

The Topology of Community in Aristotle: A Phenomenological Approach

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The Topology of Community in Aristotle: a Phenomenological Approach

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Abstract

This work responds to the question of community at an ontological level before notions such as identity and subjectivity have been assumed. I ask the question of community in terms of the principles that give rise to the being-togetherness of people. Modern philosophy's responses are famously a version of Laws, social contracts, universal definitions, ideals, and values. Post-enlightenment philosophy assumes such categories as laws, norms, and religions across the board, applying them to all gatherings of peoples. Especially with respect to the Islamic community, and more particularly during the colonial era, categories such as religion and religious laws were used by orientalist to define Muslims, non-Muslims, and different sectors among them.

Against this background, this work attempts to study the gathering of "a people" and the genesis of the laws at an ontological level. This approach will ultimately show how one's interpretation of the existence of beings in general reflects one's reading of the legal or political gatherings in particular.

I will argue that Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian phenomenology can serve as allies since they have already initiated this line of questioning by their radical critique of the authority of the subject. Heidegger separates his way from the mainstream phenomenology by formulating his critique of subjectivity by way of reviving the Greek, especially Aristotle's philosophy. Through what he calls *Destruktion*, or deconstruction of the tradition, he shows that the above-mentioned modern formulations of the self and the world are ultimately based on a certain scholastic reading of Aristotle, which reduces all meanings of being to a categorial one.

Derrida carries this critique of identity over to the ethical and political realm. He investigates human beings' interpretive relation to "otherness" by replacing identity or

self with “following.” The “otherness” that we are in “following” can be a god, another human being, the animals and the environment, or the tradition of the past. In all these relationships, the hermeneutic strategy towards “otherness” is principally the same.

Derrida’s suggestion for the most authentic mode of ‘following’ is deconstruction itself. He shows that there are the same schematic formulations involved in explaining the coming-to-be and gathering of things in nature as are involved with “a people” in a community. The genesis and the function of laws are the same in the creation of events and bodies in a natural world as the actions and productions in a political and ethical realm.

Following such a critique, especially through Derrida’s deconstruction, I try to reveal the forces in Aristotle’s text that can potentially lead to two different formulations of the gathering of a people. For Aristotle, the notions of *hylomorphism* and *teleology* explain the genesis of multiplicity and difference. In the political and ethical realm, these principles give rise to the constitution of a just “exchange community.”

The critique of these notions opens the door for alternative modes of gathering. By questioning the predetermined end (*telos*), I will suggest that the generation of multiplicity and gatherings become “nomadic.” Thus, deconstruction as the most authentic attitude towards “otherness,” when applied to Aristotle’s teleology, turns into “nomadic distribution” and “nomadic following” of the other.

As an example of the effect of this critique and its actual ethical and legal consequence, in the history of philosophy and among actual communities, I examine the genesis of gatherings and laws in Islam and among Muslims. I explain what it means to “follow” the other in nature and in human society in Islam. Finally, I examine what it means to be a nomadic follower of the laws of Islam. I argue that the rituals of Islam, like Hajj, illustrate the being of Muslims as the followers of otherness in the most explicit way. The analysis of Hajj reveals the conflict of laws and justice because the ritual is not about mere obedience to laws. Instead, through performing it, Muslims are led to contemplate and wonder about their relationship to God, nature, and their fellow human beings. In Hajj, the nature of “following” is illustrated and brought to light.

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To my daughter Anahita

For her patience and loving support

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The abbreviations for the books used in this work

BT: Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward S Robinson. New York: Harper, 1962.

BC: Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Indiana University Press, 2009.

CT: Heidegger, Martin, and Farin, Ingo. *The Concept of Time*. Continuum, 2011.

PI: Heidegger, Martin. *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*. Indiana University Press, 2001.

BW: Heidegger, Martin, and David Farrell Krell. 2011. *Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger*. London: Routledge.

IM: Heidegger, Martin, Gregory Fried, and Richard Polt. 2014. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Psyche: Derrida, Jacques. *Psyche : Inventions of the Other*. Stanford University Press, 2007.

OH: Derrida, Jacques. *The Other Heading : Reflections on Today's Europe*. Indiana University Press, 1992.

MP: Derrida, Jacques. *Margins of Philosophy*. University of Chicago Press, 1982.

DDP: Derrida, Jacques, and Erin Ferris. "The Transcendental 'Stupidity' ('Bêtise') of Man and The Becoming-Animal According To Deleuze." *Derrida, Deleuze, Psychoanalysis*, edited by ERIN FERRIS and Gabriele Schwab, Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 35–60.

AR: Derrida, Jacques, and Gil Anidjar. *Acts of Religion*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

B&S: Derrida, Jacques, and Geoffrey Bennington. *The Beast and the Sovereign*. Seminars of Jacques Derrida, V. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.

FL: Derrida, Jacques, "Force De Loi: Le Fondement Mystique De L'Autorite," *Cardozo Law Review* vol. 11, no. Issues 5-6 (July/Aug. 1990): p. 920-1046.

PREFACE: The Trajectory and the Existential Ground of the Work

Background and Aims

The overall aim of this study is to understand the notion of community as being-with-others-in-the-world. Considering human beings in their hermeneutic situation, always in relation to others in tradition and “before the laws” and the *logos* of others, this investigation turns into how one interprets and ‘follows’ the laws of tradition and society. Borrowing the term from Derrida,¹ I call this particular perspective on community ‘following,’ which is one of the phenomenological moments of being-with-others, besides being-before and being-along-side.

In a sense, other moments of being-with can be understood from the perspective of ‘following’ as well. When one follows another, she can be before or after the other. But before taking what is followed into consideration, the principles of this ‘following’ are the focus of the investigation. I will look at different modes of ‘following’ a tradition which shed light on different moments of being-with-others through time. This approach problematizes the community in its temporality as an already made product and investigates it in its genesis. While community as an institution or product defines self and its responsibility in accordance with the laws and principles of social contract, questioning the institutionalized form of community from the angle of ‘following’ sheds a new light on these well-worn notions as well. Thus, the answer one gives to the how of being-with at the transcendental level, then, will give a fresh meaning to being a self, identity and responsibility.

There are two sources of inspiration for why I chose to approach community as “following” the other rather than, for example, a dialogue or social institution of some kind. I have been drawn by two simultaneous concerns: one personal and existential, the other, methodological. Firstly, as a Muslim, I am existentially inclined to answer the pressing problem of Islamic community. Secondly, I have a long-standing interest and

¹ For the notion of being-oneself as *following*, I am deeply indebted to Jacques Derrida and his essay “l’animal que donc je suis”, in which he introduces this notion in regard to the relation of man and animal. He point out that “*suis*” in French means, “I am” and “I follow” at the same time. Nevertheless, beyond the accidental similarity between the verbs, “following” as “being-after” or “being-before” underscores different moments of being-with which seems to be co-originary with being-self. Such a formulation mainly targets the Cartesian identity as a pure thinking-self, but, on another level takes on Heidegger’s Dasein, whose “originary existence” is the product of the rejection of others and public.

training in phenomenology. In fact, the idea of the project has originally sparked in 2011 when I did a sabbatical at University College Dublin, working on the phenomenology and hermeneutics of religious experience and during a seminar on the “Hermeneutic of the Gift” by Professor Richard Kearney. I have ever since been making myself more familiar with Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and deconstruction as avenues to study Islamic community.

After reading a lot about anthropological and philosophical studies of community and law in Islam, I realized that most of them are either too broad or too narrow. It has been the most frequent and commonsensical understanding of Islam to reduce the colorful, ambiguous, paradoxical and exploratory nature of Islam to a rather straightforward essentialized depiction of it as a religion just like Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, etc., in contrast to secularism. In short, it can be argued that these post-enlightenment distinctions are not necessarily applicable to Islam. In fact, in the history of Islam there has never been a similar distinction between the secular and the religious, such as the domain of science as separate from metaphysics of Islam, or politics as separate from religion, etc.²

In all these definitions and categorizations, scholastic and modern, the becoming of these communities and their relation to what has come before and after them are reduced to a systematic, synchronic mold or construct, as if all elements and series that gave rise

²Shahāb Ahmed in his seminal work, *What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic*, argues that any definition of Islam has to be addressed from within the terminology of Islam itself and not through the terminology that is devised by western orientalists in characterizing Islam as a **religion** (as if like Christianity and as opposed to secularism), culture, law, orthodoxy, philosophy, Sufism, etc. Ahmed claims that the underlying assumption of such a category of **religion**, despite every recent effort in the study of religion to uproot the field from the soil of enlightenment modernity, is that all religion everywhere models itself off the archetype that is Christian Religion, and functions within the following binaries or dualities: religion vs. science, sacred vs. profane, religion vs. secular, ordinary acts vs. extraordinary acts, natural vs. supernatural. He contends that such a category as religion assumes religious authority to be fundamentally, and at its core, the proscription and the prescription of ethical acts in their particularities. Ahmed does a fantastic job in examining all of these studies in an attempt to provide the most inclusive definition of Islamic community. According to Ahmed, such perspectives and methodologies have gradually led to two major routes in Islamic studies that are either too reductive or simply wouldn't give us a unified definition. In the first case, the investigator tries to extract mainly from the textual sources of the Qur'an and *Hadith* (the sayings of the Prophet) as the original points of reference, some kind of normative claim, written or tacit law or cultural structure which constitute Islamic community as opposed to its others. He contends that in the first case Islam would be reduced to: (1) some kind of religious law (Shari'ah), (2) various forms of Sunni and Shiiat Sufism and Mysticism (Ahmed, Shahab. *What Is Islam? : The Importance of Being Islamic*. Princeton UP, 2016.)

to “a people” happen *at the same time*. Most of the anthropological or historical studies are about the behaviors, lifestyles, beliefs and troubles of existing communities and cultures, or the communities and cultures of the past, trying to show how multitudinous Islamic community is. Meanwhile they do not consider the locus of the genesis of such paradoxical and different forms and the forces of their becoming from the same ground. Given the dominance of laws and political, national, or religious institutions over the daily life and body-politics of “a people,” most of the scholarship approaches the topic of community as some sort of construct, product or substantial content.³ That is what I would like to question and problematize through a phenomenological study of being-togetherness as following a tradition.

One of the most recent ones of these studies is Alex Orwin’s political philosophy of al-Fārābī. He tries to show the Greek origin of al-Fārābī’s thought and how inclusive and tolerant he had been in defining what is Islam and Islamic community. Similar studies have been done about Ghazālī and Ibn Sīnā, among others. While these studies demonstrate how scholastic thinkers formulate Islamic community, they are not addressing the forces that compel a Muslim to follow one interpretation rather than another. These studies do not explain the fundamental essential relationship between these interpretations at a philosophical level and the being of Muslim self that derives in

³ In most formulations, especially in the early modern political philosophy of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, etc., community is looked at as laws of social contract, laws of reason, philosophical or political ideas of a scholar, or certain people or simply as *habitus* of “a people” in a certain geopolitical and historical situation. I would refer only to one example here, in which the author is influenced by the prominence of the laws in Islam and assumed that they are the same as the normative laws everywhere, like a social contract or a timeless sets of rules of conduct.

“Normative Islam” is that form of Islam through which Muslims have access to ultimate norms that are valid for life, action and thought ... In classical Muslim terms, normative Islam is the *Shari’a*. [*Shari’a*, from the root *ša, ra, ‘a*, means “a wide road or pathway”, referring to a general pathway of religion normally determined by orthodoxy.](Jacques Waardenburg, *Islam: Historical, Social and Political Perspective*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002, p. 97)

Many non-Muslims, orientalist, and many scholars of Islam like Alex Orwin, interpret the community of Islam as comprised of followers of some basic rituals and laws of conduct, or some philosophical ideas. (Orwin, Alexander. *Redefining the Muslim Community: Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics in the Thought of Alfarabi*. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017.)

Most of the formulations of community offered in Islamic philosophy, namely Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Taymiyyah, derive their definitions and formalization in reference, for or against Greek and especially Aristotelian philosophy. In light of a Heideggerian retrieval of Aristotle, we can see that their formulation of what Aristotle might have meant only constitutes one form of community, while the history of Islam has witnessed far more variety as to what we call Islamic community.

following them. They merely reduce being Muslim to a set of ideas and ideals which do not explain the multifarious modes of being Muslim throughout history.

My interest in studying community is sparked by this observation. I am interested in understanding how one is compelled to act in accordance with one interpretation of tradition rather than another, hence ‘following’ Islam. This will include providing an innovative take on tradition, that is a kind of ‘following’ which does not ‘follow’ any particular existing interpretation and considers to prior completed essence for Islam. Altogether, I am trying to understand how one keeps one’s precarious relationship to the others of the same background or history or others who are bound by the same public norms or laws (like other fellow Muslims or historical others) without imposing any essential content to them or to oneself. That is why, the question of community in Islam turned into an ontological question for me. Instead of asking what the essence of Islam is, or what a particular philosopher or mystic thinks about Islam or how an individual views the world as a Muslim, I ask a more ontological question as to the being of any ‘follower’ of tradition as such. Being as ‘following’ a tradition is a ploy to go much deeper to the transcendental conditions of any gathering by considering individual action (*praxis*) and making (*poiesis*) rather than theoretical constructs and beliefs.

While the formation and formulation of different modes of community in Islam can be explained as for or against Aristotle’s philosophy as they received and incorporated it in Islamic theology, modern categories of community, laws, state of nature, reason, religion, etc., are far removed from and alien to the Islamic context. Therefore, the fate of Aristotelian politics and laws in Islam at the ontological level is in the background of this study.

With such a concern about the laws and the structure of religion, the categories that determine the body-politics of “a people” beyond the subjective, psychological, or historical categories, Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle and Greek philosophy against modern and idealist approaches proved to be very helpful. I found the resources for the critique of identity and subjectivity and at the same time the critique of scholastic and Islamic adoption of the Greek philosophy in Heidegger and his version of

phenomenology. Heidegger's scholarship, especially his lectures on Greek philosophy, gave me the transcendental ground on which I could found the building of Islamic formulations of community beyond what Islamic philosophy, theology, politics, and mystical thought have formally formulated or failed to formulate as such. Heidegger's destruction of the history of metaphysics while very helpful at the ontological level, does not give enough theoretical and conceptual apparatus for a political investigation. The task of the destruction (*Destruktion*) or deconstruction of the metaphysics at the ethical and political level has come to fruition in the works of Jacques Derrida. His close ties with Heidegger's take on history of philosophy and particularly his critique of laws make him the final and most important point of reference in this work. In fact, *destruktion* itself as Heidegger's approach to the tradition and its maturation in form of deconstruction in Derrida turns out to be the most authentic mode of following the other.

To figure out all the modes of community that can arise from Aristotle's texts, the ones that he has acknowledged and promoted and the ones that he has tried to avoid, all at the service of finally getting to explain how Islamic community begins and multiplies has proven to be a very large project whose completion in a just and fruitful way would take volumes. That is why, I divided the project into several smaller projects to do over time. The present study is the first step, which prepares the ontological terminology I need to develop a critical understanding of the notion of community. However, to cast a provisional light on the significance of the critique in what comes below and at the end as part of the conclusion of this work, I will take the analysis to the concrete and existential context, which was the context of the questioning to begin with. The application of the analysis to the Islamic context, I hope, will shine a light on what is at stake in the abstract metaphysical critique conducted in the main body of the work.

For the present study, then, I take a phenomenological deconstructive approach to what I term the metaphysics of 'following' in Aristotle. I will look at how Heidegger interprets the natural constitution of community and laws through studying Aristotle's basic concepts, especially in *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, as well as the Derridean deconstruction of the just community in Aristotle. This critique of what I call the politics

of nature, the critique of the necessary laws of nature that are extrapolated to human community opens Aristotle's natural laws to alternative possible worlds, one that is more hospitable to more contingency in nature and strangers in community. Beyond rational constitution of the *polis*, the sovereignty is akin to a more bestial formation that is not in control of reason. The rational, just, and beautiful modes of community that Aristotle tries to establish through the laws of community raises problems regarding the nature of innovation or creative interpretation of tradition. Following Derrida, I will point to the places where he admits to this difficulty as a result of which the nomadic community comes to the fore in full force.

At the end of this volume, I give an example of how the same aporia of 'following' the laws is staged in following the Islamic laws. This discussion in the Conclusion, I hope, makes the metaphysical explanations of the previous chapters more apparent and more concrete. It also reveals how Aristotle's metaphysics and politics have been read and criticized in Scholastic Islam. This will sharpen the critique and prove my inclination to read Aristotle the way I do.

Once again, in what follows, I would like to share the place where the question is raised and what is existentially at stake in asking such a question. I shall explain my sources of inspiration in posing the question in terms of 'following,' and where I will be heading with this investigation as whole.

Islamic Community: Being-in-Following, Being-in-Trouble

In order to illustrate the nature of community as 'following,' I would like to begin with an anecdote. The whole idea of the project is inspired by the vision that is described below.

Ibn 'Arabī, the great mystic Sufi of Andalusia, explains in the introduction to his masterpiece, *Meccan Revelations*, that the whole book is given to him by the prophet Muhammed himself in the state of a dream. He narrates the dream at the beginning of the book as an introductory speech (*Khuṭba*). He stages a mode of 'following' the prophet that has inspired generations of scholars after him, including myself.

I climbed over it [the rock, where the prophet was standing], until I was in the same place and level of his standing position, peace be upon him, but a sleeve of white shirt was put for me on the step where I was standing, so as not to resume the place that he, peace be upon him, resumed with his feet, that was because of his high esteem and honor, and a warning and observation for us that the state from which he saw his Lord is not available for his heirs but only from behind his veil, otherwise we may witness his same revelations, and we would know what he knows; do you not see when you track someone for intelligence, that you do not see from his road what he has seen and you do not know how to tell about him but by negating his descriptions.⁴

By positioning himself behind the veil of the one he is following, Ibn ‘Arabi implies that understanding, for a follower of faith, is always mediated, partial, and can only be accomplished by first grasping it in its partiality. We can only explain the truth in its negation and as a ‘follower.’ While ‘following,’ as Ibn ‘Arabi admits, our vision is always blocked by the one ahead of us, the same person that opens the landscape for us to begin with, or the *captain*⁵ of the vessel. We can never directly perceive the landscape that is stretched before the guide and is opened by him. The follower’s knowledge, then, is always associated with a kind of interpreting and at the same time not-knowing or impossibility of absolute knowing.

⁴ ‘Arabi, Muhyiddin Ibn. *The Meccan Revelations* (volume 1 of 37) (*al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya*) (Kindle Locations 1294-1300). . Kindle Edition.

⁵ Incidentally, to take the question of politics and authority in this spatio-temporal perspective is to ask about the destination, leader, and the capital of Islam. Reading with Derrida’s web of concepts all associated with the head and heading in his essay, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe*, we could ask such spatio-temporal questions as “where we are *heading* as Muslims?” or “where the *Capital* of Islam is?,” “Who the *Captain* of this vessel is?” Or, as suggested by Derrida, are we to replace the heading with *the other* of the heading towards a more open and divergent understanding of Islamic Community?

This is a recurrent motif throughout Islamic mystic literature.⁶ On the one hand, of course, the story is simply meant to imply the priority of faith in the messenger and the revelation which is mediated by him. On the other hand, however, the story points to the significance of the position of being a follower. The being of followers as a community is determined by the sense⁷ they make, or the way they deal with this problematic situation. Their being-togetherness is characterized by their *take on* tradition. As a result, this sense of community, although it is spatio-temporal or directional, does not primarily occur in one place or time as a synchronic construct or institution.

On the significance of the modes of community as different ways of ‘following’ the tradition, especially the tradition of Greek philosophy, one needs to go back more than a century before Ibn ‘Arabī, to the works of Muhammad Ghazālī, the 11th century theologian, philosopher, and jurist. Ghazālī, in his confessional autobiography, *Deliverance from Error*, writes in the form of a response to an inquiry by a student:

You [the inquirer] also want to hear about my daring in mounting from the Low-land of servile conformism to the highland of independent investigation: and first of all what profit I derived from the science of *kalām*; secondly what I found

loathsome among the methods of the devotees of *ta’līm*, who restrict the attainment of truth to uncritical acceptance of the Imam’s pronouncements; thirdly, the methods of philosophizing which I scouted; and finally, what pleased me in the way pursued by the practice of Sufism.

(Ghazālī, 1999. 1)

A couple of paragraphs later, Ghazālī mentions that the way to truth cannot be beyond these claimants. In the quote above, he primarily assumes two basic levels of being-togetherness of “a people.” One is the level of blind “conformism” which is still a lower

⁶ The most famous of these stories which is based on a Qur’ān, is the story of a sage called Khidr and Moses. God gives Khidr a knowledge from His own absolute knowledge and Moses wants to learn the secrets of that knowledge. However, he falls short when asked by Khidr to have patience and follow him on his path. In every juncture and every moment of decision, Moses chooses calculative reasoning over blind obedience or faith in Khidr, which leads to Khidr’s frustration and them parting ways.

⁷ Literally, in French, *sens* as meaning and direction

level of ‘following’ the authority or “servile conformism” (*taqlīd*, meaning “imitation,” also of the same root as *qallādah*, meaning a necklace and a leash). This level seems to be associated with the *everyday economy* of being-with-one-another, what I would ultimately call *community as exchange*. Yet, the moment the follower feels uneasy with his static situation is already the beginning of her ascent. There comes another mode of ‘following’ Ghazali calls the “independent investigation (*ijtihād*).” He describes this level as follows:

The aim of this account is to emphasize that one should be most diligent in seeking the truth until he finally comes to seeking the unseekable. For primary truths are unseekable, because they are present in the mind; and when what is present is sought, it is lost and hides itself. But one who seeks the unseekable cannot subsequently be accused of negligence in seeking what is seekable. (*ibid.*, p. 5)

In the second mode of ‘following,’ there is still no pretension of having the truth, or seeing the end, or attaining absolute knowledge; rather, it is depicted as an active comportment on the path of ‘following.’ He considers this search to be the same as searching for certainty and the truth. Yet, later, Ghazālī admits that his radical doubts left him in wonder and despair, and he found it impossible to reach absolute certainty. He admits that it was God’s grace which found him again and put him back on the path of seeking (*Ghazālī*, 1999. 4-5).

Altogether, one can argue that the level of creative investigation of truth for Ghazālī seems to be beyond philosophy, theology, and other claims to knowledge, and is associated with the ‘following’ and seeking itself, while admitting what is “unseekable.” Thus, by directly questioning Aristotelian philosophy as well as Islamic theology and actual sectors of Muslims of his day, he, in effect, opens the door for a transcendental study. It is in the light of such an opening that I will apply a phenomenological reading of Aristotle to explain essential modes of following altogether.

It is significant that Ghazālī considers all modes of comportment as actual and present and obliterates their relation to one another. He considers all these takes on

tradition as synchronic constructs or institutions. In other words, the question still remains as to the genesis of such gatherings in ‘following’ Aristotle or the Islamic tradition. One cannot simply dismiss the current interpretations of a text as wrong or deviation from the original without first explaining what is the nature of ‘following’ as interpreting. Ghazālī describes the experience without explicating the place (*topos*, hence topology) where such different modes of ‘following’ become possible and multiple at the same time. The answer to the question of the being of ‘following’ will determine the being of “a people” (in this case Muslim philosophers, theologian, mystics, politicians and the common people) who are in various modes of ‘following.’ That gives us conceptual apparatus to clearly understand what the problem is with the dynamic of being-in-a-community responsibly and creatively while having to abide the laws of the community as well.

Moreover, I will show in this work that Ghazālī’s critique of Greek and Aristotelian philosophy is in fact prepared and allowed by Aristotle himself and in the dialectical structure of his work. It is as if before Ghazālī, it is Aristotle himself who deconstructs his own metaphysical system. However, as Ghazālī does not read Greek, what he questions is already an interpretation of Ibn Sīnā and the scholastic tradition of the time. This is another reason to engage with Aristotle’s text albeit in a deconstructive way.

Moreover, I will be following Ghazālī in yet another way. Ghazālī’s formulation of Islamic community and the difference between its internal sectors is more accurate and advantageous than any of its post-enlightenment, post-colonial versions. Projecting post-enlightenment notions (as in Rawls, Habermas, etc., following Kant) like secular, religious, laws, etc., does not in any way describe the relation of Muslims to God and to society. One should not confuse Ghazālī’s using of such categories as *kalām*,⁸ philosophy, laws (*Shari‘a*), religion, etc. to describe different sectors of Islam with the post-enlightenment orientalist’s usage of the same terms. Ghazālī’s characterizations and terms

⁸ The science of proving the creed and the principle beliefs and tenets of Islam. The one who practices it, is called *mutikallimūn* (theologians) who are distinguished from Islamic philosophers and jurists.

refer to “a people” *within* the Islamic community and the local idiom of Islam of his time. These categories do not have the same meaning as what post-enlightenment orientalist meant by laws, religion, and the like.

Although Islamic community per se is not the subject of this study, it looms in the background as the place in which I would like to see the results of this research be examined. That is what I will offer at the conclusion of this work, only as a blueprint of a more expansive study in future works. In light of the outline above, chapter one explicates the question, aims, and methodology of the work as whole.

INTRODUCTION: The Ontology of Community as ‘Following’

The Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study

Purpose of the Study

This work seeks out the grounding for the sense of following the laws of a community, the meaning of identity, and our responsibility towards others. Before and beyond the actual divisions between people, be they political or religious, we need to seek the sources that attract human life towards being-with-one-another in general. Equally important are the criteria for exclusion, whereby some individuals are designated as ‘others,’ such as the divide between citizens and immigrants.

This work has two major strategies, both of which take their lead from Heidegger. Firstly, against the modern conception of self, identity, and community, I look into the Greek and especially Aristotelian definition of man and his others (e.g. animals, or the natural world).

I argue, following Heidegger, that the conception of modern self and identity is ultimately founded upon a specific medieval interpretation of Platonic/Aristotelian tradition. Taking the essential, categorial understanding of Being as primary, this reading reduces human experience to a series of subject-object relations and reduces the relationship between selves to inter-subjectivity or empathy.

Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, ventures to critique the primary role of categorial understanding. He calls such an interpretation of Being, “forgetfulness of Being” (*Seinsvergessenheit*), which ultimately reduces “the multiple senses of Being” in Aristotle into the one associated with the available and familiar meaning of being as the present and actual. Therefore, in Heidegger’s view, if there is to be any original examination of different possibilities of being a self or being human, it has to be found in the critical analysis of the origin of western metaphysics in Greek philosophy.

Following Heidegger and Derrida, I argue that the Greek interpretation of being-in-the-world in terms of *logos* not only sheds light on the sources of political community (*polis*) and laws but also reveals the origins of their mistreatment and essential limitations in addressing the singular character of individuals. I perform this critique of Aristotelian metaphysics by showing that the program of political society in Aristotle follows his general strategy to establish the science of metaphysics. Finally, I propose that Aristotle's philosophical diligence in admitting the mistreatment in his system puts his metaphysics on an alternative path beyond what he formally anticipated.

Thus, the retrieval of Aristotle does not mean to repeat what *he* proposed as the original relation of man to the world. It is not merely to celebrate what scholars think Aristotle offered as the best, most excellent, most just relations in the city. In my treatment of Aristotle's philosophy, as I explain below, I find myself in the same hermeneutic situation before and in relation to Aristotelian scholarship as well. Then, I am compelled to enact what I believe will turn out to be the most 'just' and authentic 'being-with,' or 'following,' of the other, in this case the Aristotelian tradition itself. What I will try to argue to be the most authentic community and 'following' informs my reading from the beginning.

This approach has been made possible by Heidegger's basic hermeneutic insight that "every inquiry is a seeking [*Suchen*]. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought" (*BT.*, 5/24). What is sought in this case is the authentic treatment or the 'following' of the other. Such a being-with-tradition for Heidegger in *BT* is tantamount to "a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology" (*BT.*, 24/45). One can argue that it is this strategy which is adopted and radicalized by Derrida as deconstruction especially with respect to notions of justice as law versus responsibility. Destruction and deconstruction, as I will demonstrate in this work, are not merely a negative attitude of rejection or refutation. Quite the contrary, these strategies will reveal the hidden powers and forces of the tradition. Heidegger writes: "this destruction is just as far from having the *negative* sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary,

stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its *limits*” (BT., 23/44).

In this way, the principles and forces of Aristotle’s philosophy will be liberated from their pre-meditated context and give rise to an original treatment of the problem. I will finally argue that the origin of the alternative modes of the community is still within Aristotle’s text, perhaps in what he intentionally, systematically, or even unintentionally leaves out in order to produce a metaphysical system or the science of metaphysics.

Background: ‘Following’ and the Critique of Identity

The most poignant critique of the modern notion of identity and self as independent and separate from others and the world can be found in post-Heideggerian philosophy, especially in Jacques Derrida. Derrida warns us against the notion of identity as already formed, present, and identical to itself, as a source of irresponsibility, and violence. He writes,

Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violence, those that we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are being unleashed... (OH. 6)

What seems to be the problem for Derrida is our obsession with identity as “identical to itself,” or altogether present to itself. In modern philosophy, following Descartes, identity is assumed to be a complete, independent construct which only then tries to know the world as its object or to empathize with others. In these modern formulations, like that of Hobbes and Locke, the community is famously defined as a social contract between independent subjects who have departed the “state of nature.” The “state of nature” for Hobbes and Locke is characterized by self-serving animal desires and emotions that need to be overcome by social contract or the authority of a sovereign representative. Even for

Locke whose state of nature is supposed to be run under the natural laws, as Steven B. Smith acutely observes, human qualities of peace and cooperation and duty very quickly degenerates to the state of license and war (*Smith*, 166-67). Smith underlines Locke's numerous references to how human greed and desire would turn them into beasts of prey. He calls this "Locke's bestiary" which looks like a thinly veiled and disguised version of Hobbes' state of nature (*Smith*, 168). This brutal condition brings individuals to the brink of the realization that they need to come to an agreement or a contract.

The subjects of social contract theories are characterized by universal categories like 'reason' and 'will' as a result of which they can decide to be part of a community or to follow the laws and abide by a social contract. In most of these formulations, there is a sense in which a central organizing principle defines and determines the relation between selves giving them a cultural, social, or religious identity at the expense of the singular character of the individuals. In this sense, Derrida sees no difference in putting God, man, or reason at the center as an authority.

Establishing this organizing principle inevitably leads to a universal construct, which imposes a proper or present character or trait to every individual member of the community. To be part of such a culture is to *have* something in common with everyone in that culture. For Heidegger and Derrida, at issue is the very character of this relationality with others which is always already mediated by tradition or given laws of some kind. According to Derrida, for a culture to remain a living culture, for cultural identity to exist, it has to claim its singular character (*OH.*, 7). For example, to be a Muslim is to revive the very meaning of Islam and the very principles that constitute the identity of this culture and community.

There is then a precarious and problematic situation before everyone in assuming an identity or claiming to be part of a community. One is facing the situation of having to 'follow' the same way of life to be part of a community while trying to assert the singular character of oneself as a responsible free agent. Derrida's political and ethical works are largely about showing the problematic nature of this 'following.' He contends not only that the so-called subjects need to continually re-define their relationality to their history

and culture, but more importantly that “what is proper to a culture” is to not be the same as oneself (identical to oneself) in ‘following’ but to be “different” (*OH*. 8). Otherwise ‘following’ falls back to the same ordinary and repetitive structure of the tradition incapable of giving an authentic character to the ‘follower.’

...what is proper to a culture is to not be identical to itself; not to not have an identity, but not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say "me" or "we"; to be able to take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself (*avec soit*). There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference with itself in the history of culture. (*OH*. 9)

What this means is, perhaps, that we can still talk about identity and a “we” in or as a culture only if we define it in terms of a “difference.” A community can be characterized not only in terms of what ‘a people’ share in common, but also as every singular original difference with others including the difference with the tradition. The choice of the term ‘following’ explains this precarious connection with others of the same era as well as that of the past or the tradition alike. ‘Following’ is the term Derrida uses to investigate the modes of the being of humankind as already in relation with others while questioning the very mode of this relationality.

It is very critical to keep in mind that this line of questioning owes a lot to Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity, a main component of *Being and Time*. Heidegger strives to go beyond the present categories of object or subject by delving into the more existential character of the being who finds himself in the hermeneutic situation of ‘following’ and asks about the meaning of Being. For the being of the questioner, he chooses the term *Dasein*, ‘there-being,’ to avoid all connotations and implications associated with the term ‘human.’ *Dasein* is the entity whose “being is an issue for him” (*BT*, 12/32).

...and this implies that *Dasein*, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being- a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further

that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being.
(*BT.*, 12/32)

That is to say, Dasein is the site, the place (*Da*), where some interpretation of Being comes to pass. This place is, for Heidegger, where the historical ‘givenness’ of meaning and tradition is for the most part available to Dasein.

In its factual Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is 'what' it already was. It *is* its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along 'behind' it, and that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein *is* its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ (*geschehen*) out of its future on each occasion. (*BT.*, 20/41)

For Heidegger, and for Derrida, occurrences in the world make sense or are understood “proximally and for the most part” through their relation to the givenness of tradition and history. As the translators of *BT*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, emphasize as well, the word that they translate as “historize” “ordinarily means ‘to happen’” (*BT.*, 41).⁹ According to Heidegger any understanding of the occurrences is accomplished through ‘following’ the tradition. In effect, being-with-others-in-the-world is, in fact, the hermeneutic situation one, “primarily and for the most part” finds oneself in.

Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. Its own past-and this always means the past of its 'generation'-is

⁹ The translators write in the footnote: '*weltgeschichtliches Geschehen*'. While the verb '*geschehen*' ordinarily means to 'happen', and will often be so translated, Heidegger stresses its etymological kinship to '*Geschichte*' or 'history'. To bring out this connection, we have coined the verb 'historize', which might be paraphrased as to 'happen in a historical way' ; we shall usually translate '*geschehen*' this way in contexts where history is being discussed. We trust that the reader will keep in mind that such 'historizing' is characteristic of all historical entities, and is not the sort of thing that is done primarily by historians (as 'philosophizing', for instance, is done by philosophers). (On 'world-historical' see H. 381 ff.)

not something which *follows along after* Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it. (*BT.*, 20/41)

Heidegger distinguishes here between history as events occurred in the past with the way Dasein, as the place of the occurrence of interpretation, understands everything initially through the sedimented semantic network given by others before or alongside it. Therefore, the historicity of Dasein is not necessarily limited to events that the others in the past have undergone, but rather it refers to the way one's being is always already in a precarious relationship with others. Accordingly, the question of 'following' becomes the central question for the meaning of the being of the self.

In *BT* and its summary, *The Concept of Time*,¹⁰ Heidegger deals particularly with the question of the "who" of Dasein. He mentions that this connection with others is existential and that, ontologically speaking, Dasein is always *mitsein* or being-with. The being of Dasein is co-originary with that of other Daseins. The challenge is for Dasein to find her authentic voice amongst the loud cry of the ordinary public discourse or the voice of 'the One' (*das Man*) (*CT.*, 20-21). Thus, most of *BT* is the elucidation of the existential structure of Dasein in search of its most authentic mode of access to the meaning of being. We find out that it is only the resolved Dasein, facing his own death, who can finally re-establish an authentic (*eigentlich*) connection to other beings in the world and other Daseins. Despite the ethical and political implications of Heidegger's investigation into Dasein's connections with its world, he does not directly address such matters in *BT* or *CT*.¹¹

Perhaps inspired by one of the passages above, Derrida takes the meaning of being-with-others as 'following.' 'Following' for Derrida seems to extend Heidegger's "Dasein" to an ethical context, focusing mainly on Dasein's relationality with others. Derrida explicitly attends to this term in one of his pieces, "The Animal That Therefore I

¹⁰ In this work, I refer to this treatise as *CT*.

¹¹ When referring to the dominance of the public discourse, the language of *CT*, completely becomes political, rife with political terms such as how the one and idle-talk *govern* the way Dasein finds oneself in "for the most part" or ordinarily. Or that idle-talk *dominates* Dasein's expression of oneself in a way that conceals his being more than revealing it.

Am (More to Follow),”¹² where he underlines the ambiguity of the usage of the verbs to be (*être*) and to follow (*suivre*) in the French language. Both verbs would conjugate as *suis* for the first person singular, which makes the Cartesian formulation “I think therefore I am” (*Cogito ergo sum*) ambiguous between “I am” and “I follow.” However, beyond the coincidental similarity in words, embracing the association of self with ‘following’ introduces an essential otherness to the structure of being a self. Being as ‘following’ or coming-after in this way questions the very separation of the thinking “I” from its world. It brings the abstract independent subject back to its hermeneutic situation in relation to others and history. ‘Following’ indicates that the “I” is already connected to what it tries to distinguish itself from or what it ‘comes after,’ i.e. nature, the animal, and the tradition.

Derrida further elaborates that being-with [-others-in-the-world] comprises different phenomenological *moments*. It could consist of being-alongside or -near, being-after or ‘following’, and being-before, or generating (*Derrida*, 2008. 10). That is to say that the “I” ‘follows,’ comes-after, comes-before, and along-side nature, the animal and tradition. But, the word ‘following’ already contains most of the connotations within itself and therefore problematizes the straightforward temporal structure of coming-after or before. “I am” as “I follow” could simply be interpreted as before and/or after. My interpretation of what I receive from others becomes the signature and the character that I leave behind from myself at the same time.

A community in this sense is not only about the way present individuals, pure and simple, empathize with one another. Rather, the problem is how our being as humans is always already constituted by our “being-huddled-together-in-the-world” through the mediation of history or tradition, which are in one way or another textual. Derrida argues that being as being-with

express[es] a certain order of being-huddled-together [*être serré*](which is what the etymological root, *pressu*, indicates, whence follow the words

¹² Derrida, Jacques., and Mallet, Marie-Louise. *The Animal That Therefore I Am. (l’animal que donc je suis)* New York: Fordham UP, 2008. Perspectives in Continental Philosophy.

prés, auprès, après), the being-pressed, the being-with as being strictly attached, bound, enchained, being-under-pressure, compressed, impressed, repressed, pressed against,” (Derrida, 2008. 10) ¹³

What he means is that being-with as coming before (*prés*), coming after (*après*), being alongside or near (*auprès*) (“neighboring”), has an ambiguous and paradoxical character. It indicates at the same time two things which are different yet essentially connected to one another (*pressu*). Finally, the explication of community in this sense is the existential-ontological analysis of this precarious relationality with otherness, the analysis of the place (*topos*) where different modes of otherness come to pass for Dasein.

In this way, we manage to take the perspective of the individual to talk about the community and not a general principle of a set of ideas. The question of community in this perspective is not about some central beliefs people gather around or the power relations that establish an institutional whole. Borrowing the word ‘following,’ I will address the mode of being of an individual in relation to the culture and laws (*nomos*) that come before her.

I argue that the decision to be in ‘following’ is not merely a conscious and psychological one; instead, it is the one that constitutes the being of the ‘follower’ and the ‘followed’ at the same time. For example, ‘following’ Islam does not consider the prior existence of Islam as a construct which then Muslims consciously or unconsciously choose to follow in a certain way. Instead, it is the way of ‘following’ that determines the character of Islam and Muslim at the same time.

Now, my investigation is no exception in being historical and in ‘following’ the scholarly and academic discourse that addresses it. As I argue below, any phenomenological analysis of this kind begins with such an admission to its hermeneutic

¹³These set of metaphors and concepts that I will use as reference points all come in this book: Derrida, Jacques. *The Other Heading : Reflections on Today's Europe*. Indiana University Press, 1992. In Derrida’s parlance, we need to question where one is *heading* in *following*, who is being *followed* and *heads* this movement (the *captain*) and where the place of the final or temporary gathering, if such a thing exists, is (*la capitale* in French which refers to the *capital* city as a central organizing principle of the movements or a place which attracts the movements of bodies). This is to ask about the organizing principle, authority or sovereignty, about the *capital*, which of course bears the same root as the cap, *captain*, etc., and is associated with the *head* (authority) and *heading*.

condition. That is why the question of methodology as phenomenology is very much the most relevant question here.

Methodology: Phenomenological Hermeneutics

In this section, to explain the methodology of my study I will apply Heidegger's methodological insights at the beginning of *Being and Time* to explain why I choose his version of phenomenology and how my research brings me to Greek philosophy, particularly to Aristotle.

As I mentioned above, in studying different modes of community, this study examines the place (*topos*) where different modes of otherness emerge, before and beyond the constitution of a thinking self or the subject. We are dealing with the transcendental characteristics of the place of the manifestation of the other. Although "transcendental" in this sense bears some similarity with Kantian "conditions of the possibility," before the actual experience, for Heidegger as for me, the very being of the place and its historical givenness is in question. In this sense, the notion of the transcendental as a mode of existence beyond human consciousness bears a strange affinity with the medieval rendering of the transcendental.

In order to avoid both Kantian and medieval connotations of the term 'transcendental,' Heidegger elaborates on his methodology as phenomenology. As he admits in *BT* and *CT*, he owes his methodology to Husserl's *Logical Investigation* (*BT*., 38/62). One may argue that the turn in transcendental philosophy has already begun with Husserl. That is, instead of looking into the conditions of the possibility of the constitution of the world by a subject (*a la* Kant), the "transcendental turn of phenomenology" considers the world as given, and "inquires into the *how* of the giving, the manner of its givenness, the *how* of its acquisition of meaning" (*Englelland*, 2017. 13, my emphasis).

Ironically, however, phenomenology brings Heidegger closer to the Greeks rather than the mainstream phenomenological scholarship. This is perhaps because of the major shift of focus from the question of the manifestation of beings toward Being itself. For

Heidegger, phenomenology studies the being of the place where the manifestation of being occurs, that is the being of Dasein. The very being of this place, its historical conditioning its relation to the world and others are all still in question and problematic for him.

That is perhaps why his version of phenomenology is firstly the same as ontology (the study of the being of things) and secondly, it has to be performed hermeneutically.

Ontology and phenomenology are, not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein...(BT., 38/62)

Firstly, while unpacking the internal structure of the word, Heidegger explains that the task of phenomenology is the expression or the account (*logos*) of the phenomenon, “*legein ta phainomena*” (BT., 28/34). William Richardson explains the expression as follows:

Legein has the sense of *legion* (to make clear) or, more precisely, *apophainesthai* (sc. “to permit something to appear of itself, make itself seen”) and *phainomena* means “that which shows itself as it is.” Hence phenomenology means *apophainesthai ta phainomena*, sc. “to permit that which of its own accord manifest itself to reveal itself as it is.” (Richardson, 2003. 46)

Heidegger’s understanding of the whole project of phenomenology is very much indebted to his reading of Aristotle. In a primary sense as a method, phenomenology as the method consists in the commitment of the investigator to “let the phenomena show themselves as they are,” that is, to not let any subjective assumption and categorization interfere with this process. Such a turn makes this approach ontological, emphasizing the study of the being of things as they are rather than how one knows them. But then the emergence happens in *logos*. Heidegger elaborates on the historical and interpretive situation of Dasein by alluding to Aristotle's definition of man as life-possessing-*logos*. Dasein is the

place where the meaning of being comes to pass in *logos*. The latter consideration transforms the whole investigation to an interpretive activity with respect to *logos*. “Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in *interpretation*” (*BT.*, 38/62). In this way, and with the subsequent critique of *logos* and temporality in Aristotle, “Heidegger gives a transcendental critique of transcendence...” (*Englelland*, 2017. 172).

Such a turn in the notion of the transcendental on Heidegger’s part leads to a major critique of the notions of identity and subjectivity and the very meaning of phenomenology as I mentioned. Through this ontological focus, Heidegger accomplishes both a critique of idealism and of the presence of truth in *logos* at the same time. For example, the question of ‘following’ the other is not merely the exploration of the *how* of the givenness of the other to a subject, but it is an investigation of the locus of the disclosing with regard to its being. Not only is the being of that which emerges in *logos* in question, but also the very process that happens in *logos*. The very fact that the locus of investigation is speech (*logos*) which is historically conditioned makes phenomenology in this sense fundamentally hermeneutic.

That is precisely why I call this investigation the topology of community. An investigation of the topology of community in Aristotle brings to light all modes of otherness that are sanctioned by his metaphysical account, such as the modes of community that are allowed as a result of his account of justice, or how Aristotle accounts for or interprets the being of others, aliens, and outlaws in his city.

Deconstruction of *Logos*

In an ontological outlook, therefore, the notions which are commonly associated with subjectivity and subject which are crucial to the question of ‘following’ need to be re-defined with respect to their ontological ground. Some of these crucial notions which are constitutive of agency and responsibility including judgment, decision, and measure are extensively used in this work. This is exactly what Heidegger does right at the beginning of *BT*. He deconstructs the tradition by revealing what it have systematically

left out and re-defines the problem in terms of the presencing of beings in *logos*. Heidegger accomplishes this critical re-definition by redefining Aristotle's basic concepts.

The merit of Aristotle's philosophy for Heidegger is that Aristotle does not reduce individuals to independent subjects, nor does he reduce the world or other beings to hypostatized objects. For Aristotle, human beings are essentially connected to life (life-possessing-*logos*) and essentially tied together in a *polis* (*zōon politikon*). Before the distinctions between selves, animals, and plants are formed, the same principle controls the generation and expression of different individuals as a whole. For him, beings first appear-as present (*parousia*) in *logos*. Thus, the critical understanding of *logos* in every realm explains the principles of the gathering of individuals in that realm.

Thus, that is how Heidegger deconstructs the history of metaphysics, by looking at the way *logos* as the constituting element of the being of human beings has been interpreted throughout the history of western philosophy. *Logos* has been the most overarching principle or measure that has defined the characteristic properties of entities. How one interprets *logos*, as well as its relation to human beings and all other beings in the world, leads to totally different accounts of beings and their relationship to one another. He acknowledges that "*logos* [in the language of the Greeks] gets 'translated' (and this means that it is always getting interpreted) as 'reason,' 'judgment,' 'concept,' 'definition,' 'ground,' or 'relationship' (*BT*, 32/55). The way we understand *logos* determines the meaning of all these terms as well. As Aristotle defines human beings as life-possessing-*logos*, their relations and actions have been interpreted in light of all these renderings of *logos* which has led to different schools of philosophy and different notions of community, laws, and politics.

He argues that in Scholastic and Modern philosophy, *logos* has been interpreted as only one form of expression: rationality. Maintaining that man is a "rational animal" creates a measure by which every being that is not "rational" can be judged by contrast to man. In other words, it is reason that defines what is proper to individuals and their coming-together in time. Conversely, one needs to attend to the *automatic* presenting of beings in *logos* to figure out its structure before attributing one form or another to *it*.

For Heidegger, Aristotle's *logos* is more fundamentally and broadly related to speech or discourse (*dēloun*) rather than reason. Aristotle, he says, "has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as *apophainesthai*" (*BT.*, 33/56). He further explains the structure of *logos* as discourse as follows:

The *logos* lets something be seen (*phainesthai*), namely, what the discourse is about....Discourse 'lets something be seen' *apo*...: that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (*apophansis*), so far as it is genuine, what is said [*was geredet ist*] is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says [*in ihrem Gesagten*], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party. This is the structure of the *logos*.

He emphasizes the function of discourse as "letting something be seen by pointing it out." Discourse in this definition is precisely not one particular form of judgement as rational nor is it a natural language like English or German. Moreover, if *logos* involves synthesis, it is the synthesis of expression and what is expressed. The "*syn*" of *synthesis* refers not to the binding of representations in the mental sphere but rather the binding or the togetherness [*Beisammen*] of the expression with what is indicated. In this way, the problem of otherness is not the problem of the representation of the other for a subject, nor is it the *how* of this representation, but rather is the critique of *logos* and how difference as such manifests itself in its immanent plane.

The Critique of the Presence in *Logos* and the 'Address'

As Heidegger's critique of *logos* implies, there is always a gap between the being of a thing and its manifestations. We can already catch a glimpse of a provisional understanding of the problem of the community as being-with-others in this understanding of *logos*. We glean that any appearance of the other in *logos* comes to pass in the background of a concealing at the same time (*Richardson*, 2003. 46).

By highlighting the ontological difference and focusing on the power of concealing (the power of the negative), Heidegger's phenomenology receives a critical power which can unsettle the immediate experience of the other and the world as expressed in *logos*. The introduction of *logos* into the problem of otherness puts the investigator in a hermeneutic situation. An interpretation of *logos* is always already given by tradition as a source of sense-making and complicates the authentic presencing (*ousia*) of beings.

'Discourse' as *logos* for Heidegger does not simply and naively solve the problem of otherness. For 'discourse' as *logos* not only indicates what it is about but it also produces a gap. It cannot present the being of the other purely and simply. Therefore, for Heidegger, *logos* is the locus of the presencing of beings as this or that thing and at the same time the locus of the withdrawal of Being itself.

Heidegger owes this critical perspective to Aristotle. As he contends in *BT*, the most fundamental immediate experience of the world (*noein*) never completely surrenders itself to *logos*. It is experienced purely and simply (*aisthesis*) in a direct perception of the world. Hence, *aisthesis* as the "sheer sensory perception of something," is always 'true' (*BT.*, 34/57). It is always 'true' to the being of a thing that is perceived. The immediate perception or *noein* of things presents them in accordance with their being. In other words, *noein* as "the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess" always *addresses* the primordial experience of beings and can never cover them up as what they are not, it is always judged as true (*ibid.*,). It is only with the introduction of *logos* that the possibility of covering the truth of being emerges. Accordingly, *logos* can in fact cover the true being of a thing.

Throughout this work, I perform a critique of the emergence of otherness in *logos* as a result of the laws of nature, or the laws of society. I will follow Heidegger's critical outlook to problematize the straightforward, immediate, and complete understanding of the other in order to examine the possibility of the expression of authentic difference in *logos*. We will see that we are always already caught up in a hermeneutic situation of being determined by our being-with-one-another in *logos*, where the very nature of *logos*

complicates our immediate access to others. I will argue that to ‘address’ the other justly and ethically, as well as to express one’s authentic voice, follows the same strategy of conceding that *logos* is ambiguous and problematic.

Heidegger, in his lecture courses, including Marburg lectures on Aristotle¹⁴ as well as his major work, *Being and Time (BT)* deconstructs Aristotle and the Greek tradition in general, revealing that such a critical stance has been left unthought and forgotten in the Scholastic as well as Modern readings of Aristotle. As a result, he reveals the internal forces within Aristotle’s “conceptuality” and thereby *recycles* what has been ignored or put away by Scholastic and Modern philosophy alike.

Critical Reading of Aristotle

It is vital to notice that, unlike most of the Aristotelian scholarship, Heidegger is not merely after Aristotle’s intentions; instead, he is after the operative concepts in Aristotelian texts (what he calls Aristotle’s conceptuality) which can be taken in multiple directions and interpretations well beyond Aristotle’s intentions.¹⁵ Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle is a part of his critical reading of Greek philosophy, a project in search of a more authentic and originary sense of *logos*

This does not mean that all possibilities of sense-making are limited to the text of Aristotle or even Western philosophy in general. Quite the contrary, my contention following Heidegger is that such a critical look at the origin of Western thought will help us formulate alternative modes of being-togetherness that were *not* thought of or formulated as such in Western philosophy. In this sense, this study becomes part of a

¹⁴ This is published as *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

¹⁵ Especially after the publication of his Marburg lectures, Heidegger has been fiercely criticized for his seemingly free or “violent” interpretation of Aristotle. For example, Gonzalez, Francisco J. (2006) in “Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heidegger’s Interpretation of *Energeia* and *Dunamis* in Aristotle.” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 44 (4):533-568]. What Gonzalez misses, however, is that Heidegger is particularly interested in what has been left unsaid in Aristotle. This has little to do with the author’s intentions and in fact is meant to reveal the directions of the author’s system beyond and in spite of his intentions. Heidegger calls this regime of sense in Aristotle and Greek life-world in general, “conceptuality.” In this sense, one can go as far as to claim that, before Heidegger’s retrieval of Aristotle, scholars like Gonzalez could not possibly have any more insight into Aristotle than scholastic readings of him.

much larger project in explicating the actual diverse modes of being-togetherness as anticipated by this critique of Western thought.

It is also in this context that the formation of the Islamic notion of community and the way Muslim philosophers formulate it is relevant. One can argue that the Islamic community and its philosophy have a peculiar kind of neighboring with western philosophy, most saliently with Aristotle. Muslim theologians have formulated the notions of Islamic community partly as for or against philosophy, including Aristotelian philosophy. A critical reading of Aristotelian philosophy could provide a gateway to understanding this neighboring and possibly non-western modes of community.

My contention is that, firstly, the source of such understandings is still in Aristotle himself, perhaps in what he has been systematically avoiding or mis-treating; and secondly, it is Aristotle who poses such problems with no theological or practical concerns at the ontological level. The very existence of such a critique in Islamic philosophy which is based on Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy points to the multiple interpretations and directions that Aristotle's metaphysics could possibly take. For example, with respect to the political significance of the natural philosophy, it is enough to notice the role of God's will in creating events in nature and its effect on human's actions and expressions in Scholastic philosophy. In short, one's perspective on the natural generation of events and the possibilities that natural laws can afford determines the kind of impact human actions can have on the world. I will offer some of the Islamic controversies around Aristotle's laws of nature in the Conclusion of this work.¹⁶

Thus, this work aims at using Aristotle's original insights and limitations to prepare the transcendental conditions or places (hence, *topology*) where later communities for and against his formulations can emerge.

¹⁶ As I will argue, and I have already mentioned briefly in the preface to this work, Ghazālī's philosophy and the alternative laws of conduct (*adab*) he is proposing for a genuine follower, alongside the whole mystic tradition (including Ibn 'Arabi), are all shaped as a reaction to such Aristotelianism, but they either have theological and eschatological concerns (in the case of Ghazālī) or do not develop a formal ontological construct for the mode of *following* they are offering. Their writings mostly remain in the form of expressing their intuitive experience and poetry more than the ontological conceptualization of the modes of following.

Even a short glance at Heidegger's works on Aristotle reveals that he reaches this particular critical stance by attending to the question of the meaning of Being in Aristotle, i.e., all the ways being is talked about. Being-togetherness, too, as a kind of being, can be talked about in different ways.¹⁷ Aristotle attends to the multiplicity only to account for it in different ways and bring a new form of unity to the multiplicity.

This study is interested in revealing different strategies Aristotle applies to deal with the problem of multiplicity and difference to make the science of the nature and establishment of a political community possible. I believe that Heidegger's insight into Aristotle's basic concepts reveal that, in fact, these strategies are similar. Aristotle is bound by the almost the same limitations in explaining the generation of multiplicities in nature as in his treatment of singularity and alterity in the community of human beings. I will suggest that, in what Aristotle leaves behind or marginalizes as alien or abnormal, the seed of a nomadic mode of distribution is already planted.

In order to define community and self, then, we need to clarify the organizing principles in nature in general and their relation to the modes of expression and man. The essence of community in Aristotle, like the essence of any other thing in nature (*physis*), depends on the understanding of its motion (*kinēsis*) within itself and also its borders or limits (*peras*) (Trott, 19). The coupling of these two principles with the definition of human beings results in several assumptions that guide a phenomenological reading of Aristotle.

Firstly, it is argued that things in nature, for Aristotle, are defined in their actuality (*en-tele-cheia*, translated by Joe Sachs as being-at-work-staying-itself which literally means that they are always already being towards their end (*telos*) where they receive their form (*morphē*). There is an essential relation between a body/material (*hylē*)¹⁸

¹⁷ For example, in *BT*, Heidegger problematizes the primary role of categorial understanding. He calls such an interpretation of Being, "forgetfulness of Being (*Seinsvergessenheit*)," which ultimately reduces "the multiple senses of Being" to the one associated with the 'present,' or actual.

¹⁸ In his commentary to Aristotle's *Physics*, Joe Sachs mentions that he chooses the term "material" as the translation of *hylē* to distinguish between a modern understanding of matter as independent of forms. He points out that "material" is already a teleological and relational term pointing to a sense or function to come.

receiving its desired form (*hylomorphism*), a body or material being-towards-its-end (*teleology*), and its being actual in nature (*entelecheia/ energeia*). The Aristotelian neologism, *entelecheia*, for actuality is meant to emphasize a certain kind of being-at-work which is always towards being-the-same-at-the-end. In other words, as Sachs confirms, Aristotle's attempt to account for motion and change as such turns them into a new ideality, the repetition of the same in nature.

Secondly, according to Heidegger, for the Greeks, *logos* as *legein* is where the meaning of beings is uncovered (*alethuein*). This very movement inherent in *logos*, particularly in definition (*horismos as logos ousias*), is essentially related to the way the material of thing in potency (*dynamis*) is headed towards its expression in the form (*morphē*) or in its end (*telos*) (Trott, 22). For an entity to be what it is (*to ti hei einei*) amounts to expressing itself in its definition.

Thirdly, human being's first definition as life-possessing-speech (*Zōon logon echon*) (Heidegger, 2009. 16) suggests that man is the place where the meaning of being comes to pass in its actuality, and in its being towards completion. For a human being to be what it is (*to ti hei einei*) is akin to be the place where such a movement of nature towards its end is uncovered.

Finally, Heidegger refers to yet another definition of man by Aristotle, as life-in-the-polis (*Zōon politikon*) (Heidegger, 2009. 33). The coupling of these two definitions plus the former assumptions amounts to defining community as the natural end of man where the world in its actuality, in the city, is revealed. If we define happiness or flourishing of a being as the fulfillment of its function or definition, "life-possessing-*logos*" finds its flourishing in the actualization of a *polis*. A result of this assumption can be that the world, in its actualization, is a matter of negotiation in *logos*. "...according to nature, both the human and community strive towards completion, through *logos*, they determine what constitutes completion for them" (Trott, 14). Accordingly, community for Aristotle is not simply a contract among pre-established selves, or a psychological state of empathy between minds, but the fulfillment, negotiation, and the perfection of the definition of man as political life (*Zōon politikon*).

Hence, the formation of community in Aristotle is part of the same *hylomorphic* schema at work in his physics and metaphysics in general. The principles that account for the getting together of bodies and souls in community, as he underlines, for example, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* -particularly Book V - or the systematic hierarchy of the structure of society staged in the *Politics*, are similar to the ones that govern the generation of animals, or the coming-to-be of things in general. These principles explain not only the production of things and bodies in nature but also the genesis of the community as a natural phenomenon.¹⁹

As for the critique of this formulation, Heidegger examines the association between this *telos*, the ends of man, the limit (*peras*) and the form (*morphē*) which determines the essence of things.²⁰ Through such an association, one can see that what defines a being as it is (*to ti en einai*), its form (*morphē*), is mapped on to what determines the border (*peras*), the end (*telos*), or the completion of the thing. In the same manner, different modes of community arise as a result of the interpretation one offers of the end and completion which subsequently gives rise to the temporality of the movement towards that end. Different treatments of the end and completion provide various directions to the way one understands the relation between parts that comprise the whole. That is where Heidegger brings up his critique against Aristotle.

His phenomenological approach reveals what is left unmentioned or is systematically left out because of Aristotle's metaphysical commitments and general

¹⁹ One of the recent works that incorporates a lot of recent Aristotelian scholarship in this regard and will be addressed here is Adriel Trott's *Aristotle on the Nature of Community*, by Cambridge University Press, 2014. In this work, he extensively argues about the natural origin of community. He contends that *Polis* for Aristotle is a natural development of his definition of man and a natural and necessary stage on his way to flourishing and happiness.

Taking on the modern and enlightenment formulation of community as social contract separate and in spite of the state of nature, he argues that, for Aristotle, political community is not a break from this essential motion. There is no sharp distinction between nature and reason in Aristotle and there is no need for a break from nature for the community to occur. (Trott, Adriel M, pp.16-41)

²⁰ Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, pp. 27-28

principles.²¹ Heidegger problematizes Aristotle's metaphysics by underlying the paradoxical nature of *logos* and the limit as well as the privilege of the actual. As Sheehan explains: "Man has access to entities only in terms of their meaning in the broadest sense, that is only in terms of some form of *presentness-as* in *logos*" (Sheehan, 1983, 140). This is to say that man's access to the presencing of beings is limited to the interplay and negotiation within speech (*logos*).

This is translated in political terms as the fact that the limits of the political community are determined in a dynamic interaction between constitution (general laws of the city) and deliberation (subsumption of alterity, individual cases, and newcomers) (Trott, 2014). He is assuming the actual community as the basis for establishing the distinction between normal and common (according to *doxa* or *endoxa*) and the abnormal, outlaw, and fringe. Deliberation is always already limited to the constitution of the city as actual.

It is in light of such a critique of generation, temporality, and the limit (the *peras* in *logos*) that Heidegger and post-Heideggerian philosophy investigates the possibility of freedom or originary modes of being-in-the-world. For example, Heidegger substitutes the actual end and completion of humankind with his being-towards-death, which is the end of all actual possibilities. Such a substitution introduces a new *momentary* mode of temporality which opens the sense-making power of there-being (*Da-sein*) to unanticipated and creative potentials.

There is also a tension within the structure of *logos* in Aristotle whose reduction, in one way or another, misses parts of the picture. On the one hand, *logos* is associated with the function of man, where the immanent movement of the material comes to light in expression, and on the other hand, the differentiations within speech (*logos*) are determined by the transcendent forces imposed by the communal nature of *logos*. In other words, *logos* is at the same time the expression of freedom and singularity as well as

²¹ This phrase is left out by most of the commentaries, even the most recent ones (c.f. Trott's *Aristotle on the Nature of Community*, 2004). They seem to want to revive Aristotle against most modern and contemporary formulations of community. However, obsessed with what they think Aristotle's intentions were, they miss the general operation of concepts in Aristotle which would later lead to the very modern formulations of community they are criticizing.

limitations of communication and commonality. *Logos* is pressured by the communal forces which are supposed to guarantee the communication of the meaning of things.

Different approaches to this *aporia* and the tension within *logos* with its singular-plural nature constitute different attitudes towards the self, community, freedom, responsibility some of which are explored in this study. I will argue, following Derrida, how such an *organic* community (i.e., in accord with natural generation and motion) is not hospitable to strangers and foreigners. This community, I argue, takes shape at the expense of marginalizing alterity, as well as unforeseeable and innovative takes on tradition.²²

Overview of the Study

This study as a whole deals with natural constitution of community as exchange, the ontology of its laws, and the *aporia* it necessarily comes across. I will demonstrate how in dealing with the happiness of man in community, for Aristotle, ‘following’ the laws of community becomes inevitable and how the same laws make the consideration of the otherness of the other impossible. At the end of this dissertation, I will provide a conclusion in which I will also stipulate the possibility of an application of such a critique to an actual community, specifically the Islamic community.

In Chapters 1 and 2, I will delve into Aristotelian principles according to a phenomenological reading of Aristotle. In Chapter 1, I will focus on Aristotle’s treatment of multiplicity in nature and how it becomes hierarchical, evaluative, and political. We take a look at the principles and schemata that bring clarity to the structure of presencing in nature and how they become *aporetic* in the same process. In Chapter 2, I will look at the web of concepts constructed in Aristotle to deal with motion and generation in nature. I will argue that generation is explained and effectively accounted for in the relation between form and matter, potency and actuality, on the one hand, and in relation to a limit (*peras*), end (*telos*), and more importantly, speech (*logos*), on the other. Finally, we will

²² Without really mentioning the reference or admitting the influence, Trott simply borrows the naturalness of community from Heidegger, although he does not mention its limitations and implications the way Heidegger’s analysis does.

look at Aristotle's treatment of the generation of the abnormal. I will argue that the question of otherness is tied to the *aporia* of *logos*. These two chapters prepare the scene and provide the general principles that will guide the whole project within Aristotelian philosophy.

The next 2 chapters take the natural principles, temporality, and the critique offered in the previous two chapters to the level of the ethical 'following' (Chapter 3) and being-in-the-*polis* (Chapter 4). In Chapter 3, I will follow mostly Heidegger and his commentators to illustrate how Aristotle's ethics are part and parcel of his general metaphysical concepts. I will explore the natural and immanent constitution of community and how 'following' this community is beset by the same *aporia* of *logos* and the limit. In Chapter 4, I will mostly implement a deconstructive reading arguing that, for Aristotle, the end of human community as happiness is tied with justice as the end, which is implemented by the enforcement of laws. We will see that the same way that *logos* acts as the means of expression, medium, and equalizer in communication, laws act like money as the medium for equalizing the differences in a reciprocal exchange in community. Through an original reading of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, especially Book 5, I will explicate how the constitution of a just society is bound to enforcing the laws while laws themselves share the same paradox as *logos*. Following Derrida's treatment of justice as law, I will argue that Aristotle ends up admitting the impossibility of justice being based on universal laws, which means that in adhering to justice as laws one is bound to do injustice of some sort.

This brings us to Chapter 5, the Conclusion. After giving a summary of the discussion, I will provide a roadmap of how this work can be continued. In the conclusion to this volume, I will also take the discussion to Islamic philosophy and the Islamic understanding of identity and laws. By taking a concrete example, I hope I can sharpen and clarify the distinctions of the previous chapters. I will perform this through the interpretation of the pilgrimage and the negativity that it injects into the structure of ideological laws of religion as a whole.

For this work, I will end here with the admission that there are solutions within the Aristotelian corpus and model for the problem he comes across in politics and ethics. By itself, however, this does not undermine the argument I am making.

1. Chapter 1: 'Following' the Multiplicity to Unity

“And indeed the question
which was raised of old and
is raised now and always is
the subject of doubt,
namely what being is, is
just the question, what is
ousia.” (*Met.*, 1028 b3-5)

1.1. The Proto-Phenomenology of Aristotle

Before attending to the question of being-with-others as ‘following’ in a political realm, the very ontological meaning of ‘following’ should be investigated. In this approach, as I explained in the previous chapter, ‘following’ the laws of community or a culture, for Aristotle, is part of a more general question of the natural gatherings of beings in *logos*. That is what captures Heidegger’s attention in Aristotle.

Against notions like transcendental ego, self, subject, first person perspective, etc., he adopts the Aristotelian understating of the human (life-possessing-*logos*) as being always already in an immediate understanding of the world. Heidegger aims at grasping the being of entities as they give (*es gibt*) themselves. He owes such an insight to Aristotle’s proto-phenomenological approach to reality.

At the center of the constitution of identity and subjectivity is a substantial understanding of beings in the world. One tends to presuppose the presence of the self and/or the world. It is only then that the question of relationality and community is asked. However, using Aristotle’s original treatment of nature and motion, Heidegger aims at the forces that make the emergence of the world possible. It is worth remembering from last chapter that, Heidegger deals with Dasein initially and for the most part as Being-in-the-world. Thus, the question is Dasein’s access to the most original givenness of beings in the world including itself and other human beings.

This original givenness of being in the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle is rendered as substance or essence of something which is the translation of the word *ousia* in Greek. Such translations do not capture the movement in the structure of *ousia* (Brogan, 47). Heidegger believes that following the scholastic translation or mistranslation of *ousia*, modern philosophy’s fixation on subjectivity or identity is due to a forgetfulness of that initial Aristotelian insight. Even today in scientific discourse, entities are not interrogated with regard to their being (BT., 94).

In order to find Aristotle’s most significant contribution to the critique of self and identity, Heidegger goes deeper to the *Physics*, where Aristotle explains the origin of nature (*physis*) in its presencing (*ousia*). After initially keeping *ousia* untranslated,

Heidegger translates *ousia* firstly as *Seiendheit*, beingness, which is his strategy to keep the relation of beings to Being under scrutiny before they are hypostatized as present beings (Brogan, 47). He tries to capture the temporality and becoming in the very existence of things in nature. Aristotle's understanding of things as being-at-work-presenting-themselves helps him unsettle the stable and theoretical presence of beings we consider actual. Heidegger thinks that this introduces originary temporality in the very structure of the repetitive, organic, and orderly coming-to-presence of beings in nature.

According to Heidegger, *ousia* means presencing, the coming-to-be of the beings already present. He mentions that *ousia*, which in the ordinary use of Greek meant possession or property, estate, etc., gained the meaning of the "how" of the presencing when it entered Aristotle's terminology (BC., 36). He later translates *ousia* with a word that has the same ambiguity in German, *Anwesenheit*, between possession and being (Brogan, 48). Altogether, he thinks that Aristotle's original insight was that things in their presence, in their looks and the way one has them in their immediacy are always already indicating the how of their presencing. Aristotle pictures a world in which more often than not one is *silently* in relation to the presencing of beings. Thus, although in everyday engagements one is only tacitly aware of the being of things, she potentially has access to the originary character of them.

This automatic giving²³ force which runs the presencing, in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is nature (*physis*). In his reading of Aristotle's *Physics*, Heidegger finds out that for Aristotle the principal mode of *ousia* is nature (*physis*). *Physis* is the way things are in their beingness (*ousia*) as opposed to when the beings are somehow manipulated by an agent through *technē*. Heidegger comments that, according to Aristotle, what we normally consider as naturally present and familiar (*Vorhandenheit*) is already contaminated with *technē*, the way we manipulate things or categorize them. This manipulation does not let beings in their nature (*physis*) show themselves (Brogan, 56).

²³ Heidegger uses the expression *es gibt*, for 'there is,' implying that every present thing is a givenness which owes its existence to Being itself. However, in one breath, every giving for Heidegger amount to the withdrawal of Being as well.

In order to emphasize that by *physis* he does not mean natural beings or events, but the automatic force of motion accompanying the giving of the gatherings or the assemblages, Heidegger initially does not translate the word *physis*. As Brogan observes, Heidegger finally renders *physis* as *Aufgang* which means the appearance as well as the way, the steps, towards this appearance. The word *Gang* from *gehen* means movement, flow, passage. It can also mean the passageway itself through which something moves (Brogan, 46).²⁴ Consequently, like *ousia*, *physis* initially unsettles the understanding of natural beings and instead reorients the investigation toward the automatic ‘giving’ of life.

Heidegger focuses on the very problem that Aristotle is grappling with, multiplicity and motion (*kinēsis*), to delve into the very coming-to-be of beings before they freeze into present and actual categories. In this way, he hopes he can catch a glimpse of the very force (*dynamis*) that makes the gathering (*legein*) of beings possible. This force is revealed in the way things are and should not be imposed like mental categories. Therefore, the first proto-phenomenological Aristotelian insight, Heidegger underscores, is that nature (*physis*) is not equal with natural beings, but is instead the very force involved in making natural beings.

Aristotle’s treatment of nature (*physis*) and its principle as motion (*kinēsis*) was already a critical stance towards the Greek thought of his time that considered motion either impossible (*a la* Parmenides) or not intelligible (*a la* Plato). Conversely, Aristotle underscores the multiple ways “being is said” which initially unsettles the unity of being and *logos*. Such a stance opens a scission in the structure of sublunary beings and introduces multiple modes of being as opposed to just a substantial being.

Physis as the principle behind the original expression of diversity and otherness constitutes that which is classically known as the causes (*aitia*). Again this has become a source of misunderstanding according to Heidegger, as if nature is some force or a being

²⁴ Brogan translates *physis* as upsurge which has little to do with nature as the animal or plant life, let alone the biological study of plants (Brogan 47). *Physis*, in this view, is not even about the movement in heavens and earth; rather, it refers to the coming-to-present of gatherings per se. This entire intervention means that *physis* names the activity of appearance of natural beings as well as the “how” of the appearance.

present before or behind the present familiar natural beings (*Brogan*, 46). But, as I mentioned, *physis* in terms of *ousia*, the presencing, is nothing present and actual (*Brogan*, 57). Thus, the independence and transcendence of the cause from effect is challenged drastically. In this way, Aristotle establishes a plane of immanent change and transformation, which is run automatically by nature and come to the fore in *logos*.

So far, using Aristotle's original insight, Heidegger shows that beings in their actual categories are always in-the-making as a result of the immanent principle of motion and rest in them and not the judgment imposed by a subject or a categorization applied by an ego. Therefore, as for the critique of the ideal categorization of the world and the self, Aristotle's approach provides the necessary means for the Heideggerian critique against idealism. By attending to the beings in their appearing, Aristotle is a pioneer in the path of phenomenology the way Heidegger understands it. After using Aristotle against the more modern and ideal depiction of self and the world, Heidegger delves deeply into Aristotle's own basic conceptuality to demonstrate the necessary conflict that it is dealing with, and the prices Aristotle has to pay to establish the science of metaphysics.

1.2. Multiple Senses of *Ousia* and *A-letheia* in *Logos*

Aristotle's proto-phenomenology seems promising as it tries to capture the authentic character of individuals through their presencing in nature. We need to further investigate how Aristotle explicates the access of human Dasein as life-possessing-*logos* to this original presencing of beings from the depth of material mixture to their looks on the surface. Aristotle explicates the presencing (*ousia*) in nature, that is, how things express their individual gathering in *logos*. He accomplishes this by explaining the immanent emergence of the look (*eidos*) of beings from an underlying being (*hypokeimenon*). The challenge is to account for the genesis from being to beings while accounting for the sameness (*hama*) of the thing throughout the process. This is the function of a particular kind of *logos*, Heidegger calls the 'address' and Aristotle calls the definition (*horismos* as *logos ousias*).

Aristotle attempts to *address* beings in their singularity, demonstrating how they come to expression from an underlying level while they remain the same in keeping with the generic sameness. In the language that I have adopted in this work, every being, for Aristotle, appears to have a singular mode of ‘following.’ This means potentially that every being in nature should have a singular comportment to being in its presencing. That is, in coming-to-be, things have their particular path. Nonetheless, the otherness/difference does not seem to be totally free to appear as it is. The multiplicity of expressions comes to the fore only within the boundaries of the unity of a focal point (*pros hen*), the analogy of being, or by the pre-established genera and species.

The limitations become more manifest when we look at the genesis of *logos* itself. That is due to “the there” of the manifestation of being which belongs to humans as life-possessing-speech (*zoōn logon eckon*). Insofar as humans are also political life (*zoōn politikon*), the immanent singular ‘address’ has to be in keeping with the general and public speech to be altogether comprehensible. That is to say that “on the way to language,” the original expression of things, their singular voice, their ‘address,’ becomes contaminated with the look or familiarity of the things given by history. In almost the same meaning, Derrida, too, uses ‘address’ particularly with an ethical tone of ‘addressing’ as being just or “*juste*” and accurate with regard to the singularity of things. For the ‘address’ has the manifestation or treatment of ‘the other’ within it and to recognize a being in its definition (*logos ousias*) is already a response to the call of a being to be ‘addressed’ in its singularity. It can be argued, then, that Derrida owes such an ontological formulation of justice as the ‘address’ to Heidegger’s understanding of *logos* for example when Heidegger writes:

On the basis of this natural way of being in the everyday arises the characteristic possibility of a peculiar speaking that *addresses* being-there in its genuine presence, in the character of its [limit] (*peras*)²⁵. It *addresses* it in such a way that being-there is *addressed* in its limitedness (*BC.*, 28)²⁶

²⁵ πέρας

²⁶ emphasis and italics are mine

According to Heidegger, the very immanent movement and the originary ‘address’ in the language of Aristotle (*logos ousias* or definition) turns out to be pressured by what is already available and present at the surface, with another kind of *logos*. The already available genera are established by what we are “speaking about” and the communicative aspect of *logos* itself (CT., 21-22)

1.2.1. From Multiplicity to Unity

In order to capture the original experience of the being of things in their presencing, Heidegger begins with the immediate, *silent* experience of *ousia* in its multiplicity, described by Aristotle in Book V of the *Metaphysics*. Heidegger interprets Aristotle as striving to demonstrate how in the process of coming to the determinacy of their limit (*peras*) and the clarity of *logos*, beings keep expressing their originary character as the same (*hama*). On the other hand, Heidegger contends that the process of coming-to-expression in *logos* becomes necessarily conflicted and pressured by what is already there on the surface.

In his reading, Heidegger lists different senses of *ousia*, and shows how Aristotle keeps the unity between them. There, Aristotle demonstrates how from the most independent and underlying material elements of life, earth, and fire, a genuine expression of *logos* (definition (*horismos*) as *logos ousias*) emerges on the surface or the look (*eidos*) of things (Met., 5.1017a 10-11). In effect, Aristotle explains this immanent process of generation of beings in their multiplicity from an underlying material (*hypokeimenon*) which is already familiar and available at hand (BC., 25). While explaining how beings become varied in different genera and species, Aristotle shows how their expression is in gestation at the same time (*hama*).

Heidegger summarizes that discussion in Book V about different meanings of *ousia*, by maintaining that in all the ways being is talked about, from an underlying independent element (*hypokeimenon*), to that which determines the beings as a *this* (*tode ti*), the emphasis is on immediacy, familiarity, particularity, and limitedness of beings in their being. He writes: “It [*ousia*] designates the being in so far as it is at-hand as “that

there” such that this “that there” is visible, determinable, apprehensible, in its beingness” (BC., 23).

Heidegger maintains that in different ways we talk about *ousia*, there is already a movement from what determines a being materially and immediately in its being towards the way it comes to be known to us in *logos*. *Ousia* implies the being of things from where it is known in itself to the ways it is known to us. Consequently, Aristotle gradually prepares the silent immediacy of material to come to the expression immanently and naturally without losing its unity and sameness. That is manifest in the fourth and fifth kinds of the way being (*ousia*) is used. The fourth kind is “what it is for something to be (*to ti ēn einai*).” This fourth kind is where Aristotle’s system is finally ready for the ‘address’ and *logos*: “[*ousia*] also means *to ti ēn einai*, the articulation of which is a definition (*logos ousias*) (Met., 5. 1107b 21).²⁷

Unlike other meanings of *ousia*, then, *to ti ēn einai* does not introduce a new meaning of being; rather, it is a new perspective on the things that appear in everyday familiarity and prepares them for the clarity in definition.

Being in the character of *to ti ēn einai*, is the genuine topic of *logos* that we are now discussing as *horismos* [definition]. This being-character is that of *hekaston*. Every being that is there in its particularity is determined through *to ti ēn einai* (BC. 25).

Heidegger indicates that this expression was not invented by Aristotle and that he inherited it from the Greek tradition. This is a level of the being of things, that part of the material constitution of things that reaches the surface and is available to the definition (BC., 23). It is the being of a particular (*ousia hekaston*), (Met., 5. 1170b 22) in its genuine level of coming-to-be. In this sense Dasein is in an originary mode of ‘following’ the being of the other, ‘addressing’ it to its being through a definition. That is to say, the definition is immanent to the natural presencing of a being and it is addressed as such.

Heidegger underlines that *ekas* means “far.” Thus, he interprets *ekaston* as a particularity of a thing that is grasped at a distance or by holding at a distance in its look

²⁷ Heidegger’s translation

(*eidos*)(*BC.*, 24). It is noteworthy that we are getting ready for a genuine ‘address’ and as a result inevitably we confront a distance, a gap. “What is particular is precisely not what is seen initially and directly, but is accessible only when I take a distance from it” (*BC.*, 24). The other senses of being are associated with the things we are engaged with on a daily basis immediately but not in *logos*, the ones that are not seen in their particularity, only grasped tacitly as if in the background. On the contrary, *to ti ēn einai* is the result of some kind of interruption of that full engagement and the flow of everyday experience. “Taking a distance is required to see everydayness in its being-there, to have it present” (*BC.*, 24). For Aristotle, this movement brings about the *ousia* of a thing in its genuine singularity.

Heidegger points out the role of time and history in the constitution of the structure of *to ti ēn einai* and the significance of such a temporality. The literal translation of this phrase is, according to Heidegger, “what-being as it was already” (*BC.*, 23). As Heidegger contends, this movement is still in-the-world, a movement from an unclear determination of a being in the ordinary engagement toward a clear, particular givenness of a thing that is still given as what-it-was-already (*to ti ēn einai*). This is what Heidegger and later Derrida will refer to in terms of the paradox of *logos* as ‘address.’

The fifth meaning of *ousia* emphasizes this very movement. Aristotle summarizes all meanings of *ousia* in two general categories and introduces yet another category. He summarizes the above definitions as follows:

It turns out, then, that *ousia* is meant in two ways, both as the ultimate underlying thing which is no longer attributed to anything else (*hypokeimenon*) and whatever is a *this* and separate and of this sort is the form or look (*eidos*) of the thing (*Met.*, 5. 8. 1170b 24-25).

Heidegger is altogether in agreement with Aristotle about the movement he puts forth in-the-world as from the immediate familiarity with the surrounding world towards a clear expression in *logos* as definition. This movement calls for an interruption or a detour in the flow of everyday experience. The fifth meaning of *ousia* is the look (*eidos*) (*Met.*, 5. 1027b 26), and according to Heidegger, Aristotle has the particular species in view (*BC.*,

26). In this sense, the particular being of a thing becomes available through the everyday engagement with a particular being.

Heidegger clarifies this with an example: “As a master builder builds a house, so he lives and operates initially in the “*eidōs*” of the house, in the way it looks” (BC., 26). The movement from unclarity to clarity which determines beings in their original particular determination is a temporal movement which is guaranteed by *to ti ēn einai*. This movement results in what Heidegger later calls the discovery (*Entdecktheit*), a semantic network of everyday familiarity with the world that we inherit from the tradition and the public (CT., 27).

In this way, Aristotle seems to have managed to ‘address’ the unveiling (*alētheuein*) of the sense in a particular this. In order for things to appear *originarily* to me as a particular “*this*,” there must be some interruption in the flow of everyday dealings and familiarity with the world. The emergence of the “this” is revealed in “*to ti ēn einai*.” That is because “*to ti ēn einai*” is connected to *ēn* as being-there of beings as it is given in history (BC., 25).²⁸

Aristotle’s claim is that things as *hypokeimenon* are complete or constitute a whole on the background of which a new determination can take shape. The completedness of the background as opposed to the limitedness of the “this” is the key for the formation of a definition.

The being that is there in this way, [*to ti ēn einai*], [is] coming from out of its history into being. This being that is there in this way is complete, it has come to its end, to its completedness (BC., 26).

Joseph Owens confirms that the structure of the phrase, *to ti ēn einai*, looks like a past tense which makes it “the genuine topic of that *logos* ... as definition (*horismos*)” (Owens, 180). Owens shows that there is also a stable character within the structure of *to ti ēn einai*. He observes that “the literal rendition of the phrase would be “the what-was-Being,” (Owens, 181) which leaves a mark of past on its meaning. On the other hand, in

²⁸ Paul Ricoeur explains this relation in terms of sedimentation and innovation. Any particular and new determination of being or sense comes in the background of what has already been sedimented in the discourse.

this particular phrase, the copula refers to something “still present”. Yet, it seems that it might as well be applicable to “timeless separate Forms”(Owens, 183). Therefore, the phrase is at the same time (*hama*) associated with the generality of something fixed and with the singularity of a unique and present determination. In this phrase, through its constancy as well as being past, Owens notices that there is a “necessity” attributed to the being of a thing which is of course “implied rather than expressed” (Owens, 184).²⁹

This phrase by itself, as Heidegger also confirms, captures Aristotle's philosophical problematic as a whole. It refers to the stable, universal character within the manifestation of some individual thing in speech. Something happens during this process of sense-making that turns the contingent character of a composite to a timeless constant form. This phrase suggests that somewhere along the process of the expression of indeterminate matter for Dasein, the genuine ‘address’ turns into what has already been determined as necessary and stable. Owens even suggests that a more elaborate version of the sentence would be “what (essentially, necessarily) *is* Being” (Owens, 184). He goes on to explain that the character of the phrase, referring to a “timeless being,” can only be captured in English by using an arbitrary symbol like: “*what-IS-Being*” (Owens, 185). By referring to being as *to ti ēn einai*, Aristotle presents “the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing” (Owens, 185).

A thing is its generic nature, its matter, and the composite. They are “what it is.” But what it necessarily and unchangeably and definitely is, is its form... ...only its form can be its what-IS-Being (Owens, 186).

Thus, even things in their particularity only make sense because of the constancy of a form implied by their very presencing. Heidegger concludes that in this way things in

²⁹ The same necessity is produced by the necessity of the *hylomorphism* in natural presencing.

their look (*eidos*) do not have to be produced but are derived as constant and complete from history.³⁰

This has two paradoxical consequences: on the one hand, Heidegger stipulates a kind of understanding in everyday dealings with beings in the world which is non-representational and immediate. He associates this with affects, mentioning that: "What one thinks of affects [*Affekte*]...must be understood via discovery [*Entdecktheit*] as the state one finds oneself in attunement [*Befindlichkeit*]" (CT., 27). Affective understanding in this sense seems to be individual and personal. It refers to a silent attunement with the world. On the other hand, in the same statement, he refers to the "discovery" as that which comes from history and looks public. What "discovery" seems to be giving the individual experience is an "interpretedness" which comes from history, sedimented and fixed in public usage. "Dasein which has come into the world through birth, grows up into such 'interpretedness.' This 'interpretedness' entails a self-interpretation of Dasein" (CT., 28). This means that this sense of a being for Dasein is not immanent to the internal constitution of the thing from an underlying being. It is a givenness on the surface and not from the depth.

In conclusion, Heidegger underlines that all these modes of being-there as *ousia* can be summarized under two major principles: "1. primarily presence, present, 2. being-complete, completedness; [such are] the two characters of the *there* for the Greeks. In these two characters, all beings with regard to their being are to be interpreted (BC., 26). Heidegger associates this meaning of *ousia* with what Aristotle himself calls *entelecheia*, something's holding- (or maintaining) -itself-in-its-completion- (or limit) (IM., 65).

Thus, Heidegger is in accord with Aristotle in his suggestion of the movement from unclarity to clarity which shines a new light on the correspondence theory of truth against the idealist constitution of objectivity and subjectivity. However, Heidegger

³⁰ Heidegger captures this notion again, this time by referring to the being of an entity as "*es gibt*" which means 'there is' and also "it gives," in which "it" is the source of the meaningfulness of the thing. "It" is implicit in the existence of everything and is the source of being of a particular being. For Heidegger, this means that in every presencing of an entity in its contingent composite, namely *es gibt* or givenness, the formal structure of being in general is implied. Every giving in its particularity (*hekaston*) in *logos* is only made possible because of the distance it takes from its Being.

complicates the process by showing how Aristotle, at the end, makes this immanent movement *head* towards what is already available as the look of the things given by history.

The paradoxical nature of the completedness is highlighted when we take the last step and meet the surface structure in definitions (*horismos*). There, one can see beings at their end, where their *heading*, i.e. final destination, is determined. It is this paradoxical nature of the look that creates the paradoxical character of being-with as well. Things which are there for ‘me’ in their look and availability are always already given by history and the public. One is always in the precarious relationship with others, in ‘following,’ others even in the most immediate perception.

1.2.2. Being-in-Clarity³¹ of the Definition

1.2.2.1. Being at the Limit

The being-there as present is for Aristotle “obscured,” “covered over,” “unarticulated”³² (*Physics*, 1. 184a 22; *BC*. 26). Perception of the present is a process of learning and recognition. It consists in the movement from ordinary *logos* where otherness exists in an obscured manner to the definition (*horismos* as *logos ousias*) where the genuine presencing of the other is ‘addressed.’ In different contexts, Aristotle describes this movement as a path of learning to be taken from what is immediately known to us to what is known in itself. He writes, “Learning, becoming acquainted with something, is accomplished for everyone by proceeding from what is more familiar to us

³¹ The expression “clarity” is chosen advisedly, having Aristotle’s *Poetics* in mind. Regarding the number of metaphors allowed in a poetry or tragedy, he underlines that it should be done in moderation not to hurt the “clarity” of the language. Altogether, he believes that the wording (*lexis*) needs to be as clear as ordinary use of language (*kurion*). There, he makes the same distinction between an understanding of the world which is immediate and non-representational (*idion*) which interestingly becomes equal with the normal, the most frequent use of language (*kurion*)

³² συγκεχυμένον from συγκεχυμένα

to what is more familiar in itself (*Met.*, VII 3, 1029 b 3).³³ What is more familiar to us, however, is jumbled up and unclear. It has to come to light in form of a particular kind of *logos*. Moreover, this process involves a detour, a taking a distance which separates or analyses the ordinary givenness any puts it together (*synthesis*) and subsumes every particular under a whole.

But the things that are first evident and clear to us are more-so the ones that are jumbled together, but later the elements and beginnings become known to those who separate them out from these. (*Physics*, 184a 20-30)

Things are only understandable to us when they are offered as in relation to wholes (*katholon*). As a result, the detour to understand particular things is also in considering them as a whole or part of a whole.

it is necessary to proceed from what is general to what is particular, for it is the whole that is better known by perceiving, and what is general is a kind of whole since it embraces many things as though they were parts. Something of this same kind happens also with names in relation to their meanings, for a name too signifies some whole indistinctly, such as a circle, but the definition takes it apart into particulars. (*Physics*, 184a 20-184b)

Aristotle calls the final clarity which gives the accurate, just character of things to the investigator the “definition (*horismos*).” Definitions give clarity to the names in the same way.³⁴ Definitions are the kind of speech that are connected to the being of things in their particular determination (*to ti ēn einai*).

³³ Also look at the *Physics* where Aristotle expresses the same process in knowing or understanding events: “The natural road is from what is more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by nature; for it is not the same things that are well known to us and well known simply. For this reason it is necessary to lead ourselves forward in this way: from what is less clear by nature but clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by nature” (*Physics*, 184a 20-23).

³⁴ Children, gifted poets and also madmen in different ways have a privileged access to the world in its unarticulated whole. While Heidegger assumes that this means that they have it naively and obscurely, one may regard this obscurity, this forgetting of the distinctions, as the first step in questioning the already articulated logo-centric world of Aristotle. That is to say that although he believes that the definitions bring the moments of the articulation of the world to light, this articulation seems to be already established by “the prevalent” usage of the terms (*kurion*.) It is controlled by the common sense.

...the [orismos] *ὀρισμός* is determined as *οὐσίας τις γνωρισμός* [ousias tis gnorithmos]. *Γνωρισμός* [gnorithmos] means: “making known with . . . ,” “making familiar with . . . ,” presenting a matter. [Horismos] (*Ὀρισμός*) is making one familiar with a being in its being (BC. 14).

As we mentioned above, Heidegger replaces the definition with a particular kind of speaking which ‘addresses’ the genuine being-there of things in their limits.

On the basis of this natural way of being in the everyday, arises the characteristic possibility of a peculiar speaking that *addresses* being-there in its genuine presence, in the character of its [limit] (*peras*)³⁵. It *addresses* it in such a way that being-there is *addressed* in its limitedness (BC., 28)³⁶

This genuine recognition of otherness happens either through imitation (*mimesis*), as one can read in the *Poetics*, or definition (*horismos*). “The [logos] *λόγος* as [horismos] *ὀρισμός* ‘addresses’ beings in their [ousia] *οὐσία*, in their being-there” (BC., 29). *Logos* as ‘address’ is a moment of an originary interruption from the flow of organic life in that being-in-the-world is manifesting the very structure or the how of the articulation. What has been prepared in the immanent motion of presencing from an underlying being (*hypokeimenon*) to what-IS-being (*to ti ēn einai*) manifests itself in that part of life which possesses *logos*, in Dasein. The whole presencing is looked after and guarded in the safety of *logos*. It is as if *logos* as this originary ‘address’ is the home of being as presencing.

What ‘address’ as originary *logos* does to the things in general familiarity and obscurity is that it analyzes them into their moments and combines them in their relation to their being (*to ti ēn einai*). What becomes clear in the philosophical definition of a particular thing is the very articulation of the parts that bring about a thing in its limitedness.

The words ‘limit’ and ‘limitedness’ are of utmost importance for Greek culture and Heidegger's phenomenological reading of Aristotle. For the being-there (*Da-sein*),

³⁵ *πέρας*

³⁶ emphasis and italics are mine

ousia needs to be established as being complete and having an end. One sees the same tendency toward a function, the for-the-sake-of-which or that which brings the being to its completedness in present. In chapter 17 of Book V of the *Metaphysics*, limit (*peras*) is characterized as “the *esketon*, the outermost aspect of what is there at the moment, outside of which, at first, nothing more of the matter encountered is to be found and within which the whole of the beings encountered are to be seen” (*Met.*, 5. 17, 1022 a 4).³⁷ In this way, the limit (*peras*), origin (*arche*), the look (*eidos*), and the end (*telos*), come together in the *logos ousias* as definition (*horithmos*). According to Heidegger,

This character of the *πέρας*[*peras*] is then determined, without qualification, as [*eidos*] *εἶδος*. The having-of-limits is the genuine “look of a being that has any kind of range” (*Met.*, V. 17, 1022a 6).³⁸ *Πέρας* is, however, not only [*eidos*] *εἶδος* but also *τέλος* [*telos*].³⁹ *Τέλος* [*telos*] means “end” in the sense of “completedness,” not “aim” or even “purpose.” That is to say that completedness is a *πέρας* [*peras*] such that “movement and action go toward it” (*Met.*, V. 17, 1022a 7)⁴⁰—[*kinēsis*] *κίνησις* and [*praxis*] *πρᾶξις*, the being-occupied with something where a movement or action finds its end. (*BC.*, 28)

In the definition of the limit⁴¹ the beginning and end come together and become present. Having limits or to establish being-there as limit is as timeless as having an end and the beginning at the same time (*hama*).

³⁷ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐκάστου καὶ οὐ ἔξω μηδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν πρότον, καὶ οὐ ἔσω πάντα πρότον.

³⁸ εἶδος [. . .] ἔχοντος μέγεθος

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ ἐφ’ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις

⁴¹ Defining the limit *πέρας* in the *Metaphysics*, Book 5. Aristotle writes: “Limit” means: (a) The furthest part of each thing, and the first point outside which no part of a thing can be found, and the first point within which all parts are contained. (b) Any form of magnitude or of something possessing magnitude. (c) The end of each thing. (This end is that **to** which motion and action proceed, and not the end **from** which. But sometimes it is both the end from which and the end to which, i.e. the final cause.) (d) The reality or essence of each thing; for this is the limit of our knowledge of it, and if it is a limit of the knowledge, it is also a limit of the thing. Thus it is obvious that “limit” has not only as many senses as “beginning” but even more; because the beginning is a kind of limit, but not every limit is a beginning. (*Met.*, 5.17. 1022a5-15)

As part of the definition of limit, Aristotle very quickly goes on to explain matter and form. Perhaps this is because in regard to matter and form the whole idea of efficient and final causality comes to the picture. The final cause, or the for-the-sake-of-which, can be regarded also as the limit, the function and the formal cause. The efficient cause as the beginning, as we will see, is also determined by this limit. This is parallel to the structure of *hylomorph* in which the end as *energeia* already determines *hylē* as *dynamis*. This being-at-one's-end (*entelecheia*) is, of course, explained not in terms of pure being (*a la* Parmenides) but rather as "pure *energeia*," which has a character of activity as putting to work (*en-ergon*). However, it still retains the mode of stability. Aristotle often speaks of *ta onta* (entities) as *synhestota* and *synhistamena* (respectively, *Physics* B, 1, 192b 13 and 193a 36). These participial forms are from the verb *histemi*, "I stand" or "I make to stand" (Sheehan, 1983. 143). In this reading, then, the world of the Greek is populated with entities as "the stable" (*das Ständige*), i.e. both independent and enduring/subsistent (Sheehan, 1983. 143-144).

This limit is associated with the last step in an originary expression of being in *logos* or philosophical description. That is to say beings are obscured by averageness and must come to light in a philosophical investigation (or as I will argue later, through *philomythos*, that is the kind of imitation which is informed by philosophy). Categorizations and predications in philosophy (or definitions in general) seem to be the product of the task of analyzing and putting together (synthesizing) of the world as it is in its immediacy. Therefore, there has to be an originary and primary motion at work in the very presencing of beings in their being, through which the articulation of the world as present comes to light. According to Heidegger the definition is Aristotle's attempt to 'address' beings in their being. That is why, there is such an affinity between a sort of speech (*logos*) with the being of things. Things turn into an image of themselves (in *logos*) to be put in relation to a whole in a philosophical definition to come to the clarity of truth.

Definition puts particulars and universals in a relationship of predication. But, we should be careful not to turn this to an idealization. The basic concepts and conditions of

this motion are explained as follows: “*Definitio* is *horismos*. *horismos* is a *logos*, a “self-expression” about being-there as being. ... the specific character of the definition ultimately arises from the fact that the being itself is determined in its being as circumscribed by the limits. Being means being-completed” (BC. 11). That is to say to define is not to impose mental categories to the things in the world, but it is a discovery, an interruption that says nothing but the “how” of the presencing itself. Nature in itself expresses itself in speech. Humankind is constituted in such a way that their meditation would reveal the “how” of this expression at the same time. The access to this presencing and the meaning of the *ousia* of the things is a phenomenological moment of the being of human being as the life-possessing-*logos* (*Zoōn logon ekhon*). Life for Heidegger is being-with not only other human beings but also animals. It is a sense-making-being-alongside-one-another.

It is worth remembering the value of this analysis for Heidegger and the critique of community. This fundamental ontological analysis helps us see the nature of being-with in a new light. Animals and humans are not at hand next to one another, but are *with* one another; and (in the case of humans) they express themselves reciprocally. Self-expressing as speaking about . . . is the basic mode of the being of life, namely, of being-in-a-world (BC., 16). The relationship of man to its world is not that of being located inside the world or holding a subject-object relation with it; but rather, human beings “*have* their world.” What “life-possessing-speech” says is that, the being-in-the-world of the human being is determined in its ground through speaking.

As for the critique of that which has been revealed in the process of definition, one can argue that this motion is altogether controlled and tamed instead of revealing the genuine character of otherness as it claims. The movement involved in the definition is a circular one, beginning with a particular (thing or action), which presents an apparent distance from the universal, and ending with bringing the particular under the universal again. In the next section, I will argue how considering limit as definition in *logos* ends up making the whole movement *aporetic*.

Meanwhile, this is exactly where Heidegger and others begin their critique of *logos* as the limit by introducing a different understanding of the limit and the whole. Heidegger introduces the end of life or death as the limit which targets the very actuality (*energeia*) of the end in Aristotle. Derrida, on the other hand, considers the inaccessibility of the other as the limit. That is to say that to ‘address’ the other as the other is always plagued by the paradox of *logos* as public and private at the same time. My intention to ‘address’ the other would have to use the public, common-sensical and familiar language which belongs neither to me nor the other. Now, it is by considering this limit as limit rather than anything accessible, familiar, or clear, that the possibility of the emergence of the other can be thought about.

In considering community as ‘following,’ as I mentioned in the previous chapter, we are confronted with this latter form of limit. The being of a follower is constituted always already by her attitude towards her limited access to the other which I called the ‘being-in-trouble’ of man. That is, one always falls short and is at a loss in understanding the other completely or appropriating that which is given to her by the tradition or others in language. Conversely, Aristotle seems to think that ‘following’ *ought to* be controlled by the clarity of the definition. To tease out this tension, we need to attend to the paradox that unsettles *logos*.

1.2.2.2. The Paradox of *Logos*

It is at this point that the second kind of *logos*, or the other sense of *logos* which is closely tied to and is equi-primordial (co-originary) with the ‘address’ is brought to light by Heidegger. *Logos* is the very exhibition of the “about which” of speaking. In this sense, speaking is not simply “uttering a sound,” but rather, “the genuine function of [logos] λόγος is the *apophainethtai* the bringing of a matter to sight” (BC., 15). Speaking about things (*logos ousias*) as the fundamental character of the being of human beings is a delimiting of the meaning of things (*horismos*). In the very process of “bringing a matter to light,” in the very admission that speech is “about” something else, that it is an indicating, a pointing beyond, we are already pointing to a caveat, a scission that

generates bifurcating series from within the structure of the being of the thing (*BC.*, 17). In this sense, definition (*logos ousias*) is always at risk from within by the multifariousness of sense generation force in its structure, which is expressed as presentness-as or as appearing-as.

Here is where Aristotle is conservative and cautious. He prefers to remain in the boundaries of the actual world (the world of being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*)). As we can see in the case of semantic innovation and metaphor in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, Aristotle is quite aware of the danger of multiplicity in appearances at this very level and ultimately contends that appearances need to be controlled by the prevalent usage of speech (*kurion*) (*Poetics*, 1458a; *Davis*, 124). In this sense, the apparent discovery is the discovery of the structure of the world as present and historical.

Heidegger reformulates the tension in speech (*logos*), contending that such a disclosing function at the same time (*hama*) has a tendency to “speak about something with others” (*BC.*, 14). This other function is related to the look (*eidos*) of a thing in the social sphere. Speech indicates something as common (*koina*) which works through the function of memory and the temporality of the past. We “grow into such a *common intelligibility*” (*BC.*, 16). From this, we can conclude that for Heidegger, at least at this stage of reading Aristotle, the revealing function of speech (*logos* as *address*) is supplemented or limited by its social and historical function.

The expressed “lies fixed,” is a [*keimenon*] κείμενον. The [*keimena onomata*] κείμενα ὀνόματα, precisely as [*keimena*] κείμενα, “fixed,” are available to others; they are [*koina*] κοινά (*BC.*, 16).

When the value of linguistic items, especially names, are fixed, according to Heidegger, they turn into the “currency”⁴² that is controlled by grammar. Their freshness in revealing the “givenness to *me*” of “*my*” experience and “*my*” desires would be reduced to a value function in a system with “a character of *averageness*” and “without an explicit relationship to the matters spoken about” (*BC.*, 16). Therefore, as he admits, that which is spoken no longer belongs to an “individual.”

⁴² As if like money that is administered by law to remain proportionate and just.

Heidegger adopts a peculiarly Nietzschean language with reference to truth, the same language that is used and expanded by Derrida. He readily acknowledges that speech which was supposed to function in disclosing (*alethuein*) turns into a common language which is "worn out, used and used up" (BC., 16). He elaborates: "Everything expressed harbors the possibility of being used up, of being shoved into the common intelligibility" (BC. 16). That means that the 'address' to the being of the other as it is, is inevitably reduced to the public language. Words become like currency, the capital that people spend without expressing genuine difference.

Heidegger and Derrida's enemy is prevailing authority and sovereignty of the ordinary language (*kurion*) which grounds the logical and scientific language as well. Because of their availability in usage, they gain a false form of clarity which does not speak about any original experience anymore. We will come back to this point later when discussing the function of money and law.⁴³ So, although there is a virtue to speaking clearly as if the same as others, the genuine 'following' of the other is necessarily vague and in an awkward language.

Heidegger uses the term "interpretedness" to refer to this common intelligibility which comes from history. In the *Concept of Time* as well as *BT*, he calls the fixed *logos*

⁴³ In a different context, Derrida underlines this usage of language through underlining different usages of the word *usure* in french. On the one hand, *usure* refers to the same wear and tear of the freshness of the creative moment of a word when it turns into a concept. It is necessary for a truth to cover its origin if it is to have an eternal claim. Like the coin (*nomisma*) which has to undergo such a wear and tear, wipe off the figure on its face in order to have an eternal value. Up to this point, he is in accord with Heidegger and Nietzsche.

On the other hand, however, he cautions to underline the second meaning of *usure* as in usury. The surplus value in the process of exchange itself. This possibility appears to be ignored by Heidegger. Heidegger simply goes past the level of surface and the force and the movement of language itself. Although he seems to be talking about the disclosing function of language, apparently this disclosing function is supposed to be without any waste, surplus or unanticipated darkness or surprise. Language seems to become transparent and to simply reveal the meaningful life of humans. Heidegger seems to believe that at least at some basic everyday level language becomes transparent to reveal what lies beyond it (CT., 22). Language is basically is a "speaking about something."... in the case of humans, they express themselves reciprocally. Self-expressing as speaking about... is the basic mode of the being of life, namely, of being-in-a-world. Where there is no speaking, where speaking stops, where the living being no longer speaks, we speak of "death." (BC. 16)

Therefore, like Aristotle, the only mode of community that Heidegger explicitly elaborates on (at least up to *Being and Time*) is this economic average being-togetherness. For Derrida, on the other hand, there is a surplus in this exchange that he points out through the profit earned in usury. It is money itself that is producing the surplus value. This is a production at the surface. Death and the impossibility is already part of life and part of experience for Derrida. And it is precisely in experiencing such an impossibility that life may come to pass in its richness and unpredictability.

which grounds the discovery, “idle-talk” (*CT.*, 28). As idle-talk is the way in which interpretedness is preserved, it retains the latter’s basic structure. Interpretedness means to address something as something in a state of concerned engagement (*besorgenden Umgangs*) (*CT.*, 28). In this sense, concerned engagement will end up addressing nothing more than the idle-talk.

A long as this activity involves some kind of interpretation and ‘address,’ Dasein can have some active or passive role in it. That is what constitutes the ethics of ‘following.’ Heidegger is clearly putting Dasein at an intersection where he can choose to cover things within their common intelligibility (through, what he calls, “parroting” (*CT.*, 28)) or alternatively to address⁴⁴ things in an originary way (*Ursprünglichen Ansprechens*). Definition, for Heidegger, should be doing *this* task. Should Dasein choose to uncover and make clear (to use Heidegger’s term from *BT* to “be-in-truth”), this would happen through learning and giving definitions. As I mentioned above, Heidegger emphasizes this character of *logos* as the ‘address.’⁴⁵

This movement is crucial in regard to the consideration of a particular, the abnormal and the outlaw as well as the innovative and creative ‘following’ of the other. That is because, after all, “that which is given in advance is only given in the averageness of being-there” (*CT.*, 28). Heidegger is in agreement with Aristotle in insisting on the necessity of such movement from “more familiar to less familiar.” He simply paraphrases Aristotle, “I must proceed precisely from what is ungenerally there to what is genuinely passed over in acquaintance” (*CT.*, 28). However, as I argue below, Heidegger and some other readers of Aristotle also demonstrate that confronting the threat of the abnormal and monstrous, Aristotle gives in to the pre-established structure of the world in genus and species and reduces the contingent motion (*kinesis*) in the nature (*physis*) to a perpetual *hylomorphic* activity of being-at-work-staying-itself, generally and for the most part.

⁴⁴ It is noticeable that for Derrida, ‘address,’ is what we aim at but it is impossible. That is, we are bound somehow or another by the common intelligibility. For Heidegger, originary address becomes possible when Dasein faces her own finitude.

⁴⁵ “*Horismos* is a type of speaking, of addressing the world such that beings are addressed with regard to their completedness and in this completedness as present” (*BC.* 26).

Idle-talk extends over to seemingly genuine questions and investigations, thus keeping Dasein from engaging in original interpretation and examination (*Auseinandersetzung*) (CT., 29).

Thus, while Heidegger agrees with the necessary disclosing function of truth (*aletheia*), he finally accuses Aristotle of reducing the result of the discovery to the respected opinion (*endoxa*) and the dialectic within the boundaries of the reasoned discourse (*logos*). In fact, Heidegger is even suspicious of the givenness of the world in the definition, and scientific investigation as a whole, too.

Talk of this kind is distinguished by the lack of any original appropriation of what it is about and through the so-called verbal thinking (*Wortdenken*) which has surrendered to the power of certain verbal phrases (*Wortbegriffe*), it may also pervade and govern the treatment of problems within scientific disciplines (*Wissenschaft*). (CT., 22-23)

Besides, it does this by *endoxa* or the dominant view,⁴⁶ what Heidegger calls the “intractable domination of ‘the one’ (CT., 22).

[used up *logos*] obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by instituting a dominant view (*herrschende Ansicht*). ...Usually and for the most part the *ontic* mode of being-in (discovery) is in concealment (CT., 28).⁴⁷

Thus, in the ordinary concerned engagement (*besorgenden Umgangs*) with the world it is ‘the one’ (das Man) that talks. Everyone participates in the world that is co-revealed to being-in-the-world-with-one-another. That is to say, the public is jointly concerned with the surrounding world (*miteinander besorgten Umwelt*) without authentically appropriating it as one’s own (*uneigentlich*) (CT., 20).

⁴⁶ We will see that what hold a city at its best is what the elite think of as just and through the laws that they establish.

⁴⁷ That is why, Aristotle insists, in the *Metaphysics* 4. Chapter 2, that being can be talked about either in terms of truth, in categories (*κατηγορία*), or in terms of the *hylomorphic* movement from potency (*dynamis*) to being-at-work (*energeia*) or else it is false or by chance (*κατά τύχη*).

This suggests that although the genuine philosophical investigation for Aristotle may involve moments of unclarity or wonder, those moments are at the service of a clarity. The clarity points to the meaning of being as *ousia* and in all the categories which are more or less available already in the world. “Aristotle did not get beyond the thematization of the being of entities as *ousia*, whether in the particular regions of entities or in the highest instance-the divine” (Sheehan, 1983. 141).

Thus, as differential and active as *ousia* is, it is still in-the-world. As far as the question of an originary ‘following’ and innovation is concerned, the clarity is a clarity *in-the-world*. In fact, such a motion is completely circular. Discovery is not the discovery of something utterly new but the re-discovery of that which has been given in history.

As much as Aristotle tries to put his philosophy forward as the genuine mode of inquiry (*historía* as genuine inquiry) or ‘following’ authentically, his philosophy does not discover a radically new otherness but rather shines a light on the way things have already been revealed (*historía* like the knowledge or narration of the past).

Still, this should not be read only as a criticism. Philosophy’s task for Aristotle is expected to be the discovery of what is unclear in nature or uncritically accepted as public opinion. Nonetheless, my critique, following Derrida and Heidegger, highlights the necessary marginalization that afflicts his attempt to make a science of nature and change by reducing the presencing to actual and present beings.

1.3. *Ousia* and the Limit

1.3.1. *Ousia* and the Critique of the Limit

Heidegger is in accord with Aristotle’s explication of the way beings come to pass in their determinate forms, in their being-at-their-ends/limits. For him, that is the condition of the possibility of coming-to-present altogether. In his interpretation of *ousia* from Book V of the *Metaphysics*, Heidegger demonstrates that Aristotle’s emphasis on the determinacy and limitedness of the being of things as well as the way they express themselves in *logos* is to be underscored as the way being comes to pass in “the

there” (Da-sein) for human beings. He stipulates that human beings as life-possessing-speech (*Zōon logon echon*) and the “there” of disclosing have access to the separateness of things in an originary *logos* (*idion*).

Heidegger maintains that the Greeks, especially Aristotle, read entities as *phainomena*, appearances that show up in a correlative *noein* or *legein*, which manifests their meaningful presentness-as or is-ness (*ousia*, *Seiendheit*, beingness). (Sheehan, 1983. 137)

On the other hand, he holds that for Aristotle like the rest of the Greek, *ousia* ends up being associated with thinghood, the available and actual beings in use. He reviews the coming-to-be of this term in Aristotle and concludes that *ousia* has yet retained its ordinary meaning as “estate, property, possessions and goods”⁴⁸ (BC., 17-18).

Heidegger believes that for the Greeks the most general mode of being (*ousia*) is the being-there as *use*, being in its availability as what he calls ‘ready-to-hand’ (*zuhanden*) as well as ‘present-at-hand’ (*vorhanden*). This is how things appear to humans initially and for the most part. At this primary level the question “what is being?” concerns the question of “the Being of beings” (*τί τὸ ὄν*). It is replaced by the being of beings: *τίς ἡ οὐσία* (*Met.*, 7.1.1028b 2, BC., 18), that is, their presencing in the everyday dealing with beings, “in appearing, an entity appears *as* something meaningful- [in a practical field or else in *apophantic* sense].” (Sheehan, 1983. 137)

Ousia does not mean *univocity* for Aristotle. It does not mean absolute being or the One either. The very distinction he establishes between the divine and what is in

⁴⁸ He underlines that there are two basic ways such technical terms are established. Either “a determinate concrete context, seen anew for the first time” for which a completely new term must be coined together with the matter. In this situation, an expression “that was not at hand” is coined and then gains currency as soon as it is used in ordinary speech. The example for such a term would be the word *entelecheia* coined by Aristotle himself to capture the being of natural phenomena as the completion of a process. There is, yet, another way as well. A word that is fixed for an ordinary use gains new, technical significant while still retaining its own meaning. In this case, the technical aspect of meaning is added or “co-intended with the ordinary meaning” (BC. 18). He mentions that thinghood (*ousia*) is one of those terms of the second group, meaning it is available in natural language and customary use and has given additional signification or terminological clarity. In other words, it has a meaning “initially and for the most part.” (*Ibid.*) for the “people.” Heidegger contends that even in the terminological sense of the word, thinghood (*ousia*) does not completely lose its customary meaning. This customary meaning, according to Heidegger, is “property, possession, possessions and goods, estate. It is noteworthy that definite beings—matters such as possessions and household goods—are addressed by the Greeks as genuine things” (BC. 18).

motion shows that he has a very different reading of the world from the Eleatics. Still, he does not consider an originary motion in this perspective but rather deals with the products of motion in their actual presence. This results in an investigation of different meanings of being (diversity and multiplicity) in the way being is related to a core concept (thinghood of the thing). This is famously described by Aristotle as follows:

There are many senses in which a thing may be said to “be,” but they are related to one central point, one definite nature [*pros hen kai mian tina phusin*], and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health [etc.]. ... So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point [*mian arkhên*]; some things are said to be because they are “substances” [*ousiai*], others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process toward substance [etc.]. ... As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in other cases also. ... It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study all things that are, *qua* being. But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. (*Met.*, 3. 1003a 33-b18)

The multiplicity as a whole seems to be the character of the sublunary world which involves necessary motion and change. According to Aubenque, “change instills a “scission” in the sublunary beings so that they are ecstatic, standing outside themselves, never all at once what they are” (*Protevi*, 33-34). Because of this scission, between the thinghood and the accidents, the ontology of sublunary beings is dispersed among categories. They are capable of accepting different predicates, different answers to the categorial question of “quality” (how?), quantity (how much?), place (where?), and so on (*ibid.*, 34). In fact, this scission, for which Derrida uses the terms the originary trace, symptom, originary cut, even ‘the fall,’ and Heidegger uses the expression, “Ontological difference,” is the condition of the possibility of multiplicity, difference and generation.

Aubenque believes that such a categorization of sublunary beings as becoming-other in motion and change puts them in a paradoxical if not contrary situation of always being-other than themselves. This is what, I think, he means by the “scission” as well. In order for a being to be something in this world, it has to be of such and such an attribute, which means that it is partly “not” or at least “other than” the unity of *ousia*, a “focal meaning,” or “*pros hen*.”

Thus, in *logos* or as species (*eidos*), they would only artificially come together as an entity that stays the same while in fact they are judged as things holding certain attributes. For Aristotle, sublunary beings, the beings that are in motion and change, through their very contingent character “escape from a thought which only speaks by combining that which is divided” (Aubenque, 487). This means that *thought* cannot capture the scission fully and yet it is the scission that gives beings. The “it” which “gives” in Heidegger’s “*es gibt*” which is his formula for “there is” or existence seems to be this mysterious and uncapturable scission by which things are what they are in species. Thought only arbitrarily and abstractly captures being as *hypokeimenon*, predicate, etc.

To overcome the inability to capture the scission, sophists would deny the existence of a *pros hen* altogether (hence, univocity of being). In effect, for them, only accidents (*sumbebekos*) really exist and consequently scission simply disappears. On the other hand, there are Eleatics who also deny the scission by contending that: “there is only one substance and no accidents” (hence, equivocality of being) (Aubenque, 486). The discovery that being is core-dependent, and not just a mere homonym means that a science of being is possible, even though the absence of a univocal sense of the predicate *being* entails that there cannot be a Form or Idea of being (the case is comparable with that of the Good or Justice; cf. *NE.*, 1096a 23-29).

That is where the philosophy of Aristotle is ultimately *headed*, toward some sort of “regulated economy of being,” focused around the unity a focal meaning (*pros hen*) or the analogy of being between all the modes being can be said. These strategies in dealing with the meaning of being can be observed for almost any major concept. He first acknowledges that being is used in multiple ways and then he establishes a core-

dependent homonymy between them. This strategy, as we argue in the following chapter, is tied to the explication of motion as well. Things are what they are in spite of a non-substantial change. Different accidents respond to questions: how much? Where? How? When?, etc., nonetheless, they retain their wholeness.

In Heidegger's interpretation, then, while attending to change and generation in nature, Aristotle prioritizes the generation of "the same", "for the most part" or what is already available and familiar. Nature (*physis*) for him is mostly actual (*energeia*) and at its end or completion (*entelecheia*), and change for him is towards a pre-determined end (*teleology*). The material in potency (*dynamis*) is already *headed* towards becoming complete and appropriated⁴⁹ in the being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*). All change and growth is therefore anticipatable, organic, and *hylomorphic*, since such movement is always towards a present, actual and familiar "heading". That is to say it is teleological and its limits are already determined. The "heading" or the target is always already determined and in-the-world. Aristotle has, in effect, marginalized the creation of the abnormal, the unaccountable, and the monstrous. This does not mean that he does not allow the creation of the abnormal. Nature is *reigned* by what is actual, prevalent, and more frequent, as if there is a virtue attached to large quantities or the many. Although this is not a denial of the existence of alterity, it is an arbitrary ruling of the familiar and the common.⁵⁰

In all cases of generation and motion, the authority of the limit in *logos*, *eidos*, *entelecheia*, and so on, keeps the unity of presencing intact. The being of unity and sameness is kept at the same time as the articulation of change and motion. That is what

⁴⁹ The partial italicization is meant to emphasize the unduly preference for the proper and the actual creeping into Aristotelian discourse.

⁵⁰ Being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*) and the organic presencing reigns the world of Aristotle. He uses the most political words, related to ruling and sovereignty for being and presencing. In the *Categories*, chapter 5 opening line, he says "*ousia* is the most lordly sense (*kyriotata*)..." The translators sometimes render this word as "the strictest or truest" but the primary meaning of it which Aristotle uses for the people in the *Politics* (*Pol.* 1306b20) is "having power or authority over". The words *entelecheia*, and *hyparchē* for the determination of the limits of being "at the end" or "in the beginning" in every individual determination have political connotations and actual political meaning as well. They share the root *archē* which means holding, possessing and having authority over. This is significant given that the ground of the science of metaphysics is *entelecheia* and *hyparche* which refer to beings in their the look and availability.

Derrida underlines as *hama*, which means together at the same time. Derrida writes of this word:

The entire force of Aristotle's text depends on a single word which is scarcely visible because it is so evident; as obvious, it is also discreet and hidden, but it operates all the more effectively for escaping thematic attention. The tiny *hama* is that which sets the discourse in motion in terms of its articulation; from this point on, it will constitute the inner core of metaphysics; it will be the small key which both locks and unlocks the history of metaphysics—the skeletal frame on which the entire conceptual apparatus of Aristotelian discourse is supported and in terms of which it is articulated. In a certain sense, it expresses the dyad as the minimum. (*MP*, 56)

The *hama* guarantees that while we are dealing with motion and change, the end and the result of change remains in view,⁵¹ and the structure of unity and wholeness remains intact. The target or the 'heading' in the motion is in-the-world, familiar, and already appropriated and controlled by the eternal, accountable laws of nature. Consequently, the world that Aristotle depicts is colorful and multiple but still controlled under certain unities. Unfamiliar colors and languages are not allowed.

What comes to the fore in *eidos* and *logos* remains in, to use John Protevi's terminology, horizontal and vertical unity (*Protevi*, 39). Horizontal unity refers to the unity of an actual being during its acquisition of different categories. This motion does not produce a new species or genus. It is intra-genera. That is, intra-genera motion is possible within the categories in reference to a focal point (*pros hen*), or through the analogy of being.⁵² Also, vertical unity guarantees that the inter-genera change is possible too, insofar as the transformation from one being to another remains within the independent and separate boundaries of the genera. This means that there would not be

⁵¹One can argue that having in view (in French *voir*) is a mode of *having* (in French *a-voir*) after all. It is a mode of delayed presence.

⁵²As for analogy, look at Appendix 1 for further discussion.

any surplus or unanticipated genus or species created during the process of change between species and that the transformations are accountable.

1.3.2. *Ousia* and the Critique of the Present

We began the chapter by contending that the authentic mode of ‘following’ can only come about by admission to the incomplete, relational, and historical structure of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Heidegger calls the relational being of Dasein, “Care [*Sorge*]” which is essentially related to temporality.

It is as impossible to omit Dasein’s being-in as it is to omit its while-ness [*Jeweiligkeit*]. As Care [*Sorgen*], this entity, which in each case is oneself remains forever *on its way to something*. Dasein’s being is intent on [*Aussein auf*] that which it has not yet become but is able to become. (CT., 38)

Considering the being of Dasein as “ability to become” opens Dasein to possibilities beyond what is actual or the exhausted possibilities in-the-world. It is to consider Dasein as potency (*dynamis*) as opposed to actuality (*energeia*).

Ousia as presencing as opposed to present beings, or the static structure of Dasein and its others gives Heidegger an initial critical tool against modern idealist connections like self and identity. Notwithstanding, Heidegger argues that the promise of *ousia* has been systematically compromised in favor of a regulated economy of being as the same rather than the expression of difference as such.

Oὐσία [*ousia*,] means “being-there,” and it does not have an indifferent sense of being, as, ultimately, there is no such thing. *Oὐσία* is the abbreviation for *παρουσία* [*parousia*], “being-present.” Usually the opposite is *πουσία* [*pousia*], “absence,” not simply nothing but something there, although there as a lack. (BC., 24-25)

Entities in all of their determinations, in all senses, are defined for Aristotle in terms of presence. Even the “absence” is defined in terms of a lack, which ultimately points to a presence. Aristotle’s philosophy becomes increasingly concerned with different modes of such presence as “constancy,” and more importantly with an idea of becoming-present

“in the sense of coming forth into the unhidden, placing itself into the open” (GA 9: 272/208),⁵³ and to show how in fact they can be schematically read as the same. Brogan translates Heidegger as follows:

In Aristotle’s time, *ousia* is used both in this sense (of property) *and* in the meaning of the fundamental term of philosophy. Something is present. It stands in itself and thus manifests itself. It *is*. For the Greeks, “being” basically meant this being present (*Anwesenheit*). But Greek philosophy never returned to this ground of being and to what it conceals. It remained on the surface⁵⁴ of the presencing itself (*des Anwesenden selbst*) and sought to observe them in their available determinations. (Brogan, 48)

I find it significant that Heidegger emphasizes the surface as opposed to the ground. The implication seems to be that there can be a kind of presence on the surface which is not grounded in *ousia* or genuine presencing of beings. Apart from the word “surface,” what this citation highlights is that being (*ousia*) actually had a sense of property, and *capital*, as though we have⁵⁵ being in its individual occurrence. Heidegger observes that, for Aristotle, the particular being of things is associated with their look (*eidos*), which is brought about from the neighboring of beings and concepts “on the surface”. In other words, Heidegger criticizes Aristotle for systematically betraying his own discovery by controlling the movement (*kinēsis*) of revelation with the present manifestation of things in the public realm or the opinion of the many (*endoxa*).

The manifestation on the surface for Heidegger comes from what is already available in the ordinary public discourse which does not address or define beings in their

⁵³Cited from, White, Carol. J. (2005) “Heidegger and the Greeks,” in *A Companion to Heidegger* (eds H. L. Dreyfus and M. A. Wrathall), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK. Chapter 8. p. 137

⁵⁴Italics and underline is mine.

⁵⁵*Avoir* in French, which is associated with *voir*, to see, to look which denotes the basic familiarity with things in their looks.

being. They do not correlate to an immanent motion, to the clarity of the *logos*.⁵⁶ He believes that this being-with is inauthentic and does not capture the genuine character of Dasein and its others (CT., 21). The consequence of the Greeks' neglect of what remains absent, in the background, and not appearing, is the preference for beings as if they are of certain particular properties, traits (*Züge*), being present-as this or that, which they possess in their being-at-work (*energeia*).

Time, in this sense as "the number of change," would stay homogeneous. That is, the rate and quality of time does not change. Aristotle thereby makes sure that the future, for the most part, resembles the past. Things are as much present now as in future and in past. Perpetual necessary laws of presencing guarantee presence of beings in future and past. In this sense even absence is not pure.

But, Heidegger acutely observes that the Pandora's box that Aristotle opens between being and the multitude of expressions ("being can be said in many ways." (*Met VII*)) cannot really be closed by such a metaphysical system and reveals its internal paradoxes, insofar as we attend to its conceptuality. Conceptuality does not refer to any mental or categorical system, but the way concepts are correlated with one another making the experience of the world as a whole (BC., 15).

In order to reap the benefit of this conceptuality, the understanding of the 'limit' and 'limitedness' needs to be re-evaluated and modified. The question of being for Heidegger is a question which concerns presencing and not present beings. That is why he sets out to open the question of the difference as such. By questioning the status of the limit, as death as the non-being, he re-orientes the question of being back to the difference itself (CT., 40-45). That is where, Heidegger thinks, we should begin the questioning: "We must stand within the difference that let beings be" (*Brogan*, 49). The disclosing function produces a necessary gap between the being of the things in their immediacy in

⁵⁶ In *Concept of Time* Heidegger talks about presencing (*anwesenheit*) in terms of familiarity and public discourse. Knowing things and others initially and for the most part is available to Dasein in public discourse. That is the kind of discourse that make us able to find our bearings in the word and be-with others (CT., 20-23).

everyday experience and their manifestation in order to be able to bridge the gap with a definition (*logos ousias*).

That is where, I believe, Heidegger goes beyond Aristotelian and Greek philosophy to think about the originary possibility of being instead of what is proper, commonsensical, and actual. He challenges the notion of identity by focusing on being human as an interruption or as a standing in the difference. Before things are present and actual, fixed and used up in a commonsensical or ordinary propriety and identity, they can be read or interpreted-as this or that. The reading or as-structure comes before the identity of the subjects and the objects and constitutes them both. “....this as-structure bespeaks the arrival of meaning among entities, the irruption that occurs only with the arrival of man” (*Sheehan*, 1983. 138). Gathering in reading, or sense-making is co-originary with human beings through the as-structure.

Da-sein, Heidegger’s term for human being, is his strategic choice of a term for highlighting the standing in the difference. Da-sein is a gathering in reading. It is not a self who has a text before him to read or to interpret, but rather, Da-sein is already

constituted by the gathering that happens in this reading (*Silverman & Ihde*, 1).⁵⁷ This reading is co-constituted by the originary *logos* that ‘addresses’ beings in their being.⁵⁸ At the same time, as long as Da-sein is co-constituted by the as-structure, it is the possibility of being otherwise than it actually is. It is open to the possibility of non-being and difference as such.

Heidegger and following him Derrida take the possibility of the difference as such (the scission, the gap and the ‘it’ that gives) seriously and express interest in the way every presencing is a withdrawal of being at the same time.⁵⁹

Wherever the thinking of the Greeks gives heed to the presencing of what is present, the traits (*Züge*) of presence which we mentioned find

⁵⁷ The comparison is noteworthy with a very short passage called “*Was heisst Lesen?*” Which is translated by Sallis as “*What is called Reading?*.” Some simply translate this as “*What is Reading?*” but one should note that this word, *heisst* as a verb has two meanings: as an intransitive verb it means “to be called; to be named, like in *Wie heißt du?* (What is your name?) *Ich heiße* (“I am called); as a transitive verb it means “to call (someone something), to direct, call to do something” as in “*Sie hieß ihn nach Schule anrufen*”, meaning roughly, “what is reading?” Heidegger writes,

What is [calls forth] reading? That which is sustaining and directive in reading is gatheredness (*die Sammlung* meaning to collect, to gather and to congregate). To what is gathered? To what is written, to what is said in writing. Authentic reading is a gatheredness to that which, unbeknown to us, has already claimed our essence, regardless of whether we comply with it or withhold from it. Without authentic reading we are also not be able to see what has us in sight nor to gaze upon any appearance or semblance. (Heidegger, M, 1954. Tr. By John Sallis)

There is a lot to unpack in this short passage. One point is what John Sallis *reads* as an alternative in translating *heisst* in a transitive sense meaning that we are *directed or called* to read even before we decide consciously to do so. This is confirmed by Heidegger right after, when he writes as if something is already ‘directive’ in the text. Something in the “writing” that “unbeknown to us has already claimed our essence.” It is an ‘essential’ call. We are not asked to reflect on a text as subjects confronting the text but rather our very essence ‘claimed’ by the ‘gatheredness’ is constituted in the act of reading and writing. There is a gatheredness in writing, as if there is a kind of writing as the place of community and ‘following’ before we decide deliberately to write or compose any law or social contract. Dasein is the place of the emergence of writing which calls forth for an authentic reading. To be for different for Dasein, to have a signature and writing for Dasein is already a take a reading on what has come in the gatheredness. In this sense, everything down to every perception of the appearances of things turn to a reading which is equi-primordial with writing.

⁵⁸ “We are trying to attain a basic orientation toward being-characters by examining the extent to which all of these apparently different characters of being are linked as characters of the *there*” (*BC*. 24). In this sense, talking about community is to study the modes of gathering in “the there.” The question is whether there can be an originary presencing in “the there,” or what comes to fore in “the there” is always pre-determined by the necessary organic presencing of nature or the necessary expression of the world in the categories.

⁵⁹ For Derrida, this very movement defines the law of supplementarity. The fact that we always arrive either too early or too later at the place of the presencing of beings. Being never shows itself completely and we can never be at the presence of being as such.

expression: unconcealment, the rising from unconcealedness, the coming and going away, the duration, the gathering, the radiance, the rest, the hidden suddenness of possible absencing. These are the traits of presencing in whose terms the Greeks thought of what is present. But they never *gave* thought to the traits themselves, for presencing did *not* become problematical or questionable to them as the presencing of *what* is present. Why not? Because the only thing for which *they* asked and perhaps had to ask, responded and replied, that is, answered to their questioning in these traits of presencing which we mentioned. (Cited by *Brogan*, 48; *PA.*, 25)

Heidegger effectively emphasizes this withdrawal of being (*Entziehung*, *Entzug*) in the very process of presencing which was ignored or left out systematically by the Greek and their later interpreters. That which is considered the proper, the completion or the end or the limit in the present by the Greeks, for Heidegger, is but a trace left of a more originary withdrawal, the retreat of Being which can give rise to the multiplicity of beings and a new for of temporality directed towards future.

Following Heidegger, Derrida radicalizes this emphasis on the difference as such so that every trait, *property* or *appropriation* of the meaning of being as well as the individuation as *a being*, is to be understood as an originary re-*trait*, or retreat of Being (*Psyche*, 52). Hence, *retrait* is a ‘translation (without translating)’ of the expression, withdrawal of Being, (*Gasché*, 156). Derrida replaces the gathering altogether with the difference, the rift of being (*Fuge des Seins*) that ultimately challenges property, authority, and sovereignty.

Altogether, I follow the same trend in questioning the tyranny of the actual and present in philosophy in favor of the potential and difference as such. I will follow Heidegger and Derrida, in this regard, by exploiting the gap of presencing opened by Aristotle.

1.4. Conclusion

In this section, I explored some of the ways Aristotle attends to diversity in beings and the way different categories come to surface (*logos and eidos*) immanently. This suggests also that the categories of being are tightly connected with the categories in speech. Aristotle believes that *logos* has an immanent genesis related to the way things come to surface (presencing) in their particular look (*eidos*) rather than being an arbitrary imposition of mental categories to beings. In fact, Heidegger argues that truth as *aletheia* means exactly that. That is, the definition (*horismos as logos ousias*) of a thing is true, if and only if it corresponds exactly to the way things come-to-be or become present in *logos*.

At the same time, I demonstrated that the generation of diversity is restricted in a two-fold manner. Multiplicity in nature is controlled by completely different and independent genera and species in reality on the one hand, and by different, independent categories of language on the other. That is precisely why innovation in *logos* is a good indication to study whether the generation of the singular or innovative is allowed or not in Aristotle's system. The way he treats innovation in language, in other words, indicates how his system deals with alterity, the abnormal, immigrants, and aliens.

The reference to immigrants is not only metaphoric but relates to Aristotle's conservativeness in regard to foreign words and metaphors: "For people feel the same way about wording as they do about foreigners and fellow citizens" (*Rhetoric*, 3. 2. 1404b 10). Too many metaphors and foreign words makes the language unfamiliar and barbaric for Aristotle. *Logos*, for Aristotle, is not simply a medium of communication but it is the very *place* where the presencing comes to light and safeguarded.

In all cases, however, we are also taking into consideration that in order to be able to explain diversity and change in nature, he has to open a gap between an underlying level of being (*hypokeimenon*) and an appearing of some sort in particulars, the gap of difference which he tries to watch over and bridge with philosophy through some different schemata.

While the science of metaphysics for Aristotle works within the temporality of the present, the actual consideration of the singularity, otherness or the difference as such

calls for a new kind of temporality. Heidegger and Derrida are after the time of the time of the soul (*energeia*), of the coming-to-be of the original difference which does not count the lapses in between changes of the present categories or species but the one that gives different expressions in the first place. For that, they need to define new limits that are not pre-established as present and actual categories and yet provide some form of whole.

I did not elaborate on Heidegger or Derrida's solutions here but only suggested that they replace the actual or present end of the categories with precarious limits like death of oneself or the other to provide the possibility for genuine presencing in the future. In this way, Dasein as human kind of understanding is more associated with potency (*dynamis*) than being-at-work (*energeia*). In the following chapters, we look at the promises and shortcomings of the Aristotelian limit and the way 'following' of the other justly, 'addressing' the other as different being that it is involves a new limit that gives a new temporality as well.

2. Chapter 2: Motion and Change: The Nature's Heading

2.1. Introduction: Aristotle on Motion

We mentioned that, according to Aristotle, man as the life-possessing-*logos* is the locus of the expression of life. Life-possessing-*logos* is the place where the genuine character of beings can be revealed. We also mentioned that Heidegger exploits this direct access of man to its others (to the world and other people) in order to critique the notions like subject, self and object as separate from the world. Besides, Aristotle potentially provides the possibility of a pluralistic world by assuming the multiple senses of being. By focusing on presencing (*ousia*) rather than present beings, at least initially, Aristotle allows the emergence of a world that is hospitable to multiplicity and alterity. Life is pregnant with possibility, which can come to the fore in *logos*.

On the other hand, *logos* is also associated with the end (*telos*), limit (*peras*) and the look (*eidos*) of beings. Heidegger mentions that for the Greek, including Aristotle, presencing (*ousia*) retained its ordinary usage, which denotes beings in their availability and use. In other words, that which emerges in *logos* for the Greek remains the available, present, and actual beings rather than a necessarily immanent character of being. Multiplicity is allowed within the boundaries of the familiar genera and species. Different meanings of beings should ultimately be accessible through the core meaning of being (*pros hen*) or by analogy.

The next challenge is to explain how things stay within the boundaries of being while they are growing or changing to other things. The question is whether Aristotle's metaphysics allows the generation of an absolutely new and free being. In the language used in this work, the question is whether his system welcomes an originary generation of otherness or an authentic 'following.'

Again, Heidegger takes his lead from Aristotle by a) Aristotle's consideration of motion as a process separate from agents and beings, in fact, as a stage of being where things are not-yet-at-their-end and still actual (i.e. as *energeia ateles*) and b) Aristotle's recognition of the undetermined material (*hylē*), a stage where beings are not yet actual and present. Both of these characters of the science of motion would potentially permit a

generating that is not headed towards already actual or present beings. Life-possessing-*logos* could accommodate the ‘following’ of the liberated other or oneself as the other. In other words, human beings could understand the presencing of the other without being responsible for, or accused of⁶⁰ limiting the existence of the other or one’s original expression through representation or categorization of some kind.

Aristotle explains the immanent motion (*kinesis*) which generates beings from a potential material (*hylē*) to their actual looks (*eidos*) which is the informed matter (*hylomorph*) so as to account for the generation of the singular beings. However, in an attempt to develop the science of motion, he systematically prioritizes one form of generation, that is natural organic generation, which creates some form of accountable ideality in repetition. In effect, he also marginalizes the accidental and inorganic formations while admitting that they rarely happen.

In developing the science of natural motion, one encounters the same conundrum as before. On the one hand, establishing a science to understand the generated beings calls for the laws, which are able to anticipate future events and beings, on the other hand, such an anticipation inevitably places a universal limit on the genuine character of future events as well as the presence of an unanticipated other. All that is in future in this way turns into the repetition of the same or similar present and actual beings.

In this chapter, I will first examine the phenomenological reading of Aristotle’s laws of generation. I explore the way Aristotle manages to study motion as such and the price he has to pay for making the science of motion possible. The former is a celebration of potency (*dynamis*) and the originality of ‘following’ while the latter is the strategic systematization, which gives a static identity to the follower. I will argue that Aristotle’s recognition of the immanent motion in nature plants the seed of yet another mode of generation or the deviation from the organic and normal mode of ‘following’. In other words, using Derrida’s terminology, Aristotle first recognizes and subsequently marginalizes the creation of the abnormal. Thereby, it is Aristotle himself who provides

⁶⁰ This refers also to the mental categorization. It is worth remembering what *kategoria* in Greek originally means. In Greek *kategoria* means "accusation, prediction, and category." It is a verbal noun from *kategorein* "to speak against; to accuse, assert, predicate."

the ontological ground for the ‘nomadic’ distribution of beings. An example of such a ‘following’ can be seen in the work of art, which according to Heidegger, manifests the creative power of difference as such.

Considering being a self or community as ‘following’ some universal laws that ordinarily establish one’s horizon of understanding of being jeopardizes the authenticity of one’s being. Then, I suggest that, should we have originary ‘following,’ that is an authentic possibility of considering oneself and the other as such, we need to have a motion whose end is not already pre-determined or written.

2.1.1. Motion in Aristotle, Two Rival Views

The merit of Aristotle’s formulation of motion, as I mentioned above, is his attempt to bring the motion itself (*energeia ateles*) to light. In fact, some scholars like Brogan in his seminal work, *Aristotle and Heidegger, The Twofoldness of Being*, precisely argue to this effect. He claims that what is established as the necessary presencing (*ousia*) in nature is nothing but this life-giving force of motion (*kinēsis*). Thus, *ousia* in Aristotle is already potency (*dynamis*) rather than being-at-work (*energeia*).

He emphasizes that by becoming an actual natural being, the being has not lost its potency (*dynamis*). That is, potency (*dynamis*) is not a certain potentiality that vanishes when it has become actual. Quite the contrary, he emphasizes that *dynamis* needs to be understood like *hylē* as perpetually at work in the presencing of natural beings and holding them in their being (Brogan, 85).

Another group of scholars including Derrida attribute this discovery to Heidegger and his critique of Aristotle’s thought. I believe that it is the bifurcating tendencies within Aristotle’s thought, as I briefly mentioned above, that give rise to such opposing interpretation of his work. That is to say, to explain all modes of ‘following’ that Aristotle’s work gives rise to, one needs to consider the forces and laws that he prefers and the ones that he marginalizes.

I argue that Aristotle himself prioritizes the present status of nature, nature as being-at-work, and motion as the necessary and eternal principle that “for the most part”

generates the same or similar. Following Derrida, I will argue that it is precisely in this “symptomatic mis-recognition or mis-treatment” (*DDP*, 6) that Aristotle sanctions a hidden, differential and unfamiliar movement; I call ‘nomadic movement.’ The scale of this systematic marginalization becomes manifest in the recurrent re-appearance of the abnormal in different contexts in his text and his treatment or mis-treatment of them, whether in the *Generation of Animals* and *Ethics* or the intervention of strange and alien words in the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*. In all of these cases, we notice him allowing the multiplicity, which he subsequently tames or limits by the anticipation of the similar father figure, the integrity of the system, or clarity of ordinary and dominant language (*kurion*).

By conjuring up the forces of motion from the depth of the material mixture where being is still in gestation, Aristotle opens the door to the creation of unfamiliar, unworldly bodies and forms. Below, I argue that Aristotle usually attributes these bestial formations to accidents, unfamiliar mixture in underlying matter, or an unintentional but necessary and tragic flaw, a missing the mark (*hamartia*). Part of the necessary motion in nature is the contingent and unanticipated events which lead the motion to miss the target. The created catastrophe in this way, like the ones in the Greek tragedies, does not look like a normal turn of events or any familiar form. It is essentially a deviation and deformity from the hylomorphic structure of nature and still it is a genuine expression of the immanent movement in nature. Beyond the normal, ordinary formations of nature, accidents and *hamartiai* unveil the neutral creative power of difference as such. Moreover, the existence of these monstrous or bestial formations underlines the arbitrary preference of Aristotle for the organic generation in nature.

In fact, investigating the most originary form of presencing, Heidegger finds an alternative to the necessary and natural presencing. He suggests that one can be in touch with such an expression of difference in the work of art. Apart from the ordinary *logos* and the organic laws of nature that reflect the inherent motion in life, the authentic revelation of nature (the automatic force of creation) comes to pass only in the work of

art. The gifted poet suspends the already determined *telos* and *logos* and reaches this inorganic animal motion.

2.2. The Economy of Motion

We mentioned that motion once again highlights the disclosing character of *logos* and its relationship with nature. The question is whether Aristotle manages to account for the generation in nature while keeping the singular character of the other intact. I will argue that he acknowledges the genetic power of motion within the material mixture within the material mixture while strategically and economically bringing it under the economy of a scientific account.

2.2.1. Motion as *Energeia Atēles*

In reference to motion (*kinēsis*), we come across another formulation of presencing (*ousia*) as potency (*dynamis*) versus being-at-work (*energeia*). Aristotle takes control of motion, which is essentially the state of being incomplete (*aperon*), by formulating it as an interdependent relationship with material potential (*hylē*) on the one hand and an actual form (*morphē*) on the other. As I have already pointed out, the form corresponds to the final, complete shape or look (*eidos*) of the thing in speech (*logos*). Heidegger confirms the latter, maintaining that, “the clue by which *eidos*- and thereby also *morphē*- are graspable is *logos*.”⁶¹ Or again, “*Morphē* must be understood from *eidos*, and *eidos* must be understood from *logos*.”⁶² That is to say that *hylomorphism* is plagued with the same paradox of *logos*.

In his study of change, Aristotle reasons against Eleatics who deny change. He believes that by their insistence on “a single principle,” they closed the possibility of studying nature in general. Change for the Eleatics would make being plunge into non-being while for Aristotle it happens “within the horizon of being” (*Met.*, 4.2.1003b 10).

⁶¹ WEG 345f=250 (Cited in *Sheehan*, 150)

⁶² WEG 345=249 (Cited in *Sheehan*, 150)

That is the promising aspect of his physics which welcomes a kind of being which is still not-yet (*dynamis*) but actual (*energeia ateles*).

He manages not to eliminate the unity of being, *ousia*, altogether. In other words, insofar as we say “non-being *is* non-being” and as long as we are attributing some kind of “*is*-ness” to it, it has to *be* at least minimally on the surface of things. In yet another formulation, it is argued that change occurs in such a way that it would not dismantle the vertical (inter-generic) or horizontal (intra-generic) unity (Protevi, 2001. 6-8) of the essence.⁶³ In the former case, the underlying material principle, *hypokeimenon*, retains the unity of essence during the alteration, which occurs within the categories of existing entities (motion). For the latter, i.e., vertical unity, the *hylomorph* would guarantee the unity and particularity of the entities while alteration occurs across the borders of substances of existing entities (generation and destruction). The relationship *between* entities with vertical unity would be established through analogy. For Aristotle then, there is no lapse of non-being throughout the change even in destruction but rather we would see a change in appearance from one existing entity to another. Thus, we can conclude that beings are constantly present as if they do not destroy.⁶⁴

Aristotle defines motion as the being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*) of a potency as potency (or as such) (*Physics*, 201a 10-11, 27-29, b 4-5). The ingenuity of this definition is that it keeps the paradoxical situation of motion intact while managing also to keep it within the structure of *logos*. For a being to be represented or manifested in *logos*, it has to come to its completion and stability, to its being-at-work-staying-itself

⁶³ Before Aristotle, change from A to B was thought to be first, from A to non-being and then from non-being to B. And since non-being cannot be thought of, it is considered impossible. This is the logic of ontological contradiction while Aristotle proposes a logic of phenomenological contraries for motion. John Protevi finds the clue as to such a strategy in Aristotle’s use of negative particles. That is Aristotle uses negative particle “*mē*” in “*to mē on*” exclusively *Physics* 1 to refer to the becoming-not that is involved in change, yet, whenever he wants to refer to absolute non-being he uses “*ouk on*.” Therefore, that which is not X (*to mē on*) equals to that which *is* non-X” while “*ouk on*” equals that which simply absolutely is not” (Protevi, 1994. 46). Walter Brogan cites and translates Heidegger from *Vorträge und Aufsätze* about the signification of these terms as well, concluding that in thinking about motion in this way, Aristotle is thinking being and non-being at the same time, while keeping them distinct. (Brogan 75)

⁶⁴ That is, incidentally, where Heidegger introduces death as a precarious form of completion and end, the one that contains an element of absence and potency. Death as opposed to constancy of familiar life injects the character of potency to motion precisely because it is an event which is not-in-the-world.

(*entelecheia*). And since “man has no access to entities except in terms of their being (i.e., their meaningful presence in *logos*),” this means that human beings only grasp beings in so far as they are in *energeia*, while *ergon* of *energeia* and *telos* of *entelecheia* express the element of stability and endurance in them (Sheehan, 131). For Aristotle, movement and change are still a mode of being and in fact the fundamental mode of being in the sublunar sphere. According to the definition, then, motion can reach *logos* (because it is *entelecheia*) but that which it brings to *logos* is the potency (not-yet appearing) as such.

However, saying that entities are in motion essentially amounts to saying that they are endless (*ateles*) while the definition of the entity has to be about beings in completion (*en telei*). Such is the paradoxical character of becoming and motion. Sheehan explains this as follows:

A moving entity as moving is present in *logos* somehow standing in its *telos* but as not yet having come fully into its *telos*. To understand a growing thing as what it fundamentally and properly is, namely as growing, we must understand it as appearing (*en eidōi*), but appearing in such a way that the entity brings with it into *eidos* a nonappearing (Sheehan, 150).

Thus, there is a sense in which the genuine character of things in motion emerges as the suspension of appearance or the anticipation of appearance. What appears in motion maintains a mysterious appearance of an absence. Heidegger calls this paradoxical notion a “pres-ab-sence” (Sheehan, 150). At least in this rendering, Aristotle manages to talk about motion in its appearing in *logos*, that is as *energeia atēles*. It can be argued that the ambiguity and the potential paradox that Aristotle produces through the notion of *energeia atēles* gets him closer to pre-socratics like Heraclitus more than Parmenides.

For Heidegger, still, the prime example of this motion in Aristotle is nature (*physis*). Thus, a part of what an entity manifests in motion is an absence, a non-appearing. For example, as opposed to a grown tree, whose soul is flourishing in its *ergon* (function) as nutrition, the seed appears as not-yet grown tree which is still *energeia* as it

is fulfilling its function in being an incomplete apple tree or a *virtual* apple tree, a not-yet-apple tree.

Aristotle describes this virtuality as potency (*dynamis*). Therefore, potency (*dynamis*) is not a capacity, inactive and simply potential, but rather an activity of manifesting the appearance and the nonappearance at the same time. Richardson calls this the “ambivalent nature of *physis*” (Richardson, 310) in Aristotle.⁶⁵ In this sense, motion includes an interplay of “*Anwesung* (coming-to-presence) that is negated (*Abwesung*)” (Richardson, 310).⁶⁶ When something comes-to-presence in *morphē*, receiving its *eidos*, it brings with itself that which it has negated, or taken out of presence. For example, when an apple receives the form of an apple, it announces the necessary dis-appearance of the blossoms of the tree let alone the seeds (Richardson, 313).

Now, the withdrawing of the seed of an apple tree or the blossoms into itself is its *dynamis*. It is important to note, however, that for Aristotle (and perhaps not for Heidegger and Derrida) *dynamis* is still headed towards *entelecheia*. It is that detour away from absolute stable presence. *Dynamis* for Aristotle seems to be always not-yet fully complete but *can* be and is the source of repetition. This repetition is the basis for its ideality which makes the science and laws of nature possible.⁶⁷

As we read in chapter 2 of *BC*, Heidegger sees a fundamental relationship between the Greek terms *ergon*, *peras*, and *telos*, by which being-at-work (*energeia*) is prioritized over potency (*dynamis*) as being incomplete and in motion. That is to say, although

⁶⁵ Richardson among others sees the reflections of some pre-Socratic and particularly Heraclitean conception of *physis* here, where for Heraclitus “*physis* is Being itself.” *Physis* is ambivalent in that as being it manifests itself and at the same time is “inclined to conceal itself.”

⁶⁶ Sheehan has found other expressions in Heidegger explaining this non-appearance accompanying appearance: *An-sich-halten* (to restrain oneself), *In-sich-Zurück-gehen* which means to “withdraw into oneself” (Richardson 310).

⁶⁷ It is also significant that *physis* is only the being of the entities which have their principle of motion and rest in them. “The plant keeps its principles (*archai*) within itself.” That is why, in contrast with the artifacts which have their principle and source outside themselves for example in their maker's mind and whose ends are genuine *energeia* as complete (*teleia*) and outside the process of creation, natural entities can never bring their not-yet-ness completely into *telos*. Sheehan uses a very key term to explain this process of “allowing the possibility to remain possibility” (Sheehan 151). We may say that the natural entity as opposed to the artifact (*technē*), keeps on repeating its possibility (*re-petere*: to reach out for again and again) (Sheehan 151-52).

motion in Aristotle happens between contraries and everything can actually turn out otherwise than expected, the measure is still the appropriation of the end.

A natural being maintains itself and is maintained “in” its sameness.

Therefore, it must in a way not be itself. Inasmuch as it directs itself towards itself, it *is* not itself but in relation to (*kata*) itself (Brogan, 77).

This relationality and directionality, which constitutes the being of a natural being, is towards a natural being’s limit (*peras*). A natural being is striving toward being itself. Aristotle, in turn, admits that in reference to potency he had to invent a new term to make motion understandable. This term, which is interchangeably used with *energeia*, is fabricated or, as Aristotle writes, “designed” for the treatment of *dynamis* or motion par-excellence. The term is *entelecheia* which combines several key notions in Aristotelian philosophy, (*en-tel-echeia*).⁶⁸ It is almost the same as *ousia* in its non-terminological, political connotations as “possessing, having, and ruling.” Motion in the sense of potency is always toward or with an eye on the completed state. In a complete formulation Sheehan expresses the unity of such terms as *ergon*, *telos*, and *peras* as follows.

An entity, *standing* or *lying present* (*hypokeimenon*, etc.) in its self-limitation (*peras*) and showing itself for what it is (*eidos*), “has itself” (*cf. echein*) “in its fulfillment” (*en telei*): *en-tel-echeia* (Sheehan, 144-145).

It is only in that complete standing in presence that an entity is performing its proper function or work (*ergon*), hence *energeia* as well. Therefore, motion in this sense seems to be still a delayed presence. To use Derrida’s terminology, it is *headed* towards the proper, the same, and the capital. Brogan even emphasizes that the direction is towards “being the same unity with themselves” (Brogan, 76). That is to say that the beings in motion keep their sameness with themselves, they are always already towards that anticipated sameness given by their form. So, as much as he tries to establish a difference

⁶⁸ As we mentioned following Heidegger, “*telos*” in *entelecheia* does not mean primarily “aim” or “purpose” neither “cessation” but rather “completion, fulfillment, and accomplishment. Also “*echain*” in “*entelecheia*,” meaning “has itself,” has the same root as *hexis*, as habit, in turn meaning “possession,” “holding” or “having.”

in the motion from this to that, in fact, a being is *headed* towards nothing different but toward being-identical- to-itself.

Aristotle accomplishes the thinking of *kinēsis* in its belonging together with *peras*. *Physis* is a way of *ousia*. Change can be *kata to auto*, in respect to the same. The *kata* here somehow holds together and yet separates. It does so through the *hama*, as Heidegger points out in the section 19 of *Basic Problem of Phenomenology*. Through this word, Aristotle is able to articulate the structure of the being of change. Natural beings are beings whose necessity, unity, and simplicity allow for change and coming to be in time (*Brogan*, 76).

This is the kind of thinking of change that makes time as the neutral “number of change” possible. Time is simply counting this becoming-other while being the same. In other words, what Aristotle regards as “other and other” of time do not produce different numerical unities or entities but rather count the same (*hama*) being (*Physics*, 218a 10). The “other and other” of time never destroys the “same and the same” of time (*Lawlor*, 21). Directionality does not produce the unanticipated and so time turns circular, producing the same over and over.

The *Metaphysics IX*, section 5 explains the force of life or the automatic *kinēsis* in *physis* which leads natural beings necessarily towards their limits. “Natural beings emerge out of themselves and direct themselves *toward* their being while maintaining themselves in the necessity of their limits. Their coming to be is not by chance or force, but a necessary coming to be that is continuously governed by their being” (*Brogan*, 69-70).

Therefore, Aristotle first welcomes the not-yet-named or non-appearing and then very quickly controls it in favor of repetition for the establishment of the science of nature. It is as if he wakes up the dormant forces of the material mixture in nature and then strives to put them to sleep back again. One can argue that through the temporary suspension of the *telos* and *logos* for a moment the other, the difference as such gets a chance to reveal itself as not-yet fully appropriated.

However, since what appears in this way might very well be against the familiar, organic world, in the hierarchy of natural generation, Aristotle regard them as less perfect or totally monstrous. This will have its corresponding effect when the motion reaches the surface in language.

That is when power of silence is unleashed to give voice to the genuine character of the world or to ‘address’ the otherness as such. When comes to pass in this way, the *logos* is not anticipated and may come into conflict with the established, sedimented *logos* of the past or the public discourse. As a deviation from the public discourse it is in form of a metaphor or altogether a foreign language.⁶⁹

While regarding the automatic motion in nature as originary, Aristotle still maintains his preference for what is actual, in view, knowable and accountable by prioritizing a *heading*, a capital “towards” which beings are *headed* just to maintain their constant being.

2.2.2. Motion and the Material Mixture (*hylē*)

Attention to the motion in itself (*energeia ateles*) and the material (*hylē*), that mode of being which is not-yet appropriated, little by little begin to release the power of yet another kind of motion that can express the unfamiliar and the original difference as such. I argue that Aristotle is aware of this a-teleological, ‘nomadic’ motion; but he strategically controls it in favor of the necessary and eternal one which imitates the circular locomotion of the heavens.

⁶⁹ In this regard, one can remember the opening remarks of Socrates in the dialogue “the Apology”. He mentions that what he is going to say in his defense will be truth and nothing but the truth. Yet he also characterizes his speech and his *logos* in two ways: one is that his language will appear “not ornamented”. It is not a decorated version of the language of the present. He says, “I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment.” This mode of expression seems to be of a different form of temporality. The expression is coming “at the moment.” Now even a more startling character of this speech is that it is idiomatic and perhaps idiotic. The language of the truth is not only ugly but also like a foreign language. Socrates expects people of the jury understand him and yet he says: “I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue and after the fashion of his country.” The language of revelation, the authentic language of the truth and originary ‘following’ is a foreign language compared with the ordinary language. It is idiomatic and private (idiom) as if idiotic and stupid.

At the beginning of Book A of the *Physics*, Aristotle gives two rival interpretations of *physis*: the material (*hylē*)⁷⁰ and the form (*morphē*) (*Physics*, 193a 28-31).⁷¹ According to Brogan, Aristotle presents the subject as two ways of ‘addressing’ *physis* (Brogan, 82). It is worth remembering that *physis* does not refer to any natural being per-se but implies the automatic self-generating power of generation. Therefore, Aristotle is situating the generating force of difference within both material mixture and form. Then, there is this corporeal material force in depth underlying the expression of the singularity, which comes to the surface in an unanticipated way, thereby threatening the integrity of the system. The images, simulacra, and semblances are examples of such makings.

That is why Aristotle very quickly takes control of this unfamiliar source of nature. According to Brogan *hylē* for Aristotle is the underlying substance of change, and that which is in a “fundamental relation with that to which it belongs and for the sake of which it counts as matter” (Brogan, 83). Thus, as Brogan confirms, “inasmuch as it is addressed from the point of view of *morphē*, *hylē* co-constitutes the being of natural beings. When the *hylē* gathers itself (*kinēsis*) in its proper place and stands forth as the being it is (*eidos* as *morphē*), then *hylē* is the *ousia* of natural beings” (*Met.*, 1042a 32; Brogan, 84). This is the meaning of *hylomorphism*.

Hylomorphism in this manner does not mean that there is some dark matter before the formation of something in *logos*, which could potentially be used otherwise. Material (*hylē*) is part of the definition of a thing as long as it is already formed. “Only inasmuch as the matter is directed toward and delimited by *morphē* (as *eidos*) is a being embodied in its *ousia*, and one with itself. Thus, it is *morphē* that defines what a being is and determines the appropriate matter that is essential to this being” (Brogan, 87). For Aristotle, it is only retrospectively and by reversal that the material exists as potency. The

⁷⁰*Hylē* in Greek originally means forest and woodland, and not merely the trees or wood. It never means some originally unformed and indeterminate stuff that then is formed in some way.

⁷¹ Heidegger translated the passage in the *Physics* which is cited by Brogan with his own equivalent terms for German words as follows: “It is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a whole; second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say, that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which one is wont to go cringing; and finally, that we let the sweep of our suspense take its full course, so that it swings back into the basic question of metaphysics which the nothing compels: Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?” (Brogan 82)

most original movement for Aristotle is the one, which leaves nothing unaccounted for or unformed. Natural motion has to meet its anticipated end. “The essential characteristic of natural movement is that it originates out of and toward itself while remaining in itself” (Brogan, 86). Consequently, through *kinēsis*, a natural being simply embodies, incorporates itself. Aristotle makes a similar statement about the generation of the same in the *Physics*, “man generates man” (*Physics*, 193b8), meaning the controlling *eidos* is within the very generation itself, and hence the process of generation entails the self-provision of that which is “appropriated for...” The “from which,” say, (Smith Sr.) and the “to which” (Smith Jr.) have the same *eidos* (“Man”) (Sheehan, 1983. 153).

Aristotle still depends on *hylē* for individuation when he writes: “If form is the definition of a being in general, *hylē* determines its thisness (*todē ti*)” (*Met.*, 1045b 18). Nonetheless, the process of generation of a natural entity as being-underway from Senior (father) to Junior (the son) (*genesis* as *physēos hodos eis physein*- see *Physics* 193b 12) never has to go outside of itself but rather consists of *instantiation* of the *eidos* (Smith Sr.), and the second *instantiation* of the same *eidos* (Smith Jr.) (Sheehan, 1983. 153).

This is confirmed by Heidegger’s translation of individual being in Aristotle, which is aligned with how a thing appears in its “look” in public rather than the genuine occurrence of difference. The individual being (*hekaston*) in its private presencing is translated by Heidegger as *das Geeinzelte*. Brogan explains that this choice of the term in German is not very common and emphasizes the prefix *Ge-* which indicates a gathering or community (Brogan, 84). Altogether, it seems that Heidegger would like to underline that what is considered individual is essentially connected to the what is common (*koinon*) and public, indicating that *hylē* needs to be understood as headed towards being in common with other individual beings (Brogan, 84). *Hylomorph* is *headed* towards appropriation, a kind of having and being *proper* in *eidos* and *logos* which is public as well as private.

Now, if it is the combination and mixture in the material that in reality give rise to beings why is that Aristotle prioritizes form as what determines the being of a thing. This is in line with what we mentioned in the last chapter. It seems that before the material

change immanently expresses the character of individual beings, their end is already determined by what they look like for the most part. It is the surface, the being, the *ousia* as being available, that has already determined the result of the generation before the individual is given the time or chance to reveal itself. The reason seems to be the priority of natural generation for Aristotle.

2.2.3. The Necessary Nature of the Organic Making

The paradigmatic example of motion and change within categories for Aristotle is the necessary movement in nature.

Natural beings emerge out of themselves and direct themselves *toward* their being while maintaining themselves in the necessity of their limits. Their coming to be is not by chance or force, but a necessary coming to be that is continuously governed by their being. The *heneka*—that “for the sake of which” they are becoming (as *archē* and *telos*) (*Physics* 200 a8) governs the movement that is necessary “in order to” (without which a being could not be—*ou aneu ouk endechetai*) (*Met.*, 1015 a20; *Physics*, 200 a6) (*Brogan*, 69-70).

Aristotle makes a distinction between natural genesis, which is automatic and necessary, and an artificial making (*technē*), which imposes some deviation on natural presencing. The necessary nature of this movement and the already anticipated end and *telos* makes the movement already in-the-world and inhospitable to innovative creations. That is, there has to be a prior tacit awareness of the unities that are necessary in the horizon of the motion and generation. “It is only from a prior awareness of this unity that we can even relate to beings and recognize the nature of their being” (*Brogan*, 88). In effect, natural beings are not made up of formless, indeterminate material. Every material is already in a necessary relationship with the order of the organic nature which violently puts it to use. Being in accordance with nature for Aristotle is equal to being necessary and eternal (*aidion*).

The originary character of natural beings is due to this necessary and eternal nature. That which is in the way of eternal (*aidion*) has the character of being necessary, whereas that which happens to come along with such a being, but does not constitute its beingness, is incidental (*sumbebēkos*). Natural beings, according to Aristotle, are both everlasting and necessary (*Brogan*, 67).

Aristotle emphasizes this fact in all sort of ways. “Each being itself and its *logos* are one and the same and not merely in incidental way” (*Met.*, 1031 b19–20). For beings to be necessary and everlasting, they have to be a whole or united. “That which is as a whole and that which belongs to this kind of unity as “that without which the whole would not be possible” is the necessary (*Met.*, 1015 a20). There is, then, evidently a virtue or an advantage attached to that which is necessary, united, and everlasting as opposed to what is incidental and singular. Aristotle himself insists that only beings that emerge out of themselves and go forth into their being without being caused by manipulation (*bia*) or chance (*tychē*) are necessary beings and thereby ever-presencing as they are (*Physics*, 199 b15–19). *Technē* is said to violently interrupt this first kind of motion, changing the natural course of beings to what an agent has in mind.

In this reading of nature, it is suggested that ‘following’ naturally as the same is the most stable and the best way and any imposition of a form from outside must be examined with the already established destination in *logos*. Instituting an arbitrary gathering or category from beyond is considered violent. In other words, an event that does not follow the necessary structure of the world, as we know it, is not natural and is violent. Thus, the philosopher’s expectation for the events to follow the same way as before has made them ontologically more original as well.

2.2.4. The Violent Nature of the Organic Making

Movement by nature is possible because necessity rules over the world of nature. The material mixture has to follow the laws to become available and visible. Without necessity, the free movement from out of itself toward its *telos* that is the essence of a natural being would be impossible.

There are two kinds of violence imbedded and admitted by Aristotle in the implementation of the necessary natural laws. Firstly, there is a violence in the way in which the natural laws incorporate an 'other' as a "such" into a "this." This process is, in fact, the fundamental insight that allows Aristotle to develop the categorial understanding of beings (*Brogan*, 71). Aristotle poses this as an immanent and free appropriation of matter to produce multiplicity in natural world within the boundaries of genera and species. Still natural and organic, the second form of violence is when the eternal presencing of nature is cut short by another process from beyond the immanent material mixture of a being (*Physics*, 199b33).

The incredible fact is that Aristotle himself finds another form of necessity within the process of natural presencing (*Physics*, 199 b33). There are two kinds of necessity involved in nature. He implies that there could be the imposition of form from outside where the path towards *telos* is cut short.

There is a movement in nature that makes a things what it is. A grass is a grass because its form incorporates its material necessarily in form of a grass. However, a cow might eat the grass according to its nature and the nature of the grass and this is a second sort of movement in nature, a motion that impedes another motion or is in community with it. (*Brogan*, 71)

The second form of necessity cuts the path of the coming to be of the grass short in order to turn it into milk, a nourishment for a cow (*Brogan*, 71). Both of these movements are organic and necessary but the second one is also violent for they are imposed from beyond the unity of the entity.

There are always two paradoxical forms of necessity: one that is the necessary and homogeneous life-giving force, "that without which, as the accompanying cause (*sunaition*), life would be impossible" (*Met.*, 1015 a20–21). This is the necessity by which things come to be rather than not-be. However, the second kind of natural necessity is the one that is "compulsory" (*Met.*, 1015a 27). In both forms of natural and

organic necessity, there is an inevitable violence imposed by the natural laws which Aristotle is aware of.

Brogan explains both kinds of natural necessity as the inherent violence in nature. “By enforcing its limits, necessity appropriates what is not governed by necessity and what is therefore non-being and limitless change. Change according to necessity is change that is directed toward and “for the sake of” the *aidion*.⁷² It holds itself within the ever-presencing of *ousia* and is this sameness with itself” (Brogan, 69).⁷³

Hence, natural beings in motion are in fact identical to themselves from the very beginning and the time is still like the number that is being “the same and the same” as opposed to “the other and the other.”

Here is where reading *physis* as *kinēsis* begins to reveal its internal paradoxes. The more one emphasizes the necessity of natural movement and the repetition thereof, the more political and forceful it gets. I would like to underline particularly the words that in Brogan’s language has a forceful and political connotation. It is as if we are asking about the sovereignty or the one in charge of the inherent automatic motion in nature. That is where we encounter the violent and arbitrary foundation of authority in this metaphysical system.

Thus natural beings, which are under way toward and becoming what they are, are already *governed* by their being. Being-toward cannot be *properly* understood by analogy to an abstract line. A natural being in its movement toward itself is always already itself and its movement is a returning or turning back upon itself. (Brogan, 86; my emphasis).

It is noteworthy that we are still concerned with the motion that is free and automatic and yet Brogan’s language is rife with political terminology. The significance of these terms is that they attribute a sense of cultural and political appropriacy to a certain kind of

⁷²According to Brogan, *aidion* refers to *aei deios*, that which remains in shining of presence and therefore is seen (*theoria*) in unconcealment.

⁷³By referring to the *aidion*, he in fact refers this necessity to the immediate access to the being of things through *noein* before any external imposition of form is performed on the beings. It is as if in the presence of the divine, or the timeless things are already present in their necessity.

generation rather than another. There is a virtue attached to staying the same or ‘following’ the necessary laws, which ironically makes them not purely natural anymore. In explaining the automatic nature of natural movement in Aristotle, Brogan’s language brings together “the eternal, the necessary and the violent” altogether in one paragraph:

Change according to necessity is change that is directed toward and “for the sake of” the *aidion* [eternal]. It holds itself within the ever-presencing of *ousia* and is this sameness with itself. Necessity is this violent holding itself together of a movement that is governed by the need to be. Life is violence. It appropriates to itself what is necessary in order to be (Aristotle gives the example of nourishment and breathing). Aristotle says necessity does violence in this way to what lies in the path and gets in the way of the thrust (*hormē*) or the deliberately chosen direction (*prohairesis*) (1015 a28) (Brogan 70-71).⁷⁴

While establishing the sovereignty of necessary laws of nature, Aristotle perhaps unintentionally sanctions and lay the grounds for the existence of that which is not purely organic. Philosophers are tasked with watching over this hidden motion at the heart of nature against the incidental semblances, which might occur (*tychē*) or exploited by the sophists.

That is perhaps why, with the admission to the marginal improper makings and gatherings in nature, the ones that are not organic, we already noted above, Brogan’s language has turned political and forceful as well. Altogether, the point is that, phenomenologically speaking there is no reason one should use the language of violence or non-violence to explain the generation of beings in the world. If as phenomenologists, we are to describe the experience of reality as it is, there should not be any presupposition of the ‘heading’ of change. In the case of change in Aristotle however, organic making is evidently prior and more proper in virtue of being more frequent.

Thus, for Aristotle, the principal example of *ousia* in the sublunar realm is *physis* which as I have argued he understands as being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*).

⁷⁴my emphasis

Natural generation for Aristotle eternally reveals the best and the most stable beings. Motion in this realm is definable in speech (*logos*) only as far as nature's acts are anticipatable "generally and for the most part." In fact, as Joe Sachs puts it in his commentary to the *Physics*:

Aristotle speaks of the patterns of nature as present not *always* but "for the most part." His way of understanding the causes of things does not do violence either to the stability or to the variability of the world, but affirms the unfailing newness-within-sameness that we observe in the return of the seasons and the generations of living things (*Sachs*, 25).

Unlike Brogan, Sachs believes that there is no violence in considering the multiplicity in the world and prioritizing what happens "for the most part." This is because of the very double character of Aristotle's philosophy, that he intentionally and knowingly marginalizes other forms of making (accidental or man-made) as improper. Yet, it is precisely this decision which gives the improper motion an ontological sanction to present the unfamiliar or the abnormal.

On the same hierarchical distinction in nature, Brogan actually quotes Aristotle about one strange improper motion. In the beginning of Chapter III of Book II of the *Physics* Aristotle writes: "Since *physis* is the originating and governing over being-moved and thus over the upsurge [*ousia*] which bursts into the open, our *methodos* must not allow *kinēsis* essentially to remain in concealment. For whenever *kinēsis* remains unfamiliar, *physis* also remains in unfamiliarity" (*Physics* 200 b12–15; *WBP*, 341). What he seems to be doing is to bring *kinēsis* under the light of *logos* and familiarity before it begins to create unfamiliar and unaccountable (*alogon*) entities. That is how he indicates some "unfamiliar" *kinēsis* for which we might have an "unfamiliar" *physis*.

It is worth noting that Aristotle does not deny the existence of an improper *kinēsis*, that is a *kinēsis* which is not in accordance with natural presencing. He merely underlines that in order to be able to scientifically account for motion we have to bring it

to unconcealment. And if all motions need to come to unconcealment, they have to remain familiar and organic.

Now, there is no objection to the automaticity of change which remains immanent to nature, however the problem is the familiarity that is assumed which connects the limits of motion with the established *logos* and already present and familiar forms. By assuming that we can move from what is more familiar to us to what is familiar in itself, he is basically prioritizing the commonsensical normality, thereby taking the absence and hiddenness away from the process of natural making.

Aristotle is well aware of the fact that beings may be impeded from reaching their *telos* even though the movement toward their end is an automatic one and governed by necessity. He calls the kind of necessity that characterizes natural beings hypothetical, i.e. “if nothing interferes” (*Physics*, 199 b35). He is wary of the occurrence of accidents that might interfere with the process and lead it toward unanticipated results. The natural necessity is always haunted by the inorganic motion, accidental events, or (in the case of the sophists) the political intentions which might carry them away to produce alternative realities or monstrous results.

The leading example of such accidental anomalies is *hamartia*, the accidental flaw which makes the organic order of things get carried away towards an improper or unanticipated end. I follow Joe Sachs and Michael Davis in rendering this word in accordance with its original root as “missing the mark.” Of course, *hamartia* originally refers to the flaw of the tragic hero, the one that leads him to a disastrous fate, a fate that he could not anticipate but was already necessary and written for him. As I will argue in the following chapter, *hamartia* is a recurrent theme in Aristotle, pointing to the cases of an unaccountable or unanticipated disaster that brings about wonder and catharsis. *Hamartia* in this sense is symptomatic of an unfamiliar movement at work in nature which is not organic per-se and misses the target or *telos*, as well as *logos* and *eidos*. It is unfamiliar, as if altogether not in-the-world. The important point is that these kinds of makings are considered inappropriate and catastrophic as if imposed on peaceful and normal natural order of things.

2.3. Alterity and the Beast, an Example

What gets increasingly clear as we proceed with the generation of animals is that the dominant trend is that of *hylomorphism* of some sort, while at the same time acknowledging the threat of the fringe and of the abnormal which *ought to* be tamed as far as possible. The important point, however, is that Aristotle acknowledges that the movement of generation starts completely naturally and the abnormal is unavoidable to a large extent due to possible unknown natural deviations (*hamartia*). But when it occurs the movement would breach the vertical unity and instead of *hylo-morphe* produces *catastrophe*.⁷⁵ These final unexpected, unforeseen ends and deformed matters, Aristotle calls monsters. I owe this discovery to John Protevi's critical reading of Aristotle although he does not refer to the significance of *hamartia*. This section is the elaboration and contextualization of his account from his book titled, *Time and Exteriority: Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida*.

The immediate source of motion in most of animals is the male principle, the father, who sets the seeds in motion through injecting semen into female body. While doing this, in fact, the natural organism is participating in the immanent movement of nature. Ordinarily, this should not cause any problem and through participating in it living organisms "have a share in what always is and is divine" (*De Anima*, 2.4.415a 30).

This is only when they are doing their main function properly, "since the most natural thing for a living thing to do is to make another like itself, for an animal to make an animal and a plant to make a plant" (*De Anima*, 2.4.415a 30-b).

The most ideal model for this form of life-giving is when the superior male principle through the seed of the father victoriously overcomes the motion inherent in the maternal material on which it works, thereby producing the appearance of the same form in a father-resembling male child. Aristotle writes: "If the seminal residue in the

⁷⁵catastrophe (n.)1530s, "reversal of what is expected" (especially a fatal turning point in a drama, the winding up of the plot), from Latin *catastrophā*, from Greek *katastrophē* "an overturning; a sudden end," from *katastrechein* "to overturn, turn down, trample on; to come to an end," from *kata* "down" + *strechein* "turn" (on line etymology)

menstrual fluid is well-concocted, the movement derived from the male will make the form of the embryo after its own pattern” (*GA*. 4.3.767b 15 -17). The detour of woman needs to be gone through, only to return to the same paternal form.

Then Nature, aiming at the best end, uses it up in this place for the sake of generation, that another creature may come into being of the same kind as the former was going to be, for the menstrual blood is already potentially such as the body from which it is discharged (*PA*, 738b 1-5).

It is in this way that, according to Protevi, during the whole patriarchal history of philosophy the generation of the body is controlled under the *hylomorphic* production of the same. In other words, the maternal material is mastered so that the detour of the mother’s matter will not break, but only provide the circumference of the circle of the species.

Aristotle observes the reproduction of animals and tries to explain both normalities, gender distinctions and abnormalities alike. He acknowledges that semen does not have a simple, pure potency with clear seeds. It is, in fact, “common mixture (*panspermia*) of many elements”(GA. 4.3.769b 29). He then confirms that the anomaly and gender distinction as well as monstrosity is as a result of this original mixture of elements in the seed, that is, seeds are prone to be bifurcated, digressed from their original path if they come across some mishap (*hamartia*). Moreover, he clearly states that “what is called ‘*panspermia*’ exists in potency, not being-at-work; it cannot exist in being-at-work, but it can do so as potency” (*GA*. 4.3.769b 2-4).

Monstrosity occurs and beasts are created as a result of the process being carried away (hence *kata-strophe*) from the appointed *eidos*. To contrast with the eternal, necessary, and organic presencing in nature, I would call this alternative path, the path of the inorganic/nomadic making. The deviation⁷⁶ begins with nature taking the path of “the female type” rather than producing the same looking son. Aristotle both gives in to the creation of the female and at the same time tries to show that it is somehow accountable.

⁷⁶ literally from *dēv*, and *dīv* in Indo-European languages meaning beast or monster also the same root as -*deo*- and *theo*- meaning divine.

Anyone who does not take after his parents is really in a way a monstrosity, since in these cases Nature [*physis*] has in a way strayed from the generic type. The first beginning of this deviation is when a female is formed instead of a male, though (*a*) this indeed is a necessity required by Nature, since the race of creatures which are separated into male and female has got to be kept in being; and (*b*) since it is possible for the male sometimes not to gain the mastery either on account of youth or age or some other such cause, female offspring must of necessity be produced by animals (*GA*. 4.3. 767b10-15).

But, of course Aristotle concedes that the monstrosity happens:

As for monstrosities, they are not necessary so far as the purposive or final cause is concerned, yet *per accidens* they are necessary, since we must take it that their origin at any rate is located here (*GA*. 4.3. 767b10-15).

By its very nature the unknown and risky material of woman is monstrous and would literally create a flaw of some kind if it leaves any residue, surplus and trace.⁷⁷ The surplus, then, is necessarily not controlled by the form and would remain animal, outcast, outlaw, unnatural and abnormal. Aristotle readily equates monstrosity with inorganic nature, that is the nature that “strayed away from the generic type.” Also, he claims that the sudden turn away (*kata-strophe*) from the generic and natural form begins with female.

Anyone who does not take after his parents is really in a way a monstrosity, since in these cases Nature has in a way strayed from the generic type. The first beginning of this deviation is when a female is formed instead of a male (*Ibid.*).

Aristotle finds it necessary to account for the threat, perhaps to help avoid it. He mentions that the seed or semen is the soul in potency which needs to be concocted properly or in an appropriate form. The propriety becomes very significant when we take

⁷⁷ If the movements imparted by the semen are resolved and the material contributed by the mother is not controlled by them, at last there remains the most general substratum, that is to say the animal.

our criteria from the common sense and common language which is a public realm. Monstrosity, *abnormality* and improper, Aristotle attribute to the violation of unity and *hylomorphism*.

For, following what has been said, it remains to give the reason for such monsters. If the movements imparted by the semen are resolved and the material contributed by the mother is not controlled by them, at last there remains the most general substratum, that is to say the *animal*. (*GA*. 4.3. 767b 10-20)⁷⁸

The animal substratum then needs to be controlled and tamed in the boundaries of the familiar look (*eidos*) and familiar speech (*logos*). This is a peculiar admission that persuades Heidegger to develop the idea that Dasein exists in *potency* and not *energeia*.

Developing on Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics, in contrast to the way of the father, the logo-centric way, Derrida has explicated the way of the mother, based on the notion of "metaphoricity." He argues that in the absence of a pre-determined *telos*, and *eidos*, Aristotle admits, the surplus produced as a result of the workings of motion (considered as such), or the animal matter would not stop creating beings, but rather it is pregnant with all kinds of formless (*aperon*), monstrous creatures. This clearly shows that what appears nonsensical or unaccountable (*alogon*) to Aristotle, the outlaw, the abnormal and metaphorical is in fact the condition of the possibility of sense, justice, and law.

2.4. *Hylē* and the Force of Life

As we just mentioned, even in the *hylomorphic* and automatic movement of nature, there is a necessary violence. On the contrary, I would simply call the Gestalt or the appropriation that is inherent in nature, "the tyranny of the organic." In fact, I think the preference for *physis* over *technē* in the making of beings⁷⁹ only makes sense if we

⁷⁸Then people say that the child has the head of a ram or a bull, and so on with other animals, as that a calf has the head of a child or a sheep that of an ox. (Peck, A. L. *Generation of Animals*. Loeb Classical Library; 366. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942., 4.3. 767b 10-20)

⁷⁹ and other (perhaps inappropriate) kinds of makings

already assume that there is more to be revealed in nature than natural laws can ever unveil. In other words, there can be unknown motions at work in nature which necessary natural laws cannot incorporate.

Again, Aristotle is vigilant to recognize that a being can still be viewed as not what-it-is or at least as not-yet-what-it-is. *Hylē* can show itself as a privative (*sterēsis*) way of being (*Met.*, 1033a 8-12). Brogan explains this is a curious language which is very revealing. He says that in such cases the “matter” is here presented as not yet dwelling in its *eidos*, and therefore as not presencing as such” (*Brogan*, 85).

Hylē can bring to light the mode of being of not-being-at-home (which Heidegger would call “*unheimlich*”) or being-unfamiliar. It is a state of being “privative,” not-yet-*proper*, *improper*, or inorganic. Brogan follows Aristotle in this case by accusing such appearances as “falling away from the truth” or being a “semblance” (*Brogan*, 85). Yet, it is in the very admission to the possibility of such an individuality that the ontological path is opened to an alternative path of distribution, the path of simulacra or “semblance.” He writes: “The individual appears as not yet in its being. When we address the individual natural being as matter, we point to a moment or phase of this being that is only properly grasped in terms of the *structure* of being as a whole” (*Brogan*, 85). This very distinction between the proper and improper path of motion is an admission to some alternative path of following and gathering. Non-being, as we have already discussed, is not simply nothing but rather that which is, but has no independent being of its own, and *is* only inasmuch as it appears along with what appears in itself as itself.⁸⁰

Aristotle refers to this kind of appearance as incidental (*sumbebēkos*). The philosopher is the one who is able to see the proper and needs to keep an eye on what truly shows itself as itself. To do so, he or she must separate (*krinein*) the being from non-being, that which only appears to be. At this point, there seems to simply be no measure other than what has already appeared as present in *eidos* or *logos* to determine what is natural and what is incidental. The only measure is repeatability as the same or being

⁸⁰ See also Schumacher, Eric. *Aristotle on the Nature of Analogy*. Lexington Books, 2018.

eternal as if copying the eternal circular locomotion of heavens in the presence of an eternal god.⁸¹

Heidegger uses Aristotle's attention to the process of natural presencing "from more familiar to us to more familiar in itself" (*Physics* 184 a16ff) to turn our attention to where the authentic possibilities are in gestation. In addition, he radicalizes the move by going beyond natural beings in life and in-the-world, calling them "idols" and present ideas people cling to all the time.

It is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a whole; second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say, that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which one is wont to go cringing; and finally, that we let the sweep of our suspense take its full course, so that it swings back into the basic question of metaphysics which the nothing compels: Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing? (*BW*, 112)

This is where the idea of death or nothingness seems to have replaced the end, limit as *entelecheia* in-the-world. I read Heidegger's suggestion to "let the sweep of our suspense take its full course" as the being-in-trouble of 'following.' 'Following' can take its full effect if one realizes that one does not know where the end or destination is. Of course, there are those who 'follow' the "idols," the already appropriated and incorporated material. Those remain in the economy (literally *oiko-nomos* the order of the household) of presencing of what is already present, but Heidegger is pointing to the possibility of embracing the possibility of impossibility (nothingness) and the unfamiliar (*unheimlich*, literally not-homely).

Therefore, clinging to what has come to presence instead of the process by which generation occurs turn the generated into idols. That is where Heidegger seems to suggest that the revealing force of motion and generation does not necessarily have to be natural. The significant stage is the end (*telos*), which has to remain in potency and should not

⁸¹This referred to precisely in Book Lambda. In other words, the generation and motion in nature unlimitedly imitates the circular locomotion of heavens at the presence of eternal god.

turn into some mental category or natural beings alike. Here, Brogan is not a hundred percent clear whether it is *physis* or *technē* that has a more revealing power. Yet, he is vigilant to point out that there might be more to *technē* than he previously mentioned as inferior to the natural presencing. His consent comes, perhaps, as a result of going back to the origin of presencing and focusing on the difference between being and beings, highlighting that motion is the *archē* of presencing but not any present being. He almost admits that there might be in a sort of *technē* the same or even more originary power of presencing than natural expression of beings per-se. He does this by referring to Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" (Brogan, 70). Heidegger writes:

True, there lies hidden in nature a rift-design, a measure and a boundary and, tied to it, a capacity for bringing forth— that is, art. But it is equally certain that this art hidden in nature becomes manifest only through the work [meaning the work of art]"(BW., 195; Brogan, 70).

What Heidegger believes will come to the fore in the work of art is not the beings as they are in their ordinary look, neither some mental image in the intention of the artist, but the very rift, or difference itself. Heidegger also holds that the rift, or the gap itself, constitutes that which *attracts* human attention. The *trait* (*Zug*) of a being as withdrawal, as that which *retreats* from appropriation and manifests the rift as such for the first time comes to pass in the work of *art* and not in the *ousia* of natural beings plainly and simply. That is how, I believe, Brogan admits that Heidegger has in fact gone beyond the actual presencing in nature and challenges the distinction between necessary and artistic (*technē*) altogether.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued why Heidegger attends to Aristotle's explication of nature to study the being of human beings. He finds Aristotle an ally against idealism and psychologism in explaining the presencing of things in nature for human Dasein. He thinks, also, that the way he raises the question of the ground of being as presencing (*ousia*), has strategically been in one way or another reduced to the study of a being (like

God), beings or some form of intellectualism. Therefore, he thinks the question needs to be revived from the dawn of western metaphysics again.

Now, what is important for him in Aristotle which he thinks is the necessary ingredient in the study of the authenticity and freedom which I render as originary ‘following’ is at least two-fold. One is his appreciation of particularity and multiplicity and second is the motion and generation in nature. Aristotle attempts to account for both at the same time. In spite of the solutions he provides, the very problem he raises unsettles the identity and authority of a subject or one single organizing principle. He famously gestures against the authority of the overarching dominance of Platonic Forms over particulars or the static nature of being in Eleatic philosophy.

In providing a response or an account to the problem he raises, however, Aristotle ends up prioritizing the structure of present and actual (*energeia*) over the possible and potential (*dynamis*). Multiplicity is allowed as far as it is bound to the schema of categories and produces different genera and species already available. And motion of the undetermined material (*hylē*) is only proper if it is headed for the appropriation in the form (*morphē*). Again, he does not deny the existence of improper making, but establishes such an arbitrary hierarchy that makes his account of nature and physics already political. He clearly prefers the present and actual constitution and generation of things in nature. *Hylomorphism* and *teleology* still guarantee the generation of the same or “for the most part” in spite of differences and multiplicities.

I discussed that in his explication of Aristotle’s account of natural making and the necessary appropriation of the material (*hylē*), Brogan’s language has already become political and expresses the essential violence and hierarchy involved in the process. The very distinction between proper and improper making is a sign of such an arbitrary distinction between proper and improper making. Later in reference to the most authentic making in the work of art for Heidegger, Brogan wonders about the problematic state of such distinctions. I explained the hierarchical system of values in nature that results from this metaphysics of presence as if nature is already political for Aristotle.

In the following chapters, I will elaborate on how the principles and laws of the gathering of people in Aristotle is just an extension of the same politics of nature elaborated in this chapter. Gathering of bodies in a community for Aristotle seems to follow the same tensions that are at work in the generation in nature as well. The tension gives rise to different modes of being-with as following in both individual and social level.

3. Chapter 3: Ethics of 'Following': the Nature of Laws in Aristotle

3.1. Introduction: The Overview of the Chapter

In this chapter we begin addressing the problem of community and following in the human domain according to my phenomenological reading of Aristotle. The discussions in this chapter are divided into three major parts that trace the natural origin of laws in Aristotle and the conflicts that arise along the way. Here is how chapter is divided:

1. **Logos as the law of community:** The merit of a Heideggerian reading of Aristotle is that it distances itself from the laws as simply a political/social imposition of abstract categories and demonstrates their essential connection to the well-being of every 'follower.' Community, being-with, and 'following' one another are not a break from the natural definition of man as life-possessing-*logos* and life-in-the-*polis*. The nature of *logos* brings about the being-togetherness for Aristotle. Other moments of *logos* are 'speaking-about' and 'speaking-with' which means that *logos* is co-constituted with other concepts and in communicating with others. For Aristotle, the ontology of laws is part and parcel of the ontology of *logos* and altogether beset by the same difficulties.

According to Heidegger, Aristotle connects the ontology of laws with the ontology of language by delving into the very genesis of expression of desires. Aristotle believes that the presencing (*ousia*) of community among humans, like other animals, is as a result of a form of indicating, directing and being directed in everyday life through voice towards the pleasant and away from the painful. Before classical distinctions between nature and culture, to explain the genesis of *logos* and the principles of its coming to be, Heidegger follows the track of this voice (*phonē*) in animals in search of the place where it becomes particularly human. This is still not necessarily a moral community or a political community for Aristotle.

This stage is very crucial especially because of the way Aristotle talks about it in the *Rhetoric*. In an attempt to show how we have immediate access to the world and others (being-in-truth), he goes to an inorganic level of animal forces, the place where

logos is still in gestation. I argue following Heidegger and Derrida that here is where he unleashes the power of the unfamiliar and the ‘other’ which is not confined to the familiar and clear *logos*.

2. Being-just, Being-towards-the Good: Reading Aristotle in this way, Heidegger helps one see how the laws that are supposed to help individuals choose the golden mean of virtues, the most just, the most proportionate, and noble are not abstract or psychological; rather, like the rest of Aristotelian basic concepts, they are ontological and teleological.

Heidegger mentions that Aristotle regards the life of contemplation as the end and the most complete happiness for humans. Therefore, any deliberation of action needs to be in accordance with the end of man as contemplation. According to Heidegger, Aristotle brings the whole basic conceptuality that I discussed in the previous two chapters, namely *teleology*, *hylomorphism*, and the unity of *logos*, *eidos* and *peras* back to the picture. Deliberation (*boulē*, *bouleusis*) is supposed to bring the presencing of beings to the clarity of the limit, end, or *logos*. It is not simply a psychological act but that which makes the realization of an action or an event in its right place and time necessary.

Heidegger believes that Aristotle manages to prove the priority of the life of contemplation *immanently* through the notion of pleasure. Aristotle demonstrates this by setting up a hierarchy of pleasures and showing that we are naturally drawn to find contemplation of things as they are in their *entelecheia* as the most pleasurable comportment. Being true to one’s nature and function means to follow the ethical laws to preserve and guard the necessary and actual presencing of beings in themselves (*entelecheia*). The virtuous action, in this sense, is to hold one’s desires in such a balance so as to not fall for the appearance of things and ‘address’ them in their true being.

This gives the moral virtues, particularly justice, an ontological sense. Heidegger finds in this movement from the appearance of the pleasant to what is truly pleasant the merit of Aristotelian philosophy. For him, this is essentially the same movement from the

ambiguity and unclear ‘fallenness’ of man in “the one” (*das Man*) to the clarity of revealing the truth of beings in their ‘definition.’

This is also where Derrida diverges from Aristotle’s notions of justice, end, and happiness. In the same vein as Heidegger, Derrida contends that in fact what Aristotle prioritizes as the most appropriate and proper end of man is akin to the affirmation of what is most familiar, actual (*energeia/entelecheia*), and stable.

That is where the critical part of the chapter begins. The paradox of the end and the limit will be examined in two moments, one in this chapter and one in the next. In this chapter, I highlight the passages where Aristotle comes across the *aporias* within his system. One is the case of the judgment of the right action or the golden mean. According to Aristotle’s formulation, one expects that were we to deliberate and exercise virtues, our actions should hit the target. Instead, having perhaps the tragic figure in mind, Aristotle himself grapples with the case that in spite of upholding the virtue and deliberating, one still misses the mark (*hamartia*). It seems that what ultimately determines the results of one’s actions is beyond deliberation, implying an unforeseen force as the source of bringing about events.

I will conclude from the discussion that although Aristotle accurately pinpoints the immanent process by which people’s desires alongside deliberation bring about actions and makings, he ultimately prefers the deliberative operation by which the most appropriate making comes to pass. For Aristotle the immanent process of making actions and decisions is not the most original or authentic mode of following. The most authentic action is, instead, the one in accordance with deliberation and *logos* which is ‘headed’ toward the most noble, appropriate, and a pre-determined end. Notwithstanding, Aristotle admits that the most effective, creative, and beautiful action, as in poetics, is not the one that simply ‘follows’ or ‘does not follow’ the rational principle, the one which is logocentric and similar to the past, but rather it is the kind of action that is aligned with this unfamiliar and hidden natural force of desire. Actions and events resulted from this force produce catastrophic ends of action as in the case of tragedy and the tragic figure. Should we want to embrace the true ‘following,’ we would have to choose the path of

nomadic following which celebrates unanticipated ends, or pure possibility (*dynamis* as *energeia ateles*).

3.2. *Logos as the Laws of community*

Heidegger believes that an important facet of life-possessing-*logos* is being-with-others. Thus, characteristic of his critique of the Cartesian self as the thinking subject, he stipulates the being of being human before one is a subject or a self. Before one is a thinking subject, separate and independent from other selves, one is by nature wired to “be-as-speaking-with-one-another through communicating” (*BC.*, 33). Consequently, what Heidegger finds helpful and worth reviving in Aristotle is the relationship he establishes between the two definitions of man as life-in-the-*polis* (*zoōn politikon*) and life-possessing-speech (*zoōn logon ekhon*). It is not only speaking (*logos*) that informs the life of man but speaking-with-others.

In the being of human beings themselves [*zoōn logon ekhon*], lies the basic possibility of being-in-the-[city state (*polis*)]*πόλις*. (*BC.*, 33; *Politics*, 1253 a 9)

It is crucial to notice that this mode of being-with, for Aristotle, is not linguistic in the sense of any natural language or at the level of concepts or reason yet. At the very basic level, Heidegger argues that essential to the being-togetherness of all animals is the immanent desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. They use different kinds of voice (*phonē*) to lead each other towards the pleasant or away from the painful. He translates Aristotle from the *Politics* (1. 2, 1253 a 9) in the following way:

In the mode of speaking about . . . human beings uniquely have their being-there among that which lives. Vocal announcing (*φωνή*, [*phonē*]) is an indicating ([semion] *σημειον*) of [*édē*] *ἡδύ* and of [*luperon*] *λυπηρόν*, of what is pleasing and of what is distressing, of what supports and upsets being-there, and therefore it, (*φωνή*, [*phonē*]), is at hand as a mode of living alongside other living things (human beings possess this announcing

as well, but it is not the *ἰδιον*, the ‘peculiarity,’ that constitutes the being of human beings) (*BC.*, 33).

Heidegger explains the transition from animal gathering to human gathering in terms of a transition that occurs in voice (*phonē*). Necessarily and naturally, we are-with-others in directing one another towards what appears pleasant or away from what appears harmful. Like animals, human beings, at a very basic level, announce what is pleasant or seems pleasant or painful to each other. This is the most basic mode of community before humans are even subjects independent of the world and nature. At this level, we are dealing with purely immanent forces of desire. Although this state looks very much like the state of nature for modern philosophers, especially Rousseau, the fact that *logos* is the link to the state of being-with-others complicates the nature-culture distinction.

Thus at a very ordinary level, *logos* is in this affective communication in terms of expressing pain and pleasure, in warning or in recommending a given state of affairs or events (*Politics*, 1. 1253a 16).

And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear: For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. (*Politics*, 1293a 9-12)

Heidegger naturally connects being-in-the-*polis* to being-in-possession-of-language. “In being-in-the-*πόλις* [polis], Aristotle sees the genuine life of human beings. To show this, he refers to the fact that the being of human being is having-speech (*logon ekhein*)” (*BC.*, 34). What appears in Heidegger’s *Concept of Time* as ordinary or everyday community “being-with-one-another” can be claimed to have derived from this original insight of Aristotle. It is significant, however, that Heidegger time and again emphasizes that this community is the most basic but not the most authentic being-with one another (*CT.*, 34). As I mentioned in the last chapter this *logos* is governed by the power of the idle-talk (*CT.*, 22). Therefore, for Heidegger, this level of being-with-one-another still does not explain the quality of this hyphenated being through *logos*, the character of the *logos*,

neither the most authentic *logos*. The analysis simply indicates the co-originary character of life for human beings with others.

On the other hand, for Aristotle, it is the end, the completion, and the limit that explain the most originary presencing (*ousia*) of beings in nature. Life-possessing-speech can only meet its full potential, end, completion, and limit in the *polis*, which constitutes the second function of man as being-in-the-city. As the definition shows, the function, the for-the-sake-of-which (*ergon*) of human beings is to activate and exercise speech (*logos*). Considering that speech has several moments including speaking-about and speaking-with, it brings to light the hyphenated being of man more than any other phenomenon. Hence, *logos* is the activating (*en-ergon* hence *energeia*) of the being of human beings in a *polis*. In this sense, *logos* also constitutes the being of the laws of the community. *Logos* is the principle in accordance with which a flourishing gathering of human beings comes to pass. Aristotle would like to take a step further and argue that being-human already reveals the possibility of what is genuinely good and genuinely pleasant. The distinction between the original or authentic as opposed to that which is clear and ordinary does not become problematic for Aristotle to the extent that he seems to prioritize clarity over originality. Human *logos* is essentially headed towards what is genuinely pleasurable.

As opposed to modern distinctions between the state of nature and the social contract (in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau to name a few), Aristotle complicates the distinction between nature and culture. More precisely, the distinction between nature and culture, *nomos* and *logos*, becomes *aporetic* due to the *aporetic* nature of *logos* which we elaborated on before. One may go as far as to contend that the definition of human Dasein is only complete when *logos* unfolds its paradoxical singular-plural character.

3.3. Organic Nature of laws in Aristotle

Now the question is: how are the *laws*, the *logos* between one another explained by Aristotle? Or what is the nature of this communal *logos*? In order to show how *logos* becomes *aporetic*, Heidegger focuses on where the immanent and natural motion of desire gives rise to the human mode of following. Heidegger tracks the voice of life,

looking for where it becomes different in humans. So, at the animal level, the sounds (*phonē*) of animals indicate pain (*luperon*) and pleasure (*édē*) to other animals. Here is the rest of the quote from above, extracted from book I of Aristotle's *Politics* and translated by Heidegger. It is a long quote, but is worth analyzing.

The being-possibility of animals has of itself reached this mode of being, having perception of what constitutes well-being and being upset, being oriented toward this and indicating this to one another. However, speaking is, as such, more than this, having in itself the function of making manifest (*δηλοῦν*)⁸² (not simply referring, but being such that what it refers to is made to speak), making manifest the beneficial and the harmful, and thereby the proper and improper, too.⁸³ That is, what distinguishes the being of human beings from that of other living things is their unique aptitude for perceiving what is good and evil, what is proper and improper, and so on. The being-with-one-another of such beings (i.e., beings that are in the world in such a way that they speak with it) makes for household and the [city-state (*polis*)] πόλις (*BC.*, 33; *Politics*, 1253a 9).⁸⁴

Being moral the way that Aristotle proposes in this passage (as a distinction between human and animals) begins with an animal stage where humans and animals are both with one another and use voice to express pain and pleasure. Human beings, however, do not only use voice to indicate sources of pain and pleasure. Human beings are also, by nature, the revealers of truth (having in them the function of making manifest). This means that they make things manifest in their definitions, or in how things are in relation

⁸² *Plat. Crat.* 423a

⁸³ Thus the function of making manifest (*delon*) is accompanied by a communal aspect of indication of designation of the harmful and the beneficial, and more importantly the proper and improper.

⁸⁴ The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state (*Pol.*, 1.1253a).

to their function, *telos*, or limit. The quote explains how human expression takes the initial indicating at the level of animal that is indicating pain and pleasure to a second level of indicating what is “beneficial and harmful” as well (*BC.*, 34).⁸⁵ “The beneficial” and the “harmful,” apart from the immediate or natural satisfaction of desire, include some kind of end in view. In other words, while pain and pleasure can be immediate and related to body, beneficial and harmful are completely mediated, interpretive and related to a unity of some kind.

Heidegger interprets Aristotle as saying that man’s voice is different because it is connected to a whole, to some end, and unity. Sounds, for example, are not first received individually as pure parts which then would be put together and interpreted as this or that. We always already experience a voice as, for example, the sound of a bird or a piece of music. So, on the one hand, *logos* addresses “the there” (*Da*) as beneficial or harmful in an instant immediately; yet, on the other hand, it is only meaningful because of the proper end. The harmful and the beneficial are, therefore, at least partly determined by other human beings. That is to say *logos* is as much political as personal.

Heidegger emphasizes that being-with-one-another has less to do with “being-situated-alongside-one-another” and more with “being-as-speaking-with-one-another through communicating, refuting, and confronting” (*BC.*, 33). It turns out that the political being of man is such that in making sense of his world, man takes things as already significant. It is not the case that things are objectively there for man and only later become harmful or beneficial. Rather, things always already appear-as “the mode of the beneficial and the harmful, of that which uplifts or upsets being-there (*BC.*, 34).”

This already puts judgement and deliberation in an ambiguous and problematic situation. The measure is ambiguous for that which licenses what is beneficial or harmful. It seems that things are to be received always already evaluated by the community as beneficial or harmful. On the other hand, there is this immanent power of presencing, through pleasure itself. It is not all that clear why something is desirable to *me*. What

⁸⁵ συμφέρον, βλαβερὸν

seems to make the whole of an object also makes its meaning ambiguous. When something looks pleasant to me, the question is whether it is because of my natural inclination to it or because I understand things in accordance with the way things are evaluated in public.

This is why Heidegger emphasizes on the role of pleasure in Aristotle's ethics. Emphasis on pleasure is an emphasis on what is most immanent to every individual's being. Pleasure and pain, according to Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, constitute basic possibilities "in which the world is encountered in its initial being-there. [They] are, as such, the modes in which living things are with one another, in which the community (*koinonia*) is constituted" (*ibid.*). In this way, animal feelings of pain and pleasure are communicated and negotiated with others to establish an appropriate, communal sense. Such is the ambiguous, singular-plural character of how a sense of appropriateness is formed.

As if hiding the ambiguous (to some extent cultural and public) nature of this very basic being-togetherness, Aristotle insists on the purely natural origin of the city. It is very suggestive, then, that in the end, community as the completion of man in a city-state is compared to the growth or maturity of any natural thing, like "a horse":

Hence every city-state exists by nature, inasmuch as the first partnerships so exist; for the city-state is the end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each thing is when its growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing, for instance of a man, a horse, a household. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good. From these things therefore it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal (*Politics*, 1.1 1253a 1-5).

Gradually however, it is Aristotle's own emphasis and insistence on the natural constitution of the city that causes an ambiguity. He is well aware of the immanent motion of desire and how it produces unities automatically. And yet, he insists that by

nature a pleasant action which is in accordance with man's function has to be in accordance with deliberation in *logos*.

At the same time, another feature of *logos* that naturally brings about a community, as we mentioned, is that *logos* puts humans essentially in a communicating situation. The very same natural force makes humans live with one another and at the same time establish a limit of appropriateness to their end. For Aristotle, being in accordance with nature (*physis*) means that the good (*agathon*) is only met in a community. The motion of animal desire, which for animals and the animal world is a neutral force of producing difference and multiplicity without a *telos* is threatening for a communal and clear system of sense-making. The force of desires might create differences that would not correspond to a pre-determined whole. The motion of desire might very well be carried away by sophists who are trained in rhetoric to manipulate the communal *logos*.

Aristotle's speculative philosophy aims at watching over this motion to make sure it leads to the being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*) of every entity. So, neutral desire, which was the condition of the possibility of every motion whatsoever, "ought" not to produce a form other than what is already anticipated as proper and clear *logos*. That is why the project of politics, a flourishing being-with-others, for Aristotle, is at the same time a moral and normative project of directing to the best end.

Ironically, as Hannah Arendt shows, the political lives of the Greeks were completely separate from their ordering of the household (*oiko-nomos*). For her, political life (*bios politikos*) is supposed to provide new possibilities of action (*vita activa*) and production (*Arendt*, 22), makings and doings in a completely separate order (*Arendt*, 24). But, as I tried to show, even in the realm of politics the end simply reaffirms the order of the actual including the house as well as the city. For example, no man goes out in Aristotle's projection of the city, fighting for the rights of women. Aristotle's politics and ethics altogether account for the present or the actual order of things and in that respect legitimize the order of the house as well. Every individual's action is determined by the

ultimate good of the city which is the reaffirmation of what is truly just, truly pleasant and good in itself in accordance with *logos*.

Now, to justify and legitimize the movement towards the end of man in *logos*, or the life in accordance with contemplation and at the same time keeps its relation with the immanent movement of desire, Aristotle makes a distinction between what is truly pleasant and what appears as pleasant. That is, for him, the force of the “ought,” to do the right thing also needs to be immanent. He argues and insists that to do the right thing is more pleasurable and true to the being of human as life-possessing-*logos* and it is not simply a communal appropriateness.

3.4. Ethics of ‘Following,’ Being-towards-the-Good (*agathon*)

3.4.1. Immanent Forces in the Ordinary Speech

After asserting that the animal, natural voices make humans act and follow one another, Aristotle explains how actions in fact occur. How does one choose or not choose to follow one directive and not the other? Although all evaluations of action happen through a contextualization in terms of a whole, we still do not have the ultimate happiness or measure of judgment in view. At the immediate level, actions are still run by maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. In understating the ontology of moral laws in Aristotle, the key is in the notion of pleasure and its different kinds. Aristotle summarizes the voluntary actions that are affected by man’s desire for some good as follows:

All that men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant (*Rhetoric*, 1369b23-25).⁸⁶

Pleasure (*hedonē*) is a “determinate mode of being-in-the-world,” of “one’s well-being” (*BC.*, 35). Since, evidently, that which produces the disposition we have just mentioned is the pleasant (*hēdū*), we need to illustrate all of the forces that make events appear pleasant or worth pursuing.

The directives come more than anywhere else in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. The *Rhetoric* is where an action is talked about in terms of how people are directed to do this or that, or the forces in speech that guide it. We can see all of the manifestations and products of such presencing in rhetorical speech. In rhetoric, the speaker uses all he has at their disposal, all modes of expression, conceptual or affective, to lead the audience toward where he or she deems appropriate. Rhetoric is the art of manipulating all of the communal existential forces of humans to lead people toward a final heading intended by an orator—and perhaps “the other of the heading,” that is not a prior anticipated intention or *telos* at all. It is the place to study the genesis of different kinds of doings, makings, and directing in community.

Heidegger seems to want to suggest that Aristotle is aware of all these rather unaccountable, inorganic, or altogether bestial forces. The *Rhetoric*, like most of Aristotle’s speculative philosophy, is an attempt to watch over these forces, to treat and mold them, so as to make them accord with the most appropriate human function. To

⁸⁶ There might be a criticism against cases like courage where what one chooses does not even look pleasant. The questions in this regard is, why one does a courageous action when according to Davis, “courage is frequently rather unpleasant and can easily make one dead” (*Davis* xviii). If one truly seeks pleasure, one needs to find a more lasting and legitimate end for the courageous action. “Lasting and satisfying pleasure never comes to those who seek pleasure, but only to the *philo-kalos*, the ones who look past pleasure to the beautiful” (*Sachs*, xxiii; *NE*. 1099a 15-17, 13). In fact, in cases like courage, actions like killing the opponent do not look beautiful in the first place. The point is that the internal force of the pleasant which was supposed to take the body and desire towards the most beautiful, so that we could anticipate the good action and judge it accordingly, seems to pushing against the immediate decision to do the courageous act. One has to represent the action in a whole story or with having the good of the city in mind to begin to see it as worthy. Michael Davis takes a step further, claiming that actions basically begin to make sense when they are represented in speech (*logos*), “when they are talked about (*Davis*. xvii.).” That is perhaps why Aristotle considers honor as the second best choice after *kalon* as the ultimate end and principle of doing good actions. Or that the virtue of magnanimity (*megalopsychia*), which means greatness of soul, is considered the “the crowning virtue.” The character that is shared by all of these concepts is that they go beyond the immediate action to the image or representation of action as a whole, or in the eyes of the others.

quote Paul Ricoeur, in *The Rule of Metaphor*, “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* constitutes the most brilliant ... attempt to institutionalize rhetoric from the point of view of philosophy” (*RM.*, 16/11). That is what comes next in the *Rhetoric*. In effect, he looks at all the forces which give rise to actions and events in order to make sure that deliberation guarantees the final good making, the happiness of the doer, and the beautiful end.

3.4.2. Different Forces of Doing (*praxis*) and ‘Following’ the Animal

Unlike other animals, not all human makings and doings are natural. Additionally, not all human makings are made according to *logos*. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle observes that in everyday life the actions of human beings can be caused by “chance (*dia tyche*), nature (*dia physis*), compulsion (*dia bion*), habit (*di’ ethos*), reason/calculation (*dia logismos*),⁸⁷ anger (*dia thumos*), and desire (*di’ epithymian*).” What I called the originary ‘following,’ for Aristotle amounts to leading the life of moving past semblances of pleasure to achieve true pleasure. He explains these forces in turn as follows:

Things which are the result of chance are all those of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen without any end in view, and that neither always, nor generally, nor regularly. (*Rhetoric*, 1.10. 1369 b)

Chance (*tychē*) is unlimited (*aperon*), infinite, multiple, and evil (*NE.*, 1106b 26-30). It is not anticipatable and controllable by *logos*. This is rendered as “without having an end in view.” Accidents are rare and, as is the case with “what is contrary to nature,” they do not need to be investigated.

Nature is open to investigation because of its repetition and its happening “always, or generally, in the same way” (*Rhetoric*, 1.10. 1369 b). This repetition and generality make the incompleteness of nature look like the ‘rest’. In this respect, nature looks very much like habit (*Rhetoric*, 1.10. 1369 b). The ease and pleasure that come with

⁸⁷ λογισμός, οὗ, ὁ, λογίζομαι (I) a counting, reckoning, calculation, computation, Tan account, bill, Dem. (II) without reference to number, calculation, consideration, reasoning, Thuc., an argument, conclusion, Xen. (III) reasoning power, reason, id=Xen. (Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon)

habit are associated with this similarity with nature, which has to be mastered and revealed.

Aristotle attributes things that are contrary to nature to either some unknown mixture in nature or chance, but admits that they are rare and need not be investigated (*ibid.*). Things of this sort might also be contrary to nature not arbitrarily or by accident, but by some violence of bodily or otherwise intentional force, what Aristotle calls by compulsion (*βία*, which literally means bodily strength, force, power, might). These “are done by the agents themselves in opposition to their desire or calculation” (*ibid.*).

The actions done by calculation need to have their end in view. They are the closest to just actions because of their mathematical character. They are in accordance with calculative reasoning in spite of the fact that they might not involve actual mathematical calculation.

Out of all forces mentioned here, only one is in accordance with reason (*logismos*), and yet Aristotle argues that if the forces are in balance the result will be in line with the being of things as they are in accordance with deliberation. Since desire and anger bring about catastrophes, they need to be held at bay so that beings can be truly present as what they are. Therefore, the balance in desire and anger make beings truly present as what they are (*energeia*).

All along, however, Aristotle seems to be wary of the fact that, unlike everything else in nature, many of the doings and makings of humans are the result of their imposition of categories on nature (*technē*) and fabrications (*simulacra*) that might not resemble the truth (*RM.*, 11). He is well aware of the "dangerous power of eloquence" which may well be used with no regard for truth. He is deeply concerned about the ethical judgments and justice of the orator, for a good reason (*RM.*, 11). That is why he deems it necessary to write a philosophy of rhetoric.

The modes of presencing in rhetorical speech are not necessarily in correspondence (*adequatio*) with any real or familiar reality or natural presencing, but they are nonetheless persuasive and effective. The manipulative power of rhetoric occurs on the surface of things, making it difficult to determine what reality it refers to, if any.

For Aristotle, They are therefore semblances of truth, not the truth itself. So as to control what comes to the surface, Aristotle begins to make concessions and determine necessary ends and goals and sets up a hierarchy.

It is in this context that a choice needs to be made. A deliberate choice (*prohairesis*) is a “a matter of desiring to do what deliberation has shown to be conducive to our goal” (*NE.* 1111b26-30; *NE.*, 1112a30-1113a12; cited in *Sorabji*, 107). It is worth noting that against many commentators who psychologize this definition of choice, as I argue below, deliberation can be interpreted as a directing of the forces of desire towards an ontological settling down in *logos*. Commentators like Sorabji still believe that this operation is intellectual and psychological. This reading as I discuss below will come across some difficulties with regard to Aristotle’s notion of the end of man as political life or contemplation. Thus, while I agree with the calculative nature of the deliberate choice, I do think that this choice is that which constitute the being of the individual before she is regarded as a self or identity. At this point we need to ask what the character of the end is and how it affects every action and decision made.

3.4.3. ‘Following’ to the End

What is the ultimate measure and end which should be immanent and in line with pleasure as well as *logos*? In other words, how are we to understand the highest form of pleasure as being-in-*logos*? My contention in this section, following Heidegger, is that all modes of end suggested by Aristotle in different contexts as the most pleasurable are at the same time in line with *entelecheia*, how things already are in the present and actual. In all moments of decision-making, to deliberate is to look at the completion, the just, the most beautiful as the measure. These are all in accordance with what appears in *logos* and are still troubled with the same *aporia* and ambiguity. He famously writes in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book X (7-8) about the character of virtue being “the work of what is best in us, namely “intellect” (1177a 17-20). For Aristotle, David Roochnik argues, such a work is described as “contemplative” or “theoretical,” which is the most continuous, pleasant, self-sufficient, and leisurely activity available to human beings.

Furthermore it “alone seems to be liked because of itself” (1177b1), for it supplies no benefit other than itself. Finally, theoretical activity actualizes what is most divine in us and allows us to approximate the gods, whose “activity is superior in blessedness” and is itself “theoretical” (Roochnik, 2011. 480).

Now, for long it has been argued that this account seems problematic for it flies in the face of Aristotle’s earlier descriptions of ethical and political virtues. For Martha Nussbaum for example, this passage stands in clear contrast to Aristotle’s earlier claims about the self-sufficiency of the excellences of character (Nussbaum, 1986. 373). She denounces the intellectual activity as more Platonic than Aristotelian: “These chapters do not fit into the argument of the *Nicomachean Ethics*; indeed, they represent a line of ethical thought that Aristotle vigorously attacks” (Nussbaum, 1986. 373). Nussbaum even considers them as out of place to the extent that they might “have [been] composed separately... [or might have been] inserted ...by someone else (*ibid.*)

In contrast, firstly there are counter arguments which prove the essential homogeneity of practical life with theoretical at least in terms of the former being partial and with the view towards the latter. Secondly, there are stronger claims that shed light on the ontological character of pleasure associated with theoretical life. Such interpretations which support the Heideggerian phenomenological reading will to a large extent solve this apparent discontinuity. This gives more evidence to justify Heidegger’s understanding of the theoretical end of man as being in accordance with *entelecheia*.

Thus, in order to explain the nature of theoretical life and its relationship with the practical, there are scholars who stipulate a hierarchy among virtues. Instead of a major split between virtues, they suggest practical virtues being in unity with the whole in contemplative life. They argue that the divine nature of contemplation underscores the very partial nature of practical and political life and its essential limitedness. As Eric Salem contends, the claims in Book X chapters 7-8, underline that the ethical life is “on the way to the theoretical” (Salem, 2010. 156) and that the ethical life is “at best a partial

realization of the highest life” (*ibid.*, 158). This observation implies a homogeneity between theoretical and practical life as well.⁸⁸

A more nuanced and arguably more ontological explanation of the relationship is presented by other scholars. Roochnik, for example, agrees to some extent with the *apparent* separation of the contemplative act versus practical one. He contends that at first glance, in fact, the leisurely activity of thinking done for itself and with no practical purpose or motive in view does not seem very ethical neither practical. At first, He counts the reasons why this life of contemplation is the happiest according to Aristotle (*NE*. 10.7):

- (1) We can theorize more continuously than we can do anything else. (2) Theorizing is most pleasant. (3) It is most self-sufficient; that is, it has the least need of external goods or human assistants. (4) Theorizing is the only activity loved for its own sake, for it produces no gain other than itself. These characteristics are encapsulated by (5): it is most leisurely. Leisurely activity is performed in the absence of external constraint and without an eye to the clock. As such, it is as close to "free time" as human beings ever come. (Roochnik, 2008. 731)

Gradually however, Roochnik tries to complicate the kind of activity that we call contemplation. On the one hand, Aristotle’s mentioning that contemplation needs to emulate the divine (which is famously described in *Metaphysics* 12.9 as “thought thinking itself”) clearly makes happiness being a-political, “stranger to the commonplace or political, or ...somehow beyond the human” (Roochnik, 2008. 732). On the other hand, the existence and the expression of that (speech or action) which is unworldly can threaten the stability of the political. The emergence of the unworldly action or speech by itself makes that action or speech the most political activity. Contemplation in the sense is not simply a *having* like knowledge (*episteme*) which one learns and belongs to him. According to Roochnik, contemplation consists of an *activity* of discovering albeit

⁸⁸ This, as I will argue further, shows that although according to Arendt the political life of the Greeks belongs to a separate sphere beyond the economy of the household, and separate from contemplative, altogether political life is not fundamentally run by separate principles.

discovering the truth which has always been present in ambiguity or we already have it in memory (Roochnik, 2009. 7).⁸⁹ Contemplation, the most *divine* activity, in this sense according to Roochnik, is as much about pure leisurely thinking as about deriving the golden mean of virtues, the *practical* activity.

Roochnik does not elaborate on the ontological and political ramifications of this unity. However, his analysis sheds a good light on the ontological character of theoretical life and Aristotle's view about pleasure associated with contemplation. In other words, it seems that the controversy among scholars about the relationship between theoretical and political life arises as a result of the anthropomorphic or psychological readings of the rest of the books of *NE* (i.e., the ones before book X), or the nature of decision and deliberation.

Should we follow Heidegger's ontological account, the controversy disappears. Heidegger continues his ontological explication of human end by reiterating Aristotle's contention in book X. He interprets intellection, the ultimate happiness, as "a certain form of life associated with meaning-making (*BC.*, 32). In other words, before man become a self, the fact that one's being as well as his life-in-the-city are characterized by *logos* turns all activities of the life-possessing-*logos* (leisurely or the one's having a practical end in view) into the ones of an interpretive nature.

The complete character of contemplation becomes clear when we look at the kind of ontological pleasure that we are supposed to enjoy in it. After determining the happiness and the main activity of man as contemplation, the question is how to lead the life-possessing-*logos* to exercise her function and to choose (*prohaereisthai*) what is genuinely pleasant rather than what seems pleasant. Unlike other natural beings we are not automatically drawn to reveal our function in a complete and just (*dikaios*) way. The perpetual activity of learning and exercising rational principles is to see through these

⁸⁹ Roochnik writes about the usage of this term in *De Anima*, underlining that *theoria* there is contrasted with knowledge in that knowledge (*episteme*) is a "having" but not actively using, whereas *theoria* means being "actively engaged in the working with" (*De Anima*, 412a26) the knowledge one has. *Theoria* in this sense has an active becoming and temporality to it, its focus is the momentary application of knowledge or science. Aristotle uses the phrase "right now" (*ede theorein* *De Anima*, 417a 25) to emphasize the active character of this operation.

pretenses of the truth and let the things appear in their being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*).

While Many scholars interpret the choice which involves deliberation and practical wisdom as a cognitive process of decision making (*Sorabji*, 111-112), Heidegger argues that the choice is primarily an ontological one. The judgment to do the right thing at the right moment is not an imposition of a mental or psychological category to a state of affairs. Contemplation means letting things show themselves as they are in a just and accurate way.

This is not to deny that the choice (*prohairesis*) involves deliberation but rather that in keeping with the natural presencing of beings, deliberation of the just action, the golden mean, the most noble or beautiful is not simply a psychological or cognitive activity. Heidegger interprets deliberation in this way in accordance with the life of contemplation which is in letting beings be themselves in their categories, in their ends (*entelecheia*). Deliberation in this sense is in line with *logos*, limit and the definition of things.

This is how deliberation makes judgment. Judgment is a gathering in *logos* that addresses the being of things in the right (*juste*) way. Justice can be interpreted ontologically in this way as the judgment which is in accordance with the being of a thing. Through deliberation the proper categories are assigned to things.⁹⁰

The most perfect kind of justice means to ‘address’ beings as they are, to judge them right (to use Derrida’s terms, *juste* and *justesse*). Justice is to ‘address’ beings in their genuine categories (Derrida, *DDP*. 47-48).⁹¹ Justice and judgment in this first sense need to be distinguished from a mental or psychological process. This is also true about happiness and the beautiful, which are famously not about a temporary psychological

⁹⁰ Categories, derived from *katēgoriā*, in Greek means charge or accusation, implying that being is already to be responsible and in charge of something.

⁹¹ Categories as we showed in the last chapter refers to the presencing of beings as they are and not an imposition of mental categories on beings. Derrida reminds us that categories etymologically bears the sense of having responsibility or being accused of something.

state but a disposition or a mode of being. In this sense, being happy and being just are different expressions of the same notion.

Heidegger argues that Aristotle insists that this striving of human beings towards their end is still immanent and natural. He demonstrates that as humans, we are *naturally* inclined to find ultimate pleasure in contemplation of beings as they *are* in being towards their being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*).⁹² That is because Aristotle defines pleasure as a kind of movement towards a “settling in” a position or state (*katástasis athróa*). “Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a sudden and perceptible *settling down into* its natural state, and pain the opposite. Such is the nature of pleasure” (*Rhetoric*, 1.11.1370 a). The important thing is that the words Aristotle uses produce a paradoxical situation. Pleasure is discussed here as a motion (*kinēsis*) of the living principle. Yet, we know that not all motion and change are pleasurable. Motion is only pleasant if it restores the original presenting of the same state. He continues: “Necessarily, therefore, it must be generally pleasant to enter into a normal state” (*Rhetoric*, 1.11. 1369 b33). It is worth remembering also that, in his *Poetics*, Aristotle mentions that the ultimate pleasure produced by a work of art, like that of painting, comes as a result of the restoration of “recognition” after an initial de-familiarization or hiding. “Understanding and reasoning out what each thing is results when [one] contemplate them, for instance that “that's who this is” (*Poetics*, 4. 1448b 8-10). For Aristotle, “pleasure” in poetry is the pleasure of recognition. “We delight in contemplating the most accurately made images of the very things that are painful for us to see, such as the forms of the most contemptible insects and of dead bodies” (*Poetics*, 4.

⁹² One can argue that this his latter state constitutes also the meaning of the most perfect kind of justice as well.

1448b 10-12).⁹³ Although for the full effect of the work the detour of lexis is necessary and metaphors, foreign words, and lengthened words are necessary for the movement of the soul to happen, altogether pleasure comes as a result of the return to what is available in the normal state.

The words used for the normal state, the most pleasurable and dominant state are all of the same root. Heidegger underlines that in the expression used for this normal state, *εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν*, the word *hyparchei* can be translated as “the genuinely available possibility of the being-there” (BC. 34), like the pleasure of learning. He wants to emphasize that the normal state, the proper state, or the appropriate state is desired because it is the most pleasurable. *Hyparche* has the same root as *hexis* and habit. It indicates the subsistent and stable nature of things in their natural state. It is worth remembering from the previous chapter that *hyparche* shares the political connotation of a leading or a sovereign mode like that of *entelecheia* with the same root, *-eche*, to have, possess, or hold as well as to reign and to govern. It implies that the most genuine state of being of a thing has the most appropriate, the most pleasurable, the most natural and the most stable character.

From such an ontological viewpoint, the well-known controversy we opened this section with disappears. The problem was the incompatibility of Aristotle’s account of happiness from book X (7-8), i.e., happiness as contemplation and leisure with the rest of the book which stipulates a politically active life as the happy life. The most pleasurable life as the life in accordance with *entelecheia* of every being and individual is also the life that treats any individual being in the city in a just way that is its right place and merit. By contemplating about the just and accurate characterization of images in *logos* while

⁹³ He adds, “if one happens to have not seen him before, the image will not produce pleasure as an imitation, but only on account of its workmanship or coloring or some other such reason. (*Poetics*, 4. 1448b 18-20). By this Aristotle is conceding that there might be some affective pleasure out of some non-conceptual factors of a depiction or art. That is a creative intervention at the level of the means of delivery of art: “on account of its workmanship or coloring or some other such reason.” In terms of tragedy he tries to deal with this in wording (*lexis*) for example. Yet, he is trying to minimize this as one can see in the quote above. Furthermore, he contends that we need to have known the object beforehand and imitation is merely a return to the thing as we know it in a new light perhaps. This is a limited semantic innovation since even the surprise is like that of an eclipse which does not interfere with the *hylomorphic*, *teleological* process of motion in Aristotle.

having no practical and political aim in view, one in fact is questioning the limits and the just character of the life-in-the-city. That is why Socrates, for example, who never fights for an office or political status, is still considered a political threat for the institutions of the city. Socrates leads a private life, the life of contemplation and his activity is simply to contemplate the meaning of words but this very activity unsettles the ordinary meaning of words to the extent that in the Apology he begins his speech by apologizing from everyone for his speaking a language that sounds “foreign” to the men of Athens. By contemplating the normal, ordinary and politically established terms like justice, courage , etc., the man who is contemplating is the most political man. As if having Socrates in the back of his mind, Roochnik describes the being of the contemplative man as philosophers saying:

Philosophers bear some similarity to criminals, for they too are marginalized. Preferring leisure to being-busy, and therefore opting out of the realms of politics and war, out of the competition for money, power and fame, they become strangers. But their alienation is simultaneously a completion. For they think, they theorize. In doing so philosophers function as a paradigm of how to use leisure well. (Roochnik, 2008, 734)

More than mere leisurely activity however, being similar to “criminals,” “the outlaws” as was Socrates with respect to the God’s and the laws of the Athens, makes Socrates also the “heart” of the city as well. The contemplative activity interrupts the familiarity and universality of laws and questions the ordinary *logos* and laws as to their ground. Aristotle never goes as far as Socrates in praising that which is un-worldly or foreign and ultimately remain conservative but contemplation as this very investigation for clarity seems to be a political activity nonetheless.

Aristotle continues with another example of pleasure: habit itself. Difficult things like learning/education become pleasurable and easy when we turn them into a habit.

...the same with habits. For that which has become habitual becomes as it were natural; in fact, habit is something like nature, for the distance

between “often” and “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea of “always,” habit to that of “often.” (*Rhetoric*, 1.10. 1370a)

In the case of habit, then, it is a settling in (*katástasis*) of something that is necessary but not completely natural, turning it into something that is almost natural (*Rhetoric*, 1370a). Drives in life-possessing-logos that may turn beings into other things in an accidental, contingent, and in an unpredictable way must be educated and under control through habit. This is associated with the same dichotomy of “beings as the truly are” and “beings as they appear”. We can see that the ultimate end of mankind as happiness in contemplation seems to be but the restoration of the being of things as they “are,” as opposed to how they “appear” as a result of desire and anger:

Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them. (*Rhetoric*, 1.10.1369 b)

Therefore, in order to restore a quasi-necessary motion towards pleasurable rest, actions (*praxis*) of the individuals need to acquire habits (*hexis*). As most commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* argue, habits are in accordance with *energeia*, that is, the actively putting to work of one’s function (*energeia* as *en-ergon*). We can see that habit is the

restoration of the natural presencing of one's function in nature.⁹⁴ This is confirmed by the distinction between a feeling/disposition and *hexis* (*Met.* 5.1022b).⁹⁵

This does not mean that habits are natural, which Aristotle explicitly denies. But, he also mentions that habit are not “contrary to nature” either. Once a habit is acquired it makes the hardest learning processes easy and pleasurable. Therefore, the pleasure is the pleasure of reaching one's appropriate end and the settling in it.

Hexis, having the similar root, *ekho*, with *hyparche* and *entelecheia*, active as it is, is the state of returning to the same (settling in) in spite of all of the drives which draw the soul back and forth, acting like a spring or in Sachs example, “a Newton's wheel,” which restores its equilibrium after any move away from it (*NE.*, xii). Further, this state is a state of choosing an action knowingly and for its own sake, which makes it completely

⁹⁴ In contrasting *hexis* with disposition (*diathesis*), Joe Sachs refers to Aristotle's formulation of “disposition” in his two other works: *The Categories* (8b) and *On The Soul* (417b 15-17), reminding us that, in fact, disposition refers to “passive states” such as cold, heat and sickness. Dispositions are temporary and they are removable. They are psychological or physical in nature, but not ontological. He distinguishes between the surface level impressions that are significant but not drastic as opposed to deeper level effects that can drastically change the direction of motion and give rise to a different entity (*Sachs, NE.*, xii). He makes a distinction here that might prove to be important: he refers to dispositions as shallow, while he sees *hexis* as deep and active. Later we read in Aristotle's *Poetics* that the effect of Comedy is at the surface level and the effect of tragedy is at a deep level.

We see a similar pattern for moral virtues and acquiring habits. According to Sachs, in Book VII of the *Physics*, Aristotle remarks: “children are not changed as a result of acquiring a habit. They are not even trained. Learning is the process of one's overcoming distractions.”

The motion involved in learning is to overcome the forces that might distract one from leading the path of nature (*Sachs, NE.*, p. xii). In other words, knowledge is “an active knowing that is always already at work in us.” This is confirmed in the *Categories* (8b 27-35) when he writes:

Let habits and dispositions constitute one kind of quality. The former are unlike the latter in being more lasting and stable. Comprised among what we call ‘habits’ are virtues and all kinds of knowledge. For knowledge is considered as lasting and hard to displace from the mind, though a man may, in fact, have acquired it in only a moderate measure, unless some great change should come over him, thanks to disease or the like. And the same will hold good of the virtues—for instance, of temperance, justice. For these are allowed on all hands to be hard to dislodge or displace.

Sachs concludes that to acquire a *hexis* is to become aware, or to reveal the having or holding of a certain state or virtue. In learning, there is no alteration or change involved, but rather a turn from potency in being or having a state to the being-at-work in that state. That is why Aristotle identifies moral virtue as a *hexis* in Book II, Chapter 4 of the *Ethics*. So, if *hexis* is a kind of settling in one's being, what constitutes a good, moral action is related to the flourishing of this being and not a particular thing in the state of affairs. Sachs mentions that the central assumption of the book is this relation of virtue of an action to the doer and not the deed. By comporting oneself in a certain way, or by “holding oneself in a certain way,” (*pōs echōn*,) one can be moral. Hence why no action is universally good or bad. We have, for every person, an optimal action that is in accordance with her optimal state of balance. Aristotle calls this state that one holds as “a stable equilibrium of the soul” (*Sachs, NE.*, xiii). Sachs mentions that this phrase translates the Greek: *bebaiōs kai ametakinētōs*: implying “in a condition from which one can't be moved all the way over into a different condition.”

⁹⁵ On *hexis* in *NE* and *Eudemian Ethics* look at Appendix 2.

different from a blind adherence or copying of some rules or a blind habit. This constant comportment constitutes what Aristotle calls character (*ēthos*). The movement towards the end of man, to the appropriate body-politics is from *ethos* (with epsilon) to *ēthos* according to Sachs: from being a certain way in potency (not actively and knowingly) to being-at-work having the *same* thing knowingly (*ibid.*). This seems very much the same movement from unclarity to clarity from the previous chapter.

In the realm of human action, there would already be a shift from the animal body to a habitual body that grows out of education in childhood. Habitual actions, according to Aristotle, are done with ease and pleasure—with almost no effort, and not contrary to nature: “the virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather we are by nature able to acquire them, and we are completed through habit” (*NE.*, 1103a 25-6).

Meanwhile, man’s corporeal nature puts his being in a precarious situation of longing and desire. Irrational longing or desire, illustrated in anger and bodily desire, turns things away from what they are and therefore need to be tamed by the stability of *logos*. Both anger and bodily desire are associated with the motion of the body, always longing for being-other than a thing is. They seem to be closer to the expression of the pure difference. Therefore, it seems that the ultimate “ought” in this reading of Aristotle is “to be what one truly is consistently.”

Thus, happiness as a stable end is always already anticipated. It is not some state in the future, or a revelation that would rip the texture of the world, but it is the fulfillment of a definition. This, as Sachs points out, is confirmed in *Physics* VII, where Aristotle compares the end of man with the completion of a house:

Then just as neither do we call the completion of a house an alteration...., it is the same way also with virtues and vices, and with the things that have them or take them on, for the one kind are perfections and the other losses, and so are not alterations (*Physics*, VII. 246b).

The consequence of this is that the immanent and natural laws that bring about the city give everything in the world its proper or appropriate place. That is the first meaning of

justice as the most perfect virtue. Justice for humans is to uphold the necessary laws given as a result of the transition from *phonē* to *logos*. *Logos* gives everything in the human world its definition, its proper or appropriate (*prepon*) place. Justice, for Aristotle, is to keep beings in their presencing—what they are expressing, what they are at their end (*entelecheia*).

Heidegger appreciates this ontological character of happiness as to let beings show themselves as what they are. But again, *what they are* for Heidegger is not coming from the appropriateness of the actual world or the common ordinary language. To contrast this, we can look at how Heidegger himself established this movement in *BT*.

In *BT*, Heidegger in fact talks about the deliberation and decision, as that which is at work revealing the truth. While criticizing the limit as actual and present, he still confirms that the deciding is not psychological and deliberation is in line with revealing the being of a thing as it is. In reference to the poem of Parmenides, Heidegger writes:

The fact that the goddess of truth who leads Parmenides places him before two paths, that of discovering and that of concealment, signifies nothing other than the fact that Da-sein is always already both in the truth and the untruth. The path of discovering is gained only in *krinein logo*, in distinguishing between them understandingly and in ***deciding*** for the one rather than the other. (*BT*, 223; my emphasis)

To “distinguish between two paths understandingly” (*krinein logo*) and “to decide” are perhaps the elaborate rendering of what Aristotle calls deliberative choice (*prohairesis*). As I mentioned before, as long as Dasein is the place of the presencing of beings in *logos* it is “in truth”; but primarily Dasein finds herself in the unclear and the semblances of truth and that is why she is in “the untruth.” It seems then that Heidegger is in fact highlighting the same decision making between revealing the truth and covering it. Nevertheless, for him, what is familiar and actual does not afford any authentic possibility.

For Aristotle, on the other hand, the decision making and deliberation remains within the *logos* and has to remain present, actual and at its end. The more he tries to

establish immanent and natural end of man the more he instills appropriateness of the actual in the most intimate and inorganic levels of the generation of man. This is evident in the hierarchical system of society and the status of women and slaves in his *Politics*. This rational over-reach is exacerbated by the focus on the language of appropriateness and the insistence on the communal aspect of the proper, most beautiful or just action. All along he uses true pleasure as his evidence to prove that.

3.4.4. *Being Headed towards the Noble (kalon)*

From the beginning to the end of *NE*, pleasure remains the strongest candidate for the happiness—that is, the most self-sufficient and complete alternative for happiness. In every case, however, improper pleasure is only apparently good, the closest to us that must be questioned, put away in favor of a more lasting and permanent pleasure and for the good in itself that is in accordance with how things truly are, at their limit, *eidos* and *logos*.

We are thrown back to the original *aporia* of *logos* again. Aristotle admits, “The good is talked about exactly as variously as being” (*NE*. 1.4.1096a 23). Thereby, the original conflict at the heart of *logos* and expression is basically transferred to the realm of the ends of the action. If one wants to know what actions mean morally, or to judge an action, one is inevitably divided between the singular situation, and the communal one; the singular sense *for me*, and the language of “the other.”

The most pleasant or the most just or beautiful (*kalon*) as it appears to the particular individual, as it is *as such*, and as it is considered in society might not be the same. That is how the beautiful or noble starts to become ambiguous and *aporetic*. It starts to be used in close association with what is socially *appropriate*.

The way this happens is that *kalon* is considered the same as *prepon*, (the appropriate). As Davis Risebeck⁹⁶ observes in a gloss on the *Topics*, not only is *appropriate* the same as the most beautiful, but it is also suggested that what is *kalon* is

⁹⁶ Riesbeck, David. "Aristotle and the Scope of Justice." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* [Online], 10.1 (2016): 59-91. Web. 8 Apr. 2018

even based on what is *appropriate* (*Topics*. 1.5 102a 5-6). In the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well, these two have been associated closely with one another and with the mean between extremes in action and feeling (*NE.*, 4.2 1122a34-b7, 1123a6-9, 4.6 1126b36-27a5, 10.8 1178a10-13). The virtuous agent feels and acts as he should, when he should, toward the people he should, as much and as long as he should, for the reasons he should, and so on; appropriate action is the one that hits the mean (*NE.*, 2.6 1106b21-28). As Risebeck confirms, the idea of appropriateness is deeply political since it has the beauty and flourishing of the others in view.

Risebeck also suggests that it is in this sense that the just action is related to *kalon*. This association is particularly strong in the *Rhetoric*, which gives prominence to actions such as “those choice-worthy things that someone does, not for his own sake,” “deeds for the sake of others,” and “good actions that concern others and not oneself” (*Rhetoric*, 1.9 1366b36, 1367a3, 1367a4-5). As we will explore in the next chapter, however, the problem persists in the realm of justice, as Aristotle connects the good of the individual to that of general good, and finally the good of the other.

Also, to make sense of the *kalon*, and to give unity to all of the virtues, Aristotle associates the *kalon*, the most proportionate, with “the golden mean.” To determine the Golden Mean is not a matter for mathematics, but is not alien to mathematics either. It needs the most perfect virtue, which is justice in a general sense. The general or complete sense of justice, then, according to Aristotle, is that disposition, which makes one able to see the most proportionate, the most beautiful as the golden mean in regard to any particular virtue and any particular circumstance. So, justice in this sense is not simply a social virtue but is the fundamental orientation of life-possessing-*logos* to deliberate the sense of individual actions by putting them in relation to wholes and evaluating them as virtue or vice. In this sense, the just, the beautiful and the golden mean come together and are associated with the most appropriate.

By establishing this hierarchy, we enter the critical aspect and the aporetic nature of Aristotle’s treatment of justice. By opening the door to all animal, inorganic, and immanent forces of desire, and (*teleologically*) taming them in favor of appropriateness,

he has systematically mis-treated all gatherings that occur unexpectedly. The important point is that he admits the existence of such unnatural or demonic gatherings and tries to eradicate them altogether. Paradoxically, however, he provides the ontological grounds for them as inorganic, animal or bestial.

3.5. Conclusion: *Hamartia* and *Following* the Nomadic

Doings, makings, and gatherings, for Aristotle, always follow a hierarchy of the best (*agathon*), the most flourishing and happy (*eudaimonia*), the most beautiful or noble (*kalon*), and the less virtuous, the barbaric, the monstrous, or the completely evil. Essential to all motion and generation, as we mentioned with regard to the generation of animals, is, on the one hand, the immanent force of bodily desires for pleasure and avoidance of pain, and, on the other hand, the transcendent, rational limit that is imposed on creation by a form (*morphe, eidos*) associated with *logos*.⁹⁷ For the gathering of sense to be accounted for, the movement of desire, which is generating species, has to come to an end, meet its limits, and receive names and articulations:

For what is bad belongs to what is unlimited (*aperon*)⁹⁸ as the Pythagoreans conjectured and what is good (*agathon*)⁹⁹ belongs to what is limited whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed—easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it). (*NE.*, 2. 1106 b 29-30)

The unanticipated—the one that has no proper name *yet*—is, therefore, the monstrous, the unlimited, and the catastrophic. For the beings to be in perpetual state of pleasure and rest, in the most organic sense of the term, their desires have to be in a

⁹⁷ One can argue that this trend has been continued even more drastically throughout middle-ages by replacing the *logos* with the *logos* in religion and absolute eternal forms or ideas in the mind of God. Through a providential, divine creation every creation has been categorized as already anticipated and necessary by God.

⁹⁸ ἄπειρος boundless, infinite,

⁹⁹ ἀγαθός, good

balanced state so that they do not turn to something else. The entities at-their-end also must express their essence (*ousia*) perpetually. In other words, they always have to be towards their being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*). *Being-[perpetually]-at-one's-end* is to be at the precarious position of the limit, or border (*peras*). This is the perpetual state of expression of an entity's being what it *is* and, at the same time, what makes it distinct and separate from others. That is what makes this metaphysical notion so political. What a thing is, the expression of the genuine identity of a being is already making it differ from others. It is to determine its borders and limits. We are already talking about “the Ends of Man,” “Crossing the borders,” the immigrants, the aliens, and the monsters.¹⁰⁰

The significance of Aristotle's text is that whether in the generation of animals or the ethical contexts, he recognizes the possibility of “missing the targets,” namely, bad (*kakos*) and ugly (*aischros*) makings and doings. Notwithstanding, he insists on marginalizing or stigmatizing them as vices, barbaric language or unaccountable, bestial formations. In the case of human makings (*poiesis*) and doing (*praxis*), one of the terms he uses for the ontological deviations—mistakes in the universal laws, as well as involuntary mistakes caused by the internal constitution of human beings—is, “missing the mark (*hamartia*).”

However, missing the mark, failing to recognize, or to use Derrida's term, the “mis-recognition” or “mis-treatment” of bestial formations is “symptomatic” (Derrida, *DDP*, 39). That is to say, Aristotle knowingly, and systematically tries to circumvent such deformities or to turn all of them to accountable¹⁰¹ bad formations which can or

¹⁰⁰ In order to deal with the abnormal, singular particulars, immigrants and aliens, Aristotle himself examines different kinds of borders, limits or completions. He has different schemata to deal with the generation of the other while advocating the use of reason to determine the end in each case or, as Ricoeur would say, to keep the generation of the new under “the watchful eyes” of reason. For things in nature, the ones which have the principle of motion and rest in themselves, he contends that, they seek their necessary end “for the most part.” Nonetheless, as we mentioned in chapter 2, some unknown mixture in the seed of the father in the process of gestation, or overactivity of the receptive material in mother's womb, may interfere with the process of coming-to-be of an animal, in which case, the end would not express the same thing as its form or the form of the father and leads into the creation of monsters. That is when the immanent power of desire in nature means (i.e. want to say or express (to use Derrida's term *vouloire dire*)) more than the anticipated end.

¹⁰¹ Through the sort of accounts that are psychological, biological, physiological and the like.

“ought to” be avoided. He, himself, “misses the mark” by which he indicates or points at the creation of the abnormal, the bestial, and the monstrous. We learned from Aristotle that being comes to the fore in *logos*, but in *uttering* the results of such “missing the marks,” *he* is the one, who releases all sorts of beasts in *logos*.

Here is where in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he points to the possibility of that. In targeting the best and most balanced and moderate course of action, Aristotle contends that the end or the target is the golden mean. The Golden Mean as the most noble (*kalon*), the most balanced, proportionate, and beautiful is always mine and particular, which means that it is not Platonic. Nonetheless, it is anticipated and rational. It is controlled by *logos*. As I mentioned above, he makes sure that through calculation and deliberation, necessarily, the most just, beautiful and right results must come to pass. I also mentioned the ontological character of deliberation that controls the presencing of things towards the accomplishment of the *hylomorph*.

This is particularly critical when one is supposed to be judged, or someone commits an unjust action. When some criminal or wrong doer is judged, the question of what went wrong, who to blame, what or who is responsible for the *deviation*,¹⁰² and what the just measure is for the good versus bad action has to do with accurately identifying the agent or the source of action. Here is a bit more context to the citation above. He writes:

Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions in which excess and deficiency *go astray* while the mean is praised and gets them right [hit the mean, aim at the right, *kalon*, balance of desires, justice] and none of these belong to virtue. It is also possible to go wrong in many ways (for what is bad belong to what is unlimited (*aperon*) as the Pythagoreans conjectured and what is good belongs to what is limited) but there is only one way to get something right. (which is why the one is easy and the other is difficult,

¹⁰² The root of this word in Indo-Iranian languages “-*dēv*-” is associated with beast, bestial etc.

it is easy to miss the mark (*hamartia*) and difficult to hit it. (*NE.*, 1106b 26-30)

The Golden Mean of virtues is a modification of desires, a having (*habit*, *hexis*, *echei*) or singular targeting of desires (for the beneficial (pleasure) and the harmful (pain)) which makes the seed, the potency, or the body of an entity to be directed towards a proper (*prepon*), appropriate holding-at-one's-end (*entelecheia*). Therefore, the subsequent choices “ought” to be controlled by the power of *logos*. Here comes the symptomatic mis-treatment. In the case that a desire “goes astray” and the agent “misses the mark” in targeting the mean that he “ought” to pursue, he will produce deformity. Monsters, here, are vices that are created often much more than proper makings because we are dealing with human choice and desire.

Aristotle investigates different kinds of these mistakes to account for as many of them as he can. Some of these actions and mistakes, according to Aristotle, take place as a result of a permanent disposition. Unjust acts can refer to an unjust disposition or a vice in a person. That is when the principle of movement that causes the action is within the person and under the control of his deliberation. Still, Aristotle introduces other forms of making and doing that have a strange affinity with this one.

In *NE.*, 1135b18, Aristotle explicates a number of reasons why someone might be responsible for an “injury over his fellow.” He mentions that when the injury inflicted, happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a mishap (*hamartēma*);¹⁰³ when it happens not contrary to reasonable expectation, but without malice, it is a mistake (*atýchima*).¹⁰⁴ In the case of a mistake, the source of responsibility lies within the agent (and so it is accountable), whereas in the case of a mishap, the initiative lies outside him

¹⁰³ ἀμαρτάνω: the same root as *hamartia*: “missing the mark”

1. generally, *fail of one's purpose, go wrong*,
2. *fail of having, be deprived of*, mostly
3. rarely, *fail to do, neglect*,
4. *do wrong, err, sin*

¹⁰⁴ accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and not reasonably to be expected

(NE. 5.1135b 17-19). In a footnote, the translator draws attention to the possible relationship between the involuntary mistake and the tragic mishap or “missing the mark” (*hamartia*). He comments that there is too much similarity, here, to ignore. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in regard to the disruption of an unjust act that does not speak to the character of the agent of it, Aristotle writes:

Thus it will be possible for a deed to be unjust without yet being an “unjust act”¹⁰⁵ if the element of voluntariness is absent. By a voluntary act, as has been said earlier,¹⁰⁶ I mean an act which lies in the agent’s power to perform, performed by the agent in full knowledge and without ignorance either of the person acted on, the instrument used, or the result intended by his action. He must know, for example, whom he is striving with, what instrument, and what result he intends to achieve....

Later he continues:

A man may possibly strike his father, realizing that he is striking a man or a bystander, but without knowing that it is his father whom he is striking. (NE. 5, 1135a28) (this example likely refers to Oedipus, (*Poetics* 13, 1453a7-17 *hamartēma*)

This is a new category of events introduced here. The normal category is when the result is in accordance with the deliberation. Those choices and decisions determine the being of somebody. They are, *jus* (in *Latin*), and *juste* (in French meaning right), or just to his being. Some actions and mistakes can be referred back to the bad judgment or miscalculation under the influence of desires. Both of these results are anticipated and accounted by Aristotle’s metaphysics.

¹⁰⁵ This means that, as Whalley confirms too, an “act” has a particular implication for Aristotle. It means that it has to be teleological, aiming at a good if not at a final good.

¹⁰⁶ In book three and explication of the voluntary and involuntary.

But Aristotle is vigilant to mention particular cases like Oedipus, where in spite of all of the calculations by the individual, he does actions that does not speak to his character and would not result in a *hylomorph* but a catastrophe. In that case, the principle that is creating the event, Aristotle admits, must have been from outside of him or incidentally. The source of the making and the mistake is outside his being and he is not to blame (*NE.*, 1135b18).¹⁰⁷

Therefore, the error in the part of a character like Oedipus, points to an agent, a doer, or a maker of state of affairs, which is beyond the expectation of a rational, virtuous doer and maker, as well as the audience of the tragedy.

¹⁰⁷ There are then three ways in which a man may injure his fellow. An injury done in ignorance is an error, the person affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent supposed; for example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not with this result, but it happened that either the result was other than he expected for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound but only a prick, or the person, or the missile. When then the injury happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done without evil intent, it is (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself. (*NE.*, 1135b18)

2 The three sorts of injury are *ἀτύχημα*, *ἀμάρτημα*, and *ἀδίκημα*. The second term is introduced first, in its wider sense of a mistake which leads to an offense against someone else (the word connotes both things) . It is then subdivided into two; *ἀτύχημα*, accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and not reasonably to be expected, and *ἀμάρτημα* in the narrow sense, a similar offense that ought to have been foreseen. The third term, *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong, is subdivided into wrongs done in a passion, which do not prove wickedness, and wrongs done deliberately, which do. (*NE.*, 1142a)

[7] Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may go wrong either in your general principle or in your particular fact: for instance, either in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or that the particular water in question is heavy. [8] *ἐτι ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον*:

Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well either generally, or in reference to a particular end. Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the end in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative Excellence of some special kind.

If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which¹⁰ constitutes Prudence. Understanding, or Good Understanding. (*NE.*, 1142b)

With regard to problems, and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this. Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things—either things as they were or are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be. These are expressed in diction with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which we allow the poet to use. Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it is in the art of social conduct or any other art. In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, essential and accidental. If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an essential error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for example, a horse advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of knowledge, [20] in medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not an essential error. These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the charges contained in these objections.

Aristotle rejects the possibility of the attribution of this making (the catastrophic making) in the horizon for Oedipus to the divine writer. He says such an ending and discovery (the divine intervention) is too easy and does not bring about catharsis (*Poetics*, 1455a 15-20). In effect, he leaves no other option for the audience than thinking of a bestial force at work in the nature or the order of things that threatens everyone—and there is no secure escape from the contingency of its creation. Hereby, Aristotle admits that the disastrous effect or bad formation might occur in the process of individuation unbeknownst to the doer and against his best calculations. This is still a motion of desire, but not from within the control of the deliberation of the individual.

There is this passage in the *Politics*, where he is suggesting the characteristics of a tyrant and it has a curious affinity with this situation. Here, too, he is referring to the bestial power of generation of events. These events are not in control of the deliberation and are created as a result of a mistake or stupidity, what Derrida calls *bêtise*, from the same root *bête*, beast, and bestial (*B&S.*, 147).

...each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god. (*Politics*. 1.1253a 25-27)

This passage is too enigmatic for me to interpret in passing. But, what it does indicate is that Aristotle is evidently very wary of those “parts” that somehow or other will not be subsumed under a “whole”. They seem to be not simply anomalies that can be simply dismissed or straightened. They are in the same order as gods, Aristotle claims. These lower beasts seem to be in the same order as the sovereigns. They are also self-sufficing as if like self-generating power of *physis* or *logos*, except that they are of a different order of expression and paradoxically become active when deliberation is suspended. It seems that the thought of *bêtise* becomes active particularly when the deliberative thinking stops working (*B&S.* 148). As we mentioned in the last chapter, this is akin to the language of

difference and the gift of being. It is in the naiveté of silence or hearing that *physis* begins to express this original language of difference.

Once admitting to the existence of a mis-treatment, and the automatic power of generation of events beyond calculation, one expects Aristotle would turn into an immanent philosopher of becoming. Well, he goes deep into the multiplicity of desire through imagination in tragedy, but only in order to educate, warn, and threaten the audience *against* such unaccountable makings. That is to say that *philomythos* and *philosophy*, for him, have the same goal of bringing a kind of rationality to the picture. The gifted poet is the one who realizes this threat, and by invoking and appealing to the audiences' power of imagination, tries to threaten them about the consequence of their actions and the vulnerability of their situation.

Another place where the contingencies of action are revealed (and Aristotle deals with them head on) is in the formation of a political community. That is, in the implementation of general justice and laws to a *polis*. This will be continued in the next chapter.

4. Chapter 4: Following the Just, Following the Nomadic: Deconstruction of Laws in Aristotle

And of the man in you would I now speak.

For it is he and not your god-self nor the pigmy in the mist, that knows crime and the punishment of crime.

Oftentimes have I heard you speak of one who commits a wrong as though he were not one of you, but a stranger unto you and an intruder upon your world.

But I say that even as the holy and the righteous rise beyond the highest which is in each one of you,

So the wicked and the weak cannot fall lower than the lowest which is in you also.

(Kahlil Gibran, 40)

4.1. Introduction: Two Modes of Natural Community in Aristotle

The two communities which I believe can be read from Aristotle's text come about as a result of his attempt to establish a just society in accordance with the natural development of human beings towards their end. One formulation of community, what I call "exchange community," arises in accordance with Aristotle's general systematic conceptuality by establishing the end of man in the city. Before attending to the second mode of community about this very natural process, there are two complications within Aristotelian scholarship which need to be addressed. Right away, there is an apparent conflict between the end of man as contemplation (Book 10) and the end of man as life-in-the-*polis* or political life. In this regard, I follow David Roochnik's suggestion that there is no fundamental conflict between the two. I believe my writing in this chapter also confirms his suggestion that leading a truly contemplative life is essentially the same as leading the same as leading a political. This brings us to the actual process of the genesis of community and laws and the complications thereof.

The laws or *nomos* of this economic community are not an interruption of the state of nature (*logos* and *nomos* essay). For Aristotle, unlike modern formulations of community in contrast to so called "state of nature," one's true freedom is not compromised in community with others. It is actually quite the contrary. As we discussed before, being in community for Aristotle implies being already in accordance with *logos*, hence speaking-with others. That is to say that human beings find their true expression and freedom in accordance with their nature, (possessing-*logos*) primarily by 'following' the *logos* of the public and consequently the laws of the city.

On the way to establishing this primary mode of community, Aristotle hints at the possibility of missing the target and failing to justly 'address' the individual character of every citizen. I argue that such an admission opens the structure of Aristotelian community and its laws to an alternative mode of 'following' which is not sanctioned primarily by Aristotle's own system.

This alternative path or mode of 'following' and community which I call "nomadic following," is akin to the destruction (in Heidegger's terminology) of the

tradition or deconstruction (in Derrida's terminology) of the laws. More generally, Aristotle's self-reflection and self-criticism make him the first follower of this new mode of 'following,' albeit by taking only some initial steps in that direction. Therefore, we begin with the immanent and natural genesis of the laws of community in Aristotle and conclude with the suggestion as to what the most original mode of 'following' in general is.

4.2. Derrida on Justice, Responsibility, and the Laws

Before embarking on the study of Aristotle on law and justice, in this section I explain my critical point of view. My justification for using deconstruction of tradition as my lens is that to read Aristotle as part of the tradition is to 'address' his text justly. As I will try to show in this chapter, the only way to justly 'address' the other is through deconstruction. Especially, with regard to tradition, deconstruction (which I take it as a translation of *destrucktion* in Heidegger) is the most authentic mode of 'following.' Therefore, I will enact deconstruction to address Aristotle, Heidegger and Derrida's thought while trying to analyze how they treat otherness.

4.2.1. The Point of Departure: Dasein, Being-with, and Interpretation

It is safe to assume that Derrida's point of departure in examining the self, community, and politics is Heidegger's critique of subjectivity and psychologism. I mentioned before how Heidegger explains the hermeneutic state of the being of human beings as Dasein, the place of the interpretation of being. In most of his first books and lecture courses, Heidegger begins with the assumption that before being a self or having an identity, the primary and preliminary mode of being of human beings is a "concernful engagement" (*Besorgen Umgang*). This means that for the most part, things matter to Dasein in a pragmatic and practical sense and not theoretically. Being-at-home and being-in-familiarity with one's environment (*Umwelt*) is the most basic form of being-in-the-world-with-one-another (CT., 22), in fact, more original than notions like empathy or inter-subjectivity.

Heidegger asserts that the relationship between Dasein and its others is primarily guaranteed by the essential community in making sense of the world. “One (das Man)” Heidegger’s word for the being of the public, “shares (*teilt*) and has a cared-about world” (CT., 23). I also mentioned before that Heidegger does not hide the Greek origin of this formulation (humans as life-possessing-*logos* and life-in-the-*polis*) and contends that as being-in-possession of language, this essential community has an interpretive character. He calls this most ordinary state of being-with-one-another in the world or being-at-home-in-the-world “communication or communion” (*Teilnahme*) (CT., 23). What we *share* is not just mine or yours, but it is an essential state we find ourselves in together. We depend on it to be able to find our bearings in the world.

Familiarity includes trusting the world and submitting to it without suspicion and arrange, cultivate, harness, and keep [the surrounding world]at our disposal. (CT., 24)

He further develops the linguistic character of this familiar sense-making in terms of the idle-talk (*Gerede*). Dasein grows up into and primarily develops this elaborate hyphenated existence through the most ordinary way we make sense of the world around us. We learn what is good for what, where, when, and how and interpret things and people under this light. Our being, incomplete and relational is our most useful property, estate, and fund which we can depend on and spend every day with ease. Heidegger emphasizes the fact that this basic sense-making power is not authentic yet it is our main and primary asset before abstract and theoretical constructs like cognition and representation.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ It is important to remember that Dasein’s hyphenated and incomplete existence as opposed to being-at-one’s-end and complete or having an essence should not be understood negatively as a lack. That is the route of psychoanalysis or even Marxism which highlight the unconscious psychic or economic forces behind and before the constitution of the self and consciousness. For Heidegger, being under-determined turns Dasein’s existence into a positive, life affirming discovering power and an interpretive force (*möglichkeit*). On the other hand, Heidegger still distinguishes between an average primary discoveredness as opposed to an originary discovery (cf. CT., 28).

Although structurally speaking, Aristotle’s definition of truth as *aletheia* paves the way for Heidegger towards such a distinction, Aristotle himself has reservations with regard to the emergence of the unanticipated as truth.

In everyday life we talk without originally appropriating what the talk is about what we say about something-the said (*das Gesagte*)- is said on the basis of hearsay (the newspaper), parroted (*nachgeredet*), picked up from our reading; and it is ‘said without thinking’ (*daher geredet*) in this rootless fashion. When we are together with others and go about our business (*besorgenden Umgangs*), our talk (*die Umgangssprache*) is characterized by uprooted inauthenticity (*entwurzelen Uneigentlichkeit*). (CT., 22)

Therefore, Heidegger maintains that the clearest understanding of the other in this most basic mode of community is, in fact, borrowed both from the past and the average understanding. What is crucial here is the fact that he still associates the experience of the other in terms of language and interpretation. Dasein, as a relational being which Heidegger calls Care (*Sorge*), dwells in an interpretation (*Auslegung*) of the world. Nonetheless, interpretation is mostly guarded by idle-talk.

It is idle-talk –through which the most common being-together-with-one-another is lived and directed- that facilitates the intractable domination of ‘one’ (*das Man*). (CT., 22)

In other words, Heidegger believes that what constitutes being-at-home or being-in-clarity in the world does not genuinely belong to every Dasein. The meanings and definitions of things are not appropriated by each individual singularly, rather it is a common interpretedness that they discover and learn while growing up.

Dasein finds its most authentic interpretation in defiance of this basic relationality and dominance of the “one,” the public. Death provides this non-relational character for Dasein. As such, the death of everyone exclusively belongs to that particular person alone. In this way, death strips away relationality and provides the possibility of being-alone for the first time. “Death is that possibility which is the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (BT., 255). This means that while death is one’s own exclusively, one cannot experience it as such. Cutting the hands of the “one” from what is on the horizon for Dasein can potentially open this horizon for a genuine discovery. This is what Heidegger

calls Dasein's "ownmost potentiality-for-being" (*BT.*, 256). This authentic expression and 'address' for Heidegger is given to Dasein only when he shuts off the voice of the public and listens to the original not-yet-determined giving of Being (*There is as es gibt*). Being-towards-death of Dasein has little to do with its actual demise or the linear temporality towards an end in time. It nonetheless strips away Dasein's responsibility towards others.

Thus, it is at this very point that the interpretation of otherness is essentially tied to the problem of language, interpretation and 'address.' When one assumes that the being-togetherness is constituted by different modes of language, the understanding of the other essentially becomes a matter of interpretation. Whatever method or strategy one maintains for interpretation in general is also applicable to the interpretation of another person or the historical 'other.'

One can argue that Derrida's point of departure in the critique of justice and the treatment of others in law is founded upon these basic assumptions about Dasein's hermeneutic situation and its interpretive and textual being. Derrida also agrees with the inauthentic character of ordinary speech and the idle-talk. In order to be in responsible 'following' of the other "rather than seeking conformity, one may have to set oneself apart from what is publicly or commonly accepted." (*GD.*, 26) One's true and authentic being emerges as a result of a *heretical* stance against what is inherited from the tradition or the public.

This is the very meaning of ethics and responsibility for Derrida. One's actions are only one's own and appropriated when one takes responsibility for them. One's signature on an event or action which makes that action genuinely one's own comes about only when it is not in conformity with the system of sense-making or the laws. It has to be irresponsible with regard to the inherited. In other words, responsibility is tied here to *heresy* in all the senses of the term: "departure from a doctrine, difference within and difference from the officially and publicly stated doctrine and the institutional community that is governed by it" (*GD.*, 26).

With regard to the interpretive character of being-in-the-world, the most genuine 'following' or community is the most original interpretation of otherness and the most

just response to the other which ‘addresses’ her as such. On the other hand, however, this most authentic ‘address’ is necessarily *heretical* in relation to the interpreted discourse and unjust in relation to the instituted laws. Such is the paradoxical and impossible character of laws in relation to justice. Authentic being-in-following is the perpetual experience of this trouble and *aporia*. That which is the most authentic expression of Dasein or the most responsible and ethical mode of ‘following’ is necessarily and paradoxically the most heretical, amoral, and unlawful.

It is noteworthy that *aporia*, as the term suggests, is a blind alley; hence, a non-experience. That is, the very statement “experience of an *aporia*” is paradoxical. That is because the experience seeks a passage to the other or to its object which, in this case, is blocked and hampered. That is why, for Derrida, every genuine reading or understanding of the other is finally a translation, and every translation is a transformation which falls short of expressing the character of the other.

Notwithstanding, this impossibility, as the one with Heidegger’s notion of death, is not a paralyzing or a negative indifference. Quite the contrary, it is the only passage towards the other and oneself alike. Here, the problem intersects with the political, ethical, and legal each of which has a claim in guaranteeing the just and accurate treatment of the other.

Laws claim to ‘address’ the rights and merits of others and consequently my own. Especially in theories like that of Aristotle, for whom the city is a place where the function of man is realized, the laws that determine the role of individuals in the city enjoy a particular ontological character. It is primarily the job of a judge or a statesman to recognize the proper character of individuals and their merits. Laws in such a system do not merely delimit individuals’ social or economic rights; instead, they sketch the most beautiful, flourishing, and balanced being-togetherness of people in *logos*. Laws are not a contract between already molded and complete selves but rather they outline and formalize the most virtuous way of being-togetherness which subsequently delimit oneself as well. They finally determine how one ‘ought’ to experience the other and oneself or how one is to ‘follow’ the other.

The problem becomes more evident and significant with regard to religious traditions and laws in two ways. First, laws in religious traditions and cultures define the self as already connected to the absolute other, God. Secondly, receiving the laws is always tied with the interpretation of texts and tradition. Altogether, the laws that project the “who” of human beings and their others are tightly tied with one’s interpretation of language and ‘address.’

4.2.2. Deconstruction of Laws and Justice

4.2.2.1. Deconstruction as Justice

As I tried to show in this work, destruction or deconstruction of tradition in Heidegger and Derrida is not trying to destroy the tradition. On the contrary, they aim at ‘addressing’ the true character of a philosophical tradition in order to disclose what has left unmentioned in them. In this sense, it is deconstruction itself which is the mode of ‘following’ that lives up to the singularity of a philosophical text, not by parroting “the said” or the “interpreted,” but by translating and transforming the text’s forces.

Deconstruction is about criticizing the foundation of laws for better judgments and more just interpretation of others. Derrida’s problem with moral laws is their pretense to establish universal justice, which excludes diversity and brings about unity among all. Derrida thinks that the dependence on the sovereignty of such laws threatens personal responsibility, free judgment and decision-making.

The privilege granted to unity, to organic ensembles, to community as a homogenized whole – this is a danger for responsibility, for decision, for ethics, for politics. That is why, I insisted on what prevents unity from closing upon itself, from being closed up. It is not only a matter of description, of saying that this is the way it is. It is a matter of accounting for the possibility of responsibility, of a decision, of ethical commitments.
(Derrida & Caputo, 13)

Derrida sets out to defend the essentially ethical character of deconstruction in his lecture “Force of Law.”¹⁰⁹ As I elaborate on below, in this essay in a Socratic style, he defends the integrity and consistency of deconstruction with regard to the question of justice (*McCormick*, 399). He tries to show that all of his philosophy from the very beginning deals with the question of laws and justice either directly or indirectly. Derrida insists that the word “law” is not merely limited to legal context but rather it can point to a meaning that is “moral, juridical, political, natural, etc.” The problem is the universal claims of any such laws, which makes them deconstructible. This is precisely what I tried to accomplish in previous chapters with regard to natural and ethical laws in Aristotle.

By destabilizing, complicating, or bringing out the paradoxes of values like those of the proper and of property in all their registers, of the subject, and so of the responsible subject, of the subject of law (*droit*) and the subject of morality, of the juridical or moral person, of intentionality, etc., ... such a deconstructive line of questioning is through and through a problematization of law and justice. A problematization of the foundations of law, morality and politics. (*McCormick*, 400)

Deconstruction in this sense does not consist in any particular system of thought or methodology, but an ethical *intervention* or ‘following’ in the historically inherited discourses of all kinds. Deconstruction suspends the said and unsaid intentions of the texts and the audience and let life as potency reveal itself from within the texts and tradition. “Deconstruction, as Derrida defends it here, pursues the unceasing interrogation of the authority of all opinion, conventional or political, even those of philosophers” (*ibid.*).

For Derrida then, the most authentic mode of ‘following’, the one that does not have a presumed *telos* and is nomadic is realized in deconstruction itself. Especially in regard to the political community, deconstruction as ‘nomadic following’ explains the

¹⁰⁹ Derrida, Jacques. "Force De Loi: Le Fondement Mystique De L'Autorite," *Cardozo Law Review* vol. 11, no. Issues 5-6 (July/Aug. 1990): p. 920-1046. In this chapter I cite this essay as (*FL*)

hermeneutic situation of Dasein with respect to otherness. Therefore, it is in fact neither controversial nor surprising to hear Derrida claim that “deconstruction is justice.”

‘Deconstruction is justice,’ since it calls for an untiring (in principle infinite, because never “finished”) analysis of the philosophical heritage and its juridico-political systems, an analysis that is inseparable from an equally infinite responsibility (*Weber*, 2005. 42).

Deconstruction is justice not in a legal sense, but in terms of responsibility. In studying the history of philosophy or in reading any particular system of thought, deconstruction does not claim to reveal the intentions of the author or the underlying meaning of the text. Instead, it remains on the margin of philosophical texts revealing what has been left unmentioned or systematically marginalized by the text.

Deconstruction considers the other as singular and the encounter as an event which is not repeatable and cannot be subsumed under any law. Justice in this sense is constant deferral of law or of universal decision. It is the admission that in any and all enforcement of laws, one falls short of doing justice to the other and ultimately falls back in some theoretical, institutional, or political system. Therefore, it seems that the only real solution to keep the force of justice active is to experience justice as an impasse or impossibility. Deconstruction reveals the complicity and the contradiction involved in any pretense of justice as law or any expression that claims to be an ‘address.’

With this new decision and path comes a new mode of motion that is not without ‘followers.’ Deconstructive ‘following’ is a perpetual calculation and dealing with all sorts of law as present. Derrida says:

I want to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts ‘law’ (*droit*) but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a strange relation to it that it may just as well command the ‘*droit*’ that excludes it (*FL.*, 927).

While the being of the ordinary Dasein is, according to Heidegger, characterized as being-in-familiarity or being-at-home, ‘following’ in Derrida’s sense describes Dasein’s perpetual attempt to find one’s bearings after finding oneself “in-trouble” or in an *aporia*.

For Derrida, ‘following’ the other is a heedful conduct and an *a-teleological* nomadic ‘following.’ It is a perpetual territorialization through deterritorialization. It is not simply dialectical as for or against any system of thought, but rather a movement or intervention within them. Derrida calls this movement in his early works deferral or *différance*. In defending the integrity of deconstruction, he repeats the same term in “Force of Law” again:

For me, it is always a question of differential force, of difference as difference of force, of force as *différance* (*différance* is a force *différée-différante*), of the relation between force and form, force and signification, performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary force, of persuasive and rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature, but also and especially of all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange places (*FL.*, 929).

Therefore, it is only by weakening the structure of law and emphasizing the generative force of the surplus that the laws of all kind become open to the other of the law or to the uncalculated. Derrida does not simply add a new concept to philosophy. He intervenes at the level of phonemes and diacritical marks within an existing word, a law, or a concept, and delays its present meaning. Again, it is worth noting how in this very concept of *différance* deconstruction as justice is enacted. Derrida has not heedlessly added a new concept to the philosophical tradition as if like an authority. He signs, however, by putting off the present meaning of a concept (in this case *différance* in French) by an intervention at the level of graphemes, i.e. turning “e” to “a.” For him, then, ‘following’ justly is the same as *différance* and the very process enacted in the term.

Derrida’s way of treating discourse, his enacting of deconstruction itself is an enactment of what he means by justice. His writing and style is performative in the sense that it shows how one might be able to find his bearing in a text without necessarily having a pre-established *telos* or any pre-established law. The terminology of deconstruction as well as the new nomadic categories gradually come to pass in this engagement with the text or tradition at hand, and the same time as Derrida is

demonstrating the internal conflicts in the texts that he engages with. The measure and the new writing under his signature are created in the very act of reading and ‘following’ the text and subsequently uncovering the constellation of concepts that comes to the fore. Deconstruction as this intervention in reading the tradition and interpreting otherness does not claim to understand the other or even to be able to have a dialogue with the other; instead, it takes full responsibility for the violence that one is bound to commit whenever one embarks on such a task.

After Derrida’s intervention, one is bound to pause before the concept and let it make sense as if it were a new language. He injects temporality—what he calls metaphoricity—within the body of the concepts, cultures, and commonsensical issues that are already benumbed and stupefied, and turns them into singular problems and fresh questions. There is no pretense of presence, completion, or identity, and there are especially no general laws or community. Deconstruction is not a method or theory but an intervention which ‘follows’ the emergence of concepts while they are coming to be.

Laws in general and particularly in terms of political context define inside and outside, normal and abnormal. Their application always involves some kind of positive force of elimination and delimitation. Deconstruction exposes the marginalization committed by these general laws as well as their *aporias*. “...the exposing of the *aporias* and the margins of the traditional is an act of resistance and an openness toward the future. The future is a possibility of transcending violence, a possibility already aspired after in the tradition itself” (*McCormick*, 399). In the lecture, I just cited, Derrida sets out to prove his point in a performative way. In a Socratic way, as in the *Apology* or the *Republic*, he acts out the essential relationship between justice and language with his audience while giving a speech about this topic. He puts his audience in a position to witness in person the necessity of deconstruction, the violence inherent in the laws, and the *aporias* involved with complete compatibility of laws and justice. Far from encouraging resignation or a turning away from politics, these *aporias* actually render more urgent the demand of justice. Here, I will review this performance before applying the same critique to Aristotle’s laws.

4.2.2.2. Deconstruction and the *Aporia* of the ‘Address’

At an American university conference titled “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice,” Derrida spoke to an audience of law students. Derrida scrutinizes and objects to the very title of the conference he is invited to. He mentions that by way of coordinative conjunction “and” in the title, the organizers of the conference have initially set these two concepts apart as if they were incompatible. Thereby, they question whether deconstruction can in fact be co-extensive with justice. Derrida goes on to explain how the application of laws is beset by some *aporias* as well as the fact that laws essentially involve some kind of force and violence. Derrida points out that for him to come and give that speech for example he has to abide by the laws and regulations around holding a conference one of which is to speak the language which is not his. He sets out to show that as a result of such *aporias*, the experience of justice becomes "an experience of the impossible" (*ibid.*), that is, of the incalculable and the unpredictable.

One of the *aporias* which he performs with his audience is the *aporia* of the ‘address.’ The conflict is between the uniqueness of the address and the name and necessity of the generality of the law.

An address is always singular, idiomatic, and justice, as law (*droit*), seems always to suppose the generality of a rule, a norm or a universal imperative. How are we to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other or myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value or the imperative of justice which necessarily have a general form, even if this generality prescribes a singular application in each case? (*FL*, 946)

Derrida cunningly compares the case of the impossibility of justice to that of the ‘address’ in his own case. He admits to the impossibility of ‘addressing’ the audience justly and yet his desire to do so (*vouloir dire*). It is worth remembering that throughout this work we have been dealing with this immanent and natural desire to give full expression to one’s experience or to the presencing of nature and the failure to do so completely. Derrida

writes about this trouble in addressing the other as follows: “A sort of *polemos* already concerns the appropriation of language: if, at least, I want to make myself understood, it is necessary that I speak your language, I *must*” (*AR*, 232). Justice in this sense calls for a response and responsibility, the call that one feels compelled to (must) answer.

As we explained with Heidegger, as well, the problem is with *logos* and its relation to an ‘address.’ Justice, according to Derrida, is to ‘address’ the other as they truly are or a thing as it truly is—to manifest a thing in a proportionate manner regarding its being. Justice as ‘address’ is to define, to delimit a thing, or in an English expression “to judge someone or something on their own merits.” The ‘address,’ therefore, is necessarily tailored for the singular. Anything more or less in an ‘address’ is unjust. To send a parcel or a piece of mail to a particular person, you need an exact direction or address otherwise, your parcel will never meet the destination and will “miss the mark.”

However, the speaker’s intention to address people fairly, according to Derrida, always already becomes impossible by the nature of ‘address’ itself. The complication is not one but many. For one, *my* intention to address an issue in language (*vouloir dire*) must involve the language of the audience, or the addressee, to be able to be an address in the first place. Derrida writes: “I must speak in a language that is not my own because that will be more just, in another sense of the word *juste* as opposed to justice as [law] *droit*” (*FL*, 923). I have to use the language of the other to express my intention. This is to say that in order for one to be understood, one has to enter the public realm. This is the first stage of reducing the singularity of “me” and the other to what is not mine and does not belong to any singular other. This is what Derrida considers as violence upon oneself and the addressee alike. I use the language of the other thereby not only reduce my intention and myself, but I also deprive the world of its full expression by limiting it to speaking. I “must speak” is always violent per se.

The challenge that Derrida’s thought addresses to us is to realize the need to ‘learn’ -from the other, from the nameless, from the phantom -how to address ourselves to her; how to learn her name with the keen awareness

that looking for that name and learning it bears in itself the risk of ‘losing,’ forgetting, betraying it in its singularity. (Weber, 2005. 41)

Therefore, in order to be fair to the audience and address them authentically, I have to translate, to commit an injustice, or to use violence with the *problem* I am ‘addressing’ as well as to *my* intention, which has been contaminated with my language and background. Thus, Derrida argues that the condition of the possibility of justice in ‘addressing’ one’s otherness fairly is the condition of its impossibility. My arrow would necessarily “miss the mark” without any moral fault of anyone in particular. It is simply tragic, and in keeping with the language of the previous chapters, catastrophic (*kata-strophic*) as opposed to *hylomorphic*.

It is significant that the question of justice and law finds its way not only to the question of language, but also to that of translation. Derrida says, “It is more just to talk the language of the other” (*FL*, 921). This statement already contains a mediation between the two parties: addresser and the addressee. This invokes the question of translation as a “desire to say” (*vouloire dire*), that will remain as an “always imperfect compromise between two idioms” (*FL*, 925). In all such cases, we are dealing with the problem of supplementation and mediation, which is both necessarily violent and unjust due to the nature of language.¹¹⁰

4.2.2.3. *Aporias of Laws and the Priority of Responsibility*

The problems involved with the laws in general are threefold depending on different stages of their emergence and the decision or distinctions based on them. These

¹¹⁰ Derrida makes another intervention at the level of language that needs to be looked at carefully. “The word “enforceability” reminds us that there is no such thing as law (*droit*) that doesn't imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility of being “enforced,” applied by force.” We assume that the parties involved in justice as law are enacting a contract between themselves. The verb collocation for law in French, “*appliquer la loi*,” (applying the law) according to Derrida, exacerbates this misunderstanding. The English collocation “enforcing the law” is closer to the phenomenon which underlines the fact that law has been present before us and one is simply under the obligation to abide by it in order to be able to address or be addressed. It is in this sense that he also refers to Kafka’s “Before the law.” We are always already before the law which is our only way of access to the other. (ibid., p. 925)

stages may vary from a pre-political, natural state to a state where we already have political laws applicable to each case by judges.

In the former stage, as we saw with Aristotle's account of nature, it seems that Hobbes and Aristotle are on the same page. They both seem to believe in an essential violence in a pre-political stage. Aristotle as we mentioned before is not particularly fond of a limitless and chaotic nature and sets out to find its limits and ends. Against religious and particularly Abrahamic violence as in the command to sacrifice of Isaac, "Derrida identifies this [pre-political] kind of violence as Greek, as enlightenment, and later, as 'mythic'" (*FL.*, 63; *McCormick*, 405). Derrida contends that such a tendency has not been diminished at all throughout the centuries.

A constant trope in the study of law throughout the many socioeconomic and political changes of the past several centuries is the opposition of law and violence, law, on one hand, and 'the way of beasts,' as some authors put it, on the other. (*McCormick*, 418)

Ontologically speaking then, the laws of society in this first sense are no different from the laws that separate man from nature. I have already mentioned that for Aristotle, for example, the pre-organic stage is associated with this silent, bestial, and un-informed matter. In a similar way, at the level of society, laws determine the merit and the character of individuals give them a place and address in the city whereby they are known. Laws save anonymous beings and give them a name and voice. That is to say that there is a kind of violence associated with the pre-political stage, which needs to be overcome by laws and the legal system. Moreover, I have also explained the essentially *logocentric* nature of this emergence, presencing, and naming.

Whatever their differences, the most Greek testament of the Bible, like the Greek philosophic tradition, privileges 'the word' or 'reason' in a way that is potentially idolatrous from the standpoint of Judaism. If such '*logocentrism*' is not fully idolatrous, it certainly has homogenizing, imperializing or coercive tendencies. (*McCormick*, 406)

I have already elaborated in chapters 2 and 3 about the ontological necessity of these laws and their essential violence in producing a sharp distinction between normal and abnormal, proper and improper, etc. Derrida mentions more difficulties of practically the same nature with regard to the political systems. McCormick nicely summarizes these as mentioned by Derrida:

(1) judges apply previously established rules, on one hand, yet create law freshly in the moment of decision. As a result, they conserve yet destroy the law; they function in one way as machines but in another as founders. Legitimacy is threatened because, on one hand, each case is different and should be treated as such, and, on the other, consistency is required to prevent arbitrariness. (2) Derrida emphasizes the undecidable, that which cannot be sublated under a rule or even, for that matter, a prudential decision. It "haunts" not only hard cases but, as if a ghost, even routine cases. Finally, (3) there is the imperative of urgency, the fact that a decision must be rendered now and cannot be put off. Derrida observes that there is a "madness" to this aspect of the decision (*FL* 23-28). (*McCormick*, 403)

As a result, judges conserve yet destroy the law; they function in one way as machines but in another as founders. That is to say, the dominant and sovereign character of laws, the fact that they have to act impersonally and automatically, make them conspicuously blind to singular character of individuals. "Automatic application of existing legal doctrines, especially combined with the exclusory aspects of operating within a legal idiom cannot embody just decisions" (*Mathews*, 33). Therefore, the problem, as Mathews observes too, "lies in this conflict between imposed universality and unique circumstance. The law fails to achieve justice if it applies reductive generality without considering the singularity of each case and the requirements these different realities produce" (*Mathews*, 34). Derrida's distinction between law (*droit*) and justice, justice being the undesconstructible force and the laws being inevitable and yet economical, is meant to deal with this precarious situation. "If I were to apply a just rule

without a spirit of justice and without in some way inventing the rule, the example for each case, I might be protected by law (*droit*), my action corresponding to objective law, but I would not be just”¹¹¹ (*FL*, 940). While law is backed by institutional force, justice calls for a critical force of resistance which results in less violence as it does not effectively make or destroy anything. This force of resistance is not equal with inaction, indifference, or pacifism. It is an invitation to question the laws as to their foundation and interpretation of reality. Patience and indecision puts the current forces of action on a creative path than other than what is already made towards the promise of justice “to come.”

For Derrida, then, it is only in the experience of the impossibility of the law (that which can be accounted for) that a call for or a promise of justice, “if such a thing exists,” is constituted. Only recognizing one’s *aporetic* situation as a ‘follower,’ one’s being-in-trouble, constitutes the just attitude towards any law with universal and necessary claims. That is when the necessary, violent order of laws is suspended in favor of patience, and a heedful comportment towards the other is held, regardless of justice as law. This is evident in the reaction of the tragedy’s audience to the incomprehensibility of the fate of the tragic figure. Their calculation is interrupted, and they experience the impossibility with “pity and fear.” They only “wonder” and fear for their vulnerable and delicate situation. Justice belongs to the realm of the gift beyond calculation, whereas the law belongs to the economy of presence and strategic political decisions.

Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that law exists. But justice is incalculable. Justice requires one to calculate and reckon with the incalculable. The *aporetic* experience of justice is this experience, which is as improbable as it is necessary. According to Derrida, these *aporetic* moments of decisions are the ones in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule (*Ibid.*).

¹¹¹ Elsewhere he reiterates almost the same complexity: If the act simply consists on applying a rule, of enacting a program or effecting a calculation, we might say that it conforms to law and perhaps by metaphor, that is just, but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just.

Justice at this moment calls for a supplement beyond justice, beyond adequation, and beyond calculation. It calls for a surplus of excess that paradoxically restores justice. Being moral in passing judgments will inevitably be beyond the confines of the lawful and will amount to being disproportionate:

Transformations, indeed juridico-political revolutions take place—cannot be motivated, cannot find its movement and its impulse (an impulse which itself cannot be suspended) except in the demand for an increase in or supplement to justice, and so in the experience of an inadequation or an incalculable disproportion (*FL.*, 957).

Paradoxically, then, to be just, one is necessarily disproportionate and unjust, and that is why justice can only be experienced in its impossibility. Derrida compares his ethics and politics of responsibility with that of Levinas's celebration of otherness as justice and equity. He quotes Levinas calling for “the equitable honoring of faces (*droiture de l'accueil fait au visage*)”(ibid.).

The merit of Aristotle's discussion of laws and justice is that in the dawn of western philosophy, Aristotle lays the ontological foundation for both of these modes of attending to the otherness. Aristotle explains the force of justice behind both inevitable laws and the ever-transcending promise of fairness or equity. But, in the interest of establishing the city, he sets forth on the course of philosophy and prefers the former stable system by which he misses the mark.

4.3. Aristotle's Natural Politics: The Statement of the Problem

As we argued in previous chapter, for Aristotle, being in possession of *logos* naturally allows humans to direct and be directed by others in a community. As Trott confirms, the community in *logos* is Aristotle's roadmap for humans to achieve their end (Trott, 105-109). Aristotle believes that it is only in the city that man can manifest his true function and excellence of character. According to Heidegger, this claim aligns with the basic Aristotelian principle that being something requires fulfilling one's definition, which for humanity involves possessing *logos* (*zoon logon ekhon*) as well as living in the

polis (*zoon politikon*). Therefore, for Aristotle, laws of the city have an essential connection with the being and the character of individuals.¹¹² Laws function like *logos* in determining the authentic character of man, his world, and his others. In this sense, Aristotle's community and laws are already normative and moral. The general principles that constitute the perfect form of justice (*dikaionē*) are to reveal the right or *juste* (using Derrida's word) manifestations of beings as such in society. Therefore, it is only in a just city and through its laws that the originary character of individuals can come to fruition.

Grounding the laws based on *logos* besets them with the difficulties of *logos* as well. Being aware of the *aporetic* character of *logos*, which makes it vulnerable to innovative and sophistic misuse,¹¹³ Aristotle himself does his best to provide some kind of basis for modification and change in 'following' the laws in order to 'address' the individual character of citizens. Aristotle contends that laws establish "partial justice." For Aristotle, this "partial justice" has the same genus as the more complete form of justice, which he calls "fairness." He considers the same force involved in both choosing the most proportionate, beautiful, or just action privately with regard to *all* virtues (complete justice) and choosing the lawful action in society (partial justice).¹¹⁴ That's why, whenever the laws as partial justice fall short of making a judgement in a particular situation, the more general justice comes to the rescue.

¹¹² The principles that produce just actions are to 'address' beings or individuals in their being in a *juste* manner. This is what I call, following Derrida, the ontological meaning of justice as the right-giving or *juste-giveness*. Aristotle calls this use of justice, fairness or equity (*epieikeia*).

¹¹³ As we explained before, *logos* is the place of the manifestation of the being of things. It involves the motion from inorganic matter towards expression and clarity. In this way, if anywhere in the process the motion goes astray in sophists' case for example, the correspondence between the thing and its expression becomes distorted. That is the expression in the *logos* does not reveal but conceal the true nature of reality. So the sophistic misuse is grounded in the essential motion in the character of original, private (*idion*) *logos*.

¹¹⁴ He in effect inserts an originary temporality into the eternal and universal laws which will eventually create more original gatherings and comportment towards otherness, not anticipated by him or his laws. Thus, in fact the force of justice which ultimately cannot be bound to the laws of the city or even the *phronetic* decision making of the judges in accordance with the spirit of the same laws.

He thereby ensures that being in accordance with *logos* does not mean that the laws of the city are fixed like universal rational “categorical imperatives.” As Trott contends, laws that are in accordance with *logos* are always subject to criticism and reformation (Trott, 106). This, is because the laws are the result of deliberation, which is at the same time both a natural capacity and inclination of every man. In this way, for Trott, Aristotle’s city is very much organic, natural, and subject to perpetual modification of the end. He contends that this is the very meaning of human happiness as the life of contemplation.

As I discussed in previous chapter about the nature of contemplation, Trott’s reading is also confirmed to some degree by David Roochnik understanding of happiness. Roochnik gestures against Martha Nussbaum’s contention about the rift between two definitions of happiness in *NE* from books I and X, one stipulating happiness as the life of contemplation and the other as political moral life. Accordingly, for both Roochnik and Trott, the political nature of man makes his contemplative activity essentially political. The concept of human nature as possessing-*logos* and at the same time life-in-the-*polis* “makes nature and its end a question for politics instead of being a prescription that might be used to exclude persons from political life” (Trott, 106-7). Both Trott and Roochnik are in line with Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in emphasizing the ontological character of ethics and politics. The definition of man, his original ontological make up in *logos* make his natural deliberative activity a political one.

It is important to note that although both Trott and Roochnik agree on the political nature of contemplation, Roochnik seems to be pointing to a qualitatively different mode of thinking more in line with Socrates than Aristotle himself. For Roochnik, the best activity of man as contemplation is also a “leisurely, divine, and un-wordly activity” to the extent that the ones who engage in it resemble the criminals and outlaws (Roochnik, 2008. 731). He insists on the active nature of contemplation as opposed to mere knowledge (*episteme*) but implies that it is not of the same nature and quality as calculative deliberation or political life since Aristotle famously rejects the political life

of honor and power as the happiest life. As an example of such a private life I mentioned the political activity of Socrates.

As I mentioned in the last chapter, the critical activity of contemplation looks increasingly like the dialectical activity of Socrates in the city. Socrates deliberately chooses the private life over public because a philosopher cares for the truth rather the opinion of the many, the latter being a necessary ingredient for the life of a statesman. But, the very act of questioning the real meaning of words and virtues by Socrates is already perceived by the authorities of the city as a threatening political activity. That is to say that the life of contemplation, the life of happiness in private and in leisure, not caring for money, favors, or popularity, is also the most political life. If what holds a city together is *logos*, and one is happy when one is engaged in deliberation in *logos*, then to deliberate and question the ends or the definitions of concepts is to envision different ends for the political system and to question the authority. This is the real political activity associated with contemplation and not the establishment of a city or being a statesman, which is associated with a life of honor. Nor is contemplation merely a private and mystical activity. Again I believe that in the public realm and in the city, Aristotle only hints at this way of thinking. In cases where the universal laws fail, he pragmatically and strategically chooses the same kind (*genus*) of deliberation to restore the stable character of the city. In other words, he prefers the stability of the city over the multiplicity and innovation.

On the contrary, Trott reduces the activity of contemplation to more of the same calculation. Consequently, for Trott, the free and critical activity of contemplation works within the boundaries of laws albeit trying to improve them.

Consistent with the naturalness of being human, Aristotle conceives of freedom that accompanies reason as the capacity a person has to achieve the *telos*. According to nature, human beings strive toward their completion; living in *logos*, human beings determine what constitutes completion for them. *Logos* is the end and fulfillment of being human and also the source that projects humans to their end. According to this way of

being in *logos*, a person is shown to be free, but that freedom does not compromise a person's naturalness. (Trott, 107)

Freedom in this sense is to reveal one's true nature as deliberation and to be in accordance with *logos*. Trott takes a step further and claims that being in accordance with nature does not necessarily determine the *telos*, nor does it limit the constitution of Aristotle's politics as an unchangeable end. He holds that Aristotle's laws and politics, based on *logos* and deliberation, provides freedom for individuals to achieve their unique happiness. Hence, he denies that the logocentric city faces an *aporia* with regard to innovation or alterity. He writes:

The way a human being accomplishes the life that amounts to happiness will be unique to each person, but achieved in each case by *logos* according to virtue. The end- happiness determined through *logos* – remains the same for human beings, but what amounts to that end- what rational activity will mean and look like – will depend on the deliberations in which we engage to consider how to achieve happiness (*NE.*, 1095a19-21). The human being is stable in the internal projection towards an end, but variable regarding which life so constitutes that end and how to achieve that end. (Trott, 107)

Although Trott does not properly mention his source,¹¹⁵ his claim is strikingly similar to that of Heidegger. What Trott's discussion lacks, however, is the deconstructive critic that informs Heidegger's take on tradition. *Logos*, which provides the basis for the deliberation of the end of the city and man, for Trott, is still universal, homogeneous,

¹¹⁵ He refers to Heidegger's reading of Aristotle only in a very short footnote in passing.

present, albeit as a *means* to determine “unique ends.”¹¹⁶ He does not scrutinize the character of *logos* in terms of temporality. For him, *logos* acts without a surplus in determining the unique character of people’s ends. If the being of man or Dasein is constituted by *logos*, *logos* cannot simply be considered a means to define one’s end. It is not the case that the being of human is first constituted and one subsequently uses *logos* as a tool to determine his particular end. Dasein as the place of interpretation of the world is constituted *by logos* which is already historical and temporal.

Trott does not attend to the double character of *logos* as if *logos* is completely natural and does not own any arbitrary or conventional character, due to its public and historical usage. In fact, it is this initial historical character that constitutes the being-at-home of human beings in society in the first place. In contrast, as I mentioned before according to Heidegger, public historical *logos* for Aristotle has to be clear and in frequent use (*kurion*) or it becomes idiomatic, enigmatic, and barbaric. Homogeneous *logos* is not mine and not free but dominated by the idle-talk of the “one” (*das Man*). The freedom which Heidegger is after, a ‘freedom’ which is the authentic expression of one’s being, is inevitably marginalized by this deliberative and natural (even *phronetic*) progress of the laws.

In what comes below, I argue that Aristotle himself is aware of the trouble involved with the contingency, innovation, and alterity in both metaphysical and particularly political level of analysis. It becomes evident that the end of the city and the establishment of clear *logos* or universal laws limit the genuine expression of individuals in a city. One needs to follow Aristotle’s footsteps to find out why his noble attempt to establish a just city, which aims at ‘addressing’ the citizen’s individual characteristics,

¹¹⁶ With reference to Socrates, it is worth remembering that for him as he mentions in the Apology, *logos* of the philosopher is fundamentally foreign (like a foreign language) to the public language of “the men of Athens.” This fundamental heterogeneity between the language which is directed and committed to the truth and justice is reduced to the contemplation of different ends for Trott.

Perhaps, it is this very heterogeneity with the public *logos* that approximates the language of Socrates to those of the prophets and sorcerers on the one hand (as in Euthyphro, where Euthyphro claims both Socrates and himself are considered to be men of divinity by the many), and ironically enough to the innovators and sophists on the other. What constitutes Socrates’ difference from sophists seems to be his integrity and admission to the problematic situation and his indecision with regard to passing hasty judgments and decisions.

necessarily misses the mark. It is as if unbeknownst to his conscious intention, the force of justice, the one that aims at the singularity of the other or a genuine ‘following’ of the other, makes the universal laws ‘miss the mark’ and become necessarily violent to the other. All at the same time, the force of justice and the surplus it creates founds the ontological ground for an alternative path to an alternative mode of gathering.

4.4. Immanent Constitution of Laws in Aristotle

In the realm of ethics, the challenge that Aristotle takes up is the implementation of laws of nature, namely the ones that determine the being of humans, in social and economic interactions. In Book V of the Ethics, Aristotle is still struggling with two aims at the same time. On the one hand, man’s definition carries him over to the city, and he needs to show that the good of the city, which is eventually carried out by the laws and public *logos*, is equally constitutive of man as the contemplation of *logos* in private. On the other hand, the good of the city as a whole might very well undermine the true expression of one’s individual character. Economic and political needs of the city, as we will examine here, add new factors to consider making the impersonal and authoritative laws necessary. The dominance of the laws and public discourse can shut off and conceal the unique voice of individuals. Thus, Aristotle strives to prove that the being of man is such that, from the very beginning, the same rational and calculative operation is involved both in determining the golden mean of virtues in private as well as the judgments and jurisdictions in public and political domain.

He has, of course, already prepared the scene by defining man as essentially in relation to others. Defined by *logos*, with every decision, man is already living in and modifying public discourse. Thus, in determining the golden mean of virtues, for example, one activates the same deliberative and *phronetic* intellectual virtue that informs the decision-making of the judges in public.

Aristotle does concede that on the way from the singular expression (*idion*) to the public expression (*kurion*), the nature of *logos* seems to have changed or at least become ambiguous. Singular expression of individuals, their free and responsible expression,

does not seem to match perfectly with the universal good of the city. Furthermore, entering into society means one needs to develop virtues in addition to those needed in private. Even private virtues need to change essentially in order to fit the socio-economic context.

Having all these considerations in view, at the beginning of book V of *Ethics*, Aristotle conducts a rather semantic analysis of the way people use the words “justice, just, and unjust” for actions and virtues (*NE.*, 5.1.1129a). He finds out that people use “justice and injustice” ambiguously. That is to say, justice can potentially help Aristotle establish the connection between the authentic expression of individuals and their responsibility in public. Being informed about justice seems to involve the human ability to knowingly choose the best and the most noble (*kalon*) action in every individual context. Moreover, justice seems to be the glue which holds the community together in the most excellent fashion. Instead of determining certain specific acts as inherently just and unjust in society independent of individual contexts, Aristotle once again examines the forces that drive actions in general. Aristotle portrays justice as a driving force that makes bodies move or act in a certain way. Justice is “that characteristic” which makes them [i.e. people] performers of just actions” (*NE.*, 5.1.1129a 7-9).

Yet, the ambiguity in the usage of justice which Aristotle wants to equate with a polysemy or analogy turns out to be indicative of a much more serious ontological “stumbling block” that he has struggled with throughout *Metaphysics* under ‘individuation.’ This division or conflict is evident in the two different kinds of justice he defines. The first is defined immanently in relation to how an individual perceives the good and the beautiful for himself, the other, and the city. The second is defined as the social or communal force that makes sense of the action and characters in public and that makes actions subject to the judgment of public reason. The former he calls “the fair” and the latter “the lawful.”

Altogether, his attempt, at least at the beginning of Book V, is to hold on to the conflict between these two forms of justice, hoping that what turns out to be the Good of oneself and the other in any individual context would retain an anticipatable relation to

the general Good of the city as determined by the laws. “The unjust [person] is both a lawbreaker and unfair and takes more than his share. So that obviously a law-abiding and a fair man will be just. Consequently, ‘just’ is what is lawful and fair” (*NE.*, 5.1.1129a 30-35). According to this provisional definition, justice is defined as the political or social virtue that holds society together in balance, as well as the political virtue that guarantees the well-being and flourishing of an individual. It has a normative value implicated in law. Justice in conformity with Aristotle’s *teleological*, *hylomorphic* system guarantees his desired logocentric body-politics in a social domain. But first, let us consider what makes all virtues part of justice in general.

The most general force of “ought” or moral force towards the golden mean is the same as the one involved in choosing the golden mean of virtues and just action towards others in public. Virtues hold an essential relationship to the beautiful, noble (*kalon*), and the proportionate. Virtues are defined, as Joe Sachs writes in his commentary, as “the most beautiful (*kalon*).” The force of justice in the most general sense is also the force of the “ought” behind all virtues aiming at the most beautiful making or doing.¹¹⁷ Aristotle mentions that “it orders one to do the deeds” (*NE.* 5.1.1129 b20). In this sense it acts like the form of all virtues. All virtues aim at the golden mean, which is both the most beautiful and the most proportionate. To define beauty as proportionate implies that parts are regarded in relation to a whole. If it is a part of a whole, an action is most beautiful when it plays its proper role in the organic structure of the whole city. In other words, justice in the most general sense is the same as other virtues “conceived from different point of view” (Stewart, 401). In this sense, justice should rather be called “the virtue of

¹¹⁷ This is confirmed and complicated by Michael Davis who considers the same operation at work in the *Poetry and Poetics*. In that book also Aristotle is aiming at explaining the most beautiful making. In both cases, it seems his most beautiful is the one that is in accordance with *logos*. Yet, as I argue in this chapter the striking admission that the best making and poetry arises as a result of the creative rational activity of a poet or an affective activity of an insane person complicates the picture drastically. Aristotle thereby concedes that in fact what brings about the most beautiful making is not always the most calculative and the clearest but the unknown (hence bestial), private (*idion*, *idiotikon*) force of generation which is *alogon* and unaccountable.

"righteousness" or of "moral Justice" a virtue displayed towards others, a social virtue (*Chroust & Osborn*, 129-130).¹¹⁸

Virtue is the state conceived simply as a state; Justice is a state conceived as putting its possessor in a certain relation to society (*Stewart*, 401).

As a social-political virtue, justice goes beyond all other virtues in that it governs the employment of all virtues towards other citizens. It is not simply to be able to implement measures "at home," but towards others. It is the excellence of being-together.

Justice (*dikaiosunê*) is, most properly, an active condition of the soul by which one chooses neither more nor less than one's fair share of those goods that one can have (by depriving others of them); this is the justice that is a part of virtue, but the word is also used for the whole of virtue, regarded as a relation toward other people (*NE.*, 1129b 26-27). In the latter sense, justice is a willing acceptance of the laws of the community as governing one's life (*NE.*, 1129b 12-19). In the former sense, justice is subdivided into its various manifestations: in the distribution of honor and of a community's common supply of possessions in proportion to what people deserve (*NE.*, 1130b 30-33, 1131a 25-29); in the equitable judgment of penalties for those who wrong others in any way and thus gain undeserved advantage (*NE.*, 1132a 6-14); and in the equitable reciprocal exchange of commodities and services (*NE.*, 1132b 31-34). All forms of justice in its particular sense are opposed to greed (*pleonexia*), the desire to have more of some good thing than one deserves (*NE.*, 1129b 1-10).

Justice involves a quantitative judgment, even when the things judged are not strictly measurable. This quasi-mathematical aspect of justice means that the judgments that govern choices of just from unjust constitute the form of *all* virtues. If the final cause of all virtues is the Good or the Beautiful, then justice is the formal cause of virtues.

¹¹⁸ Anton-Hermann Chroust & David L. Osborn, "Aristotle's Conception of Justice," *Notre Dame L. Rev.* 129 (1942)

Most of book V of the *NE* is about Aristotle's attempt to establish partial justice (the laws of the city) and prove that it is homogenous with the perfect form of justice (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 8). They are both run by a force of mathematical and rational calculation, which from Book III of the *NE* we learn is called deliberation. He explains how the force of justice makes possible the laws that guarantee the happiness of the whole while also determining the characteristic difference of individuals.¹¹⁹ Entering the actual realm of community and action with others, more uncontrollable contingencies arise, making impersonal and universal laws inevitable.

4.5. The Force of Justice and Laws of the Exchange Community

Aristotle has a very basic story to tell about the origin of society. He contends that everything started with human desires and needs. He remarks that the original community is perhaps created out of necessity among "people who are different and unequal". He writes: "For a community is not formed by two physicians, but a physician and a farmer, and in general by people who are different and unequal" (*NE*. 5.5.1133a 16-17). For example, I am house builder, but I need shoes that I do not know how to make. The shoemaker, in contrast, needs a house. Community is therefore formed out of exchange. It is in this context that partial justice is introduced. Therefore, the essential difference and inequality among people and their arts is a necessary condition for the emergence of a community.

Moreover, this reciprocity (exchanging goods) has to be done excellently and fairly. In accordance with partial justice, Aristotle believes that the job of a judge is to "restore equality" according to the individual's merit. The excellence of exchange is justice as the most beautiful (*kalon*) and balanced proportionality because "if there is no proportionality, the exchange is not equal and fair" (*NE*. 5.5.1133a 12). Thus, he equates

¹¹⁹ Also, perhaps this is the most important political lesson one can learn from Aristotle, that the most immediate and private or personal form of happiness comes to pass only in understanding the fact that one's happiness is most essentially tied to the happiness of others in a city. Politicians and the nobles accomplish this through establishing the law.

the good and beauty of an exchange with that of every individual. It is only in a fair exchange that the merit of every individual in society is met.

In order to establish a just exchange, “everything that enters into an exchange must somehow be comparable” (*NE*. 5.5.1133a 19-20). This is why the initial inequality and difference must be equalized. This is the task of “money” (*NE*. 5.5.1133a 18). Money makes the singular character of individuals as show-makers, builders, doctors, and soldiers... equalizable and translatable in exchange. Therefore, although at first blush we may think that the difference in the characters are at work in the community, in exchange, it is not the real difference which provides community but the nominal value of money. This nominal value in exchange has nothing to do with the proper character of individuals for it is arbitrary. For example, as a technical character, one may be a unique calligrapher but in exchange and in the eye of the laws, he is worth a sum of money comparable to a shoe-maker or a builder. This is because there is an arbitrary leap from the proper trait of an individual which is immanent to his being and the value assigned to him by the laws determined by the society and implemented through money.

The word for money (*nomisma* comes from the same root as *nomos*, which means “law” or “convention.” Money is the measure and the value that is concretely used by the law to establish equality among the various members of a given community. It is used in rectificatory or distributive ways to restore balance. Although money owes its existence to that of difference and exchange, through its usage, it equalizes differences. Justice in this sense serves to equalize through money because, as Aristotle asserts, without the function of a middle-term, there would be “no exchange and no community” (*NE*. 5.5.1133a 24). This is how an individual’s characteristics become “equalizable,” “comparable,” or translatable in proportional terms to one another. More and more, law and its generality take the place of individual decision making. The establishment of money as the common medium of exchange paves the way for the automatic application of laws that are less dependent on individual responsibility and more on the stability of a system. Dependence on money and the impersonality of laws becomes more concealing than revealing.

Gradually, with entering the public realm, the incentive for a more concrete, yet more abstract and repeatable measure for calculation and judgement increases. We are still naturally drawn toward creating law that becomes more abstract and gradually replaces justice to serve the city, like a machine with a character of repeatability at the service of more stability and efficiency for all. “Proportionate equality of benefits to burdens and contributions stabilizes the city by giving all parties reason to co-operate and benefit one another” (*Politics*, 5.8 1307b26-8a13). This is how laws increasingly look like a solution. They constitute an impersonal system which modifies itself immanently. Anyone who works according to the law or is “appointed by” the law is in harmonic relation to the whole and can govern accordingly. Political science, which informs and establishes the laws educates everyone, including the magistrate, to govern according to the established code. Modifications can also happen but occur under the same calculative system.

Aristotle wants to ensure that when the opportunity arises, one knowingly makes the morally appropriate decision in society. The laws provide the political infrastructure to educate and mold the bodies as the means of justice.¹²⁰ Little by little, the good of the city determined by the laws and adherence to them, enjoys preference over the characteristic differences of individuals.

Every community is established for the sake of some good, since everyone does everything for the sake of what they think to be good (*Politics*, 1.1 1252a2-3). Justice is whatever promotes and preserves that common good (*Politics*, 3.12 1282b17, *NE.*, 5.1 1129b25-27).

In order to guarantee the latter, the common good, Aristotle very quickly connects this to the program of the city and political science, the “most governing and most master art,” (*NE.* 1094a 30) which puts all other forms of knowledge in their most proper place.

Political science

¹²⁰ It should be noted that law is not made out of the vision of a charismatic leader or anything like modern conception of law. At this stage at least he is following the course of nature in establishing the being of entities as they are, this time in a city and communally and in relation to actions.

...lays down the law about what one ought to do and from what one ought to refrain, the end of this capacity should include the ends of the other pursuits, so that this end would be the human good. (*NE.*, 1094b 4-6)

Political science establishes laws that work automatically like natural laws and determine what is just for every possible situation in accordance with *logos*. The political laws work to achieve the best and most *hylomorphic* results, the ones that commonly occur and are anticipated by the laws. He writes:

Will it not better enable us to attain what is fitting, like *archers having a target to aim at*? If this be so, we ought to make an attempt to determine at all events in outline what exactly this Supreme Good is, and of which of the theoretical or practical sciences it is the object. Now, it would be agreed that it must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences—some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such is manifestly the science of Politics. (*NE.*, 1. 1094a 23-28, my emphasis)

Aristotle considers political science, which can put all arts including rhetoric in its place, (*NE.*, 1. 1094b4) as the best and most ruling science to help every individual hit the target, or avoid “missing the mark.” Here, he is using the analogy of the archer, which confirms my observation in relating this to *hamartia* and “missing the mark.” This is yet another indication that hitting the *teleological* and *hylomorphic* target and not missing the mark is the most just and noble and systematically preferred. This *hylomorphic*, appropriate target is the end of the city.

For even if the good is the same for one person and for a city, that of the city appears to be greater, at least, and more complete both to achieve and to preserve; for even if it is achieved for only one person [10] that is something to be satisfied with, but for a people or for cities it is something more beautiful and more divine. So our pursuit aims at this, and is in a certain way political. (*NE.*, 1094b 8-11)

Here is the regulated *economy* of means and ends to provide happiness for the city. Aristotle acknowledges that the good choices (*proairesis*) of individuals are important

and can end beautifully, but he attributes divinity to the good of the city. Therefore, the good of the city is the final aim of politics. It is worth noting that while the aim of politics and legislation is “the good man,” (*NE.*, 1. 1100a 1) which Aristotle equates with the good of the city, the caveat between the programmatic good of the city and the individual remains open.

Under the guise of justifications lies what Derrida calls the “mystical foundation of authority.” Aristotle admits that the happiness of the state, which is a form of *energeia*, is divine—like the unmoved mover or the perfect circulation of cosmos—and yet from the *Physics* we know that that is unknowable and unreachable for sublunary beings. Such is the impossible motion already inherent in *logos* that constitutes the “mystical foundation” (*Derrida*, 1990. 947) of law under the guise of reason or speech.¹²¹

The divinity that Aristotle attributes to the good of the city is associated with how things are from the divine or eternal perspective. Now, the danger is that a philosopher or a statesman would think that he has access to this divine creative power of making, that he can anticipate the creation or has access to its principles (*archē*). He considers this threat when he writes:

...it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of the citizens, and according to this same principle, even if it be better for certain men to govern, they must be appointed as guardians of the laws and in subordination to them; for there must be some government, but it is clearly not just, men say, for one person to be governor when all the citizens are alike. It may be objected that any case which the law appears to be unable to define, a human being also would be unable to decide. But the law first specially educates the magistrates for the purpose and then commissions them to decide and administer the matters that it leaves over ‘according to the best of their judgment, and furthermore it allows them to introduce for

¹²¹ Here a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act. The “mystical” is an abyss in the heart of what is supposedly well founded: vanished cruelties at the moment of constituting a state, forgotten terror when new law comes into force, events which remain historically “uninterpretable or indecipherable (*ininterprétables ou indéchiffrables*).” (*Derrida*, 1990. 943)

themselves any amendment that experience leads them to think better than the established code. (*Politics*, 1287a 19-23)

The law is the principle that replaces the government of a monarch. Aristotle argues that because all humans have the same essential definition, which determines their function and flourishing, it makes no sense that one person should govern the rest. Therefore, it is preferable that everyone should obey the law, and the magistrate would merely watch its execution.

Obviously, Aristotle is avoiding the emergence of tyranny and sophistry alike. However, this choice amounts to a conservative decision to choose stability over innovation and particularity. Like the anomalies, accidents, or abnormalities in nature, he goes as far as rejecting all that is not in accordance with *logocentric* laws as bestial.

He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also; for appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law is wisdom without desire. (*Politics*, 1287a 19-25)

Aristotle does not deny the creative power of animal desire, but systematically prefers the stability of public reason, even equating it with the laws of the divine. The very equation of individual with bestial reminds us of his earlier claims about the indeterminacy of the material and the desire, which needs to be controlled and brought under the reign of *logos*. Systematically and gradually, the clear, the normal, and the lawful are preferred and are approximated with that which is divine. It is this emphasis on the sovereignty of the laws of wisdom which makes him compare the individual with the beast.

As I mentioned chapter 3, however, Aristotle is always pre-occupied with the tragic character and the bestial force involved in determining the catastrophic end of man. It seems as though there is an affinity between the innovator, the philosopher, the one who has a privileged and private access to truth (*idiotikon*) on the one hand with the tyrant and the sophist who pretends to have access to the universal truth on the other hand. Aristotle is obviously aware of this affinity and aims to deal with it. He prefers the

stability of the rational community, thereby violently discards the irrational innovator or the singular character as bestial or abnormal.

4.6. Aristotle on Justice and the Deconstruction of Laws

In this section, I look at how Aristotle strives to tackle the problem of individuation and innovation especially in the realm of action and how he admits to its *aporetic* nature. What is the universal definition that can guarantee and anticipate the emergence of the individual in all instances? We explicated in previous chapters of this work that Aristotle has a general response to this question. He formulated the question in terms of the presencing (*ousia*) and tried to deal with the contingencies involved through several schemata (*hylomorphism*, and *teleology*) and a regime of concepts, including potency vs. actuality, material vs. form, etc.

4.6.1. Individuation: an Ontological Stumbling Block

For the realm of action with its inherent contingencies, the stakes are so high that the concern for a measure of individuation in the application of the universal laws is

raised in the middle of *Metaphysics* Book VII, chapter 3, where Aristotle is examining what the underlying meaning of being, which endures motion, is.¹²²

At first, Aristotle considers the material (*hylē*) instead of the definition or form (*morphē*) as a serious candidate for the underlying meaning of being with regard to what is individual (the principle of individuation) (*Met.* 7.3.1029a10-30). Although he ultimately rejects the material as “evidently unknowable by itself” (*Met.*, 7.3.1029b28), he refers to the problem as a “stumbling block” (*aporotátei*)¹²³ (*Met.* 7.3.1029b 1). That is, the relationship between material (indeterminate and unknowable, yet individual) and form (knowable but universal) is problematic even in the realm of nature and eternal natural laws. His strategic solution to make the science of metaphysics possible, as I elaborated on in previous chapters, was to make the material knowable and accountable in *hylomorph*. It is only through reversal from the already shaped and formed individuals that we can fathom the material stage. Nonetheless, Aristotle does not deny the immanent

¹²² Much like the discussion about *ousia* in Book V, here in Book VII Aristotle distinguishes between at least 4 meanings the thinghood (*ousia*) of a thing. First, Being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*). Which he contends is “the keeping on being of a thing what it was to be”. Second, the “universal”. Third, “the general class” and forth, what underlies these. With the four meanings mentioned above, he contends that the *hypokeimenon* or what underlies as primary form of thinghood, has to be the one, “the others are attributed to and itself not attributed to anything else.” (*Met.* 7.3.1029a 22) However, he is ambiguous about *hypokeimenon*. He mentions that in some sense “material is said to be the first underlying thing.” His justification is of course that what remains of things after their demise is their body or material- which makes it look like the *hypokeimenon* or the underlying thing, he also says that “Now thinghood (*ousia*) seems to belong most evidently to bodies...” which survives the death of the form. Then he tries to extract the form from body. Aristotle looks at the bodies, looking for where the particular identity or sense of a thing becomes separate or independent from it. It is curious how he points out the difference between the middle or inside of the body with their “limits”, “such as a surface and a line and a point and the unit.” (*Met.* 7.3.1028b 20). That is, he distinguishes the surface and the borderlines as more independent than “a body or a solid.” (*ibid.*) He even compares the limits with the “everlasting forms” in Plato, which are simply an expression of ideality or how things could make sense. On the other hand, he contends that it is the form which is the underlying thing. Yet, another is the third, which is the combination of these. (*Met.* 7.3.1029a 1-5) Although, the third candidate looks more promising as it implies the scheme of the *hylomorph*, he quickly modifies his claim saying that what is more primary than material should in fact be more primary that “what is made of both.” (*Met.* 7.3.1029a 8) At this dialectical stage, he seems to be completely divided between what constitutes the thinghood as universally true, as an ideality which is repeatable, can be attributed to but not attributed to something else and what makes that ideality particular to the “this-ness (*to de ti*).” While offering no response at this stage, we know from some commentators that finally the schemes *hylomorph* supplemented with other schemes like potency vs. being-at-work are the efficient economic ways he would address the “stumbling block” (*Met.* 7.3.1029b 1) of individuation confronting universality.

¹²³ *ἀπορωτάτη* is of the same root as *ἄπορος* meaning without passage, having no way in or out.

movement in matter that originally gives rise to beings. With the contingency of results and the paradox of *logos*, the problem is exacerbated in the realm of action.

The same stumbling block in the *Metaphysics* seems to afflict the application of the universal good for the good of every individual in society. It is noteworthy that he anticipates the problem in the *Metaphysics* which has no practical concerns in view. He writes "...where actions are concerned, one's job is to make what is completely good [*telos* perhaps] be good for each person out of the things that are good for each one" (*Met.* 7.3.1029b 6-8). Aristotle is extending the question of foundation for individuation in metaphysics to the realm of laws and its application to the good of an individual. He understands that the job of whoever is expected to pass judgement is to somehow subsume the individual under general laws and to 'address' or to do justice to the being of the individual. However, he acknowledges that the law has come to be "out of the things that are good for each one". That is, that which originally "gives" the laws is the singular expression of the individual (*idion*).

It is worth remembering, from the previous chapter, that *ousia* as the most fundamental meaning of being is already a combination of present and absent. *Ousia* is not simply any well-founded present *being* but the presencing of that which is not-yet. But, as soon as we enter the realm of action, ethics and especially politics, in order to guarantee the execution of his supposed laws, Aristotle strategically supposes a divine end for the city and establishes the universal laws of justice. The silent familiarity with truth remains the mystical foundation for the strategic decision-making in Aristotle. However, as has already been shown, the same laws which are supposedly founded upon individual experiences gradually hide their private foundation. The laws, which are supposed to be "just" to each member of the exchange, somehow become blind to the particularity and necessarily negate their own foundation.

Later it can be seen that every time we approach the individual experience, the ambiguity comes back. On the one hand, the original experience of every private citizen (*idiotikon*) is and has been the foundation of *logos* and the law, and on the other hand, this experience somehow must follow the law and the common language in order to be seen

or recognized in the first place. The individual experience is confined and marginalized under the tyranny of the laws just like the language of the poet that has to abide by the prevalent language of the public.¹²⁴

Once again, it is in this sense that justice as law becomes the ethico-political fulfillment of Aristotle's *hylomorphic* and *teleological* metaphysical system. The normative implication is that the law-abiding citizen has a more flourishing being than the outlaw. It is noteworthy that this is not simply a moral claim but an ontological one. It is justice that guarantees the fulfillment of human function in society. It is also justice that makes humans act in a way that maintains their being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*). In this sense, it is the universal law of justice that ensures hitting the target or *telos*. Through the formulation of law, Aristotle ensures that a law-abiding citizen can flourish by being in a state of harmony with his *telos*. Thus, he stipulates that a law that is most universal is relevant for any particular follower as well. Still, I will point out below the place where the "stumbling block" of individuation in the *Metaphysics* seems to have reappeared in regard to the laws of actions.

4.6.2. The Paradoxical Character of Laws and Money

¹²⁴ One may argue that philosophy for Aristotle begins with wonder and not the clarity. To which I will respond as follows: Wonder is, according to Aristotle, the beginning of philosophizing, and authentic thinking:

It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression raising questions about the greater matters too, *e.g.* about the changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe. Now he who wonders and is perplexed feels that he is ignorant (thus the myth-lover (*philomythos*) is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders). (*Met.* 1. 982b 15-20 my emphasis)

This quote points to the affinity between philosophy and myth-making on the one hand and the kind of wonder that Aristotle has in mind on the other. The wonder, in the tragedy, and in the study of nature in general is not of the strange occurrence in the language itself, nor is it of the divine intervention but of the very repetition of the same in the making of the nature. It looks more like the wonder of a biologist, who studies nature and is amazed by the generation of the seasons every year or an astronomer who studies the wonders of the repetition of movements of the heavenly bodies. Such a scientist of nature is amazed by the accidental interruptions of difference like an eclipse, but would not go as far as attributing it to a divine intervention. His wonder motivates him to give an account for the accountable discoveries and accountable interruptions and not unaccountable (*alogon*) makings. The proper philosopher and myth-lover for Aristotle is the one who explains the events and wonders when he can and suffers the misgivings of the bad makings in pity and fear with others.

To show that laws and their implementation and normalization through money act very much like *logos*, I shall begin again with the genesis of community and the necessity of money in Aristotle. This will further reveal the paradoxical character of justice as laws.

I mentioned already that Aristotle takes “exchange communities” as a paradigmatic context for reciprocal justice (*NE* 5.5 1132b31-33b28). From here, Aristotle talks about community as reciprocity and exchange and partial justice as the mechanism that holds the balance and equality in an exchange.

As was remarked with Heidegger, this is very much comparable to how *logos* functions for Aristotle. Language (or speech) is the medium of communication. Without it, no particular person’s desire, needs, or demands would come to light or be expressed. The public expression, nevertheless, has to be controlled by the measure of clarity for it to communicate anything at all. Moreover, language like money, “exists by current convention and not by nature” (*NE* 5.5.1133a 30). Aristotle even assumes that in the case money, “it is in our power to change and invalidate it” (*NE* 5.5.1133a 35).

As Heidegger remarks, on the one hand, *logos*, “a self-expression about being-there (*ousia*) as being” (*BC*. 11), is supposed to bring the nature of individual beings and speakers to light. On the other hand, *logos* acts like money as the currency that an individual or a society might invalidate partially or completely. In other words, being-essential and being-conventional are “inseparable structural aspects of the [*logos*] λόγος” (*BC*., 16).

Just like currency, *logos*, when it is fixed, turns into a *keimenon*. Now, *keimenon* in a different context refers to a “text,” or as Heidegger reads it, as “what lies fixed.”¹²⁵ The character of the fixed, written, or textual names (*onomata*) is that they are communal and partly arbitrary. Heidegger considers the fixed terms as common or communal (*κοινά*) (*BC*. 16).

Therefore, in Heidegger’s reading, *logos* has these two separate aspects at the same time. It brings to light the speaker and the matter at hand while also detaches itself

¹²⁵ Heidegger cites *Metaphysics* on this issue: “*Met. Z 15, 1040 a 11: τὰ δὲ κείμενα κοινὰ πᾶσιν.*” *Keimeno* means to lie; to have been set/put

from the speaker, so as to be able to enter the social realm. Thus, “language is something that belongs to everyone” (*BC.*, 16). This is the Aristotelian version of the language we live in as the common intelligibility of the world around us. We are thrown and born in such an intelligibility. In other words, language in this sense is the expression of human beings’ being-in-the-world as communal and *not* personal, singular and perhaps innovative. It is not one’s singular mode of ‘following.’¹²⁶

This is how Aristotle claims that the means of communication and mediation (whether it is speech or money) needs to be neutral, bleached out, and used up in usage, acting simply as a catalyst in exchange. In order to establish justice as laws, Aristotle considers money as neutral in exchange without any surplus or intrinsic value, exactly as a medium, or in Derrida’s language, “bleached out” in usage (*usure*) (*Derrida & Bass*, 2009. 216).¹²⁷

According to Aristotle, money has an ideality that provides the possibility of repetition in the future (*NE*. 5.5.1133b 11). He warns that the value of money, like the objects it stands for, might fluctuate over time (diachronically), but ‘synchronically’ speaking, it has the constancy needed to establish a system of reciprocity. Without any reservations, Aristotle acknowledges that money “acts like a measure: it makes goods commensurable and equalizes them” (*NE*. 5.5.1133b 17-18). He even goes as far as to admit that as a neutral unit and measure of exchange, money “must be established by

¹²⁶ Heidegger uses the same Nietzschean language that Derrida later adopts in “White Mythology” in reference to the metaphysical language of philosophy. In fact, as Derrida demonstrates, this is the characteristic of all such metaphysical systems that try to consider all of their members “*at the same time.*” And such a system that ignores the essential temporality between its members is at risk of producing some transcendental signifier or mystical foundation by which it establishes itself and its authority.

Derrida refers back to Saussure, illustrating the fundamental similarity of the communal aspect of language and money. For Derrida’s reading of Saussure on the relationship between language and economy look at *Of Grammatology*. Also for a further discussion of Saussure’s perspective look at Appendix 3.

¹²⁷ But, as Derrida points out, by becoming separate from its original function comes money’s second usage along with the second meaning of the word “*usure*,” as in usury. Derrida explains the additional product of a certain capital, the process of exchange which, far from losing the stake, would make that original wealth bear fruit, would increase the return from it in the form of income, of higher interest, of a kind of linguistic surplus value. This second meaning of *usure*, indicates the resistance against complete neutralization of money, or language. In the language, this is the case which words would not simply bring worldly things to light or simply be reduced to their general meaning but they express nothing but themselves. This produces another level of sense-making that gives rise to a new turn in *metaphors* and would start its own intervention in the exchange or totally abolish the exchange and open it to another realm or domain, that of the gift of justice. The mode of sense-making in this realm would be the gift of sense beyond exchange, what Derrida calls the donation of sense (*donation la sens*). This would be also the beginning of a new form of community being law or reciprocity altogether.

arbitrary usage- hence the name ‘currency’” (NE. 5.5.1133b 21-22, *nomisma* from the same root as *nomos*; my emphasis).

Thus, here are the principles that give rise to community as exchange summarized by Aristotle: there is no community among equals. That is, no community if there is no difference among the parties involved. “It is need which holds parties together as if they were one single unit....There is no community without exchange, [and] there is no exchange without equality and no equality without commensurability” (NE. 5.5.1133b 5-20).

For the Aristotelian community, it is through reciprocity, exchange, and equalization without surplus that the just community can properly perform its function. The original different, the condition of the possibility of community, is also conceived as a threat of injustice. *Eco-nomy* is not only about the ordering of a household (*oiko-nomos*, literally the ordering of the household but also, all political activity is run by exchange and economy. Even charity, which can be an instance of getting out of the economy of exchange, is instituted in the city as a form of a proper exchange.¹²⁸ He writes:

It is by their mutual contribution that men are held together. That is the reason why [the state] erects sanctuary of the Graces (*charis* the root of our word, charity) in prominent places in order to promote reciprocal exchange. For that is the proper (*prepon*) province of gratitude: we should return our services to one who has done us a favor, and at another time take the initiative in doing him a favor. (NE. 5.5.1133a 1-5)

Charity is part of the exchange (returning a favor) as if bound to the anticipatable system of quid pro quo of the economy. No activity, political, ethical, and even poetical (related to imagination and rhetoric) is allowed to be beyond the boundaries of exchange if it is supposed to be accountable and just in Aristotelian sense.

¹²⁸ Although Arendt considers the political life (*vita activa*) as an essentially different activity, in this analysis one can see that even among the Greeks only a fringe minority like Socrates engaged in such an economic activity. The rest including Aristotle raised the fortresses of the city so high that the house and the city look more the same structure in different size run by the same metaphysical principles.

Up to this point in Book 5 of the *Ethics*, Aristotle has established at least one version or form of community as reciprocity, an economic community between different arts and different members. Such a community is based on partial justice or justice as law, which is expected to put different arts in a harmony that brings about the flourishing of the city as a whole.

Concretely, however, in everyday dealings of people, it is the institution of law that accomplishes justice. It is the law and its means (money) that gives the value and place of individual makings and doings in the city-state. Ontologically speaking, law acts like a linguistic system that gives and evaluates actions. Thanks to the universality of law, we have a measure to make sense of actions as part of a whole.

The outlaws are the ones who not only ignore or threaten the balance implicated in law, but also the balance of the whole value and meaning-making system of community. This is why doing an unlawful act does not merely violate a particular individual's fair share or territory, but threatens the whole system of sense-making in the community.

4.6.3. The *Aporia* of Law and the Force of Justice in Aristotle

In this section, I argue that the condition for the possibility of justice in Aristotle's definition of justice as laws are also the conditions of its impossibility. Justice can be experienced only in the experience of the impossibility of justice as law (in Derrida's language "justice as *droit*"). This experience occurs for Aristotle in a particular case when he deals with the outlaw as a singular case and not simply as a general category.

Aristotle claims that universal law came about as a result of one individual's need to take part in exchange. Yet, as I argued, the moment the neutral law is established, it ironically loses the capacity it is made for: to care for and include future particular cases.

He anticipates the problem at the beginning of Book V, where he makes a distinction between justice as law and justice as fairness. There is a curious relationship between the unfair and the unlawful, which he tries to deal with "in terms of part and whole." He writes, "Unfair and unlawful are not identical but distinct and related to one another as "a part is related to a whole" (*NE*. 5.2.1130b 11).

As Aristotle puts it, “Everything unfair is unlawful but not everything unlawful is unfair” (*NE*. 5.2.1130b 11). Hence, fairness is more complete and more encompassing than justice as law. However, fairness is homogeneous with justice as law. He remarks (at the beginning of book V) that fairness is part of justice along with lawfulness. After this primary proposal, the rest of book V is an attempt to reconcile these two modes of justice by meticulously examining different kinds of justice and law. After examining all forms of justice, Aristotle returns to the original definition and division above. He expresses his unease with the situation, describing this as an impasse (*aporia*) regarding fairness (*epieikeia*).

Joe Sachs gives a footnote to his translation confirming that by the distinction between fairness and justice as laws, Aristotle means to deal with the exceptional cases in law. Nonetheless, it seems that the gradual development of the argument has let the exceptional cases take the stage and lead to a new beginning. Moreover, Aristotle is trying hard to subsume the exceptional cases under the universal while admitting to the impasse. “The impasse concerning what is fair follows roughly these reasons, but they are all correct in a certain way and not at all mutually contradictory” (*NE*. 5.10 1137b 7).

Aristotle even insists that the nature of fairness is of the same kind (*genos*) as justice, although “the fair thing, ...is better than a certain kind of just thing” (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 8). While he confirms that it is an impasse to justice “according to law,” he nonetheless contends that “as an impasse ...it is a making-straight of what is legally just” (*NE*. 5.10. 1137b 11). His language suggests that he is trying to meticulously avoid a “missing the mark” that he seems to have anticipated on the horizon. He seems to have seen a problem or a catastrophe on the horizon that he wants to avoid very calculatedly. His language is the language of force. He insists that there is “one force” that drives human beings or citizens to do both lawful acts and fair acts. From the very beginning, we were after the same force that makes people do just actions and, here, Aristotle claims that the force we are looking for might be “the force of the impasse itself.” In both the *Metaphysics* and here in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he explains “the stumbling block” or the impasse as follows:

The reason is that all law is universal, but there are some things about which it is not possible to *speak (legein)* correctly when *speaking* about them universally. Now, in situations where it is necessary to speak in universal terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it *misses the mark (hamartia)*. The law itself is nonetheless correct. For the mistake lies neither in the law nor the law giver, but in the nature of the case. (NE. 5.10 1137b 12-18)¹²⁹

From this quote, it is evident that the problem is tied to the nature of speaking, or ‘addressing’ the abnormal other, a new problem, an individual case, or any unanticipated particular. “The law and the lawgiver” are correct, Aristotle confirms. The *aporia* that makes it impossible is “in the nature of the case.” Of course, this does not invalidate the law with regard to normal cases, but the issue for Aristotle is that a new claimant of truth, an absolutely new case, an alien or foreigner, and the untranslatable ‘other’ call for justice as well. Such cases question the foundation of the laws.

What is wrong with “the nature of this [*new*] case” (*physei tou pragmatos*) other than it is not anticipated by the universal law or the frequent language? Its fault is that it is not normal, it could not be anticipated and the general did not apply to it. It was undetermined, unknowable, unaccountable (*alogon*), unlimited (*aperon*). But, it is being considered abnormal and monstrous only when the law is enforced. Justice as law violently marginalized the individual as abnormal and *aporetic* in nature. It is noteworthy that what is natural as such can be neither normal or benign nor abnormal or monstrous. It is only the laws that begin to make such distinctions. One needs to pay attention to the fact that by being considered out of the law, the abnormal does not turn into an animal. The animal has its place in the hierarchy of natural genera for Aristotle, however, lower than human. But this impasse is related to a mistake, a fall, or a wrong doing which one

¹²⁹ my italics and emphasis.

commits without malice or intention neither out of vice. It is associated with the claim of a finite system that aims at schematizing infinite cases.

The economical structure of law, as Aristotle admits, necessarily comes to a halt. He writes, “there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement” (*NE.*, 5.10. 1137b 17). The local currency cannot not measure the novel issue anymore. We are not in the order of the house (*oiko-nomos*) but the realm of the gift and innovation.¹³⁰

While justice as law works in the economy of the present, the momentary suspension of it opens the economic structure of time. The eternal natural laws used to give the eternal natural world an anticipatable future, a future like present. By the break-down in the system of universal laws, for the first time, possibilities are not anticipated and are in a limitless motion (*energeia ateles*). In short, the consideration of the other as an absolute other irreducible to general laws gives Aristotle’s system an *a-teleological* force and a new form of time that brings about the becoming of justice. For a moment, the structure of presence collapses and “difference,” with its full force, begins to create the possibility of “a call” for justice.

The problem of universal laws is not confined to Aristotle, but rather afflicts any law that establishes a synchronic system between its members. Considering either a present and actual, ~~divine~~ or necessary order of things would inevitably lead to the impossibility of addressing innovative singular cases justly. In regard to receiving a tradition, the follower is not seen singularly by the general laws of the past or the public discourse and one lacks a measure to treat others justly. If attentive and conscientious, the follower would realize that he is ‘in-trouble,’ that he falls short of being just, and yet he is bound to make decisions and pass judgments all the time.

I shall look more closely at the tragic and catastrophic fate in Aristotle’s desire to establish justice to try and see why and how the universal law misses the mark and what the consequences of that is. Going back to the earlier quote from Aristotle, he mentioned that there is something wrong or abnormal with the outlaw that makes it an *aporia* for the

¹³⁰ The reference is to Derrida’s 1992 book *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money* and the contrast between the gift and economy. For Derrida on the Gift, look at Appendix 4.

universal law, and therefore makes it miss the mark. As is evident in the quote above, Aristotle is talking about a mishap, (*hamartia*). “Now, in situations where it is necessary to speak in universal terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the mark (*hamartia*).” *Hamartia* is the word that is used several times in different forms and derivations in the *Poetics* referring to the fatal flaw of a tragic character.

Hamartia, as I mentioned before, is an essential flaw or a natural symptom that carries the events away from their anticipated end results. I suggested that with respect to natural laws and natural motion, *hamartia* is responsible for violating *hylomorphic* anticipated end. Concerning actions and decision, *hamartia* carries the rational calculation of a character in a tragedy away from its calculated, anticipated end in happiness. The result of this flaw is the *cata-strophic* end of *not following* the course of nature or the universal laws of justice. Consequently, Aristotle implies that the same way that unknown or unaccounted mixture in matter brings about deformities in the course of reproduction, some unknown abnormality in the nature of the particularity brings about the failure of the universal laws.

However, in referring to a particular other, or the personal or private context of experience the activity involved in decision making that is not in accordance with the laws is regarded as more just than justice itself. As I noted before, by approaching the individual Aristotle’s language becomes enigmatic. Here, he mentions that to go beyond the law is more just than justice itself. He even surpasses this by contending that the outlaw is what founds the law itself:

That is why the fair is both just and also better (*beliton*) than just in one sense. It is not better than just in general but better than the mistake due to the generality [of the law]. (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 8)

He, of course, expects that at the moment of the creation of a new law or the expansion of a previous law, the new law would be subsumed under the general. He hopes that the same kind of calculation will give new laws. He does his best to restore the structure of present. Thus:

In situations which law speaks universally, but the case at issue happens to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the shortcoming, in other words the omission and mistake of the lawgiver due to the generality of his statement. Such a rectification corresponds to what the lawgiver himself would have said if he were *present*, and he would have enacted if he had known [of this particular case]. (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 19-25)

With the words that he uses, it is evident that he is making an extra effort to make the universal *present* again after its legitimacy is dramatically breached. Because after all, some sort of “logical or universal criteria are required for the legislative practice to be a rational enterprise. For this is the only way to make equality and justice possible” (*Contreras*, 2013. 23). In reality, it was the very operation of the rational calculation that caused the mishap in the first place. It is like asking Oedipus to calculate more to avoid his catastrophic fate while the calculation of the same kind brought him to that point in the first place.

In the *Rhetoric* (1.13.1374a-1374b24), Aristotle discusses almost the same situation about the laws which miss the mark due to the infinity (*aperon*) of cases. His language is fraught with the same ambiguity as he introduces the notion of equity as the supplement to the laws. As many commentators noted, he advises that when coming across novelties or singularities of this kind, the judges should take the whole into consideration and re-establish the law anew rationally and deliberatively (*Contreras*, 2013. 24; *Leyden*, 1985. 96-7). Aristotle suggests

to look, not to the law but to the legislator; not to the letter of the law but to the intention of the legislator; not to the action itself, but to the moral purpose; not to the part, but to the whole; not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally. (*Rhetoric*, 1.13.1374b 17-18)

Aristotle mentioned before that “the problem is not in the laws but in the nature of the matter at hand.” Here in this quote, he is trying to re-establish and re-affirm the integrity of the law by supplementing it. He looks for the presence of a solid measure in “the

intention of the legislator” or a “moral purpose” only to finally contend that what the man is at the moment should be judged in reference to what he has always been.

Although for a judge who wants to make a strategic judgement what Aristotle suggests is absolutely necessary. What I am objecting to is the metaphysical and ontological consequence of the generalization of such a strategy. To say that one should consider “not what a person is now” can be a very charitable strategy, but it is also an admission to the impossibility of knowing the individual in its singular and indefinite character in the context at hand.

For where a thing is indefinite, [perhaps accidental or by chance] the rule by which it is measured is also indefinite. (*NE*. 5.10 1137b 20-33)¹³¹

It is in this very indecision and admission to the indefinite nature of the material mold of the particular that Aristotle acknowledges an a-teleological moment or a paradoxically indefinite measure. Aristotle implies that “the indefinite” (*aoriston*, meaning limitless) is the condition of the possibility of any definite solution. After all, the laws are to ‘address’ the presencing (*ousia*) of such private experiences (*hetōn praktōn hylē*). The indefinite matter of action (*praktōn hylē*), like the original potential material in the *Physics*, reappears again as potency, this time with an ambiguous end as if without *telos*.

He contends that the solution is to create a measure for the indefinite mold by adapting the law at the same time (*Contreras*, 2013. 22).¹³² Aristotle tries to re-establish the correctness, if not logically at least strategically, but as I mentioned in the previous chapter, he is preoccupied with the exceptional cases of the tragic figures.

Now, Contreras among others asserts that Aristotle is still asking for more laws. In other words, the corrections for Contreras do not have to lay the foundation of indecision or paralysis. I do agree with him on that. However, what I do not agree with is that Aristotle’s laws, even when they are developing *phronetically*, will include the other. This was the case with Trott’s formulation of progress in Aristotle’s city as well. As I

¹³¹ *περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανὼν ἐστίν*

¹³² Contreras’s citation in this page has a typo. Or he has “missed the mark” and referred to a text that is actually in Nicomachean Ethic while he claims it to be in the *Rhetoric*.

mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the universal measure to apply to individual cases and pass judgements for Trott was a homogeneous *logos* which is used deliberatively and *phronetically*, but what I tried to show here is the gradual modification of the very nature of measure or *logos*. I highlighted the movement in the text, where Aristotle is gradually getting carried away by his own admission to the *aporia*. One can see that the nature of the laws, which are supposed to be just, needs to transform from purely logocentric ones. Evidently, Aristotle does not intentionally and theoretically follow that route, but his language points in that direction and lays its foundation. For example, he offers a new measure whose character and categories are given by the indefinite. This is evident especially in the paradigm that he provides right after mentioning “the indefinite measure” to clarify what he means: “As for example the leaden rule used in Lesbian construction work. Just as this rule is not rigid but shifts with the contour of the stone, so a decree is adapted to a given situation” (*NE*. 5.10 1137b 20-33). The reference is to the Lesbian molding that had an undulating curve. The leaden rule, as explained by Steward in the footnotes was a “flexible piece of lead that was accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid” (*Steward*, 531).

Here is the paradoxical moment where justice is in pondering alongside the outlaw. How are we to understand this space of suspense, of interruption? As Derrida confirms, the interruption of decision is not an amoral or unethical moment. Quite the contrary, it is a moment of the creation of justice but in paradoxical or rather contradictory terms. “More just than justice” in Aristotle's terms lacks proper criteria of calculation. I suggest, following Derrida, that such a mis-recognition produces a mistreatment, which is symptomatic of a surplus or an outlaw, which is more just than justice itself. “It is now plain what the equitable is, and that it is just, and that it is superior to one sort of justice” (*NE*. 5.10. 1138a). What he thinks is now “plain” does not seem to be without difficulty and constitutes the nature of a different kind of ‘following’ and a different kind of law. Aristotle is conceding, in effect, that it is not always through

calculation of *phronēsis* but through miscalculation that a state of affairs is created involuntarily. This miscalculation is what he calls *hamartia* or “missing the mark.”

Upon the collapse of the universal law and justice as law (*droit*), equity emerges in honoring the singular as singular. This final determined decree is the foundation of a new law. The law or the decree exists as undecided or indefinite given by the *aporia* itself. However, the moment a law or judgment is passed, it takes the form of injustice rather than justice. As Aristotle writes: “A man is fair/equitable who chooses and performs acts of this sort, who is no stickler for just in bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his share, even though when he has the law on his side” (*NE*. 5.10. 1137b35-1138a2).

Aristotle is readily admitting that to do justice is to not abide strictly (i.e. justly) to the law and to be satisfied with injustice, namely “less than one’s share” even if the decree says otherwise. This is where Aristotle concedes to this alternative mode of being-with and hints at the fact that it might be even superior (*kritton*) than the written word of justice (*nomikondikaion*). He seems to have realized the systematic misrecognition by the written word of the laws he created. Notwithstanding, his own miscalculation and *hamartia* has already set out a motion that is no longer *teleological*. This is how the force of justice has overcome this paralyzing melancholia before the impossibility of the laws. I believe that the implication of what Aristotle concedes to is that in fact any decision (to act or not to act) should be taken while acknowledging the impossibility and the promise of justice.

Scholars like Contreras are accurate in believing that Aristotle thinks that equity is rational (if not logical at least axiological, that is “the congruence of the value with the purpose of the [original] legislator) and a restoration of justice as fairness” (*Contreras*, 2013. 23). But, my contention is that the force of justice has already carried away Aristotle in admitting to a level of creation beyond deliberation. There emerges another kind of justice which cannot be supplemented by the same measures. In addressing otherness as such, as Aristotle admits, one is dealing a new case that is unanticipated and thus outside the juridico-political paradigm already established. The new judgement

emerges as a supplement, which will necessarily not correspond to the definition of the just as we know it. This judgement is basically without a measure. The person who is making the decision is at this point is at the brink of the generation of an absolutely new making, the generation that is akin to the work of poets rather than judges who act like machines.

Unlike the Contreras' suggestion about the operation of practical wisdom (*phroēsis*) and more calculation of the same kind at the time of the creation of the new laws, other examples in Aristotle's treatment of innovation confirm my reading. Another such moment happens when in the *Poetics* Aristotle explains how a gifted poet creates a new tragedy or poem. Aristotle adopt a similar strategy there to provide the possibility of innovation in moderation.

4.7. The Gifted Poet and the Insane:

As we mentioned before ordinary *logos* is supposed to capture the present structure of being-with-others-in-the-world. To deal with new experiences, Aristotle offers a modification in expression or a decorated expression of some kind, what he calls *lexis*. In this sense the poetic language is to fit the coming-to-be of events and things in the world.

Aristotle confirms this task when he maintains that as part of wording, metaphor is needed to expand or enliven the world "before our eyes." Alongside foreign words, neologism, and lengthened words, metaphor is the most powerful means to bring the material potential or dark undetermined material or thought (*dianoia*) to light and life (*Poetics*, 1455a22). Aristotle later acknowledges that the process of bringing to light cannot simply be done by ordinary language.

By merely combining the ordinary names of things this [to bring new experiences of people to light] cannot be done, but it is made possible by combining metaphors. For instance, "I saw a man weld bronze upon a man with fire," and so on. A medley of rare words is jargon. We need then a sort of mixture of the two. For the one kind will save the wording from being

prosaic and commonplace, the rare word, for example, and the metaphor and the "ornament," whereas the ordinary words give clarity. (*Poetics*, 1458a)

But, as we read in this quote, not only should there be a moderation and balance between ordinary words (*kurion*) and the new expressions but also not all metaphors are appropriate. He delves into the structure of metaphor to find the most *proper* one. He defines metaphor as a process or a carrying (*epiphora*). The root and the structure of the word metaphor as *meta-pherein* literally means to "carry over."

Metaphor is a carrying over of a word belonging to something else, from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy. And I speak of analogy whenever a second thing has to a first a relation similar to that which a fourth has to a third; for one will state the fourth in place of the second or the second in place of the fourth, and sometimes people add the things to which the replaced word is related. Old age to life is like evening is to day; accordingly one will call evening of life, or the sunset of life. (*Poetics*, 1457b 8-10)

By breaking down the concepts to their constituting categories and re-combining the parts again, Aristotle manages to express new experiences by the same old terms. As Aristotle holds in the definition of metaphor, the transference (*epiphora*) is controlled either within the boundaries of categories or through analogy like a hidden syllogism. In other words, according to Lawlor, "metaphor uses sedimented predicates to describe new experiences or experiences of new things" (Lawlor, 1992. 31).

On the other hand, in order to produce *proper* metaphors, this movement (*epiphora*) of metaphor as *meta-pherein* has to be completed to form a complete analogy. That is, metaphorical language has to communicate in order for a tragedy to meet its end. Thus, the role of wording (*lexis*) is to empower the plot to actually accomplish its task and to bring the audience toward the end, which is "the contradiction," according to Aristotle:

In order to organize the stories and work them out with their wording, one ought, as much as possible, to put them *before the eyes*. Only thus by

getting the picture as clear as if he were present at the actual event, will he find what is fitting and detect contradictions. (*Poetics*, 1455a 21-25; my emphasis)

In this sense, the most beautiful wording captures the strangest, the most unheard of experiences and yet the tragedy as a whole would accomplish its end. Metaphor needs to act as a part in a whole. In the *Poetics*, he literally brings examples from poets where, in the absence of a present concept in the language, they create a new, unheard of term. But, he quickly says that this creation has to be in moderation so that the language would not become enigmatic, nonsensical, or altogether “barbaric” (*Poetics*, 1458a 25).

Therefore, even in the treatment of the absolutely new, Aristotle creates a hierarchy of the propriety. Of course, there is no doubt difference between good and bad makings but the point is that he prioritizes the ordinary language over foreign words, alien words, and metaphors. This strategy which defines a proper metaphor is not hospitable to immigrants, strangers, and individual cases alike. Also, this is not only about words. “For people feel the same way about wording as they do about foreigners and fellow citizens” (*Rhetoric*, 3. 2. 1404b 10). He is literally advocating for a stable community and the kind of innovation which does not threaten the integrity of the system.

Therefore, in order for the metaphor to work properly, that is to actually bring the making of the *logos* to light, the cycle of recognition, which consists of a detour of syllogistic reasoning, must be complete. Recognition is a key element both as a discovery in the plot and as means to provide clarity in language. For, as Aristotle holds, the pleasure and the delight of poetry as imitation (*mimesis*) is in the recognition which presupposes a prior familiarity (*Poetics*, 1448b15-20). If the end of man or the happiest life of man is in accordance with contemplation (*theoria*), recognition is to bring about contemplation for the audience through the detour of metaphor.

According to Aristotle, making a proper and successful metaphor is the job of a gifted poet like Homer, who is able to metaphorize well, “to metaphorize well is to contemplate what is like (*homoion*)” (*Poetics*, 1459a 6-8). The gifted poet has the power to see through the future and find similarities between events and objects to make novel

connections. He must have a sharp eye to seek out similarities between the way events are talked about and bring together concepts and make new combinations out of the old ones. In this sense, a metaphor for Aristotle does not illustrate something absolutely new, but rather sheds light on the way concepts and predicates are made to refer to events and referents. Metaphors shed light on the coming-to-be of the concepts. As Aristotle contends, metaphors are to put the coming to be of events and things “before our eyes.” In this way, the reader or the audience is able to focus on the *process* of the coming-to-be of the world as it already is in actuality.

The creative activity of a gifted poet is what he calls *philomythos*, which is a kind of poetry that is more philosophical (related to unities and wholes) than the accounts of history, which is merely about the episodic events in the past) (*Poetics*, 1451b1-6). But, even in the *Poetics*, Aristotle mentions an alternative to rational making:

Hence the poetic art belongs to either a naturally gifted person or an insane (*manikos*) one, since those of the former sort are easily adaptable and the latter are out of their senses. (*Poetics*, 1455a 30-35)

This is a very striking passage in the *Poetics*, where after writing extensively about the rational constitution of the most noble making (*poieisis*,) Aristotle readily admits that the whole operation might as well be the work of stupidity and *insanity* (what Derrida calls “*bêtise*”). “Missing the mark,” miscalculation, private language (*idiotikon*, which is of the same root as idiocy, idiot) are all pointing to the same level of thinking, which is not in accordance with deliberate calculation, and *logos* and yet brings about a kind of making albeit not *hylomorphic* making.¹³³

While hitting the mark creates the necessary anticipated form, “missing the mark” creates an unanticipated gathering or a coming-together that is deformed and even monstrous.

In the *Ethics*, as I tried to show in the last two chapters, Aristotle seems to be aware of actual makings whose source and principle are not in the familiar laws of nature or the deliberation of an agent. Still, he advocates for more prudence and more

¹³³ Look at Appendix 5 for Derrida on *Betise* in the history of philosophy.

calculation for an anticipated outcome. This is the task of book VI of the Ethics, where he sets out to scrutinize into the intellectual virtues of man to figure out a deliberative function that can be used as a measure for more calculation. Nonetheless, the point I was trying to make was the alternative mode of ‘following’ that Aristotle’s system of justice as laws unintentionally gives rise to. In fact, the suggestion in Book VIII that “between friends there is no need for justice (*NE.*, 8.1.1155a26-31) ensures that he has taken steps towards alternative measures to ‘address’ the otherness beyond the calculative thinking involved in justice as laws. This, of course, is the topic beyond the scope of the present work.

4.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined how the deconstructive critique of the laws can explain their genesis and failure as well as different modes of community within and on the margins of Aristotle’s text. The merit of the Aristotelian formulation of community and the ontology of laws is the internal dialectic that is in progress within his analysis. He puts on trial his own suggestions and formulations out of which he lays the ground for the development of thought process and even alternative modes of thinking altogether.

What I argued about Aristotle’s version of justice and community is an answer to the question of the ontological foundation of law at the dawn of western philosophy. I tried to show that his text is bifurcated between two kinds of being-with whose excellence is justice. I called them “community as exchange” and “nomadic following.” Both of these comportments towards otherness are intrinsic to the essential development of human beings’ nature towards its flourishing in being-with-others-in-*polis*. In keeping with the natural growth of man, both of these communities at their ends are associated with *logos* and interpretation.

There are two moments in which Aristotle points to the genesis of community along with its laws and principles. One is when he tries to establish a just city in accordance with man’s function and definition as life-in-the-*polis*. Here we witness the immanent constitution of a city whose function is to bring the originary character of citizens to the

fore. However, two forces carry the original aim away towards impersonal and universal laws. One is the function of money in community as exchange, and the other is the question of sovereignty of laws over man. Gradually, Aristotle replaces the good of every individual with the good of the city and as a result, the laws turn a blind eye to the singularity of individuals.

In such a circumstance, the second moment of the genesis of community and laws comes to pass. When, as a result of the previous measures, justice as universal law becomes impossible. Aristotle tries to rectify the laws with more of the same genus. He assumes that at the moment of the creation of law, *phronēsis* would go beyond both nature and convention—and in one stroke found both of them. But *phronēsis*, as he admits later in book VI, can be abused by the sophists as a tool and not a measure. Consequently, *phronēsis* cannot stand outside the system. It has to be contained within the boundaries of reason and universals. It is part and parcel of the whole Aristotelian system of intellectual virtues and his cosmology, which as we explained in previous chapters, is bound up within the structure of the actual and the present.

Nonetheless, my argument in this chapter was that admitting to the impossibility that afflicts his metaphysical system, Aristotle hints at a path beyond his own solutions; the path of “nomadic following” and the heedful conduct. The laws of “nomadic following” are not based on calculation of the same kind but are given by the indefinite material at hand. They are realized only if one takes the potency of the indefinite matter or singular case at hand seriously. Following this path allows the laws to move beyond calculation in the silence of logos and provides an ability to hear the voice of the ‘other.’ This does not mean that the laws do not establish some form of justice. Instead, it means that the general laws are blind to the most originary case which founds them in the first place.

Applying the Derridean deconstruction of law to Aristotle’s formulation, one can explain how and why the process of the immanent constitution of a just community in exchange, admittedly becomes *aporetic*. In a general critique of laws, Derrida enacted

this aporetic situation in a lecture himself, comparing the implementation of laws to the laws of language and other cultural and institutional conventions.

For my part, I argued that the nature of laws of exchange in Aristotle and their implementation through money are comparable with presencing of beings in *logos* and its double character. Thus, laws are plagued with the same *aporia* as *logos* with regard to the problem of alterity, innovation, and the singular expression of individuals. That is to say, just like the natural laws and presencing in *logos* that for the most part generate the same and the familiar and do not necessarily ‘address’ the abnormal or the unfamiliar, Aristotle admits that the universal laws of justice do not meet some special circumstances (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 19-25). It is noteworthy that he is not admitting to a failure in the laws but an essential unaccountable otherness in the nature of the singular context (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 18). We need a new measure to apply to that which is indefinite. This measure needs to be given by the indefinite or the singular other, which is not reducible to the same (*NE*. 5.10 1137b 20-33). He calls this second more complete form of justice “fairness” (*epieikeia*).

With respect to this admission, my contention in this chapter was twofold. Firstly, Aristotle is well aware of the problem of laws and systematically prefers the stability and generality of laws over unaccountable innovations or the radical alterity of the other, and secondly, this very mistreatment of singularity ontologically grounds a mode of community and ‘following’ that he calculatedly and deliberately tries to avoid.

His admission to the *aporia* of laws, the failure of partial justice in ‘addressing’ the singular other transforms the nature of fairness (*epieikeia*) into a completely different mode of being-with-others. Fairness turns into, trans-forms, or undergo a metamorphosis into something other than a mere supplement or rectification of justice in the way that Aristotle initially puts forth (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 19-25). The rectification of the law, which is necessarily unjust, is paradoxically the most responsible comportment towards the other. “Following creatively,” without a predetermined system or calculation in headful comportment towards the other is in fact the most responsible mode of being-with. However, as I mentioned following Derrida, such a ‘following’ is always “heretical” in

all senses of the term. Any decision or judgment in that territory is considered outlaw yet carries the signature of the one who makes them. That is why decisions at this realm are still more free and responsible than a blind following of the law.

One of the best examples of this aporetic situation and its resolution in an unlawful yet responsible decision can be seen in the well-known novel *Les Misérables*. My reference is to the judgment and the critical decision of Bishop Myriel. Valjean a recently discharged convict seeks refuge in his church. Myriel accommodates him and shows hospitality to him. In spite of all that, Valjean steals silverware from him. But the police capture him again and bring him to the Bishop and ask him about the issue. Myriel saves Valjean from jail by claiming that he had donated the silverware to him and there was even more for Valjean to have.

The significant point here is that according to the laws of justice, Myriel should have turned Valjean in. This is what the fanatic police inspector Javert would do even to himself had he ever even thought of violating the laws. On the one hand, we have the claim of the law to recognize the agent as who he is, in this case the criminal that Valjean is. On the other hand, it seems that it is Myriel who really heeds the otherness and the singularity of Valjean's situation. Even though he recognizes Valjean as a criminal, Myriel decides to set him free, a decision which is in itself unjust according to the laws. Nonetheless, as the story proceeds, it seems that his action leads to a major transformation in Valjean's life. Valjean becomes Mayor Madeleine, the founder or executor of the laws. Unlike what Aristotle suggests for such moments as deliberating the character of the individual at the moment or as he has been all his life, Myriel celebrates the other individual as a possibility of what he *can* be. The fact that right after his decision Valjean commits another crime reminds the reader of the threat and wager in embracing the possibility.

This kind of comportment towards the other, according to Derrida, is necessarily unjust in a calculative sense and is more similar to heedful conduct with respect to the alterity of the other. In this chapter, I referred to the point in Book V of *NE* where Aristotle seems to be drawn towards this direction. In such a moment, it seems, he gives

up his calculative deliberation and completely gives in to the alterity (NE. 5.10.1137b35-1138a2).

I aimed at demonstrating that Aristotle opens this path, which I called the path of ‘nomadic following’ by admitting to the *aporia*. This is a route that does not have an end in view and celebrates motion and change in the subject, the object, and measures alike. However, this will undermine his initial metaphysical project based on the beingness (*ousia*) as the present (*parousia*). Things are present at their limit or are headed towards their pre-determined limit in-the-world.

By exercising heedful conduct, the conduct that is receptive to alterity and welcomes an essential modification, opens Aristotle’s metaphysical system to a new kind of temporality that lays the foundation of a different kind of calculation. Justice as laws, just like the laws of nature, presupposes the presence of beings in the future and the past. The events and individuals have to be anticipatable as if they are similar or the same. Time as “the number of change,” for Aristotle, stays homogeneous. Aristotle thereby makes sure that the future, for the most part, resembles the past. Things are as much present now as in the future and in the past (BC., 24-25). Had he embraced the consequences of the suspension of the laws, he must have prepared himself for a new kind of temporality beyond the economic temporality of the present or the temporality of the ‘givenness.’ This primordial temporality gives beings as if for the first time and in an unanticipated manner.

Laws in this way cannot be based on the actual and present availability of beings. The principle of motion in presencing as being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*) will have to be replaced with the ones that accommodate pure potency (*dynamis*). Aristotle plants the seed of this generative force, this potency, which later bifurcates into two very different understandings of ‘following’ the laws in Islamic philosophy and theology.

5. Chapter 5 : Conclusion: Being a Muslim, Being a ‘Follower-in-Trouble’

5.1. Conclusion (1)

Post-Heideggerian phenomenology is characterized by the critique of identity as identical or present to itself and the community as a kind of making (*poiesis*) or ideality. Derrida, in particular, emphasizes the potential danger and violence of any political community which is gathered around such ideal makings, or institutions as state, nation, Europe, the West, and so on. Such a construct serves as an organizing principle that gives completed definitions and identity to its members. The horizon of these definitions is always already determined, leaving little room for the authentic possibility of the individuals to flourish.

By attending to the treatment of alterity and innovation in these systems, one can truly liberate the force of this critique. For Derrida, any such heading or capital is formed at the expense of eliminating those that are not identical or similar to this arbitrary making. Even in Aristotle, whose political system promises moral flourishing, the system altogether is not very hospitable to strangers or innovators. According to him, as I argued in this work, this goes back to the laws that determine every synchronic system. As Aristotle admits, due to the generality and universality of the laws, they are not tailored to address the singular character of every member of the system (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 19-25). Thus, they are essentially *enforced*. That is, the laws are established by producing a normal, repeatable state of affairs, and as a result, they do injustice to the singularity of individuals. Besides, the laws repeat and legitimize what is typical, which consequently marginalize what is considered abnormal or creative. Accordingly, Derrida drastically problematizes the bold line between the outlaw as a criminal and the outlaw as an innovator.

To avoid falling prey to such synchronic systems and constructs, I took the perspective of the individual in dealing with the problem of community and identity. I approached being-togetherness in terms of ‘following’ the other. ‘Following’ the other can take a temporal angle in which case it amounts to talking about ‘following’ a tradition. It is worth remembering that the question of ‘following’ is not about a subject who decides according to specific measures to choose between one reading of tradition or

one community rather than another. Formulating the problem in terms of ‘following’ means to ask about the moment where ‘following’ gives rise to the ‘follower’ and the ‘followed’ at the same time. It is the ‘givenness’ of a particular event, the encounter with a singular other, which creates the ‘followers’ and the ‘followed’ at the same time.

For example, an anthropologist can look at the followers of a religious tradition and imagine them as identities following some essential principles and laws of conduct or performing the same rituals. They might act the same way and say similar things, like Muslims who attend Friday prayers at the same time toward a certain direction (*qibla*)¹³⁴ and almost exactly in a predictable way. But, I am interested in the original moment of distinction that gives rise to their being as ‘followers’ and what they ‘follow.’

Aristotle’s view, Heidegger argues, can put the whole discussion on an immanent existential plane because, for him, the human being is not defined as an independent self or subject who, only then, decides to comport oneself to others. For him, to be-with-others is not “to be” an individual subject who abides by the laws of reason, social contract, etc., but rather, it is already to be-in-community with others (*BC.*, 45). Also, in *BT*, he seems to be adopting the same basic Aristotelian insight when he talks about *Mitdasein*. He supplements the term *Dasein* with *Mitdasein*, arguing that they are co-originary: “certain structures of *Dasein* ...are equi-primordial with Being-in-the-world: Being-with and *Dasein*-with [*Mitsein und Mitdasein*] (*BT.*, 115/149).” That is to say that humans always already find themselves in a hyphenated existence in relation to others.

For Aristotle, human beings as life-possessing-*logos* and life-in-the-*polis* are always already in being-in-the-world-with-others. Humankind is first and foremost “life,” a mixture of the world and others, and the rest (i.e., self, subject, object, etc.) are secondary abstractions. According to Heidegger, life in this sense is not *bios* or the world of nature in a biological sense (*BC.*, 14). Our being as humans is already constituted by our meaning-making relationship with life. Life in this sense, *matters* to human beings and is on the way to express itself in *logos*. This does not mean that a human being is an

¹³⁴The *Qibla* meaning “direction”, or “facing” is the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays during *Ṣalāṭi* (prayer). It is fixed as the direction of the Ka‘aba in the city of Mecca. Most mosques contain a wall niche that indicates the Qibla, which is known as a *miḥrāb*.

independent subject that constitutes or represents the world in knowledge, but that the human being is the place where life shows its unfolding in *logos*.

With a collapse of subject-object distinction in this formulation of human existence, the whole question turns into how life in its animal formation unfolds in itself automatically to become manifest in a communal *logos*. Dasein, for Heidegger, names the place where the presencing (*ousia*) (not present beings) comes to pass and meets its limit or completion in *logos*. Therefore, the question of community is deeply connected with the unfolding of the nature, the laws, and principles under which the nature meets its end as well as the nature of the end.

In keeping with the phenomenological reading of Aristotle, in this work, I tried to demonstrate that for him, the same basic concepts that determine the coming-to-be and generation of beings in nature are at work in accounting for how people are with one another in time. In this way, I argued that Aristotle's meditations about the coming-to-be in nature produces the necessary ingredients of the critique of any gathering of a people as a construct, an arbitrary institution, or a making. However, we demonstrated with Heidegger that the moment Aristotle tries to turn his meditations into a science, or a metaphysical system, he 'misses the mark' and produces another ideality.

Aristotle produces a system of present entities not merely by focusing on beings but by giving them a familiar end (*telos*). That is how the metaphysics of presence is created by prioritizing the familiarity with the look (*eidos*) of the things, i.e., the *telos* of presencing, and thereby closing the possibility of the emergence of the difference as such. I argued that in such a synchronic system, the interpretation of tradition as 'following' the others of the past engenders the repetition of their way of life. 'Following' turns out to be like a son 'following' and resembling his father.

Aristotle in effect marginalizes some modes of 'following,' calling them monstrous, bestial, or abnormal. Conversely, the genuine or authentic 'following' is to defy the laws of the present and the actual as well as to question the very legitimacy of them. The transcendental study of the law makes it possible to see similar patterns of its

occurrence in establishing every metaphysical system and to show the arbitrary ground of sovereignty or the “mystical foundation of authority” (*Derrida*, 1990. 920).

In each chapter of this work, I tried to show the same problem with the Aristotelian formulation of universal laws. I investigated different forms of law, first in nature (the universal formulas that explain multiplicity plus the ones governing motion and generation), then in moral action (the educational rules of conduct toward the golden mean of virtues) and finally in the social sphere (the just laws of the community). In all these cases, I argued, Aristotle refers to the universal formula as that which establishes a hierarchy of the noblest making, the most appropriate and the most stable as opposed to less appropriate or altogether bestial formations, human vices, unjust acts, or the outlaws. However, the very attention of Aristotle to the indefinite matter (*hylē*), as that which has no name yet, or the immanent force of desire releases other forms of makings and doings that bring about the creation of the outlaw as well as the innovative. Thus, each chapter of the present work consists of two main parts: the formation of the ideal system and the dissemination of marginal forces that give rise to alternative gatherings.

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In each chapter, this form of making or doing is discussed under the concept of 'missing the mark' (*hamartia*), which implies an unintentional but essential flaw like that of the tragic character. As opposed to the normal and familiar makings and doings *hamartia* produces unfamiliar and bestial modes of making. Derrida talks about the concept of *bêtise* in French, which is very much similar to *hamartia* in Greek although he does not establish the relationship. *Hamartia* for example in the case of the character of tragedy is not an intentional wrongdoing or fault of character (as in vices) but a mistake, miscalculation, stupidity (*bêtise*), or some flaw. However, this seemingly epistemological flaw is not an error because as opposed to the Cartesian error or mistake, there is not scientific method that can avoid it. In chapter four and in analysis of different kinds of mistakes according to Aristotle, I pointed out that the source of this mistake is not within the intention or deliberation of the agent nor does he attribute it to a divine force. In effect, it points to an alignment in thought with the creative forces that are not anticipatable, and are *a-teleological* or nomadic.

Having the literal meaning of *kategoria* as accusation or blame in mind, *hamartia* like *bêtise* in French is responsible for such accidental, stupid, catastrophic, or monstrous makings and doings as those of the events and the fate of the tragic figure.¹³⁵ As such an alignment in thought, which is obviously not intentional, non-calculative, and nomadic, *hamartia* does not act in accordance with Kantian categories of mind or even Aristotelian categories of speech. It is point to a trans-categorical category much the same way that medieval thinkers way before Kant describe. Derrida writes about *bêtise* as follows:

This category is precisely a category whose signification is never assured*bêtise* is not one category among others. Or it is a transcategorical category. One will never be able to isolate a univocal meaning of a concept of *bêtise* in its irreducible link to the French idiom. Now, if it is a category, then *bêtise*, as an accusation and as an attribution, an attribute, a

¹³⁵ Derrida writes: the word “*bêtise*” belongs to the language of indictment; it’s a category of accusation, a way of categorizing the other. It is most often manipulated as an accusation, a denigration, an incrimination, blame that tries to discredit not only a mistake in intelligence or knowledge but also a misdeed, an offense, an ethical misdeed, or quasi- juridical accusation. (Derrida, *DDP*. 48)

predicate, a predication, if this category doesn't belong to the regime of the normal series of categories, if it is an exceptional category, a transcategorical category, then it corresponds to the first literal definition of the transcendental in the Middle Ages. Long before Kant, "transcendental" meant *quid transcendendi omni genus*. It's a category that transcends all the categories and doesn't belong to the series or table of categories. (Derrida, DDP. 48-9)

In this work, I argued, Aristotle himself paves the way for his medieval reader to find out about all the forces of generation and motion and as a result different modes of community. Therefore, each chapter consists of first, outlining Aristotle's attempt to explain the immanent expression of beings in nature or the constitution of actions and makings in the natural growth of man towards fulfilling its definitions. Secondly, I tried to show how with respect to all of his necessary laws, Aristotle inevitably and gradually is drawn and compelled to point to the possibility of the alternative mode of movement, generation or gatherings.

In this light, in Chapters 1 and 2, I delved into Aristotle's *Physics*, into what I called the politics of nature, looking for the principles of the emergence of any gathering in nature and how for Aristotle beings are judged, differentiated, and evaluated. I asked what the laws are under which such a natural presencing occurs. I argued, following Heidegger, Brogan, and Sheehan, that there is a sense in which Aristotle is perhaps the first philosopher that attempts to successfully account for the laws of motion and generation in nature, that is the principles according to which individual beings come after one another. I argued the most original and the best example of presencing (*ousia*) for Aristotle is the natural presencing (*physis*) that is the repetitious and automatic coming-to-be of things immanently.

The coming-after in nature follows such necessary and eternal laws of presencing. This stands against the human making in the arts (*technē*) which is not done automatically and therefore is not in accordance with the being of things in nature. In such cases, the artists or artisans impose arbitrary forms or categories on natural material.

They violently carry the natural beings away from their natural presencing and impose the form in their minds on natural material (*Sheehan*, 151-52; *Brogan*, 88).

On the other hand, Heidegger observes that while trying to capture the original presencing of things (instead of present beings), Aristotle sets up different schemata to make this motion accountable like a science. They include *hylomorphism* and *teleology* which are two of the most important schemata to account for automatic natural change. These schemata explain the being of things in nature and evaluate them as flourishing or deteriorating. For example, *hylo-morphism* explains how a seed of an apple tree as a material (*virtual material* (*hylē*) is in potency (*dynamis*) always already towards its being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*) or enactment of its function or form (*morphē*) as an apple tree. Being an apple tree is the enactment of what is already in potency in the material; it is *en-ergeia* literally *en-ergon* (putting into work/function). The form also constitutes its perfection, completion, and end which it begins the growth always already towards it. That is motion does not happen without having some completion in view (*teleology*).

In nature, being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*) reigns. The pre-Socratic origins of nature in the matter, chaos or strife, or unlimited motion (*energeia ateles*) “ought to” follow the necessary and eternal laws of nature, meet their end and be appropriated by the form (*eidos*). This immanent motion is characterized by *hylomorphism*. *Hylomorphism* does not mean the combination of form and matter but that there is no unformed or uninformed matter. The matter in motion can only be known when it is appropriated at its limit (*peras* which is associated with *logos* and *eidos*) or with respect to its being-towards the proper limit.

In order to produce the science of nature whose principle (*archē*) is motion (*kinēsis*) Aristotle provides another ideality, which is repeatable. There is a sense in which the motion (*kinēsis*) and generation in nature “for the most part” generates *the same*, in spite of the differences and accidents (*tychai*). There is a limit to the change and motion that is determined by the way things are in their familiarity and availability. The *heading* or *telos* is already anticipatable, otherwise it would be accidental and unaccountable

(*alogon*). Natural generation “ought to” follow the necessary and eternal laws of nature (*physis*) rather than being an imposition of mental categories or being unaccountable and monstrous.

The proposed limit and end exacerbates this situation. Heidegger remarks that *ousia* keeps its everyday use of the term as well when it enters Aristotelian terminology. It still means estate, possession, almost akin to the notion of currency or capital. The familiarity of the look (*eidos*) of the things in everyday use constitutes the end (*telos*). Thus, Aristotle prioritizes the end which is in our possession.

Altogether, Heidegger pinpoints two findings or emphases in Aristotle that are unprecedented and crucial: first, his focus on end (*telos*) and limit (*peras*) and second, his attempt to account for motion. Still, he criticizes Aristotle’s priority for the present and actual beings. He shows how the problem is exacerbated when Aristotle, in fact, associates the end with speech (*logos*). Speech (*logos*) is the place where the primordial character of beings is ‘addressed.’ Using the term ‘address’ and pointing to the human character of *logos* make the revelation of the truth of beings problematic and ambiguous. For, in one sense, speech (*logos* as ‘address’) is the final destination of the process of the coming-to-be of beings in clarity and yet clear speech is already determined as that which is current and communicable in public. That is to say that clarity of the ‘address’ in the second sense is, at least to some extent, conventional rather than natural. In other words, if the primordial character of beings is addressed in *logos*, and the most appropriate *logos* is determined by communicability (public language), how the truth of beings comes to the fore is pre-determined by those limits set by the public language itself. To be understood and come to clarity, beings have to choose from a pool of “used up,” sedimented terms. As a result, the original function of *logos* in letting things show themselves as they are is compromised. The presumed place of clarity where the primordial character of beings or the characteristic difference of beings was supposed to be revealed (*alethuein*) is already pre-laden with the actual usage of language.

Aristotle acknowledges the underlying motion at work in the presenting of beings, but in order to be the individual determinations that they are, in their looks, in their

availability and their use, beings need to meet their end in *logos*. All that is indeterminate and formless has to meet its end in the actual presence and availability of things. This giving priority to the actual presence, availability or the familiarity with things in nature produces a hierarchy of the most proper and appropriate presencing as opposed to the least proper and monstrous. The priority for what is available, the same and actual make the structure of nature already political and hierarchical. Human beings as part of life are no exception to this politics of nature. The seed of the father “ought to” produce an end that is predetermined virtually, as a similar looking son. The proper limit seems to determine the *archē* or the law of motion as well.

Heidegger’s solution is to radicalize Aristotle’s consideration of motion and potency and to take the withdrawal embedded in presencing seriously. In a critical reading of Brogan, I demonstrated that both kinds of makings either through the imposition of the end by natural laws or the imposition of arbitrary mental categories are just as violent. To ‘address’ a being in its presencing is to stand in the difference and let the thing appear as an unforeseen possibility. Because of its crucial role in my analysis in this chapter, I repeat this quote here again:

It is of decisive importance, first, that we allow space for beings as a whole; second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say, that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which one is wont¹³⁶ to go cringing¹³⁷; and finally, that we let the sweep of our suspense take its full course, so that it swings back into the basic question of metaphysics which the nothing compels: Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing? (*BW.*, 112)

By questioning the heading, the end, the appropriation at the end in Dasein as (*energeia/entelecheia*) and replacing it with potency (*dynamis*), the necessary and eternal nature of the laws of presencing becomes unsettled. Heidegger manages to turn every presencing in

¹³⁶ make or be or become accustomed

¹³⁷ To cringe: [krinj] to bend one's head and body in fear or in a servile manner.

reality into a gathering in reading. The temporality of such a comportment is constituted by what-is-not-yet, as opposed to what-is-already.

In chapters 3 and 4, I followed the same trend, this time regarding the laws of action in general (perfect justice) and in the constitution of the just society. I demonstrated that the generality of the laws of action in both realms is rooted in consideration of a proper end, which is in accordance with human definition and function as life-possessing-*logos* and life-in-the-*polis*. This most proper end comes about through different schemata for Aristotle and is associated with such terms as happiness (*eudaimonia*), the good of life, justice, contemplation, the noble (*kalon*), and the mean. In Chapter 3, I showed how Aristotle establishes that the ends are immanent to the natural presencing of life-possessing-*logos*. He is diligent to point out that in the realm of action, things are much more contingent and the best actions are not created naturally.

Desire is the cause of things being done that are apparently pleasant. The things which are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are among pleasant things; for men do with pleasure many things which are not naturally pleasant, when they have become accustomed to them.
(*Rhetoric*, 1.10.1369 b)

Still, Aristotle's task is to show that if one uses deliberation and calculation, she can align her desire and anger with the natural and automatic making to hit the target. This is the job of habit. In order to restore a quasi-necessary¹³⁸ motion towards the pleasurable rest, the individuals need to acquire habits (*hexis*). Their actions have to become *almost* natural to produce the best end. The *hylomorph*, the best result in the realm of action, is the golden mean of virtues. The flourishing life-possessing-*logos* is the one who brings desire under the control of deliberation to let the proper and accurate character of beings as they really are come to light.

The golden mean of virtues is a modification of desires, a having (habit, *hexis*, *echei*) or singular targeting of desires which directs the seed, the potency, or the body of

¹³⁸ It is quasi-necessary because of the contingent character of human action. Habit is not necessary like nature but it is quasi-necessary like something that is not against nature either. To act according to habit becomes like nature, second nature.

an entity toward a proper (*prepon*), appropriate holding-at-one's-end (*entelecheia*). Nevertheless, the appropriate or the end is still determined by *logos* with its paradoxical singular-plural character. Human choices “ought” to be controlled by the power of *logos*. With the intervention of *logos*, the complications we mentioned above enter the realm of action as well. What Aristotle claims to be genuine pleasure as opposed to apparent pleasure may, in fact, be an appropriate pleasure in the sense that it is determined by public opinion (*doxa*).

The character of the *hylomorph* and reign of the actual (*entelecheia*) becomes clearer when Aristotle attends to the judgment of the abnormal doings and mistakes. The way Aristotle justifies mistakes and errors shows his preference for the *hylomorph* and yet his concern about the creation of the catastrophe. As I mentioned above, in the characterization or categorization (from *kategoria*: “to blame” or “to charge”) of beings as abnormal and actions as mistakes lies the foundation of another kind motion and creative power. The question is who is to blame for a catastrophe. It is worth remembering that such bad ends against all expectation happen rarely in the realm of natural making. But, as Aristotle admits, it is easy to ‘miss the mark’ in the realm of action which is more contingent.

For the good and bad actions as long as the result is in accordance with the deliberation we can anticipate the end and we can claim that the metaphysical principles of *logos* are at work. In other words, we can still anticipate and judge the being of an individual through judging the result of his actions although the action might not naturally follow his being, due to the intrusion of desire or anger. In other words, actions and mistakes can be referred back to a bad judgment or miscalculation under the influence of desires. Both of these results are anticipated and accounted by Aristotle's metaphysics.

However, Aristotle is diligent to mention particular cases like Oedipus, where in spite of all of the calculations by the individual, he does actions that do not speak to his character and would not result in a *hylomorph* but a catastrophe. In that case, the principle that is creating the event, Aristotle still admits, must have been from outside of

him or incidentally. The source of the making and the mistake is outside his being and he is not to blame (*NE.*, 1135b18).¹³⁹ Thus, the error in the part of a character like Oedipus, points to an agent, a doer, or a maker of state of affairs, which is beyond the expectation of a rational, virtuous doer and maker, as well as the audience of the tragedy.

Aristotle rejects the possibility of the attribution of this making in the horizon (the catastrophic fate of the character) for Oedipus to the divine writer. He is careful to point out that should the tragedy have a real effect on the audience and bring about catharsis and wonder for them, the fate of Oedipus cannot miraculously (by divine intervention) turn into good fortune. He regards such an ending and discovery (the divine intervention) too easy and ineffective (*Poetics*, 1455a 15-20). In effect, the blame, the responsibility

¹³⁹ Aristotle writes: “There are then three ways in which a man may injure his fellow. An injury done in ignorance is an error, the person affected or the act or the instrument or the result being other than the agent supposed; for example, he did not think to hit, or not with this missile, or not this person, or not with this result, but it happened that either the result was other than he expected (for instance he did not mean to inflict a wound but only a prick), or the person, or the missile. When then the injury happens contrary to reasonable expectation, it is (1) a misadventure. When, though not contrary to reasonable expectation, it is done without evil intent, it is (2) a culpable error; for an error is culpable when the cause of one's ignorance lies in oneself, but only a misadventure when the cause lies outside oneself.” (*NE.*, 1135b18 5-8)

The three sorts of injury are *ἀτύχημα*, *ἀμάρτημα*, and *ἀδίκημα*. The second term is introduced first, in its wider sense of a mistake which leads to an offense against someone else (the word connotes both things) . It is then subdivided into two; *ἀτύχημα*, accident or misadventure, and offense due to mistake and not reasonably to be expected, and *ἀμάρτημα* in the narrow sense, a similar offense that ought to have been foreseen. The third term, *ἀδίκημα*, a wrong, is subdivided into wrongs done in a passion, which do not prove wickedness, and wrongs done deliberately, which do. “Again, in deliberation there is a double possibility of error: you may go wrong either in your general principle or in your particular fact: for instance, either in asserting that all heavy water is unwholesome, or that the particular water in question is heavy. (*NE.*, 1142a 7-8) (*ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευέσθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον*)

Again, a man can be said to have deliberated well either generally, or in reference to a particular end. Deliberative Excellence in general is therefore that which leads to correct results with reference to the end in general, while correctness of deliberation with a view to some particular end is Deliberative Excellence of some special kind. If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which constitutes Prudence. **10.** Understanding, or Good Understanding, (*NE.*, 1142b). With regard to problems, and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this. Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things—either things as they were or are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be. These are expressed in diction with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which we allow the poet to use. Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it is in the art of social conduct or any other art. In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, essential and accidental. If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an essential error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for example, a horse advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of knowledge, [20] in medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not an essential error. These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the charges contained in these objections.

falls on neither the deliberation of the agent nor the divine intervention. He leaves no other option for the audience than thinking of a bestial force at work in the nature or the order of things that threatens everyone—and there is no secure escape from the contingency of its creation. Thus, Aristotle admits that the disastrous effect or bad formation might occur in the process of the creation of an event in the future unbeknownst to the doer and against his best calculations. This is still a motion of desire, but not from within the control of the deliberation of the individual or the necessary laws of nature.

With this admission of the existence of a mis-treatment and the automatic power of generation of events beyond calculation, one expects Aristotle would turn into an immanent philosopher of becoming. He goes deep into the multiplicity of desire through imagination in tragedy, but only in order to educate, warn and threaten the audience *against* such unaccountable makings. That is to say that *Philomythos* and *Philosophy*, for him, have the same goal of accounting for the appropriate events and warning against the unaccountable. Wonder for him, as Joe Sachs acutely observes, seems to be like the wonder of a scientist who sees an anomaly like an eclipse for the first time, but very quickly restores rationality by accounting for it. The gifted poet is the one who realizes the threat of the unaccountable in the future. By invoking and appealing to the audiences' power of imagination. The poet tries to warn them about the consequence of their actions and to awaken them as to the vulnerability of their situation.

In Chapter 4, I mentioned another such complication, this time, in the social realm where the basic community as exchange is formed between different parties. There, of course, it is not directly *logos*, but laws, which mediate the communication between the parties. The paradox of *logos*, I demonstrated, is repeated for the laws as well: the laws are composed and passed to 'address' and meet the characteristic difference of individuals in order for a just community to take shape. Meanwhile, due to their generality, laws are necessarily bound to equalize the differences between them through money. I argued following Derrida that the universal character of the laws of justice stirs up the same *aporetic* condition in dealing with particular contexts as that of *logos*.

Derrida treats this essential limitation by demonstrating the similarity of the general forms of the laws with those of language. He enacts the essential impossibility of justice as universal laws in terms of the impossibility of the 'address.' Thus, the 'address' is his term for the force of justice beyond any established law which targets the singularity of the other.

Being-with as 'following' the other and always being-after leaves us in a hermeneutic situation. It leaves us in the trouble of forever being an interpreter of what is revealed in *logoi* of others. In the realm of society, the trouble is doubled by being also "before the laws" while the singularity of the other always falls outside the bounds of the established law. Despite being inevitable and necessary, the laws treat individuals not in their true character but strategically and temporarily as the same as others.

In the social realm, the temporary and strategic character of the laws becomes even more evident when Aristotle admits the inability of universal laws to deal with new particular cases. In order to restore justice the laws need to be supplemented by what is not recognized by them.

Aristotle first accuses the particular case as being abnormal. He mentions that the problem is not in the laws or the lawgiver but the nature of the indefinite matter (*NE*. 5.10 1137b 12-18). However, he suddenly changes his tone, suggesting that in the case when the general laws become impossible, it is the indefinite (*aoriston*, limitless, without boundaries) itself that *gives* the new laws (*NE*. 5.10.1137b 19-25). The judge needs a new measure given by individual material of action (*hetōn praktōn hylē*) itself. Finally, in the toolbox of culture and tradition, he finds a solution for the problem (*NE*. 5.10 1137b 20-33).

The solution arises as a result of his admitting to the impossibility of the general laws of the past. Aristotle seems to concede that at the moment of judgement with respect to the unprecedented, every 'follower' have to come to terms with her being-in-trouble. The judge has to grapple with the indefinite matter of action and be creative in concocting measures. He refers to a specific kind of ruler that Lesbian people use. The reference is to a Lesbian molding that had an undulating curve, a "flexible piece of lead

that was accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most closely into those of the stone already laid” (*NE.*, 531).

The actual character of this ruler is not clear but the implication is that Aristotle notices that the laws and measures of the past are not working and they need to be replaced by a new measure. Against his own claim before that the problem and abnormality is in the nature of the case, he is gradually coming to terms with the fact that the shortcoming is in the nature of the measure which needs to be modified constantly to and become other than what it is to fit the individual.

Consequently, the indefinite matter calls for an indefinite measure which establishes the just action and decision at the particular moment of encountering the *aporia* as *aporia*. The individual judgment does not arise as a result of the application of the universal to a particular context or expanding the reach of the universal. Rather, acknowledging the singular as indefinite and problematic would, at one single moment, establish the law, the doer, and the object at the same time.

It is in this context and by admitting to the *aporetic* nature of the laws that Aristotle implies an alternative mode of conduct, the one that goes beyond his own calculation and deliberation. This is a creative moment when Aristotle, haunted by the invisible force of the indeterminate, makes a transgressive decision. He is a firm believer of calculation and economy.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, he replaces the laws of justice with a mode of *heedful conduct* toward the other. Aristotle says:

A man is fair/equitable who chooses and performs acts of this sort, who is no stickler¹⁴¹ for just in bad sense, but is satisfied with less than his share, even though when he has the law on his side. (*NE.* 5.10. 1137b35-1138 a2)

The moment of heedful indecision can open the possibility of a mode of nomadic ‘following’ and heedful conduct toward others, with the possibility of justice to come.

¹⁴⁰ It is worth remembering that even charity (*Chariton*) which can be the best place to break with the economy of the quid pro quo and celebrate the singularity of the other for him has an institution in the city and should be accounted for in a reciprocal economy (*NE.* 5.5.1133a 1-5).

¹⁴¹ a person who insists on a certain quality or type of behavior.

For a moment, the structure of presence collapses and difference in its full force begins to create the possibility of “a call” for justice. The suspension of laws can break the economy of the present (the *quid pro quo* economy of law) and bring about an originary temporality. While laws make actions and judgments anticipatable as if they are present and actual, the suspension of the laws brings about the temporality of future, or unanticipated event of singularity.

In this way, I demonstrated that Aristotle’s attempt to come up with the most just laws leads him to go outside the law and to the presence of the ‘other.’ There is no prepared formulation for ‘addressing’ the ‘other’ rather, should there be any hope for justice, it is in the suspension of the laws of the present and the heedful conduct toward the ‘other’. The task of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) should be understood in this light as well. Most of the time and in ordinary cases, practical wisdom subsumes the particular under the universal. However, this is only true if the future always resembles the past or is the same or equal with the past.

After a discussion on methodology below, I am going to illustrate this *aporia* in regard to the difficulty of being “before the laws” in Islam. I will investigate how the same difficulty besets the general laws of religion. I will argue that to be a ‘follower’ of Islam, as the ‘follower’ of tradition, is plagued by all these difficulties. To illustrate this, I delve into the experience of the pilgrimage of Hajj as one of the most complex rituals of Islam where Muslims are to manifest their firm adherence to the laws. Paradoxically however, I contend that this particular ritual also reveals the problematic of following the laws as well. Hajj in this sense is not just one of the rituals of the tradition that every ‘follower’ of Islam must perform to be a Muslim; rather, it is that action whose performance stages the *aporia* of being the ‘follower’ of the revealed laws. In effect, pilgrimage provides a possibility for Muslims to begin a nomadic, creative ‘following’ of the tradition.

5.1.1. Methodology and Limitations

In the introduction, I proposed the methodology of work as phenomenology. Also, I investigated the modes of ‘following’ tradition in a phenomenological study of some of the figures in the history of philosophy. In dealing with the history of philosophy, I tried to be faithful to the very concerns that I am grappling with; I too am following a tradition. Below, I argue that this work as a whole is an enactment of phenomenology as ‘following’ and as far as it is demanded to be an original ‘following’ albeit a miniature contribution, it is grappling with the same *aporia* and limitations.

I would like to cite a text in two parts by Heidegger where I imagine him standing in a similar position. The text is from a footnote around the beginning of *The Concept of Time*, where Heidegger feels compelled to reflect upon his methodology and expresses his gratitude to the ones he is ‘following’ as well as the limitations of the ‘following.’ He writes:

This investigation takes a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology’s first breakthrough came with Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* (1900/01). This ‘definition’ is intended to indicate that phenomenology can be understood only by studying and learning from this foundational text. Yet, phenomenology is so far from being a ‘method’ that we must glean the modes of examination from the things themselves [*die Sachen selbst*]. The author [Heidegger] owes his understanding of this, less to the book than to vigorous personal guidance by Husserl. Through regular instruction and by generously allowing the author to view numerous unpublished studies, Husserl introduced the author to the most diverse fields of phenomenological research during his years of apprenticeship [*Lehrjahre*] in Freiburg. (CT., 11, footnote)

I would like to think myself as doing phenomenology the way Heidegger explains here. In a single phenomenological moment of ‘following,’ he is, in fact, enacting the phenomenology of ‘following’ in a couple of ways. He is on the verge of introducing a new kind of phenomenology, that is his own existential phenomenology, and at the same time wants to acknowledge his being-in-following the tradition of phenomenology.

Just as I proposed in terms of ‘following’ the laws, in order to do justice and ‘address’ Husserl’s text, he first acknowledges the source where the principles of phenomenology are coming from only to suspend them and in fact to do violence to them. He suspends phenomenology as a “method” and opens the laws to a new beginning. He mentions that “laws” or the “principles” of the study of every particular subject is “given” by the thing itself. That is akin to what I called ‘nomadic following.’ For the one who is going beyond the *method* of phenomenology, in the realm where the laws are as novel as the world given, every step is a heedful conduct, a dangerous wandering in the “apprenticeship of philosophy.” Apprenticeship, following at the level of personal experience of the other (“vigorous personal guidance”) when Husserl’s works and writings were not yet published, is where he seems to have found a breakthrough beyond Husserl’s method of phenomenology. The apprenticeship of philosophy is learning in the naiveté of being a student and not an intellectual adopting or arguing with Husserl’s texts. In effect, Heidegger acknowledges how he has gone beyond Husserl, and found his personal and different voice in understanding him. Understanding not as repeating or parroting, not even in challenging but in saying what has left unsaid from the naiveté of personal experience of the other. That is how he receives his own language and the new phenomenology begins to enlighten his nomadic path. As is obvious from his later texts he remains a faithful reader of the history of philosophy but keeps the same phenomenological attitude towards them as well.

This leads to a major difficulty and limitation that this dissertation is grappling with as well. That is, when one suspends the intellectual assumptions and strives to remain open to the givenness of the tradition, the language of the otherness may come out as very awkward and unclear. In fact, the whole attempt in this work was to show how the clear, familiar language of the public is not hospitable enough to host the novel, the stranger. Nomadic following suspends not only the laws of the present but also the grammar and structure of the ordinary speech (*logos*). Heidegger explains this in a marvelous way as he continues with the footnote:

The awkwardness of the formulations in the following study is due in part to the nature of the investigation. It is one thing to tell stories about entities [*Seiendes*], but quite another to grasp the being [*Sein*] of entities. We often lack not only suitable words but above all suitable grammar. Language is primarily a matter of articulating and expressing entities [*das Seiende*] rather than shedding light on the being of such entities. (CT., 11. footnote)

Other than the implicit reference he makes here to Plato's *Sophist*, the one that gives a bit more context to the prologue in *BT*,¹⁴² the problem he is referring to is that of the ontological difference. We mentioned this as the problem embedded in regarding being as presencing (*ousia*) and not any present being. I argued following Brogan that this was Heidegger's strategy to unsettle the meaning of being as actual and present (beings) and let the traits (*Züge*) of things appear as what they are. He is also recalling the *aporia* of the 'address:' that every presencing in language is as much a retreat, a withdrawal of being (*Sein*) at the same time.

To speak the language of in-between means that you are in effect speaking a foreign language, the one that Aristotle may simply marginalize as barbaric. Heidegger is admitting that his expressions and more importantly his grammar are going to be awkward. The reason is that grammar as the unity which gives sense to the particulars of language is a sedimented system of thought which does not easily tolerate any major shift or innovation. A foreign word or two, a metaphor or a simile, an analogy of some kind are tolerated within the overarching system of language but the unsettling of the whole system calls for a new grammar.

My attempt in this work is fraught with the same difficulties. I am trying to investigate the transcendental conditions of 'following' the 'other', while engaging with the most classical texts of a tradition and yet trying to enact an original way of 'following.' This is, as explained above, what I mean by phenomenology: to walk

¹⁴² Heidegger begins *BT* by alluding to Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist*, with this short citation: "For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed" (*BT*, prologue)

through the givenness of a tradition or the ordinary being-with-others without an assumed *logos* and *telos*, trying to remain open to the emergence of thought. I hope that Heidegger's explication illustrated my malady as well.

In this light, there are a couple of issues that might seem as limitations to this work. By virtue of being an original contribution, my 'following' Aristotle, Heidegger, Derrida is a creative one. Rather than claiming what they wanted to say, I showed where their writing is taking them perhaps without their intention or deliberate choice. My approach to Aristotle was to consider where his theory is heading in ethics and where his mis-treatments or missing the marks (*hamartia*) might have carried away his theory toward another notion of justice or law. I enacted what I meant by 'following' by demonstrating how in attending to particulars and motion, Aristotle in fact conjures up the very forces that carry his text toward admitting to the *aporia*.

As a result, my intervention in tradition might seem dismissive of the literature. I owe very much of my understanding of Aristotle to Heidegger, Aubenque, Owens, Derrida, Brogan, and Sheehan among others, but my aim here is to creatively respond and expand their ideas to a new direction that pushes the discussion forward.

Phenomenology, as nomadic 'following,' means that I have only a constellation of what the future of the project might look like and I insist on letting it not fulfill itself, i.e., letting it remain in motion (*energeia ateles*). For me, that is the meaning of being open to the modes of examination, methods and measures given by "the things themselves [*die Sachen selbst*]."

One major path to follow is different modes of creativity. This work has a strong affiliation with the imagination and poetics. We are talking about creative 'following.' However, the limits of the scope this work do not allow me to go further. Aristotle himself has a way of taking care of creative 'following' in the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, a topic which I referred to only in passing and the full examination of which remains to be done in later works. In other words, while 'nomadic following' is just hinted at in ethics in perhaps an unintentional admission, Aristotle deals with creative takes on tradition head on as different kinds of making (epic, comedy, and tragedy) in the *Poetics*. Here, I

merely showed that even imagination and human making for him is a rational process aiming at the clarity of expression more than anything else. But the nature of the experience of the other in “pity and fear” and different modes of experience of innovation as in epic, tragedy, and comedy remain to be studied independently. In this sense, this work has just begun here on the verge of discovering different modes of innovative ‘following’ in Aristotle.

This work started as a response to a call, from another part of the world and another part of history. While studying Aristotle and the forces of creation embedded in his text, all along I had the transcendental conditions of the Islamic community in mind. Thus, although it is impossible to do justice to the topic of different modes of ‘following’ Islamic laws and tradition, I would only venture to pose the question of Islamic community and identity as an example of the analyses done here. I am not really concerned with how philosophy or theology of Islam has followed Aristotle. Instead, I conduct a phenomenological study of how different modes of ‘following’ are played out in the context of ‘following’ Islamic rituals.

5.2. Conclusion (2): ‘Following’ Islam, ‘Following’ Aristotle

The ontological problem of presencing we posed in Chapter 1 following Aristotle is repeated and reproduced in the medieval context and especially Islamic philosophy and theology. Although the scope of this work does not afford a lengthy discussion about the philosophers and theologians on this matter, I would like to highlight how the problem is transferred and what the ontological ramifications of it are to formulate the problem between religious laws and the revelation in terms of ‘the address.’

What is significant is that, following Aristotle, for Islamic philosophers and theologians alike the problem of politics and laws are tightly entangled with natural philosophy. They, too, realize that to explain the laws of society even in reference to the revealed laws, they first need to explain the principles of presencing of events and modes of existence (possible, necessary, contingent) in the world. They realize that for human being defined as the life-in-the-polis at the same time as life-possessing-logos, the

ontology of laws is tightly connected to how they explain the temporal presencing of beings and their limits in speech (logos). Nature's presencing in time and logos is the root of the problem of laws and community. For instance, it is in regard to the discussion about the nature of time and the eternal existence of the world that Ghazālī charges Aristotelian philosophers, especially Ibn Sīnā, with diverting from the creed and of being dismissive of religious laws (McCarthy, Richard Joseph & Ghazālī, 1999. 9).

Without getting too involved in the wide-ranging discussions back and forth between philosophers and theologians, I will focus on how the Aristotelian problem is transported and in fact crystalized at two levels of natural laws of presencing and the laws of human society within the Islamic philosophy).

5.2.1. The Laws of Nature

The argument is that as an Aristotelian philosopher, Ibn Sīnā follows him in his strategic economy of prioritizing actual presencing of nature “for the most part” (taking the form of necessary and eternal natural laws). Laws of the creation of the world are eternally present and are coextensive with God as their creator. For Ibn Sīnā, God is not temporally prior to the world but ontologically so (Griffel, 2016, 200). That is to say that although God created the world and the world is caused by God but they are contemporary. It is not the case that God existed and then decided to create the world at some point in time. The latter, according to Ibn Sīnā, amounts to change of state in God which is impossible. Therefore, as Ghazālī observes in his *Incoherence of Philosophers*, there seems to be no God without the world and its laws (Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 42). This would simply reproduce and highlight ever more strongly the present and necessary laws of nature in Ibn Sīnā's philosophy.

Also, with the necessary presence of God and his perfectness and completeness, the actual becomes ever more real and good. The natural laws as they are, are not neutral in terms of values but are clearly more proper than what is accidentally or deliberately imposed by human making (*technē*).

Altogether, the world of Ibn Sīnā is populated with events and existences that are either “possible,” “necessary,” or “impossible” (Griffel, 201). Things that are actual are necessary, which means that they follow necessarily from the existence of God as “the necessity of existence” (*Wājib al-wujūd*). What needs to be addressed by Ibn Sīna are the criteria for the possible and impossible. That is the place for a potential freedom or contingency. He is in agreement with Aristotle, supposing that the possibility as the unformed prime matter (*hylē*) only exists in the actual *hylomorph*. That is, the possibility is already virtually informed by the actuality from the past. It is always already towards a certain possibility of appropriation.

The substratum of possibility was found in the unformed prime matter (*hylē*) that underlies all physical creations. Since the world has always been possible, so one of Ibn Sīnā’s arguments goes, the substratum of this possibility, namely prime matter, exists from eternity in the past. (Griffel, 201)

The Aristotelian dimension of potency (*dynamis*) as being towards being-at-work-staying-itself (*entelecheia*), or the limit, is crystalized in Ghazālī’s objection to Ibn Sīnā. As I demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, Aristotle is well aware of the multiplicity and the alternative path of presencing in nature. However, he strategically restrains the accidents and subdues what he regards as abnormalities in nature. Ghazālī does not seem to be aware of Aristotle’s mis/treatment of contingency but he adds this cautionary angle to the discussion by criticizing the philosophers for their negligence of God’s will. For him, God’s will is characteristically beyond natural laws as understood by human intellect.

Ghazālī is wary of the fact that, according to the tradition, miracles do happen and any faithful description of the world needs to describe them. The laws need to be able to describe miracles as un-wordly, out of the world, and only dependent upon the will of God. For him, the philosophers’ world does not afford any real possibility for the intervention of the unknown (*ḡayb*). The limit is still the actuality and the familiar *logos*, what human logic and speech can allow as possible or reject as impossible. Ghazālī explains the philosophers’ confining of the possibilities as follows:

Anything whose existence the mind supposes, [nothing] preventing its supposing it possible, we call “possible,” and if it is prevented we call it “impossible.” If [the mind] is unable to suppose its nonexistence, we name it “necessary.” For these are rational propositions that do not require an existent so as to be rendered a description thereof. (al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 42)

As Griffel confirms, “Such a God exercises no choice about whether to create or not. In fact, Ibn Sīnā’s God never exercises true free choice (*ikhtiyār*)” (Griffel, 2016, 201). *Entelecheia* still reigns here. Possibilities and impossibilities are determined by the structure of the actual world and the logical semantic possibilities of the human mind.

There, “possible” has been understood as a synchronic alternative; that is, something is possible if we can mentally conceive of it as an alternative to what exists in actuality or what will exist. We call something impossible if we cannot mentally conceive of it as an alternative (Griffel, 202-203).

In this sense, possibility is not deferred to future but it is already present. There is no real temporality as the past, present, and future which correspond to real unanticipated change. Everything seems to be present at the same time. All possibilities are already available in the knowledge of God which is in the eternal activity of presencing perpetually. “God becomes a creation-automat who turns His knowledge, which may be regarded as the blueprint of creation, into the world that we live in” (Griffel, 201).

The will of God, the unanticipated force of creation, as Ghazālī suggests, can add a delay between events and let them be in potency before become actual. The essential goodness of the creation still holds for Ghazālī, besides he still is an advocate of causality and the laws of nature. However, for him they are not based on common sense reason but rather they are completely contingent upon the free will of God as the unknown and unknowable (*ghayb*). This amounts to a major critique of necessitarianism of Ibn Sīnā. In effect, Ghazālī considers this world as the contingent effect of God’s free will and His deliberate choice between the “alternative worlds” (Kukkonen, 2000).

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Ghazālī does not deny the objectivity of the object, nor the subjectivity of intellect in constituting the object. Rather he is just making

all the process depend on a miraculous event, the dice throw or the will of God to give rise to human time and human world. God's will according to Ghazālī is not contingent upon anyone but God, the one who can constitute sense as well as annihilate it.

Ghazālī asks for a delay¹⁴³ (*intizār* also meaning expectation, pause or waiting) in philosophical as well as commonsensical judgement and decision, which constitutes the essence of temporality in the nomadic 'following' of religion. This temporality comes about when one exercises patience, holds laws in suspension, and waits for God's will to manifest itself in the creation of that which has no name yet. God is the only real agent and every event is contingent upon His will (al- Ghazālī, *Faith in Divine Unity and Trust in Divine Providence*, 16).¹⁴⁴ The term for the delay (*intizār*) is the time that we are after to substitute for the temporality of the present. This word, *intizār*, has many implications with its several meanings and in different declensions in Arabic and Persian. It means both looking, awaiting, and expecting. However, it can also mean monitoring and looking after, heeding and looking out.

The present temporality is associated with the look (*eidos*) of things in their immediate everyday familiarity which is also related to having and looking (in French *voir* and *avoir*). Conversely, the way Ghazālī contrasts *intizār* with the present temporality as having or being familiar gives *intizār* the temporality of future that is an expectation of an event to come. He is referring to it as not looking *at* something present but looking *out* for something which is always to come. Temporality, in this sense, is the time without any object corresponding to it *yet*, the time of a surprise. This is perhaps what Derrida calls the *temporalizing* of time itself (*Derrida, Given Time*, 14).

¹⁴³ If not the same, the concept of *intizār* looks very much alike the temporality of difference as defined by Derrida as deferral. Both of them imply indecision and non-completion as well as expectation of that which is not pre-determined.

¹⁴⁴ See Burrell, David B. *Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993, pp. 52, 54, 80-81, 121. Burrell comments that in reaction to the Emanationist philosophy of Ibn Sīnā and others, al-Ghazālī and the *Ash'arites* take care that 'God alone will properly be called agent, and what we take to be causal activity will be explained as customary connections established by the divine will' (*Ibid.*, 52).

It should not be left unmentioned that by this very short exposition of Ghazālī's critique of philosophers, I do not mean to neither endorse nor object to it.¹⁴⁵ It would take another book to show the effect of such a critique in Ghazālī's own system of thought and Ibn Rushd's criticisms of that and so forth. Nonetheless, at this level through Ghazālī's critique of Ibn Sīnā, one can see the very paradoxical forces produced by Aristotelian philosophy and their real implications in moral and religious decision-making. Consequently, Ghazālī's critique supports my reading and understanding of the problem that afflicts Aristotelian metaphysics, the one that produces two opposite modes of being-with or 'following.'

The necessity of the laws of nature applied by Aristotelian philosophers in Islamic context as well depict a world, which is more or less familiar and rational (accountable through *logos*). At the same time, the critique of such a system, by scholars like Ghazālī, continues to provide the possibility of "alternative world" dependent solely upon the free will of God. In the next section, I delve into the political dimension of these two visions of the world.

5.2.2. The Laws of 'Following' Islam

Ibn Sīnā like Aristotle has a vision of the complete and perfect good or happiness as contemplative life. This is best illustrated in his description of the good of man and the perfect manifestation of it in the character of the prophet.

His hierarchical explanation of human existence begins with his well-known flying man experience. Through this experiment, very much like Aristotle, he establishes that human flourishing is not contingent upon his body. What makes human form and function, what defines human is the rational soul. He imagines a person of complete (*kāmilan*) intellectual power devoid of her sensations. He stipulates that such a person still can be aware of her existence and develop to full rational capacities. He writes, "Our

¹⁴⁵ As Khalidi points out, in *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) offers an "implicit criticism of Ghazālī's conception of God. He hints that the view of causation put forward by Ghazālī would lead ultimately to an unsatisfactory conception of God, who would be seen to rule over the universe like a despotic tyrant (as opposed, perhaps, to a law-abiding authoritarian)" (Khalidi, 'Introduction,' xxxix).

perception/awareness of our essence is itself our existence”¹⁴⁶ (cited by *Black*, 63-87). However, for humans, this is just a primitive intellectual awareness, which has to be “overlooked” and human beings “need to be alerted to it”. Effectively, even for Ibn Sīnā a rational soul (*nafs nāṭiqā*) ultimately has to go through the process of knowing which is an individual odyssey in logical reasoning in order to become united with its object and become absolute knowing.

The perfection proper for the rational soul is to become (*taṣīra*) an intelligible world (*‘ālama ‘āqiliyyan*) inscribed in it, the form of the Universal and the intelligible order in the Universal...until the entire configuration of existence is completely contained within the soul itself. (*Avicenna & Marmura*, 2005. 350)

Therefore, the end or completion of knowledge is conceivable and desired for human beings. For Ibn Sīnā, it is the prophet himself who has reached this level of ascent by inspiration or insight (*ḥads*). But, for the rest of the people this has to be implemented and mediated by the prophet. This is where the problem of ‘following’ enters its public phase, revealing our essential being-togetherness which is already constituted by *logos*.

The problem of ‘following,’ the one I mentioned in the preface with reference to Ibn ‘Arabi and his ‘following’ of the Prophet as the perfect man, is posed by Ibn Sīnā in an essential manner as well. In his *De Anima*, he first proves that humans need the prophecy as far as they are characterized by life-in-the-community. He applies a characteristically teleological argument, namely that because of God’s attributes, He would choose the best for His creatures (Ibn Sīnā, *De Anima*, 171–8, 248–50). Franz Griffel summarizes his first argument most succinctly as follows:

Prophecy is necessary because humans are by nature beings that can only exist and survive through association with other humans. Their nature determines the formation of partnerships and these partnerships need legislation. The best legislation is ordained through prophecy to elected human beings. Before presenting this argument, Ibn Sīnā had already proven

¹⁴⁶ *shu ‘ūru-nā bi dhāti-nā hula nafsū wujūdi-nā*

that God must necessarily act for the best of his creation. The equally proven possibility that prophecy exists becomes in light of this latter premise a necessity. (*Griffel*, 110)

In this way, Ibn Sīnā translates Aristotle's necessary natural laws to the realm of religious laws. For Ibn Sīnā, like Aristotle, the laws are not simply ordained by a social contract but are given for the good of man as understood by *logos*. The apparent difference is that in the case of a religion like Islam, one would object that the laws are given by God and do not have to abide by human *logos*. But, nowhere better than religion does the problem of *logos* as the 'address' become clearer. That is because the revealed *logos* necessarily goes beyond common sense or the ordinary *logos*. Revealed laws are personal (*idion*) as far as they are revealed to one person and exceed his public, commonsensical understanding and yet they are to be universal and ordained to everyone in the community.

The problem of the laws in this way is probably solved for one person, the prophet, or the saints or "the perfect man" (*insān kāmil*, a mystic term for a selected few in every era who can intuit the truth) because of the direct intuition and relation to God.¹⁴⁷ Ibn Sīnā explains that the prophet receives the universal laws as theoretical knowledge in his intellectual faculty (*quwwa 'aqliyya naẓariyya*). This intellectual capacity of the prophet is called intuition (*quwwat al-ḥads*), through which, according to Ghazālī's reading of Ibn Sīnā, they immediately become aware of the middle terms of syllogisms (Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 272–274.2; cf. Ibn Sīnā, *De anima*, pp. 248–50). As one can see, although God is the one who is playing the active role, this depiction of immediacy of the middle-term is very much the same as the immediacy of the *noēn* for Aristotle. One can personally have an intuitive perception of the truth which only comes to light for the public in ordinary language or the universal laws.

¹⁴⁷ This immediacy as we will see below is still challenged even for the prophets, especially in the case of Abraham and the transgressive commands of God to leave his family stranded in the desert or to sacrifice his son. However, what Ibn Sīnā means by the perfect man is the restoration of Aristotelian *noēn*.

Conversely, being heedful of the impossibility of visitation (*liqā'*) (or the unity with the absolute) for human beings other than the prophet even after death,¹⁴⁸ Ghazālī, considers this ascent towards the absolute as well as the ascent toward becoming united with the self always problematic and in-trouble. Being a self in this sense is always already underway and incomplete, consisting of a certain topology. Thus, the *telos* or the actuality at the end, the identity with oneself (*entelecheia*) that constituted Aristotelian *hylomorphism* is interrupted by the lack of a proper end. The motion towards being a self, or a self-sufficient community under the laws is, thus, carried away on the path of perpetual becoming, education, and preparation.

Ghazālī calls the principle of this motion and the laws of conduct, *adab* and the educated *adīb*. *Adab* in this sense is the central notion in the Islamic thought and the very *topos* of community as perpetual process of acting, sense-making and interpretation. The word *adab* which I translate as “heedful conduct,” literally means etiquette, manners, respect, awe and punishment (*ta'dīb*) as well as literature and art. What is central and most significant, I believe, in this notion is that it contains a detour away from the *hylomorphism* of Aristotle or the intellectual identity and unity in Ibn Sīnā. As Treiger demonstrates, any identity for Ghazālī is a just a temporary station on the path of education which is only authentic if one acknowledges its temporary status (*Treiger*, 7). According to Treiger, Ghazālī’s “pedagogy of salvation” leads him to develop a theory of the levels of instruction (Ghazālī, *Mīzān*, 406-408; cited in *Treiger*, 8)

Very much like Aristotelians, for Ghazālī, education is achieved not simply by intellectual meditation or syllogistic reasoning but by *praxis* (that is actually going through and turning in the circle of economy) and in the process from a student of *adab* towards *adīb* (the one characterized by *adab*). Such a system makes all identities partial, and communities *nomadic*. Therefore, although Ghazālī is very much in accord with Aristotelians on their emphasis on action and developing habits, his interpretation of the

¹⁴⁸ Pur Javādī shows that according to Ghazālī not everybody receives the visitation or witnessing (*liqā'*) of Allah even after death. In other words, the Absolute is usually the expression of its forgetting or is experienced in its negation. Especially since, for Ghazālī, the life in heavens is also bodily, which means it carries the same impossibility for the bodies that do not have the capacity to ascend and annihilate in the Absolute and become united with God.

laws and the rules of conduct is informed by the perpetual critique of the end and the impossibility of the unity with the absolute as the absolute ‘other.’ That is why, as Ghazālī observes, *our* relation to revelation is always an interpretation, where we need to deal with the problem of measure to determine the sense and the value of the revealed command.

While in the experience of the prophet, we as humans are all the singular ‘addressees’ of the message, and we need to ‘address’ each other singularly as well, the ‘address’ (in dealing with one another and the absolute ‘other’ is always revealed in a language which is historically and publicly determined. Through direct intuition, the perfect man receives the laws, which are then ordained to human community, tainted with public language and common sense understanding.

The root of the problem goes back to what I mentioned in chapter 4, following Derrida, the *aporia* of the ‘address’ with reference to otherness, whether this other is the absolute other whose message is mediated by the prophet or the call of any singular other for justice. We tend to reduce ‘the call’ or ‘the address’ to human *logos* and even worse to the public use of reason. Qur’ān gives several examples of this situation of being a ‘follower’ as being-in-trouble.

Ghazālī expresses his melancholia in finding the truth of the ‘address’ that is not communicable as such. Every individual’s experiences, the revelations, and inspirations, like of the prophet are personal. On the other hand, they cannot be a law unless they are ordained for the community of ‘followers.’ But, the moment a call, an interpretation or a revelation is received in language it is already afflicted with the gap and the withdrawal of the ‘address’ itself. The paradox of the revealed law is that it is that communal law (for everyone) that must be received and perceived singularly and responsibly or it turns to blind conformism. The character of being-in-‘following’ is highlighted and intensified by this *aporetic* situation. The revealed message stands in-between the ordinary commonsensical *logos* and the foreign and personal (perhaps idiotic, bestial) ‘address.’ Solving this problem in any universal way that is systematically or intellectually amounts

to making the meaning of the ‘address’ present and actual and reducing the potency of the message or the call to a forged and superficial actuality.

In other words, this is the *aporia* of finding a measure for the laws when the measure is the laws. As I mentioned in the introduction, Ghazālī admits that only the grace of God saved him from the paralyzing effect of this *aporia*. We are melancholic in responding to the call of the other. It is noteworthy that the religious laws like Aristotelian laws are ontological which means that they are not merely rules of conduct for and between already established selves. Instead, these laws are the ones that determine the being of a self as well as others. Thus, the *aporia*, which makes the appropriation of laws always partial, pose the same impossibility with regard to receiving the message of god as the call of the other. Griffel reiterates the *aporia* as follows:

At the root of all of the objections is the paradoxical feature of the judgment itself. On what criteria can one distinguish a revealed concept from a lie when it is the concept itself that is establishing the criteria? (Griffel, 113)

That is to say, how are we to judge when the evidence or measure for the laws are the laws themselves? It seems that the laws are not given to provide easy solutions. What seems to be revealed in the message of Islam, as I argue below, seems to be no easy solution or set of established moral normative laws but problems that emphasize the aporetic *nature* of the message and the human condition itself. The moral laws are to problematize the universality of laws and call for responsibility.

The originary mode of ‘following,’ then, seems to be that of ‘following’ the nomadic path of independent investigation (*ijtihād*). The laws are not merely the commands to be followed blindly, although that is one way of ‘following’ them; rather, they are problems that remind humans of their groundlessness in this world and emphasize the followers’ being-in-trouble. The authentic attitude towards the laws is perhaps to suspend their actual and present character and to replace them with heedful conduct towards the ‘other.’ Nonetheless, I tried to show in this section, that the apparent universal character of the laws, and their ontological claim to educate Muslims towards the most flourishing and pleasant life created at least one form of following the laws. On

the other hand, Ghazālī's critical engagement with Aristotelianism revives the long-standing *aporias* and the nomadic forces imbedded in the philosophy of Aristotle. Again, despite the question of the legitimacy of Ghazālī's own system of thought, the significance of his critique for us here is that it can support my observation about the forces of generation and motion within Aristotle's philosophy, the forces that create gatherings and generate life beyond what Aristotle's metaphysics and politics can fathom.

5.2.2.1. Community as Exchange vs. Nomadic Community in Islam

I cited an anecdote in the Preface, suggesting that many philosophers and intellectuals in the Islamic tradition, including Ibn 'Arabi and Ghazālī, pose the problem of religious community and laws at the ontological level as that of 'following' and interpretation and the necessary trouble involved with them. In responding to the problematic situation of the follower, whose existence is always partial and incomplete in the Preface, I referred to Ghazālī's personal story and the way he suggests one can be in "servile conformism" or the "independent investigation," towards the tradition (Ghazālī & McCarthy, *Deliverance*. 1). Applying what we learned about the metaphysical grounds of the generation of life and gathering in nature in the context of Aristotle, we can understand the actual being of these modes in a new light. Ghazālī writes: "we will inform you of it [path toward felicity] and raise you from the lowlands of 'following' the authority of others (*taqlīd*: literally imitation, emulation) and guide you to the smoothness of the path (Ghazālī, *Mīzān*, 29).

The former mode of 'following' is associated with what we explicated in previous chapters as the synchronic being-togetherness. It is the most primary, the most familiar relationship between people that levels out the original differences among them in the everyday economy of being-with-one-another. Following Aristotle, I called this first economic form of community which is necessary for humans to function in a city in the first place "community as exchange." That is to say that considering the laws of religion uncritically as present or even negotiable in terms of jurisprudence, or otherwise anticipatable, gives rise to a rationalized calculative order or economy. Such a community

presupposes an appropriated truth and an established measure of justice and happiness whose legitimacy comes from the past, common sense, or a leader. In such a community, the very question of the ontological status or the legitimacy of laws is not posed. ‘Following’ the message does not become a problem as if the laws are totally justified, universal, and transparent.

It is worth remembering that for Ghazālī in this regard, there is no difference between philosophers, theologians, judges and the followers of a saints (*Taʿlimiyyah*) whom he regards as intellectuals being concerned with the “worldly sciences.” As useful as these sciences are, according to Ghazālī, they are bound to the structure of the present and actual what he calls the science of [worldly] actions *ʿilm al-muʿāmilah* (literally meaning reciprocal interaction, exchange and business) (*Ghazālī & McCarthy, Deliverance*. 9).

Yet, the moment the ‘follower’ feels uneasy with his static situation is already the beginning of her ascent. There comes another mode of ‘following,’ what he refers in the quote above as the “smoothness of the path.” However, this latter path is not so smooth and plain. As we discussed in the Preface, it is characterized by Ghazālī as the “independent investigation (*ijtihād*),” which he describes as “seeking the unseekable” (*ibid.*, 5). With regard to what we discussed about Book V of the *NE*, “independent investigation” refers the moment where one has to go beyond the laws to establish them anew or to ‘address’ the singular characteristic of the other. It is paradoxically the moment that in going beyond the law one take up her responsibility for the first time.

In the second mode of ‘following’ still, there is no pretension of having the truth, or seeing the end, or owning the absolute knowledge; rather, it is depicted as the active comportment to the way of ‘following.’ One can argue that the level of “independent investigation” of truth, the way Ghazālī describes it, seems to be beyond philosophy and theology, and is associated with the ‘following’ and seeking itself, while admitting what is “unseekable.” Thus, by questioning Aristotelian teleological laws of nature and community as well as Islamic theology, including actual sectors of Islam of his day, he, in

effect, opens the door for a transcendental study well beyond any economy of faith or philosophy (*Ghazālī & McCarthy, Deliverance*. 4-5).

Finding the best path of ‘following’ for Ghazālī, is the subject of a particular kind of religious science, he calls “the science of the Hereafter.” Ghazālī writes about this science, in his book *The Revival of Religious Sciences*. What he elaborates on in this work are different modes of ‘following’ some of which are limited to the life, laws, and the *logos* in-the-world, those which he claims will end with one’s death and the other which is the celebration of life of the Afterlife. By revival one may wonder he means this latter mode of ‘following’ which is associated with living after life.

‘Revival’ as a mode of following religion is nothing like theology nor philosophy.¹⁴⁹ Ghazālī’s system is not merely guarding the creed of Islam or the law as empty, dead formulations in the affairs of the worldly life, which he condemns theologians for concerning themselves with. Rather through the science of the Hereafter, one can potentially ascend to different levels of being united with the presencing of life. He wants to establish a science that takes people to the threshold of going beyond the worldly life, which he considers barren, economic, and threatened all the time by one’s immanent death. The science of the Hereafter does not merely consist of a set of laws which promise a reward to the obedient ‘followers’ of them in the afterlife. That is according to Ghazālī the theologians’ business, which is another mode of economy.

Instead, his whole system is defined in terms of *adab* (heedful conduct and poetics in general) a kind of treatment of the other which is informed by the *aporia* of otherness and the ‘address.’ In this way, such a conduct is always already pregnant with the mystery or the secret. For him in different texts or even in one text in different contexts *adab* refers to the heedful indecision and suspension in experiencing the impossibility of appropriation of the other, the presentation of the absolute, or encountering the mystery.

The word, for “revival” in Arabic, *iḥyā*, does not only mean to give life again but rather and more importantly means to give or breath life as if for the first time. In this

sense re-vive and sur-live suggest a giving of life perpetually and anew. It is to give life all the time eternally for the first time. In fact, in answering the question: “what is the life worth living?” he answers the life that can go beyond life and after death. For some followers of the path, that would consist in the path of salvation and freedom from punishment (*najāt*) but for some would end in happiness, felicity (*sa’ādat*). Therefore, for him ethics is not only in obeying the law which establishes one in her own status of being as an imitator (*muqallid*), but rather it consists of attending to the movement inherent in *adab*, and by breaking with the economy of the present.

In what follows, I intend to illustrate the nature of this experience in action. It is one thing to theoretically and metaphysically explain these modes of following and yet quite another to existentially describe the experience. Thus, in interpreting the ritual of Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca), my purpose is to investigate how the possibility for every Muslim has been offered to go beyond the economy of the laws of the tradition and come to the threshold of asking about their ground. The major task and the story performed by the pilgrims during this ritual is the story of Abraham and the sacrifice of Ismā‘īl, the one that inspired Kierkegaard to talk about Abraham as the Knight of Faith. The story in *Fear and Trembling* begins with the ethical question of the law that addresses the community of followers and how this following becomes problematic for Abraham (*Kierkegaard and Lowrie*, 38). The difference and the significance of the story in the pilgrimage is that it is mandatory for every Muslim to experience the *aporetic* nature of the message.

My argument and suggestion is that, through the performance of Hajj, every Muslim has to encounter the *aporetic* nature of the laws not only in Islam but in trying to establish justice as laws. I will argue that, in fact, Hajj targets the very appropriation of the truth and consequently the legitimacy of the measure of justice and laws. It thereby introduces a supplement to the laws which ultimately undermines the very essence of the laws and turns them into a heedful regard of the ‘other.’

5.2.3. Pilgrimage of Hajj: Staging the Identity in ‘Following’ Islam

5.2.3.1. Introduction to the Pilgrimage of Hajj

The overall aim of this section is to explicate different modes of ‘following’ Islam that are staged in the pilgrimage of Hajj. This section is neutral with regard to the question of what Islam in general, or what the proper interpretation of Hajj should be. Instead, it is an existential analysis of the elements of the performance of the ritual and the narratives behind them, which target the ground of the laws in Islam.

While most studies refer to the philosophical, theological or historico-political justifications when approaching the question of identity and community in Islam, I argue that the interpretation of the ritual of the pilgrimage can by itself reveal the multiplicity that exists in ‘following’ the tradition. Moreover, I will explore the existential experience of the pilgrims in performing the ritual. I argue that certain actions and symbols of Hajj first unsettle the economy of faith (especially the *Sharī‘a* laws) as that measure and organizing principle that people have (like money or *capital*) at present and, second, induce an evident shift in the attitude of the pilgrims towards the laws of the tradition, namely from blind ‘following’ towards a more critical engagement with them. Beyond Islam and Muslim identity, this section sheds light on the meaning of identity as possible modes of ‘following’ a tradition. I should also add that this perspective toward Muslim identity through analyzing the rituals is unique to this work.

The identity of Muslims, their body-politics, and how they lead their lives are characterized by ‘following’ the tradition and the laws of conduct (*Sharī‘a*). Either in defying, interpreting, innovating, or merely obeying and imitating these laws, being-Muslim is defined in terms of ‘following’ the tradition. Should one consider the meaning of these laws present and justified, the centrality of these laws of conduct socially and in private makes Islam a system of presence or ideology. That is to say that the laws of religion give an apparent measure to make judgments and evaluate actions as if these laws are rational and calculated

Pilgrimage is a unique ritual since not only is it one of the most complex rules of conduct, but also it is that ritual which reveals the being of the laws and the *aporias* thereof. In other words, Hajj discloses the underlying structure of ‘following’ the

tradition. Hajj dramatizes the *aporia* of being a ‘follower’ and gives a chance to every Muslim to come to the threshold of the confrontation with their *aporetic* condition corporeally and emotionally.

This, as I argue below, is confirmed by Ghazālī’s theological and mystical interpretation of Hajj. He contends that unlike other acts of worship which are part of the economic structure of laws of religion, Hajj introduces a gap, an interruption which makes it a particular kind of act of worship. The complexity and sometimes absurdity of the actions included in Hajj make the pilgrim wonder how we understand (*fahm*) and follow any law of religion and why. Hajj is the ritual that questions the laws as to their ground and measure. That is to say, it ultimately unveils the ontological limitations involved in the existence of human beings as the followers of the ‘other’ both with respect to God as the Absolute other and another person.

5.2.3.2. Pilgrimage and Seeking the Unseekable: Two Moments

The pilgrimage of Hajj stages one of the most complex actions of Islam, where all Muslims do more or less the same ritual as a community. In most of the daily actions, Muslims emulate the tradition of the prophet Muhammad. Especially in rules of worship and conduct, the life and the words of the Prophet are the criteria and exemplification of Islamic actions. As one might expect, the laws draw a sharp line between being-Muslim and non-Muslim. Such is the case for almost all rituals that distinguish Muslims from their others and characterize their community. Daily prayer (*Ṣalāt*), which today has to be performed in the direction of Ka‘bah, characterizes Muslims from other religions by introducing this new place of ‘attraction.’ The words “place” and “attraction” are used here advisedly in keeping with rest of my topological terminology. Having a new direction and being attracted as opposed to being located or having a place on earth are

all suggestive of the nomadic mode of existence.¹⁵⁰ It is noteworthy that the prayer at the dawn of Islam used to be performed towards al-Aqṣā Mosque in Jerusalem. The prophet changed the direction towards Ka'bah to give character to his people. Even as Ghazālī contends, Hajj itself is supposed to replace similar gatherings in other religions and communities. Hajj according to Ghazālī is the most characteristic feature of Islam (*Ghazālī, & Umar*, 140). It is not one among rituals or acts of worship but rather the one that illustrates the nature of humankind's relation to God and to one another. In short, Hajj is a depiction of the being-in-trouble of human kind in this world and the *aporetic* nature of following in general. Paradoxically, then, the most characteristic feature Hajj which makes it the principle action that Muslims do and share, goes beyond Islamic history and tradition.

Hajj refers to more than the story of Islam and the tradition of the prophet Muhammad. The pilgrims associate their actions throughout Hajj with a couple of grand narratives including the Abrahamic narratives (esp. the sacrifice of *Ismā'īl*) and the eschatological narrative of the Day of Resurrection. Accordingly, the call to Hajj is as much a call to 'follow' the Islamic tradition, that is the complex laws of conduct in the pilgrimage, as it is to explore the call through different stories and temporalities. We can imagine a Muslim from wherever in the world setting out on this journey. According to tradition, the call to Hajj is an Abrahamic call. God asks Abraham to renovate Ka'bah and call all believers to the ritual (*Qur'an*, 22: 27). Responding to the call, not of the prophet of Islam but of Abraham, one already enters the realm of imagination and history of all revealed religions rather than merely abiding by the laws of Islam. The obedience to the economy of Islamic laws in Hajj from the very beginning seems to make them ambiguous. The call gleans mythical, Abrahamic, and existential senses at the same time.

¹⁵⁰ This attention has a critical implication towards the problem of the settlement of the Jewish people in the land of Palestine. Being in a community like the Jewish community in this sense is necessarily associated with a place but the contrast that I am implying here is between 'owning,' 'having' and occupying a place as opposed to being directed at a place. The place in this sense should never be appropriated should it be capable of giving sense or direction to its people. Otherwise, it turns to a capital city, a center which makes the associated members of identities who are not authentically expressing any difference.

Studying Hajj is a strategy to approach the laws of conduct in Islam and how they become problematic. So the most important feature of Hajj is that it invites and makes all the followers of the path to experience the problematic situation of their existence as well as the trouble of ‘following.’

Now in order to show how Hajj brings every Muslim to the verge of wonder and let her experience her *aporetic* situation, I will distinguish two characteristic sets of actions and symbols. These actions are of course intermingled throughout the process even in one single action but to glean the specific effects of every action, I separate the actions in accordance with these two essential characteristics. In other words, through these two moments, one can see how for the pilgrims the revelation and religious laws first become necessary and then following them become *aporetic*.

The first characteristic theme associated with a set of actions is the defiance of the authority of the actual and common sense laws given by calculative reasoning as well as the ones given by the everyday economy of faith. Throughout the ritual one can glean several actions and symbols that can potentially draw the pilgrims to this existential moment. These actions radically challenge the centrality of any present and actual authority or organizing principle and prepare the pilgrim to look for a new mode of following religion. In this way, economic ‘following’ becomes impossible and every pilgrim becomes a reader and interpreter on the path of nomadic following. The effect of this first moment then is exacerbated by the whole story of Abraham.

Ghazālī stipulates that the negation of the laws of calculative reasoning opens the space for a new measure, the revelation, and the desire (*shawq*) for the presence of the Absolute, the unseekable. But, he assumes that the confrontation with the interruption of calculative reason will only produce a sense of passivity and humility in following the laws of religion and he does not at this stage problematize these laws at all. Meanwhile, I argue, that the second character of this whole process is about the foundation of the laws. Using Ghazālī’s own interpretation and the phenomenological existential analysis of the actions, I will argue that Ghazālī has just mentioned the first moment of encountering otherness. The other in this first moment is God whereas the nature of this otherness and

His singular ‘address’ is yet not in question. Meanwhile, as we saw with Aristotle and as Ghazālī confirms the interruption of universal and actual laws and the force of justice or (in this case) the promise of justice opens the place for a new mode of following and potential laws informed by the *mystery*. I will explore how this place prepares the new mode of temporality for the nomadic mode of being.

Given this, the second moment is more focused on the problem of the ‘address’ and the impossibility of justice as laws. I contend that this second moment brings the pilgrims to the awareness of their existential trouble in relation to laws – what I called being-in-trouble (*Qur’ān*, 90:4). The trouble refers to the groundlessness and the lack of measure in interpretation of the laws in relation to a singular other.

It is worth noting that the story of Abraham, the story of the one who is commanded to do the impossible, to sacrifice one’s own son, is here to be experienced by every Muslim at least once in their life time. It is not a unique demand from the Knight of Faith; but rather, it is an invitation for every Muslim to reflect upon the criteria of laws of religion especially when they are so excessive (*Kierkegaard and Lowrie*, 37). Instead of followers of a dogma or a system for ideology, Hajj invites Muslims to all be the knights of Faith.

I argue that at this stage what Muslims share is this trouble rather than any central idea, belief, or anything substantial. It is the attraction toward the unseekable, that creates the nomadic laws of ‘following’ and the nomadic community. What characterizes people, or according to Derrida, their *trait*, is the very *attraction* produced by the withdrawal or *retreat*, *retrait* of the Absolute. It is in sharing this tragic lack, and the subsequent nomadic motion that “a people” is constituted.

5.2.3.2.1. Hajj and the Deconstruction of the Law as Present

Deconstruction of the laws of the tradition occurs in Hajj through the negation of the everyday economy of life and faith. The presence of the laws that gives temporality and spatiality to human actions and one’s system of sense-making needs to be brought into question. This presence as having, owning, appropriating (*le capital*), the captain and

head as the Messenger, as well as the place associated with Islam where Muslims are headed toward (*la capitale*) are targeted in my interpretation of the pilgrimage of Hajj.

Hajj deconstructs the everyday economy of religion as what Muslims *have* (*le capital*) or what they do in “time” as present. It reveals that what they perform day and night is nothing but remaining in the circle of the market economy and the exchange of the *capital*. The everyday economy of faith is by no means meaningless, as it is the economy with “God,” and as God has promised, in the Heaven, one would receive the bounty and mercy for every good deed he or she has done. However, as is evident, the structure of laws are anticipatable and present.

I argue that all the elements that can serve as a head or heading, center or capital, and can give rise to identity (as identical to itself), including the person of the prophet, or the place of the revelation, in Hajj, are given in their negation. Everything that normally gives sense to the rules of conduct and is normally taken for granted comes under scrutiny and is questioned as to its ground.

Although Ghazālī does not interpret Hajj in relation to the problem of Islamic identity per se, his mystic interpretation of the ritual confirms my observation. In the *Revival of Religious Sciences*, he points out that what makes this ritual very peculiar is the absurdity and transgressive nature of the actions that the pilgrims have to do (*Ghazālī & Umar*, 143). Many of the actions in the pilgrimage, he observes, do not make sense intellectually, or in an everyday economy of religion. This is how he explains the rationality and intellectual activity involved in the everyday ordinary laws of religion:

Zakat [charity] is kindness; its meaning is understood and intellect has an inclination to it. *Fasting* is a break with bestial passion, which is the tool of the enemy of God, and involves concentration on worship by abstaining from [normal] occupations. Bowing (*Rukūʿ*) and prostration (*Sujūd*) in prayer [express] submission to God Most High through acts which represent the [outward] forms of submission; and souls have fellowship through [common] glorification of God Most High. (*Ghazālī, & Umar*, 140)

Doing these actions, then, is not necessarily problematic nor Islamic. They make sense intellectually. They do not challenge the authority of reason nor do they make religion necessary or problematic. They establish a sense of familiarity and being-at-home very much like Aristotle's laws of justice. Their sense and value is considered actual (*energeia*) and present. Ghazālī explains the psychological process at work for these laws very acutely and succinctly as follows:

...whatever the intellect understands, to that is nature inclined; this inclination thus cooperates with the command and together with it incites to action. Thus, perfect bondage and servanthood [to the Lord] are hardly manifest. (*ibid.*, 140)

In this realm, it is the intellect or deliberation that provides the measure of judgement and evaluation. The terms "bondage and servanthood" are the terms that I would try to modify in terms of a special kind of 'following,' the one that leads to the realization of one's being-in-trouble. The actions that are significant and different in the ritual, according to Ghazālī, are the ones that

...people are not acquainted with...(la ta'nus bihā) and whose meaning no intellect can find out, such as casting pebbles at stones and running to and from repeatedly between *Safā* and *Marwa* [two small hills that pilgrims need to run between them as part of the ritual] for example. It is through such acts that perfect bondage and servanthood is manifest. (*ibid.*)

He repeats the words 'bondage' and 'servanthood' (*'ubūdiya*) again here as signifying the necessary attitudes toward the authority in religion. This is the first moment not only in Hajj but in 'following' religion as seeking the unseekable in general. That is also why Hajj is perhaps the most important ritual that distinguishes Islamic identity or the Islamic mode of 'following' from other religions or other intellectual activities. For the very reason that the actions make no sense in any other temporality than that of 'following' Islam. This is also confirmed by Ghazālī, mentioning that Hajj was that which distinguished Islamic community from other religious communities. He takes it a step further, mentioning that the task of the Prophet Muḥammad was to restore the accurate

way of ‘following,’ to “restore the heavenly way [of life] and to set the law of [previous] Apostles once again on its course” (*ibid.*, 104)

In accordance with the first characteristic feature of Hajj mentioned above, it defies the apparent necessary laws of society or commonsensical understanding of the world. Due to the everyday and regular nature of the laws of conduct, over time, one may find natural or intellectual justifications for them. Little by little, they become clear and dominant like common sense. Hajj highlights the arbitrary nature of this familiarity (*uns*). That is because, as Ghazālī explains, “there is no impetus to perform them other than the mere command [of God] and the intention to comply with that command” (*ibid.*, 138). That is, the complex and rather arbitrary nature of actions in Hajj frustrates intellectual and commonsensical understating of laws, thereby divertesthe pilgrim’s attention to their ground.

It is worth remembering that Ghazālī’s contention, in line with his critique of the philosophers (in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*), is that the real commands, the real cause of all actions and events and the real authority is that which is not familiar or in-the-world. I would follow him in proposing that Hajj is the perfect manifestation and reminder of this fact in action. Hajj reminds the pilgrims that the real author of the events and actions is *not* in-the-world, that God is absent (*ḡā’ib*). Meanwhile, God give commands and asks everyone to obey the orders which one has no criterion to evaluate, understand, or justify. “In such obedience the intellect desists from its [normal] operations and the soul and the [innate] disposition are detracted from their [proper] social course” (*ibid.*, 140).

This first moment is very crucial. That is, the pilgrims have no way out but to seek refuge in the very process or the plot of actions and the ceremony itself to find a criteria for the truth of the laws. There is this moment of passivity and obedience ingrained in confronting the *aporia*, a moment of indecision and naiveté which can be very violent at the same time.¹⁵¹ That is the moment that wary of the hasty decisions due to the absence of a valid intellectual touchstone or the universal laws of reason, one is

¹⁵¹ The words that Ghazālī uses to describe this first moment of humility and passivity are different forms with the same root (*mustakīnīna*, *istakānata*, from the root *S,K,N* meaning dwelling, staying, submitting, being at peace with) all indicating a sense of passivity and obedience as well as dwelling and resting.

very vulnerable to literal interpretation of the message. That is to say, one may simply begin to think that the laws are clear or given as an easy solution to trouble. However, as I explain below, the nature of the actions are much more complex than simply provoking a blind acceptance of authority or, as Ghazālī maintains “a command which requires obedience pure and simple” (*ibid.*, 137). It turns out that the obedience is not that “plain and simple” after all.

In the second moment, entering the story of Abraham, the pilgrim is confronted with the problem of “address” and mediation in interpretation in general. The actions of the follower challenge the authority of Islam, since what God asks contradicts other divine rules of conduct actions are about to challenge the authority of religion as well. The invitation to do what is not normally part of religion and intellectually not justified plus the transgressive and excessive demands of the laws (e.g., to slaughter a lamb or leave the town and stay in a desert) creates a paradoxical situation for the pilgrims. This makes the laws necessary and impossible at the same time. The effect is that the laws are challenged as to their ground, where they are coming from, and who the authority is.¹⁵² In other words, Hajj reveals how, at first, ‘following’ the authority of the prophet becomes necessary and then impossible.

The actions and narratives in Hajj accomplish the second moment at the same time as the first by perpetually defying the presence of a center or authority (like that of a prophet), or negating the appropriation of any definite meaning of the revealed laws. The everyday significations and everyday understanding of the rules of conduct which act as the necessary ingredient to grant Islam a present and actual system and body-politics, are negated in a way that invokes multiplicity and non-identity. Notwithstanding, the narratives provide an imaginative space where having identity becomes a perpetual task of interpretation and seeking the unseekable.

¹⁵²The trouble and the *aporetic* situation is intensified and exacerbated by the fact that many of the actions and scenarios in Hajj somehow or other accomplish the first and the second moment at the same time. They challenge the authority of common sense laws as well as the presence of God, or the Prophet at the same time. In other words, at the same time, ‘following’ becomes necessary while it is not obvious who the *captain* is or where the pilgrims are heading. This will produce a present-absent effect which brings about the experience of ‘following’ together with its *aporia*.

While Ghazālī would assume that the initial encounter with the impossibility of the laws of the present would bring about more of the same ‘following’ and obedience to the laws, I think the narratives and other signs in Hajj have a different story to tell. The actions that Ghazālī interprets as the celebration of the glory of God or the passive obedience to the commands can, in fact, be regarded as an invitation to the independent investigation, (*ijtihād*).

After having to give up one’s familiar system of sense-making there remains no choice but for the pilgrims to become readers and ‘followers’ of the stories happening in the place of the rituals. The pilgrim seeks refuge in following all the narratives which share one main basic conceptuality, the *aporia* of ‘following’ as “seeking the unseekable.”¹⁵³

My contention is that it can be shown that the ritual of Hajj is an invitation to invoke an active comportment to the way of ‘following’ Islam as opposed to mere passive obedience. Paradoxically, however, the active comportment takes the form of negation or transformation of the laws toward a heedful consideration of the singularity of the other. That is when after the suspension of the laws of tradition as given and past, a new momentary temporality is created a new mode of following in perpetual consideration of the other.

By neutralizing the everyday economy of life and faith, the pilgrims are ready to perform as the protagonists of several stories happening around the same time in one site, al-Ḥarām Mosque (literally meaning the forbidden mosque) in Mecca. Identifying with the characters of these historical and mythical stories, i.e. Abraham, *Ismaʿīl*, Hājar, or the dead who have risen from the graves to be judged, etc., and confronting the unexpected absence of God in Kaʿbah (the house of God), pilgrims are expected to undergo a radical change in their attitude towards the laws and find a new direction in their everyday faith.

¹⁵³ The theological term for this activity of defying any absolute knowledge and remaining a seeker is “the divine unity” (*tawḥīd*). It is worth noting that *tawḥīd* is a verbal noun which refers to an action more than a concept or a principle of belief. Regardless of the theological meaning of the divine unity, it is nonetheless, associated with all actions in Hajj which defy the presence of God in this world. Or as Ghazālī mentions: “confessing that He is above being confined by a house or encompassed by a town: “*ma ‘a i ‘tirāfi bi tanzihihi ‘an ‘an yaḥwihi bayti ow yaktanfihi baladi*” (*ibid.*, 139-140)

5.2.3.2.1.1. From Time to Place: The Deconstruction of Time as the Present

In order to break with the *economy* of faith toward an originary take on the Message, the first thing to do is to unsettle the present temporality of everyday life which provides our actions with present and familiar meaning. is the negation and the destruction of time and meaning as present. The event which is supposed work must unsettle the meaning-making structure as we remember it from the past. “It [the event] should be anticipated as the unforeseeable, the unanticipatable the non-masterable, non-identifiable, in short, as that of which one does not yet have a memory”¹⁵⁴ (Derrida, *OH*. 18). There are a lot of actions and symbols associated with such a break, but in this short interpretation, I will choose the ones that are associated with the idea of presence and capital, the head and the heading.

Deconstruction in Hajj begins with the invitation to the place, (*la capitale*), which is the source of tension in time. We need to go to a place where the laws as present become impossible and turn into a creative take on tradition. That is because Hajj is the ritual that reminds pilgrims of the impossibility of the appropriation or the understanding of God as present (*Ghazālī & Omar*, 139-140).

Any journey or pilgrimage can, more or less, provide the possibility of a break with the economy of everyday life. One may not be able to follow the same schedule as one holds at home and thereby feel unsettled. Hajj leaves no chance for the pilgrim to lead one’s life through memory. It exclusively targets the temporality of the present.

It is significant that in the chapter of the *Revival of Religious Sciences (al-Iḥyā’ al-‘ulūm ad-dīn)* dedicated to the secrets of the pilgrimage, Ghazālī recommends to the pilgrims to avoid any shopping or business matters during the pilgrimage. He emphasizes the rejection and defiance of any monetary or business activity during this trip, although he confirms that it is not forbidden by the laws of the tradition. He argues that this whole trip is supposed to avert the pilgrims’ attention from worldly engagements and so “financial matters are not recommended and strongly talked against” (*Ghazālī & Omar*,

¹⁵⁴ Perhaps a more natural rendering could be “unmasterable,” “unidentifiable”.

127-128). For he believes that cutting those worldly engagements creates the desire (*shawq*) for the Lord of the house, as symbolized by the emptiness of the house (*ibid.*).

Many elements in the ritual suggest this emphasis on a radical change in temporality. In fact, if nothing more, Hajj can be described as the introduction of space to the temporality of Islam. The harmony between place, time, and actions is evident and is the most important aspect of Hajj. Pilgrims are to stay in certain places at certain times doing certain actions. Sometimes, even, there is no particular action. One is grounded in a desert (for example in *Muzdalifah* near Mecca, on the route between *‘Arafāt* and *Minā*) for a night or a day, only to stay and wait. They are to stay in a *place* until a certain *time*, doing nothing obligatory, just thinking or asking for forgiveness.¹⁵⁵

All actions are done in anticipation of the time of the judgment to come, the Hour (*as-sā‘a*) (*Qur’ān*, 22:1). The association of the last Judgment, when actions and their meanings finally come together with the time, the Hour, as well as the Day of the Religion or law (*yam ad-dīn*), in the *Qur’ān* problematizes the meaning of lawful and unlawful actions in the human realm. What is promised to the pilgrims is the emergence of the time (the Hour) as if what they experience everyday is everything but the time. The only time that is really meaningful and provides a genuine experience is the time, the Hour, to come. It is only through the anticipation (*intizār*) of this time that actions might make any original sense. Therefore, in human realm as we discussed in previous section with Ghazālī, the anticipation (*intizār*) is the only temporality that gives sense. Human judgments in this light are always partial and awaiting the Last Judgment to come. The meaning and the value of actions on this nomadic path do not come from the past and

¹⁵⁵They are in fact performing the drama of the Day of the Resurrection, when everyone is waiting for their turn to be judged by God.

memory. But rather, they are promised (*wa'dah*)¹⁵⁶ to make a final sense, not evaluated and judged on the Day of Resurrection and at the presence of God. For Muslims, to believe in the principle of *Ma'ād* (Resurrection on the Day of Judgment) negates the authority of the laws as that which is fully determined and has a complete meaning in the present. The question becomes even more evident when we realize that this new temporality is organized around a place which is the ultimate source of contradictions, Ka'bah, the empty house of God like a promise that is not fulfilled and is literally hollow.

There is another indication as to the transition from the everyday temporality to the temporality that is informed by the mystery of this place. The ritual of Hajj starts at a place which is called "*Mīqāt*." *Mīqāt* is not one specific place, but a virtual, symbolic circle of certain kilometers round Ka'bah where no one can enter before embarking on the process of the ritual called "*Ihrām*," part of which is to wear a certain garment and to formally decide (*niyat*) to start doing Hajj. Although this word is the name of a place, its root, "W, Q, T," (as in "*waqt*"), means time. It means, therefore, *the place of time*.¹⁵⁷ It implies the location where time meets place. Or perhaps the place that time begins "temporalizing," the place that gives time (Derrida, *Given Time*, 14). I understand this movement as a movement from temporality of the economy of Islam which one is born and grown up in it, towards the temporality of the place of the event to come, the temporality of nomadic following.

¹⁵⁶ From the root: "w, 'd": which mean promise. It is another word associated with the principle of *Ma'ād*, and intensifies its future implication. As opposed to most of the events in the Qur'ān which as God's creations are happen in the past or present emphasizing God's plan and providence for the world, the actions and events associated with the after life are all promises and hypotheses. They do not make sense with the present system of time more our language can afford their understanding and so they are spoken in their negation or as a promise. We read in Qur'an that: "They want you to bring upon them their punishment without delay. God never disregards His promise. One day for God is equal to a thousand years for you.[22: 47]; Or yet other verses like: "It is a promise[*Al-Wa'dah*], of Allah. Allah failed not His promise [*Al-Wa'dah*], but most of mankind do not know." [30: 6]. Therefore, it is interesting to note that "*Ma'ād*" as one among the three principles of Islam, by its root means the time, the place of the promise, the return or the appointment. The verses mentioned plus the meaning of the root all point to a radical new temporality and a new dimension of life.

¹⁵⁷ The Arabic language is very helpful in pointing out this compatibility and harmony between time and place in the pilgrimage. That is because the morphological form of place-nouns is the same as time-nouns and it is only context that determines which one is which.

From here, pilgrims enter the place of the revelation of laws and the new temporality that schedule and shape the actions according to them. But, it is important to have the original problem in mind here. For the new schedule, is still within a new economy and more complex laws of the same format. However, my observation is that the new configuration is centered around a place which defies hypostatization and appropriation of laws as present. This place, Ka‘bah, itself generates different kinds of temporality other than the present economy of the creed. It perpetually gives time, the time that never becomes present. Entering *Iḥrām*, whose root is the same root as the word for the forbidden act (*harām*) and means respecting, being in awe, observing the laws, etc., the pilgrims’ schedule has to be in accord with heeding the mystery that is hidden in this place.

I use the word mystery (*sirr*) advisedly, for this place, that is the house of God,¹⁵⁸ does not give in to any absolute appropriation or understanding. As the *capital* of Islam, the house of God is the source of an *aporia* instead of a source of a major illumination or knowledge.

5.2.3.2.1.2. Ka‘bah and the Capital (*la Capitale*) of Islam

The most important mark of space and symbol of Hajj is Ka‘bah itself. For Ghazālī, the House of God within the al-Harām Mosque and its surroundings symbolize the court of a king. Everything and every action around Ka‘bah somehow or another are interpreted as if they are glorifying the majesty of the king who is so majestic that no house can really accommodate him and all of the attempts to serve him fall short (*Ghazālī & Omar*, 143). He contends that the glory of the house and its emptiness makes it a great indication or symbol referring to the Lord of the house. The emptiness of Ka‘bah illustrates the groundlessness of humanity in this world, and it refers to the glory of what is to come in the afterlife.

However, looking at the house from the followers’ perspective, the house is much more a symbol of desperation and helplessness than hope. The pilgrims who are

¹⁵⁸ Perhaps what is referred to in the Qur’ān is *al-balad*, (city)

compelled to follow the laws and are called from a far distance to visit the Lord, are confronted with an empty building. They are in fact confronted with their groundlessness, confronted the promise which is not kept and which nevertheless demands for more patience and loyalty.

When one is invited to somebody's home, the host is expected to be there. Ka'bah is the house of God and at the same time, the house of no-thing. It is literally empty. I mentioned that Hajj is the illustration of the day of the Resurrection when human beings would be finally judged in the presence of God and the presence of justice. In many other pilgrimage sites, there is an icon or the body of the person who is associated with the place. Ka'bah is completely empty. It seems that people are invited to a great party where the host is not present. No revelation, no miracle, no discussion or argument. Nothing.

One may wonder whether the building itself is the intended message. Yet, unlike the architecture of the mosque which by its complex structure brings about a certain kind of revelation, this building is not an elaborate one; just four walls and a roof. It is a simple house re-built and prepared in the middle of a desert by Abraham, after he was told to do so by God.¹⁵⁹ It is built in a rather unknown place in the desert. Mecca, at the time of the construction of Ka'bah, was not the center of Abrahamic religions. Also, it is not located in a crowded city or amid the largest and oldest centers of civilization. The building is very humble in construction, in the middle of a desert with no windows.

Perhaps that is because it is itself the Call of God, a radically new cry in the absolute silence of a desert. Buildings in a city are in perpetual dialogue with each other. In narrow streets, they whisper in each other's ears, and in wide streets they have to shout to be heard. Some tall skyscrapers humiliate small huts and flats. Some have big windows to express what they have in their hearts and some hide secrets of the society behind their tall walls and bars in the absolute silence.

¹⁵⁹ "Thus We settled Abraham at the site of the House saying [:" Do not associate anything with Me," and purify My house for those who walk around it, and those who stand there] praying [, and those who bow down on their knees in worship. [*Qur'an*, 22: 26] "And proclaim unto mankind the pilgrimage. They will come unto thee on foot and on every lean camel; they will come from every deep ravine." [*Qur'an*, 22: 27]

But, in a desert, whatever a building says is actually a cry within silence, a cry that nobody answers. That is why, I believe, it has a secret in its heart. Normally, a house is where one lives; it is what gives an address, an identity to the dweller or the visitor. Your house is your address, your history and your place in the city. But, what about this house? It is the house of a question. The house of no-thingness, where no-thing can fill it. The house itself without any ritual is the annihilation of the economy of laws and a depiction of groundlessness. It is the negation of any kind of identity.

At the same time, an empty house, which is not like any other building, shrine or temple, may symbolize the source of creativity and productivity, like the womb of the universe. It actually is the center which gives meaning to the whole process of Hajj and yet it is itself empty. It is the symbol of that which organizes everything around it and yet itself is the hiding place of the secret, of the absolute other.

Upon arriving in Mecca, the pilgrims first circle around Ka‘bah seven times in a ritual called *Tawāf*. The very nature of the movement around an *empty* center deconstructs the economic structure of laws of religion. One may compare this place with Shia pilgrimage sites where followers of an Imām visit his shrine. The building is full of his symbols and his exact words are repeated by the pilgrims. His historical character is celebrated and the historical event of his death is mourned for. Even in his death, the Imam is still present and gives a center to the laws of conduct. And yet, Ka‘bah is the site of the presence of a primordial absence or lack.

Confrontation with Ka‘bah gives rise to the pilgrim’s understanding of her own existential incompleteness, one’s incapability to encounter God, or to appropriate any conception of Him. That is how the economic structure of laws and the identity of Muslims as present and actual are annihilated. The implication, I assume, is that the whole purpose of the trip is for the pilgrims to be awakened to this existential groundlessness or lack which sparks the urge of human beings to become complete, the fact that in the finite human world we are in-trouble and groundless.

From the annihilation of the center, the capital or the heading, the pilgrim is directed to the *other* of the heading, where there cannot be any present determined *logos*

or *telos*. All the actions and movements from here become nomadic. That is, they are attracted to temporary constellations/gatherings, where things seem to gather momentarily but never as an ultimate *telos* or completion.

This, as Ghazālī confirms, produces the impression of not simply the absence of God but rather a present-absence which necessarily refer humans to the heavens (*malakūt*). He declares that the absence produces a longing that bypasses the pilgrims' sense of helplessness and desperation.

As for longing, this results from understanding and from the realization that the House belongs to God Most High, that it was established on the analogy of a royal palaces such that whoever visits it is [in reality] visiting God Most High and whoever betakes himself to the House [while] in this life is worthy not to have his visit wasted, for the object of the visit, which is the vision of God Most High, will be granted to him in its fixed time in the Eternal Residence. (*ibid.*, 143)

That is, he argues that the very presence of an empty and not full house, plus the circumambulation around it *as if* there is something present, refers the pilgrim to the possibility of the Lord not present *here* but present in the realm of the unseen (*al-ḡayb*) (*ibid.*, 143). Everything in the revelation from that moment turns into an indication or a sign rather than a present or actual thing. Accordingly, the revealed law also loses its present and actual meaning. It does not become meaningless because it still refers to the event to come but its actual significance becomes deferred to the time, the Hour, when judgment becomes possible.

The present meaning of laws in this way are deferred and every word becomes a metaphor (*meta-pherein* literally meaning a carrying-over) a movement towards an originary sense. That is what according to Ghazālī the laws of heedful conduct (*adab*). Such a change in the meaning of the laws is evident in the process itself. As I will show, the lawful and unlawful (*ḥarām*), the guilt, and forgiveness for one's sins gain completely new significations as a result of the exposure to the mystery of Ka'bah. Instead of

referring to their apparent present and actual meanings in language, they are impregnated with the unexpected possibilities offered by the emptiness of the center.

5.2.3.2.1.3. The Prophet, the Captain of the Journey

Finally, after the annihilation of the capital or the central organizing place, one may wonder if the historical life or the discourse of the prophet can be the source of presence and act as a measure. That is the question of the *captain* of the journey or the head or sovereign of the community. Perhaps to be a Muslim is to ‘follow’ and have faith in the historical character of the prophet Muḥammad and his life or the historical life of the saints and Imāms. This is the point of contention among Muslims and create sectarianism among them.

Different sectors and divisions within Islam tell different stories to deal with this groundlessness and offer possible alternatives that can fill the gap like the historic character of the prophet or the saints. An obvious easy way to circumvent this groundless moment is to bring in the authority of the prophet or saints. However, the Iranian prominent Qur’ān scholar Shabestari insists that in fact what is essential to Islamic laws (as opposed to the doctrine and the dogma of Catholic church) is “the essential openness” of the structure of the religion of Islam (*Shabestari*, 44). He writes:

The essential structure of the religion of Islam is an open structure. From the very beginning the system of the Islamic religious thought was an open one... In such an open system, on one side there is the message of God and on the other there is human. Man as the one who is the ‘addressee’ [of the message] is invited by God to understand [or rather to “tie together” or to “Knit,” “contemplate,” “gather together,” the word root in Arabic is “‘, Q, L” meaning also to think and understand] His message. (*Shabestari*, 43 my translation and my emphasis)

He rejects any easy solution for the being-in-trouble of man. The nature of tying together and contemplating, arguably, for Shabestari, ends up confining the Message to the rational understanding of human language; but at this point his emphasis on the original

groundlessness and human responsibility in reference to the ‘address’ is significant and supports my claim.

This moment constitutes the place where all the controversy over the interpretation of the revealed laws originates. Some try to provide intellectualist responses and interpretations which, as I demonstrated, become impossible once entering the domain of revelation. Our rational anticipation is frustrated and negated right at the beginning and yet we are commanded to think and understand. Some other schools try to attach a literal interpretation to the message and follow it blindly as if it is possible to overcome the problem of the ‘address’ without accepting the responsibility of interpretation.

With regard to the authority in interpretation, Shabestari cautions that “There is no formal authority (*motewalli*) for the interpretation and understanding of the message of God in the essential structure of Islam” (*Ibid.*). Interestingly, the term that Shabestari uses here for “authority” is a very politically charged word, *motewalli* meaning authority and leader but at the same time has the same root as the word “*wali*,” meaning “friend of God,” or “appointed by God.” Of the same root, *wilāya* is a prominent and mainstream Shia doctrine of authority that Shabestari is hereby challenging.

The pilgrimage by itself challenges the authority of the Prophet or any one person as the center. One may think that the Prophet and his property are the purposes of this trip. There are two clear evidences supporting my claim, firstly, according to the Qur’ān, the call to perform Hajj is performed by Abraham and not Muḥammad, not even addressing Muslims exclusively but all humankind (*Qur’ān*, 22:27). Therefore, before being Islamic at all, the trip is an Abrahamic one, that is associated with the mythical stories rather than a historical event.

Secondly, none of the places associated with the prophet Muhammad’s historical presence or even the history of Islam as such are part of the ritual. Although most of the Muslims go visit the shrine of the prophet Muhammad in the city of Medina after or before Hajj, visiting that is not part of Hajj. In this regard, it is noteworthy, to compare Hajj with other pilgrimages in Islam.

For Shia Muslims, the pilgrimage sites are the places where the shrines of Imāms are located. In contrast to Hajj, in most of Shia gatherings and pilgrimages, the authority of an Imam is celebrated. In those pilgrimages all places, symbols, and characters are historical. The purpose of the visit is to pledge allegiance to the way of life of Imam. Shias literally mourn or celebrate the historical events of the life of Imāms and saints. As if the historical and real character of Imams or the prophet is the measure to interpret the revealed law.

However, in Hajj none of these historical characters or their houses which are located around the same city are part of the ritual. Instead, pilgrims are invited to take part in the story of Abraham. It is noteworthy that the stories of the prophets in the Qur'ān are presented not as historical events but as mythical or figurative stories. They are not even told as complete events but as elliptical references throughout the Qur'ān as if they are part of the common culture that people shared. The pilgrimage of Hajj seems to imply that the faith in Islam entails going beyond the history of Islam and its laws as present. Therefore, although the narrative of Islam as another source of temporality associated with the place of mystery is indispensable to the pilgrimage, it is only through neutralization of the real and historical presence that new characters are formed and actions become significant. The significance of every character, object, and action is in gestation and making.

Thus, even to believe in the Prophet is to see in him what he is not. For example, he appears to be a man, a head of state, a historical figure whose acts are more or less contextually and historically determined. Hajj defies any identity, sexuality, or leadership as the characters of the head or captain of this journey. This journey begins and ends altogether with the defiance of authority. Like other principles in Islam, to believe in the Prophet consists in precisely the movement of going beyond his historical, contextual and literal character. The prophets as Ibn 'Arabi and other mystics depict in their works are to be understood as different approaches and comportments towards the mystery of life and creation and in response to the *aporias* of the revealed laws.

Therefore, like the presence of the house of God which produces a presence-absence effect rather than a complete presence or complete absence, here too, the guidance is provided not through the actual life history of the prophet Muḥammad but by participating in the story of the prophet Abraham. As a result of this present-absence, a new mode of indication, law, or *logos* is in gestation. This is the context in which the laws of revelation need to be understood. The laws of revelation are given in this sense not as actual commands but as a perpetual ‘address’ and perpetual reminder of one’s being-in-trouble in finding a criterion for interpretation of the revealed laws.

As I argue below, at this point, overwhelmed by the melancholic trouble of groundlessness and wandering, the ritual enters the process of encountering the second moment that is of ‘following’ the other and the ‘address’. As the head and the capital of the community are negated, pilgrims are ready to be introduced to the climax of the story and the authentic attitude towards the revealed laws and commands. Suddenly, the pilgrims who in confronting the emptiness of Ka‘bah and the lack of an authority were left wandering in the desert find themselves right in the middle of the story of Abraham.¹⁶⁰ The story of Abraham as depicted in Hajj is the manifestation of the ‘other’ of the heading par-excellence.

5.2.3.2.2. Nomadic Following as Being-in-Trouble

Little by little, entering the second characteristic moment, the ground for the foundation of the new ethical attitude is prepared. The laws of the nomadic ‘following’ are given by the revelation and perpetual consideration of the mystery itself. Without any capital, patience (*intizār*) in its full force imposes itself on the pilgrim. Of course, one could remain oblivious to his being-in-trouble, or simply follow the path of theology,

¹⁶⁰ It is noteworthy that the structure of Hajj as a style of story-telling, is very much like the Qur’ān and the way it tells stories. The Qur’ān rarely begins a chapter with a story nor does it tell stories from beginning to end. It gives stories very elliptically and pointing to a sign or a turn of events in a story as if everyone knows these stories and the Qur’ān is just offering a new reading of some of their events. The stories in the Qur’ān are also within one another, that is before one story ends another story begins. The same structure is emulated in the Mystic literature like that of Rumi’s works among others. This style in Hajj, one can say, intensifies the feeling of being always in the middle and incomplete. We are never actual writers of any new story as if constituting the world for the first time. But rather, we are always already in a hermeneutic situation and our existence is constituted by reading.

jurisprudence, or philosophy to give some general economic solution to the problem. Even worse, one can accept the authority of a leader in giving sense and measure to her actions. But this is to circumvent the problematic situation and to reduce the singularity of the 'address' to a general formula. This amounts to naive responses to a problematic situation that makes sense only as a problem.

It is worth remembering from Ghazālī in his autobiographical work that the ascent toward the level of independent investigation (*ijtihād*) for him comes to pass as a result of the melancholia that fell upon him he consented that he is trouble in finding a measure. It is noteworthy that for Ghazālī, too, the problem was not only about Islam, but the problematic situation of human beings in search of truth. That is to say, the problem is ontologically and existentially posed: we fall short of finding evidence for certainty and truth when the truth is supposed to defy our common sense and logic. The grace which put him on the path of independent investigation (*ijtihād*) came when he exercised patience.

It is crucial to note a major difference in the story of Abraham as it is experience in Hajj with the one that is known in Christianity as in Kierkegaard. The major question for Kierkegaard seems to be the attitude of Abraham, the Knight of Faith. In Islam however, the story of Hajj and Abraham is not merely his story but as much and even more importantly the story of Hājar and Ismā'īl, as the faithful followers. It is not only Abraham but also Hājar and Ismā'īl who depict the authentic attitude towards the command. Kierkegaard does not seem to be concerned with the attitude or response of Isaac. Kierkegaard remarks in passing that, as a result of Abraham's reticence in not sharing the command of God to sacrifice him, Isaac is just very hurt and has lost his trust in his father. Whereas in the Qur'ān, it is Ismā'īl who tries to soothe his father after he shares the command of God with him. That is why I believe this story in Islam is about the authentic attitude of every follower with regard to the laws. Muslims are not only invited to keep faith while they intuit the command like Abraham. They are in trouble in a second sense as well. The question for them is to undergo the maladies and the consequences of the mediation to the prophet and still keep faith and remain 'followers.'

In this sense, the story of Abraham for Muslim pilgrims is more ethical and political question of dealing with the laws when we receive in language and mediation of the prophet.

Pilgrims, at the first scene of the story of Abraham, are in the same situation. They do not act as Abraham himself but as Hājar, who, according to the tradition, as a result of command of God to Abraham, and as a test of his faith, is left in the middle of a desert.¹⁶¹ The Quran affirms that this was yet another test for Abraham (*Qur'ān*, 14:37). As I mentioned before, this confirms my observation that the laws are not to provide simple solutions and guidance. All laws regardless of the performative aspect of their language, unveil a fundamental human condition and question, or a “test.”

Hājar's story is the depiction of the situation of all ‘followers’ in-trouble where they are not able to make sense of the Message. Every believer is like Hājar, frustrated with not understanding the laws, and finding themselves in a Kafkaesque situation “before the laws” while being compelled to follow them.

What the follower *can* or *should* do according to the narrative is very telling and significant. Acting as Hājar, the pilgrim has to stay for a couple of days in this desperate state, before the law, left in the middle of the desert with no hope or revelation. The pilgrim is in the state of *Ihrām*, which unlike most of rules of conduct in Islam, including the holy war (*Jihād*), the prayer, the “enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, (*amr bi l-ma'rūf wa nahy 'an l-munkar*)”¹⁶² stages a state of heedful indecision rather than an active intervention.

¹⁶¹ “When Ishmael was still nursing, God yet again chose to test the faith of his beloved Abraham and commanded him to take Hagar and Ishmael to a barren valley of Bakka 700 miles southeast of Hebron. In later times it would be called Mecca. Indeed it was a great test, for he and his family had longed for such a time for offspring, and when their eyes were filled with the joy of an heir, the commandment was enacted to take him to a distant land, one known for its barrenness and hardship.” Mufti, Imam Kamil. “The Story of Abraham (Part 5 of 7): The Gifting of Hagar and Her Plight.” *The Religion of Islam*, 3 Apr. 2006, www.islamreligion.com/articles/296/story-of-abraham-part-5/.

¹⁶² The examples of this rule in the *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah* (tradition) are abundant. The rule commands Muslim to intervene in the affairs of other fellow believers and invite them to do good or warn them of their bad actions. From the *Qur'ān* for example we read: “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.” (3:104)

The state of *Ihrām* continues for several days during which several actions are being performed by the pilgrims. Some of which are:

1. *Ṭawāf*: circumambulating around Ka'bah
2. *Sa'y*: which means "effort." This practice commemorates the search for water made by Hājar when Abraham left her and her infant son Ismā'īl in the desert.
3. *Taqṣīr*: which means "to shave or to cut;" the pilgrims cut or shave their hair (women cut off only a small amount) and return to Mecca to repeat *Ṭawāf* and *Sa'y*.
4. *Iqāmat*: which means sojourn or stay: pilgrims head to Minā, where they spend the day. Early the next morning they go to 'Arafah (or 'Arafāt) to spend the day.

It is noteworthy that every action from this list can be interpreted in different ways in accordance with the three narratives of Abrahamic, mythical (the Day of Resurrection) and the history of Islam. I focus on only one meaning which is related to the story of Hājar and her predicament. She has been left alone with a hungry and thirsty infant in the middle of the desert, literally "before the laws" having to way out but to obey and follow them. She is wandering and awaiting the sense and resolution of the command to come without being able to constitute a meaning to the problem or finding a way out of it.

All 4 actions intensify the follower's experience of helplessness and groundlessness, in addition to the need for patience and care toward the other. Moreover, in the background of all these experiences is the hope for the revelation to come. The actions that take place with this heading in view begin in the context of a complete absence and end in symbolic or mimetic presence. I explained the preliminary effect of *Ṭawāf*. The action (2) (*Sa'y*) which involves walking and running between two hills, after doing the circumambulation (*Ṭawāf*), simply depicts Hājar's desperate attempt to find water for herself and her child before they die. After completely getting disappointed, she prays for help and a spring (*Zamzam*) opens up from the dry ground with which she quenches her son's thirst. God's mercy a sign of His presence comes in the form of pres-absence again, what I called mimetic presence. Like the experience of Ka'bah, here too the pilgrim is not left with absolute absence in a nihilistic fashion but with an indication

of a presence in heavens, a presence to come. The spring, the water, a heavenly material looks like something which is both of and not of the world. It has a quasi-presence. Ghazālī understands *Sa‘y* along the same lines. He writes:

As for the running between Safā and Marwa in the courtyard of the House: this resembles the movements to and fro of a slave in the courtyard of a king, coming and going time after time, [thus] showing his loyalty in service, hoping for a look of favor, in the manner of one who enters [the presence of] a king and goes out without knowing what the king has ordered with respect to his case, acceptance or repulsion, so that he keeps coming back to the courtyard time after time, hoping to be forgiven in the second [time] if not in the first. (*Ghazālī & Omar*, 150)

The very nature of a response from heaven is so important that pilgrims take bottles of water back home at the end of the journey as a souvenir of the trip.¹⁶³ It is one single glimmer of hope that a Muslim is supposed to cling into. Yet, as it is clear from the nature of a miracle, it cannot be anticipated and does not point to any center or appropriation. It is a new kind of sense, and points to a new kind of law, the one which has the mystery of the place in view.

After the confrontation with the emptiness of the house, *Sa‘y* is a natural effect which is a wandering out of despair although it ends with a *taste* of inspiration and hope for the *woman* of the story. It all seems to indicate that, should there be any redemption, on the way of ‘following,’ it is in the admitting the impossibility of the presence of the absolute and yet, despite this fact, to never become disappointed and to never lose faith. This means to live the conundrum of ‘following’ all the time instead of providing a philosophical or theological solution for it. This is what will effectively happen in action number 4 *Iqāmat* (Stay). Pilgrims have to stay in a desert for a certain time as if stuck “before the law.” They have nothing to do but to think why they are grounded there and ask for forgiveness. This welcoming the effect of the laws in patience, the active attitude

¹⁶³ The graphic novel, *Habībī*, by Craig Thompson, is inspired by the revelation of Zamzam, to such an extent that one of the two main characters of the novel is called Zamzam. In effect, the whole course of that story is in search or hope of finding Zamzam, the impossible and improbable revelation.

in waiting and ‘following’ like that of Ismā‘īl and Hājar promises some kind of hope, redemption, and creativity which is not the same kind as the one promised by the faithful following of the laws. Obedience to the laws is rewarded, too, but their reward comes economically in the afterlife. Hājar receives a glimmer of hope in a form of water which is a heavenly material in *this* world. Later, Ismā‘īl’s following the order of his father to accept the sacrifice exercises the same patience and follows the laws. His action brings about yet another miracle, another glimmer of hope in the form of a ram. Both of these revelations and rewards are granted as a result of the hope and trust in an unanticipated event, rather than the economic quid pro quo structure of laws. The actions of sacrificing (*qaṣr*) and shaving (*taqṣīr*) in both situations involve a kind of cutting, with words of the same root which connects them to one another. The patience (*intizār*) welcomes the contingency and a new mode of temporality which is in accordance with “the alternative worlds.” I mentioned that patience was Ghazālī’s supplement to the laws of nature, the one that opens the organic natural world to “the possible worlds.” The introduction of the new temporality perfectly explains the subsequent ontological transformation of the laws. The present and actual laws from this moment transform to temporary constellations informed by the promised action of God, who is the ultimate source of all actions.

5.2.3.2.3. Following the Law as Receiving “the Address”

One may object that the tradition (*Qur’ān and Hadīth*) and laws are given specifically as a substitute for the wandering that results from the exposure to the mystery. But in Hajj, laws crystalize the being-in-trouble of the follower. The follower this time is not just any ordinary one but Abraham. For him, this problem is looked at in a different way. He has the problem of communicating the orders as well as following them. On the other hand, what is revealed to the prophet as truth might make no reasonable sense to others. Nonetheless, this story, is a heroic attempt to overcome human limitations and make the laws present in human realm. As I mentioned, for Ismā‘īl and Hājar, the accurate attitude in facing the fact that they are “before the laws” was to exercise patience and to live the partial, nomadic life of following and keeping their

hopes up for a revelation to come. For Abraham, the one who have received the laws immediately, the attempt is to establish the laws, make them present and in fact make God as the absolute justice present in this world.

Abraham wants to be the first person to overcome human limitations and overcome the problems of the 'address.' He is on the receiving end of the orders from God and yet has to somehow reconcile them with the language and understanding of the people to be able to bridge the gap between his intuition of God's message and the public speech.

The complications with the *address* are not one but many, all of which are staged in the story of Abraham. Abraham is trying to understand God's command to sacrifice his own son. The very transgressive nature of the command is supposed to underline Abraham's malady and trouble. He is up to an impossible task for God's laws and God's intervention is necessarily un-worldly. God is the absolute other, the one that gives the laws in the first place. We remember from previous chapter and with Aristotle's laws, that at the moment of the creation of a new law, it is the singular other that gives the law. The law that is *phronetically* established by looking at the examples in the past and by applying the universal to a new individual case still re-affirms the structure of the world as it has always been. In order to give a new law one has to try a calculation of a totally different kind. Now, the transgressive command that Abraham receives from God, the absolute other, is so monstrous and un-worldly that defies any intellectual understanding.

Still Abraham intends to make the impossible possible. He has received the command and he has no doubt that is the command of the other. I would like to emphasize that the order to kill one's own son, like most of the interventions of God in the stories of the prophets has to be transgressive. This is to emphasize the unworldliness and transgressive nature of absolute justice in the realm of human beings. The commands must necessarily defy commonsense or they are not absolutely innovative and new. In the previous chapter, I mentioned that this is the character of a kind of innovation and creation which goes beyond simple applications of a general or universal law of justice and tries to 'address' the otherness of the other.

The problem is not at all limited to the moral laws and goes back to the nature of innovation and the ‘stumbling block’ of individuation. I mentioned in chapter 4, that similar demonic and unworldly forces impose themselves upon Descartes when he is on the verge of the creation of something absolutely new. The difference is that for political reasons he has to ascribe the transgressive creations and commands to an evil demon as opposed to culturally and politically correct understanding of God as the absolute good. The nature of creation however is the same; that is, the creation of the absolutely new is to rip the structure of the commonsensical good world as we know it.

Abraham is up to the same task of trying to establish what he thinks is the most just laws, the one’s that do not have to abide by the rules of reason and common sense. He does not even try to speak to anyone but Ismā‘īl about what he is doing. His actions has to make no sense and judged as unjust in accordance with the established laws of the present and yet he has faith that he can establish God’s command in the human realm.

The commands are almost impossible to ‘follow.’ Abraham receives the order to leave his family stranded, but even worse he is asked to sacrifice his son to prove his faith. He performs the first order which makes the story more appealing to follow. He might be able to establish the presence of the absolute justice after all. But, as I mentioned above, that part of the story in Islam is not even about Abraham but about Hājar on her receiving end “before the laws.”

The latter story of Abraham, the great sacrifice, for the pilgrims start with what is called the Bigger Hajj, which involves two major actions: *Ramy al-Jamarāt* (stoning of the pillars) and finally *al-hady* (sacrifice). At this stage, the pilgrims are still in the story of Abraham¹⁶⁴ grappling with the *aporetic* situation of following the laws. Yet, they must begin again with the story not as a normal human being, but as the prophet Abraham trying to overcome the *aporia* once and for all. Thus, should Abraham be able to establish the laws once and for all, he must deny and defy all partial, intellectual appropriations of the order. Abraham is not to be satisfied with anything but the final complete actualization of the laws, something that even Aristotle finally ended up

¹⁶⁴ like Moses following the of Khidr

admitting was impossible. Whatever comes to pass (as an intellectual idea, a psychological satisfaction, a sense of completion and appropriation) turns into an idol that has to be defied.

All the signs so far tell the audience as and the pilgrims that Abraham can do what he sets out to do it. Pilgrims act out this attempts by first perform the *Ramy al-Jamarāt* (stoning the pillars). The pilgrims throw pebbles at the stone pillars known as *al-Jamarāt*. The practice commemorates Abraham's stoning of Satan when Satan tried to tempt him to disobey God or to interpret His order otherwise. Satan's suggestion to interpret the laws intellectually to a present or commonsensical meaning reduces the unworldly character of the command. In the ritual of stoning, Satan (the pillar) is symbolically defied by throwing stones. At this level, one can interpret the stoning of the pillars as the perpetual defiance of any interpretation and appropriation of the message in favor of the final fulfilment of God's command.

And finally comes *al-hady* (the sacrifice), the ritual commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Ismā'īl and God's provision of a lamb as a substitute sacrifice. Sacrifice is the ultimate excess. Identifying with the character of Abraham, the pilgrim is ready to do everything she can to make the laws present and actual.

However, with the offering of a ram, Abraham is about to learn a tragic lesson. The lamb or ram seems to be a reward more for Ismā'īl than his father. As I mentioned, Ismā'īl is being rewarded for his patience and remaining a 'follower.' But for Abraham, the story is his failed attempt to make the meaning of laws actual and present. The moment one assumes that he has found the truth, that he has actually performed the orders and established the truth and justice, the truth of the message has already transcended beyond the actual occurrence of it.

We can see that the sacrifice, had it been done successfully, would reductively and superficially solve the problem of 'following' the law, turning the faith to a *quid pro quo* economy. That is, one could simply gather that absolute obedience to the literal word of God, to the singular address is possible for the 'follower.'

But, this magnificent story remains open for Abraham could not sacrifice Ismā‘īl and was given a lamb instead. The very “cut”¹⁶⁵ carries the pilgrim back to the *aporetic* situation of ‘following’ again. The sacrifice of a lamb involves cutting, and returning to the realm of impossibility. That is how the story of the sacrifice highlights not only the trouble of understanding the law as the address that cannot be shared, but also the impossibility involved in its performance. It points to the fact that all laws in religion are temporary and strategic constellations in facing the trouble of ‘following’ and an invitation to a heedful conduct towards others.

5.2.3.2.4. The Transformation of Laws and the Heedful Conduct

The final attempt of Abraham to found the laws fails and no grounding is established. From here all laws should be interpreted again having such an impossibility and groundlessness in view. In this light, from the very beginning the laws in Hajj had a curious negativity and indecision to them as a result of which being lawful and unlawful gains existential and ontological meaning above and beyond the ordinary meanings of guilt and sin. I believe this negative quality adds an additional significance to the strict laws of religion, and gives them a nomadic character.

A good example of this can be found in the strictest rules of *Iḥrām*. I mentioned that the first narrative, the story of Hājar, begins with the state of *Iḥrām*. The present laws of Islam already begin to make other senses at the stage of *Iḥrām* which begins at *Mīqāt*. This is evident in the fact that the unlawful act (*ḥarām*) gains an ontological meaning well beyond the ordinary sense of it. In the formal state of *Iḥrām* the pilgrims wear a costume. The word *Iḥrām* is from the same root as an unlawful act (*ḥarām*) and also respect, awe, and care.¹⁶⁶ It seems to imply that the pilgrims enter the state of the heedful conduct where their actions are determined only by the laws of the ritual and in attending to their aporetic situation and patience (*intizār*). Literally, the pilgrims cannot do many

¹⁶⁵ And sacrifice bears undeniable similarity with the other cut I referred to in the process, *taqṣīr*. Both cuts point to impossibilities involved in the human condition and as a result transform the meaning of the laws.

¹⁶⁶ *iḥtirām* (*m*) verbal noun of *iḥtarama*, “to respect” (form VIII); respect

things that they can normally do. Therefore, all of the rules and regulations of the *Ihrām*, stated below, start with negation. In the state of *Ihrām*, the pilgrim cannot:

1. Look at the reflection of one's face or the body in anything like a mirror or even water.
2. Wear one's regular clothes and perfume
3. Shave or trim
4. Have marital relationships
5. Argue or have any altercations
6. Hurt, kill, or eat any kind of creature, including uprooting any plants.

In terms of identity, number 1 suspends one's relationship to one's image and disconnects her for some time from the image she has of herself from memory. Numbers 2 to 4 intensify the situation and distort the image of one's self and what one normally associates oneself with. So far, the effect, as I mentioned, is the defiance of identity as one remembers from everyday life. This brings about the suspension of the laws of the present as well. The pilgrim loses her everyday political body.

Although these orders are still more laws to be followed and failing to abide by them results in a retribution of some kind, the structure of negation, the fact that there is not much instruction as to what they should do other than asking for forgiveness leaves pilgrims in a state of suspension and indecision. In other words, these laws are more about what they "cannot" do, which make pilgrims wonder about their direction and place in regard to the laws. Numbers 5 and 6, in particular, make these more look like a heedful suspension of action rather than an affirmation of action as in an invitation to a holy war or prayer (*Jihād* and *Ṣalāt*).

The repetitive nature of laws which used to give a schedule to Muslims' everyday life is interrupted by the dramatic actions which are associated with a mythical, apocalyptic as well as historical temporality. Such an interruption makes the participants wonder about the very constitution of their everyday life of faith in the light of the

narratives they are engaged in.¹⁶⁷ The ritual is introducing a shift in focus, a turn to the very center that complicates the very existence of laws as present and repetitive.

The action of asking for forgiveness (*tawba*) for your sins is another aspect of the Hajj which surpasses everyday praying and other rites associated with the economy of Islam. It seems that the story of Abraham and the confrontation with the emptiness of Ka'bah are supposed to give rise to one's new understanding of the meaning of guilt and unlawfulness. One could have asked for forgiveness in one's hometown as well, for a Muslim must believe that God is everywhere and always ready to listen to and forgive the believer. But, as I mentioned before, this emphasis on the place, that is the particular place dedicated to ask for forgiveness, marks a break with the temporality of everyday life as well as everyday faith. The "call," referred to by the Qur'an, is not only for Muslims, but is that which asks all human beings to confess their existential guilt. Everyone is bound by some worldly laws or limitations and as a result guilty of some kind. We would like to be unconditionally hospitable to the other but that is virtually impossible due to our human condition. In other words, any judgment or decision needs a present measure. In the world, where the presence of the Absolute is defied, any decision-making becomes a matter of being-in-trouble and confronting a steep path.¹⁶⁸ The new meaning of the guilt is this existential lack, which is only remedied by the impossible presence of the Absolute. Under this new light, all actions turn into ethical comportment, or a kind of heedful indecision. We are always already guilty of having no ground and being in the state of economy, not hospitable enough to receive the 'other'

¹⁶⁷In the language of Heidegger, it is only when the everyday familiarity with the world (what he calls ready-to-hand (*Zuhanden*) understanding) is breached or interrupted, the whole structure of being-in-the-world becomes manifest for Dasein. However, it is evident that the possibility for freedom, in an originary temporality and an authentic meaning of existence or possibility for Dasein, is not created in reference to death, but in identifying with the characters of the narratives in the pilgrimage.

¹⁶⁸The steep path is a Qur'anic allusion that is *al-'aqaba* in the chapter *al-Balad* (The City) where the question of ethical judgment is raised.

unconditionally. And yet we are advised to exercise care.¹⁶⁹ Care and patience (*ṣabr wa al-marḥama*) are the new laws of conduct (*Qur'ān*, 90:17).¹⁷⁰

The situation is intensified with the symbolic “cut” in action number 3. The word *taqṣīr* is from the root “Q, Ṣ, R”, meaning the action of limiting, restricting, and cutting. From the same root, “*muqassir*” means delinquent or guilty. Both in asking for forgiveness in the stay (*Iqāmat*) and in reference to *taqṣīr*, besides the common signification of guilt, we are dealing with an invitation to admit our limitation in trying to make the absolute present. And that is in this context, the meaning of the existential guilt. It is not that one has done something wrong or one is responsible for something, but rather perhaps indicating that as ‘followers,’ individuals are essentially limited not to have the knowledge of the absolute. Thus, the pilgrim would symbolically cut one’s hair, admitting that she is existentially limited and always in ‘following.’

5.2.4. The Final Word

I have tried to show here that by studying the actions in the ritual of Hajj and stories associated with them, one finds that the main theme is not about Islam per se, but about the trouble of humans as ‘followers’ of the commands which are revealed in an incomprehensible and singular ‘address,’ which has to be necessarily transgressive to challenge the common sense. I intended to exploit the imaginative and mythical character of the story, to illustrate the point I was trying to make in the rest of the work. In other words, with the actual complication involved with the implementation of the religious

¹⁶⁹This new meaning of the law and ethical comportment is inspired by an interpretation of Chapter 90 (al-Balad) of the Qur'ān. There, the whole discussion is about the place or the city (perhaps Mecca of the time) where the laws are defined in a new way. There, the decision-making is highlighted and choosing to do charity and other lawful actions are described in terms of a being at the juncture and standing before the Steep path. My point is that, if to figure out what to do, was as easy as following the laws, why is He talking about a steep path. The difficulty pointed out here, in my humble opinion is the existential difficulty in being a follower.

“And what can make you know what is [breaking through] the difficult pass? It is the freeing of a slave. Or feeding on a day of severe hunger. An orphan of near relationship. Or a needy person in misery. And then being among those who believed and advised one another to patience and advised one another to compassion.” [Qur'ān, 90: 11-17]

¹⁷⁰And then being among those who believed and advised one another to patience and advised one another to compassion.(17)

laws, I tried to shed light on the nature of laws in general and the inevitable radical transformation they have to go through when they encounter the singularity of the other.

I showed how Hajj is the best place to see this transformation and how Muslims in fact experience the troubles and the violence that plague the actual enforcement of the laws. The transformation began in Hajj with the radical defiance of authority and annihilation of the time as present. The actions, costumes, places, and symbols associated with the beginning of Hajj all target the pilgrims' economic system of sense making and laws. They find themselves in a place where they have to abide by a totally different schedule, wear different clothes, completely forget what they know about themselves and their daily routine and act according to the laws of the particular place. The whole process puts the heading and authority of the laws into question. The actions, the practices, and stories behind them illustrate such defiance of authority in numerous ways. I analyzed the ritual to show how each and every movement is performed in defiance of the system of sense-making as present, from memory, or a central idea or a heading. What pilgrims used to have as present and economic laws is questioned as to its foundations. The major sign of this foundation and center is Ka'bah, the house of God, which is the house of no-thing and symbolizes the groundlessness of humans in the world. It is a center, an authority whose writing and orders have to be obeyed in God's absence and they consequently call for more interpretation.

From then on, the pilgrim is compelled to follow the authority of the prophets. But, the choice of the prophet and the stories are curious. It is not Prophet Muhammad that they have to follow, but Abraham. I argued the stories associated with Abraham are about the 'address' and following the laws. The whole story of Abraham is meant to put the messenger and the followers in a paradoxical situation. The transgressive nature of commands received and performed in these stories problematize all laws of religion for Muslims. The messenger is to bring the laws which are for "a people," and yet the address is necessarily personal and private. The pilgrims, I suggested, experience this singular-plural nature of the address and experience the being-in-trouble of the follower.

Like Hājar or Abraham they find themselves “before the laws” and compelled to make decisions.

The message of the ritual, I argued, is this very suspension of decision and laws and the admission of the impossibility of the identity in following the laws. If there is such a thing as following the tradition, it is in the heedful indecision (*ṣabr* or patience in the Qurānic language) and in the exercise of care (*marḥama*) toward others with regard to the transgressive and mysterious origin of the laws. This is not a passive reaction to the laws but an active critical take on the tradition such that one considers oneself as the original addressee of an impossible address. This attitude involves a perpetual engagement with reading and interpreting the tradition instead of blindly following the commonsensical and ordinary understanding of it in public language. For the religion whose main book bears the title of the Qur’ān, meaning reading, following the tradition cannot mean anything but reading it differently all the time.

The End

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Appendix 1: On Analogy of Being

There is a long-standing and controversial debate as to its nature and if there is such a thing as analogy of being in Aristotle. For example, as Aubenque argues, being is a homonymy which is hardly a form of unity. The tendency toward unity, *unity pros hen*, which Aubenque calls “unity of convergence” is not really unity at all. It is, rather, quasi-unity. While *unity kata genos* is unity in virtue of something else (namely, falling under a substantial definition), so called “unity *pros hen*” is only “unity” in virtue of approximating unity, which is to say failing to achieve it. It is not as if things share some higher genus through which they form an identity. It is an analogical unity. Aubenque goes out of his way to argue that Aristotle has been persistently misinterpreted as advancing a theory of the “analogy of being” when, in fact, he develops a theory of being’s homonymy. Being is a homonym [*homonymon*]. Nonetheless, for Aristotle as far as entities are defined in their species and genera, also changing from one definition to another or establishing some form of relationship between them systematically, the unity as a whole is intact. The key idea, I think, is that such a relationship needs to be *explicable* for the analogy to work. That is because for analogy to work there should be a prior presence of species and genera and a clear systematic relation between them. This is evident in how he understands difference. “Difference” (*diaphora*) is distinct from “otherness” (*heterōs*). For that which is “other” than something need not be other in a particular respect, since everything which is existent is either “other” or “the same.” But that which is different from something is different in some particular respect, so that that in which they differ must be the same sort of thing; i.e. the same genus or species. For everything which is different differs either in genus or in species—in genus, such things as have not common matter and cannot be generated into or out of each other, e.g. things which belong to different categories; and in species, such things as are of the same genus (genus meaning that which is predicated of both the different things alike in respect of their substance)” (*Met.*, 10. 1054b23-30).

Aristotle seems to believe that separate genera are basically “other” (*heterōs*) than each other and have nothing in common. Aristotle’s example of things that differ from one

another in the absence of a common genus are *genera themselves*. Genera among themselves are merely “other” (*Met.*, 10. 1055a26-7), “too far distinct and incommensurable [*asumblêta*]” (*Met.*, 10. 1055a 6-7). So, for example in the case of metaphor as transference (*epiphora*), as we will discuss in Chapter 3 and 4, there is a presumption of having established clear genera that are already present and complete which only later come into the relation of *analogy*. This should be contrasted with synonymy. Synonymy describes the relation of species (*eidê*) within a single genus—in other words, species are “said in one sense” of their genus (cats and dogs are animals synonymously and “animal” is univocal). In contrast, Aristotle thinks analogy describes the relationship *between different genera*. Genera themselves are not subordinated to a higher generic unity. There are no “super-genera”. Aristotle says genera are related to one another by analogy in terms of their properties. Biological genera, such as fish and birds, are related in terms of their analogous parts: birds’ feathers and fishes’ scales are analogous (*PA* 644a 16; cf. *PA* 653b 35). Although analogy means a relationship in the absence of a shared genus, Aristotle does talk about “unity by analogy” (*hen kat’analogian*) (*Met.*, 1016b34-5), if only to contrast it with the unity of species within a genus. Even though there is a marked contrast between being, which is not a genus, and the genera (e.g., birds and fish) that are internally unified but only related to one another by analogy (since such genera are not themselves species of some super-genus), nevertheless both “unity in genus” and the “unity of analogy” are types of unity, even if the latter is rarefied and weak. Protevi calls this function a “vertical unity” (Protevi 39).

To give an account of this unity, Aristotle proposes definition (*horismos*) as a valid way of capturing the being of entities in their multiple manifestations. He criticizes Plato’s method of division on the basis that it is unscientific; it doesn’t conform to Aristotle’s standards of theoretical science, which proceeds by demonstration (*apodeixis*) operating by means of deductions or syllogisms (*An. Post.* 71b 18-20). Division in Aristotle must conform to the standards of “specification,” a relation among species (*eidê*) and genera (*genê*), the inverse of generalization. He contends that we need to proceed through syllogisms based on immediate premises. As I mentioned before, the

function of definitions are to establish such a relation between parts and wholes. In fact, they are Aristotle's way to signify the "what-IS-Being" (*Top.* 102a3). Definitions in terms of categories are both the most immediate to entities and a bridge to what is the farthest and most universal. This is evident in the fact that they are, in fact, indemonstrable in the way that premises are supposed to be (*An. Post.* 92a5), and at least one way of understanding definition is as the "indemonstrable formula" (*logos anapodeiktos*) of essence (*An. Post.* 94a11; cf. 90b24). Aristotle's word "*diaphora*," is the word usually translated "*differentia*" in the logical treatises. Aristotelian *differentiae* are said relative to kinds or *genê*, in which capacity they are crucial for generating scientific definitions. The definition of *x* (finding the *logos* of the essence of *x*) is accomplished by isolating the appropriate genus and *differentiae* (*An. Post.* 96b25).

For example, if *cow* is the object of a scientific demonstration, it will be correctly explained by isolating the appropriate kind ("horned animal") and specifying essential *differentiae* ("the possession of a third stomach and only one row of teeth") (*An. Post.* 98a14-19). Scientifically, *differentiae* are differences relative to a kind. On the other hand, he does not deny that things might go wrong or things might not miss their targets, as we will see in the case of monsters. This would be considered a *cata-strophe*. Catastrophe literally as "turning down" is an unexpected turn of events or unexpected end of motion. It refers to the generation which is not in the boundaries of genus and species. In this sense, we can say that analogy means a kind of higher-order form of identity, a way to tame the anomaly of the undetermined equivocality. We still have a *capital* that determines the organization of beings around it. In effect, this is Aristotle's way of avoiding total dissemination of sense. In Derrida's terminology, we may say that thinking of being as analogical will never get beyond treating differences as relative to already existent forms of identity. Derrida, on the other hand, highlights the possibility of a distribution which is so-called "nomadic," because it doesn't proceed as if the territory were already partitioned and appropriated. Rather, the occupants of the territory distribute themselves, forming such relations among one another that were inconceivable, or at least unpredictable, before the distribution occurred.

Appendix 2: On Hexis

The key is in understanding the word, "characteristic," i.e. *hexis*. *Hexis* (ἕξις) is a relatively stable arrangement or disposition, for example a person's health or knowledge or character. It stems from a verb related to possession or "having," and Jacob Klein, for example, translates it as "possession." It is more typically translated in modern texts occasionally as "state" (e.g., H. Rackham), but more often as "disposition." Joe Sachs translates it as "active condition," in order to make sure that *hexis* is not confused with passive conditions of the soul, such as feelings and impulses or mere capacities that belong to us by nature. Sachs points to Aristotle's own distinction, explained for example in the *Categories* 8b, which distinguishes it with the word *diathesis*, normally uncontroversially translated as disposition. In this passage, *diathesis* only applies to passive and shallow dispositions that are easy to remove and change, such as being hot or cold, while *hexis* is reserved for deeper and more active dispositions, such as properly getting to know something in a way that will not be easily forgotten. Another common example of a human *hexis* in Aristotle is health (*hugieia*, or sometimes *eu(h)exia*), and in cases where *hexis* is discussed in the context of health, it is sometimes translated as "constitution."

Apart from needing to be relatively stable or permanent, in contexts concerning humans (such as knowledge, health, and good character) *hexis* is also generally understood to be contrasted from other dispositions, conditions and habits, by being "acquired" by some sort of training or habituation. It is active like a second nature that affects one's immediate perception and desires; however, it is not automatically and almost passively engaged like a habit. Although it is translated correctly as *habitus* in Latin which refers to having stable characteristics but does not have the same connotations of habit in English as passive conditioning. "Having" (*hexis*) means, then, a disposition (*diathesis*), in virtue of which (*kath' ho*) the thing which is disposed is disposed well or badly, and either independently or in relation to something else. Further,

any part of such a disposition is called a state (*hexis*); and hence the excellence (*arete*) of the parts is a kind of state (*hexis*) (*Met.* 5.1022b).

Nonetheless, in perhaps the most important case, Aristotle contrasts *hexis* with *energeia* (in the sense of activity or operation) in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1.8.1098b33) and *Eudemian Ethics* (2.1.1218b). The subject there is "happiness" (*eudaimonia*), and *hexis* is contrasted with *energeia* (*ἐνέργεια*) in order to show the correctness of a proposed definition of happiness - "activity (*ἐνέργεια*) in conformity with virtue."

Now with those who pronounce happiness to be virtue, or some particular virtue, our definition is in agreement; for 'activity (*ἐνέργεια*) in conformity with virtue' (*aretē*) involves virtue. But no doubt it makes a great difference whether we conceive the Supreme Good to depend on possessing virtue or on displaying it—on disposition (*ἔξις*), or on the manifestation of a disposition in action. For a man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result, as for instance when he is asleep, or has ceased to function from some other cause; but virtue in active exercise cannot be inoperative—it will of necessity act (*praxis*), and act well (*eu praxeis*). And just as at the Olympic games the wreaths of victory are not bestowed upon the handsomest and strongest persons present, but on men who enter for the competitions—since it is among these that the winners are found—so it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life. (*NE.* 1.8.1098b 8-20)

Happiness then, is an *energeia*, but virtue of character (often translated as "moral virtue") is made up of *hexeis*. Happiness is said to deserve honoring like the divine if it actually achieved, while virtue of character, being only a potential achievement, deserves praise but is lower.

The best way to talk about *hexis* as an intermediate state between *energeia* and *dynamis*, not completely actual and yet a stable holding of a disposition, is a state of perpetually having the *telos* in view. Aristotle would like to make sure that a courageous person has the golden mean in view all the time and is always driven actively towards figuring it out in every particular situation. Thus, in what follows, Aristotle is going to explain the driving force which makes people do just actions and want just things. This is how body-politics works for Aristotle. He talks about justice as an activity of the soul which forms and informs the corporeal matter so that one's body turns into another body

with a different set of desires and inclinations as before. That is why to know what justice is, is not a mere "science (*episteme*), neither is it a mere capacity (*dynamis*)" waiting to be activated (NE, 5.1.1129a10-15). Justice is that characteristic that is actively seeking its *telos*.

Appendix 3: Saussure on the Economy of Language

In his search for the best method of studying language, Saussure comes across similar forces involved in molding and folding the sense of linguistic signs in time (diachrony) as opposed to the social and systematic institution of signs that work through the fixation of their values in comparison to one another and the overarching system of language (synchrony). As Derrida points out, Saussure readily acknowledges that he has borrowed such a distinction from economic sciences and, in comparison with the function of money, “. . . that duality [between synchrony and diachrony] is already forcing itself upon the economic sciences” (*Saussure*, 79). Derrida underlines that Saussure is trying to advocate the value system for language, that is to say that any signifier in the system of language derives its meaning that is its value in reference to other signifiers in language in a differential system. Saussure compares the whole process with economy and the value of money. He mentions that the same problematic inflicts economic sciences: on the one hand the question is the historical or generative process by which the value of the capital is created and other hand the institutional, and political process by which these values are fixed “*at the same time*”, hence synchrony. He feels obliged to apply the same distinction to the linguistic sciences. In both cases he believes we are dealing with the notion of value and the question whether the value of the items comes from their relation to their history and historical processes or in a system and differentially for any particular era. He writes: “Proceeding as they have, economists are-without being aware of it-obeying an inner necessity. A similar necessity obliges us to divide linguistics into two parts, each with its own principle. Here as in political economy we are confronted with the notion of value; both sciences are concerned with a system for equating things of different orders-labor and wages in one, and a signified and a signifier in the other” (*ibid*). But of course he does not stop here and continues to explain that in fact the synchrony-diachrony distinction must be applied in all sciences when the question of value is at stake. However, Derrida takes interest in that moment of diachrony that always already contaminates synchrony and in fact is the condition of its possibility. Derrida’s

brilliant discovery in the case of language, is metaphor and in the case of economy, the usury. But first, Derrida underlines the analogy that Saussure establishes between linguistics and economics. Saussure underlines that he would like to substitute an understanding of language as a mere “naming process” with a more sophisticated value system. “... we must clear up the issue [of the relation between value and signification] or risk reducing language to a simple naming process....To resolve this issue, let us observe from the outset that even outside language all values are apparently governed by the same paradoxical principle. They are always composed: (i) of a dissimilar thing that can be exchanged for the thing of which the value is to be determined; and (2) of similar things that can be compared with the thing of which the value is to be determined. Both factors are necessary for the existence of a value. To determine what a five-franc piece is worth one must therefore know: (i) that it can be exchanged for a fixed quantity of a different thing, e.g., bread; and (2) that it can be compared with a similar value of the same system, e.g., a one-franc piece, or with coins of another system (a dollar, etc.). In the same way, a word can be exchanged for something dissimilar, an idea; besides, it can be compared with something of the same nature, another word. Its value is therefore not fixed so long as one simply states that it can be “exchanged” for a given concept, i.e., that it has this or that signification: one must also compare it with similar values, with other words that stand in opposition to it. Its content is really fixed only by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it. Being part of a system, it is endowed not only with a signification but also and especially with a value, and this is something quite different” (Ibid., Part II, Ch. iv, §2, 114-15).

In Derrida’s view, however natural one may assume the process of naming, as soon as the signs enter the process of exchange their sense is supplemented by the terms of the exchange, and that is how Saussure compares signs’ value with the function of money. For Derrida, the most universal example for signs that has been a point of reference for philosophers from the very beginning of philosophy is “the sun.” Entering the idiomatic realm of language exchange, however, even the sun has to abide by the laws of “*semantic exchange*.”

An object which is the most natural, the most universal, the most real, the most clear, a referent which is apparently the most external, the sun- this object, as soon as it plays a role in the process of axiological and semantic exchange (and it *always* does), does not completely escape the general law of metaphorical value: The value of just any term is accordingly determined by its environment; it is impossible to fix even the value of the signifier 'sun' without considering its surroundings: in some languages it is not possible to say 'sit in the sun' (Derrida, 1982. 250).

The important point in regard to Saussure and his system is that while the relationship between signifiers in language seems objective, the differential relationship between them gives rise to a 'mystical foundation' that make us be able to anticipate changes and predict events in language. This Mystical foundation that gives us such a power and authority Saussure calls "*langue*" as opposed to all empirical usages of language, "*parole*." "Langue" never occurs in reality and yet everything is a particular example or manifestation of it. Under the guise an unbiased scientific system, Derrida shows how Saussure has produced another onto-theological system.

Heidegger offers the same critique in his reading of Aristotle's double character of *logos*. As I mentioned before, *logos* is "used up" in averageness: "Everything expressed harbors the possibility of being used up, of being shoved into the common intelligibility." I remarked earlier that he is adopting a Nietzschean language which connects truth, as bleached out metaphors on the one hand and the figures on the coins that are wiped out or worn out on the other. Derrida looks at different facets of the exhaustion of the value of money as in the expression, "*usure*" in French which has two meanings. Its first sense according to Derrida is "wear and tear", erasure by rubbing, exhaustion or crumbling. (Derrida, Jacques, and Alan Bass. *Margins of Philosophy*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2009.)

Appendix 4: Derrida on the Gift

In Derrida's analysis, conditions of possibility of the gift elaborated by both Marcel Mauss in his anthropological study of pre-economic societies, "The Gift", produce, at the same time, the annulment of the gift." In his view, the gift cancels itself by being part of an economy, a cycle of return. It cancels itself because as a present it is never completely free. Derrida rigorously investigates conditions of the possibility of the "Gift", 'if such a thing exists'; he analyzes these conditions with reference to each element of the gift formula: donor, recipient and gift object.

On the part of the donor, any recognition of the gift as gift anticipates some kind of return, either symbolically as a good feeling of satisfaction -intentionally or unintentionally- or materially in the form of gratitude, pleasure or a tangible gift. Even in the situation where one's gift is rejected the very consciousness of oneself as a giver who is hurt would be a kind of reinforcement of one's identity as a subject – and this in itself is a kind of return (albeit negative) which annuls the gift. He writes: "if he recognizes it as a gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is present to him as present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift. why? Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a symbolic equivalent" (*ibid.*, 13).

From the point of view of the recipient, any awareness of the intentional meaning of a gift places that person in the cycle of exchange. When I receive something I perceive to be a gift, I have already responded with recognition. Even if my response to the giver is one of indifference, it would be in my recognizing the gift as gift that I cancel it. Thus the gift is not the gift anymore because it is a burden one feels of being indebted to the other. "It cannot be a gift as gift except by not being present as gift... There is no more gift as soon as the other receives—and even if she refuses the gift that she has perceived or recognized as gift" (*ibid.*, 14).

Considering the gift-object itself, we are faced with further difficulties. The gift-object may be a real thing or it may simply be a value, a symbol, or an intention (*ibid.*, 12-13). Again, the problem is that of recognition, which always has a reference to perceiving subjects in the present. Therefore, the problem is not whether or not the gift is

phenomenal, but the fact that as soon as it appears as a gift, its gift-aspect disappears. As Derrida notes, “its very appearance, the simple phenomenon of the gift annuls it as a gift, transforming the apparition into a phantom and the operation into a simulacrum” (*ibid.*, 14).

For Derrida, then, the problem lies in his definition of time as that which gives. The Gift which is for Derrida always a gift to come, cannot be present. Therefore, when one recognizes something as a gift or oneself as a giver or recipient one is actually making it present for oneself. Yet, when something becomes present it is no longer the gift. For Derrida, the market economy is the present version of the gift, the gift which is fixated in the here and now and has lost its effectiveness in giving signification and identity to its participants’ life. Derrida provides a linguistic, sociological and anthropological analysis to show how the ambivalent meanings of the “gift” have always made it impossible for the gift to appear ‘as such’ and whatever is called a gift has already been reduced to a kind of economy which betrays the truth of the gift. (*ibid.*, 36.)

On the other hand, as I mentioned in passing, there is a messianic dimension to Derrida’s idea of a gift to come or impossible gift (i.e. the drive within the impossible itself which drags everything towards the future). He calls it *Khora* which means: a radical otherness that “gives place” for being. *Khora* is a radical openness and otherness which gives. This event Derrida calls “Messianicity without messianism”, that is the possibility of the “Gift” as such, if such a thing exists; the possibility unactualizable and impossible; a pure gift involving the radical negation of any subjectivity; a writing without *logos* and without *theos*, a pure “*gramme*” whose transcription is inherently other than it ever pretends to be or other than that which it marks as its being. What is important in Derrida’s discussion for our analysis is primarily this: the radical annulment of the gift in the realm of possibilities in the historical world and for the historical Dasein. In other cases, also Derrida talks about for example of “Hospitality” to-come or “Justice” to-come which is the only way to keep these notions meaningful. Otherwise they would be present and remain fixed in idle, passive and infertile ideas, unable to give individualized, authentic identity to anybody. Secondly, Derrida never claims that we can go without gift,

and he insists on the circular movement and economy in it; nevertheless, he considers it necessary to acknowledge the impossibility [of the gift to turn] of turning the circular movement into a dialectical spiral.

One should not necessarily flee or condemn circularity as one would a bad repetition, a vicious circle, a regressive or sterile process. One must, in a certain way of course, inhabit the circle, turn around in it, live there a feast of thinking and the gift, the gift of thinking, would be no stranger there.

(Ibid. 9)

Derrida claims that, if the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain *aneconomic*. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep a relation of foreignness to the circle, a relation without relation, of familiar foreignness. It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible.

Appendix 5: Derrida on the beast (*Bêtise*)

Derrida writes extensively and in multiple terms about this automatic force of generation, as the madness of the Gift, excess, transgression, etc., but most importantly as *bêtise*. He associates it with the creating power of “thought beyond calculation” even beyond a Lesbian measure. “*Bêtise* is a thought. *Bêtise* is thinking. It’s a thinking and thought freedom” (Derrida, 2007. 49). He explains it aptly with reference the character of judgement described by Descartes.

For Descartes the motif of the beast and the possibility of the emergence of the beast, bestiality and also error in judgement arise in several places. But from the very beginning in Meditation one when he considers the lack of any ground and fathoms for a moment the possibility of not having the Divine ground or the common sense knowledge as ground, right away the beast finds its way to his thought.

But perhaps, even though the senses do sometimes deceive us when it is a question of very small and distant things, still there are many other matters concerning which one simply cannot doubt, even though they are derived from the very same senses: for example, that I am sitting here next to the fire, wearing my winter dressing gown, that I am holding this sheet of paper in my hands, and the like. But on what grounds could one deny that these hands and this entire body are mine? Unless perhaps I were to liken myself to the insane, whose brains are impaired by such an unrelenting vapor of black bile that they steadfastly insist that they are kings when they are utter paupers, or that they are arrayed in purple robes when they are naked, or that they have heads made of clay, or that they are gourds, or that they are made of glass. But such people are mad, and I would appear no less mad, were I to take their behavior as an example for myself. (Descartes, René, ProQuest, and Cress, Donald A. *Discourse on Method; & Meditations on First Philosophy*. Fourth ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1998. 60)

In considering insanity and nonsense, he is drawn into the world where he has no body and finally reaches a point where he meets the beast, the sovereign, and the possibility of unleashed thinking. It is at this point that he is struck by the strangest of the metaphors and thoughts, the most prominent of which is the evil genius. The evil genius of Descartes has all the motifs in one place. It is not just like a god but the most unjust, and

is not abiding by any rules even of mathematics and logic. The creative power of the beast is an undifferentiated, pure domain of force that is infinite. Later in Meditation six, when he seeks the justification for the error in judgment, the infinite force of the will acts in accordance with the infinity of the power of the beast.

Descartes establishes that the faculty of judgement like all other faculties is given by God, “like everything else which is in [man], [he] certainly received from God [this faculty]” (*ibid.*, 37). Thanks to the perfectness and goodness of God we cannot be deceived by wrong perceptions nor be endowed with poor faculties. Thus the error lies in the mismatch between the infinity of the will and the finitude of human intellect.

Judgment implies, at the same time, perception and understanding, that is, intelligence and the intervention of the will, the voluntary decision, so that, according to this Cartesian terminology, *la bêtise* would be at the crossroads of the finitude of the intellect and the infinity of the will. So, the precipitation to judge, the excess of the will over understanding, intellect, would be proper to man and would lead to *bêtises*, that is to say, stupidities, out of precipitation, the precipitation of the will, which is disproportionate to the finitude of the understanding. That’s why there is an abyssal implication, a vertiginous one, of *bêtise*, which in this case always touches, or is touched and moved by, a certain infinity of freedom in a Cartesian sense. (*Derrida*, 2007. 46)

It seems that the inability to calculate properly, or conversely to calculate too much and not to conceded to the finitude of the intellect will cause stupidities, mistakes. But then such a naiveté is aligned with a thinking that has the most creative power. It should be noted that this thinking is not simply associated with animals. As Derrida insists, “*bêtise* [is] proper to man.” A lion or wolf cannot be *bêtises*. There should be an intention to understanding involved for a making to happen.

Derrida emphasizes time and again that *bêtise*

is not a nonrelationship to judgment the way we could say a stone doesn’t judge. But it is a blunted, dulled faculty, a nonfaculty, but “non” by some fault, by some secret perversion of a faculty that is not very well oriented, that is debilitated or diverted in judgement. (*ibid.*)

That is also where he points to the category of judgement involved in *bêtise*:

if this category doesn't belong to the regime of the normal series of categories, if it is an exceptional category, a transcategorial category, then it corresponds to the first literal definition of the transcendental in the Middle Ages. Long before Kant, "transcendental" meant *quid transcendit omni genus*. It's a category that transcends all the categories and doesn't belong to the series or table of categories (*ibid.*, 48-49)

That is to say that, it is not simply an epistemological or conceptual mistake but an alignment with the pure movement of thought. This is still very much like the unformed, inorganic matter in Aristotle.