt of punishment (*reatus poenae*), and sacrifice with our reconciliation to God:

> Christ's Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner; but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ's soul it acts in a meritorious manner; considered as being within Christ's very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption; but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice.[67]

In his treatment of each mode and effect separately (qq. 48–49), and in his later recapitulation of the topic, however, Aquinas relativizes this correlation and singles out satisfaction as a paramount explanatory mode. He does so by mapping the properties and effects of satisfaction

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[63] *ST* III.46.4 ad 1; cf. *ST* III.22.1–6; 26.1–2; 46.4 ad 2; 46.10 ad 2. For Aquinas's understanding of Christ as a conjoined instrument of God, see *ST* III.13.2–4; cf. III.2.6; III.17–20. The notion of instrumentality sounds foreign in the contemporary context that asserts human autonomy and spontaneity. We must keep in mind, therefore, that, for Aquinas, the human being is an instrument of God not *in spite of* but *according to* the inclinations of human nature which is endowed with freedom and intellect. To avoid the misunderstanding, Lonergan will instead use the notion "ministerial agent"; see *Redemption,* 585.

[64] See *ST* III.49.6 ad 1. Remember that, in Aquinas's anthropology, which appropriates Aristotelian hylomorphism, the soul is the form of the body. Christ in his humanity does not lack either. See *ST* I.76.1; III.5.1–4.

[65] See *ST* III.48.1–3; 49.1.

[66] *ST* III.48.2–4.

[67] *ST* III.48.6 ad 3: "Passio Christi, secundum quod comparatur ad divinitatem eius, agit per modum efficientiae; inquantum vero comparatur ad voluntatem animae Christi, agit per modum meriti; secundum vero quod consideratur in ipsa carne Christi, agit per modum satisfactionis, inquantum per eam liberamur a reatu poenae; per modum vero redemptionis, inquantum per eam liberamur a servitute culpae; per modum autem sacrificii, inquantum per eam reconciliamur Deo." Cf. *ST* III.49.1–5.

on the other two modes pertaining to Christ's body (sacrifice and redemption), and by often subsuming them under the term "satisfaction."

In *ST* III.48.3, for instance, Aquinas interweaves the key elements of Augustine's teaching on sacrifice with the quasi-Anselmian vocabulary. Sacrifice as a reconciling work of mercy, offered by the one mediator between God and humankind, he contends, is carried out "for that honor which is properly due to God."[68] Furthermore, in *ST* III.49.4, sacrifice is explained as a kind of compensation for a personal offense (as in satisfaction). Likewise, in *ST* III.48.4, Aquinas interprets redemption (ransom) from sin in such a way that the notion of satisfaction becomes its major underpinning: "the atonement (*satisfactio*) by which one satisfies for self or another is called the price, by which he ransoms himself or someone else from sin and its penalty."[69] Satisfaction, hence, explains not only liberation from the debt of punishment, but, mediately, also the pardon of guilt and human reconciliation with God.

The way Aquinas recapitulates his explanation of the modes and effects of Christ's passion in the rest of *Pars Tertia* also indicates that his speculative interest lies with satisfaction. While earlier he listed five explanatory elements (efficiency, merit, redemption, sacrifice, satisfaction), now he has only three (efficiency, merit, satisfaction), which implies the prominence of satisfaction among the "fleshly" elements (i.e., satisfaction, sacrifice, and redemption). For instance, in q. 62 a. 5, Aquinas states: "Christ delivered us from our sins principally through his passion, not only by way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of satisfaction."[70] In qq. 14–15 Aquinas again subsumes the three "fleshly" modes into one: the

[68] *ST* III.48.3c: "sacrificium proprie dicitur aliquid factum in honorem proprie Deo debitum."

[69] *ST* III.48.4c: "Nam ipsa satisfactio qua quis satisfacit sive pro se sive pro alio, pretium quoddam dicitur quo se redimit a peccato et poena." Note, the translation I am quoting, uses "atonement" for Aquinas's *satisfactio*.

[70] *ST* III.62.5c: "Christus liberavit nos a peccatis nostris praecipue per suam passionem, non solum efficienter et meritorie, sed etiam satisfactorie."

reason for Christ's assuming of the "bodily defects" (corruptibility, passibility, and mortality of the body) is the work of satisfaction.[71] There is a similar tendency in his Scripture commentaries, where Aquinas frequently speaks of Christ's passion and death as satisfaction.[72]

Augustine's influence on Aquinas's soteriology, and the centrality of satisfaction in St. Thomas's account, can be further bolstered by bringing to light a passage from the *Compendium Theologiae*.[73] Here Aquinas's merging of Augustine's understanding of Christ's salvific work in terms of *exemplum et sacramentum* with the notion of satisfaction seems to be most conspicuous.[74] Christ's passion, Aquinas maintains in this abridgment of the Christian doctrine, works by way of *satisfaction, sacrament,* and *example*:

> Christ willed to submit to death for our sins so that, in taking on Himself without any fault of His own the punishment charged against us, He might free us from the death to which we had been sentenced, in the way that anyone would be freed from a debt of penalty if another person undertook to pay the penalty for him. Another reason why He wished to die was that His death might be for us not only a remedy of *satisfaction* but also a *sacrament* of salvation, so that we, transferred to a spiritual life, might die to our carnal life, in the likeness of His death…
>
> Christ also wished to die that His death might be an *example* of perfect virtue for us. He gave an example of charity, for "greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13). The more numerous and grievous are the sufferings a person does not refuse to bear for his friend, the more strikingly his love is shown forth. But of all human ills the most grievous is death, by which human life is

[71] See *ST* III.14.1 and 15.1. Besides satisfaction, the other two reasons why it was fitting for Christ to assume bodily defects, is both that they make Christ's humanity credible and that, by bearing the consequences of these bodily defects, Christ can show us an example of patience (*ST* III.14.1c). The former reason echoes some Greek patristic authors, such as Athanasius, whereas the latter is linked to Augustine's *Christus exemplum* theme.

[72] For instance, see *Super Rom*., cap. 5, l. 2: "Ipsa autem mors Christi pro nobis caritatem ostendit Dei, quia dedit filium suum, ut pro nobis satisfaciens moreretur."

[73] *Compendium* is St. Thomas's unfinished *opuscula*, organized around the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. The work is interrupted in the beginning of the second treatise on hope. The fact that it was not completed led some (e.g., Pierre Mandonnet, O.P.) to place its composition at the end of the life of St. Thomas. Relying on the fact that it was dedicated to Reginald of Piperno, who at the time held the position of the secretary to the Master of the Dominican order, Chenu argues that it was written before the *Summ*a, probably around 1265–67 at Rome. See Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 332. As Torrell points out, the date of the first part (*De fide*) indeed goes back to this period, while an unfinished second part (*De spe*) might be from a later period, probably after Aquinas's return to Naples in 1272. See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, 164–65.

[74] According to St. Augustine, Christ "harmonized with each part of us by becoming in [the] flesh the sacrament for the inner human being and the model for the outer one"; see *trin.* 4.3.6 (CCL 50: 167.56–57, WSA, *The Trinity*, I/5, 156). For more on Christ as our *sacramentum et exemplum* in Augustine, see Basil Studer, "*Sacramentum et exemplum* chez saint Augustin," *Recherches Augustiniennes* 10 (1975): 93–102.

> snuffed out. Hence no greater proof of love is possible than that a man should expose himself to death for a friend.[75]

After bringing together the prominent themes in Augustine with the gem of Aquinas's own explanation of Christ's work as satisfaction, explained through the biblical analogy of friendship, Aquinas further recapitulates Augustine's teaching on *timor mortis*: "in not refusing to die for truth, Christ overcame the fear of dying, which is the reason men for the most part are subject to the slavery of sin." [76] By further highlighting that "Christ did not abandon justice in the face of adversity,"[77] Aquinas concurs with Augustine (and Paul, for that matter) that the solution to the problem of evil, epitomized in death, is the divine justice manifested on the cross.

The foregoing demonstrates that the vicarious satisfaction of Christ is a major (although not exclusive) explanatory account of the cross event in Aquinas's soteriology. We have also shown that, by appropriating Anselm's achievement, *de facto*, Aquinas transposes Augustine's "justice over power" motif: the devil has been overcome by the satisfaction of Christ, which manifests divine justice. Likewise, we have traced the various elements which Aquinas

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[75] *Compendium* 1.227: "Christus pro peccatis nostris voluit mortem pati, ut dum poenam nobis debitam ipse sine culpa susciperet, nos a reatu mortis liberaret, sicut aliquis debito poenae liberaretur, alio pro eo poenam sustinente. Mori etiam voluit, ut non solum mors eius esset nobis satisfactionis remedium, sed etiam salutis sacramentum ut ad similitudinem mortis eius nos carnali vitae moriamur, in spiritualem vitam translati, secundum illud I Petri III, 18: Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est, iustus pro iniustis, ut nos offerret Deo, mortificatos quidem carne, vivificatos autem spiritu…. Mori etiam voluit, ut nobis mors eius esset perfectae virtutis exemplum. Quantum ad caritatem quidem, quia maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis, ut dicitur Ioan. XV, 13. Tanto enim quisque magis amare ostenditur, quanto plura et graviora pro amico pati non refugit. Omnium autem humanorum malorum gravius est mors, per quam tollitur vita humana, unde nullum magis signum dilectionis esse potest quam quod homo pro amico vero se morti exponat." Emphasis mine.

[76] *Compendium* 1.227. For Augustine's treatment of *timor mortis*, see *trin.* 4.12.15; *ciu.* 13.2–8, 12.21. For Augustine, just as the epitome of the punishment for sin is death, so *timor mortis* is the epitome of the two permanent debilitating effects of original sin on the soul, ignorance and weakness. See also Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 32–43; "*Timor Mortis* e La Questione Degli *Exempla Virtutum*: Agostino, *De Civitate Dei* I–X," in *Il Mistero Del Male e La Libertà Possibile (III), Lettura Del De Civitate Dei Di Agostino*, ed. Luigi Alici et al. (Roma: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1996), 7–47.

[77] *Compendium* 1.227. The motif of Christ as *exemplum et sacramentum*, and of the twofold death and resurrection, reappears in 1.239. In 1.231, Aquinas also speaks of Christ's passion as efficient by way of merit, thus the *Compendium's* list of *modi efficiendi* being: sacrament, exemplar, satisfaction, and merit.

appropriates from Anselm. They are brought together in the article dedicated specifically to satisfaction (*ST* III.48.2):

> He properly satisfies for an offense who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience (*ex caritate et obedientia*), Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which he suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of his life which he laid down in atonement (*satisfactio*), for it was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on account of the extent of the passion, and the greatness of the grief endured…. And therefore Christ's passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the human race.[78]

By clarifying the key role that Christ's charity plays in meriting the grace of salvation, Aquinas here skillfully integrates Anselm's notion of satisfaction with his own development. At the same time, by drawing on the language of offense and compensation, he foregrounds that satisfaction regards the restoration of justice. The passage above does not clarify, however, how justice and charity are ordered to each other. Furthermore, at times, Aquinas's text sounds like no more than a paraphrase of Anselm. To grasp the full force of Aquinas's transposition, his treatment of Christ's satisfaction in the *Summa* now needs to be situated and explained in the broader context of his theology. For the sake of orderly exposition, we first treat Aquinas's understanding of the human problem.

[78] *ST* III.48.2c: "ille proprie satisfacit pro offensa qui exhibet offenso id quod aeque vel magis diligit quam oderit offensam. Christus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo, maius aliquid Deo exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius offensae humani generis. Primo quidem, propter magnitudinem caritatis ex qua patiebatur. Secundo, propter dignitatem vitae suae, quam pro satisfactione ponebat, quae erat vita Dei et hominis. Tertio, propter generalitatem passionis et magnitudinem doloris assumpti... Et ideo passio Christi non solum sufficiens, sed etiam superabundans satisfactio fuit pro peccatis humani generis."

2. Clarifying the Human Problem

Mali enim nulla natura est; sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit.

—St. Augustine[79]

Aquinas teaches that those who share (*communicant*) in Christ's passion "by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith," are delivered from all sin, original and personal, both in respect to guilt (*culpa*) and to the debt of punishment (*reatus poenae*), and thus are reconciled with God who, in Christ, opens for us the gates of heaven.[80] Christ's satisfaction is needed, in other words, because there is an objective and subjective hindrance, which keeps the human being away from God. To clarify these impediments and why Christ's satisfaction fittingly takes them away, let us first consider Aquinas's understanding of evil in general.

2.1. Evil as a Privative Defect

We might want to start with a thought experiment: Is it evil that a bird cannot learn math or a woman cannot fly by flapping her arms? What about a man born blind? A lion devouring a stag? Is it evil that not only the stag, but also the lion, and all living organisms, some day, will perish?

Aquinas's metaphysical account of evil provides the necessary basics for answering these questions. Siding with Augustine, Aquinas conceives evil as a defect. Evil has neither being nor goodness; it also does not have a formal or final cause, and the role played by the efficient cause of evil is only accidental.[81] Due to a more developed account of what is natural, Aquinas also provides a more advanced account of Augustine's insight: evil is not just any defect, but a privative defect, that is, the absence of the good that is due by nature.[82] Aquinas summarizes this

[79] *ciu.* 11.9 (CCL 48: 330.70–71).

[80] See *ST* III.49.5.

[81] See *ST* I.48.1; I.49.1–3.

[82] *ST* I.48.3; cf. I.48.5 ad 1; I.49.1. While Augustine was no stranger to the Neoplatonic notion of evil as the privation of the good, he did not have the theoretical framework for situating the defect with respect to nature.

in terms of the triadic ontological structure of being, not-being, and privation: "evil is distant both from simple being and from simple 'not-being,' because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation."[83] Correspondingly, a defect which is merely negative but not privative, is not an evil but a sign of creaturely finitude. In Aquinas's examples, it is not evil for a human being to lack the speed of a roe, or the strength of a lion, but it is evil to be deprived of eyesight.[84] The former belongs to the good of (limited) human nature, the latter is the evil of a "natural defect" (*malum naturalis defectus*).[85]

In a similar vein, of itself, the corruptibility of a living organism is not an evil but a natural property of creaturely finitude.[86] What is evil, as Rudi te Velde notes, is not the existence of a corruptible thing but the actual corruption of things, "the fact that they … lose their goodness and perish."[87] Aquinas's explanation as to why such a world in which good things can be corrupted is willed by God basically accords with the reasons of Augustine and Anselm. God's permission of evil aims at the preservation of the beauty and order of the universe:

> The perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself a certain evil.[88]

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[83] *ST* I.48.2 ad 1.

[84] *ST* I.48.3c. As Aquinas notes elsewhere, "the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite" (*ST* I-II.85.2 arg. 1).

[85] For Aquinas's use of the term *malum naturalis defectus*, see, e.g., *ST* 19.9c.

[86] *ST* I.48.5 ad 1: "It is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature." Cf. *ST* I-II.6.5 ad 2.

[87] See Rudi A. te Velde, "Evil, Sin, and Death," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 143–66, here at 146.

[88] *ST* I.48.2c: "Perfectio universitatis rerum requirit ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia; ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint; ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere. In hoc autem consistit ratio mali, ut scilicet aliquid deficiat a bono. Unde manifestum est quod in rebus malum invenitur, sicut et corruptio, nam et ipsa corruptio malum quoddam est." Cf. *ST* I.48.5 ad 1.

Finitude, and the possibility of evil, then, are constitutive of the good of nature: "there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized."[89] From Aquinas's viewpoint, creation of such a world does not imply any defect or injustice on God's part for every agent does "what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole."[90]

Hence, it is bad for a stag to be eaten, but it is good for both a lion, and for the whole ecosystem, that lions eat stags. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is an intrinsic (material) necessity for a body composed of contraries to be dissolved, physical corruption and death are natural to the stag and the human being alike.[91] But humans are not stags. They are rational creatures, and this complicates the picture. Aquinas contends that the human being is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of matter taken separately, but not as regards the nature of the human soul, the form of the human body.[92] If the human soul would have functioned as it should, we would not have to die. But we do die. This brings us to the problem of evil in things voluntary.

2.2. Fault and Punishment

To provide a context for Aquinas's understanding of evil as voluntary, let us first briefly recall the basics of his anthropology. According to St. Thomas, as rational and free, the human being is naturally oriented toward the twofold end, natural and supernatural happiness.[93] While the

[89] *ST* I.48.2c; cf. *ST* I.47.2.

[90] *ST* I.48.2 ad 3; see also *ST* I.47.2.

[91] See *ST* II-II.164.1

[92] *ST* I.76.1. Due to its intellectual power as immaterial, the rational soul is also a spirit and as such can share in the incorruptibility of the spiritual nature (see *ST* I.97.3; cf. *ST* I-II.85.6; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, q. 2).

[93] *ST* I-II.62.1c. As we have noted earlier, Aquinas conceives the human capacity for the supernatural end in terms of *potentia obedientialis* to the absolutely supernatural; the latter unfolds in the dynamism of the human being as an *imago Dei* who attains to God "through its own operation of knowledge and love," as elevated by grace (*ST* III.4.1 ad 2; see also *ST* I.93.1, 4). For a lucid explanation of *potentia obedientialis*, see Lonergan, *"De Ente Supernaturali/*The Supernatural Order," in *Early Latin Theology*, trans. Michael Shields, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 19 (2011), Thesis 4.

connatural end can be attained (albeit not without divine assistance) by means of natural principles—such as the faculties of intellect and will[94]—to attain the supernatural end, the creature also needs to receive certain supernatural principles of operation proportionate to this end.[95] The remote principle is the entitative habit of sanctifying grace, which resides in the essence of the soul, while the proximate principles are theological virtues (*per caritatem formata*), perfecting the rational powers of the soul.[96] The human being is essentially free to choose either the course of action which is conducive to attaining the ultimate end to which s/he is naturally oriented and supernaturally directed, or to forfeit it.[97]

Aquinas typically thinks of free-will as *liberum arbitrium*, which he associates with the will of the means to an end. The will of the means follows upon the will of the end, i.e., willing a real or apparent good. This twofold act of willing the means and the end is the proper act of the will. In distinction from the commanded act of the will (*actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus*), which is put into execution by means of some other powers, the proper act of the will is a natural inclination to some understood good and as such is always free of coercion.[98] The proper willing of the means comprises deliberation (*consilium*) and the choice of the means (*electio*), which

[94] In Aquinas's metaphysical psychology, the will is a rational appetite which is always inclined to its natural end, some good as apprehended by the intellect (see *ST* I-II.8.1; I-II.10.1; I.82.2; I.82.4; cf. *ST* I.59.1). Besides the two higher faculties, there are also lower sensitive appetites in the rational soul, the concupiscible (desiring) and irascible (struggling) powers (*ST* I.79; I.82).

[95] See *ST* I-II.62.1 and 3; see also *ST* I-II.3.8; I-II.1 and 2; I-II.114.2; I.1.8 ad 2.

[96] See *ST* I-II.62.3–4; II-II.23.2 and 8; I-II.110.3–4. The theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity are ordered to each other: in order of generation, faith precedes hope and hope precedes charity, whereas in the order of perfection, charity is first because it is the form that brings faith and hope to full perfection, and is the "mother and the root of all the virtues" (I-II.62.4c).

[97] Sin, as we will see in a moment, does not destroy human freedom but, by taking away a habitual disposition to choose well, it brings about moral impotence. The moral impotence due to sin basically means that we cannot not sin without explicit deliberation, which practically amounts to the fact that the probability of not actually sinning approaches zero. For a helpful explanation of this matter, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (2000), 51–52.

[98] See *ST* I.82.1; I.83.1–4; I-II.6.4–5; I-II.8.2–3; I-II.13–15.

becomes simply consent (*consensus*), if there is only one possible alternative with respect to the means.[99] The *liberum arbitrium*, then, is the free choice of the subject, accomplished through human rational powers as mutually interdependent: *electio* is the act of the "intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect."[100] In distinction from some contemporary libertarian accounts, for St. Thomas, the act is voluntary not primarily because one can do otherwise, but because the agent is moved by an intrinsic principle (but not necessarily the first principle unmoved by another),[101] such as the rational will moving itself to act (or not) for an end of which one has a certain knowledge.[102]

According to Aquinas, the failure of the free will to choose as one ought with respect to a morally obligatory and divinely ordained end is *malum culpae*, culpable evil (evil of fault),[103] which results in what Aquinas calls *malum poenae*, the evil of punishment (evil of pain). The

[99] Cf. *ST* I-II.15.3 ad 3.

[100] *ST* I-II.13.1c. This interplay underpins the possibility of the failure of free rationality, which might be explained as follows. While the intellect apprehends the good and presents it as an object of the will, the will presents the intellect with a certain set of objects to apprehend. Influenced by the lower appetites (passions), the will can command the intellect to turn away from the rational good and the good of the divine law, and instead to focus on more pleasurable things and thereby choose an apparent good (cf. *ST* I-II.75.2c; cf. I-II.77.1; I.82.2; I-II.75.1 ad. 3). The evil, thus, is sought only accidentally inasmuch as the good which accompanies evil is more desired than the good of which the evil is privation (*ST* I.19.9).

[101] For Aquinas, one creature cannot act on the will of another creature, except by persuasion. However, it is different with God. As the cause of a thing's nature, which can cause a natural movement in that thing, God can move the will directly, indefectibly, and non-violently. See *ST* I-II.9.6; *SCG* III.88.

[102] Cf. *ST* I-II.6.1; I-II.6.4; I-II.9.4 ad 1. In *ST* I-II.6.3, Aquinas, in addition, clarifies that there can be voluntariness without an exterior act (as when one wills not to act) and without even an interior act (as when one does not will to act). Furthermore, he upholds that the freedom of the will is not taken away when one necessarily wills that which the intellect conceives as absolutely good, such as happiness by wayfarers and God by the saints in the beatitude (*ST* I.82.1; I.82.2). For more on free-will in Aquinas, see Eleonore Stump, "Aquinas's Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will," in *Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays*, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 203–22; Lonergan*, Grace and Freedom*. Lonergan provides a following succinct summary as to why, for Aquinas, the will is free: "the first cause is the objective possibility of different courses of action; the second cause is the intellect that knows this objective possibility; and the proximate cause is the will that selects, not because determined by the intellect, but through its own self-motion" (*Grace and Freedom*, 98).

[103] As Lonergan points out, the failure of free will is twofold: "the failure … to choose a morally obligatory course of action or its failure to reject a morally reprehensible course of action" (*Insight,* 689).

evil in things voluntary (*malum in rebus voluntariis*) is either *malum culpae* or *malum poenae*.[104] In distinguishing the two categories, *malum culpae* and *malum poenae*, Aquinas refines Augustine's suggestion in *De libero arbitrio* that there is evil committed and evil suffered.[105] According to Aquinas, *malum culpae*, is a disorder in the human willing, a privation of the due order in the human free and rational operations. *Malum poenae* is any evil suffered, both moral and physical, inasmuch as it opposes the human will: to be contrary to the will is intrinsic to the *ratio poenae*.[106] Since the will always naturally tends to some good,[107] inasmuch as the evil suffered is contrary to this natural inclination, it is a punishment. Hence, the moral corruption of the sinner and bodily death alike are punishments for sin.[108] Aquinas summarizes this in the following manner: "just as it belongs to the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will, so it belongs to the nature of fault to be voluntary. The fault, hence, reduces one to infirmity, while the penalty to death. Just as the way to punishment is fault, so infirmity leads to death."[109]

Aquinas's division between *malum culpae* and *malum poenae* is grounded in the metaphysical analogy of first and second act. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the

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[104] "*Omne malum in rebus voluntariis consideratum vel est poena vel culpa*" (*ST* I.48.5c; cf. *ST* I.48.6; *De malo* 1.4–5). *Poena* means "penalty" and as such has an aspect of "pain." For Aquinas, pain simply (*dolor*) requires two things: "conjunction with some evil (which is evil insofar as it deprives one of some good), and the perception of this conjunction" (*ST* I-II.35.1c).

[105] Augustine, *lib. arb.* 1.1.1. Peter Lombard also has this distinction (see *Sent.* 2.35.6).

[106] Cf. *De malo* 1.4c: "it is of the nature of fault to be according to the will, but of the nature of punishment to be contrary to the will, and the will is found only in an intellectual nature." Aquinas further clarifies that punishment is contrary to the will in three ways: sometimes it is contrary to the actual will, sometimes only to the habitual will, and sometimes only to the natural inclination of the will (ibid.). Cf. *ST* I.48.5 ad 2.

[107] *ST* I-II.8.1.

[108] In claiming that *malum poenae* involves moral corruption, Aquinas again follows Augustine. See Augustine, *conf.* 1.12.19: "every disordered soul is its own punishment" (WSA, *The Confessions* I/1, 52).

[109] *Super Sent*. lib. 4, *pr.*: "quia ratio poenae est ut contra voluntatem sit, sicut ratio culpae ut sit voluntaria; et ideo culpa ad infirmitatem reducitur, poena ad mortem: quia via ad poenam est culpa, sicut infirmitas ad mortem" (my translation). Aquinas explains that the moral corruption that follows from *malum culpae* unleashes a vicious circle in which our freedom for choosing good is curbed with each sinful act and gradually becomes entangled in habitual sinful inclinations, which lessen the human capacity for virtuous acts and, inversely, increase valency for vices. See *De malo*, 1.4 ad 7–8; cf. *ST* I-II.75.4; I-II.71.3–4; I-II.85.1–5.

second act is its operation.[110] Though this seems to be counterintuitive, the consequent evil (*malum poenae*) is a privation of the first act (deprivation of form, bad habit), and the basic evil (*malum culpae*) is the defect of the second act (bad operation):

> The evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the *ratio poenae*; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above for it is of the very *ratio poenae* to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has *ratio culpae*; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will.[111]

An important upshot of this underpinning in terms of a metaphysical faculty psychology is that, by failing to operate as free and rational creatures ought to do, our integrity is corrupted not only on the psychological, but also on the ontological level: by doing evil we ourselves become corrupted.

On the whole, Aquinas's teaching on *malum culpae* and *malum poenae* has several important ramifications. First, Aquinas affirms the biblical belief that corruption and death are "the wages of sin" (cf. Rom 6:23), as regards human voluntariness. This, as we will see later, opens up the possibility of rethinking Anselm's disjunction *aut satisfactio aut poena*. Second, serendipitously for modern developments, Aquinas avoids naturalizing and romanticizing evil: anything that is apprehended as opposed to the will (all suffering) is evil.[112] Third, Aquinas's distinction enables him to show how the derivative evil (pain or punishment), is the means by which divine order is restored after the evil of fault. Fourth, Aquinas's distinction entails that

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[110] *ST* I.48.5c; *De malo*, 1.4c. For an explanation of the two acts, see Lonergan, "*The Supernatural Order*," 99–103.

[111] *ST* I.48.5c: "Malum igitur quod est per subtractionem formae vel integritatis rei, habet rationem poenae; et praecipue supposito quod omnia divinae providentiae et iustitiae subdantur, ut supra ostensum est, de ratione enim poenae est, quod sit contraria voluntati. Malum autem quod consistit in subtractione debitae operationis in rebus voluntariis, habet rationem culpae. Hoc enim imputatur alicui in culpam, cum deficit a perfecta actione, cuius dominus est secundum voluntatem."

[112] According to Aquinas, the intelligibility of injury (*ratio nocumenti*) is present in both *poena* and *culpa*, however, under two different aspects: the *ratio poenae* includes the injury to the agent in himself, whereas the *ratio culpae* includes the injury to the agent in his operation (*ST* I.48.5 ad 4).

alleviation of the evil suffered hinges upon the eradication of the evil of fault: *malum culpae* is a greater and more basic evil than *malum poenae* and cannot be fittingly fixed without the free-will's cooperation.[113] Fifth, as explained below, *malum culpae*, for Aquinas, is also a personal offence to God, and reconciliation depends on the redress of fault.

2.3. Sin: A Disorder and Offense

To justify his judgment that *culpa* is more characteristically *ratio mali* than is *poena*, Aquinas puts forward a twofold reason. First, he contends that *culpa* is a greater evil than *poena* because "one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of penalty."[114] Second, he insists that it is *malum culpae* but not *malum poenae* which is in proper opposition to the uncreated good: *culpa* is contrary to the fulfilment of divine will and to the divine love whereby divine goodness is loved for itself.[115] The latter reason is intrinsic to the intelligibility of *culpa* not merely as moral failure but also as the root of sin in the properly theological sense.

While Aquinas as moral philosopher defines the formal aspect of sin as *malum culpae*, the failure of the will to apply the rule of reason or the divine law,[116] Aquinas as theologian has something to add. Commenting on Augustine's definition of sin as "a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law,"[117] Aquinas notes that "the theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense

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[113] *ST* I.48.6.

[114] *ST* I.48.6c: "ex malo culpae fit aliquis malus, non autem ex malo poenae." Echoing Augustine, Aquinas further contends that having a bad will is much worse than being lacking in some other goods, for the bad will makes bad use even of good things and morally corrupts the whole person.

[115] In addition, fault is worse than pain both because penalty has some connection to good (it is brought about so that the fault might be avoided) and because the second act has greater perfection than the first (*ST* I.48.6 ad 1, 2).

[116] Cf. *ST* I-II.75.1 ad 3; *De malo*, 2.2. Notably, while *malum culpae* is the formal element of sin, sin cannot be reduced to it: "if we wish to consider all that is in sin, sin consists not only in the privation (of the due rule of reason or the divine law) nor only in the interior act, but also in the exterior act" (*De malo*, 2.2c); "Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order (*actus debito ordine privatus*)" (*ST* I-II.72.1 ad 2). Thus, *malum culpae* is something like a "basic sin," to use Lonergan's term. See *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 689.

[117] *ST* I-II.71.6 arg. 1. Cf. Augustine, *c. Faust*. 22.27.

against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason."[118] We note this twofold— theological and philosophical—distinction regarding sin because while Aquinas's account of Christ's satisfaction responds to both, he primarily understands satisfaction to be a remedy to sin in a theological sense, that is, sin as a personal offense against the loving God.

With regard to the Christian doctrine of original sin, articulated by Augustine, Aquinas first explains that human nature, in both its original and corrupted states, needs elevating grace for the attainment of union with God. Original sin as originated, however, adds an "incitement to evil," an inability not to sin without the help of healing grace:

> It is one thing to speak of the human being according to the state of nature as it was instituted and another thing to speak of the human being according to the state of fallen nature: because according to the state of nature as it was instituted the human being had nothing impelling him to evil, although the good of his nature did not suffice for the attainment of glory; and therefore he needed the help of grace to merit, but not to avoid sins, because by reason of what he had received in accordance with his nature he could remain steadfast. However, in the state of fallen nature, he has an incitement to evil, and therefore he needs the help of grace not to fall.[119]

Aquinas's account of the fallen state here echoes Augustine's *non posse non peccare*.[120] However, his more differentiated anthropology implies a certain natural agency which is not destroyed by sin either original or personal.

Reflecting on the effects of sin, Aquinas's distinguishing a threefold good of human nature—the good of nature as to its substance, the good of the natural inclination to virtue, and

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[118] *ST* I-II.71.6 ad 5.

[119] *De malo*, 3.1 ad 9: "Ad nonum dicendum, quod aliter loquendum est de homine secundum statum naturae conditae, et aliter secundum statum naturae corruptae, quia, secundum statum naturae conditae, homo nihil habebat impellens ad malum, licet bonum naturae non sufficeret ad gloriae consecutionem; et ideo indigebat auxilio gratiae ad merendum; non autem indigebat ad peccata vitandum; quia per hoc quod naturaliter acceperat, poterat stare; sed in statu naturae corruptae habet impellens ad malum, et ideo indiget auxilio gratiae ne cadat; et secundum hunc statum Augustinus divinae gratiae deputat quaecumque mala non fecit; sed hic status ex praecedenti culpa provenit."

[120] Cf. Augustine, *nat. et gr.,* 8–9, 57–59. According to Aquinas, even with the help of grace, we cannot avoid all venial sins (*ST* I-II.109.8). The corrupted lower appetite of sensuality entices the disordered movements of the will, each of which can be repressed taken individually "but not all, because whilst he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid these movements" (ibid., cf. *ST* I-II.74.3 ad 2).

the good of original justice—makes clear that each of the three are unequally affected.[121] First, the good of nature in itself, viz., "the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them," are neither destroyed nor diminished by sin.[122] Thus, sinning does not entail the loss of freedom of the will. Second, the natural inclination to virtue is diminished but not destroyed by sin.[123] While the inclination to virtue remains (or else sinners would not experience the pangs of remorse), it is not reduced to act because the sinner is deprived of grace and thereby an obstacle is placed against the virtue's attaining its term. As this already implies, the third good, the supernatural endowment of nature by grace, is entirely taken away by sin.

According to Aquinas, because of *peccatum originale originatum*, each human being is born into this grace-less state.[124] As collective participants in Adam's voluntary trespass, we also share in Adam's punishment, which is the corruption of our human nature.[125] While in the state of original justice, human reason was subject to God, the lower human powers subject to reason, and the body subject to the soul, fallen human nature is stricken by disorder in the soul and by corruption of the body, neither of which is any longer "held in check" by the soul's reception of grace.[126] As wounded and sick, human nature is in need of healing grace: "through sin, the

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[121] See *ST* I-II.85.1–2; I-II.85.4.c; *De malo* 4–5. In *ST* I-II.85.1, Aquinas primarily speaks of the threefold effect of original sin, which is later applied to personal sin as well (cf. *ST* I-II.85.3c; 85.5 ad 3). Importantly, for Aquinas, the good of original justice/habitual grace is the good of human *nature* only in a very qualified sense, inasmuch as it is the supernatural gift superadded to human nature out of divine liberality (cf. *De malo*, 4.1 arg. 11), by which created supernatural principles in the soul are given, thus elevating the human being above the condition of its nature *ad participationem divini boni* (*ST* I-II.110.1). The supernatural principle is "natural" to *natura elevata* but not *natura lapsa* or *natura pura* (the latter is a theoretical construct that St. Thomas himself never used).

[122] *ST* I-II.85.1c.

[123] *ST* I-II.85.1–2. For Aquinas's teaching on the natural inclination to virtue, see *ST* I-II.63.1; cf. 60.1.

[124] *ST* I-II.82.4. Aquinas explains that original sin is hereditary, that is, transmitted by human generation, as it spreads "from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers" (*ST* I-II.83.3 ad 2; cf. *ST* I-II.81.1–5; III. 8.5 ad 1; *De malo*, 4.1c).

[125] Aquinas uses the analogies of community (*collegium*) and the living body to explain in what sense our partaking in the sin of the "first parents" is voluntary (*ST* III.8.5 ad 1; cf. *De malo*, 4.1).

[126] See *ST* I-II.85.3 and 5; I.95.1–4; 97.1. Formally, then, original sin is the defect of nature (in the sense of being the privation of original justice), whereas materially, Aquinas concurs with Augustine, it is concupiscence, a disorder of the soul's powers (*ST* I-II.82.3; I-II.81.1; I-II.82.4; I-II.83.2; *De malo*, 4.1 arg. 11.).

reason is obscured … the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous."[127] Human suffering and death enter the scene.[128]

While the contemporary (mis)understanding of human autonomy makes us suspicious of Aquinas's notion of the liability to penalty based on our collective participation in Adam's failure, this should not divert our attention from his genuine insight into the human condition. To put it simply, objectively, the problem is the culpable loss of grace through sin. The *de facto* entanglement in "a nonpersonal sinfulness of all human beings,"[129] to use Te Velde's phrase, and in personal sin, to which this entanglement makes us prone, cuts the human being away from God. According to Aquinas, "since sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, … no one existing in a state of sin can merit eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought about by grace."[130]As culpable, the loss of grace is not to be imputed on God's part, however, "but on the part of human nature in which there is an impediment incompatible with it."[131] In personal terms, this culpable separation from the source of divine life is a loss of friendship with God. The enmity is, however, unilateral: sin

[127] *ST* I-II.85.3c Aquinas proposes that fallen nature has four wounds (*vulnera naturae*) that are the contraries of the four cardinal virtues: reason, where prudence resides, is afflicted by ignorance, the will as the subject of the virtue of justice, is stained by malice, while the irascible and the concupiscible appetites, the seats of fortitude and temperance, are corrupted by weakness and concupiscence. Aquinas equates the last three vices with Augustine's *difficultas*, whereas the first one reformulates his *ignorantia*. He also likens original sin to a bodily sickness, the loss of a healthy bodily equilibrium (*ST* I-II.82.1c; cf. I-II.82.4 arg. 2; 83.3c).

[128] As Aquinas puts it, "death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the divine favor preserving the human being from death" (*ST* II-II.164.1 ad 1; cf. *ST* I.76.1; I.85.6; I.97.1). In distinction from original sin, personal sin "deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does" (*ST* I-II.85.5 ad 3).

[129] Te Velde, "Evil, Sin, and Death," 163.

[130] *ST* I-II.114.2c: "Cum enim peccatum sit quaedam Dei offensa excludens a vita aeterna… nullus in statu peccati existens potest vitam aeternam mereri, nisi prius Deo reconcilietur, dimisso peccato, quod fit per gratiam." "In statu peccati" here applies to living under the bondage of the original sin as originated and in personal mortal sin.

[131] *De malo*, 4.1 ad 11.

makes us enemies of God without making God into our enemy.[132] In biblical terms, Aquinas notes that God does not count our trespasses.[133] In speculative terms, God's love is immutable.[134]

In terms of the metaphors of the stain on the soul (*macula in anima*) and the debt of punishment (*reatus poenae*), Aquinas's objectification of the double loss, which we suffer through sinning (by way of *culpa* and *poena*), further illustrates how two dimensions of sin—subjective and objective—are brought together. Aquinas conceives *macula in anima* as a loss of the soul's comeliness or brightness, as if sin were a shadow or a distance interposed between God and the soul, causing alienation from the light of the beloved.[135] While the *macula peccati* metaphor has a personal side to it, *reatus poenae,* at first glance, seems to be an exclusively juridical category: it is incurred by sinning "in so far as [sin] causes an irreparable disorder in the order of divine justice."[136] Aquinas's further explanation of what sin means, however, has an unmistakably interpersonal dimension: the irreparable damage consists in the human being's withdrawal from supernatural charity, understood as friendship.[137] This impediment on the human side, however, does not stop God. As Aquinas's Christological treatise in the *Summa* aptly demonstrates, God assumes our humanity to solve the problem of sin as if "from inside."

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[132] In *ST* I.20.2 ad 4, Aquinas explains that God loves the sinner inasmuch as s/he is God's creature and hates the sinner as sinner. This should not be understood in the anthropomorphic sense, however. The "hatred" of God here means the opposite of God's creating love. Since whatever God loves *is*, and the basic sin does not have being, God cannot be said to love the sinner as sinner. To say this would mean that God causes sin as the failure of the will, which St. Thomas denies.

[133]See, for instance, *Super Rom*., cap. 5, l. 22. See also Rom 5:8–10; Cor 5:19. Cf. *ST* III.48.4 ad 1.

[134] See *ST* III.49.4 ad 2; I-II.113.2c; cf. *ST* I.9.1; I.20.1 ad 1; *SCG* I.15.2.

[135] On these effects of sin, see *ST* I-II.85–87.

[136] *ST* I-II.87.5c; cf. *ST* I-II.87.3. Sins that involve contrariety in respect to the last end (original sin and personal mortal sin) incur not only *poena sensus* (temporal punishment) but also *poena damni* (eternal punishment); cf. *ST* I-II.87.4–5. In distinction from mortal sin, original sin incurs everlasting punishment "not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace" (*ST* I-II.87.5 ad 2). The temporal debt of punishment may remain in a justified person (*ST* III.86.4).

[137] *ST* I-II.113.2c; cf. *ST* I.20.2 ad 3.

2.4. The Problem and the Solution

How is the foregoing related to our question as to why the satisfaction of Christ was *convenientissimum* for solving the human problem of sin? In particular, how does this solution correspond to the human problem? How does it fit within God's providential plan? Permit me to offer some initial observations to be complemented as we proceed through the rest of the thesis.

Christ's satisfaction matches the human problem of the culpable loss of grace through sin by confronting not only the objective but also the subjective aspect of the problem. By making satisfaction, one does not simply pay the *reatus poenae* but also, and above all, seeks reconciliation for a personal offense. As Aquinas points out, the human being never ceased to belong to God in the sense of being subjected to God's power, but, through sinning, stopped belonging to God in the sense of being united with God in charity or friendship.[138] If the root of the human problem is our voluntary loss of supernatural friendship, some apocalyptic or coercive scenario, one must admit, would hardly be *conveniens*. Because God does not force us into loving, the divine solution needs to involve the cooperation of the human self. The offer of divine forgiveness, the infusion of grace, is fittingly received only in and through the human willingness to undergo the pain intrinsic to facing the consequences of sin, and resolving to amend for the wrong done, as intended in satisfaction.[139]

The problem that calls for a supernatural solution which also involves the human self, according to Aquinas, is solved by Christ who alone can make a condign satisfaction for sin that corrupts all human nature and, on account of God's infinite majesty, is an offense of infinite

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[138] *ST* III.48.4 ad 1.

[139] Cf. *ST* III.86.4 ad 1; ST III.86.5c; *ST Suppl.* 1.1. In treating a question related to the medieval penitential practice of crusades, Aquinas applies Augustine's saying that removing the sword is not the same thing as healing the wound (*trin.* 15) as a metaphor to explain the twofold problem of *culpa* and *reatus poenae*. The remission of sin (taking out the sword) needs to be accompanied by re-formation of the *imago Dei* "through works of satisfaction" (healing the wound). See *Quodlibet*. 2.8.2 s.c. 1.

gravity.[140] Christ's satisfaction brings about just the kind of involvement of the human self that is needed: in his humanity, Christ willingly suffers our penalty so that, justified by his merit and conformed to him, we may cooperate in the divine work of our restoration.[141] According to Aquinas, Christ's assumption of our *poena* but not *culpa* fittingly serves this purpose.[142] Everything in Christ's satisfaction, from the assumption of finitude and bodily defects to the manner of his death, conduces to the end of our reconciliation.[143] It does so on the presupposition that the solution to the human problem lies in Christ's perfect willingness to suffer *malum poenae* for the sake of disarming evil at the basic level, that of *malum culpae*. In this willingness we ought to share, as "the flow of salvation from Christ to humankind is not through a natural propagation, but through the zeal of good will in which a human being cleaves to Christ."[144]

Besides illuminating the correspondence between the problem and the solution, the previous discussion of Aquinas's metaphysics of evil and sin also aids our understanding how Christ's satisfaction fits within God's wise and just governance of the universe. The triadic ontological structure outlined earlier corresponds to the tripolar expression of the divine will: just as there is being, non-being, and privation of being, so God wills being, does not will things that are not, and permits evil.[145] Aquinas qualifies the latter: God neither wills nor does not will the

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[140] *ST* III.1.2 ad 2. Here Anselm's influence is obvious.

[141] Cf. *ST* III.1.2 ad 2: "satisfaction of every mere human being has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ." See also *Super Sent.,* lib. 4, d. 15, q. ,1 a. 2; *ST Suppl.* 13.1; *ST* I-II.114, esp. aa. 1 and 6.

[142] Cf. *ST* III.1.1 ad 2; 14.4; 15.1.

[143] See *ST* III.14–15; 46.3 ad 2; 50.1.

[144] *SCG* IV.55.30: "effluxus salutis a Christo in homines non est per naturae propaginem, sed per studium bonae voluntatis, qua homo Christo adhaeret."

[145] Cf. *ST* I.19.9. In *ST* I.19.12, Aquinas articulates the tripolar dynamic as five expressions of divine will, namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission. These "expressions" of the divine will (as aspects of divine will in relation to us) refer to something which is revealed about God's single and immutable act of divine volition from its multiple effects known with respect to the present and to the future. With respect to the present, God permits evil and brings about good by God's operation. With respect to the future, the good necessary for salvation is ordered, the good of greater perfection is counseled, whereas the evil of sin is only prohibited. Augustine is not at odds with Aquinas, but he lacks the exactitude and explanatory rigor of Aquinas. For instance, in *conf.*

privation of free rationality, *malum culpae*.[146] Instead, God rather prohibits it. However, by willing the good of order, God indirectly wills the evil of punishment: *Deus est auctor mali poenae, non autem mali culpae*.[147] The divinely ordained order of the universe violated by sin bounces back, as it were, and re-emerges by reintegrating the harmony of the whole through *poena*.[148] Aquinas thus summarizes the multiple effects of divine volition:

> God in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, God does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice God wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, God wills some things to be naturally corrupted.[149]

St. Thomas emphasizes, however, that God indirectly wills *malum poenae* so that *malum culpae* may be avoided[150] and shares in Augustine's view that the divine permission of evil is only conceivable on the presupposition that, ultimately, God wills to transform evil into good.[151] Aquinas, reiterating an early Christian belief, says that sin is a *felix culpa*, since on account of sin, human beings are raised to even greater dignity.[152] This suggests, as Lonergan will later illuminate, that the single act of divine willing implicitly brings about a fourth ordering, so that

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1.10.16, Augustine proposes that God is the "disposer and creator of everything in nature, but of our sins the disposer only" (WSA, *The Confessions* I/1, 50).

[146] Cf. *De malo*, 2.1 s.c. 4: "it is not true to say that God wills evils to be done, because thus God would be their author, nor even that God wills evils not to be done, because thus God's will would not be efficacious."

[147] *ST* I.48.6c. For Aquinas's discussion of God as the first cause of the act of sin inasmuch as the act has being but not inasmuch as it is an inordinate, see also *ST* I-II.79.2.

[148] See *ST* I.19.6: "Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished." Cf. *ST* I-II.87.1c.

[149] *ST* I.19.9c: "malum culpae, quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum, cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam; et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter corrumpi."

[150] See, for instance, *ST* I.48.6 ad 1: "licet culpa terminetur ad poenam … tamen culpa non intenditur propter poenam … sed potius e converso poena inducitur ut vitetur culpa."

[151] Cf. *ST* I.48.2 ad 3.

[152] *ST* III.1.3 ad 3.

besides directly willing good from good, indirectly evil from evil, and in no way evil from good, God directly wills to transform evil into good.[153]

Aquinas's teaching on the different orderings in divine governance[154] implies that Christ's satisfaction is willed by God inasmuch as it is a fitting way of manifesting God's bringing good out of evil. God does not will the death of Christ directly, but only indirectly, inasmuch as God in no way wills sin which Christ's crucifixion overcomes. On the contrary, God opposes sin and condemns it in the divine choice to nullify the evil of sin by means of Christ's satisfaction, as Aquinas's discussion of three ways in which Christ's death can be thought of in his commentary on Paul's letter to the Romans makes clear. Of itself, Christ's death is not acceptable to God because God does not rejoice in the perishing of living beings. As caused by crucifiers, the death of Christ earns God's supreme displeasure as evoking great indignation instead of reconciliation. The death of Christ is only acceptable to God on account of Christ's charity and obedience, by virtue of which his satisfaction is meritorious and sufficient for the reconciliation of all human beings.[155] In the *Summa*, as we will see in a moment, Aquinas's discussion of Christ's satisfaction links the intelligibility of the threefold divine willing with the intelligibility of the justice of the cross.

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[153] See Lonergan, *Redemption*, Thesis 17 of *De Verbo Incarnato*.

[154] To recall: for Aquinas, governance (*gubernatio*) is the temporal term of providence which orders all beings to their end (cf. *ST* I.22.1 ad 2).

[155] See *Super Rom*., cap. 5, l. 2: "mors Christi tripliciter considerari potest. Uno modo secundum ipsam rationem mortis. Et sic dicitur Sap. I, 13: Deus mortem non fecit in humana natura, sed est per peccatum inducta. Et ideo mors Christi, ex communi mortis ratione, non fuit sic Deo accepta, ut per ipsam reconciliaretur, quia Deus non laetatur in perditione vivorum, ut dicitur Sap. I, 13. Alio modo potest mors Christi considerari secundum quod est in actione occidentium, quae maxime Deo displicuit. … Unde mors Christi sic considerata, non potuit esse reconciliationis causa, sed magis indignationis. Tertio modo potest considerari secundum quod processit ex voluntate Christi patientis, quae quidem voluntas informata fuit ad mortem sustinendam, cum ex obedientia ad patrem … tum etiam ex caritate ad homines... Et ex hoc mors Christi fuit meritoria et satisfactoria pro peccatis nostris, et in tantum Deo accepta, quod sufficit ad reconciliationem omnium hominum." Cf. *ST* III. 47.6; 48.3 ad 3.

3. Satisfaction: Justice and Charity

Caritas ergo inchoata inchoata iustitia est.... caritas perfecta perfecta iustitia est.
—St. Augustine[156]

Our detour to Aquinas's understanding of the human problem has brought to light the intrinsic intelligible relationships that undergird his focus on Christ's satisfaction as the heart of the explanatory account of the cross event. To recapitulate: if the human problem consists in the culpable loss of grace through sin, understood as a disordered act and a personal offense against God, then the solution needs to address both the reconciliation and the reintegration of due order—the need in Aquinas' hamartiology represented by the notions of *culpa* and *reatus poenae*. The satisfaction of Christ is a fitting solution to this problem because it reconciles human beings with God and restores the due order in a manner corresponding to the ordinary functioning of human nature. There remains a vexing question—the answer to which Aquinas does not make easy—namely, what is the relationship between the two ends of Christ's satisfaction—the reintegration of the just order and the restoration of human beings' personal relationship with God. In other words, where do justice and charity meet?

The starting point for answering this question is Aquinas's discussion in the *Summa* of the necessity of Christ's passion (*ST* III.46.1), in which he insists that Christ's passion was in harmony with both God's justice and God's mercy. Indeed, according to Thomas, the redemption through the cross was "of more copious mercy than if [God] had forgiven sins without satisfaction."[157] Aquinas explains in the *Scriptum* that Christ's satisfaction is the greatest

[156] *nat. et gr.* 84 (CSEL 60: 298.21–23).

[157] See *ST* III.46.1 ad 3: "That the human being should be delivered by Christ's passion was in keeping with both his mercy and his justice. With his justice, because by his passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so the human being was set free by Christ's justice: and with his mercy, for since the human being of itself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature… And this came of more copious mercy than if he had forgiven sins without satisfaction."

manifestation of divine mercy because it not only takes away the fault but also restores human nature's dignity with an integrity most conducive to the final end.[158]

While the young Aquinas of the *Scriptum*, agreeing with Anselm, holds that it is not just to dismiss sin without satisfaction,[159] in the *Summa* he explicitly maintains that God's justice is in no way violated even without satisfaction. In response to an objection that, without undergoing the passion, Christ would have denied himself as the embodiment of divine justice, Aquinas replies:

> If [God] had willed to free the human being from sin without any satisfaction, God would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against another… But God has no one higher than God-self, for God is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if God forgives sin, which has the nature of fault in that it is committed against God-self, God wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly.[160]

St. Thomas supports this view in his treatise on the *iustitia et misericordia Dei* in the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa*,[161] by demonstrating that the law of God's justice is nothing else but God's infallible wisdom which orders the manifestation of divine goodness.[162]

This is the metaphysical underpinning for Aquinas's insistence that divine mercy and justice are not mutually exclusive, neither in creation, nor in redemption. Since whatever a

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[158] See *Super Sent*., lib. 3, d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 2: "in hoc quod Deus per satisfactionem hominem reparari voluit, maxime manifestatur ejus misericordia: quia non tantum culpam ab eo voluit removere, sed etiam ad pristinam dignitatem humanam naturam integraliter reducere: quae quidem dignitas perpetuo in natura manet sed poena ad modicum transit; unde magis manifestatur misericordia in perducendo ad aeternam dignitatem, quam in dimittendo temporalem culpam."

[159] *Super Sent*., lib. 3, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2 s. c. 1: "Sed reparatio humani generis non potest fieri nisi peccatum dimittatur; nec justum est ut peccatum sine satisfactione dimittatur."

[160] *ST* III.46.2 ad 3: "si voluisset absque omni satisfactione hominem a peccato liberare, contra iustitiam non fecisset. Ille enim iudex non potest, salva iustitia, culpam sive poenam dimittere, qui habet punire culpam in alium commissam... Sed Deus non habet aliquem superiorem, sed ipse est supremum et commune bonum totius universi. Et ideo, si dimittat peccatum, quod habet rationem culpae ex eo quod contra ipsum committitur, nulli facit iniuriam, sicut quicumque homo remittit offensam in se commissam absque satisfactione, misericorditer, et non iniuste agit.

[161] *ST* 21.1–4.

[162] See *ST* I.21.2c; 21.1 ad 2.

creature has is a gratuitous gift from God, he contends, "the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon."[163] With respect to the divine mercy after wrongdoing, "God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against God's justice, but by doing something more than justice," as does anyone who forgives an offense committed against him.[164] Because forgiveness is like giving a gift that exceeds one's due, Aquinas concludes, "it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fullness of it."[165] He goes on to explain that both justice and mercy communicate God's wisdom and goodness, albeit in such a way that when perfections are given in a due proportion we speak of God's justice, while when they are given to expel misery, we praise God's mercy; "the part of justice is to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery."[166] Aquinas further argues that even if mercy is more visible in salvation whereas justice is more visible in reprobation, there is justice in salvation, too.[167]

In order to understand how, concretely, the mutual coexistence of divine mercy and justice, tentatively explored above, can be conceived with respect to Christ's saving passion, we now turn to examine Christ's satisfaction in the light of Aquinas's notions of justice and charity.

3.1. Justice and Christ's Satisfaction

In his treatment of Christ's satisfaction in the *Summa*, Aquinas contends that "satisfaction implies some equality with the trespass, since it is an act of justice."[168] The claim that satisfaction concerns justice is further supported throughout the *Pars Tertia*: we are set free by Christ's justice, delivered from the devil's bondage by Christ making just satisfaction to God,

[163] *ST* I.21.4c.

[164] *ST* I.21.3 ad 2.

[165] *ST* I.21.3 ad 2. Aquinas gives an example of a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, and draws an analogy between such a gift and the salvific work of Christ.

[166] *ST* I.21.4 arg. 4. See also *ST* I.21.3c and ad 2.

[167] *ST* I.21.4 ad 1.

[168] *ST* III.48.2 arg. 3: "satisfactio importat aequalitatem quandam ad culpam, cum sit actus iustitiae."

Christ is for us the justice of God, by suffering for justice Christ merited for us salvation.[169] In like manner, it is a manifestation of divine justice that the Father handed over (*tradidit*) Christ and Christ handed over himself unto the cross by means of the unity of their wills in charity.[170] Concerning this *traditio*, Aquinas decidedly distinguishes between, on the one hand, the roles of Christ and the Father, and, on the other hand, the role of Christ's crucifiers: the deed of the latter was a grievous crime and injustice.[171] The hallmark of the justice of the cross, he argues, is that it proceeds from charity:

> The same act, for good or evil, is judged differently, accordingly as it proceeds from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and consequently we give praise to both. But Judas betrayed Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear, for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly are held guilty.[172]

Aquinas's differentiation of distinct factors of the complex reality involved in the justice of the cross, especially, of the role of charity as its source, highlights how Christ's satisfaction cannot be understood as a kind of divine retribution.

Furthermore, St. Thomas does not reduce Christ's saving justice to Christ's paying for us *reatus poenae*, even though the latter certainly occupies an important place in his account.[173] Notably, the article dedicated to Christ's satisfaction in the *Summa* does not even directly mention the debt payment. Nor does *reatus poenae* explicitly figure in Aquinas's response to the question whether there was some other more suitable way to deliver the human race (e.g., by

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[169] Cf. *ST* III.46.1 ad 3; 46.3 ad 3; 48.4 ad 2; 49.2c; 46.11 arg. 1; 48.1c.

[170] See *ST* III.47.3 ad 2.

[171] See *ST* III.47.6; 46.11 arg. 1. Lonergan makes this fully explicit in *Redemption*, 263, 475, 519.

[172] *ST* III.47.3 ad 3: "eadem actio diversimode iudicatur in bono vel in malo, secundum quod ex diversa radice procedit. Pater enim tradidit Christum, et ipse seipsum, ex caritate, et ideo laudantur. Iudas autem tradidit ipsum ex cupiditate, Iudaei ex invidia, Pilatus ex timore mundano, quo timuit Caesarem, et ideo ipsi vituperantur."

[173] That satisfaction concerns paying the debt of punishment, Aquinas explicitly states, for instance, in *ST* III.48.4c.

God's simple *fiat*) than the cross.[174] Instead of arguing from the relative necessity of paying the debt of punishment, Aquinas maintains that "among means to an end that one is the more suitable whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to such end."[175] St. Thomas's list of the concurrences that are conducive to the salvific end includes the persuasive, exemplary, meritorious, and dignifying value of Christ's passion for the image-restoration in the human being. As Aidan Nichols notes, this passage implies that "liberation from sin is not the whole of salvation"; in addition, there is the human reunion with God.[176]

All in all, a close reading of Aquinas's account makes us wonder: What kind of justice, precisely, is manifested in Christ's satisfaction? In what sense is Christ, through undergoing his passion, giving God what is justly due to God? In the search for a response to these questions, we need to examine more closely the aspect of justice within satisfaction. We start with clarifying Aquinas's notion of justice. Next, we consider the distinction between punishment and satisfaction. Lastly, satisfaction is situated within its proper context of penance.

3.1.1. Aquinas's Notion of Justice

To provide a roadmap for a massive topic in Aquinas's moral theology, we should note at the outset that Aquinas's notion of justice is not univocal. Aquinas applies the term "justice" in a proper and improper (or metaphorical) sense, as when something is called "just" derivatively or when *ratio iustitiae* is present in some limited way (as in virtues connected with justice). Let us briefly examine each of these senses.

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[174] See, respectively, *ST* III.48.2 and III.46.3. In q. 48, for instance, Aquinas prefers speaking of the compensation for the offense, *recompensatio totius offensae humani generis,* rather than *reatus poenae*.

[175] *ST* III.46.3c: "tanto aliquis modus convenientior est ad assequendum finem, quanto per ipsum plura concurrunt quae sunt expedientia fini."

[176] See Aidan Nichols, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Passion of Christ: A Reading of *Summa theologiae* IIIa, q. 46," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43, no. 4 (1990): 449.

Aquinas's definition of justice in the proper sense integrates the classical *suum cuique reddere* with Aristotle's virtue ethics: "justice is a habit whereby the human being renders to each one his or her due by a constant and perpetual will."[177] Hence, justice is a virtue—a disposition of mind, a good operative habit—that makes both the person and her work just.[178] The proper act of justice is rendering to each one his or her due (*debitus*) "according to equality of proportion."[179] Notably, justice is the only one of the four cardinal virtues whose proper subject is the will.[180] While the will is in no need to be perfected in respect to the agent's own good (the will is naturally inclined to it), the will needs to be directed in willing that which transcends such a good. The virtues of justice and, ultimately, charity, shape the rational appetite as the agent moves beyond self-referential love.[181] Whereas the other cardinal virtues are primarily about what is "mine," justice is about what is "yours" and "ours": it "disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity."[182] Whether it will be humanity, one's community, neighbor, or God, justice in the proper sense essentially directs the agent in his relations with others.[183]

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[177] *ST* II-II.58.1c : "iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit."

[178] For Aquinas's general definition of virtue, see *ST* I-II.55.1–4; cf. I-II.62.1 arg. 1. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.6.

[179] *ST* II-II.58.11c; cf. *ST* II-II.61.2; II-II.61.4. As appointed according to the proportion of equality, the mean of justice is real, not merely rational (cf. *ST* II-II.58.10 ad 3; II-II.61.2; cf. *ST* I-II.56.6c; II-II.58.10c; I-II.63.2c; I-II.64.1c). This implies that the mean of justice varies according to the proportion of merit and demerit, and the status of the persons involved. For instance, in Aquinas's medieval society, if one strikes a prince, the proportion of equality between penalty and crime is different than when the wrong is done to an ordinary person (cf. *ST* II-II.61.4c; II-II.58.10 ad 3; II-II.61.2 ad 3).

[180] The subject of prudence is practical reason in relation to the right will (*ST* II-II.47.1 and 47.4; cf. *ST* I-II.57.4–5; 58.4; 61.1; 66.5; II-II.47.6). Temperance and fortitude perfect the sensitive appetites, respectively, the concupiscible (desiring) and irascible (struggling) powers, directing them to that which accords with right reason. See *ST* I-II.60.3–5; I-II.61.1–5; cf. *De virtutibus,* q. 1 a. 5 co.

[181] See *ST* I-II.56.6c.

[182] See *ST* II-II.58.11 s.c. Aquinas recalls the words of St. Ambrose here (*De Offic*. 1.24). Prudence has a more supervening function that prevents it being simply self-regarding, but only justice is primarily other-oriented.

[183] Cf. *ST* II-II.58.2c.

Aquinas distinguishes three basic relationships guided by justice. As defined by the "whereto" of the relationship, they can be described as (1) "individual (part) to community (whole, sovereign)," (2) "individual to individual," and (3) "community to individual." In accordance with whether the "whereto" term is the whole or a part, Aquinas first distinguishes between general and particular justice.[184] General justice defines one's relation to the community/sovereign and thus directs the individual's acts to the common good.[185] It stands foremost among all the moral virtues inasmuch as the common good transcends the individual good of one person.[186] Particular justice, which is further divided into commutative and distributive justice, is concerned with the right relationship toward an individual.[187] Commutative justice regards right relations between individuals.[188] The mean in commutative justice is observed according to the equality of proportion between "thing and thing" (thing done or given and thing received; passion and action).[189] Retributive justice, which regulates payment for services, restitution, rewards for merits, and punishments for demerits, belongs to commutative justice.[190] Distributive justice directs the common good to particular individuals (community/sovereign to individual). In distributive justice, the mean follows the proportion

[184] See *ST* II-II.58.5 and 7. For more on general justice and its relation to particular justice in Aquinas, see Mary M. Keys, *Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). The present discussion is indebted to her insights.

[185] *ST* II-II.58.7 and 8. General justice is also "called 'legal justice,' because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good" (*ST* II-II.58.5c). Aquinas, however, is not ignorant of the fact that human laws are not always just (cf. *ST* II-II.80 ad 4).

[186] *ST* II-II.58.12c. Aquinas notes that not only legal justice but even particular justice, because of having the will as its subject and being oriented to another, excels the other moral virtues (ibid.).

[187] In his discussion of justice, Aquinas draws on Aristotle; see *Nicomachean Ethics,* 5.4.

[188] *ST* II-II.61.1c.

[189] *ST* II-II.61.2.

[190] *ST* I-II.21.3; II-II.62.1; II-II.61.4.

between "things and persons" and depends on the diversity of the status and circumstances of the recipients of the common good.[191]

Aquinas's notion of justice *sensu improprio* applies to several realities. First, since justice resides in the will, by way of causality, justice can be metaphorically predicated of the righteousness of the will itself, and of the justice as justification whereby the will is rectified.[192] In agreement with Anselm, then, Aquinas affirms that "justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will."[193] Likewise, in line with Augustine, Aquinas grants that we can metaphorically speak of that justice which faith works in us.[194] Second, derivatively, Aquinas also speaks of the justice of the virtues integrally connected with the cardinal virtue of *iustitia*, such as religion, piety, friendliness, and penance.[195] These virtues have something in common with the principal virtue but in some respect they fall short of the perfection of it. It is common to all such virtues annexed to justice that they are directed to another person. Since justice formally concerns rendering to another his or her due according to equality, these virtues annexed to justice can fall short either by lacking an aspect of equality or the aspect of what is due. For instance, in case of religion and piety, whatever a person renders to God or one's parents is due, but it cannot be equal, while, in friendship, there is little of the nature of the due (*ratio debiti*), even if friendship is conducive to the greater rectitude of a friend.[196]

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[191] See *ST* II-II.61.2c and ST II-II.61.4 ad 2.

[192] *ST* II-II.58.2c.

[193] *ST* II-II.58.1 ad 2.

[194] *ST* II-II.58.2 ad 1.

[195] Cf., respectively, *ST* II-II.81; II-II.101; II-II.114; III.85.3. For more on the aspect of what is due in *amicitia*, see *ST* II-II.23.2 ad 1.

[196] *ST* II-II.80.1c.

As we will see in more detail shortly, the different meanings of justice discussed above are germane to Aquinas's understanding of the divine justice as revealed in Christ's satisfaction. It suffices to say now that, while Aquinas agrees that there is a form of divine judgment (*forma divini iudicii*) which has the *ratio* of commutative justice,[197] his primary understanding of divine justice relies on an analogy of distributive justice. God is not directed to other things, but rather other things to God. Furthermore, there is nothing that God can receive which God does not already have. God is no one's debtor. Rather, just as "a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves," so God "gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition."[198] Thus, the "order of the universe, which is seen both in the effects of nature and in the effects of will, shows forth the justice of God"[199] and is above all a free gift of the self-diffusive *bonitas divina*.[200]

3.1.2. Punishment and Satisfaction

While distributive justice provides the main analogy for divine justice (and as such controls our ultimate claims about it), acknowledging the different expressions of divine willing in the single order of the universe implies that there are also different expressions of divine justice, rendered intelligible by different analogies.[201] Since salvation *prima facie* deals with the problem of a culpable loss through sinning, Aquinas conceives Christ's salvific work, as we have seen, primarily by analogy with satisfaction. Satisfaction, for him, is achieved by an act of penance, and the principle of this act is the virtue of penance—a virtue annexed to commutative justice.[202]

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[197] See *ST* II-II.61.4 ad 1.

[198] *ST* I.21.1c and ad 3.

[199] *ST* I.21.1c.

[200] See *ST* I.5.4 ad 2: "bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse."

[201] On the expressions of divine willing, see *ST* I.19.9 and I.19.12. See also above, section 2.4.

[202] See *ST* III.85.3; *Super Sent*., lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1 qc. 2; *ST Suppl*. 12.1–3.

As such, satisfaction goes beyond restitution and does not regard punishment simply but punishment in a qualified sense. Let us consider this in more detail.

To recall, in the footsteps of Augustine and Anselm, Aquinas contends that sin incurs punishment because it violates the divine order:

> Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.[203]

As Aquinas argues further, an inordinate act or sin incurs punishment because it disrupts three interrelated orders to which the human will ought to subject itself: the sinner acts against the order of reason, of human law, and of divine law.[204] Thus, sin opposes justice in all senses inasmuch as the order of reason concerns the rectitude of the will and the life of virtue, the order of the human law regards general and particular justice, while the universal order of divine government pertains to divine justice, analogous to and more excellent than any kind of human justice because it conforms to the rule of God's infinite wisdom.

Aquinas proposes that punishment for sin can be considered in both an unqualified sense (simple punishment) and in a qualified sense (medicinal and satisfactory punishment). Punishment simply (*secundum rationem poenae*) is suffered involuntarily and is regulated by the principles of retributive justice. According to Aquinas, simple punishment always comes to the sinner by reason of his or her own sin, whether original or personal. It "is not due save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will."[205] Since,

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[203] *ST* I-II.87.1; cf. I-II.87.3c.

[204] See *ST* I-II.87.1. Cf. *ST* I-II.55.4 ad 4.

[205] *ST* II-II.108.4c. cf. *ST* I-II.87.8

under the punitive aspect, the sole end of punishment is the restoration of order, simple punishment takes both temporal and spiritual goods away.[206]

Punishment *secundum rationem medicinae* has a curative and preventive goal.[207] It is a privation in a qualified sense: "the human being suffers the loss of a lesser good that he may profit in a greater good as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God."[208] By medicinal punishment alone (*poena medicinalis tantum*), a person can be punished without a personal fault (yet still on account of the moral corruption due to original sin).[209] The medicine, however, "never removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser."[210] Thus, medicinal punishment never takes away spiritual goods. While all punishments are directed to some good (such as restraining a criminal, or honoring God), not all punishments are merely medicinal.[211] Medicinal punishment of itself is contrary to the will but, as it changes one's disposition, it might be suffered willingly.[212]

The defining characteristic of satisfactory punishment is that it is undergone with an antecedent willingness to suffer. As willingly undertaken, Aquinas explains, satisfactory punishment loses some degree of the *ratio poenae*, but not entirely: "it is voluntary simply, but

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[206] See *ST* I-II.87.7–8.

[207] Cf. *ST* II-II.108.4: "punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause."

[208] See *ST* I-II.87.7c. cf. ST II-II.108.4.

[209] See *ST* I-II.87.8. Medicinal punishments can be "inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters," inasmuch as one, in some way, belongs to them (ibid.). Aquinas contends that if one bears such punishment patiently, it is good for one's soul.

[210] *ST* II-II.87.7c.

[211] Aquinas notes that there is a medicinal aspect to all divine punishments, but not necessarily with respect to the one punished. For instance, "the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments" (*ST* I-II.87.3 ad 2). Some Protestant theologians, such as Hugo Grotius, will later pick up this reason for inflicting penalty in interpreting Christ's passion as working "by way of terrorism," to use Lonergan's idiom. See Lonergan, *Redemption*, 99.

[212] Cf. *De malo*, 16.5. For more, see Lonergan, *Redemption,* 121.

involuntary in a certain respect."[213] In this way Aquinas qualifies Anselm's absolute disjunction, *aut satisfactio aut poena*. To understand what Aquinas means, we need to recall that, for him, the human act is voluntary inasmuch as an agent moves herself by an intrinsic principle, according to the inclination of the will as rationally free.[214] Even external violence cannot cause involuntariness as long as there is the will to suffer the action brought about by an extrinsic agent.[215] This antecedent willingness to suffer, however, does not mean that evil as evil is not repugnant to the will's natural inclination to good: by nature, we do not will our suffering in itself. Nonetheless, the "punishments" can be willed inasmuch as some higher good is attached to them. Aquinas's differentiated anthropology enables him to distinguish this more accurately: while punishment simply is contrary to every aspect of one's willing, satisfaction is against one's *voluntas sensualitatis* and *voluntas ut natura,* but not against *voluntas secundum rationem*.[216] According to St. Thomas, this is true also for Christ's satisfaction: "although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in him": his human rational will was attuned to the saving will of God.[217]

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[213] *ST* I-II.87.6c.

[214] See *ST* I-II.6.5.

[215] *ST* I-II.6.5: "Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, there is no violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently, this cannot be called involuntary." Cf. *ST* I-II.6.4.

[216] My explanation takes into account that Aquinas distinguishes between (1) the will of sensuality, *voluntas sensualitatis*, which is called will by participation (e.g., as in instinctively shrinking from pain) and (2) the rational will, *voluntas rationalis*. The latter can be considered in two ways: (a) after the manner of reason, *voluntas secundum rationem* (the will as acting in *libero arbitrio*) and (b) after the manner of nature, *voluntas ut natura* (as in automatically or instinctually willing one's own good by necessity). See *ST* III.18.5c.

[217] *ST* III.18.6c: "licet voluntas naturalis et voluntas sensualitatis in Christo aliquid aliud voluerit quam divina voluntas et voluntas rationis ipsius, non tamen fuit ibi aliqua contrarietas voluntatum. Primo quidem, quia neque voluntas eius naturalis, neque voluntas sensualitatis, repudiabat illam rationem secundum quam divina voluntas, et voluntas rationis humanae in Christo, passionem volebant." Cf. *ST* III.18.5.

The fact that satisfaction is, in a sense, voluntary (while punishment as such is not) corresponds to the broader purpose of satisfaction.[218] Satisfaction is not meant simply to restore the violated order (as *poena simpliciter* does) but, among other things, also to contribute to the healing of the human being: "When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But [satisfactory] punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it."[219] Hence, satisfaction has also some curative and preventive effects: *satisfactio est medicina curans peccata praeterita, et praeservans a futuris.*[220]

Inasmuch as it solidifies the rectitude of the will healed by grace, satisfaction shares not only in the *ratio poenae*, but also in the *ratio medicinalis*. Aquinas explores this aspect of satisfaction to some greater detail in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, where he discusses penance together with justification.[221] To return to the state of justice by means of grace, the human will, which previously had swerved from rectitude, needs to "abandon sin by moving in a contrary direction from those movements whereby it was inclined toward sin."[222] This movement away from sin is accomplished by means of penances which serve as an antidote: just as pleasure in

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[218] As we will see later, as voluntary, satisfaction can be carried out on behalf of another, inasmuch as there is the unity of wills. See *ST* I-II.87.7–8.

[219] *ST* I-II.87.6 ad 3: "remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum aequalitatem iustitiae." The *poena* in question here is *poena satisfactoria*. See also *Super Sent*., lib. 4 d. 15 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 3 co.: "satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins." Cf. *SCG* III.158.5.

[220] *ST Suppl.* 13.2; *Super Sent.,* lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1 s. c. 2.

[221] *SCG* III.158. In the *Summa Theologiae*, the two questions are separated because Aquinas follows the *ordo diciplinae* rather than the historical order. The connection between the two topics still remains conspicuous, especially with respect to Aquinas's discussion of the twofold movement of the will (cf. *ST* I-II.113.3–5). Repentance, for Aquinas, is "the human being co-operating with God for his justification" (*ST* III.85.2 ad 2).

[222] *SCG* III.158.1: "oportet quod per contraria voluntas recedat a peccato his per quae in peccatum inclinata fuit. Fuit autem inclinata in peccatum per appetitum et delectationem circa res inferiores. Oportet igitur quod a peccato recedat per aliqua poenalia."

sinning has previously drawn toward the consent to sin, so penances strengthen one's detestation of the past sin and the resolution to avoid future sin.[223]

3.1.3. Penance and Satisfaction

As the foregoing already suggests, according to Aquinas, the reintegration of a sinner into the divine order through satisfaction is ultimately directed to fully healing and restoring his or her personal relationship with God. This is especially evident in Aquinas's teaching on the virtue and sacrament of penance.[224]

To begin with, Aquinas proposes that, in keeping with the final end of reconciliation, there is a threefold change (*triplex immutatio*) intended by the penitent:

> The first is by regeneration unto a new life, and this belongs to that penance which precedes Baptism. The second is by reforming one's past life after it has been already destroyed, and this belongs to penance for mortal sins committed after Baptism. The third is by changing to a more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to penance for venial sins, which are remitted through a fervent act of charity.[225]

While in the broader context of the sacramental life repentance intends the *triplex immutatio* of *regeneratio*, *reformatio*, and *perfectior operatio vitae*, the specific end of the sacrament of

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[223] *SCG* III.158.1–2.

[224] See esp. *ST* III.85.1–6; 84.2–3; 90.2; *ST Suppl.* qq. 1–2, 12–15. The sacrament of Penance (but not Baptism and Confirmation), Aquinas argues, can be considered under the aspect of virtue because in Penance the human acts of contrition, confession, and satisfaction with respect to sin take the place of the sacramental matter. Since "virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue" (*ST* III.85.1 ad 1). Aquinas notes that we can also consider penance as passion, a kind of sorrow in the concupiscible part of the soul, and as sorrow which is an act of the will elicited by charity, from which the specific act of the virtue of penance proceeds (*ST* III.85.4; cf. 85.2 ad 1; 85.1 ad 2). Penance should be understood, therefore, as a kind of infused moral virtue. For a helpful discussion on Aquinas's understanding of such virtues, see Rudi te Velde, "The Hybrid Character of the Infused Moral Virtue according to Thomas Aquinas," in *Faith, Hope and Love: Thomas Aquinas on Living by the Theological Virtues*, ed. Harm J. M. J. Goris, Lambert Hendriks, and Henk J. M. Schoot (Leuven: Peeters, 2015).

[225] *ST* III.90.4c: "Est autem triplex immutatio a poenitente intenta. Prima quidem per regenerationem in novam vitam. Et haec pertinet ad poenitentiam quae est ante Baptismum. Secunda autem immutatio est per reformationem vitae praeteritae iam corruptae. Et haec pertinet ad poenitentiam mortalium post Baptismum. Tertia autem immutatio est in perfectiorem operationem vitae. Et haec pertinet ad poenitentiam venialium, quae remittuntur per aliquem ferventem actum caritatis."

penance, and the immediate end of the virtue of penance, is the reformation of one's life through the detestation of past sins and the resolve to amend one's life accordingly.[226]

Aquinas argues that, by virtue of having for its special matter human sins, and by being the principle of the acts that are meant to destroy sin, penance belongs to a kind of commutative justice. It is just not simply but relatively, in analogy with the justice which is possible not between equals but "between parties of whom one is subject to the other."[227] Even more importantly, satisfaction does not belong to the species of retributive justice. Aquinas's explanation in what way penance is a special virtue, and a part of justice, is worth quoting at some length:

> Penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.[228]

For our purposes, there are two things to note in relation to this passage. First, repentance concerns not simply sorrow for sin, as elicited by charity, but sorrow turned into detestation of sin, which aims at eliminating and uprooting sin, a sorrow which is not merely sadness about evil

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[226] *ST* III.90.4c.

[227] See *ST* III.85.3. Aquinas illustrates this with analogies taken from his patriarchal culture, such as of a "servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband."

[228] *ST* III.85.3c: "poenitentia non habet quod sit virtus specialis ex hoc solo quod dolet de malo perpetrato, ad hoc enim sufficeret caritas, sed ex eo quod poenitens dolet de peccato commisso inquantum est offensa Dei, cum emendationis proposito. Emendatio autem offensae contra aliquem commissae fit non per solam cessationem offensae, sed exigitur ulterius quaedam recompensatio, quae habet locum in offensis in alterum commissis sicut et retributio, nisi quod recompensatio est ex parte eius qui offendit, ut puta cum satisfactione; retributio autem est ex parte eius in quem fuit offensa commissa. Utrumque autem ad materiam iustitiae pertinet, quia utrumque est commutatio quaedam. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est pars iustitiae." Cf. *ST Suppl.* 12.2.

(at which we are rather good), but, above all, the resolve to amend for the offense.[229] In the sacrament of penance, the detestation of sin and the resolve to amend for it is manifested in that repentance proceeds from contrition to confession to satisfaction: from an interior movement to exterior acts in word and deed.[230] Second, in satisfaction, by contrast to retribution, compensation is on the part of the wrongdoer rather than the one wronged. Namely, in retributive justice, the penalty is imposed involuntarily and by observing the equality of proportion to the injury that the offended person suffered, as decided by an impartial judge. In satisfaction, the offender makes compensation with the willingness to atone in accordance with the will of the offended person. The willingness to atone in the offender includes a readiness to let the aggrieved determine the right measure of atonement. Aquinas summarizes this in his treatment of the acts of the sinner in the sacrament of penance: "the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition," while the second and third, fulfilled by confession and satisfaction, are submission to the judgment and decision of the priest representing the offended person, that is, God.[231]

The difference is accounted for, as Aquinas further explains in his discussion on the sacrament of penance, by the fact that in the case of penance "we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship."[232] In keeping with the ultimate end of restoring friendship, St. Thomas maintains, penance proceeds from charity, understood as love of friendship. Charity is both the first

[229] See *ST* III.85.2c: "[penance] aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against God." Lonergan's sacramental analogy for atonement in Thesis 16 of *De Verbo Incarnat*o takes up this element of Aquinas's teaching to explain the interior motive of Christ's satisfaction. See Lonergan, *Redemption.*

[230] See *ST* III.90.1–4; cf. *ST* III.86.6c. Significantly, God can and does forgive sins outside of the sacrament of Penance, albeit not without the virtue of penance (see *ST* III.86.2).

[231] *ST* III.90.2c.

[232] *ST* III.90.2c.

operative principle and the ultimate end to which the virtue of penance is subordinated.[233] While sorrowing for evil or loving good and rejoicing therein are acts directly elicited by charity, satisfaction, inasmuch as it intends the destruction of sin, proceeds from the charity as if commanded by it (*quasi a caritate imperatus*).[234] A penitent may cooperate with actual grace and respond to the promptings of the Holy Spirit even before the infusion of the habit of supernatural charity in justification, but the free filial offering to amend for sin can only proceed from charity.[235] Without charity, there is no satisfaction "for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity."[236] Whenever sin is presupposed, the opposite, in a sense, is also true: charity is not realized without the act of penance: "charity demands that a person should grieve for the offense committed against his friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction to his friend."[237] This can be understood as a corollary to Aquinas's teaching on justification: the infusion of grace is simultaneous with the twofold movement of the free-will: toward God through love and against sin by the act of penance, the whole movement terminating in reconciliation. With respect to sin, yielding to charity's lead always entails penance. No conversion without aversion.[238]

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[233] For instance, see *ST Suppl.* 12.2 ad 1: "as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity." The latter passage verbatim follows *Super Sent.,* lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2 ad 1.

[234] *ST* III.85.2 ad 1. See also n. 225 above.

[235] See *ST* III.85.5–6. Aquinas enlists four cooperative acts which precede the infusion of the habit of supernatural charity (justification): conversion, faith (*caritate informata*), servile fear, and hope (*caritate informata*). Then follows the act of charity and the act of filial fear whereby a person, out of reverence to God, freely offers to make amends to God. While the object of servile fear is punishment, the object of filial fear is God.

[236] *ST* III.14.1 ad 1. See also *Super Sent.*, lib. 4 d. 15 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 2; *ST Suppl.* 12.3 ad 2; 14.2. This indicates that penance is an infused moral virtue (cf. *ST* I-II.65.3; III.85.6).

[237] *ST* III.84.5 ad 2.

[238] See *ST* III.85.6; I-II.113.5–6. Aquinas distinguishes four things in justification: infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity (*fides per caritatem formata*), the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, and forgiveness. In the causal order, they

The central role of charity, according to Aquinas, relativizes the very necessity of satisfaction (but not repentance): "through the strength of one's love for God, and of one's hatred of past sin, there is removed the need for punishments of satisfaction of purification."[239] This coheres with Aquinas's teaching on the key role of contrition. Though all four parts of the sacrament of penance—contrition, confession, satisfaction, and absolution—are integral to the sacrament and ordered to each other, contrition virtually includes the whole, not as to its essence, but the way the foundation includes the whole building.[240] Contrition, the free act of the will by which one sorrows for all sins committed and wills to atone for them, is the inner foundation of the outer work of making satisfaction. Lonergan will later explicitly draw a parallel between the inner and outer acts of penance and Christ's satisfaction for our sins.[241]

To sum up the main thread of thought on Aquinas's treatment of justice in relation to satisfaction: Satisfaction is an act of the virtue of penance, which is annexed to commutative justice but goes beyond mere restitution. It does not regard justice between equals nor does it concern simple punishment, which is always against one's will, but proceeds from an antecedent willingness to suffer punishment as a means to personal reconciliation between the wrongdoer and the wronged, according to the will of the offended person. This account of satisfaction

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follow each other as just enumerated, while in time they are simultaneous. For more on justification in Aquinas, see Daniel A. Keating, "Justification, Sanctification, and Divinization," in *Aquinas on Doctrine*, 139–58.

[239] *SCG* III.158.6. Aquinas further explains that if the strength of one's attachment to God by love "be not great enough to set aside punishments entirely, nevertheless, the stronger it is, the smaller will be the punishment that suffices" (ibid.). Cf. *ST Suppl.* 5.2.

[240] *ST* III.90.3 ad 2 and ad 3. Cf. *ST* III.90.1–4; 86.6c; 84.5 ad 3. The first three parts of penance, the acts of the penitent in respect to sin, stand to the words of absolution as matter to the form (the acts themselves are the proximate matter, whereas the penitent's sins are the immediate matter; see *ST* III.84.2c; cf. *ST* III.84.7c).

[241] See Lonergan, *Redemption*, 191–95, 497, 543–47.

implies that Aquinas analogically conceives the justice of the cross in terms of penance and friendship rather than other virtues annexed to justice, such as religion or piety.[242]

3.2. Charity and Christ's Satisfaction

Before considering the bearing of the foregoing discussion on justice, satisfaction, and penance on Aquinas's understanding of the justice of the cross, we still need to clarify further the role charity plays in his soteriological account. As indicated above, Aquinas contends that satisfaction both proceeds from charity and aims at the restoration of our friendship with God: *reconciliatio autem nihil aliud est quam amicitiae reparatio*.[243] By analogy, Aquinas conceives Christ's satisfaction as an ultimate act of friendship which reconciles us to God. Because this analogy has a biblical provenance, we first examine it by drawing on Aquinas's scriptural exegesis and then turn to his exposition of charity as friendship in the systematic treatises.

3.2.1. Out of Friendship and for Friendship

Aquinas's Scripture commentaries, especially on the Gospel of John and Pauline epistles, attest to his understanding of Christ's satisfaction as subordinated to the biblical claim that God took the initiative to reconcile us with God's self while we still were the enemies of God.[244] As Aquinas notes in his comments on Eph 2:4–7, this initiative does not have any ulterior motive

[242] This partially goes against the proposal of Daria Spezzano who interprets Christ's satisfaction as the "exercise of the charity-infused virtue of religion, which allows us to render justice to God by giving to him the honor that is due." See "'Be Imitators of God' (Eph 5:1): Aquinas on Charity and Satisfaction," *Nova et Vetera* 15, no. 2 (2017): 619. There are two major problems with her position: the first is exegetical (Aquinas explicitly conceives satisfaction as the act of the virtue of penance, not religion), the second is theological (piety as such does not necessarily deal with sin).

[243] *Super Sent*., lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 5 qc. 2 co. Cf. *Suppl.* 13.1c.

[244] For instance, see Aquinas's comments on Eph 2:16 in *Super Eph.* cap. 2, l. 5, which is packed with scriptural references to other Pauline epistles: "But the hostility that existed between God and men through sin, he killed in himself when he blotted out sin through the death of the Cross. 'When we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son' (Rom 5:10). 'God wanted all fullness to dwell in him, and through him, to reconcile all things unto himself' (Col 1:19–20). Since Christ satisfied sufficiently for our sins, reconciliation occurred as a consequence of his having paid the price (1 Cor 6:20)." Cf. *Super Rom.* cap. 5, l. 2, 22; *Super II Cor* cap. 5, l. 5. Cf. Eph 2:14–18; Rom 5:6–10; Cor 5:19. See also *ST* III.48.4 ad 1; *Compendium* 1.227.

except God's merciful love: "The efficient cause of the divine blessing of justification is God's charity."[245] Affirming continuity between creation and salvation, Aquinas notes that Paul's "exceeding charity" (Eph 2:4) refers to a fourfold goodness and efficacy of divine love: it brings us into existence, it makes us in God's own image as *capax Dei*, it regenerates in us the *imago Dei* corrupted by sin, and it gives God's only Son for us.[246]

The divine goodness shown forth in the mystery of redemption, Aquinas contends in his *Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura*, is the highest manifestation of friendship. As John announces, "greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (Jn 15:13).[247] St. Thomas argues that John's meaning should be interpreted in the light of Rom 5:8: "But God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us."[248] The two claims that Christ is our friend and that he died for his/God's enemies, Aquinas thinks, are compatible. Christ has laid down his life for his friends "not in the sense that they were friends who loved him, but rather were those whom he loved."[249] Hence, "Christ did not lay down his

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[245] *Super Eph.* cap. 2, l. 2. Correlating Eph 2:4, 5, and 7 with the Aristotelian causes, Aquinas explains that the efficient cause of our justification is God's love, the exemplar cause is Christ, and the final cause is "the abundant riches of grace" in this life and the next. There can be no other ulterior cause because God is not subject to any threat, coercion, or higher law: "misericordia Dei est infinita, quia non coarctatur angustiis divitiarum, neque timore nocumenti restringitur, et neque lege superioris" (ibid.).

[246] "Efficiens autem causa beneficii divini iustificantis, est caritas Dei. Et quantum ad hoc dicit *Deus autem qui dives est in misericordia, propter nimiam caritatem*. Dicit autem *propter nimiam caritatem*, quia dilectionis divinae possumus considerare quadruplicem bonitatem et efficientiam. Primo quia nos in esse produxit... secundo quia ad imaginem suam nos fecit, et capaces beatitudinis suae... tertio quia homines per peccatum corruptos reparavit… Quarto quia pro salute nostra filium proprium dedit" (*Super Eph.* cap. 2, l. 2). The Latin *propter nimiam caritatem* here translates Paul's *διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἀγάπην* (Eph 2:4). In the context of the recent surge of interest in the accounts of salvation which do not isolate it from creation, this passage in Aquinas is very up-to-date.

[247] See *Super Io*. cap. 15 l. 2, no. 2009. Aquinas quotes Jn 15:13 throughout his works multiple times. In the *Summa Theologiae* alone, this verse appears at least six times: *ST* II-II.26.5 arg. 3; II-II.124.2 arg. 2; II-II.124.3c, II-II.184.5 arg. 3; II-II.184.2 ad 3; III.66.12.

[248] *Super Io*. cap. 15 l. 2, no. 2009.

[249] *Super Io*. cap. 15 l. 2, no. 2009. In the *Summa*, Aquinas explains our enmity with God as follows: "God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him" (*ST* I.20.2c).

life for his enemies so that they would remain his enemies, but to make them his friends."[250] The ultimate end of this friendship, offered to those abiding in Christ's love, is their divinization: "[Christ] loved them to the extent that they would be gods by their participation in grace."[251] By being conformed to Christ, his disciples become partakers of the divine nature.[252]

This brief excursus into Aquinas's scriptural commentaries[253] indicates that St. Thomas understands Christ's satisfaction as the act *of* friendship and *for* the restoration of friendship, the trajectory of which extends from the moment of creation to the eternal bliss of the human partaking of the divine nature in the beatitude. Let us turn now to examine the speculative counterpart to Aquinas's scriptural exegesis exposed above, in particular, by focusing on the satisfaction of Christ as a vicarious act proceeding from charity and terminating in charity.

3.2.2. The Vicarious Satisfaction of Christ

We have learned thus far that, in his systematic treatises, Aquinas conceives satisfaction in terms of repentance, inasmuch as satisfaction is prompted by sorrow for sin and seeks the destruction of it. Furthermore, satisfaction as a voluntary suffering of punishment for sin has curative, preventive, and, ultimately, unitive ends. As sharing in some aspect of *ratio poenae*, satisfaction corresponds to the problem of *reatus poenae*, as having the *ratio caritatis,* it answers to the problem of alienation from God, metaphorically apprehended as *macula peccati*.

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[250] *Super Io*. cap. 15 l. 2, no. 2009. Cf. *ST* III.49.4 arg. 1 and ad 1.

[251] *Super Io*. cap. 15 l. 2, no. 1999: "filius… [discipulos] dilexit, ut scilicet essent dii per participationem gratiae."

[252] See *Super Io*. cap. 15 l. 2, no. 1999. Characteristically, Aquinas here refers to 2 Pet 1:4.

[253] For more on Aquinas's exegesis on John and the Epistles of Paul, see Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais, eds., *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012); Weinandy, Keating, and Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to his Biblical Commentaries.* See also Cessario, *The Godly Image*, 33–39.

All this makes perfect sense if we think of satisfaction as made by a sinner. But how does this apply to Christ who was both sinless and impeccable[254]? As sinless, Christ could not have grieved over his own sins nor was he liable to punishment. As sinless and impeccable, he did not deserve even a merely medicinal punishment.[255] Perhaps the most conspicuous clue in answering this question comes in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*:

> But the things that we can accomplish through the efforts of our friends we seem to do ourselves, for friendship makes two persons one in love, and especially in the love of charity. And so, just as a person can make satisfaction to God by himself, so also can he do it through another person, especially in case of necessity. Indeed, the punishment that a friend suffers for oneself one regards as if it were suffered by oneself. Thus, one does not escape punishment provided one suffer along with a suffering friend—and all the more so, the more one is the cause of his suffering. Besides, the love of charity in the person who suffers for a friend makes his satisfaction more acceptable to God than if he suffered for himself, for in the one case it is prompted by charity; in the other, by necessity. It may be taken from this that one person can make satisfaction for another provided both abide in charity. Hence, the Apostle says in Galatians (6:2): "Bear ye one another's burdens, and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ."[256]

There is, then, the possibility of vicariously suffering satisfaction for one's friend, which achieves an even more perfect satisfaction because one suffers purely out of charity. Significantly, such a vicarious satisfaction is not a substitution because the wrongdoer still undergoes a suffering through another. The reason for this is the love relationship, and not a juridical obligation: united in charity, who would not suffer when one's friend suffers?

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[254] Cf. *ST* III.87.8c. For Aquinas' discussion of Christ's sinlessness, see *ST* III.15.1–2; cf. *ST* III.7.9. Aquinas follows the Chalcedonian doctrine that Christ was consubstantial with the Father as to his divinity and consubstantial with us as to his humanity, the latter meaning "like us in all things but sin."

[255] My reasoning here is indebted to Lonergan's discussion of this matter in *Redemption*, 525.

[256] *SCG* III.158.7: "Quae autem per amicos facimus, per nos ipsos facere videmur: quia amicitia ex duobus facit unum per affectum, et praecipue dilectio caritatis. Et ideo, sicut per seipsum, ita et per alium potest aliquis satisfacere Deo: praecipue cum necessitas fuerit. Nam et poenam quam amicus propter ipsum patitur, reputat aliquis ac si ipse pateretur: et sic poena ei non deest, dum patienti amico compatitur; et tanto amplius, quanto ipse est ei causa patiendi. Et iterum affectio caritatis in eo qui pro amico patitur, facit magis satisfactionem Deo acceptam quam si pro se pateretur: hoc enim est promptae caritatis, illud autem est necessitatis. Ex quo accipitur quod unus pro alio satisfacere potest, dum uterque in caritate fuerit. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, Galat. 6–2: alter alterius onera portate, et sic adimplebitis legem Christi." Cf. ST *Suppl.* 13.2c.

The analogy of vicarious satisfaction helps to solve the intellectual problem as to how Christ's ultimate act of friendship restores *our* friendship with God. Just as in human affairs one friend can bear the burden of another inasmuch as they are one in a certain way (*unus portet poenam alterius inquantum sunt quodammodo unum*),[257] so Christ has offered satisfaction for our sins by virtue of becoming one with us in his humanity and in love, but not in sin. As Aquinas explains, "Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for his, but for our sins."[258] It is for our sins that he endured his passion, it is us whom he has redeemed from the bondage of sin and alienation from God, and for us he merited the grace of justification, thus reconciling us with God.[259] We now need to examine more thoroughly the precise sense in which we are one with Christ, as well as the consequences it has.

3.2.3. Charity as Love of Friendship

In the soteriology of the *Summa*, Aquinas directly applies the analogy of friendship to Christ's satisfaction in his response to the objection that Christ could not have saved us by way of satisfaction because the other two acts of the penitent (contrition and confession) cannot be carried out vicariously. Aquinas clarifies the way Christ's satisfaction can merit grace for us in the following manner:

> The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ's satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members. Also, in so far as any two humans are one in charity, the one can atone for the other as shall be shown later. But the same reason does not hold good of confession and contrition, because satisfaction consists in an outward action, for which helps may be used, among which friends are to be computed.[260]

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[257] *ST* I-II.87.8c. See also *ST* I-II.87.7c: "since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see individuals take the debts of another upon themselves."

[258] *ST* I-II.87.7 ad 3.

[259] *ST* III.49.1c. See also *ST* III.46–49.

[260] *ST* III.48.2 ad 1. Cf. *ST Suppl.* 13.2; *De ver*. 29.7. As we will see later, in Thesis 16 of *De Verbo Incarnato*, Lonergan develops an explicit analogy between the third part of the sacrament of penance and Christ's

Here Aquinas brings together two great themes of Augustine: that of *totus Christus* and friendship. As suggested in reading the above passage in the context of Aquinas's broader undertaking, the analogy with friendship provides the primary explanatory framework for understanding Christ's vicarious satisfaction, while the image of the body of Christ undergirds Aquinas's treatment of how Christ's merit applies to us sacramentally.[261]

That the analogy based on friendship plays a key role in Aquinas's soteriology comes to the fore not only in his treatment of satisfaction as discussed thus far, but also in his theology of grace. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit makes us members of Christ and thereby adopted children of God.[262] In speculative terms, this corresponds to the infusion of sanctifying habitual grace, by which we receive a supernatural principle of charity, which Aquinas also understands by the analogy based on the love of friendship. Charity as friendship is reciprocal and therefore can be grasped in a twofold sense: the love by which God loves us as God floods our hearts with the gift of the Holy Spirit (cf. Rom 5:5), and the love by which we love God and all else in God.[263]

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satisfaction. Aquinas has a few other tacit references to Christ's satisfaction as analogous to the penitential act of a sinner (cf. *ST* III.15.1 ad 5; III.48.2 arg. 1), but never makes the sacramental analogy fully explicit. It seems that what prevents him from doing so is that Aquinas's understanding of Christ's psychological constitution is less differentiated than Lonergan's. For Lonergan, inasmuch as it is a detestation of sin, contrition, too, is vicariously experienced by Christ.

[261] For Aquinas's treatment of the mystical body of Christ, see *ST* III.8.1–6; cf. III.48.1; 49.1.

[262] See, for instance, *ST* III.8.5; 23.1–3. The pneumatological dimension of grace is emphasized in Aquinas's scriptural commentaries; cf. *Super Rom*. cap. 8, l. 1; 9; *Super I Cor.* cap. 12, l. 3. For more on the Trinitarian aspect of charity as friendship, implied in the notion of adoptive filiation through the Holy Spirit, see Herwi Rikhof, "Trinity," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 36–57, at 52–54; Matthew Levering, "Aquinas on Romans 8: Predestination in Context," in *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas*, 196–215, at 202–204; Keating, "Justification, Sanctification, and Divinization," 151–55.

[263] See *Super Rom.* cap. 5 l. 1: "Caritas Dei autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo pro caritate qua diligit nos Deus, Ier. XXXI, 3: *caritate perpetua dilexi te*, alio modo potest dici caritas Dei, qua nos Deum diligimus … Utraque autem caritas Dei in cordibus nostris diffunditur per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis." While Aquinas does not use the technical terms of objective and subjective genitive, the passage conveys the twofold meaning of Paul's *ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ*.

For Aquinas's discussion of charity as the created supernatural principle in us, see *ST* II-II.23.1–2. In *ST* II-II.23.2 he clarifies that charity as our love for God is a created supernatural principle in the will by virtue of which the Holy Spirit moves the will to love God and all things in God in such a way that the will also freely moves itself.

Aquinas's notion of charity as friendship integrates the biblical and Augustine's understanding of friendship by drawing on Aristotle's notion of the friend as an *alter ego*:

> When a person loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called one's "other self" (*alter ipse*) (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul (*dimidium animae suae*)."[264]

In the footsteps of Aristotle, Aquinas affirms that the love of friendship or beneficence (*amor amicitiae, seu benevolentiae*) arises from a kind of actual likeness. In contradistinction from concupiscence, "a friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure" (*amicitia utilis seu delectabilis*), where one friend has likeness only potentially and therefore loves another in a self-referential manner, *amor amicitiae* is properly directed to another.[265] The friend is loved for his or her own sake, "as that for whom good is desired."[266]

Since "friendship makes two persons one in love,"[267] there are two indispensable characteristics of *amor amicitiae*: common love, *mutua amatio* and mutual benevolence, *mutua benevolentia,* founded on some kind of *communicatio* (as in *communis facere*).[268] Looking upon

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The positing of this created supernatural principle in the will enables Aquinas to affirm human freedom and the possibility of meritorious human acts. As Aquinas elsewhere explains, by charity we adhere to God as God is in God's self because charity perfects and elevates our natural love for God (*ST* I-II.109.3 ad 1). Infused together with justifying grace, charity, for Aquinas, is the form of all virtues without which even the other two theological virtues, faith and hope, are as if dead (see *ST* I-II.62.4; 65.2 and 4; 113.4 ad 1). Cf. Jas 2:26 and Gal 5:6.

[264] *ST* I-II.28.1c: "cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae." Note that Augustine's *dimidium animae suae* comes from Horace (Horatius Flaccus), *Odes* 1.3.

[265] See *ST* I-II.27.3. In *ST* I-II.26.4, Aquinas clarifies that "the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a person wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to whom he wishes some good. Accordingly, the human being has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good." Of note, the love of friendship does not exclude the self-love that proceeds from and terminates in God. A friend-love is not greater than rightly understood self-love (see *ST* I-II.28.3 ad 3; cf. II-II.26.4).

[266] *ST* I-II.2.7 ad 2. Cf. *ST* I-II.28.3c.

[267] *SCG* III.158.7. See also *ST* I-II.28.1–2; II-II.23.1, 3, 4, 6. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8–9.

[268] *ST* II-II.23.1: "Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione."

each other as "another self," friends not only wish and do good things for their friends just as they do for themselves but also regard the good or the evil done to each other as done to themselves.[269] Because of this quasi-identification, which the union in love brings about, a friend regards the punishment that a friend suffers as if it were suffered by himself or herself and thus can satisfy for the sins of a friend. Aquinas concurs with Aristotle that "what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves."[270] The love of friendship, then, according to Aquinas, effects a kind of mutual indwelling (*mutua inhaesio*):

> In the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently, in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.[271]

In distinction from human friendship, however, the human-divine friendship is based not on the readily available unity of wills but on divine *communicatio* by which we are made friends and adopted children of God.[272] Christ's love for the human being does not presuppose the ready-made unity of wills in charity, as we have seen in Aquinas's scriptural commentaries. Initially, *amatio*, as yet, is not mutual. Instead of presupposing it, supernatural charity creates the unity of

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[269] *ST* I-II.28.2.

[270] *ST* I-II.5.5 ad 1: "Quae enim per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus." Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 3.3.

[271] *ST* I-II.28.2: "In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante." We will see that Lonergan develops the notion of mutual indwelling in "The Mediation of Christ in Prayer," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958–1964,* CWL 6, 160–182.

[272] See *ST* II-II.23.1c.

wills. Aquinas's analogy with the love that one has for the friends of one's friend helps understanding how this works:

> Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.[273]

We can think through the implications of this analogy as follows.[274] By virtue of the hypostatic union, Christ's grace and charity are perfect. United to us not only in his humanity but also through the fullness of charity *par excellence*, which, as divine Person, the Son has as his own, Christ in his humanity loves us in virtue of his love for God and because of God's immutable love for us as (potential) friends of God. On account of Christ's merit, the rest of humankind can share in supernatural charity and thereby extend the same friendship to God's other friends-in-the-making.[275]

Aquinas's analogy of Christ's vicarious satisfaction as friendship, as we can see from the considerations above, explains not only how Christ's vicarious satisfaction works for our benefit but also how we, in fact, receive the benefit. The notion of "alter ego" situates our *regeneratio, reformatio,* and *perfectio* within the context of *conformatio* to Christ. According to Aquinas, while Christ made a superabundant satisfaction, "in order to secure the effects of Christ's passion, we must be likened unto Him," "Christ's satisfaction works its effect in us inasmuch as we are incorporated with Him, as the members with their head."[276] In light of the foregoing, however, the suffering that the members of Christ's body willingly accept is no longer simply a

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[273] *ST* II-II.23.1 ad 2; cf. *ST* II-II.23.1 ad 3.

[274] For understanding this, I owe to Lonergan's "principle of the diffusion of friendship"; cf. Lonergan, *Redemption,* 633.

[275] As we will see later, this will become a cornerstone in Lonergan's explanation of the historical causality of the cross event.

[276] See *ST* III.49.3 ad 2 and ad 3, respectively.

matter of undergoing temporal punishment in payment for their actual sins, or a medicine which both heals the moral corruption due to original sin and prevents future sin. First and foremost, such a suffering mediates our assimilation into Christ. Once in love with their head, the members of Christ's body "complete what is lacking in Christ's afflictions."[277] Incorporated in Christ by the grace of adoption, we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.[278]

3.3. Where Justice and Charity Meet

In discussing the order of charity, Aquinas teaches that "it belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained."[279] By way of concluding this third section, we now consider the nature of the justice willed by charity that is manifested in Christ's satisfaction. In particular, we finally are in a position to answer our main question: in what sense the justice of the cross is just.

To answer this question, we should recall that, for Aquinas, the *ratio iustitiae* consists in giving each one his or her due according to the proportion of equality. The justice of the cross, as our discussion has demonstrated, is to be primarily understood in the context of penance and friendship. Considered as virtues connected with justice, the former, as we have noted, lacks something as regards strict equality, while the latter is lacking in respect to what is strictly due. In the light of what we have learned thus far about satisfaction as an act of penance and about charity as friendship, let us examine, first, the aspect of equality and, second, the aspect of what is due in relation to Christ's satisfaction.

First, what kind of equality is implied in Aquinas's account of the justice of the cross? This can be clarified by drawing on his tacit analogy between Christ's satisfaction for sin and

[277] *Super I Cor.,* cap. 1 l. 2. Cf. Col 1:24.

[278] *Super I Cor.,* cap. 1 l. 2. Cf. Rom 8:17.

[279] *ST* II-II.26.7c: "ad caritatem pertinet, ut velit iustitiam Dei servari, secundum quam meliores perfectius beatitudinem participant."

satisfaction as in penance. In this context, the form of justice is fulfilled in comparison with the one offering satisfaction "for friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible."[280] Thus, the form of justice is safeguarded in that the *satis* of satisfaction denotes, not a quantitative, but a proportionate equality according to the capability of the one offering satisfaction (*homo reddat quod potest*).[281] Furthermore, as explained by Aquinas's discussion of the difference between punishment and satisfaction, the capability in question is a matter of one's good will, inasmuch as satisfaction is voluntary and proceeds from charity.[282] In this light, it seems right to propose that, for Aquinas, in Christ's satisfaction the proportionate equality between "thing and thing" (as is proper to commutative justice) concerns the rectitude of Christ's will against the inordinateness of the human willing.[283] To draw on Lonergan's insight into Aquinas's contribution, the justice of the cross regards the *victory of Christ's will* over sin, the victory revealed in his suffering *ex caritate et obedientia*.[284]

If my understanding of Aquinas is correct, thinking of the proportion of equality in the context of commutative justice alone would mean telling only half of the story that was unfolding before our eyes in tracing the various aspects of Aquinas's soteriology throughout this

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[280]See *Super Sent*., lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 co.: "sed sufficit ut homo reddat quod potest: quia amicitia non exigit aequivalens nisi secundum quod possibile est; et hoc etiam aequale est aliqualiter, scilicet secundum proportionalitatem: quia sicut se habet quod Deo est debitum ad ipsum Deum, ita hoc quod iste potest reddere, ad eum; et sic aliquo modo forma justitiae conservatur; et similiter est ex parte satisfactionis. Unde non potest homo satisfacere, si ly satis aequalitatem quantitatis importet. Contingit autem, si importet aequalitatem proportionis, ut dictum est." Cf. *ST Suppl*. 13.1c.

[281] See *Super Sent*., lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 co.

[282] See *ST Suppl.* 13.2: "poena habet vim satisficiendi maxime ratione caritatis." Cf. *ST* III.14.1 ad 1: "the principle [of satisfaction] is the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity." See also *ST Suppl.* 14.2.

[283] To recall, this is the corollary of Aquinas insistence that, in the case of satisfaction, compensation is on the part of the offender (see *ST* III.85.3c).

[284] Locating a proportion of justice primarily in the rectitude (or the lack whereof) of the will does not seem to contradict the traditional argument (as in Anselm) that, in virtue of the dignity of Christ's person and the abundance of Christ's merit, the satisfaction he made for sin was, in a way, infinite (cf. *ST Suppl.* 13.1 ad 1). It can be said to be infinite inasmuch as it proceeds from the infinite love/charity that is Christ's by virtue of his divinity.

chapter. The context of friendship, especially the fact that, with respect to satisfaction, Aquinas replaces Anselm's principle of supererogation with the principle of charity, brings to our attention the aspect of distributive justice proper to the mystery of the cross. Aquinas does not make this aspect fully explicit in his discussion of Christ's satisfaction (or of satisfaction as such).[285] However, the discussion of both divine mercy as the beginning and the end of justice, and the role accorded by Aquinas to charity in satisfaction (as exposed earlier) has availed itself of his judgment that distributive justice is the most fitting analogy for divine justice; and so it seems plausible to suggest that, besides commutative justice, distributive justice is another, and perhaps more fundamental, analogy for the justice of the cross.

This can be supported by considering the aspect of what is "due" in Christ's satisfaction as an act of friendship. In friendship, according to Aquinas, one gives what is due in a way that far surpasses what is legally due in relation to commutative justice: friends confer on each other a gratuitous favor.[286] If this is the case with human friendship, this should be incomparably truer of charity as supernatural friendship, which is "not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God."[287] Since even merely human satisfaction derives "a certain infinity from the infinity of divine mercy,"[288] Christ's satisfaction can be conceived as the very embodiment of God's infinite mercy. Divine mercy, however, is not deprived of divine justice but is the fullness thereof.[289] This becomes especially evident when divine justice is primarily

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[285] Since he ceased writing the *Summa* just before getting a chance to update his interpretation of satisfaction, and we have to rely mostly on the young Aquinas's treatment of the topic in the *Sentences*, we can only speculate whether he would have made it explicit there.

[286] *ST* II-II.23.3 ad 1: "Nam iustitia est circa operationes quae sunt ad alium sub ratione debiti legalis, amicitia autem sub ratione cuiusdam debiti amicabilis et moralis, vel magis sub ratione beneficii gratuiti." See also *ST* II-II.80.1; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 8.13.

[287] *ST* II-II.23.3 ad 1.

[288] *ST Suppl.* 13.1 ad 1.

[289] *ST* I.21.3 ad 2.

understood as distributive. To recall, while commutative justice upholds the equality between the thing done and the thing suffered, distributive justice regards the equality between thing(s) given and the person(s) who are receiving.[290] Christ's satisfaction as an act that restores the friendship between the wrongdoer and the one wronged conforms to this equality inasmuch as it takes seriously the misery of the human race by giving the "thing" that most fittingly suits the situation of the sinner as entangled in the pervasive moral corruption due to both original and personal sin. In this light, the proportion of equality in Christ's satisfaction is between the profound need of the human race and the divine willingness or love, out of which God in God's wisdom chooses to heal human misery.

Let us summarize our exploration of the sense in which the justice of the cross is just. The equality of proportion in Christ's satisfaction primarily regards the wills of the parties involved. Above all, justice is attained "according to the will of the person offended,"[291] which is the divine willingness to regenerate the human race because of God's immutable love for humanity. Second, justice is realized through Christ's willingness to suffer on our behalf and for our sake in the way that divine wisdom saw and divine will chose to meet our need. Christ loved us this way *before* we were friendly to him and *in order* that we might be made friendly. Third, God willed the regeneration of the human being to be accomplished through human co-operation as free and rational: *regeneratio* involves the *reformatio* of our willing and the *perfectio* of our operations. Hence, the third kind of willing that the *aequalitas crucis* takes into account is the will of the justified sinner, an enemy of God made friend. The analogy of proportion in relation to the justice of the cross matches the willingness of the wills involved, and this willingness is

[290] See *ST* II-II.61.2c and II-II.61.4 ad 2.

[291] *ST* III.90.2c.

grounded in charity. Therefore, it seems right to conclude that, in Aquinas's soteriology, justice and charity "meet" in the will as their immediate subject: the will of God who diffuses *bonitas divina*, the will of Christ, the friend-mediator between humankind and God, and the will of the sinner justified by Christ's satisfaction, who is conformed and assimilated to Christ in charity.

In addition, we should note that apart from linking it to penance, Aquinas does not make fully explicit what kind of justice (in the proper sense) constitutes the justice of the cross. In the context of all that has been said thus far, this suggests that Aquinas thinks of the justice of the cross not so much in the proper sense of justice, but in a derivative sense of it. For someone like St. Thomas, the magister in *sacra pagina*, the justice of the cross should, first and foremost, have been both the justice of *Christus iustus* and God's justifying justice revealed in him: the justice that fittingly reconciles us to God and reintegrates the sinner into the order of the universe. Thereby we are restored to the order of grace, the order which regenerates, reforms, and perfects us by conforming us to Christ. Hence, Aquinas understands and conceives the justice of the cross primarily as a reconciling and therefore restorative justice.

Conclusion

Reconciliatio autem nihil aliud est quam amicitiae reparatio.

—St. Thomas Aquinas[292]

At the end of the section dedicated to vicarious satisfaction in his lecture on redemption, Lonergan notes: "what I am saying so briefly on satisfaction is the sort of thing that is batted around for weeks in theological classes and not ended off as quickly as that."[293] Similarly, we might say that the present interpretation still has not exhausted Aquinas's understanding of the justice of the cross as manifested in Christ's satisfaction. There is a number of topics which would still be interesting to explore in relation to Christ's satisfaction as Aquinas's primary explanation for the cross event: e.g., his understanding of how the merits of Christ are sacramentally mediated, the convergences of St. Thomas's soteriology and Trinitarian theology, his understanding of the salvific significance of Christ's resurrection, etc. The scope of this thesis, however, does not allow for pursuing these new avenues.[294] Hence, we bring this work to a close by summarizing our findings, and offering a compendious assessment of the genetic development from Augustine to Aquinas.

To summarize my argument: Aquinas conceives the justice of the cross as reconciling and therefore restorative justice, manifested in Christ's vicarious satisfaction, which proceeds from supernatural charity, understood as friendship. Christ's passion and death is vicarious *satisfaction*, not retributive punishment, since it is a voluntary (on the part of Christ's rational

[292] *Super Sent*., lib. 4, d. 15, q. 1, a. 5 qc. 2 co. Cf. *Suppl.* 13.1c.

[293] Lonergan, "Redemption," 23.

[294] The reader might find the following secondary sources helpful for thinking through these issues: Liam G. Walsh, "Sacraments," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 326–64; D. Juvenal Merriell, "Trinitarian Anthropology," ibid., 123–42; Keating, "Justification, Sanctification, and Divinization," in *Aquinas on Doctrine*; John P. Yocum, "Sacraments in Aquinas," ibid., 159–82; Herwi Rikhof, "Thomas on the Church: Reflections on a Sermon," ibid., 199–224; Matthew L. Lamb, "The Eschatology of St Thomas Aquinas," ibid., 225–40; Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

will) expression of sorrow for sin, rather than an involuntary infliction of a penalty. It is *vicarious* satisfaction (rather than a penal *substitution*) because, out of an antecedent friendliness with us, Christ does for us what we cannot do for ourselves, yet without taking away our responsible freedom. This freedom enables us to accept or reject God's offer of friendship, and to follow through by doing what we can to make amends for our sin. Through Christ the mediator and by grace, God does the reconciling and restorative work *in nobis, sed non sine nobis*, for without us grace is sufficient but not efficacious. Hence, what is justly due which satisfaction fulfills is measured against the rectitude and charity on the part of the wills involved, namely, God's immutable love for human beings, Christ's antecedent willingness to vicariously suffer for his friends, and the sinner's willingness to be conformed and assimilated to Christ. This implies a *mutua amatio et benevolentia*: the unity of wills, based on God's communication of divine nature to us. In the world where sin is a fact and where God acts through secondary contingent causes according to their nature (and therefore does not use force to violate our free-will), such a unity is achieved only dialectically, through repentance: the shift from "bad" to "good" will.

The preceding demonstrates that the "why" of the cross, for Aquinas, is primarily a matter of *convenientia*, namely, of what was most suitably conducive to restoring us to the supernatural friendship with God, and to our ability to love everything in God. We could have been saved in many other ways, but being redeemed by Christ's satisfaction was most fitting inasmuch as repentance is intrinsic to asking and being given pardon. Since the main problem is that, through our sin, we stopped belonging to God in the sense of no longer being united with God in charity (but not in the sense of no longer being subjected to God's power),[295] the

[295] See *ST* III.48.4 ad 1.

adequate solution is the restoration of our friendship with God, not God's reclaiming power over us. Correspondingly, the notion of friendship is the theoretical center of Aquinas's explanation, and this new explanatory element presupposes the entitative disproportion between charity and natural love. As a result, the justice of the cross concerns primarily the restoration of the right order of human willing. Through the cross, our disordered love is healed by Christ's own *caritas ordinata et ordinans*.

This understanding of the justice of the cross enlarges and deepens Augustine's soteriology, which St. Thomas transposes by integrating Anselm's notion of satisfaction and Aristotle's metaphysics. In Augustine's *De Trinitate*, the justice of the cross was primarily the humble love that restores the fallen order by neutralizing the power of pride that is dialectically opposed to the power of God's love. The objective and subjective dimensions were explained by two complementary mechanisms of salvation, which correspond to our liberation from sin and conformation and assimilation to Christ.[296] Aquinas's account reaffirms that it was fitting to redeem us, not by force, but by God's communication of friendship manifested and accomplished by Christ's self-sacrifice, understood through an analogy of vicarious satisfaction. This analogy attends to both the objective burden of *reatus poenae* and the subjective alienation by *culpa*. By virtue of sharing in both the *ratio poenae* and *ratio caritatis*, Aquinas's notion of vicarious satisfaction integrates Augustine's two explanatory mechanisms, and the subjective and objective dimensions, conceptualized in terms of voluntarily paying the debt of punishment as the fitting means to reconciliation after a personal offense.

[296] The two mechanisms are embedded in Augustine's soteriological motif "justice over power" and in his understanding of Christ as *sacramentum and exemplum* in *De Trinitate*. For more on Augustine's explanations of how Christ saves, see J. Patout Burns, "How Christ Saves: Augustine's Multiple Explanations," in *Tradition and the Rule of Faith in the Early Church. Essays in Honor of Joseph T. Lienhard, S.J.,* ed. Ronnie J. Rombs and Alexander Y. Hwang (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 193–210.

Aquinas's transposition of Augustine's soteriology, however, does not lie simply in providing a speculative underpinning to Augustine's claim that charity is the beginning and the end of justice although it certainly does that. Here we suggest that the gist of the development regards the sublation of the dialectical opposition "justice over power" by the dialectical opposition "good will over bad will." I use "sublation" here following Lonergan's meaning of sublated and sublating operations of consciousness—as not a replacement or negation but a higher integration, enrichment, expansion of Augustine's meaning based on a differentiated development. This development not only presupposes Augustine's meaning, but employing Aristotle's finer notions of justice and friendship, also transforms that meaning by lifting it onto a more explanatory level. We can convey the development from Augustine through Anselm to Aquinas under the following five headings: (1) theorem of supernatural; (2) the tripolar division; (3) from supererogation to supernatural charity; (4) from necessity to fittingness; (5) from "justice over power" to "good will over bad will."

(1) *Theorem of supernatural*. As Lonergan has demonstrated, the introduction of the theorem of supernatural by Philip the Chancellor of the University of Paris around 1218–1230 is a game-changer.[297] In the light of this systematic theorem that was made possible by the reception in the Latin West of Aristotelian metaphysics, Aquinas was able to move beyond Augustine's and Anselm's historically conditioned inability to distinguish (without separating) two entitatively disproportionate orders, the natural and the absolutely supernatural. According to this theorem, the infinite nature of God absolutely exceeds the proportion of any finite nature.

[297] On Philip the Chancellor's contribution, see Artur Michael Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1952), 161, 182–83, 196–201. Lonergan clarifies the background philosophical structure of the theorem of supernatural in an early Latin work as follows: "proportion of nature can be understood as parity of relations between substance and existence and between accidental potencies and operations." See Lonergan, "*The Supernatural Order*," 67; cf. ibid., 79–96. See also *Redemption*, 109.

God is not an item—or even the supreme item—in the order of other beings, but the self-subsistent act of being (*esse: ipsum esse per se subsistens*) and infinite ground of all contingent being, in whom all created reality participates in its own limited way.[298] As the primal and transcendent cause of everything else that is, God is everywhere by God's power, presence, and essence. God is also present in a special way in the human soul: through our created participation in God's infinitely free rationality, we are the *imago Dei*.[299] As such, we have a natural obediential (receptive) potency for elevation by God's grace to the supernatural order that is in a way proportionate to God, so that as human beings we share in God's own nature, albeit in a limited manner.[300]

As an important corollary of the introduction of the theorem of supernatural, it became possible for Aquinas to distinguish between philosophy and theology, and their respective methods. The rest of salient developments pertaining to our treatment depend on this distinction. Let us consider them in more detail.

(2) *The tripolar division*. The appropriation of Aristotelian metaphysics and the theorem of supernatural enabled Aquinas to articulate the middle terms between being and non-being, and between sin and grace, which Augustine was not able to do. This yielded two triple divisions, first, as regards ontology: being, non-being, privation of being; and, second, as regards human anthropology: nature, sin, grace.

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[298] See *ST* I.4.2c. See also *ST* I.7–8.

[299] *ST* I 43.3c. Cf. *ST* I.8.3c; I.44; I.14.13; I.19.8; I.22.4.

[300] *ST* I.93.1–9, esp. I.93.4. See also *ST* I.12.4; I-II.3.8; I-II.5.5; I-II.62.1; III.23.1–3. Aquinas describes grace as participation in the divine nature: grace is *ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis* (*ST* I-II.110.2 ad 2), *quaedam divinitatis participatio* (ST I-II.62.1c). Lonergan later synthesizes Aquinas's teaching on grace defining it as "created communication of the divine nature, which is a created, proportionate, and remote principle whereby there are operations in creatures through which they attain God as he is in himself" (Lonergan, "*The Supernatural Order*," 65).

First, the complete thematization of the tripolar order of being made it possible to speculatively ground the absolutely privative character of the evil of fault and to clearly distinguish it from the evil of punishment. This, in turn, allowed for systematically conceiving three transitive orders in the single act of divine volition.

Second, by his more differentiated anthropology and theology of grace (discussed here in a very contracted manner), Aquinas was able to refine Augustine's disjunction sin-grace and so to navigate between the Scylla of Augustine's tendency toward anthropological pessimism and the Charybdis of Pelagianism[301] by coherently accounting for both human freedom and moral impotence caused by to the loss of grace.[302] Furthermore, the metaphysics of nature enabled Aquinas to distinguish among the different orderings with respect to volition, which in turn let him integrate scriptural and patristic teachings on death as punishment for sin with Anselm's insight that Christ's "punishment" was not simple (involuntary) but satisfactory (voluntary). Lastly, Aquinas's distinction between natural and supernatural love freed him to make friendship the theoretical core of his explanation of the cross event.

(3) *From supererogation to supernatural charity*. Once the above speculative developments were made, Aquinas could propose a higher synthesis of Augustine's objective and subjective aspects of redemption. Since the human problem consists in the culpable loss of grace through sin understood as both a disordered act and a personal offense, Aquinas's account of the divine solution could encompass both the issue of reconciliation and the reintegration of due order, expressed in the notions of *culpa* and *reatus poenae*.

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[301] In a way, this dialectic shows up again in the Bañezian and Molinist interpreters of St. Thomas in the 16th century.

[302] To point out the obvious, for Aquinas, human nature is presupposed and perfected by grace: *gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit*; cf. *ST* I.1.8 ad 2. Furthermore, as we have discussed, according to Aquinas, sin corrupts nature and thereby makes virtue difficult and sinning *de facto* unavoidable; however, it does not destroy nature.

The key to integrating both aspects was Aquinas's development of Anselm's notion of satisfaction whereby he shifts from supererogation to supernatural charity as the principle of Christ's merit. This shift made it possible to reclaim Augustine's emphasis on love, for, once supernatural charity had been distinguished as entitatively disproportionate to natural love, the shift from supererogation to supernatural charity could stress the result of Christ's satisfaction as, first of all, our personal reconciliation with God. Hence, any remaining suspicions that the redemption is simply a matter of placating an angry God, can be eliminated.

In light of Aquinas's metaphysics of creation, moreover, understanding charity as God's communication of divine friendship grounds the objective lovability of a creature in the love of the Creator: to-be-lovable is to-be-loved.[303] God's justifying grace, merited by Christ's satisfaction, makes the human being pleasing to God: "God remits sins on account of love, though God himself has mercifully infused that love."[304] In this context, our sharing in the mystery of the cross by satisfying for our own sin is not an antecedent condition for grace to be given but rather the consequent condition of its efficaciousness.[305]

(4) *From necessity to fittingness.* The theorem of supernatural made it possible to grasp the middle ground between aesthetic reasons (characteristic of Augustine's account) and necessary reasons (characteristic of Anselm's account). *Pace* Anselm's *necessitas*, Aquinas

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[303] This, as we will see, later shows up in Lonergan's account of sanctifying grace as being-in-love with God.

[304] *ST* I.21.4 ad 1.

[305] The reader might recall that the act of repentance is intrinsic to the acceptance of justification; cf. *ST* III.85.6. Cf. I-II.113.1, 3, 7–8. If persons make themselves better, Aquinas further argues, they do so by grace, while those who fail, can only blame themselves. While God predestines us for grace and eternal glory, sin alone is the cause of reprobation (eternal damnation) for "guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true—namely, 'Destruction is thy own, O Israel'" (*ST* 1.23.3 ad 2). Inasmuch as this concerns God's will, Aquinas contends that "God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply" (*ST* 1.23.4 ad 3). For more on the problem of predestination in Aquinas, see Harm Goris, "Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination, and Human Freedom," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas,* 99–122.

reclaims Augustine's notion of the *convenientia* of the cross event by situating it in relation to the difference between philosophical and theological *rationes.*

Without this middle ground made possible by the theorem of the supernatural, Anselm naturally dismissed *convenientia* as merely aesthetic and opted for *necessitas* as the only philosophically tenable position, whereas Aquinas's theoretical framework could ground fittingness in God's free choice of acting in accord with God's wisdom and goodness, and in the human being's rational freedom in willing to accept the gift of reconciliation. Aquinas's speculative interest permitted him to clarify—in light of the New Testament and Augustine's breakthroughs—in what sense divinely introduced means are most conducive to making this acceptance possible and probable within the *de facto* fallen state of humanity.

(5) *From "justice over power" to "good will over bad will."* In light of the theoretical developments outlined above, Aquinas's account elevates Augustine's "justice over power" dialectic to the higher viewpoint of an internalized "good will over bad will" dialectic.[306] Even though this sublation enriches and expands the understanding of the justice of the cross by displacing pride-power framework from being the chief issue at stake, it also eliminates Augustine's (pre-critical) historical perspective. While Augustine's "justice over power" can be framed by his narrative on how *libido dominandi* corrupts not only individuals but also empires, Aquinas obviously understands that on the speculative level any reference to historical processes is nugatory. Although the analogy of "extended friendship," as explained later, can be made central to an understanding of the historical agency of Christ, head and members, Aquinas did not expressly elucidate this implication.

[306] Though Aquinas favors a rather internalized notion of this dialectic (its primary locus is the will), his teaching on justice, theology of the sacraments, and of the mystical Body, demonstrate that he clearly conceives this dialectic in the context of community.

The absence of the historical aspect notwithstanding, it remains that Aquinas transposes Augustine's "justice over power" dialectic into a broader explanatory context. In Augustine's account, doing away with sins by power is not compatible with that particular aspect of the economy of salvation which has been already espoused by St. Paul in terms of the *kenosis* motif in Philippians 2:6–8: pride-power contradicts the humble love of Christ the mediator. For Aquinas, redemption by force contradicts the economy of salvation as a whole, namely, that divine wisdom and goodness infallibly conceived and irresistibly willed that divine justice is to be achieved, not in spite of human nature, but in accordance with its natural inclination and operation. As Lonergan has noted, Aquinas makes it clear "that God acts not by whim or willful display of power but in accordance with the justice of his wisdom."[307] Moreover, though Aquinas does not downplay the fact that God has chosen not to use God's absolute power to redeem humanity,[308] he emphasizes strongly that the cross event reveals another kind of power, indeed, the highest kind of power: the power of God's mercy.[309]

[307] Lonergan, *Redemption*, 361; cf. 201.

[308] Aquinas's conviction that God can do whatever does not involve an internal contradiction (*ST* I.25.3) implies that, as noted earlier, the problem of redemption could have solved in many other ways (*ST* III.1.2; 46.1–2).

[309] Cf. *ST* I.21.4; I.25.3 arg. 3 and ad 3. Notably, what is new here is not so much Aquinas's idea alone, but his emphases. Aquinas explicitly adopts Augustine's "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil" (see *ST* I.48.2 ad 3). Correlatively, Aquinas stresses that "power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from his knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified" (*ST* I.25.1 ad 4). Christ shows forth God's loving and supremely wise power by suffering and dying on the cross (*ST* III.48.6c and ad 1). For more on Aquinas's understanding of God's power as operative in Christ, see Thomas Joseph White, *The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 359–64.

Epilogue

> *This is why the Son of God became man, suffered, died, and was raised again: because divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed, not to do away with the evils of the human race through power, but to convert those same evils into a supreme good according to the just and mysterious law of the cross.*
>
> —Bernard J. F. Lonergan[310]

The work of interpreting St. Thomas's account of the justice of the cross in these pages is part of a larger project that focuses on the transformation of evil into good, as inaugurated by the Word Incarnate and, by the power of the Holy Spirit, historically realized in and through the mystical body of Christ. This transformation is aptly expressed in what Lonergan has styled as the Law of the Cross: the spiritual law and precept that calls, in conformity to Christ, to lose one's life in order to gain it.[311] Such a law implies that the criterion of Christian authenticity is an antecedent willingness to suffer for the sake of God's reign. Though the nature of this thesis has limited our focus on the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas—a theological genius whose contribution constitutes some major junctures in Latin soteriology that enabled this later development in conceiving the justice or fittingness of the cross—permit me to shed some light on the sequel to the interpretation of Aquinas presented here.

Lonergan's soteriology enlarges St. Thomas's expanded and enriched notion of Augustine's "justice over power" dialectic. In his account of the "just and mysterious Law of the Cross," Lonergan synthesizes Augustine's and, especially, Aquinas's achievements and transposes them into the context of a historically conscious interiority, a context in which theology finally appropriates the modern turn to history and subject, and operates in accordance

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[310] *Redemption*, 197.

[311] In biblical terms, this law is expressed in all four canonical Gospels. The Lord says: "Take up your cross, and follow me. For whoever wants to save one's life will lose it, but whoever loses one's life because of me and because of the gospel will save it." Cf. Mk 8:34–35; Mt 16:24–25; Lk 9:23–24; Jn 12:24–25; Mt 5:11–12, 38–48.

with the modern understanding of science.[312] In particular, as Lonergan has noted later in his career, the Law of the Cross provides a strictly theological complement to his philosophy of history.[313] In his Latin soteriological treatises, Lonergan connects the dots of Aquinas's account by making fully explicit two analogies for understanding Christ's redemptive work: an analogy with the sacrament of reconciliation and the analogy with friendship. In light of these analogies, the Law of the Cross is structured with respect to human conversion.

In a nutshell, Lonergan's account of the Law of the Cross focuses on the transformation of evil into good as psychologically fitting, historically decisive, and eschatologically definitive. Correspondingly, the *lex crucis* is understood as a supreme manifestation of transformative justice. The justice of the cross, as Lonergan maintains, does not concern justice in itself (i.e., justice as equality of proportion which abstracts from the reality of sin) but the possibility of justice among sinners. Such a possibility pivots on the ongoing conversion (or the lack thereof), which is chiefly conceived as a withdrawal from inauthenticity to authenticity. This withdrawal, for Lonergan, entails a triple self-transcendence: intellectual, moral, religious. Intellectual and moral self-transcendence are grounded in and transformed by religious conversion, an unrestricted falling in love with God by grace, which overflows into antecedent willingness, in faith and hope, to be displaced into God, to be taken up into God's projects, to acknowledge the God-willed order of the universe as one's terminal value. In the human world as it exists *de facto*—historically, as the compound of progress, decline, and redemption—seeking justice involves surrendering one's self-regarding motives and taking up one's cross, the true value of

[312] See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 352–83, here 353.

[313] See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, "The Transition from a Classicist Worldview to Historical Mindedness," in *A Second Collection*, ed. John D. Dadosky and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works 13 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 3–10, here 8.

which is known through mutual self-mediation with Christ. Consequently, for Lonergan, the proximate criterion of the justice of the cross is the transformation of evil into good, while the remote criterion is an authentic subject as constituted by the otherworldly love.[314]

To sum up, Lonergan's theology of the cross, transposes Aquinas's dialectic of "good will over bad will" into the dialectic of "authenticity over inauthenticity." Furthermore, in the context of historical consciousness, Lonergan integrates soteriological motifs explored in this thesis with the systematic account of the human good of order and with the biblical theme of the restoration and reconciliation of all things in Christ (cf. Eph 1:9–10; Col 1:20).[315] In continuity with Augustine's *mira commutatio* and Aquinas's *mutua inhaesio*,[316] Lonergan develops the notion of our mutual self-mediation with Christ in relation to the mystery of Christ making our cross his own. Integrating this notion with his philosophy of history and his Latin soteriology—which is deeply indebted to St. Thomas—allows for further developing Lonergan's account of Christ's historical agency. This agency, as the sequel to this thesis on Aquinas's soteriology explores, is historically realized through a kind of emergent *agape* network: the coming-to-be of the mystical body of Christ, the body constituted of God's friends who, united in charity, are conformed and assimilated to Christ in accordance to the Law of the Cross.

[314] Following Lonergan's frequent usage, "otherworldly love" here refers to the dynamic state of being in love with God; such a love is otherworldly inasmuch as it transforms this world by grace.

[315] See *Redemption*, 227, 255, 295, 441, 481, 657, etc.

[316] See Augustine, *en. Ps*. 30.2.1.3; *Io. eu. tr*. 21.8, 108.5, 111.6; *ep. Io. tr.* 10.3; *trin.* 4.1.4; Aquinas, *ST* I-II.28.2.

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