"No Human Being is Illegal": Comparing Framing Strategies in the Immigrant Rights Movement

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

“NO HUMAN BEING IS ILLEGAL”:

COMPARING FRAMING STRATEGIES IN THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT

by

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Abstract

Immigration policy has undoubtedly taken a forefront spot in the national dialogue in our contemporary political moment. However, there is considerable disagreement among and within political parties about how to address this issue. This paper seeks to better understand the priorities of immigrant rights activists in the U.S. by executing case studies on 11 immigrant rights organizations. I explore which framing strategies each group uses to push for its goals and theorize about how these social movement organizations (SMOs) arrive at the strategic frames that they do. Through discourse analysis and coding of interviews, websites, and other media sources, I conclude that the most relevant factors in determining what frame a group arrives at are its external resource environment and how professionalized the organization is. There is additional evidence to suggest that the political opportunity structure, salience of a previously successful 'master frame,' and the age of leaders also affect framing processes. Finally, my data does not suggest that being immigrant-led versus led by non-immigrant 'allies' directly affects an SMOs' framing strategies, but it does affect the external resource environment from which it is able to draw.

Acknowledgements

As I write this section, I am sitting at home in quarantine due to the still-emerging COVID-19 crisis. While the pandemic cut short my senior year and shook up any sense of normalcy and certainty, I must say that I am thankful to this thesis for giving me something tangible to work towards and feel proud of. It certainly has become a constant for me even during this time of ceaseless changes.

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Thank you to my parents who are always willing to drop everything to make sure I have everything I need to succeed, and who are constantly making sure that I know that they're proud of me. Thank you to David for being a wonderful and encouraging quarantine buddy, and for inspiring me every day with your resilience. To my siblings who yelled at me to keep writing and refrained from distracting me (sometimes), I'm thankful for your help too.

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Introduction: Why Talk about Framing?

On September 5th, 2017, the Trump administration rescinded the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) created under the Obama administration. Protests erupted across the country in locations such as college campuses, busy areas of major cities, and in front of buildings including Trump Tower. The volume and magnitude of these protests and those that followed for the next six months or more exceeded any high-profile public demonstrations regarding immigration policies under the Obama administration. Why did this particular policy decision spark the intensity of resistance that it did? How it was able to gain such widespread support? Did the framing strategies used by activists to attract widespread support compromise their fight for other movement goals, such as permanent protection for *all* immigrants?

These questions are crucial to better understanding of the current state of the immigrant rights movement. This paper will explore how eleven different immigrant rights organizations in the Northeast United States employ framing strategies and speculate about why they choose the frames that they do. Through a case study approach, I analyze discourse produced by each organization along with interviews with leaders to arrive at conclusions about how each organization frames the 'issue' of immigration and what factors might impact these choices. The results of my analysis are key to understanding the contemporary challenges and conflicts that the movement faces, as well as to predict where the movement is heading in the years to come. To begin, I will describe the response to the Trump administration's decision to rescind DACA in 2017 to illustrate the how movements use framing to push for their goals. This political moment

highlights the importance of examining frames, understanding their limitations, and considering how choosing frames can cause tension between achieving a movement's numerous goals.

DACA was created in 2012 under Barack Obama's presidency. The program protects individuals who came to the United States before the age of sixteen from being deported and provides them with a work permit. It was expanded in 2014 to lengthen the work authorization and deferred action periods and to include a wider range of eligible ages (Duke, 2017). The 2014 memorandum also established "Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents" (DAPA) whereby parents of citizens or permanent residents would undergo a similar deferred action period, but the Supreme Court ruled against the program in the summer of 2016 (Duke, 2017). The memorandum that formally rescinded DACA was released on September 5th, 2017. President Trump gave Congress a 6-month deadline to "legalize DACA" (according to a tweet), setting up a rush for lawmakers to find an alternative (Pramuk, 2017).

Opposition to the Trump administration's decision was seen across both parties and among a wide constituency of people. Powerful Republican lawmakers including then House speaker Paul Ryan urged President Trump not to rescind DACA (Acosta & Kopan, 2017). Various news articles published in the aftermath stressed the damage to the economy that the rescission could bring. According to CNBC, an early 2017 study estimated that U.S. GDP would be reduced by $433 billion over the next 10 years without the economic contributions of DREAMers (Pramuk, 2017). During the week of the announcement, more than 400 business leaders signed a letter addressed to Donald

Trump and congressional leaders stressing that DREAMers are vital to the economy (Wichter, 2017). Executives and founders of Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, Disney and many more corporate figures publically expressed their disapproval of the decision. President Barack Obama also alluded to the economic contributions of DREAMers in a statement: “To target these young people is wrong—because they have done nothing wrong. It is self-defeating – because they want to start new businesses, staff our labs, serve in our military, and otherwise contribute to the country we love. … and it is cruel” (Edelman, 2017). Many DREAMers themselves also stressed the importance of their dynamic contributions to the economy in press interviews and statements.

Other challengers emphasized the moral and human rights implications of this decision. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which is Republican-aligned, said that the decision is "contrary to fundamental American principles and the best interests of our country,” appealing to the way many understand America’s foundational values (Pramuk, 2017). In one protest, protestors chanted, “This is what community looks like,” emphasizing the vital part of our communities that DREAMers comprise (Shear and Davis, 2018). Protestors called upon America to consider its supposed values of welcoming all and being the land of opportunity. Others emphasized that Dreamers are doing the “right thing.” In an interview with the New York Times, a Dreamer said, "We just want to stay here and contribute to this country, to the economy. We are good people, we’re not criminals" (Shear and Davis, 2017).

Other protesters emphasized the innocence of children in a similar appeal to moral values. In a statement, John McCain said "I strongly believe that children who were

illegally brought into this country through no fault of their own should not be forced to return to a country they do not know" (Pramuk, 2017). Barack Obama chimed in along similar lines: "Let's be clear: the action taken today isn't required legally. It's a political decision, and a moral question… We shouldn't threaten the future of this group of young people who are here through no fault of their own, who pose no threat, who are not taking away anything from the rest of us" (Edelman, 2017).

Some called attention to the cruelty inherent in revoking a policy that provided hundreds of thousands of people with protection. In an interview with Kathy Sheehan, Mayor of Albany, NY, she stated that it is cruel to make a promise that encourages DREAMers to come out of the shadows and live more fully and then to rescind that and induce fear (Fox News, 2018). House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi called Trump's decision "cruel and heartless" (Pramuk, 2017). Many of the posters at protests and rallies invoked this idea to put shame on America for doing something that could separate families.

The numerous angles that protesters used to challenge Trump's decision reflect *framing* by social movement actors. Frames can be defined as "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals to "locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large"(Goffman, 1974). Framing is a process used to make meaning out of the world and experiences in a way that is "intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Benford & Snow, 2000). When movement actors engage in framing, they

are advocating a particular interpretation of an event or experience, typically in hopes that it garners support and challenges adversaries.

When one looks at the response to the decision to rescind DACA, a variety of frames emerge among opponents. Some focused in on the positive contributions to America by DREAMers, especially economic contributions. These actors moved the conversation away from polarizing political and moral beliefs about immigration and attempt to align their cause with a widely-shared belief in improving the U.S. economy. This framing may have helped the movement to appeal to a wider range of people, such as business owners, who feel as if they have a stake in the potential losses due to this policy. Other opponents attempted to bridge their opposition to the decision with concern for American values. Emphasizing the innocence of children and lack of choice tries to evoke sympathy from those who may otherwise by apathetic towards immigrants. Notably, these statements may also potentially drive a wedge between Dreamers—who are depicted as innocent and worthy—and their parents, who would not be considered worthy or deserving under this framing. Those who emphasized the cruelty of the decision to rescind DACA frame the act as objectively morally reprehensible, hoping to appeal to universal ideas such as fairness and justice.

A question remains: Why did the Trump administration's decision to end DACA cause as much uproar as it did in contrast to other immigration-related policies? One answer may be found by looking at what's *left out* of the opposition's framing. The issue was framed in a specific way that emphasized the lack of choice that Dreamers had in immigrating to the United States. This framing allowed people who are normally not

sympathetic to undocumented immigrants to get behind the movement because it emphasized the characteristic of innocence. What was less present in the protests that erupted following September 5th was a call for a long-term solution to protect *all* undocumented immigrants. It was somewhat common to see signs that say things such as 'No human being is illegal,' which employ a more universal human rights and human dignity frame. But by and large this utopian framing was not the focus of the protests. One Dreamer interviewee stated that he was protesting with the goal of permanent protection, respect, and dignity for the immigrant community (Keneally, 2017). However, I would argue that the framing used during this particular moment in time does not necessarily encompass this goal. The protests were able to garner such widespread, bipartisan support because DREAMers were depicted as a type of immigrant who "deserve" their place in the U.S. The movement does not address their parents, for example, who are identified by many primarily with their decision to break U.S. law, rather than with empathy toward their situation. The framing that protestors used to support their cause was extremely effective in garnering the support of individuals from many different ideological backgrounds. However, it is worth nothing that the framework may be limited with regard to goals such as "protection, respect, and dignity for the immigrant community" by creating a dichotomy between a 'deserving' and 'undeserving' immigrant. There is a clear conflict between deploying framing strategies that appeal to a wider range of potential supporters and deploying frames that risk alienating certain groups of people, but might be more aligned with the movement's long-term ideals.

This discussion of the 2017 decision to rescind DACA by the Trump administration gives insight into the way that framing processes operate in the wake of significant political decisions. In the current political moment, considerable changes in immigration policy are being enacted at unprecedented rates. As a result, we've seen some level of increase in activity by social movement actors. Some of these groups and individuals have been fighting against anti-immigrant policies since previous administrations, and others have newly emerged in response to Trump. Going forward, this paper seeks to better understand the immigration rights landscape as it exists today. Specifically, I am interested in understanding how different types of social movement organizations (SMOs—which include non-profits, grassroots organizations, etc.) underneath the same umbrella movement construct blame, devise tactics, and mobilize adherents.

The primary objective of these questions is to understand how leaders from different backgrounds recognize strategic opportunities to push for their organization's goals. This can best be understood by examining each group's framing strategies. There are a variety of sociological debates that address *why* leaders and groups might make the strategic choices that they do. This question is taken up by a variety of scholars who highlight different contributing factors: the external resource environment (J. D. McCarthy & Zald, 1973, 1977); organizational structure (Bartley, 2007; J. D. McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Piven & Cloward, 2012; Staggenborg, 1988); class differences (Leondar-Wright, 2014b; Rose, 1997); age, and documentation status (Abrego, 2011; Negrón-Gonzales, 2014; Patler, 2018; Seif, 2011).

This paper sets out to explore what framing strategies are being used in the immigrant rights movement and explore why SMOs adopt the framing strategies that they do. By extension, why do they reject other framing strategies? This paper will add to the field's understanding of how leaders of SMOs who advocate for immigrant rights choose which strategic frameworks to organize around and identify opportunities to make change. This study will reveal if the various types of groups are united in their approach to immigration justice, or if there is conflict between SMOs and their aims. Furthermore, it aims to reveal how certain demographic and organizational factors affect these framing processes. This may reveal *who* frames the issue which way. Are immigrant community organizers interpreting the political landscape in a very different way than college-educated non-profit professionals, for example? Scholars have explored why these groups' interpretations and solutions may differ from one another due to class differences (Leondar-Wright, 2014b; Rose, 1997) and the availability of resources for different types of organizations (Bartley, 2007; J. D. McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Piven & Cloward, 2012; Staggenborg, 1988).

These questions have powerful implications for organizers, policymakers, allies, and other stakeholders in the world of immigration policy in the U.S. The outcome of this analysis gives insight into how leaders of different groups—who are distinguished by many factors including class, age, immigration status, and education level—arrive at conclusions about what is 'wrong' about immigration policy today. It will pose many complex questions about social position and social movement aims. Returning to a previous example, if immigrants are interpreting the landscape one way, and white, non-

profit professionals are arriving at very different conclusions, what does this suggest about how background impacts social movement activity? If undocumented youth and older documented immigrants hold conflicting frames, what does this suggest about the direction that the movement is heading in for the future?

To explore these questions, I use a case study approach to compare eleven immigrant rights organizations in a city in the Northeast United States. A variety of types of SMOs are represented in this sample. These include well-funded non-profits that focus on public policy, immigrant-led grassroots organizations that rely on crowdfunding, an organization of lawyers that utilizes impact litigation, a mutual aid fund to pay bond for folks in immigration detention, and others. The research primarily uses discourse analysis of documents that each organization has put out publicly such as their websites, press releases, and videos. It is supplemented by four, in-depth semi-structured interviews with leaders of three of the organizations. The interviews and other discourse that I gathered have been qualitatively coded to identify the frames that are employed by social movement actors. My research question opens the door to exploring many factors that impact an organization's outcomes, such as the age, education level, migration status, and ethnic background of leaders, as well as organizational structure and culture. The interplay of all of these factors affects the outcomes this research is interested in: framing processes and strategies. Thus, this study benefits greatly from the constructivist paradigm that a case study approach lends itself to.

In the next few chapters, I will review the relevant literature on framing as it applies to social movements. I will then overview some theories that seek to explain why

groups may employ certain frames, such as resource mobilization theory. This section will also take a look at arguments about the role of professionalization and formalization in the social movement sector. I will then examine what scholars have proposed about the effects of social position—such as class and migration status—on movement activity. The following section will provide an overview of the history of immigrant rights mobilization in the U.S., including how it emerged, the contemporary challenges that it faces, and how this new research will add to our current understandings. The following section will describe my methodology and criteria for including and excluding groups in this analysis. It illustrates how I collected my data and how it was coded. The next chapters will discuss my results and analysis. It will articulate the frames that emerged in the case studies and theorize why particular groups employ the framing strategies that they do. Finally, the paper will conclude by posing some implications of this data for organizers, policymakers, and other stakeholders.

Chapter 1: Defining and Understanding Frames

As I described in the introductory chapter, this paper is interested in comparing framing strategies by social movement organizations (SMOs) as a means to better understand the dynamics of the immigrant rights movement. This chapter serves as a deeper introduction to framing by taking a close look at the contributions of some of the scholars who have developed our modern sociological understanding of this idea. I will review a variety of definitions of framing as well as describe different framing processes that groups may engage with. Later in this paper, these concepts will be used to analyze the frames utilized by my case study organizations. These theoretical understandings are helpful for assessing my research question about what types of immigrant rights groups employ which types of framing strategies and why. This chapter will explain why theories about framing came about in the first place and how they are used to better understand how movement actors push toward their goals. I will apply these concepts in my coding of discourse by eleven case study organizations to more adeptly characterize their framing strategies and assess the extent to which they're useful for understanding the immigrant rights movement as a whole.

The Emergence of Framing Literature

The concept of frames as they apply to this paper was first coined by Erving Goffman in 1974. His work focuses on the overall human experience: how do individuals perceive and make sense of their realities? In this foundational work, Goffman suggests at the outset that any one person's experience of a given event is likely to be very

different from another person's experience of it because to speak of any "current situation" is to pick out from many different things what's important and what's not (Goffman, 1974). For Goffman, the concept of a *frame* comes out of the idea that "definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them" (1974, p. 10-11). This brings us towards his idea of the *primary framework*. Each primary framework, he suggests, "allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). That is to say that individuals perceive events in terms of a primary framework which operates as a way to describe and interpret the event to which it is applied. At any given time, there are millions of different stimuli for our brains to choose to acknowledge and mark as important. These primary frameworks help us to make sense of it all and take appropriate subsequent action. This theory operates on the individual level, but it has been adapted to apply to a wide range of social science disciplines including cognitive psychology (Bateson, 2000), discourse analysis (Tannen, 1993), communications (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele, 1999), and policy studies (Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 2017). Frames have become a landmark way of thinking about how humans make meaning and respond to their surroundings.

Benford and Snow adapted this theory to study social movements (1988, 1992, & 2000). According to these scholars, "The recent proliferation of scholarship on collective action frames and framing processes in relation to social movements indicates that framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and

political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 611). As they articulated, theories about framing processes are among a variety of highly-regarded theories that try to understand why social movement actors make the choices that they make.

These theories about framing came about because of a perceived gap in social movement literature. Early social movement theorists tended to simply describe ideology, treating it as given. Resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977)—one of the fundamental theories of social movement literature—mostly treats a movement's ideology as irrelevant to the outcomes it's interested in. Benford and Snow found that these scholars were completely understating the way that social movements play an essential role in constructing meaning, beliefs, and values. That is to say, movements are not simply carrying existing ideologies, but are actively involved in *producing meaning* (i.e., interpreting, planning, and acting) for movement participants, bystanders, and antagonists (Benford & Snow, 2000). In addition, Benford and Snow were not satisfied with simply applying cognitive concepts—such as a mental schema—to social movements because they don't capture the way that creating meaning is a collective, constructivist process that is negotiated by movement actors over time. Building off of these gaps in the scholarship, Benford and Snow view social movement actors as actively involved in the process of "meaning work" as signifying agents (D. A. Snow & Benford, 1988). These actors *produce* meaning for their constituents as well as bystanders and observers in a similar way to the media and state and local governments (D. A. Snow & Benford, 1988). For example, during the presidency of Donald Trump thus far, certain

immigration policies have resulted in very public opposition and protest, while other anti-immigrant policies have been enacted without much resistance from the general public. Immigrant rights organizations play a critical role in interpreting the meaning of policies and disseminating related information. Whereas certain policies could have been deemed meaningless or insignificant to much of the general public, organizations pick up on them and push forward a particular interpretation that gets their audience to view them as unjust or intolerable, which may result in mobilization. This is one way that organizations make meaning for their adherents and bystanders. In this theoretical understanding, ideological factors—such as values, beliefs, and meanings—are not given, but are constructed as movement participants interact (D. A. Snow & Benford, 1988).

Defining Frames

Frames are defined in a variety of constructive ways. Frames generally refer to the construction of meaning; they help to render events or occurrences significant and guide action (Benford & Snow, 2000). *Collective action frames* are the result of framing activity within entire movements; they similarly make meaning out of the world in a way that is "intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (D. A. Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Benford and Snow describe collective action frames as an "action-oriented set of beliefs that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (2000, p. 614). A collective action frame that exists for one of the groups in my analysis focuses on the lack of progress for immigrant rights that has occurred through legislative action, and thus puts its hopes in strikes and boycotts to demonstrate the necessity of

immigrants in the U.S. and build support. They place a strong emphasis on working outside of the electoral system and believe that the path forward involves building community power. This collective action frame understands immigrants as central to the economy of the U.S. and promotes campaigns that demonstrate their centrality, which has the potential to mobilize business owners, for example, to offer them support. Importantly, collective action frames result from negotiated meanings constructed actively by groups. They are not aggregates of individual perceptions, but come about as movement actors discuss and come to terms with a shared understanding about some situation or system in need of change (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Collective action frames also include shared understandings about who or what is to blame for the issue at hand. This is called *diagnostic framing,* and disagreement about the locus of blame is a common source of distinction between SMOs. In the immigrant rights movement, certain groups place a great deal of blame on local law enforcement for cooperating with ICE and hastening deportations, while other groups are more concerned about federal policies and may actually encourage immigrant communities to build relationship with local law enforcment. The way that each of these groups diagnoses who is to blame for deportations greatly impacts who they cooperate with, who they antagonize, and what types of campaigns they rally around.

Benford and Snow put forward some other "core framing tasks" that describe SMOs' framing processes. *Prognostic framing* refers to the articulation of a solution to the identified issue as well as a strategy for how to achieve that solution (Benford & Snow, 2000). A clear-cut example is how one SMO may see fighting for legislative bills

and meeting with policymakers as the path forward for immigration rights, while others may see a need for building community power and engaging in more disruptive direct action. *Motivational framing* occurs as groups try to mobilize individuals in their struggle. This includes "calls to action" and justification for folks to engage in collective action. Such framing may toggle with language around urgency and severity (Benford & Snow, 2000). For example, when the Trump administration enacted policies that allowed and encouraged family separation at the border, groups used motivational framing strategies to emphasize the urgency of keeping families together and not allowing children to 'get lost' in the bureaucracy of detention centers.

How can SMOs get members of their community to care about immigrant rights? How do they convince them that their strategy is the most effective one? These questions tap into the very practical question of rallying sustained support. This study will dive deep into variations in diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing that exist in the SMOs in the Northeast U.S. city selected for this case study. Based on Benford and Snow's hypothesis, groups are expected to vary in how they identify the problem as well as how broad or narrow they are in terms of the number of ideas they incoporate (Benford & Snow, 2000). These are useful terms for evaluating and comparing the various groups' framing processes.

Benford and Snow put forward a set of three other processes that groups proceed through while attending to their core framing tasks. *Discursive processes* include all of the discourse that a group puts forward, including speeches, social media, press releases, and other written communications (Benford & Snow, 2000). These serve to connect and

align the events and experiences that this group wants to highlight so that observers are led to understand them in light the group's overall frame. Importantly, groups utilize *strategic processes*. These are framing processes that are deliberate on the part of the group and are used to achieve that group's particular goals. The first strategic process is *frame bridging,* which involves linking two structurally disconnected but ideologically compatible frames, often through a group's outreach and information diffusion. (D. A. Snow et al., 1986). An example of this could be an SMO that chooses to highlight the connection between their movement to abolish ICE with the movement to abolish prisons as a whole. The second process is *frame amplification*. This refers to the "idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Movement actors call upon basic or universal values, such as justice or fairness. Family values are often called upon within the immigrant rights movement—such as in the wake of the family separation policies—to urge bystanders and opponents to look past notions of nationality and empathize with the shared value of keeping families together. *Frame extension,* the third strategy, is used to enlarge a group's adherent pool by presenting its interests as aligned with those of the constituents it's trying to reach (Snow et al., 1986). If a groups that advocates for working-class immigrants suspects that participants in the labor movement would be sympathetic to their cause, they may work to present their goals as aligned with those of the labor movement. The final strategy is *frame transformation,* in which movement actors try to create new understandings and beliefs that often challenge old understandings and ways of living. A group may observe a widely-held belief that immigrants held in detention are

criminals and undertake a campaign dedicated to unraveling this conflation through releasing the personal stories of otherwise law-abiding citizens who were placed in detention. These four strategic processes are laid out consisely in the table below.

Frame bridging: The linking of two ideologically compatible but structurally disconnected frames. This can occur at the organizational level—between SMOs of the same movement—or on the individual level through a group's outreach and diffusion of information (D. A. Snow et al., 1986).	***Frame amplification:*** The "idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). Values can include those that are considered basic to prospective constituents. Beliefs can include those about the urgency of the issue, the locus of blame, or the need to stand together (D. A. Snow et al., 1986).	***Frame extension:*** This involves aligning the current frame with larger issues and concerns that may be of interest to an SMO's adherent pool and potential adherents. A group may be trying to enlarge its participant pool by presenting its interests as aligned with those of the constituents it's trying to reach (Snow et al., 1986).	***Frame transformation:*** Generating new understandings and challenging previously held beliefs or conventional ways of living.
Example: Highlighting the connection between a movement to abolish ICE with the movement to abolish prisons as a whole.	**Example**: Protesters of the decision to rescind DACA appealing to ideas of fairness and justice by emphasizing how cruel it is to revoke a policy that promised individuals that they would be protected.	**Example**: A group that focuses on advocating for working-class immigrants presenting its cause as connecting with the goals of the labor movement.	**Example**: A group running a campaign dedicated to unraveling the conflation between immigrant detention and crime by releasing the anecdotal stories of law-abiding citizens who were put in detention.

The final processes that Benford and Snow (2000) suggest occur within SMOs are *contested processes*. These scholars believe that the generation of collective action frames is a contested process which arises from navigating framing contests between groups (such as reacting to counterframing by opponents) as well as framing disputes *within* movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). There has been heavy counter-mobilization and repression during the short history of the immigrant rights movement. According to an analysis by López-Sanders and Brown (2020), following the 2006 protests, English-language press in South Carolina began to increasingly identify immigrants as 'Mexicans' and presented them as a cultural threat and a drain on U.S. resources. This corresponded with increased political influence of anti-immigrant groups in the state (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Repression is also incredibly prominent in the administration of Donald Trump, which employs various types of repressive tools: from xenophobic rhetoric to explicitly anti-immigrant policies and executive orders. Movement actors must navigate the successes and increased resources of countermovements and reach toward ways to counteract them.

Collective action frames are also responding to the social and cultural context within which they arise. One of the most fundamental claims of social movement literature is that protest is not separate from institutional politics; rather, collective action is connected to changes which leave "the broader political system more vulnerable or receptive to the demands of particular groups" (McAdam and Snow, 1997, p. 334). This is called the *political opportunity structure*. Bloemraad and Voss (2020) observe that there has been little attention given to understanding the relationship between political

opportunity structure and the immigrant rights activism, and what does exist suggests that the relationship is inconsistent at best. Importantly, they note that within the current literature, "the line between threat as a motivation to action or a source of repression appears thin" (Bloemraad and Voss, 2020, p. 693). That is, threatening political shifts have sometimes produced action (such as the large-scale 2006 protests in response to H.R. 4437) and other times haven't (such as various anti-immigrant bills passed under the Trump administration). However, Nicholls (2014) does suggest that immigrants can sometimes make successful claims for greater rights even during inhospitable political conditions by finding *niche openings*. For example, he argues that undocumented youth found a niche opening in the federal system by arguing that since they were educated in the U.S., brought to the U.S. as children, and have absorbed U.S. values that they are particularly deserving of legalization in their fight for DACA (Nicholls, 2014). As previously discussed, the limit of this strategy comes in its privileging of certain immigrants with those attributes while contributing to further repression of anyone who does not possess these characteristics.

Overall, the immigrant rights movement is in the position to respond to the political opportunity structures provided by both the federal and the state levels, as states and localities have the authority to deny or extend certain benefits and protections to immigrants. However, as Bloemraad and Voss (2020) note, "niche openings and differing political opportunities at the local and federal levels legitimates some activists and claimants over others" (p. 694), thus potentially driving some tension between the claims of national and grassroots groups.

Cultural opportunities and constraints refer to the cultural resources from which movements draw to push forward their goals including beliefs, ideologies, and narratives that exist 'out there' (Benford & Snow, 2000). Similar to political opportunity structure, cultural opportunities also constrains and facilitates movement activities. Collective action frames are not created in a vacuum, but respond to each and every one of these external and internal factors. With significant political changes, for example, groups may be compelled to do some reframing so that their messaging connects more with the new reality of potential adherents. I suspect that many groups underwent reframing processes upon the election of Donald Trump in 2016 to respond to new threats and challenges posed by his anti-immigrant stances.

Reframing connects with Benford and Snow's idea of *frame resonance*. In general, this concept assesses the extent to which a given frame is effective at mobilizing adherents. When are framing efforts actually effective and when are they constrained? Some frames may be effective for a while, and lose their effectiveness over time due to changes in political or cultural opportunity strucutres. To diagnose the "mobilizing potency of frames," Benford and Snow discuss four factors to consider (1988). The first is how well movement actors develop and connect the core framing tasks—diagnostic, prognostic and motivational—to present a *cohesive* message that adherents can get behind. If potential adherents find an immigrant rights frame to be contradictory or disjointed in terms of its approach, they are less likely to want to rally behind it.

Benford and Snow then consider external constraints. How central and urgent are the beliefs at hand to the adherent pool? After the election of Donald Trump in 2016, for

example, standing up for immigrant rights became a central concern for many liberal and progressive individuals in the United States due to strong anti-immigrant rhetoric in Trump's campaign. However, will the frames that were developed over these past four years still be as effective if a Democrat is elected for president in 2020? There still may very well be threats to immigrant rights if a Democrat is elected, but it's likely that many folks will no longer have the same sense of urgency around these issues as they had under the more explicit and direct threats posed by the Trump administration. Immigrant rights groups may have to reframe to emphasize the threats that still exist in a way that resonates under the new political arrangements.

In a similar vein, Benford and Snow pose the question of how relevant movement framing is to individuals' lived experiences: does this framing fit into their lives and help them explain the world around them? Or is it too abstract? Does the framing have empirical credibility? These questions put frames through the test of practicality and assesses how likely individuals are to see the frame as relevant to their understanding of the world. Finally, Benford and Snow look at the timeline of when frames emerge because they believe that it affects how constrained they are. They argue that frames that emerge *earlier* in a cycle of protest actually function to color future movements, while frames that emerge *later* in cycles of protest are constrained by the pre-existing "master frame" and may not resonate as strongly with adherents (Snow & Benford, 1992). Nicholls (2014) argues that, early on, immigrant rights organizations and undocumented youth crafted a representation of young immigrants that rested on notions of 'Americanness' (through American symbols and narratives of cultrual assimilation) and

hard work. This helped these young people to be seen as an exceptional group, no longer a threat to American values, and thus entitled to legalization. Nicholls argues that these themes formed the master frame from which groups have since drawn to assert rights claims in the public sphere (2014). If Benford and Snow's proposition reigns true, the existence of this early master frame constrains the resonance of future frames that challenge it or take another route. The more intersectional frames that are used by many undocumented youth organizations today (ones that are more inclusive of immigrants with criminal records, for example) challenge this master frame, and could face difficulties in attracting groups of adherents due to early, lasting salience of the previous deservingness frame.

My analysis will take these aspects of framing processes and apply them to the data that I have collected through my case studies on eleven immigrant rights organizations. My work is in the company of other scholars who have worked to identify and the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings that exist among SMOs in various movements (Benford 1993, Marullo et al 1996, Meyer 1995). Importantly, my analysis seeks to explain *why* groups employ the framing strategies that they do. Now having introduced framing, the following chapters will dive into a host of theories that could help answer this explanatory question. The following chapter will explore resource mobilization theory and how scholars operating out of this perspective may understand framing strategies. It will then take a closer look at organizational structure and culture—specifically the professionalization and formalization of organizations—and discuss how scholars expect this to impact a group's framing processes. The essay will then turn to

theories about social position and background—including class, migration status, and age—to bring even more nuance to how framing processes develop.

Chapter 2: Resource Mobilization and Organizational Structure

The study of social movements first gained traction in academia in the 1950s. Since then, a variety of scholars have theorized about the mobilization process. How do individuals with shared grievances get together to collectively take action? How do problems come to be defined as those worth mobilizing around? What are the strategic dilemmas that social movement actors face? These are some of the many core questions that theorists have tried to parse out. Because this paper is concerned with the strategic processes employed by social movement organizations, this literature review will start by discussing how various scholars speculate why actors make the choices that they do.

Early theories of social movements generally understood social movements to arise as a result of preexisting collective grievances and beliefs. Most of the early theorists clung to the idea that movements arose from an change in the magnitude, intensity, or tolerability of shared grievances or deprivations among a certain population (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Under this framework, collective action is only possible when a collectivity shares a grievance and holds similar views about the causes of this issue and perhaps the means of reducing or eliminating it. Theorists in this line of thought include Gurr (1970), Turner and Killian (1957), and Smelser (1963). Although these authors put forward distinct theories, they all operate from the idea that movements erupt from objective, collective grievances.

The Emergence of Resource Mobilization Theory

McCarthy and Zald (1977) took issue with the idea that discontent alone produces a movement. They believe that previous perspectives ignore structural factors and focus too much on the psychological state of movement supporters. They quote Turner and Killian (1972) who wrote about the need to look at a population's central political processes to understand movement behavior: "…there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group" (p. 251). In the context of the immigrant rights movement, Turner and Killian would argue that there are always enough folks who are angry or frustrated about the lack of rights for immigrants in the country, and there are also enough individuals who oppose the advancement of immigrant rights. But these grievances alone will not spark movement activity. Activity will only come about if a group sees it appropriate or possible to organize around these grievances, given the political climate, and if they're able to attract elite resources and support. McCarthy and Zald add that grievances may even be defined or manipulated by issue organizations, which becomes a more central line of thought in later theories (1977).

Resource mobilization theory attempts to fill previous gaps by focusing on the external resource environment within which movements arise and operate. This perspective holds that movements are more likely to arise if those who share a common grievance or preference are already organized in some way, such as communally or associationally (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Thus, those who share preferences but are

structurally disconnected are unlikely to collectively organize. McCarthy and Zald draw on economic theory to explain collective behavior: they pay attention to factors such as incentives and cost-reduction/efficiency. They understand movements to be competing for a limited amount of resources. These include tangible resources—such as money (funding), time, cultural capital (skills), social capital (networks), and facilities—as well as intangible resources, such as legitimacy in the public eye.

In the resource mobilization perspective, movements are not necessarily comprised of the labor and resources of those who are actually *affected* by the given issue. Rather, "Conscience constituents, individual and organizational, may provide major sources of support. And in some cases, supporters—those who provide money, facilities, and even labor—may have no commitment to the values that underlie specific movements" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1216). *Conscience constituents* refers to direct supporters of a movement who do not stand to benefit from the movement's goals (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In the immigrant rights movement, these have historically included non-immigrant activists, many of whom are involved with religious organizations, labor unions, and civic associations (Nicholls et al., 2020). While the old tradition viewed a movement's choice of tactics and activities to depend on factors such as ideology and previous success with certain strategies, McCarthy and Zald assert that choosing tactics is impacted by a number of strategic considerations that groups have to make. These may include "mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in target" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217). Choosing tactics may cause dilemmas when achieving one of the

aforementioned goals conflicts with achieving another. In striving to achieve any number of these goals, an SMO's framing strategies may be adjusted. For example, if an SMO relies on conscience constituents for funding, they are tasked to frame things in a way that would appeal to this audience and encourage them to contribute more funds. The implications of such a shift in framing are discussed in more detail later in this chapter in the debate regarding the effects of professionalization on a group's framing processes.

Overall, society provides the infrastructure upon which movements draw to achieve their goals. The external environment influences things like what type of communication methods are available, expenses, adherents' levels of affluence, access to institutions and facilities, and preexisting networks (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). McCarthy and Zald make a strong case for examining all of these external factors when attempting to understand an SMO's framing choices. In the immigrant rights movement, funds may be limited due to some of the barriers that immigrants face in civic participation. Bloemraad and Voss (2020) argue that:

> "Often, social movement 'challengers' are marginalized from centers of power because they are resource-poor. Relative to the general population, challengers' education levels might be lower, with implications for civic leadership and political efficacy; financial resources also tend to be more limited. Indeed, a significant proportion of immigrants face these hardships, especially those in precarious legal statuses." (p. 691)

Immigrants' status as challenges and having relatively limited resources caused the immigrant rights move to turn to creating coalitions of schools, churches, unions, civic associations, and hometown associations that came together across cities and communities in the 2006 protests to translate their political aims into collective action (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Thus, the availability of infrastructure from which to draw

may pose a particularly strong challenge for immigrants who are organizing for their rights due to variables like legal status, education levels, and language barriers (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).

McCarthy and Zald also suggest a variety of useful terminology for talking about social movements and their participants that I will employ going forward. A *social movement* refers to "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217-1218). At narrower level of analysis appears *social movement organizations* (SMOs). These are the organizations that comprise a social movement and are united by a broad issue area—in the case of this paper, this would be the rights of immigrants in the U.S. The movement of which the SMOs are a part is called a *social movement sector* (SMS). For example, some well-known national SMOs that embody the broad goal of rights for immigrants in the United States include the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), United We Dream, the National Immigration Law Center, and UnidosUS. In the context of this paper, all of the organizations that I've chosen for my case studies are considered SMOs as part of the immigrant rights movement. Despite them each having their own specific goals and approaches, they are all united by identifying as fighting for the rights of immigrants in the United States.

To refer to the various participants in a movement, McCarthy and Zald draw a distinction between *adherents* and *constituents*. The former are all those involved with a movement who support the goals of the movement (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The latter refers to those who provide resources to the SMO. Adherents and constituents may

or may not actually stand to benefit from the goals of the group. Those who participate or support but are not beneficiaries of the goal are called *conscience adherents* and *conscience constituents*. In the immigrant rights movement, conscience adherents and conscious constituents may be U.S.-born individuals who want to support immigrant rights in the United States, despite not directly benefitting from the achievement of these goals.

Circling back to the task of an SMO under the resource mobilization perspective, McCarthy and Zald suggest that any given SMO has a set of target goals, or preferred changes, that they are working towards and *must* possess resources (ex: legitimacy, money, labor, facilities) to work towards those goals (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Such resources must be controlled or mobilized *prior* to action, and an SMO's activity toward accomplishing their goal is a direct function of their control of resources (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Given these conditions, McCarthy and Zald suggest that any given SMO's task is to convert adherents into constituents and maintain constituents' involvement (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Groups may achieve this through a wide variety of strategies, such as expanding their target goals to appeal to a wider range of potential beneficiaries, working to target bystander publics (those who are not adherents but are not opposed to the movement) into adherents, or by appealing to conscience constituents. Any of these strategies to compete for a pool of limited resources may affect a group's framing strategies. The undocumented youth who worked toward passing the DREAM act after the election of Former President Obama employed a framing strategy that appealed to a wide range of adherents by emphasizing the economic and cultural contributions of

undocumented youth and presenting their continued presence as aligned with fundamental American values. This strategic framing brought support to the movement from subsectors of the U.S. population who may have not have previously viewed immigrant rights as a cause worth mobilizing around. By utilizing this framing and gaining the support of a wider group of participants, the movement was able to attain many more resources, including legitimacy and funds. As groups' resource needs change, they may decide to adjust their framing processes to appeal to a larger audience or a new subset of the population.

Impact of Organizational Structure and Culture

In line with their observations about the effects of the external resource environment on an organization's decision-making, McCarthy and Zald also theorized about the explicit role of professionalization and formalization of SMOs. One of their most highly-quoted assertions is that the resource mobilization approach to collective action is associated with *formalized* organizations. They argue that due to the availability of more funding for movement activists to make a career out of activism, SMOs are more likely to formalize their leadership and structure. With a larger income flow to an SMO, the more their organizational maintenance requires skills such as lobbying, accounting, and fundraising (J. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This process leads to professionalization. They also suggest that this professionalization is becoming more common among SMOs, as funding sources become more readily available for activists to make a career of their activism. The immigrant rights movement has seen a 'scaling up' to more professionalized, national organizations since 2006 (Nicholls et al., 2020). Given the

political opportunity structure for immigrant activists that limits access to civic institutions and certain job opportunities, this could mean that the movement is being co-opted by non-immigrant activists who are more able to make a career out of organizing.

McCarthy and Zald theorize about the effects of professionalization on movement participation. They observe that SMOs with professional leadership have "paper" memberships—that is, nonexistent or flimsy membership—and mostly rely on conscience constituents for resources. They argues that the role of active membership to a movement has become reduced, and SMOs have become more concerned with acquiring financial resources from constituents. Contributing financially to a movement is considered a "low-risk" form of participation. Thus, a shift in focus and membership due to professionalization may have an impact on an SMO's strategies and engagement tactics.

Another aspect of McCarthy and Zald's theory has to do with the role of professional activists in 'manufacturing' grievances. They argue that, in response to the availability of resources, movement professionals become movement "entrepreneurs" who start new (formalized) organizations in which to work. Under this perspective, the evolution of new movements or SMOs is greatly independent from the presence of grievances and more directly correlated with the availability of resources for movement professionals. This argument has been challenged "on grounds of lack of evidence that professional managers and their SMOs originate insurgent challenges, although they may play a role in representing unorganized groups in more established interest group politics" (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 590). The consequences for the immigrant rights

movement may thus take one of two forms based on these theories: 1.) Professionals manufacture grievances to further their professional goals that may not align with the actual grievances of their base, or 2.) Reliance and dependency of foundations due to professionalization cause professionals *not* to take up new or different grievances of their base that could challenge their funding structure, even if originating this challenge would expand their base.

Since the publishing of these theories, their thoughts on the role of professionalization and formalization have been expanded on and criticized by a variety of scholars. Staggenborg is one such scholar who expanded their ideas and tested them against a social movement sector: the pro-choice movement in the 1980s. She examines the effects of organizational leadership and structure through conducting case studies on thirteen pro-choice movement organizations. Building off of McCarthy and Zald's assertion that different types of SMOs require different levels and types of participation, she argues that, "the professionalization of social movements and activists does not necessarily help expand the social movement sector by initiating activities and organizations, but that professionalization and formalization importantly affect the structure and maintenance of social movement organizations, their strategies and tactics, and their participation in coalition work" (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 586).

Her article poses a few challenges to McCarthy and Zald. First, she disagrees with McCarthy and Zald's idea that movement professionals and become movement entrepreneurs. In her analysis, these are distinct types of activists who play different roles in the social movement sector. Also contrary to McCarthy and Zald, she argues that

"nonprofessional leaders and informal SMOs remain important in initiating movements and tactics that are critical to the growth of insurgency" (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 603). As Nicholls et al. argue (2020), "The immigrant rights movement in the United States evolved from largely localized and grassroots struggles in the 1990s into a coherent and coordinated national social movement in the late 2000s and 2010s. Scaling up in this way is challenging because grassroots organizations tend to lack the resources needed to operate at the national level over an extended period" (p. 705). While McCarthy and Zald may see the increased prominence of national, professionalized organizations as a challenge to the influence and success of grassroots organizations, Staggenborg would argue that grassroots organizations may still contribute greatly to the growth of the movement. This may be especially true since both federal and local policies determine the rights and protections of immigrants in the U.S., so grassroots groups may have a stronger voice in local matters than national groups.

There are a few main consequences of formalization that she suggests that do not necessarily pose a challenge to McCarthy and Zald, but build off of their work and contextualize it. Firstly, formalized SMOs seem to be able to maintain themselves over a longer period of time than informal SMOs (Staggenborg, 1988). One of the reasons for this pattern is that foundations and other distributors of elite support prefer dealing with organizations that have formalized structures and professional leaders. In addition, a formalized structure enables and encourages an organization to continue to solicit these resources because they have the organizational capacity to facilitate this. Their structure better prepares them to take advantage of elite preferences and environmental changes, as

compared to informal organizations who are less prepared to adapt to constituent concerns.

In terms of formalization's effect on strategies and tactics, Staggenborg situates her argument against the backdrop of Piven and Cloward's 1977 thesis that large, formalized organizations defuse protest. Staggenborg disagrees with this assertion, arguing that they indeed play an important function especially following-up from the protest victories of informal movements. However, Staggenborg's work supports Piven and Cloward's argument that formalization leads to a decline in militant, direct-action tactics (1977). She observes that formalized SMOs tend to engage in institutional tactics and frequently stay away from disruptive, direct-action tactics. Staggenborg describes two processes: the first is that as movements are pushed to work in the institutional arena, they tend to formalize so that they can engage in institutional activities such as lobbying (a process reminiscent of McCarthy and Zald's resource mobilization argument). In addition, "once SMOs are formalized, institutionalized tactics are preferred because they are more compatible with a formalized structure and with the schedules of professional activists" (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 599).

Finally, Staggenborg argues that formalized SMOs are more likely to engage with and maintain successful coalition work. This is because they are more likely to have dedicated staff to represent the organization and maintain these relationships. It is unclear whether or not this is true for the immigrant rights movement. Coalitions have long characterized the immigrant rights movement and have often been formed from civic associations, unions, churches, families, schools, and hometown associations (Bloemraad

& Voss, 2020). A 2020 study of unions in San Francisco, Houston, and Chicago reveals that unions have increased their involvement with grassroots immigrant rights groups in all three cities and have contributed to the continued prominence of the immigrant rights movement and have successfully fought some state and federal anti-immigrant laws (de Graauw et al.). This may pose a challenge to Staggenborg's assertion and suggest the potential of developing grassroots coalitions that have the opportunity to effectively coordinate various parts of a community.

Staggenborg concludes that formalization may help to sustain social movements, but it leads to the institutionalization of action. However, she does not readily accept that this leads groups to become less radical, but suggests that perhaps their demands and goals become incorporated into institutional life. It could be that these groups have a role in shifting what is seen as legitimate in institutionalized politics. There has been a trend toward formalization in her analysis, but she notes that the line between informal and formal is considerably blurred in many cases, and that many groups do not fit this pattern of informal to formal. Staggenborg's contributions help to explain SMOs' framing processes by highlighting the explicit effects of professionalization that she found in her analysis. Although she does not address framing directly, some of the consequences of formalization that she suggests—including institutionalization and moderation of strategies and tactics—are intimately connected with a group's framing processes. In addition, her ideas about a stronger relationship between elites and formalized SMOs is likely to have strong effects on framing processes as these groups work to sustain elite support by adapting to their preferences.

Another response to McCarthy and Zald comes from Everett (1992), who analyzes social movement trends post-1961 to look for patterns related to professionalization and formalization. His work shows that *inter-organizational* relations have become more dense as the number and differentiation of organizations has increased (Everett, 1992). Importantly, he observes moderation among groups in terms of tactics and ideology during this time period that he studies. He attributes this moderation to groups' efforts to expand their appeal, which resulted in increased participation. A precursor to his work is McCarthy and Zald's hypothesis that the role of membership decreases as groups professionalize. Everett finds this to be true and proposes that low-risk means of participation and appealing to a wider constituency may be a good thing because 1.) it can invigorate and build solidarity and allegiance among members, and 2.) protest events—and especially those which receive strong media coverage—can sustain membership involvement and help to attract new supporters (Everett, 1992). In agreeance with Staggenborg (1988) he notes that professionalized groups dedicate more energy towards maintenance and preservation, which may help to explain the tendency of groups to lower the risk of participation and widen their appeal (Everett, 1992). Although Everett's argument is supported by the social movement industry that emerges in the 60s, 70s, and 80s (which was largely influenced by political events and the growth of the new middle class), his ideas and observations still have relevance to the study of social movements today. His work helps to explain why groups may moderate their tactics and ideologies and pushes scholars to pay deeper attention to how SMOs function as part of an entire ecosystem and look for patterns that emerge as a result.

A final perspective in the realm of professionalization comes from Bartley (2007) who assesses the role of foundations on social movements and the trajectory of social change. Bartley acknowledges that various scholars before him have argued that the involvement of foundations and elite support tends to push SMOs to pursue less radical tactics and strategies, but he suggests that the *process* by which this happens is underdeveloped (2007). Bartley notes that "while early versions of resource mobilization theory portrayed elite support as a prerequisite for the emergence of robust movements (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), critics argued that elites were primarily reactive to grassroots activism and acted in the interest of "cooling out" movements' most radical elements (Haines, 1984; McAdam, 1982)" (Bartley, 2007, p. 229). Although Bartley foundationally agrees with these early theorists, he does not think that this idea of simple "social control" by elites is well-supported; he instead argues that foundations are *channeling* movement activity. He summarizes two mechanisms that earlier scholars tend to fall back upon: the first being that foundations and other elites tend to support more moderate organizations, thus 'cherry-picking' from existing SMOs and ignoring more radical, grassroots movements. The second proposed mechanism is that foundation funding *transforms* SMOs over time because it (directly or indirectly) encourages groups to adopt a more bureaucratic division of labor and professionalized staff, and meanwhile encourages dependence on donor funding which leads to less grassroots funding efforts (Bartley, 2007). Both of these mechanisms can be seen in earlier arguments that I've presented.

However, Bartley suggests that these explanations overlook what's actually occurring as a result of elite support: the creation of an organization field colored by elite preferences that enrolls SMOs of the same umbrella movement into one collective project. He explains, "beyond selecting and professionalizing SMOs, foundations often play the role of 'institutional entrepreneurs' that champion a particular model of social order and attempt to build new arenas of social life—that is, new organizational fields—to institutionalize that model" (Bartley, 2007, p. 231). Foundations are thus "field-builders" (Bartley, 2007). In this way, foundations contribute largely to shaping social movements by creating a field that yields a particular construction and understanding of a social problem. Bartley suggests, "Building an organizational field entails fostering inter-organizational networks, promoting particular conceptions of appropriate action (or field frames), and enrolling others into a collective project" (Bartley, 2007, p. 249). He is calling attention to the way that foundations play a role in creating meaning and constructing certain practices and activities as legitimate and others as inappropriate or illegitimate. Thus, foundations may play a role in movement framing as a whole by leveraging their power to promote a particular interpretation of events, activities, and social change.

Given that previous researchers have suggested that SMOs' embeddedness in a multi-organizational field shapes their goals, strategies, and organizational forms that carry legitimacy (Clemens 1993; Ganz 2000; Wilde 2004), Bartley's work draws attention to how foundations shape the character of SMOs' embeddedness. As this paper unfolds and dives deeper into an understanding of framing processes, it asks questions

derivative of Bartley's work to understand how the field in which the immigrant rights movement exists may be shaped and constructed as a result of foundations and elite support.

Categorizing Formal and Informal SMOs

Another contribution made by Staggenborg that is worth noting and parsing out is a useful way of defining and categorizing types of organizations and leaders. In her analysis, *professional managers* refer to paid staff who make careers out of movement work and are likely to jump from movement to movement throughout the course of their careers (Staggenborg, 1988). In contrast stand *nonprofessional leaders,* who can either be unpaid, volunteer leaders, or *nonprofessional staff leaders*. These are leaders who are compensated for some of their time but do not make a career of their activism (Staggenborg, 1988). Some may behave similarly to professional staff if they are dependent on this income, but others will behave more like volunteers. They may serve as part of an SMO staff for a short period of time. Staggenborg argues that nonprofessional leaders are more likely to initiate *movements* (not other SMOs) and tactics than are professionals.

In terms of categorizing movement organizations, Staggenborg describes *formalized SMOs* as those which have "established procedures or structures that enable them to perform certain tasks routinely and to continue to function with changes in leadership" (Staggenborg, 1988, p. 587). Other features of formalized SMOs include bureaucratic decision-making structures, strong divisions of labor, explicit membership criteria, and rules regarding the existence and functioning of chapters, federations, or

committees, such as boards of directors. They are associated with professionalized leadership. In contrast, *informal SMOs* have few established procedures, minimal divisions of labor, and loose requirements for membership. Decision-making tends to occur in an ad hoc manner and their organizational structure may be frequently adjusted to meet immediate needs. Responsibilities and procedures can be delegated in response to environmental changes and new needs. In addition, the individuals who act as leaders have stronger influence on the organization's functioning than they do in formalized structures, and change in leadership may cause major changes in the activities and structure of an SMO. In Staggenborg's analysis, she used these categorizations to label the thirteen SMOs that she studied to understand their division of labor and organizational structure. As I will describe in my methodology section, these categories were used to code my case study organizations.

Chapter 3: Social Position and Demographic Features

In the last chapter I reviewed some ways that scholars suggest that the external resource environment and organizational structure affect movement outcomes. These factors are expected to have strong effects on SMO framing processes, since framing is one way for groups to respond to the incentives and challenges that these scholars discuss. However, these theories on resource mobilization and dependency (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Staggenborg, 1988) leave out questions about the actual *identities* of leaders and participants and whether these affect critical movement outcomes. In developing a hypothesis for this project, I felt it important to pay attention to how the social position of the individuals who comprise an SMO affect framing processes. Within the immigrant rights movement, one can easily observe a wide variety of social and demographic differences between leaders, such as age, class, migration status, education level, and ethnic background. It is important to now review what scholars have theorized about how these factors impact social movement activity so that my analysis can adequately assess how they affect framing processes in the immigrant rights movement. These questions are integral to understanding the character of the movement, as they will reveal if there are major discrepancies between how different social groups interpret and address the issue of immigration rights.

The Impact of Class

Unsurprisingly, class may have a strong effect on movements and movement-building. Some foundational work on the relationship between class and social

movements comes from Rose (1997) who argued that social class "orders consciousness and shapes the interpretation of interests," which has strong effects on political and organizational behavior (p. 461). While he notes that classes are not inherently moderate or radical and does not want to overstate the effects of class, he criticizes other scholars for dismissing the significance of class in explaining behavior, idea formation, perceptions, and priorities. Rose defines class culture as "beliefs, attitudes and understandings, symbols, social practices, and rituals throughout the life cycle that are characteristic of positions within the production process" (1997, p. 472). That is to say that each class is conditioned by a different authority arrangement inside the workplace. Additionally, each class's beliefs and expectations are shaped by families, schools, and the media (i.e., structures outside of the workplace). Bourdieu (1984) calls this phenomenon class *habitus:* internalized forms of class condition and the conditioning that informs ideology and collective action.

In sum, Rose asserts that working-class movements typically seek to resolve more immediate goals that have to do with the economic and social interests of its members; middle class-based movements strive toward 'universal goods' that are non-economic. In other words, "Middle-class movements have always framed their issues in moral terms, and working-class movements will continue to frame their issues in terms of interests" (Rose, 1997, p. 484). A moral framing that has prevailed historically in the immigrant rights movements—especially since the 1990s—is the family separation frame. It employs emotional language of families being ripped apart because of detention or deportation, and intends to get its audience to understand this not as a political issue, but

as a moral one where people are having their loved ones taken away from them. By contrast, a frame that employs interests would be the approach of the United Farm Workers Union in California during the 1960s and 70s. As immigrant farmworkers, they were essential to the state's economy, but were being exploited by giant agriculture businesses. In their landmark strikes and consumer boycotts, their frame reflected a contest of interests between the fair wages and wellbeing for the farmworkers versus the growth of giant agribusiness and benefit of corporate elites.

To explain this difference in framing, Rose (1997) observes that "workers experience opposition to their wants and needs from the power of outside groups that control the system of rewards and punishments… In this power struggle, the working class achieves its interests through winning against the interests of others" (p. 479). These power relations and structures influence how working-class activists approach movement-building. They view change through the lens of interest competition and see outside groups as working for their own interests. These groups primarily appeal to interests in their framing since those who join these organizations are generally trying to improve some immediate condition. The United Farm Workers Movement is a strong example of immigrant-led organizing to improve immediate, material conditions—i.e., wages. The interests that they were organizing against were the interests of big agribusinesses, who were benefitting by hundreds of millions of dollars per year at the expense of their farm labor (Holmes, 2010).

Despite appealing primarily to interests, Rose notes that, "This distinction between the interests of people who are oppressed and of those who are exploiting, of

those who lack and those who wield power can only be made with reference to moral language" (1997, p. 480). Thus, while these groups attempt to appeal to (legitimate) material interests, they still employ moral language to highlight the injustices of certain power relations. The United Farm Workers Union certainly highlighted the exploitation by corporations that led to them needing to struggle for improved wages and unionization. However, in pushing for improvement of their working conditions, their framing certainly made moral claims about what justice and fairness should look like in the relationship between employers and employees.

Ginwright (2002) describes the working class framing that Rose discusses as a *materialist frame*. This frame is rooted in material conditions, such as low wages and high rent, and focuses on changing concrete, immediate conditions (Ginwright, 2002). These frames establish power relations that understand those outside of the working class to be in control of resources, rewards and punishments, and understand inequality as a result of misuse of power. In this framework, "struggles over power, resources, and access are common themes" (Ginwright, 2002, p. 550).

On the other hand, Rose argues that middle class social movement goals reflect a desire for a fair and orderly world in which clear standards for reward and punishment exist (1997). Rather than understanding the barriers to change as opposing powerful groups, they are more concerned with values, norms, and understandings. Middle-class individuals join SMOs to advance their ideas, skills, and beliefs, either to advance their careers or affirm their identities (Rose, 1997). The middle class does not antagonize the

bureaucracy in the same way that the working class does: the bureaucracy is far more accessible and benign to middle class interests.

Ginwright (2002) describes this as a *culturalist* framing: the goal is to challenge ideas and values, not groups of people with power. According to Ginwright, "Through a shared set of ideas and values, culturalist frames focus on symbolic meaning and abstract theories of the social world and attempt to change social meaning and personal identity" (2002, p. 550). This middle-class based framing encourages expertise-based change, and challenges "authoritarian control" over social and cultural meaning (Ginwright, 2002). As an example of how this framing could play out, certain SMOs in the immigrant rights sector focus their activism on being staunchly anti-ICE. One of the case study groups for this paper would fall into this camp, and bridges their fight with the broader movement against prisons in the U.S. In many ways, this group is mostly concerned with changing the dialogue around immigration to fit into a broader narrative of how the U.S criminalizes communities of color. They aim to change the narrative from a narrow focus on how immigrants are affected by criminalization to how *many* marginalized communities are harmed by the same systems. Their framing is much less concerned with improving a specific, immediate condition for immigrants, and more concerned with a narrative shift in how we understand immigrants as implicated in a larger, unjust system.

These frames affect the way that individuals interpret community problems and create solutions to them. This class-based disparity is highlighted in Ginwright's 2002 study of ethnically homogenous grassroots organizations. While factors such as race, she observes, can foster solidarity among members of an SMO, these commonalities cannot

suppress the disparities in problem interpretation and conceptualization of community issues that arise from class differences. Her study calls attention to the effects of class in determining how problems are defined, interpreted, and addressed. In her case study, she observed the way that middle-class members of an organization would respond to certain issues in ways that obscured the concerns of the working-class members, and would privilege and legitimize culturalist framings over materialist ones (Ginwright, 2002).

A 2014 book by Betsy Leondar-Wright builds upon this foundational work about class by exploring specifically how class affects movement-building. She suggests that class may have a stronger impact on the ability for people to build movements than was previously understood. She found that class colored how individuals framed issues in the context of movement meetings. For example, she notes, "In the movement for pay equity, middle-class feminists sometimes framed the issue differently than did unions" (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 3). Within her analysis, she decided to categorize 362 meeting participants into four major class categories that she felt best captured them: lifelong-working-class, lifelong-professional-range, upwardly mobile, and voluntarily downwardly mobile. The forefront assertion of this book is that:

> For a surprisingly large number of attitudes and behaviors, I found that class does predict how an activist may think or act, more so than race, age, or gender. The subtle interplay between how things are done in each movement tradition and the effects of individual members' class predispositions paints a complex picture of why activists tend to think and act as they do. (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 4)

Her book examines the role of class on movement traditions, recruitment and group cohesion, speech differences, antiracism frames, and responses to extreme behavior. These are all tasks and challenges commonly faced by movement leaders, and she urges

her readers to work to understand class-culture differences as a prerequisite to successfully building a mass movement.

One of her significant findings is that neither militant nor moderate political beliefs correlated with particular classes. Instead, she found that strains of moderate and radical were found in every class. While this supports Rose's 1997 theory, it poses a challenge to some earlier theorists as well as to observations about the U.S. as a whole, in which working-class people tend to be more socially conservative and economically liberal, for example (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 63). Other dynamics that didn't correlate with class include how formal or informal meetings were and how much time was spent in meetings talking about wider political issues (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 227). Leondar-Wright suggests that class impacts these movement challenges and dynamics in two important ways. The first is that "a group is most likely to run into the troubles associated with the class conditioning of its founders and the majority of its members, the individual predispositions they bring into the group" (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 82). Simultaneously, a group will be affected by the class-based roots that are particular to that group's movement tradition (ex: grassroots community organizing, professional advocacy, labor organizing etc.). Each group that she studied showed a strong correlation between the class background and current class of the members with a particular movement tradition.

Although this literature review will not capture all of her observations about how class specifically affects movement outcomes, I will briefly discuss some of her observations that may be relevant to a group's framing strategies. In categorizing her

participants by class, Leondar-Wright weighs an individual's higher education status and occupation a lot higher than other factors such as income because the former two carry much more social and cultural capital: "it changes what people know, who they know, how they talk, and their level of confidence about political participation—all relevant to activist involvement" (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 33). This said, higher education alone may be relevant to how individuals frame issues.

Leondar-Wright details a few general observations about the behaviors and tendencies of individuals from each class category in the context of organizational meetings. Most lifelong working-class individuals (which included many immigrants of color in her analysis) did not take up major roles or positions of power in their respective organizations, seeing themselves more as "worker bees" (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 41). Some viewed themselves as too inexperienced to play larger activist roles, and were described as disempowered. Others appeared to be preparing to take on larger roles, typically found actively listening and awaiting "marching orders" (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 41). A smaller subset of lifelong working class activists did not fit into this more quiet archetype, whom she described as "powerhouse radical leaders" and who were all women (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 42). Importantly, Leondar-Wright notes that, "Solidarity, unity, and strength in numbers defined many working-class activists' understandings of how social change happens… Thus, solidarity sometimes meant suppressing individual dissent in favor of standing together and backing leaders. Allowing political differences to divide the group was seen as foolish" (2014, p. 45).

Lifelong professionals, who tended to be U.S.-born and white in her sample, tended to speak with confidence and an air of authority which commanded the attention of other group members (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 48). She observes that their opinions typically prevailed, and they were seen as empowered and knowledgeable regardless of their prior experience.

Straddlers, who are those who have dramatically risen in class since childhood, often played very strong roles in their groups and pushed "a moral certainty that they linked with their working-class backgrounds" (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 54). Many persistently called for their groups to remain true to their principles and values and often found themselves at the center of groups' conflicts. The common thread connecting straddlers among the groups she analyzed is the centrality and strength of their ideologies. Some were gentle and others more assertive in pushing their ideologies, but most were fierce defenders of working-class members of their groups.

Another interesting observation that is relevant to framing processes is what Leondar-Wright finds about the challenges that are faced by those in the "Professional-Advocacy" movement tradition. She notes that because these groups are dependent on public and foundation funding, financial stakes are higher, and groups reported "turf wars" among member groups who are in competition for limited financial resources (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 72). Evocative of a resource mobilization dynamic, this observation calls into question the way that groups in the same umbrella movement relate to one another. In addition, she notes internal conflict over issues including whose frame would be used in a group's public communications. These groups had high regard for

developing strong relationships with government officials and private funders—given their resource mobilization task—and the question of which frame to use for the group's messaging could "make or break a member's reputation" with those individuals and groups (Leondar-Wright, 2014, p. 72).

Leondar-Wright takes on the explicit question of framing and class dynamics. In her analysis, she looks at how class impacts framing of racism, but her insights can certainly be extended to better understand the role of class in other framing processes. First, she emphasizes her profound findings about speech differences in groups as a clear-cut class-cultural difference. She found that lifelong working class folks were more likely to reference specific people and places in their discourse (Leondar-Wright, 2014) and speak in a more action-oriented manner. By contrast, the professional middle-class groups used more abstract speech and less concrete referents (Leondar-Wright, 2014). Her example quotes reveal such activists often 'tip-toeing' around what they truly want to say and who they want to call out. These speech differences likely have an enormous impact on SMO framing processes, especially if the SMO at hand is comprised of a particular class majority.

In her analysis of framing race, racism, and antiracism, she finds three pervasive frames among her groups: *an institutional-racism frame* (emphasizing white privilege and systemic subordination of communities of color), *a multicultural diversity frame* (placing blame on segregation, solution as diversity), and an *anti-bigotry tolerance frame* (emphasizing prejudice, discrimination, and hate and the need for tolerance and unity) (Leondar-Wright, 2014). While she saw each frame appear in every class group, there

were strong correlations with the rate at which each frame appeared in different class groups. The institutional racism frame was common among college-educated groups, and the anti-bigotry frame was most common among lifelong working-class folks. She hypothesizes that working-class groups may be drawn to the anti-bigotry frame because of a desire to perform respectability, or because it aligned with their overall social change strategies (Leondar-Wright, 2014). They did not disagree with the structural frame, but notice that it could be pushed in counterproductive ways, including the use of alienating jargon. Once again, although this framework deals specifically with racism, it will be interesting to see if her observations about anti-bigotry versus structural factors holds up in relation to the immigrant rights movement.

Leondar-Wright contributes a great deal to how this article analyzes class and its effect of framing processes in the immigrant rights movement. Although limited information was available with regard to the class background of leaders' parents and family in my case studies, some inferences can be made from class-based characteristics, such higher education and other displays of cultural and social capital.

Age and Migration: The Undocumented Student Movement

Examining the social position of movement leaders is particularly important in the immigrant rights movement because migration status affects one's access to the institutions through which they can make claims and express grievances. Many immigrant rights organizations across the country are led and supported by individuals who do not hold citizenship in the U.S., which means they must operate outside of the legal or civic system to achieve their goals. This may greatly affect what demands groups

have and how they set out to achieve these changes. These questions have been explored to a great extent in literature related to the undocumented student movement in the United States. Not only do undocumented youth have a unique social position and relationship to the state and institutions, but they also bring forward the question of age and how it affects organizing outcomes.

Various authors have tried to describe the unique social position of undocumented youth, many of whom are DREAMers. Abrego (2011) theorizes about undocumented youth in contrast to undocumented adults. Whereas undocumented adults have mostly remained 'in the shadows' and are inhibited by fear to make claims, undocumented youth are much more actively making demands for access to opportunities in the U.S. and are more willing to organize (Abrego, 2011). There are various reasons that Abrego suggests may contribute to this difference, including the stage of life at which individuals arrived in the U.S. and the central social institutions which with each group interacts on a daily basis. These social institutions are where each group is developing their legal consciousness. Thus:

> "For undocumented first-generation immigrants whose daily lives are filled with stories about workplace raids and family separations, their fear of deportation can powerfully restrict them from making claims at work or anywhere they feel threatened. Undocumented 1.5-generation youth, however, develop a legal consciousness based in stigma that is certainly a setback but can be overcome to make way for greater claims-making." (Abrego, 2011, p. 354-355)

Although undocumented youth still face stigma, many have been able to overcome this barrier, in contrast to undocumented adults who are still largely inactive in movements due to fear. Cabaniss (2019) calls attention to the fact that undocumented youth have

been educated about U.S. civics in schools, which distinguishes their engagement from that of their parents' generation greatly.

Negrón-Gonzales (2014) argues that undocumented youth must navigate and reconcile with "their juridical identities as undocumented migrants and their subjective identities as US-raised children" which has served as a catalyst for political mobilization of the populations she studied (p. 259). Their unique position as being legally prohibited from residing in the country they were raised in contributes to strong political mobilization among this subgroup which has its own very particular concerns and challenges. Seif (2011) adds that undocumented youth have a keen understanding of the fact that their life chances and those of their loved ones depend on social change, as they are rejected by the nation-state. These authors have drawn considerable attention to the tension between undocumented youth's social and political identities and how this affects their movement engagement.

Given these observations about identity, other authors have suggested that youth activists are reframing the immigrant rights movement in various ways. One study by Cabaniss (2019) observes that undocumented students are reframing themselves as the rightful leaders of a movement that for too long has been dominated by adult citizen advocates. This involves both calling into question the legitimacy of adult citizens to speak on these issues and casting undocumented youth as the ones who deserve to lead the movement (Cabaniss, 2019). Cabaniss' sample reported feeling invisible, silenced, and talked-down to by adult-led movements. They draw attention to the specific struggles they face due to their age. In addition, they express frustrations with adult citizens who

characterize the immigration problem as "broad, systemic, and indiscriminant in its impact" and make "no room for the special problems, concerns, and priorities of undocumented youth" (Cabaniss, 2019, p. 486). This literature suggests that in addition to the typical framing tasks of an SMO, undocumented youth leaders are tasked with asserting themselves as the rightful authorities in the conversation and standing up for their age group. For some groups, they choose to create their own groups, with new tactics and strategies, hoping to foster political empowerment for youth who haven't felt welcomed in other spaces (Gordon, 2010). Many authors point to immigrant youth's struggle in asserting political influence in more established social movement organizations who hold more social and reputational capital as well as economic support (Gordon, 2010; Nicholls, 2013; Taft & Gordon, 2013). Cabaniss details how the groups in her study used collective storytelling and character work to subvert the influence of adult citizen-advocates and fight against collective experiences of being disempowered and tokenized by groups led by adult citizens.

Apart from having to assert their deservingness against a movement dominated by adult citizen advocates, undocumented youth have also overwhelmingly mobilized against harmful frameworks of citizenship and belongingness. A variety of authors observe how youth activists have contributed to this reframing. This is one observation that seems to characterize this generation across the literature. Unzueta Carrasco and Seif (2014) note that undocumented youth increasingly fight for and defend people who fall outside of the nation-state's traditional notions of citizenship. Undocumented youth are thus fighting for a broader framework, one which is not so focused on specific federal

legislation but more concerned about the rights of *all* immigrants to be present in the United States (Unzueta Carrasco & Seif, 2014). These activists understand traditional ideas of "good citizens" to be based in problematic assumptions based on race, gender, and class. They thus desire to redefine what constitutes 'good citizenship' to include those who "have limited access to education, work in the underground economy, are queer or are caught in the prison-industrial complex," for example (Unzueta Carrasco & Seif, 2014, p. 296).

Importantly, these activists note the wedge that can be driven between undocumented youth and their parents, skilled and other workers, and those with criminal histories versus those without them due to these narratives. They ultimately desire to rise above these divisive normative standards and affirm a more inclusive version of human rights. Abrams (2016) agrees that these activists reject respectability politics and offer a broader vision of justice for migrants. Abrams also observed this phenomenon as coupled with the embrace of more confrontational tactics to influence the government as well as more dramatic and emotional displays of resistance (2016). Activists have undertaken this change in strategies and tactics despite the risk of alienating conservatives who may question them for criticizing U.S. policy, or even more liberal allies, such as President Obama, who believed that he was supporting undocumented youth and may find the displays as excessive or ungrateful (Abrams, 2016). This framing corresponds with the culturalist frame put forward by Rose (1997). It's concerned with norms, values, and cultural understandings. While this could represent a generational shift in thinking, it

could also be a reproduction of the class-culture differences that Rose points to, given that many of these youth activists are students at universities.

Negrón-Gonzales (2014) writes about how undocumented youth have rearticulated what 'safety' means, such that undocumented youth sometimes feel safer upon disclosing their documentation status. They've achieved this through a number of successful mobilizations that have halted deportations though mass letter writing, call-ins, and petitions (Negrón-Gonzales, 2014). Enriquez and Saguy (2016) note a similar phenomenon that has occurred by groups harnessing the cultural schema of 'coming out' that was already present in LGBTQ+ movements. By creatively employing an already familiar concept with strong cultural meaning, movements activists were able to address movement participants' fears about revealing status and increase social movement participation.

However, one author disagrees with the claim that youth activists are drastically reframing the movement, and instead observed that legal and normative ideas of citizenship were still very present in the campaigns that she studied (Patler, 2018). She notes that these ideas were especially present in campaigns that advocated on behalf of students, as movement activists portrayed them as high-achievers with a certain level of acculturation, civic engagement, and accomplishment. Patler argues that these qualities "reflect normative notions of deservingness built into immigration policies and prosecutorial discretion guidelines" (2018, p. 100). That is to say that these frames both shape and are shaped by ideas about membership and deservingness that are present in immigration laws, court decisions, and discretionary guidelines and programs (Patler,

2018). Importantly, Patler does note that these frameworks depend on the political moment: the campaigns that she studied all took place in the lead up to congressional action on the DREAM act. Thus, a group's choice of frameworks may be influenced by the policy cycle and political opportunity, as discussed in the previous chapter. In addition, reversing an individual's deportation should certainly be seen as a victory for the movement overall. However, it is a victory that looks very different compared to shifting normative understandings and structural changes, which have more permanent, lasting effects. Thus, not all victories of the movement should be weighted—or criticized—equally. Perhaps it's not bad to use frames that are limited in their inclusiveness if they lead to victories for the movement.

The student versus non-student framing disparity that Patler calls attention to is also present in the media coverage of anti-deportation cases led by undocumented activists. A study found that media outlets were more likely to give coverage to cases of undocumented students over non-students, suggesting that the media privileges those who align with broader understandings of citizenship and deservingness as they garner more public sympathy (Patler & Gonzales, 2015). The media helps push narratives such as citizenship as acculturation, citizenship as civic engagement, and deservingness vis-à-vis victim status (Patler & Gonzales, 2015). By extension, media pushes forward a narrative that those who do not meet these criteria are not deserving of rights through selective media coverage. The reality of this disparity in media coverage may affect groups' framing choices if they are trying to reach a broader audience.

This section provided an overview of much of the literature relating to undocumented youth mobilization in the United States. It calls attention to the particular challenges that they face due to their citizenship status as well as their age. It attempts to theorize about the impact of these factors on mobilization and strategies. Given that one of the eleven groups that this article explores through a case study is an undocumented youth-led organization, these questions and theoretical understandings will be important as I go about analyzing their framing strategies.

Chapter 4: A Brief History of the Immigrant Rights Movement

By taking even a preliminary look at scholarly literature that focuses on the immigrant rights movement it's easy to deduce that the movement is quite new. When major social movement activity was taking place in the 1960s—providing the foundation for much of the social movement literature of the field—the share of immigrants in the United States was at its lowest point in the 20th century (Bloemraad et al., 2016). In many ways, as you will discover in this historical overview, a true social movement for immigrant rights—one that includes collective action, change-oriented goals, some temporal continuity and a degree of organization (D. Snow et al., 2004)—didn't exist before the 1980s (Bloemraad et al., 2016). By contrast, in 2019, immigrants comprised 13.6% of the U.S. population (Radford, 2019) and many scholars have agreed that a true social movement has arisen since the 1980s in favor of immigrant rights. The movement has certainly ebbed and flowed in terms of success and resonance with the broader U.S. population during this time period, and has focused on different fights at different points, such as the fight for legal presence versus immigrants' access to benefits. The following chapter will provide an overview of the forms in which this movement has existed in recent U.S. history and conclude with thoughts about the contemporary challenges that it faces today.

From the 1850s until the 1960s, U.S. immigration policy was largely characterized by exclusion. Occurring alongside the heyday of European immigration to Ellis Island were a steady stream of laws that barred certain groups from entering the

United States, starting with Chinese and Japanese immigrants, then barring virtually all Asians, and then excluding groups from Eastern and Southern Europe (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). From the 1920s to the 1960s, the list of who could migrate was even stricter. There was some pro-immigrant sentiment from segments of the population during this period, including from some presidents, religious groups, business leaders (who were mostly concerned with labor supply) and labor unions, but there was certainly nothing close to a social movement emerging from these groups, especially compared to the women's suffrage and labor movements that dominated the early 20th century (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).

The 1960s through to the 1980s included some important precursors to what would later become the immigrant rights movement. These movements provided tactics, leadership, and inspiration to the future movement (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). The Chicano civil rights movement of the 1960s is the first of these precursors, which encompasses labor organizing in California and student movements in the Southwestern United States. The broad goals of these movements were to "advance the livelihoods of agricultural workers, militate for the political and social inclusion of U.S.-born Mexican Americans, and improve the quality and inclusiveness of education" (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020, p. 686). Although these movements made incredible advancements in their own right, they cannot necessarily be considered pro-immigrant social movements as they weren't concerned with legal status or rights, but rather with the everyday concerns and aspirations of migrants living in America (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).

The sanctuary movement of the 1980s—which focused greatly on helping Central Americans fleeing violence—is closer to an early manifestation of the movement given that it focused particularly on migrants (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). As part of this movement, migrants provided public testimonials regarding human rights abuses they had faced to try to shift public policy and opinion. But by-and-large the most visible activists were white, middle-class Americans with no personal experiences of migration who were mobilized by churches and other groups (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). One could argue that it was during this time that early notions of deservingness were being constructed. As the majority of migrants and refugees from Central America were feeling civil war, repression, and economic devastation (Gzesh, 2006), activists understandably pushed forward a narrative that emphasized asylum-seekers' deservingness based on extraordinary conditions at home. However, in the context of increasing negative stereotypes about immigrants in the 1980s, activists constructed a "model immigrant" whose deservingness was based on humanitarian concerns and contrasted with someone migrating for economic reasons, for example (Yukich, 2013).

The 1980s were also a time of landmark court cases and legislation. Brought forward by the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, Plyer vs. Doe guaranteed undocumented children access to K-12 public schools (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020) which undoubtedly expanded the realm of opportunity and institutional access that allowed for many migrants to have their voices heard. A few years later, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act was passed. Although its primary goal was to restore control over heightened levels of unauthorized migration and penalize employers who knowingly

hired undocumented migrants, it also allowed for three million immigrants to legalize their status in the United States (Baker, 1997). This marked another step forward for infrastructure in place intended to serve migrants (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).

The 1990s were characterized by a series of anti-immigrant legislative actions that further provoked collective action. Importantly, the 1990s highlight the interplay between federal and state laws that respectively made advances for and infringed upon the U.S. immigrant population. Bloemraad and Voss (2020) note that the U.S. federal government oftentimes makes the laws that govern legal status, while the rights and benefits that immigrants have access to are decided by state legislators. Proposition 187, approved by California voters in 1994, would have denied undocumented immigrants in California access to crucial social services including healthcare and public education. Although it ended up being declared as unconstitutional, it nonetheless sparked some of the largest protests and school walkouts since the Chicano movement, bringing 70,000 people out into the streets (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Two federal laws were passed in 1996 that restricted noncitizens' access to social benefits, increased resources to border control, and strengthened the government's power to deport noncitizens (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). These laws marked the mobilization of various groups across the United States, including non-profit social service providers, local governments, legal clinics, and advocacy groups, who had some success in rolling back certain changes to public benefit access, but were largely unsuccessful against growing deportations and immigration enforcement (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).

The most well-documented uptick in immigrant rights activism—regarded by many scholars as the peak of the movement even to this day—were the 2006 protests that brought between 3.5 and 5 million people into the streets in protest (Voss & Bloemraad, 2011). The bill they were protesting would have involved a substantial investment in border security, greater cooperation between the department of Homeland Security and local law enforcement, the criminalization of living in the United States without valid documents, and criminalization of those who assist unauthorized residents (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). This marked an increase by adversaries in characterizing immigrants not as unauthorized or undocumented, but 'illegal,' increasing policymakers' perceptions of immigration as an issue of law and order (Navarre, 2013). Not only did this mobilize immigrant advocacy groups, unions, and religious networks, but it mobilized unprecedented numbers of otherwise uninvolved folks. It is during this time that legalization became a primary goal of immigrant rights activism, rather than benefits (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Sassen (2006) argues that claims-making in the 2006 protests is best understood through a human rights frame, evidenced through pervasive slogans like "No human being is illegal," which appeal to universal human rights values (Bloemraad et al., 2016).

Various scholars think about the immigrant rights movement through a 'pre- and post-2006' lens and have theorized about what these large-scale demonstrations have meant for the movement since they occurred. Nicholls, Uitermark, and van Haperen (2020) observe the development of a "sophisticated, durable, and national infrastructure" of pro-immigrant advocacy groups since 2006 (p. 723). While the early days of the

movement were characterized by coalitions of unions, churches, schools, and civic associations, 2006 led to 'scaling up' to national pro-immigrant groups. These professionalized groups have enabled pro-immigrant advocates to have more access to the 'center' of national politics, speak with a common discursive voice, and attain greater financial resources (Nicholls et al., 2020). However, they note that such professionalization has also resulted in internal ruptures in the movement, especially between grassroots groups who prefer disruptive tactics coming into conflict with national leaders who prioritize maintaining access to institutions (Nicholls et al., 2020). Although this is a pattern for many social movements, this may be even more detrimental for the pro-immigrant movement because "the fault lines between national and grassroots leaders tend to overlay distinctions between activists with legal status or citizenship and those without it" (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020).

Many scholars echo Bloemraad and Voss (2020) in understanding the decade and half following 2006 to largely consist of reactive mobilization and many disappointments for the movement. However, there are some structural changes that occurred post-2006. For one, there has been a lot more high-profile engagement and protest from undocumented migrants and the children of deported parents (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Largely until 2010, these groups were focused on passing a DREAM Act but were at first unsuccessful. Scholars note that after 2010, many groups became more radical and adopted a more intersectional framework that understood their identities at tied to multiple forms of oppression (Nicholls, 2013; Terriquez et al., 2018). In response to feeling ignored by federal policy, DREAMers and young allies began to adopt more

confrontational and dramatic direct-action tactics, such as hunger strikes, rallies, sit-ins in the offices of public officials, and laying in front of buses driving migrants out of detention centers (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). They also employed social media to encourage calling representatives and writing letters to halt deportations (Patler, 2018). These early demonstrations were successful in getting the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program passed in 2012 by the Obama administration. Although this was a major victory, former President Obama also oversaw hundreds of thousands of deportations during his time in office (Voss et al., 2020). The 2010 Affordable Care Act excluded undocumented immigrants and was followed by various state and local laws that also excluded them (Voss et al., 2020). This speaks to the deep disagreement that exists among American politicians and voters about the rights, benefits, and protections that unauthorized migrants should be entitled to.

Contemporary Challenges and Recent Studies

The election of current President Donald Trump has fueled even more anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy on a federal level. Although it has not been studied as heavily in the scholarly literature because the election is still quite recent, his anti-immigrant policies and their reactions are well-documented in news media. During his first two months in office, Trump signed executive orders that denied entry into the United States—even for nationals—from seven Muslim-majority countries and temporarily suspended all refugee admissions (Boghani, 2019). He ended Temporary Protected Status in September 2017 which had protected individuals from a variety of countries who could not return home due to violence or conflict, and has taken various

measures to reduce the flow of asylum seekers into the United States. One of the most widely-criticized measures that has been taken by the administration are family separation and "zero tolerance" policies that began in the spring of 2018. In addition, the Justice department has threatened to withhold federal funds for law enforcement for sanctuary cities and states (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). Most recently, he attempted to institute a public charge rule, which despite being blocked by federal judges, caused many immigrants to avoid enrolling in crucial public benefits. A theme throughout this administration is the switch from targeting immigrants with criminal histories—which was the case in the Obama administration—to targeting *all* immigrants (Bloemraad & Voss, 2020). What prevails throughout all of these policies is the constant fear and uncertainty that he has induced in immigrant communities in the United States (Goodman, 2017). Bloemraad and Voss (2020) note that repression in the form of nativist counter-mobilization is a powerful force in the Trump administration.

Although the majority of literature has not systematically analyzed changes in the movement under the Trump administration, some recent studies have looked at current framing processes employed by the movement to achieve their goals. Bloemraad et. al (2016) observe a framing contest that centers on three domains: rights, economics, and family. The rights frame breaks down into two separate forms of rights: civil and human rights. While civil rights are awarded based on nationality, a human rights framing appeals to rights based on human dignity and equality regardless of birthplace (Bloemraad et al., 2016). The human rights frame is present in recent protests which employ the phrase "No human being is illegal" (Bloemraad et al., 2016). The economic

frame highlights the economic contributions of immigrants and feeds into notions of the 'good' American (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Various boycotts and labor strikes that have tried to highlight the centrality of immigrant labor in the U.S. are employing such a frame by accentuating membership as workers and consumers (Bloemraad et al., 2016). Finally, Bloemraad et al. (2016) observe a family frame that became widely used starting with anti-deportation activism in the 1990s. It employs emotional language of families being ripped apart and casts immigrants as parents and family members, irrespective of their citizenship. Many link this frame with American values (Bloemraad et al., 2016).

In their 2016 study that asked which of these frames is most resonant and for whom, they concluded that political ideology had a great effect on which of these frames would be most effective (Bloemraad et al.). They found that the family framing was more likely to move political conservatives toward greater acceptance of immigrants' presence in the U.S. (Bloemraad et al. describe this as acceptance of "legalization"), but did not do much to sway their opinions of immigrants' deserved access to benefits. They also find that appeals to human rights did not expand their sample's notions of membership and deservingness (Bloemraad et al., 2016). A significant finding of this study is that "alternative framings resonate with—at best—one political subgroup and, dauntingly, frames that resonate with one group sometimes alienate others" (Bloemraad et al., 2016, p. 1647), which speaks to a the challenges of SMOs in the immigrant rights movement in trying to figure out which language will be most effective for making claims.

Bloemraad and Voss (2020) examined patterns in framing and collective identity in the immigrant rights movement and found that "During the Obama administration,

activists crafted a new frame highlighting the Americanness and deservingness of young undocumented Dreamers, a discourse that resonated with political leaders and in public opinion" (p. 695). However, this framing notably can stigmatize others who fall outside of these deservingness narratives, including Dreamers' own parents. Some of the challenges of the movement today come from responding to the changing frames of opponents of immigrant rights. Bloemraad et al. (2016) observe that opponents have shifted from portraying immigrants as drains on public services to portraying them as criminals and even terrorists. While activists can respond to this framing by portraying immigrants as law-abiding citizens—as they often do—the more inclusive narrative that many groups have adopted today actually sees this response as driving an even deeper wedge between immigrants with criminal backgrounds and those without.

This paper seeks to examine the framing processes employed by SMOs in the immigrant rights movement in a city in the northeast United States. Given that the immigrant rights movement is largely understudied and there has not been much literature that attends to the movement's status after the election of Trump, this paper expects to bring a host of new insights to the literature. This paper is the first of its kind in comparatively examining framing strategies by SMOs in the movement and hopes to reveal how these processes are affected by factors such as mobilizing resources, political opportunity structure, and the social position of organizers. In the following chapter, I will describe my methodology for choosing groups for these case studies and detail how I qualitatively coded various forms of discourse to produce my analysis.

Chapter 5: Data and Methods

Immigration policy and the immigrant rights movement have undoubtedly taken a forefront spot in the national dialogue and media in this contemporary moment. Our current President, Donald Trump, campaigned on a staunchly anti-immigrant platform where he promised to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico. His presidency is largely characterized by anti-immigrant policies and there has been a large wave of immigrant rights mobilizing in response. The debate surrounding immigration is undoubtedly one of the most talked-about issues in the media in the last four years (although most news coverage at the time of releasing this paper has transitioned almost exclusively to coverage about the emerging COVID-19 crisis). Furthermore, the disagreements about immigration policy that exist even within parties became extremely apparent in the 2020 Presidential race. The wide range of ideas about how to reform immigration policy reflected among the Democratic candidates raises important questions about where America stands on how our borders should look and operate. This project evolved out of a desire to better understand where those who have felt compelled to organize around the issue of immigration stand on where America should be headed. Exploring their framing strategies appealed to me as a comprehensive way of comparing and contrasting how different groups interpret the current moment and how to proceed.

The data for this article is based on case studies of eleven immigrant rights organizations that operate in the metro area of a city in the Northeast United States. Although this was a convenience sampling based on my geographical location, they nonetheless represent a diverse sampling of different types of immigrant rights

organizations with differing priorities and strategies. A case study is an appropriate approach for this research question because it seeks to explore 'why' or 'how' something occurs (i.e., how groups develop framing strategies) and it is describing a contemporary phenomenon. These are two of the qualifications that Yin offers in his description of when a case study approach is useful (2009). I will be employing a multiple case study approach to address my research question because I am interested in understanding the *field* of immigrant rights organizing, not just one particular organization.

Each of the eleven groups were chosen because they either focus on organizing or advocacy for the purpose of advancing rights of immigrants in the U.S. Some of these organizations are primarily direct-service organizations which also have an advocacy component to their work. I included any groups that self-identified advocacy as one of their organization's main focuses. Organizations that only provide direct service for immigrant communities were excluded from this analysis. I identified the groups by searching on the internet, social media, and using databases that list non-profit organizations in the area. Once the existing groups were identified, I used all public media put forward by these groups to begin collecting data. This media included their websites, social media pages, videos, and news interviews as available. I also conducted in-person or virtual semi-structured interviews with four leaders of three of these organizations to gather more firsthand data about framing processes and some of the outcomes I was interested in understanding. Each interview lasted from 30-45 minutes and were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. All of the names of organizations and

names of interviewees were given pseudonyms during the transcription phase to protect the identities of participants.

The data from the organizations was qualitatively coded for various factors that this study takes interest in. The conceptual distinctions used by Staggenborg (1988) to characterize organizations and types of leadership were used to code my case organizations. The data was also coded for a variety of other factors, which are laid out in the data table in Appendix 1. My analysis was guided by the principles of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Chun Tie et al., 2019; Glaser, 1967). This approach entails a constant comparative method between initial and new codes, continuously refining my relevant concepts and categories, to aid in the process of arriving inductively at a final theory. The overall process involved data collection, constant comparative analysis, memo writing (analytic notes about the data and connections between categories), coding, selecting core categories, and theoretical coding (Chun Tie et al., 2019). This said, there were many 'layers' of data collection and coding—while my collection began with scraping websites and other secondary sources of each SMO, I continuously kept pulling relevant information out of the data and placing it in the context of the theories I was considering. My theoretical codes were based on each of the theories that I presented in my literature review. For example, when a group's framing strategies appeared to be impacted by resource dependency, I would code that data as such. I also looked at my data through the lens of "front-stage" versus "backstage" framing, which encourages me to consider who the intended audience of any given piece of discourse is (Goffman, 1959).

Analyzing the data was aligned with the approach of discourse analysis (Johnston, 1995; Melucci, 1995). Discourse is defined as "the summation of symbolic interchange, of what is being talked and written about, of the interrelations of symbols and their systematic occurrence," which can refer to documents, spoken words, and interactions that can be audiotaped or video recorded (Johnston, 1995, p. 218). It also includes knowledge of who is doing the talking, what is their social location, and to whom are they writing. Discourse analysis aims to reconstruct the mental structures of interpretation of movement participants, moving from the text to the frame (Johnston, 1995). Discourse is expected to reflect concepts such as frame bridging, frame alignment, frame extension, and other strategies and helps the analyst to understand why participants and social movement organizations act the way they do.

Limitations

Building off of Melucci and Johnston's writings about the utility of discourse analysis to understand framing processes, it's also important to remember that these texts are being taken as self-apparent reflections of the organization and their strategy. Because it is rare that information about who composed the text is provided, it's important to recognize that there could be subtle differences between individual leaders' frames and this may be reflected in the discourse with no way to distinguish different voices (Johnston, 1995). Johnston notes that "speech or writing is produced from within a role perspective; and, second, role perspectives frequently change in the course of textual production, with commensurate changes in what gets said, and often subtle changes in what is meant" (1995, p. 224). In discourse analysis, it is important to try to recognize the

intention behind creating each piece of discourse, especially pausing to ask who is the intended audience.

Importantly, as Melucci (1995) suggests, researchers must acknowledge the potential influence that they have on the participants' answers (especially in interview data). The presence of an outsider creates an 'artificial situation' and analyzing data produced in this scenario requires a great degree of self-reflexivity to understand the potential impact of one's identity (Melucci, 1995). In the context of my study, leaders of the organizations may certainly have felt a pressure to present the 'positive' aspects of their SMO while shying away from sharing more vulnerable information on certain organizational dynamics. As I was interested in understanding the field of SMOs in the area, I recognize that interview participants could have been less likely to criticize other organizations, despite understanding that this data would be anonymized. Although I would characterize my interview participants as having been relatively open about their experiences as SMO leaders, a more effective way to understand internal SMO dynamics could have been to observe meetings so that I could draw my own conclusions about the structure and culture of each organization.

In a more practical vein, my data was limited to what was made available online by the movement organizations. While some organizations are incredibly active on social media and have robust websites, others have very limited information available online. Although the interview data was extremely helpful in better understanding framing processes for the organizations I was able to get in touch with, my interviews represent a very small sample of the leaders of all the case organizations. Due to these two factors, I

was able to gather much more information on certain organizations than others. In addition, although discourse analysis is extremely useful for understanding framing strategies, my case studies could have benefitted from additional interviews and ethnographic observation, if conditions had permitted. Interviews and secondary sources represent just two pieces of a larger puzzle of an organization's framing strategies. While I cannot draw strong conclusions about conflict and tensions within each SMO, my data allows me to address questions of field composition and formal social movement frames.

Chapter 6: Findings

The findings that I present in this chapter are situated in a very unique political moment. With the 2016 election of Donald Trump, there has certainly been a shift in how immigrant rights groups are received. President Trump's anti-immigration rhetoric and policies pulled immigration far further into the arena of hot-button political and social issues. This has undoubtedly changed the resource environment for immigrant rights groups: they now have more legitimacy in the eyes of the general public in America (among those who do not support Trump), have attracted increased material resources, and have had to adapt to a growing anti-immigrant countermovement. These have all undoubtedly affected the way each group goes about mobilizing adherents, and has even spurred the existence of new SMOs. With the 2020 presidential election in sight at the time of this writing, it is unclear how this resource environment may shift once again. If President Trump is re-elected, the movement may face even harsher repression and an even more vitalized countermovement to repress them. But as I will suggest in the data analysis below, increased repression may strengthen these groups further and lead to increased mobilization. However, the other major possibility is the election of Joe Biden, who promises to unravel harmful Trump-era policies, but will stop short of more progressive reforms. For many Democrats in this country, his election may seem to signal an end to the anti-immigrant threat and thus decrease the availability of resources to immigrant rights organizations who will undoubtedly continue fighting for long-term reforms and the upholding of campaign promises. This is thus a pivotal moment for immigrant rights groups who need to ensure that their framing not only resonates in a

new political reality, but that it actually continues to drive people to action. I will observe how social movement organizations attempt to rally continued support in the face of changing political and cultural opportunities.

A Brief Summary of the Literature Review

Before diving into the analysis of my case study groups, it's useful to briefly reiterate what scholars expect to find. To summarize what was presented in the literature review of this paper, Benford and Snow—pioneers of the study of framing processes in social movements—bring attention to the political and cultural opportunity structure within which a movement is operating. They discuss how this can motivate or repress action and provide certain niche opportunities to make claims. It determines how receptive audiences might be to the goals of the SMO. Benford and Snow (1992, 1998, 2000) also ask how central the beliefs at hand are to the adherent pool. They pay attention to cycles of protest and look at whether a given frame was used toward the beginning of a movement or later in the protest cycle, once an accepted 'master frame' had already been developed. McCarthy and Zald (1977) are most concerned with the external resource environment of SMOs—money, legitimacy, facilities, labor, etc. Due to the need to mobilize resources in a competitive environment, groups may adjust their framing strategies for a number of related purposes: appealing to conscience constituents, transforming bystanders into sympathizers, or converting adherents into constituents. Groups may also have to adapt to being resource-poor or marginalized from centers of power, which could lead to coalition work or strategies that draw from unique sources of legitimacy.

The professionalization of an SMO is a large part of the literature I presented. McCarthy and Zald suggest that more funding leads to a greater desire to formalize a group's leadership and structure, and that the role of membership will decrease upon formalization. The presence of money from large foundations or governments may cause groups to deny taking up the grievances of their base if they would challenge their funding structure. This may be coupled with a decline in direct-action or militant tactics, and a shift toward institutionalized tactics. Professionalized SMOs are expected to engage in successful coalition work and foster a stronger relationship with elites. Bartley (2007) claims that the presence of foundation support contributes to the building of a social movement field that carries with it one particular interpretation of the social world and a singular conception of appropriate action.

Scholars who focus on class, including Rose (1997) and Ginwright (2002) expect differences in framing between middle class and working-class activists. Middle class movement leaders are expected to frame things in terms of morals, values, and norms, while working class activists will frame things in terms of interests and fight for improvement of material conditions. These theories derive from the conditioning of the workplace of each class and how each experiences systems of reward and punishment. According to Leondar-Wright (2014), class-culture contributes to speech differences among individuals, such that middle-class individuals tend to speak with more abstract language while working-class groups use more concrete, specific language. SMOs are not only affected by the class-cultures of their founders and leaders, but of the historical class conditioning of their movement tradition. Leondar-Wright looks at antiracism frames in

her study, and finds that college-educated organizers were more likely to blame racism on structural factors such as white privilege and systematic subordination of communities of color, while working-class individuals in her study were more likely to place blame on bigotry and focus on a need for tolerance and unity.

Finally, I presented a variety of studies that theorized about the emerging undocumented youth movement in the U.S. which point to ways that both age and the unique legal and social position of undocumented youth may have a great effect on framing strategies. Abrego (2011) suggests that while undocumented youth have developed their legal consciousness in U.S. schools, adults are socially formed in the workplace, and youth are therefore not as constrained by fear as a barrier to making claims for themselves. With respect to age, Cabaniss (2019) argues that undocumented youth have felt sidelined by adult citizen advocates throughout the history of the movement, and are taking strides to assert themselves as the rightful leaders of this movement. Seif (2011), Cabaniss (2019), Negrón-Gonzales (2014), Unzueta-Carrasco and Seif (2014), and Abrams (2016) all discuss how undocumented youth have played a part in reframing the movement by adopting a more intersectional, inclusive approach and employing more dramatic, confrontational tactics.

Findings

Appendix 1 includes a sizeable piece of the data I've collected on my case study organizations. To account for how professionalized each organization is, I include information about the type of organization they are, their leadership structure, and their funding sources. In this table, I've also included a blurb about each group's strategy

which in many ways represents their prognostic framing. I collected data on whether the group is focused on advocating for migrants of a particular region or ethnic background and the primary languages that their discourse is produced in. The table also includes information about leaders' education background, if available. Higher education is a strong indicator of class-culture differences between individuals, and is a stronger determinant of these differences than income or profession (Leondar-Wright, 2014). Not included in this table are the data that I coded with regard to each group's diagnostic frame (who or what is to blame) and motivational frame (how they call people to action, how they justify their work).

The Immigrant Rights Ecosystem

There are a few ways of understanding the immigrant rights environment in this Northeast U.S. city. The infographic below characterizes each organization by how much direct service versus advocacy that they engage in and whether they form part of a statewide coalition led by Legislative Action for Immigrants' Rights (LAIR). The organizations to the left of the dotted line all form part of the LAIR coalition, which is a statewide, policy-focused organization that partners with over 130 member organizations who keep them abreast to challenges and developments on the ground, guide their policy agenda, and ensure that they consider a range of viewpoints.



Ecosystem of Immigrant Rights Organizations

The LAIR coalition holds a lot of legitimacy in the eyes of the state. The executive director has served on numerous committees and advisory boards to the federal and local government on immigration policy, including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. They possess a high level of material resources and have the second-largest paid staff out of the case study organizations in this article (only behind the legal aid organization Northeast Legal Aid, which is also a member of the coalition). The major pieces of immigration-related legislation that have been filed and have received widespread support over the last few years (primarily since 2016) have been spearheaded by LAIR, including a current bill that would bar local law enforcement from asking about someone's immigration status

and would limit notifications to ICE. Some of the member organizations, such as Alcanzando las Estrellas, are part of the steering committees of such bills. LAIR attempts to bring together immigration advocates, faith communities, and allies to craft and campaign for support of these policies, which is how their member organizations are typically involved.

There are notably four immigrant rights organizations that are not members of this coalition, which include Partners for Just Borders, the Center for Education and Action, La Comisión de la Huelga, and Immigration Action Now. All of these groups fall into the category of informal organizations with a grassroots funding structure. All of these groups place less of an emphasis on changing public policies and more emphasis on grassroots organizing and building up the leadership capacity of immigrant organizers. Although it is not clear why exactly these groups do not take part in the coalition, it is clear that policy change is not their prognosis for the ills that they identify in the country with regard to immigrant rights. While these groups seem to acknowledge that legislative work is an important part of reducing harm right now, it seems that they are fighting for bigger, more structural shifts in how the immigration system operates. Riley, a core organizer for Partners for Just Borders reports feeling defeated and disillusioned by legislative work, as it does not address things holistically. She suggests, "The depth of change that's needed couldn't ever happen in a legislative cycle and it couldn't even happen… in our current political system," which is why they've transitioned to a model of direct service that is characterized as 'harm-reduction.' Three out the four groups (the outlying group being the Center for Education and Action) that are not part of the LAIR

coalition actually collaborate frequently with one another. For example, Partners for Just Borders, while mainly a direct-service group for immigrants detained in ICE detention centers, partners with La Comisión de la Huelga and Immigration Action Now because those are both immigrant-led grassroots groups who use a similar political framework to them, according to Riley. Immigration Action Now mobilizes its youth base in support of the organizing strategy used by La Comisión de la Huelga, and the two groups frequently coordinate actions because they too report having a similar approach. The Center for Education and Action is the final group that is not a part of the LAIR coalition, and it is unclear if they actively partner with other groups.[1]

Importantly, many of the case study groups in this analysis describe themselves primarily as direct service providers but include advocacy as a priority. In the infographic, I've laid these organizations out on the Y-axis depending on to what extent they engage primarily in advocacy versus direct service work. For Northeast Legal Aid, Pathways Forward, and Immigration Services and Integration, their models prioritize direct service to immigrant communities and they choose to engage in advocacy when they come across issues that directly impact the populations they serve. Partners for Just Borders also prioritizes direct service but will only support mobilization if it can be directly tied back to directly-impacted folks, i.e. immigrants themselves.

Overall, there do not seem to be relationships of antagonism among the immigrant rights groups in this city, but rather there is caution on the part of the more radical groups

[1] The website for this group was under construction during the entire duration of this project, which limited the amount of data I was able to collect on them.

regarding who they are willing to work with based on whether they share certain aspects of their political framework. An important dynamic to note is the allocation of resources among these groups. LAIR seems to hold a strong plurality of material resources and legitimacy in the eyes of the state and even federal legislatures. While immigrants currently account for about half of LAIR's staff, it is not an immigrant-founded organization. It certainly appears that LAIR has brought together a strong coalition that is representative of many immigrant-led groups making diverse claims, but what are the limits of making claims on others' behalf? It is unclear how well-represented the community groups feel as part of this coalition, but this dynamic would be worth exploring in future research.

Emerging Diagnostic Frames

Three primary diagnostic frames emerged from the groups in my case study: the structural blame frame, individual biases frame, and the poor policies frame.

The **structural blame frame** focuses on addressing and calling attention to the root causes of issues that affect immigration and immigrants. The two organizations that primarily embrace this frame are the Center for Education and Action and Partners for Just Borders. The Center for Education and Action dedicates a lot of attention to the root causes of forced migration and calls on the United States to reckon with its role in perpetuating structural violence specifically in Central America. They emphasize the harm caused by U.S. interventionism historically and presently and how it has supported oppressive military regimes. The Center for Education and Action actively criticizes harmful partnerships between the U.S. and Mexico that essentially extend the United

States' security apparatus. This diagnostic framing is tinged with human rights frames as well, as this group emphasizes how these security practices violate international law and the human rights of immigrant communities. A different side of a similar structural blame frame is promoted by Partners for Just Borders, who focus their stances on oppressive systems sponsored by the state. Importantly, Partners for Just Borders uses frame bridging to connect immigrants' struggles against militarization and hyper-surveillance to similar struggles faced by Muslim communities after 9/11, Black communities, and indigenous communities defending their land. Their blame frame suggests that immigrant communities have always been the subjects of militarized immigration enforcement, and that this is not new with the election of Trump. An extension of this frame includes seeing local law enforcement as actively aiding federal authorities in carrying out wrongful deportations, and thus complicit in this militarization. One of their foundational values is to judge the system, not the people, further calling attention to their view of the entire immigration and security apparatus of the U.S. as the biggest injustice to be toppled. Their use of the structural blame frame is also coupled with appeals to the human rights of immigrants, understanding immigration jails as dehumanizing and lacking basic human services.

Despite having diagnostic frames that complement one another in many ways, these two groups have different prognostic frames. Partners for Just Borders is an organization in which leaders and volunteers are mostly allies (i.e. non-immigrants), but works closely with immigrant communities and immigrant-led organizations. Partners for Just Borders see their role as 'harm-reduction' in the context of an oppressive system that

over-criminalizes immigrants and isn't likely to change anytime soon. Their goal is to mobilize resources to get immigrants released from ICE detention and thus allow immigrants *themselves* to initiate and participate in systems-change organizing. In the words of Jacob, a 24-year-old white male leader of this organization, "Even though we're a direct service organization, we're still rooting for systems-change." They adopt a very strong anti-prison and anti-militarization framework and see themselves as a force to help politicize and radicalize non-immigrant volunteers who have otherwise not come into close contact with the harmful immigration system. However, as they are not immigrant-led, they do not see it is as their responsibility to engage in systems-change organizing, but rather to follow the lead of immigrants who are.

On the other hand, the Center for Education and Action—a grassroots-oriented group that is led primarily by Central American migrants—integrates community organizing with basic services and education and frequently takes up public actions such as staging protests in front of the Mexican Consulate to condemn the human rights abuses by the Mexican State at the order of the Trump administration. Additionally, they call upon white allies to use their privilege and take a proactive role in struggling toward a more "just and democratic society" and "demand that the US government focus its foreign policy on addressing root causes of migration." While their main goal is to empower their members and allow them to share their stories, the Center for Education and Action understands that because they are operating with very few resources, they call upon allies to weaponize their power and privilege as a way to legitimize them in the eyes of the government.

The next diagnostic frame that I found is an **individual biases frame,** which tends to emphasize factors like hate, prejudice, and racism as the locus of blame, and focuses on the need for greater understanding and empathy as the solution. Alcanzando las Estrellas uses a lot of language that calls attention to such factors, putting blame on 'the spirit of racism,' xenophobic arguments by legislators, negative rhetoric, lies, and hate. Their approach and prognostic framing extends pretty clearly from this understanding of the root causes of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. They focus on trying to emphasize the positive contributions that immigrants have made to the U.S., because they believe that many lawmakers do not have exposure to the real stories of immigrants. They want to 'take control of the narrative' and present their contributions to this society, which they do through social media and outreach to share testimonies on how immigrants contribute and strengthen the U.S.

The Latinx Leadership Council, Immigration Services and Integration, and Pathways forward all employ similar framing language that is notably broader than most of the other groups in my study, and includes combatting racism, xenophobia, and 'all the isms,' as the Latinx Leadership Council puts it. Each organization uses vague language and desires to work toward goals such as fair treatment and allowing immigrants to successfully take advantage of what the U.S. has to offer. Although the language used is not super specific, these groups tend to focus on the need to eradicate the individual biases and prejudices that make the U.S. an inhospitable place for immigrants. Rather than combatting 'the –isms' on a structural level, these groups are more focused on dispelling negative stereotypes and shifting biases. The Workers' Alliance for

Immigration Rights partially employs this frame, as they call attention to the way that abuse and exploitation toward immigrant workers can be partly blamed on racism and racialization due to language and cultural differences. However, they more frequently employ a policy change approach.

What is common among the groups that identify the need to target individual biases is that they all use some elements of direct service—such as legal assistance, citizenship classes, language classes, civic engagement and leadership development—as tools to push for greater acceptance of immigrants in the United States. Rather than pushing against the barriers that the state puts on immigrants, they employ a direct service model that tries to build up the legitimacy of immigrants in the view of the state and other institutions and then pushes for their voices to be heard. In contrast to groups actively trying to change systems that repress the opportunities of immigrants, they concern themselves more with attending to the immediate legal and social needs of immigrants and then trying to give them a platform to shift harmful anti-immigrant narratives.

The final diagnostic frame that emerged from the groups in my case studies is quite straightforward: the **poor policies frame.** These are groups who generally argue that the plight of immigrants in the U.S. boils down to bad policies that don't address their needs. It differs from those who are calling for structural change because it accepts the legislative and electoral system as they are and believes that with the right legislation in place this country will be able to be more welcoming for immigrants. The two groups that are best described with this framework are the LAIR Coalition and Northeast Legal

Aid. The LAIR Coalition is highly-professionalized and its main priorities are pushing for legislation to protect or extend the rights of immigrants in the United States. Northeast Legal Aid is primarily a legal aid organization that provides free legal assistance to immigrants but also engages in impact litigation and some lobbying when they become aware of 'holes in the system' that affect their clients. These groups employ more of a step by-step approach to making change in the immigrant rights sector through close contact with institutions that make the rules.

Immigration Action Now somewhat employs a poor policies blame frame, but it is more pointed toward antagonizing and defeating Donald Trump. While Trump's name acts somewhat as a stand-in for anti-immigrant sentiment overall, this group tends to focus on how his policies and platform are attacking immigrants and have emboldened other anti-immigrant forces. However, their response does not focus squarely on policy change, but in standing in solidarity with all communities who are excluded from Donald Trump's vision for the world and engaging together in nonviolent civil resistance. As seen from these three groups, a poor policies frame does not only lead to one type of prognostic frame.

The only SMO that I have not categorized into either of these three frames is La Comisión de La Huelga. While it somewhat sits between the poor policies and individual biases frame, it has a very specific blame frame that stems from its frustrations with a lack of legislative progress. They frequently talk of broken promises by political parties, and argue that every year politicians battle for their votes but stall legislation that addresses their needs. They are an entirely "self-sustaining movement," meaning that

they exclusively do grassroots funding, because they believe that if they receive "big money," it's because the funder(s) want to control their movement. Through a national strike of immigrant consumption and labor, they desire to shift the question from whether or not this nation *wants* immigrants (the very question that has led to such stalled progress) to the understanding that it needs immigrants. La Comisión has a very pointed, specific diagnostic and prognostic frame that is not taken up by any other groups. They specific blame politicians, political parties, and big funders for stalled progress for immigrant rights. Their prognostic frame follows from this logic and harnesses immigrants' power as workers and consumers—a strong example of working 'outside the system' to make their demands.

Emerging Motivational Frames

The next frames that I present are those which SMOs use to justify their approach and mobilize people to action. These capture 'how the groups frame the issue of immigration.' These frames capture how they think that their adherents, bystanders, and antagonists should interpret and think about issues around immigration. When addressing potential adherents, SMOs use these following frames to justify why someone should care about immigrants' rights. These frames include: human rights, civil rights, economic contributions, the American Dream, and intersectional solidarity.

The first frame—**human rights**—is the frame that appears at the highest rate among all SMOs studied. It understands attacks on immigrants as attacks on inherent human rights and human dignity. What's important about the human rights frame is that it transcends questions of national identity and citizenship, and attempts to get the

audience to empathize with immigrants' inherent human dignity and rights to seek health, safety, and wellbeing. It often invokes international law and international human rights conventions to make more substantiated claims about what individuals and families are entitled to. SMOs that I studied use phrase such as, "We all have basic rights no matter where we were born," "No human being is illegal," and "The dignity of each human is the same regardless of skin color" to push forward a human rights framing. Whether to attract adherents or respond to antagonists, the human rights framing tries to get at something that's universal. They want their audience to empathize with all of humanity.

For some groups, including Alcanzando las Estrellas and Pathways Forward, the human rights frame is used primarily with reference to humanitarian policies such as Temporary Protected Status, a policy designed to allow individuals from countries with armed conflict or natural disasters to live and work in the U.S. for a set period of time. Groups also often reference DACA with language related to human rights and human dignity. Thus, it might be easier to make a human rights claim when the issue at hand invokes humanitarian concerns that induce more of a "moral shock" to adherents.

Human rights framing is not always explicit, but is sometimes implied. For example, Northeast Legal Aid prioritizes serving victims of violence, exploitation, trafficking, and other dangerous situations. While they would like to serve as many people as possible, they prioritize those "who are in the greatest need" according to Meredith, a staff attorney there. They thus prioritize clients in a way that mirrors how the U.S. prioritizes asylum-seekers, employing humanitarian ideals of offering refuge from violence as their prime concern (this is certainly more of an ideal than a reality, given the

years-long backlog of asylum applications). Northeast Legal Aid pushes a human rights-related interpretation of immigration issues by prioritizing individuals who were faced with violent injustices that infringed on their human rights. Immigration Action Now, La Comisión de La Huelga, and Partners for Just Borders also employ human rights language frequently, calling upon immigrant communities' inherent right to live a safe and dignified life and right to be protected. Partners for Just Borders criticizes ICE Detention Centers as violating peoples' human rights due to their denial of "humane supports and access to basic services."

Other groups do not as frequently evoke a human rights framing, but focus on a **civil rights frame**. These differ because the civil rights frame focuses on what immigrants should be entitled to as people living in the United States. Civil rights are "embedded in a particular American set of institutions [the Constitution, judicial review] and an implicit appeal to a narrative of US citizenship" (Bloemraad et al., 2016, p. 1652). The three groups that employ this frame most frequently are the Latinx Leadership Council, Immigration Services and Integration, and the Workers' Alliance for Immigration Rights. Their focus is on engaging immigrants in democratic processes and fighting for ideals such as equal political representation, a voice in public debates, and greater access to legal citizenship. Immigration Services and Integration does a lot of organizing around voter registration and voting. Rather than fighting for more rights to be extended to undocumented migrants, as some of the human rights-focused groups do, a civil rights frame stays more strictly within the bounds of the U.S. civic system. These

groups all prioritize addressing immigrants' legal and citizenship needs as to allow immigrants to take advantage of what the U.S. has to offer and "lead productive lives."

The next frame was a heavy part of the response to rescinding DACA that I wrote about in the introduction to this thesis, and that is the **economic contribution frame**. This frame is used primarily by three groups: Alcanzando las Estrellas, LAIR, and La Comisión de La Huelga. When making their claims, Alcanzando las Estrellas emphasizes how immigrants have contributed to the U.S. through opening businesses and stimulating the economy. Language around these economic contributions are common throughout their discourse, and it is coupled with references to their "social, cultural, and spiritual" contributions as well. Given that Alcanzando las Estrellas is a faith-based organization that operates as a social ministry of a bilingual church, much of their discourse has underlying religious or theological references to how immigrants strengthen the U.S., including how they have contributed to building and sustaining places of worship.

LAIR also frequently invokes an economic contributions frame. For example, among the factsheets available on their website that provide data about immigrants in the state, they provide a lot of data on how immigrants fit into the workforce, data around them being consumers and taxpayers, and overall trying to explain—through empirical data—that immigrants are essential the state and national economy. This framing comes up most frequently in factsheets and reports that may be used to present to legislators and other stakeholders, suggesting why they may be employing this frame to begin with.

To some extent, La Comisión de la Huelga is also employing an economic frame in their long-term campaign for strikes and boycotts. These tactics specifically highlight

immigrant labor and consumption as integral to the economy in hopes that this will persuade legislators and the public to understand the centrality of immigrants. La Comisión is highlighting deservingness of membership based on immigrants' status as workers and consumers. Notably, however, La Comisión is employing a direct-action approach to highlighting immigrants' centrality in the economy, whereas the other groups use this fact more as a 'talking point' to persuade adversaries. In addition, the former groups highlight economic contributions to emphasize immigrants' deservingness. La Comisión, however, employs economic tactics because they are a source of non-institutional power to raise immigrants' voices and then make demands.

Deeply connected to the economic frame is the **American dream and meritocracy frame**. This is one which emphasizes certain characteristics of immigrants such as being hardworking, law-abiding, or accomplished to highlight their deservingness to remain in the United States. These qualities correspond with the 'American Dream' narrative—arrive with nothing, work hard, and prosper. The two groups which utilize this most extensively are Alcanzando las Estrellas and the LAIR Coalition—two of the same groups that highlighted economic contributions. In making the case that immigrants deserve a place in the U.S., Alcanzando las Estrellas emphasizes qualities such as good moral character, being hardworking, law-abiding, responsible, and being someone who has invested in the economy. In using this language, they are suggesting that deservingness can come from merit, or the possession of certain qualities. In the chapter on the history of the movement, I noted how activists who fought for the DREAM Act and fought against deportations of youth often used a similar frame; they would often

highlight the fact that the individual was a student, working hard, and had accomplished a lot. As I've discussed, this framing may be effective in convincing judges to rule against an individual's deportation, or it might convince some antagonists to view certain immigrants more favorably, but there are notable limits to this frame's inclusivity of *all* immigrants.

The LAIR Coalition also invokes imagery and references to the American Dream narrative. They use a fair amount of American symbolism and imagery, including hosting a fundraiser called "Give Liberty a Hand" and citing Emma Lazarus' poem from the statue of liberty to substantiate their call to "make America a land of hope and opportunity." They explicitly reference the American dream in their discourse, suggesting that if immigrants are under attack, then the whole American dream is under attack. American symbolism and imagery was a trope used frequently by immigration rights activists earlier in the movement, especially around the 2006 protests. It may be useful in connecting with more conservative individuals who typically hold pride in the American Dream narrative and other symbols of freedom.

The final frame actively rejects the last two frames I've described. The intersectional solidarity frame is most used by Immigration Action Now and Partners for Just Borders. This frame tries to undo any framing that is only inclusive of certain types of immigrants, such as the economic and meritocratic frames, and advocate for a frame that is more inclusive of those who aren't typically considered 'strategic.' While other movement actors could highlight a picture-perfect, law-abiding citizen who has raised a family and started a business because these accomplishments and behavior would be

strategic in persuading an antagonist, the "new frame" takes notice of how these frames exclude many people. For Immigration Action Now, their embrace of this frame aligns greatly with what Seif (2011), Cabaniss (2019), Negrón-Gonzales (2014), Unzueta-Carrasco and Seif (2014), and Abrams (2016) all hint at in their scholarship about how undocumented youth have reframed the movement. Immigration Action Now has been working to create a Queer Undocumented Project Team, a Women's Collective, and an UndocuBlack team. Immigration Action Now wants to emphasize the fact that many people are multi-marginalized and believes that these communities must mobilize in solidarity to protect one another. They highlight that it's not just immigrants who are under attack, but people of different religions, racial and ethnic groups, gender identities and expressions are all at risk under the Trump administration.

Partners for Just Borders overtly criticizes frames that paint a 'good immigrant' versus 'bad immigrant' and attempts to actively unravel the conflation between immigrants and criminalization. They argue that criminal charges do not equal non-deservingness, as some of the early frames would suggest. In stressing this point, they call for solidarity with other communities who have been the targets of criminalization, namely Black communities, Muslim communities, and Indigenous communities. What Partners for Just Borders and Immigration Action Now have in common is frame extension: that is, they present the issues that affect immigrants as inherently tied with other groups who are facing oppression and call for solidarity to build community power from the ground up. In the following chapter I will present my analysis on how groups

arrive at a particular frame and what factors seem most relevant in determining which frame an SMO will arrive at.

Chapter 7: Analysis

In this chapter, I will discuss what seemed to be the most relevant factors in determining why SMOs in my study arrive at a certain frame. In summary, there is evidence to suggest that the most relevant factors are resource mobilization (primarily in the form of dependency on foundations), professionalization, and political and cultural opportunity structure. In addition, the movement overall seems constrained by the "master frame" that was created by early movement activists. There is some evidence that confirms the effect of age as well, as the groups led by younger folks are more likely to adopt an intersectional solidarity frame. Finally, it does not seem that immigration status or ethnic background of the leaders alone impacts a group's framing strategies, but some of the challenges that are unique to the social position of immigrants affects how they are able to mobilize resources. Class-culture differences in framing are also not confirmed by my data. There is no evidence to suggest that foundations are functioning as field-builders among the movement organizations in this study, nor are grievances being manufactured by professional career activists.

Cycles of Protest and Master Frames

Benford and Snow (1992) suggest that frames that emerge *earlier* in a cycle of protest actually function to color future movements, while frames that emerge *later* in cycles of protest are constrained by the pre-existing "master frame" and may not resonate as strongly with adherents. Overall, this seems to be relevant to the immigrant rights movement in the city I studied. Early on, immigrant rights organizations and

undocumented youth crafted a representation of young immigrants that rested on notions of 'Americanness' through American symbols and narratives of cultural assimilation and hard work. Nicholls argues that these themes formed the master frame from which groups have since drawn to assert rights claims in the public sphere (2014). It seems that this frame remains salient in many ways by the groups that I've studied, and only two groups actually reject this frame and are trying to create something more inclusive.

The SMOs that continue to utilize this master frame, which takes many forms, likely recognize it as strategic and successful. Indeed, this was the frame that made great advances for immigrants' rights in 2006 and later in passing the historic DREAM Act. In trying to cope with an onslaught of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies, it is not surprising that groups would choose to adopt aspects of a frame that has proven successful historically and emphasizes a type of immigrant that fits into America's 'foundational values.' They especially might be trying to appeal to a more conservative audience given the growing anti-immigrant countermovement. However, groups like Immigration Justice Now and Partners for Just Borders recognize the limits to these frames and show that they may have unintended long-term consequences on the narrative surrounding immigrants.

Nonetheless, this master frame still remains pervasive among the groups I studied. While for some groups this frame is more overt, other groups simply have traces of its ideals, such as referencing being responsible citizens or making claims to deservingness based on having a family in the U.S. Overall, it seems that the movement is still largely adheres to this master frame, and very few SMOs are rejecting, challenging, or strongly

deviating from it. Given that the main groups that are challenging this narrative are youth and young adult-led, this could give us insight into where the movement is heading in the future. This younger generation on leaders is recognizing the effects and limits of frames and working to create a frame that's more inclusive and far-reaching.

The Prevalence of Resource Dependency and Professionalization

There is strong evidence that SMOs' framing strategies are impacted by resource dependency and professionalization. These two factors are separate but intimately connected, as the resource mobilization approach to collective action is associated with formalized organizations. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that due to the availability of more funding for movement activists to make a career out of activism, SMOs are more likely to formalize their leadership and structure.

The prevalence of resource dependency in my data set manifests itself in a few different ways. I'll start by describing one of the most professionalized groups in this study: the LAIR Coalition. The LAIR Coalition is highly formalized, has a strong division of labor, and is well-funded. They have seventeen full-time paid staff and focus on policy analysis, legislative and administrative advocacy, and strategic communications. They also hold a high level of legitimacy in the eyes of the local and federal legislatures. LAIR's framing focuses most heavily in the realm of the American Dream framing as well as economic contributions. Within their frames, they push forward strong relationships with institutions as well as local law enforcement. It is clear through their desire to maintain strong relationships with the government and other institutions that they try to maintain the legitimacy that has allowed them success in the

policy arena. As a result, they stray far from more radical assertions or anything that is too critical of current power structures.

Through my interview data, it is clear that other SMOs in the area get the sense that this organization is constrained by these institutional relationships. Riley, an organizer with Partners for Just Borders, shared with me that the director of the LAIR Coalition suggested on a radio show that it is important to build relationship with local law enforcement when there are threats coming from the federal level (this was in the context of the Customs and Border Patrol Tactical Units—or SWAT teams—that were rumored to be coming to enforce mass deportations). Riley noted: "And sometimes I also know groups sort of have to because when they're more formal and they have whatever their funding sources and whatever, different relationships, but what's great about being a decentralized network is that we don't have to play by those rules and we can say what we actually believe." Another organizer with Partners for Just Borders echoed this sentiment, suggesting that LAIR doesn't always say what they want to say.

In many ways, LAIR's framing is strongly connected with the question of what might change a legislator's mind. Whereas other groups are concerned with individual biases and prejudices that lead to discrimination at all levels, for example, LAIR is much more willing to adopt dominant assumptions in the pursuit of 'practical' institutional change. LAIR focuses much less on the individual level of hate and bias, and more on creating a frame that is going to resonate with people in power. Their framing is careful and calculated and does not use terminology that would be too polarizing. This evidence is strong because it provides a stark contrast to grassroots organizations in my study that

don't seem to have the same constraints. Overall, the grassroots groups in my study are more willing to make "radical" or polarizing claims, including being more up front about the role of racism, white supremacy, and structural oppression. For example, the Center for Education and Action is entirely grassroots-funded and operates on relatively low resources. They are also very outspoken about U.S. interventionism and militarization as the root cause of forced migration. Their framing stands in strong resistance to the U.S. and they take a more aggressive, direct-action approach to their organizing. They are overall more 'up front' with their blame frame and are not actively trying to keep ties with government, but rather to antagonize it.

Another strong departure from the professionalized nature of the LAIR Coalition is Immigration Action Now, the youth-led collective fighting for liberation of the undocumented community. Interestingly, Immigration Action Now was created in 2005 as a project of LAIR to campaign for greater access to higher education for undocumented youth. In 2008, Immigration Action Now stopped working under the umbrella of LAIR "to expand its student base" and transitioned to being an independent organization. What's stark about this case is that their framing and organizational deeply departs from that of LAIR. They are entirely crowdfunded, adopt a "decentralized democratic participation model" that is not hierarchical, and their framing is much more radical and intersectional. Their organizing strategy uses civil disobedience and direct-action tactics. While I will discuss the particular implications of age and social position a bit later in this chapter, it seems that their framing departs so strongly from that of LAIR because of their differing organizational structure and resource dependency. Immigration

Action Now uses liberationist, anti-establishment language that contrasts that of their former parent organization, who readily engages in institutionalized politics. The splitting off of these two organizations and their strong departure in framing speaks to the strong effect of resource dependency and professionalization on a group's framing.

Northeast Legal aid is a legal services organization that provides free legal representation to immigrants in the metro area and employs impact litigation to affect public policies and landmark court decisions. While not as obvious as the case of the LAIR Coalition, Northeast Legal Aid largely uses framing that would appeal to an audience of policymakers, judges, and other stakeholders in shaping what our immigration landscape looks like. By and large, they use a human rights framing. Not only does this make sense as it corresponds with international law and norms, but their framing also mirrors how the U.S. prioritizes asylum-seekers. The U.S. generally has an asylum system that prioritizes individuals who are at the greatest risk in their home countries (although, as we know, this isn't always what plays out). In a similar way, Northeast Legal Aid prioritizes clients based on these criteria. According to Meredith, one of their staff attorneys, as an organization "it is always focused on humanitarian legal rights and human rights." I would not argue that this group chooses to be a humanitarian-focused group because it would be easier to secure legitimacy and resources, but I would argue that their framing suggests that they try to remain squarely within the realm of what the U.S. views as legitimate cases for asylum.

Some other theories about the effects of the external resource environment also reign true in my study. The first is how groups must adapt to being "resource-poor," i.e.,

marginalized from centers of power and resources. This is the case for many immigrant-led groups nationwide, given that many leaders and participants do not have access to running for public office nor to vote in elections. In general, many immigrants are denied access to power and resources due to their status as 'outsiders,' and they must adapt to this positioning to carry out effective organizing on their own behalf. A strong example of adapting to the denial of institutional power is the approach taken by La Comisión de la Huelga. The campaign that their organization rests on is focused on leveraging the economic power of immigrants—consumer power and their labor—to organize a nationwide strike of immigrant labor and provide an ultimatum to the public. La Comisión is using a type of power that immigrants certainly already have to adapt to being denied institutional and civic power. Their strategy is a direct result of their resource environment. Whereas they are denied certain forms of legitimacy, they garner legitimacy through different means.

Overall, the groups in my study use frames that largely correspond to who they are trying to attract resources from. While more professionalized groups, such as LAIR of Northeast Legal Aid, might use frames that are made to appeal to government officials and large funders, other groups also use frames that correspond to their target adherent audiences. It seems that some groups are trying to convert bystanders into adherents, while others are specifically trying to appeal to conscience constituents, which are some of the resource mobilization tasks that McCarthy and Zald point to. Alcanzando las Estrellas mostly uses a frame that is meant to convert bystanders into adherents, that is, people who wouldn't otherwise care about immigration rights but aren't actively against

them either. Their campaigns—such as their social media and outreach campaign where immigrants can share their personal story of how they make America strong—make sense given this goal. Other groups seem more focused on mobilizing conscience constituents. The Center for Education and Action—an immigrant-led SMO—puts a lot of effort into getting white allies to join their fight and leverage their privilege and power to demand that the U.S. changes their actions. In a very different vein, Partners for Just Borders, which is a group led mainly by non-immigrant allies, also focuses their efforts on engaging conscience constituents. Primarily through connecting with faith organizations, Partners hopes to 'politicize' its non-immigrant volunteers through their direct service and accompaniment programs that then lead volunteers to take action for systems-change. In addition, their financial resources almost entirely come from conscience constituents in faith communities with whom they try to build solidarity. With both of these groups, one can see how the groups cater their framing to appeal to whichever groups they're trying to engage, which greatly connects to the resource mobilization hypothesis.

Political and Cultural Opportunity

One of the questions posed by Bloemraad and Voss (2020) is whether political threats lead to repression or stronger mobilization for immigrant rights groups. In my data, it seems that repression has led to mobilization and action because of a greater availability of cultural capital. Many previously uninvolved people are politicized by the current administration, and beliefs about how immigration policy should look are much more central to the adherent pool of these organizations than they were before the current administration. The shift to an administration that's much more hostile towards

immigrants' rights has led to more action on the part of these organizations, which is evidenced by their growing support on social media, stronger resonance with adherents, and a greater number of overall demonstrations, rallies, and events since 2016. In addition, SMOs' framing strategies have greatly taken to antagonizing Trump and rallying their bases around defeating him and what he represents. His name has become somewhat of a stand-in for anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in general for many of these groups. The Workers' Alliance for Immigration Rights actually shifted their focus from just labor issues to immigration upon Trump's election because of the threat that he posed and the changing needs of their constituents. Partners for Just Borders was actually founded after the election of Trump in response to increased deportations of community members.

Another example is Immigration Action Now, which started as an organization focused on increasing access to higher education for all immigrations. But upon the election of Trump, they shifted their framing entirely to begin to advocate for all issues that affect immigrants and focus more on multi-marginalized communities that Trump has been hostile towards. Other groups have changed their organizational structure and goals in response to political changes in the past. For example, the LAIR Coalition was founded in 1987 in response to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 which allowed 3–5 million undocumented immigrants to become permanent residents in order to advocate for the "rights and integration of those immigrants." However, in 1996, a welfare reform law that placed new restrictions on immigrants led them to grow by a dozen staff members and adjust their framing to fit with the new political reality.

Overall, I find that mobilization by my case study groups concentrates around significant political events. Rather than instilling fear and repressing action, it seems that these groups have trust that there will be enough support to carry out successful mobilization in response to political changes. Despite a simultaneously rising anti-immigrant countermovement, these groups are adapting their frames to fit with the new political reality and the priorities of adherents and potential adherents.

Age and Social Position

A variety of authors have theorized about how undocumented youth must navigate a unique social position as being raised in the United States but legally prohibited from residing here. Because of their unique realities, many undocumented youth-led groups have been challenging the status quo of the movement in feeling like their concerns are not being adequately represented. They have a strong sense of who should be telling the story, and it is not older, citizen advocates. Aligned with these observations, the two groups in my study that most vehemently reject the master frame that derives from the beginning of the movement are primarily youth and young adult-led: Immigration Justice Now and Partners for Just Borders. The former is immigrant-led and the latter is not, which could suggest that this "new frame" has more to do with generational differences than one's background as an immigrant. Both groups actively reject the exclusive claims made by other SMOs and call for solidarity among a variety of marginalized groups. They understand that other frames create notions of deservingness that inherently exclude certain groups of immigrants, and want to create a narrative in which they are fighting for liberation for *all* immigrants—whether they fit the

deservingness narrative or not. That this phenomenon is a result of generational differences is likely, given that it corresponds with larger cultural shifts in the use of inclusive language.

Despite having similar frames in terms of inclusivity, the two groups have vastly different prognostic frames. The immigrant-led group uses direct-action and community organizing to campaign for their concerns, while the ally-led group considers themselves "followers" of any organizing action that is put together by immigrants themselves. These roles fit in nicely with how Cabaniss (2019) describes how the undocumented-led movements she studied see how roles should be allocated: "They take a position that unambiguously cast DREAMers and their allies in different roles: DREAMers (should) lead; allies (should) follow" (493). It seems that, to some extent, younger allies are deciding to concede their power to make room for immigrant youth, who are painted as the proper leaders to speak up and organize.

How far-reaching is class?

Class-based claims were quite difficult to make in this study because I did not have clear data on the class backgrounds of leaders and participants. In trying to determine to what extent groups used materialist versus culturalist frames (Ginwright, 2002; Rose, 1997), there was a mixed bag of groups that used each type of frame, and their usage did not fall along my perceived class-culture lines. The intersectional solidarity frame, for example, is a culturalist frame because it is interested in interrogating harmful norms and values. Although the groups that were more likely to adopt it do have higher education backgrounds, there are many groups with leaders with

higher education backgrounds who do not use a culturalist frame. As I mentioned, it is much more likely that this frame corresponds with generational differences and a larger cultural shift that's occurring, rather than class-culture differences.

There is, however, some evidence of certain groups being more likely to use the individual biases frame—the frame that focuses on hate, prejudice, and discrimination as the roots of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. —which was observed by Leondar-Wright in her 2014 book as being more characteristic of working-class groups. Alcanzando las Estrellas, the Latinx Leadership Council, Immigration Services and Integration, and The Workers' Alliance for Immigration Rights were the four groups most likely to use this frame. All four groups are led by individuals with bachelor's or advanced degrees, thus contradicting the expectation that these groups would adopt this frame due to the class-culture of their leaders. However, these groups all employ a direct-service model where they are consistently working with working-class folks in a capacity that not all other groups are. They are providing legal advice, citizenship classes, civic engagement classes, and more. The Workers' Alliance is focused on the working class pretty much exclusively. This suggests that while the groups' framing may not be impacted by the class of their founders, their frames might have something to do with the class background of the constituents with whom they constantly interact. Their constituents undoubtedly shape how these organizations advocate, given that their advocacy models all rest on advocating based on the needs of their client base.

Leondar-Wright suggests that individuals with a higher education background would be more likely to adopt institutional frames that focus on systems and structures of

oppression. While there are certainly groups who employ such a frame, it does not seem to fall along the lines of which SMOs are led by leaders with a higher education background.

Immigrant-Led Groups versus Ally-Led Groups

One of the major factors that I was interested in exploring that does not seem to have a strong effect on SMO framing strategies is whether or not the leaders of the SMO are immigrants themselves. In this study, seven out of the eleven organizations that I studied are completely led by immigrants. Of the four groups that are "ally-led" (i.e., led by non-immigrants), one—the LAIR Coalition—has a staff that is about half immigrants and half non-immigrants, according to their website biographies. The other three SMOs (Northeast Legal Aid, Pathways Forward, and Partners for Just Borders) are primarily led by non-immigrants. When looking at framing alone, my data did not suggest that this factor directly affected a group's framing strategies. There were more similarities among SMOs' framing processes when they were groups in terms of professionalization and resource dependency.

However, it's important to note that even if the immigration status of leaders does not *directly* impact how a group decides to frame the issue, it certainly can impact their legitimacy in the eyes of other organizations. As I've mentioned, Partners for Just Borders will only support community organizing that is led by immigrants themselves. Immigration Action Now makes it clear that they are asserting themselves as the rightful leaders of a movement that has for too long been dominated by voices that don't value their particular concerns. In general, it seems that there is a stronger realization across the

board that immigrants themselves should be the ones leading the charge, and this is a sign of progress in the movement. There does not seem to be as much fear among immigrants who are at the forefront of organizing, as was the case in the early movement days. As I mentioned in the history of the movement section, many immigrants preferred to stay 'in the shadows' due to fear and stigma. This does not seem to be the case today, and many immigrant-led groups are making radical claims that challenge the way that the state operates.

Another thing to note is that the resource mobilization tasks of an organization may be affected by one's background as an immigrant, especially if one is undocumented. In an interview with Domenica, co-founder and programs director of Alcanzando las Estrellas, she talks about how at a young age, she realized that her capacity to make change in her community did not depend on "the system, did not depend on having a SSN, it did not depend on immigration status," speaking to how undocumented people can have a strong voice in their communities no matter if the system is barring them from certain forms of action. La Comisión de la Huelga is a strong example of how immigrants must reckon with being denied certain arenas of power, but that they can adapt to this denial of resources by leveraging another kind of legitimacy: their labor and consumer power. While it is true that La Comisión de La Huelga is adopting this strategy because they are immigrant-led, it is not based on the sole fact of being immigrants, but on the resource mobilization challenge that they face because of their status as immigrants. Thus, the factor of resource dependency is a stronger factor to consider in what affects their framing strategies. However, it's important to note that a

part of their framing has to do with being disappointed by legislators who promise to listen to them and protect them, but fail to do so year after year. In their own words, "They want our phone numbers for their elections but they never call us after they're elected." They express frustration at seeing immigration reform stall in Congress for over a decade, and are taking a new approach due to years of broken promises. This framing is the closest evidence of a group's framing being explicitly affected by the immigration status of their leaders. They express a sense of urgency, a sense of being 'used' by politicians, and a sense of defeat that can only really be claimed by immigrants themselves who experience the repercussions of stalled immigration reform. Thus, while my data does not suggest a clear-cut, consistent way in which being immigrant-led or not affects SMO's framing strategies, there is a certain legitimacy in the claims being made by immigrant-led groups that cannot exist in ally-led groups.

Conclusion

This paper explored the framing strategies of eleven different immigrant rights groups and analyzed a variety of reasons why they might arrive at the frames that they do. The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of how proponents of immigrants' rights are interpreting the current political moment and get a sense of whether groups are on the same page about how America should be moving forward. This study aimed to assess the extent to which certain factors impact a social movement organization's choice in framing. It also highlighted the tension between choosing frames that would appeal to a wider audience and potentially garner more resources versus choosing frames that represent the movement's long-term, utopian ideals.

The factors I chose to explore are their external resource environment, the organization's level of professionalization, and the background of the leaders in terms of class, status as an immigrant, and age. The data pointed strongly to the importance of a group's external resource environment in determining how—and to whom—they frame the issue. Professionalized groups operating with more resources were more likely to employ frames that encouraged maintaining relationships with government institutions, pushed forward traditional notions of deservingness, and remained aligned with the U.S.'s current guidelines for accepting asylum-seekers. The political and cultural opportunity structure and existence of a previously salient 'master frame' seem to impact groups' framing processes as well. There was strong evidence for generational differences in how the issues are framed, hinting at a future of the movement that embraces more inclusive, intersectional claims. The data did not suggest that leaders'

background as an immigrant directly accounted for differences in framing strategies among SMOs, but leaders' status as immigrants certainly impacts the resource environment from which they are able to draw.

What remains unclear is whether there is a long-term strategy employed by many of the groups. La Comisión de la Huelga—the group that is planning a large-scale, nationwide strike of immigrant labor and consumption—seems to have the strongest long-term strategy in place. But the majority of other immigrant rights groups are attending to the problems of 'right now': whether through putting major resources into direct service and legalization programs or through advocating for certain policies that provide minor relief. As I hinted throughout this paper, it will be worthwhile to keep our eyes on how immigrant rights organizations adapt to the potential change in national leadership in November of this year. Whether there is a new President who takes moderate steps towards changing the immigration landscape, or we remain with the anti-immigrant leadership of Trump, groups will certainly have to adjust their framing processes to maintain their volunteer bases or fight against the anti-immigrant countermovement.

Future research would benefit by taking a wider look at the framing processes employed by the movement across the nation. Since different cities can face completely different immigration environments based on their local and state governments, it would be useful to explore whether certain frames are more common in certain localities than others and to theorize about how the political and social realities of that location might impact these outcomes.

The findings presented in this paper point to a rising generation of young leaders who are not afraid to challenge harmful notions of deservingness that are present in the movement historically and currently. In addition, there seems to be a slow move towards more empowerment of immigrant-led groups and a tendency for groups that are not led by immigrants to step aside and make room for folks who are directly-impacted to voice their own concerns. The movement appears to be heading towards a future that centers more squarely on the voices of immigrants—and perhaps more undocumented immigrants—and employs framing that encourages broader solidarity across different social movements and causes.

Appendix I:

Organization name	Type of organization	Leadership structure	Funding source	Strategy	Leaders' ecucation level	Migrant-led?
Alcanzando las Estrellas	Non-profit, a social ministry of a protestant Christian church, informal	Non-professional staff leaders and volunteer leaders	Grants, some support from state agency for citizenship classes, and service fees	Legalization and citizenship classes alongside community organizing and civic engagement classes to promote leadership of thse who are directly impacted by a lack of immigration reform	Founders hold bachelors degrees; wide variety of professional backgrounds for other leaders and volunteers, including accountants, teachers, counselors, IT technicians, stay-at-home moms, Pastors and college students	Yes, migrant-founded and all leaders are immigrants
Center for Education and Action	Non-profit, grassroots-oriented, informal	Professional managers and volunteer leaders	Crowdfunded, other funding sources unclear	Community organizing, leadership development, and basic services	Executive Director holds bachelors degree; volunteers and other staff unknown	Led primarily by Central American Immigrants
Latinx Leadership Council	Non-profit, informal	Volunteer leaders	Crowdfunded, other funding sources unclear	Educational and leadership opportunities, essential services, grassroots organizing, allying with domestic workers groups	Director holds bachelors and masters degree; volunteers and other staff unknown	Led and directed by immigrants; also primarily women-led and women-focused
Immigration Services and Intergration	Neighborhood-based, formalized	Professional managers, strong division of labor	Fees, government contracts, individual contributions, grants from corporations and foundations, and support from the local United Way	Education, services, advocacy, acommunity organizing, leadership development, lots of focus of voter registration	All leaders have degrees and some advanced degrees	Many staff members are bilingual and immigrants themselves
Northeast Legal Aid	Non-profit, formal	Board of directors, strong organizational structure, professional managers	Local law firms, individual lawyers, foundations and charitable organizations, individual giving, state-sponsored legal services organization	Providing free legal services to low-income immigrant residents of the city and metro area; carrying out systemic "impact advocacy" (mostly class action litigation), advocating for legislation, and working with government agencies to promote procedures that would benefit how cases are decided; provides legal information to community groups	Mostly advanced degrees across the board	No
Legislative Action for Immigrants' Rights (LAIR)	Non-profit, coalition, formal	Paid employees, board of directors, strong organizational structure, professional managers	United Way, large grants from foundations	Policy advocacy, institutional organizing, academic and community-based research, and member training to reach goal of full integration of immigrants and refugees	All staff hold Bachelors degrees or advanced degrees	Half of the staff are immigrants themselves, the other half is not; organization was not immigrant-founded
Pathways Forward	Non-profit, formal	Large staff, likely hierarchical, professional managers	Emigrant support program from the Irish government, an insurance foundation, many other foundations and corporate sponsors	Legal, education and wellness services to empower immigrants and refugee familites, advocate for "fair and just policies" including Comprehensive Immigration Reform alongside LAIR and community groups	Appears to want Bachelor's degrees in their hiring posts	No

Workers' Alliance for Immigration Rights	Non-profit, formal	Some paid staff, mix of professional managers and volunteer leaders	Foundations, 2 medium-sized business partners	Join immigrant workers and their families in fighting against economic, social and political marginalization through ESOL, leadership and civic engagement, health literacy training, community organizing	Mixed: some with advanced degrees (executive director holds PhD) but the rest with lower than Bachelors degree (ex: certificates)	Founded by immigrant workers, and almost all board and staff come from the community that they serve and organize
Immigration Action Now	Grassroots, informal	Decentralized democratic participation model: each team (which develops and grows organizally) gets a representative in the statewide coordination body—the core leadership—which makes strategic decisions for the whole organization. Three full-time people that are nonprofessional staff leaders	Completely grassroots	Develop a network of immigrant youth organizers and provide political education, leadership training, protection, guidance, and safe healing spaces; engages in nonviolent actions of civil resistance and wants to disrupt any ICE efforts to disrupt communities; supports the movement by La Comisión de La Huelga. Strategy has 4 parts: mass meetings throughout the state to respond to harassment and vioence, trainings on community organizing and nonviolent civil resistance, carrying through on organizing and mobilization, and standing in solidarity with anybody who is being antagonized by Trump	Organizers are currently students for the most part	Yes
Comisión de la Huelga	Grassroots, informal	Diverse, decentralized network of organizers supporting communities in over 20 states across the country; no paid staff, but does have a network of volunteer organizers who support the movement full-time	Completely grassroots	Believes that effective change only comes through direct action such as large mobilizations and general strikes; employs a 4-phase strategy that includes building support, political intervention (public ultimatum for public officials), boycotts, and a massive strike of immigrant consumption and labor; sees itself as a contemporary continuation of United Farm Workers mobilization	Unclear, but very intentional about encouraging people from all educational backgrounds, life stages, and careers to join their movement	Yes

Partners for Just Borders	Grassroots, informal	Network of faith communities, individuals and other activist groups, volunteer leaders	Grassroots with support from some religious congregations	Court accompaniment, participating in rallies and vigils, rides and letters of support to detained immigrants, fundraising for bonds, locating legal support; goal is to be completely led by the voices and mobilization of directly-impacted folks; see themselves as part of "harm reduction" in the context of an oppressive immigration system that allows more immigrants to engage in systems-change organizing	Core leaders who interviewed with me are recent college graduates and other leaders are clergy from the Unitarian Universalist Church	No

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