The Trinitarian Telos of the Summa theologiae: Thomas's Application of the Aristotelian Ordo Disciplinae to Sacra Doctrina in light of his Augustinian Heritage

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The Trinitarian *Telos* of the *Summa theologiae:* Thomas's Application of the Aristotelian *Ordo Disciplinae* to *Sacra Doctrina* in light of his Augustinian Heritage

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The Trinitarian *Telos* of the *Summa theologiae:*
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I argue for a performative reading of the *Summa theologiae* in relation to Thomas Aquinas's coordination of the trinitarian processions with the trinitarian image and the process of teaching and learning. Specifically, I argue that the *Summa* is skillfully arranged in order to initiate the student into the graced process of conceiving words about the Triune God that burst forth into love—the very processions by which we are *ad imaginem Dei* and become more like God. Learning to speak truly and love rightly prepares students to preach about God within their culture, just as Thomas's own efforts to preach the trinitarian mystery indicate. My argument takes into account Thomas's life as a Dominican preacher and teacher in thirteenth-century Europe as well as his theology of the mixed life of contemplation and action. With respect to the latter, Thomas maintained that the Dominican must draw in contemplation what he will pour out later on in preaching (*contemplata aliis tradere*). Thomas wrote the *Summa theologiae* with this pastoral orientation in mind. In light of this historical context, I argue that the *Summa* is a performative text and transformative encounter with *sacra* doctrina written to prepare Dominican students to hand on the fruits of their contemplation. This interpretation of the *Summa theologiae* and Thomas's trinitarian theology enriches standard contemporary interpretations of the psychological analogy.

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"Mary treasured all these words and pondered them in her heart."
Luke 2:19

To my mother and my son,
who have helped me appreciate divine love
through the gifts of receiving and giving life.

In an interview, Lonergan once said:

Oh, my whole theory of the Trinity has changed, you know. …According to Aquinas, the Son is the *verbum spirans amorem* – the judgment of value, not a judgment of freedom. According to Rosemary Haughton (though she doesn't put it this way), what in Thomas is called *amor procedens*, the Holy Ghost, is *thanksgiving*. …It is the same sort of relationship, only it is the procession of judgment of value from *agape*, and of thanksgiving from both.[1]

With that said, in a dissertation on Thomas Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan on the Trinity, it is only fitting to begin by expressing my gratitude to the friends, mentors, and family that helped me traverse the trials and joys of graduate school and supported me throughout my dissertation.

First, I would like to thank my dissertation committee, and especially my director, Dr. Dominic Doyle. Professor Doyle, thank you for your support of my project from its inception to its completion. Your patience with my many drafts and your prompt turn-arounds helped me progress toward chapters that were more clearly written and more effectively organized. I am especially grateful for the class on Aquinas that I took with you during my coursework. During that course, I learned to appreciate the intricate structure of the *Summa theologiae*, and the importance of its prologues. This appreciation was one of the two seedlings that sparked my dissertation. Professor Brown, thank you for your enthusiasm regarding my interest in Thomas's theological method and his understanding of theology. I am indebted to you for your guidance through the first chapter on the historical background of the *Summa theologiae*. I am also grateful for the kindness you have shown me throughout my time in the Theology Department. Professor Wilkins, you have been helping me understand Aquinas and Lonergan from the beginning. Thank you for your many e-mails, and for writing so many articles that were relevant to my project! I am also grateful for your encouragement and your confidence in me, as well as your friendship. During a course on the Trinity, Fred Lawrence mentioned your response to Karl

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[1] Pierre Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going, eds., *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the life of Bernard Lonergan*, Thomas More Institute Papers 82 (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 61-62 (emphasis added). I owe this reference to Charles Hefling, "Over Thin Ice: Comments on *Gratia,* Grace and Gratitude," *Lonergan Workshop Journal* vol. 18 (2005), 99.

Rahner's critique of the psychological analogy—that was the beginning of my fascination with the intersection of trinitarian theology and theological method.

Professor Byrne, you have been my most important and favorite teacher. When I was writing my senior thesis in philosophy on Kant and Marcel, you mentioned Lonergan and his relevance to my questions. It was the first time I had heard of this "Lonergan thing." At the time, I was a senior ready to graduate, but the following year, I would remember that comment and understand just how right you were. You explain Lonergan and engage philosophical and theological questions in a way that always illuminates matters for me, and helps me gain understanding where before I lacked it. During your *Insight* course, you communicated Lonergan in a way that solidified my appreciation of his importance for some of humanity's most significant and perennial questions, and his relevance to 20th and 21st century concerns. Perhaps most meaningful for me in my personal journey was the respect I gained for trying to raise any and all relevant questions. I am especially grateful for the time you spent with me to help me understand *Verbum*. Additionally, you have been a mentor and friend whose presence I could always count on, and whose integrity in all areas of life has taught me many things about my own decision-making. You have been a companion during times of discernment, as St. Ignatius would have it. Thank you, and I look forward to continuing to learn with you as my own scholarship and teaching move forward.

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the incarnation is one of the most memorable learning experiences I have had. During that course, Lonergan's *The Way to Nicea* came to life for me, as you helped us travel to Nicea, and then again, to Chalcedon. I came to appreciate what Lonergan meant by Dialectics and Foundations. I am especially grateful to the time you have spent answering my questions about the inner word. The responses you sent me (and Brian Traska) over the summer of 2016 played a pivotal role in my third and fourth chapters. You helped me move pass some of the impasses in my own thinking and reception of *Verbum*. Additionally, your short articles on soteriology and sin have been important resources during my own courses. My students have found these articles accessible and meaningful. Thank you.

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only my scholarship, but all aspects of my life. I will be forever grateful, Fr. Flanagan.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Preliminary Remarks

In this project, I work to retrieve Thomas's trinitarian theology and relate it to his trinitarian anthropology (the *imago Trinitatis*) and his theology of the mixed life of teaching and preaching. The *Summa theologiae* represents Thomas Aquinas's mature and most expansive trinitarian theology.[1] Therein, Thomas advances Augustine's psychological analogy, proposing that what he (Thomas) calls the "intellectual emanations" of word and love in us are analogous to the divine processions of Word and Love in God, respectively. It is central to my project to note that Thomas began writing the *Summa* for his Dominican students at Santa Sabina. He did so both to counter the pedagogical deficiencies he found in other texts and to prepare these Dominicans to become teachers, who in turn would prepare Dominican preachers. Based on my retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology, his trinitarian anthropology, and his theology of the mixed life, I argue that the *Summa theologiae* is a performative text and transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina* through which the student can come to know and love the Trinity more deeply, and therefore become more and more like the triune God. Following Frederick E. Crowe, I call this process of assimilation "trinification."[2] Recovering Thomas's trinitarian theology and retrieving the *Summa* as a text written to promote a transformative encounter intended to prepare Dominican students for their ministry demonstrates that the psychological analogy continues to be both intelligible and worthwhile for trinitarian theology and for supporting the Christian's spiritual journey.

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[1] Thomas's most concise, yet mature, trinitarian theology is found in the *Compendium theologiae*, trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1947). Henceforth *Comp. theol.*

[2] Crowe uses this term to "stress the fact that the only God there is a triune God, he communicates himself to us as triune, and therefore the deification of the human world is really its 'trinification'" (Frederick E. Crowe, *The Most Holy Doctrine of the Trinity*, ed. Leo Serroul (Toronto: Regis College, 1970), 178).

Alongside a retrieval of Thomas's psychological analogy for the Trinity in the *Summa*, I also draw upon recent historical scholarship in order to recover Thomas as a preacher and teacher within the Order of Preachers. Specifically, I focus upon the mixed life Dominicans lead in which they hand on the fruits of their contemplation to others for the sake of their neighbors' souls (*contemplata aliis tradere*). Within this context, I will also demonstrate that for Thomas, a deep connection existed between speculative theology, as practiced in the *Summa*, and the Dominican ministry of preaching and teaching. To do so, I turn to some of Thomas's own sermons and his commentary on the Gospel of John. In the former, we find a striking example of Thomas's own efforts to preach the fruits of the psychological analogy—but without the technical jargon of the analogy—to a group of lay persons during Lent. In the latter, we encounter Thomas's theology of contemplation and teaching within the context of the divine missions of the Son and the Spirit. We also find in his prologue to this commentary that he considered John the Evangelist one of the supreme contemplatives of the Christian tradition and an example of a person was able to hand on "the deep things of God" to others precisely because of his contemplation.[3] Therein, Thomas also proposes that friendship is central to divine self-revelation and to Jesus' own teaching ministry. Friendship is at once the context of coming to know what Jesus has been sent to teach as well as the goal to which his teaching is oriented. In friendship, we discover one another's secrets (deep things) and become more and more of one mind and heart. Conversation, as one of the primary activities of friendship, cultivates this union of mind and heart.[4] The conversations of friendship are intimately connected to Thomas's understanding of trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology because each of these three centers on the operations of knowing and

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[3] See Thomas Aquinas, *Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura*, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and Daniel Keating, Html-ed. Joseph Kenny, O.P., http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SS1Cor.htm#22, c. 2, lect. 2, n. 102, accessed August 17, 2017. Henceforth, *In 1 Cor.*

[4] See *Summa Theologiae, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas*, Volumes 13-20, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, eds. The Aquinas Institute (Lander: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), Ia-IIae, q. 28, a. 1 ad 2. Henceforth, *ST.*

loving, and more specifically, the processions of word and love. With Augustine, Thomas maintains that the human person becomes more like the triune God when God is the object of the human person's knowing and loving.[5] As I will explain, friendship and conversation with God is the divinely ordained context in which this assimilation takes place.

My consideration of the psychological analogy and the *imago Trinitatis* is aimed at exploring their relevance for Dominican preaching and teaching in their cultures. Drawing out the connection between trinitarian theology and the mixed life in Thomas's theological work, and in his own preaching and teaching, supports my efforts to retrieve the psychological analogy for contemporary trinitarian theology and its concern for the transformative possibilities of belief in the Trinity. Given this goal, I concentrate my presentation of the analogy and the image upon their shared conversational elements of speaking and listening, and the significance of the *verbum* therein. In focusing on conversation, I offer a creative retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology. In addition, I emphasize Thomas's mature coordination of the divine processions with the creation of the human person *ad imaginem Trinitatis*.[6] I argue that the very same operations (the intellectual emanations of word and love) and terms (the presence of the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover) provide (1) the analogical conception of the divine processions; (2) the explanation of the mode of divine indwelling and the assimilation of the *imago* to its trinitarian exemplar; and (3) the explanation of the process by which teaching and learning occur, both naturally and in the supernatural context of the divine missions. This threefold process, in the context of *sacra doctrina*, is itself embedded within assimilation to the Trinity and is central to understanding the human teacher's participation in the pedagogical aspect of the divine missions. I argue that the process of becoming more like God and the process of becoming a preacher/teacher are closely linked because they entail the same operations and terms and

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[5] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 8c.
[6] See *ST* 1a, q. 93, esp. aa. 4, 7, and 8.

because both processes take place in the context of friendship with God. These are, in fact, the same operations by which any Christian is assimilated to the triune God. However, for Thomas, the preacher and teacher have a special role in the divine economy for the sake of the common good.[7] For example, Thomas observes that "if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pt. 4:10, 'As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.'"[8] Furthermore, to help others to know and love God, one must first be knowing and loving God, himself. Or to put it in terms of friendship, fostering one's own friendship with God through a contemplative knowing and loving of God helps one encourage others in their friendship with God.

The first two parts of this process (the ones pertaining to the psychological analogy and the *imago*) have been argued in some combination by, for example, Bernard Lonergan, D. Juvenal Merriell, and Jeremy Wilkins. The third part of the process (the one pertaining to the mixed life) will be the topic of the final chapter (Chapter 6), and serves as my own contribution to the retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology. I argue that we can further appreciate the deeply trinitarian elements of Thomas's theology and in particular, the way trinitarian doctrine permeates the entire *Summa,* in both its content and form, by uncovering the trinitarian features of his pedagogy and theology of the mixed life. Thus, not only do the spiritual processions of word and love connect Thomas's trinitarian theology and his theological anthropology, but they also link those topics to his theology of the mixed life of preaching and teaching.

In light of the foregoing, I can expand upon my argument: the *Summa theologiae* is a contemplative study supporting the Dominican student's trinification and friendship with God.

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[7] *ST* II-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 2. The persons to whom one preaches or whom one teaches may not be able to devote their time to contemplative study on account of the roles they, in turn, have within divine providence and the divine economy, and other commitments they have, for example, as lay persons.

[8] *ST* Ia, q. 96, a. 4c.

The more the student of the *Summa* comes to know and love his friend, God, the more he becomes like God. Consequently, the better able he is to help others develop their friendship with God by speaking to them about the God he has come to know and love as a friend through his contemplative study. The *Summa*, then, is an effort to cultivate friendship between God and the human person, as well as among human persons. Friendship requires work, especially the work of conversation by which we come to know and love our friends more deeply and according to which we develop a deeper and deeper communion of mind and heart.

Furthermore, I endeavor to accentuate the trinitarian dynamism and trinitarian *telos* of the *Summa theologiae*. By "trinitarian dynamism" I mean that the *Summa* is an ongoing transformative encounter with the triune God, with oneself as created *ad imaginem Dei*, and with all of creation insofar as the triune God is its beginning and end. That is, the mystery of the Trinity animates the entire text; the Trinity is not an afterthought in Thomas's theology. The Trinity animates the content of the *Summa*; it is not restricted to, e.g., to Questions 27-43. Rather, once the missions are introduced in Question 43, they are gradually unfolded throughout the remainder of the text. The Trinity animates the form of the text insofar as Thomas organizes the text to promote understanding and love of God. By "trinitarian *telos*" I mean that those who travel the path (*ductus*) of the *Summa*—and who are practiced in the life of charity—arrive at the *Summa*'s goal (*skopos*), trinification. Yet, this goal is not about the student's personal holiness. Rather, assimilation to the Trinity and friendship with the triune God are for the sake of helping other wanderers on the journey to salvation.

In the conclusion to this project, I illustrate how the *Summa*, in each of its parts, supports trinification and friendship for the sake of preparing students to speak about God to others. This illustration brings us full circle to one of the major efforts of this project, which has been to argue that the form and content of the *Summa* belong together. When kept together, traveling the wisely ordered path of the *Summa* can be a transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina*. Keeping form

and content together also discloses the centrality of trinitarian theology to the unfolding of the *Summa* as well as the trinitarian *telos* animating it. In order to appreciate the importance of this project, I turn to the state of the question surrounding Thomas's trinitarian theology.

2. The State of the Question

20th century Catholic systematic theology saw a renaissance in Trinitarian theology. During this renaissance, it became customary to introduce a fundamental distinction between 'Greek' (or 'East') and Latin' (or 'West') conceptions of the Trinity: the East starts with the divine persons whereas the West starts with the unity of divine nature. This assumption is not value-neutral: 20th and 21st century theologians predominantly opted for the East's trinitarian theology. In this paradigm, the contributions of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are seriously questioned because they are perceived as representative of 'Latin essentialism' and its preoccupation with metaphysical speculation about the Trinity. This renaissance thus ushered in a dispute over the role—if any—the psychological analogy should play in the renewal of Trinitarian theology. The presumed fundamental divergence between the East and the West framed the debate, thus presenting only two options: personalism and salvation history (the East) or essentialism and metaphysics (the West).[9] When expressed in these terms, it becomes routine and almost obligatory to opt for the latter, and to do so apart from devoting serious attention to the West's trinitarian theology. The result is that the psychological analogy has been left out of the valuable

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[9] To mention a few who seem to disregard the Augustinian-Thomist tradition: Colin E. Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991); Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1984); Catherine M. LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); Jürgen Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God*, trans. M. Kohl (San Francisco: Harper, 1981); ibid., *The Crucified God*, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper, 1974); John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary, 1985). For explicit rejections of the psychological analogy, see Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* 1/1 (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1936); Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology* Vol.1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 295, 375; Karl Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1997); Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Love Alone: The Way of Revelation* (London: Burns & Oates, 1968); ibid., *Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990); ibid., *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics 1: Seeing the Form* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1982).

contemporary conversation about the Trinity as an "ultimately practical doctrine with radical

consequences for Christian life."[10] Catherine Mowry LaCugna here draws attention to the

possibility that the doctrine of the Trinity revolutionizes not only how we think about God and

about what it means to be human but that it also drastically transforms the political and social

forms of life appropriate to God's economy. The doctrine of the Trinity is nothing short of a

doctrine demanding social transformation and the liberation of oppressed peoples. The East's

trinitarian theology seems better equipped to substantiate the claim that God is relational, which

is the basis of turning to the doctrine of the Trinity as a transformative and liberating doctrine.

While the psychological analogy cannot be affirmed or denied on the basis of its practicality, it

merits question whether or not the analogy can augment contemporary endeavors to develop the

doctrine of the Trinity as a doctrine with radical consequences for Christian living.[11]

2.1 The Historical Issue: De Regnon's Paradigm

There are three major interrelated issues associated with this East/West paradigm in the

contemporary disputation over the psychological analogy. One is historical, another

methodological, and the final exegetical and systematic. The first issue concerns the historical

narrative, itself, which shapes the reception of the past in the present milieu. Michele René Barnes

has problematized this narrative by disclosing that the existence of this East/West (or

Greek/Latin) paradigm is a unique property of modern Trinitarian theology.[12] He traces this

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[10] LaCugna, *God for Us*, 1. While I would temper the notion that the Trinity is *ultimately* a practical doctrine or the separation of (rather than distinction between) the speculative and practical, contemplative and active, I do maintain with LaCugna that this doctrine is one that has radical consequences for Christian life.

[11] The analogy must first be evaluated as to its intelligibility and fruitfulness for illuminating the mystery of faith. If it is affirmed to be intelligible, its value can then be engaged, which ought to include the fact that it is intelligible.

[12] See Michele René Barnes, "Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology," *Theological Studies* 56, no. 2 (1995). For other scholars who question this paradigm, see Yves Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, trans. David Smith (New York: Crossroad Pub. Co, 1997); Andre de Halleux, "Personnalisme ou essentialisme trinitaire chez les Peres cappadociens?" in idem, *Patrologie et Oecumenisme. Recueil d'estudes* (Louvain: Leuven

paradigm back to its source, a 19th century study on the Trinity by Theodore de Régnon.[13]

Barnes shows how 20th century systematic theologians organize their work around this paradigm, but without showing self-awareness that the paradigm needs to be demonstrated or that it has a history.[14] Additionally, these theologians generally misrepresent de Régnon's actual paradigm and its nuances, developing it instead into a caricature of both Greek and Latin trinitarian theologies. Barnes's conclusion is that the popular judgments of Augustine and the "Latins" are too burdened by the unreflective use of a questionable paradigm to be regarded as established or even likely.[15] Historically, the labels "essentialist" and "personalist" do not accurately reflect the theologians to whom they are ascribed, nor do they reflect what was actually going forward in trinitarian theology in the Greek and Latin speaking worlds. A return to the texts themselves is needed.[16]

University Press, 1990); Edmund Hill, "Karl Rahner's 'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise *De Trinitate* and St. Augustine,'" *Augustinian Studies,* 2 (1971).

[13] Theodore de Régnon, *Études de théologie positive sur la sainte Trinité.* 4 vols. (Paris: Victor Retaux, 1892-98).

[14] In fact, Barnes draws attention to the oddity that often in English-language scholarship, de Régnon's paradigm is promulgated without crediting or acknowledging him. See Michele René Barnes, "De Régnon Reconsidered," *Augustinian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1995). In this article, Barnes highlights the differences between de Régnon's paradigm and the caricatures that follow. De Régnon, himself, is not necessarily aligned with those who appropriate his work, consciously or not. For another scholar who endeavors to distinguish de Régnon from those who use his work, see Kristin Hennessy, "An Answer to de Régnon's Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of 'His' Paradigm," *Harvard Theological Review* 100, no. 2 (2007). For theologians who follow de Régnon's paradigm either without acknowledging it or without the awareness that needs to be demonstrated or that it has a history, see, for example, Colin E. Gunton, "Augustine, The Trinity, and the Theological Crisis of the West," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43, no.1 (1990); LaCugna, *God for Us*; Rahner, *The Trinity.*

[15] These historical questions have largely been raised and settled. They will figure into my project as part of the argument, but will not constitute my primary concern as I find many scholars have addressed the historical locus of the contemporary rejection of the psychological analogy *as* the analogy of the essentialist and metaphysical 'West.' For other scholars contributing to this discussion, many of whom build on Barnes's work, see Sarah Coakley, "Disputed Questions in Patristic Trinitarianism," *Harvard Theological Review* 100, no. 2 (2007); Gilles Emery, "Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in St. Thomas Aquinas?" trans. Matthew Levering, *The Thomist* 64 (2000): 521-63; Jeremy Wilkins, "Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology: Karl Rahner's Critique of the 'Psychological' Approach," *The Thomist* 74.3 (2010).

[16] For Augustine, see especially Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011); Lewis Ayers, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Luigi Gioa, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine's De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). For Aquinas, see especially Gilles Emery The Trinitarian Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: Toronto

2.2 The Methodological Issue: The *Ordo Disciplinae*

The second issue is methodological and it pertains to Thomas's two so-called treatises, *De Deo Uno* and *De Deo Trino*.[17] Many theologians in the 20th and 21st centuries—including Karl Rahner and Catherine Mowry LaCugna—assume Thomas's division crystallizes the West's "preference" for the divine essence. For them, the sequence of questions in Thomas' *Summa theologiae* represents a theological judgment about the priority of divine essence over persons. It also indicates a 'substance ontology.' This prioritization isolates the Trinity from the rest of theology and ultimately from the lives of believers. It is therefore the reason why Rahner accuses Thomas of "locking the Trinity in itself."[18] In fact, Thomas's perceived preference for the divine essence is one of the primary reasons why "Christians are, in their practical life, almost mere 'monotheists.'"[19] Other theologians, such as Gilles Emery and Bernard Lonergan disagree, maintaining that the sequence is methodological, governed by pedagogical considerations. More generally, scholars as such as Mark D. Jordan and Vivian Boland have rightly argued that to misunderstand Thomas's pedagogical concerns is to misunderstand the nature of his thought.[20] Historical research corroborates these conclusions. For example, Leonard Boyle and M. Michèle Mulchahey have brought attention to the fact that the novelty of the *Summa* belongs as much to its structure as it does to the content of its teaching. There is also exegetical evidence for Thomas's pedagogical-mindedness. As Boland writes, "These pedagogical concerns are clear from two things: the introductions and prologues in which Aquinas presents his works, and the structures, at

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University Press, 1997) (henceforth, Verbum, CWL 2); Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004).

[17] Interestingly, most theologians who critique Thomas's ordering neglect the fact that the *Prima Pars* actually includes *three*—not two—sets of questions. The first considers the divine essence, the next the distinction of persons, and the final the procession of creatures from God. He sets this structure forth in his prologue to the second question, Ia, q. 2, prol.

[18] Rahner, *The Trinity*, 15-18.

[19] Ibid., 10.

[20] See Mark D. Jordan, *Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after his Readers* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) and Vivian Boland, O.P*., St. Thomas Aquinas* (London: Continuum, 2007).

times traditional and at times experimental, by which he constructs his works."[21] Recent

rhetorical studies such as those conducted by Mary Carruthers are also now bearing upon

Thomist scholarship, continuing to challenge us to read ancient and medieval texts like the *Summa*

more responsibly and perhaps with even more wonder.[22] Similar to the consequences of

recognizing that the East/West paradigm has a history, distinguishing between the form and

content of the *Summa* meets a number of the accusations leveled against Thomas's trinitarian

theology. This distinction discloses that the order of questions in the *Summa* is not an order of

importance but rather an order of a pedagogy seeking explanations of the matter at hand.

 While many Thomists are engaging not only the *Summa* but Thomas's entire corpus—

especially his commentaries on scripture and his sermons—in the light of these exciting

developments in historical and rhetorical scholarship, other Aquinas scholars (as well as

theologians and philosophers at large) continue to read Thomas as if he were an essentialist, a

"mere" philosopher or metaphysician, or a dogmatist and not the pastorally- and pedagogically-

minded Dominican he was. Yet, historians have more recently begun to accentuate Thomas's life

as a *Dominican*, arguing that the Dominican educational institutions—not Paris and its

university—were the focus of Thomas's intellectual labors. This change in emphasis is significant

because the goals of Dominican education were distinctively evangelical and pastoral. As a

preaching friar, Thomas's life was "a life wholly given over to the care of souls through handing

on the fruits of contemplation by the preaching of the gospel."[23] Thomas ought to be read in this

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[21] Boland, St. Thomas Aquinas, 89.

[22] For the rhetorical features of both ancient and medieval thought, see Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1990); ibid. *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). For an example of Thomas scholarship making use of her discoveries, see for example, Peter Candler, *Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction, or Reading Scripture Together on the Path to God* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006); Gilles Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom: The Spiritual Pedagogy of the* Summa theologiae (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 2015); Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason, and Following Christ* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[23] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, ix.

Dominican context and its distinct goals. Yet, the work of scholars such as Boyle, Mulchahey, and Carruthers is only beginning to influence how philosophers and theologians read Thomas. Thus, my first chapter attends to the history and meaning of Thomas's life as a Dominican friar trained to teach and preach. It thereby sets the stag for Chapter 2, which engages Thomas's pedagogy in the *Summa*, arguing that pedagogical concerns govern the organization of the text. Importantly, other contemporary Thomists such as Frederick Bauerschmidt, Gilles Mongeau, and Anastasia Wendlinder are already drawing out the implications of what it means to read Thomas in light of his distinctively Dominican formation and goals. I hope to add to the conversation by specifically elaborating the implications of this reading for his trinitarian theology.[24]

2.3 The Exegetical and Systematic Issue: The Psychological Analogy

The third issue pertains to the psychological analogy, itself, and is a matter of exegesis and systematic theology. The psychological underpinnings of the analogy are often the main source of the dispute. This is especially true among theologians who prefer a social analogy and presume the psychological basis of the analogy makes it *de facto* solipsistic (because it requires introspection), contending that Augustine is the first "Cartesian."[25] Rahner raises two objections to the

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[24] Ibid.; Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*; Anastasia Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart: Beyond Analogy* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2014).

[25] See Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology*. This caricature of Augustine as the first Cartesian is equally a caricature of Descartes, and thus unhelpful for understanding either of them.
The psychological analogy is not solipsistic for two reasons. One, it is an analogy that obtains most perfectly at the level of authentic human conversation. This is a level at which mind and heart are one. Consequently, it is also the level upon which we can conceive words in love, which thence break forth into love. Such words are trustworthy words that open people outward toward one another.
Two, it is true that the analogy draws us inward to draw us upward. However, the interiority proper to the analogy is also outwardly directed insofar as an authentic interior life and loving interpersonal relationships are mutually mediating. Trustworthy words conceived in love are again central here. Conceiving words in fear dispose us to manipulate and suspect one another, and create social structures to mirror our manipulative and suspicious dispositions. In speaking of "trustworthy words conceived in love," I am making an advance on both Augustine's and Thomas's presentation of the psychological analogy. However, I am doing so by building on critical element they share in common, namely, that the divinely proceeding word is not just any kind of word, but a particular kind of word. Thomas speaks of it as the word "who breathes forth love" and Augustine says "the Word we speak of is knowledge with love." See *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5, rep. ad. 2 and Saint Augustine, *The Trinity,* intro., trans., notes Edmund

psychological analogy. One, he objects to its hypothetical character. Two, he laments its

metaphysical speculation, for example, about whether the processions are *processio* [*per modum*]

operati or *processio operationis.* He believes that in all its metaphysical speculation, the psychological

analogy has forgotten about the economic Trinity, which is why Thomas's trinitarian theology is

responsible for the "monotheist" crisis among contemporary Christians and why he argues for a

return to God as experienced in salvation history. Similarly, LaCugna finds the introspection of

the psychological analogy to be opposed to and forgetful of interpersonal relations.

These objections, especially the first, can be responded to in part by revisiting questions of

theological method. However, they must also be addressed by way of the analogy, itself, because

careful appropriation of the analogy can disclose the link between it and the soteriological

experience Christians have of God's economy. This same appropriation can challenge the claim

that the introspection of the psychological analogy is opposed to interpersonal relations. The two

are actually intimately and mutually related. In fact, introspection as both self-appropriation and

self-examination done specifically in the context of trinitarian doctrine cultivates a converted

interior life, which in turn promotes authentic interpersonal relations, which are themselves

indispensable to a just and charitable world intolerant of oppression and revenge. Thus, where

Rahner and LaCugna find the psychological analogy, both in its metaphysical speculation and

introspection, forgetful of the divine economy and interpersonal relations, respectively, I suggest

that appropriating the analogy supports a rich theology of the economy and calls Christians to

more authentic relationships.

Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1991), 279. Henceforth, Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.10.15 (Hill, 279). In Thomas's reply to this question on the divine missions, Thomas quotes Augustine with respect to the unicity of this word.

For a third reason the psychological analogy is not solipsistic, see Neil Ormerod, "Augustine and the Trinity: Whose Crisis?" *Pacifica* 16 (2003), 30-31. For example, "[W]e can see that for Augustine the mind is inherently relational. The process of introspection is not withdrawal from the world. Rather, the mind is discovered precisely in its relationships with the objects of the world," 31.

In their challenges to the psychological analogy, most theologians fail to grasp what the relevant psychological analogy actually is, for there are multiple psychological options within human interiority, but not all of them are suitable analogies. Further, many theologians presume the analogy pertains to three analogues for the three divine persons, when it actually pertains to two natural analogues for the two divine processions—a hard-won insight for Thomas as he came to terms with Augustine's preferred analogy.[26] Specifically, as Lonergan contends, most theologians, in their own self-knowledge, overlook the significance of the procession of the inner word (*verbum*) from the act of understanding, which thus obfuscates the analogy for divine processions.[27] This procession is what Thomas names an "*emanatio intelligibilis*" (intellectual emanation).[28] Not only Thomas's critics, but also Thomists often fail to take note of the relevant psychological analogue. Even when adverting to the inner word, scholars consider its procession so quickly and without much explanation that it is questionable whether the analogical and explanatory weight of the intellectual emanation of the inner word is actually grasped, let alone the import of both Augustine and Thomas insisting that not only is it exclusively the *inner* word that is relevant, but also a particular kind of inner word—one that breaks forth into love.[29] The problem is compounded because this emanation yields explanatory significance not only for

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[26] See D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas's Teaching* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1990).

[27] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2; ibid., *The Triune God: Systematics*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 12, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) (henceforth *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12).
The significance of the procession can only really be grasped when one adverts to her own acts of understanding, for only then can one distinguish between the variety of psychological processions in human consciousness and which of these is actually relevant for the Trinitarian processions. This is why self-appropriation is required for the psychological analogy. Not any interior procession will suffice.

[28] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1.

[29] For example, see Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 57-61. Emery spends a considerably short amount of time considering the procession of the 'word of the heart.' Granted, the book is intended to treat Thomas's trinitarian as a whole. However, Emery does not articulate the analogy with the level of astuteness it requires. Moreover, I would argue that the psychological analogy is the centerpiece of the whole of Thomas's trinitarian theology, so grasping its details by way of subtle self-appropriation is crucial for understanding all that follows, both with respect to the intratrinitarian life and the missions.

Question 27 in the *Prima Pars* in which Thomas considers the *emanatio intelligibilis* explicitly; it is central for the remaining trinitarian questions (28-43) and for the consideration of the divine missions, which Thomas unfolds throughout the remainder of the *Summa*. It is also the key to the analogy's potential to contribute to the elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity as a transformative and liberating doctrine with radical consequences for Christian living. Given the host of interpretive issues that arise with respect to the analogy, the entire middle section of this project (Chapters 3-5) is dedicated to retrieving the natural analogues for the divine processions and expanding upon the trinitarian theology of Questions 27-43 and Question 93 of the *Summa theologiae*.

3. Statement of Goals

Contemporary theology is rightly concerned with the doctrine of the Trinity as a transformative and liberating doctrine.[30] For this reason, I aim to continue the conversation about the plan of the *Summa* that M.D. Chenu began in 1939 by attending to its trinitarian elements in relation to the *ordo disciplinae*, which Thomas uses in the service of faith seeking understanding. Attending to the intersection of Thomas's trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology in the context of pedagogy and the mixed life supports retrieving the *Summa* as a transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina*. Overall, I argue that Thomas facilitates the reader's transforming encounter with the Christian message of salvation not only by the material he presents, but also through the dynamics of the form in which he presents it. Structurally, the *Summa* is a set of questions deliberately and skillfully arranged in order to initiate the student into the ongoing and dynamic

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[30] However, it is important to recognize that the truth and value of a speculative engagement with trinitarian theology—like the psychological analogy—is not to be found immediately in its practicality (e.g., its usefulness for directing the actions of the human person, see *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 4.). Rather, its truth and value are first located in its intelligibility, it the psychological analogy as a possibly relevant way of understanding what Catholics believe about God, namely, that the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and that are three are equally God. It helps them understand how it is intelligible that God is at once perfectly simple and at the same time, procession is found in God.

process of knowing and loving the triune God so he can better direct his life to God, and as a Dominican, so he can better "speak about God" to others. In other words, the structure of the *Summa* is isomorphic with the restructuring of human experience by way of grace. Further, since the apex of that transformation is the deification—or, better, trinification—[31]of the human person according to which she is not only assimilated to God but actually participates in the divine life, the material on the Trinity takes central place in the architecture of Thomas's mature theological text. That is, not only is the trinitarian mystery present throughout the *Summa* by way of content, but this mystery is also ever-present in the very dynamics of the student's intentional acts insofar as these acts are engaged in actually knowing and loving the triune God, who is the subject of this *scientia, sacra doctrina*.[32]

Given the importance of the issues contemporary trinitarian theology raises, and in response to the state of the question regarding Thomas's trinitarian theology, I have two goals in

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[31] Trinification is a way of expressing Thomas's position that by the gift of the Holy Spirit, the human person's intelligible emanations of word and love are made to participate in the divine processions of Word and Love, themselves, such that she freely knows God truly and loves God rightly (Ia, q. 38, a. 1). Herein, Thomas refers both to the participation of the human person in the very divine processions, themselves (rather than limiting deification to a relatively impersonal participation in the divine nature) and to the way in which this graced participation actually changes the human person. Trinification is the point of contact between appropriating Thomas's trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology and advancing them in the contemporary theological context. I aim to express how the psychological analogy is related to trinification, and how in turn trinification is related to the radical consequences of the doctrine of the Trinity for Christian living. To do so, I focus on the relationship of one's interior life of knowing and loving to one's interpersonal relationships. See *Trinification of the World: a Festschrift in Honour of Frederick E. Crowe in Celebration of His 60 Birthday*, ed. Thomas A. Dunne and Jean-Marc Laporte (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978). For more on deification in Thomas Aquinas, see Daria Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace: Deification According to St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015); Fáinche Ryan, *Formation in Holiness: Thomas Aquinas on Sacra doctrina* (Dudley: Peeters Press, 2007); A.N. Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[32] See *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3 in which Thomas explains, in no uncertain terms, that the revelation of the trinitarian mystery (which must be revealed, as it is inaccessible by the light of natural reason alone) makes possible a correct understanding of both creation and salvation. As Joseph Wawrykow writes, "For a Christian theologian, creation and salvation are not trivial or incidental matters, but will stand at the heart of theological work. Trinity, according to Aquinas, is needed for the perceptive handling of these central themes; the subsequent inquiries in the Summa will have, then, a Trinitarian cast." See Joseph Wawrykow, "Franciscan and Dominican Trinitarian Theology (Thirteenth Century): Bonaventure and Aquinas," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Trinity*, ed. Gilles Emery and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 182-196, at 183.

this project. One, I pursue history and systematic theology in order to engage recent Thomist scholarship on the spiritual pedagogy of the *Summa* (Chapters 1 and 2). Specifically, vis-à-vis the *Summa*'s pedagogy and form, I aim to bring into relief the texts particularly trinitarian features. This contribution also retrieves Thomas as a deeply trinitarian theologian and as a Dominican committed to his students' intellectual, spiritual, and pastoral formation. Historically, I turn to recent scholarship on the rise of the Dominican order in thirteenth-century Europe and its unique features. More specifically, I explore Thomas's role within the Order of Preachers, and how his vocational decision illuminates his theology. In terms of systematic theology, I focus on the psychological analogy in order to demonstrate that it is an extraordinary contribution to trinitarian theology and one that can and should be pursued today. I aim to recover Thomas's rendition of the psychological analogy in the *Summa theologiae* by exploring the meaning of intellectual emanations (Chapters 3 and 4). However, this recovery also involves returning to the source of the analogy—Augustine's *De Trinitate*—and Thomas's own engagement with Augustine's text (Chapter 5). For this return, I make use of D. Juvenal Merriell's work on Thomas's intellectual development with respect to trinitarian theology. Merriell demonstrates how Thomas's ongoing re-reading of *De trinitate* continued to transform Thomas's understanding of the Trinity and the *imago*, reaching its apex in the *Summa theologaie*. This recovery also involves turning to Bernard Lonergan's interpretation of the psychological analogy in Thomas's work. In doing so, I turn to Lonergan both as a thorough guide to Thomas's trinitarian theology while at the same time guiding the reader through Lonergan's thought and contributions to trinitarian theology. In each instance, my goal is to clarify the meaning of "*emanatio intelligibilis*" (intellectual emanation), which in turn clarifies the psychological analogy and makes room for its advancement into the phenomenologically and existentially rich terms of "conversation."

Two, based on my historical and systematic work, I argue for a creative retrieval of the psychological analogy in terms of the conversational activities of speaking and listening (Chapter

6). I advance this retrieval in the context of Thomas's idiom, *contemplata aliis tradere*. I recover the idiom, itself, by exploring Thomas's understanding of the role of the mixed life in the divine economy, and the relation of both the mixed life and the divine economy to friendship. I argue that *contemplata aliis tradere* is best understood as an activity of friendship and that it is also one way in which the process of trinification can occur, both for those handing on their fruits and for those receiving them. In this way, *contemplata aliis tradere* is a participation in the divine plan for salvation. Furthermore, the process of a teacher or preacher handing on the fruits of their contemplation is "triniform" insofar as it is based in acts of true speaking and holy listening. In arguing for this creative retrieval of the psychological analogy and connecting it to the mixed life, I aim to demonstrate that this analogy continues to be relevant to contemporary trinitarian theology and its emphasis communicating the radical consequences of belief in the triune God. Both of these goals, then, are aimed at eventually recovering Thomas's trinitarian theology for the 21st century.

4. The Centrality of the *Verbum* to this Project

Throughout this project, the thread that holds my exegetical and constructive work together is the notion of the *verbum* (inner word). While many Thomist scholars have come to the defense of Thomas's trinitarian theology, few have explored the depth of meaning of the *verbum* in Thomas's *Summa*. Though Lonergan devoted years of research and writing to the *verbum* within Thomas's trinitarian theology, his work is still largely overlooked in Thomist and trinitarian scholarship.[33] For example, Gilles Emery ignores Lonergan in his works on Thomas's trinitarian theology, never

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[33] I aim to combine Lonergan's incisive analysis of the meaning and significance of the *verbum* with more recent scholarship on Thomas's pedagogical concerns, pastoral-mindedness, and rhetorical tools. For example, pedagogically, the verbum is central to the complex act of human knowing and as such, is formative of Thomas's own pedagogical goals and methods. Pastorally, historical research underscores the Dominican concern to find "the right consoling word" in their preaching and hearing of confessions. Questions arise about how to train people to be able to find such a word and what makes a word consoling. The verbum is significant for such questions. Rhetorically, Thomas treats the verbum in ongoing depth throughout the Summa, making use of the repetition. The *verbum*, then, is important for understanding Thomas's methods, goals, and theology—his trinitarian theology, his trinitarian anthropology, and his christology.

referencing or citing Lonergan's scholarship. I will build upon Lonergan's consideration of the intellectual emanation of the inner word by thinking through the meaning of the *verbum* in Thomas's trinitarian theology, trinitarian anthropology, and theology of the mixed life of contemplation and action. I will complement this exegetical and systematic exploration of the *verbum* with historical scholarship on early Dominicans as preachers and confessors formed to speak about God. I will also complement Lonergan's work by rhetorical scholarship on the presence and repetition of *verbum* throughout the *Summa*.[34] That is, I aim to combine Lonergan's incisive analysis of the meaning and significance of the *verbum* with more recent scholarship on Thomas's pedagogical concerns, pastoral-mindedness, and rhetorical tools. For example, pedagogically, the *verbum* is central to the complex act of human knowing and as such, is formative of Thomas's own pedagogical goals and methods. Pastorally, historical research underscores the Dominican concern to speak meaningfully about God and to find "the right consoling word" in their preaching and hearing of confessions. Rhetorically, Thomas treats the *verbum* in ongoing depth throughout the *Summa*, making use of the rhetorical tool, repetition. For example, while he does not raise specifically trinitarian questions until Question 27 of the *Prima Pars,* numerous references to the Trinity—and especially the *verbum*—are laced throughout the *sed contrae* of prior questions, many of which are quotations from Augustine's *De trinitate* or John's gospel, the two primary sources for Thomas's reflections upon the divine Word. Thus, the *verbum* is important for understanding Thomas's methods, goals, and his theological content (including his trinitarian theology, his trinitarian anthropology, and his theology of the mixed life).

The *verbum*, itself, has a threefold meaning in the *Summa.* There is the intellectual emanation of the *verbum* in the human person, which is the basis for the psychological analogy,

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[34] For example, I will look at the *sed contrae* (which are themselves illuminated by familiarity with Thomas's rhetorical expertise), which reference the *verbum* prior to either Thomas's epistemological, trinitarian, or christological questions. For this rhetorical approach, see Gilles Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom.*

informs Thomas's pedagogy, and illuminates his theology of teaching and preaching as activities of the mixed life, that is, as activities related to both contemplation and action. Then there is the divine *Verbum,* both the eternal *Verbum* and the incarnate *Verbum.* The *verbum* as the natural human analogue, as the eternal Word, and as the incarnate Word receives ongoing elaboration and deepening consideration from the first part of the *Summa*—even before the trinitarian questions— through to *Tertia Pars.* As I will argue in Chapter 6, the *Summa* specifically as a *contemplative* study endeavors to help the student move from the incarnate Word to the eternal Word. This movement is, according to Thomas, the same project John undertook in his gospel, which was the fruit of John's contemplation of the eternal Word.[35]

The centrality of the aforementioned particular kind of inner word (the word bursting forth into love) in the Augustinian-Thomist tradition of the psychological analogy is the touchstone of my efforts to advance the analogy, as I explore the possibility that just as the eternal *verbum* and the incarnate *verbum* are a very particular kind of *verbum*, so too must the intellectual emanation of the *verbum* in us be a particular kind of *verbum* in order for the psychological analogy to fruitfully obtain and in order for trinification to become a lived reality in history. It is in the context of the graced effort to conform our *verbum* to God's that the psychological analogy contributes to the doctrine of the Trinity as a socially transformative and liberating doctrine.

The most fruitful and fitting way we can become attentive to the different ways in which we conceive inner words is by attending to their conception in the context of our conversations.[36] Here, I propose a creative retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology. Advancing the psychological analogy in terms of conversation is in keeping with Thomas's own rather revolutionary way of

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[35] See Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of John,* Chapters 1-5, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), prol., n. 1, 7, 10. Henceforth *In Ioan.*

[36] See Frederick G. Lawrence, "Grace and Friendship: Postmodern Political Theology and God as Conversational," in Frederick G. Lawrence, *The Fragility of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and the Human Good,* Eds. Randall S. Rosenberg and Kevin M. Vander Schel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

conceiving charity in terms of Aristotelian friendship.[37] In order to explain how the mutual love constitutive of friendship ("since friendship is between a friend and a friend") obtains in divine-human friendship, Thomas argues that there is communication between the human person and God, in which God communicates God's happiness to us. The love based upon this communication is charity, that is, friendship. Further, Thomas addresses the objection that God and the human person cannot be friends because friends dwell together. It is in this context that Thomas adverts to conversation. With respect to the human person's outward life there is no communication or conversation between the human person and God. However, with respect to the human person's interior life—"the spiritual life in respect of the mind"—there is conversation (*conversatio*) between the human person and God.[38] Further, with this gift of sanctifying grace, the whole Trinity dwells in the human person.[39]

To conclude, the analogy requires subtle self-appropriation, but it also requires honest and authentic self-examination, best done in the context of our conversations, human and divine. Do I conceive my words in love? Do I conceive trustworthy words, words that are true? Do my words cultivate loving responses? If not, what keeps me from doing so and what are the consequences of my words? Do I listen with openness to the words others speak, including God? Ultimately, these questions about our words, our love, our conversations are questions about ourselves—what kind of *person* am I? Jesus not only speaks words conceived in love; he *is* the Word conceived in Love. This self-appropriation and self-examination promotes the awareness that not only am I responsible for who I become, but that I am a subject of history—meaning I am an *agent* of history; history is what it is because of human subjects. Similarly, salvation history is what it is because two divine subjects have entered into it. As human persons, our being is becoming

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[37] For Aristotle, friendship was among equals, so to characterize the relationship between God and human persons in terms of Aristotle's philosophy of friendship amounted to quite a proposition.

[38] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1c; rep. ad 1.

[39] See *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a. 3.

and our becoming is conversational.[40] And the conversations we *are* constitute the movement of history. In other words, my interior life has real and tangible consequences for my interpersonal, social, and historical life, similar to how the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity.

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[40] See Lonergan, "*Existenz* and *Aggiornamento*," in *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 4, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993), 223 (Henceforth *Collection*, CWL 4); See also Jeremy D. Wilkins, "'Our Conversation is in Heaven': Conversion and/as Conversation in the Thought of Frederick Lawrence," in *Grace and Friendship: Theological Essays in Honor of Fred Lawrence, from His Grateful Students,* eds. M. Shawn Copeland and Jeremy D. Wilkins (Milwuakee: Marquette University Press, 2016), 320.

CHAPTER 1
FRIAR THOMAS AQUINAS, A PASTORALLY-MINDED THEOLOGIAN

1. Introduction

IN 1220, ONLY A FEW years after Dominic and his companions began preaching in Toulouse, the members of this young order gathered to establish a set of formal constitutions: "Our order is recognized as having been especially instituted from the beginning for preaching and the salvation of souls, and our study should be principally and ardently directed to this end with the greatest industry, so that we can be useful to the souls of our neighbors."[1] The Dominicans began literally as an order of preachers. Their entire lives were structured around their vocation as preachers.[2] Moreover, they envisioned their preaching as a learned ministry—one to which study was indispensable—and shaped their constitutions accordingly. They studied because they were committed to being useful to the souls of others in their preaching. This commitment was over and above their pursuit of personal holiness and salvation. Their dedication to outwardly directed missions was the source of what set the Order of Preachers apart from their contemporaries.[3] Specifically, these Preachers needed to learn how to speak about God. Speaking about God was their craft as a guild of preachers.[4]

Thomas Aquinas entered this Order of Preachers despite familial resistance.[5] Recently, historical research has contributed to the development of a more nuanced interpretation of Thomas's decision to join the Dominicans and of the early Dominican order, itself. Three

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[1] "The Primitive Constitutions of the Order of Friars Preachers," prologue, *Order of Preachers*, accessed August 15, 2015, http://www.op.org/sites/www.op.org/files/public/documents/fichier/primitive_consti_en.pdf.

[2] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 173.

[3] John Van Engen, "Dominic and the Brothers: *Vitae* as Life-forming *exempla* in the Order of Preachers," in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, eds. Kent Emery and Joseph Peter Wawrykow (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 8.

[4] Ibid., 18.

[5] See below, §4.1 Thomas's Dominican Life, p. 20.

interrelated elements of this research especially enrich one's reading of Thomas's theology: his

vocational decision, what set the Dominicans apart as a religious order, and the role of

Dominican schools for the formation of Preachers. Scholars have rethought Thomas's vocational

decision in light of a deeper understanding of the unique character of the Dominican order's

mission, on the one hand, and the relationship between the Dominican order and the universities,

on the other.

Together, these three elements present a new way of understanding Thomas, and

consequently, enriching possibilities for interpreting his texts. Thomas was a person whose life was

first and foremost the life of a Dominican, that is "a preaching friar—a life wholly given over to

the care of souls through handing on the fruits of contemplation by the preaching of the gospel."[6]

Further, not only was Thomas himself a member of the Order of Preachers, but he was also one

of its most prized teachers and he was appointed a preacher-general. In the latter role, he

coordinated all preaching activity in the entire geographical region of Naples from 1260 until his

death in 1274.[7] The role of the university within Thomas's life is re-contextualized in this light

because it becomes apparent that Paris was a means to the end of caring for souls. As

Bauerschmidt contends, "Dominican educational institutions were the primary framework for

Thomas's intellectual activity, even when he was teaching at a university."[8] With this focus, a

relatively new picture of Thomas begins to emerge, one that is only beginning to influence how

philosophers and theologians are reading Thomas. Much work remains to be done in this vein.

For example, even historically sensitive Thomist scholarship like Chenu's overlooks the

significance of Dominican institutions in Naples, Viterbo, and Rome in Thomas life,

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[6] Bauderschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 9.

[7] See Nicholas Ayo, introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, *The Sermon-Conferences of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Apostles' Creed,* trans. Nicholas Ayo (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1998), 1-16, at 2. A preacher-general was a permanently licensed preacher. To become one, the Dominican needs three years of theological instruction.

[8] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 9.

characterizing them as "merely episodes in his intellectual development and in his career."[9] With

Leonard Boyle, Frederick Bauerschmidt, M. Michèle Mulchahey, Anastasia Wendlinder and

other recent historians and Thomist scholars, I maintain that Dominican educational institutions

were not merely episodes, but rather the focus of Thomas's labors.[10] As Bauerschmidt writes,

"Though the line between the university and the Dominican *studium* was not always sharply

drawn, particularly in a place like Paris, the goals of Dominican education remained distinctively

evangelical and pastoral, and it is in light of those goals that Thomas ought to be read."[11]

      This chapter sets the stage for exploring the evangelical and pastoral purpose of Thomas's

trinitarian theology, as well as the ways in which his trinitarian theology enriches in turn his

understanding of the Dominican mission to care for souls through teaching and preaching. It is

also concerned to enrich the reader's appreciation of Thomas as a pedagogue and preacher.

Ultimately, I argue that Thomas's self-understanding with respect to these vocations was enriched

by his trinitarian theology and theological anthropology because for Thomas, these two topics—

related, as we will see, by his understanding of the spiritual processions of word and love—

informed his understanding of what it meant to prepare for and participate in the teaching and

preaching initiated by the divine trinitarian missions. With these ends in mind, I offer a history of

the early years of the Order of Preachers, focusing specifically on their pedagogy and preaching,

which set them apart from other religious orders, in order to develop a deeper engagement with

Thomas's specifically Dominican life. Uniquely, Dominican pedagogy was study through

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[9] M.D. Chenu, *Aquinas and His Role in Theology*, trans. P. Philibert (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2002), 18-19.

[10] See Leonard Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas," reprinted in *Aquinas's* Summa Theologiae: *Critical Essays*, ed. Brian Davies (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas;* M. Michèle Mulchahey*, 'First the Bow is Bent in Study': Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1998); Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart.*

[11] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, x.

contemplation, and their preaching doctrinal.[12] This history must be situated within the intellectual developments and religious movements of the early and central Middle Ages out of which the Order arose. Seismic shifts that began in the eleventh and twelfth centuries converged into institutional structures during the thirteenth century, specifically the university and the mendicant religious orders.

2. Intellectual Life in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries Middle Ages

The most recent scholarship on Thomas Aquinas includes an emphasis on two historical developments in the centuries preceding his work: the intellectual and religious movements of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[13] These movements are best understood in connection to the transition from the rural monastery to the urban school, from monasticism to scholasticism, from the monastic *collatio* to the scholastic *quaestio*, from monastic cenobitic life to mendicant itinerant life, and from the communal *vita apostolica* to the evangelical *vita apostolica*. The rise of the Dominicans in the thirteenth century participated in and influenced these movements. Intellectually, "[T]he friars' schools represent an important part of the development of the structures of learning in the thirteenth century, a century in which medieval intellectual endeavour is seen by many to have reached its high-water mark."[14] As part of the evangelical religious movement, every component of Dominican spirituality had an apostolic quality: "The all-absorbing ambition of the friars was to be 'useful to the souls of others.' Their own spiritual

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[12] Mulchahey treats the Dominican unique pedagogy of study as contemplation from an historical perspective. Wendlinder, building upon Mulchahey's historical work, systematically and theologically explores study as contemplation by way of Thomas's use of religious language.

[13] For example, see Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*. Also see Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*. I am indebted to both these scholars for alerting me to the most relevant historical research for this section of Chapter 1, as well as for ways to frame the historical background informing Thomas's theology.

[14] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, x-xi.

exercises were designed to make them better preachers, and their own spiritual progress was not sought as a goal in its own right, but rather as a kind of spin-off from their service of others."[15]

Established historians and Aquinas scholars such as M.D. Chenu and Simon Tugwell have written extensively on these intellectual and religious developments.[16] They chronicle the *vita apostolica* and the place of the Dominicans within this movement. Chenu also brings the humanism of the twelfth century and the scholasticism of the medieval university to life, while Tugwell paints a picture of the preacher and the spirituality of both the early Dominicans and Thomas. Contemporary historians, especially Mulchahey, deepen our understanding of the intellectual life and pedagogy the Dominicans developed in order to achieve their practical and pastoral concerns. In light of this historical work, recent Thomist scholarship has begun to accentuate the significance of Thomas's Dominican life and his contributions to his brothers' religious and intellectual formation, which includes reading the *Summa* as a personally transformative text.[17]

I begin with the intellectual and religious movements that arose at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries before turning to the thirteenth century consolidations and early Dominican history. There were critical social, economic, and political shifts occurring that affected both the intellectual and religious lives of people during this period known as the central or high Middle Ages. These gave rise to changes in the location of education centers, a

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[15] Simon Tugwell, O.P., "Introduction," *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings,* ed. Simon Tugwell, O.P. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 4.

[16] M.D. Chenu, O.P., *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968). Also see Simon Tugwell, O.P., introduction to *Early Dominican Writings*. The contributions of these Dominican experts and Thomist scholars are supported by and expanded upon by historians of the central Middle Ages, such as John Baldwin, Jacques Le Goff, David Nichols, and R.W. Southern. See John W. Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle, Volume 1* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Jacques Le Goff, ed. *Medieval Callings*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990); David Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Medieval World: Society, Government and Thought in Europe, 312-1500* (New York: Longman Publishing, 1992); R. W. Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe,* Volume 1 (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).

[17] See Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*; Ryan, *Formation in Holiness*; and Williams, *The Ground of Union*.

new demographic of teachers and learners, the development of pedagogical methods, and the introduction of new texts both by way of translation and innovation. These shifts also inspired the rise of an evangelical spirit, which took a variety of forms and instigated diverse responses.

2.1 Intellectual Life: Social, Economic, and Political Changes: The City, its *Magistri*, and their *Quaestiones*

One of the most significant shifts, both in itself and for the intellectual and spiritual lives of Europeans, was the emergence of the city and the development of urban life. It was closely related to a sharp rise in population, the development of international trade made possible by the new capital economy, and increased political stability. Historian David Nicholas assesses that the population at least tripled between 1000 and the late thirteenth century.[18] Further, "Prior to 1150, most of the population increase had occurred in the agrarian sector. Between 1100 and 1300, the suburban populations (towns) quadrupled."[19] This shift had far-reaching intellectual, social, and moral consequences.[20]

Intellectually, the demographic shift affected the type of person teaching and learning as well as the *location* of education. With respect to the type of student, according to Nicholas, "Most of the pupils were sons of merchants who were preparing for a secular career, not holy orders."[21] This change occurred largely because by the year 1300 anyone who hoped to rise above a purely menial occupation had to learn to read.[22] The basic curriculum of Latin literacy taught to these students in and cathedral schools was the seven liberal arts, that is, the *trivium*—grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic—and the *quadrivium*—arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. These

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[18] Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Medieval World*, 283.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Le Goff, "Introduction," 17. See also Jacques Rossiaud, "The City-Dweller and Life in Cities and Towns," in *Medieval Callings*, ed. Jacques Le Goff, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 128-180.
[21] Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Medieval World*, 322.
[22] Ibid., 340.

schools were not primarily schools for theology.[23] Further, intellectual life had now begun its

passage from the monastic rural schools to the urban cathedral and municipal schools.[24] This

passage was one of the most important developments of the central Middle Ages. By the

thirteenth century, a ready contrast was perceivable between the relative freedom and movement

of the university and the enclosure and immobility of the monastery.

During this transition from rural to urban education, Paris began its intellectual

ascendancy as a theological center. One of the many reasons was because students were able to

pursue theological studies because the canons regular of St. Victor were near by (whereas the

cathedral schools focused on the liberal arts).[25] This is illustrative of the fact that alongside the

urban schools that made a liberal arts education more available, there was also a development in

specifically theological education. Paris was home to renowned teachers in theology such as Peter

Abelard. This bustling intellectual environment attracted a new rising generation in the twelfth

century: young men traveled from city to city to hear the masters (*magistri*). These masters were a

new social category that was "in nearly every case without ties to the monasteries which until that

time had been the chief promoters of culture and education."[26] They were the emerging scholars,

bringing the wave of the intellectual activity known as "scholasticism" to medieval education. As

Chenu writes of this transition of pupil and place:

> From the old monastic schools we pass with these people to the new city schools where
> the clerical teachers, under episcopal control, were fulfilling the needs and aspirations of
> students of their own kind, a clientele that could not have been assimilated intellectually
> any more than socially into the monasteries. These were no longer men of the cloister
> (*claustrales*) but scholastics, scholars (*scholastici, scholares*).[27]

These *magistri* partially constitute the appearance of a new kind of person upon the

medieval stage, what Brocchieri calls "the intellectual." The intellectual was someone who worked

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[23] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 2.
[24] See Richard C. Dale, *The Intellectual Life of Western Europe in the Middle Ages* (Boston: Brill, 1992),147-48.
[25] The canons regular were clergy affiliated with a cathedral.
[26] Chenu, *Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century*, 273.
[27] Ibid.

with words and the mind, rather than with the hands. While the medievals would not have recognized the term "intellectual" as applied to a person, "they nevertheless knew the *magister* (master), *doctor* (doctor), *philosophus* (philosopher), *litteratus* (an educated man and, in particular, one with knowledge of Latin)—people who worked with words and the mind."[28] With the rise of the intellectual and his labor, theology began embracing speculative and scientific aspirations.[29] Intellectual labor was significant for Thomas's theology and for his ministry, especially for his reflections on the contemplative and active lives. As Brocchieri writes, "For Thomas, who operated within the Dominican order to which he belonged, 'working with one's intelligence' was above all 'teaching and preaching.'"[30] Thomas echoes this new kind of work when he speaks of teaching as a spiritual work of mercy.[31]

The *magistri* were becoming a new interpretive authority alongside the Church Fathers, though not with the same definitiveness. As these new urban schools became organized and regulated, men were given a license to teach (*licentia docendi*), which in turn bestowed the title of "master" upon them. This license also made the master a theologian. Now there was a new teacher of the faith quite distinct from the traditional teacher, the bishop.[32] As Bauerschmidt explains, "[they] were neither monks, who studied the liberal arts and theology in the context of reflection on scripture as a text for prayer, nor were they bishops, who did theology in the context of pastoral care."[33] Though distinct, the *magistri* were still under the bishop's or the diocesan chancellor's administrative supervision. It was in part the masters' efforts to emancipate

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28 Le Goff, "Introduction," 19-20.
29 Speculation was not new to Christianity, but its development into the science of sacred doctrine was.
30 Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri, "The Intellectual," in *Medieval Callings,* 191.
31 See Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*. Trans. John Procter (London: Sands & Co., 1902). Updated and corrected by Joseph Kenny, http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraImpugnantes.htm. Accessed August 17, 2015. Henceforth, *Contra Impugnantes.*
32 See Chenu, *Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century*, 274-76.
33 Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas,* 3.

themselves from the episcopal administration that led to the formation of guilds of masters, which gave birth to the university in the thirteenth century.

Not only had a new kind of teacher entered the scene, but these teachers also began to introduce new tools and methods into their subject matter, including theology. The key developments of this "professionalization of theology" took place in the twelfth century. Their techniques reached perfection in the thirteenth century where "faith was being fashioned into a science."[34] That is, as intellectual activity began to take place in urban schools rather than monasteries, how this activity was conducted also changed.[35] The scholastics continued to employ the ancient practice of *lectio*—commenting on an authoritative text—but their development of this pedagogical method also ushered in a unique contribution of the medieval schools, namely, the *quaestio*.[36] The *quaestio* was a method of raising questions in response textual difficulties. According to Chenu, "This [Aristotelian] method was brought into lively activity by the new kind of biblical *lectio,* in which interpretation opened with a 'statement of the question' concerning elements of the text under study. The question (*quaestio*) was the characteristic act as well as the literary form assumed by scholastic theology."[37]

While the theological practice of raising questions in response to textual difficulties certainly predated the scholasticism of the high Middle Ages, what was previously spontaneous became systematic in the twelfth century because questions were now posed technically and methodically. Chenu credits this technical development to the burgeoning curiosity of faith combined with the widespread use of the dialectic of the *trivium*. (Dialectics pertained to the ability to resolve contradictions, for "dialectic" was "the art of true speech.") The *quaestio* is one of the

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[34] See Chenu, *Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century*, 279-80.

[35] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 3.

[36] These terms, i.e., *lectio, quaestio,* and dialectic, will be expanded upon below. See §4.2 The Rise of Urban Guilds and the Birth of the University, p. 30

[37] Chenu, *Nature, Society, and Man in the Twelfth Century*, 291. I will attend more closely to lectio, quaestio, and disputatio in the following chapter on the *ordo disciplinae*.

key constituents of the new intellectual activity that emerged in twelfth century, and it is closely related to the rise of scholastic humanism, to which we now turn.

2.2 Intellectual Life: The Renaissance of Humanism

Alongside the demographic changes occurring was the rise of scholastic humanism, or what Chenu terms the "renaissance of the twelfth century."[38] Scholastic humanism was the rebirth of confidence in the human ability to grasp nature and act accordingly.[39] This confidence was accompanied by a growing awareness on the part of Christians that by directing their interest upon the world, they were "fulfilling at least some part of their destiny, on the supposition that man is a being consecrated to the world and that in coming to know the world he comes to know himself as well."[40] Thus developed the notion of the human person as a microcosm, in which she stands at the "paradoxical borderline" of matter and spirit, unifying the two, participating in the divine reality and raising all below her to participation, too.[41] The twelfth century can be characterized above all by this rebirth of confidence. Furthermore, scholastic humanism "did not reject the supernatural but looked on it as the final, however imperfectly knowable, end and goal

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[38] Ibid., 1-48. This renaissance began at Chartres. Chenu explains that the men at Chartres—William of Conches and John of Salisbury, for example—"were bent upon a search for the *causes* of things—the most keen and arduous as well as the most typical of the activities of reason when, confronting nature, men discovered both its fecundity and the chains of necessity by which it is bound; an activity proper to science and one which clashed violently with religious consciousness, which when it was yet inexperienced and immature, was willing to engage in its characteristic activity of looking immediately to the Supreme Cause, at the expense of disregarding secondary causes. St. Thomas would react firmly against this dissociation of religion from natural science: 'To slight the perfection of created things is to slight the perfection of divine power" (Ibid., 11. Chenu is citing . *Summa Contra Gentiles* 3, c. 69, §15. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Volume 3, Providence. Trans. Vernon J. Bourke. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. Henceforth *SCG*).

[39] See Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, vol. 1, 17-133.

[40] Chenu, *Nature, Society, and Man in the 12th Century*, 33. Chenu cites an example from the *Summa theologiae*, Ia, q. 96, a. 2

[41] For the significance of the microcosm in Thomas's thought, see W. Norris Clarke, S.J., *The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 118. ibid., "Living on the Edge: The Human Person as 'Frontier' Being and Microcosm," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 36 (1996).

of all intellectual inquiry."[42] In fact, it required the supernatural as a necessary and complementary completion of the natural world, adding a further, positive dimension to the complexities of human life and nature.

Southern distinguishes four characteristic features of scholastic humanism, all of which are based on the shared confidence in the capacity of human persons to understand nature and to guide their action accordingly. Scholastic humanism emphasized the dignity of human nature, introspection as an instrument of inquiry, the cultivation of friendship (human and divine), and systematic intelligibility. Each of these features is relevant for recognizing the novelty in which Thomas's theology participates, and the specific contributions he made both to the emerging vision of the human person as microcosm and to realizing scholastic humanism's goals by contributing to humanity's actual understanding of itself and its universe. His contemporaries and immediate predecessors shared this milieu, and Thomas built upon their successes as he committed himself to the vast task of "thinking out the Christian universe" by integrating and sublating traditions as diverse as the Neo-Platonism of Pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle.[43]

The anthropology of the Middle Ages continued to emphasize the Fall. In the immediately preceding century, "the conception of the *inherent* dignity—that is to say, the intelligibility and rational plan—of nature, whether human or cosmic, had scarcely existed in the period of stress from which western Europe was just emerging in the second half of the eleventh century."[44] Previous centuries had sought dignity elsewhere. For example, they associated the dignified in human life with miracles and the supernatural, with symbolism and ritual. Thus, "It was only in wearing symbolic garments and performing sacramental acts, in touching the earthly

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[42] Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, vol. 1, 22.

[43] For "thinking through the Christian universe," see *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 1, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), esp. 66-93, at. 82 (henceforth, *Grace and Freedom,* CWL 1). For the challenge of integrating these diverse traditions, see Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century,* 24. I will address the Christian universe in greater detail in section 4.2 below.

[44] Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, vol. 1, 25.

remains of those who already belonged to the world of eternity, that any great enlargement for

humanity could be hoped for."[45] The twelfth-century schools took a different approach to human

dignity. They attempted to restore, as far as possible, the knowledge that had been forfeited at the

Fall. They understood the universe as divinely created, and the human person as a microcosm of

this universe.[46] The goal of their studies was nothing short of systematic knowledge of all that was

intelligible. Grace's perfection of nature began to take the place of a more magical

supernaturalism.

Alongside this emphasis on the value of human intelligence was an "increasingly serious

search for knowledge of the human mind itself."[47] Here, scholasticism drew significant inspiration

from eleventh-century monastic developments, during which the search for God within the soul

became one of the monastery's principal innovations. This turn to the soul was another profound

novelty that marked the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. As Southern writes, "Here

then…we find an appreciation of the self at the root of a new programme of spiritual growth,

beginning with human nature in its most unpromising aspect of self-love, and ending in the most

refined forms of love of others and ultimately of God." [48]

To understand God by understanding oneself is associated with the third features of

scholastic humanism, again monastic in origin but scholastic in expansion: friendship, both

human and divine. Southern relates this to two features: "If self-knowledge is the first step in the

rehabilitation of mankind, friendship—which is the sharing of this knowledge with someone

else—is an important auxiliary, for through sharing, self-knowledge is more than doubled."[49]

Again, friendship between God and the human person represented another emerging novelty of

scholastic humanism. Though it may seem a commonplace theme now, in the early Middle Ages,

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[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., 22.
[47] Ibid., 26.
[48] Ibid., 27.
[49] Ibid., 28.

God was a Creator, Judge, and Savior; God was not a friend but someone whose anger must be appeased by material and financial penances. Similar to the aforementioned supernaturalism, God was someone only to be approached through the saints. Something fresh took root in the central Middle Ages. Friendship between God and humanity appeared, "and it lifted a great weight from human lives."[50] Closely related to this development was the newfound recourse to the humanity of Christ the Redeemer. He began to appear as an expression of God's fellowship with humanity. The humanity of Christ became a strong emphasis from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries because of the religious movements and the humanist confidence in human nature.

Finally, these three features are supported by and oriented toward the fourth—the efforts toward systematic intelligibility, toward restoring the knowledge humankind forfeited at the Fall:

> The dignity of human and cosmic nature is the foundation of scholastic humanism; the intelligibility of nature is its symptom; and the friendship between God and Man is an expression of this theme on the very boundary between reason and sentiment. And since God is the creator and upholder of both human and cosmic nature, a similar intelligibility and sentiment must (so far as human limitations permit understanding) characterize the nature of God and His relationship with creation. The elaboration of this intelligibility was central to the whole program of the schools.[51]

Looking ahead, the first two features are related in Thomas's trinitarian theology, for the source of human dignity is found in the belief that the human person is made to the image of God. In turn, when seeking an analogy for the Trinity, Thomas turns to foundation of the image, the human person's interior processions of word and love. The third feature is also represented in Thomas's trinitarian theology, for mutual knowing and loving constitutes friendship. Further, Thomas's explains the indwelling of the Trinity in terms of the new interpersonal established by the gift of *gratia gratum faciens* (the grace that makes one pleasing), or in other words, friendship. Lastly, the fourth feature characterizes Thomas's theological project as a whole, into which he integrates his trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology. In fact, in thinking out the

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[50] Ibid., 29.
[51] Ibid., 30.

Christian universe, Thomas sets forth—in a systematic and scientific fashion—just how close the

Trinity is to our interior lives and to our friendships.

2.3 Intellectual Life: New Translations, New Texts

Finally, related to these developments in scholastic pedagogy and humanism, was the translation

of ancient texts into Latin and the composition of new texts, including the new genre of the

summa. In the following chapter, I will attend in detail to the development of new texts in the

twelfth and thirteenth centuries in order to situate Thomas's use of the *ordo disciplinae* in his *Summa*

theologiae.[52] Presently, it is worthwhile to become familiar with the influx of texts, as this influx

contributes significantly to the changing intellectual scene:

> Though Rome had drawn much of its culture from Greece, the Romans did not seem to
> have much taste for Greek philosophy or science, and thus few of these texts were ever
> translated into Latin…Up until the twelfth century, therefore, the great philosophical
> figures and texts of antiquity were known mainly by reputation, if at all. This all began to
> change around 1140, when a torrent of Latin translations of ancient works began to flow
> through the West.[53]

Initially, many of Aristotle's texts were translated from Arabic rather than the original Greek.

Eventually, scholastics such as Thomas were able to work with Latin translations from the Greek

representative of all aspects of Aristotle's diverse corpus.[54] Many challenging questions about the

relationship of philosophy and theology arose with the introduction of Aristotle into the Latin

corpus.

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[52] This will include situating Thomas's *Summa theologiae* in relation to Abelard's *Sic et Non* and Lombard's *Sentences*.

[53] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas,* 4.

[54] See Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, vol. 1, 36-38. Boethius played an important bridging role in the gap that persisted from the early centuries of Christianity to the Middle Ages. He recognized the loss of connection that was occurring between the Greek-speaking East and the Latin-speaking West, and devoted himself to translating Greek philosophical texts into Latin before his untimely imprisonment and execution. See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 4; Southern, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, vol. 1, 36-37.

3. Spiritual Life in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: The Religious Movement of the *Vita Apostolica*

These shifting intellectual currents and the transition to urban centers, driven themselves by the socio-economic, political, and technological changes, also provoked religious movements in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Desire for reform abounded from within and from without the institutional forms of Christianity. Christians were troubled by the institutional Church's abuses, monastic wealth, clerical immorality, and clerical ignorance. In response, monastic communities had begun evaluating their ways of life. At the same time, a whole new class of Christians was on the rise, with their own pastoral concerns. They were encountering a changing society and urban development, in which they had to discern how to live. Like the burgeoning theologians, they met the perennial problems of nature and grace, of the world and gospel. What ought the encounter between the gospel and the world be like?

As we have seen, a rebirth of confidence in human nature and knowledge was occurring in the intellectual world. Similarly, religious movements experienced a rebirth of their own, that of the *vita apostolica* (apostolic life). It was a desire to live the apostolic life, which had been a cornerstone of monastic and religious spirituality in the ancient Church. The twelfth-century rebirth of *vita apostolica* grew from the Gregorian reform of the eleventh century, which had stressed the early Christian community of the Acts of Apostle, proposing it as the model the Church should strive to emulate. Hinnebusch recounts this renaissance's history in relation to the desire for reform: "It returned to the Scriptures and apostolic times as the source of its inspiration and for the answers to the great abuses, particularly among a clergy who were often ignorant, incontinent, without zeal, and who seldom preached."[55] This endeavor to live like Christ and his apostles was the religious ideal that all spheres of the Church were taking up in response to the cultural shifts and the questions they posed about the encounter between the gospel and the

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[55] William A. Hinnebusch, *The Dominicans: A Short History* (New York: Alba House, 1975), 1-2.

world. Each sphere, however, lived their own unique interpretation of what it meant to imitate the apostles and how the gospel and the world ought to encounter one another.

The history of the Dominicans must be understood in relation to this religious movement and the variety of forms it assumed. While Dominic was indebted to the wisdom of monasticism, the evangelical approach to the *vita apostolica* was especially formative for Dominic's foundation of the Order of Preachers.[56] Thomas's own decision to pursue the Preachers' evangelical model of the *vita apostolica* over the monks' cloistered communal model re-contextualizes his theological project by highlighting its outwardly directed mission. Additionally, the *vita apostolica* was a religious movement that generated theological insights for Thomas and his contemporaries because of its lived engagement with the encounter between nature and grace, the gospel and the world. As Chenu writes, "Throughout [the twelfth] century, the return to the primitive life of the church, to the life of the apostles, the *vita apostolica*, by inspiring new states of life, inspired as well a new awareness of the ways that grace could take root in nature."[57]

3.1 The *Vita Apostolica:* Monks, Canons Regular, and the Laity

While the central Middle Ages was unified in embracing the *vita apostolica* as their response to the encounter between the gospel and this new world, exactly how people and communities understood this *vita* varied greatly. During the eleventh century, monks, canons regular (clergy affiliated with a cathedral), and the laity all gave birth to religious movements that sought the renaissance of the *vita apostolica* in their own distinctive ways.

There were two general emphases that people embraced as the genuine return to the *vita apostolica*, namely, the communal model or the evangelical model.[58] Those who stressed the communal model embraced the apostolic *modus vivendi* (mode of living), while those more

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[56] Ibid.
[57] Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, 203.
[58] See Tugwell, *The Way of the Preacher*, 111-16.

evangelically-minded sought to imitate the apostolate of the apostles. Monastic communities perceived the first apostles as monks, and so they understood the *vita apostolica* to be an exhortation to return to their monastic roots. Other sectors of the church felt a strong call to the evangelical spirit of the first apostles who went out into the world two by two. Those embracing the communal model were inspired by Acts 4:32, the classic description of the first community of Christians, whereas those living the evangelical model took Luke 10:1-12 to heart, which narrated the poverty and mission of the seventy Christ appointed.

The monks and canons regular tended to emphasize the communal life of the apostles, while the laity had a more evangelical spirit and committed themselves to poverty and preaching. The monks embraced the *vita apostolica* by returning to the *communis vita* because they understood these two lives as equivalent. They had already begun equating the two in the eleventh century as the remedy to clerical decadence, which is why controversy erupted when clerics also began embracing the same *vita apostolica*. Monks such as the Abbot Rupert of Deutz argued that monastic life *was* the realization of apostolic life; monks were the authentic successors to the apostles; the first apostles were monks; the rule of the monks was equal to the gospel of the apostles.[59] In fact, "the ideal Christian, or more simply the Christian, was the monk, a Christian dead to the world."[60] This equation of the monastic cenobitic life and the apostolic communal life was not new in the history of monasticism. However, as C.H. Lawrence observes, "what is new in the twelfth century is not the myth [of the *vita apostolica*] but the apologetic use made of it by both defenders and critics of established practice."[61]

For these monastic communities, the primary concern was the personal holiness of the monk. Thus, in Rupert's estimation of the *vita apostolica*, we find virtually nothing of the

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[59] See Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, 205-06.
[60] Ibid., 212.
[61] C. H. Lawrence, *Medieval World: Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, 4th Edition (London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 135.

apostolate, that is, of preaching. Rather, the apostolic life concerns the internal life of the first

Christian communities, as narrated in Acts 4:32, "Now the company of those who believed were

of one heart and soul, and no one said that any of the things which he possessed was his own, but

they had everything in common." Chenu uses the confrontation between the gospel and the

world to characterize these three main efforts to embrace the *vita apostolica*.[62] With respect to

monasticism's appropriation of this life, he writes, "[T]he institution [of monasticism] seemed,

because of its very triumph, to rest comfortably on the Christianity it had built; and the people of

God had only to enjoy this triumph. It its final realization, this *vita apostolica* left out of its

consideration that confrontation of the world which the gospel demanded."[63] The monastic

reforms ultimately distanced the monasteries from the expanding world of education and

preaching, without seriously considering the encounter of the gospel and world.

 The canons regular can be difficult to categorize because they embraced the *communis vita*

like the monastics while also recognizing the significance of the apostolate—especially preaching

and baptizing—for the lives of the apostles.[64] Tugwell chronicles the passage from and the tension

between the monastic and canonical adaptations of the *vita apostolica*:

> [T]he significance attached to this appeal to the apostolic norm varies. At first it is the
> monks who claim to be the heirs of the apostles, and the essential element in this claim is
> their common life without private property. In the eleventh century, in the wake of the

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[62] That is, the efforts of monks, canons regular, and the laity.

[63] Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, 213.

[64] Canons regular were in existence prior to the twelfth century. However, it was during this period that
they began to gather together to live an austere common life because of their devotion to the reform-
minded return to the *vita apostolica*. Nicholas clarifies their relationship to the monks: "The orders of
canons regular have occasioned some confusion. The monks were the spiritual leaders of Christendom in
the early Middle Ages, and the notion spread during the eleventh century that the apostles had really
been monks. Hence some priests began living a monastic life under a rule, and houses of canons regular
appeared in northern Italy and southern France from the mid eleventh century and spread, often under
the influence of reforming bishops. Most large church had chapters of canons attached to them to chant
the offices. The 'Rule of St Augustine' became standard for the canons regular" (Nicholas, *The Evolution of
the Medieval World*, 372.) Soon, there were many distinct communities of these canons regular ("regular"
because they followed the *regula*—rule—of Augustine), for example, the canons of St. Victor in Paris.
They resembled the monks and their monastic communities and similarly emphasized the common life as
the essential feature of the first apostles. However, as time progressed, they began to include the
obligation of pastoral work.

Gregorian reform, the emphasis shifts slightly. It is now the canons who claim to be the exponents of the *vita apostolica*, and their charter is the Rule of St. Augustine. The ideal envisaged by the canons is explicitly clerical and pastoral, so that an element of apostolic work is now attached to the concept of apostolic life. Thus…unlike the monks, 'who are responsible only for their own souls,' the canons 'will have to answer for themselves and for the people as a whole.'[65]

The monks emphasized the contemplative life and personal virtue and holiness, while the canons stressed the active life. Nevertheless, while the canons did acknowledge their responsibility for the care of souls, the canons, like the monks, appealed to the *vita apostolica* primarily in terms of their living together in community. As Tugwell explains, "Even where an apostolate *is* formally envisaged, the specifically apostolic element in their life is not sought there."[66] Thus, for both the monks and the canons, the apostolic life is essentially a particular *modus vivendi*, which carries a certain ascetic pattern and moral pursuit; it is not essentially an apostolate. However, these differences in appeal alongside their shared desire to return to communal life led to controversies between the monks and the canons regular over the authenticity their respective *vita apostolica*.

This eleventh century renaissance met with something much more radically new in the twelfth century, namely, the evangelical preaching movements.[67] Preaching assumed primacy of place in the *vita apostolica*. Voluntary poverty and penance also became integral to the attempt to imitate the apostles. This evangelical movement—certainly more than the monastic form of the *vita*, but also more than the canons' form—indicated a new encounter between the gospel and the world, for these people moved *outward* into the world and championed the *active* life. For them, the scriptures were meant to be read for personal sanctity and shared.

According to Chenu, in the twelfth century, it was the lay persons who were "the most effective promoters of the *vita apostolica*, the ideals and needs of which were far from being

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[65] Tugwell, *The Way of the Preacher*, 111.
[66] Ibid., 112.
[67] Ibid., 113.

exhausted by the reform of the regular canons."[68] They were better able than the institutionally-bound clerics to devote themselves to the return to the gospel's emphasis on witnessing to the faith, fraternal love, poverty, and the beatitudes. Their preaching was moral preaching, generally an exhortation to penance. Some of these movements pushed poverty and asceticism to the extreme (often coupled with a form of dualism), such as the Waldensians and Albigensians.

As the centrality of the laity in the Christian apostolate rose, the encounter between the gospel and the world came to be understood differently. The evangelical ideal expanded beyond the inherited institutions. These Christians rejected the 'rules' (*regulae*) and traditional conformity of religious life in favor of a singular reliance upon the gospel, which ultimately meant that the gospel could make *regulares* out of any believers. Instead:

> [I]t followed that the definition of Christian life, far from being shaped by the monastic life as in Rupert of Deutz, on the contrary came to be formulated in its own terms, independent of the peculiarities of this or that state. The monastery could no longer be considered 'the city of God' to which one would lead society. Society existed and Christians lived in it; to do so was their calling.[69]

The twelfth century was a turning point in the history of western Christian spirituality. A new consciousness of what it meant to be a Christian began to materialize. Each state in the secular life was considered an essential aspect of God's providence. The fifth master-general of the Dominicans, Humbert of Romans, even collected sermons for the variety states that existed. Furthermore, in these evangelical movements of the twelfth century, there was a recognition of God's presence in the world and an acknowledgment that the lay Christian was a complete Christian actively participating in God's work—a far cry from the earlier monastic insistence that the ideal Christian was a monk, dead to the world.[70]

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[68] Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, 219.
[69] Ibid., 221-22.
[70] Ibid., 212 and 227-28.

Again, Chenu proposes understanding the three primary appropriations of the *vita apostolica* in the twelfth century—monastic, canonical, and evangelical/lay—in terms of the encounter between the gospel and the world, between grace and nature. He assesses this encounter in the twelfth century as follows:

> Whereas the *monastic* view of God tended to reduce the truth and the causality inherent in things to little more than symbols or occasions of grace, and hence to reduce the use and enjoyment of things to a concession, the *evangelical* outlook allowed, and more than that encouraged, the discovery of the laws of nature, an awareness of the demands of reason, and the value of social structures—all within the realm of grace. The evangelical outlook regarded grace as having a unique dominion, but a dominion in which nature, reason, and society as always served faith and grace all the better for not being under some infantile tutelage but autonomous in their methods of operation.[71]

Both the intellectual and spiritual lives of twelfth century persons shared a rebirth of confidence in human nature and in the human ability to know and love. These in turn supported both the thirteenth-century theological advances with respect to the complex but harmonious relationship between nature and grace, and the emergence of a new form of religious life that embraced the encounter of the gospel and the world. We now turn to the thirteenth century institutionalization of these intellectual and spiritual developments, both of which are interconnected in Thomas's historical context and in his own life.

4. The Thirteenth Century: The University and the Itinerant, Learned Preachers

The great intellectual transformations of the eleventh and especially twelfth centuries coalesced in the thirteenth century, as the shift from monastic to urban education climbed to its peak in the establishment of the university. The cathedral and urban schools also produced other educational institutions, such as those found in the intricate academic structure of the Order of Preachers. Unlike monastics, Dominicans embraced the urban environments as centers of education and as occasions for the *vita apostolica*.

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[71] Ibid., 228.

The religious movements we have explored gave creative life to the mendicant orders of the Order of Preachers and the Franciscans. The universities, the Dominican educational institutions, and the Dominican apostolate must all bear on our encounter with Thomas's theology, for the medieval university and Thomas's Dominican life are interdependent backgrounds.[72] However, which of these we emphasize affects our understanding of Thomas's theology. Where previous scholarship gave precedence to Thomas's university life, more recent scholarship convincingly argues that Thomas's Dominican life was the real focus of his intellectual labors.

With the interrelated contexts of Thomas's life as a master in theology and as a Dominican in mind, I proceed to first recount a few moments of Thomas's life and then continue to highlight some relevant features of the origin of the university and its pedagogy before engaging what I consider the most influential factors of Thomas's theological life—his Dominican roots and commitments. When studying the Order of Preachers, I emphasize their mission as a religious order of priests preaching and hearing confessions, along with the preparatory academic and practical formation the friars received.

4.1 Thomas's Dominican Life

Thomas was born in 1224 or 1225 in Roccasecca, Italy. His birth came during an age of many new beginnings. Chenu accentuates the new encounters with other religious traditions and philosophies that were taking place during this era of Christianity's history.[73] These encounters affected the Christian consciousness and also shaped in many ways Thomas's own theological method and goals, as he set himself to the tremendous task of thinking out the Christian universe in light of this complex and newly emerging diverse whole.

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[72] See Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 27.
[73] Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, 11.

His father, a feudal lord, presented Thomas as an oblate at the powerful Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino in 1230, when Thomas was still a very young boy. There he received a rural monastic education and religious formation. Due to resumed conflicts between the Pope and the Emperor, Thomas was forced to leave the abbey and study at the schools of Naples in 1239. In so doing, Thomas transitioned from a monastic to urban education, experiencing in Naples university instruction. Significantly, at that time, Naples (unlike Paris) taught Aristotelian philosophy. Further, it was in Naples that Thomas first encountered the Order of Preachers and their radical way of embracing the *vita apostolica*. Interestingly, as Bauerschmidt explains, "In moving from Monte Cassino to Naples, Thomas in a way reproduced in his own life the shift that occurs in the twelfth century with regard to both intellectual and religious life…Thomas would spend five years in Naples, having passed from the monastic world to the scholastic and mendicant worlds."[74] It was during this time that Thomas decided to become a mendicant Dominican rather than a monk. Thomas's family did not take well to his decision. They entrapped him for one or two years in their castle, using both overt and subtle methods to persuade him to change his mind. Having recognized the futility of their efforts, they released him and he returned to the Dominicans. Thomas's transition from the Benedictine monastic life to the Dominican mendicant life cannot be underestimated. Why did Thomas become a Dominican, despite such pressures and risks?

The Dominican schools in which Thomas was educated and taught had a practical and pastoral orientation because the overriding concern of medieval Dominican education was to prepare men as preachers and confessors ready to serve others. This outwardly directed mission is what set them apart from their contemporaries, for example, monastics and seculars. It was also the basis of their pedagogical decisions. For example, even Dominicans sent to the universities to

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[74] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 23-24.

study theology were typically not there for academic careers or even to complete degrees. Rather, they were sent there to study in order to become teachers for the basic Dominican conventual schools.

Conventual schools (*scholae*) were the most elementary tier of Dominican education. It was these schools that were the primary locus for training friars for their apostolate, not the order's advanced provincial or university *studia*. Further, even the most academic Dominicans were not simply pursuing their own intellectual interests. Rather, they were above all pedagogues, expected to educate other Dominicans. The pedagogical orientation of even these most exceptional Dominicans (such as Thomas Aquinas) is evidenced by the fact that most of their writings were inspired by what their students and fellow Christians needed.[75] In fact, Mulchahey has found that some of the most famous Dominican manuals and *summa* were meant to be used at the conventual schools. They were written specifically with the Dominican schools and pedagogy, and not the university, in mind.[76] For these reasons, historians now emphasize that the texts that are the most authentic expression of medieval Dominican achievement were not university texts, but the texts written for and within the context of the Dominican educational system.[77] Thomas Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* was one such text. He composed the *Summa* at Santa Sabina specifically for his Dominican students in response to the pedagogical deficiencies in the texts to hand. Many of these students would go on to become lectors at the conventual schools after their training at Santa Sabina with Thomas.[78]

Previously, it was assumed that Thomas joined the Dominicans for intellectual reasons and out of academic ambition, choosing them because of their emphasis on study and their

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[75] Tugwell, "Introduction," *Early Dominican Writings*, 25.

[76] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 131.

[77] See Ibid., 130.

[78] However, even though Thomas may have intended the *Summa theologiae* to become a textbook for training Dominicans in theology, it was ultimately rejected as a text for the *schola* (conventual school) and the emerging provincial theology programs. See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study,'* 331.

university connections.[79] This point of view is especially prevalent among those who consider

Thomas's achievements as primarily philosophical. However, based on historical research, as well

as the increasing significance given not only to Thomas's scripture commentaries, but also to his

sermons, scholars now believe the apostolate of the Dominicans was the primary motivation of

Thomas's vocational decision, not their intellectual life and connection to the university. For

example, historical research into Dominican education demonstrates that the Dominicans' study

focused on scripture, not Aristotle and other philosophical texts. Further, it was not likely that a

Dominican's life would keep him long at the university, as his responsibilities were elsewhere.

Thomas is really the exception that proves the rule. It was his own talents—scholarly and

pedagogical—along with the demands of his era that brought him twice to Paris—as a *magister*—

and that led to his expansive commentaries on Aristotle.

Given the structure and orientation of Dominican education, if Thomas's primary

interest was Aristotelian philosophy or if he had desired an academic career, he would have been

better served to become a secular master in the Faculty of Arts at a university rather than a

Dominican.[80] The life of a friar preacher was not the life of a university master or of a

philosopher. [81]So then, why did Thomas become a Dominican, despite familial opposition?

Bauerschmidt rightly suggests that it is because

> Thomas wanted to do what Dominicans were in fact founded to do: to preach the Gospel
> of Jesus Christ and to care for souls, primarily through hearing confessions…Thomas, as

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[79] At the time Thomas entered, the Dominicans had only one *studium*, St-Jacques of the University of Paris.
It was not until 1248 that they officially expanded, creating *studia generalia* at four other universities.

[80] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 175.

[81] There is a school of interpretation, prevalent since the mid-nineteenth century, that perceives Thomas
Aquinas as a philosopher—as a theologian whose achievement was essentially philosophical—and that
Thomas understood his project as fundamentally philosophical. For example, F. Van Steenberghen, *The
Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1955). For a brief history
of this interpretation, see Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 41-82. For twentieth-century attempts to correct
this misinterpretation, see Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A.H.C. Downes (London:
Sheed & Ward, 1950) and Josef Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays* (South Bend: St. Augustine's
Press, 1999) and *Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. R. and C. Winston
(South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2001).

a preaching friar, is oriented primarily toward *communicating* the Gospel of Jesus Christ in such a way that his hearers are disposed to the inner movement of grace. This is what he aims at in all his intellectual work, whether preaching to a lay audience in the vernacular, or teaching his Dominican brothers, or even writing an Aristotelian commentary.[82]

This perspective on Thomas as a communicator—as a preacher speaking about God based upon his contemplative knowledge—should bear significantly any reading of his trinitarian theology.

4.1.1 Thomas the Pastorally-Minded Theologian

Once his family released him and he returned to the Dominicans, Thomas headed for Paris in 1245, where he first met his teacher, Albert the Great. They spent three years in Paris together (1245–1248). Thomas then accompanied Albert to the *studium generale* at Cologne (1248–1252), where he studied for another three years before returning to Paris (1252–1256). Thomas ascended the academic ladder to becoming a master in theology at a rapid pace, bypassing the age and curriculum restrictions placed on becoming a *baccalarius* (bachelor) and a *magister*.[83] Teaching was an integral component of scholastic formation, at which Thomas also excelled. He became a biblical bachelor at Cologne, where he taught *cursorie* (cursory lectures) on Jeremiah, Lamentations, and part of Isaiah.[84] The last of these lectures bears a series of *collationes* or marginal annotations. These *collationes* are notes about the spiritual or pastoral expansions of his literal commentary on Isaiah.[85] What is significant about this early moment of Thomas's teaching and pastoral career is that he reflects upon the Word of God to develop the practical orientation theology can assume. Commenting on this collation, Jean-Pierre Torrell writes:

> This last collation is a highly structured meditation on the place of the Word of God in theology and preaching. From the outset, [the Word] is a light for the intelligence. But

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[82] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 175.

[83] For example, Thomas was likely allowed to begin theology while still finishing his philosophical formation. See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 24.

[84] See Ibid., 27. James Weisheipl suggests this teaching regimen.

[85] Thomas always gave preference to the literal sense of scripture when commenting.

affectivity also finds a place there: to meditate on the Word is joy…We see in this development the practical goal that Thomas assigns to theology.[86]

Thomas's comments upon the Word of God also reflect his commitment to preaching and some early indications of his philosophy of teaching, both of which are integrally connected to what Thomas later calls, in his commentary on the second article of Apostle's Creed "attentive listening to the Word of God" (*diligens verbi divini auditio*).[87] This commentary is actually a series of Lenten vernacular sermons Thomas gave. These sermons represent some of Thomas's preaching near the end of his life. As we will see below and in more detail in Chapter 6, in these sermons, Thomas makes use of the psychological analogy to illuminate the Trinity for those to whom he is preaching. The fact that he explicitly draws upon his mature, systematic trinitarian theology in his preaching is significant because it discloses the close link Thomas perceived between scientific *sacra doctrina* and his apostolate to care for the souls of others. Here, we can observe Thomas attempting to hand on the fruits of his contemplation for the sake of others. The fruitfulness of the Word of God for theological reflection and practice becomes a constant thread throughout Thomas's Dominican life.

4.1.2 Thomas the Public Theologian

The University of Paris was the site of animated controversies in which Thomas was called upon to participate. When he had returned to Paris in 1252, the controversy between the seculars and the religious was in full force. The seculars' resentment was fueled by the fact they were losing theology chairs to mendicants, both the Dominicans and Franciscans.[88] The threat was so great

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[86] Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, vol. 1, 31.

[87] Ibid., 32. Also see Thomas's commentary on the second article of the Creed: "Therefore, if the Word of God is the Son of God and all the words of God bear a certain likeness of this Word, then we ought to hear the Word of God gladly; for such is a sign that we love God." See Thomas Aquinas, *The Sermon-Conferences of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Apostles' Creed*, trans. from Leonine Edition, ed. and into. Nicohlas Ayo, C.S.C. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 51.

[88] See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work, vol. 1, 76-79, esp. 76.

that Thomas had to give his inaugural lecture under the protection of royal archers.[89] During this controversy, Thomas wrote *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem* as a Dominican response to William of St. Amour, who argued that the religious should return to their monasteries and perform manual labor.[90] As Torrell explains, the wave of opposition represented by William encompassed more than the university. At its core, the opposition questioned "the very legitimacy of the ministry of the mendicants, who claimed to be devoted to study and teaching, and to live, not by labor, but by alms."[91]

This work was the first of three polemical texts Thomas wrote in response to secular university masters. It is a text of Dominican self-understanding, correcting the puerile misunderstandings William set forth in his refutation of the mendicants. Throughout *Contra impugnantes*, Thomas articulates the mutually supportive relationship between contemplation, study, teaching, and ministry. He argues that contemplation—attained in study*,* as practiced by the Dominicans—prepares one to teach.[92] Further, Thomas expresses the essential place of study and teaching to the Dominican life and apostolate, as both study and teaching bring spiritual consolation to souls.[93] He also maintains that both study and a holy life are necessary for those who, like the Dominicans, minister to the souls of others. Finally, he presents preaching and teaching theology as a spiritual work of mercy, thereby defending the legitimacy of the Order of Preachers despite their novelty in engaging in these particular works as their primary ministry.[94]

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[89] See Ibid., 79.

[90] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 27. As Torrell explains, William of St. Amour misunderstood the mendicants. He did not understand that the mendicants were *not* monks, nor did he comprehend the extent to which the Order of Preachers was defined by study and preaching. See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 79-80.

[91] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 79.

[92] For Thomas, all religious have contemplation as their perfection and end, but there are differences in how they attain contemplation. Monastics seek contemplation by way of *lectio*, where the Dominicans seek contemplation by way of study. *Contra impugnantes,* c. 1. Also see Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 109.

[93] See *Contra impugnantes*, prol.

[94] See *Contra impugnantes*, cc.1, 2, 66-68. I am indebted to Mongeau's work, *Embracing Wisdom*, for drawing my attention to this work and its significance for enriching one's understanding of Thomas.

As Mongeau suggest, this work in particular is a model of public theological reflection and demonstrative of Thomas's understanding of his own mission in theological education as a Dominican.[95] Further, we can observe in this and other polemical works, traces of Thomas's own battle to join the Dominicans and the more passionate side of his personality. As Torrell writes, "In these polemical writings defending the religious life, Thomas commits and manifests himself personally in a more open way than in other works; we feel him touched here in that which he holds most dear: the vocation for which he struggled in his youth."[96]

Thomas was recalled to Paris in 1268 because his assistance was needed in the face of another controversy that had broken out at the University. This time, the struggle was not only about corporate rights but also about doctrine "because the place of Aristotelianism had provoked an intellectual and moral crisis that was becoming daily more acute."[97] He stayed in Paris until 1272, at which point he moved to the University of Naples as the head of the theology faculty, where he remained until his death in 1274.

4.1.3 Thomas the Dominican Teacher and Preacher

In addition to his scholastic duties as a master of theology, Thomas was also a celebrated Dominican teacher and preacher. He was included in important pedagogical revisions at chapter meetings. In 1265, he was enjoined to establish the first, and experimental, Dominican provincial theology *studium*. It was held in Rome at Santa Sabina. He was given full authority over his students. They were sent from all over the province to study with him.[98] Precipitated by the pedagogical and ministerial needs of these students, Thomas began to write the *Summa theologiae*.

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[95] See Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 108.
[96] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 90-91.
[97] Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, 13.
[98] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 278-279. I will detail the history of this *studium* in Chapter 2.

At Paris, Thomas became a bachelor and teacher of the *Sentences* at age 27, even though

bachelors were supposed to be 29.[99] Now a *baccalarius formatus* (fully formed bachelor), Thomas

had only to complete the third and final step to become a master in theology: assist his master in

disputes. He accomplished this final task and became a *magister in sacra pagina* in 1256. He taught

at Paris until 1259. As part of the ceremony of becoming a master, Thomas gave an inaugural

lecture on Psalm 103:13, "Watering the earth from his things above, the earth will be filled from

the fruit of your work." Together with Question 10 of *De veritate,* "On the Teacher," it represents

his initial reflections upon theological education, especially as a ministry, as a service for others,

not oneself. When he returned to Paris for his second regency, he wrote two other pieces on the

role of studying and teaching with respect to pastoral ministry—questions from the first and third

quodlibets.[100] In these pedagogical reflections, Thomas sets forth his understanding of teaching as a

participation in God's instruction in which the teacher is a secondary cause. James Collins

explains the unique role *theological* education played in this participatory understanding of

teaching, which reflects the scholastic humanist mentality:

> As a theologian, St. Thomas regarded sacred doctrine as the supreme instance of the
> teaching office. Every human effort at communicating new knowledge to others shares, in
> some manner, in the central aim of education: the humanistic and religious aim of
> perfecting man's grasp of truth and thereby his participation in the knowledge and life of
> God himself.[101]

Frequently, as we will see, Thomas expresses the teacher's role by way of analogy with a

doctor—both accomplish their end not as the principal agent, but rather, in cooperation with the

student's/patient's own nature.[102] The analogy is noteworthy because in addition to explaining

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[99] See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 36.

[100] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 111. See especially *Quastiones Quodlibetales* I, qq. 7-8 and III, q. 4, trans. Sandra Edwards (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval Studies, 1983), http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDquodlib.htm. Accessed August 18, 2017.

[101] James Collins, introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas, *The Teacher, the Mind: Truth, Questions X and XI*, trans. James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,1962).

[102] God is the principal agent, and only God can teach interiorly. Teachers only cooperate with the God-given nature of their student. See below, Chapter 6.

the particular kind of agent the teacher is, it also expresses that the teacher, like the doctor, can heal. This is significant for our understanding of the *verbum* (inner word)*,* which can be a source of healing, of consolation, in a person's life. While only God can teach and heal interiorly, the doctrinal preacher can be the occasion of the word that "breaks forth" into love, that is, of the word by which God touches a person. For reasons such as these, the teacher must be contemplative in addition to being active, so as to listen to the word, which he is called to share charitably with others. In Chapter 2, we will study Thomas's role as a teacher within the Dominican order in more detail when we turn to his time at Santa Sabina, where he began to write the *Summa theologiae.*

In 1260, Thomas was appointed the preacher-general of Naples, coordinating all preaching activity for that region. He held this post until his death in 1274. Thomas preached academic sermons in Latin as a regent master and vernacular sermons as a Dominican. In both capacities, he generally followed the model of the *sermo modernus* (modern sermon), though his vernacular sermons do depart somewhat from that model to focus on the more "practical" goal of moving the wills of his hearers.[103] One of Thomas's academic sermons given during the mendicant controversy echoes the Dominican understanding of the relationship between contemplation, study, and preaching, which I will consider below. Reflecting on Luke 8, Thomas says

> 'A sower went out'…It remains now to speak about the sower's third way of going, that is, preaching, because a preacher ought to go out from hidden contemplation, *for a preacher ought to draw in contemplation what he will pour out later in preaching.* Hence it says in Is 12:3-4: 'With joy you shall water,' that is, with the joy of contemplation, 'from the fountains of the Savior,'—that is, from divine wisdom [see Wis. 1:5]…This going out is very similar to the Savior's going out from the secret dwelling place of the Father to the public area of what is visible…[104]

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[103] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 168-69. Also see Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study', 401-19.* I will discuss the *sermon modernus* in greater detail below.

[104] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 169, fn. 102. I am indebted to Bauerschmidt for his reference to this

The more we attend to Dominican education and preaching in general, and Thomas's teaching and preaching in particular, the more we can appreciate the symbiotic relationship between speculation and praxis, between the contemplative and active lives, between systematic theology and the communication of saving truth to the minds and hearts of believers.

It was in the context of his responsibility as preacher-general that Thomas gave a Lenten series of vernacular *collationes* or "sermon-conferences" on the Apostle's Creed. According to Nicholas Ayo, they were "rather longish and patterned more on the thirty-minute retreat conference of our own day than on the Sunday homily."[105] Further, "These are catechetical instructions for adults, and typically they were *not* simplistic, short, or question-and-answer format. Quite likely they were given in the evenings, when more time could be devoted to a leisurely sermon-conference."[106] Thomas preached these daily in 1273 to lay Catholics at the church of San Domenico Maggiore in Naples. He challenged his audience intellectually and enjoined their freedom as beings made to the image of God. While Thomas's sermon-conferences were intellectually challenging, Torrell notes that generally, when compared to his contemporaries, "Thomas distinguishes himself by his simplicity and his sobriety, the absence of scholastic subtleties and technical terms."[107] Notice that there is a distinction in Thomas's sermons between challenging his audience intellectually and using scholastic and systematic language. Thomas is also concerned to avoid "oratorical flights," such as those found in the *exempla* (little stories) used by many of his contemporaries, which Thomas found frivolous. Mongeau suggests that these *collationes* represent Thomas as a preacher, pastor, and catechist while also giving us

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sermon. Thomas Aquinas, *Sermon 9: Exiit qui seminat*, in *Thomas Aquinas: The Academic Sermons*, trans. Mark-Robin Hoogland, C.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 120 (emphasis added).

[105] Ayo, introduction to *The Sermon-Conferences*, 2.

[106] Ibid., 5.

[107] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, vol. 1, 72.

insight into how Thomas approached lay formation. Torrell insists that if we wish to know

Thomas better, we must familiarize ourselves with this part of his literary accomplishments.[108]

One sermon-conference is especially noteworthy for the trinitarian orientation of this

project. When preaching on the second article of faith, Thomas explains that we know the Trinity

now by faith, but we will know it with perfect vision once we pass from this life. However, he

speaks of the Trinity in this life for our consolation and edification: "But for our consolation and

edification, let us say something further about [these beliefs]."[109] He then proceeds to actually

walk his listeners through the first moment of the psychological analogy, the procession of the

inner word, as the best analogy for the generation of the Son, the Word of God. It is exceedingly

significant that Thomas chooses to make use of the psychological analogy in his preaching,

though without the technical terminology and scholastic distinctions to be found, for example, in

question 27 of the *Prima pars*.[110] He challenges the retreatants intellectually and then proceeds to

enjoin them to make the following commitments to the Word of God, now analogically

illuminated by way of an accessible interior experience: (1) to willingly hear God's words; (2) to

believe God's words—for then God's Word dwells in us; (3) to mediate upon this Word (which

guards against sin); (4) to manifest this Word to others and; (5) to be doers of the Word. When

considering the manifestation of the Word, Thomas's Dominican orientation comes to the fore:

"When one's heart is full of the word of God, then it ought to overflow in preaching, counseling,

and enkindling others."[111] In these five commitments to the Word of God, we see echoes of both

the praise of the Word of God we saw in Thomas's *collationes* in his commentary on Isaiah and his

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[108] See Ibid.

[109] Aquinas, *The Sermon-Conferences*, 49. Herein, Thomas is speaking specifically about the Father and the Son, affirming the belief that they are two persons who share one nature.

[110] See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, vol. 1, 72. While Thomas's sermon-conferences were intellectually challenging, Torrell notes that generally, when compared to his contemporaries, "Thomas distinguishes himself by his simplicity and his sobriety, the absence of scholastic subtleties and technical terms" (72).

[111] Aquinas, *The Sermon-Conferences*, 53. I am indebted to Torrell for the reference to this sermon. See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, vol. 1, 31-33.

aforementioned sermon about the relationship between contemplation and preaching.

Specifically, we witness the pastoral relevance of the psychological analogy in Thomas's own

preaching ministry. I will return to this theme in Chapter 6. Now, I will highlight a few elements

of university pedagogy in relation to Thomas's position as a regent master

4.2 The Rise of Urban Guilds and the Birth of the University

Not too long after Abelard's time in Paris, the *magistri* there began to consider themselves as

forming a guild—a *universitas*—and did so very much in response to pressing social needs

materializing in their urban centers.[112] While the word "*universitas*" did not assume its present

meaning as "university" until rather late in the Middle Ages, a medieval university could always

be recognized by the fact that it had a guild of masters, "a privileged corporation which controlled

its own membership, and these guilds were frequently hostile to outside attempts to infringe on

their rights."[113] As a guild, these masters acted as a body pursuing a common interest and

developing a certain craft.[114] Ideally, a university had a faculty of Arts, as well as one of the three

higher faculties, law (civil or canon), medicine, and theology. Paris was the most renowned of the

universities for its theology program.

The master in theology had three university tasks, *legere, disputare*, and *praedicare. Legere*

means "to read," and in the specifically theological context of the Middle Ages, it meant to read

the Bible and comment on it verse by verse. This teaching by lecturing (*lectio*) included both

textual analysis and the formation of the aforementioned *quaestiones* regarding the text. The

literary genre that resulted from the *lectio* was the commentary or gloss.[115] During the thirteenth

century, Lombard's *Sentences* became an important text in the university faculty of theology upon

which people commented. At first, masters lectured on these *Sentences*, but eventually it became

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[112] See Dale, *The Intellectual Life of Western Europe in the Middle Ages*, 234.
[113] Ibid., 210.
[114] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 9-10.
[115] See Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, 91.

the task of bachelors. As part of their degree, these *baccalarii Sententiarii* lectured on the *Sentences*, thereby producing their own commentary. Only masters, however, could lecture on the Bible. Thomas's commentaries on Paul's letter to the Romans and the *reportationes* (recorded by a secretary while Thomas taught) on the Gospels are examples of the fruits of this form of teaching.[116] While the *Sentences* assumed a lasting place in the medieval theological curriculum, the Bible held ongoing significance throughout the Middle Ages as the basic text of theology. The same was true for Thomas in particular. As Torrell notes, "Though long overlooked in favor of the *Sentences* or the *Summa*, this kind of biblical teaching was nevertheless Thomas's ordinary labor."[117]

The content of lectures changed significantly in the thirteenth century as Aristotle's work began filing into the schools. There was controversy, especially at Paris, over Aristotle's teaching, and in particular the *Metaphysics* and his natural philosophy. According to Bauerschmidt, "Part of the disruptive effect of the introduction of Aristotle was the difficulty of deciding where his works should be taught."[118] For example, the *Metaphysics* did not fit into any of the seven liberal arts. The result of the eventual acceptance of the entire Aristotelian corpus at Paris in 1255 is the transformation of the faculty of arts itself. Thus, the arts faculty of the seven liberal arts became de facto a faculty of philosophy. Aristotle's introduction into both the curriculum of the university and the intellectual life of Christianity brought both controversy and a tremendous intellectual challenge.

Thomas participated in the controversy by defending the use of Aristotle at both the university and within the Dominican educational system. He answered the intellectual challenge

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[116] See Hoogland, introduction to *Thomas Aquinas: The Academic Sermons*, 4.
[117] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 55.
[118] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 11.

by his effort to, as Lonergan expresses it, "think out the Christian universe."[119] This thinking out was Thomas's broader context for dealing with questions of grace. For Thomas, grace is one particular instance of God's providence. To "think out the Christian universe" is to grapple with the structured yet dynamic order of the entire world order. It is thus similar to Aristotle's philosophical achievement, but with the higher viewpoint afforded by divine revelation, including the affirmations that the universe and its order are created and that God is providential. That is, Thomas seeks to understand the universe in relation to God, as revealed in Christianity. He seeks to understand how the divine transcendent mystery, which lies beyond human knowing, makes itself known in the very activity and order of the created universe. He seeks to understand how all the mysteries of faith are intelligibly related to one another.[120] He aspires, in other words, to a synthesis—not a static explanation of everything, but a dynamic perspective from which we can continually integrate our diverse experiences according to a wisdom wide enough and deep enough to generously contain all things. Herein, Thomas demonstrates the compatibility and universality of God's providential activity, including grace, with the entire created universe, including freedom and contingency. The Dominican teacher and preacher is a secondary—but free and important—cause and participant in God's providential care of creation. We also see here the echoes of twelfth-century humanism, now making waves in the thirteenth century universities.

Masters taught under another form in addition to the *lectio*, namely, the active pedagogy of the disputation. The *disputatio* was a dialectical form of teaching in which discussion assumed center stage. These academic exercises assumed the form of the *quaestio*, enlivening the *quaestio* now as a pedagogical tool. The *disputatio* first appeared during the twelfth century and was fully

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[119] See Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, CWL 1, 82.

[120] See J. Michael Stebbins, *The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 31-32.

autonomous by the early years of the thirteenth century.[121] As Bauerschmidt explains, the

disputatio followed a development similar to that of the *quaestio*. Where in the twelfth century the

quaestio had become detached from the text of scripture in order to address a subject beyond direct

commentary, the *disputatio* now became detached from the lecture as its own independent

exercise, based upon a topic—not a text—and following its own fixed structure.[122] Theologically,

this detachment represents a development in the *scientia* of *sacra doctrina* in the Middle Ages. As

Bernardo C. Bazàn has demonstrated: "The passage from the *quaestio* to the *disputatio,*

characterized by a progressive detachment with regard to the text, was a natural process owing to

the maturity of the scientific spirit medieval and greater mastery of dialectic method."[123] The text

is no longer present, hence the autonomy of the *disputatio*. The *quaestio* and the *disputatio* represent

the setting free of human inquiry, which was the engine of the thirteenth-century scientific spirit

and the source of Thomas's efforts to develop a theological method adequate to the times.

These disputations were especially concerned with conflicts among authorities. There

were ordinary and quodlibetal disputations. The former were private, the latter public. Ordinary

disputes addressed a question set by the master while quodlibetal disputes addressed any topic

proposed by the audience (other *magistri*, students, and generally anyone interested in joining the

discussion). Thomas's *De veritate* and *De potentia* are examples of the fruits of ordinary disputation.

His *Questiones quodlibetales* originate from the quodlibetal disputations.

The master's last task was preaching, a central component of the developing *apostolica vita*.

According to Peter the Chanter of Paris, preaching was "the roof and final adornment of the

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[121] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, vol. 1, 59.

[122] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas,* 12-13

[123] "Le passage de la *quastio* à la *disputatio,* caractérisé par le détachement progressif à l'égard du texte, a été présenté comme un processus naturel, dû à la maturité de l'esprit scientifique medieval et à une plus grade maîtrise de la method dialectique." B.C. Bazàn, G. Fransen, J.F. Wippel, D. Jacquart, *Les Questions Disputées Et Les Questions Quodlibétiques Dans Les Facultés De Théologie, De Droit Et De Médecine,* (Turnhout-Belgium, Brepols, 1985), 31-32. Translation is my own. See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 60.

theological edifice."[124] The master-preacher was expected to preach sermons in Latin within the university setting, but he was also to preach in the city churches. Sermons and preaching were essential to the religious, intellectual, and institutional life of the medieval university.[125] Many masters who were trained in theology were notable preachers and dedicated to Lateran IV's reform efforts, such as refuting heresy and confirming and strengthening the Catholic faith. According to Roberts, "They were interested in the reinvigoration of Christian teaching and therefore attached great significance to popular preaching."[126] There was an extraordinary level of involvement and commitment between the university and the medieval city with respect to the preaching of these masters. Their sermons generally addressed the pastoral issues that were emerging as a result of the expanding urban centers: "Into the milieu of the medieval city, the preacher brought a message of social morality as well as denunciations of ill-gotten gain, usury, and fraud."[127]

The preaching masters of the medieval schools and universities represented a further development of the *ars praedicandi* (preaching art), which we saw earlier in the context of the *vita apostolica*. Most prior medieval preaching had been distinguished by the fact that it was preached in Latin and by clerics to clerics. However, during the second half of the twelfth century, with the rise of the evangelical spirit now enlivening the *vita apostolica*, sermons entered into another distinctive phase as popular preaching in newly expanding cities became widespread. Another change occurred in the thirteenth century with university preaching:

> By the early decades of the thirteenth century, however, there emerged a whole new rhetoric of preaching with close ties to the schools and universities where preaching, sermon-making, and the study of Scripture had long been linked. From these elements

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[124] Baldwin, *Masters, Princes, and Merchants*, 107. Baldwin is here paraphrasing one of Peter's best-known passages.

[125] Phyllis B. Roberts, "Sermons and Preaching in/and the Medieval University," in *Medieval Education*, eds. Ronald B. Begley and Joseph W. Koterski (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 83-98 at 83.

[126] Ibid., 89.

[127] Ibid.

emerged the thematic sermon, a creation of the medieval university and often called the university-style sermon.[128]

Importantly, these master-preachers were at the forefront of making scripture more accessible to audiences of both clergy and laity through their development of the thematic or modern sermon and the composition of preaching aids.[129] They also often rounded off their *lectio* with a sermon so their students could learn how to make the transition from what they studied in *lectio* to their *praedicatio*. Additionally, these masters knew how to use their own scholarship for their preaching. However, while preaching was a task of the master in theology, it was not an active element of his threefold pedagogy (*lectio, disputatio,* and *repitione*). Nevertheless, a more sophisticated grasp of theology masters as participating in the preaching of the Church helps us understand the close relationship between theology and ministry, between a theologian's study and his practical and pastoral work. This third task, then, discloses a vital piece of information: "The people of the Middle Ages saw no opposition between the scientific teaching of theology and its pastoral application. On the contrary, the first was seen as the normal preparation for the second."[130] The same harmony is true for Thomas, both as a master and as a Dominican.

4.3 Mendicants

As the intellectual developments of the eleventh and twelfth centuries coalesced into the universities of the thirteenth century, so too did the religious movements assume a novel shape in the thirteenth century, namely, mendicancy. The mendicant orders were set apart from the

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[128] Ibid., 91.

[129] These preaching aids included "Scripture with its glosses; collections of *exempla, florilegia, distinctiones*, and *similitudines*; concordances; alphabetical lists and topic charts to locate materials as well as collections of model sermons…While collections of *exempla, florilegia*, and *similitudines* contained biblical materials and served as useful reference works for the university-trained preacher, books of distinctions were most directly linked to utilizing and organizing the senses of Scripture.

[130] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and his Work*, vol. 1, 69.

monastic orders because they were supported by freely given gifts, and not by income-generating property.[131]

The mendicant movement represented a development of the *vita apostolica*. It was unlike the monastic and canonical forms because of their voluntary poverty and begging, but also because the *communis vita* was not the primary focus of the mendicants. It was unlike the lay evangelical forms because it was an evangelical movement of professed religious persons, though a completely new style of religious —neither monk nor canon regular, but a friar.[132] Both of the great thirteenth-century mendicant orders— the Dominicans and Franciscans—embraced voluntary poverty. They also preached. However, the Franciscans preached penance like the lay preachers, while the Dominicans also preached doctrine.[133] Further, they related preaching and poverty differently, which led to frequent disputes among them. As Hinnebusch writes, "[The] Dominicans imitate Christ the Preacher who was poor, while Franciscans follow Christ the Poor Man who preached the Good News…"[134] Similarly, in Tugwell's estimation, the early Dominicans were more drawn to the *apostolica*—preaching—while the Franciscans were more drawn to the *vita*—imitating Christ's life. Similarly, while both orders based their *vita apostolica* on Luke 10:1-12 (the monastics and canons regular had chosen Acts 4:32), "[t]he Dominicans rapidly los[t] interest in the details of Luke 10, concentrating their claim to be apostolic on the claim that they are doing the job of the apostles. The rest is reduced to the simple formula of 'preaching in poverty,' and this poverty is seen largely in function of the job…The Franciscans, by contrast, remain[ed] fascinated by all the details [of Luke 10]."[135]

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[131] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 15.

[132] Medieval persons such as William St. Amour confused the friars for monks, something Thomas corrects in his *Contra impugnantes*.

[133] This was a new development in the history of the Church's pastoral ministry, as previously, doctrinal preaching was reserved for the bishop as a part of his office.

[134] Hinnebusch, *A Short History of the Dominicans*, ch. 2.

[135] Tugwell, "Introduction," *Early Dominicans*, 19.

Nevertheless, both mendicant orders shared much in common. They were pioneers and indispensable to the life of a Church in need of relating to the evangelical spirit of its lay members and responding to their changing pastoral needs.

While an analogy can be drawn between the intellectual developments and the university, on the one hand, and the religious movements and the mendicant orders, on the other hand, there is also an illuminating parallel between the universities and the Dominicans. Van Engen suggests that the Dominicans' innovative schema of governance can be grasped by way of an analogy with the university guilds:

> What guildsmen attempted to achieve as laymen operating within a new commercial environment, the followers of Dominic sought to realize as clerics operating within a new religious environment. Both presupposed the social consequences of urbanization, and both sought to distance themselves from the inherited routines of the rural village (farm or church) and to claim a relative freedom over against inherited authorities (prince or bishop).[136]

Like guilds, the Dominicans were organized for the sake of a particular end, namely, preaching, or what Van Engen calls their "craft." This craft of preaching, like the crafts of other guilds, defined the Dominicans; it was their identity. As other scholars have noted, Pope Innocent III's original papal document sanctioning Dominic's order of preachers bears a significant visible alternation: from "*preaching* in Toulouse" (*predicantibus in Tolosa*) to "*preachers* in Toulouse" (*predicatoribus in Tolosa*)." From this evidence, Van Engen concludes that this document indicates the novelty of what was occurring with Dominic and his brothers. The privilege accorded them in 1217 was so unique that it "had to be hand-corrected to identify its recipients not as clerics licensed to preach but as a new type called simply 'preachers.'"[137] To preach was their essential task—their craft—and this identified and defined them.[138] I now turn to what further

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[136] Van Engen, "Dominic and the Brothers," 10.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Tugwell, *The Way of the Preacher*, 17.

differentiates the Dominicans from their contemporaries, especially from the long-reigning monastic interpretation of the aim of religious life.

5. A Unique Order: The Apostolate of the *Vita Apostolica* in the Dominican Origins

Tracing the outlines of the unique contours of the Order of Preachers assists us in composing a more accurate picture of Thomas and his work. The starting point for this endeavor is the Dominicans' identity as preachers, for a straight line can be drawn from preaching to everything else concerning these friars. There was a great need for preaching in thirteenth-century Christianity, and it was to become one of the primary ways of educating most Christians.[139] Prior to the Dominicans, no religious order existed that was adequately fitted to the particular demands of a preaching ministry, especially doctrinal preaching. Though monks were called upon, they continually failed to be successful at preaching.

Thus, Dominic rendered a great service to the faithful when sought to establish an order of "preachers." According to Hinnebusch, this service is clear when we note the little preaching that was done and the sparse amount of preaching material produced during the centuries that stretch from the age of the great Fathers to the days of Dominic. The Church hierarchy had already begun to recognize this need: "A revival of preaching was a recognized need in the church in the early thirteenth century. The bishops, who were the official ministers of the word of God, were all too frequently 'dumb dogs who will not bark,' as Innocent III complained."[140] The Fourth Lateran Council—at which Dominic was present—called for auxiliary preachers to help the bishops. Dominic's vision, however, was much more expansive. He envisaged his preachers going throughout the world in pairs, as Christ directed the apostles to do. Pope Honorius III approved the order in 1216. With this approval, they were not confined to a diocese nor were

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[139] Previously, Christians usually learned their religious doctrines and stories from iconography. This changed in the thirteenth century, when they began to learn from preaching. See Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Medieval World*, 372.

[140] Tugwell, "The Spirituality of the Dominicans," 15.

they dependent on any bishop for the mandate to preach.[141] A new moment was thus beginning in the Church's pastoral ministry. I now outline four defining features of the Preachers' contribution to this ministry, all of which take their lead from preaching.

5.1 Dominic's *Fratres Praedicatores*

First, their *poverty* is instrumental to their preaching, supporting its efficacy. In 1201, Dominic and Diego, while journeying through southern France, encountered the dualistic evangelical heretical group, the Albigensians (Cathars), as well as the Cistercian abbots sent to preach against them. The former encounter stoked the fire of Dominic's desire to preach.[142] The latter meeting taught Dominic and Diego that if they wanted to succeed in their preaching, they had to embrace poverty like the Albigensian preachers, for the Cistercians' preaching clothed in the wealth of the monastery was failing. Dominic recognized that "[o]nly someone who genuinely shared the evangelical aspirations of those who were disaffected with the official church could have hoped to make much impression on them."[143] This poverty is instrumental, for they adopt personal and community poverty because it gave them the freedom they required to preach.[144]

Second, related to their poverty was their *itinerancy*, both of which were features of their mendicancy. Like the Franciscans, their itinerancy was interpreted negatively by many of the monastic communities who viewed this constant movement as a sign of corruption, as if they were chasing illicit desires or oblivious to their own interior restlessness. Yet, both mendicant orders saw itinerancy as an imitation of Christ. As with poverty, the Dominicans understood itinerancy as of instrumental value to their preaching. It is also thereby related, as will be addressed below, to their desire to be useful to those outside of their community.

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[141] Ibid., 15-16

[142] Of course, not all lay preaching groups were heretical.

[143] Tugwell, "Introduction," *Early Dominican Writings*, 16-17.

[144] This strict personal and communal poverty was peculiar to the Dominican Order when the held their first Chapter in 1216 and their General Chapter in 1220. See Jordan Aumann, O.P. *Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition*, London: Sheed & Ward Limited, 1985), 127.

Third, Dominic was determined to preach *doctrine*. Though the Dominicans were concerned with the conversion of heretics, they were also equally engaged with instructing the faithful in the knowledge necessary for salvation. Their doctrinal preaching set them apart from other religious communities engaged in preaching, as well as from their lay counterparts. It was also unprecedented, for in preaching doctrine, Dominic and his companions were preaching what only bishops and approved preachers had henceforth been permitted to preach.[145] When Bishop Fulk of Toulouse commissioned Dominic and his companions to preach doctrine, his official sanction set Dominic's friars apart—more than anything else—from most other contemporary preachers.[146] Approved lay groups were only permitted to preach moral exhortation and were explicitly excluded from teaching doctrine. Bauerschmidt expresses the uniqueness of the kind of preaching the Dominicans sought:

> [T]he order that Dominic had in mind was something quite unprecedented: an order dedicated not to prayer and contemplation, as the Benedictines and Cistercians were, nor to the preaching of moral exhortation and penance, as the various evangelical movements of the twelfth century had been and as the Franciscans would be, but rather to the preaching of Christian doctrine, a task traditionally associated not with religious but with the order of bishop.[147]

Fourth—and intrinsically connected to the Dominican mission to preach doctrine—was the unprecedented value they placed upon *education and study*. Dominic intended his preachers to be "orthodox and theologically-informed evangelists."[148] Theological study was insisted upon from the beginning, and philosophical study eventually became an official part of the Order's study. Theirs was a *learned* preaching in which a novel and essential partnership was formed between study and preaching.[149] As Bauerschmidt writes, "Study as preparation for preaching was from the outset a hallmark of the Dominicans and almost from the very inception of the order

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[145] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 8.
[146] Ibid., 8-9.
[147] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 17.
[148] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 8.
[149] See Guy Bedouelle, O.P., *Saint Dominic: The Grace of the Word*, trans. Sister Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 158.

Dominic had his friars studying in Paris."[150] Further, preaching and education are so linked in the origins of the Dominican tradition that Mulchahey argues that in order to understand their preaching, one must understand their schools, curricula, pedagogical techniques, and mental habits.[151] This intellectual work replaced the traditional monastic manual labor.[152] Likewise, they gave contemplation a radically new orientation by seeking contemplation *as* study, which in turn gave rise to their unique pedagogy of study through contemplation.[153] Contemplative study was for the sake of preaching to others, for the sake of their souls. This serious study of sacred teaching transformed the monastic *lectio divina*.[154]

All four of these features are not only related to preaching, but to one another. For example, while the practice of granting dispensations from regular observances to members of religious orders had a history, the Dominicans were the first order to sketch "a system of dispensations to be made available not for reasons of health as had been the case in other orders, but for reasons of study."[155] In fact, study became one of the basic components of the Dominican religious observance.[156] For example, their recitation of the choral Office was to be brisk and succinct, lest their study of sacred truth be hindered.[157] Similarly, their poverty was not to inhibit their procurement of books. Nothing was to interfere with preaching (their apostolate), and studying was the indispensable preparation for this craft. According to Mulchahey, "This new emphasis on the importance of study and the needs of the apostolate in relation to other aspects of

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[150] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 20.

[151] Mulchahey, '*First the Bow is Bent in Study*', ix.

[152] Tugwell, "Dominican Spirituality," in *The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Spirituality*, ed. Gordon S. Wakefield (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1983), 120. Recall that the "intellectual" was emerging as a new medieval person—one who worked with his mind rather than his hands.

[153] See Mulchahey, '*First the Bow is Bent in Study*', 19. Also see Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 44.

[154] See Aumann, *Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition*, 127.

[155] Mulchahey, '*First the Bow is Bent in Study*', 17.

[156] See Bedouelle, *Saint Dominic: The Grace of the Word*, 158.

[157] See Aumann, *Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition*, 127.

the community's life can be seen as the Dominican order's single most characteristic innovation."[158]

While preaching is the common thread running through the Dominican's impoverished but doctrinally educated and itinerant lifestyle, something more foundational supports the preaching, itself. As Van Engen suggests, what truly sets the Dominicans apart in the thirteenth century is that their mission was not personal holiness, but rather, the outwardly directed mission of preaching and hearing confessions in order to take care of souls and lead them to God. Tugwell aptly calls their outward orientation a "generosity of self-giving," which is the cornerstone of Dominican obedience rather than meticulous observance of rules.[159]

Earlier, I referred to the 1220 Dominican constitution. This constitution illuminates these interrelated ways in which the Dominicans were unique, but also points to the fundamental purpose for which Dominic founded the Order of Preachers. Again, "Our order is recognized as having been especially instituted from the beginning for preaching and the salvation of souls, and our study should be principally and ardently directed to this end with the greatest industry, so that we can be useful to the souls of our neighbors."[160] Humbert of Romans comments on this constitution. He explains that the order has two ends, preaching and *salus animarum* (the salvation of souls). However, while preaching is the immediate aim of the order, it is subordinate to its ultimate aim, the salvation of souls. He then links the work of saving souls to serious study, for that is what will make the Dominicans serviceable.[161] As Humbert writes, "Study is not the purpose of the order, but it is exceedingly necessary if we are to achieve the aforementioned ends, namely preaching and the saving of souls, for without study we can do neither."[162] Further, as

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[158] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 18.
[159] Tugwell, "Dominican Spirituality," 119.
[160] See above, 1. Introduction, p. 1
[161] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 5.
[162] Humbert of Romans, *Expositio Magistri Humberti super Constitutions fratrum Praedicatorum* in Humbertus de Romanis, *Opera de vita regulari*, ed. J.J. Berthier, II (Turin: Marietti, 1956) as quoted in *'First the Bow is Bent*

Wendlinder comments, "Dominic discerned that this end could be better achieved through 'learned preaching' than simply through moral exhortation."[163] In other words, Dominic recognized the value of helping believers come to understand the theological reasons for Christian behavior, as well as the intrinsic value of understanding what one believes. Such understanding, as Thomas expresses, provides consolation to the believer.[164] Thus, while preaching is the common thread holding poverty, itinerancy, and education together, the cloth is woven for the sake of others' souls.

Van Engen has made a recent and significant contribution to this understanding of the originality of the Dominicans' outwardly-directed missions. All religious communities in the Middle Ages were founded upon a *regula* (rule) and formed by a *vita* (life). Their members dedicated themselves to a common *regula* and found encouragement in exemplary *vitae*.[165] These examples were meant to animate their journey to personal perfection. While the Dominicans, like the Franciscans, were founded and formed in these ways, the Dominicans were also the exception to this pattern. For example, Francis was certainly a reformer, the connection between his life and rule was similar to the pre-existing pattern, as his personal *vita* had become essential to sanctioning his *regula*. The Dominicans, by contrast, departed from this medieval pattern in two ways. First, they adopted the already-established Augustinian rule as their *regula*.[166] Second, instead of turning to Dominic's personal *vitae* (as the Franciscans had done with Francis), they turned to *several vitae*, those of the first preachers and thereby, the origin of the Order of Preachers. The point was to emphasize their unique identity as *preachers* from the very beginning: "The Dominican tradition, in short, was not grounded in a life written to capture the holy radiance of

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in Study', 5.

[163] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 29. The reason, as we will see, pertains to the understanding of *sacra doctrina* as necessary for salvation.

[164] See *SCG* 1, c. 1, §9.

[165] Van Engen, "Dominic and the Brothers," 7.

[166] This was due to a restriction placed on the formation of new religious communities by the Fourth Lateran Council. The Franciscans adopted the "rule of the Gospel."

an acclaimed saint but in life-stories written to delineate the origins of a guild of Preachers."[167]

They were not explicitly shaped by a distinguishing *regula* or *vita*.[168] Their uniqueness in this

regard discloses the source of what set them apart from their contemporaries. The reason they

focused their *vitae* on their origins as *preachers* rather than on Dominic was because their mission

was not personal holiness, but outward directly missions.[169] The Dominicans were animated by

recalling why they were founded.

There were certain distinctive features of Dominic's life that affected the Preachers.

However, even when his personal *vita* was featured in the collective *vita*, his personal virtue was

only spoken of *after* his missionary work. The emphasis was always on the latter. As Van Engen

explains:

> Unlike traditional monks or holy people, Preachers could regard their individual virtues
> as in some sense subsidiary to their mission. *This was revolutionary*. In the entire monastic
> tradition since the Desert Fathers—and in Francis too—the mission *was* personal
> holiness. Outwardly-directed missions, as functionalist arguments have presented them,
> only sprang from holy powers accrued by, or perceived as already present in, people of
> God. Dominic and his bishop from the beginning made virtue *instrumental* to the mission,
> thus adopting poverty to refute (or compete with) heretics. Dominic's band gave up
> immoveable property and became mendicants to be free for preaching, as the *vita* makes
> very clear.[170]

Here we have an entire order dedicated to the apostolate, and the radical and groundbreaking

nature of this dedication cannot be underestimated. Every aspect of the Dominican life has an

apostolic quality—prayers and devotions, studies, even their dispensations. This is because, as

Tugwell writes, "The all-absorbing ambition of the friars was to be 'useful to the souls of others.'

Their own spiritual exercises were designed to make them better preachers, and their own

spiritual progress was not sought as a goal in its own right, but rather as a kind of spin-off from

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[167] Van Engen, "Dominic and the Brothers," 11.
[168] Ibid., 8.
[169] This is not to say that Dominic was insignificant. However, "The imitation Jordan used was not of an acclaimed saint—that had not yet happened—but of holy and exemplary leader of their band," 12.
[170] Van Engen, "Dominic and the Brothers," 20 (emphasis added).

their service of others."[171] Further, their apostolate was constitutive of their religious life, rather than the other way around. Even the pope attached their preaching of the Word of God to the remission of their sins. This is important because it underscores that for these preachers—unlike monastics and canons regular—their way of sanctification was through their apostolic work, not through their regular observance. There is no gap, as Tugwell expresses it, between their religious life and their ministry. Essentially, the unique formative emphasis placed upon their apostolate underscores that for the Dominicans, personal holiness was not the goal of their order. The goal of their order was to be useful to the souls of others. This does not mean that sanctity and service are not related, but historically, the Dominicans are pioneers in seeking first and foremost the spiritual well-being of their neighbors rather than their own.

To this historical research into the unique character of the outwardly directed mission and their unparalleled dedication to the apostolate of saving souls, I add that the Dominicans interpreted their work of saving souls as *imparting the knowledge necessary* for salvation by way of studious, learned preaching.[172] Such knowledge is necessary, as Thomas expresses, because God is our end and in order to effectively direct our living to our end, we need to know about our God, our end. They grounded their serviceability to souls in studying *sacra doctrina*, and they preached because the service they endeavored to give their neighbors was the spiritual work of handing on salvific knowledge.

5.2 Thirteenth Century Pastoral Needs

The early Dominicans formed a religious order dedicated to the service of others rather than establishing a cloister for the salvation of those who entered. Thus, the shape their life took was determined by the needs of others whom they served. In the thirteenth century, these needs corresponded to the intellectual developments and religious movements of the eleventh and

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[171] Tugwell, "Introduction," *Early Dominicans*, 4.
[172] See ST Ia, q. 1, a. 1. Also see Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 27.

twelfth centuries. In many ways, the Church had failed to embrace the opportunity the evangelical spirit occasioned, and instead sequestered it to the margins and pushed people to the extremes of heresy. Dominic, however, succeeded where the Church had failed, recognizing that "[o]nly someone who genuinely shared the evangelical aspirations of those who were disaffected with the official church could have hoped to make much impression on them."[173] Further, a great number of the people who followed the heretical groups were not so much abandoning Catholicism as they were simply ignorant of Catholic beliefs. This shortcoming was related to the prior urban developments and the accompanying ecclesiastical reorganization that had taken place. As Nicholas explains:

> By the eleventh century a parish organization had developed. In principle, each parish was under one priest, who was usually assisted by a vicar and various persons in minor orders. The growth of urban populations during the central Middle Ages made some parishes too large for one man to minister to the spiritual needs of all inhabitants, and many urban parishes were subdivided…the inadequate supply of clergy in the larger centers contributed to the growth of heresy among the underinstructed masses.[174]

Compounding these ecclesiastical shifts was the fact that most of the clergy of the early thirteenth century had insufficient theological training.

Tugwell assesses a twofold need that had to be met in order for the Church to prevail in the midst of what had become a restless evangelical movement. First, the Church needed to demonstrate that the new evangelical spirit had a home within the Church. Second, the Church needed to provide basic catechesis, both doctrinal and moral, to its people by providing an effective and educated core of preachers.[175] The Dominicans responded to both of these needs, making a home for the evangelical spirit within the official Church and making catechesis available for the masses.

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[173] Tugwell, introduction to *Early Dominican Writings*, 16-17.
[174] Nicholas, *The Evolution of the Medieval World*, 372.
[175] Tugwell, introduction to *Early Dominicans*, 10.

A third need arose in response to the aforementioned intellectual developments, for a new Catholic theology was necessary to cope with these advances, especially in the recently emergent universities.[176] Just as the intellectual developments had become institutionalized in the universities in the thirteenth century, the Church found an institutional response to the evangelical movements in the advent of the mendicant orders.[177] The Dominicans also responded to this intellectual need. They supplied educated preachers by developing their own extraordinary academic structures, which educated both laity and clergy. They also contributed intellectuals to the academic world of the universities. Providing learned teachers and preachers responded to the urgent need of the Church for educated clergy, at last making the mandates of Lateran III and IV a reality.[178]

Pastorally and intellectually, thirteenth century Europe was in need of poor, itinerant, and educated preachers and theologians capable of meeting the spiritual and intellectual demands of the thirteenth century. The Dominicans provided both pedagogically-minded teachers as well as impoverished, doctrinally-sound preachers. Thomas, as we have seen, was celebrated as both. I now turn to the Dominican academic structure in order to grasp Dominican pedagogy.

6. The Dominican *Tradere Aliis Contemplata:* Handing on the Fruits of the their Contemplative Study for the Sake of Others

From the very beginning, Dominican education and ministry were interwoven into a relationship of mutual mediation. Similarly, at the inception of the Dominican order, mutually mediating relationships emerged between contemplation and action, on the one hand, and the speculative

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[176] Ibid., 4.

[177] Preaching in the Dominican and Franciscan orders is different, though related. For example, according to Tugwell, by contrast with the Franciscans, Diego and Dominic, "start preaching because preaching is needed. They are responding to an external need, not just following the impulses of their own spirituality. It is because they see a need that they want to be preachers, and it is because they want to be preachers, in this particular situation, that they find that they also want to adopt the apostolic style of life," Tugwell, introduction to *Early Dominicans*, 18-19.

[178] See Hinnebusch, *The History of the Dominican Order*, 10-11.

and practical elements of *sacra doctrina*, on the other.[179] Study serves the Dominicans' ministry of preaching, which is done for the sake of the salvation of the souls of their neighbors. Study and the concrete economy of salvation are thus intimately linked. Mulchahey illustrates the relation between preaching and study by way of Dominic's decision to adopt the Rule of St. Augustine as the rule of his order of preachers.[180] She comments on his transformation of the Rule: "At Dominic's hands the regular life became also the life of the *itinerant* preaching, contemplation was transformed into *study*, the direct preparation for preaching in word, while *austerity and poverty* became the preconditions for preaching by example."[181] Mulchahey observes that Augustine's rule was not an obvious choice for the Order of Preachers. Thus, Humbert offers reflections upon Dominic's decision, which Mulchahey summaries and which reflects the Rule's amenability to transformation:

> First, says Humbert, echoing something which seemed so obvious to Dominic, preachers must be learned; Augustine, being wonderfully learned himself, serves as a good example to the disciples of his Rule who would be preachers…Fourth, Humbert observes that Augustinian canons are not bound to a single cloister as are monks. *They are free to practise the active life, as preachers must, and they may have the cure souls in their own parishes…*And [sixth], Humbert points out that in its brevity the Rule of St. Augustine was, indeed, extraordinarily flexible. *To it could be added all the statutes needed to regulate a community of preachers, especially statutes regarding study.*[182]

Humbert's fourth and sixth points accentuate the distinct way in which Dominic understood the active and contemplative lives. The active life was specifically the activity of preaching. The contemplative life was contemplation through study. It is this transformed notion of contemplation as study that is especially noteworthy. For the Dominicans, their contemplation came from study rather than from the monastic *lectio divina*. They sought to teach and preach from

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[179] There is also a relationship between speculation (study) and contemplation according to Thomas. Speculation serves one's contemplation of revealed truth. This in turn assists one's active life of teaching, preaching, and hearing confessions.

[180] Lateran IV prohibited the establishment of new orders. Instead, it encouraged people desiring to become religious to choose an existing order. Similarly, any new foundation was required to assume the rule and constitutions of an existing order. See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study',* 11, fn. 24.

[181] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study',* 19 (emphasis added).

[182] Ibid., 14 (emphasis added).

the *scientia* they gained from this transformed contemplation. Contemplation as study must figure

into any attempt to understand Dominican education and pedagogy. Pedagogically, the

Dominicans pursued contemplation *as study*, which itself supported their active ministry. Equally,

their study was pursued *as* contemplation, that is, as directed toward the love of God, which

delights the soul.[183]

Not only did the Dominicans transform contemplation by finding its source in study

(rather than in *lectio divina*), but they also reordered contemplation's *telos* by putting it at the service

of their outwardly-directed mission. That is, they contemplated (and therefore studied) for the

sake of others. One of the most recognized Dominican mottos, *contemplata aliis tradere* (handing on

to others the fruits one has gained in contemplation), reflects this reordering of contemplation and

echoes its transformation. This phrase actually seems to originate with Thomas. We have already

seen him say as much in his sermons.[184] Thomas also practiced this motto in his own life. As a

preaching friar, he gave his life over to the care of souls through handing on the fruits of studious

contemplation by preaching the gospel.[185] Finally, what the Dominicans contemplated and sought

to hand on was nothing short of *sacra doctrina*, that is, salvific knowledge, both speculative and

practical, intended to guide the pilgrim on her journey to God. Herein lies the intimate bond

between contemplation, study, preaching, and the salvation of souls. The Dominican must study

in order to know and love God. He must know and love God in order to speak the words of God

in his preaching such that others may know and love God and direct their lives to God as their

salvific end. The shared fruits of the Dominicans' contemplation—particularly in Thomas's

hands—are knowledge and love of the triune God, which delights the soul and conforms it to the

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[183] See *ST* Ia, q. 180, a. 1c.

[184] See Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 173-74, est. fn. 123. The mottos is also sometimes construed as
contemplari et contemplata aliis tradere (to contemplate and to hand on to others the fruits of contemplation).

[185] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, ix.

Trinity, itself. In their contemplative study and learned preaching of the knowledge necessary for salvation, the early Dominicans were unparalleled.

6.1 The Locus of Dominican Theological Formation

Accompanying their pedagogical technique of practicing contemplation as study for the sake of preaching was their decision about how to educate their friars. Their ultimate goal required a novel approach to education and formation. According to Mulchahey, "As Dominic and his friars first contemplated the institutional parameters according to which they would build an *ordo Praedicatorum*, a single education concept had animated their thinking: Dominican preachers had to be formed in theology, and so they would be, right in their own convents."[186] Wendlinder summarizes the essence of Dominican formation as "the life of faith and contemplation which guided the life of study—with the active goal of learned preaching necessary for the salvation of souls."[187] The Dominicans discerned that establishing their own schools and with their own teachers was the best way of forming friars for this exceptional aim.

Dominic's commitment to being useful to the souls of others influenced the destinations he set for his preachers' education. He chose university towns because these were centers of learning, allowing the friars to study, preach, and find literate men to enter their order.[188] Within the first few years of the order, he also sent friars to study at the University of Paris. However, while the university would continue to serve a critical purpose in the Order, Dominic also envisioned the Preachers establishing their own conventual schools in which the Dominicans themselves would educate the friars as preachers. This vision of Dominic's underscores the pedagogical priorities of the young Order in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Dominican education during this time period was overwhelmingly oriented toward a pastoral and

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[186] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 219.
[187] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 33.
[188] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 26.

practical end, namely, the preparation of men as preachers and confessors.[189] This preparation

most often took place in the order's conventual schools, called *schola,* rather than in advanced

studia. However, even once these *scholae* were established, the university played an ongoing role in

the Order, for Dominic modeled these conventual schools after the universities and continued to

send friars to the universities to study theology.

6.1.1 The Dominican Three-Tiered Education System

While Dominic and his order were committed to educating the friars in the conventual schools,

they soon recognized a quickly emerging necessity—the Dominicans' local schools presupposed

the order would have qualified teachers to lecture in them.[190] At the same time, they began to

discern the possibilities of a second tier of education beyond these local schools, namely, the

studium. These possibilities arose out of the close proximity of several Dominican priories to the

university centers of Europe and their great secular *studia.* These urban priories "could develop

schools which offered an education in theology a cut above that available in most other

Dominican loci, as masters and learned men of the universities joined their communities and

began to teach."[191] The Dominican *studium* was based upon St-Jacques of Paris, which already by

1220 could be singled out as the order's *studium*—"not merely a *schola*, but a *studium*, a place of

serious study—to which the best and the brightest friars could be sent from every corner of

Europe."[192] By 1248, the Dominicans were establishing *studia* in Cologne, Oxford, Montepelier,

and Bologna. The Dominicans soon discerned even more expansive possibilities, and quickly

developed an internal three-tiered education system: the *schola*, the *studium*, the *studia provincialia*,

and the *studia generalia* (the *studium* and the *stuida generalia* are really the same tier of education, as

we will see).

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[189] Ibid., 130.
[190] Ibid., 132.
[191] See Ibid., 219.
[192] See ibid.

The first level of education, the *schola* (conventual school), provided the friars with the education they need in order to become learned preachers. The *schola* was "the doctrinal heart of Dominican training, or perhaps the theory behind the practice of the order's ministry."[193] Again, many of the Dominican manuals and *summa* were written with the expectation that they would be used in these *scholae* rather than in the university. The *schola* was in many ways the institutional realization of Dominic's dream. He wanted to create "a permanent corps of theologically-informed preachers, able to represent the teachings of the Church from a position of intellectual and ecclesiastical authority." [194] The *scholae* were the means of developing this corps and providing themselves with "the *sine qua non* of the Dominican mission: the learning which would enable them to work as preachers, as priests, and soon, as confessors amongst the Christian people." [195] These *schola* also had an open-door policy, thereby providing bishops with an educational opportunity for their clergy and meeting a pressing need of the Church.

Within twenty years of Dominic's death, the Dominicans had been experimenting with specialist curricula in order to remain current with the momentum that Aristotelian and Arabic philosophy were gaining as the thirteenth century progressed. These experiments gave birth to the second tier of Dominican education, the *studia provincialia*. Mulchahey explains the relationship of these three tiers now present with the establishment of *studia provincialia*.

> If every convent had a school [*schola*] and the order at large had access to St-Jaques [a *studium*], these new courses were to be offered by a few *studia* operating in each province. *Studia provincialia*, that is, schools administered at the provincial level for select provincial students, became the means by which the Dominican order provided intermediate training in the subject increasingly deemed to be prerequisite to the study of advanced theology at Europe's universities.[196]

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[193] Ibid., 199.
[194] Ibid., 132.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid., 219-20.

In other words, these *studia provincialia* were academically intermediate schools between the *scholae* and the *studia* of the universities, though chronologically they came into existence after the first *studium* at St-Jacques had been established. As intermediary, they represent a new chapter in the history of Dominican schools. They are also an important element of Thomas's history, as a writer, teacher, and a member of Dominican committees on education.

The first *studia provincialia* were *studia artium*. These liberal arts schools were not like those of the universities because they did not properly include the natural philosophy of Aristotle.[197] *Studia naturarum* (schools of philosophy which included Aristotle's natural philosophy) would begin to emerge later in the history of the Dominican education system, beginning with a single experiment in 1262, which eventually gave birth to a fully-integrated and permanent network of philosophy schools in 1271.[198] The Dominicans also developed a provincial school of *theology*. Thomas's *studium personale* at Santa Sabina in Rome (1265-1268) was the first such school.

Finally, the third tier of Dominican education, the *studia generalia*, was really just the development of the early *studium* of St-Jacques. (This *studium* was already a reality by 1220, and so at that time, it was considered the second-tier of Dominican education, since it predated the *provincialia studia*). In 1248, the Dominicans decided to develop four further *studia* in order to ease the pressure on St-Jacques that their rapid expansion was causing. At that point, they began referring to St-Jacques and the four others for the first time as *studia generalia et sollempnia*. Both the schools and their label were new: "St-Jacques had never been called a 'general' school, or a 'solemn' place of study; it was simply the order's '*studium*.'"[199] Their technical designation was now *studia generalia*, adopted from the great secular *studia generalia*. The Dominican *studia generalia* were

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[197] See Ibid., 222-24.
[198] See Ibid., 252-54.
[199] Ibid., 351.

exclusively schools of advanced theology, unlike the secular *studia generalia*, which could encompass any of the higher of disciplines.[200]

While their five *studia* were modeled after the Parisian one, the Dominican format of teaching differed in important ways, even at St-Jacques. One of the most significant features was the premium Dominicans placed on forming teachers, as exhibited by alterations in the curricula and by different expectations meant to allow the bachelor to become of a master of students. The master of students was a "friar bachelor" or *frater studens*—very few Dominicans became bachelors of the *Sentences*. According to Mulchahey:

> The bachelors in Dominican *studia generalia*, clearly, were there to cultivate their qualities as shepherds of students as much as they were there to be put through their paces presenting their required texts. This is a point not be glossed over when commenting upon the course in a Dominican *stadium generale: that the primary goal of the general course was, emphatically, to train teachers.*[201]

Likewise, the Dominican *magister* at a university *studium* was tasked first and foremost with training the order's teachers, who would in turn train the order's rank-and-file preachers and confessors.[202] These rank-and-file Dominicans, engaged in the order's daily ministerial work, were called the *fratres communes.* Thus, "To fill the lectorate was ever the purpose of the Dominican *studium generale*."[203] Even as their *studia generalia* progressed, the Dominicans there continued to be pastorally-minded: "[T]he Dominicans were much more concerned with creating a staged curriculum which met the needs of their pastoral work than with being at the universities *per se* or reproducing the universities' curricula in Dominican guise."[204] Such was the order Thomas chose to enter.

The Dominicans studying at the *studia generalia* were sent there in order to become conventual lectors, which meant they did not usually stay to complete their degree. They studied

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[200] Ibid., 378.
[201] Ibid.*,* 383. These changes are put in place after Thomas has already studied at St-Jacques.
[202] Ibid., 130.
[203] Ibid., 383-384.
[204] Ibid., 352.

for a maximum of three years before returning to their province for their teaching assignment at a conventual *schola*. In order to teach at the next level—the *studia provincialia*—he had to prove himself *as a teacher*. Thus, he had to serve a few years teaching at the *schola* before advancing. Next, only after teaching at least two years at the *studia provincialia* could he be nominated to serve as a cursor at one of the *studia generalia*. For the Dominicans, academic advance was not only linked to intellectual giftedness, but also to demonstrated pedagogical ability.[205]

6.1.2 The Structure of Conventual Education

Again, Dominican conventual education (the *schola*) was patterned after the university pedagogy and curriculum. The order already had a well-developed syllabus and detailed pedagogical techniques for the *schola* by the middle of the thirteenth century. It was also already well oriented toward the practical training of the *fratres communes* (the rank-and-file friars). Coming to terms with conventual education helps address questions about how Dominicans learned to preach and hear confessions.

The formal course followed the general scholastic structure of Europe's *studia generalia,* that is, the scholastic practices of *lectio, repetitio,* and *disputatio*. At the Dominican *schola*, there were two daily lectures, one on the Bible and one on the *Sentences*, a repetition of each lecture, and weekly disputation and *repetitio generales* (review of week's materials). It is significant that historical evidence now indicates the conventual lectures were on the Bible and the *Sentences*, for previously scholars presumed these texts were too difficult for beginners in theology: "A new measure of the ambitiousness of the Dominican vision for standardized training in theology for the order's rank and file lies in this basic curricular identity with Paris: the texts used at Paris in the humble Dominican *schola* were meant to be the same."[206]

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[205] Ibid., 383.
[206] Ibid., 136.

With this syllabus, the *schola* lectures provided the *fratres communes* with basic scriptural knowledge and familiarity with the basic fundamental arguments of Christian theology, thereby giving them the ministerial tools they required as the Dominican priests who would spend most of their lives as "work-a-day preachers and confessors."[207] The disputations were the way of practicing what they learned in the lectures. As at the universities, the disputation was another form of teaching, an "active pedagogy."[208] The third formal exercise of the *schola*, the repetition, was essentially a tutorial "in which an assistant to the teaching master went over the material the master had presented his lectures…"[209]

To return to the lectures, those on the Bible provided students with cursory knowledge of the *sensus historicus* (historical sense), intended to help the friars "understand the narrative structure of the text as well as its literal meaning."[210] As Mulchahey explains, this starting point was ideal for friars who would need to elucidate scripture from the pulpit. However, it was only that—a beginning, for the heart of the preacher's craft was "the *sensus moralis*, the middle of the three spiritual senses, which explored Old and New Testament alike to discover lessons for Christian behavior beneath the veil of literal meaning."[211] This transition required "right doctrine," which was provided in the second daily lecture on the *Sentences*. This second lecture especially discloses the closeness of scientific theology to Dominican ministry:

> Here, with the Lombard's help, [the young Dominicans] made first contact with the *theological science* essential to preaching and to its peculiar exegetical needs, and were given the tools with which to delve into the *sensus moralis* and to begin making the connections between Scripture, doctrine, and tropology.[212]

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[207] Ibdi., 139.
[208] Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Works,* vol. 1, 59.
[209] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study',* 175-76.
[210] Ibid., 140.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid., 141.

6.2 Dominican Pastoral Formation: the Making of a Preacher-Confessor

These three academic exercises—*lectio, repetito, disputatio*—were only one part of the training the

fratres communes received at the conventual school, for "Dominic's friars not only needed to know

the difference between heterodox and orthodox theology, they needed to now how to preach

it."[213] While *praedicare* was the third and crowning task of the university *magister*, it was not a part of

the threefold scholastic pedagogy. The Dominicans, by contrast, actually incorporated preaching

into their curriculum, "for students learned to preach just as they learned to dispute."[214] At the

schola, the Dominicans adapted each scholastic pedagogical technique to their own end of saving

souls. As Wendlinder explains:

> [E]ach of the scholastic techniques used in instruction, for the Dominicans, was intimately
> related to the friar's spiritual and religious formation: lecture as meditation on the Word,
> repetition as their life of prayer and liturgy (for example, liturgy of hours and so forth),
> and disputation as related to preaching—imparting knowledge to others; thus the
> contemplative life issued forth into the active.[215]

However, in addition to the *schola* curriculum and academic exercises—which prepared

them to think on their feet theologically—they also needed training in pastoral care in order to be

able to apply their academic lessons to their preaching and hearing of confessions. Mulchahey

demonstrates that the friars were formed as Preachers by "the oft-repeated cycle of study, hearing

the Word of God propounded, and practice in preaching to one's community." [216] That is, by

study, imitation, and practice. They consulted the relevant texts in their convent library. They

also observed their brother preachers and practiced in their own communities before preaching

publicly outside of the convent.

Until now, I have emphasized the Dominicans as Preachers because it was for preaching

that they were founded. Hearing confessions entered the order's history when, in 1221, Pope

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[213] Ibid.*,* 184.
[214] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 62.
[215] Ibid., 63.
[216] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 193.

Honorious III gave a general and unprecedented mandate to the Dominicans to become confessors. It arose from the Fourth Lateran Council explicitly allying the function of hearing confessions with that of preaching. However, hearing confessions quickly became a constitutive moment of Dominican ministry. As Boyle has demonstrated, from 1221 onward, the Dominicans saw their mission as one of both preaching and hearing confessions.[217] The friars were readily able to incorporate this sacramental ministry because though formed as preachers, they were also formed as priests. As Humbert of Romans comments, one sows the seeds by preaching and gathers the fruits by hearing confessions because "a large number of those who have been affected by the words of a preacher will be disposed to go to confession to him…"[218] Thus, hearing confessions was naturally and easily integrated into their ultimate aim of saving souls.

This ministry brings us to the third and final element of conventual education, the "*collatio scientifica*," which prepared the friars to become confessors.[219] Mulchahey posits that the best construal of this phrase in the early Dominican context is "an educational discussion" and that it is best described as a study session.[220] While "*collationes*" changed in meaning from the monastic to Dominican context, and then also evolved within the Dominican context, it acquired an established meaning very early in the order's history: "The collation became a forum for discussing the issues of Christian morality which would confront the friars as doctors of souls, a forum for examining sample cases of conscience such as would be brought to them in confession, and for staying abreast of Church law regarding the sacrament of penance and the confessor's office…"[221]

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[217] See Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas."

[218] Humbert of Romans, *Treatise on Preaching*, trans. Dominican Students Province of St. Joseph, ed. Walter M. Conlon, O.P. (Westminster: Newman Press, 1951), 116-17.

[219] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 193-203.

[220] Ibid., 194.

[221] Ibid., 198.

While these collations were not, strictly speaking, part of the *schola* curriculum, they were essential to the Dominican's formation. The *schola* were the doctrinal backbone of their practical ministry, but this ministry had to be exercised and practiced, itself. This is why there were three elements to Dominican formation: contemplation as study, practice sermons, and collations. As Mulchahey writes, "If practice sermons were important as training for the preacher, *collationes* were important as training for the confessor. If the *schola* and its classes were monitored with care, attendance mandated, curriculum enforced, the *collationes* were also vital to the brothers' formation."[222] The reason these practice sermons and *collationes* were so vital was because they were the milieu in which the *fratres communes* reviewed and discussed the practical theology essential to their apostolate. They also became familiar with the relevant pastoral handbooks during these times. The collation was integral to the formation of the *fratres communes* because it was the "academic exercise which brought the brothers of a Dominican community together in their common search for the tools which would make them better confessors and better priests."[223]

6.2.1 The Modern Sermon

The early Dominican schools are the visible sign of the friars' interior life of continual efforts to become preachers and confessors. To begin to access their interior life, itself, Mulchahey suggests turning to the practical texts they used and produced.[224] These texts facilitate discernment of how Dominicans worked to make their ministry "a practical success among the people."[225] In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, there was a wide array of materials available that had some applicability to the *cura animarum*, and Dominicans made contributions in nearly all the genres that existed. Mulchahey divides them into three main categories: "those which were designed in the first instance as preaching aids; those which had their origin in the classroom as tools for biblical

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[222] Ibid., 199.
[223] Ibid., 203.
[224] Ibid., 398.
[225] Ibid., 399.

exegesis, but which came to be recognized as having great relevance for preaching; and manuals of moral theology and law intended for use by confessors."[226]

The preaching style that began in the twelfth century reached its peak of technical development in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This new style had a new environment, and was given a new label, the *sermo "modernus"* (the "modern'" sermon). The modern sermon was closely connected to both the scholastic and mendicant worlds. The Dominicans preached "modern" sermons and their preaching aids were designed to help the friars reproduce the modern sermon. What set the modern sermon apart from the ancient manner of preaching was the elaboration upon a single *thema*—generally an individual line from scripture—rather than a verse-by-verse commentary.[227]

Equally constitutive of the modern sermon was the deliberate structure that underpinned the *thema.*[228] The preacher introduced his theme, divided it into at least two parts (*divisio*), and made each part a separate section. Once he set forth the division of his sermon, he elaborated upon the various sections he devised by a process called "*dilatatio*"; literally "an expanding," but more accurately rendered "development."[229] With few exceptions, preachers developed their theme by focusing upon the moral sense of scripture. As Mulchahey explains, "Their job was to reach the individual soul through their preaching, to convert that soul if necessary, and to lay before it the road which must be travelled to salvation."[230]

7. Dominican Preaching: Learning to Speak about God for the *Cura Animarum*

We have thus far cast our gaze back upon the contemplative study that supports the preached word. We also considered the formation of the Dominican preacher and confessor, and the type

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[226] For a full list of the literature, see Ibid.*,* 399, esp. fn. 3.
[227] Ibid., 402.
[228] See Ibid., 405.
[229] See Ibid., 402, 405-407.
[230] Ibid., 410.

of sermon he preached. It is now time to follow the preached word inward as we set our sights upon the care of souls that this word supports. What is the relationship of the preached word to the interior life? How is this word related to the word conceived in study? I presently consider these questions from an historical perspective, and will return to address them systematically and methodologically when engaging Thomas's trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology.

In an excellent and recent study, Wendlinder compares Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart on their approaches to religious language in the context of their Dominican education, teaching, and preaching. Specifically, she explores the complex and interdependent relationship between speaking about God and knowing God, which is expressed by the Dominican notion of "learned preaching." In this context, Wendlinder conceives preaching *as* "speaking about God." For the early Dominicans it was necessary to speak about God because it was the means of imparting knowledge necessary for salvation.[231] In this project, I take up Wendlinder's way of understanding preaching as "speaking about God" in the deep sense of wrestling with language about a God at once immanent and transcendent, and at once one and triune. In Chapters 3-6, I will consider speaking itself by way of Thomas's treatment of role of the *verbum* in human understanding in general and in human faith-seeking-understanding in particular. Specifically, I will engage his profound reflections upon the *verbum* in his trinitarian anthropology and trinitarian theology in order to consider anew the relationship between knowing God and speaking about God in learned preaching, and the love animating both knowing and speaking.[232]

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[231] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 64.

[232] To consider the relationship between knowing God and speaking about God, I will use Lonergan's functional specialization of theology. Lonergan's work will help me think methodologically about this relationship in terms of the functional relationship between Systematics and Communications (the seventh and eighth of Lonergan's eight functional specialties according to his method in theology). Specifically, I will consider the functional relationship between the psychological analogy for the Trinity (Systematics) and preaching about the trinitarian mystery of faith (Communications). See Bernard J.F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). First published 1972 (Great Britain: Darton, Longman, and Todd Ltd.).

As Wendlinder expresses, "Learning to speak about God is integral to the faith journey—on the part of both the speaker and the listener."[233] The preacher plays a pivotal role in the ongoing, communal process of faith. His role is a particular *way* of speaking *about* God, and he has a particular *reason why* he speaks about God. As Wendlinder writes, "the preacher's vocation is to convert; the converted believer now continues her journey towards God in personal conversation with God and with her own questioning and contemplation—a journey that takes place together with other believers *and* in the deep silence of her own heart."[234] By way of their contemplative study, the early Order of Preachers drew closer to God. By way of their preaching—their religious language—they drew others closer to God. These drawings are interdependent, flowing both ways.[235]

While preaching is their mission, it is involved in a paradox. Speaking about God is at once an impossible task and a necessary task; something believers find themselves incapable of and yet drawn to irresistibly. This paradox is linked to the paradox between knowing and loving God that Augustine raises in his search for a trinitarian analogy—which comes first, knowledge or love?[236] In considering Dominican preaching, the complexities surrounding speaking about God and the interdependent relationship between this speaking and knowing in the process of faith must be kept in the foreground. Preaching is anything but a mechanical, formulaic process because it seeks nothing short of a response of a living faith in salvific knowledge on the part of its hearers, which is something only God can give; the preacher is ever a *secondary* and *instrumental*

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[233] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 5. Wendlinder contrasts speaking *to* God and speaking *about* God. Thus, there is a threefold interdependent relationship to explore among speaking to, speaking about, and knowing God.

[234] Ibid., 2-3 (emphasis added). Conversation will figure prominently into my creative retrieval of the Augustinian-Thomist psychological analogy. My work is based upon the recent scholarship of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Robert M. Doran, and Frederick F. Lawrence.

[235] Recall that the pope attached remission of sins to the Dominicans' preaching.

[236] See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 9 (Hill, 270-85).

cause of faith (and even of natural knowledge).[237] God gives the light of faith to the hearer as well as what Humbert calls "the grace of preaching," which is a form of what Thomas calls *gratia gratis data* (gratuitous grace)—grace freely given to one person so she may cooperate in the justification of another.[238] And yet, in his speaking about God, the preacher "fuels the search for God," propelling the pilgrim onward on her journey to encounter God personally. We will return to this difficult yet necessary task in Chapter 6, once we have considered Thomas's analogy for the Trinity, which at its heart is conversational. That is, it is an analogy based upon the spiritual processions of word and love. These processions are most like the divine processions when they arise in the context of a conversation about the good, thereby imitating and even participating in (through grace), the divine conversation about the good in which there is a Speaking, Word, and Listening.

8. Conclusion

The Dominican's outwardly-directed mission seeks to speak about God for the care of other souls. Ultimately, it is speaking about God that threads together Dominican study, preaching, and the salvation of souls. It also illuminates the pastoral relevance of Thomas's trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology because meaningful speaking depends upon interiorly conceived words, which underscores the significance of his choice of the psychological analogy in which the *verbum* (inner word) is central. There is, I argue, an intimate connection between the *verbum* of the psychological analogy for the Trinity, the divine and incarnate *Verbum*, and the *verbum* of the preacher. The *verbum*—especially in its trinitarian context in which the paradoxical relationship between knowing and loving comes to the fore—is also at the center of the questions Wendlinder

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[237] See *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1.
[238] See Humbert of Romans, *Treatise on the Formation of Preachers* in *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings,* ed. Simon Tugwell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 179-370. Also see *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 111, a. 1.

poses about religious language (speaking to God, speaking about God, and knowing God). The *verbum* is a common feature of each of these intentional acts.

Attending to the role of the *verbum* in the interrelated areas of Thomas's pedagogical concerns and pastoral-mindedness enriches the more recent scholarship on these topics. In this way I seek to systematically integrate the compelling advances made by historical scholarship into theological reflection. That is, I seek to integrate the historical research on Thomas's role as a teacher and preacher-general with Thomas's theology of teaching and preaching in the *Summa*, which I argue is informed by and connected to his trinitarian theology. Not only do the spiritual processions of the psychological analogy (the processions of word and love) illuminate the trinitarian mystery, but they also illuminate the human teacher and preacher's participation in the divine economy. The divine economy, itself, establishes a trinitarian order of grace in which the teacher and preacher's spiritual processions actually come to participate in the divine processions, such that their speaking about the triune God to others overflows from their participation in divine conversation. In this way, they help to further incorporate others into the divine conversation.

This chapter has sought to present the necessary background by which we can understand Thomas as a Dominican, that is, as a friar preacher who hands on the fruits of his contemplation to others. With recent historical and Thomist scholarship, I suggest that Thomas's Dominican life is the primary lens through which to encounter his theology, not the university as previously thought. This perspective presents Thomas as a pastorally-minded theologian—a pedagogue, a public theologian, a teacher, and a preacher. I suggest that this perspective challenges us to reconsider his speculative trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology in the *Summa theologiae*—a text that was written in a Dominican *studia provincialia*, in response to

pedagogical needs, and for the Order of Preachers.[239] As I proceed, I ask, How does Thomas's life affect how we approach the psychological analogy for the Trinity? How does it challenge us to rethink the relationship between the analogy—so speculative in character—and the communication of this mystery of faith to the minds and hearts of believers (perhaps by preaching)?

In what remains, I explore how the *Summa* forms friars capable of crafting words for their sermons, words that can enlighten minds and warm hearts. This exploration will contribute to recent scholarship, which reads the *Summa* as a transformative text and attends to the place of deification in Thomas's theology.[240] I will continue this important scholarship by considering the relationship between "trinification" (assimilation to the Trinity) and preaching by way of the psychological analogy and its elucidation of the *verbum*, alongside the relationship between the *verbum* and love, of knowing and loving.

In the following chapter, I will treat the form and content of the *Summa theologiae*, focusing specifically on the *ordo disciplinae* (the order of learning) and arguing that Thomas's organizational decisions in the *Summa* primarily reflect pedagogical decisions. This consideration will also include an exposition of the meaning of *sacra doctrina*, especially insofar as Thomas argues it is a *scientia* and *sapientia*, necessary for salvation. I will also continue the historical work by engaging the context in which Thomas wrote the *Summa* and the situations to which it responds. This historical context will help to substantiate my interpretation of the form and content of the *Summa*, and how the *Summa* can be read as a formative text for learned preaching in which one speaks meaningfully about God to others.

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[239] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 277-336, esp. 321.
[240] For example, see Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*; Ryan, *Formation in Holiness*; Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*; Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas*.

CHAPTER 2
THOMAS AQUINAS, THE WISE PEDAGOGUE: THE PLAN AND METHOD OF THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

1. Analepsis and Prolepsis

THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST chapter was to bring St. Thomas Aquinas to life by retrieving him as a friar in the Order of Preachers endeavoring to hand on the fruits of their contemplation to others by learning how to speak about God. The purpose of this chapter and the next is to enliven the *Summa theologiae* by retrieving it as a pedagogically- and pastorally-minded performative text that can be fruitfully engaged as a series of contemplative questions for the intellectual and spiritual formation of the Dominican. They will treat the *Summa* in general, where the two following chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) will treat the Trinity and the mixed life of the preacher, in particular. In support of this retrieval, I argue that the form and matter/content of the *Summa* cannot be separated without impoverishing the text. The form of the *Summa* has many aspects, including its plan and method, its style, and its genre. In this chapter, I will focus on the relationship of form and content by considering the plan and method of the *Summa*. Specifically, I explore Thomas's generalized and analogical application of the Aristotelian *ordo disciplinae* (order of learning) to *sacra doctrina*. I argue that the *ordo disciplinae* is the primary motivation behind Thomas's organization of the *Summa*. In more technical terms, the *ordo disciplinae* is the internal order of *sacra doctrina* and the corresponding starting point is what does not presuppose the understanding of anything else. Thomas makes clear in the opening prologue that the order in which *sacra doctrina* is handed on is essential to its being received. Attending to the *ordo disciplinae* illuminates the intricate relationship between the *Summa*'s form and content while also enlivening the text by underscoring its pedagogical-mindedness.

As we proceed, it is useful to recall the Introduction in which I gave an account of 20th century objections to Thomas's trinitarian theology. Karl Rahner's critique has been especially

influential. In this chapter, Rahner's dismay over Thomas's "starting point"[1] in the *Summa*

theologiae and its corresponding "forgetfulness of the economic Trinity"[2] will be in the background.

Presenting a corrective to Rahner's interpretation is not my main concern, primarily because this

has already been expertly done.[3] This critique nevertheless provides a focal point for my efforts to

contribute to the renewal of Thomist trinitarian theology, which I believe cannot be successfully

accomplished apart from grasping the structure of the *Summa* that so perplexed Rahner.[4] Thus,

my consideration of the *Summa*'s plan and method in this chapter will center on the various

starting points or principles of *sacra doctrina*. In turn, my effort to retrieve the *ordo disciplinae* involves

me in the conversation about the plan of the *Summa* that M.D. Chenu began in 1939 when he

introduced the salvation-historical dynamic of the *exitus-reditus* as the basic structure of the text.[5]

My entire project is a prolonged effort to enrich this dynamic and demonstrate that Thomas's

methodology and trinitarian theology (the psychological analogy) is eminently capable of

communicating the radical consequences of the trinitarian doctrine for Christian living. I am

doing so by integrating the performative features of the *Summa* with its structural ones, focusing on

the process of trinification in the overall movement of *exitus-reditus*. I begin this effort in this

chapter. I undertake this prolonged effort to speak to both Thomas's detractors and his supporters

because it simultaneously responds to critiques and while also developing Thomist scholarship.

2. Introduction

As mentioned above, the form of the *Summa* includes at least its plan, method, style, and genre.

The plan of the *Summa* is complex and multivalent. In general, the plan is creedal because the

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[1] See Rahner, *The Trinity*, 14, 16-17.
[2] See Ibid., 134.
[3] See Wilkins, "Method, Order, and Analogy: Karl Rahner's Critique of the 'Psychological' Approach."
[4] See Rahner, *The Trinity*, 15-16.
[5] For the history of the conversation, see the Introduction to this dissertation.

articles faith are the first principles of *sacra doctrina* as *scientia*.[6] That is, the creed provides the content, which the plan marshals according to other considerations. Thomas unfolds these principles in a way commensurate with salvation history by using the neo-Platonic *exitus-reditus* structure to facilitate an expression of a fundamental scriptural pattern in which God is freely and providentially the beginning and end of all things.[7] However, Thomas systematically reorders the articles of faith into a more scientific pattern that also wisely brings the nexus of these mysteries of faith into relief.[8] Methodologically, the *Summa* proceeds according to the *ordo disciplinae* in order to develop an orderly understanding of the faith (*intelligentia fidei*) by way of Thomas's careful differentiation of the twofold mode of truth in which he distinguishes between the kinds of reasons available for the mysteries of faith and those available for naturally known realities. It thereby methodically pursues *that* God is and what God is not, but also uses analogies and arguments of fittingness (*convenientia*) to develop an understanding of revealed truths and their harmonious interrelations. Stylistically, the *Summa* endeavors to be as clear and as brief as the topic allows, while also being transparent in its intentions (a function of the prologues).[9] Further, as Mongeau expresses, the "clarity, transparency, and spareness of the text promote an adequation of the form of the text to the matter of the divine mysteries,"[10] which are themselves ordered by divine wisdom. In this way, the style of the *Summa* helps the faithful "imperfectly approximate the simplicity and comprehensiveness of the vision of which faith is a foretaste."[11] Generically, the

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[6] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 7c; a. 8c; a. 8 ad. 2.

[7] See Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Also see *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 3 ad. 1; a. 7c.

[8] See *ST* IIa-IIa, q. 1, aa. 7-8.

[9] For example, compare earlier treatments of the same topic. The *Summa* is often briefer than earlier works. This difference has led to misinterpretation, as scholars sometimes turn, for example to the *Sentences* or even the *De potentia* to elaborate on and interpret the trinitarian theology of the *Summa theologiae*, as the former generally treats the same topics at greater length. What this method of interpretation can overlook is the possibility that Thomas's thought developed, and that this development could include brevity, which often accompanies clearer and more mature thinking. The brevity and clarity of the *Summa* is recognized in comparison of different texts by Thomas.

[10] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 87.

[11] Jean-March Laporte, "Christ in Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*: Peripheral Or Pervasive?" *The Thomist* 67 (2003), 240.

Summa belongs to the medieval literary genre of the *summa*, which was scientific in its aspirations, pursuing a concise and organized explanation of the whole of a given field.[12] While all these elements are important, the plan and method are the primary focus of this chapter. To contextualize the reasons for emphasizing the complementarity of form and content, on the one hand, and to explain the meaning and application of the *ordo disciplinae* in the *Summa*, on the other hand, I present a brief overview of the reception of the *Summa* and of Rahner's objection to Thomas's starting point, respectively. I will accentuate the now-standard negative appraisal of Thomas's trinitarian theology in both instances.

2.1 History of the (Mis)Reception and (Mis) Interpretation of the *Summa*

In the history of the reception and interpretation of the *Summa*, the intricate ordering of the parts, questions, and articles has often been divorced from the content of the *Summa*. This divorce begins in the transmission of the *Summa* shortly after Thomas's death, and occurs again in our contemporary presentations of the *Summa*.[13] The most basic failure in its immediate reception was material, given the shear magnitude required of the codex. The *Summa* was copied as individual units corresponding to the Parts. However, these units were copied at different rates. The *Secunda Secundae* was copied at the highest frequency because it was deemed the most immediately useful part of the *Summa*. Soon, the *Secunda Secundae* was itself abridged, simplified, and alphabetized. This redaction (the *Summa Pisana*) became more popular than the *Secunda Secundae* itself. Even

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[12] See Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* 298-301. According to Chenu, "[I]n the XIIIth century and making allowance for unavoidable fluctuations in an evolution of this kind, the word *summa* designates a literary work undertaken with a threefold purpose: first, to expound, in concise and abridged manner, the whole of a given scientific field of knowledge (this is the original meaning of *summa*); second, to organize, beyond piecemeal analysis, the objects of this field of knowledge in a synthetic way; finally, to realize this aim so that the produce be adapted for teaching students" (299).

[13] See Boyle, "The Setting of the *Summa*"; Mark D. Jordan, "The *Summa*'s Reform of Moral Teaching – and Its Failures," *Contemplating Aquinas: on the Varieties of Interpretation* (London: SCM, 2003). For contemporary examples, see Timothy S. McDermott, ed., *Summa theologiae: A Concise Translation* (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1989). McDermott produces a one-volume translation of the *Summa* that adapts the *Summa* to the sensibilities of the modern reader, i.e., with paragraphs and chapters, rather than articles and questions. For a critique of McDermott's modern rendering, see Candler, *Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction*, 90-97.

those who defended the content of the *Summa* at large during the first Thomist controversies in the 1280s often re-arranged the questions according to the order of Thomas's first commentary on the *Sentences*.[14] They disassembled the *Summa*, gathering his answers to questions and aligning them with the standard order of topics.

From this material limitation emerged a judgment about the relative value of practical theology, and what made theology practical. Theology was practical if it addressed explicitly practical questions such as those about virtues and vices. However, this way of proceeding was foreign to Thomas's method and to his position on *sacra doctrina* as both a speculative and practical science. For Thomas, the active and contemplative lives are also interdependent, and so he presents the most complete Christian life as the mixed life.

Further complicating the *Summa*'s reception was the fact that the *Sentences* was prized as Europe's theology textbook, "*par excellence*."[15] Thus, great care was taken to regulate its presentation in the Dominican *schola*.[16] When Thomas wrote the *Summa theologiae*— "the next great theological synthesis," after the *Sentences*[17]—the Dominicans faced a challenge so momentous that they called a general chapter in 1313 to formally discern how to introduce Thomas's writings into the conventual curriculum. However, they did not introduce the *Summa theologiae* as a new textbook. Instead, lectors were to comment on the *Sentences* according to the mind of Thomas by using three or four of his articles per day.[18] Mulchahey hypothesizes that the Dominicans used both Thomas's commentary on the *Sentences* and the *Summa* in their lectures.[19] The result is again the separation of the content of the *Summa* from its form, overlooking the possibility that the former can only be adequately understood in the context of the latter.

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[14] Jordan, "The *Summa*'s Reform of Moral Teaching," 48.
[15] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 141.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., 161.

What this brief history demonstrates is that on the whole, the medieval Dominicans disassembled the structure of the *Summa theologiae*. Further, as Jordan writes, "[T]he intellectual reasons for Thomas's growing importance may have depended upon such misunderstanding [of the curricular reform in the *Summa*] – on the supposition, say, that he was offering clear doctrinal and moral formulae (rather than slow or subtle dialectical sequences)."[20] Thus, this divorce of form and content also betrays a privileging of answers, of certainty. From this perspective, what mattered was what Thomas said about this or that, and adding his pronouncement to the voices of authority. The fact that what he said had a context and was hermeneutically situated within a deliberate structure was not just overlooked, but rejected.

More recently, readers continue to mistake Thomas's project, but for different reasons, which are primarily philosophical rather than theological. The nineteenth century turn to Thomas, under the direction of Pope Leo XIII, was polemical. The concern was to counter what were perceived as grave philosophical errors in the wider culture – for example, skepticism, relativism, modern science, and modern historiography. These emerging Neo-Thomists treated Thomas as an authority and considered the *Summa* a canonical text, segmenting it accordingly. They divided the text in an attempt to harness it for responses to the philosophical errors, as if Thomas had considered and resolved all matters sufficiently, and as if closure, completeness, and certainty were his intention. However, as Jordan contends "to read the *Summa* under this regime of authority conceals all the ways in which the text is an exemplar for a single act of theological teaching. It is to miss the *Summa*'s immanent pedagogical programme."[21] Further, this approach mistakes the style of the *Summa*—its brevity, clarity, and transparency—for the completeness and finality of a closed system, and conceives his responses not as efforts at understanding but as repositories of certainties somehow capable of settling all inquiries for all times.

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[20] Jordan, "The *Summa*'s Reform of Moral Teaching," 49.
[21] Ibid. 53.

Where the medievals reassembled the *Summa* into moral manuals and so prioritized the *Secunda Pars*, the nineteenth century retrieved Thomas for philosophical reasons, and thereby gave primacy of place to the *Prima Pars* – sifting through it for its metaphysics and epistemology.[22] Historically, this division is partially responsible for the negative assessments of Thomas's trinitarian theology. These assessments presumed that since the "philosophical" questions came before the "theological" questions, Thomas privileged the former and prioritized an ontology of substance (the so-called "treatise on God") over interpersonal relations ("treatise on the Trinity"). Even when he "finally" considered the Trinity, this artificial division read Thomas's trinitarian questions as metaphysical speculation rather than theology.[23]

There was also a penchant for treating the *Summa* as if it were an encyclopedia of Catholic philosophy and theology. As we have seen, both the immediate and more recent receptions and interpretations of the *Summa* separate form and content, which in turn neglects its pedagogical intention and fails to perceive the synthetic element undergirding the moving viewpoint of the text, a movement that is transformative when performed. This neglect results in more than overlooking that Thomas was a Dominican teacher with pedagogical gifts and goals; it confuses his entire theological project, which was an effort at understanding—not certainty—and specifically, explanatory and synthetic understanding. This confusion is exemplified by Capponi della Porrecta's five-volume work, *Elucidationes formales in Summam theologicam S. Thomae*, in which he reduced each of the *Summa theologiae*'s 2,660 articles to a syllogism. Like other followers of Thomas, della Porrecta "wildly exaggerated" Thomas's appeal to syllogisms."[24] Attentiveness to

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[22] As Jordan observes, Thomas had remained integral to theological scholarship. What was distinct in the 19th century was the use of Thomas to combat perceived philosophical errors.

[23] For this reading, see Rahner, *The Trinity*; see also Catherine Mowry LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (Chicago: HarperCollins, 1991).

[24] See Denis R. Janz, "Syllogism or Paradox: Aquinas and Luther on Theological Method," Theological Studies 59 (1988), 9. He is citing S. Thomae Aquinatis Angelici et V. Ecclesiae Doctoris Ordinis Praedicatorum Summa theologica cum elucidationibus Ven. P. Fr. Seraphini Capponi a Porrecta, 13 vols. (Bonn, 1853). The number 2,660 is Janz's. Also see Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas Aquinas*,

the *ordo disciplinae* in light of Thomas's position on human knowing and its influence on his

theological method can help correct the confusion historically surrounding the *Summa* in general,

and its trinitarian theology, in particular.

2.2 Starting Points/Principles in the *Summa theologiae*

In his book, *The Trinity*, Rahner admits bewilderment over the reasons Thomas's "separated" his

consideration of God into two separate "treatises," one on the divine unity and one on the divine

persons.[25] In this respect, Thomas seems to "start" with divine essence, which Rahner interprets

as indicative of Thomas's privileging the divine essence at the expense of the divine persons.

Similarly, when Thomas does treat the Trinity, he starts not with the missions (the "economic"

Trinity) but instead with the processions (the "immanent" Trinity), which Rahner interprets as

revealing Thomas's preoccupation with metaphysics and psychology, over and against salvation

history.[26] Rahner considers both of these starting points (the starting point of Thomas's theology

in general and of his trinitarian theology in particular) to be "methodological deficiencies."[27] In

general, Thomas's theology isolates the Trinity. In particular, his isolated trinitarian theology

compounds this problem by focusing on the "immanent" Trinity to the neglect of the "economic"

Trinity. Lastly, Rahner objects to the psychological analogy on the grounds that it does not

explain with necessity why there are processions in God, and so it fails.[28] In other words, the

analogy does not attain certainty, but only understanding, which Rahner considers a

shortcoming. Rahner's criticism of Thomas's starting point (the divine essence in general and the

divine processions in particular) as he understood it suggests that there is only one valid starting

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63. Chenu considers Porrecta's presentation of the Summa in syllogisms as an act of treason against Thomas in particular and theology in general.

[25] See Rahner, *The Trinity*, 15-16.

[26] See Ibid., 119.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Karl Rahner, *The Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, trans. William V. Dych (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002), 134.

point for theology—the Father.[29] However, for Thomas, there are actually a number of different starting points (principles) for theology, depending on what specifically theology is doing. This variety underscores the methodological differentiation Thomas had acquired over the course of the year. I will also refer to "starting points" as "principles", where principle means the first term or part of something and indicates a certain order of terms/parts to each other.[30]

Rahner's criticisms actually center on three different issues, even if he does not clearly explain so.[31] Jeremy Wilkins offers an account of these three views: "(1) the relationship between systematic theology and the documents of revelation, (2) the relationship between systematic theology and the articles of faith, and (3) the problem of order within systematic theology."[32] In Thomist terms, systematic theology is roughly *sacra doctrina*, or better, *sacra doctrina* as science, and especially as speculative science. The documents of revelation are sacred scripture. The Articles of Faith are found in the Apostle's Creed. Each problem pertains to starting points, or better, to different types of *order*. Thus, these same three issues can be understood in terms of (1) the *ordo inventionis*, or the order of the sources, or the dogmatic order (which begins from authorities and moves to the determination of the mysteries to be believed), (2) the methodical order of *sacra doctrina* to the Articles of Faith, and (3) the order internal to *sacra doctrina*, itself, namely, the *ordo disciplinae*. Further, as there are multiple orders in theology, so there are multiple problems. Correspondingly, there is (1) the problem of relating systematic theology to its sources, (2) the

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[29] See Rahner, *The Trinity*, 16-17. Rahner is not alone in suggesting this starting point—which he takes to be the East's starting point which the West ought to adopt. As seen in the Introduction, LaCugna shares the same position. Numerous contemporary theologians from Eastern Christian traditions share this position, too.

[30] See *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1.

[31] I am indebted to conversations with Jeremy Wilkins for this way of focusing Rahner's critique. His article, "Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology," serves as the starting point of my own thoughts here. I seek to elaborate upon his work in what follows, primarily by focusing on the *ordo disciplinae* and the prologues and correlating the methodological structure of the *Summa* with its rhetorical features.

[32] Wilkins, "Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology," 570.

problem of distinguishing and ordering the various tasks theology has[33], and (3) the problem of determining the corresponding methods and orders for each theological task, internally.[34]

Having recounted the history of the mis-reception of the *Summa*'s form and content and Rahner's critique of Thomas's starting point, I proceed to explain what the *ordo disciplinae* is, and how it affects the *Summa*'s structure. I begin by asking , How does Thomas apply the *ordo disciplinae* to *sacra doctrina* in the *Summa*? I then go into greater detail, inquiring after Thomas's theological method. I ask two related questions: What made the *ordo disciplinae* of the *Summa* possible? What sets the *ordo disciplinae* apart as a theological method?

QUESTION 1: HOW DOES THOMAS APPLY THE *ORDO DISCIPLINAE* IN THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE?*

3. The Prologues of the *Summa theologiae* and the Performance of the *Ordo Disciplinae*

We have seen in the history of the *Summa*'s reception a tendency to segment and reorganize the text, which both betrayed and perpetuated a misinterpretation of the text. This tendency also naturally included a downplay of the significance and even a forgetfulness of its prologues. For example, the online Latin-English version of the *Summa theologiae,* supported by the Dominican House of Studies at The Priory of the Immaculate Conception, omits the opening prologue.[35] Yet, Thomas includes in these very prologues his reasons for proceeding in the order he does. He also draws his own connections among the parts and subparts of the *Summa.* These reasons most often are those of the *ordo disciplinae,* indicated by the basic formula, "having considered X, it remains to consider Y," where the implicated relation is both the spontaneous movement of inquiry from X to Y, as well as the intelligible dependence of Y on X. Nevertheless, many contemporary editions ignore the organizational reasons Thomas's explicates in his prologues and impose their own

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[33] See Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 9, a. 3. I will discuss this passage below.

[34] For Thomas, the situation was simpler than it is for us today, insofar as it was uncomplicated by historical critical method and the affirmation of the development of doctrine.

[35] See http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html.

groupings and structuring of the texts. The result is that the *Summa* is divided into artificial

"treatises." Yet, a decision about how to begin a text, how to make the best first impression on

one's reader is a critical moment for any author and pedagogue.

In considering Thomas's analogical and generalized application of the *ordo disciplinae* to

sacra doctrina as its internal order, I will treat the major prologues and three key articles.[36] What

follows is a general overview of the plan/structure of both the *Prima Pars* and the *Summa theologiae*

as a whole. The goal is to enliven the *Summa* as a pedagogical text in which the integration of form

and content enriches the student's gradual development. The remainder of this dissertation will

treat these in more detail according to the particular consideration of Thomas's trinitarian

theology and trinitarian anthropology. Therein, the goal will be to continue to enliven the *Summa*

as a pedagogical text, but to enrich this by drawing out its performative dimensions as a spiritual

pedagogy, as a text for the spiritual exercise of the beginner who will one day speak about God in

his preaching and teaching.

3.1 The *Divisio Textus* and the Introduction the *Summa theologiae*

Among other things, the prologue is a rhetorical device known as the *divisio textus* (division of the

text), it is one of the most prevalent and important rhetorical tools Thomas uses. This division is

directed especially to the student's memory. Medieval education was heavily oriented toward and

dependent upon memory. Every major part of the *Summa* is introduced by a prologue. Therein,

Thomas presents what he will consider and why. As such, these prologues serve as the student's

guidebook. As Eschmann writes, "At every point those travellers [sic] are informed as to where

they are and how they might pass from one hall to another."[37]

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[36] Ia, q. 1, a. 7; IIa-IIae, q. 1, aa. 7-8
[37] Ignatius Theodore Eschmann, "Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., The *Summary of Theology,* I-II: Prologues and Question 1, Articles 1-8" in Ignatius Theodore Eschmann*, The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two Courses*, ed. Edward A. Synan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1997): 3-158 at 10.

The opening prologue is decisive for everything that follows because it gives the primary reason for all the subsequent divisions of the text. Question 1 on *sacra doctrina* is an extension of this opening prologue and an introduction to the discipline of the *Summa theologiae*. In the opening prologue, Thomas explains that in this work, he will treat whatever is included in *sacra doctrina* and that he will do so according to the *ordo disciplinae*. In Question 1, he explains what this *sacra doctrina* is that he will hand on as a teacher of Catholic truth. The prologue to Question 2 is a companion to the opening prologue. As the first paragraph of this prologue makes clear, the content of *sacra doctrina* begins properly with Question 2. (I refer to the prologue to Question 2 as the "general prologue" because the first paragraph is really the prologue to the remainder of the *Summa*, not to Question 2.)

These prologues and the opening question belong together, forming a unitary introduction to the entire *Summa* and thereby decisive for everything that follows. They are what Eschmann calls "coordinated texts." Where the *Summa*'s opening prologue gives the primary reason for the method of proceeding (and the intended the audience, the teacher's aims and responsibilities, and the topic of this work), the general prologue lays out the plan and division of the content. Thus, these three – the opening prologue, Question 1, and the general prologue – mutually enrich one another and together, they explicate the method, content, and the plan of the *Summa*. I focus specifically on Article 7 of Question 1 because in a way, it is a culmination of the logic of the question, naming the object of this particular science. I first consider this introduction in the context of starting points, and then explain the division and plan of the *Summa*.

Opening Prologue:

> Since the teacher of Catholic truth [*Catholicae veritatis doctor*] has not only to instruct the proficient [*provectos debet instruere*] but also to unrude *beginners* [*incipientes erudire*], according to the Apostle: *Even as unto little ones* [*parvulis*] in *Christ I have fed you with milk and not meat* (1 Cor. 3:1-2); for this reason it is our purpose in this present work to hand on the things which pertain to the Christian religion in a style serviceable to the instruction of beginners.

For we have considered that beginners [*novitios*] in this doctrine have been considerably hampered by what various authors have written, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles and arguments; partly, also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the *order of learning* [*ordinem disciplinae*], but according as the plan of the book might require, or according as the occasion for disputation arises; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought about weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.

Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God's help [*divini auxilii*], to set forth whatever is included in this holy teaching [*sacram doctrinam*] as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.[38]

Ia, q. 1, a. 7c:

I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight. But in holy teaching, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, *the articles of faith*, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles…[39]

General Prologue:

Because the chief aim of holy teaching is to hand on knowledge of *God*, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) *Of God*; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.[40]

I identify four principles (starting points) in these coordinated texts which are (1) the beginner, (2) the *ordo disciplinae* (3) the Articles of Faith, and (4) God. These can be considered the subjective principle, the pedagogical principle, the scientific-theological principle, and the ultimate principle, respectively. Numbers 2-4 are presently considered. In the next two chapters, I will consider the subjective principle in order to accentuate the performative dynamism of the

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[38] *ST*, Ia, prol.
[39] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 7c.
[40] *ST* Ia, q. 2, prol.

text. The pedagogical principle corresponds to the internal order of *sacra doctrina*. The scientific-theological principle corresponds to *sacra doctrina* as a subalternate science.

In considering God as a starting point, I mean two things. One, ultimately God is the starting point of any *fides quarens intellectum* because God is the cause of faith. God proposes things for our belief, and in this way is the *causa cognoscendi* for our knowledge of supernatural truths, revealed for our salvation. God also move us inwardly to assent to the things divinely proposed.[41] A trinitarian dimension ought to be observed in this divine self-communication in which Christ reveals the mysteries of faith in the fullness of time and the Spirit moves us to listen and assent as we become adopted children of the Father.[42] Two, Thomas does *not* select God as the synthetic principle from which all our human knowledge could flow.[43] In other words, the divine essence is not the synthetic principle of *sacra doctrina* as Thomas practices it. The divine essence is the *causa essendi*, so to speak, of all that is, but knowledge of it is disproportionate to human intelligence and so unavailable as a pedagogical starting point or principle of understanding. I will elaborate more on this point below.

Based on this introduction to the *Summa*, I suggest the following division. Notice that the introduction discloses a fundamental unity to the entire *Summa*, such that there is a sense in which the whole *Summa* is a consideration of God in which the threefold division is inscribed.[44] This is not to deny more specific divisions of the text, but rather, to emphasize the theocentricity of the whole, and ultimately, its trinitarian perspective, which beautifully and seamlessly includes a consideration of God and God's image, and all that the creation and recreation of this image entails.

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[41] On the cause of faith and this twofold necessity, see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 6, a. 1c.

[42] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 4; a. 7 sc; a. 7c; Ia, q. 33, a. 3.

[43] While we cannot know the divine essence, we can "truly understand the *relations of properties* flowing from the essence, both from the connection between the mysteries and from the analogy of nature" (Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 219).

[44] See Mongeau, "Spiritual Pedagogy," 102.

Fundamental *unity* of the entire *Summa theologiae:*
"The chief aim of holy teaching is to hand on knowledge of *God* [*est Dei cognitionem tradere*]…"

GOD

Initial Distinction	**Summa**	**Second Distinction: Threefold Division**	*Summa*
God in Godself [*in se est*]	Ia, qq. 2-43	God [de Deo]	Ia
God as beginning and end [est principium rerum et finis earum]	Ia, qq. 44-119; IIa; IIIa	Rational creature's movement to God [*de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum*]	Ia-IIae & IIa-IIae
		Christ, who as human, is our way to God [*via est nobis tendendi in Deum*]	IIIa

Table 1

In the next sentence of the general prologue Thomas writes: "In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the divine essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him."[45] Where the first sentence explained the unity and division of the entire *Summa*, this sentence explains the division of the *Prima Pars.* Just as the entire *Summa* can in a sense be understood as one consideration of God, such that the threefold division is inscribed in this more fundamental unity, so too can the *Prima Pars* be understood as inscribed in the same unity. Where the *Secunda* and *Tertia Pars* are inscribed in this unity on account of relating to God as the end of all things, the *Prima Pars* is inscribed in this unity on account of (a) considering God *in se est* according to the divine essence and according to the distinction of persons, and (b) considering God as the beginning of things, that is, considering the procession of creatures from God.

Ia, q. 2 – IIIa	God
Ia, qq. 2-43	God *in se est*
Ia, qq. 44-119	God as beginning of all things – *principium rerum*
IIa-IIIa	God as end of all things – *finis earum*
IIa	The rational creature's movement toward God
IIIa	Christ, who as human, is our way to God

Table 2

In the final sentence of the general prologue, Thomas gives the division for the consideration of the divine essence: "Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is not the manner of His

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[45] *ST* Ia, q. 2, prol.

existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations – namely, His knowledge, will, power."[46] In the

prologues to Questions 3 and 14, Thomas elaborates upon this division:

> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of
> the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we
> cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering
> how God is, but rather how He is not. Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not;
> (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.[47]
>
> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's
> operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation
> proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
> abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the
> power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior
> effect…[48]

Notice Thomas's explanation for proceeding in this manner. Since operation naturally follows

substance in the order of being, he now considers divine operation. Operation and substance are

one in God, but according to the development of our concepts, it is intelligible to begin with

substance and move on to operation. We can now elaborate upon the division of the *Prima Pars:*

Ia, qq. 2-43 (God *in se est*)
    Ia, qq. 2-26 (divine essence)
        Ia, q. 2 (God's existence – *An sit?*)
        Ia, qq. 3-11 (How God is not – *Quomodo non est?*)
            Ia, q. 12 (How God is known by us – *Quomodo a nobis cognoscatur?*)
            Ia, q. 13 (How God is named – *Quomodo nominetur?*)
        Ia, qq. 14-26 (God's operations)
            Ia, qq. 14-24 (immanent operations: knowing and willing)
            Ia, q. 25 (transitive operations: power)
            Ia, q. 26 (divine beatitude)
    Ia, qq. 27-43 (distinction of persons)
Ia, qq. 44-119 (procession of creatures from God)*

Table 3

With this basic structure in mind, we can now focus on two examples of the *ordo disciplinae* as the

internal order of *sacra doctrina* and some of its corresponding pedagogical starting points. Herein, I

will present one example of how Thomas introduces a solution to a problem that has ongoing

explanatory power for subsequent problems. I will then present an example of how later parts of

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[46] Ibid.
[47] *ST* Ia, q. 3, prol.
[48] *ST* Ia, q. 14, prol.

the *Summa* presuppose understanding what was developed in previous parts. Together, these examples will clarify why the Trinity and Christ are not afterthoughts for Thomas, as if he prioritized the divine essence over either of these mysteries of faith.

3.2 The Essence-Existence Distinction: A Highly Fruitful Act of Understanding

At the outset of the *Summa*, Thomas begins from what can be understood without presupposing the understanding of anything else because he seeks to teach beginners how what is said is true. As we have seen, this does not mean starting with the divine essence as a synthetic principle. Rather, he selects these considerations about God as his *pedagogical* starting point because grasping (a) the fact that we cannot understand the divine essence, and (b) the terms and relations introduced in the *via negativa* of Questions 2-11 are necessary for all that follows.[49] These questions, together with Questions 12-13, also cultivate the methodological acuity and humility required for approaching the mysteries of faith.[50] According to Thomas, coming to terms with the fact that we cannot understand the divine essence is itself a very valuable insight and even a perfection of our knowledge of God: "[T]he more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends."[51] Thus, the *via negative* is not devoid of meaning and content.

In the prologue to Question 3, Thomas alluded to the spontaneity of inquiry and the natural relation among certain kinds of questions. *An sit* questions lead to *quid sit* questions, as Thomas remarks in commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Having established God's existence according to the *ordo inventionis* (beginning with things closest to our senses, like movement), Thomas proceeds to understand the manner in which God exists, now according to the *ordo disciplinae*. However, as more recent scholarship has demonstrated, Thomas does much

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[49] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c.
[50] For the necessity of humility, see *SCG* 1, c. 5, §4.
[51] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c.

more than "prove" God's existence in Question 2. As Mongeau explains, the question is not really

about God's existence, for that is self-evident (to God, not us). Rather, it is about how to

understand God's existence, and thus, it is really "a question of moving from foolishness to

wisdom."[52] And because, among other things, the intellectual progression from dependent

realities to an independent reality is an arduous process, Thomas repeats this exercise five times.

Thus, Question 2 is the beginning of an exercise in coming to terms with divine transcendence.

Question 3 marks the beginning of attending to the reasons *why* independent and dependent

realities are radically different, and so the beginning of coming to terms with the meaning of what

everyone calls "God." Though the ultimate reason is the unknowable divine essence, we can

develop concepts in an orderly fashion in order to help us grasp the relationship between God and

the world as one of non-reciprocal dependence.[53] In fact, as Question 13 makes clear, that which

makes us radically different than God is also the reason we can develop an analogical

understanding of God: while God is the only reality in which essence and existence are identical

(q. 3, a. 4), anything that exists participates to some degree in God's existence (q. 4, a. 3). In

Question 3, the student is initiated into the exercise of understanding essence and existence, and

the corresponding terms, potency and act; matter and form. The analogous relation is that the

former limits the latter in each pair.

$$\frac{\text{essence}}{\text{existence}} :: \quad \frac{\text{potency}}{\text{act}} 1 :: \quad \frac{\text{matter}}{\text{form}}[54] ::$$

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[52] Mongeau, "Spiritual Pedagogy," 105.

[53] See *ST* Ia, q. 13, a. 7. For thinking of Thomas's presentation of the Creator-creation relationship and distinction as a relational of "non-reciprocal dependence," see Sara Grant, *Toward an Alternative Theology: Confessions of a Non-Dualist Christian* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).

[54] This analogy is actually more complicated insofar as together, common matter and form make up the essence of a thing, such that form + common matter = essence = potency. Yet, the analogy stands insofar as what is most actual is most formal, and existence is the most formal of all things. See *ST* Ia, q. 7, a. 1c. Of these terms, existence is altogether unique, and so Thomas devotes considerable time to clarifying it. Existence is *not* a super-essence, but is rather isomorphic with the act of judgment, just as essence is isomorphic with the act of understanding. As Thomas puts it, *ens* is not a genus. See *ST* Ia, q. 3, a. 5c.

This exercise continues through Question 11, until Questions 12 and 13 when the student is brought to reflect on what all this means for his ability to know and name God.

Coming to terms with the fact that God's essence is God's existence (put negatively, that God is not composed of essence and existence) allows for the subsequent problems concerning the divine nature to be answered. For example, in dependent realities (creatures), simplicity implies imperfection. However, this is only because the creature is in potency in some regard. Existence is what makes every form actual, and it is limited by essence, but God's essence is God's existence. Therefore, there is no potency in God, which means that simplicity in God does not imply imperfection. And because (a) "existence is the most perfect thing of all,"[55] and (b) God is pure existence, God is perfect. According to order of our concepts in their development, simplicity is the "*causa essendi*" for perfection and goodness. In other words, according to the genesis of explanatory understanding in human knowing, the essence-existence distinction does not presuppose understanding anything else. Instead it illuminates what follows. Thomas uses the essence-existence distinction of Question 3 to make his argument in Question 4. Thus, these terms and their systematic relationship represent a "highly fruitful acts of understanding" and can be considered a principle of understanding, and so a starting point for theological reflection and reason's task of ministering to faith.

Coming to terms with divine simplicity is likewise indispensable to Questions 27-43. Without progressing from dependent realities to independent realities (q. 2), and without coming to terms with what radically differentiates them (qq. 3-11), the student cannot grasp the trinitarian problem. Unless the student understands the meaning of divine simplicity, confused responses to divine "tri-unity" arise. He will not appreciate the difficulty for understanding how this belief can be true, which means that the question will not spontaneously arise for him—and without good

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[55] *ST* Ia, q. 4, a. 1 ad. 3.

questions, good answers are lacking. Further, he will be susceptible to compromising divine unity at the expense of distinction (or vice versa) or distinguishing persons apart from and prior to their relations.[56]

The remaining major prologues to each part elaborate upon the division set forth in the general prologue. Thus, as the *Summa* progresses, later prologues actually shed led on earlier divisions, much like later content sheds light on earlier content. This is because as understanding develops, the reasons for the divisions and their interrelations become clearer. Thus, in keeping with the medieval emphasis on memory, recalling earlier divisions (prologues) allows the student to locate later divisions (prologues) within the overall unity of the *Summa*. At the same time, returning to earlier divisions in light of later divisions deepens the relationship among the parts and the text as a whole. These remaining prologues, in relation to the general prologue, disclose a basic movement from the general to the concrete and particular, made possible by the gradual development of terms and relations. Yet, while later prologues develop earlier ones, the earlier divisions govern each newly emerging division. This movement discloses the explanatory, synthetic goal of the *ordo disciplinae* in this ongoing narrowing and underlying unity.

3.3 The Pedagogically-Motivated Organization of the Three Parts of the *Summa*

How are we to understand the *Summa*'s organization in light of the remaining major prologues? How is this organization is pedagogically motivated? Let us turn to the remaining major prologues of the *Summa* to address these questions.

Prologue to *Prima Secundae Pars*

> Since, as Damascene states (*De Fide Orth.* ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies 'an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement': now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things

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[56] This last element is what Schmaus identified as *the* trinitarian problem—is the Father Father because he generates? Or does he generate because he is Father? Either answer involves one in a problem—identifying the Father with the divine essence prior to generation introduces priority into God (problematic given divine simplicity);

which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.

Prologue to *Secunda Secundae Pars*

> After a general consideration of virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral matters, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For universal moral discourse is less useful, since actions are singulars. Particular moral matters can be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the moral matter itself, for example, this virtue or that vice; secondly, with respect to the special states of men, for example, subjects and prelates, people in active or contemplative life, and so one for other differences of men.

> Therefore, first we will consider in particular everything that pertains to people of whatever state, secondly, what pertains to people in special states of life.

> It should first be remarked that, if we were to treat virtues, gifts, vices and commandments separately, we would have to say the same thing many times over. For, if you were adequately to treat the commandment 'Do not commit adultery,' you would have to examine adultery, which is a particular sin, and to understand it you must understand the opposite virtue. Therefore, it will be a briefer and quicker to treat together the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, along with the opposite vices and the affirmative and negative commandments…[57]

Prologue to *Tertia Pars*

> Forasmuch as our Savior the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to 'save His people from their sins' (Mt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Savior of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race.

The prologue to the *Secunda Pars* introduces the image-exemplar relationship into the division of the text. This was made possible because in the *Prima Pars*, Thomas developed the terms "image" and "exemplar," along with their relationship.[58] Now he can specify that the rational creature is the image of God, the exemplar. It is on account of being created to the image of God that God is especially the beginning and end of the rational creature of the general prologue. Thomas can also now expand on the rational creature's advance toward God because as the *imago Dei*, this

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[57] This prologue expresses value of proceeding according to the *ordo disciplinae*, indicating that by way of it, Thomas will avoid the repetition referenced in the opening prologue.

[58] See esp. *ST* Ia, qq. 35, 93.

advance will be a free advance, just as every act of God is free.[59] In this way, the prologue to the

Secunda Pars is a more particular elaboration of the earlier division. This elaboration includes the

human person's natural and supernatural movement toward God, who helps her through

instruction and grace. In this way, the *Secunda Pars* begins to unfold the coordinated divine

missions of Question 43 of the *Prima Pars*.[60] It also begins to develop the threefold image in the

human person found in Questions 33 and 93. (The human person is created to the image of God

according to nature, grace, and glory.)

     The *Tertia Pars* continues to consider God as the end, but now the focus is on Christ, the

God-human, who as such is our way to God. Pedagogically, Thomas is moving from the general

(IIa) to the concrete (IIIa) because to consider Christ is to consider the human person's concrete

means of reaching her end. Further, as the *Prima Pars* has made clear, the Son of God is the Image

of the Exemplar[61]and so the image-exemplar relationship is further unraveled. Now, it is enriched

by the notion of adoptive children.[62] This consideration continues the human person's

supernatural movement toward God, now according not only to grace but also to glory through

conformation to Christ's suffering and death. Thus, it continues to unfold the divine missions.[63]

     These major prologues enrich the general prologue as they move from the more general

consideration of the rational creature, to the more specific consideration of the rational creature

as image, to the concrete consideration of the Image by whom the human person reaches her

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[59] See *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3 in which Thomas explains why it is soteriologically necessary for Christians to know the Trinity. Knowledge of the Trinity teaches us to think rightly about creation and salvation, and this thinking rightly means understanding that both are free gifts.

[60] Particularly, the invisible missions of the Spirit and Son.

[61] See *ST* Ia, q. 35.

[62] See *ST* IIIa, q. 3. For example, Thomas writes, "Now the members must be conformed to their head. Consequently, as Christ first had grace in His soul with bodily passibility, and through the Passion attained to the glory of immortality, so we likewise, who are His members, are freed by His Passion from all debt of punishment, yet so that we first receive in our souls "the spirit of adoption of sons," whereby our names are written down for the inheritance of immortal glory, while we yet have a passible and mortal body: but afterwards, "being made conformable" to the sufferings and death of Christ, we are brought into immortal glory…" (IIIa, q. 49, a. 3 ad 3).

[63] Particularly the visible mission of the Son (and occasionally the visible mission of the Spirit, for example, at Christ's baptism. See *ST* IIIa, q. 39, a. 6.

end. These prologues accentuate the special place of the human person in both divine providence and the divine economy. God is naturally present to the human person in a special mode above and beyond the common mode according to which God is in all things by essence, presence, and power. According to this special mode, God is present in the human person as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover (here we speak of natural aptitude knowledge and love of God).[64] God is also supernaturally present to the human person through sanctifying grace, elevating human nature and thereby indwelling the human person such that he freely knows God truly and loves God rightly (here we speak of supernatural actual and habitual, but imperfect, knowledge and love of God).[65] This supernatural presence is fulfilled through the human person's glorification in Christ (here we speak of perfect knowledge and love of God).[66] Human participation is above and beyond the common metaphysical participation of every creature, and even above her own native capacities. Any account of the plan of the *Summa* needs to take this special personal participation—that is, deification (or really, trinification)—into account:

Ia, q. 2 – IIIa	God, the exemplar
	Ia, qq. 2-43 Exemplar *in se est*
	Ia, qq. 44-119 Exemplar as beginning of all things – *principium rerum*
	IIa-IIIa Exemplar as end of all things – *finis earum*
	IIa The *imago Dei*, an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self movement', who as such is the principle of his actions
	IIIa Christ, <u>the</u> *Imago Dei*, by whom we attain eternal bliss through resurrection

Table 4

       This organization is pedagogically motivated. Appreciating this will allay any suspicions that Christ is an afterthought in Thomas's theological plan. Not only does Thomas maintain that Christ is the consummation of theology, but according to the *ordo disciplinae*, it is intelligible that Christ, the God-human, would come after considering divine and human nature, divine and

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[64] See *ST* Ia, q. 8, a. 3; q. 93, a. 4c.

[65] See *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1.

[66] For this threefold distinction, see *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 4c. For the indwelling and the human person's participation in the very processions of divine Word and Love, see *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 3; q. 38. For a similar explanation of the trinitarian dynamism of the *Summa*, see Torrell, *Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master*, vol. 2, 25-226. However, Torrell does not connect this trinitarian aspect with the *Summa*'s plan.

human freedom, and grace and freedom. In the *Prima Pars*, Thomas treats the divine nature and human nature. In the *Prima Secundae Pars* and *Secunda Secundae Pars*, Thomas further discusses humankind. However, now the emphasis is human freedom—free acts—and to understand human freedom presupposes understanding human nature (operation follows substance). Herein, Thomas treats of the relationship between grace (which can be discussed now that the divine nature has been treated) and freedom. In the *Tertia Pars*, Thomas turns to the Incarnation. The Incarnation is considered third because understanding it presupposes understanding divinity and humanity. Divinity was covered in the *Prima Pars* and humanity was covered in the first two parts. Furthermore, understanding Christ's humanity presupposes understanding both human nature and human freedom. Lastly, understanding that the Incarnation occurred and the effects of Christ's passion and resurrection presupposes understanding grace.

It is also necessary to develop the student's theological method and ability to make methodological differentiations before considering Christ. Why? Because the radical contingency yet mysterious fittingness of the Incarnation and Christ's suffering on the Cross can only be understood once the divine nature and divine freedom have been understood (as far as possible). In other words, the Incarnation and crucifixion, as Thomas understands them, are contingently predicated of God. They are not necessary mysteries, like the Trinity is. And so there are no necessary reasons for the Incarnation and crucifixion, but only fitting reasons (arguments of *convenientia*). While there are "necessary reasons," so to speak, for the Trinity, these remain disproportionate to our human mode of knowing.[67] Similarly, the fitting reasons are grounded in divine wisdom, which is freely operative in itself and unsearchable to us in this life. Thus, pedagogically speaking, the student must continually be exercised in Thomas's methodological differentiations in order to grasp his christology in the *Tertia Pars*. Further, Thomas insists that

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[67] See below, §4. *Sacra Doctrina*

knowledge of the Trinity is necessary for the believer to be able to think correctly about salvation, which means appreciating it as a radical gift, and so contingent.[68] Lastly, because Thomas understands the divine missions as the divine processions with created terms, it is only after coming to an analogical understanding of the divine processions that the meaning of the missions can be worked out and integrated with the lives of grace and glory. In this way, the explanatory power of the psychological analogy is not limited to Question 27 or even to Questions 27-43, but extends throughout the *Summa*, as in a theology that appreciates the fitting connections between missions and processions.

Thus, quite contrary to the concerns that the Incarnation is an afterthought in St. Thomas, it is actually central. It is treated in the *Tertia Pars* because in order to understand the hypostatic union, we must first understand divinity, humanity, and grace. Wisdom itself is central to this entire ordering. Wisdom judges and orders.[69] These activities move us toward a single view, such that we distantly approach the way God understands. The centrality of wisdom makes the *Tertia Pars* doubly significant, for there we have the Incarnation of Wisdom itself, restoring the divine ordering of the universe.

The true depth of Thomas's thought arises when we consider how he integrated the *ordo disciplinae* with salvation history. He orders the material pedagogically, selecting a universal starting point and proceeding according to the needs of the student. Yet, he also gives voice to God's involvement with human history, not by proceeding chronologically, but by accentuating the divine wisdom and goodness holding creation and redemption together in one single and simple view. Thomas explains salvation history in its concrete unfolding in the human person and in the common good of the human community. If we turn to the role the Articles of Faith play in

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[68] *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad. 3.
[69] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 6c.

Thomas's plan for the *Summa*, we can see how he integrates the pedagogical organization of the *Summa* with the dynamism of salvation history.

Historically, many medieval theologians identified the Articles of Faith as first principles. However, the lists and numbers of Articles were as diverse as the theologians using them, as was their systematic exposition. The term, "Articles of Faith," arose in the theology of the twelfth century, and became a topic of consideration at the beginning of the thirteenth century.[70] The Articles' emergence began with the Apostles' Creed, but soon the emphasis shifted from the apostolic authorship of the Articles to their theological content.[71] Theologians began enumerating their own lists of Articles, which included either twelve or fourteen Articles divided into two equal sets. Though these lists varied, thirteenth-century theologians understood the Articles to represent the irreducible elements of faith, which is why they functioned like the first and indemonstrable principles of other sciences.[72] This development of thinking about belief in terms of "articles" in the Middle Ages has been an overlooked as an aspect of the historical development of theology as science. As Goering claims, "these articles are central to the medieval claim for a scientific status, indeed the highest scientific status, for theology."[73] This status is on account of how powerful and probative the Articles are for shedding light on reality. Let us now turn to Thomas's own mature use of the Articles of Faith in relation to *sacra doctrina*. Coordinated with the prologues to the three parts and the aforementioned introduction is Question 1 of the *Secunda Secundae*, Articles 7 and 8. These Articles specify Article 7 of Question of the *Prima Pars* in which Thomas identified the Articles of Faith as the first principles of *sacra doctrina*.

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[70] Joseph Goering, "Christ in Dominican Catechesis: The Articles of Faith," in *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans,* 127.

[71] Ibid., 128-29.

[72] See ibid., 133. For Thomas explanation of this point, see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, aa. 7-8. I will discuss these articles below when considering the structure or plan of the *Summa.*

[73] Goering, "Christ in Dominican Catechesis," 133.

IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7c

> The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle…In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to Heb. 11: 'He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.' *For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness…*

IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8c

> [T]o faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. *Two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: the secret of the Godhead*, to see which is to possess happiness; *and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation*, 'by Whom we have access' to the glory of the sons of God, according to Rm. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): 'This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the…true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.' Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the *majesty of the Godhead*, while others pertain to the *mystery of Christ's human nature*, which is the 'mystery of godliness' (1 Tim. 3:16)…

Thomas makes two important points in his enumeration of the Articles of Faith into two sets. One, the Articles fit together harmoniously as do the parts of a whole.[74] Two, a certain order obtains among the Articles of Faith, just like in the sciences, and so some Articles implicitly contain the others.[75] This means that the Articles can be systematically reordered. The theologian operating with the goal of understanding has a corresponding twofold task. He must manifest the harmony among the Articles. He must also select the most general Articles, that is, the ones that implicitly contain the others. This generality is the necessary pedagogical starting point for a beginner. Together, these tasks generate an explanatory, synthetic understanding. They also cultivate an appreciation of divine wisdom and goodness because the intelligible nexus of the mysteries discloses the fittingness of God's free involvement in human history.

Where the Articles of Faith are the principles of *sacra doctrina* in its subalteration to the science of God and the blessed, the selection of the most general of these is the internal starting

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[74] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 6c.
[75] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7c.

point (principle) of *sacra doctrina* because the most general is the most pedagogically effective

starting point. This Question specifies that there is a twofold principle, enumerated most generally

by Hebrews: God exists and is providential. Thomas explains that he takes this principle in the

most robust sense (not as the preambles of faith) such that they include all that exists in God

eternally and all that God dispenses in time for our salvation. This same twofold principle is

expressed more concretely by John: that we may know the Father (that is, the majesty of the

Godhead) and Jesus Christ, whom the Father has sent (that is, the mystery of the Incarnation). As

noted above, the Articles of Faith are based on the Apostles' Creed:

| I believe in (1) **God**, (2) the **Father** almighty, (3) **creator** of heaven and earth. | I believe in (4) **Jesus Christ, God's only Son**, our Lord, (5)who was **conceived** by the Holy Spirit, (6) **born of the Virgin Mary**, (7) **suffered** under Pontius Pilate, was **crucified, died, and was buried**; (8) he **descended into hell**. (9) On the third day he **rose** again; (10) he **ascended** into heaven, he is seated at the right hand of the Father, (11) and he will come to **judge** the living and the dead. | I believe in the (12) **Holy Spirit**, (13) the **holy catholic and apostolic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins**, (14) the **resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting**. Amen. |

Table 5

Thomas systematically re-orders these creedal proposition as follows:

Majesty of the Godhead	Mystery of Christ's Incarnation
Unity of Godhead (1 Article)	Incarnation/Conception
Trinity of Persons (3 Articles)	Virginal birth
Works proper to Godhead:	Passion, death, and burial
- order of nature (Article on creation)	Descent into hell
- order of grace (Article on sanctification)	Resurrection
- order of glory (Article on resurrection and life everlasting, or in other words, reward)	Ascension
	Judgment

Table 6

Thomas plans the *Summa* around these two creedal principles. The first pertains to God and is the

most universal. The second pertains to Christ and is the most particular and concrete. The

movement of the *Summa* is both a movement from the simpler to the more complex and from

general to concrete. In both ways, the student of the *Summa* progress toward understanding Christ. Based on the introduction, prologues and IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8, we find the following systematic reorganization of the Articles of Faith:

Article of Faith	Prologue Wording	Place in *Summa*
Majesty of Godhead (Articles 1-4, and 12-14)	God *in se est* and as *principium rerum et finis earum*	**Ia, IIa and IIIa** (wherever the question on the work of glory would have begun – after sacraments)
Unity of Godhead (A. 1)	God *in se est* (essence)	**Ia, qq. 2-26**
Trinity of Persons (AA. 2, 4, 12)	God *in se est* (distinction)	**Ia, qq. 27-43**
Work of Nature (A. 3)	God as *principium rerum*	**Ia, qq. 44-119**
Work of Grace (A. 13) [and more on human nature]	God as *finis earum* and Human as *imago*	**IIa**
Mystery of Incarnation (Articles 5-11)	Christ, *qui quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum* (Ia, q. 2, prol);, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race (IIIa, prol.)	**IIIa**
Incarnation (A. 5)	the mystery of the incarnation, itself	**IIIa, qq. 1-26**
	Things suffered and done by the Savior, God Incarnate	**(IIIa, qq. 27-59)**
Conception, Virginal birth (AA. 5-6)	- Those things that relate to his coming into this world	**IIIa, qq. 27-39**
Incarnation (again, A. 5)	- Those things that relate to the course of his life in this world	**IIIa, qq. 40-45**
Passion, death, burial and Descent into hell (AA. 7-8)	- His departure from the world	**IIIa, qq. 46-52**
Resurrection and Ascension (AA. 9-10)	- His exaltation after this life	**IIIa, qq. 53-59**
Judgment (A. 11)	"It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world" (IIIa, qq. 59, prol.)	**IIIa, qq. 58-**59 (*power* of judgment) and qq. ?[76] (*execution* of judgment)
Majesty Godhead (Article 14)	God as *finis earum*	
Work of Glory (A. 14)	"things pertaining to the end of the world"	**IIIa, qq.?** *after* sacraments (qq. 60-?) and after Christ's judgment

Table 7

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[76] Thomas also considers the sacraments in the *Tertia Pars*. Though we do not know how the *Summa* ends, since it remained unfinished at his death, if we look to the final prologue before his sacramental theology, we can gather that he would have returned to Christ after the sacraments, considering lastly the last judgment. This is consistent with the *exitus-reditus* pattern and salvation-historical dynamic that Chenu finds in the *Summa*. Of the placement of glory within his plan, Thomas writes: "We have now to consider Christ's judiciary power. Under this head there are six points of inquiry… It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world. For the present it will be enough to touch on those points that concern Christ's dignity" *ST* IIIa, q. 59, prol.

As Laporte underscores, Thomas deviates from the narrative of the Creed, *except* he concludes (intended to conclude) the *Summa* with the work of glory instead of following the systematic order he enumerated.[77]

QUESTION 2: WHAT MAKES THE ORDO DISCIPLINAE OF THE SUMMA POSSIBLE?

Having considered the pedagogical ordering of the *Summa* in relation its overall creedal plan, I now consider Thomas's theological method and the important of his methodological differentiations therein by treating *sacra doctrina* and the *ordo disciplinae* in greater detail. This consideration further specifies Thomas's pedagogy by attending to his explicit goals in handing on *sacra doctrina* according to the *ordo disciplinae*.

4. *Sacra Doctrina*

In the final sentence of the opening prologue, Thomas commits himself, as a teacher of Catholic truth, to set forth *sacra doctrina* as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow. He then immediately proceeds to elaborate upon the meaning of *sacra doctrina* in Question 1. I take up the suggestion of Bauerschmidt that the best English translation of "*sacra doctrina*" is "holy teaching" because "it refers less to a body of information than it does to a process of instruction, by which God's own knowledge is shared with human beings in order to lead them to blessedness."[78] Thomas begins by inquiring after the reason for divine instruction. According to Thomas, holy teaching is necessary for our salvation, which is the reason for its existence.[79] Thomas considers the necessity of holy teaching again in the trinitarian questions. Therein, he explains why it is necessary, in particular, to have knowledge of the divine persons: this knowledge permits us to think rightly concerning creation and salvation because it teaches us to approach them as gifts.[80]

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[77] In the *Compendium theologiae*, Thomas did follow the systematic ordering, treating the work of glory first and then Christ.

[78] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas,* 46.

[79] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 1c.

[80] See *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1, ad. 3.

Throughout the *Summa*, holy teaching carries this soteriological purpose, which amounts to understanding something of our ultimate end—the triune God—so that we may direct our lives accordingly.

Holy teaching is primarily speculative because its ultimate end is the beatific vision. Though contemplation is not technically the same as speculation, Thomas generally uses *speculativivus* and *contemplativius* as basically equivalent.[81] This is why Torrell suggests considering *sacra doctrina* as *scientia* as "contemplative knowing."[82] Dominican education exemplified the value of seeking to know God in order to speak about God. Thomas is even more radical in this regard than his fellow Dominicans. Where his contemporaries construed *sacra doctrina* primarily in terms of a practical rather than speculative science, Thomas framed the Dominican pastoral and practical curriculum within the whole of theology.[83]

We perhaps must stretch ourselves a bit to grasp the relevance of *sacra doctrina* as speculative science for Dominican ministry. Yet, this stretch is valuable. Dominic Doyle writes, "While Aquinas's theoretical mode of presentation is sometimes criticized for abstracting from concrete personal experience, such a conceptually driven account can, in Bernard Lonergan's terms, be an enriching abstraction that answers questions of intelligibility and coherence that naturally arise for reflective believers."[84] Thomas's epistemology and anthropology, which affirm a natural desire to know God and the human person's creation to the image of God, underscore

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[81] Gilles Emery summarizes Pinckaers, explaining that Thomas usually uses *speculativius* in his works inspired by Aristotle, while he reserves *contemplativus* for his works that draw on Christian sources. See Gilles Emery, "Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in Augustine and Aquinas," in *Aquinas the Augustinian,* eds. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 18, fn. 107.

[82] Jean-Pierre Torrell, "Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste* 96, no. 3 (1996), 369, as cited in Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 66.

[83] Jordan, "The *Summa*'s Reform of Moral Teaching," 43. Also see Eschmann, "Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., the *Summary of Theology*," 3-6.

[84] Dominic Doyle, "Changing Hopes: The Theological Virtue of Hope in Thomas Aquinas, John of the Cross, and Karl Rahner," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 77, no. 1 (2011), 22.

the value of ministering in response to these questions.[85] It was precisely the exigencies of the

Preachers' ministry that demanded they have clear definitions and explanations of the mysteries

of faith, especially concerning the virtues but also including the trinitarian mystery. For Thomas,

this exigency was best met by elaborating holy teaching scientifically, according to the *ordo*

disciplinae.

Given that *sacra doctrina* is necessary for salvation, it is distinct from theology, strictly

speaking, lest we be in the unfortunate position of all having to become theologians. Mongeau

helpfully draws attention to the distinction between *sacra doctrina* and revelation, which is not the

distinction between two separate bodies of knowledge, for example, theology and scripture.

Rather, according to Thomas, divine revelation refers to God's *act* of revealing or the act of

causing human persons to know what naturally they could not. *Sacra doctrina* corresponds to this

divine act, for it is the result of revelation: "We can say, then, that *sacra doctrina* is human

participation, in all its forms, in God's act of revealing."[86]

Lastly, I follow Torrell in distinguishing between the objective and active meanings of

sacra doctrina:

> In its objective meaning ('what' is taught), it initially applies to Christian truth as a body
> of doctrine, and doctrine in a wide sense that runs from Scripture to theology. In its active
> meaning (the act of teaching) *doctrina* suggests every activity through which Christian truth
> comes to us: God's instruction, made known through revelation, Tradition, Church
> teaching, theological training.[87]

These activities on the part of believers are participations in Christ's teaching activity, and as

such, they further assimilate the believer to the *imago Dei*. As I proceed in this chapter and the

next, I keep Torrell's distinction in mind, but emphasize the active dimension. In this regard, I

take up Mongeau's characterization of *sacra doctrina*: "a complex reality that holds together an

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[85] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c.

[86] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 16-17. Mongeau uses Donneaud's work as the basis of his distinction
between theology and *sacra doctrina*, illuminated by the relationship between revelation and *sacra doctrina*.

[87] Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master*, Volume 2, trans. Robert Royal (Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 2.

objective dimension, namely the content that is taught, and an active dimension, namely the various practices and tasks of the teacher who transmits the teaching." With Mongeau, I seek to develop the active dimension of *sacra doctrina* as the "pedagogical praxis of the wise teacher transmitting what he or she has received from God,"[88] *contemplata aliis tradere.*

4.1 *Sacra Doctrina* as *Scientia*

Immediately following his establishment of the salvific necessity of *sacra doctrina*, Thomas asks whether it is a science. This question was customary at the time, as was an affirmative answer. How holy teaching was a science, however, was something about which many theologians disagreed. Aquinas scholars continue to offer varied interpretations of what has historically proven to be quite an enigmatic question. Some scholars are concerned to argue that the *sacra doctrina* of the *Summa theologiae* is an Aristotelian science – even though subalternate – in the strict sense of the term.[89] However, I find it more accurate to affirm that Thomas uses *scientia* analogously in the *Summa*, and that what he accomplishes is an expansion of Aristotelian science to make room for the Augustinian *crede ut intelligere* (believe that you may understand).[90] My intention is to shed light on why Thomas was so concerned to construe holy teaching as a science, which has to do with what science could offer this *fides quaerens intellectum* (faith seeking understanding). This will begin to become clear in this section, and it will receive further elaboration when we consider Thomas's theological method. Presently, I consider Thomas's reason for affirming that the discipline of holy teaching is scientific, namely, because it is a subalternate science:

> Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of

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[88] Mongeau, "The Spiritual Pedagogy of the *Summa*," 91-92

[89] Eugene Rogers, whose scholarship I use below seems to posit that the *sacra doctrina* of the *Summa* is an Aristotelian science, strictly speaking. However, his concern is far wider than proving this, and he is most committed to demonstrating how thoroughly *theological* (rather than philosophical) Thomas is.

[90] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 221.

intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.[91]

As a subalternate science, *sacra doctrina* borrows it principles from a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Divine science includes understanding the reason for (cause of) everything, which is the divine essence, which is identical with God's unrestricted act of understanding.[92] The first principles of *sacra doctrina* and the first principles of God's science are not identical, just as the first principles of optics are not identical to those of geometry. Rather, the former are derived from the latter. Does this borrowing of first principles compromise the scientific character of *sacra doctrina*? It depends on a few things: (1) how we understand the relationship between first principles and the science that proceeds from them, (2) the relevance of whether the subalternate scientist has the possibility of knowing the principles from which her principles are derived, and (3) what Thomas intends to gain from construing *sacra doctrina* as a science. Ultimately, as a subalternate science, *sacra doctrina* has both possibilities and limitations. Working this out contributed to the possibility of the *ordo disciplinae* of the *Summa* because it specified just what theological science could accomplish. I begin with the relationship between science and its first principles.

Eugene Rogers suggests that Thomas came to understand that what makes a discipline scientific in the Aristotelian sense is its procession from its first principles. That is, the more it proceeds from first principles (*procedere ex principiis*), the more scientific it is.[93] This procession from

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[91] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 2c.
[92] See *ST* Ia, q. 14, a. 4c.
[93] According to Rogers, this phrase appears about six times in the first question. For a more nuanced interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of science, see Patrick H. Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997). Byrne argues that Aristotle's understanding of science includes both knowing a demonstration and knowing an indemonstrable principle.

principles can mean two things, either proceeding as in a deductive chain of links or proceeding

as in the development of understanding bringing new things to light. In the *Summa*, Thomas

emphasized the second of these as what makes a discipline scientific because he recognized that:

> real first principles can relate to each other, without their relation depending on our
> knowledge of it…Scientific character now *proceeds from first principles* not on account of the
> (discursive) *linkages* they boast with a higher science, but on account of the (principial) *light*
> *they shed*, even if it lies beyond us.[94]

The light first principles shed is that if one knows (or believes) the principle, then one knows

reason why (the cause) because the principle is the reason. This recognition of what makes a

discipline scientific helped Thomas to construe holy teaching as science. Though it borrows its

first principles from divine science and is therefore a subalternate science, holy teaching is

scientific because these principles shed a distinct (and ultimate) light on matters of faith and

reason alike. As Jean-Marc Laporte explains, knowledge is the more scientific the more powerful

and probative its principles are: "Because the principles of *sacra doctrina* derive from more certain

and more comprehensive knowledge, that of God, this science differs from the sciences known to

Aristotle not as a deficient instance but as a higher realization."[95] The principles of *sacra doctrina*

are the most powerful and probative principles there are. They explain the "why" (science as

knowing the reason why) of our universe and history with greater depth and breadth than any

other principle.[96] Thus, from one perspective, it is irrelevant whether first principles are borrowed

or self-evident because it is their ability to illuminate the object of the discipline that counts.[97]

When Thomas affirms in the *Summa* that a science proceeds from first principles, he is affirming

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[94] Eugene Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 27 (emphases original). Rogers is here following Michel Corbin in recognizing that Thomas developed in his understanding of Aristotelian science.

[95] Laporte, "Christ in the *Summa*," 241. See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 5.

[96] For example, *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 in which Thomas considers the explanatory power of the revelation of the Trinity.

[97] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 77.

the science's "deep connectedness with a concrete object that gives rise to it."[98] *Sacra doctrina*

shares this with other subalaternate sciences, which also draw their arguments and their probative

force from the higher science. This ability to probe is what Thomas came to emphasize in the

Summa. Working out this possibility was one of the factors contributing to the success of the *ordo*

disciplinae. Understanding the application of one's first principles helps one order them.

It also useful to note that the very fact that there are identifiable first principles (starting

points) for *sacra doctrina* is an aspect of what makes it scientific. *Sacra doctrina,* once free from the

restrictions of the commentary tradition in which the theologian was locked into the order of the

text (sacred scripture and Lombard's *Sentences,* for example), could be organized around a set of

first principles and consequently, presented in an orderly manner.

Earlier, we saw that in Articles 7 and 8 of Question 1 on *sacra doctrina,* Thomas identifies

the Articles of Faith are the first principles of *sacra doctrina*. This identification pertains to the

methodical order of *sacra doctrina* to the Articles of Faith.[99] As a *subalternate* science, *sacra doctrina*'s

starting point is the Articles of Faith, and the relevant order is its subalternation to the science of

God and the blessed. There is also the relationship between the Articles of Faith and its sources,

and the order of the sources themselves. Thomas points to sacred scripture as the source of the

Articles.[100] In the *Secunda Secundae,* in the question on the theological virtue of faith, Thomas

explains why it was necessary for the truths of faith to be collected and organized into Articles.

Notice the reason is because it was necessary for our salvation, harkening back to Question 1:

> The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression,
> and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, *one*
> *needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith,*

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[98] Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth,* 24-5.

[99] See above, §2.2 Starting Points/Principles in the *Summa theologiae.*

[100] Again, the relationship between theological understanding and the documents of revelation was less
complicated for Thomas than for us, since the historical critical method had not been developed, which
now largely mediates these documents to systematic theology. As Wilkins explains, the documents of
revelation had an immediate application to systematic theology for Thomas. See Wilkins, "Method,
Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology," 570.

many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.[101]

There is also the relationship of scripture (and so the Articles of Faith) to the incarnation of the Word, and so the revelation of the Son, and through the Son, the Father and the Spirit. As Goering explains, in addition to thirteenth-century theologians' agreement that the Articles represent the irreducible elements of the faith, they also believed the Articles were divinely revealed, and therefore a part of *sacra doctrina*.[102]

In Aristotelian scientific terms, Rogers explains that first principles take both propositional and real forms because first principles are not only the propositions of science, but also the real forms of real things: "First principles pervade everything that is. For that reason it is no paradox for Aristotle to locate first principles indifferently in two places that we moderns tend to regard as poles apart: in the mind[103] and in things in the world."[104] In *sacra doctrina* scripture and the Articles are the propositional first principles, but as Thomas writes, "the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing."[105] Later, in the same question on the object of faith, Thomas identifies these terminal things, which we will see in eternal life and by

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[101] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 9, ad. 1 (emphasis added).

[102] Goering, "Christ in Dominican Catechesis," 133.

[103] As Byrne explains, according to Aristotle, *nous* (i.e., the intellectual habit) is the principle of principles. See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 100b16 in *The Complete Works of Aristotle,* the Revised Oxford Translation, Two Volumes, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995). Henceforth *APo.* All citations from Aristotle's work are from this two volume series. I am indebted to Byrne for this comment and reference.

[104] Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth*, 21. Perhaps the following is helpful: "The inner principles or forms [of actually existing things] are sources of intelligibility or enjoy intelligibility in themselves, whether anybody notices it or not. The corresponding first principles, therefore, found sciences, whether anybody practices them or not," 23. Because the principles of already existing things and of science are the same, just in different guises, intelligibility also exists in itself apart from us, and so something can be more knowable in itself, but less knowable to us.

[105] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 2 ad. 2. Thomas implies this Aristotelian relationship between propositional and real first principles in this reply. He continues, For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith,"

which we are brought to that destination: the secret of the Godhead and the mystery of Christ's

humanity.[106]

Rogers suggests that Jesus Christ is the real first principle, for he is the concrete reality

that has given rise to the science of *sacra doctrina*. This is why Rogers argues that the more

christoform *sacra doctrina* is, the more Aristotelian it is.[107] The real first principle also means the

triune God, insofar as the entire Trinity decided from eternity to communicate Godself to us.[108]

We have seen that in the prologue to the *Tertia Pars,* Thomas identifies Christ as the

"consummation of theology" and as the one who brings us to our final destination by showing us

the truth:

> Forasmuch as our Savior the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to 'save His people from their sins' (Mt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth [*viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstravi*], whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology [*ad consummationem totius theologici negotii*], that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Savior of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race…[109]

As Rogers expresses it, referring to this prologue, "The incarnation makes the Word not just a

ratio of God, but a *via* into God. It makes the word not just the *ratio* of the First Truth, but a

rational *demonstration* of the truth that we cannot see."[110] In a word, Christ reveals his Father and

their Spirit, thereby revealing God's very self. When considering Christ's teaching activity,

Thomas explains that the Word is the "demonstration of the Father."[111] In other words, Jesus

Christ is God's strongest argument, so to speak, stronger than any philosopher or theologian

could make for God's existence and providence. He is the most fitting instance of visible things

demonstrating invisible things, and it was to demonstrate the invisible things of God that the

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[106] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8c.
[107] See Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 17.
[108] I will expand on this below when considering the order of discovery and revelation.
[109] *ST* IIIa, prol. Also see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 4.
[110] Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth*, 61. For Thomas's many uses of demonstration in this scientific sense with respect to Christ, see Rogers, *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth*, 62-3.
[111] See *ST* IIIa, q. 42, a. 6, ad 2.

world was created.[112] When considering the object of faith, Thomas recalls that conclusions can only be known through demonstrations.[113] As *the* demonstration, Christ reveals conclusions we would otherwise never know about the mystery of the Godhead and our salvation. Having considered the meaning of *sacra doctrina*, specifically its starting points as ordered subalternately to the science of God and blessed, I now turn to three of the underlying factors that made possible Thomas's generalized and analogous application of the *ordo disciplinae* to *sacra doctrina.*

5. The Mode of Human Knowing in Aristotelian Science and Thomist Theology

Where the subalternation of *sacra doctrina* to divine science was a first step in Thomas' response to the problem of the order between *sacra doctrina* and its sources, there was also the problem of the *internal* order of *sacra doctrina.* Two distinctions helped Thomas respond to this internal problem. Following Aristotle, he distinguished between two methods, the *ordo inventionis* (the order of discovery) and the *ordo disciplinae.*[114] Following Phillip the Chancellor, he systematically distinguished between the natural and the supernatural orders. In order to come to terms with these two distinctions, we have to first differentiate between the twofold operations of human knowing, namely, the act of direct understanding and of reflective understanding.

In this section, I will focus on the *ordo disciplinae*'s relationship to Aristotelian science, and analogously, to Thomas's mature theological method. This will include (a) the two goals of Aristotelian science, (b) their corresponding methods, and (c) the foundations of these goals and methods in the twofold operations of the human mind. Herein, we will see how the starting point changes with goal and method. Where the previous section addressed *how* Thomas construed

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[112] See *ST* IIIa, q. 1, a. 1c.
[113] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 3c.
[114] For Aristotle's distinction, see *APo.* I.13.75a14; *Metaphysics* 1.1.98a30: *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3.1112b18-20. For the insight concerning the significance of this distinction for Thomas's theological method, see Lonergan, *Verbum,* CWL 2, 191-221; ibid., *The Triune God: Systematics,* CWL 12, 7-123; and ibid., "Theology and Understanding," in *Collection,* CWL 4. Also see Wilkins, "Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology," 572-73.

sacra doctrina as *scientia* by considering starting points and subalternation, this section will address *why* Thomas was concerned to construe *sacra doctrina* as *scientia*, which has to do with the goal he set for scientific theology.

5.1. The Twofold Operation of the Mind

Following Lonergan, I maintain Thomas's metaphysical account of human knowing was grounded in Thomas's understanding of his own consciously experienced concrete acts of knowing. Thomas's self-appropriation took place primarily in the context of his trinitarian theology and a serious engagement with the act, *intelligere*. It is this same self-appropriation that is the basis of the psychological analogy for the Trinity.[115] In what follows, I offer the broad brushstrokes of Thomist cognitional theory, with the primary purpose of demonstrating the connection between science and theology—their analogous goals and methods—and the twofold operation of the mind. The next chapter will delve deeply into Thomas's understanding of *intelligere*. What follows will accentuate one of the most important features of Thomist cognitional theory, namely, that human knowing is a compound process, not a single intellectual operation.[116] Differentiating among intelligence's acts will clarify the very specific goal Thomas sets by construing *sacra doctrina* as *scientia*.

The beginning of the complex and dynamic process of human knowing is the natural desire to know. Human knowing begins in wonder, and from wonder arises questions. The natural desire to know sets the entire movement of the intellect toward its goal in motion. As Thomas writes: "For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men."[117] This natural desire includes wonder about God, about the divine essence of which we see the effects all around us. Furthermore, this natural

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[115] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2.
[116] For a more exhaustive list of what Lonergan seeks to recover from Thomas's analysis of human knowing, see Stebbins, *Divine Initiative*, 5-6.
[117] *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 1c.

desire is itself a created participation in uncreated light, of which Thomas writes: "[T]he

intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first

light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace

or of glory."[118] The ground of this intellectual light is the agent intellect, the source of all inquiry.

There are two experientially verifiable operations of the naturally inquisitive human

mind, the act of direct understanding, which is the parent of the definition or concept, and the act

of reflective understanding, which is the parent of judgment.[119] These acts are intimately related,

and both are needed for a complete act of human knowing. For example, Thomas writes:

> We must realize that, as the Philosopher says, the intellect has two operations, one called
> the 'understanding of indivisibles,' by which it knows *what* a thing is [*quid est*], and another
> by which it joins and divides, that is to say, by forming affirmative and negative
> statements. Now these two operations correspond to two principles in things. The first
> operation concerns the nature itself of a thing, in virtue of which the object known holds a
> certain rank among beings, whether it be a complete thing, like some whole, or an

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[118] *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 2c. As Thomas explains here, there are three lights by which the human person
participates in the divine light: the natural light of human reason and the supernatural lights of grace (in
this life) and glory (in the next life). The light of faith will be considered in the next section, and the light
of glory in the context of the *imago Dei* and deification in Chapter 5.

[119] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 25. In fact, it is even more complex, as will be clarified in the following
three chapters. Briefly, the act of direct understanding gives rise to the act of conceptualizing/defining.
The act of reflective understanding gives rise to the act of judging. Occasionally, I speak of these twofold
operations in terms of understanding and judgment, which correspond to the second and third levels of
Lonergan's cognitional theory, and everything that occurs on each of these levels. However, I have found
it somewhat misleading to speak of the twofold operations in these terms because it makes it seem as
though the act of understanding and the act of judging are parallel acts on different levels, when in fact,
the act of understanding on the second level of consciousness corresponds to the act of reflective
understanding on the third level of consciousness. It is the act of conceptualizing (second level) that
corresponds to the act of judging (third level) because these are the acts at which each level terminates.
Thus, it is more accurate to speak of the twofold operation in terms of the act of direct understanding and
the act of reflective understanding, which in fact is in keeping with Thomas's reference to each of these
acts as *intelligere*; each is a distinct type of understanding, that in turn gives rise to a second distinct act and
type of inner word.
It might be asked why Lonergan did not refer to the two levels as conceptualizing and judging, thereby
naming each after the operation at which it terminates. My hypothesis is that given Lonergan's
extraordinary efforts to overcome the conceptualism (the prioritization of concepts over understanding)
that had persisted in many interpretations of Thomas for nearly 800 years, Lonergan spoke of the second
level in terms of understanding (*intelligere*) to emphasize that understanding is the source of concepts and
the initial step on the journey toward knowledge (that is, after one has raised questions about her
experience). Similarly, another one of Lonergan's significant contributions was to clarify what judgment
is and its role in tripartite process of knowing, which is quite distinct from what is occurring on the second
level of consciousness. Hence, speaking of the third level, usually, in terms of judgment (rather than
reflective understanding) helps to accentuate the difference between these two levels of consciousness..

incomplete thing, like a part or an accident. The second operation has to do with a thing's being [*esse*], which results from the union of the principles of a thing in composite substances, or, as in the case of simple substances, accompanies the thing's simple nature.[120]

As this passage indicates, like Aristotle, Thomas observed an isomorphism between knowledge and reality. As reality divides into essence and existence, so do the two Aristotelian intellectual operations regard the quiddity of a thing and its existence.[121] Thomas refers to both operations as *"intelligere"* and to both expressed answers to the questions they address as "*verbum,*" hence some of the exegetical confusion surrounding Thomas's position on human knowing. In what follows, I will refer to the first intellectual operation (that by which the intellect "knows *what a thing is* [*quid est*]") as the act of direct understanding. I will refer to the second intellectual operation ("that by which it joins and divides…by forming affirmative and negative statements) as the act of reflective understanding.[122] Both direct and reflective understanding have their principal cause in the agent intellect, as a spirit of wonder and inquiry or as a critical spirit,

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[120] *Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, q, 5, a. 3 c. See Thomas Aquinas, *The Division and Methods of Sciences: Questions 5 and 6*, trans. Amrand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963).

[121] Thomas writes, "the first operation regards the quiddity of the thing; the second regards its existence." See *Super I Sententiarum,* d. 19, q. 5, a. l, ad 7m. See also Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 17, fn. 24. However, it should be noted that Aristotle did not achieve the same clarity that Thomas did regarding the distinction between form (quiddity) and act (existence). As Byrne explains, for Aristotle, the distinction between form and matter sufficed. One of Thomas's great achievements was to recognize and expand upon the role of act in metaphysics, a project that was underway already in one of Thomas's earliest works, *On Being and Essence*. As Byrne explains, Thomas's metaphysical distinction of form and act corresponded to his exploration of the distinction and relation between the act of understanding and the act of judgment. Two points are noteworthy. One, Thomas made an advancement beyond Aristotle in this regard. Two, metaphysics and cognitional theory correspond; being and knowing are isomorphic. I will discuss this point in greater depth later. I am indebted to Byrne for alerting me to the importance of clarifying the difference between Aristotle and Thomas on this point.

[122] Thomas typically speaks of judging (the act that proceeds from the act of reflective understanding) in terms of composition and division. For example, in *De veritate,* Thomas makes the same twofold division between the act of conceptualizing and the act of judging: "For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception of the intellect—whether the conception can be signified by a simple expression, as is true when the intellect forms the quiddities of things, or whether it can be signified only by a complex expression, as is true when the intellect composes and divides [*componit et dividit*]" *De ver.* q. 4, a. 2c.
However, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, Lonergan has demonstrated that Thomas speaks of *iudicare* (the act of judging) as not only as *compositio vel divisio* but also as a positing, an affirming. Most scholars have missed this second meaning of *iudicare* in Thomas.

respectively. Direct understanding responds to the question, *quid sit?* Reflective understanding

responds to the question, *an sit?*[123] The question for understanding seeks the formal cause, the

reason why, the *causa essendi*, the middle term. That is, the question for direct understanding seeks

the cause that explains what something is insofar as it actually exists.[124] The question for reflective

understanding seeks affirmations, denials, probabilities of whether something is so. In short,

questions for direct understanding seek reasons and questions for reflective understanding seek

truth.

    These two operations are related to Aristotelian science, which is defined as the certain

knowledge of things through their causes (*certa per causas cognitio*). This definition points to the two

goals of Aristotelian science: *certainty* and *understanding* through causes. These goals correspond to

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[123] Aristotle clarifies *epistēmē* (science) by way of epistemic questions. He identifies four such questions, reducible to two pairs, and ultimately reducible to one goal: ["Our] questionings [*ta zētoumena*] are equal in number [*estin isa ton arithmon*] to as many things as [*hosaper*] we know scientifically [*epistametha*]. We seek [*zetoumen*] four [things]: the whether [or the fact] [*to hoti*], the why [*to dioti*], if it is [*ei esti*], what it is [*ti estin*] (II.1 89b23-25)…Now what we ask and what we know when we have discovered the answers are these and thus many [questions and scientific knowns]" (*APo.* II.1 89b35-36). See Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle*, 85. All our questions can be expressed by these four types. There is a progressive and spontaneous relationship among these questions. For example, when commenting on Aristotle's four questions and their relation, Thomas turns to the numerical ratio that obtains between high and low musical notes: "[I]n the question *that*, one inquires whether there is a middle. But once we have found *that* there is a numerical ratio of high and low note, we then ask *what* that ratio is: and this is to ask *what* [*quid sit*] or *why* [*propter quid sit*]," (*In Post. An.* II, lect. 1, 90a2-24). Aristotle, as Thomas observes, bases this natural movement in psychological observation (see *In Post. An.* II, lect. 1, 89b26-32). As he explains, once we know the fact, we no longer ask "is it?" Instead, we ask, "why is it?" In this way, all four of the questions are related. We spontaneously seek (2) "the why" or (4) "the what-it-is" once we know (1) "the whether" or (3) "if-it-is", respectively. The relatedness of these questions accentuates the fact that all four actually seek a single goal: "In all these questions we are asking either if there is a middle term, or what the middle term is. For the middle term is the cause, and in all cases that is what is sought" (*APo.,* II.2 90a6-9). The middle term is the "reason why" or the cause, particularly, the formal cause. As Thomas writes, "And [Aristotle] proves that the question why inquires what the middle is. For it is obvious that a cause is the middle in a demonstration which enables one to know scientifically, because to know scientifically is to know the cause of the thing. But it is precisely the cause that is being sought in all the above questions. That this is so he manifests first in regard to the question 'that'. For when it is asked whether the moon is waning, then according to the manner explained above, what is being asked is whether or not something is the cause of the this waning. Then he shows this for the question 'why'. For once we know *that* something is the cause of the moon's waning, we ask *what* the cause is; and this is to inquire why. The same applies to the other two questions," (*In II Post. anal.*, lect. 1, 89b23-90a35).

[124] In other words, it seeks the formal cause, which is explanatory beyond the other three causes (material, efficient, and final), which only explain the coming-to-be of a thing. See Stebbins, *Divine Initiative,* 9; *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 1 c. and ad 3m.

the distinct operations of the intellect: the act of reflective understanding seeks certainty and the act of direct understanding seeks intelligibility. Given that there are two distinct objectives in science (and two corresponding intellectual operations), there are also two distinct methods or movements toward acquiring science, according to whether one intends to propose certain judgments by discovering causes or refine theories based on a mature grasp of the cause. These methods are the *ordo inventionis* (the order of discovery) and the *ordo disciplinae*, respectively. They each have their own corresponding starting point.

The first movement toward acquiring science "begins from an ordinary prescientific description of things and ends in the knowledge of their cause."[125] In other words, it starts from what is first for us (the data) and proceeds to what is first in itself. This movement has been variously called analysis, the way of resolution, the way of discovery, the way of certitude, and the temporal way. It is called the way of discovery "because previously unknown causes are discovered."[126] The other movement starts from the causes that have been discovered at the end of the first movement, and ends by understanding things *in* their causes. In other words, it starts from an understanding of the reasoned fact (the *causa essendi*, the formal cause, the reason why) and proceeds to an explanation of the data.[127] This movement has been variously called synthesis, the way of composition, the way of teaching or of learning, the way of probability, and the way of logical simultaneity. It is called the way of teaching or of learning "because it begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science."[128] The inquiring, investigating, and

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[125] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 61.
[126] Ibid., 61.
[127] See Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle*, 201-04.
[128] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 61. Lonergan's token example of these two movements is taken from chemistry: "For example of the two ways, compare the history of a science like physics or chemistry with the textbooks from which these sciences are taught. History reveals that these sciences worked out their various demonstrations starting from the most obvious sense data. But when one goes to a textbook, one finds at the beginning of the book, in chemistry, only the periodic table of elements from

demonstrating proper to the first movement, discovery, begin with what is obvious (that is, what is

closest to our senses). The second movement, teaching, begins from those concepts that can be

understood without understanding other concepts (that is, with what is most universal, most

general, simplest—which is not the same thing as what is closest to our senses). These two

movements are inversely related, and complement one another. In fact, actual thinking oscillates

dialectically between these two methods, even though one may be the order proper to a given

starting point.[129] Thus, even though the *ordo disciplinae* is the primary reason for Thomas's

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which three hundred thousand compounds are derived…*The reason for this difference is, of course, that inquiring, investigating, and demonstrating begin with what is obvious, while teaching begins from those concepts that can be understood without understanding other elements*," 61-63.

[129] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 73-74 for the oscillation between these two methods of thinking. For example, while the *ordo disciplinae* has as its goal understanding, in actual thinking, in order to understand X, we are not only understanding, but we are also inquiring, refining our questions, examining new data, working out the implications of ideas, testing our ideas out, etc. In other words, though understanding is the goal, experiencing, judging, and deciding are also operative because human knowing and doing is a dynamic reality. However, because understanding is what is sought by *sacra doctrina* as *scientia*, understanding is the objective intended by the other elements of human knowing—experiencing, [understanding], judging, and deciding—and so understanding harnesses them for its end. See Lonergan, *Method in Theology,* 125-145, esp. 133-136. Lonergan writes, "[O]ur conscious and intentional operations occur on four distinct levels" and "each has its own proper achievement and end. So the proper achievement and end of the first level, experiencing, is the apprehension data; that of the second level, understanding, is insight into the apprehended data; that of the third level, judgment, is the acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses and theories put forward by understanding to account for the data; that of the fourth level, decision, the acknowledgment of values and the selection of the methods or other means that lead to their realization. Now in everyday, commonsense performance, all four levels are employed continuously without any explicit distinction between them. In that case no functional specialization arises, for what is sought is not the end of any particular level but the cumulative, composite resultant of the ends of all four levels. But in a scientific investigation the ends proper to particular levels may become the objective sought by operations on all four levels. So the textual critic will select the method (level of decision) that he feels will lead to the discovery (level of understanding) of what one may reasonable affirm (level of judgment) was written in the original text (level of experience). The textual critic, then, operates on all four levels, but his *goal* is the end proper to the first level, namely, to ascertain the data…*Functional specializations arise, then, inasmuch as one operates on all four levels to achieve the end proper to some particular level.* But there are four levels and so four proper ends. It follows that the very structure of human inquiry results in four functional specializations and, since in theology there are two distinct phases [namely, listening and speaking], we are led to expect eight functional specialization in theology," (emphasis added).

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan is explaining functional specialization and the grounds for his eightfold division of theological operations. While such a complex, dynamic, and explicit specialization was by no means present in Thomas Aquinas's theology and theological method, he does, so to speak, functionally subalternate what Lonergan calls "Systematics" to "Doctrines" insofar as *sacra doctrina* is a science subalternate to the divine science of God and the blessed. See Jeremy Wilkins, "A Wisdom of the Concrete," 29-31 (chapter in a forthcoming manuscript). Further, Lonergan has expertly demonstrated that Thomas was intimately aware of his own process of knowing, which comes to the fore most readily

organizational decisions, the *ordo inventionis* can be used within it for pedagogical reasons—for example, establishing the meaningfulness of the question at hand by asking, *an sit?*, as we have seen in Question 2 on God's existence. Below, I will explain how the *ordo disciplinae* is not only a pedagogical order, but also an explanatory and synthetic order. For now, it is noteworthy that it is as an explanatory, synthetic order that the *ordo disciplinae* is the inverse of the *ordo inventionis*.

These two movements are connected to the twofold function that Lonergan finds in Aristotelian syllogisms. Some erroneously limit the syllogism to "an instrument for exhibiting the grounds of a judgment on the conclusion: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true."[130] This is the factual syllogism. Thomas however recognized and employed the second function of the Aristotelian syllogism, namely, as an instrument for developing understanding. This is the explanatory or scientific syllogism, which may often be overlooked given one's cognitional presuppositions.[131] The scientific syllogism is an instrument for the attainment of science's two goals, understanding and certainty. The difference within this syllogism pertains to the middle term, which can either assign the *causa cognoscendi* (cause of knowing) and so move according to the *ordo inventionis* toward certainty, or the *causa essendi* (cause of being) and thus move according to the *ordo disciplinae* toward understanding.[132] This syllogism accounts for the relationship between understanding and science because it emphasizes that science is reasoning, that is, understanding in process, moving from principles to conclusions in order to grasp both principles and

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in his trinitarian theology. We can arguably find distinctions between experience (*ST* Ia, q. 84, a. 7), understanding (*ST* Ia, q. 16, a. 2; q. 27, aa. 1-2), judgments of fact (*ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 2), and judgments of value (*ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2). Finally, throughout the *Summa,* we find Thomas adverting to experience (not only the article on God's existence, but the plethora of examples Thomas uses, especially, for example, from medicine and doctors) and making judgments (any *an sit* article). He also makes an explicit decision—a practical decision—about the right way to proceed to hand on *sacra doctrina* to beginners. (See Wilkins, "A Wisdom of the Concrete," 26.) Further, Thomas exhorts he readers to make decisions about the best way to live, offering the religious life of a Dominican as school in charity, which is the perfection of Christian life.

[130] Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," 117.

[131] For example, overlooking understanding, overlooking judging, collapsing human knowing – a tripartite activity – into one activity, e.g., experience

[132] As Patrick Byrne has pointed out to me, this distinction is in Aristotle, though the terminology is not.

conclusions in a single view.[133] When Thomas says theology is a science, he means that like

science, it is understanding in process; both theology and science are about understanding, and

they seek understanding by an orderly procession from their first principles.

In this section, I have argued that technically, the *ordo disciplinae* seeks understanding

rather than certainty, and I have done so by grounding this differentiation in human knowing and

its isomorphism with being. Before continuing with how this *ordo* can be used in *sacra doctrina*, it

remains to come to terms with Thomas's methodological differentiation between faith and reason,

and how, in light of this differentiation, we can understand the application of the *ordo disciplinae* to

sacra doctrina. Before doing so, I review what we have covered. We have observed an isomorphism

between knowledge and reality, as well as a series of parallels:

the act of direct understanding : the act of reflective understanding   [two operations of intellect]
::
essence : existence   [reality/being]
::
quiddity (*quid est*) : existence (*esse*)∕truth   [two objects of intellect]
::
understanding : certainty   [two goals of science]
::
ordo disciplinae : *ordo inventionis*   [two methods for reaching goal]

5.2 The Systematic Distinction Between Grace and Nature

In the twelfth century, theological method began undergoing a significant development. In the

thirteenth century, Philip the Chancellor made a breakthrough, differentiating between the

entitatively disproportionate orders of nature and grace.[134] Thomas systematically used this

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[133] Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," 118. Lonergan is citing *ST* Ia q.14, a.7; q. 79, a. 8; IIa-IIae, q.8, aa. 1-2.

[134] This occurred in the context of Philip's defense of the human person's *natural* love of God. The human person naturally has the capacity to love God above all things. By the gift of grace, the human person loves God in a way beyond her natural capacities. Thus, Philip "presented the theory of two orders, entitatively disproportionate: not only was there the familiar series of grace, faith, charity and merit, but also nature, reason, and the natural love of God" (Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, CWL 1, 17). However, while the human person has the natural capacity to love God above all else, for the human person to *actually* love God as God is in Godself above all else, grace is necessary. Thus, grace is necessary for the human person to love God supernaturally, and also for the human person to actually love God *uti in se est* naturally. That is, we can naturally desire God above all else, but to actually love God above all else

differentiation in his theological method and to address pressing thirteenth-century theological

questions such as, What is the relationship between divine grace and human freedom, and how

can they be related so as to preserve both?[135] Lonergan coins Philip's achievement "the theorem

of the supernatural," which I will use for brevity's sake. This theorem yielded a differentiated

account of the relation of faith and reason. It also set the conditions for distinguishing between the

kinds of reasons available for the mysteries of faith versus those available for naturally known

realities. Thomas speaks of this distinction in terms of the twofold mode of truth.

5.2.1 The Proportion of Nature

What Philip systematically posited "was not the supernatural character of grace, for that was

already known and acknowledged, but the validity of a line of reference termed nature."[136] In

other words, Philip's achievement was made possible by a recovery of the natural order, that is, a

deeper affirmation of nature's relative autonomy. This recovery was sparked by the influx and

integration of Aristotle. What did this recovery of the natural order consist in, and how did it

allow Philip to present a theory of two orders, entitatively disproportionate? It has to do with

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requires grace. I owe this clarification to Patrick Byrne.

[135] For the full breadth and depth of Thomas's achievement, see Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, CWL 1. Thomas developed his clarity about grace by not focusing on it; instead, he was occupied with "thinking out the Christian universe," which put the questions about grace on a much wider footing: "Only when St. Thomas settled down to the vast task of thinking out the Christian universe in the *Contra Gentiles* did he arrive at the truth that divine providence is an intrinsically certain cause of every combination or interference of terrestrial causes," 82. This "thinking out" included the law of universal instrumentality in which God applies *every* agent to its end (this is, in other words, an explanatory account of divine providence, for example, cf. *ST* Ia, q. 105; esp. a. 5), and so the certainty of divine providence, intelligible in the context of divine transcendence (for example, cf. *SCG,* 3, ch. 94; *ST* Ia, q. 103, a. 7). In turn, this law made a theory of the liberty of the human will possible. And in turn, this theory of human freedom made possible a theory of operative grace. In working through the order of divine providence (and clearly differentiating it from the order of grace) Thomas was able to demonstrate that on this *natural* level, the human will and divine providence were compatible, and then analogously apply this to the *super*natural level on which God operates directly on the will. In other words, just as natural operation presupposes divine providence, so too does meriting supernatural beatitude presuppose actual graces by which God moves the agent to act. For the heart of Thomas's answer to these questions, cf. esp. *ST* Ia, q. 111, a. 2 on the division of operative and cooperative grace. Also see Patrick Byrne, "The Fabric of Lonergan's Thought," *The Lonergan Workshop Journal* 6 (1986), esp. 19-37.

[136] Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom*, CWL 1, 17.

something called the analogy of natural proportion, which is found in Aristotle and taken over by Thomas. We see this theory operative in Thomas's metaphysics of participation and corresponding gradations of being or perfection.[137] In fact, the proportion of nature is a specification of the general metaphysical principle that act is limited by potency. Thomas uses this principle to differentiate between God and creatures. Whereas in God, substance and the principle of operation are one, in creatures, there is a fourfold composition of essence and existence, potency and act in which *existence : essence :: act : potency*.

The theory of natural proportion affirms that this fourfold composition is proportionate in any given creature. In other words, it explains that the soul, its potencies, its acts, and its objects are naturally proportionate to one another, and moreover, all belong to the same grade of being. For example, seeing (an act) is received in and limited by sight (its corresponding potency). Sight is a result of and limited by its substance (the sensitive soul of an animal). Stebbins puts this parity of relations in more colloquial terms: "If a thing acts in a particular manner, it is because it has corresponding capacities or potencies that, in turn, must have their proportionate source and unity in some actually existing substance."[138]

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[137] In Thomist metaphysics, perfection is a measure of act. God's essence is God's existence, which means God alone is pure act because God's existence is not limited by any potency, and therefore, God alone is perfect. Creatures, on the other hand, are composed of existence and essence, and so their act of being is restricted. Consequently, they are imperfect. However, they participate in God's perfection simply by existing and operating, for to exist and to operate is to be in act. Creatures are more or less perfect depending on their degree of actuality, that is, depending on the degree to which existence is limited by essence. Cf. *ST* Ia, qq. 2-11. For the gradation of being and the proportion of nature, cf. *ST* Ia, q. 54, aa. 1-3. For example, Thomas writes, "Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said. Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation," Ia, q. 54, a. 3.

[138] Stebbins, *Divine Initiative,* 47-8. Lonergan offers an example of how this theorem operates: "If an ox were to understand and will, you would say that it had not only acts of understanding and willing, but also a possible intellect and a will; and consequently you would further infer that the ox's body was informed by

It is on account of this proportionate intelligibility that Aristotle could reason from knowledge of objects to knowledge of acts to knowledge of potencies to knowledge of souls (of natures, of substances).[139] What occurs is an insight into an intelligible relation of dependence – that is, a cause-effect relation.[140] For example, the act of seeing is intelligibly dependent on sight, which we can gather by understanding the difference between closed eyes and blindness. Without this proportion of nature, we could not arrive at knowledge of the existence of potencies (for example, the will, the possible intellect, the agent intellect), or of the differences between potencies, or of the differences between human and animal souls, or at knowledge of the spiritual nature of human souls and the materiality of animal souls.[141]

What the proportion of nature helps us to do—and why it becomes so significant for the systematic differentiation of the natural and the supernatural—is to explain *why* the natural is natural, to explain precisely what it is that constitutes a human being as human. As Stebbins explains, "the reason why we say that anything is natural with respect to some being is that it is proportionate to that being's nature." For example, it is natural for human beings to know because they are intellectual by nature. And it is natural to humans to know by phantasms because they are embodied knowers.[142] This pertains to the mode of knowing, which is commensurate with one's mode of existence/being. As we will see, if the mode of existence of the object of knowledge exceeds the mode of existence of the knower, the knower's understanding will

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an intellective soul." See Lonergan, "The Supernatural Order," in *Early Latin Theology*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 19, eds. Robert M. Doran and Daniel H. Mansour, trans. Michael G. Shields (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 71.

[139] See Aristotle, *De anima*, II, 3, 414b32-415a13 and 4, 415a, 14-20; Aquinas *In II De anima*, lect. 6, §299 and §304–6. With this progressive method inward, Aristotle was able to differentiate plants, animals, and humans according to their potencies, which indicated different kinds of souls operating on different levels of being.

[140] It is helpful to keep in mind that the intelligibility proper to analogies is between the similar relationship that obtains between sets. For example, seeing is related to sight as act is related to potency—the former is intelligibly (in the order of knowing) and causally (in the order of being) dependent on the latter.

[141] See Lonergan, "The Supernatural Order," in *Early Latin Theology*, CWL 19, 67.

[142] See *ST* Ia, q. 84, a. 7.

be imperfect. For example, when considering whether the human soul in the present life can know immaterial substances in themselves, Thomas appeals to the proportion of nature:

> There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being disproportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are disproportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.[143]

Once a thorough grasp of nature (especially human nature) is achieved with the help of this analogy of proportion, one can develop an adequate account of grace, explaining precisely why it is absolutely gratuitous.[144] Consequently, one can come to terms with the entitative *disproportion* between nature and grace, between the natural and supernatural orders. The supernatural is what exceeds the proportion of some given nature; it exceeds its grade of being and perfection.

Grasping this distinction is essential to working out how grace supervenes on and perfects what it is that makes a human being *human* (her intellectual soul, her acts of knowing and loving, etc). In light of this distinction, the proportion of nature can be used analogically to posit a similar set of intelligible relations in the supernatural order.[145] For example, the habit of faith is entitatively disproportionate to human nature; it must be infused.[146] But as habits arise from the soul and its potencies, the soul must also be made proportionate to the infused habit of faith,

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[143] *ST* Ia, q. 88, a. 1, ad. 3

[144] It helps clarify why everything is not grace, given that everything is from God—because there are potencies and acts that are natural to the beings to which they belong. It also clarifies why humanity would have needed grace even without sin—because the beatific vision is absolutely disproportionate to our nature and natural capacities.

[145] However, this is only an analogy. Grasping the proportion of nature is not the same as grasping the proportion between sanctifying grace and faith, which are mysteries. See Stebbins, *Divine Initiative*, 51.

[146] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 5, a. 1c; ad 2. Also see Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 5 s.c "Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) 'Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.' Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural power" and "The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so by the habit of faith, the human mind id directed to assent to such things as are fitting [*conveniun*] to a right faith, and not to assent to others" (*ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 4 ad 3).

which is what sanctifying grace accomplishes. Grace, an accident in the essence of soul, elevates human nature, proportioning it to the new acts and habits fit for a sanctified person.[147] In the question on the division of grace, Thomas differentiates between the natural and supernatural orders by way of the notion of debt, thereby affirming the utter gratuity of grace in contradistinction from other divine gifts, like nature and all that follows from it:

> Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to Rm. 4:4: 'Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.' *The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature.* Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. *And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are not a debt in any sense, and therefor they especially deserve the name of grace.*[148]

5.2.2 Faith, Reason, and the Twofold Mode of Truth

The distinction of the supernatural and natural orders, together with the differentiation of the twofold operation of the mind, helped Thomas to expand Aristotelian science to make room for the Augustinian *crede ut intelligas*.[149] I will elaborate on this expansion by way of two related points. First, insofar as Aristotelian science has not one but two goals (certainty and understanding) corresponding to the twofold operations of the human mind (reflective understanding and direct understanding, respectively), certainty does not have an exclusive claim on the ideal of *sacra*

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[147] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 110, aa. 2-3: "And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being," (a. 2, ad. 2) and "And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light..." (a. 3c).

[148] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 111, a. 1 ad. 2.

[149] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 3 in which Thomas discusses the necessity of belief for the acquisition of science on the part of the learner. Also see *The Sermon-Conferences*, 18-25. Therein, Thomas explains the pragmatic necessity of believing, not only in matters of faith but in all areas of life.

doctrina as a science. Second, as the supernatural order is disproportionate to the natural order, so too are the reasons proportionate to supernatural mysteries disproportionate to human intelligence. It follows that faith and reason belong to two different orders and must be methodologically differentiated. Thus, Thomas distinguishes between the kinds of reasons available for the mysteries of faith, on the one hand, and those available for naturally known realities, on the other. He calls this the twofold mode of truth.

To the first point (certainty does not have an exclusive claim on science), we have seen that the *ordo inventionis* is the movement toward certainty, while the *ordo disciplinae* is the movement toward understanding. The same distinction of movements (the *ordo disciplinae* versus the *ordo inventionis*) and goals (understanding and certainty) is also found in theology. As Thomas writes in the *Quaestiones quodlibetales:*

> Every act should be performed in a way adapted to its end. Now an argument can be directed to either of two ends. One kind of argument is directed to removing doubts as to *whether something is so*…But another kind of argument is that of the teacher in the schools. It seeks not to remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth that the teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is important to base one's argument on reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand *how what is said is true.* Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an appeal to authorities, the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed as stated;, but *they will acquire no knowledge [scientiae] or understanding [intellectus] and they will go away empty.*[150]

Two relevant observations surface. One, the reference to "act" in conjunction with "argument" indicates that Thomas has in mind the two operations of the intellect. It is the cognitional element that guides and differentiates these two kinds of arguments. Two, the prologue to the *Summa* specifies that Thomas will pursue the latter argument—that which makes hearers understand how what is said is true. This means he is concerned with the first operation of the intellect, which is the province of the *ordo disciplinae*, and so the goal of the *sacra doctrina* in the *Summa* is understanding. Again Thomas affirms that *sacra doctrina* is a science because like science, it is

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[150] *Questiones quodlibetales,* 4, q. 9, a. 3 (emphasis added), as quoted in Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics,* CWL 12, 8-9.

understanding in process. Specifically, insofar as it proceeds according to the *ordo disciplinae*, it moves from principles to conclusions in order to grasp both principles and conclusions in a single view.[151] That is, it moves toward synthesis.

However, given that theology's subject is God—the divine reality, the divine essence—its goal is an analogical, obscure and imperfect understanding of what God is. Yet, the theologian achieves her respective goal in the same way a scientist does, by reasoning—even when reason is enlightened by faith. That is, she focuses on the first act of the intellect, understanding. Insofar as theology is analogously a science, what Thomas and the scholastics called the *determinatio fidei* is not completely different from the first movement (the way of analysis), nor is the *intelligentia fidei* completely different from the second movement (way of synthesis).[152]

In theology, the first movement (analysis, the *ordo inventionis*) leads, in general, from Christ to the triune God. For example, in the *Tertia Pars*, Thomas explains that Christ incorporates the disciples and all subsequent disciples into his teaching activity, and so, into his mixed life of contemplation and action. Thomas, himself, is part of this teaching activity, handing on to others what he has received from both human teachers and the divine teacher. Christ follows a certain order: he teaches, imprinting his teaching directly on peoples' hearts instead of writing, and entrusts to his disciples the task of teaching others, by preaching and writing.[153] This order is an aspect of divine providence, insofar as God uses human teachers to impart natural knowledge.[154] It is especially an aspect of the divine economy insofar as human teachers contribute to the common supernatural good by using reason to minister to faith.[155] In other words, there is a process of "doctrinal communication" that begins with Christ[156], is entrusted to his disciples, and

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[151] See *ST* Ia, q. 14, a. 7; q. 79, a. 8. Also see Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," 118.
[152] See Thomas Aquinas, *III Sent.* D. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 4 ad 1.
[153] See *ST* IIIa, q. 42, a. 4.
[154] See *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1. This question takes place in the group of questions on divine providence.
[155] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 2; q. 2, a. 6c.
[156] Thomas also, of course, recognizes the Old Testament as a source of revelation. See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a.

continues throughout the history of the church such that a body of material accumulates.[157] This is the aforementioned order of the sources and it is a process of discovery, which eventually reaches a point when the discovered elements can be set forth pedagogically in the *ordo disciplinae*.

With respect to the history of trinitarian theology, the Council of Nicea (and Chalcedon) can be understood as the terminus of a process of discovery in which the trinitarian belief was determined, affirming the consubstantiality of the three Persons. This was itself a movement from what was first-for-us – the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit to us – to what is first-in-itself – the relations of the Father, Son, and Spirit to one another. From this end point (consubstantiality, that is, the equality of the three divine persons), Augustine began his theological effort to understand the Trinity to whose image we are made. Augustine's *De trinitate* can also be

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[157] Laporte, "Christ in the *Summa*," 244. Thomas also includes the prophets as a mediating source of divine revelation. See *ST* IIa-IIae, qq. 171-174. For example, Thomas considers the advancement of prophecy through the three ages with respect to the two irreducible truths of faith identified earlier in the *Secunda Pars*: "Prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, 'Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me.' *Now our faith consists chiefly in two things*: first, in *the true knowledge of God*, according to Heb. 11:6, 'He that cometh to God must believe that He is'; secondly, in *the mystery of Christ's incarnation*, according to Jn. 14:1, 'You believe in God, believe also in Me.' *Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace.* For before the law, *Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead*. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, 'Do no evil to My prophets,' which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. *Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters.* Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them'; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): 'I am Who am'; and this name is signified by Jews in the word 'Adonai' on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. *Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of God Himself*, according to Mt. 28:19: 'Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost'" (IIa-IIae, q. 174, a. 6c, emphasis added). It is noteworthy that Thomas (following Augustine) expressly states that before Christ, it was not the Father (nor the Son, nor the Spirit) who was revealed, but *God*. For Thomas, biblical revelation (beginning with the Old Testament) does not begin with the Father; it begins with God. This is an important point of disagreement among Thomas and his detractors (and a point of disagreement in medieval theology among Thomas and the theologians who privileged the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the good for trinitarian theology). Like Augustine before him, this is an element of trinitarian theology because personal identity in God is because of relationships—you cannot have the Father without the Son.

understood as another terminus in this process of discovery, but now as a discovery of a way to illuminate the mystery, namely, the psychological analogy.[158] Thomas's trinitarian questions in the *Summa* can be understood as taking the determination of the Councils as his starting point insofar as *sacra doctrina* is a subalternate science. Similarly, the *Summa* can be understood as taking Augustine's discovery of the analogy as the starting point – the principle of understanding – for a systematic consideration of the Trinity according to the *ordo disciplinae.*

If we return to theology's analogous relation to science, it is complicated by the fact that Thomas identifies the subject of *sacra doctrina* as God, we come to the second point: the disproportion of human intelligence to divine mysteries and the twofold mode of truth.[159] The divine essence is the sole sufficient and necessary reason (the *causa essendi*) for everything, including the Trinity. In fact, the divine essence is also the *causa cognoscendi* insofar as it is the reason we know that God is triune (among other mysteries).[160] Yet, human intelligence cannot in this life understand the divine essence; we only know what it is not: "The vision of God is twofold. One is perfect, in which the essence of God is seen. The other is imperfect; though in this vision we do not see what God is, we do see what God is not. And in this life, the better we understand God to transcend whatever is grasped by intellect, the more perfectly also do we know him."[161]

However, faith supervenes on and perfects reason insofar as faith makes human intelligence know with certainty the *existence* of the mysteries it would otherwise never know:

> This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this

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[158] The analogy is not affirmed as another article of faith, but offered as a way to understand what is already believed. But good analogies can be a part of the discovery function of theology. For this history, cf. Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 213-221; *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 67-77.

[159] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 7. See above, p. 35.

[160] For this point, see Wilkins, "Order, Method, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology," 582-83.

[161] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c. As will be argued below, Questions 2-11 of the *Prima Pars* serve the pedagogical function of helping the student to come to terms with divine transcendence and the therapeutic function of recognizing the imperfection of their present human vision.

doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest.[162]

Thomas next introduces, in this very first question of the *Summa*, a fundamental aspect of his theology of grace – grace perfects nature; it does not destroy it:

> But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: 'Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ' (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason.[163]

Thus, while faith perfects reason, elevating the human intellect to know supernatural realities unknown to natural human reason, it does not alter the *mode* of human knowing. As one of Thomas's regular axioms has it, "Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower."[164] In this life, the human mode of knowing naturally involves the sensible world. Faith does not destroy this relationship:

> It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things.[165]

Thomas had brought these two points about the excessive intelligibility of God and the mode of human knowing together in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, which recalls the twofold operation of the mind and quiddity, understanding's goal:

> That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man's ability appears with the greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to Aristotle 'what a thing is' is the principle of demonstration) [Posterior Analytics II, 3], it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the

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[162] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

[163] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a.

[164] *ST* Ia, q. 14, a. 1 ad 3. Also see Ia, q. 12, a. 4c.

[165] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 9c. Also see IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 2c; 2, a. 3c. In this response, Thomas includes the gradual, discursive development of human intelligence as intrinsic to the human mode of knowing.

way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. *For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause.* Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power.[166]

Thus, even though the mysteries of faith are revealed to us and even though faith elevates the human mind to assent to these things beyond its ken, the mode of human knowing remains in our present state of existence in mortal bodies. Thus, the essence of God is unknown is this life.[167] However, our inability to understand the divine essence in a positive way does not mean that we cannot understand revealed truth (as found, e.g., in the Articles of Faith) in any positive fashion.[168] We are not limited to knowing that God is triune; beginning with our belief, we can start to understand how this might be so. This brings us to the twofold mode of truth.

As scholasticism and the quest for a scientific theology arose, so did the pursuit of what Anselm called "*rationes necessariae*" (necessary reasons). While today we might associate this phrase with rationalism and semi-rationalism, it would be both mistaken and anachronistic to assign that mode of thought to Anselm, and with him, Richard of St. Victor and probably Bonaventure. The doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation will serve as examples. There are mysteries that are necessary in themselves, such as the Trinity.[169] Without a precise grasp of the difference

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[166] *SCG* 1, ch. 3, no. 3 (emphasis added).

[167] See *ST* Ia, q. 12, aa. 12-13. The divine essence remains disproportionate to human intelligence in the next life even though we will have resurrected bodies united to minds illumined by the light of glory. The reason is that our minds are intrinsically finite in their mode of existence, and thereby simply cannot comprehend the divine essence, which is infinite in its mode of existence. See *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 7.

[168] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 6 in which Thomas affirms that the gift of understanding allows us to penetrate what is proposed to faith for acceptance. Also see Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," 118-19.

[169] See *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1

between philosophical and theological modes of reason—between reason and reason enlightened

by faith—a theologian can make the methodological error of presuming that because the mystery

of the Trinity is absolutely necessary in itself, and because therefore the reasons for its truth are

also necessary, that human reason enlightened by faith can actually know these *rationes*

necessariae.[170] With Thomas we can pardon theologians like Richard of St. Victor from assuming

such reasons were humanly possible and we can recognize that that they did not think the Trinity

was rationally demonstrable. We can also notice, however, how critical an adequate

differentiation between faith and reason is for the practice of theology, especially theology

construed as science.[171] When considering our knowledge of the Trinity, Thomas quotes Richard

as one objector claiming the Trinity can be known by natural reason:

> Further, Richard St. Victor says (*De Trin.* i, 4): 'I believe without doubt that probable and
> even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth.' So even to
> prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God,
> who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some
> are moved by the consideration that 'no good thing can be joyfully possessed without
> partnership.' Augustine proceeds (*De Trin.* x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by
> the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this
> above. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.[172]

In response, Thomas makes the same methodological differentiation of the twofold mode of truth

he had introduced in the opening of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*[173]:

> Reason may be brought to bear on something in a twofold manner: firstly, for the
> purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where
> sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of
> uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof
> of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the
> congruity of its results, as in astronomy the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is

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[170] It is important to note that in another sense (when considering divine transcendence), we must say that
God is beyond contingency and necessity.

[171] See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 53-58.

[172] *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 obj. 2. Notice that as attempts to prove the Trinity, Thomas includes not only the self-
diffusiveness of the good (an analogy he rejected with increasing explicitness throughout his career), but
also the psychological analogy. As we will see in his response, Thomas not only rejects the possibility of
proving the Trinity, but also argues that the psychological analogy is not an attempt to prove, but only to
understand.

[173] See *SCG* 1, ch. 1-9; esp. 3, §2.

considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. *But in the second way, reason is brought in to manifest the Trinity because granted one knows the Trinity to be true, these reason fit; but not as if the Trinity of persons is sufficiently proved by these reasons.* This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness. *Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally.* Hence, Augustine says that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.[174]

We can neither prove revealed truths by reason alone nor can we provide necessary reasons for them even when reason is enlightened by faith. These reasons remain hidden in God, excessively intelligible relative to us. But while our enlightened intellect is disproportionate to the divine essence and so to the reason for revealed truths, it is proportionate to its native activity – understanding in process. Thus, it can pursue a positive understanding of revealed truths. This understanding is imperfect because the revelation is about God, and God is not understood.[175]

All of this sheds light on *sacra doctrina* as a subalternate science – its possibilities and limitations. Its possibilities lie in (1) its ability to know, according to the first mode of truth (e.g., according to reason) that God is, what God is not*,* and how God is not, and (2) its ability to make manifest, according to the second mode of truth (e.g., according to reason enlightened by faith), what we already believe to be true. It accomplishes the latter with analogies and arguments of fittingness.[176] The ability of enlightened reason to manifest the faith underscores *sacra doctrina*'s limitations.

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[174] *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2. Notice that Thomas is explicit about what the psychological analogy does *not* do and why – it does not prove that God is a Trinity of persons because the human intellect and *ipsum intelligere* are not the same. We cannot know the latter because it is identical to the unknowable divine essence.

[175] See Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," 119.

[176] For example, the psychological analogy manifests the trinitarian belief and even integrates it with the

5.3. The Possibilities and Limitations of *Sacra Doctrina* as a Subalternate Science

To understand the possibilities and limitations of *sacra doctrina* as a subalternate science, we need to summarize the major points up until now. The first principles of subalternate science are derived from those of the higher science. Thus, while the divine essence is the first principle of the science of God and the blessed, the Articles of Faith (and scripture and Christ) are the first principles of the faithful and their teachers. These are what the theologian attempts to find reasons for, and while we cannot understand the divine essence in this life, we can advance a positive understanding of *the revealed truths*. However, we can only do so analogically and/or by arguments of fittingness (*conveniens*) because we cannot reduce our first principles to the first principle from which they are derived. Instead, we can only affirm the value of our analogical and fitting arguments by how much they manifest what we already believe to be true and how extensively they illuminate the connections among these mysteries.

Aristotelian science is *certa per causas cognitio*. But in light of the foregoing, *sacra doctrina* is not certain in the same sense that Aristotelian science is, nor is it understanding in the same way it is. This nuance brings us full-circle to the question of principles/starting points and *sacra doctrina*. On the one hand, to the extent that *sacra doctrina* is certain, it cannot be *per causas* because in this life, we cannot know God's essence or wisdom, and so we cannot know the cause of the Trinity or of the economy of salvation. Instead, we have certainty about these realities because of faith. The most we can *know* with respect to the cause is *that* the divine essence is the *causa essendi*. Inasmuch as *sacra doctrina* is certain knowledge, the first principles of *certainty* – the starting points – are the revealed truths, articulated in the Articles of Faith.

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economy of salvation. Thomas gives no less than ten reasons for why the incarnation was fitting for the restoration of the human race: five relating to humanity's furtherance in the good (culminating in the full participation of humanity in divinity) and five relating to humanity's withdrawal from evil (culminating in the meeting of humanity and divinity in Christ).

On the other hand, to the extent that *sacra doctrina* is *per causas cognitio*, it is hypothetical (or as Thomas puts it, "probable"), meaning not unconditionally verifiable.[177] Because we cannot know the cause and so unconditionally verify our manifestations of the revealed truths, any understanding we have is only analogical or fitting. Further, it is also only understanding as opposed to knowledge in the strict sense—these arguments do not increase our knowledge of the mysteries. The psychological analogy is not certain, but rather, something that seems to illuminate the Trinity. The arguments of fittingness for the Incarnation are not certain, but rather, they illuminate the economy of salvation. In this sense, when faith is seeking understanding through causes, the causes or first principles of understanding (the starting points) are the analogical or fitting principles illuminating the revealed truths of faith.[178] This pertains to the internal ordering of *sacra doctrina*, which proceeds according to the guided development of understanding.

Despite these limitations, arguments of fittingness and analogies for the mysteries of faith disclose the intelligibility of the faith, without proving the faith (recall the distinction between the levels of truth and understanding). This intelligibility can both defend and nourish the faith.[179] With respect to nourishment, while considering the relationship between faith and reason in light of merit Thomas writes, "For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit."[180] Such nourishment is helped especially by disclosing the connections among the mysteries of faith,

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[177] I owe this way of thinking about the limitations of *sacra doctrina* as a subalternate science to conversations with Jeremy Wilkins. See *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2 for Thomas's expression of the possibility of multiple theories explaining one reality.

[178] There is an ambiguity of 'principle' in the *Summa*. On the one hand, Thomas explicitly states that the Articles of Faith are the principle. On the other hand, as far as his actual performance in the *Summa* goes, principle analogically means the principle of understanding, e.g., the intelligible emanations of the psychological analogy.

[179] See *ST* II-IIae, q. 6, a. 1 ad. 1. Also see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 5 ad 2; a. 8c. See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.1.1 (Hill, 370-71).

[180] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c. Thomas is here describing the situation in which human reason is *consequent* to the believer's assent – this is both Augustine's *crede ut intelligas* and Anselm's *fides quarens intelligentia*.

which is arguably what the entire structure of the *Summa* sets forth to do, according to the *ordo disciplinae*. As we will have occasion to see in the final chapter when considering the *Summa theologiae* as spiritual pedagogy—as a text for the spiritual exercise of the beginner—this nourishment is especially the province of the teacher to whom it is given to come to a fuller knowledge of the faith for the sake of the common good.[181]

<div align="center">QUESTION 3: WHAT IS THE ORDO DISCIPLINAE?</div>

6. The Internal Ordering of *Sacra Doctrina:* the *Ordo Disciplinae*

Having considered three of the factors contributing to the possibility of the *ordo disciplinae* in the *Summa*, I now proceed to consider the *ordo disciplinae*, itself. Just as we considered one of the orders and starting points of the *Summa*—the Articles of Faith insofar as *sacra doctrina* is a subalternate science to which *certainty* belongs—now we will consider another order and starting point of the *Summa*. In this section, we will explore the order and starting point internal to *sacra doctrina* in which the theological goal is understanding. The *ordo disciplinae* assumes a technical meaning in the *Summa.* It is both a pedagogical order, as well as an explanatory and synthetic order. It bears the central organizing role in the entire work, both in its fundamental/basic division and in its careful arrangement of questions, articles, and objects. It also helps Thomas make thematic connections among the parts. However, its technical meaning and significance has been historically overlooked by poor translations of this term within the prologues and questions in which it appears.

6.1. The *Ordo Disciplinae* as a Pedagogical Order

To begin to elaborate upon the pedagogical meaning of the *ordo disciplinae*, it is helpful to become familiar with its basic related terms and its particularly scholastic context. To begin, both *discipulus* and *disciplina* derive from the Latin verb, "*discere"* meaning "to learn." As Michael Sherwin writes

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[181] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c; q. 1, a. 7 ad 2 and ad 3. Also see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 177, a. 1; q. 181, a. 1c.

in his article on Thomas's commentary on the gospel of John, "It is the *desire to learn* that is the hallmark of the true disciple."[182] Mary Carruthers explains the meaning of *disciplina* according to its memorial context and the process of thinking in images. Where Sherwin highlights the relationship between teacher and disciple, Carruthers connects this relationship to the journey that learning is:

> Although the word *disciplina* is not attached by ancient grammarians to words meaning 'route' or 'path,' it was thought to be derived from the verb *discere,* 'to learn.' And since ancient education was fundamentally modeled as 'ways' and 'routes,' the *trivium* and *quadrivium* of the arts, disciples are those who journey along the paths marked by the practical experiences of their masters…[183]

Carruthers complements the derivation of *disciplina* from *"discere"* with *"ducere"* ("to lead") and *"docere"* ("to teach"). In this light, the relationship between a disciple and teacher entails embarking on a shared journey.

I have mentioned the translation issues with respect to the *ordo disciplinae*. There is also another translation issue in the opening prologue. The difficulty is the word "*tradere*." Thomas writes: "*Propositum nostrae intentionis in hoc opere est ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent, eo modo tradere, secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientum*." Mongeau explains that the original Blackfriars translation rendered "*tradere*" as "to treat of," thereby suggesting that Thomas was producing a *treatise*. However, Mongeau, following Roy Deferrari, argues that "the more obvious translation is 'to hand over, to pass on, to transmit,' which aligns the phrase with the theological understanding of 'tradition.'"[184] A correct translation is critical because "to hand over, to transmit" suggests a joint, organic, ongoing and incremental active exercise pursued by teacher and student alike, rather than a static treatise, any part of which a reader can turn to in order to

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[182] Michael Sherwin, O.P., "Christ the Teacher in St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*," in *Reading John with St. Thomas: Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology*, eds. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 174.

[183] Mary Carruthers, *Craft of Thought*, 74.

[184] Mongeau, "Spiritual Pedagogy," 91. He suggests this translation: "We propose in this work to hand on whatever belongs to the Christian religion in a way that fits with the education of beginners."

find the answer to a question. *Tradere* is linked by way of the metaphor of the "hand" to the

rhetorical aim, *manuductio*. Further, as *tradere* is aligned with tradition, *manuductio* here means

handing on what one has received. In the *Summa*, what has been received and is handed on is the

tradition of the Christian religion. These more accurate translations even allow a conversational

dynamic of listening and speaking to emerge. It is important to hold all of these connotations

together in order to gather Thomas's meaning of proceeding according to the *ordo disciplinae*. In

the *Summa* we find a man who has mastered the discipline of *sacra doctrina* and seeks to both lead

and teach those who desire to learn this discipline by a route amenable to their journey as

beginners.

In the scholastic period, as a pedagogical order, the *ordo disciplinae* technically addresses

problems for understanding, which are to be distinguished from problems of coherence. The

former seek understanding; the latter seek to settle matters of fact. In this way, they correspond to

the acts of understanding and of judging, respectively. Problems for understanding were just

beginning to develop scientifically during scholasticism's dawn.

Peter Abelard had focused his contemporaries' attention on the lack of harmony in the

theological tradition, as exemplified by the title of his work, *Sic et non* (1120). Specifically, he

highlighted the existence of incoherencies in theology in which two arguments yield contradictory

conclusions. However, he did so without attempting to solve the dilemma.[185]As Chenu explains,

this opposition between authorities extended beyond the immediate exegesis of the text with a

view to enlarge upon doctrines, *in themselves*.[186] As this shift from textual exegesis to doctrines

occurred, the technique of the *quaestio* also developed:

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[185] For example, the Holy Spirit is *a se* and not *a se*, both from itself and not from itself. When asking
whether the Holy Spirit is *a se* (*videtur quod non*)*,* the answer is no, since the Spirit is from the Father and
the Son. But then one might remember (s*ed contra est*) that the Spirit is God and God is *a se*. Therefore, the
Holy Spirit *is a se*. Here, the question (*videtur quod non*) culminates in expressing a problem of coherence.
[186] See Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, 86.

It became no longer a simple question of submitting to research those problems already under discussion or still open to debate. Even the points accepted by everybody and set forth in the most certain of terms were brought under scrutiny and subjected, by deliberate artifice, to the now usual processes of research. *In brief, they were, literally speaking, 'called into question,' no longer because there was any real doubt about their truth, but because a deeper understanding of them was sought after.* Theologians as well as philosophers asked the question: Does God exist?…Yet, of the question, only the form remained, with the typical word *Utrum* [Whether] everywhere, and over and over…[187]

In other words, theologians were inquiring anew after what they already believed to be true, as evidenced in Thomas's aforementioned *Quodlibet*.[188] Their questions did not disclose doubt, but rather, a desire to know the mysteries of faith with greater depth. When Thomas asks the "whether" question, he is not simply settling a matter of fact or proving. Rather, he seeks a deeper understanding by "calling into question" what he believes. The technique of the *quaestio*, along with the theorematic differentiation of faith and reason, promoted the development of a methodical approach to faith's seeking of understanding.

While Abelard pointed to a preliminary ordering of topics, his primary goal was to demonstrate that incoherence existed. To that end, the relevant and controlling relation is the one between the two contradictory arguments and their conclusions, not the interrelation among the questions addressed. This is because his intention was to demonstrate conflict, not order theology from within; he was not seeking the internal order of scientific theology. This focus raised methodological difficulties when theologians attempted to move from the problem of coherence to the problem of understanding, as they did with the emergence of the *summae* genera.[189]

In response to these problems of coherence, Peter Lombard collected and organized material for their solution in his masterpiece, the *Sentences* (1158). Lombard juxtaposed authoritative opinions and set forth his own resolution to apparent contradictions. He thus began to pursue the question as expressing a problem for understanding. While Abelard's text was

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[187] Ibid., 86-87 (emphasis added)..
[188] It is another thing to be clear about this difference, especially in relation to human knowing.
[189] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 22-23.

driven by the problem of coherence, *not* the problem of understanding, Lombard and the

theologians commenting on him *were* seeking understanding, for in seeking answers, these

theologians were moving beyond the problem of coherence to the problem of understanding.

Theology as a science was developing. The commentaries on the *Sentences* began working out answers.

However, the questions themselves were still disorganized, in part because they took their cue

from the *Sentences*, which took its cue from Abelard's compilation of the problems.[190]

As theologians began working on the problem of understanding, "they soon discovered

that questions cannot be put in any order whatsoever. Some questions simply cannot be answered

until others have been resolved. And sometimes the answers to one question immediately provide

the answers to others."[191] The primary reason for the deficiencies of the *Sentences* and its

commentaries was that these texts did not adequately transcend the problem of coherence and so

they could not pursue the problem of understanding freely.

The historical scholarship indicates that it was in the context of developing his own model

of theological education that Thomas embarked on the project of composing his own *Summa*

theologiae. This means pedagogical and theological concerns and methods are intertwined in the

inception of his masterpiece. His dismay over the *Sentences* and incisive grasp of its shortcomings

came during his time at Santa Sabina.[192] It was while attempting to teach his students using the

Sentences that he realized its orderings and its commentaries' orderings were not scientific enough.

Instead of forcing students to pursue theology according to the established methods, Thomas

wanted to help them learn *sacra doctrina* in a way suited to beginners. He discovered that

theological questions themselves have to be intelligibly ordered in order to effectively pursue the

problem of understanding. Thus, we observe a difference in the order of questions in his *Sentences*

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[190] While Lombard had offered a topical organization, there is not yet a systematic ordering of questions. This is evidenced, not in the least bit, by Thomas's and Bonaventure's dismay over having to teach according to the order of the *Sentences*.

[191] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 22-23.

[192] Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study',* 280.

commentary and his *Summa theologiae* in which he distinguished the order of learning from the order demanded by commentaries.

This right ordering is the *ordo disciplinae* as pedagogical, and it is what is in control of Thomas's wise organizational decisions in the *Summa*. Thomas selects this internal order because he has discovered and made the wise judgment that answering questions individually and apart from their relation does not solve the problem of understanding catalyzed by the problem of coherence. Moreover, the ad hoc approach does not meet the natural desire to know. In fact, texts wear students down when they are not ordered in a way suitable to understanding the material at hand. Instead, the condition for understanding is to order the questions in such a way that you begin with the first problem.[193] What makes a problem first? One, its solution does not presuppose the solution of another problem(s). Two, solving the first problem makes solving the next one easier, faster. Three, the process continues. Beginning with the first problem is the starting point proportionate to the problem of understanding. Lonergan writes:

> Thus, the problem of understanding is solved not because individual answers are provided to individual questions one at a time and separately, but because the whole series of questions is ordered by wisdom, because the first question is solved by a highly fruitful act of understanding, because the later questions are solved in an ordered way by the efficacy of the first solution, because a system of definitions is introduced through which the solutions can be formulated, and because a technical terminology is developed for expressing the defined concepts.[194]

Compare this with the second sentence of the *Summa*'s opening prologue:

> For we have considered that beginners in this doctrine have been considerably hampered by what various authors have written, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles and arguments; partly, also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of learning, but according as the plan of the book might require, or according as the occasion for disputation arises; partly, too, because frequent repetition brought about weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers.[195]

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[193] By contrast, the condition for the problem of coherence is to order the material so a problem emerges.
[194] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 24-25.
[195] *ST* Ia, q. 1, prol.

It is pedagogically expedient to begin the first problem for understanding because it circumvents confusion and weariness, and even replaces them with their opposites because of the intelligible and spontaneous progress from one question to the next. Rather than raise pointless questions, each answered question discloses new questions, and prior answers both illuminate the way forward and are themselves made more intelligible and meaningful in the present context. Thus, there is also the excitement that comes with the ever-deepening understanding. Rather than repeat things haphazardly, Thomas uses repetition rhetorically to initiate students into the full meaning of the term by exercising their intellect. Rather than confuse and weary the student, the *ordo disciplinae* propels the student along, enlightening and enlivening. Moreover, all the while, Thomas develops technical terms from the beginning. They will not undergo any significant alterations, but instead become part of the student's toolbox for raising and answering further questions. This initial introduction and gradual unfolding of terms is evidence of Thomas's pedagogical expertise. As Ignatius Eschmann writes:

> The didactic skill visible in the *Summa* consists in this, that at the beginning of a given treatise principles and doctrines are proposed in the clearest and simplest way, but not with all their implications made expect. The student is supposed to consider these doctrines to understand them as far as possible, but also to hold them in the memory, ready to be used at anytime. Everyone familiar with the *Summa* knows the almost endless repetition of certain principles, their use in different contexts, and of the new light which, consequently, is again and again thrown upon them. Thus the student will be able to fill in more and more details, penetrate more and more the virtuality of a given principle, and so more and more transform into formal, intellectual, possession that which first was only a material possession of memory. The transition from implicit to explicit knowledge is indeed the key to the extremely artful pedagogy of the *Summa*. This transition takes time: intellectual growth is as slow as, if not slower than, physical growth. The two virtues required fro the accomplishment of fruitful work in the *Summa* are patience and persistence, doggedness.[196]

Ultimately, the problem of understanding for Thomas is not about having the best order among all *summae*; it is about handing on the Christian religion to Dominicans who must end their education with greater fervor than they experienced in the beginning in order that they may be

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[196] Eschmann, "Saint Thomas Aquinas O.P., the *Summary of Theology* I-II," 7.

good ministers of God's word and grace. It is not about helping students memorize useful knowledge; it is about causing understanding in the student himself, through the medium of the inner word, so that he in turn becomes a teacher. The *ordo disciplinae* is an order conducive to this kind of personal transformation because it is developed in accord with the student's immanent and dynamic self-correcting process of learning. I now consider one final aspect of this process of learning, and how it figures in to Thomas's theological method.

6.2 The *Ordo Disciplinae* as an Explanatory and Synthetic Order

As an *explanatory* order, the *ordo disciplinae* seeks to form the student into a particular kind of knower, namely one who understands the *causa essendi*. The pedagogical goal is not description but explanation—that is, understanding things as they relate to one another rather than as they relate to oneself. We saw one example of this in the development of trinitarian doctrine. Another example is "98.9" (explanatory) versus "hot" (descriptive). Description deals with things as related to me, e.g., something might feel hot to me but cold to you, depending on our body temperatures. Explanation is not totally independent of description, for it deals with the same things, but as related among themselves, e.g., a metal object may feel cooler than a piece of wood, even though both are the exact same temperature.[197] In terms of theology, insofar as *sacra doctrina* is *scientia*, it seeks explanations.

Additionally, in the *Summa theologiae*, the move from description to explanation can also be understood as commensurate with tone and goal of the *Summa*'s spiritual pedagogy. Reading the *Summa* and appropriating its theocentric organization can have a decentering effect on the reader. In other words, the *Summa* can invite the ready reader to see herself in relation to God and to

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[197] This temperature can be measured by a thermometer, which does not relate hot and cold to me, but to gradations on a column of mercury. Recognizing the connections between description and explanation is important, lest we presume that one type of knowing (usually explanation) is true while the other is false (usually description), rather than appreciate that both are correct ways of knowing something, but from different perspectives and to different ends. Nevertheless, description and explanation envisage things in fundamentally different ways.

everyone else under God (or "*sub ratione Dei*," as Thomas puts it), rather than seeing herself as the center of everything.[198] The move from description to explanation is commensurate with the decentering theocentric organization of the *Summa* because Thomas explicitly considers God, first and foremost (e.g., Ia, qq. 2-43), and he considers everything else only insofar as it is related to God (e.g., Ia, qq. 44-102), or insofar as everything in the created order is interrelated, under God and governed by God's providence (e.g., Ia, qq., 103-119). The reader can understand Thomas's theocentric approach – he can grasp the theological points made about the Christian God. But he can also *mean* and *perform* this theocentrism, such that he undergoes the displacing spiritual transforming of ordering his mind and heart to God, and to the common good, rather than to himself. As will be seen in the final chapter, this theological theocentrism of the *Summa* supports Christianity's existential, spiritual theocentrism.

The *ordo disciplinae* is also a *synthetic* order. Human wonder is persistent and so understanding continues developing even once its reached an explanation of something it sought to know. The results of human knowing accumulate, and in more than an additive way. When the natural desire is for an *explanatory* account of something, it is left unsatisfied by unrelated or loosely related insights. Instead, human wonder pushes towards a unifying insight. In other words, it pushes toward synthesis, which is the product of what Thomas calls "*intelligere multa per unam*" (knowing many things according to a single intelligibility).[199]

Understanding itself is *per se* synthetic because God, who is *ipsum intelligere* (understanding itself), knows everything through the one divine essence. As Thomas writes, "We say that God sees himself in himself, because he sees himself through his essence; and he sees other things not in themselves, but in himself, inasmuch as his essence contains the similitude of things other than

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[198] I use "theocentric" in contradistinction to "self-centered," not in contradistinction to either "christocentric," "pneumacentric," or "trinity-centric."

[199] See *ST* Ia, q. 58, a. 2, ad. 1.

himself."[200] It is on account of our created participation in this uncreated light—which is *per se* synthetic—that our desire to know spontaneously drives us toward the same single view God has, even though its attainment is supernatural and never comprehensive.

However, given the limitations of our created intellectual light—our human mode of knowing—we have to approach synthesis discursively. Likewise, we have to approach simple things by way of complexity. In response to a question on whether God's knowledge is discursive, Thomas offers an account of this naturally discursive nature of human understanding:

> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. *For many things*, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, *we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing*, if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. *Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases.* Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.[201]

By grasping the parts as in the whole, one's understanding of both the whole and the parts is enriched. Synthesis is this understanding of one thing in another rather than one thing from another. The latter is merely discursive and can stop short at the accumulation of piecemeal insights, like "the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments"[202] Thomas so lamented. This is a particular kind of insight, a synthetic insight according to which one grasps

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[200] Ia, q. 14, a. 6. Also see *ST* Ia, q. 14, aa. 4-7. Thomas says the same in the trinitarian questions in the context of the Word (*ST* Ia, q. 34).

[201] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 7c (emphasis added). Thomas's consideration of human understanding as both discursive and synthetic usually comes in the context of comparing the human, angelic, and divine intellects. Also cf. Ia, q. 58, a. 1 on angelic knowing.

[202] *ST* Ia, prol.

many objects in a single view. In human beings, synthetic understanding always represents the culmination of a development. We have now considered what made the *ordo disciplinae* of the *Summa* possible, and what the technical meaning of this *ordo* is.

7. Conclusion

This chapter that has attempted to integrate the form and content of the *Summa* within an overall creedal plan and pedagogical method toward the goal of synthetic, explanatory understanding. I conclude by complementing Chenu's suggestion that the plan of the *Summa* is cyclical with the suggestion of scholars such as Michel Corbin, P.E. Persson, and Jean-Pierre Torrell that its plan is concentric, which will serve to integrate these various elements. We have seen an aspect of this narrowing centricity in the development of the *imago Dei*. Laporte uses the image of a cone with three slices to describe the three parts of the *Summa*: "The bottom and foundational one depicts the creation-wide scope of the *Prima Pars*, the middle one the human scope of the *Secunda Pars*, and the narrowest one the Christ-related scope of the *Tertia Pars*."[203] I will borrow this image and relate it to that of a circle. These complementary images integrate the scientific, pedagogical movement of the *Summa* with its salvation-historical dynamism.

To return to science and first principles, the emphasis on deduction that comes with this Aristotelian approach can cause readers to lose sight of the manner in which conclusions, especially more remote conclusions, are related to their principles. However, as Stebbins writes of the relation of remote conclusions to their principles: "That relation is not extrinsic, as is the relation of the first link in a chain to subsequent links. Instead, it more closely resembles the relation of the centre of a circle to a series of successively wider circumferences: each conclusion enlarges the field of data that the principle is seen to order and unify in a single whole."[204]

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[203] Laporte, "Christ in the *Summa*," 231.
[204] Stebbins, *Divine Initiative*, 95.

What we have encountered in studying how holy teaching is a science and how the *ordo disciplinae* operates therein is that Christ is both the center of the circle: Christ is the real first principle of holy teaching and the first teacher in the *ordo inventionis*. He is also the tip of the cone, which if looked at from above, he is the center of the concentrically narrowing circles. Stebbins's concentric circles widen because the student is learning more and more, in an orderly fashion, and approaching the synthetic understanding in which he will understand all *in* one. Laporte's cone narrows because it is moving more and more deeply into the first principle of sacred doctrine – the consummation of all theology. Our understanding widens as we move more deeply into the center of salvation history and the incarnation of Wisdom.

It is here that Thomas's spectacular synthetic achievement comes to the fore, as the condition for the possibility of such a pedagogically wise ordering. The desire to know spontaneously seeks synthesis. However, because in human beings synthetic understanding is always the culmination of a development, a teacher cannot share the synthesis he has achieved in one fell swoop. Instead, he must proceed according to the *ordo disciplinae*, putting the students' discursive reasoning at the service of the synthesis he hopes to gradually and eventually teach them. Christ is the culmination of this development, at once the most concrete and particular moment in divine revelation as well as the fullness—and the synthesis, so to speak—of divine revelation. The most concrete is also the most synthetic because it is the *incarnation* of *divine wisdom*. At the end of the *Summa*, had Thomas completed it, we can surmise that the Dominican who traveled the journey initiated by God and cultivated by Thomas would have looked back with wisdom and charity, prepared to take up the mixed life for the common good, helping other Dominicans and the laity make the same journey toward their final communal glory. It is for the sake of this destiny that *sacra doctrina* was necessary in the first place.

CHAPTER 3
EMANATIO INTELLIGIBILIS: THE INNER WORD

1. Analepsis and Prolepsis

THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER EMPHASIZED THE significance of Thomas Aquinas's theological

method for his composition of the *Summa theologiae*. His method was informed by his differentiation

between the two operations of the mind (understanding and judging) and their relevance for

theology.[1] Thomas insisted that the goal of *sacra doctrina* in the *Summa theologiae* was understanding,

which he pursued according to a method known as the *ordo disciplinae*. Along similar lines, Thomas

also carefully distinguished between faith and natural reason and the corresponding twofold mode

of truth.[2] As the supernatural order is disproportionate to the natural order, so too are the reasons

proportionate to supernatural mysteries disproportionate to human intelligence. It follows that

faith and natural reason belong to two different orders and must be methodologically

differentiated. Thus, Thomas distinguishes the kinds of reasons available for the mysteries of faith

from those available for naturally known realities. Human beings cannot know the reason (the

'why') for the mysteries of faith because that reason is the divine essence, which in this life is not

understood. Given this, Thomas instead endeavors to illuminate the mysteries through analogies

and arguments of fittingness, which are based upon our knowledge of creatures. Our natural

knowledge as creatures comes either by way of external sense experience or by interior

experience. The former begins from sensible data, while the latter begins from psychological data.

The psychological analogy is one such analogy, starting from the interior experience of the

human *mens* (mind), pursued in order to illuminate the trinitarian mystery. This chapter prepares

the way for the psychological analogy (Chapter 5) by continuing the exploration of Thomas's

position on understanding. Now, the focus on understanding deepens by pursuing the meaning of

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[1] For these two operations, see Aquinas, *Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate,* q, 5, a. 3 c: For the relation of these
two operations to theology, see Aquinas, *Questiones quodlibetales,* 4, q. 9, a. 3.

[2] See *SCG* 1, ch. 1-9; esp. 3, §2.

the *emanationes intelligibiles* of the *verbum* and *amor* (intellectual emanations of the inner word and love), which are relevant for Thomas's trinitarian theology and his theology of the divine missions. In this chapter, I will treat the intellectual emanation of the inner word. In the following chapter, I will treat the emanation of love. In order to differentiate these two processions—which are alike insofar as they are both intellectual processions (*processio intelligibilis*)—I take up a term Thomas uses in his questions on human knowing and willing—"*inclinatio intelligibilis.*"[3] When focusing on their differences, I call the intellectual procession of the inner word an *emanatio intelligibilis* and the intellectual procession of love an *inclinatio intelligibilis.*

2. Introduction: *Emanatio Intelligibilis* and Trinitarian Theology

The psychological analogy is based on the suggestion that the divine processions can be conceived on an analogy with the human mind, and specifically, with what is highest in the mind.[4] For both Augustine and Thomas, this meant attending to the human mind in its most rational operations, where rationality is understood in the context of the mind's capacity for reflection.[5] Specifically, we must understand what Thomas names the "*emanatio intelligibilis*" because it is what in us is supposed to be analogous to the divine processions, and especially what he means by calling such emanations or processions "intellectual."[6] This is the technical term Thomas developed to explain what Augustine meant by the *verbum intus prolatum*. For example, the opening question of the trinitarian questions in the *Summa theologiae* Thomas uses this term to specify the only type of procession in us that might illuminate the divine processions:

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[3] *ST* Ia, q. 87, a. 4.

[4] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 6.

[5] See especially *De ver.* q. 1, a. 9; q. 10. Merriell expertly demonstrates that the developments observable in Thomas's trinitarian theology throughout his career came from his engagement with *De trinitate*. Thomas's understanding of this text and precisely what Augustine selected as a trinitarian analogy and why underwent significant development. See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*. I will return to Aquinas's development when discussing the *imago Dei*.

[6] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1.

Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation [*emanationem intelligibilem*], for example, of the intelligible word [*verbi intelligibilis*] which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.[7]

In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas explained in greater detail the types of processions that must be eliminated, concluding, "God is manifestly incorporeal. We are, therefore, left to understand the divine generation according to an intellectual emanation [*intellectualem emanationem*]."[8] In the *Summa*, Thomas seems to generalize "*emanatio intelligibilis*" at least once to discuss the procession of love from the intellect and in the will, calling it an "*inclinatio intelligibilis*."[9]

However, Thomas does not use the term especially frequently, though variations of it do appear as early as his Parisian *Sentences* commentary.[10] This infrequency, both in the *Summa* and in his earlier writings (and the variations of *emanatio intelligibilis* that occur) may account for the lack of attention it has received in Thomist scholarship. Thus, while "*emanatio intelligibilis*" is certainly a Thomist term, its meaning has not received wide attention. Moreover, it is a highly elusive term and it is difficult to understand. However, as Crowe underscores, "The occurrence of this phrase in two key loci for Thomist trinitarian doctrine cannot but be significant for the meaning Thomas

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[7] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1c.

[8] *SCG* 4, c. 11, §8.

[9] See *ST* Ia, q. 87, a. 4c. Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 19, a. 4.

[10] According to a search through the Index Thomisticus, "*emanatio intellectualem*" occurs in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (4, c. 11, §8; c. 42, §1) and "*emanatio intelligibilis*" occurs in the *Summa theologiae* (Ia, q. 27, a. 1c). These two phrases mean the same thing. A slight variation, "*emanatio intellectus*" occurs in *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 2c as well as in *De veritate* (q. 2, a. 4 arg. 7) and even in the *Sentences Commentary* (bk. 1, d. 27 q. 1 a. 1 ad 4; q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1 ad 1). In the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas sometimes uses "*actionem intelligibilem*" to specify the procession of the Word. Another phrase—*processio intelligibilis*—which means the same thing, appears in two additional texts, *In De divinis nominibus* (1, lect. 3) and *In Ioan.* (c. 5, lect. 3, no. 750). Thomas also uses "*verbum intelligibile*," which according to the Index Thomisticus, he uses in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, book 4. It also appears in *Catena Aurea: John*. There, Thomas is quoting Augustine. He returns to that quote in *In Ioan.*, c. 8, lect. 3, no. 1183.
Cf. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 183-85. After citing a number of texts in which Thomas uses the word "*intelligibilis*," Lonergan concludes that Thomas uses that word to designate whatever is strictly spiritual. (On the intelligible and spiritual, see below, §2. Introduction: *Emanatio Intelligibilis* and Trinitarian Theology.

attached to the phrase."[11] (The two key loci are the above quoted passages.)[12] *Emanatio intelligibilis* refers to a particular type of procession that occurs within human consciousness. It designates what Lonergan calls "the basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness," the "operation of rational consciousness," or "reflective rationality."[13] In the last phrase, "reflective" does *not* mean, as Crowe writes, "second act supervening on direct understanding and knowledge; it means rather that reflection in a special sense is internal to every procession of a word in us; it means the same as the 'because of' character of our inner words."[14] Further, this phrase, "reflective rationality," indicates the dynamism of the human mind, the very core of what about our minds is least unlike God, where dynamism means a relation of "from…to" As Crowe writes, dynamism indicates the "'because of' linking 'from X' and to Y,'" where X is *intelligere,* Y is the *verbum,* and 'because of' is the intellectual procession of Y from X.[15] More specifically, *emanatio intelligibilis* refers in general to the procession of both concept and judgment in us (though in God these are one procession) as well as to the procession of love (analogous to the second procession in God) of the Holy Spirit). The burden of this chapter is to articulate the precise meaning of Thomas's elusive term. Once the meaning is grasped, its significance for shedding some light upon the trinitarian mystery can be explored. Thus, prior to explaining Thomas's psychological analogy, we must to come to terms with the natural analogues—the *emanationes intelligibiles* of word and love—and the most fundamental reason for their selection.[16]

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[11] See Frederick E. Crowe, "For Inserting a New Question (26A) in the *Pars prima,*" in *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*, ed. Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

[12] See *ST* Ia, 1. 27, a. 1; *SCG* 4, c. 11, §8.

[13] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 48, 207. Here, "reflective" does not mean the specific act of reflective understanding that takes place on third level of consciousness, in Lonergan's terms. Rather, it means the general reflection that occurs in the processions of the word and love. For example, the word "reflects" so to speak, the act of understanding from which it arises and on which it depends. In this way, the word, like the act of speaking is also intelligent.

[14] Crowe, "For Inserting a New Question (26A) in the *Pars prima,*"338, fn. 17.

[15] Ibid. 339.

[16] Differentiating the natural analogue from its use in the psychological analogy will clarify the questions taken up in the final chapter. There, we will inquire after (1) the relevance or consequences of coming to

In order understand the human mind, we have to understand its immanent terms and relations. Relevant to trinitarian theology, in Thomas's view, are the terms and relations having to do with the acts of understanding (*intelligere,* which includes both direct understanding and reflective understanding), its relation to the inner word (concept or judgment, respectively), and the relation of understanding and its word to the procession of love in the will. Coming to terms with the acts of intellect and will as well as their relations is absolutely central to Thomas's project of developing an analogical understanding of the trinitarian mystery. If they are misunderstood, Thomas's analogy for the divine processions will also be misunderstood.

Thomas's account of the soul, its powers, and its acts was cast in metaphysical terminology. However, Lonergan argues convincingly that what Thomas was presenting was based on his "having achieved a personal reconnaissance of the psychological facts regarding the *verbum intus prolatum.*"[17] That is, Thomas's metaphysical account of *intelligere* and the human soul "reflected an incisive grasp of psychological realities."[18] Thus, according to Lonergan Thomas performed introspective rational psychology in which he came to understand *intelligere* by reflecting on his own acts of understanding (even if Thomas did not thematize his performance in psychological terms, or elevate it to a method for psychology or a technique for reflection.[19] For example, when asking about the human soul's self-knowledge, Thomas writes: "The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power and nature."[20] This passage attests to Thomas's insistence that we must grapple with the

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terms with the natural analogue, (2) the practice of using this knowledge to understand the Trinity, (3) and the way this understanding of the Trinity enriches the remainder of the *Summa* and illuminates the very structure and movement of the mixed life of the Dominican preacher and his vocation to hand on the fruits of his contemplation in his preaching and teaching.

[17] Frederick Lawrence, "Lonergan's Foundations for Constitutive Communications," *Lonergan Workshop Journal,* vol. 10 (1994), 238.

[18] See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Why Two Divine Missions? Development in Augustine, Aquinas, and Lonergan," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 77, no. 1 (2012), 56.

[19] See Lonergan, *Verbum,* CWL 2, 5-6.

[20] *ST* Ia, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3: "dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, quod est

reality of human intelligence itself and conceive the human intellect in terms of the act of understanding. We understand *intelligere* (the act of understanding) by paying attention to what we are doing when we are actually understanding something. Thus, we cannot understand Thomas's natural analogue for the Trinity by mere metaphysical analysis. Rather, with Augustine, Thomas, and Lonergan, we must advert to our own interior lives.

We will return to this passage in Chapter 5 when considering the *imago Dei* and what is required for growing in likeness to God. For now, it is enough to note that we are attempting to know *intelligere* by its own proper act of understanding through introspective rational psychology in order to develop an analogical conception of the divine processions. Such a development is a genuine psychological analogy. It is distinct from a psychological analogy that attempts to conceive the divine processions by analogy with human intelligence, but misconstrues that very intelligence. For example, intelligence is misunderstood when it is understood not on its own terms but, on analogy with human sensitive knowledge.[21]

Before proceeding, we must attend to a translation issue with Thomas's phrase "*emanatio intelligibilis*." The literal translation, "intelligible emanation," does not capture Thomas's meaning because *intelligibilis* had a more robust meaning in the medieval scholastic context than the English word "intelligible" does. The Latin word can also be translated "intellectual" or "intelligent." In this way, the Latin word conveys not only intelligible objects, but also intelligent subjects. Intelligibility is what is known by intelligent beings. For example, a human being is both intelligible and intelligent. She is intelligible because she is a created being, and all of being is

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actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et naturam."

[21] See *ST* Ia, q. 50, a. 1: "The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes. Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8). But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone." See also *ST* Ia, q. 50, a. 2; q. 75, a. 1.

intelligible—capable of being understood. She is also intelligent because she can understand and know being, at least the being that is proportionate to her intelligence.[22] Thus, there is intelligibility that is not intelligent, and there is intelligibility that is also intelligent. To distinguish the two, we can call the former intelligibility "material" and the latter "spiritual."[23] *Emanatio intelligibilis* is a spiritual intelligibility because it is also intelligent. "Intelligible" in its ordinary English meaning is an appropriate translation because causes and proportions are intelligible. Thus, insofar as the procession of the word is caused by and in proportion to the understanding from which it proceeds, it is intelligible. "Intellectual" is preferable, however, because it emphasizes that the *emanatio intelligibilis* is not a material intelligibility, but rather, a spiritual intelligibility that is not just caused by understanding but is because of understanding-in-act. This kind of causality is unique to the spiritual order. In what follows, I use "intellectual emanation" or leave it in Latin because of the importance of the fact that the emanation is a spiritual intelligibility. Sometime, I adopt Robert Doran's suggestion, calling intellectual emanations "autonomous spiritual processions" or simply "spiritual processions."

It is worth noting that Lonergan plays a major role in my examination of the *emanatio intelligibilis*. Lonergan stands out among theologians returning to Thomas Aquinas in response to Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Aeterni Patris,* in which the pope exhorted Catholic theologians to operate *ad mentem divi Thomae*. Lonergan's explicit intention was "to understand what Thomas meant by the intelligible procession of an inner word," as he remarked in the Epilogue to the final chapter of *Verbum*.[24] It seems that no prior Thomist was asking precisely the question Lonergan was in this retrieval.[25] Thus, as much of my work in this chapter is on understanding Lonergan

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[22] For example, *ipsum esse* is disproportionate to her intelligence. See *ST* Ia, qq. 12-13.

[23] See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 3, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 539 (henceforth *Insight*, CWL 3).

[24] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 222.

[25] Lawrence, "Lonergan's Foundations for Constitutive Communication," 266.

because he is such an important teacher when it comes to comprehending Thomas. Lonergan is

an important teacher because he worked at the intersection of Thomas's position on human

knowing and a method for authentically interpreting and retrieving Thomas. As he writes, "Now

to understand what Thomas meant and to understand as Thomas understood are one and the

same thing; for acts of meaning are inner words, and inner words proceed intelligibly from acts of

understanding."[26] I therefore turn to both Thomas and Lonergan in this chapter because the

ultimate systematic goal of this project is to come to an analogical understanding of the trinitarian

mystery and the relevance of this understanding to ministry and communicating Christian

meanings and values.

3. Paying attention to the Experience of the *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Levels of Understanding, Judging, and Deciding

Three passages from the first trinitarian question in the *Summa* provide the key to what Thomas

means by *emanatio intelligibilis*:[27]

> 1) "[W]henever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds
> something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing
> from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object."[28]

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[26] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 222-23.

[27] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 132-35.

[28] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1c. This translation is Michael G. Shields. See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics,* CWL 12, 133. Lonergan discovered that the key phrase in this passage had been omitted from the B. Geyer (in Florilegium Patristicum XXXVII, 1934) edition of questions 27-32 (*Prima pars*), as well as from the Blackfriars edition, except in a note (see vol. 6, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, and New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). The key phrase is *ex vi intellectivia proveniens* (issuing from our intellective power). When omitted, the translation becomes "which is the conception of the thing understood, proceeding from knowledge of it," rather than "which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge." That the inner word proceeds from our intellective power is the reason of the procession of the inner word is an *emanatio intelligibilis*. When the key phrase is omitted, Thomas's meaning is changed and the core meaning of the intellectual emanation of the inner word is lost. The edition with the key phrase emphasizes the dynamism of the intellect, namely, that the intellect originates meaning (inner words) and does so autonomously (rather than spontaneously or rather than concepts popping into it, (perhaps by *amnanesis*), which it then goes on to understand). These elements—which are absolutely essential to what Thomas means by *intelligere* and its relevance to trinitarian theology—are glossed over when the key phrase is omitted. Furthermore, the absolute dependence of the inner word on *intelligere* (on understanding) in which act proceeds from act, is also ambiguous in the inaccurate edition. See Robert M. Doran, *The Trinity in History: A Theology of the Divine*

2) "For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect…love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect…"[29]

3) "Whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood."[30]

By attending to our intellectual experience, we can verify each statement and identify these intellectual emanations in our own experiences. In so doing, we will focus on the unique characteristics intellectual emanations have as a particular type of procession. These emanations are immanent, actual, and intellectual processions. You may be able to recall four different, but related, experiences: (1) times when you genuinely understood something and could therefore explain what you understood and other times when you merely memorized something and (2) times when you judged rashly and other times when you judged soundly; (3) times when you loved something because you understood and times when you loved with infatuation or from delusion, or perhaps times when people attempted to inspire in you love of their cause without convincing you of its value[31]; and (4) times when you acted unreasonably and other times when you acted reasonably. What makes the difference among each instance is an intellectual emanation. Intellectual emanation is what is absent from memorization, but present in speaking from understanding; absent with rash judgment, but present with sound judgment; absent with irrational love but present with rational love; absent with irrational behavior, but present with reasonable behavior. The first experience occurs on the level of direct understanding, when you are intelligently conscious.[32] The second experience occurs on the level of reflective

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Missions, Volume 1: Missions and Processions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 191 fn. 38 (henceforth *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1).

[29] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3, ad 3.

[30] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1, ad. 2.

[31] See Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 124-25.

[32] "Level" is Lonergan's metaphor for distinguishing between the various identifiable sets of conscious

understanding, when you are rationally conscious. The third and fourth experiences occur on the level of decision and action, when you are reasonably or rationally self-conscious. Notice that intellectual emanations proceed not from level to level, but *within* a level. It is only on the level of decision and action (what Lonergan calls the fourth level of consciousness), when we are engaged with value (rather than with mere facts), that we have the procession of both an inner word from understanding, and of love from the word.[33]

Take the classroom as an example. The first instance of intellectual emanation distinguishes students who understand the course material from students who merely repeat what the teacher said. The worst-case scenario is one in which both the teacher and the students are merely regurgitating information. In this case, as the saying goes, the notes of the teacher pass from the teacher to the students without passing through the minds of either. Yet a good teacher can identify the student who understands because this student is able explain the material in a variety of ways; she is flexible, not tethered to the words of the book, and she is able to create her own examples. The key is to recognize *why* intellectual emanation is present in the good student and absent in the poor student. A student's ability to intelligently define, explain, give examples, etc. is possible precisely if, and because, she understands and knows that she understands. She knows that she is not "faking it." Instead, she knows that she has a sufficient grasp of the situation in order to be able to speak about it and others like it. If we can identify this difference between the presence and absence of intellectual emanation on the level of understanding, we will be

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operations—experience, understanding, judging, deciding/acting (and perhaps, loving). There are limits to this "spatial metaphor of speaking of levels of consciousness," which Lonergan, himself acknowledges. Lonergan actually wanted to remove this metaphor and replace it with Rahner's notion of sublation, which is more explanatory. See Bernard Lonergan, "Faith and Beliefs," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980,* Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 17, eds. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 36. See also Patrick H. Byrne, "Consciousness: Levels, Sublations, and the Subject as Subject" *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 1 (1995), 138.

[33] That is, we do not break forth into love when we are merely judging the correctness of our insights (the level of reflective understanding, when we are rationally conscious).

getting closer to understanding Thomas's meaning in the initial trinitarian article: "Whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object."[34] Notice that there are "two stages," so to speak, namely, the insight ("whenever we understand") and the definition (the proceeding "conception"). It is only on account of the fact that we have interiorly spoken a word to ourselves because we have understood that we are then able to communicate meaningfully with others. That is, the procession of the inner word of definition from understanding is the condition for the possibility of communicating what we have understood to others.

The second instance of intellectual emanations distinguishes someone who carefully considers matters from someone who jumps to conclusions or fails to reach a conclusion despite compelling evidence. Again, the key is to identify the reason why intellectual emanation is present in the former and absent in the latter. Here, a person judges soundly precisely if, and because, she is satisfied with the evidence, and knows it is sufficient. A rash person judges either without evidence or by ignoring the evidence. The third instance distinguishes a mature lover from the merely infatuated or the unconvinced. Lastly, the fourth instance distinguishes someone who acts reasonably (and so has a clear conscience) from someone who acts irrationally (and so rationalizes her behavior in order to quell her conscience). The reasonable person chooses a good precisely if, and because, she has approved of the worthiness of the good, and knows this approval is a sufficient reason to choose it. If we can identify the differences within the third and fourth instances, we will be closer to understanding what Augustine and Thomas mean by "knowledge with love." For example, Thomas writes, "Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but

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[34] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1c. However, it should be noted that Aquinas is speaking more broadly in this Article. This emanation includes not only the one that distinguishes understanding from memorization, but also sound judgment from rash judgment. As will be seen below, understanding (*intelligere*) for Aquinas includes two operations, each of which gives rise to a corresponding word.

one Who breathes forth Love [*verbum spirans amorem*]."[35] If we can identify experiences of these intellectual emanations in our own lives, we can then inquire after their nature, focusing upon the reason for their emergence. As these examples suggest, this reason is grounded in the "because"—precisely if, *and because*, one has understood, weighed the evidence to her satisfaction, approved. I will expand on this "because-of-ness" in Chapter 4. First, let us return to the three passages from the *Summa* and further our understanding of why the *emanatio intelligibilis* is the natural analogue Thomas selects for the divine processions.

The first two passages pertain to the intellectual emanations of word and love, respectively. The third passage pertains to the unique relationship of dependence proper to intellectual emanation in which absolute distinction is not only unnecessary, but also decreases in proportion to the perfection of the procession.[36] In order to understand the procession of the word, we have to understand the relationship between the act of understanding and its word. In order to understand the procession of love, we have to understand the relationship between word and love.

Before proceeding, a short outline of why the *emanatio intelligibilis* is the natural analogue Thomas selects for the divine processions is in order. Thomas makes a distinction between two kinds of immanent processions—that is, a procession that remains within rather than proceeding to an exterior effect.[37] First, there is the kind that proceeds from potency to act. This is the procession of a perfection (e.g, an operation such as the act of understanding) in what is perfected (e.g., the possible intellect), which Thomas calls a *processio operationis* (the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected). Second, there is a procession that proceeds from act to act. This

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[35] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad. 2.

[36] Aquinas begins working the coincidence of principle and term out in *SCG* 4, c. 11, §1-7.

[37] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1: "Careful examination shows that both of these opinions [of Arius and Sabellius] take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent."

is the procession of something produced by an operation; a procession of something operated; it is

the emergence of one thing from another. Thomas calls this second type of procession a *processio*

operati.[38] Both types of processions are immanent processions, and in both we find a distinction of

principle and term.[39] These features are relevant to understanding procession in God. However, a

processio operationis is ultimately irrelevant to trinitarian theology because it includes potency. A

processio operati is, however, relevant because it excludes potency; it is a procession that occurs

entirely within the realm of act. That is, the principle is related to the proceeding term as act to

act.[40] With respect to the Trinity, the divine processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit remain

entirely within God, the three Persons are distinct according to the relations of principle

(originator(s)) and terms (originated) among them, and God is pure act. Thus, *processio operati* is

relevant because it is an immanent procession, because there is a distinction of principle and term,

and because it excludes potency.

      Examples of processions of acts from potency are the emergence of act of seeing a shark

from the power (potency) of sight in the eye, the emergence of the act of understanding within the

intellect, or the emergence of the act of love within the will. As examples of processions of acts

from acts, there is the act of fear proceeding from an act of seeing a shark, an act of defining

proceeding from an act of understanding, an act of judgment proceeding from an act of reflective

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[38] See *De ver.* q. 4, a. 2 ad 7. See also *SCG* 4, c. 14, §3: "In like manner, too, the word conceived by our intellect does not proceed from potency to act except in so far as the intellect proceeds from potency to act. For all that, the word does not arise in our intellect except as it exists in act; rather, simultaneously with its existence in act, there is a word conceived therein. But the divine intellect is never in potency, but is actual only, as was shown above. *Therefore, the generation of the Word Himself is not like the process from potency to act rather, it is like the origin of act from act*, as is brilliance from light and an understanding understood from an understanding in act. Hence, clearly also, generation does not prevent the Son of God from being true God, nor from being Himself eternal. Rather, He is indeed necessarily coeternal with God whose Word He is, for an intellect in act is never without its word" (emphasis added).

[39] However, as we saw in the passage from Question 27, this distinction is not absolute; there can be a coincidence of principle and term, even while there is an ordered relation among them. I will discuss this point in Chapter 5.

[40] A *processio operationis* can also be an immanent procession involving the distinction of principle and term, for example, the emergence of an insight from a question. However, this is an immanent procession that involves potency, and is therefore irrelevant to trinitarian theology.

understanding, or an act of love that proceeds from an intellectual grasp of the good. Of these examples, the procession of fear is irrelevant to trinitarian theology because the procession is within human sensitivity. The last three are relevant to trinitarian theology because they are within human intelligence. Each one is a *processio operati* that is also *processio intelligibilis,* meaning that the procession of what proceeds is *because of* understanding (which cannot be said of the procession of fear).[41] As Thomas expressed in Question 27, it is this specific type of *processio operati* that ultimately is relevant to trinitarian theology precisely because of the relationship of *intellectual* dependence among principle and term.

4. The Intellectual Emanation of the Inner Word: *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Direct Understanding

While it can be easier to understand intellectual emanations on the level of reflective understanding (judgment), it is also beneficial to proceed according to the order of the levels of consciousness, especially for the sake of coming to terms with the primary act of the intellect, understanding. Thus, I begin with intellectual emanations on the level of direct understanding (insight). What we are trying to catch hold of is the difference between on the one hand, consciously 'getting the point,' and on other, conceptualizing the point in words and concepts. Keep the following chart in mind as we proceed. I will return to it in Section 4.3:

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[41] See Lonergan, *Verbum* CWL 2, 207. See above on the translation of *emanatio intelligibilis*, §2. Introduction: *Emanatio Intelligibilis* and Trinitarian Theology.

(**Act A as act**) *intelligere:* the act of direct understanding (which might or might not function as *dicere,* i.e., act as a source of speaking what it has understood)

> (**Act A as grounding another act**) *dicere:* the act of direct understanding *as* speaking, as pivoting on itself to produce a word, as processing from understanding to conceptualizing (which in us includes "sorting or figuring out," disentangling, formulating what we understand in order to speak)

(**Act B**) *concipere:* the act of formal meaning, conceiving, conceptualizing, receiving a *verbum* (inner word), a concept, a definition generated by *dicere.*

– *Intelligere* can be understood relationally. It is related to its object (illuminated phantasm) and to its term (word).
– Notice that *intelligere* and *dicere* are the same act (the act of understanding) viewed in two different ways; *dicere* is really identical with *intelligere. Intelligere* is one act that has two different modes of operating. It can operate as act (as simply being in act), and then it is termed *intelligere.* It can also operate as an act grounding another act (in which case it is operating as a procession—the procession of conceptualizing-in-act from understanding-in-act) and then it is termed *dicere.*
– *Concipere* is a distinct act, which proceeds from *intelligere.* This procession is a *processio operati,* which is also an *emanatio intelligibilis.* Notice that *intelligere/dicere* (Act A) processes toward *concipere* (Act B). The process is from the formation of the inner word (*intelligere/dicere*) toward the reception of the inner word (*concipere*). This procession of act-to-act is what *dicere* consists in.

Table 8

I offer three preliminary notes, which I will unfold in this section.[42] First, *intelligere* has two

modes of operating. It operates as the act of understanding (insight) and as the act of speaking an

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[42] I owe the words "disentangling" and "*concipere*" to Dr. Patrick Byrne. "Disentangling" (and its synonym, "formulating") is the word (the phantasm, if you will) Byrne used to help me understand the series of acts under insight's governance on the way to the final expressing of the insight, where the final expressing (the procession) is what, strictly speaking, *dicere* consists in. As Byrne said during an informal conversation we had, "Formulating is a process; but expressing is not the process of formulating; it is the end point of formulating." Insight's pivoting on itself to produce a word is the actual speaking/expressing/*dicens* of the insight.

In a conversation Patrick Byrne had once with Lonergan, Lonergan shared he called the second act proceeding from *intelligere* "*concipere*." I have, therefore, decided to use this word to name the second act throughout my dissertation. While "*concipere*" does not appear in his *Verbum* studies, Lonergan does at times use the word "conceptualization" to designate the act that *intelligere* grounds, which is one way to translate "*concipere*" (though I have chosen, on Byrne's recommendation, to use "conceptualizing" to emphasize that *act* of conceptualization). For example, Lonergan writes, "The Scotist rejection of insight into phantasm necessarily reduced the act of understanding to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding precedes *conceptualization* which is rational, for Scotus understanding is preceded by conceptualization which is a matter of metaphysical mechanics" (*Verbum*, CWL 2, 39, fn. 126, emphasis added). Again, Lonergan writes, "Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of understanding; such self-expression is possible only because understanding is self-possessed, conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding…it is in the self-possession of understanding as the ground of possible conceptualization that one may best discern what is meant by saying that the self-expression of understanding is an *emanatio intelligibilis*, a procession from knowledge as knowledge and because of

inner word; *intelligere* is an operation (insight) that operates (speaks) an inner word. To put it differently, the operation or action of the intellect has two meanings, which Thomas clarified exactly because of the precision required by trinitarian theology. As Lonergan writes, "the terms *operatio* or *action* sometimes mean simply act or being in act and sometimes mean the exercise of efficient causality."[43] When the operation of the intellect is meant in the sense of act, it is termed *intelligere.* When the operation of the intellect is meant in the sense of one act grounding another act, it is termed *dicere.*[44] Thus, *dicere* is really identical with *intelligere*, but it denotes *intelligere's* operation as grounding another act, as processing toward another act. *Dicere* is *intelligere* as a *principium operati*[45], and more particularly, as an intellectual procession—as an *emanatio intelligibilis*—of a concept from an act of understanding. It is only insofar as the intellect is in act that it can ground another act, which means that it is only insofar as we understand that we can form concepts. Insofar as we can distinguish acts according to their object, we can distinguish these two modes of operating according to whether the object of *intelligere* is the intelligibility in the phantasm (which initiates the process of understanding), or the inner word (whose procession signals the completion of the process of understanding). Understanding is, as Lawrence writes, "perfected in the utterance of the inner word."[46]

Second, notice that we have the procession of an act (*concipere*) from an act (*intelligere*)—and thus a *processio operati*. This procession is what *dicere* consists in. I have termed the second act "*concipere*," which carries the connotations both of receiving and conceptualizing. This terminology is consonant with Thomas's meaning, though he typically refers to the emergence of

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knowledge as knowledge." (ibid., 55-6). Lastly, "rational consciousness (*dicere*) is the act of understanding as ground and origin of inner words of conceptualization and judgment…" (ibid., 152). See also ibid., 38, 52-53, 56, 58, 70, 72.

[43] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 136.

[44] See ibid.

[45] Principle of a thing produced by an operation.

[46] Frederick F. Lawrence, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aquinas's Conception of the *Imago Dei:* The Trinitarian Analogy of Intelligible Emanations in God,*" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 83, no. 3 (2009), 372.

the content of the act (the concept or inner word) rather than the act of conceptualizing itself.[47]

Notice that the *verbum* is not an act, but the content of an act, and specifically, the content of the

act that *intelligere/dicere* processes toward. The fact that Thomas names this second act (*concipere*)

only implicitly by means of its content (*verbum, conceptus*) obscures the act-to-act procession. It

seems that the reason Thomas typically refers to that which proceeds from *intelligere* simply as

"*verbum*," rather than referring to the second *act* that proceeds from *intelligere* is because he is

working out the meaning of *verbum* in the context of trinitarian theology.[48] In God, there is only

one infinite act. Thus, the point in trinitarian theology is to emphasize the distinction between

intelligere and *verbum* without emphasizing the distinction of acts. However, because we are

currently trying to understand the natural analogue, we must attend to the distinction of these two

acts, for in us, one distinct act proceeds from another distinct act.

While Thomas only implicitly names *concipere* in terms of its content, he does refer to the

emergence of the *act* of judgment (*iudicare*) from a reflective act of understanding (*intelligere*), which

is the parallel act-to-act procession on the level of judgment.[49] For Thomas, the content of the act

of judgment (the inner word of affirmation/denial) is an expression in the same way the content of

the act of conceptualizing is an expression. Thus, given the parallel between the contents, it seems

that while Thomas does not enunciate a technical term for the second act that emerges on the

level of direct understanding, it is reasonable to conclude that he knew of this second act.

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[47] See Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being: The Hallifax Lectures on* Insight, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 5, eds. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 280-81 (henceforth, *Understanding and Being*, CWL 5).

[48] See above, fn. 38 (*SCG* 4, c. 14, §3). This is an instance in which Thomas alludes to an act following *intelligere*, though he still speaks in terms of the *verbum*.

[49] Lonergan aligns conceptualization and judgment (what I call "*concipere*" and *"iudicare"*) in a way that indicates that he conceives of conceptualization as the act that proceeds from understanding: "There remain to be considered the psychology of judgment, the metaphysical analysis of insight, of conceptualization, and of judgment…" (*Verbum*, CWL 2, 59). When Lonergan says "insight," he means both direct insight (from which the act of conceptualizing emerges) and reflective insight (from which the act of judgment emerges).

As another preliminary note, while my examples often include outer spoken words, these words are distinct from the *verbum*, from the "inner word" or the "word of the heart" (*verbum intus prolatum*) that Augustine and Thomas mean when they are setting forth their analogies for the Trinity.[50] Augustine speaks of the inner word as what Lonergan calls '*prelinguistic*': "for, although the words are not sounded, he who thinks utters (them) in his heart."[51] Further, "Whoever is able to get hold of a word . . . not only before it is sounded, but even before the images of its sounds are revolved in fantasy (*cogitatione*)…can see…in this dim reflection some likeness of that Word of whom it is said: *In principio erat Verbum.*"[52] A prelinguistic "word" is experienced, for example, as an interior shift to formal meaning—to knowing what you have understood, to knowing the meaning of your insight, to having a sense of the stability and universality of your understanding—that precedes any linguistic formulation (including the inner monologues that are clothed in images of sound).[53] As Lawrence explains, even Gadamer—an expert in hermeneutics—holds the same position. Lawrence summarizes:

> Although Gadamer usually stresses that both in the genesis of understanding and in the formulation of that understanding we cannot attain true understanding without using language, here he insists in that the *verbum cordis* or inner word is irreducible either to the previous use of language by which we come to understand any *Sache* or matter of concern to us, or to the conventional language that enables us to appropriate and express what we have newly understood. …Gadamer does not hesitate to recognize the necessity of an inner word in our coming to know; he realizes that it grounds his more well-known teaching that an intrinsic linguisticality, a naturally dialogical component, is essential to being human.[54]

In fact, sometimes the language does not yet exist for the concepts expressing our insights, and so language must develop beyond what Gadamer calls the "conventional language." Reflecting on

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[50] It is difficult to figure out a good English word for *dicere*, given the importance of the distinction between "outer *spoken*" words and the inner word. I use "speaking" to translate *dicere*, but admittedly this can cause some confusion given that outer words are literally spoken.

[51] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.10.17 (Hill, 407-08).

[52] Ibid., 15.10.19 (Hill, 409).

[53] See Ibid.

[54] Lawrence, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aquinas's Conception of the *Imago Dei*," 374. Lawrence is referring to Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum Press, 1989), 422-24. I owe the following Gadamer references to Fred Lawrence.

the Gospel of John in *Truth and Method*, Gadamer points to the Church's gradual realization that

the Stoic distinction between the *verbum insitum* (the innate word of the human person's native

rationality, inner thought) and "its secondary, diminished externalization," the *verbum prolatum* (the

outer word) was inadequate to express the mystery of the Word that comes forth from the Father

(John 8: 42).[55] Gadamer acknowledged the implication of the shared trinitarian theology of

Augustine and Thomas, which underscores the priority of the inner word (*verbum intus prolatum*) to

language.[56] It is only this word that is analogically relevant to understanding the Word of which

John speaks. As Gadamer writes: "The greater miracle of language lies not in the fact that the

Word becomes flesh and emerges in external being, but that that which emerges and externalizes

itself in utterance *is always already a word*."[57] This word that is "always already a word" is the

miracle of language, for it is a "word" that is nevertheless prior to language. The inner word is

completely independent of its external utterance in one or the other conventional language. It is a

word that is nevertheless prelinguistic, that is, independent of and prior to conventional

language.[58] When Augustine and Thomas turn to the problem of the *verbum* in order to find an

adequate natural analogue for the procession of the Word as uttered from the Father as speaking,

they are concerned exclusively with the this inner word and its relation to *intelligere*.[59]

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[55] Lawrence, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aquinas's Conception of the *Imago Dei*," 371. The innate word of the human person's native rationality is the conversation we have with ourselves as we try to work something out. See also Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 6.

[56] See Lawrence, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aquinas's Conception of the *Imago Dei*," 370-71. Lawrence is referring to Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 420.

[57] Ibid., 420.

[58] Gadamer recognizes the paradox of this so-called "prelinguistic" word: "It may be asked whether we are not here using the unintelligible to explain the unintelligible. What sort of word is it that remains the inner dialogue of thought and finds no outer form in sound? Does such a thing exist? Does not all our thinking always follow the paths of a particular language, and do we not know only too well that one has to think in a language if one really wants to speak it? …The 'language of reason' is not a special language. So, considering that the tie with language is irremovable, what sense is there in speaking of an 'inner word' that is spoken, as it were, in the pure language of reason? How does the word of reason (if we translate *intellectus* here by 'reason') prove itself a real 'word', if it is not a word with a sound, nor even the image of one, but is that which is signified by a sign, i.e. what is meant and thought itself?" *Truth and Method*, 421.

[59] See Lawrence, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aquinas's Conception of the *Imago Dei*," 371-72. See also

Inner words are the source of language, of what Thomas calls "outer words" or "vocal sounds".[60] These outer words are linguistic. They can be written or spoken words or they can be the imagined-sound words we use "in our heads" as we talk to ourselves. Outer words are important and they play an instrumental role as phantasms facilitating our acts of understanding and our production of inner words. In this way, language conditions and directs future acts of understanding. We use language to think things out. This is the "previous use of language" to which Gadamer refers. However, the ultimate source of outer words is understanding, for it is understanding that gives rise to inner words, which outer words signify.

We have run into an issue of paucity of vocabulary in trying to express the meaning of the Latin words "*dicere*" and "*verbum*," and especially, the relationship of the latter to outer words. Insights are pre-conceptual (and therefore prior to language, but not in the same sense as inner words—the former precede the existence of inner words), whereas inner words are concepts, and yet distinct from outer spoken words. "Prelinguistic" is the term Lonergan settles on as communicating Augustine and Thomas's meaning. In the *Summa,* Thomas addresses the difficulty surrounding the meaning of *verbum* in the question on the personal name for the Son. He distinguishes between the interior concept, the vocal sound, and the imagined sound, explaining that the first of these is the primary meaning of "*verbum*":

> [O]ur own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source…For, according to the Philosopher (*Peri Herm.* i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect. …The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (*De Fide Orth.* i, 17), saying that 'word' is called 'the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;' which is the first kind. 'Again,' he says,

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Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 420.

[60] See *De ver.* q. 4, a. 1; *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1c; *In Ioan.*, c. 1, lect. 1, §25.

'*the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart* [*rursus verbum est quod non verbo profertur, sed in corde pronuntiatur*];' which is the third kind.[61]

Given Thomas's threefold distinction, we can understand the *verbum cordis* that proceeds from *intelligere* as a word without sound, whether voiced or imagined, which itself gives rise to sounded words. This is another way to describe the meaning of a "prelinguistic" word that is nevertheless uttered or spoken within. The speaking is the aforementioned interior shift, the self-possession of one's act of understanding, the stable experience of reaching a universal definition.

4.1 Understanding the *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Experience: Understanding the "Aha! Moment" and the "Tip of the Tongue" Experiences

In what follows, two important points arise. One, the primary meaning of *intelligere* is understanding (also called insight). Two, the inner word proceeds because of understanding, which means that understanding precedes concepts (and not vice versa). This is an important issue. Scotus maintained that concepts preceded understanding. Many commentators agreed. Of conceptualism, Lonergan writes:

> Conceptualists conceive intellect only in terms of what it does; but their neglect of what intellect is, prior to what it does, has a variety of causes. Most commonly they do not advert to the act of understanding. They take concepts for granted; they are busy working out arguments to produce certitudes; they prolong their spontaneous tendencies to extroversion into philosophy, where they concentrate on metaphysics and neglect gnoseology.[62]

Lonergan's *Verbum* articles demonstrated that this conceptualist interpretation is a misreading of Thomas. Thomas, by way of an incisive grasp of psychological fact, emphatically insisted that *intelligere* means understanding, and that it precedes the formation of concepts. This ordered relationship between understanding and concepts—between *intelligere* and the *verbum*—is the central issue of an analogical conception of the divine processions, and must be grasped correctly. This procession is the intellectual emanation. In order to come to terms with it, the complex

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[61] See *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1c.
[62] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 194.

nature of the act of understanding must be grasped (Act A as act and Act A as an act grounding another act, Act B). Additionally, the distinction and relation between understanding and defining (Act A and Act B) must be grasped.

4.1.1 The Question for Intelligence: What? Why? How?

Human understanding begins with inquiry, with the desire to know. We have experiences, and we ask questions about them. In order to answer our questions, we form phantasms (images, which can be visual, auditory, etc.) and draw diagrams. We manipulate them to focus our attention on particularly relevant elements of the data.[63] For example, your teacher asks you to define "circle." You begin imagining some circles you have experienced in your own life. You imagine the wooden wheels of wagons and the rubber, metal wheels of your bike. You notice how different the two are, and that the latter is much more perfectly round. You wonder *why*. You wonder what makes the bike tire round, or more generally, why any circle is round.[64] Before this question occurred, you may have been operating only under the necessity of doing the homework. Now inquiry has taken over and you have become intelligently conscious. Your question is in charge of your intelligent acts. Your inquiry is eliciting images and past memories that it anticipates will be helpful to answering your question. Your inquiry is what is doing the structuring of your imagination. Inquiry is the phenomenon that makes your imagination creative rather than randomly associative.

Currently, you are experiencing the tension of having a question and not knowing the answer to it. At times it is even frustrating, a "nagging question." While we have thousands of questions of all different kinds, they all have one thing in common—when we have a question, we

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[63] See *ST* Ia, q. 84, a. 7c: "As anyone can experience for himself, if he attempts to understand anything, he will form phantasms for himself which serve examples in which he can consider what he is attempting to understand. This is the reason, indeed, why, when we want to help someone understand something, we propose examples to him so that he can form phantasms for himself in order to understand."

[64] The circle is one of Lonergan's most oft used examples. I use and modify his example it in what follows. See Lonergan, *Insight*, CWL 3, 31-37,

are conscious of the fact that we do not know the answer, that we are missing something. Yet, we are also conscious of the fact that we have the ability to arrive at an answer.[65] In other words, you have an interrogative anticipation of the answer, and this guides your imagining. Notice that understanding depends on questioning, and questioning depends on the desire to know. Questioning is the key activity because it transforms what is potentially intelligible into something actually intelligible; that is, questioning makes the object intellectually knowable.

4.1.2 The Act of Understanding: Insight into Phantasm and Speaking

Let us return to the example of defining a circle. You play around with these two images of circles, until you notice that the cartwheel's spokes vary in length. The bike wheel, by contrast, has equal spokes. And then all of a sudden, it hits you, "I've got it! I've grasped the intelligibility of this particular round thing I've been trying to understand." This is *intelligere*, or what Lonergan calls "insight" (Act A as act). These moments are surprising and can even catch us off-guard. Once you get it, you experience a release of tension, which gives way to the joyful pleasure of discovery, of "getting it." It is this release of tension that alerts you to the fact that you have found something that might explain what you were looking for in the first place. Nobody tells you that you discovered it; it is not something you know because there is some preliminary picture or eternal form with which you can compare your insight. Neither is it a recollection, as Plato would have us think. As Lonergan writes, "Aquinas replaced mythical Platonic anamnesis by psychological fact, and, to describe the psychological fact, eliminated the subsistent Ideas to

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[65] See Joseph Flanagan, *Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 17. Of course, this arrival may take years or even generations. We can also recognize that we are asking about something disproportionate to our intelligence (e.g., the Trinity), and so must have recourse to analogies and arguments of fittingness. Lastly, sometimes the insight that occurs is inverse, meaning we realize that there actually is no answer to our question because there is no intelligibility. For example, asking why evil exists is a question that requires an inverse insight because evil is not intelligible, given that it is non-being. But in the face of this inverse insight, another question can arise—what is God *doing* about evil? That is a question we can begin to answer.

introduce formal causes in material things."[66] You are conscious of the fact that you understood because the tension has evaporated and been replaced by joy.[67]

Despite this joy, another question arises, But what did I get? In order to figure this out, you begin trying to formulate what you've understood. It is your insight that governs this figuring out what it got, and it is the insight that speaks once it has done so. We are referring to the same act, *intelligere*, but we are now focusing on something else it does—something besides "aha!" (i.e., being in act)—namely, speaking a word (i.e., grounding another act). Let us return to the question, "But what did I get?" The tension of inquiry may have been replaced by joy, but the joy was incomplete because what exactly it was that you got is not yet clear. The "unknown" that you discovered is still a bit fuzzy—you cannot yet express to yourself what you understood. Insight still needs to sort out the relevant material from the irrelevant material in the phantasm. The reason insight does so is because, as Byrne explains, "[a]ny phantasm is always very rich and always contains more material than is relevant or necessary for the occurrence of any single insight that arises from it. Every phantasm is capable of giving rise to numerous insights. (A red circle can give rise to insights about color or about geometry, among other things.)"[68]

We can usually recognize this further question (What did I get?) as a "tip of the tongue" experience, or the experience of not quite being able to "put our finger on it." We know that we have "got it" and yet, we cannot yet quite say what it is we have gotten—we are still tied to the image that occasioned our insight, and therefore, to the particularities surrounding our insight. We have to come to terms with our understanding in order to be able to speak. Perhaps a

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[66] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 195-96.

[67] Of course, the tension can return as further questions arise. Moreover, the spirit of wonder gives way to the critical spirit, as another and distinct kind of question arises—the "Is it so?" question. And so, this joy that comes with insight is not the end of the process, but it is a crucial aspect. Thus, even though you are aware of the fact that you understand, this is not sufficient grounds for affirming that you understood correctly. You are simply aware that you have had an insight into the problem at hand, and it might be a mere bright idea. I will return to this below.

[68] I owe this understanding to Professor Byrne. This quotation is from a comment he offered on my dissertation on July 13, 2017.

classmate observes your "light bulb" moment of insight and asks you what you understood, but you find you cannot explain yourself. You respond, "Give me a moment," and you get to work. You feel another tension. This tension feels different than the initial tension because now you know you are close. Now, it is the tense excitement that comes with being on the verge of something. Before (prior to the aha! moment), when you were asking questions and playing around with your images, you might go hours or even days without actively considering the problem. In fact, the aha! experience may have come when you were not even thinking about circles—maybe it came when you were pumping your bike tire and happened to notice the spokes.[69] No matter what, you could not force the "aha!" experience. The insight did not come at your beck and call. It had to come in its own time, on its own terms. Thus, the occurrence of insight has a passive, spontaneous character.

By contrast, now that you have had the insight, you are actively and autonomously working to figure out what it is you "got." The word is on the tip of your tongue, but you cannot quite put your finger on it. Perhaps your eyes travel upwards and off to the right, as if searching for the words in your mind. Your insight is now in control of your intelligent acts, whereas prior to your insight it was inquiry that was in control of them. You've gone from the state of inquiry to the state of being intelligent-in-act. Importantly, the same act of intelligence that "got it" is still operating. Now intelligence is actively and autonomously trying to speak what it passively and spontaneously understood when it got "it."[70] Once you have an insight, your insight takes over and is in charge of your efforts to formulate what you have understood. You are operating

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[69] This highlights the reason Thomas considered *intelligere* a *pati*. The intelligible *species* is something received in the passive intellect, though its reception is made possible by agent intellect's inquisitive illumination of the phantasm. See *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 2.

[70] Recall that your questions passively occur to you. Once a question occurs to you, your inquiry takes over your intelligent acts—you play around with images, for example. In this regard, you are operating actively and autonomously once a question occurs to you. However, while you can play around with images, you cannot force an insight—insights, like questions, passively and spontaneously occur to you.

actively and autonomously, and it is precisely your active and autonomous operating that proceeds toward another act, *concipere*.

This active, autonomous activity of intelligence is the key point. The tense excitement of trying to put something you understand into words is a conscious manifestation of this activity. Once you understand what you have understood—that is, once you speak what you have—there is another release of tension, but this time it is not the joy of discovery. Rather, it is the recognition not only that you have understood, but understanding precisely what you've understood. While this is also a joyful experience, it is more like the joy of satisfaction rather than the joy of discovery; it is relaxing.

4.1.3 Intelligent Meaning and Defining

Where the release of tension that comes with the insight (aha!) is like the ecstasy of a young lover, the release of tension that comes with the speaking of the inner word is like the calm assurance of a mature love. The young lover wants to tell everyone about her beloved, but has not quite formulated the 'why' of her love. The mature lover is able to avow her love precisely because she has formulated the 'why.' Yet, like the young lover—for they are one and the same lover—the mature lover cannot help but avow her love now that she understands it. Where the young lover is impatient at her discovery, the mature lover speaks up because it is unthinkable not to. Furthermore, the mature lover is in the stable state of having grasped and firmly holding the reason for her love. In other words, you cannot help but utter your understanding (*dicere*, Act A as grounding Act B) in an act of conceptualizing, of defining, of formal meaning (*concipere*, Act B), and when you do, you experience a sense of completion, stability, satisfaction. *Dicere*, as the act of *intelligere* (understanding) formulating itself, is the (proximate) origin, and its term is *concipere*.[71]

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[71] I owe this way of putting it to Professor Patrick Byrne.

This experience of needing to speak once you know is most noticeable when you recall moments of finally "putting your finger on it." However trivial your understanding, you feel a desire to tell someone about it. You could not really tell anyone about it while it was still on the tip of your tongue. If you had tried, your words would be confused, ambiguous—though this effort could help you in finding the words for your understanding. But once you do find the word for it, you want to share it with others. You find what you have understood exciting, meaningful. And perhaps more importantly, you want to share your understanding with others because it is *yours*; because it expresses *you*, and you are different because of your new understanding. You have moved beyond yourself, who you were, by this understanding. You are becoming someone on account of your understanding. In this way, the inner word you speak about what you have understood is also always a *self*-expression.

Notice that the speaker and the spoken word are distinct, and yet there cannot be one without the other, as with the lover and love. They are relative terms. As Augustine writes, "And [lover and love] are called two things *relative to one another*. Lover has reference to love, and love to lover; for lover loves with some love, and love is of some lover…take away lover and there is no love; take away love and there is no lover."[72] The same is true of speaker and the spoken inner word. The act of speaking (*dicere*) grounds the relationship between the speaker and the speaking.[73] Thus, lover : love :: speaker : speaking. In us, having an insight and having a word are different acts (or states of being). Insight entails both the excitement of the aha! experience as well as the relaxing satisfaction of coming to terms with your insight and thereby being able to speak. The act of defining (or having a word) is like the experience of being in possession of oneself—of knowing exactly who you are, where you came from, and how you came about, and why you are here. Why? Because defining emerges precisely because insight has understood what it "got." The inner

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[72] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.1.3 (hill, 272-73).
[73] See, for example, *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3.

word of definition intelligently expresses what insight got because it was spoken by the insight, which knows itself as the sufficient grounds for speaking. The word therefore knows that it has nothing of its own but everything from the insight from which it emerged. Yet in knowing its dependence, it knows itself and could almost be said to be faithful to its source—the speaker— because it knows its absolute dependence on its source.

To summarize, your intelligent inquiry and imagining set the conditions for an insight to emerge. The content of your insight is an idea. However, as yet, you have not spoken, and, therefore, you have not conceptualized your idea; your idea is pre-conceptual, meaning it is basically undifferentiated and not yet clearly defined. (This is why you have the "tip of the tongue" experience—you've got it, and yet, you're not quite all the way there). Your idea is about why *this* circle is round; not about why all circles are round or in other words, what a circle is. Your idea is of how *this* is so or why *this* is the case. In other words, your idea is of the universal in the particular; it is not yet of the universal common to many. That is, you have intelligently disregarded what was irrelevant in this particular phantasm, but you have not yet conceived a universal definition of this kind of thing, in general. However, your idea can be universalized because the *here* and *now* of *this* particular thing are not intrinsic to the idea.[74] For this reason, your idea (the content of your insight) is the foundation for conceptualizing the universal definition of all such similar instances. In order to reach this universal definition, you need to formulate "the connection between your idea and the image that evoked it,"[75] so that you can set up what you've understood apart from its material conditions (e.g., 'this,' 'here,' and 'now') that are tethering the intelligibility to this one instance.

You begin to feel another tension—the tip of the tongue experience as you begin formulating your idea. Formulating is of your idea because it is the activity that sorts out what "it"

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[74] I owe this way of formulating the matter to conversations with Jeremy Wilkins.
[75] Mark D. Morelli, *Self-Possession: Being at Home in Conscious Performance* (Boston: Lonergan Institute, 2015), 165.

was that you "got"; it separates what is not intrinsic to the idea (*this, here, now*) and intelligently disregards them as irrelevant to the act of understanding. The content of your formulating is "the set of aspects of the image that were essential to the occurrence of your act of understanding."[76] In order to determine the essential aspects, you also have to focus on the insight, itself. When you formulate your idea, you put your finger on it and finally express or speak it.

The content of your act of conceptualizing (the content of your definition) is the idea of the universal common to many (not of the universal in the particular). That is, the content of your definition is a concept or a word. Now your idea is conceptual, meaning it is clear and differentiated because you have formulated the connection between your idea and the image. Conceptualizing (*concipere*) is the terminal activity to being intelligent; it is the terminal activity on the level of direct understanding and the inner word is the terminal object of understanding. As Thomas writes, "it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception [*conceptio*] of the intellect."[77] The primary activity of direct understanding—of being intelligent—is the insight, but we need to bring direct understanding to completion in order to press forward with our desire to know the meaning of X (e.g., of a circle). With this terminal activity, your understanding is now of the universal common to many (the concept, the word) whereas before, it was of the universal in the particular (the formal cause of the material thing) because it was caught up with the image.[78]

To bring the foregoing together, the content of the insight is the idea of the universal in the particular. The content of the conceptualizing is the idea of the universal common to many (the concept, the definition). *Dicere* is the procession from insight to conceptualizing, from the idea of this particular thing to the concept of all similar instances.

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[76] Ibid.
[77] *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2c.
[78] See Morelli, *Self-Possession*, 164-65.

Before proceeding to relate the foregoing to Thomas's metaphysical language and analysis, there is one last relevant experience to note. We can recognize in our students that those willing to risk making mistakes generally excel, while those students who prefer to remain silent or only give textbook answers by which they are assured they will earn a passing grade do not change much over the course of the semester. I can recognize this fear of mistakes in my own intellectual life when I am afraid to put pen to paper and write. I prefer the comfort of research and the excitement of insight after insight to the discomfort and challenge of putting these insights into intelligent formulations (not to mention the further challenge of judging whether what I have understood explains the data of my experience). Perhaps it will become clear to me that I did not actually understand. Like my students, the fear of making a mistake or feeling unintelligent inhibits me, such that I may not pivot from my insight to speaking. By contrast, where some are afraid to speak for fear of discovering their lack of understanding, others speak presumptuously, without any concern for the intelligibility of their words.

To recognize this in your own experience, try to recall times when you jumped to the tension of trying to speak without having actually passed through the release of the tension of insight, or even without ever taking time to figure out what your question was. I admittedly do this when I want to appear intelligent or keep up with the conversation. I also do this when I am impatient or not up to the challenge of taking the time to discern my questions and to really understand their possible responses. We may speak and engage in conversations without first understanding, but then our outer words will be empty, and perhaps even fake and meaningless. For without insight, there is nothing to express in an inner word, and without an inner word, outer words are hollow shells, recognizable as language but void of communicable meaning. And so I say something in conversation, and another person asks me to explain what I mean. I will fumble, backtrack, change the subject because I did not understand. What I am referring to is the experience of speaking too soon, whether we do so out of impatience, fear, pride, necessity, etc. It

is an important moment in our self-understanding to recognize that sometimes we speak too soon, and perhaps have even made a habit of it. Alternatively, speaking before having the words can be beneficial *if* it is directed toward trying to understand and a willingness to make mistakes along the way. Often, if I refuse to speak before I understand something perfectly, I rob myself of valuable input from others, of the possibility of learning from those who have gone before me. Discernment is key. The first situation involves an effort to mask a lack of understanding at the risk of never actually understanding what you are talking about. The second involves the risk of exposing your own lack of understanding for the sake of actually coming to understand. As humans, understanding is a complex process that can be caught up in the dramatic pattern of living our lives, though we strive to let the pure desire to know to take over.

We now proceed to understand the necessity of inner words, as this will help clarify the difference and relationship between the act of understanding and the act of defining that proceeds from it. This relationship can be puzzling, but it is the key to the analogy for trinitarian processions. The following chart will be a reference point for the next two sections:

	Potency	**→**	**Act A**		**→**	**Act B**
Metaphysical Term(s) Correspond-ing to Act	*Quaerere* (inquiring and not yet understanding)		*Intelligere* (the act of understanding)			*Concipere*, which receives the *verbum*[79]
			intelligere (Act A as act—*intelligere* in act): ordered to the intelligibility in the phantasm, *intelligere*'s agent object (phantasm ← *intelligere*)	*intelligere ut dicere* (Act A *as* grounding another act—Act A as processing toward Act B): ordered to the inner word, *intelligere*'s terminal object (*intelligere* → inner word)		
Process		*Pro-cessio operat-ionis*	*Intelligere* proceeding from the spirit of inquiry raising and answering questions (from possible intellect and intelligible species)	*intelligere* processing toward *concipere; intelligere* grounding *concipere* *processio operati*		
			ACT	TO		ACT
Description of Act	What? Why? How?	→	Having an insight: Aha! I've got it!	Insight pivoting on itself from aha! to speaking; insight processing toward conceptualizing • Sorting out/ formulating what insight "got" • Speaking what insight "got"		The act of receiving/having a word (definition, concept, meaning) that expresses your insight because you understand what you got
Content of the Act	illuminated phantasm		Idea of universal in particular, i.e., the intelligibility (pre-conceptual)	Set of aspects of image that were essential to the occurrence of the insight		Idea of universal common to many, i.e., the *verbum* (inner word, concept, definition)

Table 9

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[79] After much consideration, I have elected to refer to the insight (Act A as act; insight), formulating (the activity of identifying the set of aspects of the phantasm that are essential to the understanding, the act of speaking (Act A as grounding another Act B; speaking; the operation of the intellect as grounding *concipere*)), and the act of conceptualizing (Act B: the act of receiving the inner word/the expressing in concepts of what is understood). The most important thing is consistency in our language about these conscious operations, and acknowledgment of their spontaneous order.

4.2 *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Direct Understanding: Why We Utter Inner Words of Definitions

In order to understand the relationship between the act of understanding and the act of conceptualizing, we must clarify why understanding speaks, and what this interior speaking is. The first relevant question is, Why are we generally not content to rest with the "I got it!" but move on to figure out what it is we "got"? Why does understanding need an inner word? The second relevant question is, What is *intelligere* doing when it is producing or speaking an inner word?

First, why does *intelligere* attempt to put its understanding into words? *Intelligere* pivots from the phantasm to the work of speaking a word that expresses what it has understood for two reasons. One, because while the insight was into the phantasm, not all aspects of the phantasm are relevant to the insight. Recall that any phantasm is always very rich and always contains more material than is relevant or necessary for the occurrence of any single insight that arises from it. Byrne continues, "When an insight first arises, it is 'fused' with that rich, supersaturated, originating phantasm, with all of its material, relevant or irrelevant."[80] Yet, as merely insight (*intelligere*) it does not immediately grasp which aspects are relevant. Thus, in order to understand itself properly, insight has to "detach itself from the extraneous imaginative material and retain only the material that is relevant to its own concrete particularity."[81] Insight is aware of its dependence on the phantasm because we form images in order to understand, which helps it detach itself from the extraneous material. It is also aware of its independence from the phantasm and of the fact that it has understood something over and above the phantasm. Why? Because the fact that we raised a question about a situation or thing *anticipated* an answer that is not provided by merely in the phantasm. As Stebbins writes, "While by insight we grasp an intelligibility as related to or immanent in a phantasm, we can conceptualize because simultaneously (and

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[80] This quotation is from Patrick Byrne's comment on July 13, 2017.
[81] Ibid.

precisely because of our insight) we also know the intelligibility as something distinct from the phantasm."[82]

Two, we understand by becoming one with what we understand. As Thomas affirms, following Aristotle, knowledge is by immaterial/intentional identity—intelligence-in-act is intelligibility-in-act. [83] In other words, *intelligere* becomes an intelligent actuation of the species, i.e., of the form, which in a human consciousness is now the intelligible-in-act. That is, the form of the understanding in act is assimilated to the form of the understood in act—the possible intellect receives the intelligible likeness of the species of the material thing. According to this assimilation, we say that the two (understanding in act and the understood in act) are identical.[84] It is on account of this assimilation that we are said to understand—we understand because we have become like the understood in form (that is, in the immaterial element). However, intelligence in potency is not the intelligible in potency/material. While *intelligere* is an intelligent actuation of the particular intelligible species, it is also more than the particular species precisely because it is intelligent whereas the species is only intelligible. Yes, *intelligere* has become this species (identity in act). Nevertheless, *intelligere* is not absolutely identical with a species that also exists as the actuation of another potency that is distinct from intellectual potency (i.e., the intellect's capacity to understand the species, often referred to as the "passive" or "possible" intellect).

Intelligere does not immediately grasp its difference in potency from the intelligible. As Byrne has it, it is in formulating "that this difference of potency is grasped." Further, this act of formulating "*is* the act of understanding, not of the illuminated phantasm, but of itself. It is the act

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[82] Stebbins, *Divine Initiative*, 11.

[83] See *ST* Ia, q. 14, a. 2c.

[84] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 158-62. Lonergan quotes Thomas on this point: "This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form" (*ST* Ia, q. 87, a. 1 ad 3).

of understanding expressing itself precisely as such."[85] By doing so, *intelligere* recognizes that "to be intelligent" (which is what it is to be *intelligere*) is not identical with this intelligible species. Intelligence recognizes that in intelligence there is more to being intelligent than this particular insight—it can be an intelligent actuation of countless intelligible species in act. *Intelligere* can recognize this because we have the experience of intelligence in its unrestrictedness every time we have an insight, even though we do not actually attain that unrestrictedness. Because of this recognition, it can then figure out what the intelligence that is operating here really is, and by knowing what the intelligent contribution is, it can sort out what is essential and what is not, which enables us to know the universal common to many (beyond the universal in the particular). On the basis of this self-understanding, it can understand what conditioned the understanding in the first place, and so understanding can speak an inner word that expresses the insight. In other words, because of this self-understanding, insight can speak a word that expresses both the intelligibility (contributed by *intelligere* as its proper content) and its conditions (known by the same *intelligere*). It is for these reasons that the definition (inner word) is universal—it allows the insight to be predicated of many instances, not just the one instance through which you happened to get the insight. For example, it allows the insight to be predicated of all circles, and not just this particular bike tire through which you happened to grasp "necessary roundness."

To turn to our second questions, what is *intelligere* doing in its mode of acting as *dicere*, that is, its second mode of operating? It is sorting out the differences between the insight and the intelligibility that were not immediately grasped by the insight, and identifying the set of aspects of the phantasm that were essential to the occurrence of understanding (that is, the aspects of the phantasm that conditioned the insight). The intelligibility in both instances is the same, whether it is the received intelligible species or the uttered word expressing what has been understood.

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[85] Byrne, "The Fabric of Lonergan's Thought," 48 (emphasis added).

However, there is this difference. With *intelligere* as caused by the illuminated phantasm (first mode of operating), the intelligibility is entangled with the phantasm. With *intelligere* as grounding the *verbum* (second mode of operating), the intelligibility is disentangled from the phantasm. The intelligibility may still include general aspects of the phantasm, but only insofar as *intelligere* has understood that it was conditioned by those aspects—that it depended on them for its occurrence—thereby making them relevant to the definition. Notice that the sorting out of the relevant from the irrelevant material in the phantasm, and so also sorting out the difference between the insight and the intelligibility, is not a second act because nothing new is understood. The sorting out is done by the *intelligere* (insight), itself. As such, *intelligere* takes on the role of *dicere*.

For example, I first understand why a human being is a human being—she has a rational soul, which I have abstracted from my phantasm, from this particular image of human being, Catherine and her signate matter. Only consequently do I understand that my ability to understand this "why" was conditioned by the essential material components, flesh and bones (common matter), which allows me to define "human person" as "rational animal"—a definition that includes the why (rational) and the common matter (animal, i.e., flesh and bones). While initially I disregarded the signate matter (*this* flesh and *these* bones), I subsequently realize that I could not have understood the intelligibility (the 'why') apart from the common matter (flesh and bones, in general), which allows me to utter a definition that integrates the intelligibility and its conditions (in this case, common matter). In other words, *intelligere* now understands its conditions, which is not a further, distinct, act, but the "deepening" of the original insight. Because of this understanding of conditions, I can speak a word interiorly that expresses both the intelligibility (contributed by *intelligere* as its proper content) and its conditions (known by the same *intelligere*). Thus, the inner word expresses not only what is grasped by understanding but also what is essential to the understanding in the understood. The *verbum*, itself, is also thereby disentangled

from that particular phantasm, and is instead expressive of the intelligibility of all similar phantasms. This is why the *verbum* is universal.

Dicere, then, is *intelligere*'s mode of acting as disentanglement; its mode of generalizing; its mode of processing toward conceptualizing. As such, it is an act of self-possession because through this disentanglement, *intelligere* comes to terms with itself (with its conditions and its proper contribution). As Lonergan writes, "Conceptualization is the self-expression of an act of understanding; such self-expression is possible only because understanding is self-possessed, conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding."[86] In knowing itself, *intelligere* knows it can speak a word that expresses itself. The inner word, then, is not merely a product of understanding, but a known product. In speaking an inner word, we are conscious of what we are doing and our grounds for doing so; we are consciously proceeding from understanding to conceptualizing. Lonergan continues, "it is in the self-possession of understanding as the ground of possible conceptualization that one may best discern what is meant by saying that the self-expression of understanding is an *emanatio intelligibilis*, a procession from knowledge as knowledge, and because of knowledge as knowledge."[87]

In more technical terms, this disentanglement process is called "formative abstraction." Formative abstraction is distinct from "apprehensive abstraction" which is not only prior to it, but is actually the primary mode of the act of the intellect, *intelligere*.[88] This priority is ontological dependence, not temporal priority. While it can be the case that *intelligere* can sit for awhile as pure understanding before *dicere* and *concipere* occur, the priority of *intelligere* is is not that it occurs before *dicere*, but rather, that *intelligere* has "primary" and "secondary" functions. In other words, insight (corresponding to apprehensive abstraction) is the primary mode of *intelligere*, while the production

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[86] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 55.
[87] Ibid., 56.
[88] This terminology is Lonergan's. See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 163-179 and esp. 186-90.

of the inner word (corresponding to formative abstraction) is its secondary mode.[89] Why? Because there is no inner word without insight. Understanding can only produce an inner word because it is in act. Furthermore, one can understand without formulating one's understanding. For this reason, *intelligere* is called *dicere* only after it has produced *concipere*.[90] It is the ontological dependence of the production of the inner word on understanding that is the reason for *intelligere*'s priority. Again, it is insight that governs the formation of meanings and definitions, as well as the application of these meanings and definitions to things. Quite simply, there is no inner word without *intelligere* because inner words express what *intelligere* is; they express both its content and its act. As Andrew Beards writes, "What Lonergan and, he argues, Aquinas, mean by apprehensive abstraction is illustrated by, among other things, Euclid's definition of a circle as a series of coplanar points equidistant from the centre. In understanding what this jumble of words in the definition *mean* we have to experience the conscious *insights* that give rise to them."[91]

Apprehensive abstraction "is not of material conditions," though "it is not of something apart from material conditions."[92] Thus, the intelligibility is still entangled with these material conditions. But this is only the beginning. As Thomas writes:

> We must further consider that the intellect, having been informed by the species of the thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself a certain intention of the thing understood, that is to say, its notion [*ratio*], which the definition signifies. …But the intellect has this characteristic in addition, namely, that it understands a thing as separated from material conditions, without which a thing does not exist in reality. But this could not take place unless the intellect formed the above-mentioned intention [inner word] for itself.[93]

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[89] Andrew Beards has a helpful way of explaining formative abstraction: "[It is] precisely the further insightful of activity of our intelligence as we strive to express our conscious insights in words and concepts in as coherent and complete a way as possible." See Andrew Beards, *Lonergan, Meaning, and Method: Philosophical Essays* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 152.

[90] I owe this understanding and formulation to conversations with Patrick Byrne.

[91] Ibid., 151.

[92] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2 189.

[93] *SCG*, 1, c. 53, §3.

It is formative abstraction that sets up the object apart from its material conditions. It is the same object because it is the same essence that is known, either in the particular or common to many.[94] Again, apprehensive abstraction is prior to and the reason for possibility of formative abstraction. Insight is *into* phantasm, and this is *intelligere* operating in its mode of *receiving* the intelligible species. The formation of the inner word is abstraction *from* the phantasm, and this is *intelligere* operating in its mode of *producing* the inner word and grounding the second act, *concipere*, which receives the inner word and thereby *means* what insight understood.

We can now begin to observe here the difference between *intelligere* and *concipere*, between ideas (as the content of insights) and inner words (as the content of acts of conceptualizing). Where understanding (*intelligere*) is by identity with the understood (in that the possible intellect receives the intelligible likeness of the species of the material thing), conceptualizing (*concipere*) is by engagement with the understood. As Thomas explains, the procession of the word is an origin of act from act because it is "an understanding understood from an understanding in act."[95] Thus, you can now contemplate what you've understood (the understanding understood) because you have a general, universal word about it; the insight is linked to image, but the concept is free from the image; insight has its object in this data, but in speaking a word the insight takes possession of itself.[96] Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish understanding (*intelligere*) and conceptualizing (*concipere*) because as interior acts, they are closely united. As to content, we can observe how these two acts need one another. The word needs understanding in order to be intelligent, rational. Understanding needs the word in order to take possession of itself.[97]

Before proceeding, let me offer another example to illustrate the relationship and difference between the act of understanding as act (*intelligere*) and the act of understanding as

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[94] Recall, form and essence are not so much ontological differences as they are responses to two different kinds of questions, which are ultimately about the same thing.
[95] *SCG* 4, c. 14, §3.
[96] See Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 144.
[97] Ibid., 125.

grounding another act (*dicere*). Rather than take an example from mathematics, I offer one from theology, specifically, from soteriology. It pertains to the relationship between the redemption and what Lonergan calls the "Law of the Cross."[98] The law of the cross, as Lonergan conceives it, is "a precept of the utmost generality that enjoins not overcoming [the evils of the human race] by power but by absorbing them in a loving surrender that returns good for evil done."[99] As Hefling explains, "The law of the cross *formulates* or *expresses* the *'form,' the intrinsic intelligibility* of redemption."[100] Here, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption is what is understood in an act of understanding, and the Law of the Cross is the concept expressing that intelligibility, which proceeds from the act of understanding. The data that are understood are "the data on the human race in so far as it is in the process of being redeemed,"[101] the law of the cross expresses this insight. As Hefling notes, in this analogy, the matter of redemption is "man" and the form of redemption is what the law of the cross expresses. In fact, the relationship between the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption and the law of the cross not only illustrates the relationship between the act of understanding (as both act and as an act grounding another act) and the act of conceptualizing, but the process of affirming the law of the cross as the content of the divine judgment of value—expressed humanly in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth— namely, "that divine wisdom has ordained and divine goodness has willed, not to do away with human evils by wielding power, but by converting those evils into good in keeping with the just and mysterious law of the cross."[102]

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[98] This example came to me from reading Charles Hefling, "Grace, Christ, Redemption, Lonergan (In that Order)," *Lonergan Workshop Journal* 14 (1998), 103.

[99] Doran, *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 232.

[100] Hefling, "Grace, Christ, Redemption, Lonergan," 103.

[101] Ibid.

[102] This passage is from the supplement to Lonergan's work, *De Verbo Incarnato*. The supplement will be published as part of the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. The passage as cited is found in Hefling, "Grace, Christ, Redemption, Lonergan," 112-13.

4.3 *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Direct Understanding: The Metaphysical Terms

Recall the following:

(Act A as act) *intelligere:* the act of direct understanding (which might or might not function as *dicere,* i.e., act as a source of speaking what it has understood)

> (Act A as grounding another Act) *dicere:* the act of direct understanding *as* speaking, from understanding to conceptualizing (which in us includes "sorting or figuring out," disentangling, formulating what we understand in order to speak)

(Act B) *concipere:* the act of formal meaning, conceptualizing, receiving a *verbum* (inner word)*,* a concept, a definition generated by *dicere.*

Table 10

Let us begin with some of Thomas's own words about the process of understanding:

> There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For *in the first place* there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed [*informatur*] by the intelligible species; and *then* the passive intellect *thus informed forms* an [inner] definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by an [outer] word [*Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur*]. Wherefore the concept conveyed by an [outer] word is its definition; and an [outer] proposition conveys the intellect's [inner] division or composition. [Outer] words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.[103]

Notice Thomas's language. The intellect's act includes both being informed and forming; it is formed and forms. Not only does his language highlight the fact that he considers *intelligere* a passive operation, but it also has the effect of inexorably linking the process of forming to the act of having been in-formed. The formation of an inner word does not take place without the prior in-formation of the intellect. It also highlights that *intelligere* has two modes of operating. In-formation corresponds to the aha! moment. Formation here corresponds to the activity of formulating and speaking what you have understood as described above.

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[103] *ST* Ia, q. 85, a. 2 ad. 3. I have inserted "outer" and "inner" in accordance with the interpretation I am advancing here. My interpretation is supported by Thomas's use of "*significare*" (here translated as "express" and "convey").

4.3.1 *Intelligere* and *Dicere*

Now, I proceed to draw on the preceding sections in order to offer interpretations and clarifications of key texts from Thomas's *corpus*. In considering direct understanding, we are analyzing one act (*intelligere*) from two points of view: from the point of view of its principle and from the point of view of its term. That is, from the points of view of the intellect's being informed (=insight) and forming (=*dicere*). In other words, *intelligere* has two modes of operating. An act is not restricted to one mode of acting.[104] A passion can be an act (and insight is a *pati;* it is something we receive)[105], and further, an act can have both passive and active aspects; a potency can receive its act, and upon receiving its act, it can produce another act. We can differentiate these two modes according to their respective objects. Thomas calls the object corresponding to *intelligere's* first mode of operating an "active object" and the object corresponding to its second mode an "end" or what Lonergan calls a "terminal object."[106] Thomas identifies the active object as the phantasm; it is the principle of the act of understanding.[107] In *De veritate*, Thomas considers the inner word at length wherein he identifies the inner word as the terminal object of understanding: "For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables

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[104] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 133-38. Herein, Lonergan demonstrates that Aquinas used the Aristotelian and Avicennist schemes of analysis to account for the different aspects of understanding (*intelligere*). Failure to recognize the differences among these schemes was in part responsible for conceptualist interpretations of Aquinas. See also Byrne, "The Thomist Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic Worldview," *The Thomist* 46, no. 1 (1982), 119.

[105] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 116-121. This claim that an act can be a passion is found in Aristotle and adopted by Thomas. It is based on Aristotle's distinction between movement and operation. Movement involves succession in time and therefore is imperfect (*actus imperfecti*), whereas operation "does not become through time but endures through time. At any instant it is completely what it is to be (*actus perfecti*)." Insight, like all intellectual acts, is an operation – not a movement. Thomas broadened Aristotle's meaning of *pati* to simply mean a subject's receiving according to its potency (*pati communiter*) such that passion does not diminish but actually perfects the recipient. A recipient is perfected in receiving its act. See Byrne, "The Thomist Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic Worldview," 124-26; Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 110-16.

[106] See Thomas Aquinas, *In II De anima*, lect. 6, §305. Also see *De ver.*, q. 16, a. 1 ad 13.

[107] For example, see *In Boet. De Trin.*, q. 6, a. 2 ad 6: "The phantasm is a principle of our knowledge as being that from which the operation of the intellect begins, not as something transient but as a permanent basis for intellectual operation…" Also see *SCG* 2, c. 73, §38, as cited in Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics,* CWL 12, 572-73: "Before the reception [of the intelligible species] the intellect needs the phantasm in order to receive the intelligible species from it, and thus the phantasm is related to the possible intellect as the object moving it."

us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual

operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception of the

intellect…"[108] Thus, we can analyze *intelligere* from the perspective of both its moving object and

terminal object—an act can be passive or receptive as well as active and productive. As Byrne

writes, "As 'insight' or 'understanding,' *intelligere* is a passive act moved by its object, namely

phantasm (image) illuminated by the agent intellect (the desire to know, questioning). As

'formulating' or 'expressing,' *intelligere* expresses itself, once it has occurred, in an inner word, the

terminal object of this mode of acting."[109] The former mode is denoted by "*intelligere*" and the

latter by "*dicere*." To put it somewhat differently, insight has the distinctive characteristic of a

"passive operation" while *dicere* is the productive activity of forming an inner word.[110] *Concipere*, as

we will see, is the receiving of the inner word produced by *dicere.*

It was in the context of the precision necessary for trinitarian theology that Thomas came

to clearly specify the distinct meanings of *intelligere* and *dicere*.[111] First, we must distinguish between

operation and movement. An operation is an *actus perfecti*, whereas a movement is an *actus imperfecti*

(an act of what is incomplete).[112] For example, understanding and seeing are operations: you are

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[108] *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2c. Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 90, a. 1: ""Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition…"

[109] Byrne, "The Fabric of Lonergan's Thought," 45.

[110] See Byrne, "The Thomist Sources of Lonergan's Dynamic Worldview," 123.

[111] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 133-38, esp. 136. Lonergan contends that the ongoing misinterpretation of Thomas's position on human knowing was related to the assumption that Thomas used "*intelligere*" and "*dicere*" indifferently to refer to intelligence *only* as producing the concept, hence Lonergan's term, "conceptualism" according to which it is assumed that concepts precede understanding and are what understanding understands. It surmises that concepts mysteriously, unconsciously, and automatically are received in the mind, which the mind in turn goes on to understand. This version of conceptualism claims its roots in Thomas's analysis of the human mind, but no such roots can be found.

[112] This distinction between movement and operation is an instance in which Thomas used the same expressions to refer to different things at different times. Basically, Lonergan meant by *actus imperfecti* and *actus perfecti* what Aristotle meant by movement and operation. However, Thomas did vary in the terms he used to denote this distinction: "He referred to this contrast variously as a difference between *operatio* (operation) and *motus* (movement), or as a twofold *operatio*, or finally as a twofold *motus*" (Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2 114). Thus, as Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer explains, "the fluidity or lack of stability in the

at once understanding and have understood, at once seeing and have seen.[113] By contrast, walking

is a movement: at once, you are not walking five miles and have walked five miles. The difference

between operation (*actus perfecti*) and movement (*actus imperfecti*) is that in the former instance action

and end are coincident, whereas in the latter instance there is a difference between action

(walking) and end (having reached the destination, five miles away). The reason movement is an

imperfect action is because it is incomplete—when you are walking, you have not yet reached

your destination. By contrast operation endures through time. It "exists as a fully completed

whole at each and every instant."[114] However, while movement and operation are distinct, they

are also complimentary. Jacobs-Vandegeer explains this complementarity through the example of

understanding:

> The transition from ignorance to knowledge, for example, entails a process of reasoning,
> a movement, which eventuates in the intellectual act of understanding, and operation.
> …A person either understands and has understood or has not understood and continues
> to ponder and search. The act of understanding marks the term of the movement. It
> denotes the end anticipated in the question for intelligibility (*quid sit?*)[115]

This distinction between movement and operation is significant for grasping how an

operation can be an instance of being moved. As Jacobs-Vandegeer explains, "For Aristotle, 'the

phrase 'undergoing change' (*paschein*) is not univocal,' and operation as being in act does not rule

out the idea of passion. The distinguishing feature of movement in the technical sense lies in its

incompleteness as an action, not in its subject being moved."[116] In other words, it is not being

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meanings of key categories created significant problems for scholastic interpreters in working out the
metaphysics of cognition." See Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Reading the *Actio* of Cognitional Acts in
Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph Owens," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 88, no.1 (2014), 82. I
am indebted to Jacobs-Vandegeer for helping me come to terms with Lonergan's third *Verbum* article,
which is an attempt to cut through this "metaphysical jungle," reducing the ambiguities to merely verbal
difficulties (Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 10). Jacobs-Vandegeer's help can be seen throughout the next few
pages.

[113] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL, 12, 606-07; ibid., *Verbum*, CWL 2, 110-16, esp. 112. See
also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IX, 6, 1048b18-34; *Physics*, III, 2, 201b24-433.

[114] Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Reading the *Actio* of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph
Owens," 83.

[115] Ibid., 83-84.

[116] Ibid., 84. He is citing Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2,113; see also ibid., 119.

moved that is intrinsic to movement, but incompleteness. Movement in the broad sense (the sense that includes simply being moved) includes the *actus perfecti*, as a *pati*.[117] Thomas distinguished between *pati proprie* (*pati* in the proper sense) and *pati communiter* (*pati* in the most general sense).[118] As Jacobs-Vandegeer explains, the latter concentrates on the movement of reception and includes the meaning of perfection.[119] The significant question is whether operation, as an *actus perfecti*, can be called a *pati* in the sense of a received perfection. The difficulty in answering this question, which occurred as scholastics attempted to interpret Thomas, is that "the definition of operation seems to imply an exercise of efficient causality…The supposition that 'I' as a grammatical subject in the statement 'I see' also denotes the efficient cause of the operation [seeing] supports a common sense view of agency and action. On this view, living beings produce their own acts."[120] Lonergan, however, argued that Thomas distinguished *operatio* as *actus perfecti*, as a being in act from *operatio* as an exercise of efficient causality.[121] He writes, "in many contexts [*operatio*] denotes the exercise of efficient causality. …But such usage certainly is not exclusive. …For *operatio* also means simply 'being in act'…"[122] In other words, while we may have a tendency to associate operation or action with efficient causality, Thomas held a more expansive view, and distinguished two meanings of operation. Jacobs-Vandegeer explains the significant implications of this reading for the metaphysics of rational psychology: "No longer would the grammatical subject of the act plainly denote the ontological subject of an efficient cause. Though 'I see,' my very act of seeing may depend on an agent other than me."[123] As we will shortly see, the operation of one potency (e.g., the possible intellect) can include both meanings of operation.

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[117] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 116.
[118] Ibid., 117. See also *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 1c; *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 2c; Ia-IIae, q. 22, a. 1c.
[119] Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Reading the *Actio* of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph Owens," 84-85.
[120] Ibid., 85.
[121] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 119.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Jacobs-Vandegeer, "Reading the *Actio* of Cognitional Acts in Bernard J.F. Lonergan and Joseph

Intelligere is the operation of the intellect; *intelligere* is an operation. However, as we have just seen, operation (*operatio*), itself can "sometimes mean simply act or being in act and sometimes mean the exercise of efficient causality."[124] As Lonergan discovered, it was the precision of trinitarian theology that led Thomas to distinguish exactly between these two meanings with regard to the operation of the intellect. When the operation of the intellect is meant in the sense of act, it is termed *intelligere*. That is, *intelligere* specifies the act of understanding—the insight into the phantasm, the primary mode of the act of the intellect. *Intelligere* is simply act or being in act. It is the operation of a passive potency (the possible intellect). When the operation of intellect is meant in the sense of operating an effect, of that same act (understanding) grounding another act, it is termed *dicere*, which is the secondary mode of one and the same act (*intelligere*).[125] That is, *dicere* specifies the act of "express[ing] a word from oneself."[126] It is a kind of making, which is not contrary to the act of understanding but is grounded in it; "when we utter interiorly we form and produce an inner word."[127] *Dicere* is the operation of an active potency (the possible intellect in act).

For example, in *De veritate*, in the same question on the Word, Thomas both specifies how *intelligere* and *dicere* are distinct while also acknowledging their identity. In response to the objection that any of the three divine persons can be called "word," Thomas writes, "Here Anselm seems to contradict himself, for he says that *Word* is predicated only personally and belongs only to the

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Owens," 86.

[124] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 136.

[125] See ibid., 150. Cf. Matthew Levering, "Speaking the Trinity: Anselm and his 13th-Century Interlocutors On Divine *Intelligere* and *Dicere*" in *Saint Anselm-His Origins and Influence*, ed. John R. Fortin (Lewiston: Edwin Mellon Press, 2001). Of Thomas's trinitarian theology in the *Summa,* Levering writes, "Understanding (*intelligere*), as such, is not the procession of a word or concept, but rather is the intellect's condition of 'habitude' as being informed by what is known. …Speaking involves not simply the intellect as actualized by the thing understood, but the intellect as actualized through the speaking of a word. "By adding the aspect of the word, speaking – as opposed to understanding – 'imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understood.'" (139-40). Levering is quoting *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3.

[126] *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2 ad 4.

[127] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL, 12, 606-07.

Son, while to *speak* belongs to all three Persons. *To speak, however, means nothing else but to send forth a word from oneself.*"[128] Thus, in strict terms, *dicere* signifies the grounding of a word. This is why only the Father can be said to speak. Later in *De potentia*, Thomas revisits the relationship between *intelligere* and *dicere*. In this passage, we can again observe that *dicere* is *intelligere*, but that these two must also be clearly distinguished. He writes:

> *Dicere* may be taken in two senses. First strictly and then it means to utter a word: and in this sense Augustine (*De Trin.* vii) says that in God each person does not speak, but the Father alone. Secondly, in a broad sense in which to speak denotes intelligence: and thus Anselm (loc. cit.) says that not only the Father speaks but also the Son and the Holy Spirit: and though there are three who speak there is but one Word which is the Son: because the Son alone is the concept of the Father who understands and conceives the Word.[129]

Here, as Thomas explains, when we take "*dicere*" in the broad sense, we mean intelligence precisely because it is the act of understanding (*intelligere*) that is doing the speaking; there is no speaking unless there is understanding. In fact, if you cannot speak a word about what you have understood, it reveals that you did not actually understand anything in the first place. However, when we are considering *dicere* strictly, we are considering *intelligere* in its mode of operating as an act that grounds another act. Similarly, in the same question from *De veritate*, Thomas explains how it is that the act of understanding and the act of speaking are really the same act. Once you understand, you have the necessary and sufficient conditions to speak. He writes:

> As used of us, speaking signifies not merely understanding but understanding plus the expression from within oneself of some conception; and we cannot understand in any way other than by forming a conception of this sort. Therefore, properly speaking, every act of understanding is, in our case, an act of speaking.[130]

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[128] *De ver.* q. 4, a. 2 ad 4 (emphasis added).

[129] *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 9 ad 8. For more on the distinction the operation of the intellect as both *intelligere* and *dicere*, see *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad. 2-3, esp. 3.

[130] De ver. q. 4, a. 2 ad 5. The Latin reads, "Ad quintum dicendum, quod in nobis dicere non solum significat intelligere, sed *intelligere cum hoc quod est ex se exprimere aliquam conceptionem*, nec aliter possumus intelligere, nisi huiusmodi conceptionem exprimendo; et ideo omne intelligere in nobis, proprie loquendo, est dicere" (emphasis added).

We need to distinguish between *dicere* per se and *dicere* in us, as this will be relevant for trinitarian theology. In us, we might say that *intelligere* finally operates as *dicere* at the end of a series of stages from the original occurrence of the insight until we finally speak interiorly. *Dicere* emerges at the end of this series of stages precisely because we have to come to terms with our insight in order to get the right word. However, in strict terms, *dicere* is *intelligere* when it is actually speaking what it has understood; it is the actual event of speaking, not the disentangling, guided by *intelligere*, that leads up to the speaking. That is, in strict terms, you have not spoken your insight (*dicere*) until you have spoken your insight. A partial expression of insight is not yet really *dicere*. What this means is that disentanglement, the series of transformations in the imagination, (guided by *intelligere qua dicere* as it sorts out what imaginative conditions are relevant and irrelevant to its understanding) is not necessary to *dicere*. Disentangling, sorting out, in order to find the right word is a condition of finite embodied intellects. In us, this disentanglement is nevertheless termed "*dicere*" (and not *intelligere* as understanding in act) because it is *intelligere* as ordered toward the inner word (and not the phantasm). A perfect infinite act of understanding simply and eternally utters its understanding in one perfectly expressive word.

4.3.2 *Concipere* and the Reception of the *Verbum*

While *intelligere* and *dicere* refer to one and the same act of intelligence operating in two different modes, there is also a second act of intelligence that is distinct from *intelligere/dicere*. It is the act that *intelligere* grounds when it speaks. Above, I explained that I have termed this second act "*concipere*," which carries the connotations both of receiving and conceptualizing. Receiving signifies the dependence of *concipere* on *intelligere*, while conceptualizing (defining, meaning) signifies the distinction between *concipere* and *intelligere* as two different acts. The emanation of the *verbum* from *intelligere* is a conception of an intentional likeness of what has been understood.[131] *Concipere* is

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[131] The more perfect the procession, the more perfect the likeness, to the point of identity (yet without the

the terminal activity of the first operation of the intellect.[132] While there is no further completion

of understanding in *concipere*, there is an adequate self-expression, which is what was lacking in

intelligere alone.[133] Notice that *concipere* is an activity that occurs within intelligence. *Concipere* (the act

of defining the thing) is an act uttered within. *Concipere* at last conceptualizes what the act of

understanding understood in the phantasm, which was not a concept but an intelligibility. That

your understanding was of an intelligibility was manifest in the fact that your insight was into a

particular phantasm (whereas concepts express the universal common to many) and in the

experience of not being able to put your finger on it (whereas if you have a concept, you have

your finger on it). Thomas distinguishes clearly between the concept and the act of understanding,

explaining that "conception [*conceptio*] itself is an effect of the act of understanding…Hence, two

things pertain to the nature of our intellectual word: it is understood, and [the inner word] is

expressed by an agent distinct from itself."[134] To return to the above distinction between *actus*

imperfecti and *actus perfecti*, both *dicere* as the "speaking" of the inner word and *concipere* as the

"receiving" of the inner words are *acti perfecti*; they are not processes. Once *intelligere-qua-dicere* has

successfully completed its sorting out of the relevant from the irrelevant in the phantasm*, concipere*

emerges as an *actus perfecti.*

Recall that Thomas follows a standard Aristotelian procedure in which one moves from

object to acts to potencies to essences, and the corresponding metaphysical principle that an act

receives its specification from its object.[135] The distinction between *intelligere* and *concipere* can be

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elimination of reflection). See *SCG* 4, c. 11, §5.

[132] See *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 1: "that at which the operation of our intellect terminates, which is what is understood, what is called the conception of the intellect."

[133] I owe t his understanding and way of putting it to Patrick Byrne.

[134] *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2c.

[135] For example, see *ST* Ia, q. 77, a. 3c. Although this is the enumerated procedure, remember that Aquinas also explicitly states that the human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding (see *ST* Ia, q. 88, a. 2 ad 3). Thus, even while objects help us specify acts, when it comes to *intelligere*, Thomas maintains that the act, itself, can also be understood insofar as it is in act. The reason is because we are conscious of our acts of understanding and can thus inquire after them.

illuminated if we attend to their respective objects. There is the proper and proportionate object

of human understanding, the *quidditas rei materialis* (quiddity existing in bodily matter).[136] There is

also the agent object of an act of understanding, the illuminated phantasm. Additionally, there is

the terminal object, which is the term of the first operation of the intellect (i.e., of the direct level

of understanding), and which is the definition or concept. Relating these objects, Byrne writes:

> First there is the proper object of understanding, which is the purely intelligible content. Such intelligible contents come to human consciousness in and only in acts of understanding. Without acts of understanding, there can be no human awareness of intelligibility. Second, there are also the agent objects of insights. These are the 'illuminated' phantasms – images constructed under the inspiration of intellectual inquiry. When inquisitive construction hits upon a suitable imaginable composition, an insight with its proper intelligible content emerges and supervenes upon this agent object with its imaginable content. The emergent insight bestows its own proper object of intelligibility upon the image, since, strictly speaking, the image as merely imagined has no intelligible content of its own. Third, there is the terminal object which is a concept or definition, and which expresses the pre-conceptual, intelligible proper object of an insight. [137]

Since the intelligibility immanent in the phantasm (universal in the particular) and the definition

(universal common to many) are really distinct objects, and since acts are specified by their

objects, we may say that it is one thing to understand the intelligibility and another to define the

intelligibility. While we define what we understand, nevertheless, the object when it is grasped and

the object when it is defined are different.[138]

We can put this in terms of the difference between formal cause and essence. When the

object is grasped, the corporeal matter is made known through the senses while the intelligibility is

made known through the intellect. Further, what sense knows is the *individual* corporeal matter.

When the object is defined, the matter posited in the definition is "the common matter involved

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[136] For example, see *ST* Ia, q. 84, aa. 7-8; q. 85, a. 5, ad 3; a. 8; q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 2 ad 2; a. 3; q. 88, a. 3.

[137] Patrick H. Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment: Lonergan's Foundations for Ethics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2016).
141-42. There is a fourth object – the real object – because the definition expresses only an intelligible possibility that may not be a real, objective intelligibility. This object pertains to the level of judgment: "If the rigours of reflection and further inquiry reveal the proper object to be virtually unconditioned, then it is also the objective intelligibility of some real object" (142).

[138] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 204-07. See also Doran, *Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 321.

in *all* such expressions of intelligibility." In the definition, the intelligibility and the common matter are both known by intellect, the former directly and the latter indirectly. In other words, while both form and essence are principles of explanation, form is the correlative of the act of understanding and essence is the correlative of the act of conceptualizing. Further, we first understand form, then essence. Thus, when the object was first grasped it was known through two distinct types of acts (by sensing and understanding). When the object is then defined what was formerly known through distinct acts is now brought together in one act (conceptualizing/defining).[139] As Br. Dunstan Robidoux puts it, "as acts of conceptualiz[ing] proceed from prior acts of understanding, an inner word or definition is formed which unites an abstracted, universal form with a generalized species of matter which is typically referred to as 'common matter.'"[140] Thus, *intelligere* and *concipere* are distinct because even once *intelligere* has disentangled itself from the phantasm, still the matter and the form are known distinctly by sense and intellect. Yet, *intelligere*, by this very process, grounds *concipere*, which has nothing of its own but everything from *intelligere.* That is, while *concipere* knows in a unified way what before was known distinctly, it does not add anything to *intelligere*'s work. As Augustine says, "…from the vision of knowledge a vision of thought arises, which is a word of no language, a true word of a true thing, *having nothing of its own, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born.*"[141] *Concipere* simply receives from *intelligere* everything it needs (the disentangled intelligibility). It is for this reason that I say that *concipere* is the act of receiving the inner word produced by *dicere*.[142] Byrne

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[139] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 204-05.

[140] Br. Dunstan Robidoux, "Essence in Aquinas and Lonergan," http://lonergan.org/?m=200911. November 10, 2009.

[141] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.12.22 (Hill, 413-15; emphasis added). See also *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1c: "The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself – namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving."

[142] While we speak of *concipere* receiving the inner word from *intelligere*, it is not receptivity, *per se* that distinguishes the *processio operationis* of understanding from the possible intellect and intelligible species from the *processio operati* of the inner word from the act of understanding. Rather, it is what that which receives its act receives it from – a potency or an act? Thus, the decisive distinction is that

provides a helpful example of what it means that *concipere* receives the inner word. The

relationship between *concipere* and *dicere* is like a bucket of water receiving heat when a previously

heated poker is inserted into it. As he writes, "The heat in the poker, which is in the act of being

hot, takes on the role of heating, but only when there is a potency to receive its heat. Just so, the

passive intellect as receiving the word is *concipere*, while the intellect in act producing this word is

dicere."[143]

       Concipere is also the self-expression of *intelligere,* which is possible "only because

understanding is self-possessed, conscious of itself and its own conditions as understanding."[144]

That is, *intelligere*'s becoming self-possessed is what enables it to speak a word with autonomous

clarity in which matter and form are clearly related and distinguished. While *intelligere* and *concipere*

are distinct, they are also related. Concepts are formed only with and within the intellectual act of

understanding. This is what is meant by *emanatio intelligibilis.* These acts are related by an

intellectual emanation since we are able to define *because* and only because we have grasped the

intelligibility. This "because" names "the element of authentic autonomy in the procession"

insofar as it is because I recognize that I have understood, I recognize that I can speak.[145] Further,

it is the reason intellectual emanation is relevant to trinitarian theology. The natural analogue for

the first divine procession pertains to the procession of *concipere* from *intelligere* insofar as *intelligere*

speaks. The natural analogue is not the procession of *dicere* from *intelligere* because they are the

same act and so there is no procession.

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the possible intellect : the act of understanding :: perfectible : perfection :: potency : act
whereas
the act of understanding : inner word :: proportionate perfection : perfection :: act : act.

[143] This quotation is from a comment Byrne made on my dissertation on July 21, 2017.

[144] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 55. Lonergan continues to relate this self-expression to the three levels of abstraction.

[145] Doran, *Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 320. I will return to "because-of-ness" is Section 5.

4.4 The Relationship between *Intelligere* as *Dicere* and *Concipere:* An Analogy

I have elaborated upon the difference between insights and inner words according to the difference between form and essence, as well as according to the difference of objects. This section will offer a clarification of the relation between *intelligere* and *concipere* in terms of "origin." We proceeded thusly because we must distinguish before we can relate. The relation of the act of understanding to the act of defining or inner word, of speaker to what is spoken, is the relation of originator to what has an origin. As Thomas explains, "For whenever one thing originates from another there must be a real relation."[146] We can relate these as follows:

originator : originated   ::   insight : inner word   ::   speaker : spoken

We are trying to keep the distinction between two realities—an originator (*intelligere*) and what originates from it (*verbum*)—which are the same *except* that one proceeds from the other. The only real difference between the inner word and the act of understanding is that one is derived from the other.[147] This is why we have difficulty distinguishing between these two acts.

The relations of origin that I am referring to will become clearer with an example. An origin is *from* the originator and *in* the originated. The originated is that which has an origin. This means that origination grounds a relation between the originator and the originated. Knowledge or education derives *from* a teacher and emerges *in* a student. Knowledge as *from a teacher* is instructing. Knowledge as *in a student* is learning. The same reality is in both, but it is had differently. One has the origin as being its originator. That is, the teacher has knowledge as being the instructor, as being the one handing it on. The other has the origin as being the originated. That is, the student has knowledge as being the learner, as being the one receiving it. The teacher cannot be said to have taught nor the student said to have learned unless knowledge is present in

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[146] *De pot.*, q. 8 a. 1c.

[147] In us, this derivation is both intelligent and efficient. That it is intelligent is why it is relevant to trinitarian theology. That it is efficient means that one really distinct act is caused by another really distinct act (for an efficient cause is an extrinsic cause), even though both acts share the same intelligibility.

both. A teacher is not instructing if a student is not learning. A student is not learning but discovering if there is no teacher. This analogy is imperfect. While it demonstrates how a second intellectual act (the student's knowledge) is dependent upon a prior one (the teacher's knowledge), the knowledge in the student is not, strictly speaking, an inner word of the *teacher's intelligere*. Rather, the knowledge in the student is a second instance of *intelligere* as received because of the teacher's original *intelligere*, which gave rise to the teacher's own inner word. The teacher's inner word was, in turn, the basis of her outer words, which became the phantasms that elicited a second instance of *intelligere* (which in turn led to a second instance of an inner word) in the student.[148]

Again, the knowledge is the same in both teacher and student. As Thomas writes, "[K]nowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them…"[149] The same is true of the speaker and the spoken – the intelligibility is the same in both. The word emerges from *intelligere* and it emerges as *concipere*. The word's emergence is the work of *dicere*. To put it differently, *intelligere* utters and *concipere* is uttered. As, Lonergan writes:

> [*U*]*ttering* is the inner word itself considered as being from the act of understanding and *being uttered* is that word considered as being in the possible intellect…*to utter* would regard the act of understanding itself as related to the word produced, while *being uttered* would regard the inner word inasmuch as the word results from the act of understanding.[150]

Let us put it more colloquially. Meaning emerges from a speaker and in a spoken word; from *intelligere* and in *concipere*. Again, origination grounds a relation. Here, we are talking about the procession of the inner word, which procession we call speaking. Speaking is a procession that grounds a relation between the speaker and the spoken. In fact, it grounds two relations: the speaker's need to express itself in a word and the word's dependence on the speaker. As Hefling

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[148] I am indebted to Professor Byrne for pointing out the importance of expressing the inadequacies of the analogy.

[149] See *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1c.

[150] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL, 12, 606-07.

puts it, speaking grounds a relation of sincerity (the speaker's honesty in expressing herself) and a relation of fidelity (the word's dependence on the speaker for what it expresses).[151] Hefling's example, of course, adds a moral dimension to the basic cognitional process, but it is a helpful analogy.

The point in this analogy is that Act B depends on Act A for its origination. Let us return to the analogy of education. According to Aristotle, the fundamental requirement to be a teacher is that you understand.[152] If you do not understand, you are not going to be able to help somebody else understand. The same is true of the act of defining, of the inner word. The fundamental requirement of defining—of having a word—is that you understand. If you do not understand, you are not defining—you do not have a word. A teacher cannot teach if she does not understand and a student cannot be said to learn if she does not understand. Both may speak, but neither has the inner word expressing understanding.

Also significant is that the analogy of teaching and learning underscores the conversational structure of human consciousness. Recall the necessity of phantasms for human knowing, which Thomas explains by offering the example of the teacher: "[W]hen we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding."[153] Further, it is our intellectual light (which has its ground in the agent intellect) that makes a *species* to be intelligible-in-act because we inquire after the *species*.[154] Together, the light of the agent intellect and the phantasm move our intellect to

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[151] See Charles Hefling, "*Gratia:* Grace and Gratitude, Fifty Unmodern Theses as Prolegomena to Pneumatology," *Anglican Theological Review* 83, no. 3 (2001), 481-83.

[152] See *Metaphysics*, 1, 2, 982a10-19. Herein, Aristotle is discussing the wise man, who is wise because he is capable of teaching the cause, and as we have seen, to understand the cause is what it means to understand.

[153] *ST* Ia, q. 84, a. 7c.

[154] See *SCG* II, c. 77, §5: "So, the function of that intellect is to make intelligibles proportionate to our minds. Now, the mode of intellectual light connatural to us is not unequal to the performance of this function. Nothing, therefore, stands in the way of our ascribing the action of the agent intellect to the light of our soul, and especially since Aristotle compares the agent intellect to a light." See also *De veritate*,

understanding. The dependence of human intelligence for its act of understanding on phantasms

and questions is what underscores in part the conversational structure of human consciousness. As

Lawrence writes, "In Aristotle's and Thomas's teaching about the genesis of human knowing,

therefore, one side of the integrally dialogical and historical nature of being human is clearly

revealed: we receive sense impressions; and acts of understanding, just as the questions that give

rise to them, *occur* to us."[155] In other words, there is a listening at the heart of human knowing and

speaking. I will return to this conversational structure in Chapter 6 when discussing the *imago Dei*.

We now proceed to analyze the second operation of *intelligere*—reflective understanding or

judging—in order to discover the intelligible emanation therein. It is with the additional, fulfilling

involvement of level of reflective understanding that the psychological analogy obtains, for when

we are referring to God, we are speaking not simply of understanding, but of knowledge in the full

sense of the term—an understanding affirmed as true. However, as we will see, it is really only

insofar as the uttered judgment is not only about the true/facts but also about the

good/worthwhile that the psychological analogy obtains, for it is only an inner word that breaks

forth into love that is relevant to the trinitarian analogy.[156]

5. The Intellectual Emanation of the Inner Word: The *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Reflective Understanding

With the level of reflective understanding, we are speaking of activities distinct from those of the

level of direct understanding. While these are two distinct operations, the internal relations among

the activities of each intellectual operation are similar. On the level of direct understanding when

one is present to oneself as intelligent, we identified three activities, internally related to one

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q. 10, a. 8 ad. 10: "As physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul through its light makes all material things actually intelligible, as is clear from *The Soul*.

[155] Lawrence, "Lonergan's Foundations for Constitutive Communication," 241 (emphasis original)

[156] See *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2.

another: inquiry, direct insight, conceptualizing.[157] On the level of reflective understanding, when one is present to oneself as reasonable, there are also three basic activities: critical inquiry and reflection, reflective insight, and judging. Another inner word proceeds on this level, now as a judgment—an affirmation or denial—from a reflective insight. It is critical to recognize that no less than the first kind of inner word, this second kind also emanates from an act of understanding, here designated as a reflective insight. This table illustrates the similarities and differences among these two inner words and their corresponding acts:[158]

Inner Word of Definition	Inner Word of Judgment
Proceeds from *direct* act of understanding	Proceeds from *reflective* act of understanding
Principal cause in agent intellect as spirit of *wonder and inquiry*	Principal cause in agent intellect as spirit of *critical reflection*
Instrumental and material cause: *phantasm or schematic image*	Instrumental and material cause: reviews imagination, sense experience, direct acts of understanding, and definitions to find in all taken together the sufficient ground or evidence for judgment
Direct act of understanding generates in *definition* the *expression of* the consciously possessed *intelligibility* of the phantasm	*Reflective* act of understanding generates in *judgment* the *expression* of the consciously possessed *truth*, through which reality is both known and known as known

Table 11

In order to elaborate upon the *emanatio intelligibilis* of the inner word of judgment, I draw primarily from Chapters 9 and 10 of Lonergan's *Insight*.[159]

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[157] It is interesting to note that Lonergan's language about direct understanding as grounding a second act sometimes changes depending on the context. In science, it is called "formulation." In trinitarian theology, it is called "uttering an inner word." Sometimes Lonergan uses "utter" in the context of his philosophical work, which is a carry-over from his trinitarian work. While "utter" is intelligible in the philosophical context, the same is not true in reverse, for it would be improper to refer to the Father as "formulating" the Son. See Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, CWL 5, 134, fn. 3 and 151-52; 413.

[158] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 60-61.

[159] I owe my understanding of these chapters to Patrick H. Byrne's course, *Insight and Beyond* (Boston College, Fall 2009–Spring 2010), recorded for internet use and found at http://bclonergan.org/insight/.

5.1 The *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Reflective Understanding: A New Tension and Heightened Responsibility

As with direct understanding, let us appeal to our own experiences to understand the intellectual emanation of the inner word of judgment. Recall the difference between a time at which you judged rashly or guessed and a time at which you judged soundly. The latter occurred because of the presence of an intellectual emanation of the word of judgment. You judged because you knew you had sufficient evidence to make the judgment. It can happen the other way around, too. You can know that you have all the evidence you need to make a judgment, but nevertheless withhold your judgment. Rashness and hesitation are both instances of acting irrationally, in which there is no intellectual emanation. It is on this level of rational consciousness that the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude and probability emerge. In order to understand this kind of inner word, we have to contextualize it within reflective understanding, and in the latter's relation to direct understanding in the overall process of knowing.

5.1.1 The Proposition and the Critical Question: Is it So?

If we pay attention to our own experience, we can recognize that we ask two basic kinds of interrelated questions in our desire to know reality, and that each question requires a fundamentally distinct kind of interrelated answer. The question for intelligence asks, "What is it?" (*Quid sit?*) while the critical question or question for reflection asks, "Is it so?" (*An sit?*) Further, these questions even reveal some things we know naturally, such as the first principle that the whole is greater than the part:

> [W]hen by a natural spontaneity we ask *quid sit*, we reveal our natural knowledge that the material or sensible component is only a part and that the whole includes a formal component as well. Similarly, when by a natural spontaneity we ask *an sit*, we again reveal our natural knowledge that the whole is not just a quiddity but includes an *actus essendi as well*.[160]

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[160] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 70 (emphasis original).

While revealing our natural knowledge of one first principle, these questions also indicate that direct and reflective understanding contribute something above and beyond experience: an understanding of essence and an affirmation of existence, respectively.[161]

The question for reflection is not a question for intelligence, as you already know that you understand the intelligibility. You were satisfied with your idea for a little while, but there's something else you begin wondering about: Wait, did I understand that correctly? I think it's a good idea, but is it really true? Even though I was able to put my insight into words, I'm still skeptical. I've had bright ideas before that turned out to be incorrect. Does my word correspond to the reality I initially wondered about? The critical question transforms the concept from a mere possibility into a "something-to-be-verified," just as the question for intelligence transformed the phantasm from mere data into a "something-to-be-understood."[162] The critical question initiates you into the realm of conditionality, which is the realm in which reflection takes over and you begin reasoning, e.g., "If…then…" This is a different state of being, and distinct activities are occurring. Figuring out the conditions of the truth of a proposition is different than understanding the nature of something. You still perform intelligent operations in your attempt to verify your insight, but these are now under the guidance of reason, that is, under the guidance of reasonable/rational operations.

While these two types of questions are distinct, the critical question is related to the intelligent question because the former is asking about the content of the direct insight (which responded to the question for intelligence). In other words, we are asking about the content of a proposition, which is the formulation of a direct insight. For example, you are asking "is it so that

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[161] Existence is not something understood; it is not a "super-essence." Rather, it is something affirmed. The difference in questions for intelligence and critical questions indicates this. For an excellent piece explaining the difference between essence and existence in relation to human cognition in Thomas Aquinas, see David Burrell, *Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).

[162] For these phrases, see Stebbins, *Divine Initiative*, 14.

a circle is a set of points equidistant from a center?"[163] Your question is about the correspondence between your proposition and the reality you initially inquired about. "Did I understand circles correctly when I said a circle is…?" "Does the conceptual content I expressed when I understood actually explain the existing reality I desire to know?" The critical question is borrowing its content (the proposition) from the direct insight and bringing a new, distinct mental attitude and set of activities to bear on the content. Insofar as we are being intelligent, we consider propositions as intelligible possibilities, as merely bright ideas. Insofar as we are being reasonable, we reflect on propositions as conditioned possibilities and eventually assent to them (or deny them), in which case the propositions are no longer objects of thought but have become objects of knowledge. The proposition is formulated on the level of direct understanding and affirmed on the level of reflective understanding.

5.1.2 Reflective Insight: Sufficient Evidence

As with the question for intelligence, your critical question will linger until you satisfy its demands and reach its goal, namely, an affirmation or denial. How do you resolve the critical question in a way that really releases the tension of inquiry? It may seem that resolving the "is it so" question would be easier than resolving the "what" question since the answer to the former question is either an interior affirmation or a denial (in English outer words, "yes" or "no") whereas to the latter, there is seemingly an infinite possibility of responses. However, resolving the "is it so" question is a complex process—one which may take years or even the greater part of your life, depending on the proposition you are attempting to affirm or deny. How then do we resolve this tension? Byrne outlines the process well:

> When we ask about the correctness of a direct insight, we say in effect to ourselves, 'Now that would be true if only thus and so.' Figuring out the conditions under which something would be so is another marvelous capacity of the human spirit. Without yet knowing if our idea is correct, we can figure out how to figure it out. So our reflective

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[163] This definition is intentionally incorrect.

insights are matters of putting the idea together with what it takes for it to be correct…[Further] Logic begins with axioms and deduces conclusion. But the reflecting human spirit begins with an insight which will subsequently become something like a conclusion, and searches for the conditions under which it will be able to grant its precious and personal assent.[164]

As Byrne highlights, just as when you were asking, "What is it?" about something, your inquisitive spirit elicits images, memories, past insights, etc. to help you understand without yet understanding, so too your critical spirit figures out how to determine if your insight was correct by figuring out the conditions of its truth. In raising the critical question, you set up a demand within your own consciousness, namely, for sufficient evidence. Meeting this demand and satisfying your wondering is what gives rise to your judgment. However, between the critical question and the act of judgment there is the phenomenon of being reasonable and reflecting. In order to release the tension and properly respond to our question, we began to reflect—to return to ourselves—and the activity of reflecting terminates in a reflective insight, which is the only basis upon which we can utter a reasonable judgment.

To describe this process of what causes judgment, Lonergan selects the metaphor, "marshaling and weighing the evidence." When you are marshaling and weighing the evidence you are performing experiential and intellectual operations. That is, you are reviewing and using your imagination and your sense experience. You are also raising further pertinent questions of the *what, why, how*, etc. type, that is, questions for direct understanding in your attempt to raise and answer all further pertinent questions. What about this? Did I think of that? How would this affect my insight? Have I thought of everything?[165] Notice that insofar as critical inquiry is operative, you are performing each of these operations as rationally conscious.[166] You are asking

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[164] Patrick H. Byrne, "Spirit of Wonder, Spirit of Love: Reflection on the Work of Bernard Lonergan," *The Cresset* 58 (1994), 7-8.

[165] See Morelli, *Self-Possession*, 146-47 for a list of questions that may occur. See Frederick E. Crowe, "For a Phenomenology of Rational Consciousness," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 18 (2000), 87.

[166] That is, while you are asking questions for intelligence (questions of the "what is it?" type) when engaged in reflection, those questions are now under the guidance of the critical question, in service of releasing

them in order to be able to affirm or deny the direct insight you are critiquing and reflecting upon.

Raising and answering relevant questions is the centerpiece of reflection and the condition of the possibility for being a person of good judgment. To put this description more technically, in the process of reflecting, what we are doing is figuring out the links between our conditioned proposition and its conditions. If these conditions are met, the conditioned proposition becomes virtually unconditioned—that is, while the insight is not in itself absolutely unconditioned, the occurrence of the fulfilling conditions gives the conditioned insight the power of being unconditioned (hence, *virtually* unconditioned). Understanding how to link our hypothesis to its fulfilling conditions is key to the process leading up to the reflective grasp of sufficient conditions and the consequent judgment. The fundamental way in which we link from an insight to its conditions is by means of asking and answering the further pertinent questions until we reach the point of no further questions. This emphasis on inquiry points to the fact that despite the use of terms such as "conditions" and "unconditioned," we do not know truth through some simple process of comparing the proposition to a logically and predetermined standard.[167]

It is the direct insight that determines which questions are pertinent. As long as you are raising further pertinent questions, your initial insight is vulnerable. You might even discover a completely new slant on the issue. In this reflective conversation with yourself, you can undergo self-correction.[168] As you raise and answer further questions, your initial insight is being modified and nuanced by further insights. This process is making your insight less vulnerable. For example, you may realize that your initial definition of a circle needed to be modified because it neglected the coplanarity of the radii. This modified insight (and consequently, inner word) was modified on

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the tension of critical inquiry. Rational consciousness is sublating intellectual consciousness, in other words. See Byrne, "Consciousness," 136 and 139-40.

[167] See Lawrence, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aquinas's Conception of the *Imago Dei*," 380.

[168] See Lonergan, *Insight*, CWL 3, 309.

the level of reflective understanding as you returned to imagination and sense experience—maybe you imagined a globe—and asked why all the points on Australia did not form a circle even though they are all equidistant from the center. Now, you have a modified definition—a circle is a set of *coplanar* points equidistant to a center.

When there are no further questions, your insight is invulnerable; it has undergone all the correction it can undergo.[169] The lack of any further pertinent questions is the key to the invulnerability of an insight because it is only through further questions that further insights arise, insights that complement, modify, or revise the initial insight. If there are no further pertinent questions in this self-correcting process, you cannot make your insight more correct. When you understand that you've raised all the further questions and met them, you will have fulfilled the conditions needed to affirm your proposition, which in virtue of its conditions being fulfilled, is now virtually unconditioned. The basis for making a judgment of the correctness of an insight is the insight's invulnerability. This process of reflecting terminates in an act of reflective understanding grasping the sufficiency of evidence for affirming (or denying) that the content of an insight is correct. Only reflective understanding—not sensation, not direct understanding—grasps the sufficiency of the evidence. To grasp the sufficiency of evidence for affirming a proposition means grasping the proposition as virtually unconditioned because there are no further pertinent questions. The sufficient evidence for an insight's correctness is its invulnerability.

The reason raising and answering further pertinent questions can and does lead to a grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence and so to a judgment is because our desire to know is unrestricted; there is no reality about which we cannot ask. This unrestricted desire to know is intrinsically related to the unrestrictedness of being precisely because what we anticipate in our

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[169] Importantly, if there are further questions that currently cannot be answered—maybe they require developments in another field of study, or maybe there is not equipment sophisticated enough to make the needed measurements—the reasonable thing to do is to withhold judgment.

unrestricted questioning is being. Objectivity rests on this proportionate relation between the acts

of human knowing and their content, between knowing and known.[170] Our inquiry must be

unrestricted to obtain objectivity. The invulnerability of an insight depends on the

unrestrictedness of being that corresponds to unrestricted inquiry. The criterion of "no further

pertinent questions" is relevant to the objectivity of knowing precisely because we can ask about

any and all realities.[171]

Grasping the sufficiency of evidence in an act of reflective understanding is what finally

releases the tension of critical inquiry. The satisfaction of this inquiry feels different than the

satisfaction of your questions about what something is. Where direct insights arise suddenly and

ecstatically, reflective insights emerge slowly and carefully as you weigh the evidence. The release

of tension that comes with a reflective insight is more like an experience of confidence than the

ecstatic experience of a direct insight; it is a subtle shift from the tension of an unanswered

question to a gentle peace of mind.[172] You feel like you have assembled all the relevant questions,

and your doubts begin to dissolve.[173] It may also carry some exhaustion, but it is a satisfying

exhaustion, an exhaustion in which you feel that you've really accomplished something, and it

also brings an experience of relief because you've reached knowledge, which was what you

desired all along. A further question may arise—maybe there is a decision to be made with

respect to what you now know. But for the time being, you experience a sense of relief and

accomplishment.

With the surge of confidence that comes with grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, you

don't just feel intelligent anymore; you feel like you have some authority to speak about this issue

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[170] See Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," in *Collection*, CWL 4, 211.
[171] See Patrick H. Byrne, "Lonergan's Retrieval of Aristotelian Form," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2002), 388. See also Frederick E. Crowe, "St. Thomas and the Isomorphism of Human Knowing and Its Proper Object," in *Three Thomist Studies*, eds. Frederick F. Lawrence and Michael Vertin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000): 207-235.
[172] Byrne, "Spirit of Wonder, Spirit of Love," 7.
[173] See Morelli, *Self-Possession*, 147.

because you have ample evidence. You do have good reasons and you can state them. You are ready to give your assent, even though it feels risky because you feel like you are exposing yourself by making a judgment. Making a judgment feels personal in a way that expressing your understanding did not. Yet, if you did not give your assent upon grasping the sufficiency of the evidence, you know you would be acting unreasonably. In other words, because you know that you have sufficient evidence, you know you also have the sufficient grounds for affirming the proposition. In your reflective insight, you grasp that X's conditions have been met (and so implicitly grasp that X is certainly true). Thus, because you grasp that X's conditions have been met, you can reasonably give your assent to the proposition—"Yes, X is certainly true"—such that you make explicit what reflective understanding understood implicitly. Further, this affirmation transforms the proposition from an object of thought into an object of knowledge. It is your act of reflective insight that grounds the emergence of your act of judgment. As your grasp of evidence gives rise to your judgment, you experience an interior shift. You are no longer considering the proposition, nor are you reflecting on it. You are affirming the proposition and taking a stance on it. The proposition is now yours; you are taking responsibility for it.

5.1.2 Patient Judgment

 As we have seen, the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for you to grasp the sufficiency of the evidence pertain to having raised and answered all the further pertinent questions. But our ability to raise the pertinent questions is itself conditioned by the horizon within which we find ourselves. However, it is not that *you* do not have any further pertinent questions, but rather, that there are no further pertinent questions, period. This is why it is important to collaborate with others and consult texts. We all have different blind spots, different concerns and horizons, different areas of expertise. The key criterion for making a judgment about the correctness of our insights is to learn to pay attention to our consciousness and the peripheral questions that are

lingering, but we would rather ignore.[174] Maybe these further questions would require too much extra work. Perhaps they would take too long to answer. Maybe they disclose a gap in our present knowledge that we would prefer not to admit. Or perhaps we would simply rather spend our time doing something that requires less "mental energy." Yet, bringing your questions to their satisfactory completion is the only criterion for judging the correctness of an insight. This is what Lonergan means by authenticity—living in fidelity to oneself as an inquirer. Authenticity is learning to pay attention to the questions that you habitually push aside; learning to fall in love with your question as the ground for your knowing, rather than other things you can be in love with that can motivate you to make unreasonable judgments. Likewise, this means that a wise person is someone who undergoes the personal struggle of raising all the further pertinent questions she can, is not afraid to ask others if she is missing something, and is patient, especially when the judgment is an important one. This begins to disclose just how personal judgment is. My judgments are mine. They can enrich or constrict my world and my future judgments about it. They expose whether or not I am reasonable and indicate whether I take questions seriously or brush them aside.

This self-correcting process toward invulnerable insights also discloses just how thorough the process is by which one can make a reasonable judgment. Being a good judge about anything requires a vast accumulation of many other corrected insights and it takes a long time before people can be good judges about things in particular areas. Experts in a given field are typically people who know the field so well that they know the further pertinent questions to ask. This is why graduate students apprentice themselves to professors—their professors are there to help them learn the questions that need to asked in response to their insights. While it can take years to make a judgment about a particularly complex direct insight and while it may take a lifetime to

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[174] I owe my understanding of this key criterion to Patrick H. Byrne's *Insight and Beyond* course. See above. See also Patrick H. Byrne, Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 11, no. 2 (1993), 114-15.

become wise, in the mean time, the reasonable thing to do is to recognize the areas in which you

are already good at raising and answering questions and to also pay attention to the areas in

which you habitually ignore further pertinent questions and start taking those questions seriously.

The key is to learn to pay attention to yourself as a questioner and to embrace this fundamental

dynamism at the core of your humanity. This dynamism is the heart of our existential self-

constitution, and so it is at the heart of (1) our analogy for God, who is *in se* eternally constituted as

triune[175] and; (2) the reason we are said to be created to the image of God.

5.2 *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Reflective Understanding: The Metaphysical Terms

We now turn to Thomas to correlate his metaphysical language and introspective psychology with

the foregoing. In *Verbum*, Lonergan argues that Thomas has a subtler, less acknowledged meaning

for "judgment" (*iudicare*). Thomas typically speaks of *iudicare* in terms of *compositio vel divisio*, e.g.:

when you say "All A are B" you are composing the concepts A and B into a proposition; when

you say "A is not B," you are distinguishing A and B. Both of these are judgments. However,

Lonergan argues that for Thomas, *iudicare* also and much more profoundly meant the act of

positing or denying the *compositio vel divisio*.[176] In other words, Lonergan argues that there are two

distinct elements in Thomas's understanding of judgment, a merely synthetic element (the

composition or division, itself) and the positing of this synthesis. Further, it is understanding that is

responsible for synthesizing and dividing, while a further act distinct from understanding is

responsible for the positing.

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[175] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 177-79. See below, Chapter 5.

[176] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 62-78, esp. 61-62. Lonergan suggests that Thomas's achievement with respect to specifying the act of judgment is obscured by Thomas's use of Aristotelian terminology (translated in Latin as *compositio vel divisio*). Lonergan contends that his specification is obscured because Aristotle did not clearly draw the distinction between the two synthetic elements found in judgment—the merely synthetic and the positing of synthesis. It seems to me that part of the difficulty in making this clear distinction is that Thomas seems to treat the merely synthetic element in the context of the first operation of the intellect—the operation which gives rise to it—but does not call this synthesis a *compositio vel divisio* because he is referring to the synthesis as the *quidditas*, in keeping with the question, *Quid est?*

Certainly, Lonergan is clearer on this distinction than Thomas. The subtler meaning of judgment is obscured by Thomas's use of Aristotelian language, such that it can seem as if the act of judgment uncovers a synthesis (or division) that was not previously understood.[177] However, from Thomas's position on the act of direct of understanding along with his differentiation between two types of question and their corresponding intellectual operations, it becomes clear that synthesis (or division) emerges on the level of direct understanding as we understand relations among things or within things, relations that can only be understood, not sensed.[178] These relations get formulated as inner words that express the synthesis of A and B. In judgment, on the other hand, we assent to (or deny) the synthesis, affirming/denying the correspondence between the mental synthesis (of inner words in the mind) and the real synthesis (in the thing itself). Thomas elaborates upon these distinctions in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate*: "Of the two phases of mental activity, the first is the understanding of essential meanings, while the second is a judgment, either affirmative or negative. A dual reality corresponds to these activities: to the former corresponds the nature of a thing, according to its state of being, complete or incomplete, part or accident, as the case may be; to the latter corresponds the existence of the thing."[179]

Having discussed the mental synthesis at length in the previous section and in Chapter 2 (when considering the development of a science toward a single view), it remains to clarify the act of positing synthesis (judgment, the subtler meaning of "*iudicare*") and relate it to the foregoing account of judgment (§4.1) To begin, the first operation of the intellect (direct understanding) does not include knowledge of the similarity or dissimilarity of the concept to its object. Such knowledge only arises through the second operation of the intellect. As Thomas writes "[T]he intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by

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[177] See Ibid., 62. See also, for example, *ST* Ia, q. 3, a. 4 ad 2.

[178] See above, Chapter 2, §6.2 The *Ordo Disciplinae* as an Explanatory and Synthetic Order.

[179] *In Boet. De Trin.* q. 5, a. 3. This translation is Thomas Gilby's. *St. Thomas Aquinas Philosophical Texts,* trans. Thomas Gilby (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 221, n. 604. I owe the reference to this helpful translation to Dunstan Robidoux.

knowing of a thing what a thing is [*quod quid est*]. When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth [*tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum*]."[180] As we saw above, the proposition is transformed from an object of thought to an object of knowledge. In this passage, Thomas also compares sensitive knowledge to intellectual knowledge. What differentiates sensitive and intellectual knowledge is this ability for the intellect to know that it knows—to know its own conformity with the intelligible thing. As Thomas writes, "For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it."[181]

However, a difficulty arises. How does the intellect judge that its knowing is similar to the known? This judgment would seem to involve a comparison between the knowing and its standard. What is this standard? In *De veritate*, Thomas gives us a clue. The intellect judges by returning to itself (by reflecting, that is)—something which sense can only do partially.[182] This return is the ground for applying the term "reflection" to this intellectual activity. The standard

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[180] *ST* Ia, q. 16, a. 2 c. Thomas's distinction of the twofold operation of the mind what is peculiar to each operation can be found throughout the *Summa*—not only in the questions about the intellect in the *Prima Pars*. In fact, some of the later parts of the *Summa* convey this distinction more explicitly, as he develops more and more concepts to help the student understand what is at stake. Cf. *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 83, a. 1 in which Thomas considers prayer, determining that it is not an operation of the intellect, but of the appetitive power: "Further, the Philosopher states (*De Anima* iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is 'the understanding of indivisibles,' by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is 'synthesis' and 'analysis,' *whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not*. To these a third may be added, namely, 'reasoning,' whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown." Also see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 173, a. 2. Cf. *De ver.*, q. 14, a. 1c: "For, according to the Philosopher, our understanding has a twofold operation. There is one by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, as what man is, or what animal is. This operation of itself does not involve truth or falsity, just as phrases do not. The second operation of the understanding is that by which it joins and divides concepts by affirmation or denial. Now, in this operation we do find truth and falsity, just as we do in the proposition, which is its sign."

[181] *ST* Ia, q. 16, a. 2c.

[182] See *De ver.*, q. 1, a. 9c: "Since sense is closer to an intellectual substance than other things are, it begins to return to its essence; it not only knows the sensible, but it also knows that it senses. Its return, however, is not complete, since it does not know its own essence. …But powers without any ability to sense cannot return to themselves in any way, for they do not know that they are acting. For example, fire does not know that it is heating."

lays in the principles of the intellect itself. Later on in *De veritate,* when explaining that in us

"mind" designates the highest power in the soul, Thomas begins with the etymology of *mens,*

which is taken from the verb *mensurando:* "So, the word 'mind' is applied to the soul in the same

way as 'intellect' is. For only the intellect receives knowledge about things by measuring them as if

by according its own principles."[183]

It is in measuring things by its own principles that the intellect verifies (or denies) its

understanding of its object. This verification process occurs by a *resolutio in principia* (a reduction to

principles) which Thomas aligns with the *via iudicii* (the way of judging) in which the mind reflects

on its knowledge. Assent (the personal aspect of judgment), in order to be rational, must result

from this reduction. As Thomas writes, "Human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery,

advances from certain things simply understood—namely, the first principles; and, again, by way

of judgment returns by resolving to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has

found."[184] What occurs in this process of reflection (the *via iudicii*) is that the intellect returns to the

sources of its insight, namely, the senses and its intellectual light. We return to the data of sense to

check whether our phantasm adequately represented the sense data on our object of inquiry. As

Thomas writes, "Since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way

reduce to sense everything about which we judge."[185] For example, we may set up experiments in

which we control for certain factors in order to isolate the variable under investigation. This

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[183] *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 1. This translation is by the editors of *Verbum.* Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate: QQ 1-10,* trans. by James V. McGlynn, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953). The Latin is "et ideo nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima, sicut et nomen intellectus. Solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus quasi mensurando eas ad sua principia." McGlynn's translation does not emphasize the unique character the mind has in its ability to measure things by its own principles.
[184] *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 8.
[185] *De ver.*, q. 12, a. 3 ad 2. He continues, "Hence, the Philosopher says that the sensible visible thing is that at which the work of art and nature terminates, and from which we should judge of other things. Similarly, he says that the senses deal with that which is outermost as the understanding deals with principles. He calls outermost those things which are *the term of the resolution of one who judges.* Since, then, in sleep the senses are fettered, there cannot be perfect judgment so that a man is deceived in some respect, viewing the likenesses of things as though they were the things themselves." Cf. Lonergan, *Verbum,* CWL 2, 75, fn. 65.

return indicates that reflection has "psychological conditions."[186] Thomas attends to these conditions when he insists, for example, that one must be wide-awake in order to judge precisely because we need the full use of our senses in order to reach a judgment.[187] These conditions point to the fact that judging is an activity that involves the whole human person. Whereas in direct understanding we abstract from the here and now to form a universal concept, in reflective understanding, we return to the here and now to test the concept out.

Yet, besides human knowledge's extrinsic origin in sensitive impressions, it also has an immanent source in intellectual light. Thus, the reflective activity of the way of judgment must also return to intellectual light.[188] For Thomas, our native intellectual light is the key to our ability to reflect and hence to our ability to know reality. As Lonergan writes, "The ultimate ground of our knowing is indeed God, the eternal Light; but the r*eason why* we know is within us. It is the light of our own intellects; and by it we can know because [as Thomas writes] 'the intellectual light itself which we have within us is nothing else than a certain participated likeness of the uncreated light.'"[189] In other words, our intellectual light, "operat[es] as a relentless desire to know that is capable of discerning when it 'gets things right"[190] and "figuring out how to figure out" if its insight is correct. As such, intellectual light is the proximate reason why we know. This means that we know by what we are—beings who participate in uncreated light—rather than by any vision or contact or confrontation with the other.

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[186] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 75.

[187] For example, see *ST* Ia, q. 84, a. 8 ad. 2.

[188] As Lonergan explains, Aristotle provided Thomas with a theory of agent intellect, but with Augustine's help, Thomas moved beyond Aristotle's theory by arguing for the identification of agent intellect with the ground of intellectual light. See Lonergan, *CWL* 2, 90-1. See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 90-91. On agent intellect's illumination of phantasms, see See *ST* Ia, q. 54, a. 4.

[189] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 85 (emphasis added). Lonergan is citing *ST* Ia, q. 84, a. 5c. See also *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 2c. In affirming that the ultimate ground of our knowing is eternal Light, Thomas is agreeing with Augustine. In locating the reason of human knowing within, Thomas is transcending the Platonism of Augustine's theory of divine illumination.

[190] Lawrence, "Lonergan's Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity," Paper presented at Boston College Systematic Theology Colloquium (April 2013), 10-11.

Thomas describes the return to intellectual light as an instance of '*ratio terminatur ad intellectum*' (reason attains its term in understanding).[191] This phrase has two meanings, both of which are relevant for understanding the *via iudicii*. First, *intellectus* refers to the *habitus principiorum* (habit of principles).[192] In returning to intellectual light, the intellect returns to naturally known first principles (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction), which are an effect of intellectual light. Thomas explains why we need to return to intellectual light in addition to sensation by explicating the relationship between the light of agent intellect and first principles:

> Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things; *nevertheless*, the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that they may be received in the possible intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a certain sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of the agent intellect) through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which we judge about other things, and in which we foreknow these others.[193]

For example, the principle of non-contradiction "does not arise from an insight into sensible data but from the nature of intelligence as such; and so its field of application is not limited to the realm of possible human experience."[194] Reducing the proposition to these principles provides evidence for making a judgment.[195] Until the resolution reaches these principles, one can doubt.

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[191] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 77. Lonergan bases the following on Peghaire's study on *intellectus et ratio* in Aquinas.

[192] See *De ver.*, q. 1, a. 12c: "For example, first principles are immediately known when we know their terms, and for this reason intellect or understanding is called 'a habit of principles.'"

[193] *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 6c. Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 58, a. 3. Cf. *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 171 a. 4.

[194] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 69.

[195] For example, Thomas considers the process of making a judgment as a collection of evidence and return to first principles, which is similar in both speculative and practical matters: *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 53, a. 4: "Thought [*consideratio*] signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about something [*intellectus veritatem rei intuentis*]. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. *Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.* Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin" (emphasis added). Here, Thomas is using "reason" (*ratio*) and "intellect" (*intellectus*) to refer to the faculties of reason and intellect, which is different from the distinction we have been using been using between two kinds of intellectual acts of understanding, namely, direct understanding and reflective understanding (which occur on the levels of

But once one has reached them, doubt is excluded. Whenever a correct resolution to principles is performed, falsity cannot be in the intellect.[196] The intellect's return to its sources in sensitive impressions and intellectual light is in Thomas's terms what we explored above as the raising and answering of all further pertinent questions – the activity that linked the conclusion (the conditioned proposition) to its principles (the fulfilling conditions).[197]

Second, according to Lonergan, the phrase "*ratio terminatur ad intellectum*" refers to the fact that reason is *understanding* in process. Given this relationship between reason and understanding, and given the connection Thomas makes between human reasoning, judgment, and the *resolutio in principia* in Question 79 (a. 8), this means that the *resolutio in principia* cannot be interpreted solely in logical terms (i.e., in terms of coherent inferences from premises) but must also be interpreted in terms of understanding.[198] Thomas continues in Article 12 of Question 79, referring again to human reasoning (*ratiocinatio hominis*): "The human act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge [*iudicamus*] of those things which we have discovered by reasoning."[199]

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intelligent and rational/reasonable self-consciousness, respectively). This question takes place in Thomas's consideration of imprudence. For the relationship between reason and intellect, see *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 8. Cf. *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 63, a. 1: "…In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason…" For Thomas's use of *inquisitio*, see Roy J. Deferrari and Sister M. Inviolata Barry, *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas based on the* Summa theologica *and Selected Passages of his other Works* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 565.

[196] See *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 12c: "But [falsity] never occurs if a reduction to first principles is made correctly."
[197] However, in grounding the objectivity of judgment in the raising and answering of further pertinent questions, Lonergan made a significant and original contribution, above and beyond Thomas's cogitional theory.
[198] See Lawrence, "Lonergan's Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity," 10.
[199] *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 12c.

What this amounts to is that *via iudicii*—the reflective process of reasoning—results in an

act of understanding no less than the discursive process of reasoning (level of direct

understanding) results in an act of understanding. Further, "For no less than the first type of inner

word, the second proceeds from an *intelligere*. No less than the procession of the first type, the

procession of the second is an *emanatio intelligibilis*."[200] These are two distinct types of

understanding—two distinct acts of *intelligere*—and so two distinct types of proceeding inner

words. One is a direct act of understanding that understands the intelligible in a phantasm and

speaks its understanding in an inner word that is a definition of *essence*. The other is an act of

reflective understanding that understands the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming the *existence*

of that essence and speaks its understanding in an inner word of judgment. We can observe the

distinction between these two kinds of words in the following passages:

> Consequently, the quiddities formed in the intellect, or even the affirmative and negative
> propositions, are, in a sense, products of the intellect, but products of such a kind that
> through them the intellect arrives at the knowledge of an exterior thing. Hence, this
> product is, in a fashion, a second means by which understanding takes place.[201]
>
> For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the thing, or even an affirmative or
> negative proposition.[202]
>
> [T]hat which is the first and direct object in the act of understanding is something that
> the intellect conceives within itself about the thing understood, *whether it be a definition or*
> *proposition according to the two operations of the intellect* mentioned in *De Anima, III.* Now this
> concept of the intellect is called the interior word and is signified by means of speech: for
> the spoken word does not signify merely the thing understood, or the intelligible form
> thereof or the act of understanding, but the concept of the intellect through which it
> signifies the thing…[203]

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[200] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL, 77.

[201] *De ver.*, q. 3, a. 2c. See also *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2: "For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that
our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that
at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the
conception of the intellect – whether the conception can be signified by a simple expression, as is true
when the intellect forms the quiddities of things, or whether it can be signified only by a complex
expression, as is true when the intellect composes and divides. Now, for us every object of understanding
really proceeds from something else."

[202] *De pot.*, q. 8, a. 1c.

[203] *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 5c.

[T]hat is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when understanding. Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its operation which is called "the understanding of indivisibles," it forms a definition; while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort.[204]

If the intellect reduces the conclusion (i.e., the proposition that emerged as a possible intelligibility on the level of direct understanding) to its principles in the *via iudicii*, the intellect must assent to the conclusion (i.e., affirm that the proposition is a real intelligibility).[205] Assent is the act of judgment, though it emphasizes the personal aspect of judgment. What leads up to it is reflection and what grounds it is a reflective act of understanding that has grasped the reduction to principles. Thomas discusses the necessity of making a judgment once one has resolved the conclusion to its principles in his commentary on Boethius's *De trinitate*. He is differentiating between modes of assent, e.g., judgment, belief, and opinion:

> It may be said: Whenever there is acceptance of a truth, by whatever mode of assent, there must be something which moves the mind to assent: *just as the naturally possessed light of the intellect causes assent to first principles, and the truth of those first principles causes assent to conclusions made from them*…But that which inclines the mind to assent to the first principles of understanding or to conclusions known from these principles *is a sufficient induction which forces assent*, and is sufficient to judge of those things to which the mind gives its assent.[206]

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[204] *In Ioan.*, c. 1, lect. 1, n. 25.

[205] See *De ver.*, q. 22, a. 6 ad 4: "In demonstrative sciences conclusions are so related to principles that when the conclusion is removed the principle is removed. And so from this fixity of the conclusions with regard to the principles the intellect is forced by the principles themselves to assent to the conclusions" (cited in Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 75, fn. 62).

[206] *In Boet. De trin.*, q. 3, a. 1 ad 4. Interestingly, in this passage Thomas also compares the habit of faith with the habit of principles. While the former is infused and the latter is natural, the habit of principles is not caused by sense but only receives a determination from sense. Similarly, the habit of faith is not caused by preaching, but only receives determination from hearing, e.g., in preaching: "And thus it is evident that faith comes in two ways: namely, from God by reason of the interior light which induces assent, and also by reason of those truths which are proposed exteriorly and take their source from divine revelation. These latter are related to the knowledge which is of faith as things known by the senses are to knowledge of first principles, because in both cases there is a certain determination given to cognition. Therefore, as cognition of first principles is received by way of sense experience, and yet the light by which those principles are known is innate, *so faith comes by way of hearing*, and yet the habit of faith is infused."

This passage indicates the relationship between the reflective act of understanding and the proceeding act of judgment or assent in which the former serves as the motive for the later. One gives one's assent when one judges the conception of the thing to be true.[207]

To summarize, in considering the standard by which the intellect measures things, we can refer to *intellectus* in relation to the *habitus principiorum*. In this case, we are referring to the criteria by which we make a judgment—*resolutio in principiorum*. We can also refer to *intellectus* in relation to reflective understanding and the assent that follows upon it. In this case, we are referring to the effect of this measuring return—an act of judgment proceeding from an act of reflective understanding.[208] Before moving on to the next chapter, it will be helpful to summarize this section by explicating the relationship among the activities performed in the *via iudicii*. The relationships on the level of reflective understanding are the same as those on the level of direct understanding, so we proceed quickly through them. The following will be helpful:

> Act C as act: *intelligere,* the act of reflective understanding
> > Act C as grounding Act D: *dicere,* the act of reflective understanding *as* speaking
> Act D: *iudicare*, the act of judgment; the content of this act is the *verbum* (inner word of judgment—i.e., proposition, affirmation/denial)

Table 12

5.2.1 *Intelligere* **and** *Dicere*

As with direct understanding, we have been analyzing one act—reflective understanding (*intelligere*)—from two points of view: from the point of view of the instrumental cause (agent object) and from the point of view of the term (terminal object). In this case, the agent object is the sufficient evidence (resolution to principles) and the terminal object is the inner word of judgment. To put this in colloquial terms, the act of reflective understanding "does" two things: it grasps

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[207] *De malo*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 14 cited in Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 73.

[208] There remains a third element with regard to the intellect's measuring of things. It is what Lonergan calls the critical issue, and it pertains to knowing our very capacity to know the truth. See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 86. The critical issue is intimately related to becoming present to oneself as created to the *imago Dei* and therefore, for coming to a truly fruitful understanding of the analogy for the Trinity.

(*intelligere*) the sufficiency of the evidence, and it pivots on itself to speak (*dicere*) an affirmation

(*iudicare*) that expresses this grasped sufficiency. As with direct understanding, once you have a

reflective insight, your insight is in control of your reflective activities, and so you are operating

autonomously. As such, you are able to speak a word of judgment. It is as if, once grasping the

sufficiency of the evidence, you say to yourself, "Oh, wow! I've got it!" and so you recognize you

can reasonably proceed to affirm your (modified and nuanced) insight.

5.2.2 *Iudicare; Verbum*

The act of reflective understanding is distinct from the act of judgment that it grounds.[209] Again,

we can recognize this distinction by turning to the respective contents of these two acts. As

sufficient evidence is one thing and the true is another, so also the act by which the evidence is

grasped as sufficient is distinct from the act by which the true is affirmed.[210] Thus, we must

carefully distinguish between *intelligere* (the act of understanding by which the sufficiency of

evidence is grasped) and *iudicare* (the act of affirming the true, which is an interiorly uttered word).

At the same time, the two acts are connected by an intellectual emanation, for we are able to

affirm the true because we have grasped the evidence as sufficient.[211] There is no *dicere* grounding

iudicare unless there has been a reflective grasp that the conclusion has been resolved to its

principles. Affirmation/denial depend upon reflective understanding being in act and upon

reflection knowing that in its grasp of sufficient evidence it has the sufficient grounds to speak a

word of affirmation/denial. In other words, reflective understanding-in-act understands itself as

the sufficient ground for the act of judgment, and so it speaks. Affirmations are given only with

and within the reflective act of understanding. This is what is meant by *emanatio intelligibilis*.

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[209] For example, see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 53, a. 4 ad 2: "All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment…"

[210] See above, §5.1.2 Reflective Insight: Sufficient Evidence, pp. 186-87.

[211] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 204-05.

5.3 *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Reflective Understanding: The Necessity of the Inner Word

As with the inner word of definition, we can ask why we need the inner word of judgment. According to Thomas we form inner words in order to judge external things. In other words, inner words play an intermediary and mediating role between understanding and external things. As he writes, "The intellectual conception is a medium between the intellect and the thing known, because through its mediation the intellectual operation attains the thing. Hence, the intellectual conception is not only that which is understood but also that by which the thing is understood. Consequently, that which is understood can be said to be both the thing itself as well as an intellectual conception."[212] The necessity of these two types of inner words is related. In fact, to know the thing is the entire reason the intellect forms a concept: "The concept of the intellect is ordered to the thing understood as to an end; since the reason that the intellect forms in itself the concept of the thing is this, that it might know the thing understood."[213]

On the level of direct understanding, the inner word was necessary for effecting the transition from grasping the preconceptual quiddity in the material thing (the formal cause) to the definition of the thing (the essence). However, at this stage, the conceived object is only an object of thought. When you raise the critical question of truth, which introduces a duality between your inner word (of definition/concept) and the external thing, then you begin to use your inner word as a medium of knowledge through which you apprehend the external thing.[214] To say that your inner word is a medium of knowledge means that your knowledge of the existence of the external thing *is* your knowledge of the truth of your inner word (your proposition). Truth—a true judgment—is the medium by which we know reality. In other words, the second operation of the

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[212] *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 2 ad 3. According to Lonergan, this position on the mediating role of inner words appears as soon as Thomas moves beyond his initial *Sentences* commentary and remains throughout his thought.

[213] *De pot.*, q. 8, a. 1c. For this reference, see Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 22, fn. 41. Also recall *ST* Ia, q. 85, a. 2 ad. 3.

[214] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 21; 200-01; Cf. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 597-601.

intellect (reflective understanding) introduces the duality of idea and thing and makes the former—which is the inner word (the idea formulated on the level of direct understanding)—the medium in and through which one apprehends the latter when one passes judgment on the truth of the definition or concept.[215] For example, to know that the human person is a rational animal is to know the truth of your inner word (your definition, your conceived object, your proposition) "a human person is a rational animal." Further, the reflective insight is not enough to serve as a medium of knowledge because it is a grasp of evidence, not an affirmation of truth.

McShane summarizes the necessity of both types of inner words. First, on the necessity of the inner word on the level of direct understanding, he writes, "There is a first necessity of moving from grasp of the quiddity of the material thing by insight into phantasm, to conception of the thing, in which intelligible form and common matter are combined. Without this conceptualization the thing is not known as thing but only its form by insight and its matter by sense, so there is simply no defining the thing."[216] On the necessity of the inner word on the level of reflective understanding, he writes, "The further transition from object of thought to knowledge of the existing thing makes necessary a *verbum* that is not a definition but a judgment, proceeding from grasped sufficiency of evidence, and through which one knows concrete reality. It is distinct from understanding as a grasp of sufficient evidence and affirmation of truth are distinct."[217]

We can put the foregoing in terms of essence and existence, which also points toward the necessity of inner words for our ability to move beyond the sensible world. The inner word of definition expresses the essence of X; the inner word of judgment expresses that X exists. Both inner words are necessary because the material things we inquire after are composed of both

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[215] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 21.
[216] Philip McShane, "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God" *Theological Studies* 23, no. 4 (1962), 555.
[217] Ibid., 555-56.

essence and existence. Further, we need inner words even for that to which our intellects are disproportionate. Thus, we need them to know God analogically in this life. While we cannot know God's essence, we can inquire after God's effects to formulate a proposition such as "God exists" and by affirming this proposition, we know that God exists.[218] In fact, in the trinitarian questions in the *Summa*, what Thomas is doing is helping the reader develop concepts—inner words of definitions (i.e., processions, relations, persons)—in order that she may develop an analogical understanding of Trinity in itself, which can then be elaborated upon to illuminate a theology of the divine missions. However, within trinitarian theology, the theologian must be content with potentially correct concepts.

To integrate the sections on the inner words of definition and judgment with one another, and also to draw out the relationship between knowing and being, and the relevance of the foregoing to trinitarian theology, Crowe has a very helpful summary:

> [For] St. Thomas the process [of intellectual emanation] was the expression of a *word*, that is, the inner word of mind, not the outer word of speech (which would be a later operation); further, he distinguished a twofold word in man, one on the level of understanding (the *verbum incomplexum*), and one on the level of reflection or judgment (the *verbum complexum*, so-called because a judgment is formed of subject, copula, and predicate). Now the concept, or *verbum incomplexum*, corresponds to essence, while the judgment, or *verbum complexum*, corresponds to existence; but in God, as essence and existence are one, so the concept and judgment are one; God utters but one eternal Word. However, either word in man offers an analogy for the *emanatio intelligibilis* of that divine Word.[219]

As Crowe underscores, while there are two distinct emanations in us—the emanation of the inner word of definition and the emanation of the inner word of judgment—in God, there is but one eternal emanation of the Word in which there is perfect understanding and judging. That is, in God—who is the infinite act of understanding—direct understanding and reflective understanding are but one perfect act.

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[218] See *ST* Ia, q. 2, a. 3.
[219] Crowe, *Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 145.

6. Conclusion

Having considered the intellectual emanation of the inner word on the levels of direct and reflective understanding, it remains to consider the second type of procession, which is not the procession of a word, but rather, a procession of love. To distinguish this second type of emanation, I at times use Thomas's phrase, intellectual inclination (*inclinatio intelligibilis*). Like the procession of the inner word, the procession of love has an intellectual basis. However, there are important distinctions, hence the distinct term for this second type of intellectual procession. Before continuing, recall some of the key elements of the foregoing analysis of the procession of inner words. Insofar as the operation of the intellect (whether on the level of direct or reflective understanding) is meant in the sense of act, it is termed *intelligere*. Insofar as the operation of the intellect is meant that one act is grounding another, it is termed *dicere*. On the level of direct understanding, the grounded act is termed *concipere* (the act of conceptualizing) and its content is the inner word of definition or concept. On the level of reflective understanding, the grounded act is termed *iudicare* (the act of judging) and its content is the inner word of affirmation or denial. In both cases, the inner word proceeds because of understanding, and its procession is what *dicere* consists in. This procession is what we have been calling the intellectual emanation, and it is what is analogous to the procession of the divine Word in God.

CHAPTER 4
INCLINATIO INTELLIGIBILIS: PROCEEDING LOVE

1. Analepsis and Prolepsis

THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER PREPARED THE way for the psychological analogy (Chapter 5) by

examining the first kind of procession in us, namely, the procession of the word. In this chapter, I

will first explain the meaning of "*emanatio intelligibilis*" as a unique kind of procession. The

processions of word and love share in this unique character, in which the second act emerges

because of the first act. We define/judge and love *rationally*—we define or judge because we have

understood, and we love based on this word. I will then treat the procession of love, the

emanation of love. Together with Chapter 3, these two sections of Chapter 4 will prepare the way

for the following chapter in which we will turn to the psychological analogy, using the processions

of word and love in us as analogues for understanding—fruitfully yet imperfectly—the processions

of Word and Love in God. This starting point—an analogous understanding of the processions—

allows for a progressive development of further concepts that build upon one another, namely,

relations and persons.

2. *Emanatio Intelligibilis*: Intellectual Dependence

Before proceeding to discuss the psychological analogue for the second divine procession, i.e., the

procession of the act of love, I will examine what intellectual emanation means and thus, why it is

relevant to trinitarian theology. I begin with considering intellectual emanation before the

procession of love because this consideration will help clarify the relationship between the first

and second processions, and so between knowing and loving. More specifically, it will prepare us

to appreciate the intellectual element of love's procession and thereby cut through the obscurity

that has long surrounded the second procession. The procession of the word and the procession of

love are processions in the same sense—they are both intellectual emanations—but they are not

the same procession. Rather, the processions themselves are related, i.e., love proceeds because of the word, whereas the word proceeds because of understanding.

Recall that while there is intelligibility that is not intelligent, there is also intelligibility that is also intelligent. Again, intelligibility is what is known by intelligent beings. For example, a human being is both intelligible and intelligent. She is intelligible because she is a created being, and all of being is intelligible—capable of being understood. She is also intelligent because she can understand and know being, at least the being that is proportionate to her intelligence.[1] Thus, there is intelligibility that is not intelligent, and there is intelligibility that is also intelligent. To distinguish the two, we can call the former intelligibility "material" and the latter "spiritual."[2] *Emanatio intelligibilis* is a spiritual intelligibility because it is also intelligent. It is a particular type of procession that occurs within human consciousness. In us, there are a few aspects to the procession of an inner word. There is the actual aspect insofar as there is a procession of an act from an act. This aspect is relevant to trinitarian theology insofar as God is pure act, but irrelevant insofar as there is only one infinite act in God (not three). There is also the productive aspect insofar as the act of understanding is the efficient cause of the procession of a word. The productive aspect becomes increasingly irrelevant in Thomas's trinitarian theology as his thought matures, for the Father is not the cause of the Son.[3] Instead, with the Latin Fathers Thomas prefers to speak of God the Father as "principle." This aspect is supplanted by the intellectual aspect, which sets intellectual emanation apart from other kinds of immanent processions. This kind of causality ("because-of-ness") is unique to the spiritual order. In the actual aspect the procession is *processio operati*. In the intellectual aspect the procession is *processio intelligibilis*.[4] The latter involves a different type of dependence, and this is precisely what Thomas calls "intellectual

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[1] For example, *ipsum esse* is disproportionate to her intelligence. See *ST* Ia, qq. 12-13.
[2] See Lonergan, *Insight*, CWL 3, 539.
[3] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1. Efficient causality is extrinsic causality, making it irrelevant to an analogy for the divine processions. See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 108.
[4] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 207.

emanation." It is not just caused by understanding but is because of understanding-in-act. This kind of causality is unique to the spiritual order.

The intellectual aspect of the procession of the inner word in us should already be familiar in light of the previous Chapter, especially Section 3. Recall that once you have an insight, your insight itself takes over your intelligent activities; insight is operating autonomously. It does so in order to formulate a word that expresses what you've understood. Once insight has figured out what it "got," it cannot help but speak a word about it. Thus, an act of conceptualizing proceeds from an act of understanding through an intellectual emanation— through the speaking of a word. In other words, intelligent speaking grounds the relation between understanding and conceptualizing. Once the intellect comes to terms with its insight through its own autonomous activity, it *knows* that it is the sufficient ground for speaking a word that expresses its understanding.[5] This "knowing that it is the sufficient ground for speaking" is what *intelligere* as *dicere* is (the operation of the intellect grounding another act). The act of understanding speaks and knows it is the sufficient ground of speaking precisely because it is operating autonomously as intelligence-in-act. It is this *knowing* that is the intellectual aspect of the inner word's procession.

We can appreciate the intellectual aspect of an intellectual emanation if we compare it with causality. *Intelligere* and *verbum* are related as cause and effect; in us, the act of understanding does produce the inner word. However, the *verbum* is not only the product of the act of understanding, but it is also the *rationally conscious expression* of understanding. As Lonergan writes, "This production is not merely utterance, *dicere*, but the utterance of intelligence in act, [either in] rationally conscious disregard of the irrelevant [or in] critical evaluation of all that is relevant, of

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[5] Again, *intelligere* is one and the same act as *dicere*, but it is not the same as *concipere*. It is difficult to find the English terms to say all of this properly. Here, my use of "conceptualizing" is not meant to be equated with *dicere*. It is, rather, *concipere*.

intelligere."[6] Crowe elaborates on this point: "[W]hen we define, not as parrots, but as intelligent men, we do so in virtue of understanding; when we judge not as bigots, but as rational men, we do so in virtue of reflection, and that 'in virtue of' does not indicate causation in the *ontological* sense; it indicates that the *verbum* is not only *caused by* but also is *because of,* in the *cognitional* sense of proceeding from rationally conscious grounds."[7] Where productive dependence relates principle and term on the basis of efficient causality, intellectual dependence relates principle and term on the basis of *rational consciousness, within the unity* of consciousness.[8] This unique type of dependence occurs only within intelligent beings, and more specifically, only within intelligence—not within, for example, imagination.

The key to understanding this dependence is to come to terms with "because-of-ness" as distinct from cause and effect. Inner words proceed because of the act of understanding, which is why Lonergan says inner words proceed with reflective rationality. The difference between ontological causality and cognitional "because-of-ness" is the difference between natural procession and the procession of the inner word. Both processions are intelligible. For example, when fire heats a steak, we can understand this natural process, but this heating process is not itself intelligent. As Crowe puts it, "our act of understanding the fire is not the fire's act of heating."[9] However, when understanding speaks a word that expresses itself, this spiritual process is not only intelligible (for we can understand it, as we have been doing); it is also intelligent. When we speak a word, we can understand this process (intellectual emanation, which is what *dicere* consists in) *and* the speaking process is itself intelligent (*dicere* is *intelligere*). The intelligibility of

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[6] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 150.

[7] Crowe, *The Doctrine f the Most Holy Trinity*, 144-5. Recall Thomas's words in the *Summa*, which are akin to Crowe's language of 'in virtue of': "Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge" (*ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1c).

[8] See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,* (unpublished manuscript), 109. Wilkins cites *In Met.* 5 lect. 2 §775.

[9] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 145.

the procession of the inner word is intelligible not passively or potentially, like the procession of heat, but actively and actually, because the procession of the inner word is the activity of intelligence in act.[10] In this case, "our understanding is not now a separate act (except in further reflection) from the spiritual process itself; in the very act of defining or judgment we are intelligently conscious of what we are doing and of our sufficient cognitional grounds for doing it."[11]

Further, the fire's heating process has the intelligibility of some specific natural law, e.g., the laws of thermodynamics. It does not have the intelligibility of the very idea of intelligible law. This is precisely what the word does have. It proceeds as the very idea of intelligible law, as the pure case of intelligible law. There is no law for understanding the process of intellectual emanation; the process *is* understanding in operation already. As Crowe puts it, "Formulations of the law of sufficient reason, of the principle of non-contradiction, etc., are attempts to approach this pure case from without. But you cannot *impose* such laws on rational process, as a law is imposed on fire to govern its heating; intelligence is itself constitutive and creative of law."[12] These principles are not specific laws that govern the operation of intelligence; the operation of intelligence is the reason we know these laws in the first place.

In the following passage, Lonergan contrasts natural process and the procession of the word in a way that captures the unique type of process that occurs only with and within intelligent consciousness:

> Any effect has a sufficient ground in its cause; but an inner word not merely has a sufficient ground in the act of understanding it expresses; *it also has a knowing as a sufficient ground, and that ground is operative precisely as a knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient.* To introduce a term that will summarize this, we may say that *the inner word is rational,* not indeed with the derived rationality of discourse, of reasoning from premises to conclusions, but *with the*

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[10] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 47.
[11] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 145.
[12] Ibid.

basic and essential rationality of rational consciousness, with the rationality that can be discerned in any judgment, with the rationality that now we have to observe in all concepts.[13]

Focus on the phrase, "an inner word…has a knowing as a sufficient ground…" Here, we can observe the operation of the intellect as sufficient ground (*dicere*) of a second act (either *concipere* or *iudicare*) precisely because that ground is a knowing (*dicere* is *intelligere*). An intelligent inner word emerges *because* an intelligent person can and does understand an intelligibility. An affirmative inner word emerges *because* a reasonable person can and does understand the sufficiency of the evidence. It is this "knowing that you know" or "a knowing that knows itself to be sufficient" that is the reason for the intellectual aspect of the procession of the inner word. The inner word proceeds from the act of understanding *consciously*; intellectual emanation always includes a conscious awareness of the dependence of the word on the act of understanding. Thus, the inner word consciously expresses the intelligibility grasped by the act of understanding. While all causes are proportionate to their effects, the act of understanding is proportionate to the inner word and knows itself to be proportionate to the inner word. *That* is why we say in us, the inner word is not only caused by but it is also *because of* the act of understanding.

While the intellectual emanation of the inner word has the aspect of both natural and intellectual processes, it is the intellectual process that is analogous to the procession of the divine Word. That is, it is the conscious rather than the causal aspect that is relevant. Later, in his article "Cognitional Structure," Lonergan captures this basic rationality of human consciousness in terms of its functional role in our self-constitution as human beings:

> But human knowing is also formally dynamic. It is self-assembling, self-constituting. It puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached. *And this occurs, not with the blindness of natural process, but consciously, intelligently, rationally.* Experience stimulates inquiry, and inquiry is intelligence bringing itself to act; it leads from experience through imagination to insight, and from insight to the concepts that combine in single objects both what has been grasped by insight and what in experience or imagination is relevant to the insight. In, turn, concepts stimulate reflection, and

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[13] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 47-48 (emphasis added).

reflection is the conscious exigence of rationality; it marshals the evidence and weighs it either to judge or else to doubt and so renew inquiry.[14]

When Augustine and Thomas turn to the human mind as created to the image of God and as the analogue for the Trinity, it is because of this basic rationality of consciousness. If we do not grasp the conscious, rational character of our defining and judging, we might as well use fire's heating as the analogy for the procession of the divine Word.[15] Crowe explains this rationality as follows:

> [It] has to do with internal process. It is a process within intelligence. It is an intelligible process; more, it is an intelligent process. It is a process from knowledge to knowledge, *from* knowledge as insight, as perfection, as insight into particular phantasm, *to* knowledge as the expression of the insight, knowledge as conceived, objectified, made universal. It has a 'because of' character. It is a 'because of' intrinsically in itself and not just as seen in an object.[16]

What Crowe highlights is that the procession of the inner word is intellectual because it is a procession from knowledge to knowledge; it is a procession that happens entirely within intellectual consciousness, and therefore the procession itself is also intellectual. With regard to the intrinsic "because of" character of the rationality of consciousness, what Crowe means is that while the objects we inquire after each have a "because of" immanent in them (that is, they have a *reason,* a *why*, a formal cause, a *causa essendi*), human rational consciousness is itself a "because of." Intelligence grasps not only the reason for the eclipse, but intelligence also grasps that it is the reason it grasps the reason of the eclipse; intelligence grasps that it supervened on the phantasm, contributing something above and beyond experience. Thus, the word does not emerge blindly nor automatically. It has reason (a "because of") and that reason is intelligent and autonomous.

In speaking of the fact that the inner word is rational because it has a knowing that knows itself to be sufficient, we are speaking of a unique capacity that intelligence has—only intelligence is capable of reflection. Thomas writes of this reflection in the trinitarian questions of the *Summa*

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[14] Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure," 223 (emphasis added).

[15] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 145. See also *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1: "Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from how occurs is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot…."

[16] Crowe, "For Inserting a New Question (26A) in the *Prima Pars*," 339.

Contra Gentiles.[17] He then differentiates among the grades of intellect, demonstrating that "in perfect intellectual reflection, principle and term are identical without the elimination of the reflection and so without an elimination of the procession."[18] The possibility of this identity is due to the unique relationship of dependence proper to intellectual emanation in which absolute distinction is not only unnecessary, but also, decreases in proportion to the perfection of the procession. As one forms a rigorous conception of what one has understood and lets go of the unnecessary parts of the phantasm, the closer the identification between the conception and the act of understanding becomes. This is what Thomas means when he writes:

> Whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood.[19]

It is precisely in the intellect's capacity for reflection on itself that makes the intellect relevant to the procession of the word. (Here, I am referring to reflection as a characteristic of intelligence as such, not to the specific reflection that occurs on the level of judgment). While the human intellect can reflect on its own act to the point of coming to scientific knowledge of itself, the kind of reflective capacity to which we are here referring is something much more fundamental. This type of reflection is internal to *every* procession of a word in us. Any time there is an intellectual emanation in us, it is because of this reflective capacity. Thus, this type of reflective rationality does not require clear knowledge regarding the existence of the act of understanding, of inner words, and of their relation.[20] This reflective capacity internal to every

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[17] *SCG* 4, c. 11, §5.
[18] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 206.
[19] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1, ad. 2.
[20] Rather, the point is that "adequate inner words come from acts of understanding spontaneously and consciously when certain conditions are fulfilled; one can operate in accordance with the structure, and in that sense grasp consciously the why of the production of an inner word, without having clarity regarding the structure" (Editor's note in Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 610-11 fn. 7). It is not clear to me why the editor uses "spontaneous" here when Lonergan typically contrasts the spontaneity of

procession of a word in us is a basic and fundamental element of human knowing: we consciously and autonomously speak because we understand. In the following chapter, in the context of the *imago Dei*, we will consider the intellect's explicit self-reflection.

3. The Intellectual Emanation of Love: The *Emanatio Intelligibilis* Emerging from Judgment

In considering the intellectual emanation of two kinds of inner words, definitions and judgments, we have considered the natural analogues for the divine procession of the Word. While the procession of the Word in God is analogous to both the emergence of a concept from an act of understanding and to the emergence of judgment from an act of grasping the sufficiency of evidence, there is no distinction in God between direct and reflective understanding. The divine Word is therefore simultaneously both concept and judgment.[21] God does not merely entertain the divine essence as an object of thought, but in one perfect act of understanding–judging, understands and knows (affirms) the divine essence (and all of creation).

Thus, while both kinds of inner words are relevant to trinitarian theology, the inner word of judgment proceeding from one who reflectively understands is nevertheless more relevant because judgment is the highest point of rational reflection. Yet, as Thomas explains in the question on the divine missions, this affirmative inner word is not any sort of word, but one that breaks forth into love (a "*verbum spirans amorem*"), or as Augustine calls it, "knowledge *with* love."[22] Thus, beyond an affirmation of the existence of something, there is also simultaneously the affirmation of the goodness of something, and this affirmation itself grounds another *processio intelligibilis*, that of love. Following Lonergan, I call this affirmation a "judgment of value."[23]

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insights with the autonomy of speaking inner words. It may be meant to indicate the fact that whenever we do understand, a word proceeds within us simply because we understand.

[21] See Charles Hefling, "'Over Thin Ice: Comments on *Gratia,* Grace and Gratitude," *Lonergan Workshop Journal* vol. 18 (2005), 100.

[22] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2. See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.

[23] This is technically following the "later" Lonergan, as Lonergan did not recognize the distinct fourth level

Though this is not Thomas's term, it is a helpful way of distinguishing between a judgment that addresses the *an sit* question and a judgment about the goodness of something, which is the kind of judgment that results in a *verbum spirans amorem*. This second kind of judgment is different from an *an sit* judgment that affirms or denies the existence of something. However, it includes and sublates the prior kind of judgment. To distinguish the procession of love from the procession of this affirmative word of value, while also maintaining the crucial aspect—that Y proceeds *because of* X—I occasionally pick up on Thomas's phrase, *inclinatio intelligibilis*. However, Thomas's phrase is imperfect because, as we will see, love is not only an inclination, but also a resting—a complacency—and in fact, the latter is a better analogue for the procession of divine Love.

Of the similarity between the processions of word and love, Lonergan writes, "once one grasps the *processio intelligibilis* of inner word from uttering act of understanding, there is not the slightest difficulty in grasping the simple, clear straightforward account Aquinas offered of proceeding love."[24] While it may seem counterintuitive to refer to the procession of love as an intellectual emanation, Thomas's point in using this phrase to name the type of procession that occurs in God is that both processions are rational, meaning there is a relationship of intellectual dependence—principle and term are related on the basis of *rational consciousness, within the unity* of consciousness. That is, both inner words and love proceed with reflective rationality.[25] The second procession is distinct insofar as it proceeds from the intellect to the will in humans. Lonergan helpfully defines "intellectual emanation" in a way that accentuates what the two processions have in common: "Intellectual emanation, then, is the conscious origin of a real, natural, and conscious act from a real, natural, and conscious act, *both within intellectual consciousness*

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of human consciousness until after writing *Verbum* and *Insight*. As Byrne underscores, Lonergan had attempted to ground the affirmation of goodness in the affirmation of being in *Insight*, but this is inadequate.

[24] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 211.

[25] See above, Chapter 3, §2. Introduction: *Emanatio Intelligibilis* and Trinitarian Theology.

and also by virtue of intellectual consciousness itself as determined by the prior act."[26] Thus, both the

procession of word and that of love occur within intellectual consciousness and by virtue of

intellectual consciousness itself—that is the crucial point; judgment and love each proceed *because*

of prior conscious acts within intellectual consciousness. As Crowe puts it, "Now this flow of love

in the will from the *verbum* is also an *emanatio intelligibilis*; we do not love irrationally, at least love

need not be irrational; we do not choose blindly; there is something of the rationality of intellect

in the act of the will.[27] The reason *verbum spirans amorem* is an *emanatio intelligibilis* is because the love

proceeds from a knowing (judgment) of the value for the sake of which one loves. It is a love that

can only process because of a knowing of the value of the beloved. The reason both processions

are intellectual emanations then is not because *verbum spirans amorem* is, as Byrne explains,

"intellectual-as-*intelligere*, but because it is intellectual as carrying the understanding of the beloved

(the *intelligere* of the beloved) within its act, just as *concipere* carries its *intelligere* within it as its proper

self-expression."[28]

Doran suggests a new phrase to capture Thomas's and Lonergan's meaning:

"autonomous spiritual processions." He writes, "What Aquinas refers to as *emanatio intelligibilis* can

be formulated in the language of autonomous spiritual procession, where 'autonomous' refers to

processions of act from act grounded in an intelligible proportion between what proceeds and the

principle from which the procession originates."[29] That is, "the word 'autonomous' refers

precisely to the 'because of' and 'in accord with' or 'in proportion to' aspect of the procession, as

that aspect is *known* to constitute the relation between the principle and what proceeds from it."[30]

Again, the reason both processions are called "intellectual emanations" is because this phrase

captures a unique kind of causality that occurs only in the spiritual order ("because-of-ness"); it

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[26] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 140-41 (emphasis added).
[27] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 146.
[28] This is from a comment on my dissertation from July 23, 2017.
[29] Doran, *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 183.
[30] Ibid. (emphasis added).

refs to an intelligibility that is also intelligent. In short, the preceding section ("*Emanatio*

Intelligibilis: Intellectual Dependence") applies equally to both processions, and was intended to

underscore the intellectual underpinning of proceeding love for this section.

Thomas often speaks of the relationship between word and love in terms such as these:

"[T]he image of the Trinity [*imago Trinitatis*] in the mind is considered primarily and principally

according to acts, namely as by thinking we form an inner word from the knowledge we have,

and from this we burst forth into love."[31] Further, Thomas does in fact make a distinction

between two kinds of judgment, which he does according to the distinction between the true and

the good. In the commentary on the *Sentences* he writes, "…because there can be a twofold

apprehension, either of the simple truth, or of the truth as it is expanded to take in the good and

the fitting—and this latter is perfect apprehension—hence there is a twofold word, namely, of

something pleasing that is set forth, a *word that spirates love*—and this is the perfect word—and the

word of something also that displeases…or does not please."[32] The reflective understanding of

something as not only true but also as good and fitting that, as such, gives rise to a word that

spirates love entails both relevant natural analogues for the two divine processions: the emanation

of a word (Son) from a grasp of the truth-as-good (God), and from this grasp and word, the

emanation of love (Spirit). All three Persons share this grasp of the truth-as-good, as Speaking,

Spoken, and Spirated—all within the single unified grasp that is God.[33]

Before proceeding, given that I turn to Lonergan in order to further clarify the reality of

the second procession, an ambiguity in Lonergan's own work is noteworthy. Lonergan, both in

his earlier theology (i.e., the trinitarian theology we find in *Verbum* and *The Triune God: Systematics*)

and later trinitarian theology (i.e., esp. articulations of the psychological analogy found in

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[31] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 7c.
[32] *Super I Sententiarum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 sol as cited in Lonergan, *Verbum*, 109-110, fn. 20.
[33] I owe this formulation to Patrick Byrne.

"Christology Today" and *Method in Theology*), maintained that the inner word that provides the analogue for the divine Word is not a concept nor a judgment of fact, but rather, a judgment of value (*iudicium valoris*). However, while writing his systematic work on the Trinity, Lonergan had not yet adequately appropriated what makes a judgment of value true nor did he ever explicate his appropriation of the procession of a true judgment of value as clearly as he had the procession of a true judgment of fact. Many years passed before Lonergan fully differentiated the operations that occur in response to questions of value and so to articulate the affective grasp of value that belongs to judgments of value. This differentiation was included within his decisive break with the tradition of faculty psychology.[34] Later, once Lonergan had explicitly appropriated the role of feelings in relation to judgments of value and decisions, his articulation of the psychological analogy began to change because he expressed it not solely in terms of intellectual consciousness but more extensively in terms of existential consciousness. Existential consciousness includes and extends—that is, it sublates—intellectual and rational consciousness, and it pertains to the kind of person one is becoming through her decisions.

Based on more recent work in Lonergan scholarship as exemplified by Byrne, I will explore the procession of true judgments of value and their proceeding love in order to illuminate the reality of this second procession, and in order to address questions about the relationship of knowledge and love, and the relevance of this relationship to the psychological analogy. In what follows, I do not mean to impose Lonergan's advance on Thomas, himself. Thomas does have a detailed account of appetite, the passions, etc. in the *Secunda pars*. However, his division of intellect, will, and appetite—and especially the misleading distinction between apprehensive and

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[34] See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "What the 'Will' Won't Do: Faculty Psychology, Intentionality Analysis and the Metaphysics of Interiority," *The Heythrop Journal* 57 no. 3 (2016), 2-3. Wilkins writes, "[O]ne may surmise that the elimination of an artificial distinction between apprehension and appetition opened the way for Lonergan's later position that feelings apprehend value and his interpretation of Pascal's 'reasons of the heart.'"

appetitive faculties[35]—constrict the integrative approach to the human person and human development that comes with Lonergan's intentionality analysis.[36] The goal is to illuminate the reality of the second intellectual emanation—now of love from the word of the intellect—in order to creatively retrieve Thomas's articulation of the psychological analogy and its relationship to preaching, thereby rediscovering the fecundity of this tradition of trinitarian theology.

3.1 Understanding the *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Experience: The Affective Response of Love

Where the procession of the words of meaning and judgment were roughly parallel, the procession of love is differently grounded, though its procession is still intellectual because it is also a procession that follows upon a "knowing" as its sufficient ground. In brief, where inner words are proportionate to and because of acts of understanding (direct or reflective), love is proportionate to and because of a judgment of value and the preceding "value-reflective act of understanding."[37] This term, "value-reflective understanding" is meant to differentiate the act that grounds a judgment of value from the act that grounds a judgment of fact (namely, reflective understanding).[38] The "knowing" that is the known sufficient ground of love is the reflective grasp of the sufficient evidence for the value of something together with the judgment of value to which

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[35] See Wilkins, "What the 'Will' Won't Do," 2. For Thomas's account of the powers of the soul and the relation of apprehensive and appetitive powers, see *ST* Ia, qq. 75-89 and Ia-IIae, qq. 6-18.

[36] For detailed accounts of the differences Lonergan's break with faculty psychology makes for understanding human development, see Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and the Problematic of Habitual Grace," *Theological Studies* 72, no. 4 (2011). See also Wilkins, "What the 'Will' Won't Do."

[37] This term, "value-reflective understanding" is meant to different the act that grounds a judgment from value from the act that grounds a judgment of fact (namely, reflective understanding).

[38] I take this phrase from Byrne. With respect to the procession of a judgment of value from understanding, he uses "value-reflective act of understanding, i.e., insight" to distinguish it from the reflective act of understanding that occurs on the third level of consciousness and which grounds a judgment of fact. See Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 199. See also Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 116. Vertin names the act of understanding that occurs on the fourth level of consciousness a "deliberative insight." Byrne's name is preferable because it keeps the reflective element that the third and fourth levels share in common. It also makes more room for a judgment of value that is simply about the goodness of something.

it (the reflective grasp) gives rise. Value-reflective understanding and the judgment of value operate as one principle grounding love.

We have sought to identify experiences of intellectual emanations of words on the levels of understanding and judgment. Let us now try to identify in our experiences the intellectual emanation of love. You may be able to recall the following experiences: (1) times when you acted unreasonably and other times when you acted reasonably and (2) times when you lovingly consented to a good that simply is and times when you were merely infatuated or alternatively, uninspired to love. Or as Crowe puts it, "For the understanding of the second procession, think of the difference between the dull, routine performance of an other-directed automaton and the sensitive, rational performance of one who has seen his duty and done it. In one case, conduct that does not flow from formulated appreciation of the good, in the other case, conduct that does so proceed: *amor a verbo.*"[39]

In other words, the only adequate principle of rational love is the understanding of the true good expressed to oneself. What makes the difference among each instance is an intellectual emanation/ autonomous spiritual procession. Intellectual emanation is present with reasonable decisions but absent with irrational decisions. Similarly, intellectual emanation is present with a loving consent to a good that exists or could exist, but absent with responses of infatuation or when one is out of harmony with being as it is. Of loving consent, McShane writes, "it is most availably exemplified in that imperfect beatitude constituted by the contemplation of acquired truth."[40] It is an affective response that proceeds because of a judgment affirming the value of the existence of some good, or even its possibility.[41] Such love is a "consent to being"[42] or a "resting in

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[39] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 125.

[40] McShane, "Intelligible Emanations," 548.

[41] Crowe actually speaks about the intellectual emanation that is an affective response of will that follows on any judgment of *being*. Here, if I follow his argument correctly, he is distinguishing between speculative and practical intellect, suggesting that complacency in the good follows speculative intellect's judgment of being, whereas concern (*intentio boni*) follows practical intellect's judgment of the good. He does not mean

reality" or a resting in the possibility of some good before continue to try to bring the good

about.[43] In both experiences (acting reasonably and lovingly consenting), a judgment of value

grounds an intellectual emanation. In the first instance, it grounds a decision, which is an act of

love. In the second instance, it grounds an act of complacent love. What is important is to notice

that in both cases, an act of love (a decision or complacency) emanates from a judgment of value,

whether that value is a good to be done or made, or a good to be contemplated, respectively.[44]

As we have noted, judgments of value are distinct from the judgments of fact delineated

in Chapter 3.[45] We can distinguish the two kinds of judgment according to the questions to which

they respond. Judgments of fact answer the question, "Is it so?" Judgments of value answer

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a cold judgment of being, but a judgment of being that spirates love, the way you and I can rejoice in the sheer existence of the beloved; beyond knowing that such and such a person exists, we value the existence of the beloved. Crowe writes of the "real" difference between *compacentia boni* and *intention boni*: "If one recognizes [that the difference is real] he can grant that will may respond to the good in passive affection, and so have no trouble whatever in admitting both that *speculative* intellect 'moves' the will and that 'moving' the will is the exclusive province of the *practical* intellect; the 'moving' is simply taken in towtwo different senses. Speculative intellect moves the will to harmony with the good that it presents as being; practical intellect moves the will to pursuit of the good that may be achieved" (Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 129).

[42] See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 126.

[43] See Mark J. Doorley, "Resting in Reality: Reflections on Crowe's 'Complacency and Concern'," *Lonergan Workshop Journal: The Structures and Rhythms of Love: In Honor of Frederick Crowe, S.J.*, 13 (1997).

[44] In trinitarian theology, Crowe suggests that the act of love that springs from the inner word of affirmation is better conceived of as an act of complacent love than a decision. Yet Lonergan, even after Crowe's Thomist studies, continues to use the language of decision to articulate the act of love that proceeds from a judgment of value. For now, the essential point is that an act of love springs from a judgment of value. With respect to trinitarian theology, McShane argues that just as there is no real distinction in God between the act of conceiving and the act of judging so there is no real distinction in God between the two acts of love, complacency and decision. See McShane, "Intelligible Emanations," 549. Cf. Hefling, "Over Thin Ice," 106-08. McShane is basing his position on Crowe's refinement of Thomas, and offers a way of unifying Crowe's refinement with Lonergan's 'early' trinitarian theology. Michael Vertin has an interesting approach to the question about specifying the act of love that springs from the judgment of value. He refers to both complacency and concern as decisions. He characterizes complacency as "a decision to enjoy an actual good." He characterizes concern as a "decision to attempt actualization of the possible value." See Michael Vertin, "Judgments of Value for the Later Lonergan," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no .2 (1995), 239.

Below, I identify a third good, namely, the good of affirming and deciding what kind of subject it is worth becoming. This is the good of self-constitution. From one perspective, we can understand this as a decision—I decide it is worthwhile to become such and such a person, and so we can say that one's own self is a good to be made. From another perspective, we can also contemplate the good that we already are or the good of becoming a person like X.

[45] See Lawrence, "Lonergan's Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity," 28. For a study of decision-making and ethical judgments of value, see Byrne, *Ethics of Discernment*.

questions such as, "Is it worthwhile?" or "Is it truly good or only apparently good?" or "What

should I do? and "Should I do it?" These are questions for evaluation and deliberation, and they

intend value, just as questions for intelligence intend the intelligible and questions for reflection

intend truth and being.[46] There is a difference between questions for evaluation and those for

deliberation, even though both intend value. Questions for evaluation "are simply for the sake of

knowing values without any immediate intention to make decisions or undertake actions on the

basis of these judgments of values."[47] Deliberation, however, includes considering possible courses

of action, or what Byrne calls "ethical values." Deliberating is "the process of seeking judgments

of ethical value for the sake of choosing and acting on the basis of those judgments."[48] Though

Byrne does not make this connection, I find a connection between evaluative questions and

complacency, on the one hand, and deliberative questions and concern, on the other. Raising

questions for value makes one present to oneself as responsible, as rationally *self*-conscious[49], as

existentially autonomous, and judgments of value occur on what Lonergan calls the fourth level of

consciousness.

The process of evaluation and deliberation is similar in structure to the process of

reflection that leads to judgments of facts. (Recall, we are now in the territory of Lonergan

scholarship and Lonergan's advance on Thomas's position. Below, I will correlate the findings of

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[46] See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 30. The question for value asks neither about the intelligibility or the truth of the situation in which an evaluation, decision, or action is required. Rather, it presupposes a correct understanding of the situation. However, if an emergency situation arises—e.g., someone's life is in danger—you may immediately raise a question for value, moving from your experience to deliberation, and assess the intelligibility and truth of the situation under the direction of your deliberative activities. Here, I am in agreement with Byrne's understanding of sublation, in which a higher level of consciousness preserves and brings lower acts to completion. Thus, of such an emergency situation, Byrne writes, "Inquiry, insight, and factual assessment of the situation do indeed take place; but I would suggest that they take place in a consciousness that sublates itself directly from the first to the fourth level because it is immediately and thoroughly immersed in the urgency of ethical deliberation," (Byrne, "Conscious," 139).

[47] Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 212.

[48] Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 212.

[49] In Lonergan's terminology for cognitional theory, one is rationally conscious on the level of judgment and rationally *self*-conscious on the existential level of value, decision, and action.

this section with Thomas's own thought on the second procession, which will bring some of the incompleteness of position to the fore.)[50] We have already observed one similarity—the questions raised in each process (Is it so? and Is it worthwhile?) intend one or the other of a mutually exclusive pair of conscious operations, namely, affirming or denying, whether that be existence or value, respectively. Further, as Byrne explains, "judgments of fact will be reasonable only insofar as they are motivated by a reflective understanding of the virtually unconditioned as ground for affirming or denying."[51] Similarly, judgments of value will be responsible only insofar as they are motivated by an act of value-reflective understanding that grasps the good or the possible course of action as "virtually unconditioned value."[52] Because each type of judgment (of fact or of value) is motivated by an act of understanding, the inner words of both types of judgments emanate intellectually. Given these similarities, I restrict this section to highlighting three distinguishing features of judgments of value relevant to trinitarian theology. One pertains to how a value-reflective insight occurs. Another pertains to the end of the respective processes, that of reflection (in the strict sense, as this term applies to the level of rational consciousness) versus that of evaluation or deliberation. The last pertains to the heightened self-constitution that occurs in acts of decision. The most relevant decision for trinitarian theology is the existential decision in which one "decide[s] for oneself what one is to make of oneself"[53] such that one's self-constitution becomes deliberate as she makes the one and only edition of herself.

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[50] Again, the goal is to use Lonergan's advance to further illuminate the reality of this second procession, and to address questions about the relationship of knowledge and love, and the relevance of this relationship to the psychological analogy. Ultimately, these efforts will help my goal of creatively retrieving Thomas's articulation of the psychological analogy and its relationship to preaching, thereby rediscovering the fecundity of this tradition of trinitarian theology.

[51] Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 115-16.

[52] This virtually unconditioned is similar to the one discussed with respect to judgments of fact, except that it addresses a question regarding value. As will be discussed, virtually unconditioned value is also reached by raising and answering all further pertinent questions, but how questions are determined to be pertinent in the realm of value is distinct, as this determination involves feelings as intentional responses to value.

[53] Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 121.

First, answering questions for evaluation or for deliberation involves both intelligence and the realm of feelings. Here, "feelings" is meant in Lonergan's technical sense according to which feelings are intentional responses in which our apprehension of value occurs.[54] These feelings are self-transcending, and are to be distinguished from feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction or of the agreeable and disagreeable, which are self-regarding and self-centered.[55] As Lonergan writes, the felt intentional response to value "both carries us toward self-transcendence and selects an object for the sake of whom or which we transcend ourselves."[56] Feelings, though immanent and operative in the process of reaching commonsense judgments of fact, play a heightened role in deliberation.[57] While feelings play a complex and important role in making judgments of value, perhaps the most relevant element to mention is their relationship to the value-reflective act of understanding. The relevance of this element is that it helps to specify the distinction between of judgments of value and judgments of fact, while at the same time recalling the way in which any judgment is an intellectual emanation—because they proceed from a grasp of the sufficiency of evidence, that is, from a grasp of a prospective judgment as an instance of the virtually unconditioned. Of this role of feelings, Byrne writes:

> [T]heir role is to provide the criteria according to which the individual subject will regard further questions as pertinent to the judgment of value. …Hence the feelings are not themselves the grasp of virtually unconditioned value, for that is the province of a kind of understanding or insight separate and distinct from either direct or factual reflective insights. Nor are feelings the fulfillment of conditions for the judgment of value, since that comes only when all of the further pertinent questions have been properly answered.

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[54] See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 30-34, 37-38, 58, 66. As Lonergan writes, "Without these feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin" (30-31). It took Lonergan years to fully differentiate the operations that occur in response to questions of value and so to articulate the affective grasp of value that belongs to judgments of value. I do not mean to impose Lonergan's advance on Thomas, himself. While Thomas has a detailed account of appetite, the passions, etc. in the *Secunda pars*, nevertheless his division of intellect, will, and appetite constrict an integrative approach to the human person, even though he does, for example, discuss the will as a *rational* appetite and the *desire* to know.

[55] See Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 31. Cf. Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 118-19.

[56] Lonergan, Method in Theology, 31.

[57] Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 117.

Instead, the horizon of feelings determines what further questions will be felt as pertinent to the correctness of judgment of the values as felt.[58]

Thus, on the level of reflection the pertinence of further questions was determined by whether their answers would yield "an immediate difference to me" (in the case of commonsense judgments of fact)[59] or whether they would lead to a difference in my understanding of "how things relate to one another (in the case of explanatory judgments of fact).[60] By contrast, on the level of evaluation and deliberation, what determines the pertinence of a further question are feelings, which "select an object for the sake of whom or which" we evaluate and deliberate. As Byrne explains, the value or object made present to me through my feelings functions in a way like the "immediate difference to me" or the "difference in my understanding of how things relate to one another" function in my judgments of facts. Given that feelings determine the pertinence of further questions in evaluation and deliberation, we can only be as responsible and authentic as our feelings permit. Recall that the authenticity of the wise person was grounded in her ability to raise further pertinent questions and her commitment to paying attention to them. It is similar here with the virtuous person, but complicated by the fact that being virtuous requires a maturation and refinement of one's feelings.[61]

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[58] Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 199-200. It should be noted that "[o]ur judgments of value can be virtually unconditioned *relative* to values of our horizon of feelings" (201, emphasis original). This raises the question of merely subjective values and the necessity of conversion. For the possibility of the objectivity of judgments of value, see Byrne, *The Ethics of Discernment*, 207-40.

[59] For commonsense knowledge, see above, Chapter 2, 6.2 The *Ordo Disciplinae* as an Explanatory and Synthetic Order.

[60] Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 119.

[61] Ibid., 123. Beyond determining the pertinence of further questions, feelings also determine the flow of images, and images (phantasms), which are what we inquire after and have insights into. Yet, as Byrne argues, the determinative role of feelings is not absolute. One, there are also pre-conscious sources of phantasms within us (subconscious) and within our physical environments. Two, given the non-systematic component of the universe, we can expect that sooner or later, that "physical stimuli will give rise to images beyond the systematic control of any one person's patterning of experience" (123, fn. 51). Lastly, there is God's grace, which can immediately subvert the control of self-regarding feelings in a radical way. I would add that authentic conversations fulfill an important function in subverting the control of self-regarding feelings. There are conversations that can reinforce our self-regarding feelings (one has only to scroll down to the "comments" section of internet news articles or blogs) but these conversations are inauthentic insofar as they perpetuate various biases and neglect, in one way or another, the desires to

Second, while the process of reflection reaches its natural end in judgments of fact, the process of value reflection does not reach its natural end in judgments of value.[62] Rather, as Lonergan says, judgments of value provide but "an *initial* thrust toward moral self-transcendence."[63] This point brings us to the pertinent element of judgments of value for considering the intellectual aspect of love. In considering the procession of love, the focus is not on the judgment of value *per se*, but rather, on the judgment of value and the value-reflective act of understanding as the principle of another act. Like the inner word of a judgment of fact, the inner word a judgment of value is the term or product of a reflective act of understanding. That is, a judgment of value intellectually emanates from a value-reflective grasp of understanding. However, unlike a judgment of fact, a judgment of value itself grounds another and distinct kind of intellectual emanation, i.e., that of love, within the same level of consciousness. In other words, whereas a judgment of fact is the terminal activity in the response to critical questions, a judgment of value is not the terminal activity in response to questions of value because it is only in the act of love that the value is fully realized. For example, the lover is not only affirming the worth of the beloved, but is also grateful for the goodness she has discovered and come to know[64]; one is not only affirming the worth of a course of action, but is personally committing oneself to it.[65] Thus, with respect to the procession of love, we are concerned with the relationship between knowing and loving, or in terms of faculty psychology, between intellect and will.

Lastly, judgments of value and their proceeding decisions constitute the subject in a profound way. While all cognitional acts are constitutive of the subject, decisions constitute one as

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know and love.

[62] See Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 116.

[63] Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 38.

[64] See Hefling, "Grace and Gratitude," 480-81.

[65] See Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God,"110. Byrne argues that values are only fully realized in decisions. I am taking his basic point, but generalizing it to include complacency. I understand his basic point to be that that on the level of existential consciousness, judgments of value are not the terminal activity; decisions are. By contrast, on the level of rational consciousness, judgments of fact are the terminal activity. As Byrne writes, "deciding is an act which completes a process of deliberating," (111).

authentic or inauthentic. As Byrne writes, "Compilation of acts of experiencing constitute one as increasingly aware; accumulation of insights constitute one as learned and, when they combine with judgments which they ground, one is constituted as wise. But it is decisions that constitute the kind of being one is to be."[66] In other words, decisions actualize two things at once. One, they actualize a reality apart from oneself—the result of your action. Two, they actualize the being, the person, one becomes through this action. However, this second point is elusive. One may not—or ever—realize that by those very decisions, one is also constituting oneself: "If and when one does recognize this fact, there is a drastically altered 'assessment of the situation' which now encompasses certain knowledge of oneself. Such a discovery raises the stakes involved in making decisions, and indeed confronts one with a radically different kind of decision."[67] This decision is an existential decision, in which one "decide[s] for oneself what one is to make of oneself"[68] such that one's self-constitution becomes deliberate as she makes the one and only edition of herself.

The fourth level of consciousness includes a range of activities, from a judgment of value about the worthiness of a work of art to a worthwhile goal and the means of achieving it. In the realm of trinitarian theology, we are concerned specifically with a judgment of value about the good as *end*, rather than with the deliberation and judgments about *means* to an end because God is the ultimate good. Thus, in knowing and loving Godself, God is knowing and loving *the* end. As prime examples of the judgment of value relevant to trinitarian theology, Lonergan suggests judgments that affirm a good to be done or made, judgments that affirm goodness of the beloved (e.g., an other, oneself, the created universe, a work of art), and judgments in which one affirms what kind of person it is worthwhile to become.[69] In each case, one exercises existential autonomy, according to which a word comes forth from understanding and an act of love from a

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[66] Ibid., 116.
[67] Ibid., 117.
[68] Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 121.
[69] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 176-79.

word. According to Lonergan, the best psychological analogy (and therefore, the best trinitarian analogy) is taken from existential self-constitution, which is, as Doran explains "the emergence of a good decision from an authentic judgment of value based on a reflective grasp of evidence, precisely with regard to the question, *What am I to make of myself?*"[70] The reason existential self-constitution is most relevant is because when we are inquiring about the Triune God, we are considering how God *in se* is eternally constituted as triune, that is, we are considering divine self-constitution.[71] In this chapter, I will focus on the judgment of value that affirms the goodness of the beloved. In the following chapter, I will consider the judgment of value in which one affirms what kind of person it is worthwhile to become, for this is especially relevant to the consideration of the *imago Dei* and to articulating the most suitable psychological analogy for the Trinity.

Examples of an act of love proceeding from an affirmation of the goodness of the beloved abound in our experiences. In many cases, we fall in love with people in ways that are totally disproportionate to anything that has preceded the act of love.[72] We experience such love as a gift.

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[70] Robert M. Doran, "Lonergan on Imitating the Divine Relations," *in René Girard and Ceative Mimesis,* eds. Vern Neufeld Redekop and Thomas Ryba (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 210.

[71] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 176-79. Analogous to our existential self-constitution and the autonomous processions of word and love that occur in that realm, "the divine Word is a judgment of value resting on *agape*, Loving Intelligence in act…Divine Proceeding Love, the Holy Spirit, is spirated from such a dual origin: from Loving Grasp and the divine 'Yes, this is very good!' as the two acknowledge each other's lovableness and breathe the Spirit of Love that unites them" (Doran, "Lonergan on Imitating the Divine Relations," 210).

[72] Later in his life, Lonergan came to recognize a minor and major exception to the scholastic dictum, *nihil amatum nisi prius cognitum* (nothing is loved unless it is known beforehand): people fall in love with one another and with God in ways disproportionate to anything that has preceded their falling. Reflecting on this dictum in *Verbum*, Lonergan writes, "For Augustine, our hearts are restless until they rest in God; for Aquinas, not our hearts, but first and most our minds are restless until they rest in God" (*Verbum*, 100). For an account of Lonergan's "Augustinian turn" and its affect on Lonergan's hermeneutics and his effort to bring history into theology, see Lawrence, "Lonergan's Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity." See also Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 122-23. Lonergan explains here that the gift of God's love—the major exception to the dictum—recreates us in the dynamic state of being in love, and our love reveals values to us that we had not before appreciated. Yet, this state cooperates with what Lonergan calls the movement from below upwards—from experiencing, to understanding, to judging, to deciding. We need to learn to integrate what is occurring within us because of this gift, and so we have to inquire, investigate, and seek counsel. In light of the incarnation (which Lonergan refers to as God's "outer word") we can come to understand the gift of God's love (which Lonergan likens to an "inner word" and identifies with the Holy Spirit) such that we come to personally know with whom we are in

In other cases, our love proceeds because we have understood and responsibly affirmed the value of the beloved. This is the intellectual emanation of love that is relevant for an analogical conception of the second divine procession. Byrne cites an illustrative example of such a procession from Viktor Frankl's *Man's Search for Meaning*. In this passage, one of Frankl's fellow prisoners invited him to see a beautiful sunset. Frankl is reflecting on the intensification of inner life that occurred for the prisoners in the camps, sparked by his own remembrance of his wife, of whose fate he was uncertain. I quote Frankl at length because he vividly describes moments of the emergence of love from a reflective grasp of value—in this case, natural beauty—in the context of one of life's most fundamental questions for evaluation and deliberation: is life meaningful? Is human existence worthwhile?

> The intensification of inner life helped the prisoner find a refuge from the emptiness, desolation, and spiritual poverty of his existence, by letting him escape into the past…As the inner life of the prisoner tended to become more intense, he also experienced the beauty of art and nature as never before. Under their influence he sometimes even forgot his own frightful circumstances. If someone had seen our faces on the journey from Auschwitz to a Bavarian camp as we beheld the mountains of Salzburg with their summits glowing in the sunset, through the little barred windows of the prison carriage, he would never have believed that those were the faces of men who had given up all hope of life and liberty. Despite that factor—or maybe because of it—we were carried away by nature's beauty, which we had missed for so long. …Standing outside we saw sinister clouds glowing in the west and the whole sky alive with clouds of ever-changing shapes and colors, from steel blue to blood red. The desolate gray mud huts provided sharp contrast, while the puddles on the muddy ground reflected the glowing sky. Then, after minutes of moving silence, one prisoner said to another, 'How beautiful the world *could* be!'[73]

Byrne explains the relationship of this exclamation to feelings: "Frankl's companion was expressing a felt intentional response to value which, for a time at least, affected his whole pattern of experiencing in a way that made him want to bring into being a world of ineffable beauty."[74]

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love. In seeking to understand the experience of God's gift of love through the outer word of Christ, we can affirm the value of being given the gift of God's very self, which can itself inspire the love of gratitude for being made God's beloved and for God's offering of Godself as our beloved.

[73] Viktor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (New york: Simona nd Schuster, lnc., 1971), 62-3 (emphasis added).

[74] Byrne, "Analogical Knowledge of God," 122.

Affected by these feelings and understanding the valuable possibilities the sunset discloses, the prisoner affirms the value of what is not, but what could and should be. He understands the evidence for the goodness of the sunset and the potential goodness of the world, inwardly says "yes!" to this goodness, and momentarily rests content, grateful for the promise of goodness he has found and come to know.[75] Unlike judgments of fact, judgments of value can say "yes!" to what does not exist because they are not restricted to what is but extend to what could or should be. If a certain good does not exist, there is an exigence to bring it into existence and even to become the kind of person capable of bringing such a good into existence. In watching the sun set, this man felt the value of the world as such. At the same time, he sees the sunset cast against the darkness of the surroundings of the concentration camp, and felt the disvalue of the world as it is. Perhaps a question arises—is the world beautiful? How could it be given such atrocities? Certainly his circumstances could lead the man to despair. Instead, as he raised questions in relation to his feelings, he found meaning and possibility within the beauty of the sunset. This led him to grasp that while the world is dark, it should be as beautiful as the sunset and say, "yes!" to this value that could and should be. And from this affirmation arises an act of love that rests momentarily in gratitude for this beloved possibility—the beauty of the world, the possibility of meaning and value beyond the walls of a concentration camp. It is a good that is known—the beauty of the world—but known as potential, as unfinished.

Such gratitude can in turn become a principle of choosing to creatively introduce beauty into despairing situations, as is captured in the film, *Life is Beautiful.* Here, a father is faced with a seemingly impossible situation—he is in a concentration camp with his little boy, separated from his wife. What should he do? Out of love for his son, he deliberates and judges that rather than try to escape or to rise in the ranks, that it is more worthwhile to somehow create a loving

[75] See Hefling, "Grace and Gratitude," 480-81.

environment and the semblance of safety for his son in order to shield him from the violence and inhumanity of camp life. This judgment of value gives rise to the father's decision to dedicate himself to keeping his son safe and making a life for him through the creation of a game. Even more fundamentally, the father affirms the value of his son and the value of being a father. From this judgment of value, he decides against all odds that he will continue to be a father to his son despite their circumstances. To look at it from the perspective of complacency or gratitude, from his judgment of value, an act of love flows, the love of—even under these conditions—being a father. It becomes for him an opportunity to reaffirm (judgment of value) and recommit (love) himself to fatherhood and his son as he discerns new creative ways to live out being a father.[76] In other words, he is making an existentially self-constituting decision about what kind of person it is worth being in this situation, in relation to this little boy.

These are examples of acts of love that flow from reflectively grasping the value of something that is or could be, whether that act of love is gratitude or a decision. At the same time, they also underscore the way being in love—with one's wife, with one's son—"reaches down to transform the whole of one's subjectivity."[77] Being in love reveals other values to us that inspire us to ask further questions and affirm goods and possibilities we may otherwise have ignored, and from such affirmation, to be moved to further acts of love. In other words, the gift of being in love can bestow a new creativity on the spontaneous process in which we move from experience, understanding, judging, and thanking/deciding. This is because being in love is a state, not an event, and so the lover "is engaged in loving not only while attending to the beloved *but at all*

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[76] When deliberating about what to do as a parent, we are in the state of being in love. Thus, "a father's love transforms his sense of responsibility, eliciting new patterns of evaluation and discernment, inquiry and perception, intersubjective spontaneity" (Wilkins, "Grace and Growth," 745). In this process, his judgment of value continues to be ordered to a decision, an act of love, even while his entire process of deliberation is motivated, sustained, and enriched by love. He is discerning how to be a good father—a good lover—and become a better one.

[77] See ibid. 732.

times"[78] such that "she is different in what she is likely to imagine, notice, suppose, or wonder about, in whom she is willing to trust, in what she is open to accepting. Love underpins, overarches, and gradually penetrates the whole of subjectivity, transforming patterns of spontaneous attending, inquiry, presumption, valuation, and decision."[79] Thus, far from obliterating the movement of human development from experience upwards, the gift of love both heals brokenness and unleashes creativity by setting it within a new and even unrestricted horizon. Lawrence explains the interaction of knowing and loving in human development: "intellectual development's rhythm of believing to understand and understanding to believe is both inevitable and reasonable because it describes just how reason works."[80]

Before proceeding, it will be helpful to further flesh out the relationship between knowing and loving. Falling in love pertains to what Lonergan names the movement from above downwards, in which the way of healing and tradition moves from above downwards, operating through love's influence on one's decisions, judgments, insights, and experiential perceptions.[81] I am emphasizing the mutual relationship between the healing (above downward) and creative (below upward) vectors. Being in love not only immediately influences our decisions, but it also influences our experience, which must be newly understood, etc. What I mean by my phrase "unleashing creativity" is what I take Wilkins to mean in the following passage: "Hence, to be in love is to be involved in an ongoing process of personal growth. Agape does not replace but does take us beyond our 'mere' humanity, not only healing but also sublating (or, as the Scholastics put it, 'elevating') the whole flow of our conscious operations toward a new and impossible finality, friendship with God and all things in God."[82] Further on, he writes, "In a precise and explanatory sense, development is 'from above' whenever developments on higher levels initiate

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[78] Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 32.
[79] Wilkins, "Grace and Growth," 732.
[80] Lawrence, "Lonergan's Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity," 32.
[81] See Bernard Lonergan, "Healing and Creating in History," in *A Third Collection*.
[82] Wilkins, "Grace and Growth," 733 (internal citations omitted).

corresponding developments on the lower. In this sense, 'from above' and 'from below' point to the functional interdependence of the different genera, and different levels within each genus, in the process of human development and integration."[83]

I take sublating as Wilkins uses it to mean that love sublates knowing, not negating or obliterating knowing but enriching and expanding it, which would still allow for knowledge to give way to love on the fourth level of consciousness. This point is important for trinitarian theology because the order of knowledge and love is central to understanding the second divine procession. Even in the dynamic state of being in love, knowledge is still ordered to love, such that judgments of value give rise to acts of love. For example, love takes priority in motivating and directing our entry into the world mediated by meaning and constituted by value. This is the world in which human development from below upward takes place. For this reason, effective teachers are those who inspire the trust of their students in order to teach them.[84] The horizon of trust—a horizon of love—is the basis on which students learn and develop. Thus, while love takes priority, this learning motivated by love itself involves the movement from experience, to understanding, to judging, to decision (the way from below) in which knowledge still gives way to love. In other words, the way of learning—the *via disciplina*—still operates as such even when motivated by and grounded in the state of being in love, and this state actually enriches learning.

In light of this, when it comes to trinitarian theology—and what distinguishes Lonergan's earlier trinitarian from his later—love continues to remain dependent on an act of judgment. Once Lonergan came to terms with the priority of love, rather than conceiving God as an infinite act of intellectual consciousness, he took his starting point for the psychological analogy in "that the higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried

[83] Ibid., 745 (internal citations omitted).
[84] Ibid.

out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature."[85] Thus, Lonergan began conceiving of God as the infinite act of understanding love or loving understanding, as Lawrence often puts it. Lonergan's recognition that the Scholastic dictum has its minor and major exceptions did not change the order of knowledge and love within existential consciousness, but made existential consciousness the starting point of the psychological analogy, not intellectual consciousness, such that the analogy obtains when one's judgments of value and acts of love emerge within the state of being in love. Being in love does not negate being intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

3.2 *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Existential Consciousness

As has been the case throughout this chapter, the goal is not a strict exegesis of Thomas. Rather, it is to understand the reality of intellectual emanations as best as possible for the sake of a creative retrieval of the psychological analogy. Nevertheless, I do also aim to demonstrate that this understanding of intellectual emanations has its basis in Thomas's thought and that the advancements do not negate Thomas's own achievement. To do so, I will first correlate some of the foregoing with Thomas's technique of the analysis of proportion and the corresponding metaphysical terms and relations.[86] I include an important study Frederick Crowe conducted on Thomas's understanding of the will and its basic act, love. Second, I will address an interpretive issue in Thomist scholarship that is fundamental to understanding the procession of love in us and its analogical relevance to trinitarian theology, namely, whether there is a *processio operati* (that is also a *processio intelligibilis*) in the will or not.

While the language of faculty psychology is no longer helpful in our contemporary context, it is useful to note that Thomas conceived of the will as a *rational* appetite. That he so conceived of the will underscores the complex relationship between the intellect and will and may

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[85] Lonergan, "Christology Today," in *A Third Collection*, 93.
[86] For the analysis of proportion, see Chapter 2, above.

help us understand the important interpretive point, namely, that the act of love proceeds from the intellect to the will.[87] However, like Aristotle, Thomas conceived of the will as an *appetite* and accordingly stressed love as a tendency.[88] As we have seen before—for example, with judgments of fact—Thomas sometimes attempts to move beyond Aristotle when Aristotle's definitions were confining. The same is true here. Aristotle's definitions of the will as an *appetite*, the good as the object of *desire* or an end, and the will's basic act—love—as a *tendency or inclination* each confine Thomas throughout his writing.[89]

However, Crowe, in one of his Thomist studies, *Complacency and Concern*, argues that "Thomas recognized, at least incipiently, that the will is *not* just appetitive or desiring, that the good is *not* just something which is 'away,' something to be headed towards, and—most relevantly here, that love is not just tendency or concern, whether in the form of *agape* or *eros*."[90] Accordingly, Crowe demonstrates that Thomas understood love to have *two* aspects. It is in articulating this second aspect that Crowe observes Thomas trying to move beyond Aristotle's confining definitions in relation to the will. There is love as tendency, desire, appetition, which Crowe names "concern." It tends toward possession of the good. Lonergan's conception of the proceeding act of love as a decision emphasizes this aspect of love. There is also love as rest, harmony, consonance, quiescence. Crowe names this "complacency" in the good. It is an affective response to, a resting in, a union that comes with the attainment of the end, a complacency in the good that is.[91] The above examples of the act of love proceeding as gratitude

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[87] Contrary, for example, to irrationalist approaches that understand love as ineffable. Thomas teaches that the intellect specifies the act of the will, which is to say that the will is rational.

[88] See *De ver.* q. 22, a. 1c: "But to desire [*appetere*] is nothing else than to seek [*petere*] something, that is, to tend [*tendere*] toward something as ordered to it."

[89] See Hefling, "Over Thin Ice," 105. Hefling cites Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 124, 137.

[90] Hefling, "Over Thin Ice," 105.

[91] In light of the convertibility of being and the good, the good is not only a desired end (the good as perfective), but is also as a harmony between being and appetite. See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 115-18. It is this particular harmonious *relation* between being and the good that is significant.
Crowe argues that because there are Thomist accounts of the good in which being and the good are

or affective response emphasize this aspect of love. Crowe argues that Thomas generally—but not

exclusively and consistently—conceives love as a tendency or inclination, and that this "dogs"

Thomas throughout his work, as do the related concepts of the will as an appetite and the good as

an object of desire or an end. Furthermore, Crowe argues that while love as concern is usually to

the fore in Thomas's thought, it is actually love as complacency—often only implicit in his

thought—that is basic both psychologically and ontologically.[92] The real difficulty is that Thomas

never successfully integrated these two aspects, and it seems that neither did Lonergan. In order

to try to integrate these two aspects of love, Crowe retrieves Thomas's division of psychological

activity into a *duplex via* that includes a *via receptionis* and a *via motionis* to explain Thomas's

understanding of the will.[93]

Before proceeding to integrate the two aspects of love by way of Thomas's *duplex via*, I cite

the following passages in which love as complacency comes to the fore in Thomas's thought. The

first passage is from the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. The next two passages are from the *Prima Secundae*

and represent Thomas's questions on the general form of love:

> Now, it is quite clear that man chiefly clings to God through love. For there are two
> things in man by which he is enabled to cling to God, namely, intellect and will. …Now,
> the union which is effected through the intellect is completed by the union which pertains

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convertible (distinct from the account in which the good is perfective of being), it means that the will is
also referable directly to being as being (in relation), and not primarily to being as good (see, e.g., *De ver.*
q. 1, a. 1c). In such cases, the will is still dependent on the intellect because we still have to judge that a
thing is in order to love it, and we love things that *are*. For example, we rejoice in the sheer fact that the
beloved *is*. I maintain that this is still a judgment of value—not of fact; it is still a word that spirates love
because it is a judgment that unifies knowing and feeling. At the foundational level, to discover and affirm
that being is good can spirate a consoling complacency. Crowe helpfully characterizes this affective
response to the judgment of being as "consent to being" (p. 126). It is a judgment of value that simply
affirms or approves of the goodness of something existing or being so, rather than a judgment of value
that seeks to bring about a good.

[92] Crowe highlights passages from the *Prima Secundae Pars*, particularly Ia-IIae, qq. 26-39 on the general
form of human love and Ia-IIae, qq. 8-17 on the general psychology of human acts (rather than the
questions on the particular and personal love that is charity in IIa-IIae, qq. 23-46. This is because he is
attempting to base his integration and theory on the general form of love, rather than its more particular
personal form. See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 96-7.

[93] See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 81-91.

to the will, because through his will man in some way rests [*quiescit*] in that which the intellect apprehends.[94]

And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love [*aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor*], which is complacency in good [*complacentia boni*].[95]

Love belongs to the appetitive power, which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above, *love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it.* It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.[96]

In the *via receptionis*, the will is at the end of a process, receiving from the intellect. Willing is a rest in a good that simply is, *complacentia boni*. Complacency regards the good that is. We possess this good by understanding.[97] In the *via motionis*, the will is at the beginning of the process, moving other potencies to their actions. Our orientation toward the good is a tendency, an *intentio boni*.[98] Concern regards the good that is not yet. A similar *duplex via* can be observed in the intellect. In the *via receptionis*, knowledge is received. In the *via motionis*, knowledge is causative of things (i.e., practical knowledge of the to-be-done or the to-be-made).[99] Similar oppositions can be observed between speculation and art, respectively. It can also be observed between faith (as the contemplation of what is) and prudence, respectively.[100] It is also this *duplex via* that reconciles the priorities of the intellect and will with respect to one another. For example, Thomas writes, "Will and understanding have a mutual priority over each other, but not in the same way. Intellect's priority over will is in receiving [*via receptionis*], for if anything is to move the will it must first be

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[94] *SCG* 3, c. 116, n. 2 as cited in Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 125, fn. 25.
[95] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 25, a. 2c.
[96] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 1c (emphasis added).
[97] See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 132-34.
[98] See ibid., 95.
[99] See Ibid., 82-84. Crowe cites *De anima*, a. 20c. *Quodl.*, 7, q. 1, a. 3c, and *In 4 Sent.,* d. 50, q. 1, a. 3c in support of the twofold function of the intellect involved in the *duplex via*.
[100] See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 84. Crowe cites *De ver.* q. 14, a. 5 ad 11 for the *duplex via* applied to faith and prudence with respect to the intellect.

received into the intellect…But in moving or acting [*in movendo sive agendo*], will has priority, because every action or movement comes from the intention of the good…"[101]

What Crowe's study suggests and why it is relevant for understanding the procession of love is that the basic act of the will (love) is a term rather than a principle.[102] As he explains, "the will's first response to the good is not movement toward it but a simple change in the subject, a complacency."[103] Love's basic and primary act then is complacency, not concern—even when that complacency gives way to concern because the good demands action. The following is an instance in which Thomas speaks of the first response to the good as complacency. This passage describes the threefold structure of love's activity: *complacere, desiderare, quiescere*, beginning with love as complacency, then love as principle of desire and of the consequent process leading to joy: "Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called 'love,' and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is 'desire'; and lastly, there is rest which is 'joy.'[104]

Love is a term insofar as it is spirated by a word expressing value. Again, the intellect's priority over the will is in receiving.[105] In this *via receptionis*, love is a term. In this case, the will

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[101] *De ver.*, q. 14, a. 5 ad 5 as cited in Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 82. See also *ST* Ia, q. 82, a. 4; Ia-IIae, q. 9 a. 1.

[102] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 89, 102. Crowe lists a number of terms Thomas uses to describe love itself in its basic act in the *Prima Secundae*, especially Ia-IIae, qq. 23, 25-26, 29: *inclinatio, proportio, consonantia, coaptatio, connanturalitas, aptitudo, complacentia, convenientia, immutatio, intentio*. Of these terms, only *inclinatio* and *intentio* clearly convey the notion of tending. Further, *inclinatio* actually refers to the subsequent movement. The remainder of the terms indicate a relationship, a harmony, an agreement, a resonance, a similarity, a concord. These terms are suited to the notion of love as a term and as love as a principle of tendency. Crowe stipulates that this proliferation of terms indicates Thomas's struggle to express an idea that does not yet have its own technical name. We see Thomas struggle similarly in the trinitarian questions when contrasting the two divine processions and remarking on the lack of a good term to express the process by which love originates or for the relationship of love to its principle. See *ST* Ia, 37, a. 1. The questions on the nature of love in the *Prima Secundae Pars* and those on the intellectual emanation of love in trinitarian questions of the *Prima pars* refer to the same aspect of love, which has not been properly worked out and given a technical name.

[103] See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 108. See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 4.

[104] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 26, a. 2.

[105] See Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 82-86. See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 9, esp. a. 3c and ad 1. Here, Thomas expresses that while the will move does move itself, its self-determination presupposes that it has already

depends on the intellect. It is only in the *via motionis* that love is also a principle. This is relevant for two reasons. One, and perhaps most importantly and most basically, understanding that love is a term emphasizes the dependence of love on a judgment of value, i.e., on knowledge. This is important for understanding that the relevant *processio operati* when it comes to love is from intellect to will, as will be discussed below. Two, and Crowe's primary point, is that while both complacency and concern are spirated by a word expressing value, complacent love is not first receptive and then active (efficient), but simply a passive (receptive) act. That is, there is an act of proceeding love that simply rests content without the impulse to become the principle of something else. It simply accepts what is. However, in this life, for us, such complacency can only be fleeting.[106] Of love as simply a "passive act," Crowe writes:

> [It is] simply the end of a process, a coming to rest, an act that is more accurately named complacency in the good than will of an end. It is an affective response to the good that *is*, rather than a seeking in any form, selfish or self-giving, of a good that *is not*. It is under this aspect that love corresponds to and provides an analogy for the procession of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, where the Third Person is a term bringing the divine processions to a close and is certainly not a Love for an object good-to-be-made, to-be-done, to-be-attained, or to-be in any way that involves a not-yet.[107]

It is like seeing a beautiful work and simply affirming its value and being grateful for its existence. There is not further impetus to do anything; you simply rest, beholding its beauty. As Thomas writes, "beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that 'good' means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the 'beautiful' is something pleasant to apprehend."[108] (Notice the dependence of love upon a judgment of value.) By contrast, there is what we might call decisive love (concern, in Crowe's terms), which is also first receptive—it is also spirated from

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been actuated with respect to its end. For the relationship between the intellect and will with respect to the question about grace and freedom, see Lonergan, *Grace and Freedom,* CWL 1, 94-104.

[106] For example, see *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4.

[107] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 90-1. "Passive act" is Crowe's term. He means to distinguish it from an act that is first passive and then active.

[108] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 1 ad 3.

a judgment of value—but it then desires something more, as it tends toward bringing about a possible good.[109]

We have already seen that Thomas does in fact make a distinction between two kinds of judgment, which are differentiated because one type of word of judgment spirates love.[110] Let us now proceed, in light of the *duplex via* applied to love, to correlate the foregoing on judgments of value and proceeding love with Thomas's work. In the *Prima Secundae*, Thomas revisits the question of the human will in the context of the human person as created to the image of God, specifically as the "principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions."[111] As such, the human person can cooperate with God's moving her toward Godself. Love as concern and the orientation of the will as tendency toward *intentio boni* is palpable in this prologue and indeed throughout much of the second and third parts of the *Summa*.[112] For example, Thomas writes, "Love is called that which is the principle of movement tending toward the loved end."[113] In this context, Thomas discusses the consent of the will, which sheds further light upon the type of judgment that spirates love. He writes, "the order of action [*agibilium*] is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means."[114] In this article, Thomas argues that consent is desire for the means, not the end.[115] In the third reply, he maintains that consent is followed by choice, as choice includes a relation to something to which something else is preferred, whereas counsel could approve of many means to the end. Lastly comes execution, the action itself. Wilkins correlates the elements of this passage with judgments of value and love as follows:

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[109] Crowe maintains that both *agape* and *eros* are consequent active forms of love, seeking the good of the other or the good of self.

[110] *Super I. sententiarum*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 sol as cited in Lonergan, *Verbum*, 109-110, fn. 20.

[111] *ST* Ia-IIae, prol.

[112] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 1, prol; q. 2, prol; q. 6, prol.

[113] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 26, a. 1 as cited in Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 95.

[114] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 15, a. 3c.

[115] In Article 1, Thomas describes this consent as complacency in the various means. See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 15, a. 1.

Now, of the acts in this sequence, the first is an act of the intellect specifying the object of the will, i.e., making a judgment of value. The second is the spiration of love proceeding in the will from the judgment of the intellect. The third step, counsel, is a process of deliberation in the intellect, moved by the will, and terminating in a practical judgment about possibilities. The fourth, consent, is a movement in the will, in act with respect to the end, determining itself to the judgment of the intellect about what is to be done. The fifth, election, is a choice of means, and is followed by execution.[116]

Like the judgment of fact, the judgment of value is also grounded on an act of reflective understanding that grasps the sufficiency of the evidence. Agent intellect, manifested here in the question for value and deliberation, is an efficient potency (a principle of movement *in* the other, or in the self as other), marshaling and weighing the evidence. It is inquiry in charge of your value-seeking, deliberative activities. The possible intellect is a receptive potency (a principle of being moved *by* the other, or by the self as other) that receives the act of reflective understanding. The activation of the possible intellect is the aha! moment that cannot be forced. Once the possible intellect is reduced[117] to act by the reflective insight, it is proportionate to produce the inner word of a judgment of value. This is the "yes!" that approves the goodness understood because of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is this word, which is spoken by the intellect, that specifies the will's object. Together with the universal good (which is the will's object, just as the universal true is the intellect's object), this word moves the will to an act of love for the end. As Wilkins explains, "In this movement, the will is first receptive, then efficient. As from the intellectual apprehension of the good, it is a passion, love."[118] This corresponds to the *duplex via*. Crowe offers a helpful chart by which we can synthesize the above passage from the *Summa* with the *duplex via*:

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[116] Wilkins, "What the 'Will' Won't Do," 17. It is important to note that the correspondences between faculties and levels of consciousness are not direct. It is not that practical, moral, and existential consciousness are the will while intelligent and rational consciousness is the intellect. Rather, the levels of consciousness "are expansions of the subject's presence to the world and concomitant presence to herself" (18).

[117] Byrne suggests that a better translation of is "elevated." See Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle*, 23-25.

[118] Wilkins, "What the 'Will' Won't Do," 17. Love is the basic act of both passion and appetite. See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 25, a.. 1-2; q. 26, a. 2c.

Figure 1

A through D are acts that occur within the intellectual field. X and Y are acts in the

sensitive field. A is the judgment of value on the good as end, specifying the act of willing the end.

This judgment is a word proceeding from a reflective act of understanding. B is the spiration of

love from the intellect in the will (the arrow from A to B). B is the passive act of willing the end, in

which the will is moved, not a mover. C is the counsel of intellect searching out means to the end.

It is an activity exercised under the influence of B in the *via motionis* (the arrow from B to C). D is

the election of some means to the end, the act in which the will is moved and is also a mover. X is

the influence of the sensible world on the higher powers in the way from things to the soul (*via a*

rebus ad animam). Y is the activity of the human person, artistic or moral, on her own sensitive

nature and the sensible world in the way from the soul to things (*via ab anima ad res*).[120] Again, the

crucial point Crowe is making is that B, where the *via receptionis* ends and the *via motionis* begins,

can be simply a passive act. The process can simply stop at B because B is in some sense perfect or

reflective of perfection. Sometimes, we simply rest in the beloved's presence. Sometimes the good

is not an end to which we must find means. Sometimes the good simply *is*. And it is in an affective

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[119] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 90.

[120] Crowe revisits this process later. It is worth quoting him: "Thus, to judgment of what is there
corresponds an affective complacency of the will which comes to rest in this act as in a term. But the
same intellect which has arrived at knowledge of what is may advance to a knowledge of what is not yet
but could fittingly be; the result in will is a *velle finim*. This, in its first stage, *is still passive, still receiving, still a*
form of complacency; but a further judgment makes us aware that the good which is not yet can be effected
through our own efforts by appropriate means, and then will responds with the first indeterminate *intenio*
finis. At this point deliberation about means can occur, the *via motinis* has begun, and freedom emerges"
(*Three Thomist Studies,* 134).

response to the good that *is* that we simply rest complacently in the good, and love is simply a term of the first *via* without also being the principle of the second *via*. However, in us, there is often a consequent, and active pursuit of the good. And while in God *in se* no such active pursuit is necessary, and so the divine processions are not according to the *via motionis*, this way is nevertheless analogous to the procession of creatures from God and to the divine missions.

Thus, while sometimes (and primarily) complacency is simply a term, it also is a term that can become a principle. We might simply rest in the beloved, contemplating her goodness. But then this contemplation can in turn be the occasion for concern, perhaps to give ourselves fully to the beloved or to become a better lover.[121] For example, if the good merely calls for approval, then complacency is the right and rational attitude. If, however, the good calls for action, then mere approval and complacency will not do. In the latter case, first we rest, then we seek as a *viator*, and then we finally come to rest in beatitude. We observed this progression in the passage on the structure of love's threefold activity, love is the principle of desire and of the consequent process leading to joy. In other words, complacency is the principle leading to any further action toward the good. Yet, the very fact that love is a principle presupposes that love is something itself. What Crowe convincingly argues is that in itself, love is complacency and further, that complacency, as the principle of all movement, is not itself a movement but a simple change of will. This change in the will is because of the intellect. As Thomas writes, "for because intellect moves will, willing is the effect of understanding."[122] It is a change in the subject—a complacency—because of a judgment of value. The first response to the good is not a movement toward it, but simply the moved subject, where moved refers to the movement of act from act.[123]

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[121] Doran agrees that these two meanings of *complacentia boni* persist in Crowe's writings. See Robert M. Doran, "'Complacency and Concern' and Basic Thesis on Grace," *Lonergan Workshop Journal*, 13 (1997), 74.

[122] *In Rom.*, 7, lect. 3, n. 564 cited in Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 103.

[123] It is worth noting that it makes sense that Thomas speaks of a complacency that eventually leads to joy in this context—that is, in the context of the *Secunda Pars* about the human person's free movement

It is difficult for us to notice complacency in our own lives because of the predominance of concern in human existence. In our current state as *viatores*, complacency *per se* is fleeting because we cannot contemplate continuously and because we must also actively pursue the good, both through works and study. [124] We will return to the journey of the *viatores* in the final chapter when considering the mixed life in relation to Thomas's trinitarian theology. What is clear by now is that in us, the basic act of will is a term, but in an imperfect way. Crowe summarizes: "Because it is a term it gives rest, complacency, beatitude. But because it is imperfect there remains a *tendere*: '[Will] is not *simply* quiescent except in what is ultimate. For as long as anything is still awaited, the movement of will remains suspended, even though it has already reached a sort of term.'"[125]

3.3 *Processio Operati* and the Second Procession

Having attended to the two aspects of love, it remains to address an interpretive issue in Thomist scholarship that is fundamental to understanding the procession of love in us and its analogical relevance to trinitarian theology, namely, whether there is a *processio operati* (that is also a *processio intelligibilis*) in the will or not.

The interpretive difficulty arose with John of St. Thomas and continues to find its way into Thomist trinitarian theology. This view bases its conception of the second divine procession on the following assumption, which Doran summarizes: "[T]here are in our dynamic intellectual

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toward beatitude, which is not yet ours in our pilgrim state.

[124] For example, Thomas writes, "But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: *but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued.* And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man … in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were, continuous." (*ST* Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4).

[125] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 111 (emphasis added). Crowe is citing *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 11, a. 3c.

consciousness two processions, one within the intellect and the other within the will; in the first, the act of understanding produces the word, and in the second the act of loving produces the presence of the beloved in the lover."[126] This conception presumes that there is one procession in the intellect (the procession of the word) and another procession in the will (the procession of love), and that these two processions are parallel. As the act of understanding produces the word, so the act of love produces the presence of the beloved in the lover. Contrary to this typical interpretation of Thomas's trinitarian theology, Lonergan convincingly demonstrates (1) that there is a *processio operati* from the intellect to the will, and (2) that the presence of the beloved in the lover *is* the act of love. I will take these two related points in order. As we proceed, the following is helpful to keep in mind, as it underscores that while these two processions are similar in a very important way, they are not parallel:

> [T]he *reasons* for holding that there is, in God, something analogous to the procession, in us, of an 'act of love' should be the same as the reasons for holding that there is something, in God, analogous to…the procession of the 'inner word' of concept or judgment. *But while the reasons for drawing the two analogies ought to be same, the analogues ought to be different*, so as to account for the fact that in God the Word is not the Spirit. In other words, the two processions need to be processions in the same sense, but not the same procession.[127]

In discussing the *processio operati*, we will be considering the procession of love as an intellectual emanation. The reason the processions of word and of love are analogues is because both are intellectual emanations (including the fact that both are processions of act from act). The difference is in found in the relationship between word and love and the distinct kinds of presence in knowing versus loving.

3.3.1 *Processio Operati* or *Processio Operationis*?

We have already discussed the difference between a procession of an act from act (or the emergence of one thing from another) and a procession of an act from a potency (or the

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[126] Doran, *Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 343.
[127] Hefling, "Over Thin Ice," 100.

emergence of a perfection from and in what is perfected).[128] We have also expressed that an

intellectual emanation is a particular instance of a procession of an act from an act, which makes

it especially relevant to trinitarian theology. The question remains if and how Thomas conceives

of the procession of love also as a *processio operati*.[129]

In *De veritate*, after drawing the distinction between these two kinds of procession, Thomas

maintains that there can be no procession of an act from a potency because in God there is no

capacity to be perfected.[130] Thus, the analogue for divine processions must instead be sought in

the procession of act from act—the emergence of one thing from another. He writes:

> One thing may proceed from another thing in two ways; First, it may proceed from it as
> action proceeds from an agent or as an operation proceeds from one operating. Second, it
> may proceed as a term of an operation from one operating. Now, the procession of an
> operation from the one operating does not distinguish a thing that is substantially existing
> from another substantially existing thing; it merely distinguishes a perfection from what is
> perfected, because an operation is a perfection of the one operating. On the other hand,
> the procession of the term of an operation distinguishes one thing from another. Now, in
> God the distinction between a perfection and what is perfected cannot be a real
> distinction. There are, however, distinct things in God, namely, the three Persons. Hence,
> a procession signified as existing in God as an operation from the one operating is a
> procession merely according to our manner of thinking. But a procession signified as that
> of a thing proceeding from a principle can really be found in God.[131]

Thomas then goes on to differentiate between intellect and will according to the points at which

their operations terminate: "Moreover, there is this difference between the intellect and the will:

an operation of the will terminates in things, in which good and evil are found; but an operation

of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which the true and the false are found, as is said in the

Metaphysics."[132] This distinction is very significant for trinitarian theology and for coming to terms

with the second procession. Given that the operation of the will terminates in things and not in

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[128] See Chapter 3, §3. Paying attention to the Experience of the *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Levels of
Understanding, Judging, and Deciding

[129] The following is based on Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 107-09 and *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12,
144-230, esp. 218-30.

[130] *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2 ad 7.

[131] Ibid.

[132] Ibid.

the will, Thomas denies a *processio operati* within the will. This is the passage that has "so exercised

Thomistic writers" to the point of many assuming Thomas must have changed his mind, except

without providing adequate proof.[133] Thomas writes:

> Consequently, there is nothing in the will that proceeds from the will itself except what proceeds in the manner of an operation. But intellect does have within it something that proceeds from intellect itself, not only in the manner of an operation, but also in the manner of something produced by the operation. Consequently, the word is signified as a thing that proceeds, but love, as an operation that proceeds. Hence, love is not such as to be predicated personally in the same way in which word is.[134]

What proceeds in the manner of an operation is a *processio operationis*. Thus, Thomas is saying that

in the will, there are only *processiones operationum*, whereas in the intellect there are both. However,

if love pertains to the will, if there is no *processio operati* in the will, and if only a *processio operati* is

relevant for trinitarian theology, how can we have an analogue for the second divine procession?

This problem only persists if one assumes that there should be a parallel between the intellect and

the will, and that accordingly the two processions should proceed in a parallel fashion.[135]

However, intellect and will are not parallel. Neither are the two processions parallel (which, if

they were, would make it difficult to understand how they are to be distinguished). Rather, it is

precisely in the relation between intellect and will that we find the relevant analogue.[136] This is the

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[133] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 108 (internal citations omitted). Wilkins suggests that something scholars would have to overcome if they wanted to prove that Thomas abandoned this position is that Thomas continues to maintain that the true/false is in the mind whereas the good/evil is in things. The relevance of Thomas keeping this position is that given that the true and false are *in* the mind, it underscores the presence of *immanent* processions in the intellect. But if the good/evil are in things, this is in keeping with the position of *De veritate* that what proceeds in the will terminates outside of the will, and so is a transitive procession.

[134] *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 2 ad 7.

[135] According to Lonergan, this position does in fact seem to be the position of Henry of Ghent and Scotus. See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 109.

[136] Gilles Emery is a contemporary Thomist who maintains a basic parallel between intellect and will, and so between the two processions. He finds a way of distinguishing the processions, but still misconceives the second procession. He writes, "When we say that 'the Holy Spirit [is] Love in person,' this name 'Love' does not designate the act of loving, but the *fruit* of the Father and Son's act of love, that is to say, the "impression" or the dynamic impulse that arises in the loving will of the Father and the Son. This impression of love proceeds within the loving will (immanent procession); it possesses a relation of origin to the will from which it proceeds, and to the Word who is presupposed to love (the will loves what the understanding has first conceived): This allows one to show the distinction of the Holy Spirit in

relation we have been attending to in the previous two sections. It is not the relation of the act of

love to the will that is relevant. Nor is it the relation of one act of love to another act of love.[137]

Rather, it is the relation of the act of love to understanding-in-act that is relevant. Further,

Thomas considers the second divine procession to be analogous to an intellectual emanation no

less than the first. Thus, to conceive of the second procession as parallel to the first except that it

occurs in the will, with no clear relationship to the intellect, obfuscates how it is that this second

procession is intellectual. Instead, according to Thomas, the act of love emerges *from* intellect and

in the will, and that emergence is a *processio operati* because it is the emergence of the act of love

from the act of value judgment. Therefore, like the first procession, this is also an intellectual

emanation.

Let me summarize this seventh objection from *De veritate* that we have been examining in

terms of intellectual emanation. In God, there are no real relations between the intellect and the

act of understanding, nor between the will and the act of willing. Further, in us, the emergence of

the act of understanding, the emergence of the inner word, and the emergence of the act of love

are all emergences of perfections. The act of reflective understanding and the act of judgment are

themselves acts that emerge in or from the intellect. The act of love emerges in the will. Even so,

what counts is the relationship of these acts to each other, and what provides the relevant

analogue is that one of these acts emerges from the other. Even more relevant is that one act

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relationship to the Father and the Son, and thereby to manifest the relative property of the Holy Spirit"
(Gilles Emery, *Trinity in Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008),
154; emphasis original). Emery does correctly identify love's dependence on the word. However, he also
identifies a procession *within* the will, that is, in the will from the will. We have seen that Thomas denies a
processio operati in the will. As Wilkins observes, "The relation of proceeding love to the will—whether as
actuated, or as a potency—is in fact irrelevant to the analogy for the divine processions; what is relevant
is the relation of proceeding love to understanding-in-act" (Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology,*
unpublished manuscript, 115).

[137] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 5 ad 3: "As above explained, God understands all things by one simple act; and by
one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of
Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being
manifested His perfect fecundity." In us, there is a procession of one act of love from another, but not in
God, and so this kind of procession of love is not relevant to trinitarian theology.

proceeds *because* of the other act. Thus, the act of value judgment emerges *from* the act of value-reflective grasp of the evidence *because* that evidence is *known* to be grasped. Similarly, the act of love emerges *from* the act of value judgment *because* the evidence on goodness of the beloved is understood and affirmed. If I affirm the value of the beloved, I know I have every reason to love him.

Lonergan has gathered an array of other texts throughout Thomas's career supporting his interpretation that love depends upon and proceeds from the word.[138] However much scholars may argue over the passage from *De veritate* and about the *processio operati* in relation to the will, these passages make it clear that Thomas understood there to be a *processio intelligibilis* from the word of the intellect to the act of a rational appetite[139] (and such a procession is a type of *processio operati*). A few are worth quoting:

> "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Word the way love proceeds from a mental word."[140]

> "For love proceeds from a word, inasmuch as we cannot love anything unless we conceive it in a word of the heart."[141]

> "For it cannot be nor can it be understood that there is love of a thing that is not conceived beforehand by the intellect; wherefore any love whatever is from some word—we are speaking of love in an intellectual nature."[142]

> "It belongs to the very essence of love that it does not proceed except from a conception of the intellect."[143]

> "But it is clear that we cannot love anything with an intelligible and holy love, except that we conceive it in act through the intellect. But the conception of the intellect is a word, wherefore it must be that love has its origin in a word."[144]

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[138] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 109-11, fn. 20. Cf. Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 225-27.

[139] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 209.

[140] *In I Sent.*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

[141] *SCG* 4, c. 24, §12.

[142] *De pot.*, q. 10, a. 5c.

[143] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3.

[144] Thomas Aquinas, *De rationibus fidei*, trans. Joseph Kenny, O.P. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Rationes.htm. Accessed August 18, 2017. c. 4.

Together with the passage from *De veritate* as well as the previous sections on the experience of the procession of love, these passages do settle quite convincingly that Thomas conceived of the second procession as an intellectual emanation from intellect to will.[145] Perhaps to differentiate this second procession from the first while maintaining the crucial way in which the two processions are similar, we can call it "an intellectually grounded volitional emanation."[146] In fact, if this were not the case, it would not be clear why the will is defined as a rational appetite.

3.3.2 The Presence of the Beloved in the Lover

Closely connected to the interpretive issues regarding a parallel between intellect and will is the question about how to understand the presence of the beloved in the lover. Is this presence *produced* by love or *constituted* by love? As Lonergan writes:

> The importance of this question is that corresponding to these opposed opinions there are opposed theoretical systems. Some take the trinitarian analogy from determining that there are two processions in us, one within intellect and the other within will; so that, just as the act of understanding produces the word in the first processions, so the act of love produces the 'beloved in the lover' in the second…[147]

If the presence of the beloved is produced by love, this means it is "something really distinct from love and something that proceeds from love and so something that is produced by love in the mode of a *processio operati*."[148] There is an occasion in which Thomas seems to say that the act of love produces the beloved's presence.[149] However, the many texts cited above are to the contrary,

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[145] While these phrases may seem to negate Lonergan's later recognition of an exception to the dictum, "*nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*," recall that I argued that the order of the processions of word and love remains in the state of being-in-love. That is, love continues to remain dependent on an act of judgment. Once Lonergan came to terms with the priority of love, rather than conceiving God as an infinite act of intellectual consciousness, he took his starting point for the psychological analogy in "the higher synthesis of intellectual, rational, and moral consciousness that is the dynamic state of being in love. Such love manifests itself in its judgments of value. And the judgments are carried out in decisions that are acts of loving. Such is the analogy found in the creature" (Lonergan, "Christology Today," 93). See above, §3.1 Understanding the *Emanatio Intelligibilis* on the Level of Experience: The Affective Response of Love.

[146] Dominic Doyle suggested this phrase to me.

[147] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 220-21.

[148] Doran, *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 341.

[149] *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1c. Here, Thomas draws a surprising parallel, surprising because it does not correspond to his usual characterization of the two processions. He says that from the fact that someone understands

as is our own experience. Doran suggests that given the proximity of the two contrary positions (the beloved's presence is constituted by the procession of love at q. 27, a. 3 and the beloved's presence is produced by love at q. 37, a. 1), perhaps the question was not an explicit one for Thomas at the time of the composition of the trinitarian questions of the *Summa*. It is also interesting to note that in Question 37, Thomas is struggling with the linguistic lacuna for talking about love in technical terms. Given the context of what this question (the name of the Holy Spirit) and article (whether it is 'love') are wrestling with, perhaps Thomas was preoccupied with the linguistic lacuna and did not take enough care to negate the parallel. Lastly, we have just observed that Thomas denies such a procession of love within the will. It is easy to assume such production if one conceives the will as parallel to the intellect, for the intellect-in-act does produce a word. However, what we have seen is that it is the *act* of love that is a term. This act is produced by intellect-in-act uttering a value judgment, and this act of love *is* the beloved's presence in the lover-in-act. Thomas maintains the beloved's presence is constituted by an act of love. That is, the presence of the beloved is really the same as the act of loving. By contrast, if one maintains that the beloved's presence is produced by love, the assumption is that this presence is really distinct from love and is something that proceeds from love.[150] Doran puts this contrast in terms of a question: "Does love 'operate' something, namely, the presence of the beloved in the lover, or is that presence constituted by the very procession of love from the grasp of sufficient conditions and

there emerges in the one who understands the conception of the thing understood, and similarly, from the fact that someone loves there emerges a certain impression of the beloved in the affections of the love. He seems to be saying that as the word is produced by the act of understanding; the presence beloved is produced by the act of loving. He writes: "…there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love… For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands…" This passage is what Emery refers to in his argument.

[150] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 220-21.

the judgment of value that follows from that grasp?"[151] The former represents the presence of the

beloved as produced by love, and the latter as constituted by love.

Thomas gives his perhaps most detailed explanation of the presence of the beloved in the

lover in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. He proceeds in three steps.[152] First, he argues that in everyone

who understands, there must also be a will.[153] Next, he argues that the basic act of the will is

love.[154] Lastly, he underscores the difference between the presence of the beloved in the intellect

and her presence in the will of the lover:

> what is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but in his will as well; but in one way
> and another. It is in the intellect by reason of the likeness of its species; it is in the will of
> the lover, however, as the term of a movement is in its proportioned motive principle by
> reason of the suitability and proportion which the term has for that principle. Just so, in a
> certain way, there is in fire the upper place by reason of that lightness which gives it
> proportion and suitability to such a place, but the fire which is generated is in the fire
> which generates by reason of the likeness of its form.[155]

Here, the lightness is akin to the lover's love. As the lightness is the principle of motion toward the

higher level, so the act of love is the principle of motion toward the beloved. Thomas does not say

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[151] Doran, *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 341.

[152] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 209.

[153] *SCG* 4, c. 19, §2: "For an intellect is made to be in act by an intelligible form so far as it is understanding, as a natural thing is made to be in act in its natural being by its proper form. But a natural thing, through the form by which it is perfected in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations and to its proper end, which it achieves by operations, 'for as everything is so does it operate,' and it tends to what is fitting for itself. Hence, also, from an intelligible form there must follow in one who understands an inclination to his proper operations and his proper end. Of course, this inclination in an intellectual nature is the will, which is the principle of operations in us, those by which he who understands operates for an end. For end and the good are the will's object. One must, therefore, discover a will in everyone who understands."

[154] *SCG* 4, c. 19, 3: "Although several acts seem to belong to the will, to desire, to delight in, to hate, and others of this kind, nevertheless for all of these love is found to be the one principle and the common root. This can be gathered from the following points. The will, as was said, is related to intellectual things as natural inclination to natural things (this is also called natural appetite). But natural inclination arises thus: The natural thing has an affinity and correspondence from its form (which we have called the principle of the inclination) with that to which it is moved. The heavy has such a relation with the lower place. Hence, also, every inclination of the will arises from this: *by an intelligible form a thing is apprehended as suitable or affective*. To be affected toward something—so far as it is of this kind—is to love that thing. Therefore, every inclination of will and even of sensible appetite has its origin from love. For from the fact that we love something we desire that thing if it be absent; *we rejoice, of course, if it be present*; and we are sad when we are kept from it; and we hate those things which keep us from the beloved, and grow angry against them."

[155] *SCG* 4, c. 19,. §4.

that the lightness produces the higher level.[156] Rather, where the beloved is present in the intellect

"*per similitudinem speciei*, the beloved is present "dynamically"[157], as the term of a movement in the

movement's proportionate principle. Thomas continues:

> And because, as was shown in Book I, the proper object of the divine will is His goodness, necessarily it is first and principally His goodness and Himself that God loves. But, since it has been shown that the beloved must somehow be in the will of the lover, and that God Himself loves Himself, it needs must be that God Himself is in His will as the beloved in the lover. *But the beloved is in the lover so far as it is loved—an act of love, of course, is a kind of act of will…*[158]

Thomas maintains in this passage that the beloved is in the lover inasmuch as the beloved is

loved, not because love produces something in the love. The lover's act of love makes present to

her the beloved.

If we turn to a few later works, we find the same position on the beloved's presence as

constituted by love. In the *Summa*, Thomas maintains that while the object of the intellect is in the

intellect by a similitude of species, the object of the will or love is in the will, not by reproduction,

but as a goal is present through rest in or tendency toward the goal.[159] (This also means that while

the procession of the divine Word is a generation, the procession of Love is not). Neither then

does the act of love produce the beloved. In the *Compendium,* Thomas proceeds to the same point

succinctly, and also connects love's relation of dependence on the word:

> *…what is loved is in the one loving inasmuch as it is actually being loved.* The fact that an object is actually loved proceeds from the lover's capacity to love, and also from the lovable good actually understood. Accordingly, the fact that the beloved is in the one loving proceeds from two principles: from the loving principle, and from an apprehended intelligible, which the word that has been conceived concerning the lovable.[160]

Lastly, if we recall *De veritate* in which Thomas maintains that nothing proceeds *within* the will after

the manner of a term of an operation (*processio operati*), then we can also conclude that "the beloved

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[156] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 223.

[157] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 209.

[158] *SCG* 4, c. 19,. §7.

[159] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3c. See Lonergan, *Verbum*, 2, 210.

[160] *Comp. theol.*, c. 49. See also *De Malo*, q. 6, a. 1 ad 13.

in the lover" is constituted by love rather than produced by love.[161] With Lonergan we can conclude that Thomas explicitly taught that the second procession is of love from word; there is not a procession in the will except what proceeds in the manner of an operation (*per modum operationis*); and the beloved is present in the lover because the beloved is loved.[162]

Before concluding this section and chapter, it remains to ask what *kind* of presence the presence of the beloved is. Lonergan conceives of this presence "dynamically" as being moved *toward,* and so in terms of final causality. The most suitable name for love conceived in this way is choice or decision. Lonergan uses "election." For example, "We choose [*eligimus*] *because* we judge and *in accordance with* what we judge to be useful or proper or fitting or obligatory…"[163] As we have seen, Thomas also speaks of love in terms of impulse and movement: "Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object."[164] This is quite clearly concern, not complacency. How does Crowe's retrieval of complacency as the basic and primary act of love alter our understanding of the presence of the beloved in the lover by the procession of love?

Recall that Crowe argues that while both aspects of love—complacency and concern— are present in Thomas's thought, he never successfully integrated them. Yet, in coming to terms with complacency as the basic and primary act of love, we can understand that complacent love is the best analogy for the second procession. Resorting to complacency rather than concern as the analogy for proceeding love does not negate intellectual emanation—both rest and inclination arise because of a judgment of a value. Neither then does this negate that the procession of love is a procession *per modum operati* from the intellect to the will. It is still the *dicere* and the *verbum* that

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[161] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 227. Cf. Doran, *The Trinity in History*, vol. 1, 342.
[162] There is a fourth conclusion, which I will treat in the following chapter, namely, that the Holy Spirit is both the beloved in the lover and proceeding love.
[163] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 138-39 (emphasis original).
[164] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 4c.

spirate complacency (not the will itself). Selecting the notion of love as rest rather than tendency seems to have no negative consequences for trinitarian theology, but actually makes a positive contribution. As Crowe writes:

> Which of the two is to be retained and exploited in the Trinitarian analogy? Clearly, the Holy Spirit is to be conceived on the analogy of *complacentia boni*. For that is love in its basic form, love as a term, *love in clearest dependence on the word*, love as passive. Nor is there any loss to Trinitarian theory through discarding the notion of love as tendency … we can … avoid the incongruity of comparing the Holy Spirit with an impulse *ad aliquid faciendum* [toward something to be done]. *Moreover, the divinity of the Spirit is as well conceived through the presence of the loved object in the will by complacency as by its presence as the term of movement.* The twofold *habitude* [relationship] to the Word as principle and to the divine goodness as object, still remains. The difference between a procession which results in a similitude by reason of the mode of procession (*generatio*) and one that does not on this account result in a similitude but for another reason, also remains. There seems to be no significant loss and a clear gain.[165]

As Crowe indicates, the presence of the beloved in the lover as constituted by love (not produced) remains. Rather than conceive of such presence as dynamic, we can conceive of it as affective.[166] Both dynamic and affective presence are constituted by the act of love; neither is a term produced by love, in other words. Such presence need not be by tendency. To view this from another perspective, given that the presence of the beloved is constituted by love, such that the act of love *is* the beloved's presence, conceiving of this act of love as complacency does not negate the presence of the beloved, who is present as perfectly "possessed" rather than as absent. For example, in the *Prima Secundae* when considering the mutual indwelling of the beloved and the lover, Thomas considers their affective union according to complacency, which can either be a term (delighting in the beloved) or a principle of movement. He writes "As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure [*delectetur*] in it, or in its good, when present; or,

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[165] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 140. For the twofold *habitude*, Crowe cites *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1c and ad 2; *SCG* 4, c. 19, §8.
[166] See Crowe, *Doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity*, 148.

in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it [*per desiderium tendat…*]"[167]

Thus presence of the beloved can also be constituted by resting in the possession of the good.

One term Crowe suggests in place of complacency is gratitude, which can help us appreciate the presence of the beloved according to complacency. The quality of the act of love constituting the beloved's presence can be the quality of gratitude rather than impulse.[168] It is noteworthy that Lonergan uses "thanksgiving" to conceive of the second procession later in his career:

> Oh, my whole theory of the Trinitarian has changed, you know. …According to Aquinas, the Son is *verbum spirans amorem* – the judgment of value, not a judgment of freedom. According to Rosemary Haughton (though she doesn't put it this way), what in Thomas is called *amor procedens*, the Holy Ghost, is thanksgiving. …It is the same sort of relationship, only it is the procession of judgment of value from *agape*, and of thanksgiving from both.[169]

For these reasons, it is better to develop a psychological analogy according to an act of love named and conceived in line with complacency rather than decision. I would also add, following Lawrence's conception of God as conversational, that "gratitude" and "thanksgiving" correlate with how he understands "listening," insofar as the presence of the beloved in the lover by way of complacency is like a restful listening to the value of the beloved. I will return to this when considering the *imago Dei* in order to offer a way of possibly integrating both complacency and concern when it comes to trinitarian anthropology and our graced participation in the divine processions as *viatores*.

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[167] *ST* Ia-IIae,q. 28, a. 2c.

[168] Hefling does flag one difference between Lonergan's way of construing the procession of love and Crowe's. Hefling speculates that Crowe conceives of the Spirit *in some sense* as an image or likeness or similitude, though not for the same reasons as with the Word. He writes, "For Lonergan the presence of the loved, as the presence of an end in tendency to that end, cannot be thought of as likeness or similarity to the beloved. The divine Word is an 'image'; the Spirit is not…Whether this is a serious flaw is a further question, but it might be pointed out that the Eastern Trinitarian theology commonly speaks of the Spirit as an image of the image which is the Word" (Hefling, "Over Thin Ice, 106-7).

[169] Pierre Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going, eds., *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the life of Bernard Lonergan*, (Montreal: Thomas More Institute, 1982), 61-62 as cited in Hefling, "Over Thin Ice," 99. Hefling credits Michael Stebbins with bringing this passage to the front of his mind.

4. Conclusion

We have now attended to the natural analogues for the two divine processions, the intellectual emanations of word and love. We have focused on the meaning of intellectual emanation as an intellectual rather than merely natural process. In so doing, we have underscored the basic rationality of rational consciousness that accompanies the procession of every word and act of rational love, as it is this basic rationality of our rational human consciousness that is the reason we can search within our minds for a trinitarian analogy. That is, it is the specifically unique "because-of-ness" within our intelligent, rational, and deliberative levels of consciousness in which we constitute ourselves within a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value that makes us most like God, who is eternally constituted as triune: Speaker, Word, Listening. We, too, can be meaning-makers, wise judges, and virtuous people, creatively and lovingly constituting ourselves precisely because we understand—directly, reflectively, and value-reflectively. We have also focused on the relation between the two procession. In focusing on their relation, we have specified that it is the procession of a judgment of value from a value-reflective act of understanding, and the procession of love from both that is relevant to trinitarian theology. We now proceed to apply the natural analogue to trinitarian theology by examining Thomas's psychological analogy in the *Summa theologiae*.

CHAPTER 5
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALOGY AND THE *IMAGO TRINITATIS* IN THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*

1. Analepsis and Prolepsis

IN THE PREVIOUS TWO CHAPTERS, we inquired after the intellectual emanations of word and love that Thomas selects as the natural analogues for the divine processions of Word and Love. Specifically, we focused upon the relationship between *intelligere* and *verbum*, and subsequently, between these and *amare*. We explored the intellectual emanations in our own experience and in Thomas's writing. When turning to Thomas's metaphysical expositions of the intellect and will, we cut through two confusions that obscured his trinitarian theology. First, an act is not restricted to one mode of operating. *Intelligere* is both the act of understanding and that same act as grounding the procession of the *verbum*. Second, a faculty need not produce its own act. The act of love proceeds from the intellect to the will. These two clarifications shed light on the natural analogues for the first and second divine processions, respectively. Most importantly, we attended to the fact that the analogy for the divine processions lies in the analysis, not of knowledge in general, but specifically of intellectual reflection, of rational consciousness. Rational consciousness (*dicere*) is the act of understanding as ground and origin of inner words of conceptualization and judgment, and these inner words proceed as act from act, and specifically because intelligence itself is in act.[1] In fact, both speaking a word and spirating love are operations of rational consciousness. This is what it means that both processions—whether of word or of love—are *intellectual* processions or emanations. However, these processions are not parallel. What matters is the relationship among these three acts, namely, value-reflective understanding, judgments of value, and love. What provides the relevant analogue is that one act proceeds *because* of the other act. Thus, the act of value judgment emerges *from* the act of value-reflective grasp of the evidence

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[1] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 153-54.

because that evidence is *known* to be grasped. Similarly, the act of love emerges *from* the act of value judgment *because* the evidence on the goodness of the beloved is understood and affirmed.

My consideration of the psychological analogy and the *imago Dei* in this chapter is aimed at exploring their relevance for Dominican preaching and teaching in their cultures (Chapter 6). Given this goal, I concentrate my presentation of the analogy and the image upon their shared conversational elements of speaking and listening, and the significance of the *verbum* therein. In addition, I focus upon Thomas's mature coordination of the divine processions with the creation of the human person *ad imaginem Trinitatis*.[2] Ultimately, I argue that the very same operations—the spiritual processions of word and love—provide (1) the analogical conception of the divine processions; (2) the explanation of the mode of divine indwelling and the assimilation of the *imago* to its trinitarian exemplar; and (3) the explanation of the process by which teaching and learning occur, both naturally and in the supernatural context of the divine missions. This threefold process, in the context of *sacra doctrina*, is itself embedded within assimilation to the Trinity and is central to understanding the human teacher's participation in the pedagogical aspect of the divine missions. The first two parts of this process are the topic of this chapter, and have been argued in some combination by, for example, Bernard Lonergan, D. Juvenall Merriell, and Jeremy Wilkins. The third will be the topic of the final chapter, and serves as my own contribution to the retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology. I argue that we can further appreciate the deeply trinitarian elements of Thomas's theology and in particular, the way trinitarian doctrine permeates the entire *Summa*, by uncovering the trinitarian features of his pedagogy. Thus, not only do the spiritual processions connect Thomas's trinitarian theology and his theological anthropology, but they also link those topics to his pedagogy.

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[2] See *ST* 1 q. 93, esp. aa. 4, 7, and 8.

2. Introduction: Analogy, Image, and Trinification

Where the previous two chapters developed the natural analogues for the divine processions, this chapter will apply the analogues to the Trinity. The first section will address the psychological analogy and the second will address the *imago Dei*, including the human person's ongoing graced assimilation to the Trinity and the indwelling of the Trinity. The analogy and the image are related. When Augustine sought an analogy in *De Trinitate*, he sought it in the human person as the *imago Dei*. He insisted that the basis of this inquisitive search was the Catholic faith—the beliefs in the Trinity and in God's generously creating the human person to God's own image.[3] At the same time, the analogy and the image address different questions. On the one hand, an analogy seeks to help people understand the Trinity. On the other hand, when the *imago Dei* is considered, the question is whether X accurately represents the Trinity. In the *Summa theologiae*, on account of his mature appreciation of *De Trinitate*, Thomas was able coordinate the analogy and the image. Such a coordination is possible because the psychological analogy (unlike other analogies) is simply the "reverse side" of the doctrine of the image of the Trinity.[4] It is the psychological analogy's turn to the mind's immanent processions of word and love that can be coordinated with the assimilation of the mind-as-image to God through its imitation of and participation in the divine processions.

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[3] For example, see Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 1.1.1 (Hill, 66): "The reader of these reflections of mind on the Trinity should bear in mind that my pen is on the watch against the sophistries of those who scorn the starting-point of faith, and allow themselves to be deceived through an unseasonable and misguided love of reason." Ibid., 8.4.6 (Hill, 245-46); 15.1.1–15.2.2 (Hill, 395-96): "Faith seeks, understanding finds; which is why the prophet says, 'Unless you believe you shall not understand' (Is 7:9, Septuagint). And again, understanding still goes on seeking the one it has found…" (15.2.2; Hill, 396). Notice that Augustine's explanation of his methodological procedure – faith precedes understanding – occurs at the very outset of *De Trinitate* and then recurs in Book 8 in which he begins searching for a trinitarian analogy, and then finally again at the culmination of the journey in Book 15. See also *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2: "Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely."

[4] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 88. Therein, Merriell is explaining why in his commentary on the *Sentences* Thomas failed to see the connection between the image of the Trinity and the procession of the divine Persons.

Three notes about the *imago* are in order. One, following Augustine, Thomas posited that the *imago Dei* was to be found in the human *mens*. Augustine and Thomas spoke both of the image of God and the image of the Trinity. As Merriell explains, "These two phrases refer to one and the same reality in the rational creature, although by our power of reason we can distinguish aspects in this one reality that justify the use of one or the other phrase."[5] That is, in so far as the human person bears the image of God, and given that God is a Trinity of Persons, this image also bears the image of the Trinity. Yet, just as we can consider God apart from our consideration of the Trinity of Persons in God, so too can we consider the image of God apart from our consideration of this image as the image of the Trinity. Two, the Vulgate version of Genesis 1:26-27 has the phrase on the image of God as "*ad imaginem*." Thomas thought this significant and incorporated it into his theological exposition by focusing on the progressive imitation the human person can undergo. Third, while we know we are created to the image of God by faith, we know our souls through reason.

With respect to trinification, recent scholarship has been retrieving Thomas's understanding of sanctification *as* deification.[6] This term originates in Frederick Crowe's work. He uses it to "stress the fact that the only God there is a triune God, he communicates himself to us as triune, and therefore the deification of the human world is really its 'trinification.'"[7] According to Dionysius, deification is "the attainment of godlikeness and union with God."[8] In the *Summa*, Thomas first introduces the language of 'deiformity' in Question 12.[9] Dominic Doyle

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[5] Ibid., 11.

[6] For example, see Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*.

[7] Crowe, *The Most Holy Doctrine of the Trinity*, 178.

[8] Dionysius, *On Divine Names, Celestial Hierarchy, and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, trans. Colm Luibheid as Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 1.3 PG (3.376A) as quoted in Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 1.

[9] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 30: "The beatific vision is presented as the goal and perfection of all human knowing and loving, which must involve greater participation in the likeness of God."

explains how deification is related to the unique position the human person holds in creation. He

writes:

> Deification is a key concept in Aquinas's account of human participation in God. It finds
> its scriptural basis in 2 Peter 1:4's expression of the hope to 'become participants of the
> divine nature.' The transforming light by which this happens reveals a radically new level
> of participation beyond a common participation in God as the source of
> existence…Whereas in metaphysical terms God is present to all creation as the source of
> its being, in theological terms God is present to the person through the operation of their
> distinctive faculties.[10]

Notice that Thomas thinks of the process of deification as progressive *participation* in the divine

nature.[11] This process is a journey of transformation. In the *Summa*, Thomas presents his mature

account of the graced movement of the wayfarer toward God. The advancement of the rational

creature toward God consists in becoming more like God; only then is the creature proportioned

to eternal life. Spezzano brings together the wayfarer's transformation with Thomas's trinitarian

anthropology. She writes:

> In this journey of transformation, the human creature is both conformed to and moved
> by the Trinitarian exemplar, the source of both its creation in a rational nature, and its
> re-creation by grace through the divine missions…. As participations in the likeness of the
> Spirit and Son, charity and wisdom make the perfection of the *imago Dei* a true
> conformation to the Trinity of Persons: charity is a created participation of the Holy
> Spirit [IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 2], and by wisdom—especially the Spirit's gift of wisdom—the
> soul is assimilated to the Son, the 'Word breathing forth love' [Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2; IIa-
> IIae, q. 45, a. 6].[12]

In addition to facilitating the coordination of the trinitarian analogy with the trinitarian

image, the psychological analogy also allowed Thomas to relate the order of grace and the order

of the Trinity such that he was able to illuminate a specifically trinitarian perfection of the *imago*

Dei in the soul, a perfection that is also a participation in "triniform" beatitude.[13] In light of

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[10] Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism*, 66. See *ST* Ia, q. 8, a. 3c; q. 43, a. 3c. See also Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 29-30.

[11] For texts on participation, see *ST* Ia, q. 3, a. 4, q. 4, a. 2, q. 6, a. 3, q. 8, a. 1, q. 44, a. 1, q. 45, aa. 6-7; Ia-IIae, q. 62, a. 1 ad 1, q. 112, a. 1; IIIa, q. 62, a. 1.

[12] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 3-4 (internal citations included)

[13] See Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions and the Order of Grace According to Thomas Aquinas," in *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown*, eds. Kent Emery, Russell Friedman, and

Thomas's efforts to systematically relate these two orders, along with the recent scholarship on

deification, we can recognize that for Thomas sanctification as deification is also always

trinification.

3. The Psychological Analogy

In order to appreciate Thomas's advancement of the psychological analogy in the *Summa theologiae*,

it will be helpful to first evaluate some of the major differences between this analogy and the other

prevalent analogy during Thomas's time, the self-diffusiveness of the good. Further, it is necessary

to understand precisely what the psychological analogy is an analogy for with respect to the

Trinity. Is it an analogy for the three Persons? The four relations? The two processions?

Moreover, what do we mean by the "psychological analogy?"[14] What does a good trinitarian

analogy need to explain?

Andreas (Speer. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011), 708.

[14] With regards to this question, Hefling observes, "There is a much-discussed way of understanding the Trinity which would have it that two of the three in God bond with each other, and that the nexus of their mutual love is a third. It is commonly called 'the Augustinian psychological analogy'…In the first place, it is not uniquely Augustinian. By one count Augustine has more than twenty analogies for the Trinity. In the second place, it is not all that psychological. What it has love uniting is not two other psychological states or acts but a lover and a beloved. In the third place, therefore, it is not much of an analogy. It assumes that lover and beloved are, and that they are distinct, before their loving unites them. There is no explanation of 'generation,' which alone distinguishes the Son from the Father. …It would be more accurate to say, on this analogy, that God is like a psychosocial community of two individuals. Hence the binitarianism so prevalent in Western theology" (Hefling, "Grace and Gratitude," 480). For the true meaning of the "Augustinian psychological analogy," see below, §3.2 The Psychological Analogy for the Trinity in the *Summa theologiae*. See also Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.10.19-15.11.20, 15.12.22, and 15.27.50 (Hill, 409-11, 413-15, 434-35).

Crowe makes a similar point, from which perhaps Hefling is drawing. Crowe writes, "A rough count runs up 23 [analogies for the Trinity] (it has to be a *rough* count – in Augustine's flowing style, you hardly know sometimes when one analogy stops and another begins). However, two especially have had better fortune than others. One finds three elements in charity itself: '*amans, et quod amatur, et amor* (VIII, ch. 10; see Augustine's summary in XV, ch. 3), and this analogy found favor with Richard of St. Victor, is still popular, *and is sometimes taken (mistakenly, in my view) to be the Catholic analogy* (v.g., in A. Nygren's *Agape and Eros*, 1953, pp. 541-42). The real analogy, it seems to me, comes a little later in the work. …[Augustine writes,] 'In the ninth book, the subject of the image of God which found in the spirit (*mens*) of man was broached; and here there is found a certain 'trinity', that is, the spirit, and the knowledge by which it knows itself, and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge; and these three are equal among themselves, and are demonstrated to be of one essence'" (Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 124, emphasis added).

3.1 Refining the Theory of the Divine Processions and the Trinitarian Analogy

Thomas refined his theory of the divine processions and the trinitarian analogy over the course of his life in at least two significant ways. These refinements are related to the need to evaluate competing analogies and determine exactly what the psychological analogy illuminates. In the first place, regarding his conception of the divine procession, Thomas increasingly favored the hypothesis of spiritual processions over the Dionysian model of the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the good. With the former, the Good remained important because the divine processions were conceived on the analogy of a "conversation" about the divine Good in which the Good is known and loved in the processions of word and love.[15] In the second place, as Thomas came to understand the Augustinian psychological analogy better, it became more and more prominent in his thought. Most significantly, he realized that what were relevant were the *acts* according to which we find the two processions of word and love rather than the corresponding triad of faculties (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*).[16] Thus, Thomas began to reject "any conception of the image that sacrifices the reality of Augustine's triads to a fondness for facile symmetry."[17] Previously, Thomas assumed Augustine's doctrine of the image was that to each divine Person there corresponded one member of the triad of the human *mens*.[18] This three-to-three symmetry was what Thomas came to reject, in favor of a deeper understanding of Augustine's triad, which actually focused on the *activity* of the triad according to which there are

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[15] See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 51.

[16] See Merriell, "Trinitarian Anthropology," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, eds. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph P. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 126-132; ibid., *To the Image of the Trinity*, 29-35 and 110-32 Augustine, *De trinitate*, esp. Books 14-15; Walter H Principe, "The Dynamism of Augustine's Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person," in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 18, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

[17] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 110.

[18] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 58, 91. See Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 1. Article 1 is on the parts of the image. However, Merriell suggests that even at this stage, Thomas "had already begun to realize the image of God in man is connected to the *operations* by which man reaches his perfection" (Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity,* 64, emphasis added). Nevertheless, Thomas had not yet come to understand the image in terms of the divine processions, which Merriell suggests reflected Thomas's lack of fully appreciating Augustine's *De Trinitate* at the time (ibid., 79).

two processions. Thus, Thomas came to understand that the starting point for systematic

trinitarian theology was an analogous understanding of the two divine processions, which in turn

would lead to an understanding of the relations and persons. According to Wilkins, the net effect

of these developments was:

> a shift away from the divine nature (goodness, beatitude) and toward the divine
> operations (knowing, loving) as the basis for conceiving the processions, and, inasmuch as
> 'personal' denotes what is proper to subsistents in an intellectual nature, this same shift
> may be characterized as a move away from generically metaphysical and toward
> specifically personal terms for conceiving the processions.[19]

By "specifically personal," Wilkins means that the processions—unlike the essential divine acts of

knowing and loving—are acts that belong to specific divine Persons, which we will see below.

Bonaventure exemplified the Dionysian model in his trinitarian theology,[20] which

reflected the achievements Alexander of Hales had made, who himself was indebted to Richard of

St. Victor. Alexander, like Richard, used the categories of natural and voluntary to explain the

reason of number in God. There is procession by the mode of nature, which is the reason for the

distinction of Father and Son, as well as procession by the mode of will, which is the reason for

the distinction of the Father and Son from the Holy Spirit.[21] This model asserts a likeness between

the dual principles of intellect (procession "*per modum naturae*") and will (procession "*per modum

voluntatis*") with the two divine processions. That is, the procession *per modum naturae* is analogous to

the first divine procession, while the procession *per modum voluntatis* is analogous to the second

divine procession. Further, these two processions are parallel—one from the intellect and another

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[19] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 52. Wilkins identifies two other
developments that contributed to this net effect (1) Thomas's increasing differentiation between *potentia
generandi* and *potentia creandi*; and (2) the clear distinction of the processions from notional acts, and the
processions are assigned a key role in the seriation and resolution of trinitarian questions. I will not
consider the first, but the second will play a part in Chapter 6.
[20] See Bonaventure, *Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity*, Works of St. Bonaventure, Volume III,
trans. and intro. Zachary Hayes (Mansfield: Bookmasters, 2002).
[21] See Alexander of Hales, *Summa Halensis*, Book I, p. 1, inq. 2, tract. un., q.3, c. 5 (p. 465).

from the will, which is what differentiates them—rather than connected, as the processions of word and love (in which the second procession is from intellect to will).

Gilles Emery explains how for Bonaventure, the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the good illuminates the Trinity, creation, and their relationship. Emery writes, "By virtue of his sovereign bounty, God spreads within himself through natural diffusion; causing his bounty to burst out beyond himself, he spreads *ad extra* through volitional diffusion."[22] This model of procession draws an analogy between the divine processions and the procession of all creatures from God, rather than the particular processions of word and love within the human person's soul.[23] Further, Emery explains that the concept of 'primacy' (*primitas*) is closely related to the concept of the good in Bonaventure's trinitarian theology.[24] He writes:

> In terms of the persons, the primacy of the Father designates that ultimate perfection which is the conclusion of the Franciscan theologian's quest into the mystery of divine communication: This primacy supplies the fundamental reason for the fecundity of the Father, who, as the principle of all divinity (fullness as source), produces other persons.[25]

For Bonaventure, the Father is conceptually prior to both the procession of generation and the relation of paternity. Further, the Father must be conceived before the Son and Spirit if we are to understand them in terms of the Father's self-diffusiveness as the font, the source, the principle of the other persons.

Thomas also made use of this analogy in his earlier works. Even when he did use the psychological analogy, it was with less clarity and precision than that of his later works. In his first commentary on the *Sentences,* Thomas used two analogues for the first divine procession: the procession of nature and the procession of the intellect, which corresponded to the analogy of the self-diffusiveness and the psychological analogy (though at this point, a less refined version),

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[22] Emery, *Trinity in Aquinas,* 47.

[23] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 89.

[24] In his *Scriptum super I Sententiarum*, Bonaventure offers two other concepts, which he counts as reasons for the number of Persons in God. The other two are the perfection and simplicity. Bonaventure, *Sent.*, 1 d. 2 a. 1 q. 2.

[25] Emery, *Trinity in Aquinas*, 47-8.

respectively. However, he used the former more frequently. As Merriell writes, "The primary analogy for the divine processions in the *Scriptum* is the procession of all creatures from God according to nature and will rather than the processions of word and love in the image of God, which only rational creatures bear."[26] Merriell underscores that Thomas's use of the Dionysian model for the processions obstructed his ability to integrate the *imago Dei* with the divine processions, as well as the missions by which the Trinity dwells within the human person.[27] The reason is because the inferior analogy compares the divine processions to the procession of *all* creatures from God, which poses difficulties because it likens the Word and Spirit to creatures. By contrast, the psychological analogy and its focus on spiritual processions lent itself to recognizing the similarity between the image and the indwelling of the Trinity,[28] as well as their dynamic relationship. In moving away from the self-diffusiveness of the good, Thomas not only came to favor the hypothesis of spiritual processions, but he also (as will be argued in Chapter 6), transcended what was at time the vexing problem in trinitarian theology, [29] i.e., about asserting the primacy of the Father when in God, nothing is prior or posterior, or to put it more specifically, whether the Father generates because he is Father, or whether he is Father because he generates.[30]

The second significant refinement in Thomas's trinitarian theology occurs within the context of the psychological analogy, itself—what the best available analogy is and what it

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[26] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 89.

[27] The reason for this difficulty will become clearer as we go.

[28] See *Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity*, 89.

[29] Emery does not appear to grasp this second point, which seems due at least in part to his oversight of some of the key developments that occurred between Thomas's *Sentences* commentary on the *Summa theologiae*. He writes, "We find here, at the heart of St. Bonaventure's thinking on the Father, a principle which was to be used by Thomas in his commentary in order to explain the connection between Trinity and Creation…" (Emery, *Trinity in Aquinas*, 48).

[30] The question can be understood as one about the relative priority of person and relation in God. Recall also that the analogy of the self-diffusiveness of the good also carried a tendency to explain the Trinity of Persons in God in terms of necessary reasons, which for Thomas was methodologically problematic. See Chapter 2.

explains that makes it valuable. Thomas abandoned the more familiar yet facile association of the Trinity with the triad of faculties in the soul. Instead, he developed the two processions of the immanent operations of knowing and loving that Augustine introduced in Book 9 and to which he returned in Book 15 in *De Trinitate.* Thus, he focused on a pair of acts rather than a triad of faculties. Book 14 is often considered the climax of the text, in which Augustine returns to the triad of *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas.* It is easy to presume Augustine has settled on this triad as the analogy for the Trinity because he writes, for example, "The trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also able *to remember and understand and love* him by whom it was made. And when it does this it becomes wise itself."[31] Furthermore, the end of Book 14 is a meditation on recreation of the *imago Dei* through grace to glory.[32] This sense of culminating meditation seems to indicate that Book 14 is the climax, while Book 15 is more of an epilogue, recounting what the previous books set forth.

However, while Book 14 may be the "dramatic culmination" of *De Trinitate*, its proper ending is Book 15.[33] Here, Augustine's preference for the analogy of inner word and love over and against the triads comes to the fore. Given Thomas's indebtedness to Augustine and his retrieval of Augustine's psychological analogy through careful and prolonged engagement with *De Trinitate*—which set him apart from his contemporaries[34]—it will be instructive to turn to Augustine's text regarding this selection of two processions rather than three faculties and the reason for this selection.

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[31] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.12.15 (Hill, 383; emphasis added to draw attention to the triad of memory, understanding, and will. However, notice that Augustine speaks of these in the active sense). This passage remains important for both Augustine and Thomas, but not because of the triad. Rather, it is because of the significance for the *imago Dei* of the mind's attention on God rather than on itself. I will return to this point in the section on the *imago* and trinification.

[32] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.16.22 – 14.19.26 (Hill, 388-92).

[33] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 28. See also Neil Ormerod, "Augustine and the Trinity," 28.

[34] With Michael Schmaus, Merriell contends that no theologian prior to Thomas "appreciated and used Augustine's analogical examination of the processions of word and love" (Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 243 and fn. 3).

In examining Augustine's text on this point, it is helpful to keep in mind the main

trinitarian questions he is considering. One, he is searching for a way to understand the equality

of the three Persons who are yet one God. Two, he is eager to find a way to intelligently

distinguish the two eternal processions, which is ultimately about how to understand the second

procession.[35] With respect to this first procession, as Crowe writes, "[Augustine's] problem was to

find in the created universe some analogy that will endow this name, 'Word,' with some meaning

for our human minds."[36] The first procession was readily understood by analogy with begetting or

generating, and so the second Person was fittingly called the Son or Word.[37] It is more difficult to

name the third Person. In Book 5, Augustine introduces the challenge of personally naming the

third Person, which sets the itinerary of Books 6 and 7 in which he considers the problem of

essential versus personal predication.[38] For example, he asks "why the Holy Spirit too is not a son,

seeing that he too comes forth from the Father, as it says in the gospel[?]"[39] Augustine explores

"Gift" as a personal name for the Holy Spirit, but finds "Love" more fitting. According to

Merriell, while there was some precedent among the Church Fathers to name Holy Spirit "Love,"

Augustine was the first to make significant use of this notion.[40]

The name of Love for the Holy Spirit shapes Augustine's search for an analogy for the

Trinity. For example, in Book 6, Augustine writes, "And therefore there are not more than three;

one loving him who is from him, and one loving him from whom he is, and love itself."[41] In Book

8, in which Augustine considers the relationship between knowledge and love, he introduces his

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[35] See Augustine, *De triniate*, 1.4.7–1.7.13 (69-73).

[36] Crowe, *The Mystery of the Most Holy Trinity*, 120.

[37] See, for example, Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.7.8 (Hil, 193-94). Beginning in Book 5 and continuing in Books 6 and 7, Augustine considers the "grammar" proper to speaking about the triune God. It is within this book that he settles on speaking of the "three *what*" in God as "persons," "no in order to say that precisely, but in order not to be reduced to silence" (5.8.10; Hill, 196). Also, Augustine notes that it is of faith that the Son is the Word.

[38] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.11.12–5.15.16 (Hill, 197-200).

[39] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 5.14.15 (Hill, 199).

[40] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 23.

[41] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 6.5.7 (Hill, 209-10).

first trinitarian analogy: "Now love means someone loving and something loved with love. There you are with three, the lover, what is being loved, and love."[42] The first of Augustine's two triads emerges from this initial analogy and the relationship between knowledge and love: *mens, notia sui*, and *amor sui* (the mind, its self-knowledge, and its self-love).[43] In Book 10, he introduces another triad: *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* (memory, understanding, and will).[44] As Walter Principe highlights, Augustine usually provided verb forms of this triad, while medieval theologians and contemporary scholars usually spoke in terms of "abstract noun forms."[45] Augustine's decision is indicative of his recognition of the importance of the mind's *actually* remembering, understanding, and willing, which intimates his preference of the processions of word and love.

Between his articulation of these two triads, in the second half of Book 9, Augustine introduces the two processions of word and love:

> Thus it is that in that eternal truth according to which all temporal things were made we observe with the eye of the mind the form according to which we are and according to which we do anything with true and right reason, either in ourselves or in bodies. And by this form *we conceive true knowledge of things, which we have with us as a kind of word that we beget by uttering inwardly, and that does not depart from us when it is born.* When we speak to others we put our voice or some bodily gesture at the disposal of the word that abides within, in order that by a kind of perceptible reminder the same sort of thing might happen in the mind of the listener as exists in and does not depart from the mind of the speaker.[46]

Further on, Augustine specifies the kind of word of which he is speaking. Not only is it not a word "spoken aloud or merely thought"—i.e., an outer word—but neither is it a word conceived about something we dislike or to which we are indifferent. Rather, "The kind of word then that we are now wishing to distinguish and propose is '*knowledge with love.*' So when the mind knows and loves

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[42] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 8.10.14 (Hill, 255).
[43] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.4.4–9.5.8 (Hill, 273-75)
[44] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 10.11.17 (Hill, 298).
[45] See Walter H. Principe, "The Dynamism of Augustine's," 1292.
[46] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.7.12 (Hill, 277-78; emphasis added).

itself, its word is joined to it with love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, the word is in

the love and the love in the word and both in the lover and the utterer."[47]

Augustine's selection of the two processions over either of the triads as his trinitarian

analogy involved an intermediary step in which he came to recognize a difference between what

Merriell calls the habitual and active levels of the triad.[48] In Book 14, Augustine writes:

> For if we refer to the inner memory of the mind with which it remembers itself and the inner understanding with which it understands itself and the inner will with which it loves itself, where these three are simultaneously together and always have been simultaneously together from the moment they began to be, whether they were being thought about or not, *it will indeed seem that the image of that other trinity belongs only to the memory.*[49]

Thus, three are reduced to one in the mind's habitual state. The active level of the triad is

different. Augustine continues:

> But because there can be no word in it without thought – we think everything we say, including what we say with that inner word that is not part of any people's language – it is rather in these three that this image is to be recognized, namely, memory, understanding, and will. *And here I mean the understanding we understand with as we think*, that is when things are brought up that were to hand in the memory but were not being thought about, *and our thought is formed from them*; and the will or love or esteem I mean is the one that joins this offspring to its parent and is in a certain measure common to them both…The truth of course is that from the moment [the mind] began to be it never stopped remembering itself, never stopped understanding itself, never stopped loving itself, as we have already shown [see Book 10]. *And therefore when it turns to itself in thought, a trinity is formed in which a word too can be perceived. It is formed of course out of the very act of thought, with the will joining the two together. It is here more than anywhere that we should recognize the image we are looking for.*[50]

Thus, the active level of the triad includes *intelligentia* actually thinking and generating a word.

According to Merriell it was during the course of *De veritate* that Thomas came to understand that

"the best image is constituted by the *acts* of memory, understanding, and love, rather than by the

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[47] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 9.10.15 (Hill 279; emphasis added). Augustine notes that even we rightly dislike things, "we like and approve of our disapproval of them, and this is a word" (ibid.).

[48] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 28-30. These are terms Thomas uses, not Augustine. However, both authors mean the same thing – that there are two levels of the triad, and this affects the analogy.

[49] Augustine, *De trinitate*,14.7.10 (Hill, 377-78).

[50] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.7.10; 14.10.13 (Hill, 377-78; 381-82; emphasis added).

corresponding faculties."[51] In fact, Thomas quotes this very passage (14.7.10) from Augustine when he emphasizes the importance of the active level of the image.[52]

While it may appear at first glance in the above passage that Augustine is highlighting the second triad as the best analogy, his point is to draw attention to the active level of the triad, which itself discloses the significance of the utterance of a word with love. He reserves his judgment of trinitarian analogies for the final book. It is noteworthy that Augustine critiques this triad (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*) at the beginning of Book 15 when he is reconsidering the journey taken in Books 8-14.[53] Those three—*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*—are really essential attributes in God and therefore are not helpful for distinguishing the Persons.[54] However, Augustine presses forward and continues his search for a trinitarian analogy in the mind of the human person. At this point, Book 15 ceases to be a summary and instead becomes a thorough discussion of the processions of Word and Love, providing the proper ending to *De Trinitate*.

In the final sections of Book 15, Augustine does not completely leave behind the highest triad (*memoria, intelligentia, voluntas*). Rather, he concentrates on the procession of the word in particular rather than the act of understanding in general. The act of understanding is an essential attribute in God, which is why it does not suffice as an analogy for the procession of the Word, which is a strictly personal name in God. The act of speaking a word, however, is a notional act in God, meaning it is properly attributed to a specific divine Person.[55] The triad, then, is only

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[51] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 148.

[52] *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 3. Thomas doesn't give an explanation of the existence of the inner word in this passage – he has already addressed this in question 4. Here, he loosely identifies the act of thinking with the procession of the inner word. See *De ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1. Merriell notes that other scholars, including Chenu, "have concluded that the *De veritate* reflects a profound and painstaking reading of Augustine's works" (Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 104. See note 21). More specifically, "The number of citations from the *De Trinitate* in question 10 is nearly twice the number from all the other works of Augustine put together. …Several articles, especially article 3, reveal that [Thomas] had mastered this section of Augustine's work. It seems, however, that he had not yet realized the significance of book 15, which he rarely cites" (ibid., 110).

[53] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.6.10-15.7.13 (Hill, 401-05).

[54] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 31.

[55] See *ST* Ia, q. 32, aa. 2-4; q. 41, a. 1c.

relevant if we understand it in terms of the processions of word and love. Augustine considers

these processions at length in this book. For example, he writes:

> If anyone then can understand how a word can be, not only before it is spoken aloud but even before the images of its sounds are turned over in thought…*if anyone, I say, can understand this, he can already see through this mirror and in this enigma some likeness of that Word of which it is said,* 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (Jn: 1:1). For when we utter something true, that is *when we utter what we know, a word is necessarily born from the knowledge which we hold in the memory,* a word which is absolutely the same kind of thing as the knowledge it is born from. *It is the thought formed from the thing we know that is the word we utter in the heart,* a word that is neither Greek nor Latin nor any other language…[56]

He continues exploring the nature of the procession of the word for a number of pages. The

following section on the inner word is perhaps one of the most illuminating in the course of the

psychological analogy's history. It captures what, for Augustine, Thomas, and Lonergan, is the

true meaning and the centerpiece of the psychological analogy because it accentuates the total,

intelligible, conscious dependence of the word on understanding:

> All these things then that the human consciousness knows by perceiving them through itself or through the senses of its body or through the testimony of others, it holds onto where they are stacked away in the treasury of memory. From them is begotten [*gignitur*] a true word when we utter what we know, but a word before any sound, before any thought of sound [*quod scimus loquimur; de visione scientiae visio cogitationis exoritur; qui quod scit loquitur*]. For it is then that the word is most like the thing known [*verbum simillium rei notae*], and most its image [*imago eius*], because the seeing which is thought springs [*exoritur*] direct from the seeing which is knowledge, and it is a word of no language [*linguae nullius*], *a true word from a true thing* [*verbum verum de re vera*], *having nothing from itself, but everything from that knowledge from which it is born* [*nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur*]. And it makes no difference when the man who utters what he knows learnt it – sometimes he utters it as soon as he learns it – provided it is a true word, that is one that has arisen from things known [*dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum*].[57]

> Thomas makes similar observations in the *Summa*. For example, in the question on the

name of "Word," after quoting from Book 15 of *De Trinitate*, he writes, "The concept itself of the

heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself – namely, from the

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[56] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.10.19-15.11.20 (Hill, 409-11; emphasis added).
[57] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.12.22 (Hill, 413-14; emphasis added).

knowledge of the one conceiving."[58] Lonergan summarizes the significance of this passage and

what it tells us about the inner word in the introduction to *Verbum*:

> In this passage, then, the Augustinian *verbum* is a nonlinguistic utterance of truth. It differs from expression in any language for it is *linguae nullius*. It is not primitive but derived: *gignitur, exoritur, nascitur*. Its dependence is total: *nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur*. This total dependence is, not blind or automatic, but conscious and cognitive: *quod scimus loquimur; de vision scientiae visio cognitationis exoritur; qui quod scit loquitur*. Finally, this total dependence as conscious and known is the essential point. It makes no difference whether the *verbum* has its ground in memory or in recently acquired knowledge. What counts is its truth, its correspondence with things as known: *verbum simillium rei notae; imago eius; verbum verum de re vera; nihil de suo habens, sed totum de illa scientia de qua nascitur; dum tamen verbum sit verum, id est, de notis rebus exortum.*[59]

Finally, at the very end of Book 15, just before Augustine offers his closing prayer, he

gestures at an analogous understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit that helps to

intelligibly differentiate it from the procession of the Son. While Augustine is modest in his

explanation, it is a significant contribution the trinitarian theology, for he "gives us the only

analogy for the Holy Spirit that has made much headway in theology, namely, the analogy of

proceeding love."[60] Augustine writes:

> So then, you [o my soul] have seen many true things, and distinguished between them and the light by which you have seen them. Lift up your eyes to that light and fix them on that if you can. *Thus you will see how the birth of the Word of God differs from the procession of the gift of God.* …But you are unable to fix your gaze there in order to observe this clearly and distinctly. …I am telling [the truth] to myself, I know what I cannot do. However, this same light has shown you those three things in yourself, in which you can recognize yourself as the image of that supreme trinity on which you are not yet capable of fixing your eyes in contemplation. It has shown you that there is a true word in you when it is begotten of your knowledge, that is when we utter what we know…provided our thought is formed from what we know, and the image in thinking [is most similar to that thought] already contained in memory [*sitque in acie cogitantis imago simillima cognitionis eius quam memoria continebat*], with will or love as the third element joining these two together as parent and offspring. That this will proceeds from [thought] [*Quam quidem uoluntatem de cognitione procedere*] – for no one wants anything if he is totally unaware of what it is, or what sort of thing it is – *and yet that it is not itself an image of [the thought] [non tamen esse cognitionis imaginem], and that thus in this intelligible case there is suggested a certain difference between*

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58 *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1c. Thomas is quoting Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.10.19.
59 Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 7-8.
60 Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 122. Crowe continues, "One can hardly even speak of forerunners in this question."

birth and procession, because to observe by thought is not the same thing as to desire or even to enjoy by will…[61]

While many scholars overlook Augustine's final return to the question of the Holy Spirit's procession[62], Thomas takes up this distinction between the processions of word and love, in which the former involves the production of an image, but the latter does not. Instead, the latter involves desire or even enjoyment.

In closing, developments in Thomas's thinking on these two fronts – from conceiving the divine processions in terms of the self-diffusiveness of the good to conceiving them in terms of Augustine's analogy, and from understanding that Augustine's analogy was based on the two processions – helped him recognize that the decisive issue was to bring together the analogical relationship of word and love with conformation of the mind to God. [63] The reason, as we will see, is because the same operations that provide the analogy for the processions are the very same operations that can make us more like God.

3.2 The Psychological Analogy for the Trinity in the *Summa Theologiae*

We have now explored the natural analogues of word and love as well as the development of Thomas's trinitarian theology. This latter element included a more detailed account of Augustine's *De Trinitate*. It is now time examine how Thomas applied the natural analogues to trinitarian theology.

The first trinitarian question Thomas asks in the *Summa* is whether there is procession in God – not, importantly, whether the Son proceeds from the Father. This is because he has realized that we must first form a concept of procession in order to form a concept of relation,

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[61] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.27.50 (Hill, 434-35; emphasis added). I have altered Hill's translation slightly. He uses "awareness" where I have used "thought," by which I mean thought in relation to knowledge or understanding. See the brackets.

[62] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 34. See also Ormerod, "Augustine and the Trinity: Whose Crisis?"

[63] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity,* 132-40, 147 (on these developments as occurring in *De veritate*) and 157-58, 184-88, 208-09, and esp. 217-221 (on these development maturing in the *Summa theologiae*).

which in turn is necessary in order to form a concept of person. I will discuss concept formation

further in Chapter 6 when considering Thomas's pedagogy in relation to his trinitarian theology.

For now, keep in mind that Chapters 3 and 4 considered the processions of word and love in

detail, which included considering the relations between the act of understanding, the word, and

the act of love in terms of principles and terms/dependents. Thus, we considered the relation of

the speaker to the word, and vice versa, as well as the relation of the speaker and word to the act

of love, and vice versa. Those chapters also attended to why, specifically, spiritual processions are

relevant to understanding the trinitarian processions. In this way, we have already sufficiently

considered the question, Whether there is procession in God? We are now applying those

concepts analogically to understand the Father, Son, and Spirit. Thus, while I do not follow

Questions 27-43 in precise order in what follows, I have attempted to present in an orderly

fashion the concepts necessary to draw the following conclusions.

3.2.1 The Analogues for the Father and Son

The analogue for the Father is *Dicere* (or *Intelligere Dicens, Intelligere ut Dicere*), which denotes

intelligere's specific ordination to the word. Recall that the act of understanding has a twofold

ordering: to its object and to its word. Thomas distinguishes these two aspects of understanding in

terms of "*intelligere*" and *"dicere*," respectively. Lamenting the lack of suitable language to express

the procession of the Holy Spirit, Thomas explains how fitting the language regarding

"understanding" is for expressing the first procession:

> As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of
> the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word 'to understand'
> [*intelligere*]; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception—
> namely, 'to speak' [*dicere*], and 'word' [*verbum*]. Hence in God, 'to understand' is applied only
> to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas 'Word'
> is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term 'to speak' is a notional term
> as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself.[64]

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[64] *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1c.

The analogue "*dicere*" is appropriate for the Father because the Father is really identical with the divine essence, which is really identical with the unrestricted act of understanding[65] (as are all the divine Persons), and at the same time he is really distinct from the divine Word. In other words, the two aspects of the act of understanding correspond to the distinction in trinitarian theology between *intelligere* as an essential act and *dicere* as a notional, proper act.[66] Essential understanding is the divine act of understanding (*Ipsum Intelligere*) ordered to its object (divine goodness), in which all the Persons share equally. Notional understanding is the act of understanding ordered to its word (*Dicere*), and belongs only to the Father.[67]

> Of the Father's identity with *Ipsum Intelligere* as *Dicens*, Crowe offers a helpful analogy:

> The *Dicens* is God for he is the divine *intelligere*. …Think of a great orator, someone speaking with the resources of full understanding; think of a grave judge handing down a decision with all the weight of a secure grasp of the evidence. …Then you will have a meaningful analogy for the God who, as *Dicens* in eternity, utters a Word from the infinite depths of understanding.[68]

If we look at Question 33 on the Person of the Father, we find that with Augustine, Thomas refers to the Father as the "principle" of the whole Deity. This term is meant only to signify whence another proceeds, and "as the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle."[69] Thomas explains that "principle" is a wider term than "cause," which is important because as was discussed in Chapter 3, what is significant in the psychological analogy is that the word is because of the act of understanding, not that the act of understanding is the efficient cause of the word. The term "principle" captures the fact that the word is because of understanding – that the word proceeds from understanding.[70] Thomas writes:

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[65] See *ST* Ia, q. 14, a. 4c.

[66] See *ST* Ia, q. 41. See also Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 118-19.

[67] On all that is spoken in the eternal Word, see *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3. I will return to this passage below.

[68] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 147.

[69] *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 1c.

[70] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 133-48 and 205-07.

Hence this term 'cause' seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word 'principle.' For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or power: whereas we use the term 'principle' even in things which have no such difference, but have only a certain *order* to each other.[71]

Furthermore, principle does not signify *priority*—either with respect to existence in time (as if the Father existed before the Son and Spirit) which would imply subordinationism, or logically (as if we have to conceive the Father before we conceive the Son and Spirit) which would be to conceive the persons apart from their relations, or in terms of honor—as if the Father is superior or more important. Rather, principle signifies *origin*.[72] Thus, the Father is not prior to the Son or the Spirit, but is the origin of the Son and the co-principle (origin) of the Spirit.

The analogue for the Son is "*Verbum*," which denotes the word's dependence on *intelligere ut dicere / intelligere dicens*. Thomas expresses this dependence in one of the questions on the name of the second Person, quoting from Book 15 of *De Trinitate* before providing his own explanation:

> The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself – namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence 'Word,' according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin. Hence the term 'Word,' according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally.[73]

As with the Father, the Word is also really identical with the divine essence and thus, the divine act of understanding. Thomas writes of the identity of the Word and the divine essence in the *Contra Gentiles:*

> Since in God, therefore, being and understanding are identical, the intention understood in Him is His very intellect. And because *understanding in Him is the thing understood (for by understanding Himself He understands all other things*, as was shown in Book I), it follows that in

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[71] *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 1c (emphasis added). See also ad. 1.

[72] *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 1 ad 3. This is significant for Thomas's approach to the *crux trinitatis*, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

[73] *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1c (emphasis added). Thomas is quoting *De trinitate*, 15.10.19. See also *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 2: "Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone, for word alone signifies that which emanates from another…when we say that the word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing…in the same way it can be called 'begotten knowledge.'"

God, because He understands Himself, the intellect, the thing understood, and the intention understood are all identical….*the being of the Word interiorly conceived, or intention understood, is the very act of being understood. Therefore, the being of the divine Word is identical with that of the divine intellect and, consequently, with that of God, who is His own intellect.*[74]

In the *Summa,* Thomas explains the way in which the Word is intelligent:

[T]o be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially, as was stated above. Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence *he is intelligent, not as producing a word, but as the Word proceeding*, forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.[75]

Where the Father is intelligent as speaking the Word, the Word is intelligent as proceeding because of understanding (in other words, as emanating intellectually from understanding). Crowe again offers a helpful analogy for the Son's identity with *Ipsum Intelligere* as *Verbum*. He writes:

The *Verbum* is God. …God's thought about God is not merely *about* God, it *is* God. When you think of the Word in God, therefore, begin with some great book that has swept you off your feet so that you had to say, 'Here is truth, deep, penetrating, thrilling truth.' …Then think of Christ as he in whom 'lie hidden all God's treasures of wisdom and knowledge' (Col. 2:3), *not now as the one speaking but as the Word containing this wisdom spoken into the world*…Then you will have an analogy for the Word uttered eternally by God as *Dicens*, the Word of infinite Truth who is himself God.[76]

However, this same identity is not true of us because our word and the second act (*concipere/iudicare*) are distinct from the act of understanding from which they proceed. In other words, "In us, there are two acts, first, an act of understanding, secondly, a really distinct act of defining or judging."[77] (What Lonergan here calls "defining" is *not* the same as what he calls "*dicrere*"; it is, rather, what I have called "*concipere*.") Even though our word is a similitude of the thing known and the *self*-expression of understanding, it is still distinct from both. Herein lies one of the ways in which the analogy falls short—the distinction of acts (*intelligere* and *concipere*) is not

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[74] *SCG* 4, c. 11, §§7, 11 (emphasis added). See also *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1c.
[75] *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 2 ad 4. See also *SCG* 4, c. 26 §5.
[76] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 147-48 (internal citations omitted, emphasis original).
[77] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 206.

relevant since in God there is but one infinite act. Thomas explains this shortcoming in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and in the *De potentia*.[78]

However, despite this dissimilarity, Thomas came to understand that "the '*content*' (so to speak) of the inner word is increasingly perfectly identical to the 'content' of the act of understanding so that, in the limit, there is a coincidence between principle and term."[79] Thus, in Question 27, Thomas assigns the reason for this difference between conception in us and conception in God:

> [W]hatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not *necessarily* distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood.[80]

Distinction of acts is not necessary to intellectual emanation. If the act of understanding from which the inner word proceeds is perfect (as it is in God), then Speaker and the Word are perfectly one, while remaining distinct because one originates from the other. As Lonergan explains, "[I]n perfect intellectual reflection principle and term are identical without an elimination of the reflection and so without an elimination of the procession."[81] Thus, Thomas does not mean Speaker and Word are *absolutely* identical—they are still two distinct Persons. Rather, Thomas means "that there can be *processio intelligibilis* without absolute diversity, indeed that the more perfect the *processio intelligibilis* is, the greater the approach to identity."[82]

In us, this closeness in identity occurs most perfectly when we are reflecting upon our own mind. In that case, not only is the content of our word (the proceeding term) close to the content of our act of understanding (the principle) since the former is always a reflection upon the act of

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[78] See *SCG* 4, c. 11, §11; *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1c. Cf. the more succinct treatment in the *Summa: ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 2 ad 1.

[79] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 113.

[80] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1 ad 2.

[81] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 206.

[82] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 207.

understanding itself[83], but the content of our word is also most like its source in this particular case because it is a word about the very mind from which it proceeds. However, this reflection never reaches the perfect identity that belongs to God alone because our intellect and its act (and therefore its proceeding word) are irreducibly distinct.[84]

What the foregoing amounts to is that while in us there are two aspects to the procession of an inner word—the productive aspect (*dicere* produces a *verbum,* which is the procession of the word as a *processio operati*) and the intelligible aspect (the *verbum* is because of *dicere*, which is the procession of the word as a *processio intelligibilis*)—only the latter is relevant to trinitarian theology because the productive aspect does not apply to God; the procession of the Word in God is different. It is not a *processio operati*, but *per modum processio operati*.[85] It cannot be a *processio operati per se* because God is one infinite act. Therefore, the procession of an act from an act becomes irrelevant. As Lonergan writes,

> In us inner word proceeds from act of understanding by a *processio intelligibilis* that is also a *processio operati*, for our inner word and act of understanding are two absolute entities really distinct. In God inner word proceeds from act of understanding as uttering by a *processio intelligibilis* that is not a *processio operati*, at least inasmuch as divine understanding and divine Word are not two absolute entities really distinct.[86]

To summarize, in the analogy as predicated of God, the Word is identical to the divine essence but distinct from the Father (*Dicere*) [who is also identical to the divine essence] because of the Word's real relation of conscious, intelligible dependence on the Speaking. Even though the Speaking and Word are both identical to the divine essence, Thomas argues they are not therefore identical to each other. Responding to the argument, "It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the

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[83] This closeness is the reason we have such difficulty differentiate the two acts (understanding and conceptualization judgment) in our consciousness.
[84] See *SCG* 4, c. 11, §5.
[85] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 145-179.
[86] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 207-08.

same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other," Thomas writes:

> According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, *if* the identity be real *and* logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but *not* if they differ logically. Hence…although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.[87]

In other words, while paternity and filiation (the Father and the Son, respectively) are really identical to the divine essence, they are "logically" different from one another, and therefore not identical to one another. Their logical difference is that they are mutually opposed relations of origin.[88] In other words, the Father and the Son are relative realities, unlike the tunic and garment which are the same piece of cloth and therefore identical with each other, differing only in name. Relative realities are really distinct from one another when they are mutually opposed.

3.2.2 The Analogue for the Holy Spirit

Turning to the second procession, the analogue for the Holy Spirit is *Amor procedens*, which denotes love's dependence on *intelligere ut dicere* and the *verbum*. *Amor procedens* is notionally distinct from divine essential love and really distinct from the divine *Dicere* and *Verbum*. The relation of proceeding love to essential love is approximately parallel to the relation of *Dicere* (speaking) to essential *Intelligere* (understanding). However, the order is reversed. As Wilkins explains:

> The act of understanding and the act of love both regard an object, and in this respect both are considered essential acts in God. But the act of understanding also is the *principle* of the (in God notionally distinct) act of conception, and in this respect it provides the analogue for the Father, *dicens*. In its relevant aspect, the act of love, conversely, is intelligibly *dependent* on the apprehension and affirmation of the good – that is, on *intelligere ut dicere* and *verbum*. It is in this latter respect that the act of love provides an analogue for the Holy Spirit, *amor procedens*.[89]

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[87] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 3 arg. 1 and ad. 1 (emphasis added).
[88] See Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 152-53.
[89] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 119-20.

Whereas with the first procession, the two aspects of the act of understanding are readily distinguished through the vocabulary of *intelligere* and *dicere*, the same is not true of the two aspects of the act of love. Given the "poverty of vocabulary" Thomas distinguishes these two aspects by naming them "to love" (*diligere*) and "love proceeding" (*amor procedens*). He writes:

> It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, 'love' and 'to love' [*amor et diligere*] are said of the essence, as 'understanding' and 'to understand'; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and 'vice versa,' so that by 'love' [*amorem*] is understood the 'love proceeding' [*amor procedens*], and by 'to love' [*diligere*] is understood 'the spiration of the love proceeding' [*spirare amorem procedentem*] in that sense 'love' is the name of the person and 'to love' is a notional term, as 'to speak' and 'to beget.'[90]

Thus, with respect to the analogues for the Father and the Holy Spirit in relation to essential acts:

<p style="text-align:center">*Intelligere : Dicere :: Diligere/Amare : Amor Procedens*</p>

However, whereas *Intelligere ut Dicere* is the principle of the *Verbum*, *Diligere ut Amor Procedens* is dependent on *Intelligere ut Dicere* and *Verbum*:

<p style="text-align:center">*Intelligere ut Dicere* → *Verbum*
&
Diligere/Amare ut Amor Procedens ← *Intelligere ut Dicere* and *Verbum*[91]</p>

Table 13

Further, what matters with respect to both of these acts (*Intelligere* and *Diligere/Amare*) is that they each have a precise relational aspect, and it is their relational aspect that makes them relevant to trinitarian theology.[92] As Wilkins explains:

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[90] *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1.

[91] I have reversed the direction of this arrow to emphasize the dependence of *Amor procedences* on *Intelligere ut Dicere* and *Verbum*. Ultimately, the reversal of the arrow foreshadows one of the main points of Chapter 6, in which I argue for a transposition of passive spiration as "Holy Listening," following Lonergan. See Chapter 6, §5.1 The Holy Spirit as Divine Personal Listening and God as Conversational.

[92] Technically, *intelligere* is related both to the intelligible species from which it proceeds and the word it speaks, and *amare* is related both to the word and understanding from which it proceeds and the actions that follow. With respect to *intelligere* only the relation to the word is relevant because the other relation is a *processio operationis*. With respect to *amare*, only the relation to the word and understanding is relevant because the other relation is one that proceeds to an exterior effect (it does not remain within).

Just as the Father is conceived as '*intelligere*' only in its precise *relational aspect* of *grounding* as '*dicere*', that is, as grounding the procession of the Word, so too the Spirit is conceived as '*amare*', '*actus amandi*', only in its precise *relational sense* as *proceeding from* the intellectual apprehension and affirmation of the good. As '*dicere*' is really identical to '*intelligere*' but really distinct from '*verbum*', so '*amor procedens*' is really identical to '*amare*' but really distinct from the intellectual apprehension and affirmation of the good on which it is intelligibly dependent.[93]

In symbolic- and picture-form:

Dicere = Intelligere as ground but *Dicere ≠ Verbum*

⟶

(*Dicere* is *Intelligere* as the principle of *Verbum*)

&

Amor Procedens ≠ Intelligere ut Dicere and *Verbum* but *Amor Procedens = Diligere/Amare* as principled

⟵

(*Amor Procedens* is *Amare* as dependent on *Intelligere ut Dicere* and *Verbum*)

Table 14

To put this in traditional trinitarian terms, the Father conceived as *Dicere* is notionally distinguished from essential understanding (*Ipsum Intelligere*), and really distinguished from the *Verbum* and *Amor Procedens*.[94] Similarly, the Holy Spirit conceived as *Amor Procedens* is notionally distinguished from essential love (*Ipsum Diligere/Amare*), and really distinguished from *Dicere* and the *Verbum*. As Thomas writes:

> [W]e must say that since in God 'to love' [*diligere*] is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. …But when the term Love [*diligere*] is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than 'to spirate love' [*spirare amorem*]; just as to speak [*dicere*] is to produce a word [*verbum*], and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.[95]

We have seen that it is not just any word that proceeds that is relevant for the analogical conception of the divine processions. It is only the word that spirates love. This brings us back to a

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[93] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 120 (emphasis added).
[94] See *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3.
[95] See *ST* Ia, 37, a. 2.

point made in the previous section on Thomas's development. While Thomas gradually

eliminated the model of the self-diffusiveness of the good from his conception of the divine

processions, the Good remained important because the divine processions were conceived on the

analogy of a "conversation" about the divine Good in which the Good is known and loved in the

processions of word and love. Given that it is only "the word that breaks forth into love" that is

relevant to trinitarian theology, which means that it is a word that expresses the affirmation of the

good, the psychological analogy "is really based on the dynamic apprehension of divine goodness.

…It is the divine being as true and lovable which constitutes the formal object of the processions

as conceived on the hypothesis of intelligible emanations."[96] Of this divine conversation about the

divine Good, Thomas writes:

> As Boethius says *(De Hebdom.)*, goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will. Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, *according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness.*[97]

Further, this conversation is ordered – love proceeds from the word and understanding as

speaking – and this ordering is what provides, as we have seen, the relational aspect of

diligere/amare.

Before proceeding to synthesize the foregoing, Crowe helpfully brings together the three

analogues for the divine Persons, specifying where the analogy works and where it falls short:

> [T]he *intelligere, verbum,* and *amor* in us become *ipsum intelligere divinum, ipse veritas divina,* and *ipse amor divinus* in God. But the three acts in us are not just three acts, they are joined to one another by rationality, by processions, by origins; the *intelligere* is *intelligere dicens verbum,* the *verbum* is *veritas dicta,* the *amor* is *amor procedens.* …So in God too the *intelligere* is not simply *Intelligere,* but *Intelligere dicens Verbum,* the *Verbum* is not simply *Veritas* but *Veritas dicta,* the *Amor* is not simply Amor but *Amor procedens, spiratus.* There is an *Amor* that is because of a *Verbum,* and a *Verbum* that is because of an *Intelligere dicens,* and a *Dicens* that is the ground of the *Verbum* and the resulting *Amor.* …Although the three acts of understanding, word, and love in us become infinite in the transfer to God and so become identically one with the divine essence and with one another, still the distinction of principle and term

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[96] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 118.
[97] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 5 ad 2. See also *ST* Ia, q. 14, aa. 1-4; q. 19, a. 2 ad 1; q. 20, a. 1 ad 3.

> remains. …the higher the nature, the nearer identity the principle and term are, though the procession remains real; what we project to is the divine procession where principle and term, *Dicens* and *Verbum* are one God, one essence, one eternity, and yet the procession is real, 'realer' we might say than any procession on earth. Our three acts as acts become on Act in God, but the *emanatio intelligibilis* remains.[98]

Here, Crowe is making the same point (and extending it to the third Person) made above when we distinguished between a *processio operati* and a *processio intelligibilis*. What is relevant for the psychological analogy is (1) that our intelligent speaking, word, and loving are related by spiritual processions; and (2) in God, the identity of principle and term does not amount to absolute identity of the three Persons (as is the case in modalism) because this identity is present without the elimination of reflection, and so without the elimination of spiritual processions. The identity is in the essence, and again, while each Person is identical to the divine essence, each person is also a "relative reality" such that each is really distinct from the other according to relations of mutual opposition.

To bring the foregoing together in terms of the psychological analogy that conceives the divine processions in terms of a "conversation" about the divine Good, we can say that the Father is God in a manner analogous to the grasp of sufficient evidence that necessitates one to judge. The Son is God in the same divine act of loving understanding, but he is the act of loving understanding in a manner analogous to the dependence of the judgment on the grasp of sufficient evidence. The Spirit is the same act of loving understanding in a third manner, but as the dependence of the act of love on the grasp of sufficient evidence and the rational affirmation. The same act of loving understanding is had differently by three Persons.[99] I will now draw together what we have considered regarding the analogues for the three Persons together with the traditional vocabulary used in trinitarian theology.

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[98] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 147, 149.
[99] See Bernard Lonergan, "Consciousness and the Trinity," in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-1964*. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 6, eds. Robert C. Croken, Frederick E. Crowe, and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 135.

3.2.3 Processions, Relations, and Persons

'Procession' signifies the origin of one thing from another.[100] Explaining specifically what kind of procession we understand to exist in God, Thomas writes:

> Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.[101]

Thus, we must conceive procession in God as intellectual emanations. We cannot know with certainty that the processions in God are intellectual emanations, but we find that intellectual emanations—which we experience in ourselves—are the best analogy we have for divine processions for the reasons already discussed in Chapter 3 and reviewed in this chapter. Again, we cannot confirm that divine processions are intellectual emanations because that would require understanding the divine essence, which in this life is unknowable.

There are two processions in God: generation and spiration.[102] Generation signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle when that being proceeds by way of similitude in the same specific nature.[103] As a concept proceeds as likeness of the thing understood from an act of understanding (and understanding is a vital operation),[104] the procession of the Word from the Speaker is generation. There is also another related, yet distinct procession. Thomas writes, "The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the [beloved – *amatum*] is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent."[105] Further, as "the will is made actual,

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[100] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, prol.
[101] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1c.
[102] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3.
[103] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 2c.
[104] See *ST* Ia, q. 18, a. 2.
[105] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3c. See also *Comp. theol.*, c. 49: "We should recall that the act of understanding proceeds from the intellectual power of the mind. When the intellect actually understands, the object it understands is in it. The presence of the object known in the knower results from the intellectual power of

not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain *inclination* to the thing willed…by way of impulse and movement toward an object,"[106] the procession of Love from the Speaker and the Word is spiration, a term Thomas settles on due to "poverty of our vocabulary."[107] As Thomas explains, we need not go on to infinitude in the divine processions, "for the procession which is accomplished *within* the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will."[108] Instead, there are two and only two processions, which are intelligible based on the analogy of spiritual processions.

We have already seen that these two processions are ordered to one another in us. The same is true of God, even though in God "will and intellect are not diverse."[109] The processions still occur in due order. As Thomas writes, "so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God."[110] As was explained in Chapter 4, even when the priority of love over knowledge is recognized and a transposition from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis is made, the explanation of the processions and their order according to the psychological analogy does not change. The reason, as Wilkins explains, is that the analogical conception of the divine Persons does not depend on the metaphysical distinction of intellect and will.[111] All that is relevant

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the mind, and is its word, as we said above. Likewise, what is loved is in the lover, when it is actually loved. The fact that an object is actually loved, results from the lover's power to love and from the lovable good as actually known. Accordingly the presence of the beloved object in the lover is brought about by two factors: the appetitive principle and the intelligible object as apprehended, that is, the word conceived about the lovable object. Therefore, since the Word in God who knows and loves Himself is the Son, and since He to whom the Word belongs is the Father of the Word, as is clear from our exposition, the necessary consequence is that the Holy Spirit, who pertains to the love whereby God is in Himself as beloved in lover, proceeds from the Father and the Son. And so we say in the Creed: 'Who proceeds from the Father and the Son.'"

[106] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 4c.
[107] *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1. See also *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3.
[108] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3c. See also *SCG* 4, c. 26, §§2-3.
[109] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3.
[110] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3. See also *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 1.
[111] See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 108-09. Note that the

is the conscious, intelligible dependence of love on word and understanding, and of word on understanding.

These two processions establish four real relations, three of which are really distinct. In the order of our concepts as they develop, relations are consequent upon processions.[112] For example, when arguing that there are four and only four real relations in God, Thomas writes, "According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion.

…Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God."[113] The relevant feature of this passage is that Thomas is explaining that we understand relations based on one of three things, and since in God, only one particular kind of these things exists—internal processions, which are "actions"—we conceive relations based on our conception of these internal processions. Just as the processions of word and love are conscious, so too are the relations they establish. Thus, we conceive relations as the conscious order one thing has to another. Thomas continues, "In respect of each of these processions [generation and spiration], two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself."[114]

Intelligere is really ordered to the utterance of an inner word; it is really oriented to its own self-expression. Further, the *verbum* really proceeds from *intelligere ut dicere*. As Crowe writes, "as

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distinction between intellect and will in God is only rational, not real. As Thomas writes, "It may be that this different mode of procession whereby the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect, and the Holy Spirit by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, since in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father *by a relation*, in that one of them proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their Persons" (*De pot.*, q. 9, a. 4 ad 15).

[112] As will be discussed in the next chapter, this is exclusively an ordering of *our ideas*, as processions and relations in God are simultaneous and identical, as there is no priority or posteriority in God.

[113] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 4c.

[114] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 4c.

both the orientation and the procession are real, hence the principle and the term of the

procession (*Dicens* and *Verbum* in God) are really related to one another."[115] The case is similar for

the relations that follow upon our conception of the second procession. The spoken *Verbum* is

really oriented to Love – "the will is a *rational* appetite, it embraces the good that is rationally

affirmed and, by the same token, the rational affirmation looks towards the love that will proceed

from it."[116] Again, since both the orientation and procession are real, *Amor Procedens* (on the one

side) and the *Verbum* and *Dicens* (on the other side) are really related to one another.

Thomas argues that relations really exist in God, basing his argument on the previous

question in which processions were conceived:

> [R]elation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, *as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations.* …Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. *But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature*, as above explained, *these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.*[117]

The relation between the word and its source is real in us too:

> Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly.[118]

Further, as long as these real relations are mutually opposed, they are distinct from one

another.[119]

Conceiving relations in the context of the psychological analogy means that just as it was

not enough to conceive of processions as *processio operati* but we had to press forward to conceive of

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[115] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 149.
[116] Ibid.
[117] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 1.
[118] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 1 ad 4.
[119] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 3c.

them as *processio intelligibilis* (i.e., as the procession of something consciously, intelligently, and intelligibly dependent on its principle), so too we must conceive of processions not simply as the relation of one thing to another, but as "the *conscious* order we experience in psychological acts."[120] Thus, in the previous two chapters, we found that we cannot help but utter a word once we understand the value of something. This is a relation of conscious obligation insofar as the value cannot but be affirmed once the evidence for it is grasped.[121] This relation is analogous to paternity. Second, the word of affirmation is absolutely dependent upon its origin, namely, the grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence. This relation is analogous to filiation. We also found that when the speaker spoke a word affirming the value of something, this word could not help but burst forth into love. This relation of the speaker and word to love is traditionally called "active spiration" (though Thomas usually refers to it as "common spiration" or sometimes simply "spiration").[122]

It is this third relation that is not really distinct. Specifically, it is not really distinct from paternity and filiation. *Dicens* is ordered to the inner word, and it is also ordered to love when it is speaking a word affirming the value of something, as is the case in the divine "conversation" about the eternal Good. Similarly, the uttered affirmation of value (the *Verbum*) not only depends on its source, but it is also not some abstract concept. Rather, it is the "full expression" of that Goodness, and thus it is a *Verbum* oriented toward Love.[123] In other words, in speaking, the

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[120] Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 150 (emphasis original).

[121] As an example to help the reader understand relation in terms of conscious intellectual activity, Crowe turns to the struggle between conscience and desire, which yields an analogy for the relation of the Word toward Love. He writes, "For the orientation of conscience is towards a certain conduct, towards an act of will (which basically is love) that should follow from the word (voice) of conscience, and in the struggle against desire does not so follow, at least not immediately. That orientation is real, vividly experienced, not a metaphysical abstraction, and gives us some idea of what it means to the eternal Word to be related to eternal Love" (Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 150). See also, Charles Hefling, "*Quaestio Disputata* on the (Economic) Trinity: An Argument in Conversation with Robert Doran," *Theological Studies* 68, no. 3 (2007), 658.

[122] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 4 ad 3 (herein, he simply refers to it as "spiration"). For his use of "common spiration," see *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 3; q. 33, a. 4; q. 40, a. 1.

[123] See Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity*, 150-51.

Father is related to both the Son and the Spirit. Similarly, in being spoken, the Son is related to both the Father and the Spirit. Together, then, the Father and the Son (being ordered not only to one another but also to the Spirit by one and the same procession—generation) operate as one principle of the Spirit, which is presumably why Thomas selects the term "common spiration" to refer to the real (but not distinct) relation of the Father and the Son to the Spirit. The Father's relation of paternity is not really distinct from his relation of active spiration, and the Son's relation of filiation is not really distinct from his relation of active spiration. However, this does not make paternity and filiation equal to one another. The Father is related to the Spirit as the Speaking of the Word that breaks forth to the Love, while the Son is related to the Spirit as that very Word breaking forth into Love.

There is also a fourth relation, namely, the relation of consciousness of dependence of the act of love on the grasping and the affirming that acknowledge the value. This is the real and distinct relation of the Spirit to the Father and Son, and it is traditionally called "passive spiration" (though Thomas usually refers to it as "procession"). The paucity of vocabulary for the second procession and consequently, the two relations to which it gives rise, can be seen here. As Thomas writes:

> But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own; and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.[124]

Notice that the third relation (active/common spiration) is a real relation, but it is not really distinct from paternity and filiation. It is real because the Father and the Son are really related to the Spirit. However, it is not distinct because their relation to the Spirit is only conceptually distinguishable from their mutual relations to one another. Active spiration is not really distinct from paternity in the Father nor from filiation in the Son because one and the same

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[124] *ST* Ia, q. 28, a. 4c.

Speaking gives rise to the Word and Love.[125] However, the Spirit's relation to the Father and Son (passive spiration) is really distinct from paternity and filiation. As Lonergan explains, that there are four real relations, three of which are really distinct, is best understood if we understand that "[i]nasmuch as speaker, word, and love regard the same object, each one is really related to the other two by a single real relation."[126] The one object they regard is the divine Good. The one Speaking understands the sufficiency of the evidence for affirming the divine Good and therefore also for loving the divine Good. Because of the evidence understood, the Word is spoken that expresses the divine Good to be loved. Lastly, because of the evident goodness understood by the one Speaking and affirmed in the Word, Love is spirated. As Lonergan writes, "From this it is clear that speaker, word, and love, inasmuch as they regard one object, are related to one another in a single system of relations; and therefore speaker is related to both word and love by a single real relation, word is related to both speaker and love by a single real relation, and love is related to both speaker and word by a single real relation."[127] For example, the one Speaking speaks "a truth that is concrete and good, so that it is impossible to speak the word without by the same token spirating love."[128] In light of the foregoing, paternity and active spiration, while real relations of the one Speaking to the Word and to Love, respectively, are only conceptually distinct from each other because they are one by ordering. That is, paternity and active spiration constitute a single order and a single real relation because "the relations of speaker to word and to love are made one by ordering, since the one who in on word utters a true good speaks the word and at the same time, through the mediation of the word, spirates love."[129] Similarly, filiation and active spiration, while real relations of the Word to the one Speaking and to Love, are only conceptually distinct from each other. Again, it is because the relations of the Word to the one

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[125] See Crowe, *The Doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity*, 151-52.
[126] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 250-51.
[127] Ibid., 250-53.
[128] Ibid., 252-53.
[129] Ibid.

Speaking and of the Word to Love are made one by ordering, "since in the one word there is spoken a true good, which as true arises from the speaker and as good is ordered to the spiration of love."[130] Before moving forward to discuss persons, the following diagrams developed by Jeremy Blackwood will help to illustrate the movement of processions and relations in the psychological analogy[131]:

Figure 2

These three real and distinct relations are the three Persons of the divine nature. That is, because each relation is eternal and eternally distinct, there are three Persons sharing the one divine nature. Thomas's preferred definition of "person" is taken from Boethius, "the individual substance [*substantia*] of a rational nature."[132] However, Thomas has actually implicitly substituted his own preferred definition of person as the term of a relation grounded in an eternal intelligent emanation/procession. Recall that in *De Trinitate*, Augustine settled on "persons" to answer the question, "Three what? or Three who?"[133] The names "person" or "substance" were meant to convey not any idea of diversity, but rather, "it wished to avoid any idea of singleness; so that as

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[130] Ibid.
[131] See Jeremy Blackwood, "The Trinitarian Theology of Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. A Summary," paper written for a course at Sacred Heart Seminary and School of Theology, Hales Corners, Wisconsin, 9-10.
[132] *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 1. See also a. 2 in which Thomas clarifies that by "substance" he means "subsistence," namely, that which exists in itself and not in another. He substitutes "subsistence" for "substance" in Article 3.
[133] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 7.4.7 (Hill, 224-26).

well as understanding unity in God, whereby there is said to be one being, we might also understand trinity, whereby there also said to be three substances or three persons."[134] Further, as Thomas argues, this name is fittingly applied to God—in a way more excellent than it is applied to creatures—because it "signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature."[135] More specifically, Lonergan observes, "the supreme perfection of a person consists in the intellectual emanations in the realms of truth and goodness…"[136]

Applied to God, the word "person" signifies "a relation as subsisting in the divine nature."[137] Whereas human persons are distinguished as individuals by their signate matter – e.g., these bones, this flesh – (as distinct from their common matter, which belongs to the definition of the human person), divine persons are distinguished as individuals by their subsistent relations of origin.[138] Thomas argues that there can be only three Persons because there are only three mutually opposed relations of origin in God.[139] Thus, paternity is the Father, filiation is the Son, and passive spiration (or procession, as Thomas has it) is the Holy Spirit.[140] The name "Trinity" in God signifies this determinate number of persons.[141] Strictly speaking, the word "Trinity" does not signify the one essence of the three persons, but rather, the number of persons of one essence. For this reason, we do not call the Father (or the Son, or the Spirit) the Trinity, as the Father is not three persons. Furthermore, "Trinity" does not express regard to another – that is, "it does not means the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other."[142]

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[134] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 7.4.9 (Hill, 227). Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 2; q. 30, a. 3.
[135] *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 3c.
[136] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 320-21.
[137] *ST* Ia, q. 30, a. 1c.
[138] See *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 4c
[139] *ST* Ia, q. 30, a. 2c.
[140] See *ST* Ia, q. 29, a. 4c; q. 30, a. 2 ad 1.
[141] See *ST* Ia, q. 31, a. 1c.
[142] *ST* Ia, q. 31, a. 1 ad 1.

These Persons, as Persons, have attributes, properties, and notional acts.[143] The attributes are divided into common (or essential), proper (or notional), and appropriated. Common attributes are those said of God by reason of essence, and thus are also said of each Person because each Person is God. Proper attributes are those that belong to one or the other divine Person, but not to all three. Notice that two Persons can share a proper attribute. The proper names of the Persons are also proper attributes. Appropriated attributes are those that are transferred from essential to proper attributes, but without excluding the other Persons. For example, we call the Son "Truth" because truth proceeds from the grasp of the sufficiency of evidence, even though "Truth" is an essential term in God.[144]

Personal properties are the relations reconsidered as properties (i.e., as properties of persons) and so conceived differently.[145] As Lonergan explains, "In God, a personal property is that proper attribute which constitutes and distinguishes a person. But…the real divine relations constitute the persons and distinguish the persons constituted. Therefore, the real divine relations *as* constitutive and distinctive of the persons are personal properties."[146] We can conceive of relation as constitutive of a person, but we can also conceive of relation as relation (i.e., personal property).[147] The difference is has to do with the order of our concepts, which can be either in a state of becoming or in a state of being. I will explore this difference in the conclusion.

Notional acts are the processions, but reconsidered (as acts of persons) and so conceived differently. The reason they are called "notional acts" is because these are the *acts* that designate the origin of one Person from another Person, and the *notions*, themselves, of the persons are the

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[143] For the following, I rely on Lonergan's summary in *The Triune God: Systematics*. He is a faithful interpreter of Thomas. He presents this particular material more succinctly and clearly than can be done by turning to Questions 33-41 of the *Summa*.

[144] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 350-55.

[145] See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 31.

[146] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 366-67.

[147] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 374-75.

mutual relations of the Persons.[148] We can conceive procession as constituting relations (and thereby persons) or we can conceive procession as procession (i.e., notional act). Again, the difference has to do with the order of our concepts. Notice that personal properties and notional acts are personal attributes. The personal properties are the proper divine attributes that constitute and distinguish a person. With respect to notional acts, as Lonergan explains, "[they] are the proper divine attributes expressed not by nouns but by verbs: for example, to generate, to be generated, to speak, to be spoken, to spirate, to be spirated, to love notionally, and to proceed as love."[149] The notional acts are nearly the last thing Thomas considers in the cluster of questions on the persons as regards each other (qq. 39-43). Questions 42 and 43 compare the persons to one another with regard to equality and likeness (q. 42) and to mission (q. 43). The previous three questions compared them to each other by way of the essence, properties, and notional acts, respectively (qq. 39-41). We have considered their equality and likeness to some extent in these sections insofar as we have considered how each person is the divine essence, even while they share in it distinctly. Before proceeding to consider the divine missions, it will be helpful to bring together in the chart below the various terms used in this section.

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[148] *ST* Ia, q. 41, a. 1 ad 2.
[149] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 368-69.

	Procession	Relation	Person	Essential Attribute	Proper Attribute	Appropriated Attribute	Essential Act	Personal Property	Notional Act	Father	Son	Spirit
To understand (*Intelligere*)							✓			✓	✓	✓
To speak (*Dicere*)									✓	✓		
To be spoken (*Dici*)									✓		✓	
To love (*Amare/Diligere*)							✓[150]			✓	✓	✓
To love as spirating (*Spirare*)									✓	✓	✓	
To love as *Amor procedens*									✓			✓
Generation	✓											
Procession (Spiration)	✓											
Innascibility					✓					✓		
Paternity		✓	✓		✓			✓		✓		
Filiation		✓	✓		✓			✓			✓	
Active Spiration		✓			✓			✓		✓	✓	
(Passive) Spiration		✓	✓		✓			✓				✓
Father			✓									
Son			✓									
Spirit			✓									
Unbegotten					✓					✓		
Truth				✓		✓					✓	
Image					✓						✓	
Word					✓						✓	
Holy					✓							✓
Love					✓							✓
Gift					✓							✓

Table 15

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[150] Technically, *intelligere* and *amare* are one in the same act in God, and so it is better to speak of God as the infinite act of Understanding Love. Thus, *intelligere* and *amare* are different ways of speaking about the same reality; they are conceptually distinct, but not really distinct. I do not mean to imply that there are two essential acts in God. I include both *intelligere* and *amare* in order to express that *dicere* and *amor procedens* are distinct from them, respectively.

4. The Divine Missions and the Indwelling of the Trinity: The *Cause* of the Trinification of the *Imago*

We now arrive at the point of considering the trinification of the human person and understanding how Thomas came to present the very same operations as providing both the analogy for the divine conception of the processions and the explanation for the mode of divine indwelling in the human person. The focus will be on the connection between questions 43 and 93, as well as a few other related texts, namely, Questions 8, 12, 33, 35, and 38. The process of trinification is linked to the indwelling of the Trinity brought about by the divine missions.

Recall that recent scholarship has been retrieving Thomas's understanding of sanctification *as* deification.[151] As Spezzano explains, "Thomas' primary definition of grace in the *Summa* – as a created *habitus* that is a 'participation in the divine nature' (cf. 2 Pet. 1:4) – is one indication that he thinks of this process as deification."[152] Our understanding of this process is enriched when we understand that since God is triune, God communicates Godself to the human person *as* triune, and so the deification of the human person is really her trinification. This suggestion is consistent with the closing articles of Question 93 in which Thomas discusses specifically the perfection of the image of the *Trinity.* The progressive perfection of the image of the Trinity *is* the trinification of the human person.

Thomas emphasizes the *trinitarian* order of grace. As Wilkins explains, "When Thomas says that 'grace is the effect of God's love in us' [*Super Ioannem*, c. 15, lect. 2, n. 1998], his meaning is trinitarian, because divine love is ordered in a trinitarian way: *gratia gratum faciens* [the grace that makes one pleasing] is the effect of the indwelling Spirit who proceeds as love from the Word,"[153] and who proceeds from the Father. Thomas's understanding of grace connects the Trinity, the divine missions, and the perfection of the *imago Trinitatis* in us: the divine missions communicate to

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[151] See above, §2. Introduction: Analogy, Image, and Trinification.
[152] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 3.
[153] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 693.

us a share in the trinitarian life of God, and it is because the human mind is a mirror reflecting the Trinity that we can come to fruitfully yet imperfectly understand the Trinity in which we believe but do not see.[154] Thomas's integrative account was made possible by the developments in his theory of the divine processions.

It will be helpful to add a few preliminary notes about the relationship between Question 43 and Question 93. As Merriell underscores, Thomas "does not mention the image in his treatment of the indwelling, and vice verse,"[155] and Merriell therefore argues that Thomas does not explicitly connect these two doctrines. However, an explicit connection between his teachings on the missions (q. 43) and on the image (q. 93) does not have to depend on the use of the same terms.[156] Spezzano offers an insightful analysis of their connection. She begins with what we have identified as the trinitarian order of grace:

> Question 43, on the missions, is the Trinitarian foundation of Thomas's treatment of the sanctification of the rational creature, by the grace of the Holy Spirit given through the Son in his visible mission. In q43 this sanctification is treated from the perspective of the divine *cause*; later in the *Summa* Thomas examines the sanctification of the rational creature from the perspective of the *effect* in the creature, both in terms of the ontological states produced in the perfection of the created image (treated in q93) and the transformation of the creature's nature and activities that brings it to the end of beatitude, treated in later questions on grace, the virtues, and gifts in the IIa *pars*.[157]

Thus, the two questions can be viewed as connected insofar as the former treats the cause of the human person's sanctification—which is the objective presence of God in the soul – and the latter treats the effect of this sanctification—which is the resulting assimilation of the creature to God.[158]

Additionally, while in the trinitarian questions Thomas generally uses "rational creature" to refer to the human person rather than "image," these two terms are synonymous. For example,

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[154] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.4.6 (Hill, 399); *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 5c.
[155] Merriell, "Trinitarian Anthropology," 142, n. 66.
[156] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 98.
[157] Ibid., 99 (emphasis added).
[158] See ibid..

in Question 3, Thomas established that "it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man [*homo*] is said to be according to the image of God."[159] Furthermore, in the earlier trinitarian questions, Thomas identifies the rational creature or "man [*homo*]" as the image of God.[160] For example, he writes:

> Of some [creatures], namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of his image, according to Deut. 32:6…And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16-17…Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rom. 5:2.[161]

> In order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man [*homo*], man is not simply called the image, but to the image, whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection.[162]

Thus, while Thomas does not use "image" to refer to the human person in the questions on the indwelling (Questions 38 and 43), he does use the equivalent term, "rational creature," which he has earlier argued is the image of God, and which he again uses in the prologue to the *Secunda pars*. As Spezzano observes, "It is not remarkable that in q43 he would use the former term [rational creature] because he had not yet treated the image *ex professo*, yet he might expect his readers to make the connection between the two questions."[163]

Lastly, there are at least two important textual links between Questions 43 and 93. First, Thomas speaks in both questions of the renewal of the mind. In Question 43,Thomas argues that "mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and *a certain renewal by grace*. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions."[164] In Question 93, Article 6, Thomas quotes Eph. 4:23-24 and Col. 3:10 in the *sed*

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[159] *ST* Ia, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2.
[160] See *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 3 and q. 35, a. 2 ad 3, respectively. See also *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 2; q. 33, a. 3 obj. 3, c, ad 1 and 2; q. 35, a. 1 ad 1, a. 2 ad 3; q. 39, aa. 7-8; and q. 41, a. 3.
[161] *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 3c.
[162] *ST* Ia, q. 35, a. 2 ad 3.
[163] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 98-9.
[164] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 6c.

contra to argue that the image belongs to the human person's mind not only because it is intellectual but also because it is the mind that is capable of renewal.[165] If we turn to Thomas's commentary on Colossians, we find that he attributes this renewal of the mind (which is the renewal of the image) to grace.[166] More specifically, he attributes it to the faith resulting from grace's renewal of the mind. Thomas writes:

> Then when Paul says, 'and have put on the new nature' [v. 10], he describes the new self. First, he shows how this renewal takes place; secondly, where it takes place. *He shows that the inner self, having become old by its ignorance of God, is made new by faith and the knowledge of God*: 'We are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another' (2 Cor 3:18). And where is this renewal taking place? *It is taking place where the image of God is, and this is not in the sense faculties, but in the mind*…In other words, the image of God in us is being renewed.[167]

In light of Thomas's commentary on Colossians, we can suggest a textual link between Questions 43 and 93 through the phrase "renewal by grace."[168] The renewal by grace we can find in people is the same renewal of the mind according to which it can be said that the mind – and the mind only – is the image of God. It is the image of God (Question 93) that is renewed by grace through the divine missions (Question 43).

Second, a more direct textual link is found in the phrase "*prorumpere in amorem*" (from our inner word we "break forth into love"). Question 43, Article 5 and Question 93, Article 7 are the only places in the *Summa* in which Thomas uses this phrase.[169] In Question 43, it is used to explain "the causal exemplarity of the Son…to whom the soul is assimilated by wisdom"[170] Notice that

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[165] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 6 sc and c. Cf. Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 85.

[166] See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura,* trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P., html-formatted by Joseph Kenny, O.P., http://dhspriory.org/thomas/SSColossians.htm, accessed August 18, 2017: "We are to put off this old self with its practices: 'Put off your old nature which belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful lusts' (Eph 4:22). *The new nature or self is the mind, renewed from within, because before grace our mind is subject within to sin, and when it is renewed by grace it becomes new*: 'Your youth is renewed like the eagle's' (Ps 103:5); 'For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation' (Gal 6:15). This new creation is renewing grace" (c. 3, lect. 2, n. 154; emphasis added). Henceforth, *In Col.*.

[167] *In Col.*. c. 3, lect. 2, n. 155 (emphasis added).

[168] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 85, fn. 41.

[169] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 231. The *Index Thomisticus* confirms Merriell's observation.

[170] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 101.

Thomas is likening the Son—the Word that breathes forth love (*spirans amorem*)—to the

intellectual illumination his invisible mission causes in us, which is the kind of intellectual

perfection that breaks forth into love. Thomas writes:

> Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love.
> Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): 'The Word we speak of is knowledge with love.'
> Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection,
> but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love
> [*qua prorumpat in affectum amoris*], as is said (Jn. 6:45): 'Everyone that hath heard from the
> Father and hath learned, cometh to Me'…[171]

In Question 93, the phrase is used to express the way in which the mind chiefly represents the

Trinity, namely, according to its acts.

> As above explained, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an
> image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look
> for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the
> Divine Persons…first and chiefly, *the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that
> is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and
> thence break forth into love* [*et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus*].[172]

The word breaking forth into love is expressing the same intellectual perfection of

Question 43 – that is, an effect appropriated to the Son's invisible mission, namely, wisdom or the

illumination of the intellect. Even Merriell submits that Thomas's repetition of this phrase in these

two questions suggests that Thomas was aware of the connection between his notions of the

indwelling of the Trinity and the image.[173] These links seem to make it clear that Thomas

understood the connections between his doctrines on the indwelling and the image, and that he

even connected them implicitly through devices such as the repetition of phrases. The link

between the two questions is also substantive, as we will see as we progress.

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[171] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2 (emphasis added). See also ad 3: "If we consider mission as regards the effect of
grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the
effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection." The
former is an effect appropriated to the Son's invisible mission and the latter is an effect appropriated to
the Spirit's invisible mission.

[172] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 7c (emphasis added).

[173] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 231.

4.1 The Divine Missions of the Son and the Spirit

In terms of the place of Question 43 on the divine missions within the overall context of the *Summa,* it is the last of Thomas's trinitarian questions, as well as the final question on God *in se.* Having compared the divine Persons according to likeness and equality in Question 42, Thomas proceeds to compare them to one another according to their missions, and so, in relation to creation.[174] Recall that in Question 32 on our knowledge of the divine Persons, Thomas explained that the primary purpose of trinitarian doctrine is to help us "have the right idea about creation" and to "think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost."[175] This right thinking includes understanding that God created with utter freedom and that our salvation – which God likewise bestows upon us freely – is accomplished through the divine missions of the Word and Spirit. Moreover, it is only through the divine missions that humanity came to affirm that God is a Trinity of Persons, for it is through visible things that the invisible things of God are made known to creatures.[176] In this light, we can observe that Question 43, while the culmination of the trinitarian questions and Thomas's doctrine of God *in se*, is also the introduction as well as the link and pivot to his consideration of creation and salvation, and so, of God as the *alpha* and *omega*. As Spezzano comments, "We are alerted by the organization of the questions on the Trinity that God's work in creation will culminate in the gift of grace, given through the Incarnation for the sanctification of human beings."[177]

Furthermore, the missions are a means to an end, and therefore, their intelligibility is related to their purpose. As Wilkins writes, "The result is a complex intelligibility, because the human situation is complex. This is why Thomas introduces the missions in the context of his

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[174] See *ST* Ia, q. 42, prol..
[175] *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3.
[176] See, for example, *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 102, a. 2; IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 3 ad 3; IIa-IIae, q. 81, a. 7; q. IIIa, q. 1, a. 1 sc; IIIa, q. 60, a. 4; IIIa, q. 61, a. 3.
[177] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 62. See also Wilkins, "Two Missions," 51.

treatise on the Trinity, but unfolds their significance only gradually as he gives fuller consideration to the human good and how it is realized."[178] That is, the fittingness of the missions of the Son and the Spirit is appreciated more and more as the *Summa* progresses because the consideration of the human person, which begins in the *Prima pars* and continues throughout the *Secunda pars*, illuminates the situation into which the Son and the Spirit are sent. Further, the *Secunda pars* includes the consideration of the human person in relation to sanctifying grace, the effect of the Spirit's invisible mission. The *Tertia pars* considers the Son's visible mission, as well as the effects his mission has on his disciples, the dispensation of grace in the Sacraments, and humanity as a whole. For example, Thomas regularly explores elements of the Son's visible mission in terms of its fittingness in relation to us, that is, in relation to our humanity and our situation.[179]

Lastly, the Trinitarian questions re-introduce the distinction between operations remaining in God (God's operations of intellect and will) and operations that proceed to an exterior effect (God's power). The consideration of the Persons (27-42) enriches the understanding of divine intellect and will, while the consideration of the divine missions enriches the understanding of divine power. Thomas then treats the procession of creatures from God. For the remainder of the *Prima Pars,* Thomas treats God's power insofar as God creates and governs. In the *Secunda* and *Tertia Pars,* we can see a continuation of Thomas's treatment of God's operations – especially God's power – and God's giving of God's very self in the missions of the Spirit and the Son. In other words, Question 43 of the *Prima Pars* on the divine missions is only the beginning of Thomas's treatment of the missions.

Thomas defines the divine missions in Articles 1 and 2 of Question 43. The concept of a divine mission has two component elements "the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that

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[178] Wilkins, "Two Divine Missions," 51.
[179] See, for example, his questions on the Incarnation (*ST* IIIa, q. 1) and the Passion (*ST* IIIa, q. 46). He also speaks in terms of fittingness with regard to, for example, Christ's life and teaching (*ST* IIIa, qq. 40, 42).

of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent."[180] With respect to the relation of the sent to the

sender, the divine missions are grounded on their eternal processions. As Thomas puts it, the

mission of a divine person is "in one way the procession of origin from the sender."[181] With

respect to the relation of the sent to the end, the divine Persons become present in a new way in

creation, in salvation history. As Thomas writes, the mission of a divine person also means "a new

way of existing in another."[182] This new existence is not a change in the divine Person, but in the

creature to whom the Person is sent.[183] In other words, the divine missions are the eternal

processions with created, external, temporal terms.[184] Further, while the processions (generation

and spiration) are eternal, the missions are temporal.[185] Of the three divine Persons, it is fittingly

said that two have divine missions. As Thomas writes, "The very idea of mission means

procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above

expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent;

but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from

another."[186] Nevertheless, while the Father is not said to be sent, he does freely give himself to the

human person to be enjoyed. As Thomas explains, "to give [*dare*]," as freely bestowing something

is fittingly said of the Father, while "to be given [*dari*]" is not fittingly said of the Father because

the Father is unoriginate.[187] In the former sense, the Father is rightly said to dwell in the human

person along with the Son and the Spirit.[188]

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[180] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 1c.
[181] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 1c.
[182] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 1c.
[183] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 2 ad 2.
[184] See *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 2 ad 3.
[185] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 2.
[186] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 4c.
[187] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 4 ad 1.
[188] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 1 ad 2. Note that just as procession does not imply inferiority of the Person who
  proceeds, neither does mission imply inferiority of the Person sent. See *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 1 ad 1.

The effects of the missions are invisible and visible. An invisible mission entails a created effect that "operates directly on the human person's mind and heart."[189] A visible mission entails a created effect that "operates through the mediation of the senses."[190] As Thomas writes:

> God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as explained above. Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures.[191]

Thomas maintains that the Son and the Spirit each have visible and invisible missions.[192] However, the Spirit's mission is principally invisible and the Son's is principally visible. The effect of the Spirit's invisible mission is *gratia gratum faciens* (the grace that makes one pleasing, which Thomas calls "sanctifying grace" later in the *Summa*)[193] and the Spirit's visible mission is indicated by signs such as the dove and fire.[194] The effect of the Son's visible mission is his taking on of human nature[195] (i.e., the created hypostatic union[196]) and the effects of his invisible mission are the effects of grace on the intellect, namely, intellectual illumination or wisdom.[197]

The last important feature to understand about the divine missions is that they are coordinated for a twofold end, namely, our "withdrawal from evil" and our "furtherance in the good," that is, the promotion of a supernatural good.[198] Importantly, the fittingness of the

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[189] Wilkins, "Two Divine Missions," 50-51. See *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5.

[190] Wilkins, "Two Divine Missions," 51.

[191] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 7c.

[192] Interestingly, Thomas notes a certain order with respect to the visible missions of the Son and the Spirit: "The visible mission of the Holy Spirit was fittingly *not* sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, *because the visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy Spirit;* since the Holy Spirit manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father" (*ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 7 ad 6).

[193] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 3c.

[194] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 7c.

[195] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 1c: "thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas 'He was' previously 'in the world' (Jn. 1:1)." See also *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 7 obj. 2 and 4, ad 4.

[196] *ST* IIIa, q. 2, a. 7c. See Wilkins, "Two Divine Missions," 51.

[197] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2-3.

[198] *ST* IIIa, q. 1, a. 2c. See also *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5; Ia, q. 43, a. 7; Ia-IIae, q. 111, a. 3 ad 1; IIIa, q. 3, a. 8 ad 3;; IIIa, q. 8, aa. 1 & 5; IIIa, q. 64, a. 3; Ia, q. 38; *Super Ioan.,* c. 14, lect. 6, n. 1958; *.,* c. 15, lect. 2, n.

Incarnation with respect to the promotion of a supernatural good includes our "full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): 'God was made man, that man might be made God.'"[199]

Recall from Chapter 2 that the human person has a supernatural end – the beatific vision – to which her nature and natural powers are disproportionate.[200] Therefore, in order to reach her end, her nature must be elevated. This elevation occurs through the indwelling of the Spirit, which effects a change in the human person (for God's love is causal[201] and the Spirit is Love, which is the first gift[202]). This change in us is *gratia gratum faciens*, and it is a transformation of our entire nature.[203] Thus, God not only creates the human person to his image through the bestowal of the form of her rational nature, but God also recreates the human to his image through the bestowal of a new form[204] and habits[205] by which the image newly participates in the divine likeness in grace and, ultimately, in glory.[206] In short, this sanctification of human nature is the beginning of her deification, and so, her trinification. The Son's visible mission is coordinated

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[199] *ST* IIIa, q. 1, a. 2c.

[200] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 1; Ia-IIae, q. 5, a. 5; Ia-IIae, q. 109, aa. 2, 3, 5.

[201] See *ST* Ia, q. 19, a. 5c.

[202] See *ST* Ia, q. 38, aa. 1-2c.

[203] See Wilkins, "Two Missions," 52. See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 4 (grace is rooted in the *essence* of the soul).

[204] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 110 in which Thomas explains that grace is an accident in the essence of the human soul

[205] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 62 on the theological virtues, in which Thomas refers again to 2 Pet. 1:4, his primary text for deification: "Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above. Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above. One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. *The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pt. 1:4) that by Christ we are made 'partakers of the Divine nature.' And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness,* even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called 'theological virtues' first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ."

[206] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 80.

with the Spirit's invisible mission, for he is the author of sanctification while the Holy Spirit is the gift of sanctification.[207] That is, the inner operation of grace is coordinate with the Word's visible mission such that we can hear the Word spoken in history. Furthermore, Christ's work, in his passion and cross, is coordinated with the Holy Spirit's invisible work of charity within the human person.[208] The promotion of the supernatural good and the sanctification (as deification) of the rational creature involves considering the indwelling of the Trinity, which we will soon examine in greater detail.

Thomas had considered the sanctification of the human person in the questions on the divine essence, namely, in Question 12 on our knowledge of God. Returning to this question helps accentuate Thomas's understanding of the progressive nature of sanctification, which further illuminates the connection between the divine indwelling and the perfection of the *imago* as the cause and effect of sanctification, respectively.[209] In Chapters 2 and 3, we discussed Thomas's affirmation of a fundamental proportion of rational creatures to God according to their participation in the divine light.[210] This participation is natural to the rational creature, brought about by her creation. Beyond her natural likeness to the divine intellect, Thomas maintains that God can raise the rational creature to a supernatural likeness according to the supernatural perfections of grace and glory.[211] We can observe, therefore, varying degrees of participation of the rational creature's intellectual light in the divine light, namely, natural, graced, and glorified participation. In this way, Thomas anticipates his later teaching on the perfection of the *imago* in grace and glory. Notice that it is the process of deification that proportions the human person to know and love God. For example, Thomas quotes 1 John 3:2 (his primary scripture reference for the deification of the image), which speaks of the similitude of the rational creature to the divine

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[207] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 7c.
[208] See Wilkins, "Two Missions," 55. See also *ST* IIIa, q. 48, a. 2.
[209] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 36
[210] *ST* Ia, q. 12, a.1 ad 4.
[211] See *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 2c.

likeness caused by participation in the light of glory.[212] This scripture passage reads, "Beloved, we

are God's children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he

appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." It is this transformation that makes the

human intellect proportionate to the beatific vision.[213] Of this progressive participation unto

perfection, Spezzano writes:

> Thomas's larger vision in the *Summa* of God as 'the source of things and their end, and especially of rational creatures,' made in the divine image is in evidence here. *It is precisely by a process of increasing similitude to God that the intellect is disposed to receive the vision.* Thomas draws a larger picture of continuity between the vision proper to nature, grace, and glory as increasingly perfect participations of the creature in the light of the divine intellect, resulting in a more and more perfect likeness to God.[214]

Thus, participation and likeness to God express the same process from different angles. As we

participate more perfectly in the divine light (caused by God's grace), we become more like God

(effect of God's grace). Furthermore, by the close Question 12, Thomas has actually outlined the

rational creature's advance toward God by this progressive participation, and he has also

established that "the goal and substance of the rational creature's perfection are the perfect

knowledge and love of God."[215] However, "the teaching on the Trinity allows us to begin to

understand more clearly how this perfection comes about, by the conformation of the image to its

Trinitarian exemplar…"[216] This "beginning to understand more clearly" is itself part of the

process of perfection. In the final chapter, we will explore how that ties in with the role of the

preacher. Briefly, the more one contemplates these teachings on the Trinity, the deeper one

enters into the Trinity, since the being of the Trinity is self-understanding, self-expression, and

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[212] *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 2 ad 1.
[213] See *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 2 ad 3.
[214] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 37.
[215] Ibid., 61, 40. See also ibid., 40.
[216] Ibid., 61.

self-love as intellectual (contemplative) emanations.[217] Given this, let us now consider the Spirit's

invisible mission in greater depth, focusing specifically on the indwelling of the Trinity.

4.2 The Indwelling of the Trinity

With respect to the indwelling of the Trinity, we must understand two things. One, what it means

for the human person to enjoy the divine Persons. Two, what the primary effect of the Spirit's

mission is, namely, *gratia gratum faciens*. First, the Spirit is personally called "Gift."[218] The Spirit

proceeds as love, and love has the nature of a first gift.[219] However, with respect to us and to the

Spirit's mission, we must ask whether the gift we receive is a created gift or whether the Spirit, *in*

se, is given to us.[220] Primarily, the gift is God, *in se*. It is God's special love, given specifically to the

rational creature, "whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a

participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since

it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature."[221]

Further, of the meaning of "gift" in relation to the divine Persons, Thomas writes:

> The word 'gift' imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or
> relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by
> anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person
> is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as
> possessed by another. *But we are said to possess what we can freely use [uti] or enjoy [frui] as we*
> *please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God.*
> Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be
> able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does
> sometimes attain thereto…Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner,
> its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be
> given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can 'be given,' and
> can be a 'gift.'[222]

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[217] I owe this formulation of the "being of the Trinity…" to Patrick Byrne.

[218] See *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1 ad. 1, a. 2.

[219] *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 2.

[220] See Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 694.

[221] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 1c.

[222] *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1c.

As Wilkins comments, Thomas uses Augustine's distinction between *uti* (things to be used) and *frui* (things to be enjoyed) in order to explain that with the indwelling of the Spirit, we receive both created gifts (*uti*) and the divine persons, themselves, as gifts (*frui*).[223] Corresponding to the former, created grace is a gift from God that is other than God. These gifts are not primary but derivative. Their purpose is to help us to know and love God as God knows and loves Godself, for example, sanctifying grace, faith, wisdom, and charity. Corresponding to things to be enjoyed, uncreated grace is a divine self-gift. Such are the divine missions, which, among other things, constitute humanity in a new relationship to God. Thus, when the Spirit is given to us, it is principally the Spirit *in se*—an uncreated gift—who is given to us in order that we may enjoy the divine Persons. Before expanding on the joyful situation this divine indwelling establishes, we must return to *gratia gratum faciens* and the fact that not only the Spirit, but the entire Trinity dwells within us through the gift of the Spirit.

Gratia gratum faciens is the source of the indwelling of the entire Trinity in the human person, and it is the reason the human person is said to have a special mode of participation in God. As Thomas writes:

> For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except [the grace that makes one pleasing—*gratia gratum faciens*]. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to [*gratiam gratum facientem*].[224]

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[223] See Wilkins, "Two Missions," 53.

[224] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 3c. I have altered the translation here to reflect the Latin. The Fathers of the English Dominican Province translate "*gratia gratum faciens*" as sanctifying grace, but Thomas has a distinct phrase for sanctifying grace, namely "*gratia sanctificationis*." As I will explain below, the former accentuates the change in relationship between God and the human person that the gift of the Spirit causes—we are "made pleasing" *to* God—whereas *gratia sanctifactionis* accentuates the change in the human person.

Gratia gratum faciens is the created term of the Spirit's invisible mission. However, the Spirit does not personally assume this term (as the Son does assume a human nature), which is why it can be said that the entire Trinity—not just the Spirit—dwells in us through *gratia gratum faciens*.[225] That is, because the Spirit does not assume *gratia gratum faciens,* this means the Spirit, in being sent, brings the entire Trinity, whereas we do not say that the entire Trinity assumed a human nature. Notice the distinction between dwelling and being sent:

> The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by [*gratiam gratum facientem*], according to Jn. 14:23: 'We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him.' But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent.[226]

Thus, "in giving their love, their Spirit, the Father and the Son give themselves."[227] This means that not only is the Spirit *in se* given to us, but the entire Trinity *in se* is given to us as our gift so that we may enjoy the divine Persons, themselves.

The effect of the indwelling of the Trinity is the elevation of human nature, enabling it to participate in the divine nature. This participation is above and beyond the natural participation the human person has in God on account of her created participation in the uncreated light—that is, on account of her intellect. In the following two articles on the essence of grace, Thomas indicates that through grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) we participate in divine nature, which makes us the adopted children of God. Recall that earlier in the trinitarian questions, Thomas linked the image of God in the human person according to grace with her divine adoption.[228] That is, not only are we by nature created to the image of God, but through grace, the image is perfected (but

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[225] See Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 692.
[226] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5c.
[227] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 692.
[228] See *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 3.

not completely) such that like the Image (the Son), we can also call God our Father. Further, in

the second article, Thomas intimates the trinitarian pattern of this participation. He writes:

> [I]nfused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: 'He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.' And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light…[229]
>
> For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.[230]

In light of the latter passage, Wilkins observes, "*Gratia gratum faciens* is a participation in the divine

nature, and faith and love are participations in the processions of Word and Spirit."[231]

Thus, beyond participation in the divine nature, the effect of indwelling of the Trinity

bestows upon the human person a share in the fellowship of the divine Persons. It is this "divine-

human interpersonal situation" that is the primary reality of grace, according to Thomas.[232]

Wilkins draws our attention to the fact that Thomas uses "*gratia gratum faciens*" rather than "*gratia*

sanctificationis" in these trinitarian questions for speaking about the effect of the Spirit's invisible

mission. The former, in speaking of the human person as "pleasing" to God on account of the

Spirit's mission, "emphasizes how grace constitutes a created person in a new relationship to God,

rather than how grace is immanently perfective of the creature."[233] Further, Thomas's definition

of charity as *amicitia Dei* was innovative and even bold because he based it on an analogy with

Aristotle's definition of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which lasting friendship is between

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[229] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 3c.
[230] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 4c.
[231] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 696-97.
[232] See Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 689.
[233] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 696.

equals, who are "alike in dignity and excellence or virtue."[234] Together, Thomas's decision to

express grace as *gratia gratum faciens* (the Spirit's effect) and his definition of charity as friendship

reflect the primacy of the interpersonal situation in Thomas's theology of grace.[235]

In order to attend to the human person's participation in the fellowship of the divine

persons in more detail, I bring together two coordinated texts, Questions 38 and 43. Insofar as the

indwelling of the Trinity makes us participants in the fellowship of divine persons, it is the cause of

the human person's trinification. Recall that in Question 38, Thomas explained the divine

Persons can be enjoyed, but only by rational creatures united to God. As we know, this occurs

through the gift of the Spirit. However, in this question, Thomas specifies that the rational

creature sometimes attains to enjoyment of the divine Persons, not through generally being made

partakers in the divine nature, but rather, through particularly being made "*partaker[s] of the divine

Word and of the Love proceeding*, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the

rational creature alone can possess the divine person…"[236] In Question 43, Thomas recalls this

significant comment:

> Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power
> of enjoying the divine person can only be according to [*gratia gratum faciens*]. And yet the
> Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself [*gratiae gratum
> facientis*]. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.[237]

Being made partakers of the divine Word and of proceeding Love is the trinification of the human

person—it is what makes us partakers not only of the divine nature, but also of the divine

processions, themselves. The trinitarian indwelling means that the soul participates in God's own

self-presence, as the known in the knower *in the procession of the divine Word* and as the beloved in

lover *in the procession of the divine Love.* Thus, not only do we naturally image the Trinity insofar as in

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[234] Frederick Lawrence, "Grace and Friendship," 795, 805-08. See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1c; Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, VIII and IX.
[235] See Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 695-96.
[236] *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1c.
[237] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 3c.

our minds is found the principle of the word, the word, and love but we also supernaturally image the Trinity because we participate in the divine Word and Love proceeding.[238] That is, our words breaking forth into love—spoken interiorly in our contemplation about God and all of creation in relation to God, in our contemplation of divinely revealed truths—participate in the eternal Word breaking forth into Love that the Father utters by understanding himself. This is the Word in which the entire Trinity and all of creation are spoken.[239] This is the Love in which the entire Trinity and all of creation is loved.[240]

We can now appreciate the connection between the indwelling of the Trinity and the perfection of the *imago Trinitatis*. As Wilkins writes, drawing from the above quote from Question 110 (Ia-IIae): "This participation in trinitarian life is also the perfection of the *imago*, which is dynamically ordered to its realization in the immanent operations of knowing and loving, and specifically in knowing and loving God. *Gratia gratum faciens* is a participation in the divine nature, and faith and love are participations in the processions of Word and Spirit."[241]

This notion of participation in the divine processions, themselves, significantly changes the analogy between our knowledge and love and God's knowledge and love, and so how we understand the perfection of the *imago*, to which we now turn. Keep in mind that we have just considered the human person's *participation* in the divine nature and processions, caused by the gift of the Spirit who comes to dwell within us together with the Father and Son. We now proceed to consider the human person's perfection in *likeness* to the divine nature and processions, which is the effect of the indwelling. In both cases, we can observe progress—progressive participation and

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[238] Cf. Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 72: "The deiform perfection of the rational creature is the knowledge and love (and so the possession and enjoyment of God as object). This is a level of participation in the divine goodness that begins with, but goes far beyond, the participation in being and divine perfection possible to those creatures that bear only a trace of the Trinitarian likeness; *it is the intentional participation of a personal being in the life of the Persons of the Trinity*."

[239] See *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3.

[240] See *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 2c and ad. 3.

[241] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 696. See also Wilkins, "Two Missions," 53. See Ia, q. 93, aa. 4, 7-8; Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 4; q. 112, a. 1.

progressive likeness. The difference between participation and likeness is that the former extends and moves beyond the former. Not only do we imitate the trinitarian processions, but we also participate in the trinitarian processions. That is, the human person not only manifests the Trinity in some way (beyond a mere trace), but she is also invited to creatively and actively participate in the life of the Trinity and the divine missions. To put it dramatically, not only is the human person a still painting "of" the Trinity, but she is also an actor in the play about the Trinity. Furthermore, this participation also makes the image more like the exemplar. We can observe here the active understanding of the *imago* in which a relationship—particularly a relation of participation—exists between image and exemplar.

5. The *Imago Trinitatis* and its Perfection: The *Effect* of the Divine Indwelling

The refinements in Thomas's theory of divine processions correlate with refinements in his conception of the human person as created to the *imago Dei*. We have already seen the move from three faculties corresponding to three persons to two operations corresponding to two processions. This development—precipitated by the focus upon the *acts* of remembering, understanding, and willing—was significant for Thomas's theological anthropology, too, as it helped Thomas gradually come to appreciate the more dynamic aspect of the *imago Dei*. A static understanding of the image emphasizes the relationship of proportionality, "in which the likeness of image to exemplar is seen as the similarity of the relations among the parts of the image to the relations among the parts of the exemplar."[242] A dynamic understanding of the image emphasizes actual imitation of exemplar in which the soul is conformed to God through its activity, and so it focuses upon the relationship between the image and exemplar.[243] In the latter case, the image functions

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[242] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 56-57.
[243] See ibid., 69.

dynamically to lead (*ducere in*) one to the exemplar through actual imitation in which one re-

presents the original (the exemplar).[244]

By the time Thomas is composing the *Summa theologiae* and reconsidering the *imago Dei* in

his mature effort to hand on *sacra doctrina* according to the *ordo disciplinae*, he defines the image

primarily in terms of the two processions of inner word and love, having begun to "realize the

power of this simplest and final form of Augustine's psychological analogy for the Trinity."[245]

Merriell notes that in particular, Articles 5-8 of Question 93 disclose the shift in Thomas's thought

toward this more dynamic account of the *imago Trinitatis* and that these Articles are "saturated"

with lines from *De Trinitate*.[246]

In the *Summa*, Thomas brought these developments (focus on acts and on a dynamic

understanding of the image) to bear on the organization of the text, more closely coordinating

trinitarian theology with theological anthropology, such that both topics draw on the theory of

spiritual processions.

While Thomas never completely separated the anthropological and trinitarian aspects of

the image, he brings them together more synthetically in the *Summa*. Therein, he relates the

doctrine of the image to other theological topics, giving it an important role in his own scientific

and pedagogical organization of the *Summa*.[247] We already observed in Chapter 2 that the theme

of the *imago Dei* is a key concept in the structure of the *Summa*, as Thomas refers to it at key points

throughout the text, including the prologues. With respect to the question on the *imago Dei*

(Question 93, Ia) in the *Summa*, it comes after Thomas has considered the nature of the human

soul and its intellectual capacity (qq. 75-89). This is a new arrangement compared to *De Veritate*.

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[244] See ibid., 57, 70. Merriell cites Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, 3, q. 4, a. 4 sol.: "Servatur etiam ibi actualis imitation ipsius Trinitatis, inquantum scilicet ipsa anima est imago expresse ducens in Deum" (The actual imitation of the Trinity is preserved insofar as the soul itself is an image that leads expressly to God).

[245] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 154.

[246] See ibid., 190, 192. For example, Thomas quotes Augustine, *De trinitate*, 14.4.6 (twice), 14.6.9, 14.7.10 (twice), 14.8.11, 14.12.15, 14.15.20.

[247] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 157-58.

With the Church Fathers, Thomas included the theme of the *imago Dei* as a central component of theological anthropology, but how he organized his anthropological considerations changed. In the prologue to his theological anthropology (qq. 75-102), Thomas expresses how the theologian enriches anthropological scholarship. He writes, "Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man [*homo*], who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin [*productione*]. *Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul…*"[248]

Two things are noteworthy in this passage. One, Thomas's placement of his theological anthropology after his consideration of angels and of corporeal creatures is governed by the *ordo disciplinae* because it is pedagogically expedient to consider exclusively spiritual creatures and exclusively corporeal creatures prior to considering the human person, who is a composite creature. Two, Thomas's consideration of the production of the human person (qq. 90-102),[249] which follows his consideration of human nature (qq. 75-89), occurs in a theocentric context and is included within Thomas's theological anthropology as a central element of anthropology (qq. 75-102). Looking back on the general prologue further confirms that the theologian considers the human person's production insofar as God is her beginning and end, and therefore, in terms of the human person's relationship to God. As Question 93 makes clear, this relationship is primarily in terms of the dynamic image–exemplar relationship.

What is different about Thomas's arrangement in the *Summa* with respect to the *imago Dei* is that previously—for example, in *De veritate*—Thomas had included his discussion of the human *mens* within the question on the *imago Dei*. In the *Summa*, he relocates the discussion of psychology

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[248] *ST* Ia, q. 75, prol.

[249] Within the production of the human person, Thomas includes "the production of man himself (qq. 90-92); the end of this production (q. 93); the state and condition of the first man (qq. 94-101); the place of his abode (q. 102)" (*ST* Ia, q. 90, prol.).

to the questions on the nature of soul (i.e., qq. 75-89, especially q. 79, a. 1).[250] Thomas's separates

psychology and the *imago* because the problems of psychology pertain to the nature of the human

person's soul, whereas the doctrine of the image of God pertains to the human person's

production.[251] In the *Summa* he can therefore treat as separate questions topics that were once

included in the question on the *imago* itself. This separation and relocation is a more systematic

organization, and it allows Thomas to treat the questions about the *imago* more freely and

succinctly. It is pedagogically more expedient, allowing for more concentrated treatment of each

topic and an orderly movement from one element of theological anthropology to another. For

example, of *De veritate* compared to the *Summa*, Merriell writes: "[I]n spite of the theological

character of question 10, the epistemological focus necessarily keeps it from being a proper,

systematic exposition of the image of God itself. It was left to the *Summa theologiae* to set the

treatment of the image in its proper place and to give it a scientific order and completeness."[252]

5.1 The Ontological Status of the *Imago Dei* and its Assimilation to the Trinity: Constants and Developments

Thomas's definition of the *imago* entails some features that remained constant throughout his

thought and others that changed as he developed. Merriell notes two important constants. One,

Thomas always made a connection between the image of God and the intellectual species or

nature of man, which was related to his definition of "image" in terms of the concept "*species*."[253]

In the *Scriptum*, Thomas adopts a definition of image from St. Hilary of Poitier: "every image is

similar in species to that of which it is an image."[254] Earlier in the *Scriptum,* Thomas had offered an

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[250] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 202, 217.

[251] Merriell explains this relocation in terms of formal and final causality. The soul as soul is the formal cause of the human person's being, while the soul as the *imago* is the final cause of the human person's creation. See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 182, 188-89.

[252] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 238.

[253] Ibid., 238-39.

[254] See St. Hilary of Poitier, *De synodis*, trans. E.W. Watson and L. Pullan. From *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series*, Vol. 9. Eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing

initial definition of image that differentiated it from vestige simply by degrees. Now, at this later point in the *Scriptum,* he defines the image as follows: "Now that in respect of which there is imitation is some quality, or form signified by way of quality. Hence, likeness (*similitudo*) belongs to the notion of image. This is not sufficient, however, for it is necessary that there be some approach to equality (*adaequatio*) in that quality, whether according to equality or according to proportion…"[255]

In this later definition adopted from Hilary, we find a more scientific definition, as Thomas now defines image in terms of the relation of imitation by which the image imitates the exemplar.[256] This relation has its ground in the species, which is similar in both image and exemplar, and for the image to approach equality, it must do so with respect to this species. Further, in this definition, Thomas affirms that the image is truly related to its exemplar, thereby confirming the ontological status of the image.[257] Thomas's teaching on this point remains constant henceforth – the image of God in the human person is on account of her intellectual nature, which is the express sign of the divine nature.[258]

Two, Thomas consistently affirmed that the image of God is permanent in the human person. This permanence is affirmed in two ways. First, the image is not lost due to sin. The reason is that the image is in the human person's *nature*; the image does not depend on grace. Second, the image remains even when the image is not actively imitating the exemplar. Thomas distinguishes between habitual and actual knowledge and love, both of oneself and of God. With

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Company,1899.), I.13. See also Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.* D. 28, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 1; Merriell, *To The Image of the Trinity*, 44.

[255] *In I Sent.*, d. 28, q. 2, a. 1 sol. ("Illud autem respect cujus est imitation, est aliqua qualitas, vel forma per modum qualitatis significata. Unde de ratione imagines est similitude. Nect hoc sufficit, sed oportet quod sit aliqua adaequatio in illa qualitate vel secundum qualitatem vel secundum proportionem"). The translation is Merriell's. See *To the Image of the Trinity*, 46.

[256] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 45.

[257] Ibid., 49.

[258] See ibid., 51.

Augustine, he affirms that the soul always *habitually* knows and loves itself.[259] These habitual operations suffice for the permanence of the image.

There are also noteworthy differences in Thomas's treatment of the image. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, following Lombard, Thomas identifies a set of characteristics according to which the psychological image in the human person represents the Trinity.[260] Thomas proposes five such characteristics: distinction, consubstantiality, equality, order, and actual imitation, noting that the last three are related directly to their objects and so vary in relation to different objects.[261] As there are three distinct Persons ordered to one another by way of origin, who are yet consubstantial and equal, so must the image exhibit similar characteristics. Focus on these four characteristics lent itself to a static understanding of the image, suggesting that the image proportionately represents the Trinity—the parts and their arrangement are similar in both image and exemplar. This is a mirror-like representation, in other words.[262] The fifth characteristic, actual imitation, brings a more dynamic aspect to the image. Actual imitation occurs in the act of re-presenting the original.

In *De veritate*, Thomas no longer speaks in terms of the five characteristics of the image. Instead, he prefers to speak in terms of two kinds of likeness between the image and exemplar, either likeness according to analogy or likeness according to conformation. In this way, Thomas begins to focus on the perfection of the image, in addition to its ontological status (that is, the fact that the human person really is the image of God). As Merriell explains, where the *Scriptum* was concerned with the permanence of the image, *De veritate* was concerned with the assimilation to God necessary for the actualization of the image.[263] The Augustinian theme of *ascent* to knowledge and love of God begins to take hold of Thomas, revealing the effect his new understanding of *De*

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[259] See, for example, *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 7 ad 4. Therein, Thomas refers to Augustine, *De trinitate,* 15.6.
[260] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 55-57.
[261] *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 4 sol.
[262] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 55-69.
[263] See ibid., 132-33.

Trinitate has on his thought. The human mind's objects determine the conditions of the image's perfection and ascent. With Augustine, Thomas understands there is a hierarchy among the objects we can understand and love. In Article 7, Question 10 of *De veritate*, Thomas identifies three classes of such objects, namely, God, oneself, and temporal things.[264]

Next, Thomas introduces the distinction between likeness of analogy (*secundum* or *per analogiam*) and likeness of conformation (*secundum conformationem* or *per conformationem*). Only when the mind is knowing and loving either God or itself is there an expressed likeness of the Trinity. Likeness according to analogy refers to the proportionality by which the structure of the image mirrors to some degree the relations within the divine Trinity. Here, the mind has itself as its object, such that like the Trinity, the mind and its object are consubstantial. As Merriell comments, it is the common features and the relations among them that is significant in this kind of likeness, not any kind of causal relationship between the image and exemplar.[265] This likeness accentuates a parallel rather than communion between image and exemplar.

Likeness according to conformation, by contrast, refers to the process by which the mind becomes more like its object. The mind is informed by the knowledge of its object. Here, the mind has God as its object, such that it becomes more like God. As Merriell observes, conformation "introduces to our consideration the special operational relationship by which the exemplar acts on its image to assimilate it to itself."[266] In *De veritate*, Thomas argues that the likeness according to conformation is greater than that according to analogy. However, these two likenesses are related. He writes:

> Therefore, properly speaking, the image of the Trinity is in the mind primarily and mainly, in so far as the mind knows God, and it is there in a certain manner and secondarily, in so far as the mind knows itself, especially when it considers itself in so far

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[264] See *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 7c.
[265] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 138.
[266] ibid.

as it is the image of God. As a result, its consideration does not stop with itself, but goes on to God.[267]

In the *Summa*, Thomas continues his preference for speaking in terms of the assimilation of the image to the Trinity rather than in terms of the image's characteristics. However, he makes a significant development with respect to his consideration of assimilation. Let us now proceed to Question 93 of the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa* to examine its structure and meaning.

5.2 Question 93: The End or Term of the Human Person's Production

We now turn to Question 93, having prepared for it through examining Thomas's consideration of the divine missions and the indwelling of the Trinity. Again, in turning to Question 93, we are investigating Thomas's explanation of the wayfarer's journey from the perspective of the *effect* produced. That is, we are considering the image's assimilation – its increasing likeness – to the exemplar. Thus, I will return to the aforementioned distinction between the assimilation of the *imago* according to analogy and according to confirmation. I build upon Merriell's work to argue that in the *Summa* Thomas brings together these two assimilations, and that the key to their integration is Thomas's mature understanding of spiritual processions and their connection to the participation of the human person in the divine processions of Word and Love. This notion of participation is the centerpiece of sanctification as trinification.

Let us begin with an overview of Question 93 and its structure. Articles 1-3 examine the likeness to God found in humans, irrational creatures, and angels, respectively. More specifically, article 1 demonstrates the existence of the image. Articles 2 and 3 clarify the nature of the image (by comparing the image in the human person with other creatures). Article 4 considers the progressive perfection of the image by the increasing likeness to God according to the immanent activities of the essence, that is, the divine operations of knowing and loving. Further, this article focuses on the *object* of these acts. These first four articles consider the image insofar as it reflects

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[267] *De ver.*, q. 10, a. 7c.

the divine *essence*. Article 4 also serves as an introduction to Articles 5-8, which examine the image of the *Trinity*. Therein, Articles 5-7 establish *that* the image exists as trinitarian and consider *how* it exists. Article 8 examines the degrees of perfection of the image of the Trinity, which, as explained in Article 4, depend on the extent to which God is the object of one's knowing and loving.[268] Article 9 considers the distinction between image and likeness, in which likeness is the expression and perfection of the image.[269] Notice that the notion of perfection is the culmination of Thomas's consideration of the *imago*. Therein, Thomas draws on the same text from John of Damascus (*De Fide Orth.* ii, 12) with which he opens the *Secunda Pars*, which itself can be understood in part as a prolongation of the consideration of the perfection of the *imago Trinitatis*.[270] Merriell rightly observes that the arrangement of Question 93 roughly follows the traditional division of a subject under investigation: *an sit?* (a. 1), *quid sit?* (aa. 2-8), and *quomodo?* (a. 9).[271]

As other scholars have noted, the development of this question basically follows the development of Thomas's entire treatment of God, in which he first considers the unity of the divine essence and then the Trinity of Persons.[272] The following table illustrates these parallels:

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[268] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 83.
[269] This understanding of likeness is a development from the *Scriptum*, as Spezzano notes. See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 97.
[270] See ibid.
[271] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 171.
[272] See ibid.

Question 93: The *Imago*		Questions 2-43: God *in se*	
Articles 1-4: the image as it reflects the *essence* of God		**Questions 2-26**: the divine essence	
	Article 1: the *existence* of the image		**Question 2**: the *existence* of God
	Articles 2-3: the nature of the image		**Questions 3-13**: the nature of God
	Article 4: the operations of the image		**Questions 14-26**: the divine operations[273]
Articles 5-9: the image as it reflects the *Trinity of Divine Persons*		**Questions 27-43**: the Trinity of Divine Persons	
	Articles 5-8: the image as it reflects the intratrinitarian life		**Questions 27-42**: the intratrinitarian life
	Article 9: the perfection of the image according to the likeness of virtue that belongs to the higher levels of the image in grace and glory. Focuses on activities of knowing and loving God in grace and glory		**Question 43**: the divine missions – the Persons in relation to us, including their indwelling according to which God is present in the human person as the known and beloved in the knower and lover, respectively

Table 16

Notice three things. One, I suggest that Article 9 treats the assimilation of the image to the Trinity according to the likeness of virtue, which belongs (as we will see below) to the higher levels of the image in grace and glory. Question 43 involves a similar consideration, except it does so in terms of the indwelling accomplished by the divine missions and the special mode of presence of God to the human person this indwelling bestows. Two, as Questions 14-20 are essential to the trinitarian questions, preparing the student for what is to come, so is Article 4 pivotal to Question 93 and its argument that the human person is not only created to the *imago Dei* but also to the *imago Trinitatis* and further, that the image can be progressively assimilated to the Trinity. Three, just as there is a progressive movement from Question 2 to Question 43, as the student journeys further into the "deep things of God" along a well-devised path, there is also a progressive movement *within* Question 93. Specifically, both movements pertain to a progressive development of knowledge and love of God. Questions 2-43 consider God's own self-understanding and self-love, first in

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[273] Merriell makes an interesting point. While technically it is the *immanent* operations of knowing and loving (and not the transitive operation of power) by which the human person imitates the divine nature, Thomas does, in Article 4, refer to the image of glory, which is proper to beatitude. In fact, the image of glory (and so the state of beatitude) is the culmination of the article. As Merriell writes, Thomas "thus completes the parallel between article 4 and the section of the *Summa* on the divine operations, which concludes with a short question on God's beatitude" (Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 190).

terms of the divine nature and then notionally in terms of the divine Persons. Question 93 is a

reflection upon the image's self-knowledge and self-love, and more importantly, on the image's

knowledge and love of God – and specifically, of the image's processions of word and love. Within

this question, the progressive movement is in terms of the image's increasing assimilation to the

divine trinitarian exemplar.[274] In this light, Question 93 can be understood as an explanation of

the graced journey that will actually unfold—and has already begun—throughout the remainder

of the *Summa*, as the student grows in understanding and love of the triune God (including divine

providence and the divine economy), learning to speak words about God and all of creation in

relation to God that break forth into love.[275]

Now we turn to Question 93 in greater detail. Having already treated the meaning of

"image" in Question 35 on Image as a personal name belonging to the Son, Thomas sets out in

the initial article of Question 93 to demonstrate that this concept is also meaningfully applied to

the human person. He emphasizes the *relation* of exemplarity between God and human persons,

insisting that it is origin, not equality, that is required for every image. Insofar as the human

person is the image of God, she proceeds from God as from an exemplar cause. Further, in

reflecting on Genesis 1:26,[276] Thomas draws the reader's attention to the fact that Genesis says

the human person, unlike the divine Son, is created "*to* the image of God" (*ad imaginem Dei*).[277] By

contrast, the language used in Genesis indicates that the human person is an imperfect image.

Additionally, "the preposition 'to' signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance."[278]

Earlier in Question 35, Thomas argued the same point, explaining that this language signifies "a

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[274] Cf. Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 84.

[275] In a further connection between Question 93 and Questions 2-43, the former builds upon Question 12, which also considered the perfection of the rational creature, but did so prior to the enriching context of the *imago*.

[276] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 1 sc.

[277] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 1 ad 2; q. 35, a 2 ad 3.

[278] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 1c and ad 2.

certain movement of tendency to perfection."[279] Thus, we can observe in the human image both

separation from and dynamism toward union with the exemplar. Article 1 anticipates the

progressive perfection of the *imago Dei*. Lastly, Thomas reaffirms the definition he draws from

Hilary in which the image is defined in terms of likeness in species. Humans are said to share a

species with God "according to a certain analogy or proportion."[280]

In Article 2, Thomas specifies that the human person shares a likeness in species with

God according to her intellectual nature, by which she knows or understands. Thus, the ground

of likeness between the human person and God is the former's mind, that is, the soul as

intellectual. [281] Spezzano connects this with the exemplar causality of Article 1, and rightly does so

in terms of participation: "God causes an analogical likeness to himself in the image by granting

to it a participation in his own highest perfection, an intellectual nature."[282] Article 3 compares

the image in the human person to the image in angelic persons, arguing that absolutely speaking,

angelic persons are more to the image of God than human persons.

Article 4 begins Thomas's consideration of the perfection of the image according to its

imitation of the immanent divine operations by which God knows and loves Godself. He is

considering the operations of the human person's intellectual nature, which are like God's own

operations. According to these immanent operations, we can observe the image in the human

person in three ways:

> First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God;
> and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men.

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[279] *ST* Ia, q. 35, a. 2 ad 3.

[280] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 1 ad 3.

[281] Recall that it is the theologian's province, according to Thomas, to consider the human person's soul, both as the formal cause of the human person (and so the soul as soul, which Thomas treats in his psychological questions, 75-89) and as the final cause of her creation (and so the soul as *imago*, which Thomas treats in the context of the production of the human person, qq. 90-102). In these later questions, and specifically in Question 93, Thomas is studying the soul in relation to God, its origin and destination. See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 182, 188-89. See also *ST* Ia, q. 75, prol.

[282] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 76. Notice that Thomas has made the same point earlier in Question 12, but here he does so in the context of affirming the human person as the *image* of God.

Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.[283]

Notice that in each of these three instances, the object of the acts is God. We will return to this when considering trinification. Further, Article 4 represents a significant development in Thomas's thought. It does not have a parallel in the *Scriptum*, and Merriell suggests that its argument is a synthesis of elements from at least two earlier works, *De veritate*, q. 10 and *De potentia*, q. 9.[284] This is the first time Thomas associated the levels of the image with the three states of the human person.[285] In *De potentia*, for example, he spoke of three likenesses, instead: the vestige, the image of creation, and image of re-creation.[286] Lastly, this article is still within the context of the *imago Dei*, not the *imago Trinitatis*. Yet at the same time, in considering these immanent acts of the human person's intellectual nature (and therefore harkening back to questions 75-89), he sets the stage for the next three articles. These latter articles consider the *imago Trinitatis* in terms of the processions of word and love.

By the end of Article 4, we can see that the rational creatures' likeness to God is truly deification. Their likeness to God is because of their intellectual nature, and so their perfection consists in reaching a likeness to God according to God's self-understanding and self-loving. Thus, as Spezzano writes, "This kind of likeness to God sets rational creatures above everything else in creation. It is truly deification, for God's self-understanding and loving are God's primary activities, identical with the divine essence and existence: God, in his one essence, is his own act of

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[283] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 4.

[284] For the differences between these earlier texts and this article of the *Summa,* see Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 184-85. For example, where *De veritate* compares imperfect and perfect levels of imitation, the *Summa* compares imperfect and perfect acts (i.e., natural acts, which fall short of understanding and loving God *in se* and supernatural acts, which can operate habitually and actually in this life, though imperfectly, and actually and perfection in the next life).

[285] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 186.

[286] See *De pot.*, q. 9, a. 9c.

self-understanding and loving."[287] Furthermore, Question 93 is on the end or term of the human person's production, and this "*finis productionis*" refers, as Merriell argues, to the image as form of the human being (which is her final cause) rather than the end of beatitude. However, as Spezzano remarks, this Article demonstrates that "the production of 'the form of man as the terminus of God's communication of his likeness' *not only includes the bestowal of the form of the rational nature but also extends to the bestowal of the new forms or perfection dispositions (i.e., habitus) of grace and glory.*"[288] These new forms and dispositions enable the image to be the principle of new and higher activities of knowing and loving God. Thus, while Question 93 refers to the "end" in terms of form and not beatitude, it nevertheless considers both the natural and supernatural forms of the *imago*. In this way, we can understand the prologue to Question 93 to include not only the creation of the image but also its perfection with respect to its nature because the recreated, elevated image is the end (*finis*) of a new divine work (*operis*).[289] Both considerations are important because Thomas proceeds from there to consider the unique role of the human person within divine providence and the divine economy, respectively.

Article 5 establishes that the image of God exists in the human person both with regard to the unity of the divine nature and to the Trinity of Persons, and that in fact, one follows from the other given that in God, the divine nature and the divine Persons are inseparable (though this does not mean that we can *prove* the Trinity on account of the image in the human person also being of the Trinity).[290] In this article, Thomas also draws upon the trinitarian questions wherein he argues that the divine Persons are distinguished by relations of origin, which themselves arise from the processions. Thus, Thomas is arguing that the primary way in which the human person

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[287] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 41 (emphasis added).

[288] Ibid., 80 (emphasis added).

[289] See ibid., 80.

[290] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 5 ad 3: "This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (*De Trin.* xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: 'We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity.'"

represents the Trinity must be found in the reflection of divine processions that occurs within the human *mens*.[291] Articles 6-7 consider how the image exists as Trinitarian, namely, in the mind and especially in its acts. Article 6 argues that the image exists only in the human person's mind. It is in this Article that we find one of Thomas's most succinct renditions of the psychological analogy, as well as his connection between the analogy and the image:

> [A]s the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by procession of the Word from the Speaker and of Love from both of these, as we have seen; so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect and a procession of love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find *the principle of the word, and the word and love* [*principium verbi, et verbum, et amor*].[292]

This is Thomas's own triad – the principle of the word, the word, and love.

Article 7 focuses on the *acts* of the soul, according to which there are these immanent processions according to which the human person is the image of the Trinity. Merriell suggests that "this article reveals Thomas's profound understanding of the movement of Augustine's search in the *De Trinitate*."[293] The reason for his suggestion is clear if we turn to Thomas's *respondeo*. Herein, Thomas succinctly expresses Augustine's final instance of the psychological analogy and its true meaning:

> If the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting both. But *in our soul the word 'cannot exist without actual thinking,'* as Augustine says (*De trin.*, 14.7). *Therefore, first and chiefly the image of the Trinity is to be found in the mind according to its acts, that is, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an inner word; and thence break forth* [prorumpimus] *into love*.[294]

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[291] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 200.
[292] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 6c.
[293] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 210.
[294] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 7c.

Thus, because we cannot form a word and break forth into love without actual thought, the image of the Trinity in us is according to the mind's activities, just as Augustine taught. Merriell makes an astute observation regarding this point:

> In the *Summa*, however, the image of the Trinity is not found *in* the acts of the mind, but *according to* these acts. In the *De veritate* it is the acts of thinking and willing that best represent the second and third Persons, whereas here it is the terms that proceed in these acts, the inner word and love, that come closest to representing the Persons adequately. For this highest representation the acts are necessary, because without the acts the two terms would not proceed.[295]

If we compare Articles 4 and 7, we can notice that Article 4 treats the human acts of knowing and loving according to which the human person imitates the same *essential* acts in God.[296] Article 7 treats these acts in their specific aspects of grounding a word (understanding as speaking) and dependence on the word and understanding (the act of love as proceeding), respectively. In this way, Article 7 treats these acts insofar as they represent the *notional* acts of knowing and loving in God. Thus, where Article 4 emphasizes nature, Article 7 emphasizes processions.

Before proceeding to Articles 8 and 9 in order to consider trinification—the effect of the indwelling in the *imago*—it will be helpful to note a few new features of Thomas's treatment of the *imago Trinitatis* that emerged during this question. First, the word "*processio*" is the central term of Articles 5-8, as the two processions of word and love assume center stage. Thomas's own triad is the one we observed in Article 6, namely, the principle of the word, the word, and love. His triad is inherently expressive of the active condition of the mind required for the image to exist in the fullest sense of the term because it includes the concept of procession within it.

Second, Thomas explains the image of the Trinity in terms of "a certain representation of the species" in Articles 6 and 7 (and in Articles 8 and 9, as we will see). We have already seen that the human person is the image of God at a distance; she is not equal with the exemplar. Thus, she

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[295] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 213 (emphasis original).
[296] See ibid., 214-17.

does not share the same species with God perfectly. However, she does participate in God, which

establishes a relationship of proportion (i.e., an analogical relationship). As Spezzano remarks, "In

q13, on analogy, Thomas describes God as a kind of universal analogical agent, producing his

own likeness in all creatures so that names apply to them according to their relationship of

proportion to God."[297] The human person is appropriately named "rational creature" and

"image" because of her particular relationship of proportion to God, namely, her proportioning

to know and love God (*capax Dei*). "Representation by species" is a special proportioning to God,

which is related to the rational creature's special participation in the divine intellect. Through

grace and glory, according to which the human person participates more perfectly in the divine

intellect, this special proportioning enables her to know and love God more deeply and explicitly.

Spezzano explains further what "representation of species" means:

> God's knowledge of his own essence as participable in a certain way, 'according to some
> degree of likeness,' constitutes the proper species of each creature [*ST* Ia, q. 14, a. 8; q.
> 15, a. 3]. If *rational* creatures participate in the divine essence 'according to the
> representation of species,' it means that God causally knows them as being capable of
> some degree of participation in his own self-knowledge and love – in the activities of the
> divine intellect and will that have God as their object and the divine essence itself as
> intelligible species.[298]

The fact that "representation by species" involves proportioning means that the assimilation

according to analogy (or proportion) is at least implicit in Question 93. This feature is important

because it helps to bring together the two ways the human person can be assimilated to the

Trinity – according to analogy and to conformation – which we now consider.

5.3 Question 93 and Trinification: The *Effect* of the Indwelling of the Trinity

We have seen that in *De veritate*, Thomas distinguished between two kinds of assimilation of the

image to the exemplar, assimilation according to analogy and to conformation. Again, the former

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[297] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 86.
[298] Ibid., 88 (internal citations included, emphasis original). These conditions are not perfectly fulfilled until
the beatific vision when the divine essence as intelligible form is directly united to the creature's intellect.

refers to the proportionality by which the structure of the image mirrors to some degree the relations within the divine Trinity. Assimilation according to conformation refers to the process by which the mind becomes more like its object. In other words, it is the difference between proportion and union, respectively. At times, there is a tension in Thomas's work concerning which of these assimilations is better. In the *Summa*, he transcends the need to decide between them because, as Merriell argues, "he refuses to consider the two likenesses as independent."[299] Rather, the image of the Trinity involves elements of both analogy and conformation. Furthermore, Thomas no longer uses this language of assimilation according to analogy or conformation to express the assimilation of the image to the exemplar. Instead, he ignores in a way his earlier distinction and focuses upon the presence of both likenesses occurring through the image's progressive assimilation. It is Thomas's selection of the "representation of the species" as the sole criterion for the image that allows him to simplify his teaching and unite these aspects of assimilation.[300] The key to the image's representation of the species of the exemplar pertains to the object of the image's acts. In order to understand Thomas's mature position on the assimilation of the image, and its connection to the indwelling, I will consider Articles 8 and 9, focusing on these two elements, namely, the representation of species and the object.

Let me begin with Article 9, which considers the difference between image and likeness (*similitudo*), because the theme of likeness—of assimilation—is the centerpiece of what follows. At first glance, this article may seem routine, as though Thomas is simply considering a traditional question. However, as Spezzano observes, "on closer examination, his treatment shows evidence of his mature reflection on the progressive perfection of the image, specifically in terms of its activity."[301] He explains that likeness can be "a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image…and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as

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[299] Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 221.
[300] See ibid., 241.
[301] Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 95.

it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect."[302] Likeness, therefore, includes the concept of the image's *perfection*, and it is with the concept of perfection that Thomas concludes his consideration of the human person's creation to the image. He continues:

> Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. …*But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image.* In this sense Damascene says (*De Fide Orth.* ii, 12) that the image implies 'an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man.' In the same sense 'likeness' is said to belong to 'the love of virtue': for there is no virtue without love of virtue.[303]

Here, Thomas connects likeness to habit and virtue, which will be considered concretely in the *Secunda Secundae pars*, under the conformity of grace established by sanctifying grace and the theological virtues.[304] Furthermore, recall that Thomas identified a threefold image in the human person: that according to nature, grace, and glory. It is found in everyone according to the first, in the just according to the second, and in the blessed according to the third. The division of the image into image and likeness helps Thomas express the difference among the threefold image. The image is in everyone according to nature whereas the likeness is the expression and perfection of the image in grace and glory.[305] While some virtues naturally exist in the soul, the likeness that is the love of virtue signifies perfection, which belongs to the higher levels of the image in grace and glory.[306]

In Question 43, Thomas argued that the Son and Spirit are invisibly sent to people by grace, and insofar as they are sent, "there is a likening of soul to the divine person Who is sent, by

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[302] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 9c.
[303] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 9c.
[304] See Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 113.
[305] See ibid.
[306] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 97.

some gift of grace."[307] The soul is likened to the Son by the gift of wisdom, and to the Spirit by the gift of charity. Here, wisdom is one of the gifts of the Spirit that accompanies charity, and which is appropriated to the Son. With respect to the gift of wisdom likened to the Son, Thomas quotes Augustine, writing, "Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): '*The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.*' Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [*sapientia*], as it were a sweet knowledge [*sapida scientia*]…"[308] Notice that Thomas is here considering the likeness that is the expression and perfection of image, and that this assimilation is the consequence of the missions—of divine self-gift. In the next article, Thomas considers increase in virtue, quoting the same passage from Augustine and therefore bringing to mind the assimilation of the soul to the Son according to wisdom:

> The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin.* iv, 20), that 'the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him.' Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace…[309]

As an example of a new act, Thomas includes the undertaking of "any arduous work," which we can surmise includes both the corporeal and spiritual works of mercy, and therefore teaching and the contemplative study necessary to it. In this way, the love of virtue according to which the image is assimilated to the Trinity includes the love of wisdom and charity proper to *sacra doctrina*. With this distinction between image and likeness, as well as the link between the latter and the invisible missions, let us proceed.

In Article 4, we observed that at each level of the image, it was insofar as the human person had God in some way as the object of her knowing and loving that she, in her intellectual nature, was said to chiefly imitate God. Similarly, in Article 8 (when Thomas has shifted to

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[307] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2.
[308] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2 (emphasis added).
[309] *ST* Ia, q. 43, a. 6 ad 2.

considering the *imago Trinitatis*), he restricts—more strongly than in *De veritate*—the range of object that suffice to establish the image of the Trinity. The object must be God, or the mind *as* the image of God as long as this self-contemplation leads to the contemplation of God, which Augustine also taught. As Thomas writes:

> As above explained image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated, are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. *But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God.*[310]

Recall the previous section in which we saw that God knows the rational creature as capable of knowing and loving him. In this article, Thomas goes further, moving beyond the acts of knowing and loving to the processions of word and love. He maintains that the mind represents the species of the Divine Persons when it utters a word about God that breaks forth into love. Notice that to truly represent the species, the word breaking forth into love must be about God; it is not enough simply to utter loving words about anything whatsoever. More specifically, God knows the rational creature as capable of speaking words about him that break forth into love—as truly capable of representing the way God knows and loves Godself, i.e., according to the procession of word and love.[311] Just as in the divine conversation, it is God *in se* (the divine Good) that is the object specifying the divine notional acts by which the Word and Love proceed, so, too, in our participation in the divine conversation brought about by the divine indwelling, our loving words are about God. The mind represents the species of the Divine species when it, like God, has God as its object and when it, like God, utters loving words about this divine object.

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[310] *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 8c.
[311] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 88.

We can put the foregoing about objects in terms of self-presence. The quality of our self-presence changes with the kind of operations we are performing, and these operations typically have different objects. Thus, when I am considering something like a stone (or better, a circle) or a horse, I am likely present to be myself on the levels of understanding and of judgment of fact. The words I conceive about them are not words that break forth into love (unless perhaps it is my own horse and I have a relationship with it, in which case, I may become present to myself on the level of value). When I am considering divine things, the quality of my self-presence is at its peak. I am uttering words about God that break forth into love, as I consider the value of who God is and of what God has done for me. Here, my self-presence is most like God's—I am considering the same object (God, the divine Good), and am also present to myself at the level at which my mind and heart are most closely one, namely, the level of existential self-constitution. More specifically, I am considering God's own constitution—how God, *in se,* is eternally constituted as Triune; the value of this divine self-constitution.[312] God's self-constitution is conversational—it is a conversation about the Good, about the value of the infinite act of Understanding Love. In God, mind and heart are perfectly one—the infinite act of understanding is the infinite act of love (essential acts), and the uttered word eternally breaks forth into love (notional acts).[313] Furthermore, such self-presence is the presence to oneself *as* the *imago Dei.* That is, it involves affirming and loving oneself as the *imago*—as taking a stand about what it means to be human, and what it means that humans participate in the divine life and conversation.[314] In the very same process by which one become

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[312] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 176-79. Analogous to our existential self-constitution and the autonomous processions of word and love that occur in that realm, "the divine Word is a judgment of value resting on *agape*, Loving Intelligence in act…Divine Proceeding Love, the Holy Spirit, is spirated from such a dual origin: from Loving Grasp and the divine 'Yes, this is very good!' as the two acknowledge each other's lovableness and breathe the Spirit of Love that unites them" (Doran, "Lonergan on Imitating the Divine Relations," 210).

[313] Again, the Word and Proceeding Love are really and eternally distinct, but they are also really related because the act of proceeding love depends on the proceeding Word. The Holy Spirit is the infinite act of love *as* dependent on Word and Speaking. I will expand upon the theme of conversation in Chapter 6.

[314] See Lawrence, "Christian Anthropology."

more like God, one also becomes more human, such that one can more "truly *image* God in the world."[315]

It is this focus on God as the object of our acts of knowing and loving, thereby specifying our processions of word and love, that is the key to Thomas's integration of the assimilation according to both analogy and conformation. When God is the object of our acts, our word breaking forth into love is like God's Word breaking forth into love. Further, our words breaking forth into love participate in the divine Word breaking forth into Love on account of the gift of the Holy Spirit, as Thomas argued in Question 38. At the same time, our participated words breaking forth into love further assimilate us to the very Trinity we are contemplating lovingly.

The mind is conformed to the Trinity because it has the Trinity as its object. We become like and are drawn toward that which we know and love. The triune God assimilates the mind to Himself by His objective presence as the known and beloved through the divine indwelling. Yet Thomas also sees the analogical aspect in this assimilation because there is an analogy between the procession of the Word in God and the procession of the inner word in us conceived from the knowledge about God, precisely because they are specified by the same object.[316] The proportion is now between the divine Word and Love proceeding and our graced word and love proceeding.[317] The principle of this analogical assimilation is our participation of God's knowledge and love.[318] Notice that conformity has to do with the objective presence of God in the

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[315] See Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism*, 69.

[316] See Merriell, "Trinitarian Anthropology," 133.

[317] See Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Hope:* "But the Trinity is not only the exemplary cause of the human mind, just as the mind is not simply a distant reflection of its exemplar. The likeness goes deeper than structural similarity. *Grace causes a real conformity of the image to exemplar. How? It perfects the mind's operations of knowing and loving through the missions of the Word and Spirit respectively.* These temporal extensions of the eternal processions gather the human person into the divine life of the Trinity (Rom. 8:14-17). Specifically, human understanding comes to share in the wisdom of the Word. 'Putting on the mind of Christ,' the person comes to see the world less through the distorted lens of sin, and more as a gift given by God. Similarly, the human heart has God's love poured into it through the Spirit (Rom. 5:5). These two missions, of Word ad Spirit, are coordinate, as the Spirit of adoption (Rom. 8:15), is 'marking upon us a likeness' to Christ. (68, emphasis added. Internal citations omitted).

[318] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 221.

soul (God as object), and analogy has to do with the acts of proceeding word and love

(participation of our processions in the divine processions). Yet, it is this very word breaking forth

into love in us that also conforms us to the Trinity because this word and its love proceed on

account of contemplating God, according to which God is objectively present in the soul as the

known and beloved.

As Wilkins observes, in the *Summa,* Thomas has come to understand that "the decisive

issue was to bring together the analogical relationship of word and love in the mind to the

procession of Word and Spirit in God, with the conformation of the mind to God in its operations

of knowing and loving."[319] He does so by showing that a proportionality holds between the divine

processions and the processions in the human mind, such that there is a representation of the

species (because the divine and human processions are both specified by the same object, God).

However, as Merriell underscores, this representation species also includes an element of

conformation because "at its highest level God acts directly on the mind as the object specifying

its act of understanding and love, perfecting the proportionality between the mind and the Trinity

by conforming the acts of the mind to the inner activity of the divine Trinity."[320] In other words,

not only can you and I focus our conscious acts on God, but God can also act directly on our

minds, which occurs, for example, through the divine indwelling consequent upon the gift of the

Spirit. This same divine indwelling by which God is objectively present in us as the known and

beloved is also the cause of our active participation in the divine processions. With respect to the

latter, the human mind participates in the procession of the eternal Word such that the Word of

God can be said to proceed in the human mind through the assimilation made possible by the

objective presence of God as the known to the human mind.[321] Similarly, the human mind

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[319] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 25. See also Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 239-41.
[320] See Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 241.
[321] See *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1. See also Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity*, 240-41.

participates in the procession of eternal Love such that Proceeding Love can be said to proceed in the human mind through the assimilation made possible by the objective presence of God as the beloved to the human mind.

This notion of participation in the divine processions significantly changes the analogy between our knowledge and love, on the one hand, and God's knowledge and love, on the other. The analogy is no longer according to consubstantiality, but rather, according to the acts themselves. [322] Therefore, in the *Summa*, the highest analogy is the analogy of acts, not consubstantiality. That is, our graced acts of knowing and loving are proportioned to the divine acts. This proportionality is made possible by our gifted participation in the divine nature and processions: "The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly."[323]

The highest analogy of proportion is not when the mind knows and loves *itself* as God knows and loves *himself*, but when the mind knows and loves God as God knows and loves Godself —that is, insofar as the mind imitates God's knowing and loving by having a proceeding word and proceeding love that are proportionate to God's Word and Love. But it is precisely insofar as these acts are specified by the same object (God) that assimilation according to analogy exists (because recall, Thomas has now connected proportionality to the representation of species). That is, for our spiritual processions to be proportionate to the divine processions, they must likewise have the same object. This means that the relevant proportion (between our processions and God's) is interwoven with conformation. When my proceeding word and love imitate God's because I am contemplating God, there is both a proportion between our words and proceeding

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[322] Consubstantiality occurs when the mind has itself as its object, such that the oneness and equality of the three divine Persons is approximated See above, §5.1 The Ontological Status of the *Imago Dei* and its Assimilation to the Trinity: Constants and Developments.
[323] *ST* Ia, q. 83, a. 1.

loves, as well as a conformation of me to God. I speak loving words proportionate to God's, and insofar as I do, God becomes even more deeply present in me as the known and beloved (which is to say, I am more deeply conformed to God). There is somewhat of a circle with respect to conformation here. Through the divine indwelling, the Trinity becomes present in us as the known and the beloved. It is this very presence that allows us to utter loving words about the Trinity, which in turn deepens the divine presence as known and beloved within us. Nevertheless, notice that now the conformation includes not only conformation to the object, but also to the acts, which for us remain distinct (my acts of knowing and loving God are distinct from God, even while they draw me closer to God). In short, through *gratia gratum faciens*, we come to know and love (acts) God (object) as God knows and loves himself, truly and rightly in freedom, which includes thinking rightly about creation and redemption. This is our perfection in salvation. This is our trinification.

CHAPTER 6
CONTEMPLATA ALIIS TRADERE: THE TRINITY, FRIENDSHIP, AND CONVERSATION

1. Analepsis and Prolepsis

IN CHAPTER 5, I EXPLORED the psychological analogy, the *imago Trinitatis*, and the assimilation of the human image to the divine exemplar. Therein, I emphasized the fact that in Thomas's mature trinitarian theology, we find that the very same operations and their terms provide the analogy for the conception of the divine processions as well as the explanation for the mode of divine indwelling in the human person. The immanent operations of knowing and loving have the processions of word and love as their immanent terms. As Wilkins explains, these immanent terms "constitute an intersubjective field: *intellectum in intelligente* in the procession of the Word and *amatum in amante* in the procession of the Spirit."[1] Insofar as the known is in the knower, the known is an inner word.[2] Insofar as the beloved is in the lover, the beloved is proceeding love.[3] Through the divine missions, which communicate a share in the divine life, the human person is brought to imitate and participate in the divine intersubjective field. This means that through graced operations of knowing and loving, God becomes present to the human person as the known in the knower and as the beloved in the lover. Furthermore, on account of the divine indwelling, the triune God is also present to the human person according to the divine processions constituting this intersubjective field.[4] In other words, the human person participates in the divine processions of Word and Love, themselves—the immanent terms of God's self-knowledge and self-love that constitute the divine intersubjective field.

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[1] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 697. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Comp. theol.*, c. 46.
[2] See *Comp. theol.*, c. 37.
[3] See *Comp. theol.*, c. 45.
[4] *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1c.

In this chapter and the conclusion that follows, I will continue to explore this divine intersubjective field and the human person's participation in it. Specifically, I will do so in the context of friendship (an intersubjective field) and one of its primary activities, conversation.[5] In turning to friendship, it will become clearer that 'knowing God' does not mean solely gaining knowledge or information about God. Rather, it means knowing God personally, as a friend. It is knowing God in this latter sense that leads us to salvation. Herein, the focus turns toward the relationship between trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology, on the one hand, and preaching and teaching in the context of the divine missions, on the other. Where the previous chapter discussed how the psychological analogy illuminates the process by which the human person becomes more like God, this chapter will consider how the psychological analogy illuminates the process by which a person becomes a preacher and teacher. (According to Torrell, "Thomas uses the terms *praedicatio* and *doctrina* interchangeably."[6]) In the conclusion, I will consider how the *Summa* is written to support this process. I argue that the processes of becoming more like God and of becoming a preacher/teacher are closely linked because they entail the same operations—knowing and loving God—and because both processes take place in the context of friendship with God. These are, in fact, the same operations by which any Christian is assimilated to the triune God. However, for Thomas, the preacher and teacher have a special role in the divine economy for the sake of the common good.[7] For example, Thomas observes that "if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting *unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others*, according to 1 Pt. 4:10, 'As every man hath received grace,

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[5] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 28, a. 1 ad 2.

[6] Torrell, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 161.

[7] *ST* II-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 2. The persons to whom one preaches or whom one teaches may not be able to devote their time to contemplative study on account of the roles they, in turn, have within divine providence and the divine economy, and other commitments they have, for example, as lay persons.

ministering the same one to another.'"[8] Furthermore, to help others to know and love God, one

must first be knowing and loving God, himself. Or to put it in terms of friendship, fostering one's

own friendship with God through a contemplative knowing and loving of God helps one

encourage others in their friendship with God.

In order to support this argument, I will return to the emphases on *contemplata aliis*

tradere—handing on to others the fruits one has gained in contemplation—(Chapter 1) and the *ordo*

disciplinae (Chapter 2). Returning to these emphases will situate the Dominican's vocation to

preach and teach within the setting of the *Summa theologiae*. I aim to recover Thomas's idiom

(*contemplata aliis tradere*) to argue that trinification—and therefore a contemplative study of the

triune God and of oneself as the image of the triune God—is relevant to preaching and teaching,

and conclude by suggesting how the *Summa* supports this process as a performative text supporting

a transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina*.

2. The *Vetula* and Wisdom

Two preliminary notes in order. The first regards a person Thomas refers to as the "*uetula*" (old

lady) who is not educated, and yet knows more about God and leading a good life than the

greatest philosopher. The second regards Thomas's distinction among types of wisdom. In raising

these preliminary notes, I hope to communicate Thomas's own awareness of the profound

limitations of speculative theology, even while he dedicates much of his life to developing *sacra*

doctrina as a science that is also wisdom, and to thinking through the place of speculative theology

in the divine economy and its relation to the works of the active life.

With respect to the *uetula,* as Thomas remarks in one of his sermon-conferences, "None of

the philosophers before the advent of Christ with all of their striving were able to know so much

of God and of those things necessary for [eternal] life as an old woman [*uetula*] knows through

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[8] *ST* Ia, q. 96, a. 4c.

faith after the coming of Christ."[9] Thomas then proceeds to argue that believing what we cannot

see is not foolish; it would only be foolish "if we were able to know perfectly all things visible and

invisible."[10] However, "our knowledge is weak to such a point that no philosopher would be able

to investigate perfectly the nature of a single fly."[11] Thomas then turns the objection on its head:

real foolishness is to forsake believing anything but that which one can know with certitude on

one's own.

What makes the *uetula* and the teacher or preacher similar is that they both value

believing, and see the foolishness of withholding their assent from things they cannot establish

with certainty on their own. They have an attitude of receptivity, of listening to God. Where a

theologian or preacher can help the *uetula* is in supporting her desire to consider whether any

reasons can be found for the truth she believes and loves.[12] As Marshall observes, "In beings who

think discursively—who cannot, like God, apprehend everything at once but must move from

thought to thought—the believing mind's yearning to share in the inherent luminosity of divine

truth naturally takes the form of a desire to see the rational connections among the truths of faith,

and indeed among all the believes we hold true."[13] To apprehend things at once is to have

wisdom, which is a single and simple knowledge of everything. As rational creatures, we must

approach this view discursively, for which the *ordo disciplinae* of *scientia* is most useful. Insofar as

sacra doctrina is a science that approaches wisdom, one of the primary contemplative fruits is to

understand the connections among the mysteries of faith, the coherence of revelation.[14] Handing

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[9] *The Sermon-Conferences*, 20-21.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c.
[13] Bruce Marshall, "*Quod Scit Una Uetula*," in *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas*, 8.
[14] See James A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *Sacra Doctrina* in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1," *The Thomist* 38 (1974).

on this fruit in preaching or teaching can provide consolation to believers because these connections help disclose the intelligibility of the Christian faith.[15]

The second preliminary note regards the distinction between the intellectual virtue of wisdom, which can be acquired, and the infused gift of wisdom, which is from the Holy Spirit.[16] As an intellectual virtue, wisdom is acquired through study and attained by the natural light of the intellect. It perfects "the intellect for the 'consideration of truth.'"[17] Wisdom considers the highest causes and accordingly judges all things and sets them in order.[18] The intellectual virtue of wisdom involves the use of reason, such that judgment (the act proper to wisdom) occurs after reason has made its inquiry, beginning with experience and the questions that arise therefrom, and passing through understanding and conceptualizing. Wisdom can also be attained through the supernatural light of faith. This wisdom is supernatural and involves one humbly surrendering her own light to the self-revealing uncreated Light.

Lonergan explains that this supernatural wisdom, rooted in the light of faith, has a twofold expansion. The light of faith can be in contact with reason and with God. When the light of faith is in contact with *reason*, it is the science of theology (*sacra doctrina*), "which orders the data of revelation and passes judgment on all other science."[19] In response to the objection that *sacra doctrina* cannot be wisdom because wisdom is a gift whereas *sacra doctrina* requires study, Thomas explains that *sacra doctrina* is "acquired by study, though its principles are attained by revelation."[20] Here we can observe the relationship between acquired wisdom and grace, recalling that grace does not destroy, but rather, perfects nature.[21] In this way, the wisdom of *sacra doctrina* surpasses

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[15] *SCG* I, c. 9, §2.
[16] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 6c; Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 2c.
[17] R.J. Snell, "Connaturality in Aquinas: The Ground of Wisdom," *Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy* 5, no. 4 (2003), http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/snell-aquinas.shtml, accessed July 18, 2017.
[18] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 57, a. 2c.
[19] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 101. Here, Lonergan is citing *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 6c and ad 2; a. 8.
[20] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 6 ad 3.
[21] See *ST* q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

the wisdom of metaphysics (which is not supernatural in any way) while maintaining an affinity with it because *sacra doctrina* does require study. Besides contact with reason, faith also involves contact with *God*. This is what is usually called "infused wisdom," which is one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit each of which "enable the person who possesses faith formed by charity to respond to the special prompting of the Holy Spirit."[22] Specifically, "it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about [divine things] on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that 'Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things (*non solum discens, sed et patiens divina*).'"[23] However, both the wisdom that is *sacra doctrina* and the wisdom that is a gift of the Spirit are supernatural insofar as they involve faith. As Wilkins explains, "*Both* the wisdom that is theology and the wisdom that is docility are supernatural: both are involved with matters too high for us, and both are grounded in a single, otherworldly love that is for us the basis for our listening, the loved law of our assent, the source and measure of the questions that follow upon it."[24]

The wisdom of *sacra doctrina* is a sort of hybrid wisdom. It is supernatural insofar as it is attained by the light of *faith*, but it is also acquired insofar as reason is operative under this light. Notice that Thomas distinguishes *sacra doctrina* as wisdom from the intellectual virtue of wisdom. *Sacra doctrina* as wisdom that is acquired does not merely complement and extend the ordering achieved by wisdom as an intellectual virtue. If that were the case, it would be limited to adding knowledge that is beyond human reason. Yet, as Levering writes, "In fact, *sacra doctrina* both *adds* this supernatural knowledge *and reorders* all that can be known *naturally* in light of the triune God as our beginning and supernatural end."[25] *Sacra doctrina* as wisdom reorders *everything* according to God's self-knowledge as revealed in Jesus Christ. Specifically, it does so according to knowledge of

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[22] Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics*, 29.
[23] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 45, a. 2c.
[24] Wilkins, "A Wisdom on the Concrete," 11 (draft of a chapter for an unpublished manuscript; cited with permission of the author).
[25] Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics*, 31 (emphasis added).

the divine persons, which Thomas counts as a saving truth we need to know in order to think rightly about creation and redemption.[26] This reordering provides consolation to the *uetula*, even amidst her gift of wisdom, because it discloses the connections among the mysteries of the faith, and so the coherence of revelation.

The gift of wisdom explains why Christians do not need to be philosophers—or theologians, for that matter—to be contemplatives. The baptized are connaturalized to knowledge of the first truth by charity through the gift of wisdom, which is both contemplative and practical because the gift of the Holy Spirit directs all aspects of the human person.[27] At the same time, "because study is necessary for *sacra doctrina*, the wisdom attained by natural reason (the intellectual virtue of wisdom) remains necessary even for the theologian possessing the gift of the Holy Spirit."[28] The theologian (or the teacher/preacher) studies precisely because he is called to "have fuller knowledge of matters of faith and to believe them more explicitly" for the sake of the common good.[29] The gift of wisdom and the wisdom of *sacra doctrina* acquired through the study each has a place within the divine economy. Thus, while these wisdoms are distinct, in the concrete unfolding of the Christian's life, they are harmonious and work together toward the graced perfection of the human person and the entire human community on the way to eternal friendship with the triune God. As Wilkins writes, "As grace perfects nature, as infused virtue perfects acquired, as the love of God transforms human loving, so the wisdom of docility to the Spirit draws up and transforms the human love of wisdom and its pursuit through study. But this transformation is not to the exclusion of cooperation but rather makes cooperation possible."[30]

This excursus on wisdom helps to clarify what I mean by claiming that the *Summa* is written as a contemplative study to support the trinification of the student for the sake of his

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[26] *ST* Ia, q. 32, a. 1 ad 3.
[27] Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics*, 31.
[28] Ibid., 33.
[29] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 3.
[30] Wilkins, "A 'Wisdom of the Concrete," 15 (Chapter 3 of an unpublished manuscript).

becoming a better teacher or preacher. I do not mean to suggest that reading the *Summa* somehow guarantees or bestows the divine gift of wisdom. What I do argue is that when the wisely ordered path of the *Summa* is traveled, the journey can be a transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina* for the traveler—and particularly with the saving truths about the Trinity, both in itself and in the trinitarian missions. The *Summa* is offered, in other words, as cooperative aid in support of the reader's assimilation to the triune God, which in turn supports his ability to speak meaningfully to others about the God he has come to know and love as a friend. Just as an encounter with a teacher can transform a student, so can an encounter with a text. Teachers and texts alike are secondary or ministerial causes within divine providence. The secondary cause never replaces the primary cause of the transformation that occurs in the process of teaching and learning, wherein the primary cause is God as the author of our intellectual light. Nor does the secondary cause negate the divine initiative that alone is capable of healing and elevating our nature and all that follows. Rather, these secondary causes are given the dignity of participating in God's providence and economy.

3. Recalling the Earlier Chapters: Thomas as Preacher and Teacher

In order to start illuminating Thomas's theology of teaching and preaching in relation to his trinitarian theology, I will review some of the most salient points from the first two chapters. Chapter 1 emphasized the ways in which the Dominicans were a unique religious order in thirteenth century Europe. It also situated Thomas Aquinas's decision to become a Dominican, and his pedagogical and pastoral roles within the order, in the context of the unique character of the Dominicans' mission and interpretation of the *vita apostolica*. Chapter 2 aimed to enliven the *Summa theologiae* by retrieving it as a pedagogically- and pastorally-minded performative text that can be fruitfully engaged as a series of contemplative questions for the intellectual and spiritual formation of the Dominican. Specifically, Chapter 2 turned to Thomas's generalized and analogical application of the Aristotelian *ordo disciplinae* to *sacra doctrina*, as well as to the main

prologues of the *Summa* and its creedal plan. When brought together, these three elements help to demonstrate that the form and the content of the *Summa* belong together. Only when form and content are kept together does the true pedagogical nature and pastoral orientation of the *Summa* come to life.

3.1 Friar Thomas Aquinas: A Pastorally-Minded Theologian

The Order of Preachers was founded with an outwardly directed mission in which the Dominicans' primary concern was the salvation of others, not their own personal holiness. Recall the following passage from the Dominicans' constitution during their establishment in 1220: "Our order is recognized as having been especially instituted from the beginning for preaching and the salvation of souls, and our study should be principally and ardently directed to this end with the greatest industry, so that we can be useful to the souls of our neighbors."[31] Thomas says something similar in *Contra Impugnantes:*

> For their own sake, [holy men] would prefer to adhere to Christ by contemplation, either in this world, in so far as human infirmity will permit them so to do, or in the next world, where contemplation is made perfect. For the sake of others, however, charity urges them at times to interrupt their much-loved contemplation, and to expose themselves to the stress of active life. Hence while by desire they enjoy the quiet of contemplation, for the sake of their neighbor's salvation they patiently endure the toil of action.[32]

Throughout this polemical text, Thomas articulates the mutually supportive relationship between contemplation, study, teaching, and ministry.

As Tugwell notes, this apostolic quality imbued every aspect of Dominican spirituality: "The all-absorbing ambition of the friars was to be 'useful to the souls of others.' Their own spiritual exercises were designed to make them better preachers, and their own spiritual progress was not sought as a goal in its own right, but rather as a kind of spin-off from their service of

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[31] *The Primitive Constitutions of the Order of Friars Preachers*, prologue.
[32] *Contra Imp.*, c. 38, reply.

others."[33] This mission set them apart from many of their contemporaries. Their entire lives were structured around their vocation as preachers.[34] Prior to the Dominicans, no religious order existed that was adequately fitted to the particular demands of a preaching ministry, especially doctrinal preaching.

Humbert of Romans commented on the aforementioned constitution. He explained that the order has two ends, preaching and the salvation of souls. However, while preaching is the immediate aim of the order, it is subordinate to its ultimate aim, the salvation of souls. He then linked the work of saving souls to serious study, for study is what would make the Dominicans serviceable.[35] Further, as Wendlinder comments, "Dominic discerned that this [ultimate] end could be better achieved through 'learned preaching' than simply through moral exhortation."[36] In other words, Dominic recognized the value of helping believers come to understand the theological reasons for Christian behavior, as well as the value of understanding what one believes. Similarly, when considering whether it is meritorious for believers to seek understanding by using their reason, Thomas writes: "[H]uman reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, *he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof,* and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit."[37] Such an understanding exercises and consoles the believer: "There are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known. This should be done for the exercise and consolation of the faithful [*ad fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium*], and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries."[38]

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[33] Tugwell, introduction to *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings*, 4.

[34] Bauerschmidt, *Thomas Aquinas*, 173.

[35] See Mulchahey, *'First the Bow is Bent in Study'*, 5.

[36] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 29. The reason, as we will see, pertains to the understanding of *sacra doctrina* as necessary for salvation.

[37] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c.

[38] *SCG* I, c. 9, §2. Thomas continues, "For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such

Lastly, Thomas echoes the Dominican ministry of saving souls through learned preaching in the first question of the *Summa* when arguing for the necessity of *sacra doctrina* on account of the necessary knowledge it hands on.[39] In the divine economy, God uses human teachers to help hand on this necessary knowledge. In the opening prologue, Thomas acknowledges that he has taken up this task.[40]

Beyond forming a novel relationship between study and preaching, the Dominicans also gave contemplation a radically new orientation by seeking contemplation *as* study. Contemplative study was for the sake of preaching to others, on behalf of their souls. This serious study of sacred teaching was part of the transformation the monastic *lectio divina* taking place at the time.[41] Dominicans sought to preach and teach from the *scientia* they gained from this transformed contemplation. In other words, the source of Dominican contemplation was study, namely, the study of *sacra doctrina*. The Dominicans also reordered the end of contemplation by putting it at the service of their outwardly directed mission. Lastly, in addition to their transformation of contemplation according to both its source and end, the Dominicans also focused the active life upon the specific activity of preaching.

These unique elements setting the Order of Preachers apart from their contemporaries were reflected in their adoption and adaptation of the *vita apostolica*. In their efforts to return to the lives of the apostles, the Dominicans embraced the evangelical model, which sought to imitate the apostolate of the apostles (rather than their communal way of life).[42] Based on historical research, as well as the increasing significance given not only to Thomas's scripture commentaries, but also to his sermons, scholars now believe the *apostolate* of the Dominicans was the primary motivation of Thomas's vocational decision, not their connection to the university. Similarly, more recent

weak arguments."
[39] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 1c.
[40] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 9 ad 2; IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c.
[41] See Aumann, *Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition*, 127.
[42] See Tugwell, *The Way of the Preacher*, 111-116.

scholarship convincingly argues that Thomas's Dominican life was the real focus of his intellectual labors. Furthermore, not only was Thomas himself a member of the Order of Preachers, but he was also one of its most prized teachers and he was appointed a preacher-general.

Lastly, the Dominican educational structure and Thomas's role therein highlighted his pedagogical concerns and skills. The first level of education, the *schola* (conventual school), provided the friars with the education they needed in order to become learned preachers. Thomas's own work as a teacher was focused at the second tier of Dominican education. These schools were called *studia provinciala*, and they included provincial schools of theology. Thomas's *studium personale* at Santa Sabina in Rome (1265-1268) was the first such school. He composed the *Summa theologiae* at Santa Sabina specifically for his Dominican students in response to the pedagogical deficiencies in the current texts. Many of these students would go on to become lectors at the conventual schools (*scholae*). Thus, Thomas was teaching students who would become the teachers of those Dominicans preparing to become preachers.[43]

At the close of Chapter 1, I called to mind that the contemplative study by which preachers hand on *sacra doctrina* for the sake of the salvation of souls is one kind of speaking about God. Here, I follow Wendlinder in conceiving preaching as "speaking about God."[44] As this current chapter proceeds, I will consider speaking, itself, in the context of the conversations of friendship, conversations which may include preaching and teaching as ways of helping others develop friendship with God. I will do so by way of the *verbum qua prorumpat in affectum amoris.* I aim to argue that Thomas understands there to be an important relationship between knowing God and speaking about God, and that the *verbum* illucidates this relationship.

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[43] See *ST* Ia, q. 103, a. 4. See below §6. Conclusion: *Contemplata Aliis Tradere*, Friendship, and Trinification.
[44] See Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 64.

3.2 Thomas Aquinas: The Wise Pedagogue

Essential to the endeavor to enliven the *Summa* as a pedagogical and pastoral text was the demonstration that the form and content of the *Summa* belong together, and cannot be separated without detriment to the text, as well as to the reader's experience of the text. Separating the form and content neglects the pedagogical intention Thomas set for the *Summa*. This separation also fails to perceive the synthetic element undergirding the moving viewpoint of the text.[45] In particular, I focused on Thomas's generalized and analogical application of the Aristotelian *ordo disciplinae* to *sacra doctrina*, paying careful attention to the opening prologue to the *Summa* and the major prologues to each of the parts. I argued that the *ordo disciplinae*, as a pedagogical order, was the primary motivation behind Thomas's organization of the *Summa*. For example, the *ordo disciplinae* is the reason the questions on the Trinity of Persons follow the questions on the divine essence, not a preference for metaphysics or the "one God." Furthermore, the goal of the *ordo disciplinae*—and of the *Summa*—is understanding, not certainty. As we saw in Chapter 2, separations of form and content often betrayed a misunderstanding of this goal, assuming instead that Thomas intended to provide, for example, an encyclopedia of answers to theological questions.

The true depth of Thomas's wise pedagogy came to the fore when considering how he integrated the *ordo disciplinae* with the Articles of Faith so as to enliven the *Summa* with the movement of salvation history. He ordered the material pedagogically, selecting a universal starting point and proceeding according to the needs of the student—that is, he chose the *ordo disciplinae* as his method. Yet, Thomas also gave voice to God's involvement with human history,

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[45] "Moving viewpoint" is a phrase taken over from Lonergan, which he uses in the introduction of *Insight* to explain his method of proceeding: "For the single book may be written from a moving viewpoint, and then it will contain, not a single set of coherent statements, but a sequence of related sets of coherent statements. Moreover, as is clear, a book designed to aid a development must be written from a moving viewpoint" (*Insight*, CWL 3, 18). This means that things worked out and developed earlier in the text are intended to aid the reader in her own personal development later in the text. As the text moves along, so one's viewpoint or horizon develops and matures, which allows the reader to enter in to new contexts.

not by proceeding chronologically, but by accentuating the divine wisdom and goodness holding

creation and redemption together in one single and simple view. In fact, he argued in the

trinitarian questions that knowledge of the Trinity is necessary precisely so that we may correctly

understand creation and redemption. He unfolded the Articles of Faith in a way commensurate

with salvation history by using the neo-Platonic *exitus-reditus* structure to facilitate an expression of

a fundamental scriptural pattern in which God is freely and providentially the beginning and end

of all things.[46] At the same time, Thomas also systematically reordered the Articles of Faith into a

more scientific pattern that wisely brings the nexus of these mysteries of faith into relief.[47] Having

recalled the unique features of the early Dominicans, as well as the method, structure, and goal of

the *Summa*, let us now turn to the relationship between trinitarian theology and trinitarian

anthropology, on the one hand, and the mixed life on the other.

4. The *Verbum*, Teaching, and Preaching

Thomas's account of the procession of the word that breaks forth into love draws together (1)

trinitarian theology, (2) theological anthropology and the assimilation of the created image to the

divine exemplar, and (3) the process of teaching and learning—which, like preaching, is an

instance of *contemplata aliis tradere*—within the divine economy. In order to draw out this

connection between trinitarian theology, anthropology, and *contemplata aliis tradere* according to the

shared operations and terms that illuminate each of these in Thomas's work, I explore the role of

the *verbum* in teaching and contemplation. I will then turn to the mixed life, itself, and the role

Thomas assigns it within the divine economy.

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[46] See Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 306-20. Also see *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 3 ad. 1; a. 7c.
[47] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, aa. 7-8.

4.1 The Role of the Inner Word in Teaching and Contemplation

Thomas's general theory of teaching highlights the dependence of the student or learner on someone or something other than herself:

> All our knowledge of the truth is from another: either from instruction [*disciplinae*], as from a teacher; or from revelation, as from God; or by a process of discovery, as from things themselves, for 'the invisible things of God are clearly known by the things that have been made' (Rom 1:20). Consequently, in whatever way a person acquires his knowledge, he does not acquire it on his own.[48]

Michael Sherwin explains the meaning of "*disciplina*": "A *disciplina* is any demonstrative science in which we acquire knowledge from demonstrations offered by a teacher (*magister*)."[49] Furthermore, the knowledge acquired from a *disciplina* is knowledge acquired interpersonally, by way of a student-teacher relationship. Thomas adverts to this relationship in a question on the religious life in the *Summa*. Therein, he focuses on the importance of the student giving himself over to the teacher's care:

> [T]he religious state is a school and exercise [*disciplina vel exercitium*] for tending to perfection. Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life.[50]

Thomas considers teaching in three distinct parts and contexts of the *Summa*. Moreover, when he considers teaching, the *verbum* of understanding usually plays a significant role.[51] This is important because it explicitly links Thomas's theory of teaching to Thomas's trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology. He first considers teaching in the *Prima pars* in the context of his

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[48] *In Ioan.* 7, lect. 2, n. 1040.

[49] Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 182. Sherwin references *In Boethii De Hebdomadibus,* 1. Patrick Byrne further clarifies Sherwin's explanation. Byrne comments that from Thomas's study of Aristotle, he would have likely known that the kind of knowledge acquired through demonstrations is not knowledge of truths, but knowledge of the reason(s) for the truths. As Byrne observes, in the present context of trinitarian theology, this would mean demonstrations that reveals the trinitarian reasons, so to speak, for truths about creation and redemption.

[50] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 5c.

[51] The exception in the passages I cite is the question on the spiritual works of mercy.

metaphysics of creation, and in particular, in his consideration of divine providence.[52] Next, he considers teaching in the *Secunda Secundae*, first its place within the divine economy for the common good, then as a spiritual work of mercy, and lastly when discussing the virtues pertaining to certain individuals, which he considers in the context of grace, and particularly, of gratuitous grace.[53] It is also in these latter questions that Thomas references the *ordo doctrinae*, specifically in the question on religious life, the final question of the *Secunda Secundae*.[54] Finally, Thomas considers teaching in the *Tertia Pars* when discussing the life Christ chose, whether Christ learned, and Christ's own doctrine or teaching.[55]

The process of human teaching and learning is a genuine instance of one human causing spiritual (as in incorporeal) development in another. As such, it is part of God's providential ordering of creation. The question is how a teacher (master) teaches a discipline to a student. In Question 117 of the *Prima pars*, Thomas explains that teaching does not occur because all humans have one passive intellect, as Averroes taught, nor because the teacher rouses the student to remember what he already knew, as Plato taught. Rather, "We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (*Phys.* viii, 4)."[56] The teacher is a helping or ministerial cause to the student's natural ability to know the previously unknown. The teacher is secondary to the principal cause, God, who bestows on all human persons the interior intellectual

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[52] *ST* Ia, q. 117.

[53] On teaching within the divine economy, see *ST* Ia-IIae, qq. 1-2. On teaching as a spiritual work of mercy, see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 32, a. 2. On teaching in relation to gratuitous graces, see *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 171, prol.; q. 177, a. 1.

[54] Recall that the *ordo doctrinae* (the order of teaching) is the corresponding element of the *ordo disciplinae*. They refer to the same reality—the order of teaching and learning—but from the two perspectives of those involved, i.e., the teacher and the student, respectively.

[55] There are numerous other places in Thomas's corpus in which he considers teaching, especially his commentary on John's gospel and a number of Pauline Epistles, as well as *De veritate*.

[56] *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1c.

light (as a participation in divine uncreated light) by which they know anything.[57] Furthermore, "anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): 'All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.'"[58] Thus, the teacher is a helping cause who cooperates with the student's own natural capacity and wisely helps the student move from known to unknown. This movement, as we have seen, is the pedagogical movement of the *ordo disciplinae.*

It is in specifying exactly what the teacher's role is with respect to the student that we find the importance of the inner word: "The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the [disciple], by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts [i.e., inner words], the signs of which are proposed to him from without."[59] Thus, for the process of teaching and learning to take place, both teacher and student must conceive inner words about the matter at hand. A good teacher is one who is able, based on her own understanding and conceptualizing, to propose appropriate "signs"—to speak intelligently and coherently, to come up with good examples, to have a variety of ways of explaining something, to provide diverse phantasms, etc.—so that the student can in turn have an insight and form concepts about what she has understood.

Earlier, in an article on the speech of angels, Thomas differentiates between speaking to oneself and speaking to another. In this distinction, a connection begins to emerge between contemplation (consideration of truth) and action (concern with external works). The connection hinges on the inner word, which can be considered within or spoken outwardly. In this article, Thomas explains that speaking to oneself involves consideration of the inner word ("*conceptus mentis*

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[57] See *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1. See also Ia, q. 12, a. 2; Ia, q. 84, a. 5.
[58] *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1c.
[59] *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1 ad 3.

interius verbum"), whereas "to speak [*loqui*] to another only means to make known the mental concept [*conceptum mentis*] to another."[60] Again, "to speak is to order the mental concept to another…"[61] Speaking is a "sensible sign," which we must use since we cannot make our inner words known to another directly.[62] Teaching, then, is one way of speaking to another. In particular, teaching has as its end not simply making one's inner life known to another, but helping a student form her own inner words. In the same question on the speech of angels, Thomas likens teaching to communicating or sharing:

> Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving [*communicet*] one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, *and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner.* …In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive [*accipiat*] something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, *and in human speech the disciple to the master.*[63]

This question not only underscores the importance of the inner word in the process of teaching and learning. It also points ahead to the importance of conversation (speaking and listening) as an activity of friendship, and friendship between God and humanity as made possible by a certain *communicatio*. Further, it highlights the significance of contemplation and role of listening in conversation. For example, when considering the second way in which speaking an inner word is ordered to another (that is, in receiving—e.g., listening), Thomas offers contemplation as an example: "Gergory says (*Moral.* Ii) that 'the angels speak to God, when by contemplating [*respiciunt*] what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."[64]

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[60] *ST* Ia, q. 107, a. 1c. Thomas here uses "*loquor*" (not *dico*) because he is discussing the outer words used to communicate inner words. Thus, as outer words are distinct from inner words, so is *loquor* from *dico*. This analogy does not hold exclusively, but it is helpful (i.e., Thomas does use "*dicere*" in the sense of speaking outer words. See, e.g., *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 76, a. 1).

[61] *ST* Ia, q. 107, a. 3 obj. 2.

[62] *ST* Ia, q. 107, a. 1 ad 1. God, however, can know our minds directly. As Thomas writes, "…it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets" (*ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 2c). As a "sensible sign," the speaking to which Thomas refers here is distinct from the *dicere* of the previous chapters, which is a "spiritual," not physical, speaking.

[63] *ST* Ia, q. 107, a. 3c.

[64] *ST* Ia, q. 107, a. 3c. In this quotation, "*respiciunt*" is a synonym for contemplating. While this Article technically considers the speech of angels, most of what Thomas expresses is also true of humans—which

Thomas also considers teaching and the role of the inner word therein in his questions on the contemplative and active lives at the close of the *Secunda pars.* While these two types of life are distinguished according to their operations, and according to what the people living these lives spend their time in and orient themselves toward, there is an operation they have in common, namely teaching. According to Thomas, teaching belongs to both the contemplative and active lives because the act of teaching has two objects: the inner word and the hearer.[65] As he writes, picking up on the theme we just discussed (that speaking is ordered to communicating the inner word to another):

> The act of teaching has a twofold object. *For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept.* Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): 'Let them choose for themselves the better part,' namely the contemplative life, 'let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge,' thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life. The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.[66]

Teaching, then, has two objects, the inner word and the student. As we saw in Question 117, the goal is to help the student understand and conceive an inner word for himself. Sometimes, we conceive inner words with a practical intention—this is when the first object of teaching (the inner word) belongs to the active life. For example, a mother thinks something over in order to direct her child toward good behavior. It may be easier to conceive of teaching, with respect to both objects, as part of the active life. However, Thomas insists that the inner word of teaching also belongs to the contemplative life. This way of life clearly involves the inner word, but it does not

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Thomas, himself, attested to when using the example of human teachers and human speech.

[65] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 181, a. 3c.
[66] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 181, a. 3c.

seem to involve teaching given that Thomas underscores the practical (rather than speculative) ramifications of conceiving inner words. To understand how contemplation and teaching belong together, we must turn to contemplation in relation to complacency and concern, which brings us also to considering the mixed life and *contemplata aliis tradere*. First, however, there is more to be understood regarding the relationship of contemplation and the inner word.

4.1.1 Contemplation, the Inner Word, and the Divine Word

I begin with elaborating upon the role that the act that proceeds from understanding (whether direct, reflective, or value-reflective understanding) and the content of the act, the inner word, plays in contemplation. In the realm of intelligibility, by the act of understanding (*intelligere*), the person becomes one with the understood, whereas by the act of conceptualizing (*concipere*) and through the inner word, the person is able to contemplate the thing understood. That is, once the inner word is spoken (*dicere*) and received (*concipere*—the act of conceptualizing, which is the act of receiving the inner word), on account of having understood, we are able to contemplate the thing. Recall that the inner word is both the product of thought as well as the object of thought. As Lonergan writes, "It is not merely a product but also a known product; and as known, it is an object."[67] It is as object of thought that we contemplate the inner word, which is our expression of the thing understood. For example, when commenting on the inner word in the context of John's gospel, Thomas writes, "in our mind there is both a 'cogitation,' meaning the discourse involved in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the truth."[68] It is the latter—the contemplation of the reality to be known and loved—and not discursive reasoning, itself, that is the goal of human life.[69]

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[67] Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 18.

[68] *In Ioan.* c. 1, lect. 1, n. 26. Thomas is comparing our word to the divine Word. He continues, "So our word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term "cogitation" does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God." Notice that contemplation remains when we are talking about the divine Word; it is discursive reasoning that is not applicable. See also *De*

The same applies in the realms of truth and value, and even more so, because concepts

are only possibilities; we must go on to affirm that they are true or valuable. For example,

Lonergan writes, "in the second operation we ask, 'Is it?' or 'Is it so?' and we weigh the evidence,

and because of the evidence we utter a true judgment, and through the true as through a medium

we contemplate being."[70] Again, he writes (comparing God's knowledge to ours), "since we

progress from understanding in potency to understanding in act, we know insofar as through

inquiry we understand, and through understanding we speak inner words, and through [true]

words spoken interiorly as through means-in-which we contemplate beings."[71] It is through true

words that we contemplate the reality of our knowledge. Similarly, by the act of value-reflective

understanding (*intelligere*), we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the value of something we

have been considering (whether that something exists or should exist). By the act of value

judgment, we affirm the value of something and are able to contemplate the things valued.

Next, let us turn to contemplation, itself. Again, contemplation is "the consideration of

truth, which is the object of the intellect."[72] This consideration of truth, and specifically, the

consideration of God, who is the First Truth, is the ultimate beatitude of the human person.[73]

Torrell calls to mind that philosophical and theological contemplation differ in Thomas's

estimation—much as the intellectual virtue of wisdom and supernatural wisdom differ.

Philosophers, insofar as they are "limited to seeking a contemplation of God starting from the

created world" on account of their appeal to reason alone, can only attain an imperfect

beatitude.[74] Christians, however, led as they are by faith, can pursue another contemplation,

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ver., q. 3, a. 2c; Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 18, 22-23.

[69] Torrell, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas*, 14.

[70] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 10-11. Here, Lonergan is referring to contemplation in general, not the contemplation of the divine, in particular.

[71] Ibid., 788-89.

[72] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 35, a. 5 ad 3; IIa-IIae, q. 179; q. 181, a. 1c.

[73] See *SCG* IIIa, c. 38; *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 4.

[74] Torrell, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas*, 9.

which is also incomplete but only temporarily because it "will blossom into the perfect

contemplation by which God will be seen in his essence in the everlasting fatherland."[75] Jordan

Aumann makes a similar distinction, though more differentiated. He distinguishes among types of

contemplation according to the aspect of truth contemplated:

> [The aspects] of truth contemplated may be the beautiful (aesthetic contemplation), the truth as such (philosophical or scientific contemplation), God as known through reason alone (also philosophical contemplation), God as known through reason enlightened by faith (theological contemplation), God as intimately experienced through faith and the intellectual Gifts of the Holy Spirit (infused supernatural or mystical contemplation).[76]

Aumann also refers to theological contemplation as "acquired supernatural contemplation,"

which is linked to the aforementioned special type of "hybrid wisdom" that is supernatural and

acquired because it involves faith's contact with reason. In speaking of the *Summa* as a

contemplative study, I am referring to Christian contemplation or theological contemplation

(acquired supernatural contemplation).

According to Thomas, study directly helps contemplation because studying helps

enlighten the intellect.[77] Studying also indirectly helps contemplation by "removing the obstacles

to contemplation, namely the errors which in the contemplation of divine things frequently beset

those who are ignorant of the scriptures."[78] Recall that in the question on *sacra doctrina*, when

considering whether scripture should use metaphors, Thomas explains that metaphors are useful

because they exercise the minds of the studious.[79] Here we see that studying the scriptures

indirectly helps contemplation (and is a prerequisite) because it requires exercising one's mind

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[75] Ibid. See also *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 4. Therein, Thomas distinguishes between the imperfect contemplation of the wayfarer and the perfect contemplation of the blessed.

[76] Jordan Aumann, "Appendix 3: Contemplation" in *Summa theologiae, Volume 46: Action and Contemplation (2a2ae. 179-182)*, Latin text, Englishs trans., intro., notes, appendices and glossary, Jordan Aumann, O.P. (New York and London: Blackfriars, McGraw-Hill Book Company, and Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1996), 104.

[77] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 5c.

[78] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 5c.

[79] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 9 ad 2.

with respect to difficult passages. That is, it prepares the mind for a consideration of the truth, which requires that the mind rise above, for example thinking of God as a body:

> Thus we read in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a human shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that 'some through seeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of truth become the masters of error.' Hence it is written (Eccles. 2:3): 'I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly.' [80]

Augustine makes a similar observation at the beginning of *De trinitate* regarding the usefulness of Scripture in overcoming the obstacles to contemplating the Trinity. He identifies three major errors and impediments:

> There are those who conceive of God in bodily terms, those who do so in terms of created spirit such as soul, and those who think of him neither as body nor as created spirit, but still have false ideas about him, ideas which are all the further from the truth in that they have no place either in the world of body, or in that of derived and created spirit, or in the Creator himself.[81]

All three classes of errors share a disease, but also a cure. He uses St. Paul's passage about the difference between milk (which is for the babes in Christ) and meat (which is for the mature) in order to explain this cure (1 Cor. 3:1-3). According to Augustine, scripture allows for the human mind to be purged or purified (*humanus animus purgaretur*) of these falsities. It does so by adapting itself to babes.[82] In so doing, scripture uses words taken from corporeal things and from spiritual creatures, but it never uses words taken from things that do not exist at all. This purification is necessary "before that inexpressible reality can be inexpressibly seen by [our minds], and in order to make us fit and capable of grasping it, we are led along more endurable routes, nurtured on faith as long as we have not yet been endowed with that necessary purification."[83]

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[80] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 5c.
[81] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 1.1.1. (Hill, 65).
[82] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 1.1.2 (Hill, 66).
[83] Ibid.

It is significant that Thomas uses the same passage from St. Paul to begin the *Summa*.

Early on in the *Summa*, he also uses a passage from Book 2 of Augustine's *De trinitate* that touches

on the same theme of the purification of the mind in relation to trinitarian theology. I will discuss

the Pauline passage below. Regarding the relevant passage from Book 2, asking whether God is

the supreme good, Thomas uses Augustine as the authority in the *sed contra:* "Augustine says (*De*

Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is 'the supreme good, discerned by purified

minds.'"[84] As we will see in Section 5, the conversation about the divine good—the Trinity of

persons—is the ultimate imitation of and participation in the triune exemplar. This conversation

requires grace as well as purified minds, formed and exercised by a skilled teacher such as

Thomas. As numerous scholars have argued, this exercising purification is part of what takes

place in the initial questions of the *Summa*, especially questions 2-13.[85]

Lastly, let us turn to the relationship between contemplation and speculation, which will

also provide an occasion to return to the relationship between *sacra doctrina* as wisdom and wisdom

as a gift of the Spirit. Though contemplation is not technically the same as speculation, Thomas

generally uses *speculativivus* and *contemplativus* as basically equivalent.[86] This is why Torrell suggests

considering *sacra doctrina* as *scientia* as "contemplative knowing."[87] However, there is an important

distinction between speculation and contemplation that sometimes surfaces in the *Summa*. In the

question on contemplation, Thomas distinguishes between the activities that lead to

contemplation and the activity in which contemplation culminates.[88] Speculation is an activity

leading to contemplation, whereas the culmination of contemplation is the consideration of truth.

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[84] *ST* Ia, q. 6, a. 2 sc.

[85] For example, see David Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding* (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975); Wendlinder, *Speaking about God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*; Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom.*

[86] Emery summarizes Pinckaers, explaining that Thomas usually uses *speculativus* in his works inspired by Aristotle, while he reserves *contemplativus* for his works that draw on Christian sources. See Emery, "Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise," 18, fn. 107.

[87] Torrell, "Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas," 369.

[88] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 3c.

As Aumann observes, "The final and perfecting act of speculative knowledge is the contemplation of truth."[89] Speculation involves the discursive process of reasoning, whereas contemplation is related to the act of understanding and its inner word because the mind rests once it has understood. Recall that all reasoning begins and ends with understanding. Reason is to understanding as motion is to rest. We can extend this analogy, keeping in mind that understanding includes the uttering of the inner word, which is the object of thought:

$$\frac{\text{reason}}{\text{understanding}} \quad :: \quad \frac{\text{speculation}}{\text{contemplation}} \quad :: \quad \frac{\text{motion}}{\text{rest}}$$

Given the relationship between speculation and theological contemplation, we can appreciate how a text dedicated to handing on *sacra doctrina* according to the *ordo disciplinae* can support theological contemplation (under the impetus of charity) and even support (but not force or guarantee) assimilation to the triune God. In the *Summa*, Thomas helps the student reason from the known to the unknown and develop an understanding of the connections among the mysteries of faith, such that the student can rest along the way in the understanding he is gradually developing. As Aumann puts it:

> For Thomas…theology is predominantly speculative, theology is wisdom, theology is therefore contemplative activity. …The contemplation of the theologian is consequently an acquired contemplation, the result of the study or discursive reasoning concerning revealed truths. It is contemplation because it is the vision of one simple *truth*—God and all things seen in relation to God; it is wisdom because it sees into the ultimate *cause* of truth, which again is God.[90]

It is only under the impetus of charity that the student traveling the path of the *Summa* can hope for his contemplative study to flower into the *scientia sapida* (sweet knowledge) or *sapientia* (wisdom) to which Thomas likens the Son's invisible mission. Only then can his faith seeking understanding utter a word that bursts forth into love as a participation of the divine processions, themselves.

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[89] Aumann, "Appendix 4: Theology and Contemplation," in *Summa theologiae, Volume 46: Action and Contemplation (2a2ae. 179-182)*, Latin text, Englishs trans., intro., notes, appendices and glossary, Jordan Aumann, O.P. (New York and London: Blackfriars, McGraw-Hill Book Company, and Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1996),110.

[90] Aumann, "Appendix 4: Theology and Contemplation,"110-11 (emphasis added).

Thus, while the *Summa* may be written to cultivate an analogical understanding of the mysteries and their relationship such that one can know and love God more deeply, it is only charity that can make this journey trinifying. Without charity (which Thomas maintains we lose when we sin mortally), faith is unformed and so the understanding we gain does not increase our knowing God in a meaningful way. It may increase what we know about God, but it does not increase our personal knowledge of God as friend. It is because of the importance of charity and its informing of faith seeking understanding that Thomas proposes, the religious life—and specifically, the mixed life—as a "exercise and school [*exercitium et disciplina*] for attaining charity."[91] He encourages his students, who are already Dominicans, to commit themselves to this school because it will help them overcome the obstacles to God in their lives. Thus, when proposing the *Summa* as a transformative encounter that supports the process of trinification for the sake of ministry, we must never forget that Thomas is teaching Dominican students whom he considers to be undergoing exercises in charity. In other words, the *Summa*'s path is only meaningfully traveled if we commit ourselves to charitable practices, for only then can it support our ongoing transformation to becoming more and more like the triune God.

Our inner word and contemplation, while related to each other, are also related to the divine Word. These three are intimately interwoven in Thomas's *manuductio* of *sacra doctrina*. At the outset of the *Summa*, in the opening prologue, Thomas quotes 1 Cor. 3: 1-2: "As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat." This is, in fact, the same passage Augustine quotes at the opening of *De trinitate* when considering the obstacles to trinitarian theology and their remedy, as explained above. In general, Thomas takes milk and meat to mean simple and difficult doctrine, respectively. In the last question of the *Secunda pars*, in which Thomas is considering entrance into the religious life, he uses a gloss on Psalm 130:2, which also references the symbols

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[91] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 1 ad 4; q. 187, a. 2; 188, a. 1; q. 189, a. 1

of milk and meat. The gloss interprets milk and meat as the "the Word made flesh" and "the Word that was in the beginning with God," respectively.[92] The former makes the invisible things of God visible, while the latter pertains to those invisible things. In Thomas's commentary on the Gospel of John, we find that this movement from one Word to the other is related to our knowledge of the incarnate Word as human and the incarnate Word as divine. For example, when commenting of John's portrayal of the disciples' knowledge of Christ, Thomas writes:

> *Christ could be known in a twofold way.* He could be known in his human nature, and every one knew him this way. With this in mind he says, 'Where I am going you know, and the way you know.' He could also be known as being of a divine nature, but they did not yet perfectly know him in this way. In reference to this, he says, 'If you had known me, you would without doubt have known my Father also.' This is clear from the fact that he adds, Philip, he who has seen me has seen the Father also.[93]

To know the Word in his divine nature is to know the Incarnate Word as equal with yet distinct from the Father. That is, it is to grasp the meaning of belief in the Trinity.

Furthermore in both capacities—as human and as divine—the Word has a particular role in our learning the things of God. For example, when reflecting on the meaning of 'in the beginning' (*principium*) in John's prologue, Thomas explains that '*principium*' refers to a certain order of things. In learning, order is found in two ways. He writes, "As to nature, in Christian doctrine [*in disciplina Christiana*] the beginning and principle of our wisdom is Christ, inasmuch as he is the Wisdom and Word of God, i.e., in his divinity. But as to ourselves, the beginning is

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[92] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 189, a. 1 obj. 4, ad 4: "Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, 'As a child that is weaned is towards his mother,' says: 'First we are conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's milk for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the beginning with God.'" Notice the Johannine imagery. The gloss on Psalm 130:2 is used to explain the progress those newly initiated into the Catholic faith make as they advance. They are taught the rudiments of faith, then they are baptized, culminating in confirmation. See also IIIa, q. 68, a. 5 ad 2

[93] *In Ioan.*, c. 14, ect 3, n. 1886.

Christ himself inasmuch as the Word has become flesh, i.e., by his incarnation."[94] With respect to the latter, Christ, himself, helps us to progress from milk to meat by teaching us as the incarnate Word. As Mongeau writes, "Christ revealed in the flesh is the very knowledge which leads us to the contemplation of the Word which is our wisdom."[95] Christ is the way and Christ is the end. Here, Mongeau is referencing Augustine's distinction between knowledge and wisdom. Thomas alludes to this distinction in the second article of the *Summa* when using Augustine in the *sed contra* ("to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened").[96] He is considering whether *sacra doctrina* is science. As Mongeau writes, "Augustine discusses this *scientia* [knowledge] fully in book thirteen: it consists of 'all these things that *the Word made flesh* did and suffered for us in space and time...' This knowledge is in us by grace, and it leads us to a contemplation of the truth which is the *eternal Word*..."[97] He continues, "*sacra doctrina*, insofar as it is wisdom and therefore contemplation of eternal things, is contemplation of the Word as end."[98] Ultimately, the movement from milk to meat heads toward the contemplation of this Word eternally proceeding from the Father and bursting forth into Love.

In the *Summa*, Thomas explicitly states that the movement from milk to meat "is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine [*ordine doctrinae*], in so far as one has to pass from [an] easy matter to that which is more difficult."[99] This is the third time Thomas uses this phrase (the order of teaching and learning) in the *Summa*.[100] The first was the opening prologue, the second was the prologue to the trinitarian questions. Thus, we can observe that in the opening prologue, with its use of the symbolism of milk and meat and its explicit reference to the *ordo disciplinae*, Thomas has

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[94] *In Joan.*, c. 1, lect. 1, n. 34.
[95] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 122.
[96] *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 2c.
[97] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 122.
[98] Ibid., 123.
[99] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 189, a. 1 ad 4.
[100] He uses a version of it in the *Tertia pars* when considering Christ's teaching. See *ST* IIIa, q. 42, a. 4c.

in mind the movement from simple doctrine to more difficult doctrine, which he connects to the

Word of God as the Word made flesh and the Word that was in the beginning with God (the

eternal Word). In the trinitarian questions, Thomas brings the reader to consider the divine Word

in its eternal relations with the Father and the Spirit. Prior to the explicit consideration of the

Trinity and the eternal Word, Thomas had introduced the incarnate Word as our teacher in

some of the initial questions of the *Summa*. That is, as Mongeau expresses it, "Rhetorically, the

Incarnate Word himself speaks directly to the student in the first person and teaches a truth about

God."[101] For example, in Question 16 of the *Prima pars,* Thomas uses John 14:6 ("I am the way,

the truth, and the life") in the *sed contra* of Article 5 to affirm that God is truth. Thus, "the Word

who speaks in his humanity in John's Gospel teaches something about the Word in his

divinity."[102] Similarly, the first trinitarian question opens with the incarnate Word again teaching

the student. This time, he teaches the student that he proceeds from God: "On the contrary, our

Lord says, 'From God I proceeded' (Jn. 8:42)."[103] In the article on whether there is another

procession in God besides that of the Word, Thomas quotes John 14:16 in the *sed contra:* "I will ask

my Father, and he will give you another Paraclete."[104]

Recall that as to ourselves, the beginning of our learning is the Word made flesh. Recall

also that speaking outer words is the means of making one's inner word known to another. In this

case, the incarnate Word is making himself, as the eternal Word of the Father, known to us. Thus,

the Word speaking in his humanity teaches us something about the Word in his divinity, leading

us to the contemplation of eternal truth according to our mode of learning, which is discursive

and gradual. Lastly, recall that, "in our mind there is both a 'cogitation,' meaning the discourse

involved in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of

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[101] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 124.

[102] Ibid. Mongeau cites three other questions in which the incarnate Word is rhetorically present as the teacher of divine things, Ia, q. 14, a. 6; Ia, q. 18, a. 4; Ia, q. 25, a. 5.

[103] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 1 sc.

[104] *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3 sc.

the truth."[105] It is the latter that is the goal of human life, which Thomas supports by leading the reader from milk to meat, even using the incarnate Word, himself, as a teacher throughout the *Summa*.

In light of the symbolism of the Pauline scripture passage (1 Cor. 3:1-2) and Thomas's selection of it for the opening prologue, I argue that Thomas offers himself as a teacher and the offers the *Summa* as a performative text that together aim to support the progression from knowledge of the incarnate Word to contemplation of the eternal Word.[106] Thomas does so according to the *ordo disciplinae*, which imitates the divine *manuductio* that leads from milk to meat, and which includes the orderly development necessary for speaking meaningfully about God as one, as triune, as exemplar, as friend. He facilitates the student's process of discursive reasoning in order that the student may understand and form inner words according to the perfect contemplation of the truth (which will only really be perfected in the life to come). Thus, we can understand Thomas's *manuductio* of *sacra doctrina* as a use of the *ordo disciplinae* to help students progress from milk to meat, from the incarnate to the eternal Word in their contemplative study, all for the sake of their ministry to be of service to others. Having considered both our inner word and the divine Word in relation to contemplation, let us now turn to the relationship among contemplation, complacency, and concern in order to understand how teaching belongs not only of the active life, but also to the contemplative life.

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[105] *In Ioan.* c. 1, lect. 1, n. 26. Thomas is comparing our word to the divine Word. He continues, "So our word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term "cogitation" does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God." Notice that contemplation remains when we are talking about the divine Word; it is discursive reasoning that is not applicable. See also *De ver.*, q. 3, a. 2c; Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 18, 22-23.

[106] For more on Thomas offering himself as a teacher in the prologue by way of the art of rhetoric, see Kevin White, "St. Thomas on Prologues," *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 98 (2005).

4.1.2 Contemplation, Complacency, and Concern

When we are contemplating God (the divine good), oneself as the image of God, and/or everything insofar as it has God as its beginning and end, our contemplation involves not simply acts of understanding, but acts of value-reflective understanding that give rise to value judgments that in turn give rise to love, that is, to complacency—a resting in the beloved.[107] With regard to why contemplation gives rise to complacency, we can turn to Thomas's consideration of whether eternal happiness is an operation of the practical or speculative intellect. Therein, he argues that it is an operation of the latter.[108] One of the reasons Thomas gives is because the speculative intellect, in contemplating truth, has the good within itself; it does not need to go outside of itself to attain the good (as is the case with the practical intellect).[109] This reason is related to the fact that contemplation is sought for its own sake. In this way, we see the connection between contemplation and complacency. That is, in considering truth, the speculative intellect has the good within itself and so it can rest. With regard to the relationship between contemplation and love as complacency, the following passage is illuminating:

> As stated above good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (*Ethic*. ix, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.[110]

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[107] Torrell also discusses contemplation in relation to love, speaking in terms of affectivity. As he writes, "In speaking of 'contemplation of the first truth,' we must therefore not allow ourselves to be drawn into error, as though we were dealing with a purely intellectual activity. Thomas speaks more precisely: 'The end of contemplation as contemplation is nothing else than truth; but when contemplation becomes a way of life it also takes account of affectivity and the good.'" See Torrell, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas,* 12. Torrell is quoting *In Sent.* III, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 1, ad 1.

[108] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 5c.

[109] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 5 ad 2.

[110] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 27, a. 2c. See also Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, wherein he discusses the relationship between contemplation and complacency in Thomas's trinitarian theology. Contemplation regards the word and complacency regards love: "In the Trinity, the basic character of Love [complacency] is not to be a principle, or to tend to anything, or to unite, but to proceed in virtue of an Understanding uttering the Truth of what God is. In the *imago Dei,* the same holds true: this is clearest in the perfect beatitude of the vision of God, where we have the fulness of truth that is due to understanding in the *lumen gloriae* what

In this case, both the object of contemplation and the act of contemplation cause pleasure.[111] This calls to mind Question 93 of the *Prima pars*, and the interpretation I gave of it in relation to Question 43 in the previous chapter. In knowing and loving God (through grace), we are assimilated not only to God as object, but also to the divine processions as acts. Accordingly, we participate both in the divine nature and in the divine processions.

While contemplation gives rise to complacency, when it comes to contemplating the divine good in this life, we do not remain in complacency. Rather, complacency becomes concern, the object of which is the good that is not-yet. This concern includes God, not because God is a good that is not-yet, but because, as Crowe writes, "our understanding of God is a not-yet and so our possession of Him by understanding is a concern, as likewise are all those things or artifacts or operations which are involved in coming to understand what He is."[112] What Crowe is discussing pertains to the imperfect beatitude of this life.[113] Recall, for example, that Thomas remarks in his prologue to Question 3 in the *Prima pars* that since we cannot know God's essence, he will instead lead his readers to understand what God is not. Yet, even this negative knowledge is rewarding: "the more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends."[114] That is, coming to terms with divine transcendence in relation to our ability to understand God is a meaningful development in our journey to know

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God is, and the consequent procession of perfected human love for God. Love no longer needs to pursue the good or to be a principle of its pursuit; its function is to rest in the good now possessed by understanding. *In the imperfect beatitude that it is possible to enjoy on earth there is the truth that comes from contemplation of what is and can be known in this state, and there is in the will the procession of a love that corresponds in a simple affective relation to this good that is already in some measure possessed*" (152, emphasis added).

Crowe continues: "Man is made for the contemplation of truth, which is a short way of saying that he is made for the contemplation through truth of being, and love is the natural complement of the truth" (154).

[111] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 35, a. 5c.
[112] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 133.
[113] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 8.
[114] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c.

and love God. It is this loving concern to understand God more that initiates the journey of the *Summa*.

Notice that concern does not pertain exclusively to the practical intellect; it also pertains to the speculative intellect insofar as our knowledge of anything (even a fly, as Thomas remarks) in this life is imperfect. In order to understand any one thing fully, we must understand how it is related to everything else, including how it fits in to the world order, itself (which also means understanding world order).[115] On account of the imperfection of our speculative knowledge, we do concern ourselves with continually seeking to know more—this is the infinite desire to know, which manifests our created participation in uncreated light. Furthermore, we may begin to act in service of the divine good and out of a desire to share it with others, which again may include coming to know and love God more deeply (God as a not-yet) so we can help others do the same. The following is illuminating for understanding the necessity, in this life, of moving from the complacency of contemplation to the concern of action:

> [O]ne's neighbor is loved insofar as she is referred to God. 'The reason for loving the neighbor is God, for what we ought to love in the neighbor is this: that he be in God.' Consequently, one loves one's neighbor not as a final end, but *propter Deum*. This is not to say that love of neighbor and love of God are two different loves. To the contrary, it is 'with the same love of charity that we love all neighbors, insofar as they are referred to the one common good, which is God.' But it is to say that God must be loved more than our neighbor. For friendship mainly pertains to that which causes the good that grounds the fellowship. The friendship of charity, therefore, principally pertains to God, who is the cause of happiness, but extends to the neighbor who participates in the same happiness. Thus, when one loves a neighbor, one participates in God's love: 'The charity by which formally we love our neighbor is a certain participation in divine charity.' And while neighbor love ranks after love of God, a neighbor, because more visible, is the first thing to demand love—which is why someone who claims to love God, but fails to love his neighbor, is lying.[116]

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[115] While we can come to understand the world order, why God chose this particular world order and not another remains a mystery to us.

[116] Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism.* Doyle is quoting *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 25, a. 1; q. 25, a. 1 ad 2; and q. 23, a. 2 ad 1, respectively.

As love of God can and should give rise to love of neighbor, so can contemplation, which gives rise to complacency, in turn give rise to concern. It is in this way that contemplating the inner word is integral to teaching, for one may contemplate divine things for the sake of handing them on to others. That is, consideration of the inner word with respect to teaching need not only be on account of directing one's outward action but can also be on account of concern for others who also need the saving truth of *sacra doctrina*. This brings us to the mixed life and *contemplata aliis tradere.*

4.2 The Mixed Life of Contemplation and Action

We have already seen what contemplation means according to Thomas. As for the active life, it is "engagement with others, the outward practice of the moral virtues under the direction of prudence."[117] Where some people are intent on the contemplation of truth, others are intent on external actions. According to these diverse intentions, human life (with respect to the intellect) is fittingly divided into contemplative and active.[118] While strictly speaking, the contemplative life is more excellent than the active life, it is fitting to sometimes prefer the active life because of the needs of the present life.[119] In cases of necessity, these works (e.g., feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, etc.) are more excellent than those of the contemplative life. Thomas considers turning to the active life in matters of necessity a kind of "addition to" rather than a "subtraction from" the

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[117] Mark D. Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas on Bernard and the Life of Contemplation," in *Bernardus Magister: papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux*, Cistercian Studies Series, n. 135, ed. John R Sommerfeldt (Kalamazoo; Spencer: Cistercian Studies, 1992), 455.

[118] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 179, a. 1c. See also a. 2c: "this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative."

[119] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 1c.

contemplative life because it is charity that asks us to engage in the works of the active life, and

charity always enriches us. Yet, even then, we must not neglect returning to contemplation.[120]

The two types of lives are interdependent and mutually supportive of one another. The

moral virtues acquired in the active life prepare one for contemplation:

> For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is
> hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul's intention
> from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues
> curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations.
> Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life.[121]

In this way, the works of the active life serve and conduce to the contemplative life.[122] These

works "exercise" one for contemplation.[123] Conversely, some works of the active life proceed from

the fullness of contemplation. This is distinct from the temporary cessation of the contemplative

life and the taking up of the active life to minister to the necessities of this life out of charity. Here,

contemplation is preparing one for certain works of the active life, namely, preaching and

teaching. That is, contemplation can anticipate and be ordered to a certain type of action. Of this

relationship, Thomas writes:

> And yet there was no inconsistency in Christ's returning to the common manner of living,
> after fasting and (retiring into the) desert. For it is becoming to that kind of life, which we
> hold Christ to have embraced, wherein a man delivers to others the fruits of his
> contemplation, that he devote himself first of all to contemplation, and that he afterwards
> come down to the publicity of active life by associating with other men.[124]

While the two lives are mutually supportive, most people seem to live the majority of their

lives in active works. The active life is critical for the journey onto salvation because without good

works, we cannot enter the kingdom of heaven.[125] However, Thomas maintains that the most

complete Christian is the one who can be both active and contemplative; that is, one who can

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[120] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 1 ad 3.
[121] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 180, a. 2c. See also q. 181, a. 1 sc.
[122] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 1 ad 2 and a. 3c.
[123] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 3 sc: "Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): 'Those who wish to hold the fortress of
contemplation, must first of all train [*exercitium*] in the camp of action.'"
[124] *ST* IIIa, q. 40, a. 2 ad 3.
[125] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 182, a. 4 ad 1.

lead a mixed life. As Thomas writes, "that form of active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation [*et vita activa secundum quam aliquis praedicando et docendo contemplata aliis tradit*], is more perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, because such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and consequently such was the life chosen by Christ."[126] Thus, while absolutely speaking, contemplation is more perfect than action, to hand on the fruits of one's contemplation—and so to engage in the active works of preaching and teaching out of loving concern for one's neighbor—is more perfect than contemplation on its own. In other words, the mixed life is more perfect than either the contemplative life or the active life.

As we have just seen, Thomas argues that the mixed life is the life Christ chose. He also suggests that we can observe both contemplative and active aspects of the divine life. For example, in the question on divine beatitude, Thomas writes, "Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe."[127] Unsurprisingly, Thomas also maintains that a religious order dedicated to the mixed life is more perfect than one directed exclusively to the active life or to the contemplative life. Religious orders are compared as to their excellence chiefly according to their ends (which are sought for their own sake), and secondarily according to their respective exercises (which are performed for the sake of the ends). As Thomas writes:

> Hence, a religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one religious order over

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[126] *ST* IIIa, q. 40, a. 1 ad 2.
[127] *ST* Ia, q. 26, a. 4c

another depends secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of the exercise to the end in view.[128]

Given that contemplation is directed to the ultimate end, our greatest good, it is more excellent than action. Based on these ways of measuring the lives against one another, Thomas also differentiates the active life into two types. The first amounts to the mixed life, and the second is the active life, strictly speaking. As Thomas writes:

> Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold. *One proceeds from the fullness of contemplation, such as teaching and preaching.* Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7, 'They shall publish the memory of... Thy sweetness,' refer 'to perfect men returning from their contemplation.' *And this work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one's contemplation than merely to contemplate.* The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like, which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, *except in cases of necessity*, as stated above. *Accordingly the highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed to teaching and preaching*, which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection, even as in other things 'the end of that which is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is second,' as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are occupied with external actions.[129]

Thus, there is the mixed life in which one proceeds from the fullness of contemplation. This is the most excellent life—even more perfect than simple contemplation. There is also the contemplative life, which is the next most perfect. It can and should be interrupted, however, when charity demands we tend to the needs of our neighbors. Next comes the active life, which in general is less perfect than the contemplative, but is more perfect than the latter when it is dealing with matters of necessity (which is the same reason contemplation must cease for the sake of action in this life). We can observe in Thomas's account of the perfections of lives and of religious orders the outwardly directed mission of the Dominicans, in which their primary concern is to be useful to the souls of others by way of a contemplative study that prepares them to preach and teach. Such was their interpretation of the *vita apostolica*.

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[128] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 6c.
[129] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 6c.

Dominican education exemplified the value of seeking to know God in order to speak about God. Thomas is even more radical in this regard than his fellow Dominicans. Where his contemporaries construed *sacra doctrina* primarily in terms of a practical rather than speculative science, Thomas framed the Dominican pastoral and practical curriculum within the whole of theology.[130] Torrell underscores how unique Thomas was in maintaining that *sacra doctrina* was primarily a speculative science: "Starting with his *Sentences Commentary,* Thomas is the first to affirm…that 'the ultimate end of this *doctrina* is the contemplation of the first truth in the fatherland (*contemplatio primae veritatis in patria*).'"[131] Thomas's placement of the practical within the overall context of the speculative corresponded to his privileging of the mixed life.

We can observe a detour and return in Thomas's construal of holy teaching as both speculative and practical, and of the most perfect life as the mixed life of preaching and teaching that does not stop at contemplation.[132] The ultimate finality of *sacra doctrina* is the beatific vision. And yet, for this very reason, *sacra doctrina* also has a practical and pastoral finality.[133] That is, there is a detour from the practical to the speculative—the *fratres communes* at Santa Sabina with Thomas spending the majority their time learning—in order to once again return to the practical. And at the same time, insofar as the ultimate finality is the beatific vision, the practical is for the sake of return to speculation. It is perhaps this detour from the practical to the speculative, and then from speculative back to the practical, all for the ultimate return to the speculative that exemplifies why the most perfect life was the mixed life for Thomas. The Dominicans, in handing on the fruits of their contemplation, do so in order that others may contemplate the truth in the

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[130] Jordan, "The *Summa*'s Reform of Moral Teaching," 43. Also see Ignatius Eschmann, "Saint Thomas Aquinas O.P., the *Summary of Theology*," 3-6.

[131] Torrell, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas*, 6.

[132] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 4. Fidelity to Thomas's understanding of the mutual relationship between speculative and practical *sacra doctrina* is critical to discerning in what ways the psychological analogy—speculative—can help to express the trinitarian doctrine so as to make the doctrine relevant to Christians' decisions about the right way to life—practical.

[133] See Wilkins, "Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology," 576.

trinifying preparation for the beatific vision. Note the resonance Thomas's specification of the

mixed life has with the Opening Prologue—both reference *tradere*. In this way, the Dominicans

study for the sake of the common good in the divine economy of salvation.[134]

4.3 Thomas's Reflections on *Contemplata Aliis Tradere:* Sermons and Scripture Commentary

First, I turn to a sermon that is especially noteworthy for the trinitarian orientation of this project.

My argument is not that the *Summa* prepares one to teach and preach specifically on the Trinity.

Instead, in turning to this sermon, we find an example of how a preacher hands on the fruits of his

contemplation, even when that contemplation has been a rigorous and thoroughgoing

contemplative study like the one found in the *Summa*. That is, Thomas's sermon helps to

concretely link together the kind of contemplative study he pursued with the type of preaching he

practiced. That we have an example of him doing so specifically with respect to the Trinity and

the psychological analogy accentuates the link between serious study and meaningful preaching

because Thomas's trinitarian theology is one of the more difficult moments of the *Summa*. It also

suggests just how central a fruitful understanding of the trinitarian mystery is to preaching and

teaching, as it enlivens this core Christian mystery. And further, it suggests just how central

Thomas thought understanding and contemplating this mystery was to living one's life as a

Christian.

Thomas gave a series of sermons on the Apostles' Creed during Lent of 1273. These were

not modern sermons given in his capacity as a *magister*, but rather, what Nicholas Ayo calls

"sermon conferences." They were more like the talks we hear at retreats. These were given in the

vernacular in Thomas's capacity as a Dominican preacher, and they are part of a series of adult

catechism.[135] When preaching on the article of faith, "and in Jesus Christ, his only Son," Thomas

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[134] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 3.
[135] Ayo, introduction to *Sermon-Conferences,* 2.

explains that we know the Trinity now by faith, but we will know it with perfect vision once we pass from this life. However, he speaks of the Trinity in this life for our consolation and edification.[136] He then proceeds to actually walk his listeners through the first moment of the psychological analogy, the procession of the inner word, as the best analogy for the generation of the Son, the Word of God:

> We are not able to grasp the generation of God except through the generation of whatever in created things suggests a comparison with God. But nothing is so like God as the soul of a human being, as the saying goes. *The way of generation in the soul is as follows.* Through the soul a human being thinks something, which is called a concept of the intellect. *A concept of this sort issues from the soul as from a father and is called an intellectual or human word* [*verbum intellectus seu hominis*]. The soul, therefore, by thinking generates its own word. Thus it is that the Son of God is nothing other than the Word of God, not a word expressed exteriorly, because such a word does not endure, but a word conceived interiorly.[137]

It is exceedingly significant that Thomas chooses to make use of the psychological analogy in his preaching, though *without* the technical terminology (e.g., *emanatio intelligibilis*) and scholastic distinctions (e.g., transitive and intransitive operations, *processio operati* versus *processio operationis*) to be found, for example, in question 27 of the *Prima pars*.[138] After challenging the retreatants intellectually, he then proceeds to enjoin them to make the following commitments to the Word of God, now analogically illuminated by way of an accessible interior experience: (1) to willingly hear God's words; (2) to believe God's words—for then God's Word dwells in us; (3) to meditate upon this Word (which guards against sin); (4) to manifest this Word to others and; (5) to be doers of the Word. When considering the manifestation of the Word, Thomas's Dominican orientation

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[136] *Sermon-Conferences*, 49. Herein, Thomas is speaking specifically about the Father and the Son, affirming the belief that they are two persons who share one nature.

[137] *Sermon-Conferences*, 48-51.

[138] See Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work*, vol. 1, 72. While Thomas's sermon-conferences were intellectually challenging, Torrell notes that generally, when compared to his contemporaries, "Thomas distinguishes himself by his simplicity and his sobriety, the absence of scholastic subtleties and technical terms" (72).

comes to the fore: "When one's heart is full of the word of God, then it ought to overflow in preaching, counseling, and enkindling others."[139]

In these five commitments to the Word of God, we see at work Thomas's thoughts about the relationship between contemplation and preaching. Specifically, we witness the pastoral relevance of the psychological analogy in Thomas's own preaching ministry. For Thomas, the psychological analogy for the Trinity is, as Mongeau expresses it, "a lived spiritual reality."[140] It is a reality to which the faithful can turn to engender their commitment to the Word of God. Thomas, himself, did not shy away from helping believers penetrate the trinitarian mystery according to psychological analogy. In this way, he leaves us perhaps a model of what he expected from the preachers he was forming—what kind of fruits he hoped they would hand on.

Next, let us consider an academic Thomas gave a sermon on Luke 8:5 ("A sower went out to so his seed") during the mendicant controversy at the University of Paris. Recall that "not only was preaching part of Thomas's life as a Dominican friar, but it was also one of his three tasks as a *Magister in Sacra Pagina*," which also included *legere* (reading) and *disputare* (discussing).[141] One of the main themes of these academic sermons was "the contemplation of God's love for us, and our love for God as a response to it" as well as "a strong emphasis on active love of the neighbor."[142] As Mark-Robin Hoogland explains, these sermons reveal—even more perhaps than his theological works—that Thomas maintains that "a believer, and especially a preacher, must live in accordance with what he or she knows."[143] Furthermore, in addition to sharing what one has (with the newly emerging urban poor of the thirteenth century, for example), one was also supposed to share what one knew (with, for example, the faithful who desired to understand what they believed).

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[139] *Sermon-Conferences*, 53.
[140] Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 105.
[141] Hoogland, introduction to *Thomas Aquinas: The Academic Sermons*, 4.
[142] Ibid., 13.
[143] Ibid.,14.

This particular sermon echoes the Dominican understanding of the relationship between contemplation, study, and preaching. The sower is Christ. Christ, a preacher, went out, and therefore so must other preachers. As to when preachers should go out, Thomas explains that going out (becoming a preacher) in one's youth is fitting. Regarding the meaning of "go out," Thomas assigns it a threefold interpretation. It means the sower must leave the state of guilt and leave the world. Yet, it also means that the sower must preach; going out is preaching. As he writes

> [A] preacher goes out from hidden contemplation and goes to the public [field] of preaching, for a preacher first ought to draw in contemplation what he will pour out later on in preaching…This going out is very similar to the Savior's going out from the secret dwelling place of the Father to the public area of what is visible. Therefore, it says in Song 7.11: 'I am (here) for my beloved (*dilectus*), and he is turned toward me,' namely, in the hidden realm of contemplation.[144]

Once again we can observe the dynamic relationship between contemplation, on the one hand, and preaching as a work of the active life, on the other.

Thomas continues, explaining that contemplation, along with prayer, turns the soul toward God, "and through internal speech God is turned to the soul. Hence the soul says: 'My beloved (*dilectus*) is mine, and I am his' [Song 2.16]."[145] Contemplation, then, is a form of conversation with God, in which the soul and God turn to one another, speaking and listening. Listening is especially crucial for contemplation and the subsequent active works of preaching or teaching. In another academic sermon, Thomas explains that progress in wisdom is shown in contemplation.[146] Such progress requires that a person "listen open-heartedly, because wisdom is so profound that no one is by himself sufficient to contemplate it."[147] This conversation between God and the preacher continues in the preacher's preaching, for he goes out *with* God.

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[144] Aquinas, *Sermon 9: Exiit qui seminat,* pt. 3, 120.
[145] Ibid. 120.
[146] Aquinas, *Sermon 8: Puer Jesus*, pt. 3, 99.
[147] Ibid., 100.

Continuing to comment on the book of Songs, chapter 2 ("Come, my beloved, let us go out in the field"), Thomas explains that "let *us* go out," discloses a particular familiarity of God with the preacher, indicating that together God and the preacher go out, God by inspiring the preacher, and the preacher by preaching.[148]

In Thomas's prologue to his commentary on the Gospel of John, we find further reflections on contemplation and its relation to some of the works of the active life. According to Levering, for Thomas, "The production of John's Gospel cannot be understood without grasping the influence of its author's contemplation and preaching."[149] Thomas considers John one of the supreme contemplatives: "[A]s Augustine says in his work, *On the Agreement of the Evangelists:* 'The other Evangelists instruct us in their Gospels on the active life; but John in his Gospel instructs us also on the contemplative life.'"[150] Specifically, John's contemplation pertained to the meat of the eternal Word: "John the Evangelist was raised up to the contemplation of the nature of the divine Word and of his essence when he said, 'In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God'…"[151] In John the Evangelist, we see someone who has handed on his contemplation to others. As Thomas writes, "John has [handed] on [*tradidit*] this contemplation to us in his Gospel."[152] Again, "so John the Evangelist, who had drawn the truth about the divinity of the Word from the very fountain-head of the divine breast, wrote this Gospel at the request of the faithful. And in it he gives us the doctrine of the divinity of Christ and refutes all heresies."[153]

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[148] Aquinas, *Sermon 9: Exiit qui seminat*, pt. 3, 121.

[149] Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics*, 40.

[150] *In Ioan.*, prol., n. 1.

[151] *In Ioan.*, prol., n. 7.

[152] *In Ioan.*, prol., n. 6.

[153] *In Ioan.*, prol., n. 10 (emphasis added). Earlier in the same passage, Thomas writes, ""[W]hile the other Evangelists treat principally of the mysteries of the *humanity* of Christ, John, especially and above all, makes known the *divinity* of Christ in his Gospel, as we saw above. Still, he does not ignore the mysteries of his humanity. He did this because, after the other Evangelists had written their Gospels, heresies had arisen concerning the divinity of Christ, to the effect that Christ was purely and simply a man, as Ebion and Cerinthus falsely thought."

Notice that as in the academic sermon on Luke 8, the works of teaching and preaching arise from drawing in the truth during contemplation. Where in the sermon Thomas spoke of the Son's going out from the secret dwelling place of his Father, here we see Thomas speaking of the contemplative's participating in the Son's presence with the Father through his closeness to the incarnate Word. For example, John writes, "One of his disciples, whom Jesus loved, was lying close to the breast of Jesus" (John 13:23). Commenting on this passage, Thomas writes:

> John here mentions three things about himself. First, the love he had for Christ as he rested on him. John said that he was lying, that is *resting*. …Secondly, he intimates his knowledge of mysteries, which were made known to him by Christ, and especially for the writing of this Gospel. He says he was lying close to the lap of Jesus, for the lap signifies things that are hidden: 'The only Son, who is in the lap of the Father, he has made him known' [1:18]. Thirdly, he mentions the special love Christ had for him, saying, whom Jesus loved, not exclusively, but in a way above others. Exactly how Christ loved him more than others will be stated more clearly at the end of this book.[154]

Again, contemplation is related to rest. Further, John's knowledge pertains to the mysteries of faith, which are the hidden things—the secrets, the deep things—of God, which the Father makes known. As for Christ's great love for John, Thomas maintains that it is due to John's purity of heart, the depth of his wisdom, and John's own love for Christ. In the following section, I will revisit Thomas's commentary on John's gospel, and on John the evangelist, himself, in the context of friendship.

5. The Trinity and the Conversations of Friendship

In what has preceded, we have considered the meaning of Thomas's idiom, *contemplata aliis tradere*. We will next consider this idiom in the context of the Trinity and the conversations of friendship. Conversation is one of the primary activities of friendship. In this section, I will relate friendship and conversation to Trinitarian theology. In so doing, I will practice what Norris Clarke calls a "creative retrieval" of Thomas.[155] Specifically, I will draw upon Lonergan's analogical conception

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[154] *In Ioan.*, c. 13, lect. 4, n. 1804.
[155] See W. Norris Clarke, "Person, Being, and St. Thomas," *Communio* 19 (Winter, 1992), 601.

of the Holy Spirit as divine personal Listening and Lawrence's advance of this conception in terms of "God as conversational."[156] While Thomas teaches the dependence of the Holy Spirit on the Father and the Son, he did not explicitly speak of this dependence in terms of proceeding Listening, but instead spoke of it in terms of Love. Yet, a similar order obtains between knowledge and love as between the event of speaking and listening.[157] As Thomas understands love to follow the conception of something understood, so we can understand listening to follow the speaking of a word. Furthermore, the notion of the Holy Spirit and hearing/listening are deeply intertwined in the Christian tradition and especially in Scripture, as it is the Holy Spirit who gives us ears to hear the Word. It is in keeping with this tradition and with the psychological analogy that Lonergan conceives the Spirit as divine personal Listening. Where Clarke attempts to integrate Thomas's dynamic understanding of being with his philosophical notion of the person, I attempt to integrate Thomas's understanding of the dependence of love on the word and its principle[158] with his understanding of the relationship between the Spirit, Son, and Father in his commentary on the Gospel of John.

I recognize Thomas's trinitarian theology to be, as Lonergan puts it, "a genuine achievement of the human spirit," which has a permanence of its own but can be improved upon and inserted in larger and richer contexts.[159] The notion of conversation is one such context in which Thomas's trinitarian theology can be inserted. Lonergan's and Lawrence's advancements are consistent with Thomas's psychological analogy for the Trinity—there are even elements in Thomas's work that are suggestive of conceiving the Trinity in these conversational terms—and have the advantage of further clarifying the relationship between contemplative study, on the one

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[156] See Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 634-685. See Lawrence, "Grace and Friendship. Postmodern Political Theology and God as Conversational." See also Wilkins, "'Our Conversation is in Heaven.'"

[157] See *ST* Ia, q. 27, a. 3 ad 3.

[158] See *ST* Ia, q. 93, a. 6c.

[159] Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 352.

hand, and preaching and teaching, on the other. This creative retrieval will involve turning to the

meaning of conversation in relation to *contemplata aliis tradere* and its role in Thomas's conception

of charity as friendship. I will then return to teaching in the context of friendship with Christ.

5.1 The Holy Spirit as Divine Personal Listening and God as Conversational

After drawing out the thematic ways in which John's gospel considers the word as a word to be

preached and heard, Lonergan proceeds to demonstrate how the divine persons are to be placed

in the same context of "true speaking and holy hearing."[160] He next considers "whether according

to the scriptures it is true that in God there exists a Word that is spoken in truth and is heard and

accepted in holiness."[161] I am using both of these together because I will use Thomas's

commentary on the Gospel of John, which does not differentiate as carefully between the gospel,

on the one hand, and the trinitarian doctrine and trinitarian theology that later develop, on the

other.

I begin with "true speaking." The mission of the Son in John's gospel is to bear witness to

his Father's heart. As Thomas comments, "in order for us to hear the divine Word directly, the

Word assumed flesh, and spoke to us with a mouth of flesh. Thus he says, who is also speaking to

you, that is, I, who was humbled for your sakes, have come down to speak these words."[162]

Furthermore, the Son is from the Father and so his teaching is his Father's teaching. Commenting

on John's passage, "The word that you hear is not mine, but is from the Father who sent me"

(John 14:24), Thomas writes:

> [I]t is not mine as coming from myself, but it is mine as coming from another, from the
> Father, who sent me. It is like saying: One who does not hear this word does not love only
> me, he also does not love the Father. And therefore, one who loves both Christ and the
> Father deserves a manifestation of each. So he says: *and the word which you hear, spoken by me,*

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[160] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 664-65. Lonergan is not claiming that the gospels directly
refer to the divine processions. His understanding of the relationship between scripture, exegesis,
doctrines, and systematic theology (among other functional specialties) is methodologically rigorous.

[161] Ibid., CWL 11, 670-71.

[162] *In Ioan.*, c. 8, lect, 3, n. 1183.

as a human being, is indeed mine insofar as I speak it, and yet it is not mine, insofar as it is mine from another. 'My teaching is not mine' (7:16); 'The words that I say to you I do not speak of my self' [14:10].

It is on account of being the Father's eternal Word that Christ receives words from his Father to speak to the disciples.[163]

With respect to whether according to the scriptures it is true that in God there exists a Word that is spoken in truth, Lonergan answers in the affirmative. While some critics of the psychological analogy "might say the Son is eternal but is only proleptically called 'Word' on account of his temporal work of revealing or of creating," Lonergan suggests that this opinion derives more from "the difficulty of explaining in what sense an eternal function of a word can be acknowledged," a difficulty I faced in Chapter 3.[164] With respect to John's gospel, Lonergan notes the twofold status John assigns to a word: it is heard exteriorly when uttered and it is heard well when it abides in us to be contemplated and observed.[165] While the sounds of words are fleeting, the words that abide within are "spirit and life" (John 6:63), the "words of eternal life" (6:68). Lonergan concludes, "But if in us our spiritual life consists in keeping and observing the words of eternal life, we can surely imagine something similar in God. For God is spirit (John 4.24); his life is certainly eternal; hence we should not in the least be surprised that there is in that eternal and living spirit a Word that is eternal, the word of life (1 John 1.1), eternal life (1 John. 1.2)."[166]

Regarding the mission of the Spirit, "we find the same context of holy listening and true speaking."[167] For example, commenting on John 14:26 ("But the [Paraclete] Counselor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you"), Thomas writes:

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[163] See *In Ioan.*, c. 17, lect 2, n. 2201; lect. 3, n. 2222.

[164] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 672-73.

[165] We saw Thomas speak of this contemplation and observation of the Word in his sermon-conference on the Creed.

[166] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 674-75.

[167] Ibid.

Next he mentions the effect of the Holy Spirit, saying, he will teach you all things. Just as the effect of the mission of the Son was to lead us to the Father, so the effect of the mission of the Holy Spirit is to lead the faithful to the Son. Now the Son, once he is begotten Wisdom, is Truth itself: 'I am the way, and the truth, and the life' (14:6). And so the effect of this kind of mission [of the Spirit] is to make us sharers in the divine wisdom and knowers of the truth. The Son, since he is the Word, gives teaching to us; but the Holy Spirit enables us to grasp it.[168]

Here we observe coordination of the divine missions in relation to teaching and as grounded in their eternal processions. As Sherwin writes, "Thomas holds that the Spirit's role in the Son's teaching mission is fitting because of the way the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son."[169] According to Thomas, John calls the Holy Spirit the "Spirit of *truth*" (John 14:17) "because this Spirit proceeds from the Truth and speaks the truth, for the Holy Spirit is nothing else than Love."[170] Unlike the spirit of the world, which impels us to love earthly things, "the Holy Spirit leads to the knowledge of the truth, because he proceeds from the Truth, who says, 'I am the way, and the truth, and the life' (14:6). *In us, love of the truth arises when we have conceived and considered truth.* So also in God, Love proceeds from conceived Truth, which is the Son. And just as Love proceeds from the Truth, so Love leads to knowledge of the truth."[171] The Spirit is teacher by making us sharers in divine wisdom and knowers of the truth, while the Son is teacher as Wisdom and Truth itself.[172]

While Sherwin and Thomas are here speaking of the Spirit in terms of Love, I would like to recall an important point from Chapter 5 that can relate the foregoing to the Spirit as proceeding Listening. According to Thomas, the analogue for the Holy Spirit is *Amor procedens*, which denotes love's dependence on *Intelligere ut Dicere* and the *Verbum*. In God, *Amor procedens* is notionally distinct from divine essential love and really distinct from the divine *Dicere* and *Verbum*.

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[168] *In Ioan.*, c. 14, lect. 6, 1958.
[169] Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 189.
[170] *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 4, n. 1916.
[171] *In Ioan.* 14, lect. 4, n. 1916 (emphasis added). Notice the connection with contemplation of account of Thomas's reference to "considering truth."
[172] See Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 189-90.

The relation of proceeding love to essential love is approximately parallel to the relation of *Dicere* (speaking) to essential *Intelligere* (understanding). However, the order is reversed. As Wilkins explains:

> The act of understanding and the act of love both regard an object, and in this respect both are considered essential acts in God. But the act of understanding also is the *principle* of the (in God notionally distinct) act of conception, and in this respect it provides the analogue for the Father, *dicens*. In its relevant aspect, the act of love, conversely, is intelligibly *dependent* on the apprehension and affirmation of the good—that is, on *intelligere ut dicere* and *verbum.* It is in this latter respect that the act of love provides an analogue for the Holy Spirit, *amor procedens.*[173]

Whereas with the first procession, the two aspects of the act of understanding are readily distinguished through the vocabulary of *intelligere* and *dicere*, the same is not true of the two aspects of the act of love on account of the poverty of vocabulary Thomas laments.[174] It is love in its *dependence* on the apprehension and affirmation of the good that I would like us to recall, for this dependence is what helps to make the transition from the Holy Spirit as *Amor Procedens* (which remains a helpful analogue) to the Holy Spirit as divine personal Listening. It is in light of this dependence that we should take Lonergan's following statements:

> [A]s the Son depends upon the Father, so does the Spirit of truth depend upon the Father and the Son. …Therefore, the truth that the Spirit of truth teaches is not his own, *but that which he has heard and received from the Father and Son.*[175]

> [i]f the Holy Spirit has any real and true dependence, such dependence is necessarily total by reason of simplicity and eternal by reason of eternal immutability. From all eternity, therefore, the Spirit of truth hears and accepts truth from the Father and the Son.176

Thus, a similar "principle" and "dependence" can be observed in true speaking (the act of understanding as the principle of the word, and so it is called *dicere*) and in holy listening (the act of love as dependent on apprehension and affirmation, and so it is called listening). This hearing is a

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[173] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 119-20.
[174] See *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 1c.
[175] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 668-69 (emphasis added).
[176] Ibid., 672-73 (emphasis added).

spiritual openness.[177] The acceptance of the word is also a spiritual openness. Lonergan

concludes, "The sort of hearing and acceptance we have found in Christ and in his disciples we

must conjecture to be found in some way in the Spirit of truth, who hears and accepts from the

Father and the Son the truth that he teaches."[178] Thus, when Thomas writes, "The Son, since he

is the Word, gives teaching to us; but the Holy Spirit enables us to grasp it,"[179] we can understand

the Spirit's enabling us to grasp the Word as the Spirit's enabling us to hear to the Word. Further,

we can understand that the Spirit's enabling is grounded in the Spirit's eternally proceeding as

Listening/Hearing. As the Son proceeds eternally as Word, and therefore in his temporal mission

fittingly gives us teaching, so the Spirit proceeds eternally as Listening, and therefore in its

temporal mission fittingly gives us ears to hear this teaching.

While it is true that both the Son and the Spirit receive, only the Spirit is said to receive as

hearing—the Son receives as spoken—because until there is a Word, there is nothing to hear.

John does frequently speak of the Son listening to the Father, but this is in the context of his

temporal mission, which is led by the Spirit. Thomas argues something similar when he objects to

the claim that the Spirit is greater than Christ because the Spirit will teach the disciples the truth

(John 16:13). He writes:

> This is not true, because the Spirit will teach them by the power of the Father and the
> Son, for he will not speak from himself, but from me [Christ], because he will be from
> me. Just as the Son does not act from himself but from the Father, so the Holy Spirit,
> because he is from another, that is, from the Father and the Son, will not speak from
> himself, but whatever he will hear by receiving knowledge as well as his essence from
> eternity, he will speak, not in a bodily way but by enlightening your mind's from
> within.[180]

Notice that this last sentence aligns with Lonergan's understanding of hearing as spiritual.

Thomas continues, explaining that the Holy Spirit hears from eternity, enabling us to hear the

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[177] See Ibid., 668-69.
[178] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 670-71.
[179] *In Ioan.*, c. 14, lect. 6, 1958.
[180] *In Ioan.*, c. 16, lect. 3, n. 2103.

Word, too. Similarly, commenting on the Spirit's reception from the Son, Thomas writes, "For

just as the Son is from (*de*) the substance of the Father, because he receives the entire substance of

the Father, so also the Holy Spirit is from (*de*) the substance of the Son because the Spirit receives

the whole substance of the Son. Thus, because he will receive from me*,* and I am the Word of

God, therefore he will declare it to you."[181] It is insofar as the Son is dependent on the Father as a

word is dependent on understanding that we analogically conceive of the Son as an inner word. It

is insofar as the Spirit is dependent on the Father and the Son as hearing is dependent on

intelligently, wisely, or virtuously spoken words that we analogically conceive of the Spirit as

hearing/listening.

From the foregoing, Lonergan concludes to a psychological analogy that conceives the

Holy Spirit on the analogy of divine personal listening. He connects the "true speaking and holy

hearing" of scripture with the eternal Word spoken in truth and heard in holiness:

> The Father is light and love (1 John 1.5; 4.8, 16). The Son is the eternal Word (John 1.1-2), not as sounding outwardly but as abiding within, the word of life and eternal life (1 John 1.1-2). *The Holy Spirit hears and accepts truth from the Father and the Son* (John 16.13-15). These conclusions lead to a further conclusion. The Word is the same as the Son. Hence, as the Son is from the Father, so also the Word is from eternal light and love. Because he is from the light, the Word is true; and because the light is also love, this true Word is a word of goodness, of life, of eternal life. But the Holy Spirit hears and accepts truth from the Father and the Son, which he certainly does if he hears and accepts the Word of the Father.[182]

> [T]he Word is the Son. But the Son is from the Father, and the Father is light and love; therefore the Word is from light and love. *Again, the Holy Spirit hears and accepts from the Father and the Son; this he cannot do without hearing and accepting the Word emanating from light and love, for God is simple.*[183]

In other words, just as we saw in Thomas's psychological analogy, there are two conscious

activities that are internally ordered to one another. There is an affirming that "inwardly and

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[181] *In Ioan.* c. 16, lect. 4, n. 2108.
[182] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 678-79 (emphasis added).
[183] Ibid., 682-83 (emphasis added).

soundlessly 'pronounces the affirming, evaluative judgment which expresses the good."[184] This is

the Father, who is the infinite act of understanding *as* uttering, *as* principle of the Word. There is

also a hearing, listening, accepting that rests content, for it is a hearing and accepting of the

goodness understood and affirmed. This is the Spirit, who is the infinite act of love *as* dependent

on the Word and the apprehension of the good. Where the Father is the infinite act of

understanding as speaking, the Spirit is the infinite act of love as listening. Thus, in this context,

listening is another way of conceiving the infinite act of love as proceeding love (that is, the way in

which the Holy Spirit is notionally the act of love). The Holy Spirit proceeds by way of

listening/hearing/accepting. In this reconceived analogy, there are still three real relations. There

is the relation of the one speaking to the spoken. There is the relation of the spoken word to the

speaking that speaks it. There is the relation of holy and spiritual listening, of holy and spiritual

acceptance to the event of speaking, i.e., to the speaker and the spoken.

Earlier in the text, Lonergan explains something we have seen him mention, namely, that

the hearing/listening we are speaking of is a *spiritual* hearing/listening, rather than a physical

hearing with the ears. In this way, hearing/listening is like understanding, speaking,

conceptualizing, judging, deciding, loving, etc. That is, it is an immanent act. More specifically,

like conceptualizing, like affirming, like loving, spiritual hearing is a rational act. In the following

passage, Lonergan expresses the way in which hearing is holy and spiritual, and in these ways, an

appropriate analogue for the Holy Spirit:

> [B]etween the speaker and the hearer there is the utterance, which of course is the Word
> with God, God (John 1.1.), full of truth (1.14)… *The one who is the perfect hearer of divine truth is*
> *holy*; and *the one who spiritually hears the one speaking spiritually is the Spirit*. From both, therefore,
> from the Father speaking and the Word spoken, there proceeds, as from a single
> principle, the Holy Spirit of truth, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, the Paraclete sent
> and given to us.[185]

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[184] Hefling, "*Gratia:* Grace and Gratitude," 480.
[185] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Doctrines*, CWL 11, 540-43. Cf. *ST* Ia, q. 36, a. 1c.

Thus, "hearing" or "listening" is an appropriate analogical conception of the Spirit's procession. Like proceeding love, listening expresses the eternal dependence of the Spirit on the Father (Speaker) and the Son (Word), as well as the Spirit's temporal mission to make us capable of hearing the Word. Further, this kind of hearing/listening is spiritual and holy.

One perhaps has only to advert to the experience of being in love to understand how love is like listening, for listening to the beloved suddenly takes over our desire to speak and be heard ourselves. Listening in this way is like love as complacency because both entail resting in the beloved. Becoming listeners because we have understood and affirmed the goodness of the beloved is an important moment in our lives and in the furtherance of good in the world, which is all too often bursting with the sounds of distractions, lies, and even hatred—sounds that make it difficult to understand and conceive genuine words or make true judgments about what is true and good. This is why, in our own lives, listening takes priority over speaking, just as questions take priority over answers. Starting with listening entails starting with questions insofar as questions occur to us, and therefore, in a way, we have to listen to our own inquiry. We also have to listen to others' questions, and do so with a spiritual openness. This starting point can lead to thoughtful words, which in turn can be heard by others.[186] Notice how in us, as compared to God, there is a sense in which the reverse is true: we begin with hearing, and end with knowing whereas God begins with knowing: the Father is uttering, the Word is uttered, the Spirit is hearing. The missions reverse the order: the Holy Spirit gives ears to hear, we adhere to the Son, are led to the vision of Father.[187]

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[186] See Lawrence, "Constitutive Communication," 241. See also Wilkins, "'Our Conversation is in Heaven'," 320
[187] This observation came to light in conversations with Jeremy Wilkins.

With regard to 'God as conversational," we have to conceive of conversation analogically. We can conceive analogically of the Trinity as a conversation about the divine Good; that is, the divine good is the formal object of the divine processions.[188]

We can also conceive of the divine conversation *as* the divine Good because it is this divine conversation that constitutes God as triune—God *in se,* which is the divine Good. It is the divine conversation—true Speaking of, and holy Listening to, the Word—that constitutes the intersubjective, interpersonal field in which God is present as the known in the knower in the procession of the Word and as the beloved in the lover in the procession of the Spirit. In Speaking the Word (Father as principle of the Word), God is present to Godself as known, and in Hearing the Word (Spirit as dependent on the apprehension and affirmation of the Good), God is present as beloved. Similarly, we are constituted in conversation—we become ourselves through our conversational acts of speaking and listening, as acts of knowing and loving, and we do so primarily in the context of friendship.

Recall that insofar as the Word bursts forth into Love, the Word is analogous to a judgment of value. Further, since the Word is infinite, it is an expression of infinite value. The Love to which the Word gives rise is likewise infinite, and is the Love of infinite value. With this in mind, Wilkins explains the analogy of conversation in relation to the Trinity, which also alludes to friendship:

> We have to 'work back,' so to speak, to the 'conversation' by thinking about conversation from the end or purpose, *which is communion of mind and heart.* In us this purpose is gradually achieved through a long series of expressions and the gradual development of mutual understanding, common judgment, common commitment. But in God it is the perfect community and in that sense the perfect conversation, one simple expression and love for infinite value.[189]

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[188] See Wilkins, "The Trinitarian Missions and the Order of Grace," 697-98. See also *ST* Ia, q. 26, aa. 1-2; q. 19, a. 2; q. 45, a. 6 ad 3; Ia-IIae, q. 110, a. 1; IIIa, q. 1, a. 1; "the general principle is introduced at Ia, q. 5, a. 4 ad 2." Thomas writes, "Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move."

[189] This formulation is from an e-mail correspondence with Jeremy Wilkins on July 2, 2017 (emphasis

That is, the divine conversation is a perfect conversation in which infinite value is eternally spoken

in an expression of infinite value and eternally heard and accepted in love for the infinite value.

Friendship, as we will see, is about working toward this communion of mind and heart by way of

conversations, which may require self-transcendence and conversion. Let us now turn to

conversation in general and its role in friendship.

5.2 *Conversatio* and Charity as Friendship

It is helpful to begin with the etymology of the word "conversation." As Wilkins writes:

> *Conversatio,* in Latin Christian literature, is semantically more expansive than its English
> cognate. It is often used (also in classical literature) to mean a 'way of life,' and in
> particular frequently translates the Greek *askêsis* to denote 'the ascetic way of life'.
> Benedict's Rule uses it in something like this sense ten times.[190] Etymologically it is related
> to conversion, a turning about. It can also convey intimacy, intercourse, mutual
> exchange, keeping company together.[191] In English it is this last meaning, with the special
> sense of mutual exchange, which predominates."[192]

Along similar lines, Jennifer Constantine-Jackson observes, "[W]hile the English word *conversation*

properly denotes a discussion between two or more persons in a particular place and time, the

Latin term *conversation* denotes also an existential orientation of one's life, thereby connoting

something of its related term, *conversion*, as an ever-present invitation of orienting that life to God

as working in and through the social engagement of discourse."[193] She also underscores that

conversatio is associated with "the civic and domestic life, and moreover, with formation of

character and community within that life."[194]

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added).

[190] *RB 1980: The Rule of St Benedict*, ed. Timothy Fry (Collegeville, Minn: Liturgical Press, 1980), 459.

[191] See Odon Lottin, "Le voeu de 'conversatio morum' dans la Règle de sain Benoît," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 26 (1959), 5-16.

[192] Wilkins, "'Our Conversation is in Heaven'," 319.

[193] Constantine-Jackson, *Conversation, Friendship and Transformation*, 12. See *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Roy J. Defarrari (Boston, MA: Daughters of St. Paul, 1960), 240: "*conversatio, onis*, f., (1) social intercourse, association… (2) conduct, way of life."

[194] Jennifer Constantine Jackson, *Conversation, Friendship and Transformation: Contemporary and Medieval Voices in a Theology of Discourse* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 126. See also Roy Defarrari, (ed.) *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1960), 178.

Conversation, then, includes the elements of speaking and listening emphasized throughout this project. It also underscores that by the performance of these activities—especially by a commitment to authentic speaking and listening as a way of life that imitates the divine trinitarian life—promotes conversion. Furthermore, conversation and conversion go together because conversion takes place in the context of relationships, especially friendships, which have conversation as their central activity. In other words, conversion is interpersonal. Conversation also illuminates both contemplation and teaching/preaching, i.e., *contemplata aliis tradere*, which belongs to friendship within the context of the divine economy. We can understand contemplation as conversation *with* God. For example, Thomas writes, "It is written (Wis. 8:16): 'Her,' i.e. wisdom's, 'conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness.' Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation."[195] Similarly, in *Contra Gentiles,* Thomas writes:

> First, indeed, this appears to be especially proper to friendship: really to converse with the friend. Now, *the conversation of man with God is by contemplation of Him*, just as the Apostle used to say: 'Our conversation is in heaven' (Phil. 3:20). Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit makes us lovers of God, we are in consequence established by the Holy Spirit as contemplators of God. Hence, the Apostle says: 'But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord' (2 Cor. 3:18).[196]

In his commentary on this passage from the Corinthians, Thomas draws together contemplation and trinification. Notice his recollection of something we observed in Chapter 5, namely, that contemplating ourselves as the image of God can lead to the personally transformative contemplation of God. Also note the connection between knowing and loving God "by the mirror of reason" and our trinification:

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[195] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 35, a. 5 sc (emphasis added).
[196] *SCG* 4, c. 22, §2.

Beholding, i.e., speculating, which is not taken from the word which means 'watch tower' (*specula*), but from 'mirror' (*speculum*), i.e., knowing the glorious God himself by the mirror of reason, in which there is an image of God. *We behold him when we rise from a consideration of ourselves to some knowledge of God, and we are transformed. For since all knowledge involves the knower's being assimilated to the thing known, it is necessary that those who see be in some way transformed into God.* If they see perfectly, they are perfectly transformed, as the blessed in heaven by the union of enjoyment: 'When he appears we shall be like him' (1 Jn. 3:2); but if we see imperfectly, then we are transformed imperfectly, as here by faith: 'Now we see in a mirror dimly' (1 Cor. 13:12).[197]

We can also understand teaching and preaching as conversations with others about God so that they may more readily converse with God as their friend, coming to know and love their friend more deeply. However, even though preaching and teaching may seem to primarily involve speaking, it is a speaking that is (a) dependent on the listening involved in the "drawing in" that takes place during contemplative study and (b) dependent on listening to those to whom one is called to minister, so as to discover how their faith can be best nourished. Notice, also, that the form of the *Summa* actually performs this listening, as it includes questions and objections, which precede the replies.

Turning now to charity as friendship, recall that *gratia gratum faciens* constitutes a new interpersonal situation "in which we come to enjoy, to know, to love the divine Persons and, in that way, to participate in the intimacy of their own eternal mutuality."[198] That is, *gratia gratum faciens* not only elevates the human soul but also gives to it the capacity to enjoy the divine Persons. As Wilkins observes, Thomas's definition of charity as friendship between divine and human persons reflects the primacy of this interpersonal situation in Thomas's conception of the order of grace.[199] Lawrence remarks that Thomas's explanation of charity as friendship with God is "an audacious move" because it is a definition that uses "the analogy of friendship drawn from Books VIII and IX of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. No one before him had attempted this because

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[197] *In 2 Cor. 3*, lect. 3, n. 114 (emphasis added). Herein, Thomas also explains that we are glorified by speaking with God. The example he gives is Moses, but his is an imperfect glorification.

[198] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 695. See *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1; q. 43, a. 3 ad 1.

[199] Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions," 695. See *ST* IIa–IIae, q. 23, a. 1c.

of Aristotle's insistence that true friendship can only occur between equals; even those who celebrated the divinization of humankind were hesitant to say that graced human beings were on a plane of equality with God."[200] In fact, as Paul Wadell writes of Thomas, in contradistinction from Aristotle, "without friendship with God we cannot truly be human at all. …God is not only the most fitting (*conveniens*) Being for us to love, but also…friendship with God (*caritas*) is our most perfecting possibility and key to our beatitude."[201] Just how radical Thomas's explanation is comes to the fore when he argues that even our enemies are our friends because they are God's friends, and friends love one another's friends.[202]

Doyle summarizes Thomas's understanding of charity and friendship: "Charity is first and foremost a friendship (*amicitia*) in which we dwell with (*convivere*) God in fellowship (*conversatio*)."[203] Dwelling with God and being in fellowship—conversation—with God characterize Thomas's understanding of this divine-human interpersonal situation, that is, friendship. According to Aristotle, any love that is benevolent, mutual, and founded on a *communicatio* is friendship.[204] Benevolence is to wish good to the beloved. However, "neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication (*communicatio*)," that is, on

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[200] Lawrence, "Grace and Friendship," 795-96. For example, Aristotle writes, "Many people believe that a sort of friendship [*philia*] could exist between man and God, but this is false: Friendship is only possible if the possibility of reciprocity exists. But loving God will always remain unreciprocated. It would be really absurd to say: 'I love Zeus'" (*Magna Mralia* II.11, 1208b, 27-31). I owe this quotation to Hans Christian Schmidbaur. See Hans Christian Schmidbaur, "Can Transcendence be Revealed in Immanence? Thomas Aquinas on Friendship of God and Image of God," in *Divine transcendence and immanence in the work of Thomas Aquinas: a collection of studies presented at the Third Conference of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht*, eds. Gabriela Besler and Harm. Goris (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 210.
True friendship here is Aristotle's friendship of virtue, rather than friendships of utility or pleasure. Friendships of virtue "are formed around the best of all goods and the most perfecting of activities, namely, a love of virtue and a desire to seek a life of virtue in company with others." See Paul J. Wadell, C.P., "The Role of Charity in the Moral Theology of Thomas Aquinas," in *Aquinas and Empowerment: Classical Ethics for Ordinary Lives*, ed. G. Simon Harak, S.J. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 141.
[201] Wadell, "The Role of Charity," 148.
[202] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 8.
[203] Doyle, *The Promise of Christian Humanism*, 88.
[204] See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Bk. VIII.

some kind of shared good.[205] Thus, as Joseph Bobik argues, the question is what "*communicatio*" means because Thomas's primary point in this article is that God and the human person have a certain *communicatio* and that the love founded upon it is *caritas*, which is some sort of friendship.[206] What is this communication that establishes mutuality and supports benevolence that makes it possible for the human person and God to be friends? Thomas identifies it as God's sharing of God's own beatitude with us, a beatitude that is eternally shared between the Father, Son, and Spirit:

> Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): 'God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.' The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.[207]

The goodness God shares with us—the shared good that establishes friendship—is in fact God, *in se*. God shares God's own self with us. As Wadell writes, for Thomas, "goodness and happiness are inseparable because goodness alone can fulfill our quest for happiness and achieve the utmost possible development of our humanity. …Goodness *is* God and human beings are happy in the measure that they share in, imitate, and are transformed by the goodness of God."[208] Furthermore, the key to human happiness is identifying what activities are unique to us as intellectual creatures, and perfecting these activities.[209] What sets us apart is that we can know and love God. The questions remain how this communication of beatitude takes place and what it sets in motion.

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[205] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1.
[206] Joseph Bobik, "Aquinas on *Communicatio*, the Foundation of Friendship and *Caritas*," *The Modern Schoolman* LXIV (November, 1986), 1-2.
[207] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 23, a. 1c.
[208] Wadell, "The Role of Charity," 150 (emphasis added).
[209] Ibid.

According to Bobik, the *communicatio* that makes friendship possible entails the following.[210] First, God (superior) has offered God's beatitude (something God makes sharable) to humankind (inferior). This offering makes friendship between human persons and God possible. Next, it is fitting that we respond to this offer by accepting the gift of beatitude and its invitation to friendship, and work at becoming God's friend, *and* at helping others do so, too, by engaging in the activities of friendship, e.g., *conversatio*. God initiates and causes the friendship between divine and human persons, and God does so in order that his friends will go forth and bear fruit.[211]

Bobik summarizes this *communicatio* in the following terms: "God has decided to share with man His eternal beatitude, His endless and blessed life. And so, man and God do have something in common, do have a *communicatio*. By His decision to share, God has offered to man the possibility of citizenship (membership) in a divine society, in a divine social group."[212] That is, God has created a new interpersonal situation in which human persons do share something in common with God. This new interpersonal situation and *communicatio* are the context in which we can perfect, with God's help, our activities of knowing and loving God that set us apart from all other creature and constitute us as the *imago Dei*. Friendship with God is the key to becoming more like God, for it is in friendship that we enter into conversation with God and others, and these conversations perfect our activities of knowing and loving God, to the extent that they involve *true* speaking and *holy* listening. The divine eternal beatitude in which we now begin to share, in fact, is nothing other than the divine conversation that constitutes the divine intersubjective field (what Bobik calls "the divine society").

The divine conversation is about the divine Good. It is an eternal affirmation of the goodness of divine being, of divine self-constitution. To put it somewhat differently, the divine

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[210] Bobik, "Aquinas on *Communicatio*," 16-18.
[211] *In Ioan.*, c. 15, lect. 3, n. 2019.
[212] Bobik, "Aquinas on *Communicatio*," 18.

friendship of the three Persons consists in conversation. The effect of the indwelling of the Trinity bestows upon the human person a share in the fellowship of the divine Persons. Specifically, it makes her a partaker of the divine Word and of proceeding Love through the indwelling of the Trinity. This partaking is the trinification of the human person—it is what makes us partakers not only of the divine nature, but also of the divine processions, themselves. Being partakers in this way is what allows us to participate in the divine conversation, elevating the human conversation beyond its natural capacity. In other words, the trinitarian indwelling means that the soul participates in God's own self-presence, as the known in the knower in the procession of the divine Word and as the beloved in lover in the procession of the divine Love. Thus, not only do we naturally image the Trinity insofar as in our minds is found the principle of the word, the word, and love but we also supernaturally image the Trinity and participate in the trinitarian conversation because we participate in the divine Word and Love proceeding.[213] That is, our words breaking forth into love—spoken interiorly in our contemplation about God and all of creation in relation to God, in our contemplation of divinely revealed truths—participate in the eternal Word breaking forth into Love that the Father utters by understanding himself. This is the Word in which the entire Trinity and all of creation are spoken.[214] This is the Love in which the entire Trinity and all of creation is loved.[215] And through the indwelling of the Trinity, we become the friends of God partaking in this divine and loving conversation, such that we speak true words and love rightly. That is, these conversations can be about God (as in preaching), they can be with God (as in prayer and worship), or they can be conversations that raise the human conversation to the divine conversation. With respect to the third of these conversations, they are

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[213] See Spezzano, *The Glory of God's Grace*, 72: "The deiform perfection of the rational creature is the knowledge and love (and so the possession and enjoyment of God as object). This is a level of participation in the divine goodness that begins with, but goes far beyond, the participation in being and divine perfection possible to those creatures that bear only a trace of the Trinitarian likeness; *it is the intentional participation of a personal being in the life of the Persons of the Trinity.*"

[214] See *ST* Ia, q. 34, a. 1 ad 3.

[215] See *ST* Ia, q. 37, a. 2c and ad. 3.

conversations in which we speak truly and love rightly, and in which we discuss, most importantly, the best way to live in light of divine revelation about who God is and who we are. Let us turn now to the conversations of teaching and preaching.

5.3 Conversation, Friendship, and Teaching: Participation in Christ's Teaching

In the earlier consideration of teaching, I noted that the human teacher is only ever a secondary or ministerial cause of the student's learning because it is God that bestows on all human persons the interior intellectual light (as a participation in divine uncreated light) by which they know anything at all.[216] Nevertheless, teachers play a significant and special role in divine providence and the divine economy. To begin, it is helpful to note that in general, intellectual creatures have a special place in divine providence. The reason is twofold: they can move themselves and the dignity of their end is higher. Through their own operations, intellectual creatures reach "the very ultimate end of the whole of things…which is the *knowing and loving of God*."[217] Not only is the ultimate end knowledge and love of God according to which God is attained *in se*. Moreover, intellectual creatures aid one another in reaching this end through mutual service. Thomas expresses this mutual aid in terms of friendship: friends help each other attain the end by helping one another know and love God.[218]

Thomas considers the role of teaching in the divine economy both in the *Secunda* and the *Tertia Pars.* Teachers of the faith and preachers, as people dedicated to knowing and loving God and handing on these fruits, have a special role in the divine economy. The economy, itself, has an educational dimension because it involves God's self-communication in which God teaches us

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[216] See *ST* Ia, q. 117, a. 1. See also Ia, q. 12, a. 2; Ia, q. 84, a. 5.

[217] *SCG* 3, c. 111, §2 (emphasis added).

[218] See *SCG* 3, c. 128, §2: "Again, the end of divine law is for man to cling to God. But one man may be aided to this end by another man, both in regard to knowledge and to love. For men are of mutual assistance to each other in the knowing of truth, and one man may stimulate another toward the good, and also restrain him from evil. Hence it is said: 'Iron sharpens iron, so a man sharpens the countenance of his friend' (Prov. 27:17)….Therefore, it was necessary for the society of men, in their mutual interrelations, to be ordered by divine law.'

about Godself. Furthermore, the divine *manuductio* has its own pedagogy. For example, divine

revelation was gradual so that humanity could progress little by little in knowledge of God.[219]

Additionally, God uses visible things to teach us about invisible things, in accordance with our

human way of knowing.

In the *Secunda pars*, Thomas first considers teaching in relation to the Articles of Faith and

for the sake of the common good. For example, Thomas explains that "[those] whose business it is

to teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe

them more explicitly."[220] Fuller knowledge requires long study and exercise, which is precisely

what those traveling the path of the *Summa* are engaged in doing.[221] In so doing, they seek to

ready themselves to assist those believers who desire to understand what they believe.[222] Next, he

considers teaching in relation to the works of mercy. Teaching is a spiritual work of mercy that

helps people understand important speculative matters.[223] In the final section of the *Secunda*

Secundae Pars, Thomas engages in a concrete moral discourse, as these concrete conversations are

the only useful ones when it comes to morality and discerning how to live a good life.[224] Teaching

is a concrete virtue that can be integrated into a virtuous way of life. Teaching another person is

an instance of gratuitous grace, whereby one person cooperates with another in order to lead him

back to God.[225] As such, teaching is part of God's plan for salvation. In the context of divine

providence, the teacher in general is a ministerial cause helping another to learn anything

whatsoever. In the context of the divine economy, the teacher of faith is an instrument of God's

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[219] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7.
[220] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 6c. See also IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad. 3.
[221] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7 ad 3; q. 1, a. 8 ad 1; q. 2, a. 3; q. 2, a. 6.
[222] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 2, a. 10c.
[223] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 32, a. 2 ad. 4.
[224] See *ST* IIa-IIae, prologue. For example, Thomas begins, 'After a general consideration of virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral matters, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For universal moral discourse is less useful, since actions are singulars….'
[225] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 111, aa. 1, 4. It is gratuitous because it is beyond the person's natural capabilities and merits, but not sanctifying because it is ordered toward the justification of another person. Also cf. Ia-IIae, q. 1, prol.

grace, helping the other know God and the divine mysteries. Teaching is also a virtue pertaining to both ways of life—contemplative and active—as well a virtue pertaining to states of perfection.

Finally, we learn that Christ is the exception to the aforementioned rule introduced in the *Prima Pars*, namely that the teacher does not cause the intellectual light and principles by which a student comes to know, but helps what naturally exists within the student.[226] Christ, by contrast, imprints his teaching directly on the hearts of his hearers.[227] In his divinity, Christ teaches us interiorly, as only God can do.[228] This interior teaching, according to which Christ imprints his teaching directly on his hearers' hearts, means that he enlightens their minds with the principles of wisdom and knowledge.[229] This is the "sweet knowledge" Thomas speaks of in Question 43 when considering the Son's invisible mission. It is coordinated with the Spirit's mission, who helps us hear the Word to whom it has listened by imprinting love, so to speak, for the Word that is enlightening our minds.[230]

Thomas presents Christ's teaching in a Trinitarian context. The Father draws us to himself through the Son's teachings, and this action of the Father through the Son occurs in and through the action of the Spirit, whose love makes Christ's human words alive and fruitful.[231] Christ impresses his understanding of his Father on the hearts of his listeners with the help of the Spirit. This inward stirring of God, this inner teaching, is the sum of all teaching. Yet, while Christ is the one true teacher, the first cause of all learning, he can also use creatures as instruments and secondary causes of his teaching, by way of his divine power and providential care of creation. Thus, the disciples become true teachers by participation. Thomas expresses the important ministerial role of teachers in his inaugural lecture, while also acknowledging their

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[226] See Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 183-84.
[227] See *ST* IIIa, q. 42, a. 4c.
[228] See *De ver.*, q. 11, a. 1 ad 8.
[229] See *De ver.*, q. 11, a. 1c. See also Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 183.
[230] I owe this observation to Patrick Byrne.
[231] See Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 190.

limitations, which demands they learn to rely on God. Therein, he reflects upon teaching in light

of Psalm 103:13, "Watering the earth from his things above, the earth will be filled from the fruit

of your works." Wondering who could be capable of this ministerial role, Thomas writes:

> Yet, although no one is adequate for this ministry by himself and from his own resources,
> he can hope that God will make him adequate. 'Not that we are capable of a single
> thought on our own resources, as if it came from us, but our adequacy is from God' (2
> Cor. 3:5). So the teacher should ask God for it. 'If people lack wisdom, they should beg
> for it from God and it will be given them' (James 1:5). Let us pray that Christ may grant
> this to us.[232]

As Sherwin explains, "Since it is by God's design that they can become teachers, their

attitude toward Christ must always be one of prayer. They must ask Christ the teacher for the

insights they need as the instruments of his instruction."[233] Herein, we can observe the importance

of listening for the teacher's development, a listening that can give rise to a contemplative study

that can in turn be handed on to others. It is according to divine wisdom that people are made

teachers, and because becoming a participant in Christ's teaching ministry is a vocation God gives

someone, teachers must continually approach Christ humbly and prayerfully in order to

participate in the process of teaching and learning that is at the heart of handing on the *sacra*

doctrina necessary for our salvation. Thus, while only God gives us the gift of the wisdom, those

preparing to teach and preach do well to acquire wisdom through study—a wisdom that is more

than the wisdom of the philosophers if not the wisdom of the *uetula* because it is the exercise of

natural reason in contact with faith. Furthermore, this study exercises their minds, purifying them

for the contemplation of the supreme good, the Trinity of persons.[234]

Christ's incorporation of the disciples into his teaching mission, as well as Christ's own

teaching, are best understood in the context of friendship. In his commentary on John's gospel,

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[232] Thomas Aquinas, *Inaugural Lecture* in Tugwell, *Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings*, 363.
[233] Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 184.
[234] See *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 9 ad 2; q. 6, a. 2cc.

Thomas "describes the disciples' participation in divine wisdom by analogy with human friendship."[235] As Thomas writes:

> Now he sets down the true sign of friendship on his own part, which is that all that I have heard from my Father I have made know to you. The true sign of friendship is that a friend reveals the *secrets* of his heart to his friend. *Since friends have one mind and heart, it does not seem that what one friend reveals to another is placed outside of his own heart*…Now God reveals his secrets to us by letting us share in his wisdom: 'In every generation she [Wisdom] passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God and prophets.'[236]

As we have seen, the conversations of friendship help us become of one mind and one heart with our friends, allowing us to know one another's secret depths. John's use of secrets, as well as Thomas's, does not intend the gnostic meaning of secret knowledge, but rather, indicates the "deep things of God." For example, Thomas writes, "The deep things are those which are hidden in Him and not those which are known about Him through creatures, which are, as it were, on the surface…"[237] These deep things pertain to the divine truths of which we need knowledge in order to progress toward life's ultimate end—to know and love God—truths we could not know apart from divine revelation. As Marshall explains, "For that we need access to what God alone can tell us about himself…Since salvation 'is accomplished by the incarnate Son and by the gift of the Holy Spirit,' the truth beyond reason which we most need to know concerns the distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father. The doctrine of the Trinity…is a *saving* truth for Aquinas."[238]

Thomas explains how it is that one may come to know the secrets of God in his prologue to his commentary on John's gospel. He does this in the context of expanding on the four ways in which John is described according to his condition. (These conditions are drawn from a passage Thomas chooses from Isaiah—the other person Thomas considered to be a "supreme

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[235] Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 190. On friendship, see *In Ioan.,* c. 14, lect. 7, n. 1837-38.
[236] *Super Ioan.,* c.15, lect. 3, n. 2016 (emphasis added). See also *In Ioan.*, c. 13, lect. 4, n. 1807.
[237] *In 1 Cor.*, c. 2, lect. 2, n. 102.
[238] Marshall, "*Quod Scit Una Uetula*," 5.

contemplative"—in order to structure his prologue). I will highlight two of these descriptions.

Thomas writes:

> The author, John, is described in four ways as to his condition. "He is described as to name as John…'John' is interpreted as 'in whom is grace,' since the *secrets of the divinity cannot be seen except by those who have the grace of God within themselves:* 'No one knows the deep things of God by the Spirit of God' (1 Cor 2:11). …John is described as to privilege since, among the other disciples of the Lord, John was more loved by Christ. Without mentioning his own name John refers to himself below (21:20) as 'the disciple whom Jesus loved.' *And because secrets are revealed to friends, "I have called you friends because everything I have heard from my father I have made known to you" (below 15:15), Jesus confided his secrets in a special way to that disciple who was specially loved…*[239]

Thus, to come to know the secrets of God, one must have grace and also be a friend of God. It is friendship with God that initiates, sustains, and cultivates our knowledge of the depth of God's heart. It is because we are friends of God that we are given to know the mysterious depths of God's heart. Friendship is the context within which we know and love God. This means that our knowledge of God is more than mere facts or affirmations; it is personal. It is only in the context of an interpersonal relationship with God that knowledge of God is truly meaningful.

Commenting on these same passages, Levering writes:

> For Aquinas, revelation depends upon the graced interior preparation and prayerful contemplation of the disciples who receive and reciprocate Jesus' love. St. John, Aquinas explains, was able to grasp and to present the mystery of Jesus' divinity in a more profound way than were the other evangelists because 'among the other disciples of the Lord, John was more loved by Christ.' In other words, St. John's appropriation of *sacra doctrina* depends upon the spiritual exercise that is friendship with Christ. …If the *Summa Theologiae's* treatise on God (one and three) is a spiritual exercise intended to form as well as inform the reader, then this spiritual exercise is necessarily rooted in contemplation of the master/friend, Jesus Christ—a contemplation of the Word through the Holy Spirit.[240]
>
> Christ's friendship with the disciples in which he shares the secrets learned at his Father's

bosom, and which he then empowers the disciples to likewise share, has educational aspects. Divine friendship is the context within which Christ teaches the disciples, and disciples put this

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[239] *In Joan.*, prol., n. 11.
[240] Levering, *Scripture and Metaphysics*, 42-43.

teaching into practice by teaching others.[241] As Sherwin writes of Thomas's interpretation of these educational aspects of the friendship among Christ and his disciples, "one of the reasons Christ educates his disciples is to incorporate them into his mission of leading people to himself."[242] In the *Summa*, Thomas observes that this incorporation—which involves the fact that Christ did not commit his teaching to writing—is in keeping with the order of teaching, so that his teaching might reach all in an orderly manner. Christ taught his disciples immediately and they subsequently taught others by preaching and writing.[243] This orderly teaching is in keeping with the divine economy and its gradual revelation, of which Thomas spoke in the questions on faith in the *Secunda pars*. It is through letting Christ's words abide in their hearts that the disciples "become fit to bear fruit in teaching."[244] His words abide in four ways: " by your loving them, believing them, meditating on them and accomplishing them."[245] As Sherwin observes, "These four actually reduce to the twin stages of contemplating and giving the fruits of our contemplation to others. We are to contemplate what we believe and love, and then embody it in our actions. …Thomas is saying that the good news of Christ remains in the disciples when they make God known by the tenor of their lives and the quality of their teaching."[246] In other words, contemplation (here understood as meditating on the words of Christ that one loves and believes, i.e., considering divine truth) in this life naturally extends to helping others know and love our mutual friend, the triune God. The word of God that abides in us is like the Word of God, which goes out from the bosom of the Father to share the deep things of God with others; the Word remains by being poured forth—by being embodied in our actions; by our manifesting the Word

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[241] As Sherwin explains, '[W]hen St. Thomas describes the friendship with Christ that the Spirit establishes among the disciples, he focuses on two *educational* aspects of this friendship: Divine friendship is the context within which (1) God teaches the disciples, and (2) the disciples put this teaching into practice by teaching others' (191).

[242] Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 191. See *In Ioan.* c. 6, lect. 1, n. 864.

[243] *ST* IIIa, q. 42, a. 4c.

[244] *In. Ioan.*, c. 15, lect. 1, 1996.

[245] *In. Ioan.*, c. 15, lect. 1, 1995.

[246] Sherwin, "Christ the Teacher," 1992.

and becoming doers of the Word, as Thomas expressed it in his Lenten sermon-conference on the Creed.

6. Conclusion: *Contemplata Aliis Tradere*, Friendship, and Trinification

Contemplata aliis tradere is best understood as an activity of friendship. It is also one way in which the process of trinification can occur. I begin with friendship. In Thomas's Dominican understanding, when a preacher hands on the fruits of his contemplation, his goal is the salvation of others. Given that our last end is eternal beatitude (the uninterrupted contemplation of God)[247] and that beatitude as shared is the foundation of friendship with God, this goal is ultimately about helping others in their journey of becoming friends of God. In this way, I argue that *contemplata aliis tradere* is not only emblematic of the mixed life. It is also a facet of the new interpersonal situation inaugurated by the coordinated divine missions and the effect of the Spirit's mission in us—*gratia gratum faciens*.[248] It is a facet of this new interpersonal situation because it is encompassed within our friendship with God (*contemplata* as *conversatio*), our friendship with each other as common friends of God, and our efforts in helping others cultivate their friendship with God (*aliis tradere* as *conversatio*). In other words, *contemplata aliis tradere* is caught up in the divine conversation and the elevated human conversation, conversations that constitute the heart of friendship. *Contemplata aliis tradere,* then, is conversational: it is a drawing in (listening) so as to pour out (speaking). Yet, even the pouring out involves ongoing listening, as one must listen to those to whom his preaching in order to speak meaningfully, lest his words fall upon deaf ears.[249]

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[247] See *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 4, a. 8 sc.

[248] This is most apparent in Thomas's commentary on the Gospel of John and especially his prologue to his commentary in which he considers John one of the supreme contemplatives.

[249] In the Conclusion, which follows this Chapter, I will return to the plan of the *Summa* in order to demonstrate how the trajectory of the *Summa* is intentionally set forth to promote friendship, conversation, preaching, and teaching, all in the context of trinitarian theology and trinification. That is, the *Summa* heads toward the contemplation of God as triune, which is both the end of being human and the Dominican's teaching/preaching.

We are able to converse with God as God's friends, such that God becomes ever more present to us as the known and the beloved. We are also able to converse anew with one another because we are now friends on God's account—our friendship has a new and stronger basis; we are brothers and sisters insofar as we are God's adopted children.[250] We can converse with each other from this new shared horizon (*communicatio*) and the new life it entails (the life of grace), helping one another cultivate the virtues necessary for this life. These conversations with God and with others entail the activities of speaking and listening. These are the very activities that constitute us as human persons, as intellectual creatures created to the image of the Trinity. These conversations also involve the oneness of mind and heart that is cultivated as friends share their interior depths with one another and as they come to know and love each other. Thus, these conversations also include the mutual indwelling of friends in one another as the known and the beloved. Lastly, conversations are one of the primary means of our ongoing conversion, which is interpersonal because we become better imitators of Christ when we follow his own way of perfection, a way that included his relationships with his Father and their Spirit, as well as his friendships with his disciples.

Contemplata aliis tradere is also one way in which the process of trinification can occur, both for those handing on their fruits and for those receiving them. In this way, *contemplata aliis tradere* is a participation in the divine plan for salvation. Furthermore, the process of a teacher or preacher handing on the fruits of their contemplation is "triniform" insofar as it is based in acts of true speaking and holy listening. As we have seen, in coming to know and love God, we are moved to help others do the same; in this life, we do not rest in our contemplation, but seeing the needs of others, become concerned for their well-being and act. In helping others know and love God, a preacher/teacher at once cultivates friendship and assists others in their journey of becoming

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[250] See *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 3c.

more like God. This is the case precisely because speaking and listening are the acts that deepen our friendship with God as well as our likeness to God. Thus, the very same acts constitute our friendship with the triune God and our assimilation to the triune exemplar.

Furthermore, assimilation to God actually involves two elements, which Thomas discusses in the questions on divine providence. One regards God's goodness: "and so the creature becomes like Him by being good…" The second regards God as "the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good."[251] Thomas uses teaching as his preferred example for this second type of assimilation. Beyond teaching, an even greater good is to teach students to become teachers. It is not surprising that Thomas, who prizes the mixed life and its emphasis on teaching, would find this to be the case. In fact, historically, teaching others to become teachers is what Thomas was doing in writing the *Summa* for his *studium personale* at Santa Sabina. In light of this dual path of assimilation to the triune God and our ultimate end (knowing and loving God as our friend), we can observe the following in relation to *contemplata aliis tradere:* (1) knowing and loving God (*contemplata*) and; (2) helping others know and love God (*aliis tradere*). The following image illustrates the relationship between trinification and the mixed life of handing on the fruits of one's contemplation, all in the context of conversation:

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[251] *ST* Ia, q. 103, a. 4c.

trinification

know & love God:
contemplative study
(conversation, listening and
interiorly speaking true
words that give rise to
complacency and concern)
[*contemplata*]
becoming good is
one way of becoming like God

[*tradere*]

help others
know & love God:
preaching & teaching
(conversation, a speaking
grounded in listening
to those to whom
one ministers)
[*aliis*]
helping others become good is
another way of becoming like God
(ST Ia, q. 103.4, 6)

mixed life

Figure 3[252]

I suggest that this relation is mutual because in helping others know and love God, we also deepen

our knowledge and love because we learn from those to whom we are sent. This is a common

experience of teachers, who often remark that they learn more from their students than their

students learn from them. One of the reasons is that it is usually only when we have to speak of

what we have learned to others that we encounter the humbling gaps in our own knowledge.

Thomas does not speak in terms of this mutuality, and so my advertence to the listening

that a good preacher must observe is a creative retrieval of Thomas's understanding of the mixed

life and the reasons for its prominence. Nevertheless, we can observe traces of a kind of mutuality

in his understanding of the order of the universe in which all creatures are interdependent.

Perhaps, however, the best evidence comes from Thomas's own teaching and preaching. For

example, in the opening prologue to the *Summa*, we have seen Thomas's attentiveness to the

[252] It is my observation that helping others know and love God occurs, in part, through a speaking
grounded in listening. However, I believe Thomas would agree with this point, especially given the
Dominican vocation to be confessors—a vocation that involves listening, and almost inevitably teaches
confessors about humanity and grace in all their concreteness.

obstacles students have encountered in learning *sacra doctrina*. As Kevin White notes, Thomas uses

the opening prologue to offer himself as a trustworthy guide for students precisely because he is

aware of the difficulties that have obstructed their path.[253] He has heard their difficulties. With

regard to preaching, Thomas sought to orient his words to his audience appropriately. As Torrell

writes:

> It is said that Thomas always denied himself the use of oratorical tricks to which
> preachers sometimes yield (display of knowledge, big words, and short stories to keep the
> congregations attention, all of which was foreign to him.) …Thomas reminds us that the
> manner of speaking must be adapted to the subject being treated. …the preacher must
> never lose sight of the essential element of Christian teaching, which is the salvation
> brought by the Cross of Christ. Therefore, those who rely on the prestige of their
> eloquence to proclaim the Cross end up emptying it of its substance. Following
> Augustine, Thomas notes that the pulpit from which Christ teaches is the Cross (*crux illa
> schola erat*).[254]

Lastly, while Thomas may not speak in terms of listening to those to whom one preaches, he

does—as we saw in his sermon on Luke 8—speak in terms of the preachers ongoing cooperation

with the Father, Son, and Spirit ("let *us* go").[255] As he writes in his commentary on Jesus'

appearance to Peter in John's gospel: "[P]reachers should have total confidence in the help of

Christ. All that night they caught nothing, because as long as God's help and the interior

Preacher are not there, the words of the preacher have no effect. But when the light comes,

enlightening hearts, the preacher makes a catch…"[256]

In adverting to God's help, Thomas calls to mind the purely instrumental role the

preacher plays in the divine economy. He also calls to mind the continuous listening to God that

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[253] See Kevin White, "St. Thomas on Prologues," *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 98 (2005).

[254] Torrell, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas*, 167.

[255] See above, §4.3 Thomas's Reflections on *Contemplata Aliis Tradere:* Sermons and Scripture Commentary.
Recall that the conversation between God and the preacher continues in the preacher's preaching, for he
goes out *with* God. Commenting on the book of Songs, chapter 2 ("Come, my beloved, let us go out in
the field"), Thomas explains that "let *us* go out," discloses a particular familiarity of God with the
preacher, indicating that the together God and the preacher go out, God by inspiring the preacher, and
the preacher by preaching.

[256] *In Ioan.*, c. 21, lect. 1, n. 2582.

takes place in good preacher—God who, unlike us, can know the minds and hearts of people

without their needing to express themselves in words.

Not only is *contemplata aliis tradere* best understood in the context of friendship and

trinification, but friendship and trinification are intimately linked: the more we come to know and

love our friends, the more we dwell in one another as the known in the knower and the beloved in

the lover. When God is the friend, it is God we are becoming more like. As we saw in Chapter 5,

this likeness occurs both because God is the object of our knowing and loving—God is who we

are conversing with—and because in knowing and loving God, we are performing the very

operations that are the reason we are *ad imaginem Dei* in the first place. Through the gift of the

Spirit, the performance of these operations in conversation with God are even participations in

the divine processions that constitute God as triune—as Speaking, Word, Listening. In the

Conclusion, which follows this chapter, I will explain how the structure of the *Summa* supports

friendship, conversation, and preaching/teaching in the context of trinitarian theology and

trinification.

In this light, I conclude with one final observation, which draws a connection between the

previous chapter and this chapter. We can observe an important connection between Thomas's

consideration of beatitude and friendship, on the one hand, and his theology of the trinitarian

indwelling and our assimilation to the Trinity on the other. In considering our beatitude at the

beginning of the *Secunda pars,* Thomas writes:

> As stated above, our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to
> attain. … Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the
> thing desired. … In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely,
> God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the
> second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else
> than the attainment or enjoyment [*fruitio*] of the last end. Now the last end is called
> happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is

something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.[257]

Notice that Thomas maintains that our last end *is* God *in se*, and that in this way, our last end is an uncreated Good. He also maintains that our last end is our *enjoyment* of God, our last end, and that this enjoyment is a created good. Now recall the following from the trinitarian questions:

> Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy [*frui*] as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person.[258]

It is on account of the Holy Spirit being given to us that the entire Trinity dwells within us, making it possible for us to enjoy the divine Persons. The Trinity's indwelling is the uncreated gift. This is the uncreated supreme good that is our last end, the cause or object of our beatitude. The ability to enjoy the divine persons is the created gift (*gratia gratum faciens* or sanctifying grace). This is the created good that is our last end, the effect in us whereby we are happy. Our ability to enjoy the divine persons is our enjoyment of our last end, and it consists in our freely knowing God truly and loving God rightly, according to which God is present to us as a friend (as known and beloved) with whom we are of one mind and heart. It is the communion of mind and heart that is enjoyable. This created ability is made possible by the uncreated gift of partaking of the divine processions themselves, for when God dwells in us, God dwells in us as God is, that is, as eternally constituted as triune—as Speaking, Word, Love/Listening, as true Speaking of and Holy Listening to the Word. We can prepare for this eternal joy, in the light of grace, through a contemplative study that includes exercising our minds, purifying them for the supreme good. The student who travels the wisely ordered path of the *Summa* progresses from milk to meat, and

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[257] *ST* Ia-IIae, q. 3, a. 1.
[258] *ST* Ia, q. 38, a. 1.

is thereby prepared to hand on the fruits of his contemplation, speaking to others what he has interiorly conceived in his transformative encounter with the Word of God.

1. The *Summa theologiae:* The Journey to Becoming a Preacher Speaking about God

Throughout this project, I have been arguing that the *Summa theologiae* is a contemplative study supporting the Dominican student's trinification and friendship with God. The more the student of the *Summa* comes to know and love his friend, God, the more he becomes like God. Consequently, the better able he is to help others develop their friendship with God by speaking to them about the God he has come to know and love as a friend through his contemplative study. The *Summa*, then, is an effort to cultivate friendship between God and the human person, as well as among human persons. Friendship requires work, especially the work of conversation by which we come to know and love our friends more deeply and according to which we develop a deeper and deeper communion of mind and heart.

This conclusion pulls together the previous chapters' insights into the particular parts of the *Summa theologiae* to demonstrate how the very structure of the *Summa*, itself, considered as a whole, supports trinification and friendship for the sake of preparing students to speak about God to others. This illustration brings us full circle to one of the major claims of this project, which has been to argue that the form and content of the *Summa* belong together. When kept together, traveling the wisely ordered path of the *Summa* can be a transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina*. Integrating form and content also discloses the centrality of trinitarian theology to the unfolding of the *Summa.*

1.1 The *Prima pars*

I will first consider the three main sections of the *Prima pars,* according to the *divisio textus* set forth in the major prologues of the *Prima pars.* Questions 2–26 prepare the student for the trinitarian theology of Questions 27–43. That the first set of questions is ordered to the second set allays any

concerns that the Trinity is an afterthought in Thomas's theology. Questions 27–43 help the student develop concepts for engaging the trinitarian mystery. Questions 44-119 help the student develop concepts about creation and about oneself as created *ad imaginem Dei*.

1.1.1 The *Prima pars:* Questions 2-26

The initial questions on the divine essence (qq. 2-26) prepare the student to raise and address questions concerning the divine persons. They do so in a variety of ways. First, they help the students develop a true concept of God, which includes helping the student understand what can be said of God. Therefore, these questions are the beginning of his learning how to speak about God to others. Here, we can observe the relationship between one's inner words and making these inner words known to others through speech discussed in Chapter 6. Second, they help the students understand important terms (e.g., potency and act as applied to God, immanent versus transitive operations, etc.), relevant to trinitarian theology. Third, they help the student purify his mind and thus transcend corporeal thinking. Lastly, the initial questions on the divine essence not only prepare the student for the trinitarian questions, but they also call the Trinity to mind at important junctures, indicating that the Trinity is not secondary to theology for Thomas, but always present, animating the believer's journey to know and love God.

First, I turn to Thomas's effort to help students develop a true concept of God and a suitable "religious language," as David Burrell puts it, for speaking about God. The goal of understanding to which the *ordo disciplinae* is ordered includes the development of concepts because understanding gives rise to concepts. We can observe Thomas helping the student develop a true concept of the true God in Questions 3–11. Beginning with developing a concept of God is a pedagogically expedient place to start for a beginner on the way to the triune God. For example, coming to terms with divine simplicity is indispensable to Questions 27-43. Without progressing from dependent realities to independent realities (q. 2), and without coming to terms

with what radically differentiates them (qq. 3-11), the student cannot grasp the trinitarian

problem. Unless the student understands the meaning of divine simplicity, confused responses to

divine "tri-unity" arise. He will not appreciate the difficulty for understanding how this belief can

be true, which means that the question will not spontaneously arise for him—and without good

questions, good answers are lacking. Further, he will be susceptible to compromising divine unity

at the expense of distinction (or vice versa) or distinguishing persons apart from and prior to their

relations. Not only is it pedagogically necessary to begin with clarifying the meaning of "God"

before asking whether there are processions in God[1], but it is also pedagogically expedient

because it avoids repetition, lest Thomas have to consider the divine essence thrice.

In Questions12–13, Thomas assists the student in coming to terms with the limits of his

knowledge and understand how to name God within these limits respectively. These questions

begin to help the student learn how to speak about God.[2] These questions cultivate the

methodological acuity and humility required for approaching the mysteries of faith.[3] Herein,

Thomas is concerned to teach his students the possibilities and limits of human knowing. They

learn to differentiate what can be known naturally and what can only be known by the

supernatural light of faith. They also learn to understand that even when human intelligence is

enlightened by faith, we cannot provide necessary reasons for revealed truths because the reason

for these divine mysteries is the divine essence, which in this life is unknown.[4]

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[1] Notice that Thomas does *not* begin the trinitarian questions by asking whether the Son proceeds from the Father. Such a question presupposes the very things it seeks to illuminate—the distinction of divine persons.

[2] For a helpful explanation of these Questions in relation to understanding, concepts, and names, see Rudi te Velde, *Aquinas on God: The 'Divine Science' of the* Summa Theologiae (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 95-122. Te Velde builds on David Burrell's work to reinterpret Thomas's doctrine of God as "grammar of God talk" (96).

[3] For the necessity of humility, see *SCG* I, ch. 5, no. 4.

[4] See *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 11.

In addition to helping the student develop a true concept of God, within Questions 2–26, Questions 3–13 exercise the student in the use of religious language, preparing him for his ministry of speaking about God, who is "the beginning and end of all things and of reasoning creatures especially."[5] As Burrell has expertly demonstrated, these questions exercise the student in learning what sorts of things can be said of that which remains incomprehensible, and how to say them in a way that is intelligible yet respectful of the divine mystery.[6] He explains that the "exercise" of Questions 3-11 "might be entitled: What, if anything, can be said about the beginning and end of all things?"[7] According to Timothy McDermott, what we find Thomas doing in these questions is turning "our very inability to know God into a fruitful piece of information about him."[8] Thomas accomplishes this, as Burrell explains, "by carefully selecting the topics for predication, and then by treating each topic in the two ways offered in [Question 12, Article 12]: first, in asserting what cannot be said of God, and then trying to show how this restrictive predication reveals not deficiency but transcendence."[9] Based on this assessment, Burrell divides Questions 3-11 as follows:

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[5] *ST* Ia, q. 2, prol. See Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding*. This phrase from the prologue to Question 2 is what Burrell considers Thomas's "shorthand" for God.

[6] Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding*, 81.

[7] Ibid., 82.

[8] Timothy McDermott (ed.), St. Thomas Aquinas*, Summa theologiae*, Volume 2 (Ia 2-11): *Existence and Nature of God*, 18, note a.

[9] Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding*, 86. Earlier, Burrell quoted Article 12 of Question 12: "we can be led from [divine effects] to know of God (1) that he exists and (2) that he has whatever must belong to the first cause of all things which is beyond all that is caused. Thus we know
(1) about [God's] relation to creatures, and
(2) about the difference between [God] and them:
                    (a) that nothing created is in [God]; and
                    (b) that [God's] lack of such things is not a
deficiency in [God] but due to [God's] transcendence."
This translation and organization of Ia, q. 12, a. 12c. is Burrell's. See Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding*, 85.

(a)	(b)
3. God's simplicity	4. God's perfection
5. General notion of good	6. Goodness of God
7. God's limitlessness	8. God's existence in things
9. God's unchangeableness	10. Eternity of God
	11. Oneness of God[10]

The questions in column (a) help the student wrestle with the fact that there is nothing created in

God (God is utterly transcendent), while the questions in column (b) help the student "turn a

denial into a piece of information," or as he puts it elsewhere, these questions help the student

understand "how that denial might spell not poverty but plenitude."[11] In this way, Thomas helps

the student learn how to speak of God in such a way that preserves both divine transcendence and

divine immanence. The concept of analogy introduced in Question 13 is what allows us to speak

of divine transcendence-in-immanence. This is what Kathryn Tanner calls "non-contrastive"

language because it helps to cultivate an awareness that God is neither in opposition to the world

nor is God identified with the world.[12] Rather, God is the "Other other."[13] Thus, Questions 3-11

can be understood as "exercise[ing] the reader in non-contrastive language-use," while

"Questions 12-13 take the reader beyond non-contrastive language by linking how we attain

knowledge concerning God [q. 12] to how we speak about God [q. 13]…"[14] It is in learning how

analogical language can be used to deepen one's awareness of God's incomprehensibility that is

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[10] Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding*, 86-87. Burrell summarizes these columns: "In effect, question five denies that we call [God] good because he performs good actions…question seven denies that God is a definite or predictable object, and question nine says that this thing alone is not in process. The companion question in column (b) asks what one might make of each specific denial" (87-88). For an alternative way of understanding the relationship of these initial questions, see Te Velde, *Aquinas on God*, 83.

[11] Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding*, 87. "Information" is Burrell's word. While in the previous chapter I contrasted "information" with personal knowledge of God, I do not find Burrell's understanding of these questions inconsistent with my own, which is perhaps exhibited by his later use of "plenitude" rather than "information." See Wendlinder, with whom I am in agreement (*Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 102).

[12] See Kathryn Tanner, *God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).

[13] See James Alison, *Broken Hearts and New Creations: Intimations of a Great Reversal* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 166.

[14] Wendlinder, *Speaking of God in Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart*, 102-03.

the key to Thomas's dynamic use of analogy.[15] This is why I emphasized in Chapters 2 and 5 that analogical understanding is always imperfect—because we cannot affirm any of the analogies we use to understand God since we cannot know God's essence—yet fruitful, because it yields a positive understanding of revealed truths.

While Burrell talks in terms of "exercises in religious language or understanding," for Thomas, these exercises were historically situated in the Dominican's task to speak to others about God for the sake of their salvation. That is, these exercises prepared the students for their contemplative study of God, the fruits of which would be handed on. Wendlinder, a student of Burrell, expresses this point well:

> The 'narrative' [of creation-sanctification-redemption] Aquinas employs in the *Summa* leads the student-readers through their own journey by exercising them in appropriately extending human language to the Divine, thus developing in future preachers and teachers skills in using language flexibly in order to draw others *away* from misconstruing the articles and doctrines of Christian faith and *toward*s knowing God. …The ultimate goal of this narrative is moving the believer from focusing on knowledge about God toward knowing God—an awareness that 'speaking about God' goes beyond describing God to building a relationship with God.[16]

Furthermore, in the first thirteen questions, "whatever Aquinas asserts about the existence, nature, or attributes of God intends to preserve the unique distinction of the Creator from creatures, and in so doing, assists the reader in developing a highly nuanced skill in speaking about God that will help others in their faith journey."[17] By the end of the Question 13, the student can truly appreciate that God's incomprehensibility far outweighs anything that can be said about God, and yet, appreciating this is in itself significant in the journey of faith seeking understanding. It is even a perfection of our knowledge of God: "[T]he more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that the mind

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[15] See Ibid., 102.
[16] Ibid., 69 (emphasis original).
[17] Ibid.

comprehends."[18] Thus, the *via negativa* is not devoid of meaning and content, and in fact, presupposes positive claims about God.

In addition to helping the student recognize the strict limits and modest possibilities of our knowledge of God[19] and learning how to extend human language to God, Thomas also introduces important terms that are necessary for questions that follow. For example, the questions on the divine operations are also pedagogically necessary for the questions on the distinction of persons and on the procession of creatures from God. The questions on immanent operations (qq. 14-21) are integral for understanding the divine processions, for which the intelligible emanations of word and love are the principles of analogical understanding (qq. 27-43). The question on transitive operations (q. 25)—that is, power—is integral for understanding the procession of creatures (qq. 44-102). The remaining questions on immanent operations, which consider intellect and will together (qq. 22-24), are integral for understanding the divine governance of the natural created order (qq. 103-119). This discloses, as Mongeau calls it, a "continuity in difference"[20] between the first, second, and third tripartite consideration of God in the *Prima Pars* (that is, God *in se est*—the divine essence and the distinction of persons—and God as the beginning of all things—the procession of creatures). Each consideration uses the pairs of intellect and will, and of immanent and transitive operations, such that what comes later depends upon and enriches what has preceded it. From the foregoing, it is clear that contrary to Rahner's evaluation of Thomas's starting points and trinitarian theology, Thomas does not prioritize the divine essence nor does he neglect the Trinity. Rather, he pedagogically prepares the student to engage the Trinity fruitfully. Particularly, his preparation of the student for the terms of the

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[18] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 8, a. 7c.

[19] To relate this to the *verbum*, we can, with Lonergan, call this "a true concept of the true God." See Bernard Lonergan, "Natural Knowledge of God," in *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.* Eds. William F.J. Ryan, S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrell, S.J., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 119

[20] Mongeau, "Spiritual Pedagogy," 103.

psychological analogy through the questions on divine immanent operations, and the clarification of terms and relations like potency and act, and especially the concept of simplicity, sets the conditions for the student to integrate the mysteries of the Trinity and the divine economy. In this way, the psychological analogy is propaedeutic for the divine missions and their subsequent unfolding in the remaining two parts.

Additionally, we can observe the *ordo disciplinae* and the orderly development of concepts at work in these questions. For example, in the prologue to Question 14 of the *Prima Pars,* Thomas explains that since operation naturally follows substance in the order of being, he now considers divine operation.[21] Operation and substance are one in God, but according to the development of our concepts, it is intelligible to begin with substance and move on to operation. In proceeding this way, Thomas is following the *ordo disciplinae,* which takes into account how the student best proceeds from one thing to another, that is, from known to unknown. He is also taking into account the unique character of the subject matter of *sacra doctrina*, God, in whom there is no distinction, nor any priority or posteriority, which the student should have grasped by this juncture in the *Summa.*

A third thing these initial questions help the student accomplish is that they aid the purification of his mind and thus assist him in transcending corporeal thinking. Purification and transcendence prepare the student for the trinitarian theology of the next set of questions and for the student's ultimate task of speaking about God to others.[22] With Augustine, Thomas found this purification to be a necessary propaedeutic to trinitarian theology, though he is less explicit about this point than Augustine. As we observed in Chapter 6 when discussing 1 Cor. 3:1-3, which

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[21] *ST* Ia, q. 14, prol.

[22] See above, §1.1.1. The *Prima pars:* Questions 2-26. First, these initial questions help the students to recognize the strict limits and modest possibilities of our knowledge of God. Second, they help the students understand important terms relevant to trinitarian theology.

Thomas and Augustine both use at the outset of their texts, the reader of *De trinitate* must undergo a purgation of the mind in order to approach the mystery of the Trinity and seek to understand it, although imperfectly, with Augustine. The reader must adopt a posture of humility in order to begin the purge because endeavoring to approach the trinitarian mystery is a journey beset with great difficulty—even Augustine is ready to admit failure at the end of his journey. Augustine demands self-awareness from his readers, humble enough to entertain the possibility that if they do not understand, it might not mean Augustine's analogy is unintelligible, but rather, that they might need to purify their minds further, re-read, and try the journey again, just as Thomas had to do in his ongoing and developing engagement with *De trinitate*.[23]

The connection between purifying the mind and overcoming corporeal thinking is important, and both are necessary for the practice of trinitarian theology. In Book 10 of *De trinitate*, Augustine considers the meaning and possibility of the oracle's command, "know thyself." Thomas references this passage in Question 87 of the *Prima pars*, which occurs in the context of his theological consideration of human understanding. He asks how the human mind knows its own essence—i.e., he asks about the mind's self-knowledge.[24] According to Augustine, self-knowledge is a laborious task because we confuse the mind with the objects it knows and loves, especially those objects below it, which come much more easily to it:

> Such is the force of love that when the mind has been thinking about things with love for a long time and has got stuck [*cogitauerit*] to them with the glue of care [*curae glutino*], it drags them along with itself even when it returns after a fashion to thinking about itself…But the mind is mistaken when it joins itself to these images with such extravagant love [*amore*] that it even comes to think of itself something of the same sort. Thus it gets conformed to them in a certain fashion, not by being what they are but by thinking it is…So in short, when the mind thinks of itself like that, it thinks it is a body.[25]

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[23] See Augustine, *De trinitate*, 1.1.3 (Hill, 66-67).
[24] See *ST* Ia, 1. 87, a. 1c
[25] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 10..5.7 (Hill, 292; emphasis added).

Augustine continues shortly afterward, further explaining how this confusion arises: "[T]hose who think it is a body do not make their mistake because mind is not available to their knowledge, but because they add those things to it without which they cannot think about any nature."[26] These things people add to their minds are images or phantasms. Adverting to one's mind as present and developing self-knowledge is hard-won because when the mind confuses itself with the bodies it knows and loves, it is also confusing the mind for an object *absent* from it, just as these bodies are absent from it. Thus, the mind overlooks that fact that in knowing anything, it is conscious of itself—and so already has the basis of self-knowledge—and instead goes off in search of itself.

It is this misleading substitution of bodies (of images, of pictures) for mind that inspires both Augustine and Thomas to help their readers overcome such misidentification through ongoing exercises that prepare them for the genuine knowledge of the mind that is requisite for pursuing the understanding of the psychological analogy for the Trinity. While Augustine and Thomas accomplish this with different techniques—one more explicit and phenomenological, the other more implicit and systematic, respectively—the common thread running through the books/questions prior to those on the psychological analogy is the active disentanglement of the real from the bodily. The real is not a body, but rather, the real is what is known.[27] And it is the mind, which is not a body, that knows reality. Augustine does not shy away from the issue, but in the very first book, speaks of the necessity of purifying our minds of the false ideas we have about God before "that inexpressible reality can be inexpressibly seen by them."[28] Thomas also makes the necessity of purification explicit in the opening prologue of the *Summa*, but he communicates this necessity by using the art of rhetoric in his reference to the same Pauline passage with which Augustine begins the *De trinitate*. Those unfamiliar with the art of rhetoric can miss Thomas's

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[26] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 10.7.10 (Hill, 294).
[27] For example, see *ST* Ia, q. 16, a. 1.
[28] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 1.1.3 (Hill, 66-67).

allusion to the Augustinian concern for purgation in order to authentically and truly pursue an understanding of what one believes. Moreover, as we observed above, Questions 3-13 can be read as a series of exercises in which the reader is meant to come to terms with the transcendence of God, an exercise which *de facto* requires coming to terms with "the real," for God is *ipsum esse*.

Lastly, Thomas rhetorically introduces the *Verbum* and the Trinity in these questions, even though according to the *ordo disciplinae,* the Trinity is treated after the divine essence. Thomas's numerous references to the Trinity in these initial questions demonstrates that his consideration of the one God is never really apart from the consideration of the Trinity of persons because they are one and the same God; everything that is said of the divine essence is said equally of each divine person. In fact, grasping this point is one facet of trinitarian theology. As we saw in Chapter 6, Thomas uses the incarnate Word in the *sed contra* of some articles to teach us something about the divine essence and/or the Word in his divinity, e.g., that God is truth.[29]

Thomas also refers to the *imago Dei* and the Trinity at various points in the questions on the divine essence, usually in the *sed contra* of an article. For example, when arguing that God is not a body, Thomas introduces the *imago Dei* to explain that even though the human person is said to be created to the image of God, this does not mean God is a body, for it is not the human body that images God:

> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image and likeness', it is added, 'And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea.' (Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.[30]

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[29] See *ST,* q. 16, a. 5sc. For other places in the initial question where the Incarnate Word is rhetorically present as our teacher of divine things, see q. 14, a. 6; q. 18, a. 4; q. 25, a. 5.

[30] *ST* Ia, q. 3, a. 1 ad 2. For other references to the *imago Dei* in these initial questions, see q. 4, a. 3sc and ad 4; q. 14, a. 2 obj. 3. For references to the *imago Dei* in the trinitarian questions, prior to Q. 93, see *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 1 ad 2; q. 33, a. 3; q. 35, a. 1 ad 1 and a. 2 ad 3; q. 39, a. 7c; q. 38, a. 8c; q. 41, a. 3c. See also q. 45, a. 7c.

In the very first question in which Thomas considers the divine essence, Thomas has already introduced the image and Genesis 1:26, which he will eventually give a trinitarian interpretation, because to be created to the image of God is to be created in the image of the Trinity, since God is triune.[31]

With respect to the Trinity, in Question 10 when considering whether God is eternal, Thomas uses Athanasius as his authority in the *sed contra:* "Athanasius says in his Creed: 'The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.'"[32] Next, when considering whether God is supremely one, Thomas calls the Trinity to mind, preparing the student to anticipate difficulties that might arise when trying to understand and conceive how God can be one and three: "Bernard says (De Consid. v): 'Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place.'"[33] In Question 12 on our knowledge of God, Thomas uses Christ's baptism as an example of one of the two ways grace elevates human reason with respect to our knowledge of God (strengthening our intellectual light and forming images): "[S]ometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard: 'This is My beloved Son' (Mt. 3:17)."[34] For Thomas, the revelation of the Trinity is the supreme example of our graced knowledge of God; knowledge of the Trinity that teaches us how to think rightly about creation and redemption. Lastly, we observed another instance in Chapter 6 when Thomas argued that God is the supreme good by way of Augustine's remark in *De trinitate* that the Trinity of divine persons is the supreme good. In order to contemplate this good, we must purify our minds.[35]

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[31] *ST* Ia, 1. 93, a. 5c.
[32] *ST* Ia, q. 10, a. 2 sc.
[33] *ST* Ia, q. 11, a. 4 sc.
[34] *ST* Ia, q. 12, a. 13c.
[35] For other references to the Trinity or to the divine persons in the initial questions, see *ST* Ia, q. 16, a. 5 ad

1.1.2 The *Prima Pars:* Questions 27-43

In Chapter 5, we saw that Thomas began to realize during his writing of *De veritate* that the

relevant trinitarian analogue was really for the two processions, which are acts. By the time

Thomas came to compose the *Summa theologiae*, he was able to present Augustine's achievement

according to his own application of the *ordo disciplinae* to *sacra doctrina*, structuring the trinitarian

questions in a remarkably different way than in earlier works.[36] Where Augustine arrived at the

two dynamic processions of knowing and loving toward the end of his process of discovery in *De*

trinitate (although he first suggests them in Book 9), Thomas begins with these two processions

because he is proceeding according to the order of teaching and learning. We have just seen the

pedagogical importance of beginning the consideration of God with the questions on the divine

essence. There is also the pedagogical significance of beginning the trinitarian questions (which

are part of Thomas's consideration of God) with the question on divine processions (rather than

with the persons, for example). Thomas expresses this in the prologue to Questions 27-43:

> Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of
> what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are
> distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the
> doctrine [*ordinem doctrinae*] leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession;
> secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.[37]

Pedagogically, Thomas begins with the processions because we need to understand procession in

order to understand relations in order to understand persons.[38]

In these trinitarian questions, Thomas helps the student develop the concepts necessary

for engaging the trinitarian mystery. He operates according to a twofold way in which concepts

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2; q. 19, a. 10sc; q. 20, a. 4 ad 2; q. 25, a. 5.

[36] Compare, for example, works as recent as *De potentia* in which the questions on the divine relations (q. 8) and the divine Persons (q. 9) precede the question on the procession of the divine persons (q. 10). See Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 95-102.

[37] *ST* Ia, q. 27, prol. The ordo doctrine is same movement as the ordo disciplinae, but it emphasizes the teaching side of the process of teaching and learning.

[38] See *ST* Ia q. 29, prol.

can be ordered. There is (a) the order of our concepts as they originate in our discursive reasoning process (the order of our concepts in a state of becoming, which corresponds to the order of intelligence)[39], and there is also (b) the order of the concepts insofar as they relate to each other in reality (the order of our concepts in a state of actual being, which corresponds to the order of reality). Both orders belong to the *ordo disciplinae/doctrinae*.[40] In each case, the goal is to understand. With regard to the trinitarian questions, the specific goal is to understand either the meaning of procession, relation, and person in God (and so, e.g., understand God insofar as God is eternally constituted as triune) or the trinitarian mystery, itself (e.g., why the Persons are so named or why they have the properties and acts they do have). Thomas expresses this twofold ordering in relation to the Father, "The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person acting."[41] The former regards our concepts in a state of becoming while the latter regards them in a state of being.

In this passage from Question 40, Thomas identifies two ways in which we can understand and conceive the same reality, in this case, a personal property. The relations (e.g., paternity) are the personal properties (e.g., unbegotten, innascibility).[42] Similarly, the processions are the notional acts. For example, Wilkins explains the relation between processions and notional acts in the *Summa*, "The processions and the notional acts are really identical but conceptually distinct; we conceive the former in order to posit relations and persons; we conceive the latter in order to think about the processions in terms of personal operations."[43] It is only upon having

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[39] This is the order we observed in the initial questions as the student was led to develop a concept of God.
[40] See Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 214.
[41] *ST* Ia, q. 40, a. 4c.
[42] See *ST* Ia, q. 33, a. 4c.
[43] Wilkins, *Order and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology* (unpublished manuscript), 100-01.

developed the necessary concepts in Questions 27-29 that Thomas then proceeds to apply them to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in general, individually, and comparatively. Whereas before one concept was leading to the next (procession to relation to person), now Thomas relates the concepts to one another. Structurally, this twofold ordering allows Thomas to reconsider relations as personal properties, and to reconsider processions as notional acts.[44] Notice that we still need to conceive "personal property" and "notional act." However, in the order of reality, properties are properties of persons, and acts are acts of persons and so the concepts in a state of actual being move from person to property to act. In other words, our concepts "in a state of actual being" still need to be conceived (they are not simply "there"). The point is that in reality persons are what have properties and it is persons that act. Again, both orders of concepts belong to the *ordo disciplinae* because in both orders, we are proceeding from what we must understand first before we can understand what comes next; understanding is the goal in both cases. The difference is that the order of concepts is reversed depending on whether we are operating according to the order of intelligence or the other of reality.

Thomas anticipated this reconsideration through the twofold ordering of our concepts in the prologue to Question 29, which he further clarifies in the prologue to Question 39: "First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other"[45] and "Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other."[46] He now reverses the order of concepts developed in Questions 27-29 and reconsiders them.[47] Thus, he begins with the persons in relation to the

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[44] On the structure of the treatise, see Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 213-214.
[45] *ST* Ia, q. 29, prol.
[46] *ST* Ia, q. 39, prol.
[47] By proceeding in this way, Thomas is able to address a further and related theological issue through the very structure of the trinitarian questions. The issue is whether the Father is Father because he generates,

essence (q. 39), proceeds to their relation to personal properties (q. 40), then to their relations to notional acts (q. 41) and lastly, to their relations with one another as regards their equality (q. 42) and their missions to humanity (q. 43). The semblance of a chiastic structure can thus be observed:

Development of our Concepts (in a state of becoming—order of intelligence)	Deployment of our Concepts (in a state of being—order of reality)
3. Questions 29: Persons	3¹· Questions 30-32: Persons in general Question 33-38: Persons individually Question 39: Persons compared to divine essence
2. Question 28: Relations	2¹· Question 40: Personal properties
1. Question 27: Processions	1¹· Question 41: Notional acts Question 42: Persons in relation to one another (equality) Question 43: Persons in relation to us

Figure 4

Thus, in these trinitarian questions, we can observe Thomas continuing his pedagogical program of proceeding in a way conducive to leading the student by the hand from the known to the unknown. Recall that the *ordo disciplinae* (which Thomas says he is following in the trinitarian questions) "begins with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a

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or whether he generates because he is Father. This is a question about whether the Father can be conceived apart from generation. In the *Summa,* Thomas answers this question negatively (though as recently as *De potentia*, he answered it positively). In Question 40, Thomas indicates his reasoning behind the *Summa*'s structuring of these trinitarian questions, which, insofar as it pertains to how we understand things, is related to the trinitarian prologue's *ordo doctrinae:* "If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own *supposita*, inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. *So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as explained above, it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain*" (*ST* Ia, q. 40, a. 3c (emphasis added)).
For more on the theological implications of Thomas's twofold ordering of our concepts in the trinitarian questions, see Lonergan, *Verbum*, CWL 2, 213-22.

step at a time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science."[48]

Herein, the student develops the concepts necessary to speak about God as triune, and then learns

how to use these concepts with respect to the Trinity, thereby continuing the project of teaching

the student how to speak about God. While the student may not use the technical terminology of

these questions in his preaching, undergoing the rigorous journey of Questions 27-43 is central to

speaking meaningfully about the Trinity, as we observed in Thomas's own Lenten sermons on the

Apostles' Creed. Further, we can observe the connection between conceiving inner words,

according to which one contemplates the object understood, and then speaking outwardly in

order to communicate the fruits of one's understanding, conceiving, and contemplating.

1.1.3 *Prima pars:* Questions 44-119

In the final section of the *Prima pars*, in which Thomas considers the "procession of creatures from

God," the student is led to form true concepts about creation and about oneself specifically as

created *ad imaginem Dei*.[49] Recall what Augustine writes, and what Thomas echoes in Question 93:

> This trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and
> understand and loves itself, but because it is also able to remember him by whom it was
> made. And when it does this, it becomes wise. If it does not do it, then even though it
> remembers and understands and loves itself, it is foolish. Let it then remember its God to
> whose image it was made, and understand and love him. To put it in a word, let it
> worship the uncreated God, by whom it was created with a capacity for him and able to
> share in him. In this way it will be wise not with its own light but by sharing in that
> supreme light, and it will reign in happiness where it reigns eternal.[50]

It is after having been purified so as to rise above corporeal things that the mind is able to begin

understanding the Trinity in which it believes. And it is in remembering the Trinity as its Creator

that the mind becomes wise. Such is the journey Thomas takes the student on in the *Prima pars*—

from the purification of the mind and engagement with the God who is at once transcendent and

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[48] Lonergan, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12, 60-61.
[49] See *ST* Ia, q. 44, prol.
[50] Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15.4.15 (Hill, 406-07).

immanent in order to form a true concept of the true God, to engagement with this same God as triune in order to develop concepts relevant to the trinitarian mystery, and then lastly to understanding oneself as a creature made by and like this triune God, and so as a creature who has a special role within divine providence.

1.2 The *Secunda pars*

As we saw in Chapter 2, the opening prologue to the *Secunda pars* introduces the image-exemplar relationship into the division of the text:

> Since, as Damascene states (*De Fide Orth.* ii, 12), man is said to be made in God's image, in so far as the image implies 'an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement': now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.[51]

Introducing this relationship was made possible because in the *Prima Pars*, Thomas developed the terms "image" and "exemplar," along with their relationship.[52] Thomas now expands on the rational creature's advance toward God because as the *imago Dei*, this advance will be a free advance, just as every act of God is free. In this way, the prologue to the *Secunda Pars* is a more particular elaboration of the earlier division found in the prologue to Question 2 of the *Prima Pars*. This elaboration includes the human person's natural and supernatural movement toward God, who helps her through instruction and grace. In this way, the *Secunda Pars* begins to unfold the coordinated divine missions of Question 43 of the *Prima Pars*. The self-understanding in relation to the Triune Creator that was sought during the *Prima pars* now spurs on the inquiry of the remainder of the *Summa*, in which the assimilation of the image to the Exemplar is explored in relation to the perfection of knowing and loving through grace—that is, through the coordinated missions of the Son and the Spirit.

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[51] *ST* Ia-IIae, prol.
[52] See *ST* Ia, qq. 35, 93.

While the *Secunda pars* continues the trinitarian theme of the *Prima pars* that I have accentuated, it also gives primacy of place to the mixed life and handing on the fruits of one's contemplation. As I argued in Chapter 6, Thomas's trinitarian theology and trinitarian anthropology are intimately connected to his theology of the mixed life. Mark Jordan has convincingly proposed that at the close of the *Secunda Pars*, Thomas exhorts his readers to choose the mixed life and imitate Christ.[53] He does so by drawing out the rhetorical motives of this final section of the *Summa*, asking, for example, what effect does Thomas want the text to have on its readers? How does the text intend to move them? Into what way of life will the text call its readers?[54] Jordan's argument hinges on the organization of the final questions of this part of the *Summa* (qq. 171-189), which is about the "concrete integration of virtues into virtuous ways of life."[55] These questions are divided in to three sections. The first division considers prophecy and gifts of speech (including teaching) as gratuitous graces. The second compares the active and contemplative lives. The third division considers the states of perfection, which include the episcopacy and the religious life. What Jordan highlights in terms of Thomas's ordering of these questions and divisions is that Thomas does not end this part with prophecy, which seems like a fitting end, for it is "a culminating description of human nature elevated beyond itself into the rapturous anticipation of the life to come."[56] Instead, Thomas concludes with the comparisons of lives and a description of the states of perfection. Why? Because, as Jordan argues, "these are not so much comparisons or descriptions as exhortations. He is here exhorting the reader to take up a way of life that will lead to beatitude."[57]

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[53] See Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas on Bernard," 457. See also Mongeau, *Embracing Wisdom*, 139.
[54] See Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas on Bernard," 456.
[55] Ibid., 457.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.

As we saw in Chapter 6, Thomas considers religious life a "school or exercise" for the attainment of the perfection of Christian life, charity, which is the universal precept for all Christians.[58] In this way, religious life "offers itself as just that education in the best human life," which helps its student come to human completion.[59] The evangelical counsels (poverty, chastity, and obedience) and religious rules of the various orders are all ways of learning charity.[60] However, as Jordan argues, "Thomas is not describing religious life as an education; he is proposing religious life as a response to the reader's desire for contemplative beatitude. Do you want to learn how to enact the coherent human life described in the *Summa*'s second Part? Take up a way of life that is a school for charity."[61] Thomas considers the religious life to be the best opportunity for being taught how to attain God—and by extension, the best opportunity to help others do likewise. The last two articles of the final question of the *Secunda pars* "place the choice of religious life squarely before the reader."[62] Thomas inquires, "Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?" and "Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends is requisite for entrance into religion?"[63] He maintains that it is a great good to persuade someone and that, in fact, it is not wrong to enter religious life without serious deliberation and counseling because "religion is something certainly from God, [and] because it offers so sure a way to learn charity."[64] Therefore, one should proceed with haste to enter religious life.[65]

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[58] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 2c; q. 184, aa. 1, 3.

[59] Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas on Bernard," 458. See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 186, a. 1c.

[60] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 188, a. 1: "As stated above, the religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of exercise."

[61] Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas on Bernard," 458.

[62] Ibid.

[63] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 189, prol.

[64] Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas on Bernard," 458.

[65] We saw Thomas argue the same point in his sermon on Luke 8. The sower ought to go out in the morning, meaning, according to Thomas, that people ought to enter religious life in their youth.

This exhortation is significant for my argument that the *Summa* is a contemplative study that supports the student's trinification, which prepares him for his ministry of speaking about God. The reason is because it contextualizes Thomas's efforts within the exercises of religious life that help one learn to lead a life of charity. Charity is essential to the journey of the *Summa*; without it, one gains only mere information. Just as the form and content of the *Summa* should not be separated, neither should the text be separated from the initiating and sustaining role charity plays in the student's integral formation. Leading a life charity is essential to becoming a good theologian, teacher, or preacher, in other words.

1.3 *The Tertia pars*

Lastly, Thomas considers the Image of God[66] Incarnate, providing the student with the most concrete example of the life of virtue. Specifically, the Incarnate Word is the example for how to know God truly and love God rightly, which includes for some believers (for Christ chose the mixed life) handing on the fruits of their contemplation to others so they, too, can join the Son in knowing and loving the Father through the Spirit. The Christology of the *Tertia pars* also provides the student with the opportunity to know and love God in the flesh so he may know and love more personally the eternal Word he first contemplated in the Trinitarian questions.[67]

While we do not have the privilege of knowing how the *Summa* ended, we at least know that Thomas placed the questions on the sacraments after the questions on the resurrection and ascension. That is, he placed the sacramental questions after the questions on the mysteries of faith that begin Easter and the life of the Church in the age of the Spirit.[68] Thus, we can conclude

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[66] See *ST* Ia, q. 35.
[67] Notice that just because the *Tertia Pars* deals with the Incarnation, this does not mean that it deals only with the Incarnate Word. For Thomas, Christology and soteriology necessitate knowing Christ both in his human nature and as a being of divine nature (see *In Ioan.,* c. 14, lect. 2, n. 1886), as well as coming to terms with the mode of union of these natures, and the effects and consequences that follow.
[68] *ST* IIIa, q. 60, prol.

that the Christian's ongoing instruction and formation in the mysteries through the sacramental life of the Church, to which the Dominicans as priests are called to minister, is placed after considering the mysteries of faith. In light of this organization, where the *Secunda Secundae* ends with an exhortation to the religious life, we might surmise that the *Tertia Pars* was heading toward an exhortation for these Dominicans to share the fruits of their contemplation and be useful to the souls of their neighbors in their teaching, preaching, and sacramental ministries.

Yet, it is important to note that Thomas did not intend to end with the Sacraments. Rather, he planned to return to his consideration of the Incarnation and then the majesty of the Godhead, considering the Last Judgment and the work of glory, respectively. As he writes in the prologue to the question on Christ's judiciary power (the last question before the questions on the Sacraments): "It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world."[69] However, this need not change the potential exhortation toward which the *Tertia pars* may have been heading because the entire reason the Dominicans embarked on contemplative studies and preached was the sake for their neighbors salvation, such that their neighbors may reach the glory of eternal life. Thus, it is fitting that a text written for Dominican teachers and preachers culminate in the work of glory because the salvation of souls is their vocation, to which all their other practices and tasks are ordered. I will return to this below.

2. The *Summa theologiae*, Complacency and Concern, and Salvation History

The journey of the *Summa* can also be understood in terms of the transition from complacency— from the rest that proceeds from contemplating the good that is—to concern about the good that is not yet. As we saw in Chapter 6, the transition from complacency to concern is related to the

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[69] *ST* IIIa, q. 59, prol.

transition from contemplation to action. In this way, we can understand the movement of the

Summa to be illuminated by the spiritual processions of word and love, and to be oriented to the

preparation of teachers and preachers who must contemplate in order to effectively speak about

God to others (and so leave their complacent contemplation for the sake of concerned action). As

Crowe observes:

> And so, following the ontological division of St. Thomas, one would say that for God the transition occurs at q. 44 of the *Pars prima,* where the theme shifts from the divine being (the object of His complacency) to the *processio creaturarum a Deo* (the object of His concern). For man, the transition occurs with the *Pars secunda,* where having studied the world that is and has come to be without our intervention, we begin to consider the world of becoming and especially our becoming, where events are at least partially subject to our own dominion.[70]

It is in the context of this concern and the transition that occurs for the human person in the

Secunda pars, that Thomas exhorts the reader to join the religious life. The religious life is a sure

way to learn charity, which includes imitating Christ in his loving concern for his friends, and so

his decision to lead a mixed life rather than a purely contemplative life.

Before concluding, let me return to the true depth of Thomas's wise pedagogy, which

came to the fore when considering how he integrated the *ordo disciplinae* with the Articles of Faith

so as to enliven the *Summa* with the movement of salvation history. He ordered the material

pedagogically, selecting a universal starting point and proceeding according to the needs of the

student—that is, he chose the *ordo disciplinae* as his method. Yet, Thomas also gave voice to God's

involvement with human history, not by proceeding chronologically, but by accentuating the

divine wisdom and goodness holding creation and redemption together in one single and simple

view. He unfolded the Articles of Faith in a way commensurate with salvation history by using the

neo-Platonic *exitus-reditus* structure to facilitate an expression of a fundamental scriptural pattern in

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[70] Crowe, *Three Thomist Studies*, 155-56.

which God is freely and providentially the beginning and end of all things.[71] At the same time, Thomas also systematically reordered the Articles of Faith into a more scientific pattern that wisely brought the nexus of these mysteries of faith into relief.[72] Thomas makes two important points in his enumeration of the Articles of Faith. One, the Articles fit together harmoniously as do the parts of a whole.[73] Two, a certain order obtains among the Articles of Faith, just like in the sciences, and so some Articles implicitly contain the others.[74] Recall the following chart from Chapter 2, which expresses how Thomas systematically re-ordered the creedal proposition[75]:

Majesty of the Godhead	Mystery of Christ's Incarnation
Unity of Godhead (1 Article)	Incarnation/Conception
Trinity of Persons (3 Articles)	Virginal birth
Works proper to Godhead:	Passion, death, and burial
- order of nature (Article on creation)	Descent into hell
- order of grace (Article on sanctification)	Resurrection
- order of glory (Article on resurrection and life	Ascension
everlasting, or in other words, reward)	Judgment

Table 17

Thomas plans the *Summa* around these two creedal principles (the majesty of the Godhead and the mystery of the incarnation).

As Laporte underscores, Thomas deviates from the narrative of the Creed in the systematic reordering of the Articles with one exception: he intended to conclude the *Summa* with the work of glory instead of following the systematic order he enumerated, which would have treated all the mysteries of the Godhead—including the work of glory—and then proceed to the mysteries of the Incarnation—ending with Judgment. That is, the narrative of the Creed ends with the work of glory, as its final article pertains to the resurrection of the body and life ever lasting. However, when Thomas proposed how the Articles should be systematically reordered, he

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[71] See Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 306-20. Also see *ST* Ia, q. 1, a. 3 ad. 1; a. 7c.
[72] See *ST* IIa-IIa, q. 1, aa. 7-8.
[73] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 6c.
[74] *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 7c.
[75] See *ST* IIa-IIae, q. 1, a. 8c.

included this final article as the last principle under the general principle, "the majesty of the Godhead." Yet, as we saw above in the prologue to the question on Christ's judiciary power (q. 59), we find that not only did Thomas intend to delay the questions on the Last Judgment until after the Sacraments, but he also intended to return to the work of glory, which has to do with the end of the world.[76] Thomas planned to return to "the majesty of the Godhead" and conclude with glory rather than with the final moment of "the mystery of Christ's incarnation," judgment.[77]

Pedagogically, it would seem intelligible to follow the work of grace with the work of glory, especially because the *Secunda Pars* opens with a reflection on the human person's last end. However, Thomas moved from considering particular states of life to considering the mystery of the Incarnation, and so delays bringing the work of grace to its consummation in the work of glory. As Laporte writes, "The *Summa* maintains the humanity of Christ as a block to be dealt with in its final part, but subsumes it into the overall *exitus-reditus* pattern identified by Chenu by making it precede the consummation of all things."[78] This departure is significant for my effort to accentuate the trinitarian dynamism of the text and its performative dimension. Why? Because the *imago Trinitatis* is treated according to the narrative pattern of salvation history in which we find God's works of nature, grace, and glory. There is a progressive movement from the natural image in the human person, to its graced assimilation in this life through sanctifying grace, and finally to its glorified consummation in the next life through the resurrection. This movement is not just theological; it is performative—the human person grows in likeness to the triune God the more he comes to actually know and love God in grace. And it is coming to know and love God more and more that the pedagogy and contemplative study the *Summa* offers is meant to support.

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[76] He explains the connection between glory and the end of the world in the first question of the *Tertia pars:* "the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world" (*ST* IIIa, q. 1, a. 6c). See also *Comp. theol.*, c. 242.

[77] In the *Compendium*, Thomas did follow the systematic ordering, treating the work of glory first and then Christ.

[78] Laporte, "Christ in the *Summa*," 238.

Rhetorically, to end (at least intentionally) the *Summa* with the work of glory can be understood as an exhortation to continue the work God has begun in oneself until God brings it to completion (Phil 1:6), and to help others do likewise. Thomas not only follows the *ordo disciplinae* by gradually developing the student's understanding so that he has the tools to grasp what is at hand and moves spontaneously from one question to the next. He also integrates it with the movement of salvation history by treating the *imago Dei* in increasing depth and illuminating how the divine missions are coordinated to concretely bring about our trinification, individually and for the common good. As the head of the Church, Christ completes the work of glory that belongs to the majesty of the Godhead. [79] It is through Christ that the human person, created *ad imaginem Dei*, completes her journey to the glorified life with the triune God.

3. Conclusion

I have aimed to recover Thomas's idiom (*contemplata aliis tradere*) to argue that trinification is fundamental to preaching and teaching, and that the *Summa* supports this process as a performative text facilitating a transformative encounter with *sacra doctrina*. It is this contemplative study, by which the student comes to know and love God, his friend, more deeply, that prepares him to teach and preach. I have also argued that trinification is connected to friendship and conversation, which connects it to teaching and preaching. That is, God graciously makes us God's friends by communicating divine beatitude to us. We respond to and deepen this friendship through conversation. In the *Summa*, this takes place through an orderly contemplative study that promotes a transformative encounter with God as well as with oneself and others as created *ad imaginem Dei* and as friends of God. That conversation assimilates the image to the exemplar is fitting because conversation, itself, provides an analogy for the Trinity: Speaker, Word, Listening.

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[79] See *ST* IIIa, qq. 7-8.

Thus, conversation is at once a means for deepening our friendship as well as an imitation of and participation in the conversation that God is. Making this argument involved a creative retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology and his commentary on the gospel of John with respect to the trinitarian missions.

Those who travel the wisely ordered path of the *Summa theologiae* come to know and love God as someone who has invited them into a deep friendship. As friends, they are part of the same community because they share a communion of mind and heart, and are even alike in virtue to the extent that via grace, the human person as the *imago Dei* can grow in wisdom and charity. They also come to know and love God as someone who invites them to help extend this divine friendship to others by helping them to know the secrets of God's heart—the deep things pertaining to the majesty of the Godhead and the mystery of the Incarnation. In this way, Thomas helps his students to prepare for a mixed life of orienting their contemplation toward the active works of preaching and teaching.

Lastly, I have attempted to accentuate the trinitarian dynamism and trinitarian *telos* of the *Summa theologiae*. By "trinitarian dynamism" I mean that the *Summa* is an ongoing transformative encounter with the triune God, with oneself as created *ad imaginem Dei*, and with all of creation insofar as the triune God is its beginning and end. That is, the mystery of the Trinity animates the entire text; the Trinity is not an afterthought in Thomas's theology. By "trinitarian *telos*" I mean that those who travel the path (*ductus*) of the *Summa*—and who are practiced in the life of charity—arrive at the *Summa*'s goal (*skopos*), trinification. Yet, this goal is not about the student's personal holiness. Rather, assimilation to the Trinity and friendship with the triune God are for the sake of helping other wanderers on the journey to salvation. In arguing these two points, I have tried to demonstrate the centrality of Trinity to Thomas's *summa theologiae*, both in terms of content and form. We have seen that Thomas's analogical understanding of the Trinity informs his pedagogy, which prioritizes understanding and concept formation over certainty and memorization. We

have also seen that his trinitarian anthropology informs the transformative goal of the *Summa*. Thus, I have aimed to contribute to the retrieval of Thomas's trinitarian theology and the psychological analogy as invaluable contributions to the Christian tradition. In so doing, I have attempted to contribute to Lonergan's scholarship, which inaugurated an authentic interpretation of Thomas's trinitarian theology in the 20th century, focusing upon the intellectual emanations of word and love. I have also attempted a creative retrieval of Thomas's rendition of the psychological analogy by way of the theme of "conversation," which ultimately will help to make this tradition of trinitarian theology more relevant to contemporary concerns regarding interpersonal relations. In this way, I have aimed to demonstrate that the psychological analogy, far from making the Trinity irrelevant to the Christian life, helps to situate this core Christian mystery within the very heart of human living.

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