The Response of Hope to the Crisis of Identity: The Theological Anthropologies of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch

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April 25th, 2018

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Thesis

We take for granted the sequentiality of days and seasons: Spring follows Winter, Summer follows Spring, and Autumn follows Summer. Likewise, we expect the sun to rise every morning and to set at night to make room for darkness. We believe in the axioms of geometry and logic on which mathematics and physics depend; and scientific observation and experimentation seems to prove that they work. As children learn to walk, they explore their "unbelief" (insecurities and fears) until at last they believe in themselves enough to put one foot in front of the other -- a process that will become so automatic as to be unconscious. Similarly, when adults drive a car, they believe in the continuity of the road. It seems that the human person needs to believe in the regularity of nature and in the regularity (read: stability) of relationships. Otherwise, he/she will be neurotic. That is what Freud and Erikson highlight from infancy: infants have to learn to believe/trust in relationships through being loved and protected by their parents, relatives, or community; attachment forms their first identity. In fact, the absence of such attachment will problematize their integration in society. Is this capacity of trusting and expecting something merely circumstantial? There should be an inner disposition toward trusting-in/hoping-from the living world. Otherwise a failed personhood results, whether neurotic or apathetic or isolated from communitarian joy.

But how does hope contribute to our identity? Is hope an abstract knowledge? Is it only for a time of despair? Only for Christians? We propose that hope plays a critical role, not only in enduring hard circumstances, but also in growing to full maturity as a person. That is our thesis: the virtue of hope and its activation contribute to the rehabilitation of a

person, both subjectively and communally, in overcoming the crisis of identity, resulting in healing, purpose, and gratitude.

In effect, we want to explore what some authors, such as Charles Taylor, Michael Paul Gallagher, Zigmunt Bauman, or Gille Lipovetsky, call soft/weak identity or the false confident subject.[1] However, we do not want only to articulate how things stand at the moment, particularly in the West, but also to propose a way of rethinking human identity in the context of hope. That is why we intend to study the theological anthropology of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch, both of which are grounded in the virtue of hope.

1.2. Prior Considerations

Our research is focused on the "Western world." Charles Taylor understood the term "West" in his acclaimed book, *A Secular Age*, as follows: "Almost everyone would agree that in some sense we do: I mean the 'we' who live in the West, or perhaps Northwest, or otherwise put the North Atlantic world."[2]

"Identity" is a complex term which has long been a subject of study. It is a notion related to the individual's formation and his behavior. In this work, the term will be regarded as the notion of humanism, particularly Christian humanism.

The term "identity crisis" is a technical one in Developmental Psychology that was coined by Erik H. Erikson. Erikson's study on completing the cycle of life suggests that the development of the human being goes through gradual stages.[3] In each stage, the person must

[1] Cf. Michael P. Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols: An Introduction to Faith and Culture*, New and rev. ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2003), 147. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 38. Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 127-47, 130.
[2] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), EBSCOhost, 1.
[3] Erik. H. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998).

resolve tension to move forward. Identity crises refer to the struggles between identity and confused identity. Erikson will also use the term "completed," but does not mean by this either a perfect cycle or a finished human being. He is aware that the human being is always developing and can never complete the vital cycle before he ends.[4]

But is there in fact hopelessness today? We must confirm that there is; otherwise there is no warrant for this study. We can look, first of all, at sociological data including drug addiction, alcoholism, the increasing instances of depression, the number of suicides, the rate of divorces, decreasing birthrates in developed countries, consumerism, and the focus on individualism. Some authors suggest, as does William F. Lynch, that some behaviors or cultural patterns -- if they belong to the sociological imagination[5] -- can be fairly enough considered symptoms of hopelessness.

On October 27th, 2017 the White House made public the battle against the now-blazing opiate crisis affecting the U.S.A.[6] In 2016 around 64,000 people died because of an opiate overdose, an increase of 4% from 2010.[7] Similarly in Spain, the government has grown

[4] Erikson uses this term, "completed," but it does not mean either a perfect cycle or a finished being. He is aware that a human being is always on a journey and can never complete the vital cycle before it ends. Cf. Erik. H. Erikson, *El Ciclo de la Vida Completado* (México: Paidós, 1988), 12.

[5] C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, A Galaxy Book ; GB 204 (London--New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). This book, launched in 1959, was a turning point in Sociology. Sociological imagination is a new perspective and method, which takes into account all at once the three dimensions of a life: biography, society, and history. Sociological imagination represents the self-conscious view of a contemporary person, within its sociological and historical context. "It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self -- and to see the relations between the two." Ibid. 6. To give an example: the rate of divorce is no longer considered a personal crisis but, rather, a structural, cultural pattern, because divorce belongs to the sociological imagination. Cf. Ibid. 9.

[6] The White House, "President Donald J. Trump Is Taking Action on Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis" (Washington, D.C., 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-action-drug-addiction-opioid-crisis/. (Consulted, Mach 2018.)

[7] Josh Katz, "Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever," *The New York Times*, January 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid-epidemic-drug-overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html. (Consulted, March 2018.)

alarmed at this silent increase among its people.[8] Moreover, the state of Massachusetts recently legalized the use of marijuana for medical reasons, principally as an antidote to anxiety.[9] This raises the questions: is there indeed a social problem with anxiety? A recent study in the U.S. links depression and anxiety with risky behaviors including excessive alcohol use and drugs, as well as obesity and stress. The data reveal that 8.7% of the population suffer from depression in the U.S.[10] When this is broken down according to key indicators, such as profession, the percentage of people suffering from anxiety is even higher in some categories.

Another mental health concern is suicide. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), suicide is a global phenomenon which constitutes the seventeenth highest cause of mortality. "Suicide occurs throughout the lifespan and is the second leading cause of death among 15-29 year olds globally." The report continues, "there are indications that for each adult who died of suicide there may have been more than twenty others attempting suicide."[11] The European continent had the worst average in 2015.[12] It is remarkable that there were 22.3 suicides per 100,000 population in Poland; 15.4 and 15.2 per 100,000 population in Sweden and Switzerland respectively; and 13.1 in Germany. In North

[8] Barbara Ayuso, "El Nuevo Perfil Del Adicto a La Heroína," *El País*, August 2016, https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/08/14/actualidad/1471195572_998082.html. (Consulted, March 2018.)

[9] Joshua Miller, "It's Official: Marijuana Is Legal in Massachusetts," *The Boston Globe*, December 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/14/official-marijuana-legal-midnight-massachusetts/10Rl2inZQMjSPrNAMSBkCJ/story.html. (Consulted, March 2018.)

[10] Tara W. Strine and et al., "Depression and Anxiety in the United States: Findings from the 2006 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System," *Psychiatric Services* 59 (December 2008): 1383–90. See also, Alexander S. Young and et al., "Persistent Depression and Anxiety in the United States: Prevalence and Quality of Care," *Psychiatric Services* 59 (December 2008): 1391–98. In the conclusions the author states: "Persistent depressive and anxiety disorders are remarkably common in the U.S. population and are associated with substantial morbidity."

[11] Cf. http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/suicideprevent/en/ (Consulted, March 2018.)

[12] The next data refer to WHO statistics. http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.sdg.3-4-viz-2?lang=en. (Consulted, March 2018.)

America the data are similar: 14.3 suicides per 100,000 population in the U.S. and 12.3 per 100,000 population in Canada. What prompts someone to commit suicide? There are many factors involved, which are related to the story of the person and its context. We now know that not every person who commits suicide is mentally ill. Suicidal thoughts are extreme internal struggles which concern dissatisfaction with the way we are living. The person longs for expansion and liberation. However, these ideas may not accurately represent our reality or maybe only part of the reality. We should deal, therefore, with the process of falling into despair.

In Spain, young people cannot buy alcohol until eighteen years of age. However, the typical way of going out on the weekend involves alcohol. Teenagers start hard drinking at 13 years. The typical wine culture has gradually been replaced with consumption habits aimed at achieving disinhibition and euphoria more quickly.[13] It is true that behavior changes after the teenage years, but those who used to drink heavily have a higher probability of becoming alcoholic. A report by at the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services states that 23% of adults and teenagers reported heavy episodic drinking in the past month.[14] The second chapter of that report referred to the neurobiological effects provoked by misuse and addiction. We should wonder, therefore, whether Western culture is nourishing healthy people. What kind of image of human development does the West promote?

[13] Cf. Javier Elzo, Joan Pallarés, and María T. Laespada, "Más Allá del Botellón: Análisis Socioantropológico del Consumo de Alcohol en los Adolescentes y Jóvenes" (Agencia Antridroga, 2003).
[14] See Figure 1.2: Trends in Binge Drinking and Past 30-Day Use of Illicit Drugs among Persons Aged 12 Years or Older, 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, "Facing Addiction in America. The Surgeon General's Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and Health," 2016, https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generals-report.pdf. (Consulted, March 2018.)

In the U.S., the average divorce rate of opposite sex couples is 41% for first marriages; 60% second marriages; and 73% third marriages.[15] In the E.U., the data show that the number of marriages has decreased, while the number of divorces has increased: in 2013 there were 4.1 marriages for every 1,000 persons and 1.9 divorces.[16] For instance, in Spain there has been a surprising decrease in married life: from 7.8 marriages per 1,000 persons in 1960, the rate dropped to 3.6 marriages per 1,000 by 2015. We know divorce is a sad and complex phenomenon, which involves economic autonomy, social expectations, levels of education, physical and psychological violence, and social context in general, but it is worth reflecting on why a man and a woman can no longer live together. This puzzle points to the communitarian dimension of human identity.

The birth rate in Spain was 1.33 per woman in 2015, but 18.67% of births were to non-Spanish women. In the U.S. the birth rate was 12.4 per 1,000 population in 2016, a slight decrease from 14 per 1,000 in 2005.[17] Some would attribute these declines to the costs, in terms of both time and finances to raise children, but we might wonder whether it is not also due to a reluctance to bring children into this tough world.

An anthropological point of view, may be able to shed light on the phenomenon of consumerism in at least two respects. (1) Consumerism in a globalized and market-oriented world valorizes the experience of freedom and the desire for liberation. We experience something similar to freedom when quasi-infinite options are set before us, such the choice

[15] Cf. McKinley Yrvin, "32 Shocking Divorce Statistics," https://www.mckinleyirvin.com/Family-Law-Blog/2012/October/32-Shocking-Divorce-Statistics.aspx. (Consulted, January 2018.)
[16] Cf. Euroestat, "Marriage and Divorce Statistics," June 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics. (Consulted, March 2018).
[17] Cf. "Number of Births in the United States from 2000 to 2016," *The Statistics Portal* (blog), May 2018, https://www.statista.com/statistics/195908/number-of-births-in-the-united-states-since-1990/. (Consulted, March 2018).

of beverages (light, zero, orange, lemon, tea), the diversity of clothing (color, branch, size), news (The Boston Globe, Die Welt, the ABC, Science), or travel destinations (Rome, Tokyo, Nairobi, New York City), etc. This experience conveys a profound sense of power -- the power of free will. (2) Consumerism suggests that, more or less consciously, the human being needs "to do" in order to satisfy a longing of being or identity. Action, what philosophy discusses as the moment of praxis, plays a crucial role in the construction of our truth and, thus, in our identity.[18] Consumerism turns out to be an incomplete mechanism that manages to satisfy and entertain certain human needs, but fails to build an ideal person. In this sense, we must study what our investigation can tell us about hope and about the value or nature of our actions.

Beyond that, hope is a theological virtue along with faith and charity.[19] These three virtues are, indeed, interrelated in the Christian experience, however, we need to speak separately about them to clarify and nourish the human experience.[20] Moreover, as they are distinguished from one another, we can say that faith is primarily related to knowledge, charity to the will (actions), and hope to the holistic and dynamic power of imagination.

Finally, some people understand hope to be an extraordinary thing, applicable in case of emergency or despair, when there is no "human" solution. Therefore, paradoxically hope

[18] In our work, praxis constitutes a critical moment of human identity. Metz and Lynch propose that the subject is built, not merely found as a result of searching for meaning. Thus, to find an epistemological foundation of the praxis see Clodovis Boff, *Theory and Praxis. Epistemological Foundations* (New York, NY: Orbis, 1987), 159-220.

[19] To find a systematic explanation on hope see Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope. On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology* (New York--Evanston, NY: Harper & Row, 1967). Pages 15-36 provide us with a good framework for our work. It is particularly interesting that Moltmann's explanation of despair and presumption as a sin, follow mainly Joseph Pieper. Cf. Ibid., 22-6.

[20] Dominic Doyle, "'A Future, Difficult, Yet Possible Good': Defining Christian Hope," *Hope: Promise, Possibility, and Fulfillment* edited by Richard Lennan and Nancy Pineda-Madrid, (Mahwah NJ, Paulist Press, 2015), 16-27, 19.

means despair. Saint Paul says: “Hope that is seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he already sees?” (Rom 8:24). This transcendental hope dimension is, indeed, essential. However, it does not mean that an easy future solution is at hand or has already been achieved. The transcendental feature of hope is only part of its truth because, if this part is absolutized, it will underlay a denial of reality (time, context, and liability). On the contrary, an ordinary life-giving understanding of hope can nourish regular life: “[Hope as an] imagination that ... imagines the real.” “Hope is indeed an arduous search for a future good of some kind that is realistically possible but not yet visible” (Rom 8:24). In sum, hope implies a transcendental and a committed incarnational dimension that embraces reality.

1.3. Methodology

Our method will be as follows: In Chapter Two we study the notion of identity. If our thesis refers to identity and its crisis, we will have to define two things: the ideal mature identity (section 2.1.), and the current state of identity in the Western world (section 2.2.). However, it is convenient to clarify the term “*ideal* mature identity.” On the one hand, identity is a process that lasts a lifetime, because our longing to be continues throughout life. But we can say that the human being reaches a moment in which his identity is somehow defined; in fact, biology confirms that our physiology, especially the brain, is more flexible and moldable at early ages. At some point people (must) define their selves sufficiently well to live in peace and “maturity” refers to that moment. On the other hand, we do not want to set up a theoretical *ideal* that is impossible to achieve or to live, because it generates anguish. That is, we do not want to develop something abstract that sets us apart from reality. On the contrary, we believe in the saying of Irenaeus of Lyon: “the glory of God is a living human

person."[21] That is why we want to ground our study in psychology and biology so that our findings can help the person to live with hope in this world. Therefore, we will try to establish a notion of identity by comparing different perspectives: psychoanalysis (Sigmund Freud, Erikson Erikson), cognitive psychology (Lawrence Kohlberg), and philosophy (Mary Warnock). It should be noted that the psychologists Erikson and Kohlberg deploy their theory in longitudinal studies, hence they have the credibility to speak with authority about human development. Mary Warnock provides us with a reflection on identity that philosophy has made over many centuries and incorporates contemporary knowledge of biology into the study of memory and the function of the imagination in the constitution of identity.

Once we have defined the ideal mature identity, we will analyze the state of the identity of the Western subject, which some authors say remains in the identity-crisis stage. We argue that this crisis has to do with the weakness of their hope. We will firstly study what sociology says, mainly through the Polish-American Zigmunt Bauman but also with references to the French Gille Lipovetsky. Also, we discuss the study of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. Secondarily, we will analyze the place and cause of the Western subject's crisis. Michael P. Gallagher and Nicholas Boyle place it, not merely at the sociological level, but anthropological and cultural as well. To put it another way, they argue that it is not enough to better organize our societies or to make more laws; we need to rehabilitate a fallen anthropology and that involves the images, symbols, and narratives of our culture. In this section, it is necessary to discuss the contribution of the economy in the

[21] Irenaeus, *Contra haereses* 4.20.7 (*Patrologia graeca* 7:1037) quoted by Dominic Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism: Thomas Aquinas on Hope* (New York: Crossroad Pub, 2011), 5. Doyle reminds us of the second part of Irenaeus's statement: "the life of the human person, however, is the vision of God." To explain this statement, intimately related with hope, is one of the goals of his book. See also Irenaeus, *Contra haereses* 3.20.2 and 5.3.

configuration of the contemporary subject, given the omnipresent role of economics in this globalized world. Nicholas Boyle provides the essential contributions for this discussion.

Next, in the third chapter, we will study the theological anthropologies of the German Johann B. Metz (section 3.1.) and the North American William F. Lynch (section 3.2.). (Since we talked about the West we wanted to bring along the two centers of the West, the European, embodied in the work of Metz, and the North American, represented by Lynch; also previously Bauman and Taylor, Erikson and Kohlberg.) Metz and Lynch find in hope a fundamental element of the human subject. Metz and Lynch claim that the individual is a vulnerable subject threatened with escaping from reality, alienated by ideologies (echoing Metz) or by fantasies (echoing Lynch) that come to justify him, to save him, or to free him. Metz and Lynch argue that the humanness of the subject is built, not given, despite the fact that humanness comes from outside. That is why their theologies are a reflection on the person and God with a strong practical and political dimension. Both theologians intend to offer ways to liberate the human being from ideologies and fantasies, and thus rehabilitate it and reintroduce it to "the valley of the human," echoing Lynch.

Nevertheless, Metz and Lynch approach from theologically different points of view. Metz develops a fundamental theology that is politically oriented while Lynch depicts, with regard to his theological anthropology, a phenomenology of hope. This divergence will allow us to put them in conversation and in some moments view one author through the eyes of the other. We will undertake that conversation in the fourth chapter with the intention of presenting our conclusions. Likewise, we will reinforce these conclusions with the contributions of the results of Chapter Two.

Chapter 2: *Status Quaestionis*: On Identity, Modernity, and Postmodernity

Modernity in the Western world has given way to Postmodernity, characterized by uncertainty and skepticism. Modernity, apart from the positive aspects that it introduced (autonomy, independence of science, the industrial revolution, secularization, modern nation-state, human rights), brought about a displacement of human individuality, which led the individual into a sort of "isolation, fragmentation, and narcissism, where life is an indifferent game and individual options are merely aesthetic and provisional."[22]

Postmodernity arises as a reaction and -- still focused on the subject -- asks for liberation and turns into a humbler understanding of the human being. This crisis of humanism and identity cannot be explained only in sociological terms, but has a deeper anthropological root at the level of imagination, according to Michael P. Gallagher the level of disposition, sensibility and horizon, domains in which are elucidated the possibility of faith, hope, and gratitude.

As we discuss identity, in order to study the roots which currently reduce or weaken people's lives, we should make clear what we assume by identity in a mature person -- with all difficulties involved in this relative term of maturity. Thus, first, we will discuss the notion of a mature identity and then we will present its current situation in the West.

2.1. What We Assume by Identity

From the philosophical point of view, modernity brings what is called the subjectivist shift or the anthropological shift. This supposes that, in general, we turn our gaze toward the

[22] Michael P. Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols: An Introduction to Faith and Culture*, New and rev. ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2003), 116.

subject and, thus, we move from the theocentrism of the Middle Ages to the anthropocentrism of Modernity.[23]

Along the same line, the studies of the English naturalist Charles Darwin (1809 – 1892) and his theory of Darwinism, internationally known after the publication of *The Origin of Species* (1859), reinforced this anthropocentrism.[24] Also, the application of the modern scientific method to study how the mind works and how human behavior is developed, corresponded with the emergence of a new independent science, psychology. Therefore, it is not by chance that the studies of the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939) which gave birth to Psychoanalysis, happened alongside the revolutionary theory of Darwin. Darwinian naturalism is comparable to the determinism of psychoanalysis because of the deterministic language they use.[25]

We should start this discussion with psychoanalysis for three reasons. Firstly, psychoanalysis has been widely influential in many fields: pedagogy, social sciences, art, and religion. At present, it is not in force, but the presence of its results is unquestionable.[26] Secondly, both interlocutors in this work deal with this psychological perspective, Metz by analyzing its effects on religious experience and Lynch by thinking from this perspective.

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[23] Cf. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 143-207, particularly Charles Taylor, "Descartes's Disengaged Reason," in *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 143–58. See also, Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), and Giovanni Reale and Dario Antiseri, *Historia del Pensamiento Filosófico y Científico*, vol. II (Barcelona: Herder, 2010).

[24] In the first part of the book Elizabeth A. Johnson, *Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love* (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2014) can be found a contemporary study of Darwin's major book, *The Origin of Species* and Neodarwinism theories. Johnson's theological interpretation, depicted in the second part, is based on a theological interpretation of Darwin's results and proposes a change of mentality almost as great as that which prevented the naturalists of Darwin's time from realizing that species mutated. The human being is primarily a co-creature, one who enters creation and depends on it not only functionally to survive but also for a community to be part of a "we." Thus, the misunderstood paradigm of domination should be changed to consider our "ecological vocation," which refers to be conscious and moral "struggle for existence."

[25] Cf. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 15-24.

[26] Cf. Carlos Domínguez, *Creer después de Freud* (Madrid: Ed. Paulinas, 1992), 9-27.

Finally, my notion of a mature identity is highly influenced by Erik H. Erikson, who develops a wider psychosocial approach to the psychoanalysis.

Thus, we are going to discuss select theories of identity, starting with psychoanalysis, then progressing through other post-psychoanalytic versions, and finally discussing a philosophical point of view, in order to integrate the very human existential experience of time within the self.

2.1.1. Psychoanalysis Perspective

This psychological perspective argues that who I am now is intimately related to human childhood and to our relations with our parents. Freud suggested the existence of a powerful sexual energy (*libido*) through which to interpret human motivations and thus, as we will see, identity. Libido forces can be either forces of pleasure and love, so called *Eros*, or forces of aggression and hate, so called *Thanatos*.[27]

According to psychoanalysis, this sexual energy had been "denied by human consciousness, repressed by the dominant morality, and ignored by science"[28] before Freud. Prior to Freud, sexuality appeared at puberty without previous childhood stages. Whereas Freud argues that there is a continuity with previous childhood stages which explains human behavior and neurosis.[29] Freud establishes two main stages from which to comprehend the

[27] Here we follow Carlos Domínguez, *Los Registros del Deseo. Del Afecto, el Amor y Otras Pasiones* (Bilbao: DDB, 2001) and also Domínguez, *Creer después de Freud*. The latter work is divided into four parts: The first corresponds to a seventy-pages summary of his previous work, *El Psicoanálisis Freudiano de la Religión* (Madrid, 1991). This book discusses the possibility of faith in dialogue with psychoanalysis. In the second part, Prof. Domínguez offers a response from the perspective of religion. In the third, the author discusses particular issues of a religious being, sex, power, and money. Finally, he discusses ecclesiastical relationships.

[28] Erik. H. Erikson, "Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations," in *The Life Cycle Completed* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1968), 26.

[29] Neurosis and dream are the hermeneutical models of Freudian theory and regarding neurosis and religion, Freud considered two aspects: on the one hand, he argues that religion is an individual and collective neurosis, a response of the risk involved in facing the experience of freedom. On the other hand, religion is a neurosis which helps in the growth of the person as well as represents one of the ways that culture has to protect against obsessive neuroses. Freud's confidence in reason affirms that those who reach maturity will abandon religion,

process of human identity: pregenital and genital.[30] In fact, during infancy, the child, overcoming the phases of the pregenital stage (anal, oral, and phallic), attains critical learning about how to organize its world of impulses-wishes (Ger. *Wunsch*, according to Freud), emotions and desires in relation with the *outerworld* (people, food, things, culture).[31]

While in the womb a child is not separated from its mother; only after being birth does the experience of lacking something begin. Then follows the individuation process,[32] which helps the child to understand what "I" and "You" mean. This emotional-sexual game of lacking (erotic experience, according to Freud) is again the manifestation of the libido.[33] Yet Freud argues that impulses, cognition, and behavior cannot be fully understood because they are ambivalently determined by irrational drives, which are rooted in the unconscious. Both conscious and unconscious constitute our psychological identity depicted through the terms *Id*, *Ego*, and *Superego* and performance in personal behavior.[34]

As people grow up through the game with the outerworld, they establish a compromise among these three elements -- Id, Ego, and Superego -- which are called to be harmonized within us, but struggle. Thus, depending on how this compromise has been

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although "not everyone ... is equally capable, in his [Freud's] eyes, to be an unbeliever and atheist." Carlos Domínguez, "Religión y Neurosis," in *Creer después de Freud* (Madrid: Ed. Paulinas, 1992), 30–50, 40. (Translation is ours.)

[30] Human sexuality reaches the primacy of genitality in adolescence, this is why he refers to erotic experiences in childhood as pregenital. Cf. Erikson, "Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations," 29.

[31] Nuances among these three terms, impulses, desires, and emotions are still controversial. Dominguez thinks that impulses may be understood as the broader category of embracing emotions and desires. Nowadays, psychoanalysis speaks about desires rather than *Wunsch*. Cf. Carlos Domínguez, "Ese Obscuro Objeto del Deseo," in *Los Registros del Deseo. Del Afecto, el Amor y Otras Pasiones* (Bilbao: DDB, 2001), 31–58, 31-2. Cf. Carlos Domínguez, "El Largo Camino del Deseo," in *Los Registros del Deseo. Del Afecto, el Amor y Otras Pasiones* (Bilbao: DDB, 2001), 67–88.

[32] The term individuation process was coined by the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Gustave Jung (1875 – 1961) to refer to the struggle for clarifying our interiority.

[33] Domínguez, "Ese Obscuro Objeto del Deseo," 32-35.

[34] Ego is "a concept denoting man's capacity to unify his experience and his action in an adaptive manner." Erik. H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), 15. The *Id* is the unconscious and the *Superego* is our expected ideal of ourselves.

reached, we can assess the maturity of the person. Following Domínguez in his Freudian studies, we can say that mature identity has been reached when the Ego has achieved a healthy balance in tension with the Id and the Superego in its relation to the external world.

However, it should be noted that this relation is not just any balance, but a healthy one.[35] The healthy relation of the Ego and the Superego supposes the handling of the drive dimension's impulses by rational control and adaptation to reality, rather than by unconscious defense mechanisms upon the Ego, the Id; repression, above all. This apparently theoretical result corresponds to the observation of the behavioral patterns of the individual, especially in relation to the two main behavioral spheres of human life: personal relationships and work. Therefore, a mature identity converges both the ability to establish stable and trusting relationships, as well as the capacity to work in a reliable and committed manner.

2.1.2. Psychosocial Perspective: Erik H. Erikson[36]

Until the 1940's, Psychoanalysis seemed not to be refuted by different psychological perspectives, however, since then Erikson has complemented the predominant psychosexual explanation with psychosocial development.[37] He says "Freud could take certain fundamental principles for granted; and with morality, cultural identity."[38]

Erikson assumes the main results of psychoanalysis: every human being is equal because they have the same internal conflicts; libido is the driving energy that explains continuity and configures the human structures in the psychological development of human

[35] Carlos Domínguez, "Místicos y Profetas: Dos Identidades Religiosas," *Proyección* 48 (2001): 339–66. Here Prof. Domínguez discusses these two dimensions with the two religious modes of life, mystical and prophetical.
[36] Erik H. Erikson (1902 – 1994) is a German American psychologist who studied human psychosocial development. Here we follow Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*. This book is a further synthesis of what had mainly been published in *Childhood*.
[37] Cf. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 15.
[38] Erikson, *Childhood*, 281.

identity; and he also admits the ambivalence of the conscious and unconscious world to explain human behavior. However, Erikson observed that psychoanalysis is oriented toward "an ego-synthesis only for the individual."[39] Psychoanalysis' main object of study is the internal battle, while the external reality -- whether social or material, is treated as an alien element ("outerworld") with which to struggle for adaptation.[40] Nor does he agree with the understanding of the human being as the one who adapts through gratification to compensate for anxieties and for transforming their drives.[41] By comparison, Erikson devotes a "systematic attention to the role of the self in the relationship between *individuality* and *communality*."[42] For him, pregenitality is not only a function of genitality -- as Freud thought -- but has a psychosocial dimension "in the ecology -- both healthy and sick -- of the individual life cycle -- and in the cycle of generations."[43]

There are three fundamental principles to understand Erikson's theory: The first is found in his studies on the breeding of the Indian Sioux and of the Yurok. The former tribe used to hunt across the prairie but now apathy evidence of social failure can be observed among the children in the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in Nebraska (South Dakota).[44] The latter is a tribe of fisherman based along the Klamath River which flows the Pacific coast of

[39] Erik. H. Erikson, *El Ciclo de la Vida Completado* (México: Paidós, 1988), 27. "It is shifting its emphasis from the concentrated study of the conditions which blunt and distort the individual ego to the study of the ego's roots in social organization." Erikson, *Childhood*, 15-6.
[40] "Thus, our proud ego, which Freud calls 'frontier creature,' 'owes service to three masters and is consequently maned by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego." Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id," in *Standard Edition* (London--New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), 12–66, 19, quoted by Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 18-9. Cf. Erikson, *Childhood*, 277-84.
[41] In particular, Erikson refers to the theory of Anna Freud and cites one of her major works, Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defense* (New York: International Universities Press, 1966). "The ego is victorious when its defensive measures enable it to develop the development of anxiety and so transform the instinct that, even in difficult circumstances, some measures or gratification is secure, thereby establishing the most harmonious relation between the id, the super-ego and the forces of the outside world." Idid., quoted by Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 18, (Erikson does not refer to the page.)
[42] Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 16.
[43] Erikson, *El Ciclo de la Vida*, 27.
[44] Cf. Erikson, *Childhood*, 114-65.

California.[45] By reflecting on an apathetic disposition observed in both tribes, Erikson observed that the environment of their children, especially the way in which maternal care was exercised in the early years, was what oriented their identity to be able to adapt to the habitat, the Sioux as hunters and the Yurok as fishermen. Likewise, the balance of the community, which is inevitably "subjected to changing *technological* and *historical* conditions,"[46] is critically dependent upon children's adaptation. This is the reason why Erikson affirms that there are three fundamental organizational processes: the *soma*, the *psyche*, and the *ethos*.[47] These contribute at all times to the unique psychosocial development of the individual. The *soma* is what experiences the libidinal forces and it needs to reach an internal hierarchical order; the *psyche* is the cognitive center subjected of the conscious and the unconscious and it needs to organize the experiences to find an "*existential identity*";[48] and the *ethos* refers to what is inscribed within the rhythms and sociocultural forms that make the human experience possible. Each of these organisms must evolve in a proper relation to reach an identity, however, when they are subjected to failure they suffer accordingly "somatic tension, individual anxiety, or social panic."[49]

The second fundamental principle corresponds with Erikson's hermeneutic. He named it the epigenetic principle; a name that was taken from embryology. This hermeneutical principle must be latent at any time when we are approaching his theory. As Erikson does, we will explain the epigenetic principle with the next table (Table 1)[50]:

[45] Cf. Ibid., 166-94.
[46] Erikson, *El Ciclo de la Vida*, 27.
[47] Cf. Ibid., 29-30.
[48] Erik H. Erikson, "Major Stages of Psychosocial Development," in *The Life Cycle Completed* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1998), 55–82, 73.
[49] Erikson, "Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations," 28-9.
[50] Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 28.

Stage III	1_{III}	2_{III}	**3_{III}**
Stage II	1_{II}	**2_{II}**	3_{II}
Stage I	**1_{I}**	2_{I}	3_{I}
	Part 1	Part 2	Part 3

Table 1: Epigenetic principle

Stages I, II, and III correspond to the gradual and sequential ascension through which the process must be evolving to accomplish a cycle of life, for instance. However, Stage II is not reached in a neat way, by isolating itself from Stage I and without aspiring to Stage III, but rather it is reached gradually in time, in parts (Part 1, 2, and 3), and without ceasing to be related to the other states, earlier or later. According to Erikson, this relationship between states and parties is known as "relativity.". The diagonal in bold (**1_{I}**, **2_{II}** y **3_{III}**) indicates the stable or culminated states of the expected cycle. This cycle (**1_{I}**, **2_{II}** y **3_{III}**) is gradually achieved over time, when the necessary and critical relativities of the whole set necessary to advance to the next state is reached. According to this, 2_{I} -- which is below the diagonal -- represents that effort: with the predominance of **2_{II}** upwards and with the 3_{I} horizontally, the critical level necessary for achieving the stable state **2_{II}** is not ready yet.

Third, a community (it depends on the stage: family, school, society -- see below) contains the minimum ethos which nourishes the ego. This means that there are innate patterns inscribed within that community, which are acting more or less unconsciously on the individual. Erikson calls these patterns or mechanisms of ritualization. For Erikson, in

the uses of language are found the highest level of ritualization.[51] And this is why he reflects on those uses, for instance between trust and fidelity.[52]

Beyond this, Erikson's psychosocial theory states that the cycle of life is completed in eight stages: infancy, early childhood, play age, school age, adolescence, young adulthood, adulthood, old age.[53] Each stage corresponds with a struggle between two opposite forces in order to reach a capacity. For instance, in infancy, the capacity that emerges from the resolution of the conflict between basic trust and basic mistrust is hope. This conflict is what Erikson designates by psychological crisis. The next table (Table 2)[54] shows us the epigenetic representation of these eight crises. Capital letters mean the strength resulting from the correspondent conflict:

Old Age (VIII)								Integrity vs. Disgust WISDOM
Adulthood (VII)							Generativity vs. Stagnation CARE	
Young Adulthood (VI)						Intimacy vs. Isolation LOVE		
Adolescence (V)					Identity vs. Identity Confusion FIDELITY			

[51] "If we accept the proposition that ritualization is one link between developing egos and the ethos of their communality, living languages must be considered one of the most outstanding forms of ritualization in that they express both what is universally human and what is culturally specific in the values conveyed by ritualized interplay." Erikson, "Major Stages," 58.
[52] Cf. Ibid., 60. He even says: "Thus, trust and fidelity are linguistically as well as epigenetically related."
[53] Cf. Erikson. The author explains the eight stages of life in pursuing the capacities correspond to the accurate one. Cf. Erikson, *Childhood*, 247-74. The great novelty between these two books is that in the former Erikson's explanation begins from old age, whereas in the latter it begins from infancy. As he says: "La adultez es, después de todo, el vínculo con las nuevas generaciones." "Comienzo mi tratamiento por el ultimo, la vejez, para averiguar en qué medida el ciclo vital completado puede dar sentido a toda la trayectoria de la vida." Erikson, *El Ciclo de la Vida*, 11.
[54] Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 57-8.

School Age (IV)				Industry vs. Inferiority COMPETENCE				
Play Age (III)			Initiative vs. Guilt PURPOSE					
Early Childhood (II)		Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt WILL						
Infancy (I)	Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust HOPE							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Table 2: Epigenetic Representation of Psychological Crises

According to the epigenetic hermeneutic, when a capacity is reached it becomes, in turn, a condition to sustain the next one. Also the capacity is widened and perfected in *hoping* for the next. Thus, as the first capacity is hope, for Erikson, every next capacity will be rooted in hope.[55] Hope means "expected desire"[56] and "seems to be related even to 'hop' which means leap."[57] He devotes some beautiful lines to explain the presence of hope in every stage, from the seeking of integrity in the last stage passing through expectation of intimacy in young adulthood, and so on.[58] For instance, the basic community in infancy is the maternal figure through which attachment is nurtured. Attachment, in turn, constitutes the basis for good self-esteem, the future capability of industry, and intimacy. In adolescence the capacity is fidelity:

> [Fidelity] maintains a strong relation both to infantile trust and to mature faith. As it transfers the need for guidance from parental figures to mentors and leaders, fidelity eagerly accepts

[55] To say it the other way around, "infant's hope already has some ingredient that will gradually grow to become faith [under the form of will, purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care, and wisdom]." Erikson, "Major Stages," 78.
[56] Ibid., 59
[57] Ibid., 60.
[58] Ibid. Cf. Erikson, *Childhood*, 247-74.

> their ideological mediatorship -- whether the ideology is one implicit in a "way of life" or a militantly explicit one.[59]

Erikson says: "hope connotes the most basic quality of 'I'-ness, without which life could not begin or meaningfully end."[60] However, in order to fully grasp the understanding of this assertion, we need to bring into the scene the three organisms which entail the shaping of the ego: the soma, the psyche, and the ethos. These three organizational processes work on the already mentioned system. In Table 3[61] (page #24) we can see the connections: row A with the soma; rows C, F, G and H with the ethos; and rows D and E with the psyche. Each process is subject to being distorted toward a failure or a pathology. To give an example, Erikson defines adolescence as "the age mediating between childhood and adulthood"[62] when *crisis of identity* takes place. In adolescence, fidelity emerges as a result of the conflict between identity and identity confusion.

> ['The core concept of individual psychology' is the self' that is] a pervasive sense of identity [which] brings into gradual accord the variety of changing self-images that have been experienced during childhood (and that, during adolescence, can be dramatically recapitulated) and the role opportunities offering themselves to young persons for selection and commitment. On the other hand, a lasting sense of self cannot exist without a continuous experience of a conscious 'I' which is the numinous center of existence: a kind of *existential identity*, then, which […] in the 'last line' must gradually transcend the psychosocial one.[63]

The process of the self does not always happen in ascending fashion; there may be some semi-intentional regressions in order to regain some essential hope from previous stages.[64] Also, the antithesis of fidelity, *role repudiation*, is a possibility: "an active and selective drive separating roles and values that seem workable in identity formation from

[59] Erikson, "Major Stages," 73.
[60] Ibid., 62.
[61] Erikson, "Psychosexuality and the Cycle of Generations," 32-3.
[62] Erikson, "Major Stages," 60.
[63] Ibid., 73. (Italics in the original.)
[64] Ibid., 60.

what must be resisted of fought as alien to the self."[65] In this line, a partially negative identity is always present but this may become pathologic under "the form of systematic *defiance*."[66]

> In summary, the process of identity formation emerges as an *evolving configuration* -- a configuration that gradually integrates constitutional givens, idiosyncratic libidinal needs, favored capacities, significant identifications, affective defenses, successful sublimations, and consistent roles. All these, however, can only emerge from a mutual adaptation of individual potentials, technological world views, and religious or political ideologies.[67]

Erikson at some point makes the relation between his theory and the three theological virtues:

> If developmental consideration lead us to speak of *hope*, *fidelity*, and *care* as human strength or ego qualities emerging from such strategic stages as infancy, adolescence, and adulthood it should not surprise us (though it did when we became aware of it) that they correspond to such major credal values as hope, faith, and charity.[68]

[65] Ibid., 73.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid., 74. Cf. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed*, 83-120.
[68] Erikson, "Major Stages," 58.

Stages	A Psychosocial Stages and Modes	B Psychosocial Crisis	C Radius of Significant Relations	D Basic Social Strengths	E Core-Pathology Basic Antipathies	F Related Principles of Social Order	G Binding Ritualiza-tions	H Ritualism
I Infancy	Oral-Respiratory, Sensory-Kinesthetic (Incorporative Modes)	Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust	Maternal Person	Hope	Withdrawal	Cosmic Order	Numinous	Idolism
II Early Childhood	Anal-Urethral, Muscular (Retentive-Eliminative)	Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt	Parental Persons	Will	Compulsion	"Law and order"	Judicious	Legalism
III Play Age	Infantile-Genital, Locomotor (Intrusive, Inclusive)	Initiative vs. Guilt	Basic Family	Purpose	Inhibition	Ideal Proto-types	Dramatic	Moralism
IV School Age	"Latency"	Industry vs. Inferiority	"Neighbor-hood," School	Competence	Inertia	Technological Order	Formal (Technical)	Formalism
V Adolescence	Puberty	Identity vs. Identity Con-fusion	Peer Groups and Outgroups; Models of Leadership	Fidelity	Repudiation	Ideological Worldview	Ideological	Totalism
VI Young Adulthood	Genitality	Intimacy vs. Isolation	Partners in friendship, sex, competition, cooperation	Love	Exclusivity	Patterns of Cooperation and Competition	Affiliative	Elitism
VII Adulthood	(Procreativity)	Generativity vs. Stagnation	Divided Labor and shared household	Care	Rejectivity	Currents of Education and Tradition	Generational	Authoritisrn
VIII Old Age	(Generalization of Sensual Modes)	Integrity vs. Despair	"Mankind"	Wisdom	Disdain	Wisdom	Philosophical	Dogmatism

Table 3: Three Organism on the Self

2.1.3. Cognitive Psychological Perspective: Lawrence Kohlberg

Another refutation to psychoanalysis came from cognitive psychology in the 1960's.[69] Jean Piaget (1896 — 1980) is one of the initiators of this new predominant school.[70] Piaget studied the intellectual and mental development of children from a biological and empirical point of view, but he did not accept the psychoanalytic line. He displayed a genetic epistemology.[71] Piaget considered that the moralization process of the individual does not consist only of "a process of *internalizing* culturally given by external rules through rewards, punishments, or identification, [as psychoanalysis states. But] internal moral standards are rather the outcome of a set of transformations of primitive attitudes and conceptions."[72] Accordingly, Piaget set up the theory of cognitive development in conjunction with a new methodology based on flexibility and personalization -- this means that depending on students' answers, the interview is led in one direction of another. This was compiled in his acclaimed book *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932).

Our interest, however, focuses on one of his followers, Lawrence Kohlberg.[73] This Harvard scholar studies the states of moral development of the person using Piaget's method

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[69] Barry J. Wadsworth, *Piaget's Theory of Cognitive and Affective Development: Foundations of Constructivism*, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1996). This book offers a guide to Piaget's studies, as well as some implications and application of Piaget's theories. For a brief history of childhood development theories see Naomi J. Petersen, "Child Development Theories," ed. Fenwick W. English, *Encyclopedia of Educational Leadership and Administration* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Reference, 2006). To find a related explanation on Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories see Ronald Duska and Mariellen Whelan, *Moral Development. A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg* (New York: Paulist Press, 1975), chapters one and two.

[70] The psychology of cognitive development is a branch of experimental basic psychology which studies cognitive processes, such as learning, intelligence, memory, attention, perception, reasoning, and motivation among others. Cf. Wadsworth, *Piaget's Theory of Cognitive*.

[71] Piaget was neither focused on behavior, as psychology does, nor on teaching, as pedagogy does. For him, the aim was "the growth and development of intellectual structures and knowledge." "*Genetic epistemology* is the science of how knowledge is acquired." Ibid., 1.

[72] Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order," *Vita Humana* 6 (1963): 11–33, 11. Also, Erikson casts doubts on the Freudian moralization process which forgot cultural contribution to identity: "Freud could take certain fundamental principles of morality for granted; and with morality, cultural identity." Erikson, *Childhood*, 281.

[73] L. Kohlberg is professor of social psychology at Harvard University. He has not yet written a book but has published his work through articles and we will follow Kohlberg, "The Development of a Moral Order." Here,

of intervention, but whereas Piaget was interested in general intellectual stages of development, Kohlberg studies moral stages and also revises some of Piaget's conclusions.

Kohlberg states that there are six stages of development in moral thought, which in turn are classified into three moral levels: pre-moral level, morality of conventional role-conformity, and morality of self-accepted moral principles. This classification is based on two criteria, the cognitive aspect of morality and motivations.[74] The next table (Table 4) summarizes his theory:

Level III: Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles (Explicitly Moral: Beyond Egoistic Impulse)	
Type 6. Morality of Individual Principles of Conscience	Rational Decisions Based on Moral Principles
Type 5. Morality of Contract and of Democratically Accepted Law	Rational Decisions According to Social Sanctioned Realities
Level II: Morality of Conventional Role Conformity (Preadolescents: Social-Material Role-Taking)	
Type 4. Authority Maintaining Morality	Autonomous Morality: Right, Assigned Duties, and Rules
Type 3. Good-boy Morality of Maintaining Good Relations, Approval of Others	Autonomous Morality: Mutual Respect and Intentionality
Level I: Pre-Moral (Childhood: Lack of Cognitive Resources in Differencing Moral Concepts from Punishment)	
Type 2. Naïve Instrumental Hedonism	Beginnings of Autonomous: Conscious Hedonism: Ego-need and Reciprocity
Type 1. Punishment and Obedience Orientation	Heteronomous and Hedonism: Following Classified and Fixed Rules

Table 4: Kohlberg's Six Stages of Moral Development (Personal adaptation)

Level I meets with Piaget's heteronomous state, where rules are fixed by an authority, but Kohlberg disagrees with Piaget's explanation. Piaget, similar to Freud's understanding of morality as superego, states that children follow commandments because of their "strong idealized moral respect for adult authority."[75] In contrast, Kohlberg argues

Kohlberg explains his theory by making a comparison with Piaget's developmental states theory. Kohlberg first presents the group of children studied (fifty interviewed every three years for a period of eighteen years), the method, and the tabled results. We are not going to focus on that but rather on the understanding his theory.

[74] "The typology rests upon 30 different general aspects of morality which the children brought into their thinking." Ibid., 14. However, these 30 aspects can be then grouped in two main categories, cognitive development and motivation.

[75] Ibid., 21.

that "good or bad [is set] according to the reward or punishment,"[76] which is expected from an older figure. The difference between Type 1 and Type 2 lies in the reasoning -- still focused on the ego, rather than on other's teachings or value itself. Type 2 performs a more conscious hedonism. In this way of thinking: "(Why should someone be a good son?) 'Be good to your father and he'll be good to you.'"[77]

Level II is reached once the cognitive development is able to understand moral concepts differently from mere rewards or punishments, around preadolescence (8-12-years-old). On the other hand, level II is favored by a larger and more communal interaction, which makes egocentrism decline by realizing the value of otherness -- mutual respect. Thus, while Type 1 and Type 2 act to avoid the painful effects of disapproval by authority, Type 3 and Type 4 try to guess what will be the reaction of a legitimate authority, disapproval or not. It should be remarked that "the preadolescent is bothered only by disapproval if the disapproval is expressed by legitimate authorities ['but not by peers']."[78] There is intentionality and a sensitivity to self-guidance by role-taking judgments,[79] but not yet within the explicitly moral domain. It is a material decision mainly determined by shared social attitudes.[80] Finally, the difference between Type 3 and Type 4 comes from the matter of justification. Type 3 judges based on natural affections of social shame; for instance, "[if you did that,] people would think you came from a family that didn't care about what you did."[81] In comparison, Type 4

[76] Ibid., 22.
[77] Ibid., 23.
[78] Ibid., 25-6.
[79] Role-taking judgment means that the person makes a moral decision, putting on the shoes of the victim. Kohlberg uses role-taking terms in the section related to Level II. Cf. Ibid., 24-7.
[80] Cf. Ibid., 25
[81] Ibid., 27.

judges based on "rights, assigned duties, and rules"[82]; for instance, consider "if you worked for something and someone just came along and stole it."[83]

Level III overcomes some psychological assumptions, which consider that there is no room for moral decisions beyond the conflict of community-egotism. Thus, this possibility of distance from egoistic impulse is the main difference between Type 3 and Type 4. Type 5 and Type 6 want to make rational decisions and assume that one must choose between conflicting norms. Type 6 judges according to moral principles,[84] such as "the utilitarian principle (the greatest good for the greatest number) and Kant's categorical imperative," [85] whereas Type 5 judges according to social sanctioned realities -- different from social ideals which constitute moral principles -- such as "legal or institutional rules."[86]

In conclusion, Kohlberg suggests that there is an invariable sequence of six states for the moral development of the person. Type 1 corresponds to a child whereas Type 6 corresponds to people like Sir Thomas More, Mahatma Gandhi, or Martin Luther King Jr.[87] Moreover, the progress through this moral sequence depends, on the one hand, on the growth of the individual, especially in terms of cognitive development and interaction with others. On the other hand, there must be a gradual transformation of attitudes, as well as an understanding of moral concepts -- it is not enough to learn a number of moral principles.

[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] "A moral principle is an obligatory or ideal rule of choice between legitimate alternatives, rather than a concrete prescription of action." John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics*, American Science Series (New York: Holt, 1932), quoted by Kohlberg, "The Development of a Moral Order," 28 (the author does not mention the page).
[85] Kohlberg, "The Development of a Moral Order," 28.
[86] Ibid., 59.
[87] Cf. Duska and Whelan, *A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg*, 78-9.

Let us recap a little. One of the key words we have used up to this point has been development: psychosexual development in Freud, psychosocial development in Erikson, and moral development in Kohlberg. The temporal and evolutionary dimension of the human being and, in particular, of identity in the conquest of maturity is clear, however, we have not yet talked about how time itself, or human's relation with time affects its existential level, that is, at the level of conscience, sensitivity, and disposition toward life and *the living world* (echoing Martin Heidegger). Mary Warnock will address this issue.

2.1.4. Philosophical Perspective: Mary Warnock

The British scholar Mary Warnock (1924 —) is interested in ethics and philosophy of the mind. Regarding the theory of knowledge, she has three main books *Imagination*[88] (1976), *Memory*[89] (1987), and *Imagination and Time*[90] (1994). In the latter, she implements the results of *Imagination* and *Memory* to explain the formation and nature of human identity.

For Warnock, the notion of identity is biological essential and linked to the memory which, in turn, has been formed in a concrete space-time continuum. Memory and, therefore, identity is not a specifically human property, but is shared by all animals. However, in evolution, the human being reached a physiology and a cerebral level and language that allow him to access the intelligibility of things; in particular, the intelligibility (self-consciousness) of its permanence in time. This gives human identity a special complexity that must be revealed by narrating our autobiography.

[88] Mary Warnock, *Imagination* (London: Faber and Faber, 1976).
[89] Mary Warnock, *Memory* (London: Faber and Faber, 1987).
[90] Mary Warnock, *Imagination and Time* (Oxford--Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994). The ultimate goal of this book is to reflect on the notion of personal immortality. However, she also develops the notion of personal identity and the role that imagination plays in its life through a magnificent journey on "the history of ideas" -- as she refers to her book -- in seven out of nine chapters.

But before going further in the explanation of Warnock's understanding of identity, it is necessary to explain this philosopher's theory of knowledge in which imagination, sympathy, value, and common sense play key roles.

2.1.4.1. Theory of Knowledge: Imagination

Warnock's theory of knowledge is not a pure realism,[91] but she does maintain a continuum with reality that allows us to access the truth of "things." It is not a pure realism because Warnock assumes our singularity in our process of knowing things, due to our genetic and historical-experiential identity. However, it is not a singularity that exaggerates the "for me" that leads to a relativism or skepticism and Warnock believes that such exaggeration would hinder the possibility of dialogue -- since we do not understand the same way, nor can we accept the other's opinion -- and would lead to isolation.[92] There are two main arguments:

First, there is no inner-outer dualism, as was collaterally held by Descartes through his soul-body anthropological division.[93] "Things" do not exist because "I" think them; they are not a function of my thought, but, following Merleau-Ponty, in perception there is a continuum with the thing,[94] and this perception occurs in our mind as thought through

[91] This theory holds that we know the thing itself. For instance, David Hume states that we receive pure impressions from outside. Warnock devotes the four chapters of *Imagination and Time* to discuss with Descartes, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, among others, her theory of knowledge. Cf. Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 1-86.

[92] She even claims it as a "destructive relativism." Ibid., 94.

[93] Warnock claims "that imagination can dissolve what had seemed to Descartes and his successors the insoluble problem of the relation between the inner and the outer, the mental and the corporeal." Ibid., 21.

[94] "The significance of a thing inhabits that thing, as the soul inhabits the body: it is not behind the appearance." Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London: New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul; Humanities Press, 1962), 31, quoted by Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 69. Warnock says: "According to Merleau-Ponty, the apprehension of this significance is an integral part of perception. We have no need to ascribe it to any particular intellectual faculty. There is no need to invoke, as Hume did, the concept of imagination to fulfil this function." Ibid., 67. However, she objects to the latter because Merleau-Ponty leaves a vagueness when he speaks about "interpretation," and "grasping a meaning" in order to explain personal views of things or happenings. Cf. Ibid. 70-1.

imagination, following Kant. Imagination is that which accesses things, whether they are in front of ourselves, in the past (i.e. memories), have never existed (fantasy) or not yet existent (hopes). She even argues that human knowledge can access, in a particular way, the rest of human beings as an object of knowledge, because of the affinity of their own species and here, Warnock follows Wittgenstein.[95] She refers to perceiving, for example, when the other person is tired or feels afraid. That is why she calls this imagination disposed toward the intelligibility of reality "sympathy" which includes the other human beings with whom we share this intelligence.[96]

The problem that the history of philosophy encounters with imagination is the need to distinguish truth from fantasy. Warnock does not settle the question, since she objects that the next criterion from Hume is insufficient: "The only difference lies in their relative force or vivacity."[97] Nevertheless, she does delimit the issue when referring to the rationality and the plausibility of events. Following John Casey, Warnock sets the example of water in a lake: How is water preserved? Because of the underground flow of the waters or because of a spaceship that comes at night to fill the lake? We do not see either of them, but one is "far-

[95] Warnock follows Wittgenstein in his discussion on "seeing an aspect" and "seeing as." Wittgenstein reflects on the difference between "It is a cat" and "he is sad." Warnock says: "The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In other words: the concept 'I am now seeing it as…' is akin to 'I am now having this image.' Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme? And yet one is perceiving something in so hearing it." Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), 193-214, 212, quoted by Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 71.

[96] In the same line, but from the study of evolution theory, Elizabeth Johnson argues that according to Darwinism, the living creature is a result of the cumulative history of creation. Living creatures are the embodied memory of this gradual, interconnected, physical-chemical, and historical process. The human being is a co-creature, but different from other creatures. Human uniqueness lies in being a conscious being. Human beings are, therefore, subjects of responsibility for what surrounds them. Their uniqueness makes them no less, no more (in terms of nature) than other creatures, but capable of consciously living life as a "brother/sister," as a people. This deployed capacity is what Johnson calls "ecological vocation." Cf. Johnson, *Ask the Best*, 281-4.

[97] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 20.

fetched," to use Casey's term, whereas the first is more credible and belongs to a shared presumption referred to as common sense.[98]

The second argument comes from the philosophy of language (Wittgenstein) and existentialism (Sartre). The human being not only perceives things, but can communicate them to others in such a way that they are understood; for example, when we say "red table" or "headache" we access a shared common schema. This happens because things are identified in a symbolic reality, not only materiality.[99] That is, reality is given in an intelligible way. Symbols are mediated through cultural context, although there are natural and arbitrary symbols with the latter requiring certain teaching, as is the case with a crucifix, whereas the former are grasped "because of something in their own intrinsic nature."[100] But still more, there are objects of knowledge that are natural symbols and overcome the temporal context; Warnock calls them *values*. There are moral values (honesty, good and evil, etc.) and other values, "such as love and hatred, fear and confidence, creativity and intellectual excitement, curiosity and the wish of truth."[101] Values are encapsulated in stories and transmitted through them, whether fantastic (i.e. *The Odyssey*) or with historical narratives, including history itself. That is why Warnock states that values remain over generations and, thus, they are universal.[102]

To end this section and, because of its importance for this work, let us recap Warnock's assumptions on imagination:

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[98] Warnock refers to John Casey, *The Language of Criticism* (London: Methuen, 1966). Cf. Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 75-7.
[99] Warnock restates Samuel T. Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual* (Burlington: C. Goodrich, 1832) by saying: "The symbol cannot be entirely separated from that which it symbolizes." Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 81.
[100] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 79.
[101] Ibid., 188.
[102] Cf. Ibid., 87-108, 87.

Firstly, imagination is a function of the brain that involves the whole body and transforms impressions into living ideas:

> [Imagination] is a power in the human mind which is at work in our everyday perception of the world, and is also at work in our thoughts about what is absent; which enables us to see the world, whether present or absent as significant, and also to present this vision to others, for them to share or reject. And this power, though it gives us "thought-imbued" perception (it "keeps the thought alive in the perception"), is not only intellectual. Its impetus come from the emotions as much as from the reasons, from the heart as much as from the head.[103]

> Meanings spring up round us as soon as we are conscious [different from animals].[104]

Secondly, it has a "role both in perception and in understanding" [105] to acquire real knowledge:

> Imagination is the image-forming faculty; but even if it is conceded that interpreting the world, seeing it one way rather than another, involves this very images-forming faculty, it does not follow that *what* we see is an image, rather than the real thing.[106]

Thirdly, it is a universal human capacity but personalized by each one through life-time-experience[107]:

> According to Kant's theory, there are functions of the *a priori* imagination which ... are shared by all rational creatures, and are fixed and unalterable; they determine the application of the categories in the light of which we parcel up the world to make it intelligible and predictable. There is also, for each rational creature, an empirical imagination which will vary from one

[103] Warnock, *Imagination*, 196.
[104] Ibid., 207.
[105] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 45.
[106] Warnock, *Imagination*, 198-9. (Italics in the original.)
[107] Warnock follows the theoretical explanation reached by Kant in what she will later explain empirically. She mainly goes through Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant sets out to study the limits of human knowledge. He argues that, although all human knowledge begins with experience, not all of it comes from experience. Thus, he identifies *a priori* knowledge that helps explain why human beings possess knowledge that is universal and necessary even if it refers to experience. The *Critique of Judgment* is Kant's attempt to reconcile the results of the first two critiques (*Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason*). His strategy to do so is through the study of two kinds of judgments, namely, the aesthetic judgment and the teleological judgment which in turn involves the function of imagination. Although Kant deals with other topics related to the faculty of judgment, it is his treatment of aesthetics that has remained more interesting for the history of philosophy. Cf. Ibid., 13-71; also, Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 1-64.

> individual to another, according to what he has actually experienced in the course of his life. For each, it will be different from all others.[108]

Finally, imagination needs to be educated in order to protect it from certain enemies:

> Besides its universal employment, the imagination has emerged, in addition, as necessarily connected with our emotions. And this is of the greatest importance. For if we think of imagination as a part of our intelligence, universally, then we must be ready to admit, that, like the rest of human intelligence, it needs educating; but this will now entail, if we are right, an education not only of the intelligence, but, going along with it, of feelings.[109]

> The great enemies of the imagination, in whatever field it is exercised are, on the one hand literalness, that is, a narrow and limited idea of the truth, and on the other hand a failure of historical sense -- what the historian Keith Thomas, following Lord Acton, called 'present-mindedness.'[110]

2.1.4.2. The Nature of Our Identity: Memory and Autobiography

Having said that, with regard to the notion of identity, Warnock begins from a fundamental biological observation: there is an "I" that perceives and creates a persisting self, a self that is capable of recognizing itself in the experiences of the past and capable of projecting itself into the future in order to guide itself in life. Consider the memory of the loss of our mother when we were seven years old; how is it possible that a person can access an "object" which belongs to the past and is no longer before him/her, but affects him/her as if she [the object which represents the mother] was really present? Another example, the case of a football player who is excited by imagining a play to train hard during the week in order to win Sunday's game; how can we access a future which does not yet exist but is experienced as a real emotion?

Warnock believes that this process involves imagination because we create a thought or an image of something that is not before ourselves. In the second example, imagination is

[108] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 114.
[109] Warnock, *Imagination*, 202. Cf. Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 187-90.
[110] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 151.

clearly involved, since the Sunday game does not yet exist, but this is different from a fiction or fantasy that has nothing tangible to do with the player's life. (A contrast would be writing a story about Martians.) This imagination is associated with a self that has gestated in time and come in the present to experience emotions by thinking about the next football game. Moreover, different players will have distinctly different ways of envisioning the game, e.g. Tom Brady (N.E. Patriots' quarterback) will differ from Nick Foles (Philadelphia Eagles' quarterback).

If we now think of remembering the death of our mother, who died when we were seven years old, we notice that it is an event of the past; therefore, our imagination draws upon a kind of memory associated with our biology, since it is not a static or quantitative memory (e.g. the number of coins in a box), but a stored, and recreated (reimagined) "object" which moves our emotions, affects our reactions, and determines our way of seeing, hearing, and understanding. Thus, personal identity may be considered a memory related to our biology. In fact, Warnock believes that neither memory nor identity are exclusive aspects of the human being. A dog has developed a memory when it has learned the habit of faithfully bringing his master's shoes in return for a caress; a parrot can be taught to repeat "Hello, how are you?" when it perceives the presence of a tall-moving-figure, a human; and a horse will have learned to avoid damage when jumping by checking for obstacles in front of him. In these animals there is, therefore, a continuity between the experiences lived (the first master's caress, the imitation of a human sound -- "Hello…," and the damage received when the horse did not avoid the obstacle) and the reactions in the present. That is what Warnock and other scholars call "habit" memory.[111] Therefore, we can say that animals are aware of their

[111] Ibid., 111.

continuity in time; they have identity. However, neither the dog, nor the parrot, nor the horse elaborate thoughts about themselves, though someone could object that what we hitherto know is limited by the fact that we cannot enter into the mind of an animal. But we can still assert that no animal can narrate autobiographically its identity to others and this is possible only in the human species.[112]

In effect, in the history of evolution[113] the human being reached a physiology (larynx, epiglottis, and the oral cavity in general) and a cerebral development (according to the theory of the three brains, the neo-cortex is the one that makes peculiar the *homo sapiens*) such that "the brain became capable of passing comment on its own activity. And from concepts grew language, and from language consciousness."[114] This, in conjunction with the possibility to communicate to one another, enables the appearance of an unusual complexity of body-consciousness, regardless of persisting in time; which, in turn, results in a more complex identity. Such concepts and thoughts allow self-consciousness to grow and access the meaning of "things." In fact, when areas of the brain's neo-cortex or the language area are injured, we observe a limitation on the human condition and although, by our affinity with the intelligibility of things (sympathy and common sense as above), we still recognize in him/her a human being, we say that he/she is "damaged."[115]

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[112] Ibid., 116.

[113] This argument had its apex moment with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (London: Collins, 1960). His main biological thesis is that evolution happens in a teleological way: the gradual ascension of conscience of matter, from inorganic to organic matter, from it to life (bacteria), and from life to more complex forms of life along with more complex forms of consciousness (larva, fish, reptile, etc.) until the emergence of the human self-conscious. See also, Johnson, *Ask the Best*, 122-53.

[114] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 117.

[115] "Though his sense of identity belongs with his memory, he need not be thought to remember everything that he has done in order that we may ascribe his actions to him, for we can identify him as a single continuing member of the species without his being able consciously to remember anything at all ... If he is so totally amnesiac, we regard him as a damaged human." Ibid., 126

Yet common sense makes us understand that the memory of human beings and that of animals are different. This does not mean that we do not share the basic memory of animals, rather that human memory becomes more complex than the previous one,[116] a so called conscious memory, according to Warnock and other scholars.[117] The new physiology, self-consciousness, and language make us perceive reality, wanting to order it and catch/find the meaning of things. Our author follows Sartre, who says: "We will not look for images, but rather will seek to explain the meanings which really belong to things.'"[118]

Furthermore, while common sense leads us to understand that human memory (and animal memory in general) is different from that of the computer; Warnock does not accept any reductionism. Some authors believe that the "brain is a computer or that a computer could be constructed which would fully replicate the human brain."[119] (Warnock discusses artificial intelligence when dealing with Daniel Dennett.[120]) They argue that computers have memory and some a logical-mathematical calculation power and storage capacity higher than the human being. Also, they state that "artificial intelligence is real intelligence (though produced in an artificial way)."[121] Warnock agrees with the latter but argues that the difference between an animal's memory and a computer's lies neither in being a place of storage, nor in the

[116] "There are not two distinct kinds of memory; but rather that memory, being essential to any individual animal of whatever species, may develop in the course of evolution into something more sophisticated, as animals themselves develop. What we are talking about is physiology or morphology; and physiology, unlike physics, is an essentially historical subject." Ibid., 112

[117] "Conscious memory or something specially allocated to the past, which is purely mental, which belongs to the inner life of humans and of them alone, and which is a matter of thoughts, images and, perhaps, meanings." Ibid., 111.

[118] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (London: Routledge, 1969), 600, quoted by Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 63.

[119] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 118.

[120] Warnock deals with reductionism and artificial intelligence in Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 117-24. The main reference is Daniel Dennett, "Why You Can't Make a Computer That Feels Pain," in *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, 1st ed. (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), 190–223.

[121] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 121.

power of calculation, but in biology: an animal's memory is affected and somehow modified (see Kant's theory below) by the exercise of knowledge itself.[122] Not only are cognitive structures affected, but also the self itself.[123]

The issue of pain management provides a good test example. Dennett argues that it would be possible to design a machine capable of feeling pain, but Warnock replies that the key is not creating a machine that can react "when kicked" by measuring the force of impact, but the significance that pain is given in our self-memory. Warnock is surprised when Dennett argues that the problem is that we have a wrong concept of pain and that machines will help us better understand its meaning.[124]

In sum, Warnock develops a "kind of empirical theory ['biological theory'] of brain-function ['suggested theoretically by Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason*']" and states that:

> It is the developing categorizing function of the brain that, in humans, develops so highly that it gives rise to self-awareness and to language, in terms of which the universe of each individual is recognized as a shared and universally intelligible universe, intelligible, that is, to all members of the same species … Kant distinguished the *a priori* self, the "vehicle of all concepts" about which nothing could be said, from the empirical self, who in the already

[122]"It is quite possible to agree with this ['artificial intelligence is real intelligence, though produced in an artificial way,'], but still to be dubious about reductionism. For intelligence in a human, or any other animal, is not and cannot be an isolated function. We exercise our intelligence on that which we perceive and then reflect upon. But none of these perceptions or reflections are without emotional concomitants. Categories are framed, and applied, in conjunction with values." Ibid., 121.

[123] Warnock makes the comparison with the way that the immune system functions and takes this example from Gerald Edelman, *Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind* (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1992). "The importance of such a model of the brain is that it does not require that information should be fed from somewhere into a pre-existing fixed system. Rather as antibodies are formed, even when quite unexpected and new viruses enter the body, if the immune system is working properly, and the system thus changes itself, so the system that is the brain itself develops ways of adapting to new events." Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 113.

[124] "If and when a good physiological theory of pain is developed a robot could in principle be construed to instantiate it. Such advances … would probably bring in their train wide-scale changes in what we found intuitive about pain … in the meantime, thoughtful people would refrain from kicking such a robot." Daniel Dennett, *Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology*, 1st ed. (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), 229, quoted by Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 122.

perceived and ordered world had a particular history, and had acquired a particular set of concepts.[125]

Romanticism tried to break Kant's distinction and, although it was not possible to eliminate his theory, as we have discussed above, it did help to think about the nature of ideas or thoughts. Romanticism maintained that thoughts were images that had been impressed on our memory in such a way that they captured a new concept-meaning "for me," the individual, which, in turn, is universalized as a shared human idea. Nevertheless, "the forms determined not only [our] aesthetic world but [our] moral sensibilities."[126] That is why Warnock states: "The existence of such persistent images, recollections which can in principle be described, is precisely what makes us inclined to say that memory is a species of imagination."[127]

Finally, Warnock takes one step further to describe our identity. It is not enough to have an identity, an animal also has one; it is not enough to be aware of it, a baby and a child also are; but we must know it. Warnock maintains that, since our identity is a memory -- a species of imagination, it is possible to narrate it as an autobiographical story.[128] Even more, autobiography may be the natural form of our identity, given the special role that language played in the emergence of *homo sapiens* and human identity -- language is for communication with other *homo sapiens*.[129] For Warnock, this autobiographical narrative not

[125] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 132.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] "When I speak of autobiography in this connection, I mean that kind of autobiography, not especially common, which attempts to tell the truth about how things were, and what they were like, not in a spirit of boastfulness, nor in order to set the record straight about events in the public arena, but simply because the enterprise seems worth doing for itself." Ibid., 127
[129] "Both space and time constitute the point of view that each of us, inevitably, adopts. The 'I' who perceives occupies a world in which continuity with past and future is part of this perception, that part contributed by imagination. Thus, narrative is a natural mode of thought. The instinct to impose order on chaos is immensely important to us, and is an essential element in the control we can exercise over the world we live in." Ibid., 92.

only contains our identity, but also helps us to know ourselves better because, along the way, we access shared values, and thus *our* nature. Shared nature, as we have already said when talking about sympathy, values, and common sense, are inscribed in the way in which the human being knows.

However, Warnock is not proposing a radical change in the understanding of identity, so that it diffuses into a kind of timeless metaphysical belonging to each other, with which to justify our moral duty with our contemporaries and even with those of the future generations.[130] Nothing like that; such diffusion leads us to a depersonalization that would weaken our identity.[131] Warnock was clear at the beginning and also now at the end: "What I will have meant all along when I used the pronoun 'I' was this complete living entity, body-including-brain."[132] However, she does believe in a continuity with all human beings, including future generations, saying:

> We can interest ourselves in it [our assertion of continuity with the future] only by reflecting that those who suffer or who benefit will be, like us, human. They will then be in the same boat that we now are in; in this sense humanity is, as a whole, all in the boat together,

[130] That is stated in Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1984). Parfit suggests changing the idea of identity to incorporate the future dimension that goes beyond the principle of utilitarianism that reaches only ones' family and neighbors during the time that the body lasts. For him, future dimension means mainly our actions. Thus, we can incorporate a "new sense of personal responsibility" into our psychology by thinking about ourselves in terms of "connectedness and continuity." "So personal identity …, according to Parfit, must not be thought of as a narrowly a one to one relation which, (if this makes sense), a relation which, as it were, confines me to my single identical body. It is rather a one/many relation, a connectedness between different phases of a human's physical and psychological life, but holding equally between one human and many others." "[According to Parfit,] to identify myself with a single member of the human species is both metaphysically naïve and morally deplorable." Cf. Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 152-7, 154-5. Parfit's suggestion might be thought of as an isolated idea but is not. The political idea of cosmopolitanism tries to conceive a new global citizenship-identity in an era of interconnectedness and pluralism. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002). Notice the difference between Nussbaum and Anthony Appiah, and the little platoons from Michael W. McConnell. See also, Kwame A. Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2006).

[131] Cf. Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 160.

[132] Ibid., 156

> regardless time. The crucial factor here is that we, being human, are unique in being able to think in these terms.[133]

In conclusion, identity is a conscious memory acquired personally during our time-span of development, within the intelligibility of the reality that we share with mankind. This faculty of the brain (conscious memory) allows us to project ourselves into the future in order to guide ourselves in life. By narrating this self-memory in the form of autobiography, which by definition entails looking for the truth, we are contributing to a better personal and human understanding of history, which, accordingly, will transform both ourselves and history.

2.1.5. Evaluation

First, with Freud we have discussed the radical experience of being separated beings from the moment we leave womb (I am "I" because "you" are different from me). This separation is experienced through a psychosexual force (libido) which appears as a frustration of not being able to fuse with a desired object. Moreover, the shaping of this force is rooted, prolonged, and lived in the critical context of the maternal-paternal care of the infant which configures a superego and a subconscious. Both will be manifested in our "behavioral identity," to highlight the determinism which embraces psychoanalysis.

Then, we have incorporated, with Erikson, the contribution of the social dimension to the formation of human individuality. (Pregenitality is not only in order to genitality; that is not the whole picture of becoming adult.) In Erikson's psychosocial approach, we have seen how maturity is reached through a "natural" sequence of conflict resolution (hope, will, competence, … and wisdom). This sequence is cumulative, based on the resolution of the

[133] Ibid., 160.

previous conflict and, at the origin of everything, the basic trust that something is expected (basic faith in hope).

Third, we have looked at the development of the mind (Piaget), particularly aimed at the moral development of the person (Kohlberg). Kohlberg affirmed that there is a sequence of moral states which the human being must ascend so that his/her actions are not solely determined by impulses and these impulses, in turn, by the desire for social acceptance. For this to happen, both the physiological development of the cognitive in the person is necessary and a cognitive change, which affects our sensitivity and attitudes. Kohlberg stresses that maturity is related to a kind of morality, which goes beyond our world of necessities, including our subconscious.

Morality presupposes that we are social beings, since it makes no sense to talk about morality if we are isolated. Morality presupposes the sharing of assets and values which, according to Warnock, are timeless, encapsulated in stories, and accessible by human sympathy (imagination). Now it is interesting to analyze the opposite case. If the individual does not sympathize with their species or with a common set of values (this means an exaggerated individualism of a relativist nature), then the only way to organize the common good would be by the (external) imposition of law based in the fear of punishment. (This is a further confirmation of the intimate relationship between our imagination and our sensitivity.) Kohlberg would situate the moral state of that person's practical imagination (morality) at level II, which does not correspond yet to the expected degree of human maturity.

Finally, the importance of Warnock is that she considers the very human act of integrating time into our existence, as well as the fundamental value that language --

particularly narration -- has in the constitution of a mature person. The person not only goes through stages, as we have seen in Freud, Erikson, and Kohlberg, but these stages leave images, kept in memory form, that transform our mental and emotional structures. Warnock comes to say that, depending on how the integration of lived historical experiences is, this will be our perception of reality and our disposition toward the living world. For Warnock, this integration is the present self-consciousness of our past and our future, effectively it is our identity. By narrating our identity (autobiography) we access the truth of ourselves which leaves us with a *sapere* (Lat. wisdom), a predominant emotion, namely: the desire to live and commit ourselves to either life or indifference, hope or hopelessness, and so on. Regardless of Erikson's theory, we could say that through autobiography is revealed the degree of achievement of the original deployment of basic hope.

In conclusion, the goal of a mature identity is the living world, which is to be able to lead us in life in a committed and hopeful way. We say that this has been achieved if a sufficient physiological development of the mind has been achieved; and particularly important are cognitive and language development. But this necessary condition is not enough to describe maturity, the following aspects should also be met:

- Self-knowledge, including certain lucidity about the subconscious. Our autobiography will help in this regard (see below).
- Level of morality, driven by principles, rather than by fear of punishment or social rewards.
- Ability to communicate our person on two different levels: autobiographical (in a personal diary, in the form of a book, before the psychologist, or to a priest) and by our placement in intimate relationships (friendship, fraternity, marriage). The first

level refers to the capacity of truth about ourselves as well as to having access to the fundamental emotion and values of our history (what do we feel when we look authentically at our person? Hope, laziness, gratitude, pity ...?).[134] But as we are study a good humanism we advocate for gratitude and hope.

- The second level is related to the rupture of constitutive separation (cf. Psychoanalysis) and the intimate level of our affections. Our autobiography should not be just for telling to ourselves, but for telling to someone who cares for us; this is what love basically is about, friendship, brother/sisterhood, fraternity, or marriage. Thus, mature persons live the constituent separation healthily because they have "learned" to establish a bridge with the other. Or according to Warnock, a mature person has learned to live peacefully what the human being is in this world, an intelligible and historical continuum that, without losing his/her autonomy, accepts his/her dependence on others, nature, culture, and history.[135]
- The above believing in and hopeful disposition toward the living world must be visible and endorsed through our behavior. A person who has the ability to establish stable and trusting relationships as well as is committed to a life working in a reliable manner.

The next image (see Figure 1) envisions what we have deployed and will be helpful later on. This rectangle has a good base width to height ratio which prevents it from tipping over when "winds" (challenges or misfortunes) come. The composition is rubber, which has some flexibility and is shock resistant, which means a good resilience (capacity to absorb the

[134] This reveals that joy is not a moment but a story.
[135] Cf. Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 170.

energy of impacts). Because of flexibility, the rectangle re-shapes after each blow. We imagine here the capacity of this (rubber rectangle) person to acknowledge his errors (even sins) and recover from them in a reconciled way. The dashed line represents the stability of emotions. This subject does have emotions, neither too high nor too low, but they oscillate under control. His resilience (flexibility combined with resistance) makes him less friable. The area represents the contact surface with the world which is related to the capacity for intimacy and stable relationships. This subject can share his story and be responsible.



Figure 1: Ideal Identity

2.2. On Modern and Postmodern Identity

So far we have discussed the notion of identity in order to identify the elements which make up a mature person. Now, we study the state of identity in the West and where its weakness may be located.

2.2.1. Status of Individual Identity

One of the key factors that characterizes the current subject is the depersonalization of responsibility which, from another point of view, is the loss of one's awareness of sin. We are not going to opt for an explanation of secularization nor are we going to adopt a direct theological perspective; although both are good options, rather we will take a philosophical and sociological view of the reality of the postmodern subject.

The beginning point of the postmodern era is a subject of discussion. While some authors like Zygmunt Bauman and Johann B. Metz say that a second modernity started in the

1960's, others like Michael Paul Gallagher and Nicholas Boyle place postmodernity in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The former has references the crisis of humanity of World War II, the Holocaust, and the subsequent revolutions of May '68, the hippie movement, and the sexual liberation movement.[136] The latter references the end of the last empire, the USSR, opening the way to the era of globalization, which in turn was made possible by the boom of the Internet. Rather than choose one or the other, we can combine both into understanding the contemporary individual. The Holocaust will undermine the moral framework and the Internet will provoke a speed and an interconnectedness in economy, politics, and human interactions that will affect our consumption and our perception of time.

The Polish-American sociologist, Zygmunt Bauman (1925 – 2017),[137] grounds his horizon of the interpretation of reality on the Holocaust, *Modernity and the Holocaust*.[138] For Bauman, "the experience of the Holocaust contains crucial information about the society of which we are members."[139] Bauman argues that the Holocaust cannot be explained as one more war in the history of human evil, nor as the fruit of Christian anti-Semitism in modern and Christian Europe ("Six million Jews were among more than 20 million people annihilated at Hitler's behest"[140]). Nor does Bauman accept to say that "the Holocaust was a failure [of modernity]," but he argues that it was "a product, of [it]."[141]

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[136] Peter Beilharz, *The Bauman Reader* (Oxford--Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Bauman responding to Beilharz says that he [Bauman] analyzes the shift from an ethical point of view whereas the other stream is focused on the aesthetic perspective. Cf. Ibid. 18-24, 21. See also Peter Beilharz, ed., "From the Work Ethic to the Aesthetic of Consumption (1998)" (Oxford--Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 311–33.
[137] An introduction to Bauman's thought can be found in Beilharz, *The Bauman Reader*, 1-29. This book organizes Bauman's diverse and non-systematic teaching by themes.
[138] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
[139] Ibid., XIV.
[140] Ibid., X.
[141] Ibid., 5. "I [Bauman] also suggest that it was the spirit of instrumental rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization, which made Holocaust-style solutions not only possible, but eminently 'reasonable' -- and increased the probability of their choice." Ibid., 18.

The "Final solution"[142] was not thought through from the beginning; the Holocaust happened gradually as a process of political and military engineering under the sense of rationality, efficiency, science, and progress -- which were the goals of Modernity.[143] Bauman having as interlocutors Raul Hilberg, Helen Fein, Hannah Arendt, Stanley Milgram, Max Weber, and Immanuel Levinas, among others, identifies the so called "holocaust-style"[144] as an organized bureaucratic system ("bureaucratization of rationality") that universalizes rationality in a way that manages to avoid alternative irrational or mythical judgment on public social life, because they do not meet modern scientific rational criteria. In addition, in that system violence is a "rational calculus."[145] Therefore, people are involved in a chain of bureaucracy and a chain of obedience, which depersonalize their liability under the rules of that game -- the distance from the final object frees the individual from any moral responsibility.

> Among societal achievements in the sphere of the management of morality one needs to name: social production of distance, which either annuls or weakens the pressure of moral responsibility; substitution of technical for moral responsibility, which effectively conceals the moral significance of the action; and the technology of segregation and separation, which promotes indifference to the plight of the Other which otherwise would be subject to moral evaluation and morally motivated response.[146]

When analyzing human identity in the era of globalization, Bauman refers to "liquid life" in the "modern liquid society." He wants to highlight the brevity of options, encounters, jobs, ... of things in general. "Liquid life means constant self-scrutiny, self-criticism and self-

[142] "[The 'Final solution'] was a product of routine bureaucratic procedures: means-ends calculus, budget balancing, universal rule application." Ibid., 17.
[143] As we have already said, modernity is a project of the Enlightenment: progress through the use of reason; scientific-technical advances to demythologize the understanding of reality, including morality; a break with the tradition, which mainly meant liberation from the teaching of the Catholic Church. Regardless of the Holocaust, it is no longer nature, history, or armament that is the object of study, shaping naturalism, encyclopaedism, or war, but the human being itself who is the object of selection and improvement of race.
[144] Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 28.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid., 199.

censorship."[147] A continuously changing culture that appears to our sensibility as a "hybrid culture," because we are sought "in not belonging: in freedom to defy and neglect the borders that bind the movements and choices of lesser, inferior people."[148] In that culture "[more and more people] live to survive (as long as possible) and to get satisfaction (as much of it as possible). Since the world is not their home ground and nor their property (having relieved themselves from the burdens of heritage ...)."[149] In that world and in this way of living, Bauman presents identity "as a problem and as a task,"[150] a task of self-realization and personal discovery.[151] The marketing of consumption constantly appeals to us to exercise our freedom to be authentic in our desperate search for individuality.[152] Thus, the game of self-assertion is basically satisfied in consumption; which makes us feel "emancipated."[153]

There are two factors at stake in every identity: "the desire for freedom and the need for security."[154] Liquid society does not feed the "communal" dimension of security, but the "societal" one of sharing common goods. This may form a "false confidence"[155] which can be maintained only by living in a permanent state of change, living as "*homo eligens* -- the 'man of choosing' (though not the 'man who has chosen'!), a permanently impermanent self."[156] Thus, there is little left of those elements that offered security such as routine, links to each other, loyalty to a store and a familiar schedule, etc.

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[147] Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Life* (Cambridge--Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 11.
[148] Zygmunt Bauman, "The Individual under Siege," in *Liquid Life* (Cambridge--Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2005), 15–38, 29.
[149] Ibid., 7.
[150] Ibid., 30.
[151] "As a task, individuality is an end product of societal transformation disguised as a personal discovery." Ibid., 19.
[152] "The struggle for uniqueness has now become the main engine of mass consumption." Ibid., 24.
[153] Ibid., 26.
[154] Ibid., 30.
[155] Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 127-47, 130.
[156] Bauman, "The Individual under Siege," 33.

> Surrender to the pressures of globalization tends these days to be claimed in the name of individual autonomy and freedom of self-assertion; but more freedom does not seem to the victims and collaterals casualties of globalization to be a cure for their troubles – they would rather trace them back to the crumbling or the forceful dismantling of the life routines and networks of human bonds and mutual commitments that used to support them and make them feel secure.[157]

The same twofold previous ideas have been argued in a less dramatic and more organized way by the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor (1931 —): the loss of the moral framework that culture must offer for the formation of the subject and thus, its effects on identity. Taylor takes a philosophical, political, and cultural journey for the causes of this phenomenon, beginning in the Protestant Reformation. In his acclaimed book *A Secular Age*, he focuses on the cultural aspect in order to explain the new conditions of belief "not just in terms of creeds, but also in terms of differences of experience and sensibility."[158] In *Sources of the Self* he makes a thorough study of the displacement which occurred in the modern subject. The conclusions of this book, alleviating the weight of its technical explanations, are found in *The Ethics of Authenticity*.[159]

Modern society has discovered the value of self-interest and the individual. Each individual has the principal and first right to self-fulfillment, in order to be happy. In fact, in a democracy of equality each individual has value because everyone has the same rights. This, which is a good in itself, has resulted in a soft relativism or a moral subjectivism. Respect and tolerance for the other, in which there seems to be no certainties and where all opinions have equal value (of course, none that come from an authority), establishes a moral

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[157] Ibid., 38.
[158] "And on this latter level [experience and sensibility], we have to take account of two important differences: first, there is the massive change in the whole background of belief or unbelief, that is, the passing of the earlier 'naïve' framework, and the rise of our 'reflective' one. And secondly, we have to be aware of how believers and unbelievers can experience their world very differently." Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 14.
[159] Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

neutrality.[160] What in another time was irrefutable ("feeling can't *determine* what is significant")[161] appears today old-fashioned, namely a universal ethic. This excessive atomization of judgments takes away, therefore, part of the "heroic dimension of life,"[162] hinders the universality of the word (relationships), and leads to a social passivity that translates into survival and compliance with the norms.[163]

Nevertheless, the previous position causes an uncertainty in our identity that makes us lose sympathy with others, centers us in excess (potential narcissism), and makes us dependent on other forms of "authority," "shrouded with the prestige of science or some exotic spirituality,"[164] for instance, self-help books, websites, or social-media news. There is an atomization and psychologization of the individual's life as well as a fragmentation and instrumentalization of the society, which is no longer understood as a community but as a market and a bureaucratic state.[165] In such a society, individuals know that they need others for self-fulfillment, but this is achieved through market relationships, leaving little space to transcend. "It is the primacy of the instrumental reason."[166]

But Taylor proposes a different understanding of individuality and authenticity. "I think of authenticity ... as an ideal moral."[167]

> Authenticity is a facet of modern individualism, and it is a feature of all forms of individualism that they don't just emphasize the freedom of the individual but also propose

[160] Cf. Ibid., 14-5.
[161] Ibid., 37. (Italics in the original.)
[162] Ibid., 4.
[163] "Survivalism has taken the place of heroism as the admired quality." Ibid., 16
[164] Ibid., 15
[165] "A fragmented society is one whose members find it harder and harder to identify with their political society as a community." Ibid., 117.
[166] Ibid., 5, which immediately echoes Adorno's critique of instrumental reason.
[167] Ibid., 22-3.

> models of society … But individualism as a moral principle or ideal must offer some view on how the individual should live with others.[168]

Accordingly, a good understanding of individualism is one that stands apart from "an atomism that did not recognize the ties of the community."[169] The human being needs others, not only instrumentally, but in the field of sentient and moral affinity (sympathy). People need to have others' recognition and to share a common horizon. Recognition means that "my own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others."[170] Seeking significance in life and trying to define ourselves have to happen in a background and horizon of things that matter.

> Horizons are given. … But more: this minimum degree of givenness, which underpins the importance of choice, is not sufficient as a horizon … It may be important that my life be chosen … but unless some options are more significant than others, the very idea of self-choice falls into triviality and hence incoherence. Self-choice as an ideal makes sense only because some *issues* are more significant than others.[171]

In conclusion, we find an identity which lacks security, but which exercises freedom in an ever-present attempt at fulfilment in a culture of globalization and marketization, which promises experiences and intimacy, but which does not provide with either the stable or communal elements that used to support the individual.

Similarly, the French sociologist Gille Lipovetsky (1944 —) refers to this time as second modernity, characterized by consumption, leisure, and mass welfare.[172] Personal liberation has already been achieved, so the battle of the self consists in fulfilling the right of happiness. Hyperconsumerist logic wants to satisfy that human longing. However, the relationship between happiness and ordinary life is not so easy. Two emotions characterize

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[168] Ibid., 44-5.
[169] Ibid., 25.
[170] Ibid., 48.
[171] Ibid., 39. (Italics in the original.)
[172] Here we sum up Lipovetsky from Gille Lipovetsky, *La Sociedad de la Decepción. Entrevista con Bertrand Richard* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2008).

this society: deception and uncertainty. (1) Culture promises us many emotions to consume, but ordinary life cannot enjoy them all, so life may become tedious and disappointing. Also, the loss of religion as a structural element of society has provoked that the feelings of frustration and envy were neglected, so the referred ordinary-life deception has increased negativity. In fact, liberating humility no longer appears in our cultural imaginary of virtues.[173] (2) Employment uncertainty is combined with the pressure for well-being. Professions change according to the logic of the market's renewal, which in turn demands personal continual training and adaptability. Moreover, persons suffer from the pressure of productivity and efficiency, according to the hyperconsumerist logic. Finally, Lipovetsky emphasizes the "presentism" of the experience. The fleeting nature of news, communication and social media conveys emptiness when we are alone. Thus, the perception of solitude has increased along with the difficulty to narrate those experiences as one personal story.

On the one hand, the three thinkers, Bauman, Taylor, and Lipovetsky converge in the idea that, as a result of Modernity, subjectivist morality has lost the empathy of belonging to a community. Also, technocentrism and hyperconsumerist logic head toward a new perception of time, which we may be not integrating it successfully. On the other hand, while

[173] When we refer to humility as a source of liberation we refer to a virtue that leads us to an appreciation of life. The one who never has enough, the one who wants everything today, the one who does not accept or understand the value of self-sacrifice and others' sacrifice, does not easily find rest for their anxieties and live in a "race against the world." (Similarly, Lynch speaks about "Gnostic imagination," see Section 3.2.) What surrounds that person lacks value beyond being a source of material resources. The non-humble does not find many reasons to live in community that promotes humanism. For the non-humble, the only debt to history and society is the payment of taxes and compliance with laws, with the intention of avoiding problems. However, the humble person is free from that "race against the world" and he/she appreciates what one has and what surrounds oneself. This person values the days, the self-sacrifice, and what others do for him/her. That person knows how to receive and, with the pleasure of gratitude, feels a debt greater than him/herself. The humble finds in reality, in history and society, a motive, a worthy and beautiful motive to continue with the commitment to exalt ordinary life. Humility, therefore, is not foolish -- it knows well the ambiguity of the world, the difficulties and confronts them -- but freedom predominates in it.

they depict the situation, they do not find the anthropological weakness in order to be able to propose something to rehabilitate the human being. This is what we study next.

2.2.2. The Place of Weakness

According to the Irish thinker, Michael P. Gallagher (1939 — 2015), current anthropological confusion entails a "postmodern crisis of imagination, disposition or sensibility," because a culture of images has been educating people more powerfully than at any previous time in history.[174]

Gallagher distinguishes between society and culture. Culture is less measurable, visible, and conscious than society.[175] Culture is related to "meaning, value, and … imagination,"[176] whereas society is related to "urbanization, work patterns, external religious practices and so on."[177] For Gallagher it is crucial to make this distinction because his approach is anthropological rather than sociological.[178] He thinks locally in terms of post-modern culture (street lived culture, community, nation, and Western culture) and worldly in terms of globalization.[179]

For Gallagher, modernity led the individual into a sort of "isolation, fragmentation, and narcissism, where life is an indifferent game and individual options are merely aesthetic and provisional."[180] As a reaction, a post-modern sensibility -- still focused on the subject -- asks for liberation and turns into a humbler understanding of authenticity.[181] "The

[174] Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 152-3.
[175] In line with Geertz: "Society's forms are culture's substance." Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures; Selected Essays* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1973), 28.
[176] Michael P. Gallagher, "Imagination Gone Secular?," *The Furrow* 57, no. 10 (November 2006): 589–93, 591. See also, Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 5.
[177] Gallagher, "Imagination Gone Secular?," 591.
[178] Ibid., 590. Cf. M. P. Gallagher, "University and Culture: Towards a Retrieval of Humanism," *Gregorianum* 85, no. 1 (2004): 149–71, 160.
[179] Cf. Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 4-5.
[180] Cf. Ibid., 104.
[181] Cf. Ibid., 104-6.

postmodern is not only a current thought ['post-modernism'] but … a wider cultural context that includes ways of life as well as forms of thinking, and which can be viewed more as a 'sensibility.'"[182] Thus, there is potentially room to discern from past excesses.[183]

Yet Gallagher uses the term secularization to think of the issue of faith,[184] although secularization no longer means a sociological perspective that studies the number of believers, belongings, and leavings from a religious point of view.[185] Now, Gallagher refers to another level of the sensibility, mentality, and dispositions, which is placed in our imagination as a fruit of the protest after modernism.[186] This approach is similar to what Taylor says: "a deeper and more significant secularization happens on the level of our self-images and dispositions, in those less conscious zones that constitute our 'social imaginary,'"[187] a social imaginary that involves an "inarticulate understanding of our whole situation."[188]

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[182] Ibid., 99.

[183] Cf. Ibid., 106-14. Behind Gallagher's hope are also the results of Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, 3rd ed. (London--New York: Routledge, 2012). This book studies, from a philological point of view, how the shift from an oral culture to a writing (technological) culture has reshaped human consciousness. It has three major statements: First, a human is a self-conscious being, thus its presence introduces artificiality; moreover, this consciousness takes time to grow (cf. Ibid. 26, 82, 104). Second, "the interaction between the orality that all human beings are born into and the technology of writing, which no one is born into, touches the depths of the psyche," [this interaction is called 'orality-literacy'], cf. Ibid. 175. Third, "secondary orality" by contrast with "primary orality," is the current orality in this "high-technology culture, in which orality is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices that depend for their existence and functioning on writing and print." Ibid. 11. Gallagher states that this secondary orality brings us a new breath of hope because it "has retrieved the lost dimension of voice" and, thus, "a new contact with personal interiority and mystery." Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 36-38.

[184] For instance, in Gallagher, "University and Culture" and Gallagher, "Imagination Gone Secular."

[185] "It involves not just a measurable problem of belonging and believing ['quantitative secularization'] but also crisis of ultimate identity ['qualitative secularization']." Gallagher, "Imagination Gone Secular?" 592.

[186] Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 100-6.

[187] Michael P. Gallagher, "Translating Taylor: Pastoral and Theological Horizons," in *The Taylor Effect: Responding to a Secular Age* (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 113–24, 116. The concept *social imaginary* is connected Taylor to talk about "new [common] ways of existing both in and out of relation with God," Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 437, quoted by Gallagher, "Translating Taylor: Pastoral and Theological Horizons," 116.

[188] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 173. Note that this concept is different from the *sociological imagination* of C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination.* (See note #5 in our work.)

Gallagher defines imagination as "an area of pre-conceptual sensibility that shapes our horizons and worldviews."[189] For Gallagher, imagination is the "key battleground[s] for meaning, values, and in particular for religious faith."[190]

In stating this, he keeps in mind a scientific point of view of the cerebral hemispheres: the left-hand analytic functions (logic, mathematics, grammar, planning) and the right-hand holistic functions (creativity, imagination, aesthetic).[191] However, our man of letters and theology cites several authors. First, Emily Dickinson who understood imagination as a crucial capacity "to experience the world, interpreting it and responding to it."[192] Second, Gallagher admires J. H. Newman to whom "imagination could foster experience of personal synthesis, linking intellect and heart, doctrine and feelings."[193] Finally, P. Ricoeur who states that imagination has "a projective function" and there can be "no action without imagination."[194] Ricoeur's statement is more than a metaphor: "the metaphor is like a spark that ignites new meaning and that extends our rationality. But imagination is more than linguistic play." He continues, "It is a vehicle of potential ethical transformation, including redemption from the isolated ego and an entry into the horizon of others."[195]

The individual is a conscious being, however, this consciousness, along with its identity, grows throughout time in a cultural context and belongs to a tradition/narrative.

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[189] Michael P. Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.ibero.mx/shapingthefuture/files/3-Topics-Identity/Identity-Mission-Gallagher-EU.pdf, 3.
[190] Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," 3.
[191] "Sociological modernity involved … the dominant logic of the left-hand brain, postmodernism protests in the name of randomness, aesthetic play, and a range of liberations associated with the right-hand brain," Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 130.
[192] Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," 6.
[193] Ibid., 7.
[194] Paul Ricoeur, *Du texte à l'action: essais d'herméneutique*, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986), 224, quoted by Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," 8.
[195] Ibid.

Following the teaching of the educational psychologist Jerome Bruner, culture "provides us with the toolkit by which we construct not only our worlds, but our very conception of ourselves and our powers,"[196] thus identity is nourished by culture. Moreover, it should be consider also the other way, we need to appropriate peacefully and meaningfully people's ordinary life: "it is only in the narrative story model that one can construct an identity and find a place in one's culture."[197] This personal narrative enactment should be done through intersubjectivity within and belonging to a community.[198] But communities do not play a mere instrumental function (*do ut des*, according to a superficial marketing relationship), because without self-transcendence imagination is simply aestheticism and fetishism that does not have the power to accomplish the healthy cycle of nurturing our humanity.[199] Communities are, thus, the places where the reality and the quality of our life exist. Our imagination should, therefore, consider this cycle not as a dangerous game but as a provocative possibility:

> Imagination is where the quality of our lives is shaped and where we shape our vision of everything. Imagination is the location both of our crisis and of our potential healing. It is crucial for the quality of our seeing, because it can save us from superficiality and torpor and awaken us to larger hopes and possibilities.[200]

But "who is imaging your life for you?" Gallagher's question echoes the New York theologian M. Warren.[201] In these technological and globalized times where capitalism dominates, there is a special link between images and the economy. Gallagher, among others, describes this culture as the culture of image.[202] The market and particularly the advertising

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[196] Jerome S. Bruner, *The Culture of Education* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), X, quoted by Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," 5.
[197] Bruner, *The Culture of Education*, 42.
[198] Ibid., 5.
[199] "[Because] work is replaced by shopping and the fetish of style." Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 103.
[200] Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," 7.
[201] Ibid., 4.
[202] Cf. Gallagher, *Clashing Symbols*, 152.

industry are the visible image of an ideology that nourishes our imagination.[203] Furthermore, according to the British Hegelian philosopher, Nicholas Boyle, the status of economic and political interconnectivity has no turning back and we are understanding ourselves more and more as consumer-producers in a global civilization.

Boyle studies the political economic roots of globalization. Looking at recent history and according to the current technological development, Boyle states that a free market and minimal protectionist policies are the way to lead the planet into the future.[204] After 1989, when the Soviet bloc fell and ended the time of empires, the scale of the market became again global.[205] Internet, TV, radio, and instant smartphone communication have been bringing the global market "into the economic, technical and cultural relations."[206] This is what Boyle calls the increasing role of the public sphere.

Moreover, Boyle claims that politics and the market were understood separately as an underlying assumption so that, when the economic system fails, the government can intervene to save it. But Boyle states differently: market and state are not simply complementary spheres under the logic that government will intervene when the market fails,

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[203] We are mainly thinking about the negative influence of advertising, but we can also provide two positive examples of its ability to change mentalities and sensibilities. First, William Leiss, et. Alt., "Consumer Cultures and Mediated Markets," in *Social Communication in Advertising Consumption in the Mediated Marketplace*, 3rd ed. (New York; London: Routledge, 2005), 263–94, tells how television advertising \was used during the World War II to encourage population growth in order to overcome the casualties. The second analyzes how advertising played an important role throughout the 50's and 60's to convey the mentality of autonomy and independence to Italian women and help them to overcome fixed gender roles by the 70's. See Adam Arvidsson, "The Therapy of Consumption Motivation Research and the New Italian House Wife, 1958-62," *Journal of Material Culture* 5, no. 3 (2000): 251–74.

[204] Nicholas Boyle, *2014: How to Survive the Next World Crisis* (London--New York: Continuum, 2010), 12. "If any historical thesis can be disproved, it is the claim that the extension and liberalization of world trade has been productive of extreme poverty."

[205] Cf. Nicholas Boyle, *Who Are We Now?: Christian Humanism and the Global Market from Hegel to Heaney* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 115-20.

[206] Boyle, *2014*, 17.

market and state are related at the level of dependence.[207] Boyle's thesis needs the "political economy," a term that underscores that politics and economics are not separated. [208]

According to his theory, the individual is a collective identity belonging to the state, to the market, and to society. The first two are faceless relationships whereas society implies potentially the possibility of knowing the other through associations, schools, or family. The state and the market are superstructures that determine and are conditioned by social behavior. However, economy and politics have not crossed any state frontier and just as there is no world-state, there is no world-institution able to provide an ethic.[209] Therefore, the crisis of identity happens -- he gives an example through his neologism "Thacherism" and the phenomenon of recession.[210]

Global society has been gradually perceiving itself as a "we" with an increasing awareness of the limited natural resources and, perhaps from self-interest, the need to rebalance global inequality. This manifests that, although there is no global political institution, "there is something [a global economy] like a shared order or expectation of order."[211] This external tendency involves us in committing to universal rights or global community.[212] Accordingly, as well as following Hegel, we are not born with freedom, but we build it.[213] "The freedom we are encouraged to have today is the freedom merely to

[207] Cf. Ibid., 103.
[208] "Only a version of political economy that can detach itself from the fiction of pre-social individuality and can rise to rethinking the relation of state and market, in terms of global institutions, will be adequate to the demands of the twenty-first century and of the Great Event that inaugurate it," Ibid., 124.
[209] Ibid., 133.
[210] Thacherism failed to assume two contrary dynamics, namely free market and patriotism. Free market without regulation weakens national borders and so gradually blurs national identity. Cf. Boyle, *Who Are We Now?*, 13-68, 37. With regard to recession, see note #215.
[211] Boyle, *2014*, 146.
[212] Cf. Ibid., 149.
[213] Boyle, *Who Are We Now?,* 9.

choose, as consumers, from whatever the market offers -- while a veil is drawn over what is in a closed system the necessary symmetrical complement of this freedom."[214] Boyle sees the interconnectivity and dependence of needs and satisfactions among people from different countries and thereby their economic systems, especially when there is recession[215]. Thus, we understand ourselves as consumers and producers -- the past as a product produced by others and consumed by us, and the future as a product produced by us -- "in an act of historical interpretation" through the word, namely through narratives and mainly literature.[216]

2.3. Conclusion

The West, based on instrumental reason, has lost the capability to nurture a moral individual. Rather it nourishes an identity which lacks security but which exercises freedom in an ever-present attempt of fulfillment in a culture of globalization and the market that promises potential experiences and intimacy, but does not provide it with either stable or communal elements that used to support the individual. Moreover, this crisis of identity cannot be explained through a mere sociological perspective, but rather through an anthropological one; a perspective that Michael P. Gallagher encodes at the level of our imagination (sensibility, disposition, and horizon). Finally, analyzing the economic roots of

[214] Ibid., 116.
[215] The phenomenon of recession shows us that we have internalized the idea of wishing be employed. First, it can be noticed that "consumerism seems designed to conceal what we may call the proletarianization of the British people." Then when the economy grows, we have a job. Thus, we can gradually spend money on increasing consumption gaining the perception of being freer and confident. The idea that we can be "flexible" consumers has been transmitted. Finally, when the recession comes, we measure our expenses better because of the feeling of fear and we can notice how dependent we are on other producers and consumers = "individuals whose needs are serviced by an anonymous market but are dependent for much of the content of our lives on our ability to work for others who in turn work for us." Cf. Ibid., 38-9.
[216] Ibid., 318.

the current globalization with Nicholas Boyle, it seems that the principal image "imprinted" (nourishes) in our imagination is the impoverished consumer-producer mentality.

In order to compare these results with the Ideal identity (see Figure 1 in # 2.1.5), let us imagine the current Western identity that we have just described as a tall and narrow



Figure 2: Emotional Identity

cylinder, shown in Figure 2. This cylinder has a large height to diameter ratio and distance represents the emotional eccentricity between two extremes: the highest, called "the feeling of all-powerful," and the deepest, called "the feeling of worthless." This is why we call it "Emotional identity." This subject is more emotional than the Ideal one (see Figure 1) and oscillates sharply between these two emotions.

The Emotional identity is promoted by the market and advertising industry which are closer and closer to the person, the "consumer/producer." The *world* of possibilities enabled by globalization gives this individual the taste of freedom, and power and, accordingly, this individual will try desperately to avoid experiencing negative emotions, because he/she also knows the taste of the dramatic change into worthlessness. To do so, the person will try to maintain the high peaks of emotions and another strategy will be defensiveness and aggressiveness to avoid feeling less or despised. (Here is where Lipovetsky and Bauman would have placed the idea of the false confident self.) But by doing so, the individual avoids

nourishing the ideal identity because it denies part of its nature and prevents itself from accepting and educating its sensibility.



Figure 3: Oscillation Graph Comparison



Figure 4: Contact-World Surface Comparison

Moreover, looking at the two oscillation graphics (Figure 3) we can see that the timings of the drama differs. In Emotional identity, everything happens quickly, so the same event has a different impact on the self (compare both slopes). This constitutes a crucial factor in our perception of life. The Ideal identity integrates existential time better within the confines of historical time, while the Emotional identity lives within an ever-present expectation of experiences and emotions. In other words, whereas what for an Ideal identity will constitute part of its ordinary life, for an Emotional identity this may become a drama. That is what also points out the comparison of the two bases: the cylinder has a smaller base and so is more easily overturned by a "wind" (challenge or misfortune).

The cylinder's material is crystal, flat, and rigid; which means low resilience and it is easily broken in case of shocks. That is why the Emotional identity reacts with defensiveness and self-assertiveness, because he/she wants to avoid being harmed. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the surface is round and the human contact surface is tiny (compare the yellow marks, see Figure 4). Roundness represents how the person avoids addressing conflicts in a mature way, namely: conflicts are only businesses that do not tell us anything

about entering into relationships with the world. Also, the cylinder's yellow line, which signifies the contact surface at the level of harmony, is scarcer than the rectangular one. This contrast tells us that, despite having the current Western identity of greater emotionality, his capacity for intimacy and for stable relationships is low. Both roundness and scarce contact surfaces speak about the lack of wisdom and imagination necessary to deal with conflicts and achieve reconciliation which social life involves.

Finally, it is worth saying that being an emotional being can be positive because of its potential empathy and the resource of energy it implies. However, this energy should be well-oriented and well organized within the self. It must be clear what constitutes the self, its resources, and illnesses, in order to build a person which fully integrates the truth of belonging to mankind in society, without falling into hopelessness or mental sickness. The resolution of this crisis is the subject of the next chapter. We argue that the virtue of hope and its activation in the human subject will result in a rehabilitation that is both personal and communal.

Chapter 3: The Role of Hope in Metz and Lynch's Theological Anthropology

In what follows, we study the theological anthropology of J. B. Metz and W. F. Lynch in order to explore the place of hope in their work.

On the one hand, Metz's theology integrates the whole of reality (not just one part of history, namely those who succeed and survive) to consider an individual who has worth also for his liability upon unjust suffering. Metz, rooted in biblical traditions, suggests a spirituality based on an apocalyptic hope. In comparison, Lynch also develops an anthropology rooted in human vulnerability but with focus on the human disposition to trust the world, to receive grace. Lynch deploys a phenomenology of hope by analyzing symptoms of hopelessness with psychoanalysis as a reference.

On the other hand, Metz is sometimes criticized for being too pessimistic or for proposing a stoic, ascetic Christianity. These criticisms may be due to the fact that he does not fully describe the elements of that spirituality. Metz does not deal with the psychological features of hope. Therefore, it will be interesting to explore Lynch's psychology of hope.

3.1. Johann B. Metz: The Place of Hope in His Theological Anthropology

> In the Auschwitz concentration camp, the prisoners received a ration of bread, water, butter, and something else. A Jewish family used to use the butter on Saturday for the prayer. One Saturday afternoon, the daughter asks her father: "Why do we waste the butter in making it burn like a candle if we do not have more to eat?" The father nods: "It's true, we cannot live without food, but neither can we live without hope."[217]

The German theologian, Johann Baptist Metz (1928 —)[218] confronts the problem of identity crisis when a subject is threatened by superficiality due to techno-scientific

[217] This story was attributed by Fr. Jaime Tatay to an American rabbi in the homily of a Mass in Madrid, 2015.
[218] Metz is known as the founder of the new "political theology," a term associated with the work of Carl Schmitt, which essentially becomes a political, legal, or social theory. Metz, by adding the adjective "new" political theology avoids, from now on having to put quotes to the other Schmitt theology and it is already clear that it is a discourse on God. Cf. Johann B. Metz, *Dios y Tiempo. Nueva Teología Política* (Madrid: Trotta,

reductionism, by moral relativism, by the obsession of innocence (inability to recognize its sin), by self-help spiritualities, and by the oblivion of unjust victims throughout history -- all these points will be developed in this chapter. In this postmodern context, for Metz the religious adjective is not a simple addition for a few people but will be understood as "natural" because of the question of theodicy for those who want to resist the disappearance of the human being -- as an ethical-religious subject -- and of its historical world.[219] Hence, his theological work appears as a practically-oriented political theology or a mystical-political theology which emerges as a correction to other more analogical discourses.[220] Metz roots his theology in the category of experience that becomes autobiography[221]; in particular, in the experience of the suffering of the just who, in the light of the event of Jesus Christ,

2002), 9. The very first of his works devoted to "political theology" is Johann B. Metz, *Teología del Mundo*, Segunda, Verdad e Imagen 18 (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1971), 139-164. He himself recognizes that "a new political theology was born when we asked ourselves about the possibility of a 'theology of the world' [he alludes to his work] in the circumstances of the modern world, with its processes of enlightenment, secularization and emancipation." Metz, *Dios y Tiempo*, 85. This political theology is not a regional theology on politics, as it can be on music, football, etc., but it is systematic. Cf. Ibid., 39-70, 50. (Spanish into English translations are ours.)

[219] "The appeal to God is not directed to any of the invented ('postmodern') images of God ... but to the image of God of the Biblical traditions. Do we really take the unavoidable and painful dialectic of this image of God seriously? This is what I ask myself when I see how pathetically positive metaphors of God are used today in preaching that only speak about divine 'love.' However, this is also what I ask myself when I read how those who are critical of the Church accuse it of having been the only one responsible for creating a dark image of God, driven as it was by the desire to frighten and humiliate human beings. No, life itself will place us before such an image of God. And a mature faith, far from limiting itself only to covering this up, must confront it -- even if only with the sigh of the creature." Johann B. Metz, *Memoria Passionis. Una Evocación Provocadora en una Sociedad Pluralista*, Presencia Teológica 154 (Santander: Sal Terrae, 2007), 21.

[220] Cf. Johann B. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad* (Madrid: Cristiandad, 1979), 2-44. "This is not to say that, in modern theology, the theologians were not -- or are not -- pious people. Here it is not about this private reconciliation between doctrine and biography, but about the fact that such reconciliation was not made into theology; that, in a certain way, it did not reach public-communicative character; that it had too little importance for the fate of the faith in Modernity." Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 123.

[221] In line with the philosophy and theology of the decade 1950-60s, it is the time of existentialism (J.-P. Sartre, G. Marcel), phenomenology (E. Husserl, E. Stein), and personalism (R. Guardini, J. Maritain, E. Mounier). Cf. Johann B. Metz, *A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity* (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 54-55.

will have the power to affect (*pathos*) and, thus, liberate our indifference to historical transformation.[222]

Our theoretical assumption here is that the anthropology of Metz is an anthropology in which the individual builds his identity (and that of the community) by sharing in solidarity the history of humanity, of his people. This constitutive factor lies in the reverse (Metz prioritizes the apophatic aspect given by our condition as creatures) of our *anamnestic* rationality (memory and the use of narration) that functions as a unifying and integrating element of ourselves in relation with human history and with God. This function is encoded by his understanding on hope.

In what follows we try to systematize Metz's theological anthropology -- Metz has not been a systematic author, he must be understood based on many articles, conferences, and collections.[223] Initially, as an introduction, we present the basic lines of his political

[222] Suffering is not something that must be pathologically desired (masochism), nor something that must be neurotically avoided (in clear controversy with Modernity), nor something that depersonalizes us from guilt (in clear allusion to the psychoanalysis of S. Freud). It is an unavoidable fact of reality that happens in history and that cannot be forgotten. On the contrary, suffering is human, insofar as it is constitutive of our struggle to survive when we need food or suffer from disease. Likewise, suffering can be a personal choice, such as the generous devotion of a parent to their children. Also, suffering can make us self-centered and selfish, but it can conversely make us more human and grateful when we allow ourselves to be affected by the suffering of others. In the latter mystical acceptance of suffering, Metz bases his anthropology.

[223] Cf. Metz, *A Passion for God*, 8-9. J.M. Ashley suggests three stages in the itinerary of Metz' thought: 1950-1963; 1963-1968; 1968 up to today. Cf. James M. Ashley, *Interruptions: Mysticism, Politics and Theology in the Work of Johann Baptist Metz* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 52-58, 57; Metz, *A Passion for God*, 11-17. Matías O. Ruz, Guillermo Rosolino, and Carlos Schickendantz, "La Fuerza Subversiva del Sufrimiento Evocado. Recepción de Walter Benjamin en la Teología de Johann Baptist Metz," *Revista Teología* XLVI, no. 100 (December 2009): 397–420, agree with that. Ashley's framework is:
1950-1963: during his studies in Münich and Innsbruck, Metz still tries to apply the transcendental Thomistic paradigm, in particular Rahner's transcendental method. This can be recognized in the first part of his work *Theology of the World*. His Christian anthropocentrism is strongly influenced by Rahner's understanding of experience, however, Metz's dialectic of progress (secularization theory) is still too positive in considering the contribution of Modernity to the future of humanity.
1963-1968: during these years the category "dangerous memory" emerges. Here Metz incorporates elements of Judaism and definitively leaves behind the transcendental method. The convulsive sixties and his dissatisfaction with Rahner's method make him interested in reviewing Marxist thought through the eyes of the Jewish scholar E. Bolch and the positivism of the Frankfurt School. Likewise, Metz will dialogue with the also Jew W. Benjamin. This change can be seen in the second part of *Theology of the World*, where he incorporates the eschatology and a more negative view of the direction that comes from Modernity. He considers that the latter

theology with which to address the subsequent understanding of the human being. Then we present his anthropology following a classical structure[224]: First, the human being in creation; second, the specificity of the human being, that is, to be human with oneself; and finally, the human being in relation to others.

3.1.1. Mystical-Political Theology or Practically-Oriented Fundamental Theology

For Metz, the current crisis of Christianity does not lie in the substance of faith, but in the frequent forgetfulness of its eminently practical orientation on the part of Christians and their institutions which, in this way, prevent that that faith is well understood.[225] He himself acknowledges that his intellectual journey changed after the experience of World War II, when he saw, among other things, a whole village die during his military service.[226] The War and the Holocaust confused him so much that his discourse on God could no longer be the same as that inscribed in the faith he received in his hometown.[227] His impotence to fully respond to suffering transforms his discourse into an apophatic theology: "Suffering leads into a void unless it be suffering unto God."[228] Hence, he found intellectual resources in J. Moltmann, E. Bloch, and W. Benjamin. As a consequence, in one of the great changes

is intimately connected with Catholic theology and Church's attitude, when faced with the human dramas of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
1968 – present: Metz introduces cultural polycentrism and makes a definitive shift in the theodicy question. In the fall of 1968, the Conference of the Latin American Episcopate met in Medellin, which represented another step in the theology of liberation, and Metz sympathized with this theological perspective. This can be seen in his work *Faith in History and Society,* written between 1968-76. Here there is a greater structuring of the subject, a final option for the *memoria passionis et resurrectionis* and narratives, and an apocalyptic eschatology development. Since then, there have been no new themes but a deepening of them: *memory of Jesu Christi* unfolds as universal ethics under the category of *compassio*, as well as a more exhaustive analysis of time. All this is reflected in his work *Memoria Passionis*.

[224] Here we are following Gabriel Amengual, *Antropología Filosófica*, Sapientia Fidei (Madrid: BAC, 2007).

[225] "The historical crisis of Christianity is not properly a crisis of its message and its contents of faith but a crisis of its subjects and institutions, which are unconcerned in excess of the unavoidable practical sense of these contents." Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 178.

[226] Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 99-102.

[227] Cf. Metz, *A Passion for God*, 54-55.

[228] Ekkehard Schuster, *Hope against Hope: Johann Baptist Metz and Elie Wiesel Speak out on the Holocaust*, Studies in Judaism and Christianity (New York: Paulist Press, 1999), 48.

that took place, Metz definitively abandoned Rahner's neo-Kantian transcendental method and turned to a dialectical critique of history with a practical orientation.[229] For Metz the transcendental method or any other idealism that uproots the being (Ger. *Dasein*) from history (referring to Hegel) or that de-subjectivizes the individual (in a clear reference to Marxism) is invalid.[230]

A theology that takes root in the scope of the questions directed to God that spring from an attentive look at the suffering of humanity throughout history; questions that do not want to agree with the *status quo*, and that therefore are uncomfortable and risky at times, but real and that affect the hope of living; profane or religious questions, depending on how we look at them, but that overcome any dichotomy between life and doctrine, and mysticism and ordinary life.[231] Accordingly, Metz has two key points: first, apophatic theology prevails, which means that he does not accept any abstract myth that resolves and accommodates the human being in his capacity to intellectually justify God before the evil of the world (he will call that abstract theology separated from reality), nor any pseudo-Christian myth that emphasizes in such a way the triumph of Christ on Easter Sunday that it becomes a pacifying therapy for omitting commitment to the sufferings of the just. Second, hope is crucial in his notion of the human being; it will be an eschatology of an apocalyptic nature (rooted in biblical tradition) contrary to any purely intellectual historicism or any *hamartologies* (understanding history of humanity as a mere history of sin). There are therefore no

[229] Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 72-76. See also, Ashley, *Interruptions*, 166.
[230] Ashley, *Interruptions*, 73-95.
[231] Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 115.

"intellectual" (a-historical) solutions, but only practical paths that begin in the suffering of others and end, unfinished, in the commitment to transform them.[232]

The subject of this theology is one who has experienced "liberation" (understood as liberated to liberate others). A subject who is not going to correspond either with the one suggested by E. Kant, or by Modernity, or by F. Nietzsche, or by K. Rahner (see below). It is a human being who bears a historical-critical reason and comes of age when, through narrations of the *memoria passionis et resurrectionis Jesu Christi* (understanding the reality of the suffering of the just from the perspective of the life, passion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ) is committed in solidarity with the suffering of others.

3.1.2. Theological Anthropology: Memory, Narratives, and Compassio *in Hope*

The anthropology of J.B. Metz is definitely a theological anthropology in which the concepts of history and human being are not separable. It has a central tenant in the dialogical character of the human being that is constituted through language and in searching for rationality about reality. Rationality and language are intimately related by the idea of *doing* or *self-doing* experience: the human being is not discovered, in the sense of the theory of reminiscence of Plato (for example in *Phaedo*), nor is it an experiment of oneself, it must be acted-created. He/she is formed fundamentally through praxis, which means to transform what we live and what we decide to live into a personal and communitarian history. Incorporating mystically into our biography the unjust suffering of people which we can see in this historical world, which we want to understand with clamor and prayer, but which we cannot fully explain unless before the paschal mystery of God, is the horizon that should guide and build the being/self-doing of the individual. It will be a painful silent, accepted and

[232] Cf. Metz, *A Passion for God*, 54-55; Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 99-102.

even loved, that by listening that divine veil ("*si comprehendis non est Deus*"[233]) configures a human subject who then takes charge of the history of humanity *from* God and *toward* God ("for God").[234]

The following words by Metz lead us through his theological anthropology which is not far from being a biography of humanity before God:

> The thread that runs through this biographical journey can be considered the *memoria passionis*, -- or, in other words, the question of theodicy, assumed in a new way with the signatures of the time and dramatized as social criticism, a question, moreover, that, in my case, is not simply silenced or satisfied by the Christian message of salvation. In all there is still a resounding and mute cry.[235]

3.1.2.1. The human being and Creation: World, History, and Rationality in the World

Metz at the beginning of his work *Theology of the World*,[236] elaborates a theology of secularization, which different from secularism,[237] is the project wanted by God that underlies the future of humanity. Thus, the truly religious subject is the one who does not allow itself to be alienated from the world, either by ideologies or by mythologies, and manages to understand the world in a committed way. In this context, Christianity is not disappearing, but has become historically effective, and the task of theology is to show the process of secularization.

> This secularization of the world -- an irreversible secularization and one we would never take too seriously -- how does this still fall under the "law of Christ"? (1 Cor 9:21). ... How does it proceed historically, in its projection toward the future, from the "hour of Christ"? ... The secular world, in which we find ourselves today, is nothing but the expression, exacerbated on a global scale, of that secular "contradiction" against the sacred, … which has always been foreseen in Christianity's project of history.[238]

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[233] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 107, where Metz refers to the famous Saint Augustine's adagio.
[234] Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 23-26, 24. Metz condenses this "in the formula 'suffering from God' (*Leiden an Gott*)." Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 109.
[235] Metz, *Dios y Tiempo*, 239.
[236] Johann B. Metz, *Theology of the World* (London--New York: Herder and Herder, 1969).
[237] Cf. Metz, *Teología del Mundo*, 51.
[238] Ibid., 17-18.

There were two theological arguments: the principle of Incarnation and, as its corollary, the "hominized world"[239] (Metz's neologism). In the Incarnation, the human was not an apparent and provisional instrument (contrary to Docetist heresy), much less a "despite" becoming flesh (contrary to Gnosticism) but God in Jesus Christ -- truly God and truly human -- accepted and assumed the world. He does not degrade the human-worldly but endows it with an unsuspected singularity. In the Incarnation, God assumes "the other," what is different from Him, without spoiling what the other is. On the contrary, because God is Love, he assumes humanity and secularity (worldliness) as it is, allowing it to be autonomous. Even in recognizing sin in the world, it cannot be said that the world was not assumed by God in its totality, because in the style of the God of Jesus Christ, in his "passivity" during the Passion (see Phil 2: 6-11), becomes visible gradually and increasingly God's love in its eschatological and consummate form. This is what Metz develops and condenses with the later concept "eschatological reserve;"[240] a concept which encodes the biblical promise of freedom, peace, justice, and reconciliation.[241] In this sense, he says that Incarnation is the horizon of the eschatological understanding of history and thus, the whole future is still

[239] Johann B. Metz, "Future of Faith in a Hominized World," *Philosophy Today* 10, no. 4 (1966): 289–299, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday196610425.

[240] The term "eschatological reserve" is received from Erik Peterson and it has two meanings, one biblical, linked to Saint Paul (Rom 8:19-22), and another political. Regarding the latter, Metz gives it a negative and a positive dimension. Regarding the negative: "we refer to the qualification of the Christian message as an 'eschatological message.' … Christian theology affirms negatively ('eschatological reserve') that 'there is no total subject of history within this world' … The Christian hope will have to express itself against those ['historical-social messianisms' that erect themselves as a total subject]." G. Angellini, "El Desarrollo de La Teología Católica En El Siglo XX," *Diccionario de Teología Interdisciplinar* (Salamanca: Sigueme, 1983), 808, quoted by Gabino Uríbarri, "La Reserva Escatológica: un Estudio Originario de Erik Peterson (1890-1960)," *Estudios Eclesiásticos* 78 (2003): 29–105, 38-9. As for the positive dimension: "the promises toward which this reserve is oriented are not an empty horizon of religious expectation, they are not simply a regulative idea, but a critically liberating imperative for our present. They are a stimulus and an assignment because these promises are effective in the historical conditions of the present, and 'confirming them' (= 'making them become true') in this way. Because truth must be done." Angellini, "El Desarrollo de La Teología." 808, quoted by Uríbarri, "La Reserva Escatológica," 39.

[241] Cf. Metz, *Teología del Mundo*, 202-3.

dependent on the "hour of Christ" (1 Cor 11:11, Eph 1:10, 1 Pe 4:7).[242] Future is always future and, therefore, unknown. We should go forward groping, confident in faith and its promise. That forward existence consists in a deepening of what was the origin, that is, the world assumed by God.[243]

As a consequence of the theology of secularization and the hermeneutical principle of incarnation, Metz develops the notion of "hominized world." The world, what is not God but oriented toward the human, is not only nature but also human history. Since Modernity, with the development of modern sciences and the process of Enlightenment, the human being no longer finds in nature "*vestigia Dei*," as St. Augustine wrote, but instead "*vestigia hominis*." That is to say, the person no longer experiences the world as a natural pre-established order (teleology) with an imposed fate in which people discover the numinous majesty of God.[244] In comparison, the human being experiences the world as in its hands: the person is *homo creator/manipulator* and through technology and social engineering can alter the individual and the human community.[245] With this Metz approaches the history of the world by making history of the continuous progress of God in humanity. "Does the world, from a Christian point of view, not appear precisely as the 'materiality' of salvation, as the beginning of the universal cosmic liturgy?"[246]

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[242] Cf. Ibid., 22-39.
[243] Cf. Ibid., 105-26. "The word of revelation in the Old Testament is not primarily a word that states, but a word of speech ... a word of promise. ... Its proclamation is an announcement of what is coming, and therefore denounces what exists." Ibid., 113.
[244] The disenchantment of the world carried by Max Weber. Cf. Ibid., 192. Also, he refers to Bultmann's demythologizing program Cf. Ibid., 52, 113.
[245] Cf. Metz, *Teología del Mundo*, 185-206.
[246] Ibid., 22.

But the Auschwitz experience changed all of his theology: he had been too optimistic. Metz abandons the dialectic of progress (the theology of secularization)[247] and since then he becomes a "theologian after Auschwitz."[248] Also, he opts for the dialectical-critical method of doing history.[249] Since then, the principle of responsibility of the human being with history and society will no longer be the experience of having received a world given by God in the hands of the human demiurge, but the suffering of the just. Metz says: "Suffering is what resists any theory that claims reconciliation between man and nature. Any attempt at conciliation eventually degenerates into a mere ontologization of man's passion. Suffering confronts nature with history, theology with eschatology."[250]

The reflection on the relationship between nature and history must come through dialectics and not teleology. Throughout the history of philosophy there have been interpretations of history and time which have suggested mythological cycles and evolutionary utopias. However, Metz criticizing Nietzsche, says that the human being cannot be reduced to mere nature, just as history cannot be a mere description of the evolution of nature.[251] Suffering breaks any teleology intrinsic within nature and makes that history face nature. Therefore, we must interpret time not as a natural time but as an accumulation of years and years of human suffering; as "inflation time" (influenced by Walter Benjamin).[252] History does not develop without the subject, without the subjects of history, but on the contrary it will be the history of their passion.[253] "The essential dynamic of history resides in

[247] Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 111-128. Here he engages in an interesting critical dialogue with the dialectics of progress.
[248] Cf. Metz, *Dios y Tiempo*, 235-40 where he has a brief autobiographical account about "How I changed my very self."
[249] Cf. Ashley, *Interruptions*, 166.
[250] Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 118.
[251] Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 92-94.
[252] Ruz, Rosolino, and Schickendantz, "La Fuerza Subversiva."
[253] Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 117-9.

the memory of passion as a negative awareness of future freedom for the overcoming of suffering."[254] Thus, God is not going to be an annex to this task, but the memory of the victims in the hermeneutic horizon of Christ constitutes the memory of the freedom of the human being.

3.1.2.2. The Human Being and Its Mystical Character: Rationality, Language, and Prayer

As we have already said, for the theologian after Auschwitz, "the potential of the meaning of history is not linked only to the survivors, to those who succeeded and broke through! 'Meaning' is not a category reserved for the victors!"[255] But for the whole story. For Metz, those lives which were prematurely taken away by injustice have not been failures nor do they lack meaning because they still have the power to awaken and liberate the morality of other people: in the light of God's paschal mystery they are "dangerous memories." In fact, something has happened to the individual who can peacefully endure looking at Auschwitz, or is so anesthetized as to have already forgotten. As Metz says, "not only the human individual, but the ideas of being human and of humanity are deeply vulnerable. Because, in addition to a *superficial history*, there is a *deep history* of the human species."[256] In particular, Metz focuses his criticism on the individual in three elements: the "bourgeois subject" that comes from the Enlightenment,[257] the one-dimensional technical

[254] Ibid., 119
[255] Ibid., 124.
[256] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 18-20, 20. (Italics ours.)
[257] The "bourgeois subject" who breaks with tradition and authority, and is oriented by models geared to controlling nature and satisfying needs. The new bourgeois human being who has achieved autonomy for reason establishes the difference between public and private in the development of political and economic systems, the law of markets (*do ut des*), and the instrumental reason. In turn, he/she falls into a cult of abstract reason that leads him to defend a tradition as knowledge without a subject (for example, Schelling's historicism or Diderot's encyclopedism) capable of relativizing the history of human suffering. Accordingly, the religion of bourgeois-reason is privatized and liturgies become ornaments for Christians' celebrations. Metz reckons this in the ability to live peacefully in a society in which only individual righteousness matters. It is therefore an elitist religion, reserved for intellectuals which, if it does not belittle the rude, treats them paternally as inferior. Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 45-61.

subject,[258] and the critique of the *Übermensch* (superior-man) of Nietzsche.[259] Beyond that criticism, what he proposes is the way to build the authentic subject through dangerous memories and their narrative.

The category of dangerous memory refers to the notes of experience as a theological place, namely: it is a phenomenon of immediacy insofar as it affects the whole person in its relation to reality, not only to reason; it is mediated and interpreted in a cultural context; and it is finite before a reality impossible to encompass with our experience and that is why we say that it opens us to transcendence ("it gives us what to think," echoing P. Ricoeur). Saying this about personal unity, Metz likewise affirms the experience of non-identity or the experience of feeling divided: "the historical life inevitably involves the experience of non-identity, the experience of duality, the experience that everything is not good, just as it is and it appears."[260] These two realities, the essential unity and the experience of feeling divided by suffering, are not contradictory for Metz, they are the place for the construction of the

[258] Metz makes the encounter with the Marxist dialectic through the Frankfurt School. Cf. Ashley, *Interruptions*, 108-115. The notion of a one-dimensional technical subject refers to the Frankfurt School, particularly the Horkheimer and Adorno critique of instrumental reason. Adorno argues that the human being is negatively affected by an exaggeration of the role of techno-science in its life. This tends to reduce the person to a single dimension given by technical reason. Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis,* 87-91. The techno-scientific world leads the human being to a technical rationality without dilemmas; to superficiality, or to a "second minority of age," according to Metz echoing Kant. For Metz, this "second minority" is more dangerous than the first because it is voluntary, while the one that Kant pointed out was a cultural inheritance. A "computerized mind" apparently free of contradictions is interested in forgetting any sensitivity that makes us suffer guilt. The disaffection of this subject to other "reasons" is found in the lack of meaning (crisis); and a crisis that can be endured only by increasing indifference and insensibility, that is, avoiding suffering in solidarity. Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 62-95.

[259] For Nietzsche, God is an invented term under which religious traditions, particularly Christianity, has erected a repressive morality for the human being. The human being must get rid of, forget, and overcome that morality by releasing his "will to power" to become the "superior-man" (Ger. *Übermensch*). Nietzsche thus formulates the argument of the death of God, as "cultural amnesia" -- in Metz's terminology -- and the myth of the eternal return for "love of life and this world." In comparison, Metz notes that what Nietzsche had predicted has happened, God has died and with "cultural amnesia" the human being has also "died" (i.e. being led into an amoral superficiality). However, this fact of reality serves for Metz to formulate the "argument of the inverse conclusion," namely: cultural amnesia involves the loss or dissolution of the condition of being human and its historical world. That is why Metz is apologetically convinced of the need for a subject with an anamnestic rationality. Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 78-97, 92-94.

[260] Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 87.

authentic moral-religious subject. That place is rationality (not understood as a simple technical reason, supra) due to its capacity to make a threefold relationship with past, present, and future. Which in turn is possible because of language.[261]

> Members of the Frankfurt School, W. Benjamin and Th. Adorno. … But also E. Bloch, H. Jonas, F. Rosenzweig and E. Levinas, who, in spite of their differences and antagonisms, seem to agree on the idea that thought is remembrance, and that undivided reason possesses a deep structure of an anamnestic nature.[262]

It is an anamnestic rationality that finds spiritual resources in the narratives of biblical traditions[263] to activate, spur, and resist any future that was already determined scientifically or ideologically. The narrative of dangerous memories wants us to experience something (*pathos*) in order to heal and liberate our experience of duality. Metz seeks to interrupt human indifference, accommodation, or the oblivion to which the bourgeois superficial subject tends. "The subject is the man implied in his own experiences and histories from which he obtains once and again an identification with himself."[264] Furthermore, this rationality is a heteronomous reason because it recognizes the authority of those who suffer (see more below), "this one makes [our rationality] 'attentive.'"[265] That heteronymous reason is not

[261] Memory plays a double role: one for the constitution of the subject in terms of its practical and critical reason; another in relation to Christianize its concrete historical and social context. Cf. Metz, *Dios y Tiempo*. Metz in *Por una Cultura de la Memoria* explains his notion of memory and its role in the constitution of the subject. He assumes the complexity of this common term and goes beyond the psychological faculty. Metz states that memory (Ger. *Erinnerung*) is not the memory of data (Ger. *Gedächtnis*) and evokes Gadamer: "liberate the memory as mere psychological faculty and recognize it as a human essential feature of its infinite and historical being." For Metz memory becomes a key notion of a discourse "that understands itself as a theoretical function of that reason that, as a freedom, wants to become practical." Cf. Johann B. Metz, *Por una Cultura de la Memoria*, vol. 111, Filosofía de la Religión (Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial, 1999).
[262] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 236, note 365.
[263] Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 213-27. It is necessary to combine the two functions, argumentative and narrative (anamnestic), so that the reason is not split. This connects the subject with the past, present, and future of history, without separating that individual with any metaphysical flight. Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 231-238.
[264] Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 229.
[265] Metz, *Dios y Tiempo*, 95; cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 211-221.

reconstructed with information and arguments but wrapped in stories, once it is identified with the story and its narrative.

> This strengthened sense of history -- not as "historiography," but as a kind of normative transmission of action -- it is and remains immanent to the reason that becomes the practice of liberating criticism. This concept, which is similar to the point of view of hermeneutics, of the inseparable relationship between reason and history, is not applied to the Enlightenment as a complement.[266]

With this Metz does not pretend in any way to sacralize suffering. On the contrary, suffering is not desirable and only makes sense before God under practical commitment that works for its transformation. Although on the other hand, unjust suffering is a fact of reality[267]:

> Historical life carries with it the painful experience of non-identity due to violence and oppression, injustice and inequality but also the experience of non-identity due to guilt, due to the fatality of finitude and death. In this sense, history is always a history of suffering in a broad sense.[268]

Suffering is therefore a theological category that is understood in an ascetic and mystical way. "As a passion for God and a suffering unto God, but … not as a suffering of God."[269] Unjust suffering or the memory of those who have suffered unjustly leads the person in searching for understanding to cry out (to God) "why?"[270] This clamor is the most particular and most universal of human languages: "a language that would have no name if

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[266] Metz, *Por una Cultura de la Memoria*, 9.
[267] In the following quotation expressed by "danger": "To take history seriously means understanding that nothing, not the highest, not the best, exists without danger, that everything is surrounded by danger, and that the meaning of history is always in danger wherever it is sought or thought of as something unendangered … Christian faith, if I understand it correctly, is just the capacity to affirm and live an endangered identity. Precisely in this are faith and history bound to one another." J.B. Metz, "Politische Theologie und die Herausforderung des Marxismus," 181, quoted by Ashley, *Interruptions*, 163-4.
[268] Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 220.
[269] Schuster, *Hope against Hope*, 48; Metz, *A Passion for God*, 58. On the recovery of sensitivity to suffering instead of an excessive emphasis on sin, Metz frequently refers to the synodal *Unsere Hoffnung* ["Our Hope"] (1977) Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 178, note 275.
[270] "Theodicy questions Hope ... for the inscrutable history of suffering in the world." Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 31.

the word 'prayer' did not exist."[271] Here Metz, by thinking of prayer, does not firstly refer to a believing dialogue with God, but to the internal cry of the human condition that demands explanation and alleviation of suffering. This implies that Metz affirms "natural theology" and, consequently, the human being cannot be a-*theo*. Again, it is decidedly a theological anthropology: "Prayer does not require the dissolution of the human being in its condition as subject in a relationship between God and God, but rather bases a final dignity of the human being as a subject, a subject before God."[272] The language of the experience of prayer is therefore prior to faith (in God) but inevitably ends in God if the constitution of the authentic subject is involved.[273] Metz condenses this "in the formula 'suffering from God' (*Leiden an Gott*)."[274]

> [Milan] Machovec recalled Adorno's aforementioned observation -- "after Auschwitz it is no longer possible to write poetry" -- and so asked me if Christians could continue praying after Auschwitz. I answered the same thing I would answer today: we can pray after Auschwitz because there was praying in Auschwitz: in the songs and in the clamor of the Jewish prisoners.[275]

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[271] Ibid., 104.
[272] Ibid., 95.
[273] Conversely to any kind of "secondary nominalism," cf. Ibid., 55-58. It is should be noted that both, Metz and Lynch (see #3.2), discuss a fundamental theology from a naturally-theological perspective. Although Lynch will say that he does not want to discuss natural theology, he does. The main issue of that natural perspective consists of a potential fall in pantheism and a narcissistic spirituality. Walter Kasper faces that issue in Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ*, New ed. (London: Continuum, 2012), 356-7. He argues that the person can be aware of a kind of pre-conceptual experience of transcendence by recognizing its limits, or by an aesthetic experience (e.g. the beauty of the sea, the complexity of genetics, the vulnerability of the homeless, or the majesty of wildlife), but this is not enough. Kasper claims that this therapeutic and anthropocentric vision of speaking to God may be followed by egocentric attitudes or "eco-idolatries" -- one might acknowledge here some postmodern religiosities. Kasper calls this "modest monotheism," "modest" because it responds to natural theology; and "monotheism" because it responds to a diffused experience of being human, when the individual questions itself in front of "one God" for the unity, for the meaning of reality, and for one's own life. (We can equate this to what has been popularized as a mere "seeking meaning.") But this experience of transcendence -- "modest monotheism" -- must be articulate through the constitutive human skill, words and language. That is why he advocates for a "concrete monotheism" which orients that experience, the Trinitarian God. In Him and his people (note the communitarian dimension) the experience of transcendence can be named, and nourished as conversion, sin, redemption, and love.
[274] Ibid., 109.
[275] Ibid., 48.

Throughout some magnificent pages of prayers of petition in the Bible (Psalms, Lamentations, Job, the Our Father Mt 6: 9-13), Metz supports the apocalyptic orientation of the human question to the meaning of life before suffering in eschatological terms: "ask God for God."[276] Metz, as we have already mentioned, suggests constructing the subject by remembering the victims in the line of *memoria passionis et resurretionis Jesu Christi*. To do this, he proposes the path of mysticism, of learning and suffering from a new language, a language which has no written rules (one learns by going through it). Also, since it is a communication (the very thing of language between personal beings) with the Other, this dialogue has no answer comparable to any human relationship. Thus, in the cry, in that groan (Rom 8:26),[277] we are invited to listen and let ourselves be led by the reverse of our complaints and our sobs (notice Metz's apophatic perspective). This inadequacy of transcendence (Metz uses the term "*pathos* of distance"[278]), which means accepting the limit of our creaturality and the limit of time as being unfinished, but with an end (longing for God as fullness), involves learning from suffering by "not being answered" in a regular way.[279] In prayer, the subject asks God for God and is informed, taught, and shaped by the personal presence of God who is "beyond" human language and feelings.

> Prayer can and should become a beginning of the renewal of that hope, a clamor against the increasingly widespread hopelessness and the insidious destruction of every unprofitable commitment. Well, that is precisely what the earliest prayer of Christianity is about, which is at the same time still extremely relevant: "Come, Lord Jesus!" (Rev 22:20). "We should not

[276] Cf. Ibid., 99-112.
[277] Rom 8:26: "the Spirit helps us in our weakness. We do not know what we ought to pray for, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us through wordless groans."
[278] This term refers to Nietzsche and, according to Metz, has no neutralizing function. Cf. Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 105, 110.
[279] This suffering of "the veil" of the difference reminds St. John of the Cross in his famous poem "Llama de Amor Viva." The experience of closeness-presence, but of distance-difference. Also, note the poem "Qué Bien Sé Yo la Fonte" which was written during John of the Cross' painful and unjust captivity (note the apocalyptic context) in Toledo. Cf. http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/la-experiencia-del-deseo-abisal-en-san-juan-de-la-cruz-qu-bien-s-yo-la-fonte-que-mana-y-corre-0/html/021b8cd6-82b2-11dfacc700218 5ce6064_8.html. (Consulted, February 2017.)

> simply believe, but watch; we should not simply love, but watch; not simply obey, but watch. But watch for what? For that great event that is the coming of Christ" (John H. Newman). It is not a coming "to" time, but the end of the temporality of time.[280]

This learning that entails entering more and more into the depths of human existence is done through faith in God. But which God? What faith? How is this trip-learning made so as to effect the construction of the human subject? Metz at this point connects again with the apocalyptic, eschatological, and biblical inspiration: faith in God does not endure only until suffering, but is in hope. Do we believe only what we believe we believe, or believe in God?[281]

> "[A dying man to Metz] Let me say just a few words: if I die, my God will die with me." My answer, after a certain time, was: "According to what you say, will my God also die? For you are dictating against him a death sentence, if my assumption is correct. Which comes to be: if your God is really God, then he is only your God if he is also my God, that is, if he is also the God of others, the God of all men. And only if you deprivatize God in this sense, can your God also be more for you -- can be other things apart from your own projection, from your private dream, which will be buried with you. So I keep my objection then for you and me."[282]

God is not indeed a timeless, a-historical, or ontological concept close to the ideas of Plato, nor is God a mythological discourse about Easter Sunday, which triumphantly exaggerates the resurrection and dilutes the unity of the paschal event -- passion and resurrection -- with therapeutic purposes or false pastoral accommodations.

> Therein lies the distance between theology and mythology. Myth forgets that question to which pain confers a special tension; hence, perhaps it is more therapeutic, more quelling of fear, even more appropriate for "assuming the contingency" of life than the Christian faith.[283]

"Hope against hope" (cf. Rom 4:18) is the Christian mysticism of suffering based on acceptance and consolation. Acceptance (which does not mean cowardly submission) and consolation should not be confused with being happy or calm before anxiety -- there is peace

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[280] Johann B. Metz, *Por una Mística de Ojos Abiertos. Cuando Irrumpe la Espiritualidad* (Barcelona: Herder, 2013), 102-17. Metz writes on prayer with its notes, solidarity, memory, resistance, longing, and expectation.
[281] Cf. Schuster, *Hope against Hope*, 76.
[282] Metz, *Por una Mística*, 39.
[283] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 21.

where injustice dwells sometimes. It consists of "the mysticism of suffering toward God."[284] Metz condenses this attitude of acceptance and consolation into the formula "poverty of spirit" of Judeo-Christian inspiration.[285] In effect, the Hebrew people did not allow themselves to be consoled by any ideology or myth and they remained faithful to Yahweh in the desert (see Ex 24) and in exile (see 2 Kgs 24:20). Catastrophes and suffering did not destroy their faith but instead opened them toward God and made them rethink and deepen the revelation.[286] This attitude also appears in the New Testament: Jesus invokes God on the Cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Mt 27:46), as well as in the Sermon on the Mount, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven" (Mt 3:5). The faithfulness of God illuminates our discourse on God during resistance to painful circumstances (see Ju 2:11-19). "[Hebrew mysticism] is not repression but the acceptance of fear, complaint, and pain."[287]

In addition, the crucial affirmation "God is love" (1 Jn 4:8) must also be conceivable in Auschwitz. Metz translates "God is love" into "God impassions us."[288] That is to say, we do not affirm the memory of a historical event but the memory of our updated identity. God was crucified in Auschwitz and now we use that updated memory to forge ourselves.

[284] Cf. Metz, *A Passion for God*, 63-9.
[285] Johann B. Metz, *Poverty of Spirit* (New York, NY: Newman Press, 1968).
[286] This is noticed in the Deuteronomist history of the exile: the Hebrew people broke with the theology of the temple, with the theology of the earth, and with the theology of the king, and deepened in the understanding of God as creator and father who had fed them through the desert and had grown the crops and sprouted life in the wombs of their women. Cf. Antonio González Lamadrid, *Las Tradiciones Históricas de Israel* (Estella: EVD, 1993), 1-206.
[287] Cf. Schuster, *Hope against Hope*, 45-6.
[288] Ibid., 48.

3.1.2.3. The Human Being and the Others: Political Character of the Subject (Ethic of Compassio *and the* Homo Peccator*)*

For Metz the subject is not constructed for itself but has a practical-political orientation where its truth is tested against any kind of conformism. Praxis understood "as a solidary and liberating action so that all people can become subjects."[289] This, the praxis of the ethic-religious subject because of its freedom, is not an a priori aspect of the subject; rather it seems that "one does not have it" and it must be attained as "a willingness to assume a change of perspective."[290] Freedom is reached when the subject is awakened from the lack of interest (echoing E. Levinas) through narrations of dangerous memories (*memoria Jesu Christi*). Once freedom has been achieved, it must be exercised in solidarity with the moral and political transformation of those who suffer or need to be freed. It is a freedom for, a freedom that frees others, a freedom to love.

> That change of perspective to which the Biblical traditions (and especially the stories of Jesus) continually exhort us; namely, to look at ourselves and evaluate ourselves with the eyes of others, especially with the eyes of those who suffer and are threatened, and expose ourselves to that look at least a tiny fraction longer than our spontaneous reflexes for self-affirmation allow.[291]

This disposition and attention to the suffering of the other, "*compassio*" according to Metz,[292] has the pretension of being a universal ethic because its authority does not lie in any ideology, but in the very authority of the others' suffering.[293]

> A consensus is not what establishes the authority of this ethic, but rather it is the prior and intrinsic authority of ethics that enables and establishes a universal consensus, the approval of all. But what grounds this authority, making it capable of being invoked today in all the great religions and cultures of humanity? It is, to put it very briefly, the authority of those who suffer unjustly and undeservedly.[294]

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[289] Cf. Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 72-73.
[290] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 167.
[291] Ibid..
[292] Ibid., 110-12. He develops this further in Ibid., 160-77.
[293] Ibid., 160-77. Here Metz discusses *compassio* as a universal ethic.
[294] Ibid., 173.

For Christianity the ethics of *compassio* comes from its origins as a community that remembers and narrates the following of Jesus: love of God and love of neighbor (e.g. in the story of the Good Samaritan, Lk 10:25-37); "passion for God" as *com-passio*. And if *com-passio* expresses our "passion for God," it must have consequences.[295]

> Whoever wants to resist the disappearance of the human being and his historical world, as well as the dissolution of memory into pure experiment, who wishes to save his identity as a subject, his language with pretensions of truth, his possibilities of communication, his insatiable hunger and thirst for justice, can do so by allying with the *pathos* that unfolds in the biblical traditions. And that *pathos* is rooted in the interlinking and reciprocity of the remembrance of God with the remembrance of human suffering. ... I hope that this has shown that Christian theology, considered more closely, is not only "political theology" in a circumstantial way, but is essentially so.[296]

In addition, the subject who has been liberated will live time in an apocalyptic way. This means to live in the spirit of Good Friday when Jesus quoting the messianic Psalm 22 ("My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" Mt 27:46) relies upon the fidelity and promise of God the Father. The tension between his commitment and his hope is historically experienced as a relationship with God. In this sense, the mystique of Christian abandonment does not consist in diluting the subject in an ocean where we can silence our difficulties, as New Age and some oriental philosophies suggest. Christian abandonment is not egocentric, but centered on others; it consists of "an increasingly deeper incorporation into an alliance, into the mystical alliance between God and the human being."[297] As the eschatological discourse states, "I assure you: Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers or sisters of Mine, you did for Me" (Mt 25).

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[295] Cf. Ibid., 160-178, 211-221.
[296] Ibid., 92. (Italics in the original.)
[297] Ibid., 168. See also Pontifical Council for Culture Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, ed., "Jesus Christ the Bearer of the Water of Life: A Christian Reflection on the 'New Age,'" February 2003, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/index.htm. This document clarifies the difference between Christian and post-modern spirituality. (Consulted, March 2018.)

> Something similar happens with the struggle between the technical and the political, between purely technological-economic planning and the political project of the future. Political fantasy will not allow itself to be absorbed definitively by technological pressures as long as it retains that religious-moral fantasy and that capacity for resistance that emanates from the memory of the accumulated suffering in history. [Considering this, he suggests another notion of politics that will use technological and economic processes in a different way.] This conception inspires a new form of solidarity, of responsibility with those who are most distant, because the history of suffering unites all men as our "second nature."[298]

For Metz, the human being is more than a world of needs (drinking, sleeping, etc.), more than nature, against any neurological determinism or cultures that promote exculpatory rationalizations -- "anthropologies of modernity,"[299] he claims. To say more, the human being is worthy not only because of his ability to analyze and achieve success, but also because of his sensitivity to unjust suffering or the acceptance of responsibility. "To the dignity of being a human also belongs the possibility of becoming guilty."[300] For that reason, once again, the religious adjective is not an addition to the subject.

Metz argues this with the biblical tradition. The Old Testament shows us that the relationship between the people and God does not consist of humiliation and obligation, but is a relationship that leads to becoming subject in the midst of fear and the complexity of historical conditioning. The subject is shaped as such belonging to the people, not in isolation, by sharing their experiences of struggle, suffering, and liberation. In other words, in the Scriptures the "idea" of God is not a superstructure that controls the already well-formed identity -- as Freud could state, but the fundament of our existence and our identity as people upon which to recognize our achievements and their failures in the midst of the historical complexity. By taking responsibility for the guilt of the unjust suffering of our people and sharing their fate in solidarity, we are not performing mere charity but also an irreplaceable

[298] Metz, *La Fe, en la Historia y la Sociedad*, 115-6.
[299] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 181.
[300] Ibid.

part of the process of becoming a subject; the "*homo peccator*,"[301] according to Metz. But the *homo peccator* "passioned" for God, capable of experiencing the mercy of God when he/she is committed to his/her people (society), does not live a sad and pitiful life, but is assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation; as God who in Jesus Christ assumed the world. "'By asking God to God,' as Jesus explains the elementary meaning of prayer, does he likewise point to the forgiveness of sins."[302]

In conclusion, according to Metz, we are social beings but not in the sense of a particular skill (e.g. being more or less shy), rather in the sense of people who are with others. This living-with (are-to-be) implies the following: at the level of nature, we are among others who share the same goods in interconnected stories (sic), throughout time and with whom we need to fulfill our psychosocial needs. But we are more than nature, suffering clashes our rationality when it tries to fully comprehend "why?" beyond an instrumental mind; suffering leads into a void unless it makes the human being to differ nature from history as suffering unto God.[303] Thus, at the level of history, the narratives of those who have suffered unjustly, within the hermeneutic of the Incarnation -- *ex memoria passionis et resurrectionis Jesu Christi*, have the power to awaken our sensibility. This *pathos* orients us toward the true humanness which provokes a historical-dialectal understanding of reality by confronting nature and history. This liberation involves leaving behind a mere adaptation to a prefigured ideological future as well as not fulfilling our psychosocial needs with market relationships (*do ut des*). Therefore, we, despite being contingent and finite, can act and create our identity

[301] Johann B. Metz, "Redención y Emancipación," in *La Fe, En La Historia y La Sociedad* (Madrid: Cristiandad, 1997), 129–45, 136.
[302] Metz, *Memoria Passionis*, 183. "To ask God; to ask God for the Holy Spirit; so to ask God for giving us himself; to ask God to God: this is what Jesus teaches us about prayer." Ibid., 101.
[303] Here we are paraphrasing "suffering leads into a void unless it be suffering unto God." Schuster, *Hope against Hope*, 49.

by belonging to a people and a history which is bigger than ourselves and which matters to us at the constitutive level. By committing to transform the history we shape our identity.

Hope pays a crucial role in this anthropology by being intimately related to the exercise of our memory. Hope is not only individual, it is not only in times of "my" despair, but it encompasses solidary and can be a source of personal and community transformation; transformation of history. It is an apocalyptic hope rooted in the Biblical tradition which seeks to end injustice. Thus, although hope energizes the person toward the future, people must look at the past and at dangerous memory to construct an always threatened subjectivity of disinterestedness and nonsense. This voluntarily mystical "suffering toward God" constitutes an ethical and a religious "imperative" (according to the natural theology of the cry -- to God). Which should not be a mere option to prove our moral perfection but that compromises our freedom endowing our existence with "hope [even] against hope."

We have explained Metz's anthropological theology which goes along with a politically-oriented fundamental theology. Hope is the eschatological milieu for those who are committed to life, society, and history *ex memoria Jesu Christi*. However, we need to deploy a psychology of hope to complete our attempt to provide a spirituality which first awakens human beings and then leads them to build "the city of man," echoing Lynch.

Lynch's starting point is, once again in our two authors, the verification of a crisis of humanity. For Lynch, some behaviors, such as drug abuse, alcoholism, depression, divorce, greed, and irresponsible consumerism, can be interpreted as signs of hopelessness. This could drag the person towards fatal consequences.

3.2. William F. Lynch: Imagination as Grace to Go through the Human Valley

The American thinker, William F. Lynch, S.J. (1908 – 1987) is one of those authors whose biography and education is evident throughout his writings. Lynch obtained a B.A. in Classics and received a Ph.D. from Fordham University with the thesis *The Central Problem in Aeschylus' "Eumenides."*[304] We refer to the way he brings images from Greek mythology such as Zeus, Apollo, Dionysus, Orestes, Aeschylus, as well as from universal literature such as Dante, Don Quixote, and Sancho Panza, the poetry of Thomas S. Eliot, etc., into the faith arena. This reflects his vast culture, his passion for literature and the arts in general, and particularly theater. In addition, his theological anthropology is elaborated from a psychological perspective open to the Christian God and modern sciences. In such an anthropology, the centrality of hope takes more prominence when we know that he himself went through the experience of depression.[305] In this way, both the new images and the incorporation of science into his thought represent his intention to create a language that allows a new approach to today's man and thus, breaks with a theological jargon that is proving unsuccessful in the transmission of Christian vitality and hope.[306]

Lynch is persuaded that images and imagination are crucial means to transform a person, society, and culture, "the city of man," according to his terminology.[307] This is why

[304] John F. Kane, *Building the Human City. William F. Lynch's Ignatian Spirituality for Public Life* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016), 24-59. Here the author, following Lynch's life chronology, deploys Lynch's evolution's thought by making reference to his writings and conferences. A complete bibliography of Lynch's writings can be found at Ibid., 251-3.

[305] Cf. Kane, *Building the Human City*, 46-9, 46. He suffers a mental crisis in 1956 and after going back to his teaching position at Georgetown University he decides to devote his life to research, writing and public speaking.

[306] Cf. William F. Lynch, *Images of Faith. An Exploration of the Ironic Imagination* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 3.

[307] William F. Lynch, "The City of Man," in *Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless* (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 21–27, 27. It corresponds to the introduction. Kane understands the term "city" in Lynch to mean "the entire interwoven social, cultural, economic, and political

imagination is a constant in all his writings and has a relevant role in his theological anthropology.[308] Lynch, however, does not make a theory of knowledge, as we have seen in Mary Warnock (see Section #2.4), nor does try to describe the function of imagination in our mind, but he does make a phenomenology of hope/hopelessness that allows him to associate hope and imagination in order to offer a spirituality and sensitivity to modern people.

Our working hypothesis is that a human disposition toward a realistic trust in the world, through a realistic imagination, is the foundation of a life (an identity) in which the color of hope predominates. This disposition widens our conception of human nature and the world.

On the one hand, Lynch discusses those lives (identities) which are grey and colored with hopelessness. The rate of depression and addiction, consumerism, asocial aggressiveness, severe individualism, and so on make a case for considering them symptoms of hopelessness in people. Furthermore, he argues that the life of hope is equated with the life of imagination and in turn, the life of imagination with the life of wishing and waiting.

Lynch states that hope and hopelessness do not appear alternatively -- one after the other -- but coexist in the human experience of living. Distinguishing these two areas and preventing the absolutization of our desires and dreams ("absolutizing instincts" that separate

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dimension of human community, whether in a large city or a small town or village. Lynch images "the city" as an embodiment of faith or unfaith." Kane, *Building the Human City*, 247.

[308] Lynch defines imagination as follows: "By imagination I do not mean fantasy, but the total set of forces in man which contributes to the formation of the full contextual image of an object." William F. Lynch, *Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless* (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 149. Here he refers to Northrop Frye, "The Imaginative and the Imaginary," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 119 (1962): 289–98, to clarify the difference between neurotic fantasy and imagination. See also, William F. Lynch, *Christ and Prometheus. A New Image of the Secular* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), 23-5. Kane sums up the concept of imagination in Lynch as "not a single 'creative' faculty, but all the resources of thought, perception, feeling, and understanding by which we receive from culture and develop through experience the images whereby we perceive and experience reality." Kane, *Building the Human City*, 248.

us from the human and humanizing rhythm) averts hopelessness from darkening the areas of hope. Otherwise, the individual will gradually manifest some of these symptoms: disaffection for the project of humanity and a distorted individualism, ideological rigidity and aggressive defensiveness, very short-term visions close to mere concern for survival or a cheerful-superficial consumerism, reduced understanding of the human, lack of wishing, and lack of imagination. Depression, schizophrenia, and suicide may be considered the human sickness of those symptoms when they have become heavy and severe. In fact, the case of the mentally ill provides a good image to explain what happens to a hopeless person.

On the other hand, considering the mentally ill, the aid of an external imagination (i.e. a doctor) can activate the wish of the ill to again fully want to belong to the human city. Trusting the doctor (or another kind of "doctor" such as a friend, an economic aid, or a clinical intervention) constitutes the critical moment to rehabilitate the internal resources of hope and to commit to the recovery process. Until then, the mentally sick person is not ready to go through the healing process that will reintroduce him into the human rhythm and the real world of possibilities; "the valley of the human" or "the city of man," according to Lynch.[309] In this regard, the images of faith provide us with sources to approach true humanness, Jesus Christ.

In what follows we explain Lynch's theological anthropology. Initially, as an introduction, we present the basic outlines of his writings and then we present his anthropology, which is rooted in a phenomenology of hope.

[309] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 117. See also William F. Lynch, "The Definite," in *Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 9–45. And Lynch, *Christ and Prometheus*, 39-72. In both Lynch writes about the human limitations and possibilities in this world, but through which and within which life itself takes place.

3.2.1. Christian Realism: A New Sensibility and Spirituality to Build the Human City

Lynch writes between the 50's and the mid 80's,[310] a period of conflicts and polarizations between traditionalists and activists, religion and secularization, liberalism and socialism, just war and nonviolence, nationalism and globalization, good and evil.[311] In that context, Lynch wants to speak to the *saeculum* from a Christian perspective. He suggests a theology of secularization which he will understand differently from the early Metz (as historical progress in the first part of *Theology of the World*), rather than a theology of culture that offers a spirituality for a modern, complex world. (That is why we see that, when the topic of nature and grace appears, the necessary division between natural and supernatural grace is blurred.)[312] The theology of secularization is the central theme in his book *Christ and Prometheus* where Lynch seeks to integrate all human, cultural, and political reality, with its limitations and conflicts, so that faith has a social and political dimension capable of generating hope. In his last published book, *Images of Faith*,[313] he says: "I am intent on creating, and in a very imaginable way, a body for faith and, very specially, a political and social embodiment of faith,… the concrete movement of faith and the imagination through experience, through time, through definite, through the human, through the actual life of Christ."[314]

On the one hand, Lynch's thought may be located in the stream of the "religious realism" of Douglas C. Macinthosh and Walter M. Horton (1930's), and the later Christian

[310] Cf. Kane, *Building the Human City*, 1-23. Here can be found a framework for Lynch's intellectual life.
[311] Cf. Lynch, *Christ and Prometheus*, vii. See also, William F. Lynch, "The Structure of the Irony of Faith," in *Images of Faith. An Exploration of the Ironic Imagination* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 77–108.
[312] Cf. Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 111-4, 157-63, 211-28.
[313] Lynch, *Images of Faith*. After this book he does not publish any more books but writes articles until 1986.
[314] Ibid., 80-1.

Realism of the famous Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr.[315] Christian Realist authors face that complexity by embracing three different realisms: political, moral, and theological.[316] However, Lynch has a particular way to deal with the moral dimension because he does not face it directly, as Niebuhr does.[317] In comparison, Lynch leaves aside moral principles as a personal achievement of the experience of faith.[318] He acknowledges that he will not study moral issues[319] but encourage cultural agents to create images and narratives toward the good, so that those narratives in turn have a positive influence on social imaginary. For example, in *The Image Industries* Lynch appeals to the responsibility of artists, writers, theologians, and academia overall in order to promote a more human society.[320]

On the other hand, Lynch follows the line of Vatican Council II (1962 – 1965).[321] He takes the complexity of the human being and of reality seriously by fully considering the human and cultural shadows and lights as a starting point.[322] He accepts the autonomy of

[315] Kane sees similar endeavors between R. Niebuhr and Lynch although the latter was less well known. Kane, *Building the Human City*, 4. Christian realism is an approach (an undetermined theory) to understand politics in order to provide society with tools to deal with the complexity of the world. Cf. Robin W. Lovin, *Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism* (Cambridge [England]--New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). This book updates Christian realism's perspective on the basis of Reinhold Niebuhr's thought.
[316] Cf. Lovin, *Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism*, 241.
[317] Niebuhr suggests, in light of the Kingdom of God, that human beings find regulative principles to guide political decisions, including the resort to war. Eventually he needs the aid of myth to integrate human sinfulness, and political and cultural contradictions. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith," in *The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr. Selected Essays and Addresses* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1986), 218–36. In comparison, Lynch uses irony to embrace human and cultural ambiguity.
[318] To see the basis of moral realism cf. Lovin, *Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism*, 11-18.
[319] "I have been unable to analyze nearly enough, to analyze [the psychological damnation and loss] in such a way as to distinguish it from the moral implications of ontological damnation and loss." Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 224.
[320] William F. Lynch, *The Image Industries* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959). In the same vein: "If the intellectual does not master these crucial, these central ironies, if he does not solve the problem of the creation of the *right* irony,…" Lynch, *Images of Faith*, 107. (Italics ours.)
[321] Vatican Council, *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents* (Northport, NY, Collegeville, MI: Costello PubCo, The Liturgical Press, 1975).
[322] "The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed,

reality as well as the autonomy of science, which nevertheless can work complementarily on building the city of man.[323] Lynch also assumes the ecclesiological shift of Vatican II by thinking that we should transform people and culture rather than bring people into the homogeneous walls of a *Societas perfecta*.[324] And last but not least, for Lynch it is clear that the person of Jesus Christ is the criterion of discernment and perfect humanness.[325]

For Lynch faith allows us to look at the world in order to become more human. A good Christian spirituality does not oppress people -- as some streams claim, but frees us.[326] Lynch defines "faith [as] a form of experience and imagination, itself a way of imagining and experiencing the world."[327] Accordingly, he had elsewhere said, "there is an equation between the imagination and experience."[328] This is why he seeks to enable and revitalize the images of faith, so that the person comes freely to the faith and then will want to live in faith, in the same line as John Henry Newman's *Grammar of Assent*.[329] Nonetheless, Lynch

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nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts." "Pastoral Constitution on The Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*," (hereafter, GS) in Vatican Council II, GS #1.

[323] "If by the autonomy of earthly affairs we mean that created things and societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which must be gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men, then it is entirely right to demand that autonomy. Such is not merely required by modern man, but harmonizes also with the will of the Creator," GS #36. Related to science autonomy see "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation *Dei Verbum*," (hereafter, DV) in Vatican Council II. "To search out the intention of the sacred writers, attention should be given, among other things, to 'literary forms.' For truth is set forth and expressed differently in texts which are variously historical, prophetic, poetic, or of other forms of discourse. The interpreter must investigate what meaning the sacred writer intended to express and actually expressed in particular circumstances by using contemporary literary forms in accordance with the situation of his own time and culture," DV #12.

[324] See Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Lumen Gentium* (hereafter LG) and "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy *Sacrosanctum Concilium* (hereafter SC) in Vatican Council II. The Church is mystery (see LG #1), the Church as people of God on the way (see LG #3-4), and the Church as sign for the world -- rather than a wall (see SC #2).

[325] "The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned truths find their root and attain their crown," GS #22.

[326] Lynch, *Images of Faith*, 4.

[327] Ibid., 6.

[328] Ibid., 7.

[329] Cf. John H. Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, 5th ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 1881). This book is divided into two parts which, *grosso modo,* correspond with the referred two movements: to arrive

does not make a theoretical development of the act of faith (as Newman did), but for him the focus of study is how the secular, the horizontal, leads us to God, to the vertical (which will not mean abandoning reality, nor to transcend it, but rather to deepen it). Because, in turn, the vertical contributes to the transformation of the world as a consequence of our moral decisions in political actions.[330] There are two fundamental principles for this dialogue with the world. (1) The literary imagination allows us to analyze reality which entails a metaphysical experience.[331] This is the main conclusion in *Christ and Apollo*. (2) As a corollary of the previous, the literary imagination can enlighten faith; and in this way revitalize the believer. (We have already mentioned Lynch's intention in the use of figures such as Apollo, Prometheus, Don Quixote, etc.)

One of the metaphysical experiences is irony; another will be hope. The irony (not anyone, of course) of the imagination captured through images and narratives is what allows the human being to integrate the multiple setbacks of reality.[332] Through irony we establish a low and a high without simplifying too soon the complexity of the world.[333] In this sense metaphysics (here the irony of the imagination) is a propaedeutic of theology, consistent with

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at faith, entitled "Assent and Apprehension," and to live in faith, entitled "Assent and Inference." Lynch refers to it in his writings; for instance, see William F. Lynch, *Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 13

[330] Cf. Kane, *Building the Human City*, 2-3, note 4.

[331] Lynch states that "metaphysics has always been more deeply engaged than any other science of man in getting at existence as existence and reality as reality." Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 190.

[332] "*Irony*—the dramatic contrasting, both in literature or theater and in life, of opposed realities, typically of something 'high,' exalted or supposedly special, with something 'low' or ordinary and even supposedly degraded, so that the contrast upends or overturns their expected relationship. Ironies of contempt typically mock the pretensions of the 'high', as when the emperor has no clothes. Deeper ironies help us see that the 'low' is the way to the 'high,' as when Socrates' ignorance leads to real truth." Kane, *Building the Human City*, 249. (Italics in the original.) A further explanation Ibid., 149-58.

[333] Cf. Lynch, "The Structure of the Irony of Faith." "The usual quality of irony is the unexpected coexistence, to the point of identity, of certain contraries." Ibid., 84.

Lynch's plan to examine the person, and therefore the culture, according to God's imagination upon the world.[334]

Finally, while Lynch does not systematically develop any theological anthropology, we can extrapolate it by the way he refers to life and to the human being. In particular, he roots his anthropology in a phenomenology of hope. He includes the perception of hope and hopelessness which connect with the question of identity (note the relation with the narrative character of identity in Mary Warnock -- see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4).

Lynch directly associates hope with imagination, that is, a theological virtue with a human capacity. A mental capacity that, as we have already said (see Gallagher referring to Ricoeur at Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2), corresponds to the holistic function of the human brain; it becomes integral to experience. For Lynch, imagination meaningfully incorporates in our identity a part of what we live. Nonetheless, it can happen that this imagination converts problematically a part into a whole, thus making it a false absolute that leads us into rigid identities. For example, it can entrap us into past solutions looking for certainties and thus prevent us from imagining new possibilities. But what we want to highlight is that, by making the correlation hope/imagination, Lynch works from a more psychological perspective and focuses on the mental, emotional, and behavioral dynamisms of the person who lives and imagines the world in hope (or despair).

[334]Cf. William F. Lynch, "The Theological Imagination," in *Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 217–47. Also Dominic Doyle would argue that secular hope not only is a mean toward eschatological hope but participates in it. Cf. Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism*, 133-140. This book studies Aquinas's transcendent understanding of hope. Within the Thomistic theological framework, *exitus*–r*editus*, Doyle explains how grace does not compete with nature. He emphasizes the unfinished aspect of being human in a dynamic society which can be sustained (perfected) by the *auxilium* of God. The human being longs for a kind of happiness and fulfillment which only God can fulfill in Heaven. But charity is the doable and workable path to journey in hope toward God.

3.2.2. Anthropological Theology: Imagination to Go through the Human Valley

We can find Lynch's anthropology of hope mainly in his book *Images of Hope*.[335] Here Lynch studies the phenomenon of hope and proposes elements to restore the life of the hopeless person, particularly through the image of the mentally ill. But, why the mentally ill and not the cancer patient or the myopic? This apparent trivial question directs us to a fundamental point: hope does not deal with merely a purely biological question, but rather with a constitutive one at the level of ideas, sensitivity, and identity.

Lynch's perspective grounds the vulnerable side of the human being. He assumes that we are all somewhat sick and in need of help (here will be placed Lynch's understanding of grace).[336] The human being experiences tensions and contrasts (dependence and independence, the self and the world, the past and the future) which he/she must learn to manage. When we fail to deal with them, a point of divergence from the "normal" may be reached such that the person loses contact with reality and becomes socially difficult, potentially, mentally ill in need of medical help. Therefore, by studying the clinical patient Lynch shows us the dynamism of getting sick and, since some ill people have recovered, he discusses the strategies to get out of our apathy and the lack of wishing.

From a psychological point of view, Lynch's thought is rooted in psychoanalysis. Notwithstanding, despite beginning writing in the 50's, he does not stay locked in the first psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud but moves to the psychosocial current of Erik Erikson.[337] This displacement is crucial in his understanding of the human being. Lynch understands the

[335] This book has three parts. (1) Lynch carefully analyzes the phenomenon of hope and despair. (2) He explains the necessary elements to build a psychology in which attitudes toward hope predominate. (3) He points out how this psychological disposition can be understood metaphysically.
[336] Cf. Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 15.
[337] See for instance his notion of mutuality which refers to Erikson's studies, cf. Ibid., 168, 209.

principle of individuation under the assumption of being-in-relation. An individual who receives "graces" from outside -- at least when we speak about a mature health identity -- to be constituted as an autonomous and free being. But not the inverse, namely, a being with an interiority who tries to adapt to the outside world to compensate their anxieties and frustrations.

Lynch assumes that the human being is relational, historical, and able to wish.[338] And this is why the question of identity can be resolved at the level of the context and related to our relationship with time.[339]

In what follows we present his phenomenology of hope and then we explain Lynch's proposal to recover and nurture a hopeless subject.

3.2.2.1. The individual as a hoping being: On Hope, Hopelessness, and the Absolutizing Instinct

Once he said, "one of the great hopes of all men is that they shall be human and belong to the city of man -- and one of the great sources of our hopelessness will come from these rigid and absolutized, these non-human constructions that lead to the self-enclosure of despair."[340] From a psychiatric point of view, Lynch refers to the schizophrenic who loses contact with reality and his/her self, and to one who suffers a crisis of anxiety which leads to despair, depression, and apathy.

For Lynch, it is not imagination that makes us ill, but a lack of imagination that encloses us in fantasies and false hopes that take us away from a possible reality not yet

[338] "Man is a temporal, historical being who is to be understood and defined in relation to the internal time scheme he occupies, from his birth to his death ... And it is by travelling back and forth in certain highly developed ways along the lines of human and Christ time that he lives the life of faith, by memory, by action, and by hope." Lynch, *Images of Faith*, 109.
[339] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 37.
[340] Ibid., 27.

created. If the individual does not imagine possibilities, then he will not pursue them. In effect, the future does not exist in an updated way; we imagine it and project it from our desires and needs. This internal dynamic also involves hope: wishing, waiting, and applying all means to move forward despite any difficulty.

On hope. Saint Paul's doctrine of hope inspires Lynch: "hope that is seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he already sees?" (Rom 8:24).[341] Hope is the reference or the image that indicates the horizon toward which we want to journey in our life. However, Lynch is cautious in thinking of hope as an ideal that can never be achieved, that always leaves us unsatisfied. Because of one or the other, either we will abandon hope or become obsessive, rigid, ideological persecutors of a ghost. "If hope is eternally beyond the evidence, if it is always stretching beyond the observable facts, then it is a completely romantic and non-scientific idea," Lynch affirms.[342]

Lynch is concerned because our nature tends to build ideals, idols, or fantasies that separate us from achievable reality. Lynch calls this tendency an "absolutizing instinct"[343] and considers it the main root of our despair.[344] That is why he develops in *Images of Hope* a psychology to enlighten our sensitivity to this struggling.[345] Lynch makes a stronger

[341] Ibid., 22, 124. To find an introduction to the Pauline doctrine on hope see Thomas D. Stegman, "'That You May Abound in Hope': St. Paul and Hope," in *Hope. Promise, Possibility, and Fulfillment* (New York--Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2013), 28–41.
[342] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 23.
[343] Ibid., 27. "By absolutizing instinct ... I mean the instinct in human being that tends to absolutize everything, to make an absolute out of everything he touches. [... It is] world of false hope which counterfeits the reality of hope. … But above all, everything assumes greater weight than it has, and becomes a greater burden. … The absolutizing instinct is not really an action of the imagination. Rather, it is a creator of fantasy, distortion, magnification." William F. Lynch, "The Absolutizing Instinct," in *Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless* (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 105–25, 105-6.
[344] This is the warning made in *Christ and Prometheus*. Prometheus differs from prometheism: Prometheus is the image of one who leads us through realistic ways, through human and humanizing rhythms. While prometheism leads us through dreams and false hopes which eroded our life.
[345] Lynch does not speak of original sin at any time, but this certainly refers to it.

statement with the pretention to sum up Saint Paul's doctrine on hope: "We live by hope."[346] Which in fact will be Lynch's anthropological belief.

Hope is not an extraordinary thing applicable only in case of emergency or catastrophe, which would immutably link it to despair, that is when there is no solution, rather link it to a life-giving disposition which nourishes regular life. "The sense of hope is: there is a way out."[347] Hope is a gift that allows us to face difficulties on a daily basis. Lynch emphasizes that hope is not a form of transcendence that would let us evade, or deny what really happens in our life. On the contrary, hope has to do with biology, with psychology, with our inner resources to achieve what we want to create. Indeed, hope is related to a mentality and sensitivity that allows us to build the truly human: "Hope comes close to being the very heart and center of a human being."[348]

Hope is indeed the closest interior resource but is not only internal,[349] In fact, hope comes from outside (see below). For example, in the case of the mentally ill, a doctor who is able to introduce a new possibility into the horizon of the patient's imagination brings hope.[350] That is why hope is not an individual exercise (nor is it a Gnostic individualism, nor an impossible voluntarism), but rather it has to do with help, with preparation, and with time.[351] "Hope not only images; it *images with*"[352] and in this sense hope cannot be achieved alone. "Hope is an act of the city of man, an act of what I call the public order, not in the external sense of that word but in the sense that it must occur between persons, whether they

[346] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 34. (Original in italics.)
[347] Ibid., 35.
[348] Ibid., 31.
[349] Cf. Ibid., 32.
[350] Cf. Ibid., 122-4.
[351] Cf. Ibid., 119-21.
[352] Ibid., 24. (Italics in the original.)

be man or God." Lynch adds, "as it occurs among human beings it represents or forges the very bonds of human society, meaning nothing less than that men can depend on one another."[353]

On hopelessness. Lynch notes from the beginning that hopelessness is a human emotion and so it does constitute a problem by definition; it can appear alongside hope and even be part of the healing process, as we will explain later.[354]

We are limited beings who live the contradiction of our volitions and contexts: we experience hatred and love; we want to be free but need others company; we desire harmony and social peace but we often find tensions, aggressiveness, and maybe social violence. Lynch often depicts this ambiguity with the image of Dionysus and Prometheus, where Dionysus represents our irrational and volitional nature and Prometheus the other side, rational and temperance.[355] That is why it is normal and even logical that, for example, in the face of a grave misfortune we experience hopelessness. This in itself is not a problem, but it is when hopelessness contaminates the areas of hope. Therefore, it is crucial to learn how to differentiate these two areas and to educate our sensibility.[356]

In addition, there is a hopelessness that is positive. This appears when the patient has realized that he/she was trapped inside a fantasy that separated him/her from reality and then

[353] Ibid., 24.
[354] Cf. Ibid., 54.
[355] Lynch uses these two images in of his major writings. See for instance, *Christ and Apollo*.
[356] "There is nothing wrong with hopelessness as long as it does not get into our hope." Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 47.

decides to undertake the arduous process of healing. This hopelessness can be a healer which purifies us from false hope: "it is a valley of peace guarded by a purgatory of fire."[357]

Beyond that, Lynch explains the mindset and the sensibility of a mentally sick person saying, "the sense of hopelessness is: there is no way out, no exit."[358] The person begins to function with the mechanism of "constant cancellation."[359] His internal discourse may say: the world is too complicated, I have not enough internal resources to deal with this life, it is impossible; so why do I try it? Bit by bit futility erodes the area of hope and overcomes human will falling into apathy.[360] In some cases, he may dramatically think that the only way to be free again is by committing suicide.[361]

The more futility, the more hopelessness and thus, the person refuses to imagine possibilities. Paradoxically, the human being, who was born to wish for creating their future reality, has cancelled this ability. Then, the individual retreats into its private imagination, avoids feeling involved, and no longer wants to be disturbed by the human project. He moves forward hardened and, thereby, the hopeless will manage hopelessness in advance.[362]

We should know the flavor and the origin of our despair. Also, we should learn that not everything can be expected; in a double sense: be aware of our absolutizing instinct and learn to distinguish the possible from the impossible. Finally, we must learn to keep the sources of despair at bay so that hope does not drown.[363]

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[357] "The path to this ambivalence is *through* hopelessness to hope. Because, when it is surmounted and accepted, the sick leave the nightmare world of unqualified, absolute feelings to revel in the valley of the human." Ibid., 117. (Italics ours.)
[358] Ibid., 35.
[359] Ibid., 49.
[360] Cf. Ibid.
[361] Cf. Ibid., 97.
[362] Cf. Ibid., 51-2. "There is a good deal of this among the well," in Lynch's words. Ibid.
[363] Cf. Ibid., 60-2.

On Hope and Hopelessness: Two Dimensions of Ending the Endlessness. For Lynch, one of hope's feature is freedom. Hope perceives that there is a future, so it is active, creative, and flexible. On the contrary, to the mentally ill person the future appears as a dizzying and interminable task; he fears the future and becomes rigid. He seeks reassurance, certainty in the repetition of past patterns by saying internally: "on another occasion I got out of trouble by doing so," or "it has always been done that way," thus he loses flexibility and creativity, and becomes stuck in the past. Complexity, the different, and uncertainty generate anxiety and confusion and he may react with anger or aggression in order to try to regain control over reality.[364] The past becomes endless and, although it was painful and did not bring great results, it is his only source of imagination. Bit by bit, deeper and deeper, he internalizes that he has a mental/spiritual lack and, eventually, cay come to feel that he does not have enough resources to live. A division between his mind and his will has become clear: on the one hand, the feeling of helplessness; on the other hand, "he has lost the taste of the human."[365]

Lynch feels badly that the person remains in that loop while continuing to compare him/herself to the cultural canons for the ideal human and, by making that comparison, feels unworthy and less than human.[366] Lynch reminds us that mental diseases happen in society and, therefore, have a context that we all have participated in constructing. Thus, society

[364] Lynch casts doubt on Paul Tillich. Tillich argued that the individual experiences anxiety when he becomes aware of his finitude. Lynch, conversely, believes that the person is pacified when he recognizes and accepts his finitude. Cf. Ibid., 58. See also "Hopelessness and Confusion," in *Images of Hope. Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless* (London--Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 81–104.

[365] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 57-79, 71. Here Lynch strongly criticizes self-help philosophies or theologies which transmits that nobody is saved except through the use of their inner resources. "There has been a deep cynicism behind the use of the saying, 'God helps those who help themselves,' and that has reflected a deep distrust of the surrounding world," Ibid. 78.

[366] Lynch thinks about neurosis in general, not in relation to good and evil -- moral perfection -- but in relation to any canon of the human that provokes (self-)exclusion. That said, it is worth noticing that Lynch's Catholic reference is the work of the Dominican friar Moore. Sebastian Moore, "A Catholic Neurosis," *The Clergy Review* XLVI (1961): 641–47.

must break down narrow understandings of the human being and broaden the notion of our nature. Because the mentally ill one is indeed a sick person as well as one worthy of being, who challenges our narrow mentality.[367]

Therefore, there are two tasks: (1) As the patient is unable to imagine, an external imagination must be applied to provide new possibilities for the future. (2) Hope is not merely an individual concern; it is up to all of us to create environments and cities that still believe in human nature. Mutuality, waiting, and trust are the elements with which Lynch colors a life with hope.[368]

3.2.2.1. A Hopeful Sensibility: Imagination as Grace to Go Through

In proposing his psychology of hope, Lynch takes inspiration from children as well as the patient-doctor relationship. First, the child begins with blind trust in adults, looking with hope to them (continually) for help with nearly all aspects of life. This shows us that hope is somehow dependent on outside sources; something is given. However, this child-hope is not yet mature enough since it has no temporal continuity; each action is perceived as isolated and does not constitute properly a journey, an identity.

Now considering the patient-doctor relationship,[369] whereby the patient seeks a doctor's insight to contrast their own rigid and impoverished images related to his self-

[367] Cf. Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 55. "Mental illness occurs only in society, not apart from it. We must face the fact that society is not an abstract: we are society." Ibid. 97-8.

[368] "No one is going to come up with a cure-all for the dense and manifold ills of the mind. But we can add, however slightly, to the weight and number of ideas that are counter-agents to the forces of illness. One of my recurring questions, accordingly, will be: what gives pause, or boundary, or end, to the sick forms of the infinitude? What are some of the absolute (but no rigid) points at which the human spirit can rest? In finding answers to those questions, one of them that we will uncover is what might be called the *psychology of the immediate* ... By psychology of the immediate I mean simply that here and now the sick person has the right and the need to conceive of himself as human and as permitted to act positively and creatively." Ibid., 79-80. (Italics in the original.)

[369] "The relationship between the patient and the doctor (or his equivalent) reaches a point that is transforming. It is a moment of trust. ... Before the moment of trust, evidence suggested that an attack was on" Ibid., 122-3. Lynch supports this argument with Freud's study: "[not because of the use of the intellect 'but slowly by his

concept and potentialities. The mentally ill patient needs to expand his imagination with the aid of an external imagination but this help will not be received unless the patient, in an integral, non-intellectual act of his sensitivity (including the subconscious), decides to trust the doctor. Until this *fiat* happens, the patient thinks that his problem is spiritual or that there is no solution. This *assent* (echoing the already mentioned Cardinal John H. Newman) is the last remaining and, at the same time, the first sign of hope. It supposes a brightness of light although it had occurred in the absolute darkness and confusion.

In that *fiat*, in that trust is where Lynch places the principle of hope: the wish to start something, to continue it (in the case of the well), or to recover (in the case of the ill).[370] Something imagined is wished, otherwise, where there is no wish, there is no imagination, and vice versa. Lynch argues that to be a person of hope is correlated with being able to wish as an unconditional absolute. Let us investigate this assertion's nuances:

The intense wish differs from wishing absolutes or imagining hallucinations. When hallucinations happen, false imagination and an absolutizing instinct work together subtlety, and the subject seeks gratification from an object that does not exist.[371]

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relationship to the physician'] faith repeats the history of its own origin; it is a derivation of love and at first it needed no arguments. Not until later does it admit them so far as to take them into critical consideration if they have been offered by someone who is loved. Without this support arguments have no weight with the patient, never do they have any with most people in life." Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (New York, NY: Liverwright, 1935), 387, quoted by Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 123.

[370] Lynch defines wish as "a tendency or a movement toward something; the movement or tendency includes the qualities of affirmation, acceptance, approval of the thing toward which I move. … An ideal wish is an absolute fact. It is not something rising out of the substratum of the self. It is myself. If it is half a wish it is half me." Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 148. It should be noted that Lynch is in contrast to Freud's idea, which depersonalized the libido as a psychosexual thing.

[371] Cf. Ibid., 143-4.

Moreover, Lynch identifies three enemies of the life of wishing and hoping: first, not to wish at all; second, wishing but not knowing for what we wish; and others do what we wish.[372] Boredom, conformity, good-boy attitude, and apathy characterizes them.[373]

Wishing differs from egotism, narcissism, or an altogether a willful act. An ideal wish does not need an audience nor is it the result of defiance; it is a neat and "self-contained absolute."[374] To be so, there must be a right relationship between the object and the person: to grasp the meaning which demands. (A wrong relationship would be conformity or defiance.) Lynch, based on the book *The Rebel* by Albert Camus, presents the example of a dandy who plays with life and the world.[375] He needs to feel special because he cannot stand reality as it is; nor to be alone, nor to be the same as others, that is, to be normal. Being normal does not mean renouncing our abilities or our desires, just the opposite! It supposes positioning ourselves adequately in the world in order to realistically imagine it and enjoy it. It is a paradox, the dandy goes out of his way for an emotion (if possible a relationship) but he feels totally strange to this world, and collapses when he is without mirrors; he has no trust in regular life. On the contrary, if what we want is the real object, we do not need an audience, neither to defy it, nor to please it. In sum, an ideal wish is the basis of hope and this why the feature of hope is freedom.

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[372] Cf. Ibid., 130.
[373] Interesting is the interpretation of the boredom. "A person who is 'bored,' in the strict sense of the word, is searching for an object, not in order to act upon it with his instinctual impulses, but rather to be helped by it to find an instinctual aim which he lacks…" Otto Fenichel, *Collected Papers*, vol. I (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1954), 297, quoted by Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 133.
[374] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 151.
[375] "He [a dandy] plays at life because he is unable to live it. He plays at it until he dies, except for the moments when he is alone and without a mirror. For the dandy, to be alone is not to exist. The romantics talked so grandly about solitude only because it was their real horror, the one thing they could not bear." Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York, NY: Vintage, 1956), 51-2, quoted by Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 154.

Finally, consistent with learning to distinguish the possible from the impossible, the areas of hope from the areas of hopelessness, Lynch suggests that wishes must be educated. Beyond that, Lynch explains the elements of hope: waiting, mutuality, imagining, and "the taking of help."[376] Let us explain them:

Waiting. "There is a strong bond, almost to the point of identity, between waiting and hoping."[377] It is a wish that knows how to wait and go through a painful path -- if necessary. It is an active wait, rather than a passive product of apathy, of willfulness, or of despair. In this wait there is no anxiety or hurry because it is not dominated by the subconscious. This wait is able to live in time without getting out of control.[378]

In the notion of waiting Lynch introduces the experience of time.[379] Lynch goes so far as to say that our perception of life toward the definite is based on how our attitude toward time is, "either strain against it or to accept it."[380] For Lynch, the human being is always between a past and a future. Life goes through different stages and phases, it has moments of drama, comedy, tragedy, and epilogue. Time is what constantly teaches us because it is a source of irony. Lynch suggests living it as Aeschylus: advancing two leagues in good times and going back a league in difficult times, but always becoming wiser.

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[376] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 129.
[377] Ibid., 178.
[378] Cf. Ibid., 190-4.
[379] It was curious that Lynch did not further develop the question of time in *Images of Hope,* given its existential value. However, he treats it in William F. Lynch, "Time," in *Christ and Apollo. The Dimensions of the Literary Imagination* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004), 47–90, and William F. Lynch, "The Images of Faith and Human Time" (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 109–75. In the former, the main theme is that not only did God ignite creation in time, so it is good, but also God fully lived human time in Christ. Thus, God continues leading the creation and the fulfilling of his pledge. In the latter, Lynch depicts the stages through which the human being passes (childhood, the unexpected, building a present moment, the moment through infinite possibility, the passage through the curse, the tragic, death, and nothingness). Consistent with the rest of the book he remarks the need of images of birth, life, and death.
[380] Lynch, "Time," 50.

Mutuality. Lynch understands mutuality as "an interacting relationship, an interacting contribution that occurs between man and the world, or between person and person, or between man and God, from which something new and free is born."[381] Lynch goes so far as to affirm that the loss of mutuality is the biggest cause of mental illness today.[382]

Today we tend to distrust the world based on an exaltation of independence. (We make ourselves believe that by accepting our dependence we are sacrificing our autonomy.) The world is perceived as hostile so we no longer breathe in unison with the world as Lynch signifies poetically.[383] Lynch calls this mentality "gnostic imagination" because it works from ideas, underestimating worldliness, and by not allowing part of our sensitivity to be affected. Lynch claims that gnostic people deny our impulse to possess (object) and to want to be (self).[384] They simplify and dichotomize reality and, accordingly, they expect a single word, maybe a magic word (religious or not), to deal with the issue.

The Gnostic mentality is based on internal confusion and the battle between love and hatred, the desire for freedom and the need for others. In fact, Gnostics do not know how to love in such confusion. In comparison, the mature person has sufficient clarity regarding its identity and sufficient confidence in being a separate identity to experience closeness without mingling suffocation.[385] That is why Lynch says that part of the healing process lies in reaching or reestablishing relationships with others and with the world.[386]

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[381] Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 169.
[382] "The breakdown of many forms of relationship, and of the hope it invariably creates, is probably a source of the waves of mental illness and anxiety that flourish among us. We become increasingly aware of this." Ibid., 170.
[383] Cf. Ibid., 160.
[384] Ibid., 113.
[385] Ibid., 92.
[386] Cf. Ibid., 170.

The Gnostic imagination tends to question everything and give a personal response and as a result, the person lives in an indefatigable and endless moralism and psychologism.[387] If ordinary life is a permanent battle of "oneself" against the world, then one perceives the other as separate from oneself, being affected by one's belonging to the human race. Which reminds us of the dynamics of despair (supra). But there is something else, the Gnostic mentality has put morality in the wrong place, namely: one has placed morality in self-sufficiency and pride, instead of in the truth and the construction of a society. Because of one's subjective moralism, because one does not trust the world, this subject may have disregarded the notion of sin and reconciliation (quite characteristic for Christian interiority), but it does experience social and labor expectations which keep one alert as if it were a trial.[388]

The taking of help. For Lynch is clear that the one who lives open to hope and trusts the world sees stories and comprehends reality completely differently from the one who lives in hopelessness and distrust.[389] He makes the case when he discusses a metaphysics of hope. Lynch argues that inwardness and imagination were given by God.

In effect, by accepting our dependence on the world (including the others), we are not constraining our freedom but guaranteeing it. We are tolerating our ambiguous nature with the premise that negativity and hopelessness do not reign.[390] We do not seek to deny part of reality but we want to know and distinguish it in order to reach some "definiteness," and

[387] Ibid., 169.
[388] Ibid., 174.
[389] Cf. Ibid., 124.
[390] From another point of view, we can argue that fantasy and negativity are two ways of facing reality. The former by avoiding it and the latter by partially facing it. Cf. Ibid.

"rest" and to love well.[391] Without this accomplishment we are only apparently autonomous. We need grace, namely: everything that comes from outside to constitute our inwardness, to sustain our identity, and enlighten our autonomy. But we have the power to recognize, accept, and wisely integrate those gifts; without this there is no such hope.[392] "Reality is healing for those who are without hope, and it is the separation from reality that causes despair."[393] And this is so, because, for Lynch, God does not become less by leaving autonomy to reality, allowing grace to be "mundane"; on the contrary, by giving up his power over reality, that is, by granting autonomy to his creatures, God demonstrates all his powerful goodness.[394]

In conclusion, Lynch's anthropology is an anthropology of hope. The fundamental elements of hope are wishing, waiting, mutuality, and "the taking of help." If the person trusts the world, then it will be easier for him to establish a relationship between his interiority and that which surrounds him. When the opposite becomes a habit, then mental distortions appear.

We tend to absolutize desires which gradually separates us from the world that constitutes a humanizing place for life, "the human valley." The absolutizing instinct makes the wishing, the waiting, and mutuality become atrophied little by little. That is the way hopelessness contaminates hope. In effect, if there is no wish, or the wishing is distorted, then there will be nothing to wait for, nothing to hope for. Likewise, our imagination and our

[391] Ibid., 175.
[392] Recalling Lynch's dialectical irony, we see two poles which are internally organized with different priorities. The very first is our disposition to trust and receive, so dependency. "Religious obedience requires persons more mature than usual to accomplish its ends and to avoid its potential risks." Ibid., 205.
[393] Cf. Ibid., 191, 209.
[394] "I would like to talk of a God who does not make things impotent, or annihilate their resources and their identity, by entering so deeply into them. The final test of his powers, as of all healthy human relations, is that he communicates autonomy: he does not destroy but creates by entering in. If, therefore, we really wish to imitate God, let us make men free." Ibid., 112. In the Thomistic line "grace perfects nature."

ability to imagine is stiffened because it tramped in past events. Apathy, or boredom, and negative identity are two phenomena of the process of hopelessness. That is why Lynch makes the case that depression, addictions, and aggressiveness are symptoms of hopelessness.

Imagination creates possibilities of the future; imagination makes reality expectable. Thus, if a desperate person receives an external imagination he/she may start wishing again for the taste of being human. This imagination activates him to reestablish his relationship with the world again. The way to nurture hopeful sensitivity/sensibility consists in trusting the "doctor" (be it a professor, a relative, a surgery, or an economic aid, etc.). In this *fiat* is where Lynch places the human condition for hope: a genuine disposition toward receiving help from any kind of autonomous thing of the world; a dependence that actually frees us and rehabilitates our autonomy. Without this disposition help cannot be received as a nourishing gift and internal confusion will tend to misunderstand it. That is why everyone (especially adults) can and must be part of this process of creating hope in the city of man for those who tramp in shadow.

Chapter 4: Rethinking Identity in Hope

In this chapter we put Metz and Lynch into dialogue in order to consider the role of hope in the crisis of identity and its rehabilitation. At the end of each conclusion we contrast the result with characteristics of the ideal mature identity we have developed in Chapter Two.

4.1. Hope a Fundamental Element of a Vulnerable Human Being: Disposition to Trust and the Communitarian Dimension of Hope

As we have seen, both Metz and Lynch find hope foundational for the human person. In their view, hope is not simply a happy feeling or mere optimism (poor self-help psychologies); nor is it easy. Hope must take account of the very difficult realities that human beings face: apathy, boredom, negative identities, depression. In the face of such factors, Metz argues that persons often become apathetic (individualism), harden their sensitivity (techno-scientific rationalism), or turn religion into "an ornament for their celebrations" (bourgeois religiosity). He believes this happens when we forget the suffering of the just fruit of psychologies, philosophies or theologies that interpret progress as a history of those who have won. Similarly, Lynch speaks about apathy, boredom, or being separated from the world ("losing the taste of the human"). In the face of such realities, an absolutizing instinct can furtively lead us to unreal fantasies that, paradoxically, constrict a healthy, realistic imagination (and wishing) in such a way that we gradually lose contact with what must be enough to humanize us. Both theologians indicate ways of being that depict impoverished, even sick, versions of the human, as in the case of depression, negative identity, or schizophrenia. In such cases, the human subject may be in a crisis of hope without knowing it. One's freedom is not as free as one believes and, as a result, one suffers from a distorted humanity, and can inflict suffering on others.

Beyond that, Lynch's phenomenology of hope helps us re-read what Metz has analyzed with his critical dialectic of history: the person has reduced reason to instrumental reason and so has devalued anamnestic reason; the person is fundamentally memory. In comparison, Lynch explains to us the inner process that has led the Western subject to that damaged subjectivity: an absolutizing instinct gradually alienates us from the world by an exaltation of our independence -- exaltation of the self -- leading us into a state of hopelessness. The result is a person who struggles in living ordinary life, preferring always "to be somewhere else," always trying to imagine the world differently from its real demands in order to satisfy a longing to "be happy."

With pride such a person does not consider the possibility of having been trapped by an absolutizing instinct which takes one away from the real world. That is, one is not able to imagine how to peacefully live with the ambiguity of one's emotions: love and hate, dependence and independence, etc. One has simplified the complexity of the world, believing that the happiness longed for will be obtained by pursuing gratifying and positive emotions, and avoiding, or disregarding the value and truth of (apparently) negative emotions. Such a person wants to be independent and is afraid to experience dependency, as if the latter were going to take away one's autonomy. In the end, one has denied that one is a vulnerable being at one's core because vulnerability is considered something negative or humiliating.[395] One has lost the capability to imagine internal conflicts. That is why Western identity struggles

[395] We have already mentioned that Lynch does not discuss the moral character of hatred, rage, or ideology (idolatry). That issue becomes even more controversial when we discuss about a mentally ill. In comparison, Metz approaches this question from an anthropological point of view. He believes that recovery of the true human entails the realization that a person's life is worthwhile, not only because of the feelings of joy, but because of being able to experience compassion and thus sadness. Hence, the person is not only worthy for his intellectual ability or success, but also for his ability to recognize his sin. Metz sums it up in the ethics of *compassio* and the *homo peccator* concept.

with confusion: ambiguity has been hidden or neglected, so one cannot properly imagine ways to reconcile internal conflicts. From the perspective of faith, one can say that understanding vulnerability/dependence in a negative way has led the individual to lose consciousness of sin.

In order to recover, Lynch suggests that we need to activate our wishing again and widen our imaginations. Our recovery involves accepting the fact that we are dependent beings and that our vulnerability is not negative, it need not humiliate us. (Remember the image of the patient-doctor relationship: only when the patient in a non-intellectual act decides to trust the doctor, can the patient receive the external imagination that the doctor wants to provide; then the patient recovers his internal resources and becomes properly autonomous.) Our nature was designed to be originally dependent, to experience mutuality, and to receive help from the aid/grace that surrounds us; otherwise "we get sick."[396] If there is a willingness to trust the world, we can learn to distinguish and order the ambiguity of our interiority. Then the internal confusion no longer reigns within us and we can access the world with freedom and autonomy, with an "ideal wish" capable of wishing the world well; that is, according to how things demand to be treated.[397]

[396] It is worth noting that one for whom sensitivity and sensibility is oriented towards being primarily a receiver and a vulnerable person, will perceive the world with gratitude. On the contrary, the one who has retired its sensitivity because the world appears hostile to him, will perceive it with domination and justification. For the former it is easier ("natural") to stablish relationships between the interior and the outside, whereas for the former it is an engineering task.

[397] Lynch even says that where there is inner confusion there is a difficulty to love. "Where there is maturity in and love between two people, there is no confusion… There is indeed self-acceptance and a minimum of envy… There is a degree of confidence in their separate identities which gives them a certain ease in allowing a close relation to grow." Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 92. Neither Lynch nor we have defined what we assume by "how things demand to be treated" but we have made some references with which embrace that idea: the hermeneutics of the Incarnation and the poverty of spirit in Metz, the education of our sensibility in Lynch, the role of the narratives in transmitting common values to be able to experience us as belonging to the humans in Mary Warnock, the non-domination Biblical mindset referred by Johnson in her study on Darwinism theory, *Ask the Best*. All of them have been made in order to reach a common understanding of the world as humans -- and common here does not mean uniformity, rather truth; true humanity.

Based on the above, Lynch imagines "the city of man" and calls upon all to be active in building spaces where human beings grow in mutual trust. For this he claims two things: we must expand our notion of the human (e.g. those who are mentally ill are indeed sick, but still human); and we must understand ourselves as potential help-beings for others.[398] In this project the images of faith help us, since Lynch considers Jesus Christ as the model of being human. (In our next thesis we will see how Metz argues Lynch's exhortation to the human project.)

What is clear is that no one will commit to the world if he/she does not trust it, if the person "trusts" the world only as a way to get material resources from it. For example, if we have no interest in delivering the world to future generations.

Finally, we will contrast the above with the results of our investigation of Chapter Two on the ideal mature identity.

Mary Warnock's theology of knowledge described imagination as a function of the mind which allowed us to access the world and break our solipsism. For example, because of our imagination and human empathy we can understand what "she has a headache" means. Likewise, we must share common values transmitted through narratives, including autobiography (i.e. identity). For Warnock a poor imagination of the human has important consequences. For example, she argues that moral relativism isolates us and dismantles us as members of the human species, so it destroys empathy and the possibility of values. To make

[398] Remember that for Lynch God granted autonomy to creation. This implies that God conceded the creation to be his agents, particularly to the person because of his capability to imagine what can become world (see note #394).

a direct connection with Lynch, we become alienated from a sensibility for the human and thus we lose our common ground of understanding the world.

Moreover, the psychosocial theory of Erikson affirmed that the development of the person goes through different stages, each of which involves the resolution of certain tension. For instance, in infancy the tension trust-distrust is resolved as hope. However, this hope is not definitive, but rather it unfolds according to the epigenetic principle throughout the other stages and tensions. Hence hope continues to develop in the early childhood stage, the adolescent stage and so on.

In conclusion, we have the ability and autonomy to adopt a fundamental stance of mistrust vis-à-vis the world, but if we do, we are going against our very nature and risk mental illness. If, on the contrary, are able to adopt a fundamental stance of trust vis-à-vis the world, it will be easier for us to make the bridge between interiority and the world and humanity.

4.2. Hope a Dynamism to Endure in Life (and History): through Hopelessness to Hope

Metz speaks about an eschatological hope with apocalyptic character; some criticize him for suggesting a pessimistic spirituality or a pure asceticism. Lynch proposes a criterion of discernment based on the taste of humanity and hope.

We fall into ideologies and apathy when we consciously or unconsciously understand life as a story of success, happy feelings, and merit. But that is not the whole truth of life and history, says Metz. When we look at the suffering of the just (as, for example, at Auschwitz), the question of meaning breaks us down. Victims of unjust violence reveal the deficiencies of our monochromatic image of a successful life. Unjust suffering confronts us with a dilemma: apparent meaninglessness -- the perfect justification for alienation, hopelessness,

and struggling for survival, or the incomprehensible Mystery (Metz quotes Augustine: "*si comprehendis non est Deus*"). He argues that the suffering of the just opens our eyes and frees our capacity for compassion and commitment. Narratives of the victims have saving power since the rational faculty of the person is anamnestic. If that memory has as its hermeneutical principle the paschal mystery of Christ then dangerous memories can be redeeming.

Metz allows us to differentiate three types of suffering: physiological suffering (e.g. experiencing cold, heat, or lack of food), suffering as a result of sin (i.e. injustice), and the optional exercise of our freedom (i.e. service, *agape*, love). The latter, which refers to *pathos*, is the one Metz adduces in his "open-eyed mysticism," in his "poverty of spirit." Once our sensibility has been liberated, those narratives will exercise, through prayer, our *pathos* in order to build the true moral and religious subject. The exercise of our *pathos* also has a practical-political dimension, namely commitment to the world and its history. This commitment lies in jointly seeking the end of oppression and preserving a memory so as to awaken/liberate others. Metz sums it up in the liturgical formulas "do this *ex memoria Jesu Christi*" and "Maranatha! (Come Lord!)."

On the one hand, since we seek the end of oppression and liberation, hope in Metz is apocalyptic (-- that is to say, it reveals already now what is to come). On the other hand, since the final end will occur only in the *eschaton* of the second coming of Christ, hope in Metz is eschatological. Therefore, we can conclude that we not only discover our true humanness but build it in relation to the suffering of the just. Our identity is built on this twofold hope.

Up to this point we can re-read Lynch with the understanding of prayer in Metz. Prayer, which is asking the Spirit of God for God, is not a mere spiritualism that would justify

escaping/avoiding/turning away from the world. It has a political dimension and works as follows with Lynch's insight: the prayer of petition assumes a wish, and increases it to imagine a just future.

But Metz' hope seems to be a bit obscure and stoic. Lynch can help us complete what Metz assumes in his spirituality.

Lynch's treatise on hope not only gives us guidelines for living in hope, but hope becomes a criterion of discernment[399]: by the effects, by the quality of our hope we will know if we are on the right path, or by being alienated from the world by fantasies where we want to obtain unreal gratifications. Lynch's strong principle is that true hope introduces us to "the human valley." When that happens we do not want to flee from that valley because we find to taste of the human and the wish to belong to humanity.

Now for Lynch there is a hopelessness that is purifying. One way of perceiving that we are living a fantasy guided by the subconscious is when hopelessness appears; that is when the bay of hope is flooded with hopelessness. It may be sad and hopeless to journey through obscurity to the light signed by hope, but to desire that light by waiting actively and in a disposition of commitment to the real world becomes healing. Then we start re-establishing right relationships with the world and feel the pleasure of being human again. Through correct relationship with the world our imagination restores existence to existence.[400]

[399] Fr. Lynch was a Jesuit and this point reminded us of the rules of discernment of the Spiritual Exercise. We made this connection in conversation with our mentor Fr. Casey Beaumier, S.J. See also Kane, *Building the Human City* which explores Lynch's thought from the Ignatian spirituality point of view.
[400] Noted here Lynch's metaphysical notion of hope (see note #331).

Therefore, Lynch's hope criterion of discernment offers a way to colorfully live Metz's mystic-politic spirituality.

Finally, we contrast the above with the results of our investigation of Chapter Two.

Mary Warnock argues that human identity is memory linked to our biology. It should be narrated to fully grasp it, to enlighten the subconscious and to perceive the emotion that it leaves. That is so because of the critical role words play in human minds. As we are working on a Christian humanism we are deriving the benefit from the emotion of gratitude by living as a result of hope.

Kohlberg explained the moral status of the human being with three levels and six stages. The third level corresponds to the moral principles stage. This is the level in which the human being not only makes adaptive decisions according to the mandate of its subconscious, but is liberated from it. (Note that it was not enough to know good principles, but that there had to be a cognitive change with regard to stage II). Therefore, on the one hand, we see that this is consistent with what Metz says about the liberation experience and remains in that state despite the adversities, "passion for God," or "hope against hope." On the other hand, we see that well-lived morality is not enslaving but, on the contrary, liberating. It makes us free to make decisions according to what is good, not according to our instinct of survival and mere gratification.

In conclusion, hope constitutes a dynamism and a way of discernment to endure in life and history despite obscurities and obstacles

4.3. Hope Invites the Person to Integrate Time and History

The experience of time is a crucial factor for hope. Metz and Lynch argue for two different emphases on the experience of time. On the one hand, Metz refers to the importance of historical time, due to the anamnestic character of our rationality. Not incorporating historical time leads us to cultural amnesia and problems to integrate and reconcile with the history of humanity (e.g. slavery, the Civil war, colonial memories, famine, etc.). Nowadays, we can see that this time is not sufficiently achieved in partisan ideologies which either forget or use history as a weapon rather than an instrument to enlighten humanness. On the other, Lynch refers to the importance of existential time and does so with the image of Aeschylus. Aeschylus accepts the contingencies, the passivities, and the different stages of life. Thereby time teaches us to learn as much from positive moments as from those which seem to delay us. Time and hope are related in the waiting process: not the waiting referred to by the (temporal) distance between now and the goal, but rather the learning process of deepening in existence.

Finally, we contrast the above with the results of our investigation of Chapter Two.

Mary Warnock argued that imagination finds one of its highest enemies in "a narrow and limited idea of the truth" and "a failure of historical sense … called 'present-mindedness.'"[401] This is precisely what we notice today. The idea of the truth tends to be reduced to moral subjectivism or techno-scientific proof. This truth tends to meet with the well, the newly-modern, or the successful. Also, existential time is lived as an ever-present of expected emotions. Finally, regarding historical time, a gap between generations has

[401] Warnock, *Imagination and Time*, 151.

emerged mainly because of technological reasons, while individualism has also ruptured the concern for future generations.

To conclude, hope, which has individual and communitarian dimensions, provides us with a way to integrate the existential and the historical. Dependence on how we live time determines our perception of life.

4.4. Conclusion

We have studied the notion of an ideal mature identity from different perspectives in order to identify some areas of agreement on the question. Afterwards, we investigated the subject's situation in the Western world. Next, we analyzed the theological anthropologies of Johann B. Metz and William F. Lynch with the aim of reflecting on the contribution of hope to the human being.

Then, on the basis of the way in which natural sciences (in this work psychoanalytic currents, cognitive psychology, neuroscience) think of the mind and the self as well as the way the sciences of the spirit (in this work philosophy, sociology, theology) think about the self, we endeavored to show that the crisis of the modern subject is on the anthropological level of hope, historically-culturally inherited.[402] Hope thus becomes a rehabilitating element of the subject, both individually and communally.

The structure of the mind and the way the process of identity formation works suggest that we must intentionally invest our imagination with hope in a way that shapes our disposition. By doing this, we will image the real to create possibilities while our sensibility

[402] Gallagher says through Eliot's words: "The trouble of the modern age is not merely the inability to believe certain things about God which our forefathers believed, but the inability to feel towards God and man as they did." Thomas S. Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets* (London; Boston: Faber and Faber, 1957), 25, quoted by M.P. Gallagher, "Culture and Imagination as Battlegrounds," 6.

(including our mind) is disposed positively for harder times, which will imply thereby strengthening resilience. Psychologically speaking, the aforementioned imagination may consist of trusting the world (which does not mean being naïve in ordinary "human transactions"), perceiving ourselves as members of a people, and incorporating time in our life through the "Aeschylean rhythm" as well as through the "inflation time." To do this, we must have a familiar, healthy approach to suffering, which is an integral part of being human and acting morally.

Hope is a theological virtue that is experienced personally. But this does not correspond to individualism, or the absence of suffering, or only a time of despair --"my" despair. At any time, in despair or not, the impoverishing human image of consumer-producer can be interrupted by dangerous memories *ex memoria Jesu Christi*, and since a central quality of hope is freedom, our idea of the human can be widened through imagination by the act of hope. From that moment, we can commit ourselves to history and society (echoing Metz), to the human city (echoing Lynch), and create an atmosphere in which to hope; a hope to relieve others' hopelessness and to dispel future despair. It is in an atmosphere of hope that true humanness rests: the wish to be truly human and belong to the human city.[403]

[403] Cf. Lynch, *Images of Hope*, 27.

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