

# Conflicted societies in motion: A study of individual and collective responses to drug-related violence in Mexico

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BOSTON COLLEGE  
School of Social Work

CONFLICTED SOCIETIES IN MOTION: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE  
RESPONSES TO DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

A dissertation  
by  
ANA MARÍA VÁZQUEZ RODRÍGUEZ

Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for a degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

March 2018

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**“Conflicted societies in motion: a study of individual and collective responses to drug-related violence in Mexico”**

**A dissertation**

**by**

**Ana María Vázquez Rodríguez**

**Dissertation Chairs: Dr. Margaret Lombe and Dr. Alfonso Hernández Valdez**

**Abstract**

Drug-related violence in Mexico has grown into a profound social problem, aggravating existing insecurity, vulnerability, and citizen’s wellbeing. In critical scenarios of this kind, the virtues of social engagement for enhanced wellbeing, improved security and true democracy appear futile. This research examines how resources and incentives for mobilization operate. Specifically, social capital and political culture are studied as mechanisms that may affect those relationships. This research draws upon theories of Collective Action and Social Capital Theory. Also used are studies on the influence of emotions and perceptions on citizen’s collective mobilization. This approach contributes by accounting for informal participation and their various political loadings in conflict environments. To achieve the objective, Regression Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling were conducted. The study uses secondary data collected in 2011 (N = 7,416) using a probabilistic sample design representative of seven Mexican states selected by their levels of violence. Two subsamples were constructed to examine the varying effects of social and political resources on mobilization across regions (north and south). Results show the emotional component associated with citizen’s mobilization for collective action. The findings also exhibit social capital and political culture as key indicators of people’s decision to organize for social

change. Finally, intriguing results related to the “negative form” of social capital were observed. To be precise, social capital appears to be insufficient to explain citizens' motives to mobilize with others for social change. Implications for policy and scholarship are presented. Specifically, initiatives regarding the importance of the effects of the weakened democratic environment, social lack of trust, government unresponsiveness and impunity, and self-directed processes of justice at the community level are highlighted.

### **Dedication**

To Rafael and Andres,  
for trusting that "playing for peace" has merit,  
your life sustains my hope.

## **Acknowledgements**

This Ph.D. was a formidable academic journey and a challenging personal search. During these years, the support of many was crucial for this achievement. I am thankful to my dissertation chairs, Dr. Margaret Lombe and Dr. Alfonso Hernández, for guiding me during the course of this project. Our many conversations were always enriching and instrumental for my work, as they helped me navigate the crisis and enlightened my way out of the chaos of the conflicting academic duties. Margaret, you kindly heard my concerns and respected my intuitions, kindly offering directions to build stronger avenues for my work. From the moment we met, you were caring and passionate about my proposal. I have learned to venture into new projects because of you. Alfonso, I will always be grateful for your advice, even years before the doctorate, you have helped me move forward, to clarify and define my research in order to become a stronger scholar. In the early days, you helped me understand my place in the doctoral program and the promises that awaited from academic work. Dr. Gustavo Morello, Sj, the third member of my doctorate committee, joined the project with enormous enthusiasm and support after a touching and enriching conversation in the summer of 2016. Gustavo, our brief and substantial interaction since you joined my doctoral committee has been crucial to this work. Your thoughts, questions, and notes of the project as well as your guidance towards incorporating a new dimension to the proposal was decisive for the outcome of this study.

I am also indebted to Boston College and ITESO, two Jesuit institutions that made invaluable efforts to launch and support the International Program in Social Welfare. Without the leadership and tenacity of Dr. Jim Lubben in partnership with former Dean Dr. Alberto Godenzi, the project would not have taken flight. At ITESO, Dr. Carlos Moreno and Dr. Elizabeth Prado supported the program and aided me in resolving academic and administrative vicissitudes. They convinced me to join the program and made it possible. Carlos and Elizabeth, your perseverance

and support for the program have been crucial to the training of Mexican researchers. I am also thankful with the Santander Foundation and ITESO for their financial support during the years I spent in Boston.

This endeavor could not have been possible without the enthusiasm, trust, and support of Dr. Jim Lubben. Jim was always present, his wise words and patience helped me solve many of the little complications involved in commencing a challenging doctoral program far from home. Jim, thank you for sharing so much at academic and personal levels. The help and warmth of Ali Burk and Chabeli Nadal was essential to navigate the new city. Ali, you opened your heart for us, making us feel at home from our arrival. You kindly checked on me all the way through *comps*, the move to and from Boston, and during the first snowstorms. Chabeli, you were always caring, empathetic, practical and optimistic; a unique combination of qualities that fitted perfectly, as you helped us solve logistics necessary to defend the proposal and the dissertation in a stress-free environment. I am also deeply grateful to Brenda Vitale, a joyful and welcoming soul who showed me the great fun of living in the Boston area. Brenda, thank you for saving my books and notes from the lost mail.

My gratitude goes also to the faculty at Boston College and ITESO, who taught me a new and challenging vision of social policy, social work and social welfare, and statistics. Dr. Kevin Mahoney, Dr. Ruth McRoy, and Dr. Ce Shen, along with Dr. Eve Spangler, Dr. C. Shawn McGuffey and Prof. William A. Gamson from the Sociology department; Dr. Rossana Reguillo, Dr. Enrique Valencia and Dr. Rocio Enriquez from ITESO and, outside Boston College, Dr. Bridget Conley-Zilkic at the Tufts Fletcher School. You all kindly made room for me in your seminars, offering me a wide range of theoretical and methodological insights that made me a stronger and more confident researcher. Particular thanks to Dr. Shen, who patiently observed



and accompanied my statistics-learning process for me to find the usefulness of statistics to my current and future work.

During the doctoral quest, I was always accompanied by the love and care of my family and friends. With Pablo Gaitan, my Mexican ally, I shared the excitements and anxieties of being the first cohort of the international doctoral program. Pablo, we have a one of a kind friendship that got stronger over coffee, long dinners, a few whiskeys, and numerous winter adventures. Pablo and Lila, you gave me a one of the kind birthday present, I will keep it forever. My Boston family is the heart and the brain that kept me going. You were with me during my own “statistical epiphany” and helped me discover the joy of converging statistical models. With you, I could “take the T just because” and share the taste of sushi and wine after long hours on the sixth floor. We crossed the city - and the country- just for the pleasure of being together. Aakanksha, Anne, Leia, and Sarah, I may grow old first, but I know I will have you for the rest of my life. Ana Sofia, even from a distance, you have advocated for me for more than 15 years; you have stayed close to share my achievements and fears with incomparable wisdom and love. Sylvia, my partner in crime, without you in my life I would not have arrived this far; you are the one who patiently listens and is not afraid to differ, who awaits solidarily, celebrates proudly, and laughs madly. My mother and father have always encouraged me to work hard, defend my convictions and achieve my goals. The dreams and sense of duty of my Grandfather and Uncle continue to inspire me... I still miss our conversations. My brother-in-law’s support and encouragement have been essential for me. Thank you all for your understanding and love \*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Chapter 1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Problem statement .....	1
1.2 Significance of the study .....	1
1.3 Background of the study .....	5
1.3.1 Mexico's levels of violence and the War on Drugs.....	7
1.4 Theoretical focus .....	14
1.5 Research questions and specific aims .....	15
<b>Chapter 2. Literature review and Theoretical framework .....</b>	<b>20</b>
2.1 Background studies: overview of the literature.....	20
2.1.1 Individual characteristics and mobilization for collective action .....	20
2.1.2 The effect of context and location on mobilization .....	22
2.1.3 Social capital in relation to political culture and collective action .....	23
2.1.4 The association of emotions and experiences with collective mobilization.....	27
2.2 Overview of existing works on the Mexican context of violence .....	29
2.3 Overview of the Theory .....	34
2.3.1 Social Capital Theory .....	34
2.3.2 Collective Action theories .....	38
2.3.3 The study of emotions and political culture for collective action .....	41
2.3.4 Summary of the theory .....	45
2.4 The focus of the research .....	47
<b>Chapter 3. Methods .....</b>	<b>49</b>
3.1 Description of the data .....	49
3.2 Study Sample.....	50
3.3 Study variables .....	52
3.3.1 Dependent Variable .....	53
3.3.2 Independent variables for the main analyses .....	54
3.3.3 Other independent variables of interest .....	58

3.4 Analysis plan .....	61
3.4.1 Data preparation .....	62
3.5 Statistical Analysis .....	62
3.5.1 Univariate and bivariate analysis.....	62
3.5.2 Multivariate analyses.....	63
<b>Chapter 4. Results.....</b>	<b>72</b>
4.1 Preliminary results.....	72
4.1.1 Univariate Statistics.....	72
4.1.2 Bivariate Statistics .....	76
4.2 Multivariate procedures.....	77
4.2.1 Regression analysis.....	77
4.2.2 Structural Equation Modeling .....	79
<b>Chapter 5. Discussion .....</b>	<b>91</b>
5.1 Relation of the findings to the theory.....	91
5.1.1 Individual characteristics and the effect of the context on mobilization.....	92
5.1.2 Social Capital and Political Culture levels influence on mobilization .....	97
5.1.3 The relationship between Social Capital and Political Culture with Emotions.....	98
5.1.4 The importance of Emotions for mobilization .....	100
5.2 Study limitations .....	103
5.3 Implications and recommendations of the study.....	105
5.3.1 Lessons for politicization: institutions, democracy and law enforcement.....	105
5.3.2 Lessons for community engagement and social organization .....	109
5.3.3 Lessons for security: the advance of social capital based policy .....	112
5.4 Courses for future research .....	114
5.5 Conclusions .....	116
<b>References.....</b>	<b>119</b>
<b>Tables .....</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>Appendix A.....</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>Appendix B .....</b>	<b>147</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

<b>Table 1.</b> <i>Statistics of the study variables (N=7,416)</i> .....	135
<b>Table 2.</b> <i>Descriptive demographic statistics of the study sample (N=7,416)</i> .....	136
<b>Table 3.</b> <i>Descriptive statistics of the study sample (N=7,416): for Mobilization for Collective Action, Social Capital and Political Culture variables</i> .....	137
<b>Table 4.</b> <i>Descriptive statistics of the study sample (N=7,416): context and perceptions variables</i> .....	138
<b>Table 5.</b> <i>Regression analysis (other variables of interest) on Mobilization for Collective Action</i> .....	139
<b>Table 6.</b> <i>Regression analysis (study variables) on Mobilization for Collective Action</i> .....	140
<b>Table 7.</b> <i>Structural Equation Model coefficient results for the study variables</i> .....	141
<b>Appendix A</b>	
<b>Table A.</b> <i>Variables and original items used for the proposed study</i> .....	142
<b>Table B.</b> <i>Pairwise correlation of the study variables (N=7,416)</i> .....	146
<b>Table C.</b> <i>Covariance matrix for the study variables (N=7,416)</i> .....	146
<b>Appendix B</b>	
<b>SEM Output</b> .....	147

## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>Figure 1.</b> <i>Annual data on homicides in Mexico</i>	10
<b>Figure 2.</b> <i>Reported Annual kidnappings (SNSP investigation added to RENPED)</i>	11
<b>Figure 3.</b> <i>Conceptual Model</i>	47
<b>Figure 4.</b> <i>Map of the selected oversampled states</i>	51
<b>Figure 5.</b> <i>Map of the selected north region and south region states subsample</i>	51
<b>Figure 6.</b> <i>Analytical model</i>	61
<b>Figure 7.</b> <i>Analytical plan for Regression Analysis</i>	64
<b>Figure 8.</b> <i>Analytical plan for Structural Equation Modeling</i>	65
<b>Figure 9.</b> <i>SEM baseline model</i>	68
<b>Figure 10.</b> <i>SEM final model</i>	69
<b>Figure 11.</b> <i>Model 6 (baseline)</i>	80
<b>Figure 12.</b> <i>Model 6.1 (adjusted)</i>	82
<b>Figure 13.</b> <i>Model 7 (baseline)</i>	84
<b>Figure 14.</b> <i>Model 7.1 (adjusted)</i>	85
<b>Figure 15.</b> <i>Model 8 (baseline)</i>	86
<b>Figure 16.</b> <i>Model 8.1 (adjusted)</i>	88
<b>Figure 17.</b> <i>Model 9 Final model for the north region states</i>	89
<b>Figure 18.</b> <i>Model 10 Final model for the south region states.</i>	89

# **Chapter 1. Introduction**

## **1.1 Problem statement**

This research investigates individual and collective responses to crime violence in contexts of enduring conflict. The study will specifically examine the mobilization of Mexican citizens living in an environment of prevailing crime violence, instability, inequality, and governmental unresponsiveness. Four conditions of this setting will serve as a base for the study: i) an ongoing circle of vulnerability due to structural socio-economic violence, ii) a strong and widespread presence of organized crime, iii) political strain due to polarization in the relationships between citizens and government, and iv) a deteriorated quality of life.

Prevailing crime violence related to socio-political crisis and the deterioration of democracy and wellbeing has been largely studied across various disciplines (Adams, 2013; Banfield, 2014; Buxton & Eade, 2016; Little, 2014; Murshed, 2014). However, critical questions about the interplay of these factors and the spread of collective mobilization in unique conflict scenarios remain largely unexplored. Such an approach will be a fruitful source of knowledge to better comprehend the current conflict resolution strategies that aim to increase security and wellbeing for the construction of sustainable peaceful environments.

## **1.2 Significance of the study**

The significance of this study lies in its emphasis on examining citizens' collective mobilization in the face of ongoing crime violence and weakened institutional capacity. The research will explore the effects of criminal violence that is hindering mobilization. Additionally, the study will show the occurrence of collective mobilization for social change and its relationship to social capital, political culture, and context-related factors. Finally, it will examine social engagement across different localities to discuss the existing and potential, formal and

spontaneous forms of collective organization.

In recent decades, global achievement of welfare for all have been critically challenged by increased poverty, exclusion, corruption, and violence (Kawachi, Takao, & Subramanian, 2013; Lora, 2013; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009). Prevailing vulnerability and instability aggravate the extended presence and impact of organized crime violence, further deteriorating social welfare. Inequality has risen at different paces the past twenty years, almost everywhere in the world <sup>1</sup>. The main sources of inequality stem from criminal violence, income inequality and income share, government regulations, educational inequalities, gender disparity and wage setting policies, among others (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). The impact of prevalent conflict and extensive crime violence on individual living conditions are of primary concern as they compromise the future development of many generations.

The idea of enhanced wellbeing appears futile within contexts of enduring conflict, (Cohen-Chen, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2015; Little, 2014) and building sustainable peace in torn societies remains a dilemma (Lederach, 1997). Societies in permanent conflict face everyday violence, social unrest, disruption and political confrontation affecting all aspects of their daily lives; unresolved disputes continue to define social relations, producing enduring

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<sup>1</sup> 2013 figures estimate that there are 767 million people living below the international poverty line (US\$ 1.90 per person per day); this equals to 10.7 percent of the global population. Children are more vulnerable; half of those under 18 years old are amongst the global poor. While poverty rates have declined, it has so unevenly across regions: East Asia and the Pacific report more poverty reduction in the past years, while in Sub-Saharan Africa, half of the people still live in extreme poverty. Most of the global poor that live in rural areas have received deficient education and are employed in the agricultural sector (World Bank Group, 2016). Access to school has improved worldwide in the past 15 years; however, there is still a literacy crisis because of the slow start in learning and low performance scores. In 2016, 10 percent of children living in the low and lower middle-income countries were reported to remain out of school mostly because of poverty, violence, gender inequality, disability, caste systems and ethnicity; children living in conflict-affected countries being the most deeply affected. (World Bank Group, 2017).

societies (Little, 2014). In addition, the possibility of isolated political agreements for substantive change is extremely fragile; if achieved, the underlying conflict remains

This research has been performed in an environment with high levels of violence, weak government responsiveness and compromised democratic practices; in such an environment, people might refrain from participating and cooperating. Consequently, the investigation will explore the patterns and obstacles of collective mobilization as well as the apparent absence of citizen participation in societies facing violent conflict (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Edwards, 2014).

Both the viability and effectiveness of individual and collective engagement in contexts of enduring conflict remain unclear. Contemporary conflict studies focus on examining the forms and incidence of violence and conflict dynamics (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; Darby, 2012; Krause, 2012) with little attention to the extensive effect they have on citizens' lives. Yet, citizens' involvement in advancing democratic change and their practices for survival and self-protection are persistent (Cammett & Malesky, 2012; David A. Shrik, Wood, & Olson, 2014). Self-directed forms of participation can be a critical resource for the fight against violence and vulnerability while they also fuel social engagement and restore relationships between government and society (Campbell, 2014; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; Graeff & Svendsen, 2012, 2013).

Most studies on social organization have focused on form and structure (for example: research pertaining to social movements, organization memberships or political affiliations) (Oliver, 1993; Putnam, 1993; Tarrow, 2015; Warren, 2001). However, little has been said about the positive impact of informal and spontaneous forms of organization, such as neighborhood gatherings or group discussions on social change and security (Ratner, Meinen-Dick, May, &



Haglund, 2013; Stockemer, 2013). By investigating levels of individual engagement in mobilization activities, this study contributes to a more complete account of the forms of organization and their various political loadings.

The intensity of organized crime violence as a feature of the environment in which mobilization occurs is of central interest to this investigation. Research on crime and drug-related violence that characterize long-lasting conflicts is quite recent and scarce (Abello-Colak & Guarneros-Meza, 2014; Cockayne & Lupel, 2009). The dominance of organized crime and the spread of crime violence have detrimental effects in an already damaged relationship between citizens and their governments in these environments. This situation needs to be revisited. As new actors take the stage within violent environments, the state's monopoly of violence continues to transform itself. A follow up of the participating actors would surely lead to better understanding of the citizens' engagement with criminal groups: What works for them? How do they mediate conflicts that continue to change? How and why do they play a part towards covering functions usually pertaining to the state? Why do they sometimes serve as stabilizing factors within these environments? (Peace Focus, 2013; World Bank Group, 2011).

This research will highlight the ways in which self-directed citizens' responses relate to the functioning of the institutional structure, consequently affecting social cohesion, crime contention policies and social welfare. The findings will help us comprehend resource use and strategy development for improved living conditions in contexts of persisting violence (Edwards, 2014; Heffron, 2000; Sabet, 2013), an urgent matter with critical implications for social welfare, social policy, conflict management and policy intervention research.

This investigation also builds upon the principle that cross-area study will better capture the complexity of contexts of persisting violence. The national violence level can no longer be

the sole unit of measurement for the analysis of conflict and violence (Paffenholz, 2014; Straus, 2012). For that matter, micro and meso levels have proved to be as relevant as macro realms (Nepstad, 2013; Straus, 2012). Guided by this perspective, the hypothesized relationships of this research will account for peoples' places of residence (Trejo & Ley, 2015). Specifically, the observed differences across regions will show citizens' positive use of certain type of resources to develop mobilization strategies to improve their wellbeing. Also, a study of the national conflict dynamics from within will put forward this research along with the most novel approaches in conflict studies (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Krause, 2012; Little, 2014; Paffenholz, 2014).

### **1.3 Background to the study**

In recent decades, fewer civil and interstate wars have occurred around the world; nevertheless, an increased number of conflict related deaths, notably due to criminal and urban violence (Paffenholz, 2014; Peace Focus, 2013). In Latin America, the second most violent region in the world (Schedler, 2013; Shirk & Wallman, 2015; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2013), crime and violence have escalated to worrisome levels. The homicide rate in Latin America doubles the worldwide average, accounting for 42% of the murders committed around the world; around 140,000 homicides per year (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2013).

Violence in Latin America is associated with the state of development and that of democratization (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). This has led to high numbers of human losses,

economic<sup>2</sup> and political consequences<sup>3</sup> (Carrion M., 2005). Further consequences such as higher levels of isolation, despair, distress, civic and social disengagement as well as the militarization of the public space, disrupt the lives of entire populations (Dávila-Cervantes & Prado-Montaño, 2014; Díaz & Meller, 2012; Salama, 2013).

The levels and features of violence in the Latin American region should be studied through their specific historical and social process, specifically concentrating on the events that occurred during the 1970's and 1980's. Existing social conflicts and structural factors (inequality, lack of governance, and corruption) meant that the region was an example of the atrocious relationship between structural violence and catastrophic policy approaches (Carrion M., 2005; Moncada, 2013; Salama, 2013; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2013). A wide variety of crimes are reported in Latin America, they include, but are not limited to, ethnic and racial intolerance, political repression, drug trafficking, child abuse, gender violence, domestic violence, as well as kidnapping, death threats and disappearances perpetrated by police squads or paramilitary groups (Diprose, 2008) .

As is the case in many parts of Latin America, Mexico's formal democratization has not translated into an improved quality of life, nor has it resulted in increased safety for citizens. Consequently, increased insecurity, general dissatisfaction with the government and the police intensified, basic human rights became less important and the weakened rule of law. El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala portray some of the most dramatic cases (Schedler, 2013) amidst a

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<sup>2</sup> If understood as business organization, drug cartels produce, transport and distribute drugs with the alliance of other criminal and state institutions. It has been estimated that drug dealing in Mexico has had a negative economic impact of about 4.3 billion dollars in 2006. Some economic gains, which remain unaccounted for, come from extortion, robbery, investment in technology and bodyguards that reinforce private security, bribery and rescue payments, among others (Robles 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Mexico's poverty has remained the same in the past decade; numbers remain at 52.3 percent since 1994 (Corona Juárez, 2014).

climate of extensive crime and violence, profound levels of poverty and inequality, which defines a situation similar to that in México (Azaola, 2012).

### **1.3.1 Mexico's levels of violence and the War on Drugs**

Along with Colombia and Honduras, Mexico's context of drug-related violence illustrates well the aforementioned complexity and the profound consequences of drug-related violence (Campbell & Hansen, 2014). The magnitude and consequences of violence in Mexico is endogenous as a result of an interplay between external factors, internal dynamics and complex interactions between different actors.” (Osorio, 2013b, p. 6)

Violence in Mexico is predominantly of the modern, organized kind. It has expanded since the late 1980s by means of corporative logic, investment in advanced technology, the emergence of new actors such as *sicarios* –assassins for the cartels–, *pandilleros* –gang members–, and *halcones* – which are street-level informants– as well as transnational crime networks and infiltration of the social system (Carrion M., 2005)<sup>4</sup>. Their criminal activities have diversified; apart from drug trafficking, *narcos* have integrated crimes of extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, gang violence and forced disappearance (Calderón, Robles, Diaz-Cayeros, & Magaloni, 2015; Pereyra, 2012). Another characteristic of the violence in the region, and particularly of Mexico, is that most homicides are targeted executions, (Rios, 2013) greed and retaliation against authorities or rivals (Duran-Martinez, 2015; Osorio, 2013b) and extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Historically, Mexican Authorities have confronted drug trafficking in Mexico via the

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<sup>4</sup> Drug cartels have developed from drug trafficking organizations to transnational criminal entities, mainly influenced by intentional and unintentional governmental policies, changes in illicit market logic, cartel mergers, and other innovations (Bunker, 2013). In Mexico, cartels have transformed from located drug trafficking families into regional drug cartels and global criminal organizations.

armed forces who operate through crop eradication, drug seizures and other tactics. By the end of 2006, the federal government launched the so-called “War on Drugs, an unprecedented frontal fight against criminal organizations (Corona Juárez, 2014),” (WoD). The lack of the state’s action towards security and the absence of a public safety plan has resulted in indiscriminate violence of critical consequences to the population (Duran-Martinez, 2015; Herrera-Lasso, 2013).

Between 2007 and 2010, Mexico accounted for the fastest growth rate for intentional registered homicides. As per 2016, the homicide rate had risen to 18%. Due to this increase, Mexico has occupied a place in the bottom quartile of the Global Peace Index since 2017, ranking at the lowest position in the region. Other spheres affected as consequence of the conflicted environment are freedom of information, government efficiency, corruption, and perceived state corruption (Killelea, 2014). Since the introduction of the militarized public security policy and its death toll<sup>5</sup>, the country has been immersed in a new civil war type of conflict for a decade (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Osorio, 2011; Schedler, 2013) representing a living example of crimes against humanity (Open Society Foundations, 2016).

Violence and the absent rule of law have become Mexico’s greatest threat. Since 2006, the WoD has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of human lives along with the people who have disappeared. The WoD has also risen the internal displacement rate, worsened the political strain and lost the trust of the public (see Figure 1). Officially, 90,246 intentional armed homicides have been reported between 2001 and 2014 resulting in a 185% increase (“How much

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<sup>5</sup> The casualty rate is now around 40 times higher than the established standard threshold used to observe the onset of civil wars, meaning that the death rate of this level of criminal violence is comparable to the onset of 50 civil wars, over the span of just six years. It has taken four times the lives people that died in the Median Civil War (Osorio, 2011; 2012),

do 90,246 dead weigh?”, 2014). According to other reports, the overall homicide rate grew by over 260% from 2007 to 2010 (Human Rights Watch, 2011) and drug-related homicides increased by 600% in the same period (from 2,766 in 2007 up to 16,603 in 2011) (Schedler, 2013, 2015). Over 5,000 people have disappeared<sup>6</sup> and around 230,000 people have been displaced<sup>7</sup> (Ley, 2015). The states with the highest level of intentional homicides are Guerrero, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, which are closely followed by Morelos, Michoacán, Baja California, Sonora and Tamaulipas (Calderón et al., 2015; “How much do 90,246 dead weigh?”, 2014)<sup>8</sup>. These states are the frontline in the fight for local and regional supremacy, and well as the scene of disputed areas between cartels (Campbell & Hansen, 2014). The five most violent cities in the continent are all in México: Ciudad Juárez, Acapulco, Torreón, Chihuahua and Durango<sup>9</sup> (Open Society Foundations, 2016; Salama, 2013).


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<sup>6</sup> Grave cases such as Ayotzinapa in 2014 have led to international involvement towards justice. One example of this is how national and international pressure created the specialized independent group GIEI, (Spanish acronym), which focused on forced disappearance and produced a series of recommendations for the government to solve cases (see GIEI).

<sup>7</sup> Forced displacement is both a reactive and a preventive action. Those leaving their homes due to crime, violence or fear, are responding to a generalized environment of insecurity and impunity (CMDPDH).

<sup>8</sup> During a month of Zedillo’s presidency, the average of serious crimes (homicide, extortion kidnapping and armed robbery) totaled 6,308 (1996-2000). The number increased to 7,629 during the Fox administration (2000-2006) and to 13,331 under the government of Calderon (2006-2012), which equals to a 75% percent increase compared to the last six years. The unofficial reported numbers of serious crimes between 1997 and 2011 added up to 13 million. Most victims were male (9 out of 10), a third of which were married “meaning that in just two decades almost 90,000 women became widows; 180,000 children lost their fathers” (Villagran, 2013, p. 125) due to crime violence.

<sup>9</sup> About forty percent of all drug-related homicides between 2007 and 2011 occurred in ten municipalities, Ciudad Juarez being the first, followed by Culiacan, Tijuana, Chihuahua, Acapulco, Gómez Palacio, Torreon, Mazatlán, Nogales, and Durango (Benítez Manaut, 2013). Attacks are more likely to happen in localities with: a) greater rivalry and violence between cartels for control over drug transfer b) greater fiscal autonomy and independent resources; and c) local opposition governments in states governed by the left where, federal authorities have left local authorities to fend for themselves in the fight towards organized crime for electoral reasons. (Trejo & Ley, 2015).




**Figure 1. Annual data on homicides in Mexico**

Source: Open Society Foundations. (2016). *Undeniable Atrocities. Confronting crimes against humanity in Mexico*. New York, pp.36.

This “cartel-state conflict” (Lessing, 2015, p. 1496), is a war of ever-changing opponents, tactics, and rules as cartels use coercive force to make policy changes to constrain institutional actors or limit forms of institutional reinforcement (Lessing, 2015). It has become a war of material gain where criminal violence and violence against the population has intertwined with corruption between state and enterprises. Local landlords, who take the role of government officials are in charge of law reinforcement. All the while, governmental spheres –involving the military and the political system- are infiltrated and controlled by organized criminals that access power at a municipal and state level<sup>10</sup>. Territories, resources and people are being controlled by

<sup>10</sup> Electoral cycles are frequently used by criminal groups to attempt against authorities and demonstrate what consequences await if authorities refuse to protect them or if they make an alliance with rival criminal groups. Violence and coercion are used against candidates and political activists, while citizens are threatened to vote for a specific party. Furthermore, elected authorities are usually forced to deliver a timely part of the municipal budget as well as their obedience. Organized crime also targets municipal

the drug market (Osorio, 2013b; Pereyra, 2012). However, there are some less affected areas where harmony and determination seem to nourish social strength, resistance and social change. (Pereyra, 2012; Schedler, 2013).



**Figure 2.** *Reported Annual kidnappings (SNSP investigation added to RENPED)*

Source: Open Society Foundations. (2016). *Undeniable Atrocities. Confronting crimes against humanity in Mexico*. New York, pp.36.

(SNSP: National Public Security System Secretariat (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública) RENPED: National Registry of Information of Missing or Disappeared Persons (Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas Extraviadas o Desaparecidas)

General concern over human right abuses has increased. In the past 10 years countless cases of torture, physical abuse, obstruction of justice, verbal or mental abuse, excessive or arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention against civilians have been identified (Daly, Heinle, & Shirk, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Such tactics aim to extract

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officials with positions in the areas of finance, security, transportation and trade regulation (Trejo & Ley, 2015).



information about organized crime or elicit forced confessions that would later be used to conceal the abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Most human right violations by security forces are never duly investigated and few drug-related homicides are actually prosecuted, which adds to the atmosphere of impunity, widespread abuse, and corruption (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Corruption, specifically that of the Mexican police, is viewed as a defining factor of the safety crisis, affecting the level of public dissatisfaction more than the violence itself (Sabet, 2014)<sup>11</sup>. Lack of confidence adds to fear that local authorities and justice departments may be infiltrated by organized crime and perceived corruption, which has led to alienated citizens and crime underreporting (Open Society Foundations, 2016). In Mexico, citizens are more likely to be to bribe the police, affecting the numbers of reported crime<sup>12</sup>. This situation feeds the vicious cycle of impunity and insecurity by protecting crime perpetrators and fostering criminal violence (Human Rights Watch, 2011; Sabet, 2014; Villagran, 2013).

The core of Mexican violence and criminal drug activities, lies in its structural motives and existing insecurity (Herrera-Lasso, 2013; Osorio, 2013a) which has been made worse in a climate of a political and economical crisis. The issue has facilitated the spread of drug crime across the country (Corona Juárez, 2014). The conflict in Mexico has evolved from being a struggle between organized crime and security forces to become an issue of national security. A situation of criminal and state violence, gang proliferation, a lack of education and of job opportunities have resulted in an immense number of victims. (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Montero, 2012; Salama, 2013).

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<sup>11</sup> Currently, Mexico stands as the most corrupt country among the OECD members (International Crisis Group, 2017).

<sup>12</sup> Recent reports indicate about 78% of crimes unreported; this “black number” (*cifra negra*) represents the body of crimes not registered by the authority (Villagran, 2013).

### *The absence of policy*

After more than a decade of the increasing drug-related conflict, the country lacks a clear policy towards dealing with the consequences of drug crime and the control of drug cartels. Public security issues remain critical. Since 2006, public security has been managed through law enforcement, the hunting down of drug-cartel leaders, and military operations, solutions that lack of concern over justice, the corruption of the police, and gang proliferation<sup>13</sup>. The situation remains unchanged. Consequently, affected individuals and communities have developed strategies to improve their living conditions (Heinle, Molzah, & Shirk, 2015; Mendoza Zárate SJ & González Candia SJ, 2016; Schedler, 2015).

The effect of violence expands beyond the number of deaths. A central concern for victims' organizations in the recent years has been the issue of double victimization (*doble victimización*); which means family and victims are targets of stigmatization and poor treatment (Villagran, 2013). The media tends to glorify drug crime, disseminate propaganda and reveal information that compromises crime-operations, finally hurting victims and their families all over again. While public space appears to have been taken over by criminals, the socially distressed have responded by pushing for self-defense groups, vigilantism, and lynching, therefore introducing a new critical dimension to the public security debate (Grayson, 2011; Olson, Shirk, & Wood, 2014). By taking the law into their own hands without directly challenging cartels and gangs, citizens have begun to act in their own neighborhoods against feelings of abandonment and threat, administering their own type of punishment in the name of

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<sup>13</sup> At the time this work was written the law of internal security was being debated and approved, with academics and organized society showing great concern. Other reforms, such as a constitutional human rights reform and the military code of justice reform- were previous developments that shed light to human right protection exposing the abuses of the military and federal police.

the community (Grayson, 2011).

Overall, the case of Mexico illustrates a conflict in which crime and violence have penetrated institutions at many levels. The conflict has inhibited and undermined the capacity of the state, enabled widespread corruption and caused major deficits to state formation (Morris, 2013; Olson et al., 2014) as criminal groups seize control over vulnerable territories that are valuable for drug trafficking (Corona Juárez, 2014; Osorio, 2013b). In addition, the incapacity of the state to prevent systematic violence has turned into a ‘two-sided failure’, as it is incapable of protecting the victims and is unwilling to do so (Schedler, 2014). The Mexican struggle to fight crime and drug-violence is not just about confrontation between the government and cartels, it is also a drug-related conflict between and within cartels, and of the government against the civil society (Campbell & Hansen, 2014).

#### **1.4 Theoretical focus**

This research will draw upon Social Capital Theory and Collective Action theories that examine the circumstances under which individuals mobilize to promote social change when living in contexts of enduring conflict. Additionally, in order to explore the hypothesized influence of the environment, the study will examine the political resources and motivations for mobilization as well as the individual experiences and emotions resulting from the living environment.

The set of resources individuals used to relate and build social relationships, the associations and the resulting social agreements is informed by Social Capital Theory (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988). It is believed that the realization of social capital will result in positive solutions to social problems, consequently promoting the generation of strong communities (Field, 2003; Portes, 1998; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). However, the degradation of social

living conditions related to distorted social bonds leading, in turn, to the degradation of social cohesion has also been observed (Portes, 2000; Wacquant, 1998). This research will be based on a broad perspective of social capital and will include context-associated factors that individuals use as resources to build strategies and alliances to improve living conditions (Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015).

Collective Action theories will also be used to account for mobilization of individuals for social change. This school of thought studies activities pursued by a group for social and political purposes (Ethridge, 1987; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004; Olson et al., 2014). The study of collective action requires observing a variety of individual and group identities, aims, roles, experiences, and values. Because of this, mobilizing with others is well related to the various contexts in which individuals live, as well as to various political motivations and opportunities for people to assemble and organize together (Edmonson, 2013). Consequently, the participation of civil society, as well as contention and struggle, are key factors that constitute collective action (Tarrow, 2015). Hence, Collective Action theories are suitable to study contexts of violence and the forms in which it restrains and stresses social movements.

### **1.5 Research questions and specific aims**

The purpose of this investigation is to study the resources used for collective mobilization by Mexican citizens living in context of enduring conflict. With that in mind, the specific aims defined for the research are:

- A1.** To evaluate forms in which the impact of crime violence on individuals living in enduring conflicts lead them to assemble and mobilize with others seeking social change.
- A2.** To assess the influence of a) social capital and b) political culture components (such

as levels of trust, social cohesion, and political awareness, among others) on people's mobilization for collective action.

**A3.** To examine the extent to which i) emotions and ii) experiences resulting from the context influence the ways in which people mobilize for collective action

**A4.** To understand the relevance of a) social capital and b) political culture as mechanisms for mobilization in contexts of enduring conflict where emotions and exposure to violence accumulate.

Accordingly, the investigation is guided by five research questions and their corresponding hypotheses as follows:

**Q1.** Are the individual characteristics associated with of a) social capital and b) political culture related to collective mobilization of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict?

**H1.1.** Individual characteristics (namely age, gender, education, and employment) will be associated with people's levels of trust, social cohesion and commitment with the community (realized Social Capital) and by their awareness, political knowledge and information levels (acquired Political Culture).

**H1.2.** The examined demographic variables will not be relevant by themselves as such, but they will be in relation to the context and other complex socioeconomic and political dynamics related to the living conditions.

**Q2.** Do the observed relationships have varying effects across locations?

**H2.1.** Variations of relationships that are observed across the territory are expected. A comparison of two groups of selected states will show the way

in which individuals use their social and political resources with the purpose of mobilization varies across locations with similar levels of violence but with socio-economic and historical differences (north and south regions).

**H2.2.** An extension of the regional differences will be observed within specific resources (Social Capital and Political Culture) used in each region, which will, in turn, result in different levels of collective mobilization.

**Q3.** To what extent do levels of social capital influence mobilization for collective action of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict?

**H3.1.** Social capital factors (trust, social cohesion and willingness to help the community) will influence people's mobilization for collective action positively.

**H3.2.** Social Capital is a protective factor in contexts ridden with conflict and crime; higher levels of Social Capital will lead people to mobilize with others with the purpose of social change.

**Q4.** How important is political culture for collective mobilization within these contexts?

**H4.1.** Because of Political Culture features, even in conflict environments, the more informed and aware citizens are about the political and institutional environment, the more inclined will they be towards mobilizing for social change.

**H4.2** In contexts of enduring conflict, political knowledge and awareness have a specifically strong role in the initiation of citizens' mobilization.

**H4.3** Additionally, the importance of Social Capital becomes stronger if citizens are encouraged to politicize.

**Q5.** How much do i) emotions and ii) experiences influence contexts for the mobilization for collective action?

**H5.1.** This research will show that the forms of collective mobilization (such as marching, petition signing and sit-in protests among others) will be variously affected by emotion levels (specifically fear) and the (direct or indirect) exposure to violence.

**Q6.** Is the relationship between i) emotions and ii) experiences with iii) collective mobilization mediated by a) social capital and b) political culture?

**H6.1.** In the context of the WoD, i) relational resources (trust, community networks, and social cohesion) and ii) political resources (information and knowledge about the political environment) significantly influence the effect of fear and experiences of violence in collective mobilization.

**H6.2.** Social Capital and Political Culture are mediating constructs that help transform the effect of the adversity faced by citizens in crime and conflict environments into mobilizing actions for social change.

**H6.3.** The mediating character of Social Capital and Political Culture will show the differentiated role of individuals and collectivities depending on the context they live in, which in turn influences collective mobilizations differently.

**H6.4.** Given the mediation of Political Culture, the influence of context-associated emotions and experiences on political action will be further supported. Specifically, fear of crime and experiences to violence strongly influence collective mobilization.

To answer the research questions, the subsequent chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents and discusses the theoretical framework used for the research, namely: a) Social Capital, b) Collective Action theories, and c) Approaches to Emotions and Political Culture. The applicable existing literature on the use of social and political resources for collective mobilization in contexts of conflict, and specifically in Mexico, is also presented in Chapter 2. Next, Chapter 3 presents and explains the methods along with the characteristics of the data set, the measures and the statistical procedures. Chapter 4 summarizes the study findings. Finally, Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the findings in light with current debates; implications for scholarship, policy and intervention levels are also discussed. The final chapter will also highlight future research possibilities for an enriched agenda, one to positively impact social welfare and the construction of peaceful and sustainable environments.



## **Chapter 2. Literature review and Theoretical framework**

An overview of the relevant studies informing the current research is presented in this chapter.

This review will allow the reader to recognize the extent to which current research is sufficiently informative for this investigation's interests; the gaps in scholarship will also be identified. As mentioned previously, this work is guided by studies on the role of social capital for social change, collective mobilization and political action research. The theoretical framework will be summarized in the second section. The chapter ends by presenting the conceptual model used for the research.

### **2.1 Background studies: overview of the literature**

Mobilization resources and collective action have been studied from different angles and with various purposes. Close attention is paid to individual and group features as well as to context-related variables that stimulate mobilization, which are most commonly defined as political sources for social change (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009).

#### **2.1.1 Individual characteristics and mobilization for collective action**

Individual characteristics influencing mobilization in violent contexts have been studied using a complex set of micro-level factors. A set of demographic, socioeconomic and opinion based variables were used by Hansen-Nord and colleagues (2014) to represent violence exposure. Distributed in negative gradients of violence exposure, a significant association of age with cognitive social capital was found (i.e. the younger age group correlated to lower social capital); the gradient was not observed for structural social capital. Associations with employment status and socioeconomic conditions (Deneulin, 2008; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; Sabatini, 2009) have also been explored. People with high socioeconomic status and high education, men and middle-aged people have been found to be more politicized and to

participate more actively in politics than others (Valkonen, 1969). However, these factors are usually treated within context, not in isolation. Even complex approaches are at risk of putting too much emphasis on the individual, and of inappropriately dealing with individual capabilities if wider development achievements are to be assessed (Stewart, 2005; Stockemer, 2013).

Because most individual features are associated to living conditions that come from or are facilitated by others –the family, the community or the government-, “placing individual subjects at the center stage of [an approach], maintains conceptual tension between the individual and his or her society” (Sabatini, 2009: 105). It has been found that individual factors are better understood if placed in context and in dialogue with macro-level environmental influences (Stockemer, 2013) and the diversity of political activities (Lorenzini & Giugni, 2012) allowing or inhibiting political involvement. For instance, Lorenzini & Giugni (2012) examine employment status in relation to the conditions of exclusion it produces, along with other alternatives of integration and participation performed by the unemployed youth. Similarly, Sabatini (2009) emphasizes the necessary study of social networks for development and well-being, which can nurture social cohesion and economic activity, resulting beneficial to individuals’ living conditions and wellbeing.

In this line of argument, research looking at the relationship between enhanced democracy and increased development (Beer & Mitchell, 2004) shows that strong social bonds and institutional transparency reduces violence and inhibits human rights violations. Special attention is given to civic participation as a protective factor that facilitates sustained development, enhanced justice and social stability (Graeff & Svendsen, 2012; Johnson, Headey, & Jensen, 2003).

### **2.1.2 The effect of context and location on mobilization**

Looking at living structures has proved useful for examining the tension between the individual and the conceptual recognition of the relational and contextual aspect of action (Deneulin, 2008). This approach looks at the necessary conditions for an individual to develop and flourish, and how their choices and their interconnection are affected. Similarly, studying the contextual factors influencing individual and group action enriches the analysis of social dynamics. For instance, Ratner (2013) assesses the characteristics of the resources and users, governance agreements, and collective institutions to determine the scope of cooperation in conflict environments.

Examples also include the study of contexts where opposite goals are pursued or excessive obligations are imposed (Graeff & Svendsen, 2012; Mustafa, 2005) and of the exclusion or reinforced degradation that results from negative bonding (Sabatini, 2009; Wacquant, 1998) and its detrimental effects. An “erosion of social capital” (Wacquant, 1998: 26) happens when public service organizations turn into instruments of surveillance and further depreciate the informal social capital available.

Modern values such as individualism and equality of opportunity are concerning (Heffron, 2000) as they displace the community as a point of reference and as a necessary source of social trust and cooperation. Everyday life experiences suggest that social networks may work as a double edged sword for wellbeing; on the one side, they nurture trust and shared values; on the other, they may allow group members to pursue narrow sectarian goals and lobby against other groups (Sabatini, 2009).

To address the incompatibility between aims and policies, a careful inclusion of other factors, such as the nature of group interactions, community leadership, and spontaneous social

organization might prove advantageous (Heffron, 2000; Montgomery, 2000; Ratner et al., 2013). Heffron (2000), for discussing policy implications and social capital, as well as the need for rules and agreements to be made in order to challenge and change structures.

A focus on the community's role when explaining the political arena helps to further distinguish structure from context (Johnson et al., 2003). Effective governance is vital for new responsibilities and structural change to move forward; this includes an analysis of the community, the available resources, as well as the nature of the neighborhood and its social capital sources and public interventions (Johnson et al., 2003). Observing the reciprocity of community values and norms as well as attitudinal and informal participation variables has proven to be useful for social capital development and to explain political participation and mobilization in contexts of weakened democracy and trustworthiness (Heffron, 2000; Klesner, 2003, 2007). However, research has shown contradictory outcomes requiring a critical look at the production and distribution of social capital (Wacquant, 1998).

### **2.1.3 Social capital in relation to political culture and collective action**

Mobilization analysis in unconventional settings also help understanding the political role of social networks. By focusing on citizen's formal political actions, research has shown the relevance of their participation in democratic transformation and in the construction of the political agenda (Pickvance, 2001; Stockemer, 2013). Looking at contextual influences in understanding individual inaction and action and at collective responses to dissatisfaction, throws a light towards understanding why some people participate in mobilizations or sign petitions and others do not (Pickvance, 2001).

Politics are at the core of social life and mobilization for change. Throughout politics, people change individually and collectively (Warren, 1990: 209). This perspective is grounded

on the intersection between power and conflict in line with democracy and democratization. In addition, having a political perspective on social processes analyses has proven to clarify interests, define the domains, and integrate everyday understandings of politics (Warren, 1990).

Political culture literature shows this is a highly contested area of research (Almond, 2000; Chilton, 1988; Formisano, 2001; Lichterman & Cefaï, 2006a). However, the necessity of a political account that extensively captures the relevance of political and democratic processes within a society is generally agreed. An examination of democratization trends on the political interest of human rights protection (Beer & Mitchell, 2004) offers a complex account of the role of context in the formation of political culture. Studies on politicization (composed of interest and knowledge about politics) are valuable to explain the variability of individual behaviors in context (Valkonen, 1969).

Political culture also results from people's political behavior in diverse environments (Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Durlauf, 1999), it stems from democratization processes where power, conflict, and violence intersect (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004; Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016; Loveless, 2013) and from the associations between victimization, crime, and political participation of crime victims (Bateson, 2012). Tragic events have been found to produce waves of concern and political action, affecting individual perceptions and changing political culture (Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016). Indeed, citizens' mobilization, a sense of social belonging, solidarity, and self-commitment to active participation are key conditions for the transformation of political culture (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004; Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016).

Change in political culture has also been studied in contexts of political unrest, as it is associated with perceptions of inequalities, global trends for resistance and alternative

globalization (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004; Loveless, 2013). Knowledge and organizational models transfer to enriched repertoires of action, constituted by harmony and tension due to coexisting diverse political cultures (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004). Similarly, when studying voter turnout, Atkinson & Fowler (2014) found reverse causation with social capital and community activity, as these characteristics appear to inhibit political participation. They conclude that social capital and collective action, often believed to be potential solutions to political participation, are actually competing political participation. In sum, evidence suggests that social capital and community activities could be either a complement or a substitute to political participation (Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012).

The association between violent and criminal contexts and the forms, shapes, and motivations for collective action have also been studied (González Gil, 2006) along with the ways in which the environment affects their effectiveness (Ratner et al., 2013; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Collective action has been found to be compelling in achieving broader social change, while no clear trend has been observed on whether it contributes to change citizen's opinions (Thomas & Louis, 2014). Consequently, the implications of strategic non-violent mobilization are under debate, specifically within contexts of high levels of distrust and corruption.

Understanding the intersection between social capital's mechanisms and the dominance of criminal violence lies at the core of this research. However, little has been said about these non-traditional conflict and post-conflict scenarios where grievance, opportunity and constantly changing circumstances affect conflict resolution (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; Little, 2014) as well as social and institutional dynamics (Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015).

It is of special interest to this research to explore the conditions in which the conflict became the norm in spite of reconciliation or peace processes (Little, 2014). For citizens living in

these environments, conflict persists and everyday life remains the same. In light with Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón's (2015) discussion, the length and intensity of current civil conflicts demand a new priority scheme for achieving resolution and reconstruction. This would mean exploring environmental dynamics and resources that could strengthen institutions and build up social capital (Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015).

Most research performed on these contexts focuses on showing the potential outcomes of social networks and resources in post-conflict countries as well as their possible positive or detrimental effects (Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Dinesen et al., 2013; El Hajj, Afifi, Khawaja, & Harpham, 2011). For instance, Cuesta & Alda's (2012) research found a negative statistically significant effect of interpersonal trust on victimization at the community level in Colombia. Other studies have also shown the implications of victimization at family and community levels (Payne & Williams, 2008) as well as the role of collective action in conflict for improved wellbeing and violence containment (Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; Ratner et al., 2013).

However, it has been proved that a decline in one measure of social capital, namely trust in individuals or cohesion, does not necessarily reflect a decline in all institutions and associations (Payne & Williams, 2008). Therefore, social trust and social activism should also be understood as having complex associations with violence and its causes (Hansen-Nord et al., 2014). This means that consequences of violent crime may vary differently for social capital components, which sustain the complexity that results from social capital and collective action constructs.

Finally, the paradoxical role of civil society in resource mobilization also requires further assessment. The possibility that some groups are more benefited than others because of their

relative social and political advantages, could produce contradicting outcomes (Son & Lin, 2008) or else obscure or inhibit interactions within a given social structure (Teney & Hanquinet, 2012). It is argued that, if social capital resources are embedded in individual and organizational networks, expressive and instrumental civic actions are produced from it (Son & Lin, 2008). These results show that, despite the faced challenges, there is a direct connection between social capital and civic engagement. In sum, as a combination of different social relationships, social capital takes various forms and is also linked to diverse forms of political engagement (Teney & Hanquinet, 2012). Furthermore, an extensive look of social and political participation is required for social capital possessed by the more disadvantaged social groups.

As the literature shows, the association between social capital and political culture has been clearly established. This connection has been notably observed in the political science literature by means of political culture and democracy debates. This line of studies suggests that norms of trust and participation develop after many decades, rules which are in turn used to explain the stability of democracies (Johnson et al., 2003). Studies on governance have also shown the viability of people for formulating and adhering to arrangements for common property management enabling long standing cooperation and sharing practices (Johnson et al., 2003).

#### **2.1.4 The association of emotions and experiences with collective mobilization**

The interaction between individual motives and collective interests is also important for analyzing mobilization and distinguishing between resources and outcomes. Emotions research allows a perspective on subjective critical components for collective action against violence and conflict (Baele, Sterck, & Meur, 2016) and it plays an important role in the creation as well as in the resolution of conflicts. Although the relevance of emotions in conflict has been proven (Baele, Sterck, & Meur, 2016; Bar-Tal & Rivera, 2007; Demertzis, 2015; Halperin & Pliskin,



2015), its conceptualization and measurement are still underdeveloped. For instance, on studying group-based emotional dynamics among Palestinians, Baele and colleagues (2016) developed a quantitative method to measure emotional worldviews and emotions configurations. As a result, the authors stress that the collective and circular dimension of the emotion, as it is first experienced individually, and intergroup dynamics are difficult to apprehend.

Specifically, emotion processes and regulation (Halperin, 2015; Halperin & Gross, 2011; Pearlman, 2013) as well as social mobilization built on emotions such as anger and desperation (Sabucedo, Durán, Alzate, & Barreto, 2011; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014) in contexts of repeated exposure to violence and crime have largely been studied. In this line of thought, Halperin & Pliskin (2015) have introduced an emotional process analysis to explain how individuals living in a society carry with them long-term factors that may shape structures and processes. Examination of emotions show that while anger, fear or hope lead to different types of actions, they are all necessary for the emergence of action, compromise and risk-taking, as well as the possibility of peaceful resolution (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Halperin, 2011).

The study of emotions in protest has shown that anger and indignation have a significant direct effect on people's intention to participate (Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). Anger has been found to have an important influence on positive emotions, which supports the importance of studying emotions in collective action to understand the key dynamics for social change (Sabucedo, Durán, Alzate, & Barreto, 2011; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). The exploration of driving forces (such as shared experiences, satisfaction, or empathy) for mobilization contributes to explain the extent to which social capital produces positive or detrimental effects (Puntscher et al., 2014; Schmid, 2002). For instance, Schmid (2002) calls attention to motive as a variable vital for understanding why some institutions remain underdeveloped and the role of sympathy and caring

in norm following.

Furthermore, by integrating emotions into models of political behavior, Groenendyk (2011) shows emotions provide a missing piece to understand collective action in democracies. As a result, incorporating emotive and sensitive components help produce clearer explanations about the conditions under which people engage in politics, therefore, facilitating political action (Groenendyk, 2011). Consequently, rather than focusing on the individual interest or political calculation, this perspective provides useful insights into the various forms of mobilization, aims and reciprocity relationships (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2011). More importantly, it understands that motivation results not only from anger, as people also need instrumentality, identity, and ideology, to actually protest and mobilize (Pearlman, 2013; van Stekelenburg et al., 2011).

## **2.2 Overview of existing works on the Mexican context of violence**

Recent studies on Mexico's current conflict have focused on the presence and character of violence (Azaola, 2012; Bergman, 2012; Calderón et al., 2015; Vilalta, 2014b) and its effect on citizen's lives (Enamorado, López-Calva, Rodríguez-Castelán, & Winkler, 2014; Ley, 2016; Shirk, 2011). The characteristics of the victims and the forms of violence and its effects have been widely explored (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Edmonds-Poli, 2013; Emmerich, 2011; González-Pérez, Vega-López, & Cabrera-Pivaral, 2012; González-Pérez, Vega-López, Vega-López, Muñoz-de-la-Torre, & Cabrera-Pivaral, 2009).

In Mexico there has been an increase in the rate of impunity and corruption in the security system, as evidence shows. The number of editors and reporters murdered has increased (Edmonds-Poli, 2013) and males aged between 20 and 44 years old face higher probabilities of dying due to violent causes (González-Pérez et al, 2009). However, due to the faced structural

vulnerability younger males (15-29 years old) and children are increasingly becoming potential victims of violence (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Kan, 2011).

Additionally, Emmerich (2011) found a 50% increase in childhood homicides related to organized crime; around 30,000 children were found to cooperate with criminal groups in exchange of rewards and recognition, resulting in an important cultural influence on them. Children have become increasingly vulnerable because the loss of one or both parents in the drug war. An estimated tens of thousands of Mexican children are orphaned directly because of the drug war (Barra & Joloy, 2011). Because of this, current violence in Mexico is mainly a phenomenon that affects the young (Azaola, 2012; Emmerich, 2011; González-Pérez et al., 2009).

As for the type of violence, Mexico's situation has been labeled as a "civil war type of conflict (Schedler, 2013) as defined by large internal migrations, displacements, exposure to crime and the militarization of public security. Moreover, massive human rights violations, systematic killings and the emergence of the so-called 'narco-refugees' also characterize this conflict. (Kan, 2011). Azaola's work (2012) shows that Mexico's historical levels of homicides have importantly increased since 2011, mostly due in the escalation of criminal violence as well as insufficient social and economic policies that effectively promote inclusion and equality.

In this context, social tension is a result of inequality and marginalization, which exacerbates institutional distrust, lack of interest and isolation. It has been found that, while the main type of violence in the Mexican scenario is interpersonal, other known forms of violence are also present, namely, self-directed, legal violence (executions or punishments), and war or civil insurrection (open revolt and disturbances) (Diprose, 2008).

Scholars have lately studied the daily effects of violence closely. Fear of crime, a form of

indirect victimization, has been found to be associated with living conditions (Vilalta, 2010, 2017) but is buffered by high levels of social cohesion by which citizens are able to respond collectively and effectively to crime and violence (Vilalta, 2010). Additionally, fear of crime has also been found to spread because of people's place of residence, direct crime experiences, levels of trust in the police and media exposure (Vilalta, 2010). Increasing impunity aggravates this perception. In Mexico, about 84% of homicides go unpunished (Killelea, 2014), and the prosecution and delivery of justice shows no improvement (Guerrero Gutiérrez, 2012).

The appearance of vigilantism (Grayson, 2011; Heinle et al., 2015) further complicates the case. It has presented itself as a worrying manifestation of the growing concern and frustration that citizens live with, as authorities have been unable to deal with crime and violence. Such responses include street vigilantism, self-procured justice, self-defense group organization, and public lynching (Olson et al., 2014; Sabet, 2013; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). In his study on the opinion of citizens on the Mexican system of justice, Zizumbo-Colunga (2010) has found that vigilantism is fueled by frustration, low confidence in state law enforcement institutions and high levels of interpersonal trust.

Research has also looked into and closely monitored the effects on policy and citizens responses in Mexico, assessments of governmental responses (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013) and daily life affectations (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Vilalta, 2014a). The new role of citizens in public security and law enforcement has also resulted in stronger, more resilient communities and social organization (Sabet, 2013; David A. Shrik et al., 2014). Paradoxically, a fruitful source of mobilization with policy implications has been the victims' movement (Villagran, 2013). Victims' organizations are constructed on the pain that those surrounding the victims suffer, on the increased risk of threats and violence inherent to organization, and "double

victimization” (*dobles victimización*). One key contribution from these groups has been the gathering and analysis of crime data and undocumented cases (Villagran, 2014). Supported by the victims themselves, these organizations have become the most visible consequence of crime and violence in the Mexican society, moving beyond fear to create pressure mechanisms pushing for justice and security (David A. Shrik et al., 2014; Villagran, 2013).

Mexico’s history of social mobilization has also been accounted for extensively (Aguayo Quezada, 2013; Alvarado Mendoza, 2010; Ley, 2015, 2016; Parás, López Olmedo, & Vargas López, 2011; Schedler, 2015). Civil participation is an indicator of the levels of commitment and the strength of a democracy and, consequently, of social behavior (Parás et al., 2011). Civil participation is also useful to understand the connections between engagement, insecurity and crime (Alvarado Mendoza, 2010; Ley, 2015). For instance, studies on the effects of violence in civil activism in Mexico have shown that violence against political actors threatens the electorate and depresses the voter turnout (Ley, 2015).

However, non-electoral forms of participation have also been stimulated by violence and crime (Heinle et al., 2015; Sabet, 2014). In Mexico, violence is a strong predictor of citizen mobilization against crime (Ley, 2015), and it is closely associated with the strength of civil society networks that help overcome inherent risks for mobilization in a given environment. It has generally been observed that citizens may use different forms of action, namely individual action, protest movement or community organization (Schedler, 2015). Given the environment of fear and indifference, the development of collective forms of responses have been slow and gradual; as noted before, they are mainly expressed through victims’ movements or the community police (Sabet, 2017; Schedler, 2014; Villagran, 2013) by which collective solidarities and shared values are expressed.

Although Mexico has faced criminal violence for decades, 2017 has been the worst in 20 years (Fisher & Taub, 2017). The high levels of violence have led communities not to trust institutions, and to form self-defense groups or lynch suspected criminals. As shown by Zizumbo-Colunga (2010), wealthier individuals do not support people taking justice in their own hands unless their trust in law enforcement institutions reaches extremely low levels. Specifically, the effect of interpersonal trust to support for vigilante justice depends on civilian perception in security and justice institutions (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010, p. 6).

Given the differentiated levels of violence and crime across the country, especially in regards to drug trafficking-related crime, an approach of differentiated analysis and intervention are needed. For instance, there are places where drug-crime has a strong social basis, which requires a 'from-the-ground work' perspective in order to substitute long-standing agreements and loyalties with positive cohesion and viable shared norms. It has also been observed that these benefits involve various actors, such as business people, investors, the police, the military, politicians, and families (Pereyra, 2012). Therefore, an array of differentiated strategies have been said to be fundamental in addressing violence and crime in the various regions (Osorio, 2015; Ramírez García, 2012; Trejo & Ley, 2015).

The current research embraces the concern of what individuals and groups can do in this context, the possible forms of democratic participation and their contribution towards political change (Benítez Manaut, 2013; Naveau & Pleyers, 2012; Schedler, 2014, 2015). This research will be a valuable account on the operation of resources and incentives for mobilization in operate in a critical episode of Mexican life. It will also be an important community resource for true democracy, as it will help promote preventive measures along with local experience (negative shocks) and regional characteristics for the realization of a true democracy (Puntscher,

Hauser, Pichler, & Tappeiner, 2014).

## **2.3 Overview of the Theory**

Guided by preceding literature, this study draws upon Social Capital and Collective Action theories as well as approaches used in Political Culture and Emotions Studies. Although they are related, these approaches present various challenges to the study of conflict and violent contexts. First, a focus on resources and motives will be used to understand what influences mobilization. An emphasis on social capital related action will offer a view on the virtues of spontaneous and informal forms of organization. Second, studying the political dimension of mobilization via political knowledge and awareness will illuminate our understanding of why mobilization happens in contexts of high exposure to crime violence and the spread of fear. By accounting for other motives, such as emotions and the vicious cycle of violence, processes of social and political construction of collective action might finally be revealed.

This compound will allow an examination of the resources used by individuals to mobilize for social change when living in contexts of enduring conflict. The research's premise is that the living environment will have an effect on mobilization. The analysis presented in the following chapters uses a theoretical compound accordingly, to examine the propensity to collective mobilization associated with experiences of violence. The central elements of each theoretical perspective and their use for mobilization analysis in contexts of conflict and violence are presented below.

### **2.3.1 Social Capital Theory**

Social Capital Theory (SCT) accounts for the study of resources (a social capital) by which individuals relate to each other and build sustainable social relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2013; Coleman, 1988, 1990). Given its attention to social relationships,

SCT examines the social structural conditions by which social capital arises and is produced, as well as the forms in which actors use it and dispute it. Social Capital Theory is, therefore, a theory of action for social change; by using SCT the actions of individuals in specific contexts and the development of social organization can be accounted for.

As a resource, social capital is productive and functional as it facilitates individuals to achieve certain ends (Coleman, 1990). However, social capital is compelling only in a “structured arena of social action” (Wacquant, 1998, p. 26). The notion of social capital is also tied to a variety of institutionalized relationships by which social dynamics are defined, and power is exercised (Bourdieu, 1986; Tzanakis, 2013). As a result, the set of actual or potential resources are linked to how individuals own and control a durable network of relations (Bourdieu, 1986). This relational dimension serves the theory to examine collective-owned capital (via membership, association or participation) enabling individuals to recognition and entitlement.

The volume of social capital –or social credit- individuals have depends on the size of the network, the connections effectively mobilized, as well as other resources (economic, cultural, or symbolic) that they have and are able to activate (Bourdieu, 1986; Portes, 2000; Wacquant, 1998). Social capital may be a source of control or of support, a mechanism of class reproduction, or the basis for social benefits (Portes, 1998, Tzanakis, 2013). Because of its nature, social capital may result in relationships of power or of mutual reciprocity<sup>14</sup>. In either case, the interactions built from social capital result from investment strategies in which

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<sup>14</sup> There are two main approaches to social capital. The founders (Bourdieu and Coleman) center in conflict and in the existence of inequalities to examine how much social capital is attained and used to achieve power or reach positions of power. The other, the continuers stress consensus, cooperation and coordination (i.e. Putnam and its followers) and assume there are conditions that favor people developing capacities and building social capital (Arriagada, 2005).



participants have expectations or acquire benefits that, in turn, facilitate the reproduction of social capital.

As a theory of social change, SCT focuses on explaining social relationships dynamics and the resulting agreements, norms, and institutions that, as argued, will contribute to solve social problems and empowering communities (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). However, the expansion of SCT, which endorses positive consequences of sociability may have, at the same time, contributed to jeopardize its true empirical value (Portes, 1998). Critics urge to revisit the theoretical foundations and to examine its unintended, and sometimes, obscure consequences, especially at community level analysis. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between the possession of social capital from its sources, and the resources from the results (Portes, 1998; Ostrom, 2000).

The lack of agreement between scholars about social capital's conceptualization and key components have affected its operationalization. Given the complexity of its measures, its various applications and the consequences it may produce, the study of social capital has proved to be challenging (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Portes, 2000; Tzanakis, 2013). If neglected, social capital is an easily affected resource, which demands attention at both individual and collective levels (Portes, 2000). External interventions may help towards the construction and renovation of social capital; however, and not without difficulty, it is highly responsive to strong relationships facilitated by its members (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). In consequence, the existing structure and context play a fundamental role in the creation, reception, use, and increase of social capital (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Portes, 2000).

Social Capital Theory research captures the paradox of social relationships. It is concerned with social determinants and their effects (Teney & Hanquinet, 2012) as well as with

their sources (Sabatini, 2009; Serra, 2011). As such, social capital can be either a resource for social relationships or a result of them. In other words, social capital can be used to describe the composition of an institution or a group as well as to define the features and quality of the relationships between its members (Sabatini, 2009), their limitations and uneven effects (Serra, 2011).

The need to explain the opposite has also been observed. If social capital erodes, the degradation of social living conditions (Portes & Landolt, 2000) and the institutional incapacity to produce positive outcomes for social cohesion (Wacquant, 1998) may result. Not all externalities of social capital are positive; sometimes group solidarity produces adverse consequences for members of other groups, generating a negative form of social capital (Portes & Landolt, 2000; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). Some of its implications are the exclusion of outsiders, restriction of freedom to members, and the creation of structures used for surveillance, suspicion, and distrust (Portes, 2000; Wacquant, 1998). This process may be explained by inaccurate research approaches. Instead of advocating only for local empowerment, the translation from micro to macro levels omits specific social and political dynamics (Portes & Landolt, 2000: 21). The result is a vacuum and depreciation of formal social capital (Wacquant, 1998).

The dual feature of social capital allows for it to be connected to the social policy agenda (Bebbington, 2007; Serra, 2011). The recognition of its various dimensions exhibits the array of potential consequences and combinations it generates. Additionally, since social capital does not produce beneficial effects by itself, its explicative limitations are promising to expose the overlapping contexts and set of social relationships that generate conflicting effects (Serra, 2011). Therefore, for instance, collective action becomes a critical source to “create local

organizations and select locals as leaders” (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009: 199) to help sustain a long-term effort that generates social capital.

In conflict and post-conflict situations, a comprehensive perspective on social capital has rarely been used. Indeed, SCT research treats contexts as settings where social capital might be built or reinforced (Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Dinesen et al., 2013) rather than as a resource with which individuals build strategies and alliances to improve their living conditions (Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015). This is not to say that social capital is ill-treated. On the contrary, the study of violence and civil society participation and the role of trust, norms and sense of belonging have been illuminating to understand the combined effect on these contexts (Dinesen et al., 2013). However, an examination of the defining environmental variables that could strengthen institutions and build social capital, particularly in contexts of cyclical violence is, in any case, rare. In sum, while social capital helps advance development and stability, its use in contexts of ongoing conflict has not been sufficiently studied.

### **2.3.2 Collective Action theories**

Collective Action theories (CAT) study the activities pursued by interest groups to achieve social and political common purposes; namely, the economic and ideological bases of social conflict and the political implications of group formation (Ethridge, 1987; McAdam et al., 2004). Acting collectively involves mobilization and organization processes, resources and strategies as well as opportunities for action. The study of collective action requires looking at numerous individual and group actors with diverse identities, aims, roles, values, experiences and social positions (McAdam et al., 2004). As a result, acting collectively relates as well to the varied spaces in which action is developed.

Because of its composition, collective action is an event built in numerous spaces.

Consequent, it requires understanding how gains and losses are valued, the functioning of the institutional structure allowing or restricting organization and the resources at hand. The political use of collective action is possible only when the varied goals, resources and opportunities are accounted for (Edmonson, 2013).

Due to its rationale, collective action is often understood as disruptive and revolutionary; it questions the prevailing forms of social organization and the operation of institutions. Depending its place and form, collective action is also a historical force used to make sense of the world by taking advantage of the existing institutional forms and the available knowledge. Charles Tilly's work (1977) is perhaps the most emblematic of studies that incorporate historical logics and the politics of protests. Tilly also accounts for the forms of organization for mobilization, the repertoires of interaction, the connections between its components, and the disruptive and transforming the character of the collectivity.

Questioning the context and its impact on action is essential (Edmonson, 2013). The creation of space for political action is necessary where no regulations to constrain interaction between actors and the political terrain exist. This also implies there are no conventions to determine where action itself begins and ends. Collective action is, therefore, understood as progressive and fluctuating over time; circulating perceptions and aims or tactics cannot be empirically established a priori (Edmonson, 2013). As a result, collective political action should not be seen as a unitary phenomenon; special attention to the generation of conditions and results is critical to assess their contributions as well as their contradictions (Foweraker, 1997).

Furthermore, collective action analysis must be examined in context. McAdam and colleagues (2004) focus on the struggles of mobilization involving governments as parties to contention. By looking at the transgressive and relational nature of movements, contentious

analysis examines the various episodes, as their constitutive elements in which multiple parties interact (Sampson, McAdam, MacIndoe, & Weffer-Elizondo, 2005; Tarrow, 1998, 2015) pursuing unconventional forms of political participation (Stockemer, 2013).

The analysis of collective action in unstable and violent environments is challenging. There is a hypothetical relationship between the existence of prolonged violence and the forms and strength of collective action within these contexts (González Gil, 2006). Such a perspective points to an analytical approach to examine forms of collective action deployed by social actors when in presence of violence (González Gil, 2006). In these contexts, violence and crime might detonate or inhibit organization, affect regularities and tendencies, condition the impact of mobilization or produce its deactivation. For that matter, CAT is an appropriate approach to study contexts of violence and the forms in which it restrains and stresses social movements.

Civil society participation is critical for collective actions. Its inclusion shifts the focus from the individual motive to a collective aim that is robust and durable overall (Sampson et al., 2005). This analytical focus also allows for the inclusion of a temporal perspective on collective action appearance and decline, its diverse forms and the emergence of new modes of mobilization. Additionally, it challenges the notions of citizenship and the actors' roles while it eases inclusion criteria (Tarrow, 1998). Among the key factors constituting a new form of collective action are contention and struggle, the density of nonprofit organizations, the linkage of a working trust with shared expectations and civic sustained capacity (Sampson et al., 2005; Tarrow, 2015). Indeed, social capital and civil society are considered "twin concepts" (Mustafa, 2005, p. 328) linked to social movements and NGOs.

An encompassing approach is required to approach the research questions for this study. Therefore, the interconnection between SCT and CAT will assemble to the study of emotions

and political culture. The result will offer a powerful mechanism for the analysis.

A strong ground for the necessary –actual and potential- resources for mobilization is provided by SCT, while CAT accounts for the aims, opportunities and contextual effects for organization. Furthermore, the drivers for mobilization (feelings and experiences) and the features orienting political action (knowledge and awareness), described in the next section, are transversely present in SCT and CAT. Their inclusion results in a potential conceptual apparatus that links the definition and discussion on social capital to the study of collective action while recognizing the diversity of forms in which individual resources and collective goals are managed, interiorized and put at work (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). This compound offers the grounds to identify the resources that different groups use to organize and achieve specific economic and political goals.

### **2.3.3 The study of emotions and political culture for collective action**

Whether collective action is expressed in open mass contention (Pearlman, 2013; Stockemer, 2013) or everyday resistance (Ash, 2009; Johansson & Vinthagen, 2014), CAT allows for a comprehensive approach to study social manifestation, spatialization as well as temporalization of resistance, civic participation and political protest. An examination of emotions (such as fear, sadness or shame) and their value, offer the possibility of assessing whether individuals can shift and use their feelings to produce successful forms of political participation (Pearlman, 2013). Additionally, it opens the road to recognize key political culture features that, together with social trust, solidarity, inclusion and cooperation, bring about effective democratic cultures and stronger successful communities (Almond, 2000; Formisano, 2001; Loveless, 2013; Putnam, 1995).

### *Emotions and collective action*

For the analysis of the way in which social resources bring people into action, a past experience dimension is required; this is, how people manage emotions and shared experiences when facing adversity and physical threat. This approach also permits inquiring about how societies with low social cohesion, distrust and inefficient institutions might mobilize for social change. An approach on emotions further refines the analysis. Specifically, it offers insights on how social capital is successfully built and used with political aims by bringing action and power to the theory (Rothstein, 2000). A theory of collective memories can strongly connect social capital and theoretical explanations on the dilemma of cooperation and organization.

Existing research on emotions of the protest shows their inherent importance to the study of collective action and social movements (Jasper, 2011; Stewart, 2002). Emotions are present in every aspect of political action (Jasper, 2011) and are indicators of the importance of an event for the social world. However, the analysis of their origin, their causal mechanisms, mutual influences and effects (both positive and negative) remain residual in the literature (Bericat, 2000, 2015; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013). Social movements' research reluctance to study emotions in protest appears to be changing; it increasingly recognizes that mobilizations are affected by context-specific feelings as well as by stable affective bonds (Jasper 2011). That is, participants build from pre-existing emotions as well as from temporary reactions to events.

Some emotions are shared by members of a group or are reciprocal with other groups, and might drive individuals to join or avoid mobilization. Most importantly, emotions help explain the networks and communities through which movements occur (Jasper, 1998). Management of despair and indifference that favors hope and active participation has proved to be useful to understand the influences and effects of collective action (Bericat, 2015; von Scheve

& Ismer, 2013). Indeed, the contentious politics approach (McAdam et al., 2004; Tilly, 1977) implicitly recognizes that for actual collective action and for collective identities, emotions matter.

Emotions for political action (people's beliefs, feelings, needs and reactions) are relational (Bericat 2016), socially, culturally and situationally conditioned. Given this, a distinction between subjective feelings (due to internal emotional experiences) from manifested emotions (expressed external emotions) follows. As a result, expressed emotions are understood as input for collective emotions, from which mechanisms of cognition, expression and practices materialize (von Scheve & Ismer, 2013).

Conflict is hard to understand without recognizing the involved emotions (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Jasper, 2014). The study of people's emotions, perceptions and actions in uncommon conflicting environments remains limited (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000). This might be due to the assumption that, in the absence of hope and scope for change, collective action is virtually impossible (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015). Actually, the development of hopelessness impatience, distrust, anger and indignation, as well as the bitterness of protracted conflicts helps perpetuate conflict by inducing indifference and obstacles mobilization that might contribute to conflict resolution (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Holmes, 2004). In contexts of violent conflict, events trigger complex sets of specific emotions experienced at different intensities (Baele et al., 2016); emotions emerge because of exposure to violence, fear of intentional material and physical harm as well as harm accidentally perpetrated by drug criminals or by the state (Osorio, 2011).

The relationship between emotions and collective action is critical for conflict and violence management; therefore, it demands further exploration (Retzinger & Scheff, 2000).



Approaching emotions for action will help better understand political action in divided societies (Holmes, 2004; Jasper, 1998), examine the dynamics of solidarity shaping mobilization (Demertzis, 2015; Jasper, 2011, 2014) as well as build efficient and credible institutions that help heal hurt societies (Rothstein, 2000)

### ***Political culture and collective action***

The study of political culture is a disputed area of research. Political culture is a rapidly changing terrain (Rodríguez Franco, 2017) as the debate on the political is the intersection of power and conflict (Warren, 1999). Political Culture theory defines political culture as a set of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations which result from processes of socialization, exposure and experiences (Almond, 2000). Political culture was first understood as a particular pattern of orientations for political action in democratic conditions (Almond, 2000; Formisano, 2001; Warren, 2001) but it gradually changed to include accounts of beliefs and culture influences.

Political culture includes sets of knowledge and beliefs about the political context, feelings and commitments to politics and their values (Almond, 2000) and assumptions about the political world that leads to a disposition in which people accept or reject alternatives (Elkins & Simeon, 1979). The political culture of a country is constituted mostly by active attitudes among its citizens but also by expressed preferences, interests and awareness (Denk & Christensen, 2016).

Current political culture definitions are more intensely driven by the increased politicization of society (Rodríguez Franco, 2017; Warren, 2001)<sup>15</sup>. Because of the politicization

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<sup>15</sup> Some debates about politicization refer to contested definitions. Being politicized has two conflicting meanings: activities forcing something into politics –make it a political issue-, and activities by which an already political element is recognized –make it consciously political (Samuels, 1992).

of a society, people are less likely to unquestionably accept and reproduce practices, routines or customs that affect the political and governmental structure and performance (Almond, 2000; Chilton, 1988). This evolution suggests that nowadays, political culture is the property of a collectivity and that every social relationship is potentially political (Elkins & Simeon, 1979; Warren, 1999).

The need for a political account that extensively captures the relevance of political and democratic processes for social life is agreed upon. An examination of democratization trends on the political interest of human rights protection (Beer & Mitchell, 2004) offers an inclusive account of the role of context and socialization in the formation of political culture and its potential distortion (Zoltán Dénes, 2013). Individually, politicization is observed in political knowledge, interest, sense of efficacy and political activity. Socially, it represents a change in the nature or parameters of the allocated values (Halper & Hartwig, 1975). It turns out that politicization processes happen at both the individual and the social level. The first has a behavioral influence and is related with the interest and knowledge a person has about politics; the latter refers mostly to shared values and focuses on the public arena.

The ultimate interest of political culture lies on the study of processes and the possibility of political transformation (Formisano, 2001; Wilson, 2000) via a reflexive understanding of politics and political socialization (Luke, 1989). Using different criteria, their attention is on how the preferences of individuals influence their action, and therefore, the possibilities for political change. Additionally, such a theory looks at preference formation, at institutional-citizen interactions and how one affects the other (Almond, 2000; Wilson, 2000).

#### **2.3.4 Summary of the theory**

The distinctive focus of this research is on explaining the political construction of social

capital. The all-encompassing theoretical framework presented in this section allows the examination of the set of resources, the effects of the context of violence, the institutional conditions for action, the motivations for social change and the forms of mobilization. More precisely, it integrates individual, contextual and institutional factors that operate jointly to shape social capital and political action for social change (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Serra, 2011). Social capital and political culture features are successfully enhanced by collective action, changing the structure of incentives, advancing reconstruction and promoting different degrees of cooperation and collectivity.


This research theoretical framework will draw upon the aforementioned theories to understand i) how individual actors use their resources for collective mobilization, ii) the effects of the context on motivation for mobilization, and iii) the influences that are relevant for the political construction of collective action. The resulting mechanism for the analysis will account for the diversity of forms in which individual resources and collective goals are managed, interiorized and put to work (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002).

To address the political construction of social capital, the set of social resources, the effect of the context of violence, and the motivations for social change will be examined. This approach will integrate the individual, contextual and institutional factors that operate jointly to shape social capital and political action for social change (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Oxoby, 2009; Serra, 2011). The analysis is refined by emphasizing how social capital is successfully built and used with political aims (Rothstein, 2000).

The way in which past experiences and emotion management bring people into action when facing adversity and physical threat is also critical for this study. Management of despair and indifference in favor of hope and active participation has proved to be useful to understand

the influences and effects of collective action (Bericat, 2015; Rorty, 1998; A. Stewart, 2002; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013). Moreover, it will contribute to the study of people's emotions, perceptions and actions in uncommon conflicting environments (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000).

The merit of the conceptual model (see Figure 3) is that it brings together social change studies, collective mobilization theories, and political change research academic traditions. Additionally, these approaches are placed in context with conflict and violence studies. The aim of this theoretical assemblage is to emphasize their contributions to the investigation while discussing the various challenges derived from the study.



**Figure 3.** *Conceptual Model*

## 2.4 The focus of the research

Drawing on the aforementioned theories, the conceptual model for this study will employ two sets of factors, i) emotions and ii) experiences of violence resulting from the context of

conflict and instability that might influence mobilization for collective action (see Figure 3). It is hypothesized that these factors, along with individual characteristics (such as age, gender, education, and employment) will differently influence why and how people mobilize for collective action to advance social change across different localities. The model assumes a direct and mediated relationship and examines a) social capital and b) political culture as variables affecting the relationship between the individual characteristics, the contextual factors, and collective mobilization.

The emotional component will capture feelings of fear and violence effects which account for the various circumstances associated with or resulting from the WoD that alter living conditions, wellbeing and governmental responses as well as citizens' attitudes towards the WoD. Social capital will be assessed on its various dimensions including trust, community relationships, and social cohesion, while political culture will capture the levels of political awareness, participation and commitment. The specific variables and measures are presented in chapter 3.

## Chapter 3. Methods

### 3.1 Description of the data

The data used for this study comes from the Citizenship, Democracy, and Drug-Related Violence survey (CIDENA) collected in Mexico in 2011. The data were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR<sup>16</sup>). The survey was designed with the purpose of providing information that would help understand the complex relationship between society, politics and drug-related violence in a tortuous historical moment in Mexico (CIDENA 2011). The survey includes 75 questions and 248 variables that captured topics such as respondents' experiences with crime and drug-related violence, attitudes towards security, political behavior, and social attitudes<sup>17</sup>.

The instrument used to collect the data was divided in ten sections: 1) Economy and Political sophistication, 2) Ideology, 3) Institutional Trust, 4) Political Efficacy and Political Knowledge, 5) Electoral Behavior, 6) Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties, 7) Political Behavior and Insecurity, 8) Causes of Violence, 9) Security and Victimization, 10) Social Capital. Sociodemographic variables include age, sex, marital status, employment, and education. Given its structure, scope, and design, the CIDENA dataset is a reliable source of information to examine the research questions and hypothesis advanced in this investigation.

Prior to the study, a proposal was sent to the Boston College Office of Research Protections (ORB) to obtain Institutional Review Board (IRB) clearance. The study has been granted an exemption in accordance with 45 CFR 46.101 (b) 4 (IRB Protocol Number 16.012.01e).

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<sup>16</sup> ICPSR Study No. 34670

<sup>17</sup> Demographic variables include age, sex and employment, marital status, number of children, education, first language and territory of residence.

### 3.2 Study Sample

The survey collected data from Mexican residents: 7,416 men and women over 18 years of age, (CIDENA 2011) using face to face interviews that combined cognitive and list experiment techniques; the interviews were conducted at the residence of the interviewee<sup>18</sup>. A probabilistic sample design representative of seven states selected by their levels of violence<sup>19</sup> was used: four states for the high-level group (Chihuahua, Guerrero, Michoacan, and Nuevo Leon), two states for the intermediate (Jalisco and Estado de Mexico), and one for the low-level group (Mexico City) (see Figure 4). The remaining 25 states were sampled using a probability proportional size<sup>20</sup>.

For the main analysis, the nationwide sample was used ( $N = 7,416$ ). Additionally, two subsamples were constructed to examine the varying effects the hypothesized relationships across regions (north and south). For the north states region, the sample included respondents living in Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon ( $N = 1,800$ ); the south states region sample used responses from individuals living in Michoacan and Guerrero ( $N = 1,716$ ). The purpose was to compare states with similar levels of violence but with different social characteristics (see Figure 5).


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<sup>18</sup> The interviews and responses were conducted and registered in Spanish. For the purpose of this study, the author conducted a simple translation of the selected questions and variables in the data set.

<sup>19</sup> Using an index of deaths associated with drug related violence reported in local newspapers.

<sup>20</sup> Mexico is a federal republic comprised of 32 states, with a “tremendous variation in levels of electoral democracy, social capital, opposition violence, ethnic cleavages, and modernization, thus inviting comparative analysis” (Beer & Mitchell, 2004, p. 298). Electoral sections stratified by state were used as the unit of reference. Results are accurate at a 95 percent confidence level, with an overall non-response rate of 8 percent. Detailed sampling and data collection techniques and response rate can be retrieved from <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/34670>.


### Mexico: selected oversampled states



Source: prepared by the author

**Figure 4.** Map of the selected oversampled states

### Mexico: selected north region and south region states



Source: prepared by the author

**Figure 5.** Map of the selected north region and south region states subsample



### 3.3 Study variables

The measures utilized in the study to explore the association between contextual and relational factors influencing mobilization in collective action are described below. To answer this study questions, 87 selected individual items out of the 248 included in the survey were used. The selection resulted from an exploration of question the question wording, data screening procedures, and preliminary statistical analysis (see the analysis plan section below).

The main analysis was conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM) for which 13 variables were used; eight variables were built from selected single items and five demographic variables were single original items. Other bivariate and multivariate tests, including regression analysis, were conducted previously to examine the relationships between the selected variables and other variables of interest. For the complete list of items and questions used for each measure, see Appendix, Table A.

Recoding and construction building of the variables helped to improve parsimony<sup>21</sup> and to assure there were no different levels of measurement which could compromise the analysis, the interpretation of results and the comparison among variables (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011). The variables used for this study were examined for normality and distribution with univariate and bivariate analyses. The reliability and validity of the constructs were examined using Cronbach's alpha. To assess construct validity the selected range of acceptable internal consistency ( $\alpha \geq 0.60$ , ideal  $\alpha = 0.80$ ) was used together with an examination of factor loadings and exploration of the question-wording. Standard deviation and variance statistics were also estimated for each item.

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<sup>21</sup> By using a composite of items, the reliability of the composite can be calculated, and fixing the value of the relevant measurement error can be considered, thus reducing the need to estimate an additional parameter (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011, p. 192).

### 3.3.1 Dependent Variable

*Mobilization for Collective Action* is the main outcome of this study and it is measured by a series of indicators of people's participation in various activities aimed at influencing or producing change. Collective action literature has defined collective mobilization as the activities pursued by a group to achieve social and political common purposes (Ethridge, 1987; McAdam et al., 2004). Acting collectively involves the organization of processes, the mobilization of resources as well as designing strategies. It also relates to the varied spaces in which action is developed. Activities that individuals do with others with a purpose of political or social change include social manifestation, civic participation and political protest (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2014; Pearlman, 2013; Stockemer, 2013).

Mobilization in collective action was measured using eight dichotomous items (No = 0, Yes = 1)<sup>22</sup>, accordingly. Respondents answered the question "In the past year have you...": i) participated in associations, ii) contacted an influential person, iii) made the media interested in a topic, iv) participated in an informative campaign, v) participated in an election campaign, vi) participated in a march or protest, vii) contacted a representative, and viii) participated in a sit-in protests. These items were employed in the statistical analyses as a compound built in a latent variable named "Mobilization for Collective Action" (*MobCA*) ( $\alpha = 0.6484$ ).

These eight items used to build the construct were examined and selected after conducting Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation<sup>23</sup>. EFA allowed exploration of the underlying factors in the given set of variables. The purpose was to test the best-factor solution measuring the various components of

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<sup>22</sup> For analyses purposes, all original dichotomous items were reverse coded.

<sup>23</sup> PCF is the default oblique rotation method used, it allows assuming that the factors are correlated.

collective mobilization. Results show the viability of a one-factor solution loading. Additionally, Cronbach alpha was tested for the referred set of items. The new variable was created using a sum of the means of the eight selected items.

### **3.3.2 Independent variables for the main analyses**

*Social Capital:* The literature on Social Capital have stressed the importance of explaining social relationships dynamics and the resulting agreements, norms and institutions which positively contribute solving social problems and empowering communities (Field, 2003; Portes, 1998; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). For that matter, social capital is defined as the set of resources by which individuals relate to each other and build sustainable social relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988). Despite the empirical difficulty of measuring and testing social capital (Sabatini, 2009), most studies examine it by looking at generalized trust and solidarity, membership activity or voluntary work, working with others and with the community, and various forms of social interaction (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Portes, 2000; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009; Tzanakis, 2013). The multidimensionality of this concept is therefore measured in this study by using items referring to trust and cohesion at the institutional, community and individual levels (see Appendix, Table A for the list of items and questions used for each construct).

This concept was measured by four constructs: i) Trust Government Institutions, ii) Trust Security Institutions, iii) Social Cohesion, and iv) Community Help.

The viability of each construct was observed in a two steps analysis. First, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation was used to test the best-fitting factor solution for each component of each construct. Second, Cronbach alpha was tested for each new variable, which was then constructed using the sum of

the means of the selected individual items.

Trust Government Institutions (*TrustGovInst*) ( $\alpha = 0.8646$ ) consisted of six ordinal items (value range 1 = not any to 4 = a lot) asking respondents “how much do you trust...” i) the Presidency, ii) the Congress, iii) the Senate, iv) the Supreme Court of Justice, v) the State Governor and vi) the Mayor.

Respondents’ trust in security institutions (*TrustSecInst*) ( $\alpha = 0.8658$ ) was assessed by two additional ordinal items (value range 1 = not any to 4 = a lot) asking respondents how much they trust i) the Army and ii) the Marine, two governmental institutions directly involved in providing security and protection in the context of the war on drugs.

Social Cohesion (*SocCohes*) ( $\alpha = 0.9288$ ) a variable measuring the likelihood of community organization was constructed using eight ordinal items (value range 1 = not likely any to 4 = very likely) asking respondents “how likely is that in your community people will organize to solve issues such as...”; options included public services, delinquency, violence, education or health among others.

The fourth measure for Social Capital was Community Help (*CommHelp*) ( $\alpha = 0.8819$ ) a construct using five ordinal items (value range 1 = not at all to 4 = a lot) asking people whether they were willing to help others with i) time, ii) work, iii) money, iv) materials or v) food.

*Political Culture:* Studies on political culture literature looks to extensively account for the relevance of political and democratic processes for social life (Almond, 2000; Chilton, 1988; Formisano, 2001; Lichterman & Cefaï, 2006). The concept of political culture considers the extent to which individuals are well informed about the institutions, processes, and issues relevant to the political life; it includes political interest and political participation (Bateson, 2012; Beer & Mitchell, 2004) and political behavior on diverse environments (Atkinson &

Fowler, 2014; Durlauf, 1999). Accordingly, Political Culture captures the levels of political awareness, levels, and forms of participation and forms of commitment, as well as how much individuals know and remain aware about the political life (see Table 1).

For analysis, the constructs were built using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation. The results displayed the best-fitting factor solution for each construct. After testing for Cronbach's alpha, the new variable was built using the sum of the means of the selected individual items.

This construct was measured using two constructs, i) Political knowledge and ii) Being informed. First, Political Knowledge (*PolKnow*) ( $\alpha = 0.5592$ ) captures respondents' awareness of issues related to national authorities and institutions and was measured by three dichotomous (No = 0, Yes = 1) questions: i) "do you know the name of the President?", ii) "do you know the name of the three Powers of the Union?", and iii) "do you know the how long is the tenure of a federal representative?". For analyses purposes, all items responses were reverse coded.

Being Informed (*Informed*) ( $\alpha = 0.7256$ ) was measured using a compound of six ordinal items (value range 1 = never to 4 = always) asking respondents the frequency with which they get informed by a) the Television, b) the Radio, c) Magazines, d) Friends and family, and e) the Internet.

*The Context:* The hypothesized influence of the context on people's mobilization was examined by looking at the indirect effect of respondents' i) Fear of crime and ii) Exposure to violence on mobilization for collective action. In contexts characterized by high social conflict and criminal violence, the conditions of the environment are critical components for collective action; specifically, because of the emotions processes and repeated exposure behavior is affected (Baele et al., 2016; Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Pearlman, 2013). Because of the context,

individuals may change or refrain from engaging in regular activities (Vilalta, 2010, 2013), or might use those experiences to collectively propose changes at the social or political levels (Groenendyk, 2011; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). Moreover, living in such environments may translate into experiences that might lead individuals to act for change or to develop measures for self-protection (Heinle et al., 2015; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).

Both measures were built using a series of items analyzed using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation. After verifying the best-fitting factor solution for each construct and testing for Cronbach alpha, the new variables were constructed using the sum of the means of the selected individual items (see table A).

Exposure to violence (*ExpViol*) ( $\alpha = 0.6628$ ) is a measure built from 12 dichotomous items (No = 0, Yes = 1) collecting responses on people's having experienced direct violence; items included having heard occasional gunshots, having been beaten, severely injured or having been kidnapped or tortured, among others. Specifically, it will account for the material and physical harm intentionally perpetrated by crime or by the state violent actions. All item responses were reverse coded for purposes of the analysis.

*Fear* ( $\alpha = 0.9047$ ) was measured by using 11 dichotomous reverse coded items (No = 0, Yes = 1). Respondents answered the question "during this year have you stopped ... because of fear of being a victim of drug-related violence?" Options included going out at night, going out for fun, letting their children go out, using public transportation or using a taxi, or stopped visiting family and friends, among others.

*Demographic characteristics:* this study used measures of Age (value range 18 to 89), Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1), Education (recoded to values ranging None = 1 to High = 5),

Employment (recoded to Non-employed or unemployed = 0, Employed = 1). For locality, identification of *State*, a count variable with seven values was used. Table A summarizes the original item values and the descriptive statistics for these variables.

### **3.3.3 Other independent variables of interest**

The influence of other individual and contextual conditions of interest were examined using regression analysis. These included 12 additional measures of social relationships, political awareness and respondent's emotions and experiences relevant for this research's argument but not directly observed in the main analysis. The measures utilized to explore these additional factors are explained below (see Table 1 for the descriptive statistics, including mean and standard deviations).

Trust in People (*TrustPpl*) was measured using a single item registering respondents' answer to the question "do you think most people can be trusted?". How much individuals trust other people is a measure used in social capital studies to account for interpersonal relationships with others (Coleman, 1988; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). For analysis purposes, the item was recoded and dichotomized (No = 0, Yes = 1) to capture positive and negative answers.

Two measures accounting for people's levels of awareness and involvement in the political life were included (Bateson, 2012; Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016). Together, these two measures account for people's levels of awareness and involvement in the political life, as well as their commitment to others and their community. Interested in politics (*Interested*) is a single recoded dichotomous item (No = 0, Yes = 1) for peoples' expressed interest in political issues. Law compliance (*LawCompl*) is a measure that measures people's conviction to obey the law; it answers the question of "When you think you are right, are you willing to go against the law?" The item was reverse coded to register responses in terms of law compliance.

The effect of the context in peoples' lives was additionally accounted for with two measures. Feeling safe (*Safe*) used a single recoded item registering responses to the question "how safe do you feel with the army in the streets?" Being concerned about the levels of violence was examined using a compound measure, *Concern* ( $\alpha = 0.8012$ ) built using three ordinal items (value range Nothing = 1 to A lot = 4) asking respondents how worried they were about drug-related violence in i) the country, ii) the community, and iii) the state. To examine the reliability and validity of the measure, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation was conducted. Results displayed a one-factor solution for this construct; after testing for Cronbach's alpha, the measure was built by using the sum of the means of the selected items (see Table A).

Three other items were used to examine the effect of respondent's opinion on the government performance in relation to the War on Drugs. Their approval of the government's actions (*GovActWoD*) was measured using a single ordinal recoded item (value range Disapprove = 0 to Approve = 3). Respondents' perception on how successful the government is at the War on Drugs (*GovWinWoD*) was measured with a single dichotomous item (No = 0, Yes = 1) registering responses to the question "In your opinion, is the government winning the fight against drug dealing?". Government's actions to obtain information for the War on Drugs (*GovObtInf*) was measured with a single list experiment item<sup>24</sup>. For it, respondents were asked: "how many of the following activities do you think the government should do in order to gather information to fight drug dealing?" The given options included: i) spy on the cartels, ii)

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<sup>24</sup> The list experiment is a technique used for sensitive topics (Lavrakas, 2008). This survey uses two sets of questions with different number of response options, one with 4 options, another with 5. For estimation we used the sum of the standardized the values for the individual measures.



interrogate any citizen with no justified reason, iii) install more checkpoints, iv) granting pardon to cooperating drug traffickers, and v) torturing detainees<sup>25</sup>.

Citizen's involvement was likewise examined using two measures. First, *CtzActWoD* ( $\alpha = 0.6849$ ) was used to measure respondents' approval on citizen's acts on the War on Drugs. The measure was built using the sum of the means of the two ordinal items (value range Not at all = 0 to Agree a lot = 3) on respondent's levels of agreement on others i) lynch criminals, and ii) organize in self-defense groups to protect themselves in the context of the War on Drugs. The second, *CtzOrgCr* ( $\alpha = 0.6586$ ) is a compound measure accounting for people's opinion on citizen's collaborating with organized crime a compound of two ordinal items (value range Unacceptable and unjustified = 0 to Acceptable and justifiable = 2) using also the list experiment technique (see Table A). Both constructs were built using the sum of the means of the selected items. Beforehand, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation was used to verify the one-factor solution for each measure, and Cronbach's alpha was tested for reliability.

Lastly, two contextual measures were included. *Economy* ( $\alpha = 0.5592$ ) used two ordinal items (value range from 1 = very bad to 5 = very good) to register respondents' opinion on i) how bad the current situation of the economy is and ii) their opinion on the state of the economy compared to the previous year. A measure of the appreciation of three human rights (*Rights*) ( $\alpha = 0.5079$ ) was also used. The measure was built using three dichotomous items (No = 0, Yes = 1) asking respondents on whether they thought i) abortion, ii) marihuana consumption, and iii) same-sex marriage should be legal. The viability of the two measures was examined using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin


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<sup>25</sup> This was the list experiment modified option.

rotation. A one-factor solution was observed for each construct and Cronbach's alpha was tested. Next, each measure was built using the sum of the means of the selected individual items.

### 3.4 Analysis plan

The statistical methods utilized to test the hypothesized relationships, including exploratory and univariate analysis, as well as multivariate methods for the main analysis are described below. The analysis was conducted using Stata 13 software. The main analysis explores five dimensions (see Figure 5): 1) the influence of Social Capital on mobilization for collective action, 2) the association of Social Capital and Political Culture, 3) the mediating effect of Political Culture, and the influence of 4) exposure to violence and 5) fear of crime in the effect that Political Culture has on collective mobilization. A sixth dimension, the varying effects across localities of all these associations, is also examined.



**Figure 6.** *Analytical model*

As explained before, two types of statistical procedures were conducted. Regression analysis used a set of 25 selected measures and items (see Figure 7) and SEM used a refined

group of 13 variables that allowed to answer the core of the research questions (see Figure 8).

### **3.4.1 Data preparation**

*Missing data:* The characteristics of the data allowed us to expect no missing data issues that would affect the analysis or the results of the study. Data screening was used to identify any missing values of the variables included in the statistical models and the exploratory analysis.

The variables used in the main analysis registered less than 2% missing values. Most variables used in the preliminary descriptive and exploratory analyses registered no greater than 4.5% missing values with the exception of Trust in People, which showed up to 11% missing values because of recoding<sup>26</sup> (see Table 1). Given the large sample size (N = 7,416) the statistical power of the statistical analysis is not compromised<sup>27</sup>. There was no concern that missing values would affect the number of cases available for analysis nor a dramatic reduction of the cases for computation. Therefore, the statistical analysis in the study dealt with missing values using listwise deletion technique, the usual treatment in Stata 13. The final sample used in SEM analysis in this study consisted of 7,210 cases, and 1,768 and 1,655 for the north states and the south states subsamples respectively.

*[Insert Table 1 about here]*

## **3.5 Statistical Analysis**

### **3.5.1 Univariate and bivariate analysis**

Univariate analysis was conducted to describe the demographic characteristics of the

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<sup>26</sup> The original item had three values: 1: Most people can be trusted, 2: You should always watch your back, 3: there are of all sorts / it depends). Value 3 was recoded to missing, 822 missing values resulted.

<sup>27</sup> Because of the several variables and parameter estimates that are typically not independent and have different standard errors, the determination of power and sample size in SEM is complicated (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 93). A rule of thumb is that a sample of 100 to 150 cases is necessary to maintain power and precision of parameter estimates for small SEM models (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011, p. 50).

sample and distribution of the variables associated with the country and the context. Statistics computed included frequencies and two-way tabulations to obtain the mean, variance, and standard deviations, as well as skewedness and kurtosis (see Table 1).


To examine the relationships between the dependent and independent variables, bivariate correlations were obtained. Results showed the association between mobilization for collective action and respondent's emotions and opinions due to the context of violence. The relationships between the dependent variable *MobCA* and the Social Capital and Political Culture measures were also examined (See Appendix, Table B and Table C).

### **3.5.2 Multivariate analyses**

First, multiple regression (MR) was conducted to examine the relationships between the dependent variable (*MobCA*) and all selected variables related to emotions and experiences of the context, Social Capital, and Political Culture (see Figure 7). This form of linear regression uses the observed data to estimate the strength of the direct effect of each indicator on the study outcome. Moreover, by conducting Multiple Regression (MR), it was possible to appreciate relationship between the set of explanatory variables and the dependent variable.

The analyses allowed observation of the extent to which individual characteristics and locality were relevant components that influence the hypothesized relationships for this study, specifically, mobilization for collective action. In other words, using regression analysis, the association between individual characteristics (age, gender, education, and employment) and the place of living (state) with mobilization for collective action was examined (*Question 1. Are individual characteristics associated with a) Social Capital and b) Political Culture related to collective mobilization of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict?* and *Question 2. Do the observed relationships have varying effects across locations?*).

Multiple regression analysis also tested for the influence of various economic, social, and political conditions of the environment and respondents' opinions and emotions related to the war on drugs on their collective action. The results helped support which measures were relevant to explain people's mobilization for collective action. Additionally, it helped distinguish the emotions, experiences, and opinions that were pertinently included to answer the research questions.




**Figure 7.** *Analytical plan for Regression Analysis*

In this phase, four models were estimated. The base line model (M1) examined the association between the dependent variable *MobCA* and the set of 23 variables of interest. Results were inspected, and the model was refined by removing the variables displaying nonsignificant values. The result was a best fitting model for the observed variables (M2). The third and fourth models used separately the two core dimensions of interest: a) emotions and experiences (M3), and b) Social Capital and Political Culture (M4). The precise purpose of

Model 3 and Model 4 was to observe the relevance of the associations between the dependent variable and the measures for the second phase analysis.

Building from MR results, Structural Equation Modeling regression analysis (SEM) with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method was used to examine the relationships between emotional and contextual factors with social and political indicators, and their influence on collective mobilization (see Figure 8).



**Figure 8.** *Analytical plan for Structural Equation Modeling*

SEM is a technique that allows researchers to statistically model and test complex phenomena by conducting a series of structural equations. The models' structure responds to various theoretical propositions hypothesizing "how sets of variables define constructs and how these constructs are related to each other" (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011, p. 2). As an extension of multiple regression and factor analysis, SEM essentially combines path models and confirmatory factor models to examine multiple relationships between observed and latent

variables<sup>28</sup> as well as accounts for measurement errors of each variable providing scores with greater validity and reliability (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011).

To interpret SEM the results various goodness of fit tests between the sample data and the theoretical model need to be inspected<sup>29</sup> (Cupani, 2012; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011). For this study, different model fit criteria were used to assess model fit, model comparison, and model parsimony (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). For model fit, the most common statistics were used: chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ), Root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized Root-mean square residual (SRMR). Model comparison was examined with the comparative fit index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). To assess the parsimony of the model the Akaike information criterion (AIC) were used. Finally, to account for the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable predicted from the independent variables, the coefficient of determination (CD or R-squared) was used.

According to the accepted convention (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011), a nonsignificant value for  $\chi^2$  is aimed, while for SRMR and RMSEA, tests indicating the fit between the hypothesized model and sample data, values less or equal to 0.05 are considered good fit values. For CFI and TLI, both comparing the proposed model with a null model, as well as for PNFI and AIC that consider the number of degrees of freedom and the differing numbers of latent variables respectively, values close to 0.95 indicate good fit.

The models were conducted using four demographic variables (age, gender, education

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<sup>28</sup> A latent variable is a supposed construct that can only be measured by a set of observed variables; it is created by using confirmatory factor models set by the researcher based on an a priori specified theoretical model.


<sup>29</sup> The fit is verified if the values of the estimated parameters reproduce as closely as possible the observed covariance matrix (the variance-covariance terms of the bivariate variables) (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011).

and employment), 16 observed variables and three latent variables. In SEM two models are included; one is the measurement model displaying how observed indicators are related to underlying latent variables, the other is the structural model which shows how the latent variables are related to each other<sup>30</sup> (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011). The model included three latent variables (Social Capital, Political Culture, and Mobilization in Collective Action) of which only Social Capital is exogenous. There are two additional exogenous observed variables (*ExpViol* and *Fear*) and two endogenous observed variables (*Age* and *Employment*). Social Capital is comprised of four observed variables, Political Culture two observed variables, and Mobilization in Collective Action eight observed variables. Finally, the direct arrows show an expected direct effect relation (see Figure 9), while the double arrow line (see Figure 10) indicates an estimated covariance effect between the observed variables.

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<sup>30</sup> The measurement model represents the relationships between the latent variables and their indicators, while the structural model represents the interrelation between constructs. The measurement model allows the researcher to validate the suitability of the selected indicators in the constructs of interest. (Cupani, 2012).






**Figure 9.** *SEM baseline model*

The proposed model was estimated. Upon results, the parameters were adjusted to obtain the best fitting model solution without compromising the theoretical assumptions of the study (Figure 10). The inspection looked at the coefficient values, significance, and direction for each of the specified parameters. Modification indices for all non-free parameters were also examined to identify the largest coefficient value suggesting that fixing a parameter will most likely improve the model fit<sup>31</sup>. The examination also allowed to determine if a particular covariance should be included to better explain the observed relationships.

To honor the theoretical assumptions for the study, covariances between the observed variables and the measurement errors were first identified (double arrow line). Using available and relevant theory and research, a new model was specified. After estimation, goodness of fit

<sup>31</sup> “These values serve as an indication of the strength of the structural relationships (prediction measure) and are also scaled from 0 to 1” (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 65)

was reassessed showing the pertinence and strength of the model to represent the relationships of interest in this study as well as reflects the hypothesized direct and indirect effects of Social Capital and Political Culture on mobilization, and the effect of emotions and experiences of violence in these relationships.



**Figure 10.** SEM final model

Eight models were conducted with SEM; six models used the national sample to examine this study hypothesized relationships, two additional models were separately estimated for the high violent north states and south states subsamples.

The first set of SEM models (M6 and its fixed version M6.1) examined three paths of associations. As portrayed in the diagram, levels of Social Capital are expected to have a direct effect over mobilization in collective action (1. Social Capital  $\rightarrow$  Mob. in Coll. Action) and also, an indirect effect on Political Culture (2. Social Capital  $\rightarrow$  Political Culture and). For this relationship, the total effect of Social Capital on mobilization will be the sum of its direct and

indirect effects. Additionally, the effect of respondents' levels of Political Culture on mobilization in collective action was also estimated (3. Political Culture → Mob. in Coll. Action). Overall, these paths contribute to answer questions related to the association between the three main constructs: a) Social Capital, b) Political Culture on c) Mobilization for Collective Action as follows:

**Question 3:** *To what extent do levels of social capital influence mobilization for collective action of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict?*

**Question 4:** *How important is political culture for collective mobilization in these contexts?*

This study also looks at the forms in which exposure to violence and fear of crime affect the effect of Political Culture (4. Exposure to Violence → Political Culture, 5. Fear → Political Culture respectively) and of Social Capital (6. Exposure to Violence → Social Capital and 7. Fear → Social Capital) on mobilization in collective action. Therefore, four paths were added for the second set of SEM models (M7 and its fixed version M7.1). In other words, these models explored if Political Culture and Social Capital mediated the indirect effect of context variables (exposure to violence and fear of crime) on mobilization in collective action. Also, these relationships allowed answers to question 5 and question 6 in this study:

**Question 5:** *How much do i) emotions and ii) experiences about the context influence mobilization for collective action?*

**Question 6:** *Is the relationship between i) emotions and ii) experiences of violence with iii) collective mobilization mediated by a) social capital and b) political culture?*

The third group of models included the paths for the sociodemographic variables on mobilization for collective action: Age, Education, Gender and Employment (M8). Its fixed version (M8.1) it is the final accepted model for the investigation. The final model illustrates the

analysis rationale of this study and includes the adequate paths for the hypothesized relationships between Social Capital and mobilization in collective action through a mediation relation –or indirect effect- of Political Culture, as well as an examination of the effect of the context on these associations.

Lastly, the final model was examined for the two separate subsamples to observe the different associations for the north states subsample (M9) and the south states subsample (M10). This last set of models provided additional information to observe the varying effects across groups; that is, whether parameter estimates are different for each group as reflected in question 2 (*Do the observed relationships have varying effects across locations?*). The study findings are presented and summarized in Chapter 4.

## **Chapter 4. Findings**

Chapter four will focus on the results of this study. First, the results of the univariate and bivariate analyses will be summarized. The univariate statistics include the sample descriptive of sociodemographic characteristics, emotions, and perceptions, as well as for social capital and political culture associated indicators. For the bivariate analysis, the data pairwise correlations and covariances were estimated. Next, the multivariate statistics conducted to answer the study questions are presented. Two types of multivariate statistics were used for the analyses. First, multiple regression analyses were used a group of selected variables to estimate the effects of the context-associated conditions, individual characteristics and the place of living as well as of the environment on mobilization in collective action (*MobCA*). Next, structural equation modeling was used to examine the complex relationships between emotional and contextual factors, on mobilization as well as the role of social capital and political culture on people's collective action (*MobCA*).

### **4.1 Preliminary findings**

#### **4.1.1 Univariate Statistics**

Univariate analysis displayed the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the study sample (see Table 2). The table includes descriptive statistics for the study sample (national) as well as for the north states and south states subsamples. Results for the (national) study sample will be first described along with some noteworthy differences across regions for illustrative purposes.

The average age for the study sample was 44.67 years old; most respondents were female (52.6%) and had completed less than High School level education (61.9%). With regards to employment status, more respondents reported being non-employed (44.6%) than self-

employed/business owner (30.5%) or else as working in the private or public sectors (20.1%). At regional levels, statistics for the north states showed similar results; however, for the south states sample more people were self-employed respondents (41.1%) and less were working in the private or public sectors (13.3%).

For the study sample, most individuals reported having completed less than high school level education (61.9%), compared to 56.4% and 74.7% for the north and the south states respectively. Differences in education levels across the three groups are worth mentioning. More specifically, the number of respondents in the north states that reported having completed High School or more education level was twice as high than those living in south states (41.3% and 23.3% respectively). Additionally, three times more respondents in the south states had received no formal education in comparison to respondents in the north states (10% and 3.1% respectively). These differences suggest careful interpretation of the study findings will be needed, specifically regarding the potential varying effects of *Education* and its possible association with economic and social features of each region.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

The statistics for the dependent and independent variables used for the preliminary and the main analyses are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. A larger mean score in the dependent variable *MobCA* indicates more participation in collective action activities for social change. The same applies to the ordinal independent variables measuring Social Capital and Political Culture; for instance, higher mean values indicate more levels of trust, of social cohesion, and of how informed people report to be.

As Table 3 shows, slight value differences were observed in the mean value for collective mobilization (*MobCA*) for the study sample (national) (0.05) as compared to north states (0.03)

and south states (0.06) subsamples. However, in forms of participation, some differences are worth noting. For instance, the study sample showed that the largest percentage of participation reported was for individuals that collaborated in an election campaign (8.1%) and the lowest percentage corresponded to individuals participating in sit-in or protest actions (2.9%) (see Table 3). In other regions, proportions are quite different. Overall, respondents living in the south states appear to be more active in collective mobilization activities than in the north states. For instance, slightly more than 5% respondents living in the north states region reported as having participated in associations, compared to the 8.5% respondents living in the south states. Also, more than 11% respondents reported having collaborated in an election campaign in south states, but only 4.4% respondents in the north did (see Table 3).

With regards to Social Capital, results showed that only 22.5% of respondents of the study sample trust other people, 9.8% of respondents reported that the community would likely organize to fight delinquency, 8.3% to advance environmental causes and 5.3% for politics. Overall, respondents from the north states reported having higher levels of social cohesion in all three items, and as much as twice more than respondents living in the south states (see Table 3). Careful interpretation of this finding is critical, as other current and historical socioeconomic differences, might affect each regions dynamics. Regarding helping the community, the study sample results indicated that respondents were more willing to help with time and work (17.1% and 16.5% respectively) than with money (8.4%).

For Political Culture indicators, as much as 90.1% respondents reported knowing the President's name, three times more than, for instance, naming the three powers of the Union (35.9%) The sources by which respondents stay informed show varied results. For instance, for the study sample, individuals reported they mostly watch television (39.1%) while a lot less use

the internet (5.4%) (see Table 3). While results are similar across the north and south regions, it is noteworthy that respondents living in the north states report reading the newspapers and listening to the radio as twice as much as those living in the south states.

*[Insert Table 3 about here]*

Statistics for contextual and perceptions variables are displayed in Table 4. More than half of respondents had stopped walking in a specific area due to fear of drug-related violence (50.8%) and about 63% had stopped going out at night. Results for these items were similarly high for the two sub-samples, with values that went up as high as 72.8% for respondents living in the north states who reported they had stopped going out at night. Exposure to violence related variables displayed a wide range of statistical values. About half of respondents of the study sample indicated they had occasionally heard gunfire while only 4% have had to cover from the bullets (see Table 4). The mean values of feeling concerned about violence were similar for the three samples; however, some differences between the proportions of respondents for the individual items were observed. For instance, about 8 out of 10 respondents of the study sample were concerned about violence in Mexico, the state and the community (79.7%, 77.5%, and 80.9% respectively), but the same feeling was reported by more respondents in the north states (more than 95% for each of the levels).

Regarding perceptions on the war on drugs, half of the study sample approved the government's actions in this context (50.1%) and about 30% indicated that the government was winning the war on drugs. Approval of citizen's actions in relation to the war on drugs and drug-related violence was found to be higher, as much as 80% of respondents were in favor of people organizing in self-defense groups and almost 68% approved criminal lynching. A large proportion of respondents, although not the majority, indicated that a peasant or a student



collaboration to drug dealing groups might be justified (46.5% and 33.1% respectively).

[Insert Table 4 about here]

#### 4.1.2 Bivariate Statistics

The relationship between the dependent and the independent study variables was first estimated using Pearson correlation coefficients (see Table B in the Appendix A<sup>32</sup>). Examination of the sample characteristics and of the relationships between the study variables validating the strength of the constructs and relevance of the hypothesized relationships. Of all the sociodemographic items, *Education* was the only variable with significant coefficients with the dependent variable and all the independent variables. Specifically, results showed that *Education* had significant but moderate association with *Age* ( $r = -0.27$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), *PolKnow* ( $r = 0.36$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and *Informed* ( $r = 0.30$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and a significant but weak association with *MobCA* ( $r = 0.12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), *ExpViol* ( $r = 0.15$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) and *CommHelp* ( $r = 0.15$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). Coefficient values of *Education* with *Fear*, *TrustGovInst*, *TrustSecInst* and *SocCohes* were statistically significant, however, there were smaller than 0.1 ( $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ;  $r = -0.07$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ;  $r = 0.04$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ; and  $r = 0.05$ ,  $p < 0.01$  respectively). *Employment* coefficients were statistically significant for most variables, except for *Fear*, *TrustGovInst* and *SocCohes*. Specifically, for *Employment* and *Informed* ( $r = 0.12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), *Age* ( $r = -0.12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and *Education* ( $r = 0.14$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), results show a statistically significant weak association. Based on the refereed results, the relevance of *Age* and *Gender* on *MobCA* was smaller than of the other sociodemographic variables ( $r = -0.03$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ,  $r = -0.11$ ,  $p < 0.01$  respectively).

The displayed coefficients show that the strength and direction of the association between

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<sup>32</sup> The full list of coefficients and significance values displayed in Table B correspond to the variables examined for the main analysis using SEM technique.

the dependent variable and all independent variables were as expected. Also, except for *TrustGovInst*, all coefficients were statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) for *MobCA*. While most of the values of the coefficients were small ( $<0.03$ ) suggesting small strength correlation, it is their direction and significance which is informative for this study, allowing to support their relevance to answer the study questions. Results show that the largest coefficient values were observed between pairs of variables used to measure the main constructs of the study. Namely, for *TrustGovInst–TrustSecInst* ( $r = 0.35$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), *SocCohes–CommHelp* ( $r = 0.33$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and *PolKnow–Informed* ( $r = 0.27$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). These results were indicative that the proposed measures built for SEM analysis were reliable and strong as expected.

## **4.2 Multivariate procedures**

### **4.2.1 Regression analysis**

To examine the relationships between *MobCA* and a set of emotions and perceptions that people have as a result from the context, as well as with their social and political resources, three sets of regression models were estimated (see Table 5). The analyses were conducted in two steps; first, a baseline model was estimated. Next, the variables with non-statistically significant coefficients were identified and removed. After this, the resulting adjusted model was estimated.

The first pair of models (M1 and M2) examined the effect of a set of 25 independent variables (5 of which were demographics variables) on mobilization for collective action (*MobCA*). After examining the results of the baseline model (M1) nine independent variables were removed. The adjusted model (M2) results show the significant effect of most independent variables on collective action. To observe in detail the effect of the context-associated variables and the Social Capital and Political Culture variables in detail, two additional models were estimated. The first (M3) examined the effect of 11 variables associated with emotions and

experiences on *MobCA*, while the second (M4) used the remaining nine variables measuring Social Capital and Political Culture. Finally, three models were conducted to estimate the effects of the 13 study variables used in the adjusted model (M2) on *MobCA*. One model was estimated for the study sample (M5), one for the north states subsample (M5.1), and another for the south states subsample (M5.2). The results are summarized below (see Table 5 and Table 6 for the full of the results).

Overall results for all models show the marginal effect of *Age* and *Gender*, while *Education* and *Employment* displayed results with mixed effects for the different levels. For instance, *Age* presented a consistent nonsignificant effect for the dependent variable. Regarding *Education*, *MidHigh Education* level was statistically significant only in M3 (when controlled for emotions and perceptions) while *High Education* level showed a statistically significant coefficient in M3 and M4 (Social Capital and Political Culture variables controlled for) (see Table 5).

In addition, results show the overall weak and nonsignificant effect of most variables associated to the context of the war on drugs. Specifically, *Safe* and *Concern* from the emotions set, and *Economy*, *GovWinWoD*, *GovActWoD*, *CtzActWoD*, and *CtzOrgCr* from the perceptions variables, repeatedly displayed nonsignificant coefficients in all models. These results were a determining reason for these nine variables to be removed from the main analysis for this study. Contrarily, results for *ExpViol* and *Fear* were consistently strong and statistically significant in all models (M1, M2, M3, and M5) (see Table 5 and Table 6). The same trend was observed for most variables associated with Social Capital and Political Culture (see M1, M2, and M4 in Table 5). Specifically, except for *TrustGovInst*, all variables displayed a statistically significant coefficient effect on people's mobilization in collective action, when other variables were

controlled for.

[Insert Table 5 about here]

As for the models using the north and south states subsamples (M5.1 and M5.2 respectively), results show some differences in the coefficients for *Fear*, *TrustSecInst*, *SocCohes* and *CommHelp*, as well as for *Gender*. In particular, the coefficient values of *Fear*, *SocCohes*, and *Gender* were statistically significant only for the south states, while *TrustSecInst* and *CommHelp* coefficient results were significant only for the north states (see Table 6).

[Insert Table 6 about here]

#### **4.2.2 Structural Equation Modeling**

Building from regression analyses, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to estimate the influence of the sociodemographic variables *Age*, *Gender*, *Education*, and *Employment* on *MobCA* (Question 1). In addition, the influence of Social Capital measures on mobilization for collective action (Question 3), the indirect effect and mediating role of Political Culture (Question 4 and Question 6) and the relationships between the context-associated emotions and experiences on *MobCA* (Question 5) were also estimated. Three sets of models allowed to explore these assumptions.


The models were estimated with Stata 13 and used the maximum likelihood (ML) method. Results are presented in Table 7 and a number of diagrams are provided to show the standardized path coefficients and standard errors for the models. The analytical rationale for obtaining the models included preliminary analyses to detect the pertinence and statistical significance of each of the selected measures, as follows<sup>33</sup>. Exploratory factor analyses

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<sup>33</sup> Please note that coefficients and covariance of measurement errors omitted from figure 11 to figure 18 to reduce the complexity of the diagrams.

conducted during data preparation were also used to validate the Structural Equation Modeling procedures described in the next section.

First, a baseline model (M6) was estimated to observe the core of the hypothesized relationships for this study: the complex multidimensional relationships between respondent's social capital and political culture and their mobilization in collective action. In this model, three paths were used to estimate the direct effect of *SocCap* on *MobCA* (1), the indirect effect of *SocCap* on *MobCA* mediated by *PolCult* (2) and the effect of *PolCult* on *MobCA* (3) (see Figure 11)<sup>34</sup>.



**Figure 11.** Model 6 (baseline)

<sup>34</sup> All models structure utilized a total of 13 observed variables to measure three latent variables as follows: four observed variables (*TrustGovInst*, *TrustSecInst*, *SocCohes* and *CommHelp*) were used to measure the latent variable Social Capital; *PolKnow* and *Informed* observed variables were used for the latent variable Political Culture; and to measure the latent dependent variable *MobCA*, eight observed variables were used (*Assoc*, *InflPrs*, *MediaInt*, *InfmCamp*, *ElectCamp*, *MarchProt*, *Repres* and *SitInProt*); additionally, 15 measurement errors were estimated.


As shown in Figure 10, all paths estimated in M6 were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). The direct positive effects of Political Culture on *MobCA* and the mediating effects of Political Culture on Social Capital were observed. Specifically, Social Capital was found to have a negative significant direct effect on *MobCA* indicating that individuals reporting higher levels of trust and social relations are less engaged in activities for collective action. Overall, the model allowed to observe the significance of the structural and measurement paths as well as the existence of direct relationships between this study measures. However, goodness of fit statistics showed mild results (see Table 7). Modification indices were estimated, after which, four paths to examine the correlation for the error terms were included; none of the structural model paths was modified (see Figure 12).<sup>35</sup>

The adjusted model (M6.1) allowed to further verify the strength, significance, and direction of the relationships between the principal measures of this study. Moreover, this model displays the complex role of political culture mediation for an increased effect of social capital on the dependent variable. The standardized coefficients for all paths were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) as well as the correlations among error terms ( $p < 0.05$ ) (see Figure 12). It is noted that, after the adjustment, the coefficient for Social Capital on *MobCA* for this model changed direction for a positive significant effect. In other words, when the error terms for the

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<sup>35</sup> The estimation of modification indices is estimated in SEM to identify all non-free parameters that, if estimated, most likely will improve model fit; the estimated coefficient value for each parameter displayed in the modification indices suggest the contribution that parameter will have to the fitting of the model. The analysis process involved examination of the parameters with the largest estimated coefficient value to determine if a particular covariance between observed variables or between the error terms should be included to better explain the observed relationships. Fundamental criteria to determine the possible modification of the model are the theoretical assumptions. To honor this, covariances between the observed variables and the measurement errors were first identified. Accordingly, this study's theoretical framework guided the definition of the new model.

structural latent variables were allowed to correlate, Social Capital had a positive effect on people mobilizing for collective action.



**Figure 12.** Model 6.1 (adjusted)

Overall, the adjusted model (M6.1) has good fit results (see Table 7). The chi-square test was significant ( $\chi^2 = 1,889.39$ ,  $df = 74$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ) suggesting the theoretical model does not fit the data sample well and that more paths should be included. However, this statistic is only one approach of the model consistency with the covariance data but it does not indicate whether the model is correct (Kline, 2011). Accordingly, other relevant information of the model fit is needed (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Taken together, the selected statistics for model fit ( $\chi^2$ , RMSEA and SRMR), model comparison (CFI and TLI), and model parsimony (AIC) supported the overall goodness of fit for the model fit of the model (RMSEA = 0.02, SRMR = 0.02, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.96). Moreover, the model accounted for 53% of the variance in mobilization for collective action ( $R^2 = 0.53$ ).


[Insert Table 7 about here]

The influence of the context was examined next (M7). The purpose of this model was to capture the indirect effect of the context on the influence of Social Capital and Political Culture on *MobCA*. For that reason, paths for *Exposure* and *Fear* observed measures were included<sup>36</sup>. Results showed that most estimated paths, including the covariances of the error terms, were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ) (see Figure 13). However, the direct effects tested of *Exposure* and *Fear* each on Social Capital showed to be non-statistically significant. Finally, it was noted that, given the strong and significant influence of *Emotions* and *Fear* on Political Culture, the latent variable Social Capital has a negative significant direct effect on *MobCA*. This is, when exposure and fear to violence are accounted for, Social Capital appears to inhibit people mobilizing for collective action. On the contrary, context-associated measures have an indirect positive effect on people's mobilization due to the mediating role of people's political knowledge and levels of information about politics.

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
<sup>36</sup> After analytical and theoretical review, one additional covariance was included for estimation; this modification allowed for the measurement of the error terms of two observed variables used for Political Culture: *PolKnow* and *Informed*.






**Figure 13.** Model 7 (baseline)

Based on these results and following the analysis rationale for this study, two paths were removed (*Exposure* → Social Capital, and *Fear* → Social Capital) (see Figure 14). The adjusted model (M7.1) results showed the indirect and strong statistically significant effect of *Emotions* and *Fear* on *MobCA* mediated by Political Culture. The standardized coefficients for all paths and correlations among error terms were statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Overall, the goodness of fit statistics also showed that the model fits well to the sample data, but most of all, that the adjusted model accounts for as much as 88% of the variance in the dependent variable ( $R^2 = 0.879$ ) (see Table 7).



**Figure 14.** Model 7.1 (adjusted)

The next set of models estimated the direct effect of the sociodemographic variables on people's levels of collective action (M8 and M8.1). The baseline model (M8) included four new paths for *Age*, *Education*, *Gender* and *Employment* on *MobCA* (see Figure 15). Results showed the small effect of all four, being *Education* the only variable with a statistically significant coefficient result. All other estimated paths, in both the structural and measurement models, were statistically significant in showing the consistency of the hypothesized models. Accordingly, and informed by the theory and the results obtained in regression analysis (Table 7), the paths for *Gender* and *Employment* were removed; estimation for *Age* was kept because of its theoretical interest for this study (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 64).




**Figure 15.** Model 8 (baseline)

As a result, the final model for this study (M8.1) included one independent latent variable (Social Capital), one independent mediating variable (Political Culture), and four observed independent variables (*Emotions*, *Fear*, *Age* and *Education*) having indirect and direct effects on the dependent latent variable Mobilization for Collective Action (*MobCA*) (see Figure 16). Apart from for *Age*, results showed statistically significant coefficients for all variables; as for the direction of the effect, all variables but Social Capital showed having a positive effect on *MobCA*. Specifically, Social Capital, *Emotions* and *Fear* with the mediation of *Political Culture* have a strong positive effect on mobilization for collective action; however, Social Capital by itself has a negative effect on people's mobilization for collective action. This is, the more social relationships, social cohesion, and trust people report to have, the less they mobilize with others for the purposes of social change.

The goodness of fit statistics for the final model showed strong and acceptable results. As explained before, despite that the chi-square value was significant ( $\chi^2 = 2,229.19$ ,  $df = 121$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ) which suggested the existence of a potentially better theoretical model to fit the data sample, the model fit was not compromised. On the contrary, all the other statistics showed to be acceptable and within the conventional criteria (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011) (RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04, CFI = 0.82, TLI = 0.78) and a large proportion of variance (90%) explained for mobilization of collective action ( $R^2 = 0.90$ ).

To further observe the suitability of this model, modification indices were estimated; nevertheless, the paths suggested by this calculation (*Education* → Political Culture, and *Education* → *MobCA*) were not in line with the theoretical model hypothesized in this study. In other words, their inclusion would represent a significant alteration of the assumptions and aims of the research. Other than its practical character, adding the recommended path would have no substantive interest for the research, which should be the “guiding force in a specification search” (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 64).




**Figure 16.** Model 8.1 (adjusted)


The last analytical step was conducted to test the final model structure (M8.1) in two separate subsamples, one for the north states and another for the south states (M9 and M10 respectively). The aim was to observe differences, if any, between these groups. It should be noted that for this test, the paths included for the models were not modified; our purpose was rather to explore whether the presumed economic and social differences between two regions with high levels of violence displayed similar results for the same relationships.

As shown in Table 7, all parameters in M9 and M10, except *Age* on *MobCA*, were statistically significant. These results indicate that, despite the different sample size, results were consistent with this study hypothesis. Finally, goodness of fit statistics for both models were mostly alike. While values for each test appear to be in the lower limit of a good fit, this might be the effect of a smaller sample size (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010), a larger proportion of the variance of the dependent variable was explained by these last two models ( $R^2 = 0.96$  and  $R^2 =$

0.95 respectively) (see Figure 17 and Figure 18 respectively).



**Figure 17.** Model 9 Final model for the north region states



**Figure 18.** Model 10 Final model for the south region states.

## Summary of main findings

Overall, the results of this study statistical analysis revealed a negative significant influence of Social Capital on mobilization for collective action. Additionally, given the results for the mediation of Political Culture measure, the positive strong effect of the context on mobilizing for collective action was observed. Finally, the compound of social relationships, trust and social cohesion (Social Capital) was found to be significant for mobilization in collective action outcomes only when mediated by people's levels of knowledge and information about the political realm (Political Culture). In other words, the relevance of Political Culture was observed in mediating the effect of the hostility of the context expressed by respondent's fear and experiences of violence. Results also exhibited the marginal effect of individual characteristics for mobilization in collective action; only *Education* showed to be significant which suggests that the more educated people were, the more they were inclined to organize with others to advance social change when living in contexts of violence and drug-related crime.

## **Chapter 5. Discussion**

This research examined the effects of social capital and political culture variables on people mobilizing for collective action in contexts of enduring conflict. The influence of context-related variables, such as fear to crime and exposure to violence was also examined. Specifically, the analysis looked at individual and collective responses of Mexican citizens, a context of prevailing criminal violence and the weak governmental response.

The preceding chapter summarized the findings from the study. This chapter will build from this study findings to discuss their consistency with the existing literature; their unique contributions will also be highlighted. By comparing the research assumptions and the study findings we will develop and offer novel and robust explanations to people's collective responses to crime violence in contexts of enduring conflict such as in Mexico. The limitations of the study are identified followed by its implications and lines for future research.

### **5.1 Relation of the findings to theory**

This study findings suggest that, in contexts of violence, such as that of Mexico since 2006, the extent to which citizens organize with others for social change is highly dependent on their social relationships and their levels of politicization. Most interestingly, this research findings exhibit that, whether citizens mobilize for social change or not, was mostly dependent on their political awareness rather than on their social relationships (their levels of Social Capital). To be precise, fear of crime and exposure to violence, two key context-related variables examined in this research, influenced people's active participation only when mediated by their political culture. Specifically, people's lives are affected by the conditions of the place they live in but they also act for change specifically if politicized.

Furthermore, while Social Capital was to be relevant for mobilization; Political Culture



conditioned its effect. Social capital is, therefore, a resource at the community level and because of close relationships with others; it is a resource contained in the most immediate circle, but for it to be a useful resource for organization for social change, it requires the input of political awareness and knowledge. Other measures of sociodemographic features were found to have a rather irrelevant role on citizens' assembling for collective action with the purpose of advancing social change.

### **5.1.1 Individual characteristics and the effect of the context on mobilization**

The association of individual features with Social Capital and Political Culture and with mobilization for collective action was explored first (**Question 1**). Not surprisingly, most demographic variables were found to be non-statistically significant on individuals' willingness to organize for collective action. Indeed, existing research has shown that the effect of individual and sociodemographic characteristics on collective action and political participation in themselves is hardly ever captured (Sabatini, 2009; Stewart, 2005; Stockemer, 2013). Moreover, as Stewart (2005) and Sabatini (2009) claimed, individual features are connected with micro and macro environmental conditions and should be explained as such. Likewise, studies that have found individual characteristics to be explicative of social action show that the levels and forms of influence are rather varied across populations and groups due to the effect of the historical or political context. As shown by the north region-south region analyses conducted in this study, the various economic development levels or cultural characteristics are also key to understand the uses of social capital (Deneulin, 2008; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014).

Particularly, the statistical analyses conducted for this study showed that, by itself, age, gender, and employment did not significantly influence people's levels of collective mobilization. In contrast, Education was important to explain respondents' propensity to

mobilize. Education is a variable that accounts for years of formal schooling; however, it is necessarily connected with social and cultural conditions by which people make sense of their living environment. In other words, Education is a measure indicating the extent to which a person can acquire, use and make sense of the political and social climate.

Specifically, this study results showed that mid and high levels of education showed to be relevant to explain citizens' collective action. Employment and education have proved to be important sociodemographic characteristics to explain levels of politicization (Lorenzini & Giugni, 2012; Valkonen, 1969). However, this study findings show that their importance can be fully explained only in relation conditions of the context.

Accordingly, as this study has shown, the extent to which individual characteristics associated to Social Capital and to Political Culture influence mobilization for collective action remains uncertain unless we account for people's lived experiences and feelings related to crime, violence, insecurity, this is, the hardships associated with the context. In line with existing empirical research, this research results displayed that when living in complex environments, where poverty, crime, and corruption intersect, the strength of individual features are obscured by fear, insecurity and mistrust due to the threats of violent crime and social isolation (Banfield, 2014; Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Wills-Herrera et al., 2011). Instead, as the study findings suggest, it might be said that the engine of social relationships powers the effect of age, education levels, gender condition or access to employment as resources for people choosing to mobilize for social change. This conclusion might also help explain why education was found to be the only individual feature that has significant effect on collective mobilization. In other words, interactions with others and relationships within the community appear to be key elements for education or employment to become relevant individual resources to advance social change

(Cuesta, Alda, & Lamas, 2007; Dinesen et al., 2013).

### *The context*

This study hypothesized that the place of residence might differently influence people's participation in collective action activities (**Question 2**). In fact, it has been observed that the diversity of political activities and the social relevance of each form of mobilization highly influence how much people get involved in political action (Gellman, 2013; Lorenzini & Giugni, 2012; Montgomery, 2000). In line with this, the findings of this study revealed that there were different forms of participation between the north region states and south region states. Additionally, individual and contextual variables, specifically influencing mobilization among people living in one region or the other, differed. Specifically, education level, fear, and social capital showed to be significant for one region but not for the other.

To test the varying effects across locations of the relationships of interest, this study used two subsamples, one for the two north region states and the other for the two south region states. Each subsample grouped states with levels of violence alike but with different cultural and socioeconomic conditions. This is to say that, given the similar levels of violence people face, a comprehensive explanation of regional differences in mobilization required the inclusion of other variables other than exposure to violence and crime experiences. At first glance, the study findings showed the two regions subsamples results were similar.

To be precise, the effect of the context of violence in people's lives, a key element in this study argument, was first examined in the univariate statistics. The analysis showed minor variations on the levels of participation reported by respondents. Likewise, the north and south regions exhibited similar levels of Social Capital. Regional differences only came up at the level of social cohesion. Specifically, in the north region states respondents reported having stronger

ties with the community than respondents living in the south region states. Regarding Political Culture measures, differences were also observed. In both regions, the analysis of individuals levels of knowledge about the government authorities showed similar results. This similarity also holds true regarding the levels and sources of information. For instance, regardless of the state where respondents live in, TV was reported to be the main source of information while the Internet was the least used.

Conversely, the differences across regions showed to be more complex to explain than what univariate analysis or demographic features initially displayed. Results from regression analyses that examine the associations between the core constructs (social capital, political culture, and mobilization for collective action) showed existing key differences across regions that ought to be explored. Indeed, as other scholars have argued, this study findings show that people related differently to their experiences and perceptions depending on where they lived (Ley, 2015; Rojo-Mendoza, n.d.). More specifically, for this study sample, fear of crime, social cohesion, and gender are relevant to explain why people living in the south region states mobilize with others for social change; a condition not observed about individuals living in the north region states. In contrast, trust in security institutions and community help showed to be of significance only for the north region states. In other words, coping with the threats of the context meant that social cohesion, and collectively built resources are more relevant mechanisms for respondents living in the north region states than external inputs (such as fear of crime or being a victim of violence).

Results obtained from SEM analysis across groups also exhibit this complexity; the analyses proved that an explanation of the regional differences was more complex than what the data revealed. First, no differences between groups were observed for the socioeconomic

measures. Likewise, results in all the examined parameters of social capital, political culture, and the context were consistent with the study hypothesis. This means that, when facing similar levels of violence and despite their different cultural, political and economic characteristics, the forms in which people mobilize and use their social relationships and political awareness hold true for the national sample and across groups.

As a whole, the findings of this study suggest that the type of resources people relate to when deciding to mobilize or not towards social change is rather different depending on the place they live in. Specifically, in the south region states, people appear to act due to fear but relying on their close relationships with others to advance social change. Both fear and social capital need to be present for mobilization to activate. On the other hand, individuals living in the north region states might mobilize for collective action based on reciprocate confidence and community bonds (people helping other people) rather than out of feelings or experiences. Institutional trust has also been found relevant to explain the likelihood of citizens mobilizing collectively. Indeed, in line with current research, this study findings show that social organization and collective mobilization has regional characteristics linked to local and shared experiences (Heinle et al., 2015; Sabet, 2014; David A. Shrik et al., 2014), and that action and engagement is associated with living conditions (Alvarado Mendoza, 2010; Mendoza Zárate SJ & González Candia SJ, 2016; Vilalta, 2010, 2017). Moreover, these processes may not only result from recent and current interventions to build social capital or politicization, but of historical events and dynamics that reach beyond the scope of this study. However, the study findings additionally suggest that a key difference on the functioning of this process might be related to how people make sense of their experiences and emotions because of their ability to understand the environment, their political awareness and the social support they may rely on.

### **5.1.2 Influence of Social Capital and Political Culture levels on mobilization**

A central issue of interest for this study is to identify and explain the effect of Social Capital on mobilization for collective action (**Question 3**). This connection, however, is not tested in isolation, but by the mediating role of Political Culture (**Question 4**). Existent literature argues that social capital is strengthened and positively activated for organization in stable conditions (Almond, 2000; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Loveless, 2013; Putnam, 1995). However, under conditions of social and political instability, no pattern can be assumed in the presence of crime violence and government unresponsiveness. Therefore, as this research proposed, the examination of other variables not previously studied is necessary.

This study findings indicated that greater levels of Social Capital were indeed associated with more collective mobilization and that political culture components mediated and strengthened those effects. Overall, results on these associations displayed the relevance of social capital and political culture as they account for the influence of context-associated emotions and experiences. That is, findings proved that, how people relate to others and how much they know about the political environment is necessarily connected for mobilization for social change to happen.

A key finding for this study sample is the negative direct significant effect of Social Capital on mobilization for collective action. In line with empirical existing research show that social networks and social resources might have positive (see Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; Payne & Williams, 2008; Ratner et al., 2013) as well as detrimental (see Cuesta & Alda, 2012; El Hajj et al., 2011) effects for individual lives and community dynamics. Except for one, all SEM model results conducted in this research showed that higher levels of trust, social cohesion and community help, tend to inhibit individuals from collective mobilization when

other factors are accounted for. In other words, Social Capital only appears have a positive direct effect on citizens decision to organize with others for social change if the influence of the context is left out of the analysis. Moreover, its indirect effect is positive and statistically significant merely because of the mediation of Political Culture.

Altogether, this apparently surprising finding shows that Social Capital components appear to buffer people's inconformity and frustration with the current state of violence, corruption and impunity. Accordingly, it might be said that close relationships with others and confidence in the institutional apparatus are sufficient key resources for people to navigate the threats of said environments, and that the effect of people's actions is contained within the boundaries of the community. The findings of this study are in accordance with current research and knowledge on the virtues of social capital and its limits in contexts of conflict (El Hajj et al., 2011; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; Mustafa, 2005). Likewise, this research analysis contribute to explain the potential outcomes of Social Capital in contexts of conflict, criminal violence and post-conflict environments (see Gellman, 2013; Mustafa, 2005; Payne & Williams, 2008; Santoro, Vélez, & Keogh, 2012). In fact, social capital takes different configurations and roles depending on the features of the context, the combination set of available resources and relationships, and the forms of political engagement at hand (Lorenzini & Giugni, 2012; Loveless, 2013; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012). If this more complex understanding is put at work, the result might lead to more effective production and use of social capital for it to be an effectively positive source for social engagement and social welfare.

### **5.1.3 The relationship between Social Capital and Political Culture to Emotions**

Another finding in this study suggests a key difference between Social Capital and Political Culture associations to emotions and experiences resulting from the context of criminal

violence (**Question 5**). Results showed that fear of crime and exposure to violence do not significantly affect Social Capital influence on mobilization for collective action. In other words, the hardships citizens face due to the context of extended violence and crime did not significantly seem to affect how they related to each other nor seemed to influence the way in which they used or not their social resources to mobilize. Contrarily, levels of political culture were significantly influenced by fear of crime and exposure to violence. This means that, when the effects of the environment are associated to more knowledge and information about the political situation and ongoing events, such emotions are a strong influence for collective mobilization. As a result, Political Culture is activated as compelling resource for people deciding to organize with others for social change.

In regards Political Culture mediating role on the indirect effect of emotions and exposure on collective action, the findings supported the argument that the more informed and aware people are, the more they lean towards mobilization (see Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Gellman, 2013; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012); the virtues of cultivating political engagement beyond formal political participation were observed. This is to say, information and knowledge of the political environment are constructs that help transform the effect of the adverse environment into collective actions for social change. These findings contribute to a wider and updated understanding of political culture use in contexts of conflicted societies.

Based on this research findings, it might be said that individuals do not rely solely on their social relationships to handle the effect of violence in their daily lives; rather, they are aware that a more profound change needs to be pursued for an improvement of their living conditions. Again, in line with the current knowledge, this research does not suggest that collective mobilization is always a disruptive action, nor that more social capital is necessarily



positive for the construction of stronger societies (see Durlauf, 1999; Mustafa, 2005). Indeed, this study findings suggest that strengthening Social Capital will make collective mobilization less recurrent (see Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; El Hajj et al., 2011; Graeff & Svendsen, 2012; Santoro et al., 2012; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012), people might find other more immediate significant experiences for security and bonding than those of political mobilization. Such an action would instead produce social isolation across groups.

#### **5.1.4 The importance of Emotions for mobilization**

Finally, of central interest for this study is the role of emotions and experiences due to the context for mobilization for collective action (**Question 6**). The variables used in this study captured the relevance of emotions and experiences for collective mobilization when levels of trust and social cohesion (Social Capital) and of information and knowledge about the political environment (Political Culture) were taken into account. Results showed that an important percentage of people have modified their daily activities because of fear of crime. For instance, up to 63% respondents have stopped going out at night.

Altogether, this study findings on the influence of the environment helped support the need for understanding why and how people modify their activities due to the presence of crime and violence in their living environments. To be precise, fear of crime –an emotion by which people refrain or change daily activities- as well as exposure to violence, consistently exhibited strong results. In line with current research, these findings help explain how collective mobilization is used to promote social change (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Ley Gutiérrez, 2014; Rojo-Mendoza, n.d.; Vilalta, 2010). As this research analyses exhibit, in the context of the WoD, social relationships and political awareness help transform the otherwise negative effect of fear and exposure to violence in people's lives. As suggested by Baele and colleagues (2016) and

Halperin & Pliskin (2015), collective mobilization can benefit people's emotions in order to channel social change and improve wellbeing.

One specific dimension of the study points to the association between social capital and emotions related to the context of criminal violence. The negative but significant effect of Social Capital on mobilization for collective action was further observed in the models testing for the influence of fear of crime and exposure to violence along with individual characteristics. As others have stressed, results suggest that responses such as indifference, inaction, and disengagement (El Hajj et al., 2011; Pickvance, 2001) or else increased participation might be taking place (Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009).

By itself, fear of crime was found to significantly influence mobilization for collective action in all statistical analyses. Furthermore, its influence is strong and significant when mediated by Political Culture measures. Such results supported that, by the effect of political knowledge, awareness and interest, an emotion such as fear might be transformed into a positive resource for action and change. Indeed, as Baele and colleagues argue (2016) emotions have a key role in the course of conflict, from the commencement of the conflict up to its resolution or perpetuation (Baele et al., 2016). This is explained by the fact that, specifically anger and fear influence group perceptions on the environment and the interpretation of institutional or individual responsibility and might, as a result, prevent cooperation (Halperin & Gross, 2011). This study findings support the argument that being informed and aware about the political environment might help people to use fear as fuel to their determination in organizing with others in order to change the current situations of adversity (see Barrett, Matter, Lisa, & Barrett, 2016; Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016; Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015).

Lastly, the indirect effect of exposure to violence and fear on mobilization for collective

action was examined. An indirect positive effect was expected. As observed in the research findings, it was only through the mediation of political culture that social capital measures appeared to have a positive effect on mobilization for collective action. In sum, this study's assumption that stronger social ties (social networks and trust) and increased political culture (access to information and political knowledge) would affect the relationship between fear of crime and exposure to violence and mobilization for collective action was observed.

### ***The study environment: Mexico***

Respondents' perceptions for this study sample on the various governmental and citizens' actions on the WoD are worth commenting on. While citizens extensively report supporting government's actions to fight drug crime, they mostly remained skeptical of their results and did not agree on the fact that the WoD had been won. A growing suspicion of the government might explain their skepticism; a general lack of trust regarding institutions contrasts with people's support towards collaborating with organized crime if they were in need, or their support on people's organizing in self-defense groups if felt threatened and defenseless. Indeed, current research shows the increasing trend of communities of taking justice into their own hands (see Heinle et al., 2015; Olson et al., 2014; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).

Regression analysis results further showed that, overall, most variables measuring opinions and perceptions about the WoD were not relevant to explain why people mobilize for collective action. More precisely, this study findings show that people do not change their practices of collective action only because of their feelings or views on the context. Rather, levels of mobilization seemed to respond to the strength and type of community relationships and to political awareness, as well as to how this awareness has been employed.

Overall, this study findings are of particular relevance for Mexico, a country deeply

affected by more than ten years of the WoD and high levels of criminal and drug-related violence. This research results showed that, in this context, government actions to fight crime or citizens forms of collective resistance and whether they had positive or negative results did not affect individuals' mobilization for collective action. On the contrary, , as other studies suggest, rather than direct exposure or emotional reactions being relevant to organizing for social change, it is possible that awareness and strong social interactions hold more influence (see Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016; Nadeau, Niemi, & Amato, 1995; Olson, Shirk, & Wood, 2014; Pagano, 2007; Pearlman, 2013; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014).

## **5.2 Study limitations**

A number of limitations of the current study must be noted. First, the research used data collected in 2011, which has been the most violent and effervescent time in recent years in Mexico. However, while the data might exceptionally capture the profound effects of the environment in peoples' lives during this particular time, its scope may be limited. This means that, despite its strength, the data was collected as events were evolving, therefore it might not have been comprehensive enough to account for the ongoing conditions and the way in which they were affecting people's lives at the time. This study is also restricted by the use of cross-sectional data. Such kind of data constrains the possibilities of looking at causal inferences or tracking observed relationships over time. Despite this, and given the time and place in which the data was collected, it continues to be a strong and informative source to achieve this study's aims.

This study is also limited by the use of secondary data designed and collected for purposes unknown by the researcher. Because of it, some responses remain limited for exploration. For instance, given events in the recent years, it might have been fruitful to the

analysis to ask about other forms of violence, experiences and emotional reactions related to, for instance, increasing numbers of human disappearances. The inclusion of more complex questions in some sections would better inform the diverse reasons why citizens mobilize or not in an increasingly violent context. Indeed, existing studies that look at social capital and citizen's participation in conflicted environments have encountered similar constraints (Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2014; Sabatini, 2009; Tzanakis, 2013). Finding out how people define and value self-defense organizations, their understanding of trusting people as opposed to trusting institutions, and accounts of other forms of drug-related violence, would also be illuminating.

An additional limitation also results from the use of secondary data. The selection of the sample assured representativeness at the national level with an adequate distribution between respondents' age, gender, and profession. However, it did not allow to observe individual and socioeconomic characteristics, such as the specific profiles of young men, citizens living in urban settings with informal employment among other aspects that other studies have stressed (see Ratner, Mam, & Halpern, 2014; Stockemer, 2013; Straus, 2012). Similarly, given the sample design, community level information is missing. Consequently, the specificity of local dynamics that inform about the association of these items across communities and the municipal levels is not captured. Complex sample techniques such as list experiment and the use of clustering or multi-stage sampling designs might contribute for an in-depth exploration of critical situations while improving access and maintaining accuracy as well as cost-effectiveness without compromising respondents' safety and anonymity.

Finally, some contextual information obtained from historical records and other documents might be useful to trace the context-specific features and further discuss the issue.

The lack of information at the local level contained in the data forbids us from proposing wide-ranging objectives that are relevant for this research nor demand careful interpretation of the study findings and implications. To further understand people's decision to organize with others when in the presence of violence and to identify the specific set of social and political resources at hand, additional research that collects primary data from respondents in critical areas in Mexico would be necessary.

### **5.3 Implications and recommendations of the study**

Based on this study findings, a number of implications can be outlined. Overall, a follow up of the highlighted lessons will be decisive to propose future lines of research and social policy in unusual conflict settings. A crucial implication is related to the processes of citizen politicization, the construction of social capital, as well as the generation and quality of information. The need for more comprehensive and current measures has also been observed. A critical analysis of the understanding and measurement of the core concepts used in this research is imperative to build stronger explanations; such an endeavor will require as well of studies and measures designed to effectively capture local and regional processes.

#### **5.3.1 Lessons for politicization: institutions, democracy and law enforcement**

##### ***i) Institutional accountability and scrutiny***

In contexts such as that of Mexico, addressing governments' unresponsiveness and the weakening of democratic institutions is of key importance in the resolution of the ongoing security crisis of the recent decades. The goal of achieving powerful political institutions is to ensure that principles of institutional design; for instance, deliberation, reasoned analysis, openness, and transparency, are used together with a transformative perspective. A perspective such as this presents a challenge to current scholarship for the development of appropriate

theorization and the development of informed responses for institutional crisis; this is, a sophistication of the notion of political culture and the development of compelling models explaining institutional change. Specifically, this study findings will allow building robust research and meticulous scrutiny of institutional performance on matters such as the exercise of rigorous comparative research covering non-conventional scenarios, the incorporation of relevant local practices, and on the production and share of community-based resources for development (cfr Braithwaite, 2004; Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015).

Furthermore, a policy and community practice inspired by the goal of building and transforming institutions is compulsory. Only by the construction of horizontal collaborative relationships between authorities and citizens, and across communities, will the aforementioned social policy perspective be fully accomplished. Based on collaborative relationships, communication will strengthen among and across institutional and social actors, and different government levels, (Shirk, Wood, & Selee, 2014) guaranteeing citizens' feedback and involvement. Furthermore, the conditions for more profound social relationships will be created. In other words, if social programs and policies built to inhibit crime effectively incorporate the local experience and sensibly incorporate the local levels and citizens' participation and commitment, stronger and more secure community relationships will be guaranteed. This, in turn, will ultimately debilitate the spread of delinquency and coercion and, in the long-term, the association between local authorities and the mafias would die down.

The violent and insecure conditions are an additional challenge for practitioners and policymakers. In conflicted societies, such as in Mexico, the development of comprehensive perspectives built from past experiences is said to be crucial in order to generate regional and local viable alternatives (Carrion M., 2005). Other forms of social capital besides building trust

within the society should also be encouraged as obligations and expectations should accompany trustworthiness for structures to respond to the social demands (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998), considering reciprocity and solidarity among actors. Building from this study findings, future research could include additional items to account other dimensions of social capital and politicization processes not included in the available data. Furthermore, as described below, reliable channels of information, effective sanctions, and clear norms will facilitate the formation of social capital, strong and non-excluding social networks, and appropriable social organization (Coleman, 1988; Tzanakis, 2013).

***ii) Containment of the effects resulting from low or negative social capital***

As observed, citizens living in environments of enduring conflict suffer the long-term effects of threats of violence on a daily basis, a situation which sometimes extends over generations (Jaspars & O'Callaghan, 2010; Little, 2014). Specifically in Mexico, and supported by this research findings, besides facing the effects of crime-violence, citizens have to deal with the consequences of a weak democratic system, corrupted institutions and government unresponsiveness (Schedler, 2014; Shirk & Wallman, 2015). In order to fill the void, citizens' organization have emerged to improve security and self-administer justice; conviviality and social cohesion, however, might be at high risk.

Containing the effects of low social capital, distrust and inefficient legal and political institutions is an urgent matter for societies like the Mexican. An understanding of citizen's endeavors and well as the form and degree of population support is urged. Current scholarship is confronted with the need to propose persuasive explanations of the ongoing clashes between government actions and citizens' needs. Citizens are organizing for self-protection because they perceive a lack of efficacy; there is a dearth in the literature of convincing explanations on the



permanence of these initiatives and their consequences for security and wellbeing. The prevailing explanation asserts that by deploying their own measures, citizens hold on to what they perceive is the last resource (Grayson, 2011; Sabet, 2014; Thomas & Louis, 2014). In line with Sabet's argument (2014) and building on the findings of this study, research focusing on social policies as public goods should be advanced; and while they are operated and promoted by security institutions and the police, their administration can only be sustained and enforced by citizens. The accompaniment of scholars and policymakers for the development of such a strategy is imperative.

In the face of the lack of support for self-protection initiatives worsened by a detached citizens-government dialogue, developing and promoting reforms focused on security management and true law enforcement is necessary to reinforce democratic values, far-reaching trust and compelling social engagement (Bunker, 2013; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). As a consequence of promoting a stronger institutional system at the civil and governmental levels, the growth of negative social capital hiding behind institutional weakness, corruption, and abuse will be effectively contained (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).

The use of valuable shared memories and experiences might be key for such a process (Rothstein, 2000). Program and intervention designs should be able to account for the legacy of shared experiences and the collective decisions to help understand why specific norms, decision-making processes, citizens' responsibilities, or legal proceedings exist. Specific transformations for ongoing programs that build up from these, the modification of ongoing agreements and the creation of new institutions can be fully advanced. This is a pressing matter in enduring conflict scenarios, where the normalization of violence permeates all forms of social interactions; systematic and succinct empirical research on the role of experiences and memory on enduring

conflicts is projected. Moreover, without efficient formal and informal institutions, the production of public goods and multilevel cooperation will remain unresolved (Wacquant, 2004). In sum, using collective memories would be a key measure to build trust from below, set institutional mechanisms to honor that trust, and allow civil society to become active in the effective production of social capital (Rothstein, 2000).

### **5.3.2 Lessons for community engagement and social organization**

#### ***i) The importance of emotions for political action***

The creation of stronger institutions would also require the incorporation of social learning and of the emotional dynamics leading social mobilization. As summarized by Braithwaite (2004) social hope can be a rich source of re-defining or creating rules, norms, and practices that would ensure room for social change and enhanced harmony. All social and government institutions embrace hope; for instance, hope for democracy, transparency, fair trade, or justice. However, as society and authorities disengage, policies and programs designed and operated from above prevail, and as a result, institutions lose their objective and action purpose. This proposal reaches beyond the recovery of common expectations about aspired living conditions; rather, it requires a shaping of the future of social organization based on effective engagement and institutional structures (see Ratner et al., 2014; Sabet, 2014; Shrik et al., 2014). For instance, by assuring the support of the population, law enforcement would be consistent and effective, foreseeing long-term social transformation

As for policy research and policy intervention dimensions, this study would help build an approach to identify propitious ways to channel citizens' emotions, perceptions and disposition; this in turn could nourish positive initiatives and programs towards crime prevention, violence, insecurity containment and building resilience (Olson et al., 2014). For instance, other than

vigilantism or self-defense groups, in Guerrero and Michoacan, two of the states most affected by violence, positive responses for collective security have been observed. Among the relevant examples, community-funded police forces and crime-reporting civilian groups have emerged, as social engagement takes the form of a “combative civil society” (Olson et al., 2014, p. 17) promoting a public debate on the rule of law and the importance of citizens’ political action.

In sum, the adversities people face when living in environments of prevalent criminal violence and impunity produce devastating distress and frustration; these emotions combined with their firm rejection of the status quo, freeze civilians in fear or force them to resort to taking the law into their own hands (Grayson, 2011; Heinle et al., 2015). Building from this research findings, future research projects and social interventions paying attention to these emotional changing processes would contribute to the increase of safety.

#### *ii) Strengthening community relationships*

The focus of this study allowed the examination of individuals’ perceptions and emotions which might develop into actions towards change or into strategies for self-protection. By emphasizing relational resources –specifically, trust and social cohesion- this research embraces the conviction among scholars of the fruitful role of social capital for engagement and institutional functionality (Bebbington, 2007; Montgomery, 2000; Wacquant, 2004; Wollebæk & Selle, 2007). However, it must also be stressed that strengthening non-governmental organization requires the true and committed participation of various actors along with collectively built institutions and the appreciation of social practices, participative rules, and decision-making processes. The resulting institutional apparatus will enable societies, such as in Mexico, to move towards more active formal participation at local, regional, national and international levels (Braithwaite, 2004). The proposed perspective will, in turn, nurture other scholars' efforts to reinforce social organization as a compelling collective force for social change (see Braithwaite,

2004; Edwards, 2014; Lazarus, 1999; Ratner et al., 2014; Sabet, 2014; Tzanakis, 2013).

As it has been discussed in the preceding chapters, there is little attention in current scholarship towards the study of ordinary and unstructured social organization, and their role on security matters is frequently underestimated (Sabet, 2014). Research projects and scholars collaboration to develop approaches to solve this gap is urged. Evidence in Mexico shows that a large part of criminal cases and violence are solved because citizens are involved in justice (Herrera-Lasso, 2013; Shirk & Wallman, 2015; Villagran, 2013). In Mexico, a number of groups and initiatives launched by victims or otherwise derived from experiences of violence can be identified. Among these non-profit organizations promoting victim's rights, there are organizations (such as *Mexico SOS* and *The Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity*) that work to advance judicial reforms and crime, on forced disappearances, the murders of journalists or kidnappings, or on campaigns that work towards gathering information or else through social media platforms (Edmonds-Poli, 2013; Olson et al., 2014, pp. 14–17; Villagran, 2013).

Indeed, victims' rights organizations have created a network which appeals to ordinary and organized action, met with authorities at the federal, state and municipal levels, and worked closely to review and improve national law reforms (such as the victim law and the disappeared laws). Altogether, the growing social networks and the efforts towards increasing trust in the police and judiciary lead to greater citizen participation and increase engagement activities in Mexico. Another more recent type of peoples' involvement has been through citizen observatories which have emerged to help “identify, develop, as well as track reliable and accurate indicators of police and criminal justice system performance” (Sabet, 2014). Examples of existing observatories, such as the Civic National Observatory of Security, Justice, and

Legality (*Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano de Seguridad, Justicia y Legalidad*<sup>37</sup>) and the National Observatory Network show the potential association between academia and practitioners. Of crucial relevance is the development of applied research projects that could strongly contribute to change social and political life as well as to enrich the current research.

### **5.3.3 Lessons for security: the advancement of social capital-based policy**

Following Arriagada's analysis (2005) on the use of social capital for policy and informed by this study findings, attention to community development is recommended. Local heritage and shared practices might constitute resources for effective social capital; actors' participation would strengthen and, in turn, state interventions would be sustained. Such an approach will emphasize the diversity of social actors and their role, integrate the cultural perspective on social and security policies, as well as help identify individuals and organizations that lead to the preservation of social capital and local knowledge.

Reforms for increasing and ensuring a strict respect of human rights, intervention of judiciary as well as prosecuting institutions, in addition to a prioritization of programs focused on effective crime prevention and prosecution are crucial to grant security and enforcement of institutions at all levels (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). Other urgent matters include greater political support and increased federal funding for state and municipal level programs focused on crime prevention, law enforcement, protection for victims and dealing with corruption (Campbell & Hansen, 2014; Sabet, 2014). An in-depth critical analysis of existing programs would be critical for the advancement of social capital-based policy. Enhancing security and intensified crime prosecuting should not overlook abuses to human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013), the

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<sup>37</sup> The observatory works to foster an understanding of the security, justice and legality conditions of the country, and to influence policy (see [www.onc.org.mx](http://www.onc.org.mx)).

fight against corruption (Morris, 2013), or the care of the thousands of children in despair (Barra & Joloy, 2011).

The lack of accurate and accessible information is also a challenge (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). Gathering relevant and reliable data to build a “cohesive security apparatus” (Duran-Martinez, 2015, p. 1383) is a task for scholars and citizens alike. Building from current local knowledge and increasing access to schooling is only one step towards the construction of political action. The increase in education should reach beyond literacy; rather, it should enhance people’s awareness and comprehension of their living context, the political structure of their country, and their ability to effectively use, produce and distribute information with the purpose of social action.

Moreover, the availability of precise information will help give a voice to effective social organization and civic initiatives, which will, in turn, contribute to reduce uncertainty and helplessness among the population. Better information will also help improve planning and operating processes of security force interventions (Guerrero Gutiérrez, 2012) at regional and local levels. Finally, reliable information will contribute to better understand the dynamics of drug-related violence, contain crime and extortion practices especially there where criminals and citizens hold relationships of patronage (Aguayo Quezada, 2013). In sum, flowing and current information will be fruitful to build a basis of knowledge from which successful community initiatives are identified and replicated, the overwhelming effect of daily violent crimes reduced, and the reliability of state protection actions increased.

Finally, fighting suspicion is a key resource for trust development. As such, an assemblage of all recommended efforts might help sustain long-term collective action initiatives (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Serra, 2011). Building from common understandings, the difficulties of

social organization may resolve (Fox & Hoelscher, 2012; Stockemer, 2013). An urgency for promoting comprehensive self-development, especially amongst the youth, is urgent in Mexico. A specific attention to education, employment and leisure is suggested as critical (Barra & Joloy, 2011). This approach must incorporate an understanding of the emotional and ideological processes that influence political action and conflict regulation (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Jasper, 2011).

#### **5.4 Courses for future research**

Building from the study findings and the identified lessons for scholarship, some lines for future research are now outlined. First, there is an urgent need to understand complex social dynamics that will lead to detrimental outcomes to social welfare. Specifically, more research on the social and political conditions for enduring conflict transformation will be proposed. As this research has shown, our knowledge on the possibilities and forms of collective mobilization in unusual enduring conflicts and the features of social engagement is quite scarce. Such a theoretical endeavor will expand on existing approaches to the development of social capital and collective action. Furthermore, it will contribute to develop novel understandings on how citizen politicization occurs as a way of managing their experiences and use them to transform their living conditions. Indeed, more research on the political use of emotions will contribute to broaden current explanations of how social capital is built and on mobilization for collective action dynamics in unstable contexts.

Future empirical research should also contribute to measuring development. A more critical analysis of the current measures which are used to examine the forms of social capital and the features of political culture is urgent, as existing empirical research on social capital in contexts facing crime violence remains limited. This insufficiency is further aggravated by the

absence of a satisfactory scale of social capital that accounts for the variety of resources determining the existence of social resources in its ample definition. Before long, an exploration of other studies and available measures would be developed, as essential steps to recognize and include elements other than trust and social cohesion, such as local shared knowledge, self-developed measures and collective memories and their associated processes.

It is imperative to propose and develop research on the political use of citizen's knowledge and mindfulness regarding the sphere of political culture, as, in spite of the existence of a large body of work on the subject, the matter remains focused on explaining political behavior or cultural environments. Likewise, research on the political use of citizen's knowledge and mindfulness is imperative. Additionally, the study of the political use of emotions remains allocated within collective action traditional approaches. The development of theoretical and empirical approaches, which still remain at the margins of scholarship, will allow to project studies that focus on the possibilities of the positive transformation of emotions to bring about effective democratic social change.

While a body of research on complex understanding of social capital (Bebbington, 2007; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2001; Ostrom, 2000; Sabatini, 2009; Wills-Herrera et al., 2011), political culture processes (Denk & Christensen, 2016; Wilson, 2000) and social emotions dynamics (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Sabucedo, Durán, Alzate, & Barreto, 2011; Stewart, 2002) exists, it remains an unfinished task. Next steps include a critical examination of how these concepts are theorized, and a study on the generation of a diversified set of selected indicators which is essential for future stronger and substantive research.

Furthermore, designing studies with the purpose of detailed examination of regional and subregional processes is compulsory; only then will a refined comparison across communities



and potent policy interventions become achievable. Such a project could additionally benefit from the actual development of local longitudinal and empirical research. A study design focused on collecting repeated observations over time and across different groups could contribute to bridge local and national spheres for policy-making as well as to account for transgenerational processes to inform social policy design.

Building or restoring the social thread is a complex task, specifically when looking at community or micro levels (Mendoza Zárate SJ & González Candia SJ, 2016). This points to the urgency of constructing empirical studies built through primary research. Research projects to identify and gather first-hand sources of information may well be developed as it is critical for a comprehensive understanding of the effects of crime violence and the stresses of the future development of citizens living in conflict-ridden environments.

## **5.5 Conclusions**

This study was intended to understand how and why citizens living in conflicting environments mobilize for collective action. It was guided by a shared concern among scholars, policy analysts and social actors about the governmental incapacity affecting peoples' daily lives and the development of strong and feasible responses to contain the effect of ongoing crime violence. Specifically, this exploration examined social capital and political culture resources and their association with context-related emotions as well as perceptions and suggested these processes might vary across localities within the country.

The study findings support the hypothesized relationships. Namely that, i) sociodemographic features will differently influence why and how people mobilize for collective action; and that ii) there is an emotional component, mostly associated with fear of crime and experiences of violence, that helps understanding under which conditions citizens mobilize for

collective action. As for the role of Social Capital and Political Culture hypothesis, this study showed that: iii) social capital and political culture measures are key indicators of people's decision to organize with others for social change, but that iv) it is because of the mediating role of political culture that both a) emotional and b) the social capital indicators are relevant for people deciding to pursue collective mobilization actions.

Overall, the results of this study suggest that most of the explored variables and paths displayed the expected effects. This was observed particularly in fear of crime, and exposure to violence, factors which influenced respondents' Political Culture and therefore supported the important effect the context has on political action. This condition, in turn, leads to an increased propensity for collective mobilization. However, some apparently surprising findings were observed related to Social Capital measures; trust, social cohesion, and community help appear to have a positive effect on mobilization only when mediated by Political Culture factors. This can be explained with what has been labeled as "the negative side of social capital". As recent research has shown (Sabatini, 2009; Wacquant, 1998), people use social bonds to develop protective measures against the threats of the environment. Therefore, if social capital is examined in isolation, its negative form predominates. Moreover, social capital measures are not significantly affected by context-associated variables, which indicates that they are valuable resources only under stable conditions; while when the environment is stressing citizens' lives, it stifles the inspiration on other types of actions. As a whole, this study findings show that Social Capital and mobilization for collective action are associated in a complex and non-straightforward manner (Portes & Landolt, 2000; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).

Some of this study's key implications for policy and scholarship relate to the importance

of developing a comprehensive theoretical understanding of mobilization in uncommon settings, such as environments facing enduring conflict and crime violence. Such development requires taking into consideration the consequences of a weakened democratic environment, high levels of social distrust, as well as government unresponsiveness and impunity. This challenge crucially requires a systematic study of self-directed processes of justice by which citizens organize with the aim of improving security and law enforcement. The risk of negative consequences will persist if we remain incapable of using local resources in order to transform existing common practices and experiences into reformed institutions and shared responsibilities.

Lying at the core of the recommendations brought on by this study, is the proposal towards containing the effects of low social capital as well as building trust from the bottom upwards. Further research on the role of collective memories and experiences that translate into social learning will help understand and use emotional dynamics positively. This will also contribute to effectively deal with the consequences of crime, and to intervene and strengthen the existing institutions.

Overall, strengthening civic engagement, reinforcing local leadership and supporting social organization will foster social engagement and institutional functionality. This will, in turn, restore the already affected citizen-government relationships via effective ordinary and unstructured collective forces for social change. As for social policy for the containment of violence, willful politics and the support of citizens is required for the prevention and prosecution of crime, as civilian participation will benefit law enforcement at national and municipal levels.

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## Tables

**Table 1. Statistics of the study variables (N=7,416).**

Variable	No. items <sup>a</sup>	N	missing values <sup>b</sup>	Mean (SD)	Cronbach's alpha
<b><i>Dependent variable</i></b>					
Mobilize in Collective Action	8	7,412		.05 (.13)	$\alpha = 0.6484$
<b><i>Independent variables</i></b>					
<b><i>Social Capital</i></b>					
Trust Government Institutions	6	7,407		2.27 (.69)	$\alpha = 0.8646$
Trust Security Institutions	2	7,373		3.01 (.83)	$\alpha = 0.8658$
Social Cohesion	8	7,400		2.09 (.76)	$\alpha = 0.9288$
Community Help	5	7,406		2.35 (.77)	$\alpha = 0.8819$
<b><i>Political Culture</i></b>					
Political knowledge	3	7,413		.54 (.30)	$\alpha = 0.5592$
Being informed	6	7,415		1.19 (.62)	$\alpha = 0.7256$
<b><i>Context</i></b>					
Fear of crime	11	7,414		.39 (.34)	$\alpha = 0.9047$
Exposure to violence	13	7,414		.11 (.13)	$\alpha = 0.6628$
<b><i>Demographics</i></b>					
Age		7,397	0.3%	44.67 (16.77)	
Gender		7,416			
Education (rec)		7,269	2.0%		
Employment (rec)		7,360	0.8%		
State		7,416			
<b><i>Other variables of interest (preliminary analyses)</i></b>					
Trust people		6,594	11.0%	.22 (.42)	
Interested in Politics		7,378		.72 (.45)	
Law compliance (obey the law)		7,160	3.5%	2.86 (1.13)	
Feeling safe		6,317	1.0%	1.82 (.94)	
Concern	3	7,413		3.71 (.54)	$\alpha = 0.8012$
Approve Government's actions on the WoD		5,750	1.0%	.51 (.50)	
Government winning the WoD		5,943		.36 (.48)	
Government obtaining information for the WoD	2	7,282		-1.12 (.99)	
Citizens' acts on the War on Drugs	2	7,389		2.43 (.92)	$\alpha = 0.6849$
Citizens collaborate with organized crime	2	7,389		.48 (.55)	$\alpha = 0.6586$
Economic situation	2	7,411		2.29 (.84)	$\alpha = 0.5592$
Rights (legalization of)	3	7,410		.36 (.33)	$\alpha = 0.5079$

a Number of original items used for the measure

b Number and percentage of missing values, values under 0.05% are not reported

**Table 2. Descriptive demographic statistics of the study sample (N=7,416).**

Variables	National sample (N = 7,416)	North region states (N = 1,800)	South region states (N = 1,716)
Age (mean)	44.67	46.67	43.71
Less than 35 years old	33.4%	30.5%	36.3%
Gender (females)	52.6%	54.8%	51%
Employment*			
Public / Private sector	20.1%	23.1%	13.3%
Self-Employed / Owner	30.5%	25.7%	41.1%
Non-Employed	44.6%	45.8%	38.8%
Education*			
None	5.3%	3.1%	10%
Less than High School	61.9%	56.4%	74.7%
High School or more	36.1%	41.3%	23.3%

\* Values do not add to 100% because of missing values.

**Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the study sample (N=7,416): for Mobilization for Collective Action, Social Capital and Political Culture variables.**

Variables	National sample (N = 7,416)	North region states (N = 1,800)	South region states (N = 1,716)
<b><i>Dependent variable</i></b>			
Mobilize in Collective Action (mean)	0.05	0.03	0.06
Participated in associations	7.3%	5.3%	8.5%
Made the media interested in an issue	4.7%	3.6%	3.8%
Participated in an election campaign	8.1%	4.4%	11.4%
Participated in a march	5.4%	2.3%	7.0%
Participated in a sit-in or protest	2.9%	0.9%	2.9%
<b><i>Social Capital</i></b>			
Trust government (mean)	2.27	2.28	2.28
Trust security forces (mean)	3.01	3.14	2.95
Trust people (yes)	22.5%	19.7%	17.2%
Social cohesion (mean)	2.09	2.18	1.97
For delinquency (very likely)	9.8%	12.7%	6.7%
For the environment (very likely)	8.3%	12.8%	6.8%
For politics (very likely)	5.3%	8.3%	4.2%
Help the community (mean)	2.35	2.41	2.35
with time (very willing)	17.1%	18.7%	15.3%
with work (very willing)	16.5%	18.4%	16.6%
with money (very willing)	8.4%	13%	7.2%
<b><i>Political Culture</i></b>			
Knows:			
The President's name	90.1%	91.9%	80.5%
The name of the three powers of the Union	35.9%	28.6%	22.8%
How long is the tenure of a Federal congressperson	35.2%	31.0%	25.9%
Informed about politics			
By the TV (always)	39.1%	38.4%	33.7%
By newspapers (always)	13.4%	18.1%	7.9%
By radio (always)	11.6%	13.4%	6.8%
By the internet (always)	5.4%	5.9%	3.4%
Interested in Politics (yes)	72.3%	68.0%	68.4%
Law compliance (always)	40.1%	44.9%	47.4%

\* Values do not add to 100% because of missing values.

**Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the study sample (N=7,416): context and perceptions variables.**

Variables	National sample (N = 7,416)	North region states (N = 1,800)	South region states (N = 1,716)
<b><i>Context</i></b>			
Fear (mean)	0.39	0.52	0.39
Stopped going out at night	62.5%	72.8%	66.6%
Stopped walking at specific area	50.8%	64.5%	46.5%
Stopped traveling by road	31.1%	41.0%	33.1%
Exposure to violence (mean)	0.11	0.14	0.09
Had property or belongings damaged	21.3%	20.1%	15.8%
Heard gunfire occasionally	52.9%	65.5%	46.1%
Heard gunfire frequently	23.8%	37.3%	17.1%
Witnessed someone being beaten	19.0%	14.8%	12.0%
Cover from bullets or shootings	4.0%	6.9%	2.7%
Had been threatened	5.6%	6.4%	4.6%
Feel safe with the army in the streets	54.6%	60.8%	53.2%
Concerned about violence (mean)	3.71	3.73	3.71
In Mexico (somewhat or very)	79.7%	95.6%	92.0%
In the community (somewhat or very)	77.5%	95.5%	87.9%
In the state (somewhat or very)	80.9%	95.8%	92.2%
<b><i>Perceptions</i></b>			
Approve government's actions in the WoD	50.1%	48.8%	49.4%
Government winning the WoD	28.7%	28.3%	36.8%
Government obtaining information for the WoD (mean)	-1.12	0.46	-0.26
Citizens actions on the WoD			
Approve lynching criminals	67.3%	68.6%	65.6%
Approve Self-Defense organization	80.6%	77.3%	81.4%
Justifiable a peasant grow marijuana	46.5%	44.1%	32.2%
Justifiable students join criminal groups	33.1%	32.4%	24.5%
Economic current situation perception*			
Really bad or bad	68.9%	69.6%	66.9%
Good or very good	10.1%	10.1%	12.9%
Rights (to be legal)			
Abortion	55.5%	50.9%	41.7%
Same-sex marriage	30.6%	28.7%	21.4%
Marihuana consumption	22.4%	23.2%	17.0%

\* Values do not add to 100% because of missing values.

**Table 5. Regression analysis (other variables of interest) on Mobilization for Collective Action.**

Variables	Other variables of interest			
	M1 $\beta$	M2 $\beta$	M3 $\beta$	M4 $\beta$
<b>Context</b>				
Exposure to Violence	0.170***	0.167***	0.181***	
Feeling safe	-0.009*	-0.002	-0.007	
Fear	0.018**	0.021***	0.019***	
<b>Perceptions</b>				
Concerned	-0.006		-0.004	
Economic situation	0.003		0.005*	
Rights (legalization of)	0.007		0.013*	
Gov. winning the WoD	0.000		0.005	
Gov. obtaining information on WoD	0.004		0.005**	
Approve Gov.'s actions on WoD	0.002		-0.000	
Citizens' acts on WoD	0.001		-0.000	
Citizens' collaborate w/organized crime	-0.007		-0.005	
<b>Social Capital</b>				
Trust people	0.000			-0.000
Trust Gov. Institutions	0.008*	0.008**		0.003
Trust Security Institutions	-0.007*	-0.007**		-0.007**
Social Cohesion	0.011***	0.010***		0.010***
Community Help	0.015***	0.011***		0.014***
<b>Political Culture</b>				
Interested in Politics	0.012*	0.014***		0.017***
Being informed	0.018***	0.016***		0.019***
Political Knowledge	0.0189*	0.015*		0.018**
Law Compliance	-0.007***	-0.010***		-0.010***
<b>Demographics</b>				
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education (baseline none)				
Low	0.001	-0.000	0.004	0.002
Mid-Low	-0.001	-0.002	0.009	0.004
Mid-High	0.004	0.012	0.021*	0.015
High	0.018	0.025**	0.043***	0.027**
Gender	-0.008	-0.005	-0.009*	-0.003
Employment	-0.005	-0.003	0.000	0.002
State (baseline: all other)				
Chihuahua	-0.041***	-0.025***	-0.049***	-0.016**
Mexico City	0.027***	0.028***	0.026***	0.028***
Estado de Mexico	0.009	0.009	0.004	0.008
Guerrero	0.013	0.017**	0.008	0.006
Jalisco	-0.021*	-0.018**	-0.021**	-0.029***
Michoacan	0.009	0.012	-0.007	0.008
Nuevo León	-0.038***	-0.035***	-0.045***	-0.037***
<i>N</i>	4,257	5,855	4,890	6,099
<i>F</i>	17.87	30.83	18.23	25.34
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.126	0.117	0.086	0.088
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.119	0.113	0.081	0.084
Constant ( <i>b</i> )	-0.039	-0.042**	0.024	-0.015

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$



**Table 6. Regression analysis (study variables) on Mobilization for Collective Action.**

Variables	Study variables		
	M5 $\beta$	M5.1 $\beta$	M5.2 $\beta$
<b><i>Context</i></b>			
Exposure to Violence	0.173***	0.090***	0.200***
Fear	0.019***	0.0119	0.038***
<b><i>Social Capital</i></b>			
Trust Gov. Institutions	0.007**	0.009*	0.012*
Trust Security Institutions	-0.007***	-0.020***	-0.005
Social Cohesion	0.013***	0.002	0.012*
Community Help	0.010***	0.007*	0.007
<b><i>Political Culture</i></b>			
Being informed	0.017***	0.014***	0.024***
Political Knowledge	0.016**	-0.002	0.008
<b><i>Demographics</i></b>			
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education (baseline none)			
Low	0.002	0.008	-0.005
Mid-Low	0.000	0.013	-0.004
Mid-High	0.013	0.028	0.008
High	0.030***	0.049**	0.033*
Gender	-0.004	-0.000	-0.014*
Employment	0.001	0.009	-0.006
State (baseline: all other)			
Chihuahua	-0.021***		
Mexico City	0.024***		
Estado de Mexico	0.005		
Guerrero	0.014*		
Jalisco	-0.019***		
Michoacan	0.007		
Nuevo León	-0.045***		
<i>N</i>	7,117	1,731	1,635
<i>F</i>	37.78	10.13	10.97
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.105	0.081	0.092
Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.102	0.073	0.084
Constant ( <i>b</i> )	-0.050***	-0.004	-0.050*

\**p* < 0.05, \*\**p* < 0.01, \*\*\**p* < 0.001

**Table 7. Structural Equation Model coefficient results for the study variables.**

							North region states	South region states
Path direction	M6 <sup>1,2</sup> <i>N</i> = 7,286	M6.1 <sup>3</sup> <i>N</i> = 7,286	M7 <sup>4</sup> <i>N</i> = 7,282	M7.1 <sup>1,2</sup> <i>N</i> = 7,282	M8 <sup>5</sup> <i>N</i> = 7,079	M8.1 <sup>1,6</sup> <i>N</i> = 7,129	M9 <sup>1,7</sup> <i>N</i> = 1,736	M10 <sup>1,8</sup> <i>N</i> = 1,645
Age → Mob. in Coll. Action					.021	.021	.017	.049
Education → Mob. in Coll. Action					.060***	.061***	.127****	.033
Gender → Mob. in Coll. Action					-.001			
Employment → Mob. in Coll. Action					.018			
Political Culture → Mob. in Coll. Action	.301***	.218***	.869***	.861***	.804***	.818***	.859****	.726****
Social Capital → Mob. in Coll. Action	-.095***	.121**	-.508*	-.508***	-.481***	-.492***	-.688***	-.374**
Social Capital → Political Culture	.236***	.554***	.866***	.883***	.888***	.893***	.960****	.907****
Exposure to Violence → Political Culture			.252***	.260***	.270***	.268***	.171****	.304****
Fear → Political Culture			.057***	.056***	.060***	.058***	.063*	.123***
Exposure to Violence → Social Capital			.027					
Fear → Social Capital			-.003					
chi <sup>2</sup>	1889.39****	372.67****	607.96****	609.47****	2,357.09****	2,229.19****	891.43****	935.37****
df	74	70	93	95	147	121	121	121
RMSEA (≤0.05)	0.058	0.024	0.028	0.027	0.046	0.049	0.06	0.06
SRMR (≤0.05)	0.053	0.022	0.025	0.023	0.043	0.044	0.05	0.05
CFI (≤0.95)	0.810	0.968	0.949	0.949	0.812	0.820	0.79	0.75
TLI (≤0.95)	0.766	0.959	0.935	0.936	0.776	0.781	0.75	0.70
AIC	65376.688	63867.965	58461.786	58459.299	170682.146	152919.974	30937.10	33329.01
CD (R <sup>2</sup> )	0.534	0.530	0.310	0.879	0.893	0.898	0.964	0.951

Standard errors are shown in parenthesis; \**p* < 0.05, \*\**p* < 0.01, \*\*\**p* < 0.001, \*\*\*\* *p* < 0.0000

<sup>1</sup> all the observed paths are statistically significant (*p*≤0.001)

<sup>2</sup> negative but statistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- SocCap)

<sup>3</sup> all the observed paths are statistically significant (*p*≤0.001), few at (*p*≤0.05), four covariances of the error terms were added: (e.TrustGovInst,e.TrustSecInst), (e.SocCohes,e.CommHelp), (e.InflPrs,e.Repres), (e.MarchProt,e.SitInProt)

<sup>4</sup> nonstatistically significant paths observed (SocCap <- ExpViol, SocCap <- Fear), an additional covariance of error term was added: (e.PolKnow,e.Informed)

<sup>5</sup> nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age, MobCA <- Gen, MobCA <- Occup, MobCA <- MediaInt, MobCA <- Repres)

<sup>6</sup> nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age)

<sup>7</sup> nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age, Fear → Political Culture, (e.PolKnow,e.Informed))

<sup>8</sup> nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age, (e.PolKnow,e.Informed))

## Appendix A

**Table A. Variables and original items used for the proposed study.**

Variable	Individual Items used <sup>a</sup>	N	Item values <sup>b</sup>		Value range
<i>Dependent variable</i>					
1. Mobilize in Collective Action	Used eight dichotomous items on respondents having: 1. Participated in associations 2. Contacting an influential person 3. Made media to be interested in a topic 4. Participated in an informative campaign 5. Participated in an election campaign 6. Participated in a march or protest 7. Contacted a Representative person 8. Participated in a Sit-in protest at a government office	7,412	No = 0, Yes = 1		range: [0,1] values: 16
<i>Independent variables</i>					
<i>Social Capital</i>					
1. Trust Government Institutions	Used six ordinal items on individual's trust in: 1. The President 2. The Congress 3. The Senators 4. The Supreme Court of Justice 5. The State Governor 6. The Mayor	7,407	Nothing = 1 Somewhat = 3	A little = 2 A lot = 4	range: [1,4] values: 36
2. Trust Security Institutions	Used two ordinal items of respondents' trust in: 1. The Army 2. The Marine	7,373	Nothing = 1 Somewhat = 3	A little = 2 A lot = 4	range: [1,4] values: 7
3. Social Cohesion	Used eight ordinal items on the likelihood that the community will organize to solve, improve or discuss: 1. Public services 2. Delinquency 3. Pollution and the environment 4. Violence 5. Education 6. Health 7. Religion issues 8. Politics	7,400	Unlikely =1 Little likely = 2 Somewhat likely = 3 Very likely = 4		range: [1,4] values: 60
4. Community Help	Used five ordinal items on people willing to help others with: 1. Time	7,406	Unwilling = 1 A little willing = 2 Somewhat willing = 3		range: [1,4] values: 29

Variable	Individual Items used <sup>a</sup>	N	Item values <sup>b</sup>	Value range
	2. Work 3. Money 4. Materials 5. Food		Very willing = 4	
<b>Political Culture</b>				
5. Political knowledge	Used three dichotomous items of respondents' knowing: 1. The name of the President 2. The three Powers of the Union 3. How long is the tenure of a Federal congressperson	7,413	No = 0, Yes = 1	range: [0,1] values: 5
6. Being informed	Used six ordinal items on how often respondents' get informed by: 1. The Television 2. Journals 3. The Radio 4. Magazines 5. Talking with family and friends 6. The Internet	7,415	Never = 1 Almost never = 2 Sometimes = 3 Always = 4	range: [0,3] values: 32
<b>Context</b>				
7. Fear of crime	Used 11 dichotomous items on things respondents stopped doing because of fear of being a victim of violence: 1. Going out –at night- 2. Allowing the kids to go out 3. Going for a walk at a specific hour 4. Going out for dinner or fun 5. Going to the movies or events 6. Using taxis 7. Using public transportation 8. Visiting specific areas in the locality 9. Visiting friends and family in the locality 10. Visiting friends and family in a different locality 11. Traveling by road	7,414	No = 0, Yes = 1	range: [0,1] values: 43
8. Exposure to violence	Used 13 dichotomous items on respondents' exposure to violence because: 1. Someone damaged his/her property or belongings 2. Occasionally heard gunfire 3. Frequently heard gunfire 4. Witnessed someone being beaten 5. Witnessed an armed confrontation 6. Witnessed a violent death 7. Was beaten up 8. Had to hide from bullets or a shooting	7,414	No = 0, Yes = 1	range: [0,1] values: 24

Variable	Individual Items used <sup>a</sup>	N	Item values <sup>b</sup>	Value range
	9. Was severely wounded 10. Was threatened 11. Had to pay for protection 12. Was Kidnapped 13. Was Tortured			
<b>Demographics</b>				
1. Age	Single item	7,397		range [18-80] values: 63
2. Gender	Single dichotomous item, reverse coded	7,416	Male = 0 Female = 1	range [0,1] values: 2
3. Education (rec)	Single item, recoded	7,269	None = 1 Low = 2 Mid-Low = 3 Mid-High = 4 High = 5 (original item had 12 values; 1: None to 11: Graduate)	range [1,5] values: 5
4. Employment (rec)	Single item, recoded	7,360	Non-employed or unemployed = 0 Employed = 1 (original item had 12 values, such as working for the government, working in the private sector, self- employed, student, housewife or working part-time)	range [1,6] values: 6
5. State	Single item	7,416	All other states = 0 Chihuahua = 1 Mexico City = 2 Estado de Mexico = 3 Guerrero = 4 Jalisco = 5 Michoacan = 6 Nuevo Leon = 7	values: 8
<b>Other variables of interest (regression and exploratory analyses)</b>				
1. Trust people	Single item, recoded	6,594	No = 0, Yes = 1 (original item values: 1: Most people can be trusted, 2: You should always watch your back, 3: there are of all sorts / it depends)	range: [0,1] values: 2
2. Interested in Politics	Single dichotomous item, reverse coded	7,378	No = 0, Yes = 1 (original item values: 1: Not interested, 2: A little interested, 3: Fairly interested, 4: Very interested)	range: [0,1] values: 2
3. Law compliance (obey the law)	Single ordinal item, reverse coded	7,160	Never = 1 Almost never = 2 Almost always = 3	range: [1,4] values: 4

Variable	Individual Items used <sup>a</sup>	N	Item values <sup>b</sup>	Value range
4. Feeling safe	Single ordinal item, recoded coded	6,317	Always = 4 Not safe = 0 A little safe = 1 Somewhat safe = 2 Very safe = 3	range: [0,3] values: 4
5. Concern	Used three ordinal items on respondents' concern of drug-related violence in: 1. The country 2. The community 3. The State	7,413	Nothing = 1 A little = 2 Somewhat = 3 A lot = 4	range: [1,4] values: 12
<b>Perceptions</b>				
6. Approve Government's actions on the WoD	Single ordinal item, recoded	7,336	No = 0, Yes = 1 (original item values: 0: disapprove, 1: Little disapprove, 2: Somewhat approve, 3: Approve)	range: [0,1] values: 2
7. Government winning the WoD	Single ordinal item, reverse coded	5,943	No = 0, Yes = 1 (original item values: No = 0, Yes = 1, Nor winning nor losing = 2)	range: [0,1] values: 2
8. Government obtaining information for the WoD	Used two ordinal items (derived from list experiment questions) registering: How many activities do you agree the government uses to obtain information to fight drug dealing?	7,282	0 to 4 / 0 to 5	range: [-1.66,2.77] values: 11
9. Citizens' acts on the WoD	Used two ordinal items on people agreeing that others: 1. Lynch criminals for justice 2. Organize in self-defense groups for protection	7,389	Not at all = 0 Little agree = 1 Somewhat agree = 2 Agree a lot = 3	range: [1,4] values: 7
10. Citizens collaborate with organized crime	Used two ordinal items that: 1. A peasant grow marihuana if in need 2. A student collaborate with organized crime if in need	7,389	Unacceptable and unjustified = 0 Unacceptable but justifiable = 1 Acceptable and justifiable = 2	range: [0,2] values: 5
11. Economic situation	Used two items on respondents' opinion of: 1. The current economic situation 2. Improvement of the economy compared to last year	7,411	Very bad / Much worse = 1 Bad / Worse = 2 Regular / The same = 3 Good / Improved = 4 Very good / Much improved = 5	range: [1,5] values: 9
12. Rights (legalization of)	Used three dichotomous items: 1. Should abortion be legal? 2. Should marihuana consumption be legal? 3. Should same-sex marriage be legal?	7,410		range: [0,1] values: 5

<sup>a</sup> All new variables were built using the sum of the means of the original items.

<sup>b</sup> All dichotomous items coded "Yes = 1, No = 2" were recoded to "No = 0, Yes = 1".

**Table B. Pairwise correlation of the study variables (N=7,416).**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	1.00												
2	0.19*	1.00											
3	0.08*	0.25*	1.00										
4	-0.01	-0.12*	-0.04*	1.00									
5	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.03*	0.35*	1.00								
6	0.10*	-0.01	-0.06*	0.04*	0.06*	1.00							
7	0.18*	0.042	0.02	0.04*	0.08*	0.33*	1.00						
8	0.11*	0.09*	0.04*	-0.04*	0.05*	0.09*	0.12*	1.00					
9	0.16*	0.13*	0.07*	0.05*	0.08*	0.15*	0.23*	0.27*	1.00				
10	-0.04*	-0.12*	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03*	-0.08*	-0.07*	-0.09*	1.00			
11	0.12*	0.15*	0.08*	-0.08*	0.04*	0.05*	0.15*	0.36*	0.30*	-0.27*	1.00		
12	-0.03*	-0.05*	0.06*	0.00	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.06*	-0.03*	1.00	
13	0.06*	0.09*	0.01	-0.02	0.02*	0.02	0.07*	0.10*	0.12*	-0.12*	0.14*	-0.45*	1.00

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).

Notation: 1. Mobilize in Collective Action, 2. Exposure to violence, 3. Fear, 4. Trust government institutions, 5. Trust security institutions, 6. Social cohesion, 7. Community help, 8. Political knowledge, 9. Informed about politics, 10. Age, 11. Education, 12. Gender, 13. Employment

**Table C. Covariance matrix for the study variables (N=7,416).**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	.0162												
2	.0032	.0163											
3	.0034	.0106	.1141										
4	-.0007	.4715	-.0110	-.0102									
5	-.0059	-.0059	.0092	.1974	.6856								
6	.0094	-.0008	-.0143	.0189	.0389	.5845							
7	.0117	.0042	.0063	.0218	.0526	.1959	.5981						
8	.0041	.0032	.0040	-.0082	.0129	.0199	.0285	.0894					
9	.0126	.0103	.0143	.0205	.0400	.0703	.1086	.0511	.3795				
10	-.0780	-.2528	.0077	.2249	.2671	.3657	-1.038	-.3231	-.9013	280.23			
11	.0154	.0184	.0273	-.0547	.0295	.0352	.1149	.1079	.1867	-4.584	1.019		
12	-.0021	-.0032	.0094	.0009	-.0193	-.0077	-.0098	-.0156	-.0297	-.4715	-.0131	.2497	
13	.0035	.0059	.0018	-.0062	.0088	.0101	.0293	.0156	.0351	-.9930	.0699	-.1126	.2500

Notation: 1. Mobilize in Collective Action, 2. Exposure to violence, 3. Fear, 4. Trust government institutions, 5. Trust security institutions, 6. Social cohesion, 7. Community help, 8. Political knowledge, 9. Informed about politics, 10. Age, 11. Education, 12. Gender, 13. Employment

## Appendix B

### SEM Output

#### *Model 6. Baseline model for Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective Action*

```
sem (SOCCAP -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> SocCohes,) (SOCCAP
-> POLCULT,) (SOCCAP -> MobCA,) > (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (POLCULT@1 -> PolKnow,)
(POLCULT -> Informed,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (MobCA@1 -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,)
(MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) (MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,)
(MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,), standardized latent(SOCCAP POLCULT MobCA)
nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(130 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement: TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed Assoc
              InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
Latent:      POLCULT MobCA
```

Exogenous variables

```
Latent:      SOCCAP
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -32687.123
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -32675.536
[Output omitted]
Iteration 6: log likelihood = -32643.344
```

```
Structural equation model          Number of obs    =      7,286
Estimation method = ml             Log likelihood = -32643.344
```

```
( 1) [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1
( 2) [Assoc]MobCA = 1
( 3) [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1
```

Standardized		Coef.	OIM Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Structural							
POLCULT <-							
	SOCCAP	.2363217	.0261172	9.05	0.000	.1851329	.2875106
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT	.300666	.0238468	12.61	0.000	.2539271	.3474049
	SOCCAP	-.0954275	.0219798	-4.34	0.000	-.1385071	-.0523479
Measurement							
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.5037793	.0179461	28.07	0.000	.4686057	.5389529
	_cons	3.308651	.0298076	111.00	0.000	3.250229	3.367073
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.6330935	.0267132	23.70	0.000	.5807366	.6854503
	_cons	3.627152	.0322505	112.47	0.000	3.563942	3.690362



SocCohes <-							
SOCCAP	.1636172	.0210013	7.79	0.000	.1224554	.204779	
_cons	2.738951	.0255355	107.26	0.000	2.688902	2.788999	
CommHelp <-							
SOCCAP	.1939923	.0216508	8.96	0.000	.1515576	.236427	
_cons	3.089249	.0281455	109.76	0.000	3.034085	3.144414	
PolKnow <-							
POLCULT	.3910834	.0228445	17.12	0.000	.3463091	.4358577	
_cons	1.792851	.0189164	94.78	0.000	1.755776	1.829927	
Informed <-							
POLCULT	.7053589	.0375781	18.77	0.000	.6317072	.7790106	
_cons	1.939759	.0198862	97.54	0.000	1.900782	1.978735	
Assoc <-							
MobCA	.4778581	.0118435	40.35	0.000	.4546453	.5010709	
_cons	.2812253	.0119447	23.54	0.000	.2578141	.3046366	
InflPrs <-							
MobCA	.5177765	.0115117	44.98	0.000	.495214	.5403391	
_cons	.2535175	.0119021	21.30	0.000	.2301898	.2768452	
MediaInt <-							
MobCA	.5127397	.0115133	44.53	0.000	.4901741	.5353053	
_cons	.222606	.0118596	18.77	0.000	.1993616	.2458504	
InfmCamp <-							
MobCA	.4749889	.0118774	39.99	0.000	.4517096	.4982682	
_cons	.2397386	.0118825	20.18	0.000	.2164494	.2630279	
ElectCamp <-							
MobCA	.443642	.0121047	36.65	0.000	.4199172	.4673669	
_cons	.2960152	.0119692	24.73	0.000	.272556	.3194745	
MarchProt <-							
MobCA	.4304721	.0123082	34.97	0.000	.4063485	.4545957	
_cons	.2403781	.0118834	20.23	0.000	.2170871	.2636691	
Repres <-							
MobCA	.4955701	.0117215	42.28	0.000	.4725965	.5185437	
_cons	.1923679	.0118232	16.27	0.000	.1691948	.215541	
SitInProt <-							
MobCA	.3642926	.0127993	28.46	0.000	.3392064	.3893788	
_cons	.1718496	.0118015	14.56	0.000	.148719	.1949802	
var(e.TrustGovInst)	.7462064	.0180817			.7115953	.7825009	
var(e.TrustSecInst)	.5991926	.0338239			.5364348	.6692926	
var(e.SocCohes)	.9732294	.0068724			.9598526	.9867926	
var(e.CommHelp)	.962367	.0084002			.946043	.9789727	
var(e.PolKnow)	.8470538	.0178682			.8127469	.8828088	
var(e.Informed)	.5024688	.0530121			.4086059	.6178935	
var(e.Assoc)	.7716516	.011319			.7497827	.7941585	
var(e.InflPrs)	.7319075	.011921			.7089117	.7556491	
var(e.MediaInt)	.737098	.0118066			.7143169	.7606056	
var(e.InfmCamp)	.7743855	.0112833			.7525835	.7968192	
var(e.ElectCamp)	.8031818	.0107403			.7824045	.8245107	
var(e.MarchProt)	.8146938	.0105967			.7941872	.8357299	
var(e.Repres)	.7544103	.0116176			.7319804	.7775275	
var(e.SitInProt)	.8672909	.0093254			.8492047	.8857623	
var(e.POLCULT)	.944152	.0123441			.9202653	.9686588	

var(e.MobCA)	.9140545	.0135381	.8879018	.9409775
var(SOCCAP)	1	.	.	.
-----				
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(74) = 1889.39, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000				
.				
. . estat gof, stats (all)				
-----				
Fit statistic	Value	Description		
-----				
Likelihood ratio				
chi2_ms(74)	1889.392	model vs. saturated		
p > chi2	0.000			
chi2_bs(91)	9641.458	baseline vs. saturated		
p > chi2	0.000			
-----				
Population error				
RMSEA	0.058	Root mean squared error of approximation		
90% CI, lower bound	0.056			
upper bound	0.060			
pclose	0.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05		
-----				
Information criteria				
AIC	65376.688	Akaike's information criterion		
BIC	65686.905	Bayesian information criterion		
-----				
Baseline comparison				
CFI	0.810	Comparative fit index		
TLI	0.766	Tucker-Lewis index		
-----				
Size of residuals				
SRMR	0.053	Standardized root mean squared residual		
CD	0.534	Coefficient of determination		

#### Modification indices

	MI	df	P>MI	EPC	Standard EPC
-----					
[output omitted]					
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.TrustSecInst)	964.192	1	0.00	1.233519	3.243579
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.SocCohes)	41.546	1	0.00	-.0470276	-.1050579
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.CommHelp)	68.572	1	0.00	-.0657757	-.1462878
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.PolKnow)	61.377	1	0.00	-.0179086	-.1099365
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.Informed)	5.685	1	0.02	-.0128193	-.0494874
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.InfmCamp)	4.224	1	0.04	.0032704	.027658
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.MarchProt)	5.567	1	0.02	-.0038157	-.0313865
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.POLCULT)	50.860	1	0.00	-.0106733	-.1586888
cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.SocCohes)	89.608	1	0.00	-.1019492	-.2103867
cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.CommHelp)	97.814	1	0.00	-.1175288	-.2414603
cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.Informed)	21.952	1	0.00	-.0350365	-.1249424
cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.MediaInt)	17.192	1	0.00	-.0073676	-.0630596
cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.POLCULT)	39.812	1	0.00	-.0139659	-.1918103
cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.MobCA)	44.431	1	0.00	-.0121578	-.1591439
cov(e.SocCohes,e.CommHelp)	745.589	1	0.00	.1898006	.331281
cov(e.SocCohes,e.PolKnow)	12.095	1	0.00	.0089056	.042904
cov(e.SocCohes,e.Informed)	63.824	1	0.00	.0420123	.1272807
cov(e.SocCohes,e.Assoc)	9.553	1	0.00	.0066066	.0382107
cov(e.SocCohes,e.InflPrs)	4.048	1	0.04	.0038741	.025171

cov(e.SocCohes,e.InfmCamp)	12.065	1	0.00	.0064651	.0429084
cov(e.SocCohes,e.POLCULT)	151.115	1	0.00	.0172963	.2018155
cov(e.SocCohes,e.MobCA)	50.331	1	0.00	.0093734	.1042395
cov(e.CommHelp,e.PolKnow)	22.810	1	0.00	.0123348	.0591611
cov(e.CommHelp,e.Informed)	198.405	1	0.00	.074866	.2258074
cov(e.CommHelp,e.Assoc)	12.035	1	0.00	.00747	.0430126
cov(e.CommHelp,e.InfmCamp)	7.315	1	0.01	.0050711	.0335073
cov(e.CommHelp,e.MarchProt)	7.518	1	0.01	.0052302	.0336127
cov(e.CommHelp,e.Repres)	7.826	1	0.01	.0042607	.0348586
cov(e.CommHelp,e.POLCULT)	377.666	1	0.00	.027654	.3212379
cov(e.CommHelp,e.MobCA)	65.146	1	0.00	.0107728	.1192691
cov(e.PolKnow,e.POLCULT)	5.732	1	0.02	.0066507	.2132416
cov(e.PolKnow,e.MobCA)	5.730	1	0.02	.0021319	.0651476
cov(e.Informed,e.InflPrs)	3.896	1	0.05	-.0030081	-.0337732
cov(e.Informed,e.POLCULT)	5.716	1	0.02	-.0247304	-.4986401
cov(e.Informed,e.MobCA)	5.730	1	0.02	-.0079385	-.1525555
cov(e.Assoc,e.MediaInt)	4.388	1	0.04	.0012478	.0299321
cov(e.Assoc,e.InfmCamp)	50.300	1	0.00	.0045096	.0987374
cov(e.Assoc,e.MarchProt)	11.917	1	0.00	-.0022021	-.046895
cov(e.Assoc,e.Repres)	35.028	1	0.00	-.0030806	-.0835175
cov(e.Assoc,e.SitInProt)	15.191	1	0.00	-.0018335	-.0515208
cov(e.InflPrs,e.MediaInt)	6.657	1	0.01	.0014107	.0380151
cov(e.InflPrs,e.InfmCamp)	5.540	1	0.02	-.0013701	-.033699
cov(e.InflPrs,e.MarchProt)	44.210	1	0.00	-.0038733	-.0926609
cov(e.InflPrs,e.Repres)	83.818	1	0.00	.0043685	.1330429
cov(e.InflPrs,e.SitInProt)	23.129	1	0.00	-.0020604	-.0650387
cov(e.MediaInt,e.InfmCamp)	7.508	1	0.01	.0014196	.0390771
cov(e.MediaInt,e.ElectCamp)	23.480	1	0.00	-.0030103	-.0677766
cov(e.MediaInt,e.Repres)	6.370	1	0.01	-.0010717	-.0365277
cov(e.InfmCamp,e.ElectCamp)	12.028	1	0.00	.0023041	.0473494
cov(e.InfmCamp,e.MarchProt)	11.842	1	0.00	-.0019099	-.0466722
cov(e.InfmCamp,e.Repres)	33.750	1	0.00	-.0026303	-.081827
cov(e.InfmCamp,e.SitInProt)	4.653	1	0.03	-.000883	-.0284731
cov(e.ElectCamp,e.MarchProt)	5.604	1	0.02	.0015805	.031591
cov(e.ElectCamp,e.Repres)	6.376	1	0.01	.001372	.0349107
cov(e.ElectCamp,e.SitInProt)	27.679	1	0.00	-.0025953	-.068446
cov(e.MarchProt,e.SitInProt)	216.333	1	0.00	.0060684	.1903207
cov(e.MarchProt,e.POLCULT)	6.911	1	0.01	.0011369	.0488457
cov(e.MarchProt,e.MobCA)	7.357	1	0.01	-.0040595	-.1662247
cov(e.Repres,e.SitInProt)	4.127	1	0.04	.000679	.0271087

-----  
EPC = expected parameter change

*Model 6.1. Adjusted model for Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective Action with four covariances of the error terms included*

```
sem (SOCCAP -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> SocCohes,) (SOCCAP
-> POLCULT,) (SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (POLCULT@1 -> PolKnow,) (POLCULT
-> Informed,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (MobCA@1 -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA ->
MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) (MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA ->
Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,), standardized latent (SOCCAP POLCULT MobCA ) cov(
e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.InflPrs*e.Repres
e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt) nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(130 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement: TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed Assoc
              InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
Latent:      POLCULT MobCA
```

Exogenous variables

```
Latent:      SOCCAP
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -32687.123 (not concave)
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -32217.034 (not concave)
[Output omitted]
Iteration 34: log likelihood = -31884.983
Iteration 35: log likelihood = -31884.982
```

```
Structural equation model          Number of obs    =      7,286
Estimation method = ml             Log likelihood = -31884.982
```

- ( 1) [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1
- ( 2) [Assoc]MobCA = 1
- ( 3) [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1

		OIM					
Standardized		Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
<hr/>							
Structural							
POLCULT <-							
	SOCCAP	.554225	.064758	8.56	0.000	.4273017	.6811483
<hr/>							
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT	.2183928	.0344626	6.34	0.000	.1508473	.2859382
	SOCCAP	.1214929	.0361085	3.36	0.001	.0507216	.1922642
<hr/>							
Measurement							
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.0740911	.0175055	4.23	0.000	.039781	.1084012
	_cons	3.308651	.0298076	111.00	0.000	3.250229	3.367073
<hr/>							
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1402685	.0192268	7.30	0.000	.1025846	.1779523
	_cons	3.627153	.0322504	112.47	0.000	3.563943	3.690363
<hr/>							
SocCohes <-							
	SOCCAP	.4030965	.0487852	8.26	0.000	.3074793	.4987137
	_cons	2.738951	.0255355	107.26	0.000	2.688903	2.789
<hr/>							
CommHelp <-							

	SOCCAP	.5866604	.0638929	9.18	0.000	.4614327	.7118882
	_cons	3.089251	.0281455	109.76	0.000	3.034087	3.144415
<hr/>							
PolKnow <-							
	POLCULT	.3999577	.0177157	22.58	0.000	.3652356	.4346799
	_cons	1.79285	.0189164	94.78	0.000	1.755775	1.829926
<hr/>							
Informed <-							
	POLCULT	.6897129	.0261348	26.39	0.000	.6384896	.7409362
	_cons	1.939756	.0198862	97.54	0.000	1.900779	1.978732
<hr/>							
Assoc <-							
	MobCA	.4971207	.0119725	41.52	0.000	.473655	.5205864
	_cons	.2812253	.0119447	23.54	0.000	.2578141	.3046366
<hr/>							
InflPrs <-							
	MobCA	.4941805	.0123259	40.09	0.000	.4700222	.5183388
	_cons	.2535175	.0119021	21.30	0.000	.2301898	.2768452
<hr/>							
MediaInt <-							
	MobCA	.5192534	.0117665	44.13	0.000	.4961915	.5423152
	_cons	.222606	.0118596	18.77	0.000	.1993616	.2458504
<hr/>							
InfmCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4950072	.0120079	41.22	0.000	.4714721	.5185424
	_cons	.2397386	.0118825	20.18	0.000	.2164494	.2630279
<hr/>							
ElectCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4500846	.0123243	36.52	0.000	.4259293	.4742399
	_cons	.2960152	.0119692	24.73	0.000	.272556	.3194745
<hr/>							
MarchProt <							
	MobCA	.4014381	.0127872	31.39	0.000	.3763757	.4265005
	_cons	.2403781	.0118834	20.23	0.000	.2170871	.2636691
<hr/>							
Repres <-							
	MobCA	.4600099	.0127442	36.10	0.000	.4350317	.4849882
	_cons	.1923679	.0118232	16.27	0.000	.1691948	.215541
<hr/>							
SitInProt <-							
	MobCA	.3251111	.0133857	24.29	0.000	.2988756	.3513466
	_cons	.1718496	.0118015	14.56	0.000	.148719	.1949802
<hr/>							
var(e.TrustGovInst)		.9945105	.002594			.9894393	.9996077
var(e.TrustSecInst)		.9803248	.0053938			.9698099	.9909537
var(e.SocCohes)		.8375132	.0393303			.7638685	.9182581
var(e.CommHelp)		.6558295	.0749668			.5241933	.8205225
var(e.PolKnow)		.8400338	.0141711			.8127132	.8682728
var(e.Informed)		.5242961	.036051			.4581918	.5999374
var(e.Assoc)		.752871	.0119036			.7298982	.7765668
var(e.InflPrs)		.7557856	.0121824			.7322818	.7800439
var(e.MediaInt)		.7303759	.0122195			.7068145	.7547228
var(e.InfmCamp)		.7549679	.011888			.7320236	.7786313
var(e.ElectCamp)		.7974239	.011094			.7759738	.8194669
var(e.MarchProt)		.8388475	.0102665			.8189649	.8592127
var(e.Repres)		.7883909	.0117249			.7657421	.8117095
var(e.SitInProt)		.8943028	.0087037			.8774055	.9115254
var(e.POLCULT)		.6928346	.071781			.5655109	.848825
var(e.MobCA)		.9081334	.0111961			.8864523	.9303447
var(SOCCAP)		1	.			.	.
<hr/>							
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSIn)		.3401155	.0105043	32.38	0.000	.3195275	.3607035
cov(e.SCohes,e.CHelp)		.12711	.0611412	2.08	0.038	.0072754	.2469446

```

cov(e.InflPrs,e.Repr) | .1211521 .0136827 8.85 0.000 .0943345 .1479697
cov(e.MchPr,e.SitInPr) | .1817778 .0121806 14.92 0.000 .1579042 .2056514
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(70) = 372.67, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

```

```

. . estat gof, stats (all)

```

Fit statistic	Value	Description
-----		
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(70)	372.669	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(91)	9641.458	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
-----		
Population error		
RMSEA	0.024	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.022	
upper bound	0.027	
pclose	1.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
-----		
Information criteria		
AIC	63867.965	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	64205.757	Bayesian information criterion
-----		
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.968	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.959	Tucker-Lewis index
-----		
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.022	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.530	Coefficient of determination

*Model 7. Initial model for Exposure and Fear on Social Capital and on Political Culture, and for Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective Action with five covariances of the error terms included*

```
sem (SocCap -> TrustGovInst,) (SocCap -> TrustSecInst,) (SocCap -> SocCohes,) (SocCap
-> MobCA,) (SocCap -> MobCA,) (SocCap -> CommHelp,) (PC@1 -> PolKnow,) (MobCA ->
Informed,) (MobCA -> MobCA,) (MobCA@1 -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA ->
MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) (MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA ->
Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) (ExpViol -> SocCap,) (ExpViol -> MobCA,) (Fear ->
SocCap,) (Fear -> MobCA,), standardized latent(SocCap MobCA MobCA ) cov
(e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt) nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(134 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement: TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed Assoc
              InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
Latent:      SocCap MobCA MobCA
```

Exogenous variables

```
Observed:    ExpViol Fear
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -30230.698 (not concave)
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -29534.518 (not concave)
[Omitted output]
Iteration 40: log likelihood = -29176.893
Iteration 41: log likelihood = -29176.893
```

```
Structural equation model          Number of obs    =      7,282
Estimation method = ml             Log likelihood = -29176.893
```

```
( 1) [TrustGovInst]SocCap = 1
( 2) [PolKnow]MobCA = 1
( 3) [Assoc]MobCA = 1
```

		Standardized	Coef.	OIM Std. Err.	Z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
Structural							
SocCap <-							
	ExpViol		.0271449	.0213535	1.27	0.204	-.0147072 .0689971
	Fear		-.003428	.020933	-0.16	0.870	-.044456 .0376
MobCA <-							
	SocCap		.8663465	.0483221	17.93	0.000	.7716368 .9610561
	ExpViol		.2519349	.0270712	9.31	0.000	.1988762 .3049935
	Fear		.0567578	.0173843	3.26	0.001	.0226852 .0908303
MobCA <-							
	SocCap		-.5082547	.1869134	-2.72	0.007	-.8745982 -.1419111
	MobCA		.8689995	.0973339	8.93	0.000	.6782286 1.05977
Measurement							
TrustGovInst <-							
	SocCap		.0870249	.0191284	4.55	0.000	.0495339 .1245158
	_cons		3.307412	.0299239	110.53	0.000	3.248762 3.366061

TrustSecInst <-							
SocCap		.146485	.019357	7.57	0.000	.108546	.184424
_cons		3.623706	.0325235	111.42	0.000	3.559961	3.687451
SocCohes <-							
SocCap		.390468	.0475675	8.21	0.000	.2972374	.4836985
_cons		2.731554	.0276549	98.77	0.000	2.677352	2.785757
CommHelp <-							
SocCap		.5463758	.0596783	9.16	0.000	.4294084	.6633432
_cons		3.078687	.0318824	96.56	0.000	3.016199	3.141176
PolKnow <-							
MobCA		.2721572	.0232141	11.72	0.000	.2266584	.317656
_cons		1.7075	.0215542	79.22	0.000	1.665255	1.749746
Informed <-							
MobCA		.4624594	.0315621	14.65	0.000	.4005988	.5243199
_cons		1.794939	.0247875	72.41	0.000	1.746356	1.843521
Assoc <-							
MobCA		.4957554	.0118951	41.68	0.000	.4724415	.5190694
_cons		.1517611	.0150763	10.07	0.000	.1222121	.1813101
InflPrs <-							
MobCA		.4978304	.0121944	40.82	0.000	.4739299	.521731
_cons		.1231734	.0150375	8.19	0.000	.0937003	.1526464
MediaInt <-							
MobCA		.5191601	.0116655	44.50	0.000	.4962961	.5420242
_cons		.0873044	.0151485	5.76	0.000	.057614	.1169949
InfmCamp <-							
MobCA		.4928697	.0119267	41.32	0.000	.4694938	.5162455
_cons		.1112975	.0149395	7.45	0.000	.0820166	.1405783
ElectCamp <-							
MobCA		.4495474	.0122422	36.72	0.000	.4255532	.4735416
_cons		.1786143	.0146857	12.16	0.000	.1498309	.2073977
MarchProt <-							
MobCA		.4029088	.012694	31.74	0.000	.3780291	.4277886
_cons		.1353936	.0141992	9.54	0.000	.1075637	.1632234
Repres <-							
MobCA		.4611123	.0126282	36.51	0.000	.4363616	.4858631
_cons		.0714235	.0146152	4.89	0.000	.0427783	.1000687
SitInProt <-							
MobCA		.325041	.0133082	24.42	0.000	.2989573	.3511246
_cons		.0871471	.0135291	6.44	0.000	.0606306	.1136635
var(e.TrustGovInst)		.9924267	.0033293			.9859228	.9989735
var(e.TrustSecInst)		.9785421	.005671			.96749	.9897205
var(e.SocCohes)		.8475348	.0371472			.7777672	.9235606
var(e.CommHelp)		.7014735	.0652136			.5846258	.8416753
var(e.PolKnow)		.9259305	.0126358			.9014931	.9510303
var(e.Informed)		.7861313	.0291924			.7309479	.8454809
var(e.Assoc)		.7542266	.0117941			.7314612	.7777005
var(e.InflPrs)		.7521648	.0121415			.7287405	.7763422
var(e.MediaInt)		.7304728	.0121126			.7071142	.7546029
var(e.InfmCamp)		.7570795	.0117566			.7343841	.7804762
var(e.ElectCamp)		.7979071	.0110069			.7766231	.8197745



```

var(e.MarchProt) | .8376645 .010229 .817854 .8579549
var(e.Repres) | .7873754 .011646 .7648774 .8105352
var(e.SitInProt) | .8943484 .0086514 .8775516 .9114667
var(e.SocCap) | .999297 .0010979 .9971476 1.001451
var(e.PC) | .16394 .0730304 .06847 .3925274
var(e.MobCA) | .7578166 .0378273 .6871878 .8357047
-----+-----
cov(e.TrtGvIn,e.TrtSIn) | .3384747 .0105966 31.94 0.000 .3177057 .3592437
cov(e.SCohs,e.CommHp) | .1512668 .0521164 2.90 0.004 .0491205 .253413
cov(e.PolKn,e.Infrmd) | .175777 .0191798 9.16 0.000 .1381853 .2133686
cov(e.InflPrs,e.Repr) | .1177681 .0136631 8.62 0.000 .0909889 .1445473
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPrt) | .1813634 .012164 14.91 0.000 .1575224 .2052044
-----+-----
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(93) = 607.96, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
.
. . estat gof, stats (all)

```

Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(93)	607.961	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(119)	10262.914	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.028	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.026	
upper bound	0.030	
pclose	1.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	58461.786	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	58834.016	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.949	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.935	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.025	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.310	Coefficient of determination

*Model 7.1. Adjusted model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective Action with five covariances of the error terms included*

```
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,)
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,)
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP ->
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT ->
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,),
covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized
latent(MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov( e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt
e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(134 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
               TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT
```

Exogenous variables

```
Observed:     ExpViol Fear
Latent:       SOCCAP
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -30455.883   (not concave)
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -29725.77    (not concave)
[Omitted Output]
Iteration 34: log likelihood = -29177.65
Iteration 35: log likelihood = -29177.65
```

```
Structural equation model                               Number of obs   =       7282
Estimation method = ml                                Log likelihood    = -29177.65
```

```
( 1) [Assoc]MobCA = 1
( 2) [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1
( 3) [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1
```

		Standardized	Coef.	OIM Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
Structural							
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT		.8610462	.0861636	9.99	0.000	.6921688 1.029924
	SOCCAP		-.5079466	.0952689	-5.33	0.000	-.6946703 -.321223
POLCULT <-							
	ExpViol		.2602549	.0238157	10.93	0.000	.2135771 .3069328
	Fear		.0558898	.0152382	3.67	0.000	.0260235 .0857561
	SOCCAP		.882959	.0413182	21.37	0.000	.8019769 .9639412
Measurement							
Assoc <-							
	MobCA		.4955531	.0118928	41.67	0.000	.4722436 .5188627
	_cons		.1527155	.0150379	10.16	0.000	.1232417 .1821892
InflPrs <-							
	MobCA		.4976986	.0121921	40.82	0.000	.4738025 .5215948

	_cons	.1241103	.0150014	8.27	0.000	.0947082	.1535125
-----							
MediaInt <-							
	MobCA	.5189784	.0116644	44.49	0.000	.4961165	.5418402
	_cons	.0882907	.0151098	5.84	0.000	.058676	.1179054
-----							
InfmCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4927208	.0119249	41.32	0.000	.4693483	.5160932
	_cons	.1122282	.0149032	7.53	0.000	.0830185	.1414379
-----							
ElectCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4494573	.0122397	36.72	0.000	.4254679	.4734467
	_cons	.1794543	.0146541	12.25	0.000	.1507329	.2081757
-----							
MarchProt <-							
	MobCA	.4027422	.0126904	31.74	0.000	.3778695	.4276148
	_cons	.1361623	.0141706	9.61	0.000	.1083884	.1639363
-----							
Repres <-							
	MobCA	.4609374	.0126257	36.51	0.000	.4361914	.4856834
	_cons	.0722975	.0145816	4.96	0.000	.043718	.100877
-----							
SitInProt <-							
	MobCA	.3248852	.0133041	24.42	0.000	.2988096	.3509609
	_cons	.087767	.0135072	6.50	0.000	.0612934	.1142406
-----							
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.0944914	.018436	5.13	0.000	.0583574	.1306254
	_cons	3.309212	.0298201	110.97	0.000	3.250766	3.367658
-----							
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1515447	.0184477	8.21	0.000	.1153879	.1877015
	_cons	3.626737	.0322561	112.44	0.000	3.563516	3.689958
-----							
SocCohes <-							
	SOCCAP	.3747762	.039951	9.38	0.000	.2964737	.4530786
	_cons	2.739633	.0255475	107.24	0.000	2.68956	2.789705
-----							
CommHelp <-							
	SOCCAP	.5204759	.049497	10.52	0.000	.4234636	.6174883
	_cons	3.08999	.0281588	109.73	0.000	3.034799	3.14518
-----							
PolKnow <-							
	POLCULT	.278611	.022605	12.33	0.000	.234306	.3229161
	_cons	1.7089	.0213319	80.11	0.000	1.667091	1.75071
-----							
Informed <-							
	POLCULT	.4749254	.0296048	16.04	0.000	.416901	.5329498
	_cons	1.797221	.0242607	74.08	0.000	1.749671	1.844771
-----							
	var(e.Assoc)	.7544271	.0117871			.731675	.7778867
	var(e.InflPrs)	.7522961	.012136			.728882	.7764622
	var(e.MediaInt)	.7306615	.0121072			.7073131	.7547806
	var(e.InfCamp)	.7572262	.0117513			.7345408	.7806123
	var(e.ElectCamp)	.7979881	.0110024			.7767125	.8198465
	var(e.MarchProt)	.8377987	.0102219			.8180019	.8580748
	var(e.Repres)	.7875367	.0116394			.7650512	.810683
	var(e.SitInProt)	.8944496	.0086446			.8776659	.9115543
	var(e.TrustGovInst)	.9910714	.0034841			.9842661	.9979237
	var(e.TrustSecInst)	.9770342	.0055913			.9661367	.9880546
	var(e.SocCohes)	.8595428	.0299453			.80281	.9202848
	var(e.CommHelp)	.7291048	.051524			.6348011	.8374178
	var(e.PolKnow)	.9223759	.012596			.8980156	.947397

var(e.Informed)	.7744459	.0281202			.7212468	.8315689
var(e.MobCA)	.7729413	.0345838			.7080454	.8437853
var(e.POLCULT)	.1423951	.0650281			.05818	.3485111
var(SOCCAP)	1	.			.	.
cov(e.InfPrs,e.Reprs)	.1177619	.0136637	8.62	0.000	.0909815	.1445423
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)	.181381	.0121639	14.91	0.000	.1575402	.2052218
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstScI)	.3373703	.0105898	31.86	0.000	.3166146	.3581259
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)	.1704259	.0396709	4.30	0.000	.0926723	.2481794
cov(e.PolKnw,e.Ifrrmd)	.1694203	.0189241	8.95	0.000	.1323297	.2065108

LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(95) = 609.47, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

. estat gof, stats (all)

Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(95)	609.475	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(119)	10262.914	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.027	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.025	
upper bound	0.029	
pclose	1.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	58459.299	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	58817.743	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.949	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.936	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.023	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.879	Coefficient of determination

```
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,)
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,)
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP ->
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT ->
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age ->
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,) (Gen -> MobCA,) (Occup_dyc -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous,
diagonal) cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent (MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT )
cov( e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent
```

Endogenous variables

Exogenous variables

Fitting target model:

```

Structural equation model          Number of obs   =       7079
Estimation method = ml            Log likelihood  = -85285.073

```

		OIM					
Standardized		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Structural							
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT	.8040213	.083765	9.60	0.000	.6398449	.9681976
	Age	.0212202	.0148448	1.43	0.153	-.007875	.0503155
	Educ	.0600203	.015983	3.76	0.000	.0286942	.0913464
	Gen	-.0013657	.0158707	-0.09	0.931	-.0324716	.0297402
	Occup_dyc	.0179468	.0159833	1.12	0.262	-.0133799	.0492734
	SOCCAP	-.4806762	.0916256	-5.25	0.000	-.6602591	-.3010933
POLCULT <-							
	ExpViol	.2704522	.025158	10.75	0.000	.2211435	.3197609
	Fear	.0600061	.0162535	3.69	0.000	.0281499	.0918624
	SOCCAP	.8885946	.0418706	21.22	0.000	.8065298	.9706593
Measurement							
Assoc <-							
	MobCA	.4999065	.0119524	41.82	0.000	.4764801	.5233328

	_cons	.0784285	.0334007	2.35	0.019	.0129643	.1438927
InflPrs <-							
	MobCA	.4964398	.0122912	40.39	0.000	.4723495	.5205301
	_cons	.0498862	.0331856	1.50	0.133	-.0151563	.1149287
MediaInt <-							
	MobCA	.52157	.011742	44.42	0.000	.498556	.5445839
	_cons	.0094482	.0345587	0.27	0.785	-.0582856	.077182
InfmCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4962514	.0119855	41.40	0.000	.4727603	.5197426
	_cons	.036095	.0331237	1.09	0.276	-.0288263	.1010163
ElectCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4489757	.0123532	36.34	0.000	.4247639	.4731876
	_cons	.1130423	.0304863	3.71	0.000	.0532902	.1727944
MarchProt <-							
	MobCA	.4039232	.0127847	31.59	0.000	.3788657	.4289808
	_cons	.0759326	.0279942	2.71	0.007	.021065	.1308002
Repres <-							
	MobCA	.4593689	.0127311	36.08	0.000	.4344164	.4843215
	_cons	.0046659	.0311274	0.15	0.881	-.0563427	.0656746
SitInProt <-							
	MobCA	.3238184	.0134214	24.13	0.000	.297513	.3501238
	_cons	.0413981	.0238081	1.74	0.082	-.005265	.0880613
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.0933614	.0187661	4.97	0.000	.0565804	.1301423
	_cons	3.304709	.0302097	109.39	0.000	3.245499	3.363919
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1532556	.0186776	8.21	0.000	.1166482	.1898629
	_cons	3.630367	.0327437	110.87	0.000	3.566191	3.694544
SocCohes <-							
	SOCCAP	.3885726	.0417178	9.31	0.000	.3068071	.470338
	_cons	2.742067	.0259294	105.75	0.000	2.691247	2.792888
CommHelp <-							
	SOCCAP	.5322323	.0512613	10.38	0.000	.4317621	.6327025
	_cons	3.090155	.0285609	108.20	0.000	3.034177	3.146133
PolKnow <-							
	POLCULT	.2655372	.0227201	11.69	0.000	.2210068	.3100677
	_cons	1.710024	.0216382	79.03	0.000	1.667614	1.752434
Informed <-							
	POLCULT	.4664004	.0301299	15.48	0.000	.407347	.5254539
	_cons	1.7919	.0246508	72.69	0.000	1.743586	1.840215
var(e.Assoc)		.7500935	.0119502			.7270334	.773885
var(e.InflPrs)		.7535475	.0122037			.7300044	.7778499
var(e.MediaInt)		.7279648	.0122486			.7043496	.7523717
var(e.InfmCamp)		.7537345	.0118957			.7307764	.7774139
var(e.ElectCamp)		.7984208	.0110926			.7769731	.8204606
var(e.MarchProt)		.836846	.0103281			.8168463	.8573355
var(e.Repres)		.7889802	.0116966			.7663852	.8122414
var(e.SitInProt)		.8951417	.0086922			.8782664	.9123412
var(e.TrustGovInst)		.9912837	.0035041			.9844396	.9981753

var(e.TrustSecInst)	.9765127	.0057249			.9653564	.987798
var(e.SocCohes)	.8490114	.0324208			.7877874	.9149934
var(e.CommHlp)	.7167288	.0545658			.6173784	.832067
var(e.PolKnow)	.92949	.012066			.9061393	.9534424
var(e.Informed)	.7824706	.0281052			.7292798	.839541
var(e.MobCA)	.8013733	.0328715			.7394682	.8684609
var(e.POLCULT)	.1256498	.0662187			.044727	.3529829
var(SOCCAP)	1	.			.	.

---

cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)	.1216114	.0137934	8.82	0.000	.0945768	.1486461
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)	.1833788	.0123214	14.88	0.000	.1592292	.2075283
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)	.3374524	.0107464	31.40	0.000	.3163898	.358515
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)	.1608002	.0435084	3.70	0.000	.0755254	.2460751
cov(e.PolKwn,e.Ifrmd)	.1812289	.0184117	9.84	0.000	.1451426	.2173152

---

LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(147) = 2357.09, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

. estat gof, stats (all)

---

Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(147)	2357.092	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(175)	11914.732	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.046	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.044	
upper bound	0.048	
pclose	1.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	170682.146	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	171066.580	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.812	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.776	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.043	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.893	Coefficient of determination

---

*Model 8.1. Final model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital,  
Political Culture, Age and Education on Mobilization for Collective Action with five  
covariances of the error terms included*

```
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,)
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,)
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP ->
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT ->
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age ->
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal)
cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent (MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov(
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt *e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(287 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
               TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes  CommHelp PolKnow Informed
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT
```

Exogenous variables

```
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ
Latent:       SOCCAP
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -77903.147   (not concave)
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -77057.513   (not concave)
[output omitted]
Iteration 32: log likelihood = -76405.987
Iteration 33: log likelihood = -76405.987
```

```
Structural equation model                               Number of obs    =      7129
Estimation method = ml                               Log likelihood      = -76405.987
```

```
( 1) [Assoc]MobCA = 1
( 2) [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1
( 3) [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1
```

		Standardized	Coef.	OIM Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
Structural							
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT		.8185479	.0855288	9.57	0.000	.6509146 .9861812
	Age		.0208382	.014639	1.42	0.155	-.0078538 .0495302
	Educ		.061067	.0159123	3.84	0.000	.0298795 .0922546
	SOCCAP		-.4921787	.0935814	-5.26	0.000	-.6755949 -.3087626
POLCULT <-							
	ExpViol		.2681826	.0251332	10.67	0.000	.2189224 .3174428
	Fear		.0583994	.0159747	3.66	0.000	.0270895 .0897093
	SOCCAP		.8929114	.0414557	21.54	0.000	.8116596 .9741631
Measurement							
Assoc <-							
	MobCA		.4997684	.011914	41.95	0.000	.4764173 .5231195
	_cons		.0851049	.0292476	2.91	0.004	.0277807 .1424292



InflPrs <-							
	MobCA	.4957064	.0122594	40.43	0.000	.4716784	.5197343
	_cons	.0571888	.0290676	1.97	0.049	.0002174	.1141602
MediaInt <-							
	MobCA	.5215803	.0117091	44.54	0.000	.4986308	.5445297
	_cons	.0170025	.0302282	0.56	0.574	-.0422436	.0762487
InfmCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4955236	.0119584	41.44	0.000	.4720855	.5189617
	_cons	.0444474	.0289893	1.53	0.125	-.0123706	.1012654
ElectCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4496208	.0123143	36.51	0.000	.4254852	.4737563
	_cons	.1191268	.0268772	4.43	0.000	.0664485	.171805
MarchProt <-							
	MobCA	.4038316	.012747	31.68	0.000	.3788479	.4288153
	_cons	.0812957	.024796	3.28	0.001	.0326963	.129895
Repres <-							
	MobCA	.4591472	.0126942	36.17	0.000	.434267	.4840273
	_cons	.0111307	.0273673	0.41	0.684	-.0425082	.0647697
SitInProt <-							
	MobCA	.3239157	.0133811	24.21	0.000	.2976893	.3501421
	_cons	.0457237	.0213648	2.14	0.032	.0038494	.087598
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.0918463	.0185981	4.94	0.000	.0553947	.1282978
	_cons	3.307911	.0301281	109.80	0.000	3.248861	3.366961
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1520139	.0186092	8.17	0.000	.1155405	.1884873
	_cons	3.634365	.0326598	111.28	0.000	3.570353	3.698377
SocCohes <-							
	SOCCAP	.3874271	.0415459	9.33	0.000	.3059985	.4688557
	_cons	2.740699	.0258281	106.11	0.000	2.690077	2.791321
CommHelp <-							
	SOCCAP	.527596	.0508736	10.37	0.000	.4278855	.6273065
	_cons	3.088062	.0284445	108.56	0.000	3.032312	3.143812
PolKnow <-							
	POLCULT	.2678532	.0228412	11.73	0.000	.2230853	.312621
	_cons	1.710142	.0215518	79.35	0.000	1.667901	1.752382
Informed <-							
	POLCULT	.4671815	.0303714	15.38	0.000	.4076546	.5267085
	_cons	1.79256	.0245206	73.10	0.000	1.7445	1.840619
var(e.Assoc)		.7502315	.0119085			.7272506	.7739387
var(e.InflPrs)		.7542752	.0121541			.7308258	.778477
var(e.MediaInt)		.727954	.0122145			.7044035	.752292
var(e.InfmCamp)		.7544564	.0118514			.7315821	.7780459
var(e.ElectCamp)		.7978412	.0110735			.77643	.8198428
var(e.MarchProt)		.83692	.0102953			.8169829	.8573437
var(e.Repres)		.7891839	.011657			.7666641	.8123651
var(e.SitInProt)		.8950786	.0086687			.8782485	.9122312
var(e.TrustGovInst)		.9915643	.0034163			.9848909	.9982828
var(e.TrustSecInst)		.9768918	.0056577			.9658655	.9880439

var(e.SocCohes)	.8499002	.0321921			.7890901	.9153966
var(e.CommHelp)	.7216425	.0536814			.6237392	.8349129
var(e.PolKnow)	.9282547	.0122362			.9045794	.9525496
var(e.Informed)	.7817414	.028378			.7280542	.8393876
var(e.MobCA)	.800346	.03351			.7372903	.8687944
var(e.POLCULT)	.1196652	.0658347			.0407074	.3517734
var(SOCCAP)	1	.			.	.

---

cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)	.1219324	.0137382	8.88	0.000	.095006	.1488587
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)	.1836682	.0122774	14.96	0.000	.1596049	.2077314
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)	.3381539	.0106952	31.62	0.000	.3171917	.3591161
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)	.163501	.0427683	3.82	0.000	.0796766	.2473254
cov(e.PolKwn,e.Ifrmd)	.1798561	.0185986	9.67	0.000	.1434036	.2163086

---

LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(121) = 2229.19, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

. estat gof, stats (all)

---

Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(121)	2229.195	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(147)	11843.951	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.049	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.048	
upper bound	0.051	
pclose	0.693	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	152919.974	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	153291.058	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.820	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.781	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.044	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.898	Coefficient of determination

---

*Model 9. Final model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital,  
Political Culture, Age and Education on Mobilization for Collective Action with five  
covariances of the error terms included / North region states subsample*

```
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,)
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,)
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP ->
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT ->
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age ->
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal)
cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent (MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov(
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt *e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(64 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
               TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT
```

Exogenous variables

```
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ
Latent:       SOCCAP
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -16426.136  (not concave)
[output omitted]
Iteration 10: log likelihood = -15414.548
Iteration 11: log likelihood = -15414.547
```

```
Structural equation model                                Number of obs      =      1736
Estimation method = ml                                Log likelihood      = -15414.547
```

```
( 1)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1
( 2)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1
( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1
```

		Coef.	OIM Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Structural							
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT	.8591283	.1950874	4.40	0.000	.4767639	1.241493
	Age	.0167414	.0285874	0.59	0.558	-.0392889	.0727718
	Educ	.1267535	.0293006	4.33	0.000	.0693253	.1841816
	SOCCAP	-.6881961	.1982149	-3.47	0.001	-1.07669	-.2997021
POLCULT <-							
	ExpViol	.1716493	.0313737	5.47	0.000	.1101579	.2331406
	Fear	.0626431	.0275677	2.27	0.023	.0086114	.1166748
	SOCCAP	.9596435	.0337067	28.47	0.000	.8935796	1.025707
Measurement							
Assoc <-							
	MobCA	.6554105	.0194657	33.67	0.000	.6172584	.6935626
	_cons	-.0662325	.0742206	-0.89	0.372	-.2117021	.0792372

InflPrs <-							
	MobCA	.5859938	.020839	28.12	0.000	.5451502	.6268374
	_cons	-.0624599	.0675579	-0.92	0.355	-.194871	.0699511
MediaInt <-							
	MobCA	.556299	.0213256	26.09	0.000	.5145016	.5980964
	_cons	-.0641562	.0644099	-1.00	0.319	-.1903973	.0620849
InfmCamp <-							
	MobCA	.6122081	.02014	30.40	0.000	.5727344	.6516818
	_cons	-.0933146	.0701624	-1.33	0.184	-.2308303	.0442011
ElectCamp <-							
	MobCA	.4735193	.02303	20.56	0.000	.4283814	.5186572
	_cons	-.0028947	.0568004	-0.05	0.959	-.1142215	.1084321
MarchProt <-							
	MobCA	.2984101	.0261603	11.41	0.000	.247137	.3496833
	_cons	.0189122	.0415786	0.45	0.649	-.0625805	.1004048
Repres <-							
	MobCA	.427064	.0249964	17.08	0.000	.3780719	.4760562
	_cons	-.0351285	.052769	-0.67	0.506	-.1385539	.0682968
SitInProt <-							
	MobCA	.3277314	.0257433	12.73	0.000	.2772755	.3781873
	_cons	-.0527244	.0437368	-1.21	0.228	-.1384468	.0329981
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.210497	.0333991	6.19	0.000	.1438758	.2771181
	_cons	3.356681	.0618131	54.30	0.000	3.235529	3.477832
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1835912	.0344792	5.32	0.000	.1160133	.2511691
	_cons	3.748805	.0679977	55.13	0.000	3.615532	3.882078
SocCohes <-							
	SOCCAP	.4136998	.0435775	9.49	0.000	.3282895	.4991101
	_cons	2.711682	.0519024	52.25	0.000	2.609955	2.813409
CommHelp <-							
	SOCCAP	.4924017	.0553549	8.90	0.000	.3839081	.6008953
	_cons	2.945705	.0554542	53.12	0.000	2.837017	3.054393
PolKnow <-							
	POLCULT	.3270657	.0498489	6.56	0.000	.2293637	.4247678
	_cons	1.737199	.0456944	38.02	0.000	1.64764	1.826758
Informed <-							
	POLCULT	.6517744	.0576601	11.30	0.000	.5387626	.7647861
	_cons	1.510208	.0521656	28.95	0.000	1.407965	1.612451
	var(e.Assoc)	.5704371	.0255161			.5225561	.6227054
	var(e.InflPrs)	.6566113	.024423			.6104462	.7062675
	var(e.MediaInt)	.6905314	.0237268			.645559	.7386367
	var(e.InfmCamp)	.6252012	.0246598			.5786899	.6754508
	var(e.ElectCamp)	.7757795	.0218103			.7341885	.8197265
	var(e.MarchProt)	.9109514	.015613			.8808588	.942072
	var(e.Repres)	.8176163	.0213502			.7768235	.8605512
	var(e.SitInProt)	.8925922	.0168738			.8601254	.9262844
	var(e.TrustGovInst)	.955691	.01431			.9280515	.9841537
	var(e.TrustSecInst)	.9662943	.0126601			.9417967	.991429
	var(e.SocCohes)	.8288525	.036056			.7611128	.902621

var(e.CommHlp)	.7575406	.0545137			.6578884	.8722874
var(e.PolKnow)	.893028	.0326077			.8313513	.9592804
var(e.Informed)	.5751902	.0751628			.4452265	.7430908
var(e.MobCA)	.9033789	.0401427			.8280295	.9855851
var(e.POLCULT)	.0395341	.0622296			.0018077	.8646187
var(SOCCAP)	1	.			.	.
cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)	.2026003	.0266481	7.60	0.000	.1503709	.2548296
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)	.2116278	.0237821	8.90	0.000	.1650159	.2582398
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)	.2095588	.0237644	8.82	0.000	.1629814	.2561362
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)	.1936932	.044393	4.36	0.000	.1066845	.2807019
cov(e.PolKwn,e.Ifrmd)	.0668025	.0583231	1.15	0.252	-.0475087	.1811137

LR test of model vs. saturated:  $\chi^2(121) = 891.43$ , Prob >  $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

. estat gof, stats (all)

Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
$\chi^2_{ms}(121)$	891.433	model vs. saturated
p > $\chi^2$	0.000	
$\chi^2_{bs}(147)$	3859.947	baseline vs. saturated
p > $\chi^2$	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.061	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.057	
upper bound	0.064	
pclose	0.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	30937.095	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	31231.899	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.793	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.748	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.052	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.964	Coefficient of determination

*Model 10. Final model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital,  
Political Culture, Age and Education on Mobilization for Collective Action with five  
covariances of the error terms included / South region states subsample*

```
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,)
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,)
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP ->
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT ->
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age ->
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal)
cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent (MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov(
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt *e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.
(71 observations with missing values excluded)
```

Endogenous variables

```
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt
               TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes  CommHelp PolKnow Informed
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT
```

Exogenous variables

```
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ
Latent:       SOCCAP
```

Fitting target model:

```
Iteration 0:  log likelihood = -17348.853   (not concave)
Iteration 1:  log likelihood = -16916.837   (not concave)
[output omitted]
Iteration 24: log likelihood = -16610.505
Iteration 25: log likelihood = -16610.505
```

```
Structural equation model                               Number of obs    =      1645
Estimation method = ml                                Log likelihood    = -16610.505
```

```
( 1) [Assoc]MobCA = 1
( 2) [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1
( 3) [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1
```

		OIM					
Standardized		Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Structural							
MobCA <-							
	POLCULT	.7258225	.130633	5.56	0.000	.4697866	.9818584
	Age	.0486315	.0299127	1.63	0.104	-.0099963	.1072594
	Educ	.032875	.0335818	0.98	0.328	-.0329441	.0986941
	SOCCAP	-.3741627	.1482382	-2.52	0.012	-.6647041	-.0836212
POLCULT <-							
	ExpViol	.3043125	.0490829	6.20	0.000	.2081118	.4005132
	Fear	.1230074	.0353824	3.48	0.001	.0536592	.1923556
	SOCCAP	.9070697	.0919712	9.86	0.000	.7268095	1.08733
Measurement							
Assoc <-							
	MobCA	.4546587	.024788	18.34	0.000	.406075	.5032423
	cons	.1044335	.0542914	1.92	0.054	-.0019756	.2108427

InflPrs <-							
	MobCA	.5632972	.0235206	23.95	0.000	.5171977	.6093968
	_cons	-.0520877	.0630472	-0.83	0.409	-.1756579	.0714824
MediaInt <-							
	MobCA	.5498532	.0231433	23.76	0.000	.5044931	.5952132
	_cons	-.0428284	.0622641	-0.69	0.492	-.1648637	.079207
InfmCamp <-							
	MobCA	.5225888	.0237542	22.00	0.000	.4760314	.5691461
	_cons	.011484	.0601634	0.19	0.849	-.1064341	.1294022
ElectCamp <-							
	MobCA	.454687	.0248811	18.27	0.000	.4059209	.5034531
	_cons	.1563876	.0543416	2.88	0.004	.0498799	.2628952
MarchProt <-							
	MobCA	.4912172	.0242383	20.27	0.000	.443711	.5387234
	_cons	.0561796	.057332	0.98	0.327	-.0561892	.1685483
Repres <-							
	MobCA	.4788237	.0254878	18.79	0.000	.4288686	.5287789
	_cons	-.05467	.0556389	-0.98	0.326	-.1637202	.0543802
SitInProt <-							
	MobCA	.3340172	.0271552	12.30	0.000	.2807939	.3872405
	_cons	.0250942	.0439427	0.57	0.568	-.061032	.1112204
TrustGovInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1120737	.0399423	2.81	0.005	.0337882	.1903591
	_cons	3.41139	.0643821	52.99	0.000	3.285203	3.537576
TrustSecInst <-							
	SOCCAP	.1936425	.0421545	4.59	0.000	.1110212	.2762637
	_cons	3.514761	.0660511	53.21	0.000	3.385303	3.644219
SocCohes <-							
	SOCCAP	.2819515	.0658047	4.28	0.000	.1529767	.4109264
	_cons	2.651788	.0523953	50.61	0.000	2.549095	2.754481
CommHelp <-							
	SOCCAP	.4075186	.0730308	5.58	0.000	.2643809	.5506564
	_cons	3.128543	.0598572	52.27	0.000	3.011225	3.245861
PolKnow <-							
	POLCULT	.305631	.0483777	6.32	0.000	.2108126	.4004495
	_cons	1.413678	.0432695	32.67	0.000	1.328872	1.498485
Informed <-							
	POLCULT	.5371252	.0588504	9.13	0.000	.4217806	.6524699
	_cons	1.519769	.0484966	31.34	0.000	1.424718	1.614821
	var(e.Assoc)	.7932855	.0225402			.7503152	.8387168
	var(e.InflPrs)	.6826962	.0264982			.6326871	.7366583
	var(e.MediaInt)	.6976615	.0254508			.6495204	.7493708
	var(e.InfmCamp)	.726901	.0248274			.6798333	.7772274
	var(e.ElectCamp)	.7932597	.0226262			.7501299	.8388694
	var(e.MarchProt)	.7587056	.0238125			.7134404	.8068427
	var(e.Repres)	.7707278	.0244083			.7243429	.8200832
	var(e.SitInProt)	.8884325	.0181406			.8535796	.9247086
	var(e.TrustGovInst)	.9874395	.008953			.970047	1.005144
	var(e.TrustSecInst)	.9625026	.0163258			.9310307	.9950384

var(e.SocCohes)	.9205033	.0371075			.850573	.996183
var(e.CommHelp)	.8339286	.0595228			.7250586	.9591457
var(e.PolKnow)	.9065897	.0295714			.8504446	.9664414
var(e.Informed)	.7114965	.0632201			.597777	.8468497
var(e.MobCA)	.8230511	.0547964			.7223642	.9377722
var(e.POLCULT)	.0533035	.1512488			.0002049	13.86893
var(SOCCAP)	1	.			.	.

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cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)	.0697568	.0300546	2.32	0.020	.0108509	.1286627
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)	.1212363	.026682	4.54	0.000	.0689406	.173532
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)	.308791	.0230511	13.40	0.000	.2636118	.3539703
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)	.2958763	.0406226	7.28	0.000	.2162575	.375495
cov(e.PolKwn,e.Ifrmd)	.0918246	.0469912	1.95	0.051	-.0002765	.1839257

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LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(121) = 935.37, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

. estat gof, stats (all)

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Fit statistic	Value	Description
Likelihood ratio		
chi2_ms(121)	935.371	model vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
chi2_bs(147)	3367.888	baseline vs. saturated
p > chi2	0.000	
Population error		
RMSEA	0.064	Root mean squared error of approximation
90% CI, lower bound	0.060	
upper bound	0.068	
pclose	0.000	Probability RMSEA <= 0.05
Information criteria		
AIC	33329.010	Akaike's information criterion
BIC	33620.906	Bayesian information criterion
Baseline comparison		
CFI	0.747	Comparative fit index
TLI	0.693	Tucker-Lewis index
Size of residuals		
SRMR	0.054	Standardized root mean squared residual
CD	0.951	Coefficient of determination

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