

Satisfaction According to Albert The Great

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Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2017

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Satisfaction
According to Albert The Great

A Thesis
Presented to
The School of Theology and Ministry
Boston College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Licentiate in Sacred Theology

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May, 2017

Part One: Introduction to Albertine Satisfaction

Having some appreciation of the meaning of Christ's crucifixion is an important part of Christian discipleship, and an important stage in the process of recognizing Christ for who He is and what He did. After the crucifixion, according to Luke's gospel, Jesus met His disciples on the road to Emmaus, although they did not recognize Him. The disciples had been discussing the things that had happened in Jerusalem lately, but they could not make sense of them. Jesus said to them

"O foolish men, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have said. Was it not necessary for the Christ to suffer these things and so to enter into His glory?" And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, He explained to them the things in the scriptures about Himself (Luke 24:25-27).¹

As this passage demonstrates, Christians have been trying to fathom the meaning of Christ's passion and death from the earliest days of the Church. A conversation was begun at that time that has continued over the centuries, even to this day.

One way to appreciate that conversation about the meaning of the crucifixion would be to focus on the innovations, that is, on the introduction of new ideas into the conversation. In that way, a distinguished place would be given to the work *Cur Deus Homo* (1098) by Anselm of Canterbury, because it contains a

¹ ὦ ἀνόητοι καὶ βραδεῖς τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῦ πιστεῦν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οἷς ἐλάλησαν οἱ προφῆται· οὐχὶ ταῦτα ἔδει παθεῖν τὸν χριστὸν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ; καὶ ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ Μωϋσέως καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν προφητῶν διερμήνευσεν αὐτοῖς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς γραφαῖς τὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. From www.nestle-aland.com

new theory, now called "satisfaction theory," that explains Christ's incarnation and death.

Another way to appreciate the conversation about Christ's death would be to study something like a textbook, where all the popular ideas of the time are discussed. The advantage of a textbook is that it brings many ideas together in summary fashion, giving pride of place to the best ideas while pointing out weaknesses. *The Sentences* of Peter Lombard, written in approximately 1150, stood as the dominant textbook of the high middle ages. But coming only fifty years after *Cur Deus Homo*, it ignores Anselm's argument, focusing instead on explanations of the crucifixion from the patristic era, especially from Augustine of Hippo. From Peter Lombard's point of view, Anselmian satisfaction theory did not merit consideration.

By the time of Albert the Great, who lived from c. 1200 to 1280, things had changed. Satisfaction theory had become quite popular. Thus, when Albert was writing his commentaries on *The Sentences* of Peter Lombard, early in his career, from 1243 to 1249, he had a lot to say about satisfaction. Later in his life, when he resumed theological writing, especially after 1274,² satisfaction theory remained centrally important to his understanding of the crucifixion.

² Especially in his *Summa theologiae*, *Super missam*, and *De corpore domini*.

Albert, today, is not much associated with satisfaction theory.³ He left no single work dedicated to the topic, and what we can glean from his vast literary corpus is that he was more of a compiler than an innovator. He is better known for his work in other fields, such as logic and the natural sciences. One way to respond to Albert's lack of innovation with regard to satisfaction theory is to classify his ideas as forgettable, but before doing so, it may be observed that the fact that Albert's views on satisfaction were not innovative or controversial testifies to their consistency and firmness, and therefore they are all the more valuable to the developing student. A student should start by focusing on ideas that are widely held to be firm and consistent, before moving on to ideas that are innovative, experimental and tentative. Once the student has grasped the best and most stable ideas, she will have a basis for considering various experiments and innovations.

That is why today's student, trying to appreciate the conversation about the meaning of Christ's crucifixion, would do well to approach the thought of Albert the Great. In doing so, she would be imitating other students of Albert the Great, such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Albert's ideas are non-

³ There is almost no literature in English on Albert's view of satisfaction theory. The magisterial 20th Century two-volume history of soteriology by J. Rivière, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, makes no mention of Albert the Great. A smaller, one volume work from the same century, *A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement*, by L.W. Grensted, covers Albert in two inaccurate sentences, which will be examined in part five.

controversial and yet highly influential, not only upon Aquinas, but upon much of medieval Christendom.

For Albert, the crucifixion is not the only part of Jesus' life that had salvific impact. Everything Jesus did on this earth was done for our salvation, beginning in the moments after his conception.⁴ Thus, to get a complete perspective on Albert's soteriology, this paper would need to be expanded to cover Albert's teaching on Jesus' entire life and ministry, both in his divinity and humanity, and it would also need to cover Albert's understanding of the Church and its activities to this day. Albert sees the entire life of Jesus as soteriological, but this paper is focused on the crucifixion.

According to John McIntyre, there are thirteen different "models of soteriology," among which satisfaction theory counts as number eleven.⁵ One could easily find elements of many of McIntyre's models in Albert's theology, but none would be as dominant as satisfaction theory. In fact, for Albert, Christ's crucifixion is almost synonymous with His satisfaction.⁶

Basically, according to Albert, satisfaction theory begins this way:

⁴ "Dicendum quod circa illud sunt duae opiniones, quarum illa videtur mihi probabilior, quae concedit rationes inductas, et dicit quod Christus non meruit ab instanti conceptionis, sed post instans illud continuo meruit." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.18, art.6, p.320a.

⁵ John McIntyre, *The Shape of Soteriology*, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 26-52.

⁶ "Unde vadens ad satisfactionem dicit, Matth. XXVI, 39 : Non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu, scilicet vis." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, p.32a.

Although we can neither harm nor injure God, by sinning we subtract from the honor owed to Him. We satisfy in order to restore the subtracted honor that is owed to Him.⁷

To restore the honor that had been subtracted by the sin of pride, a just act of humility was needed⁸ that would correspond to the gravity of Adam's offense. But that gravity was infinite, since it was God's infinite honor that was offended, therefore, an act of infinite humility was needed, but no mere man could achieve any such thing.

Ambrose says, and Anselm proves in his book, *Cur Deus Homo*, that to satisfy for us a person must have both the capacity and the debt. As Lord God only-begotten Son of the Father, Christ had the capacity, and as man, he had the debt. Thus, he had both the debt and the capacity, since he was a humanized God and a deified man.⁹

Albert not only approves of the bulk of Anselm's argument,¹⁰ but he sees it as consistent with patristic sources such as Ambrose.

Many recent theologians have not been as convinced by Anselm's satisfaction theory as Albert was. A typical modern objection to Anselm's satisfaction theory is that it

⁷ "Deum nec laedere nec damnificare possumus, peccando ei honorem debitum subtrahimus : et hoc fine satisfacimus, ut debitus ei honor, et prius subtractus restituatur." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487b.

⁸ "Nos soluti sumus a decreto Patris obligante nos ad non intrandum paradisum, nisi tanta appareret in uno justitia humilitatis quae omnibus sufficeret." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.3, p.360a.

⁹ "Et hoc est unde pro nobis satisfacere debuit : dicit enim Ambrosius, et probat Anselmus in libro, Cur Deus homo, quod pro nobis satisfacere non potuit, nisi qui debuit, et qui potuit. Potuit autem in quantum Deus Dominus Filius Patris unigenitus : debuit autem in quantum homo fuit : debuit et potuit in quantum Deus humanatus, et in quantum homo deificatus. Hoc autem probavit Anselmus." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, p.30b.

¹⁰ The chief point of difference is that Albert denies Anselm's claims that it was necessary for God to save us in the way that He did.

tends to suggest that God could only act within the framework of medieval notions of right order and right relationship. Anselm's approach, perhaps, does not allow God the sovereign freedom to shatter human expectations by an act of unthinkable mercy.¹¹

How vulnerable is Albert's version of satisfaction theory to this criticism? This paper will show in part five that Albert allows God greater "sovereign freedom" than Anselm. According to Albert, God could have chosen to save us in some other way that we don't now understand. The way God did choose seems necessary to us, but it was not necessary for God.

Furthermore, this paper will show that the bulk of Albert's notions of right order and right relationship are not particular to the medieval mind, but apply to human nature itself, whether of the medieval era or the modern era, or any other era. To that end, this paper will show how "satisfaction" as a theological category is rooted both in non-theological experiences (part three) and in the Catholic sacramental system (part four). To aid future researchers, this paper also will present, in appendix two, a transcription of an important manuscript of Albert's writings on satisfaction.

¹¹ Denis Edwards, *What are They Saying About Salvation?*, (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 16.

Part Two: Definitions of Satisfaction

Arriving at a workable definition of the term "satisfaction" poses a challenge. Albert recognizes three definitions for the term.¹² The first sense is the common sense (*secundum substantiam*). Albert will often use the common sense to describe the process of becoming satisfied, that is, of having enough. Thus, one may satisfy a hunger or a thirst or any desire. One may also satisfy a question or a petition or a demand. A plaintiff in a lawsuit will approach a court, present his plea, and ask for satisfaction. The plaintiff will be satisfied when he receives just compensation for his loss. This is the common sense of the term, which this paper will study more carefully in part three.

Theologians have added two technical senses of the term "satisfaction," building them upon this common sense. *The Sentences* of Peter Lombard more or less canonized a definition from the patristic era: "Satisfaction is a part of penance, as Augustine¹³ says, which cuts off the causes of sins, and does not even entertain their suggestions."¹⁴ This is the definition of satisfaction as a part of the sacrament of penance. It does not destroy the *fomes* or the tinder of sin, but weakens and quiets

¹² "Satisfactio tripliciter potest diffiniri." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487b.

¹³ The quotation is actually from a work called *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*, c. 54, PL 58, 994, by Gennadius of Massilia (d. ca. 496). This work was falsely attributed to Augustine for centuries.

¹⁴ "Est enim satisfactio poenitentiae, ut ait Augustinus, peccatorum causas excidere, nec suggestionibus eorum aditum indulgere." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487a.

it. This paper will study it more carefully in part four. Finally, the fifth part of this paper will consider the third definition, the soteriological one, which comes from Anselm, who put it this way: "Thus, everyone who sins owes it to God to pay him for the honor he stole away, and this is satisfaction."¹⁵

Albert is aware that there are some problems with these three definitions. For example, Lombard's sacramental definition pertains to the causes of sins, but is it not better to think of sin as something that lacks a cause, just as evil is not a positive reality, but is rather the lack of a due good? Albert explains by specifying that the types of cause that sin lacks are the *efficient* and *formal* causes.¹⁶ A hot thing warms a cool thing by giving it warmth. The hot thing is an efficient cause because it imparts some essential form to the thing being warmed. But a privation, by definition is the absence of an essential form, so no form is imparted by privation; rather, the form is removed by privation. Blindness, for example, which is the privation of sight, does not have a positive essence. Therefore, blindness, as the lack of a form, does not have an efficient cause. Thus, evil, insofar as it is evil, does not have an efficient or a formal cause, and neither does sin, insofar as it is sin.

¹⁵ "Sic ergo debet omnis, qui peccat, honorem, quem rapuit Deo, solvere, et haec est satisfactio." Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*. 1.11.

¹⁶ *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.488a.

In response, Albert explains that there is a sense in which a sinful act can be said to have three *deficient* causes.¹⁷ The desire (*libido*) may be stimulated, or there may be remnants of past sins, or there may be circumstances that encourage sin. These causes do not coerce sin, because coercion would remove free will, but they do function as deficient causes; and satisfaction, in Lombard's sacramental sense, tries to cut off these causes.

It may be objected that Albert's explanation has only made things worse, since his explanation suggests that we have the power to turn away from evil, when, in reality, conversion from evil is something that only God can do. Recall the traditional Church teaching against the heresy of Pelagianism. So, if we are the ones who make satisfaction, and if satisfaction cuts off the causes of our sins, then it seems that we are responsible for converting ourselves from evil. Albert replies by affirming that only God can convert the human will away from sin, thereby defending himself from the charge of Pelagianism.¹⁸ But he notes that even after such conversion, those three deficient causes may remain, in which case, we may labor to remove them.

Another problem with the Lombard's definition is that it is not immediately clear what it has to do with the common

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

definition of the term "satisfaction." The satisfaction that is part of the sacrament of penance (Lombard's sense) consists in prayer, fasting and almsgiving.¹⁹ What does that have to do with satisfying a plaintiff's request for justice following some loss? Albert answers by explaining that sacramental satisfaction has medicinal value, because it tends to the restoration of the sinner. The work of the satisfaction should be prayer for someone who sinned by pride, fasting for someone who sinned by lewdness, and almsgiving for someone who sinned by greed. In this medicinal sense, satisfaction is a part of justice, because the work of the satisfaction must befit the sin, just as a medicine must befit the illness.²⁰ Therefore, the sacramental sense does pertain to restorative justice, and therefore it is properly related to the common sense.

Albert also considers problems with the soteriological sense, the one most associated with Anselm. Albert sums up Anselm's definition while making slight modifications. Albert defines satisfaction

in relation to the end: although we can neither harm nor injure God, by sinning we subtract from the honor owed to Him. We satisfy to this end: to restore the subtracted honor that is owed to Him: and this is how it is defined by Anselm.²¹

¹⁹ "...satisfactio operis, quae fit per tria, scilicet orationem, jejunium, et eleemosynam." *Super Marcum* in cap.4, v.26-29, p.435b.

²⁰ *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.488b.

²¹ "Tertio diffinitur in compartione ad finem: cum enim Deum nec laedere nec damnificare possumus, peccando ei honorem debitum subtrahimus : et hoc fine satisfacimus, ut debitus ei honor, et prius subtractus restituatur: et sic ab Anselmo diffinitur." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.487b.

One problem is that the bestowal of honor, according to Aristotle,²² pertains to magnanimity, therefore Anselm and those after him should be discussing not satisfaction but magnanimity. Albert points out, in reply, that magnanimity deals with the bestowal of honor simply, but satisfaction pertains to the just *restitution* of honor that was taken away by sin.²³

The following three parts of this thesis will examine the three senses of the term "satisfaction" more closely. They are the common sense, the sacramental sense, and the soteriological sense.

²² Cf. *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book IV.

²³ *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.12, p.489a.

Part Three: The Common Sense of Satisfaction

Albert does use the terms "satisfy" and "satisfaction" in their common, non-theological sense, which is a usage that reaches far back into the classical era.²⁴ Thus, he says that one may satisfy a thirst,²⁵ and that the breathing in of air may satisfy the heart and the chest.²⁶ Albert speaks, in general, of various needs²⁷ and desires²⁸ being satisfied. He includes more abstract desires, such as a curiosity²⁹ or a question³⁰ or an objection.³¹ In classical Latin, "satisfaction" had also acquired a legal sense, such that the Romans would speak of a perpetrator making satisfaction by suffering a penalty.³² Albert, likewise, speaks of plaintiffs petitioning for satisfaction³³ and of civil judges having the authority to impose satisfaction³⁴ and he notes that a defendant may or may not be

²⁴ Cf. Plautus *Pseudolus* 5, 1, 28. Cf. Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 2, 17, 41.

²⁵ "...tantum bibunt et ut futurae et praeteritae siti satisfaciant" *De animalibus* (ed. Stadler, 1916-1920), Lib.XXII, tract.2, cap.1, p.1361.

²⁶ "...si submersione vel aliquo modo contingat impediri in attractu exterioris spiritus : tunc enim de illo quamdiu potest, satisfacit cordi et pectori." *De spiritu et respiratione* (ed. Borgnet, 1890), Lib.II, tract.2, cap.1, p.247a.

²⁷ "et cum multae sint indigentiae, varias oportet artes reperiri, ita quod homo solus secundum seipsum non sufficit satisfacere omnibus indigentis suis." *Ethica* (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.I, tract.3, cap.2, p.33a.

²⁸ "Et hoc est: 'Quis mihi tribuat,' desiderio sc. meo satisfaciens." *In Job* 19:23 p. 234a.

²⁹ "In hoc sexto libro vegetabilium nostrorum magis satisfacimus curiositati studentium quam philosophiae." *De vegetabilibus* (ed. Meyer-Jessen, 1867), Lib.VI, tract.1, cap.1, p.339.

³⁰ "Ut tamen etiam quaestioni inductae satisfaciamus..." *Analytica priora* (ed. Borgnet, 1890), Lib.I, tract.3, cap.2, p.520b.

³¹ "Inferius quidem subtiliter huic satisfaciemus objectioni." *Super Porphyrium De V universalibus* (ed. Borgnet, 1890), tract.4, cap.3, p.64b.

³² Cf. Martial, *Epigrams*, 12.14.3.

³³ "Hic quidem, scilicet litigans, qui petit satisfactionem sibi fieri de injuria, viginti minas." *Politica* (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.II, cap.6, p.152b.

³⁴ "Et est simile sicut si aliquis gratia iudicis vel senatus absolvitur a iudicio mortis, et commutatur ei in iudicium satisfactionis pecuniae vel alicujus alterius." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.55, p.750ba.

willing to make satisfaction.³⁵ What is key in the legal sense is that satisfaction is an action done for the sake of undoing some previous harm.³⁶ To give a 21st Century example: if the harm done is the loss of one's watch to a thief, then satisfaction entails the return of the watch by the thief to the offended party. This is what Albert means by the dictum "restitution is the foundation of satisfaction."³⁷ To undo the harm, what was lost must be restored.

But satisfaction includes more than the mere restoration of what was lost. Albert says that restitution is the *foundation* of satisfaction, but he does not say that restitution and satisfaction are equivalent. In fact, he distinguishes carefully between restitution and satisfaction:

Regarding the other point it must be said that someone being reconciled to his neighbor does so in two ways. Insofar as he has incurred an obligation because of the harm done, restitution will reconcile him (not repentance). And, insofar as his neighbor was disedified by his bad example, satisfaction with good works will reconcile him.³⁸

³⁵ "Si rex terrenus alicui committeret vices suas in iudicio rerum, daret ei plenariam potestatem absolvendi volentes satisfacere, et ligandi et condemnandi eos qui impenitentes permanent." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.18, art.7, p.774b.

³⁶ "Ad aliud dicendum, quod ... eadem virtus specie, diversimode moveat secundum diversum statum hominis quem movet, ut justitia aliter movet laedentem ad satisfaciendum, et aliter in communi quemlibet ad opera justitiae." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.44, p.635b.

³⁷ "Restitutio est fundamentum satisfactionis." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.45, p.535a.

³⁸ "Ad aliud dicendum, quod restituens dupliciter reconciliatur proximo, scilicet in quantum tenetur ei de damno illato : et hoc modo reconciliat restitutio, non poenitentia proprie : vel in quantum deaedicatus est proximus per malum exemplum : et sic satisfactio bonis operibus reconciliat." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.45, p.535b.

Thus, when a thief steals a watch, the restitution of the loss and the satisfaction for the crime are two different things. If the theft was from a high-end watchmaker, and the police catch the thief, then justice demands not only that the stolen watch be returned to the watchmaker, but also that some additional penalty be imposed upon the thief, such as a fine or some jail time. Thus, restitution and satisfaction are two components demanded by justice as the result of some harm being done, and both components have a penal character.

Whether we consider the juridical sphere or the sphere of friendship, satisfaction functions similarly. If Jack steals a watch from his friend Jill, there are two problems: one is that Jill does not have her watch, and the other is that Jack and Jill's friendship has been damaged, because Jack's will is at odds with Jill's. If Jack returns the watch to Jill, restitution of the lost property will be complete, but their friendship will remain in a precarious state until Jack can make some satisfaction. He must do something extra, as Albert says, to undo Jill's disedification. In contemporary language, we could say that Jack needs to do something extra to restore Jill's confidence. Satisfaction in this case might be something like baking Jill a cake or saying "I'm sorry" or giving her a gift. In this case, Jill could accept Jack's restitution and satisfaction without the intervention of any police, lawyers, or

judges, and then satisfaction does not have any penal or juridical connotations.

Albert also considers the possibility of satisfaction when restitution is impossible.

When someone hinders someone else from receiving something, he may do so justly, because he knows him to be unworthy of such an honor or such a thing, and in that case, he is not obligated to make satisfaction. He may also hinder him unjustly, and then I say that he is obligated to make satisfaction, but not restitution, because he never actually had the thing. Satisfaction in this latter case should be made according to the ability of the one satisfying and according to the judgment of good men.³⁹

Thus, satisfaction is possible, even when restitution is impossible, as long as the offending party has the willingness to make satisfaction, and this applies equally to courtroom disputants and to friends. For example, imagine that the thief lost the watch after he stole it. If the thief is poor, he may not have the means of making restitution, but he can still make satisfaction. In the judicial sphere, he would suffer a fine or do some jail time. In the sphere of friendship, Jack could do something special for Jill to try to make up for his offense. In the latter case, the friendship could still be restored, and in the former case, justice could still be done, even without

³⁹ "Ad aliud dicendum, quod ille qui impedit alium: aut juste impedit, scilicet quia scit eum indignum tali honore vel tali re, et tunc non tenetur: aut injuste, et tunc dico, quod tenetur satisfacere, sed non tamen reddere, quia ille rem illam adhuc adeptus non erat: haec autem satisfactio debet fieri secundum possibilitatem satisfaciens, et arbitrium bonorum virorum." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.43, p.532b.

restitution. "Restitution is not an essential part of satisfaction, but it is required in advance as a foundation."⁴⁰

The third part of this thesis has shown how satisfaction is a concept that is rooted in several non-theological categories. Even the juridical use of the term is derived from truths about human needs and relationships that are by no means confined to the medieval era. The following parts will show how Albert employs the term "satisfaction" in theological contexts, such as the sacrament of penance, and the atonement of Christ.

⁴⁰ "Restitutio non est pars essentialis satisfactionis, sed praeexigitur per modum fundamenti." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.10, p.485a.

Part Four: The Sacramental Sense

Satisfaction, in the sacramental sense, is something imposed by the confessor upon the penitent. Referring to this sacrament, Albert says that "these are the words which the priest says when, by binding to satisfaction, he gives absolution."⁴¹ Absolution and satisfaction go together. The priest may impose a satisfaction (what today would be called a "penance") consisting of some combination of prayer, fasting and almsgiving.⁴² The priest is able to bind satisfaction upon penitents and absolve them from their sins by using the power of the keys that Christ gave to the Church for binding and loosening,⁴³ as stated in Matthew 16:19.⁴⁴ The purpose of satisfaction is to please God,⁴⁵ by undoing the harm of sin and recovering humanity's pristine state,⁴⁶ thereby becoming free.⁴⁷ Satisfaction obtains this freedom by building up the particular

⁴¹ "Haec sunt verba quae dicit sacerdos, quando ligando ad satisfactionem absoluit." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.1, art.14, p.28b.

⁴² "Satisfactio operis, quae fit per tria, scilicet orationem, jejunium, et eleemosynam." *Super Marcum* (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.4, v.26-29, p.435b.

⁴³ Cf. *Super Marcum* (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.9, v.27-29, p.558b.

⁴⁴ "Et tibi dabo claves regni caelorum. Et quodcumque ligaveris super terram, erit ligatum et in caelis: et quodcumque solveris super terram, erit solutum et in caelis." "δώσω σοι τὰς κλεῖδας τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ ὃ ἂν δήσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται δεδεμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ ὃ ἂν λύσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἔσται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς."

⁴⁵ "Per receptionem satisfactionis Deum placarent." *Super Marcum* (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.5, v.14-17, p.449b.

⁴⁶ "Dicendum ad hoc, quod poenitentia in partibus suis habet restituere in pristinum statum, scilicet in contritione, confessione, et satisfactione : et praecipue quoad illam partem, quae est satisfactio." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.14, art.33, p.466a.

⁴⁷ "Praedestinatio non est proprie nisi gratiae, et gloriae, et alia sunt indirecte operantia ad liberationem, sicut satisfaciendo." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.I, dist.40, art.3, p.309a.

virtue opposed to the given vice,⁴⁸ so that even the root of sin is destroyed.⁴⁹ It is the task of the priest, then, when imposing satisfaction, to select a fitting combination of prayer, fasting and almsgiving.

There remain three things in satisfaction, namely, fasting which heals diseases of the body, and prayer which heals diseases of the mind, and the giving of alms which heals the diseases of ownership, whether the alms be for an emotional or a physical need or for both.⁵⁰

Satisfaction is a matter of strict justice,⁵¹ and therefore it does have a penal character,⁵² which makes it laborious to some degree.⁵³

The term "satisfaction," when used in a sacramental sense, refers to only one of the three parts of the sacrament of penance. In explaining this, Albert affirms the unity of the sacrament of penance, which "is one by the unity of the

⁴⁸ "Contrariae consuetudinis inductio per opera satisfactionis." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.12, p.567b.

⁴⁹ "Dicendum quod duplex est radix peccati, scilicet contracta et facta, secundum quod ex operibus relinquuntur similes dispositiones et habitus, ut dicit Philosophus. Prima autem radix debilitatur et exsiccat, non poenitentia, sed contrario usu benefaciendi : et secunda est quae per poenitentiae satisfactionem eruitur." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.54, p.652b.

⁵⁰ "Tres autem residuae sunt in satisfactione, scilicet, jejunium quod sanat pestes corporis, et oratio quae sanat pestes mentis, et eleemosyna vel cordis, vel operis, vel utriusque, quae sanat pestes facultatis." *Super Iohannem* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), in cap.4, v.51-53, p.193a.

⁵¹ "In satisfactione peccati, districta severitas iustitiae cibatur poenitentes." *Super Marcum* (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.6, v.41, p.483a. "Poenitentia autem [est sacramentum] iustitiae, propter satisfactionem." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.2, art.1, p.43b.

⁵² "Si autem accipitur poenitentia ut sacramentum, tunc nihil prohibet passionem esse aliquid de essentia contritionis : quia poenitentia ordinatur contra peccatum, per poenam satisfaciens de peccato." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.6, p.550b.

⁵³ "Significat satisfactionis laborem." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, cap.17, p.137b. "In satisfactionis labore." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, cap.20, p.153b.

sacramental form.”⁵⁴ The feeling of remorse for the sin is the matter for the sacrament,⁵⁵ and the form is God’s grace insofar as it informs that remorse.⁵⁶ God’s grace informs the remorse by deleting the sin, and this is done through the three parts of the sacrament, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction.⁵⁷ It is not enough to say that the words of absolution by the minister are the form of the sacrament, because it is not the words that sanctify the penitent, but rather God’s grace insofar as it informs the feelings of remorse.

Albert considers the objection that the form of contrition is different from the form of confession, and that both are different from the form of satisfaction. This might seem to undermine the unity the sacrament of penance, given the metaphysical doctrine of the unicity of substantial form. Albert replies by affirming the individual forms of contrition, confession and satisfaction, but he maintains that the unity of the sacrament is preserved, because contrition, confession and satisfaction are related to the sacrament of penance just like parts are related to a whole. Thus, a hand may have one form, and the foot another, and the intellect, too, and the will, but

⁵⁴ “Est unum unitate formae sacramentalis.” *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.1, p.540a.

⁵⁵ “Dico dolorem esse materiam.” Ibid. p. 540b.

⁵⁶ “Unde forma ipsius est informatio gratiae, vel grati informans hunc dolorem, in quantum sic informans.” Ibid.

⁵⁷ This tripartite division of the sacrament of penance comes from *The Sentences* of Peter Lombard, Book IV, distinction 16. Albert reaffirms this division all throughout his *opera*. Cf. *Super Marcum* (ed. Borgnet, 1894), in cap.1, v.5, p.351a Cf. *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.1, p.660a.

they do not have forms *simpliciter*, but only as parts of a whole.⁵⁸

Albert correlates the three parts of the sacrament of penance to three punishments. "In contrition there is the forgiveness of guilt and release from eternal punishment. In confession there is release from the punishment of purgatory, and in satisfaction, there is release from temporal punishment."⁵⁹ Thus, satisfaction pertains to some impending, external punishments, but that is not all.

Albert correlates the three parts of the sacrament of penance to three pangs of remorse that are suffered in the wake of sin. "There is a threefold guilt," Albert says.

One pertains to the fault, which is a debt of eternal punishment, and when that is removed, the guilt still remains from the debt of purgation which is beyond the abilities of the penitent, and when that is removed, there still remains the guilt of a debt an expiatory punishment adjudicated according to the manner of the fault and the abilities of the penitent.⁶⁰

Contrition deletes the first pang of remorse, confession deletes the second, and satisfaction deletes the third. Here Albert is talking about guilt, which is something that exists *inside* the person, and not in some external celestial balancing system.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 541.

⁵⁹ "In contritione est dimissio culpae et poenae aeternae, et in confessione dimissio poenae in purgatorio, et in satisfactione dimissio poenae temporalis." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.22, art.6, p.894b.

⁶⁰ "Reatus autem consequens triplex est: unus enim est conjunctus culpae, qui est debitum poenae aeternae: et illo soluto manet adhuc reatus et debitum poenae purgatoriae non proportionatae viribus poenitentis. Soluta illo, iterum manet reatus et debitum poenae expiativae arbitrariae secundum culpae modum, et vires poenitentis." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.16, art.2, p.542b.

Satisfaction pertains both to impending, external punishment, and also to the internal experience of being guilty.

That is why, according to Albert, it is not possible for someone to repent for only some of the sins that he has committed without repenting for all of them. We may sin one at a time, but repentance has to come all at once. If our sins were recorded on some chalk board somewhere, we could erase them one at a time, but it is not so. Every sin is a turning of a human person toward a *bonum commutabile*, a changeable good, that is, some good that may be changed or even exchanged for a higher good, and these changeable goods are many in number, for example, this or that morsel of food, this or that article of clothing, etc. But every sin has its quality of an offense from the fact that it is a turning away from the *bonum incommutabile*, the unchangeable good, namely God himself. The gluttonous act is a sin because it is a turning toward this food and a turning away from God. "As long as this aversion remains, the sin remains, and man cannot satisfy for one sin while holding to another."⁶¹ Either you are turned toward the uncreated good or toward a changeable good. Either you are turned toward God or

⁶¹ "Cum aversio illa maneat, alio quocumque peccato manente, non potest homo satisfacere de uno, alio retento." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.1, p.471a.

toward something else. "There can be no satisfaction until the offense has ceased."⁶²

Therefore, someone who is in a state of sin can pay the debt [of restitution] but cannot make satisfaction, because [restitution] only considers the amount of the debt, but satisfaction looks at that and also says "may it be according to the will of the good pleasure of the one being satisfied."⁶³

Given what was said about the common sense of satisfaction in part three of this paper, Albert's opposition to partial sacramental satisfaction should not be surprising, because it has parallel features. In the common sense of the term, it is not right to say that someone has partially satisfied his thirst. Either the person has satisfied his thirst, or he hasn't. Either he has had enough, or he hasn't. Being only partially satisfied is not being satisfied enough, but satisfaction is precisely the condition of having had enough (*satis*).

In the case of satisfaction, according to the common sense, in response to some harm being done, again, we would not speak of partial satisfaction. Thus, if Jack stole two watches from Jill, he may, indeed, make partial restitution, by returning only one watch, but he may not make partial satisfaction, by baking her half a cake or saying half of "I'm sorry" or buying

⁶² "Non potest sibi satisfieri, nisi offensa cesset." Ibid.

⁶³ "Ideo in peccato existens potest solvere debitum, sed non satisfacere: quia solutio tantum respicit quantitatem debiti, sed satisfactio hanc respicit, et adhuc dicit ut fiat secundum voluntatem beneplaciti ejus cui fit." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.9, p.481b.

her half a bunch of flowers. Either Jack and Jill will be restored to a condition of friendship and unity of wills, or the relationship will remain damaged.

Or, if we consider the common juridical sense of the term "satisfaction," if Jack stole two watches, he could not resume his place in society until he made satisfaction for both. Either Jack has done his time, or he hasn't. So long as he hasn't, Jack cannot resume his place in society.

Today's reader might object that Albert's teaching on satisfaction is too focused on justice, and does not adequately reckon with God as a God of mercy. Does it make sense for divine justice to demand satisfaction when human justice does not? And don't the scriptures say "mercy triumphs over judgment?"⁶⁴ This objection will not hold much water when it is recalled, as was said above, that even in human affairs, there is no partial satisfaction. As long as an offender refuses to make satisfaction he is persevering in his offense, and human justice rationally demands that the offense come to an end. This is not due to the whims of some judge, but to the real features of human nature. God's mercy is neither unjust nor irrational.

It must be mentioned that to make satisfaction, according to Albert, not only must a person have stopped sinning, but the

⁶⁴ Jam 2:13.

person must also be in a state of grace. Satisfaction is about pleasing the person whom we satisfy, so that the previous harm may be overcome.

Acts that seek to please God must be done according to the divine will and esteem (*acceptio*). God's esteem does not originate in us, or in our work, nor is it achieved by our work, but we get it from God and it sanctifies us, therefore, such works have to be performed in the state of sanctifying grace.⁶⁵

God cannot be satisfied, except by someone who is in the state of grace.

This does seem to raise a chicken-before-the-egg problem which Albert does not address. The purpose of satisfaction is to restore us to God's friendship, but we cannot make satisfaction unless God has already favored us with sanctifying grace, which seems to indicate that we were already in God's friendship, but if we were already in God's friendship, then we would not need to make satisfaction. So, which comes first: the satisfaction or the sanctifying grace? If you choose satisfaction, then you destroy the classical doctrine of grace and you espouse some version of pelagianism, because you end up with the situation of man pleasing God without God's grace. If you say that sanctifying grace comes first, then you would seem to obviate the need for making satisfaction at all. Albert

⁶⁵ "Opera in quibus quaeritur placatio Dei, sint facta secundum voluntatem et acceptionem divinam: acceptio autem Dei non est in nobis ex nobis, nec in opere nostro ex nobis, vel ex opere nostro, sed potius ex eo quod accepimus ab ipso: et hoc est gratum faciens: et ideo oportet talia opera esse facta in gratia gratum faciente." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.10, p.484b.

seems to prefer this latter option, but he does not address the apparent inconsistency.

Albert might have defended his position by arguing that we make satisfaction for our own sakes, and not for God's. Such an explanation would be analogous to the explanation Albert gives for how our sins harm God. Strictly speaking, our sin can in no way do any harm to God,⁶⁶ because God, in his absolute perfection, is not subject to change of any kind, let alone harm. Nevertheless, by sinning we try to harm God from our own point of view, as much as our state of affairs will allow. Thus, whoever sins is living as if he is harming God, and his condition does not get fixed merely by realizing that God is perfect and immutable. He must strive to please God, from his own point of view, by making satisfaction, just as he had already strove to harm God, from his point of view, by sinning. But, he cannot do so without sanctifying grace. Thus, sanctifying grace comes first, and satisfaction comes second, and the chicken-before-the-egg dilemma is avoided.

Albert considers the notion of satisfaction, in the sacramental sense, to be operative in scripture, although scripture itself does not use the term in that sense. Thus to the objection, concerning Peter's weeping after denying Christ,

⁶⁶ "Licet enim peccator Deum laedere non possit, tamen quantum est de se laedit." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.1, p.471a.

that "I read about Peter's tears, not about his satisfaction,"⁶⁷ Albert admits that "it doesn't say 'satisfaction,' but nevertheless" he insists, "natural law would not allow him to forgo satisfaction, if he sinned."⁶⁸

Albert deduces his satisfaction theory from natural law, the law of human nature, which was active in the scriptures, even if not formally declared there. Another example is the way that contrition, confession and satisfaction, the three parts of the sacrament of penance, are evident to Albert in the parable of the Pharisee and the tax collector in Luke 18:9-14.

For the tax collector also merited pardon, because in his humility he was sorrowful and lowered his eyes, and in his prayer he confessed the truth about himself, and he struck his breast to make satisfaction.⁶⁹

Another example of the scriptural basis of satisfaction was mentioned above: that the authority of the priest to "bind" satisfaction upon the penitent is rooted in Matthew 16:19.

There are two groups of people today who can make satisfaction, according to Albert. The Church militant, that is those Christians still on Earth, at various times in the liturgical calendar, makes satisfaction by undertaking

⁶⁷ "Lacrymas Petri lego, satisfactionem non lego." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.33, p.704b.

⁶⁸ "Non legit satisfactionem : et tamen naturale jus non permittit quin satisfecerit, si peccavit." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.17, art.33, p.705a.

⁶⁹ "Hoc enim etiam in Publicano meruit condonationem, qui ex humilitate confusus depressit oculos, et in oratione de se veritatem confitebatur, et in afflictione satisfactionis tutudit pectus." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, cap.20, p.153a.

penitential acts voluntarily.⁷⁰ The church suffering, that is, the souls in purgatory, is engaged full time in a labor of satisfaction.⁷¹

Can those of us on earth help the souls in purgatory by making satisfaction on their behalf? Albert takes it for granted that the traditional Catholic teaching is correct: of course they can. In fact, an innocent party, in general, may make satisfaction on behalf of a guilty party according to Albert.⁷² However, this idea that someone may satisfy for his own sins or for someone else's will cause a bit of a problem and the next part of this thesis we will come back to it.

An important takeaway from this part, that will reappear in the next part as well, is that sacramental satisfaction works to undo guilt that is in the guilty party. Satisfaction is not about balancing some celestial scales, but rather healing individuals who suffer harm as a result of their own sins.

⁷⁰ "In diebus autem profestis et in diebus luctus, sicut in jejunio, nisi sit jejunium exsultationis, sicut in Pentecoste, [Gloria] non cantatur : quia tunc timentes iram de peccatis satisfacimus, et pacem nondum adhuc donatam nobis commemoramus." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, p.21b.

⁷¹ "Illi autem omnes vel sunt in via adhuc poenitentes, vel in purgatorio satisfaciendo luendo in poenis quod fecerunt." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.20, art.18, p.855a.

⁷² "Unde poena se habet ad culpam ut medicina expiativa : et ideo infligitur innocentibus, ut satisfaciant pro aliis : cum tamen non infligatur nisi pro peccatis propriis vel alienis." *Summa theologiae* (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.22, q.131, m.2, p.437b.

Part Five: The Soteriological Sense

According to Albert, Christ's death was the most apt way for satisfaction to be made on our behalf, because it preserves justice and mercy. As was explained in part three of this paper, when a thief steals something, in justice, he owes two things: restitution of the stolen object when possible, and satisfaction according to the enormity of the offense. Thus, today, we would expect a diamond thief not only to restore the stolen diamonds, but also to make satisfaction by doing some jail time. The amount of jail time will depend upon several factors: the thief's criminal record, extenuating circumstances, the value of the diamonds, etc. In the case of soteriology, humanity's first ancestor, Adam, was a thief, because he stole God's honor by sinning. Thus Adam and his children owe God both restitution of the lost honor and satisfaction.

The analogy at this point may seem a little strained, because, as Albert states, "a sinner cannot harm God. Nevertheless," he contends, "as much as it is in him he does harm God."⁷³ Thus, a person who, by sinning, dishonors God, does not decrease God's honor *per se*, but he does do so from his own point of view. There is room here for Albert to explain more precisely the relationship between theft and dishonor. He could

⁷³ "Peccator Deum laedere non possit, tamen quantum est de se laedit." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.15, art.1, p.471a.

have done more to flesh out what it means to really take someone's honor from them, and then he could explain how this applies to dishonoring God.

After Adam's theft, justice and friendship equally demanded that both restitution and satisfaction had to be made. Not only did God's honor have to be restored, but something extra had to be given, according to the enormity of the offense. Because God is infinite, the enormity of the offense is also infinite. Thus, an offering of infinite worth was needed. Even if a human being could restore the honor that had been stolen, the guilt would still remain, until satisfaction could be made for the infinite enormity of the offense. Thus, it was fitting (*conveniens*) for a God-man to pay the debt of satisfaction, since such a being would be in debt as a man, and capable of paying, as God.⁷⁴

A key part of satisfaction as a soteriological theory is the idea that human beings are or were in debt to God. Such indebtedness is not the invention of medieval minds obsessed with juridical or feudal categories. Rather, indebtedness to God has been a key part of Christianity from the beginning. The Our Father contains the petition: "forgive us our debts, as we

⁷⁴ *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.13, art.14, p.331b.

forgive our debtors,"⁷⁵ and Jesus offered many parables explaining the notion of human indebtedness to God.⁷⁶ According to Albert, these "debts are what we ought to be paying to God through satisfaction."⁷⁷ Albert distinguishes three types of debts that we owe to God. The first is the debt that we owe from the fact of creation. Because God freely gave us everything that we have, "we owe him more than we realize."⁷⁸ The second debt comes from sin. By sinning we dishonor God, offending His infinite majesty, and we therefore owe him more than we could ever pay, even if we had until the end of the world to do so. The third debt comes from God's mercy, and this debt is so slight that even a frail man could pay it. When God, in His mercy, remits the other debts that we owe, all he asks of us, in return, is that we do His will, and this can be called a debt, in the sense that we owe it to God to do His will, because He has been merciful to us.⁷⁹

If it is true that we owe God so much, then a problem arises. "The more a service is owed, the less pleasing the service becomes."⁸⁰ For example, if someone gives you a free cup of coffee, that act is more pleasing to you, and you are more

⁷⁵ "Et dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris." "καὶ ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὀφειλήματα ἡμῶν, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν." (Matt 6:12).

⁷⁶ Cf. Matt 18:23-35, Matt 25:14-30.

⁷⁷ "Debita sunt quae reddere debemus per satisfactionem Deo." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.3, cap.20, p.153a.

⁷⁸ "Plus tenemur quam scimus." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.18, art.13, p.331a.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ "Quanto magis debita sunt servitia, tanto minus sunt grata." Ibid.

grateful, than if you had been given a cup of coffee by someone who owed it to you, because you just paid her a fair price for it. So, if we owe God so much by virtue of our creation and of our sin, then it seems we can never be pleasing (*grati*) to Him. Not even the martyrs, then, could have been pleasing (*grati*) to God. The problem is that this would do grave harm to traditional Catholic understanding of grace (*gratia*), which explains how we do become pleasing (*grati*) to God. Albert's explanation is that the martyrs paid to God what they owed by virtue of their creation, but that they did so in a most pleasing way (*gratissime*), that is, freely.⁸¹ We, too, are pleasing to God when we give Him what we already owe Him, doing so in a pleasing way.

Given that we had incurred debts to God that we could not repay, Albert's view is that Jesus Christ paid the price of those debts on our behalf, making both restitution and satisfaction.⁸² Christ did so by meriting our satisfaction. Christ merited things for himself and for us by his virtues, such as his humility, obedience and charity.⁸³

Albert considers the question of whether it was possible for God to save us in some other way than he did. Anselm had

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² "'Jesus Nazareus, rex Judaeorum.' In quibus quatuor verbis effectus Crucis notantur : quia per satisfactionem pro nobis et solutionem pretii, est 'Jesus,' auctor salutis nostrae." *Super Iohannem* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), in cap.19, v.19-22, p.656b.

⁸³ *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.18, art.4, p.317a.

answered this question in the negative, but Albert provides many distinctions and nuances. His first distinction is between God and us. "Another way was possible," he says, "considering God's power... but from our point of view, it was impossible for us to be redeemed except by a God-man."⁸⁴ Albert's answer to this question affirms the limitations of human thought. Some things that seem impossible to us, are, from God's point of view, possible. "Thus, if it be asked," says Albert, "whether a calf can be made from a tree-trunk, I say 'no,' but if it be asked whether God is able to make a calf from a tree-trunk, we say 'yes.'"⁸⁵

Albert's answer to the necessity question not only identifies some limits of human thought, it also gives an insight into why God saved us the way He did. He chose to respect our experience of friendship, sin and reconciliation. There is something *in us* that makes us believe that God had to save us the way he did. In other words, there was not some debt floating out there in some celestial balance sheet that God just could not ignore. It is that it would be impossible for *us* to grasp the idea of our salvation taking place without satisfaction being made for the debt which we had incurred. God

⁸⁴ "Alius fuit modus possibilis, considerata potestate Dei... sed tamen ex parte nostra impossibile fuit nos redimi nisi per Deum et hominem." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.1, p.356b.

⁸⁵ "Si enim quaeratur, Utrum de trunco potest fieri vitulus ? dicimus quod non. Si autem quaeratur, Utrum Deus de trunco potest facere vitulum ? dicimus quod sic." Ibid. p. 357a.

chose to save us in a way that would respect our understanding of sin and satisfaction.

Could God have saved us while ignoring the debt we owed? Could he have forgiven us without our making satisfaction? Yes. According to Albert, instead of our paying the full penalty, we could have paid only an appropriate penalty (*condigna poena*), perhaps by undergoing various chastisements on this earth and in purgatory, and there would be nothing wrong with doing so, from God's point of view.⁸⁶ But there would be something unbecoming (*incongruum*) about this from our point of view. Although God is not constrained by our notions of what is becoming and unbecoming,⁸⁷ nevertheless, he did, in fact, choose to save us in a way that accorded with our understanding.

The reason it would be unbecoming (*incongruum*), from our point of view, for us to be saved by God in some other way, without satisfaction being made, is that "from our point of view, a feeling of shame would remain, since man had taken something that he had not repaid."⁸⁸ Albert also acknowledges that God could also simply take away that feeling of shame, but he denies that God could change the truth of what happened, and the truth is that the first man, by sinning, stole something

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 357a.

⁸⁷ "Ad aliud dicendum quod congruum et incongruum ex parte nostra sumuntur, et non ex parte iudicii Dei, cui congruum est omne quod facit: quia etiam illud quod videtur incongruum ex contrario usu, si Deus faceret, congruissimum esset." Ibid. p. 357a.

⁸⁸ "Ex parte hominis remansisset verecundia, scilicet quod homo abstulisset quod non reddidisset." Ibid. p. 357b.

that he could not repay. Thus, it was most becoming (*congruissimum*) that "man, by repaying as much as or more than he stole, would be freed at once from sin and from shame,"⁸⁹ and this is exactly what Albert's version of theory of satisfaction accounts for.

One of the pitfalls of a cursory reading of Albert is that some statements, taken out of context, lead the reader to a false conclusion. L.W. Grensted wrote that

Albert the Great argues in favour of the necessity of the Atonement, but on different grounds from those given by Anselm. Original sin, he says, being a corruption of the nature derived from Adam, the natural head of the race, can only be remitted through a supernatural second Head, since a second natural Head is unthinkable.⁹⁰

He cites Albert's commentary on distinction 20 of book III of the *Sentences*, without mentioning the article he has in mind. His interpretation is false, because in the same distinction, Albert clearly states that "sin is not remitted except by a God-man satisfying on our behalf, *although another way was possible*" (emphasis added).⁹¹ Perhaps Grensted was referring to Albert's arguments in that same article denying that God could have saved us by creating a second (natural) Adam.

⁸⁹ "Homo tantum vel plus dando quam rapuit, ab approbrio simul et peccato liberaretur." Ibid. p. 357b.

⁹⁰ Grensted, *Doctrine of the Atonement*, 147.

⁹¹ "Non remittitur peccatum nisi Deo et homine satisfaciente pro nobis, licet alius modus fuerit possibilis." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.VII, p.366a.

Readers may also be confused by a statement of Albert's that "there was no other method possible for our redemption, but the payment of such a price." It may sound as if Albert is affirming Anselmian necessity on this point, but, in fact, he is not. From the context, Albert is talking about one aspect of soteriological theory: redemption. The full quotation makes this clear:

There was no other method possible for our redemption but the payment of such a price, unless 'redemption' is taken in the wide sense, as equivalent to 'liberation.'⁹²

Thus, for Albert, there were various possible ways of "liberation," which is "redemption" in the broad sense, but only one possible way of "redemption" in the narrow, strict sense. It was necessary for Albert to use technical meanings of "redemption" in this article because he is arguing against the theory that we were redeemed from slavery to the Devil by some transaction between Christ and the Devil.

Albert considers the criticism of his satisfaction theory that uses an analogy of a human judge. It would be wrong for a human judge to demand a payment from the guilty party that was more than the guilty party could pay. But, in satisfaction theory, God is a judge who demands more than fallen human beings can pay. To avoid the blasphemous conclusion that God is a

⁹² "Solutio... Non fuit alius modus possibilis nostrae redemptionis, nisi per pretii talis solutionem, nisi redemptio large pro liberatione accipiatur." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.III, p.360a.

wicked judge, we must admit, it seems, that fallen human beings were, in fact, capable of repaying to God what was lost, that is, that they could make restitution and satisfaction on their own. Albert replies⁹³ by admitting that it would, indeed, be extortion for a judge to demand more than the guilty party could pay, unless the judge himself was willing to make the payment from his own funds. Because God wanted human beings to be restored to their original dignity, and not to be afflicted by any guilty conscience for having taken honor from God what they could not repay, God did demand more than we could pay, but He also helped to foot the bill, as Psalm 111:9 says: "The Lord sent redemption to his people."

Another objection to Albert's satisfaction theory is that it is a cruel to withhold forgiveness until the death of an innocent person. How could God be so cruel? Could He not have forgiven our sins without the death of His innocent Son? Albert's response is to fall back upon the work of Anselm, and affirm that God the Father did not have some thirst for blood that needed to be satisfied.⁹⁴ Rather, the Father is perfectly just and merciful. He mercifully sent his Son to man, so that his Son could make just satisfaction on man's behalf.

⁹³ *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.I, p.357b.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

But to some this explanation may seem unjust. Taking the punishment that a guilty party deserves and inflicting it upon an innocent party, so that the guilty party can go unpunished makes little sense. Albert's reply is that it would truly be a sin for a judge to act in such a way motivated by cruelty and perversity.⁹⁵ But, if the judge did so for the sake of justice, and for the correction and help of the guilty party, then such a judge would prove himself to be both just and merciful. This shows that, for Albert, satisfaction does not pertain to some nebulous debt floating somewhere out there in the universe, in some celestial balance sheet, or in God himself. Satisfaction is for the correction and help of the guilty party. The debt exists in us, and by paying it, we are corrected and helped.

It was mentioned, in the previous part of this thesis, that souls here on earth could make satisfaction on behalf of the souls in purgatory, and that it is possible for one party to satisfy for another. For example, one party, Jesus Christ, made satisfaction for another party, the rest of humanity. However, this affirmation of vicarious satisfaction does seem to contradict a key part of Anselmian satisfaction theory: that the God-man *had* to be man in order to share our debt, because otherwise he could not satisfy on our behalf. In fact, in explaining the incarnation, Albert makes this point explicit:

⁹⁵ Ibid.

In this way, therefore, from those things which pertain to Godhead He had the power to save: but because, before a just judge, *no one may make satisfaction except the one who is in debt*, He had to assume something of our condition so that He would owe satisfaction on our behalf.⁹⁶

In one place, Albert writes that one party may satisfy on behalf of another, and, in another place, he denies it.

Albert could have argued (but did not) that the key to unravelling this apparent contradiction is understanding the relationship between the two parties. If the party making satisfaction is not really connected to the guilty party, then the objection against vicarious satisfaction stands. But if, on the other hand, they are connected by a very strong bond, then it does become possible for one party to satisfy for the other. In Albert's ecclesiology, Christian believers are united to Christ as body parts are united to their head, and all Christians are united to each other, since they are in the same mystical body of Christ.

Thus, Christ did satisfy on our behalf.⁹⁷

A punishment satisfies for sin both in the head and in the members, and therefore, it is by the mercy of God that a punishment is sometimes inflicted upon us, as

⁹⁶ "Sic ergo ex his quae deitatis sunt, facultatem habet salvandi : sed quia apud justum judicem non satisfacit nisi qui debet, ideo ex nostro assumpsit, unde pro nobis satisfacere deberet." *De mysterio missae* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), tract.1, cap.3, p.30b.

⁹⁷ "Totam tuam, o Pater, voluntatem in sanctificando homines et satisfaciendo pro ipsis perficiens." *De corpore domini* (ed. Borgnet, 1899), dist.5, cap.4, p.350b.

also upon [Christ] the head, so that satisfaction may take place.⁹⁸

Thus, if a thief steals a watch with his left hand, he may restore the watch with his right hand and also make some satisfaction, for example, pay some fee, with his right hand. Because the hands are joined together in one body, one member can make satisfaction for the other. The key to this sort of unity between the head and members, according to Albert, is a unity of wills. "Satisfaction cannot be wholly alien, because it is owed by the spirit, and therefore it must be voluntary."⁹⁹ In other words, the one on whose behalf satisfaction is being made must join his will to the one that makes satisfaction. In more concrete terms, the Christian believer must will, or at least strive to will, what Christ wills, otherwise, the satisfaction achieved by Christ will be alien to him.

This raises two points: first of all, what does it mean for a Christian to will what Christ willed in his passion? In order to will something directly, it must be perceived as good. But how could anyone think it good for an innocent person to be betrayed, mocked, tortured and crucified? In what sense, then, was the passion a good thing? Albert gives "four reasons why the death of Christ must be called 'good' absolutely and without

⁹⁸ "Poena est satisfactoria pro peccato tam in membris, quam in capite : et ideo ex misericordia Dei inflictā quandoque nobis, et capiti, ut per eam fiat satisfactio." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.36, art.2, p.586a.

⁹⁹ "Satisfactio non potest esse omnino aliena, quia a spiritu debetur, et ideo voluntariam oportet esse." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.32, art.1, p.521b.

distinction."¹⁰⁰ Each reason focuses on one positive aspect of the passion. To wrestle with these positive aspects, and consider whether they outweigh the harmful aspects is to undergo a process like that of Christ, Himself, in the garden of Gethsemane.

The second point that arises from the necessity of a union of wills between head and members is that participation in the satisfaction wrought by Christ requires willing compliance and is, therefore, not applicable to those who deny Christ. The satisfaction of Christ is "sufficient for all people but not efficient."¹⁰¹ In other words, Christ's satisfaction is real, but we are not forced to accept it against our wills. It is up to us whether we accept it or not, and we may even do so on behalf of young children. As Albert says, "another person's faith is enough for [Christ's] satisfaction to be efficacious for the baptized."¹⁰²

One topic that Albert could have explored further is why Christ's humility and obedience would count as satisfaction before God. Given that sacramental penance may be some combination of prayer, fasting and almsgiving, we might wonder why Christ went to such an extreme as crucifixion. In other

¹⁰⁰ "Dicendum, quod mors Christi absolute et sine distinctione optima dicenda est quattuor rationibus." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.20, art.13, p.371b.

¹⁰¹ "...poenam pro omnibus satisficientem sufficienter, licet non efficienter." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.13, art.25, p.374a.

¹⁰² "Sufficit fides aliena ut valeat baptizatis illa satisfactio." *Super Sententiarum* (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.6, art.1, p.118b.

words, what was it about enduring torture, abandonment and death that made them the preferred means of satisfaction, such that the satisfaction that came from the crucifixion had an effect that would not have been available merely from Christ's acts of prayer, fasting and almsgiving?¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Cf. J. Patout Burns, SJ, "The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory," *Theological Studies* 36(1975), 296.

Part Six: Conclusion

We see in the works of Albert the Great a critical espousal and a promotion of Anselm's satisfaction theory. Albert accepts the core parts of the theory: that humanity owed a debt to God as a result of Adam's sin, that finite humanity was unable to pay an infinite debt, that only a God-man could pay that debt, since as a man he would share the debt and as a God he would be capable of making an infinite payment, and that Jesus Christ, as true God and true man, did, in fact, pay that debt by being humble and obedient in undergoing his passion. Albert gives some nuance to Anselm's theory, by clarifying that from *our* point of view, it was necessary for Christ to redeem us the way he did, but that from *God's* point of view, other ways were possible, even though the way he chose was fitting (*conveniens*).

By carefully studying Albert's vast literary corpus, we see that his version of satisfaction as a soteriological theory is built upon his use of the common (non-religious) sense of the term, and also upon the sacramental sense. At the base level, Albert talks about satisfying a thirst, for example, or a desire, and he talks about making satisfaction for harm done. Thus, if Jack harms Jill by stealing her watch, he could satisfy her desire for the watch by returning it, which is called "restitution," and he could satisfy her desire for justice by paying a fine or going to jail or something similar, and this

latter part is "satisfaction," properly so called. This also applies outside of the judicial sphere. If Jack and Jill are friends, Jack would still make restitution and satisfaction in order to restore the damaged friendship. Perhaps his satisfaction would be a gift to Jill or a special kindness of some sort: something that would reassure Jill that Jack wanted to restore their friendship and their unity of wills. Justice between friends is similar to justice between disputing parties in court.

Sacramental satisfaction is some act of prayer, fasting or almsgiving, as imposed by a priest in the sacrament of penance, that allows the penitent not to make restitution for God's lost honor, but rather, to show God that the penitent desires justice, desires a restoration of friendship with God, and desires a union of wills with God. Satisfaction of this sort is made possible by Christ's crucifixion, and is an imitation of it. Christ, on his cross made a perfect satisfaction, not only restoring God's lost honor (restitution), but also doing something extra (infinitely so), to achieve justice and to repair lost friendship. Christ's satisfaction is sufficient for all humanity, but not efficient, in the sense that it is only effective for those who have united themselves to Christ's mystical body the Church.

It is true that this thesis reflects "a growing tendency" among modern scholars "to emphasize the moral and spiritual features of the atonement and to minimize what were thought to be the legalistic and commercial elements in previous accounts of it."¹⁰⁴ This tendency is growing because scholars such as Hans Küng have criticized Anselm's satisfaction theory for being dominated by legalistic logic, and for lacking an appreciation for God's incomprehensibility and freedom.¹⁰⁵ In response, this thesis has shown that Albert's version of satisfaction theory is based not merely on legalistic logic, but also on the deeper logic of human relationships. Thus, Albert's version of satisfaction includes legalistic logic, but it is not dominated by it. Furthermore, Albert emphasizes the distinction between God's freedom as it is in itself, and as we perceive it. Albert affirms that God could have chosen to save us in some other way than He did, even though we cannot understand what that might have been. Albert sees God as more incomprehensible and more free, and, therefore, Küng's criticism does not apply.

According to Robin Ryan, many contemporary theologians object to any soteriological theory that sees, in the death of Christ, some sort of transaction, as if Christ, by dying, paid some sort of a price. He summarizes the critiques of Elizabeth

¹⁰⁴ John McIntyre, *The Shape of Soteriology*, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992) p. 47.

¹⁰⁵ Hans Küng, *On Being a Christian*, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 421-424.

Johnson, Cynthia Crysdale and Jon Sobrino this way: "If the cross is isolated from [Christ's] ministry and interpreted as a transaction between Jesus and God (the Father), it leads to magical or even cruel view of redemption."¹⁰⁶ Such criticisms apply only partially to Albert's thought. Albert does describe the death of Christ as the payment of a price (*pretium*) to God, because it was a restoration of the honor that was stolen by Adam's sin. For Adam's pride, Christ showed humility, and for Adam's disobedience, Christ showed obedience. Does this mean that God is keeping some celestial balance sheet, and that God insists on a perfect reckoning before He would let us into heaven? Not exactly. Albert does talk about justice, and its demands, among which he includes the demand for punishment, but he also talks about guilt as it exists in human beings, too. We know ourselves to be in debt, and we feel guilt at having done wrong. Thus, Christ's satisfaction is, at the end of the day, really about something in us, our guilt, because God, strictly speaking, was not at a loss as the result of Adam's sin, as Albert repeatedly states.

One remaining difficulty for a modern student of medieval satisfaction theory is the emphasis it places on divine honor. Satisfaction theory reduces Adam's sin, and all other sins, to the theft of honor due to God. But today's culture does not

¹⁰⁶ Robin Ryan, *Jesus and Salvation*, (Collegeville, Liturgical Press, 2015), 133-134.

afford students as much appreciation for honor as medieval culture did. It will seem irrational to many modern students that anyone would go to great lengths, such as crucifixion, for the sake of honor. One option for today's defender of satisfaction theory is to replace honor with a similar concept, while trying to preserve the central structures of the theory. Hans Urs Von Balthasar¹⁰⁷ and Eleonore Stump¹⁰⁸ are two examples of modern authors on this path. Another option would be to distil a remedy for this modern problem by carefully studying Albert's understanding of divine honor,¹⁰⁹ and, if possible, rehabilitating it.

¹⁰⁷ "We can avoid the medieval side of [Anselm's satisfaction] theory, that is, the reparation of God's injured honor, but we must substitute for it the idea of a divine love scorned by sin." Hans Urs Von Balthasar, *To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption*, trans. Anne Englund Nash, (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 2010), 35.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Eleonore Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," in *Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology Volume I*, ed. Michael Rea, (Oxford University Press, 2009), 267-293.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Eugene Fairwether, ed. *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham*, (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1956), 56.

Appendix One: Editions and Manuscripts

Albert most directly addresses the topic of satisfaction as a soteriological theory in his commentary on distinction 20 of Book III of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Therefore, it is important to have an accurate version of this text. The most recent edition of Albert's commentary on Book III of the *Sentences* was edited by Auguste Borgnet and published in 1894 in Paris by Louis Vivès. It comprises volume 28 of the 38 volume set of Albert's *Opera Omnia*, all of which was edited by Borgnet. Working on a 38 volume set, Borgnet hardly had the time to draw on manuscript research to produce his edition of Albert's commentary on Book III. In fact, he was not aware of any manuscripts of this commentary at all.¹¹⁰ Instead, he in large part reproduced Peter Jammy's Lyon edition of 1651, but with updated citations of scripture and of the fathers of the Church, and with freshly composed introductory matter. Borgnet, as editor, felt free to make minor stylistic changes to improve the readability of the text. For example, where the Jammy's edition had "in principio 18 distinctionis posita est," Borgnet edits it to read "in principio distinctionis XVIII posita est."¹¹¹ William Kübel, the former director of the Albertus Magnus

¹¹⁰ Albert the Great, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Borgnet, (Paris: Louis Vives, 1890-1891) Vol I, p. XLV.

¹¹¹ *Super Sententiarum*, Lib.III, dist.20, divisio textus.

Institute, has noted that the Paris edition also includes attempts by the editors to clarify confusing passages.¹¹²

Despite these minor changes, on the whole, Borgnet's Paris edition follows Jammy's Lyon edition closely. Borgnet's alterations to Jammy's text are sparse. In fact, Borgnet follows Jammy so closely that he reproduces some of Jammy's typos.¹¹³ In essence, today's students of Albert's *Sentence Commentary* are relying upon 17th Century scholarship, because they have no option but Borgnet's 19th Century edition, which relies almost entirely on Jammy's 17th Century work. In the preface of the first volume of Jammy's edition, it is stated that he expurgated errors, restored passages, and added citations.¹¹⁴ In other words, he took the liberty as editor to improve the text he was working with. Did Jammy, in doing so, insert himself between his readers and the original author? Such editorial "improvement" was not uncommon at that time. One need only recall the commission of Latinists under Pope Urban VIII that revised the ancient hymns of the Roman breviary according to the neo-classical standards then fashionable. Pope Urban's "improved" hymns came out in 1632, a mere 19 years before Jammy finished his work on the Lyon edition of Albert's

¹¹² www.albertusmagnusinstitut.de

¹¹³ For example, both editions have: "... quia hoc nullus debet subiipsi subtrahere, ..." *Super Sententiarum*, Lib.IV, dist.15, art.17, solutio.

¹¹⁴ "... a mendis expurgavit, innumeris locis restituit, citationibus quae desiderabantur illustravit..." *Opera Omnia*, Ed. Jammy (Lyon, 1651), Volume 1, no page.

Opera Omnia. The same revisionist spirit that motivated the papal commission may also have motivated Jammy's work. A critical edition of Albert's *Sentence* commentary, using modern methods, is desperately needed, if for no other reason than to appreciate the editorial interventions of Jammy in 1632 and Borgnet in 1894.

A 1982 catalog lists thirteen known manuscripts of Albert's commentary on Book III of Lombard's *Sentences*.¹¹⁵ Four are from the thirteenth century, six are from the fourteenth century, and three are from the fifteenth century. Neither the Lyon nor the Paris editions of Albert's *Opera Omnia* make any reference to manuscripts. The University of Heidelberg has made one manuscript of Albert's commentary on Book III of the *Sentences* available online: Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047. This manuscript was written in France in the fourteenth century, and taken to the famous library of the University of Heidelberg in the Palatinate region of Germany. In 1623, at the end of the Thirty Years' War, the city was conquered and the library was sacked. Pope Gregory XVI ordered the contents of the library to be brought to Rome. One hundred and ninety-six crates of books were shipped across the Alps to Rome, becoming the Vatican Palatinate Library. The manuscript studied here, Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047

¹¹⁵ Winfried Fauser, *Die Werke des Albertus Magnus in Ihrer Handschriftlichen Überlieferung*, (Wesphalia: Aschendorff, 1982), 281.

remains in Rome to this day, but it is thanks to the digitization project of the University of Heidelberg that the manuscript is available on the internet to all scholars.¹¹⁶ There is a change in penmanship between folios 138r and 138v that indicates that two different scribes copied distinction 20.

By comparing Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 to Borgnet's Paris edition of distinction 20, thousands of alterations become apparent. As Jammy remarked, above, most differences pertain to stylistic concerns, such as word order. Some alterations pertain to citations of scripture or of the Fathers of the Church, and many pertain to changes of Albert's ideas, as indicated in the footnotes of the following transcription. In most of these cases, the Borgnet edition makes more sense. For example: the heading of article one in Borgnet talks about whether another method was possible, but the same heading in Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 talks about whether another method was possible *for God*. Given that the lengthy article discusses things that are possible *for God* and things that are possible *for us* and things that are possible, Borgnet's reading, following Jammy is more sensible. But there are some cases where Borgnet's reading is inferior. For example, in the solution to article five, Borgnet has Albert say that "no method *could be just* on God's part," where Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047 has

¹¹⁶ http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/bav_pal_lat_1047

"no method *would be unjust* on God's part." See note 203 below. The reading from Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047, in this instance, makes more sense and is more in keeping with Albert's other statements.

Appendix Two: Transcription of Vat. Palat. Lat. 1047
Albert the Great's Commentary on *The Sentences* of Peter Lombard
Book III, Distinction 20

[f 134c] [Mg] xx Distinctio

[Divisio Textus]

"Si vero quaeritur, utrum alio modo posset Deus hominem liberare." Hic incipit quarta pars illius divisionis quae in principio xviii distinctionis posita est. Et agitur hic utrum Deus alio modo quam per mortem potuerit liberare: et durat usque ad illum locum, ubi dicitur in hac eadem distinctione, *"Christus ergo est sacerdos, idemque hostia."*

Et dividitur in partes duas: in quarum prima ostendit rationes congruae, quare isto modo voluit redimere, cum alius modus esset ei¹¹⁷ possibilis. In secunda, exsequitur causam inter Deum, et hominem, et diabolum, ibi, *"Si enim tres illi in causam,"* etc.

In prima parte tria facit, scilicet quaestionem proponit, et secundo, causam solutionis unam dat ex juvantibus ad spem immortalitatis; tertio, dat aliam ex ratione convenientiae.¹¹⁸ Et haec tria facit in uno capitulo: et ex hoc patet sententia.

[Articulus I]

[Mg] Utrum Deus alio modo hominem a peccato diaboli potuerit liberare.

¹¹⁷ Paris om. "ei."

¹¹⁸ Paris: "justitiae."

Incidit autem hic dubium primo, si est alius modus Deo¹¹⁹ possibilis, ut dicit, vel non? Et si hoc verum est, quod alius modus est Deo¹²⁰ possibilis: tunc quaeritur secundo, ex qua potestate¹²¹ sit ille possibilis?

[1.¹²²] Ad primum autem proceditur sic. Dicit enim Anselmus quod minimum inconueniens decentissimae iustitiae Dei est impossibile, cum ergo maximum inconueniens sit iniustitia iudicii, et praecipue **[f 134d]** coram iudice illo a quo non est ad alium appellare. Ergo sustinere iniustitiam inconueniens¹²³ est Deo, sed peccatum sine condigna satisfactione remittere est iniustum iudicium: ergo hoc impossibile est Deo. Probatum autem est supra, et adhuc probatur amplius, non potuisse facere condignam satisfactionem pro peccato nisi Deum et hominem: hoc enim dixit Ambrosius in praecedenti distinctione: ergo videtur alium modum non fuisse possibile.

[2.] Item, convenientia et inconuenientia¹²⁴ opponuntur: aut igitur in genere naturae, aut in genere moris. Constat quia prout hic loquitur de his non opponuntur in genere naturae: quia non loquitur de opere naturae, sed voluntatis, quod est liberatio: ergo opponuntur in genere moris: ergo si congruum est bonum, oportet quod incongruum sit malum, quia bonum bono

¹¹⁹ Paris om. "Deo."

¹²⁰ Paris om. "Deo."

¹²¹ Paris: "possibilitate."

¹²² The paragraph numbering used here is the same as that used in Borgnet.

¹²³ Paris: "impossibilis."

¹²⁴ Paris: "congruentia et incongruentia."

non opponitur: sed Deus vel Filius Dei non potest facere malum: ergo non potest facere incongruum. Si igitur alius modus non fuit congruus nostrae miseriae sanandae, alius modus non fuit Deo possibilis.

[3.] Item, ut dicit Anselmus, cum quaeritur utrum alio modo liberari¹²⁵ potuit genus humanum? non quaeritur modus ex parte Dei qui omnia potest, sed ex parte nostra: ergo hoc est quaerere, si alio modo exire poteramus de reatu peccati? Constat autem quod non nisi per Deum satisfaciendum, qui etiam homo esset, ut dicit Anselmus et probat: ergo alius modus non fuit nobis¹²⁶ possibilis, et hoc quaeritur hic. Ergo simpliciter alius modus non fuit nobis possibilis.¹²⁷

[4.] Item, hoc videntur expresse dicere quaedam auctoritates, quarum prima est, ad Titum, ii, glossa super illud, *Apparuit gratia*,¹²⁸ etc., dicit sic: "Non essemus participes divinitatis ejus, nisi ipse particeps esset nostrae mortalitatis." Cum igitur non sumus participes, nisi per gratiam reconciliationis, non essemus reconciliati, nisi in nostra humanitate mortuus esset pro nobis.

Item, ad Rom., v, super illud, *Sicut per inobedientiam unius*,¹²⁹ etc., glossa: "illa fides sana est, qua credimus nullum

¹²⁵ Paris: "liberare."

¹²⁶ Paris: "Deo."

¹²⁷ Paris om. "et hoc quaeritur... nobis possibilis."

¹²⁸ Tit 2:11.

¹²⁹ Rom 5:19.

hominem sive per universalem¹³⁰ aetatis, sive majoris, liberari a contagio mortis antiquae, et obligatione peccati, quam prima nativitas contraxit, nisi per mediatorem Dei et hominum, et hominem Christum Jesum, cujus saluberrima fide illi salvi facti sunt."

Item, Anselmus in libro *Cur Deus homo*: "non potuit transire calicem nisi biberet, non quia non posset vitare mortem si vellet, sed (sicut dictum est) impossibile est aliter salvare mundum."¹³¹

Item, ad Hebr., ii, super illud *Per passionem confirmare*¹³² *auctorem salutis eorum*,¹³³ etc., glossa: "nisi Christus moreretur,¹³⁴ et non redemptus periret, et frustra essent omnia facta."

Ex his et multis aliis videtur concludi, quod non erat alius modus possibilis ad liberandum genus humanum.

[5.] Item quidam objiciunt sic: Deus illum modum praeviderat et praedestinaverat [**f. 135a**] quia praedestinatio est de omnibus bonis salutaribus: sed quod praedestinatum est, impossibile est non esse, ergo necessarium est esse, ergo alius modus non fuit possibilis quia impossibile non esse¹³⁵ et necesse

¹³⁰ Paris vice "per universalem" hab. "parvulae."

¹³¹ Anselm *Cur Deus homo*, Lib. 1, c. 10.

¹³² Paris "consummare."

¹³³ Heb 2:10.

¹³⁴ Paris add. "homo non redimeretur."

¹³⁵ Paris om. "ergo necessarium... non esse."

esse, et possibile non esse, sunt contradictoriae in quarto et secundo modo modalium.

[6.] Item, fides patriarcharum credidit hunc modum: fidei autem non potest subesse falsum: ergo fuit necesse esse hunc modum liberationis: ergo non fuit possibile esse alium.

Sed contra:

Gregorius in *Moralibus* in xx, "Qui nos existere fecit ex nihilo, revocare etiam sine morte sua et passione potuit."

Item, Leo Papa in legenda in ramis palmarum: "omnipotentia Filii Dei quae propter eandem essentiam est aequalis Patri, potuisset genus humanum a diaboli demonio solo imperio voluntatis suae exuere, nisi divinis operibus maxime congruisset ut nequitiae hostilis adversitas de eo quod vicerat vinceretur."¹³⁶

Item, Augustinus in libro *de Trinitate* viii contra illos qui dicunt "defuitne alius modus Deo quo liberaret a miseria ut hominem fieri vellet unigenitum filium suum humanam naturam"¹³⁷ induendo et carnem sic est refellere, ut istum modum bonum asseramus et congruum divinae deitati: verum etiam ut ostendamus alium possibilem Deo non defuisse, cujus potestati aequaliter cuncta subjacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem

¹³⁶ Greg. *Moralium* Lib. 20.

¹³⁷ Paris: "animam."

modum alium non fuisse."¹³⁸

Item, super illud Psalmi: *Et non ad insipientiam mihi*,¹³⁹

Glossa: "ut sapienter genus humanum meo sanguine liberaretur: nullus enim convenientior modus nostrae liberationis, quam ut homo qui per superbiam cecidit, per humilitatem resurgat."

Ad hoc etiam sunt rationes non solum probantes, quod alius modus fuit possibilis, sed etiam quod alius fuit magis congruus.

[1.] Sic dignum enim honore non congruit pati poenas et exilium. Filius autem fuit dignus omni honore: ergo non debebat sibi hoc ad injuriam facere, ut poenas et exilium subiret.

[2.] Item, sine satisfactione remittere peccatum fuisset majoris perfectionis: ergo fuisset Deo perfectissimo magis congruus ille modus. Probatio primae quia ad hoc nos invitat, ut diligamus inimicos, et ut dimittamus debentibus nobis, etiam post hoc quod exigamus satisfactionem. Si ergo bonum suadet nobis, ipse debuit primo bonum facere in seipso.

Item, si dicas quod seipsum negare non potuit: negasset autem seipsum si faceret contra justitiam suam. Contra: Sicut ipse est justitia sua, ut ita ipse est sua summa¹⁴⁰ misericordia quae superexaltat iudicium: ergo exigendo tam gravem emendam, videtur venire contra suam misericordiam. **[f. 135b]**

¹³⁸ Augustinus *de Trinitate* 13.10.13.

¹³⁹ Ps. 21:3

¹⁴⁰ Paris om. "summa."

[3.] Item, impius iudex est qui plus exigit in emenda, quam possit reus facere: quia ille non quaerit emendationem rei, sed sitit sanguinem ejus, cum omnis justitia non quaerat nisi emendare hominem et salvare: ergo si Deus exigit talem emendam quam non posset praestare purus homo vel homo infirmus¹⁴¹ in statu in quem ceciderat, videtur quod non decenter sic exigit, sed impie, sitiendo mortem hominis: ergo cum hoc non sit fas credere de Deo, videtur quod homo purus per se satisfacere potuit: et sic alius modus fuit Deo possibilis.

[4.] Si tu dicas, quod homo non fuit in gratia, et ideo nihil gratum Deo¹⁴² facere potuit. Contra hoc est, quod cum homo facit quod potest, statim dat ei Deus gratiam: sed multi sunt qui fecerunt quod potuerunt, et gratiam habuerunt, et sic possibile fuit de omnibus si se praeparassent: ergo videtur, quod Deus id quod potuerit facere, acceptare debuit.

[5.] Item, dicit Johannes, quod *mandata ejus gravia non sunt*.¹⁴³ Hieronymus etiam dicit, quod "anathema est quod dicit Deum praecepisse impossibilia."¹⁴⁴ Ergo numquam exigit ab homine talem emendationis modum, quem non posset explere nisi Deus et¹⁴⁵ homo, ut videtur.

¹⁴¹ Paris om. "infirmus."

¹⁴² Paris om. "Deo."

¹⁴³ 1 Jn 5:3.

¹⁴⁴ Peter Lombard, *In II Sent.* d. 28, q. 1, a. 3. Cf. Jerome *Commentarium in Evangelium Matthaei ad Eusebium Libri Quattuor*, Lib. 1, c. 5, v. 44.

¹⁴⁵ Paris: "esset."

Solutio: Sine praejudicio dico, quod alius modus fuit possibilis, considerata potestate Dei cui nihil injustum est et nihil impossibile, ut dicit Anselmus: et tamen ex parte nostra impossibile fuit nos redimi nisi per Deum et hominem: non quod hoc intendam dicere, quod si Deus nos aliter¹⁴⁶ liberasset quin essemus liberati: sed est considerare potentiam liberationis ex parte Dei, et ex parte nostra, et ex parte utriusque simul, scilicet Dei et hominis. Ex parte Dei quidem fuit alius modus possibilis: ex parte autem hominis videtur alius modus mihi impossibilis. Si autem ex parte utriusque consideratur, id est nostra potestas relaxata¹⁴⁷ ad omnipotentiam, in qua fit quidquid vult, fuit quidem alius modus Deo¹⁴⁸ possibilis, sed nullus ita conveniens. Si enim quaeratur, utrum de trunco possit fieri vitulus, dico quod non. Si autem quaeratur, utrum Deus de trunco possit facere vitulum, dicimus quod sic.

His habitis, planum est respondere objectis.

[1.] Ad primum dicimus, quod dimittere culpam impunitam dicitur dupliciter, scilicet impunitam, hoc est, sine omni poena: et hoc est impossibile coram iudicio Dei: quia, sicut dicit Anselmus, hoc esset coram Deo impius sicut justus, et placeret ei peccatum sicut virtus, quod est impossibile. Vel dimittere peccatum sine condigna poena: et hoc est iudicis

¹⁴⁶ Paris om. "aliter."

¹⁴⁷ Paris: "relata."

¹⁴⁸ Paris om. "Deo."

quaerentis emendam rei, et hoc modo fuisset, si Deus homini sine morte Filii peccatum indulgisset: puniverat enim hominem in hac vita, et purgatorio amplius punire potuit: et ideo nihil indecens ex parte sua sequeretur ad hoc.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod congruum **[f. 135c]** et incongruum ex parte nostra sumuntur, et non ex parte iudicii Dei, cui congruum est omne quod facit: quia etiam illud quod videtur incongruum ex contrario usu, si Deus faceret, congruissimum esset: unde si parceret a poena condigna, clementiae deputaretur, dummodo justitia pro tanto salvaretur, quod non remaneret peccatum inultum poena emendante, non suffocante reum.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod bene concedo, quod si possibilitas ex parte nostra attendatur, ut facit Anselmus, quod non erit justitia nisi restituens ablatum, et satisfaciens offensae: et hoc non potuit esse nisi per Deum et hominem, ut dicunt Anselmus et Ambrosius.

[4.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod omnes illae auctoritates loquuntur de possibilitate congruentiae, et non de potestate Dei in se.

[5.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod praedestinatio non imponit necessitatem, sed immutabilitatem facit: et ideo nihil prohibuit quin alius modus sit possibilis, si liberatio in genere et in se consideretur.

[6.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod fides erat de eo quod non erit aliter quam creditur, sed tamen possibile est esse aliter: fides autem et praedestinatio bene tollunt actum mutabilitatis¹⁴⁹ in contrarium, vel in aliud quam sit hoc de quo sunt, sed non tollunt potentiam mutabilitatis: et ideo illa argumenta non cogunt.

Oportet autem solvere ea quae sunt ad oppositum: quia secundum meam opinionem ex parte nostra attendendo potentiam satisfaciendi, non fuit possibilis alius modus.

Dico ergo ad primum, quod omnes illae auctoritates loquuntur de potentia Dei liberantis, et non de potentia hominis debentis.¹⁵⁰

[1.] Ad id autem quod objicitur,¹⁵¹ dicendum quod Filium Dei ex bonitate decuit omnem¹⁵² signum dilectionis homini exhibere, quod pertinebat ad salutem, nisi hoc cederet in injuriam justitiae vel deitatis: sed non in injuriam deitatis fuit passio:¹⁵³ quia deitas nec passsa, nec compassa est: sed in humana natura passus est Dei Filius: et hanc non¹⁵⁴ decuit exsilium et mortalitas.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod alio modo injuriam dimittere potuit Deus, sed ex parte hominis remansisset verecundia, sed

¹⁴⁹ Paris: "immutabilitatis."

¹⁵⁰ Paris add. "satisfacere."

¹⁵¹ Paris add. "per rationes."

¹⁵² Paris: "omne."

¹⁵³ Paris om. "passio."

¹⁵⁴ Vice "hanc non" Paris hab. "et in hac deitatem."

quod homo abstulisset quod non reddidisset. Et si quaeras, utrum Deus hanc verecundiam auferre potuisset, dico sine praedicio, quod opprobrium quidem auferre potuit: sed veritatem mutare non potuisset: quia contra se fecisset. De praeterito enim verum fuit, quod homo rapuit quae per se solvere non potuit: et ideo congruissimum fuit iudici clementissimo, ut tale faceret iudicium, ut destrueretur peccatum, et homo tantum dando vel plus quam rapuit, ab opprobrio simul et post¹⁵⁵ liberaretur.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod plus exigere quam homo possit, dicitur duobus modis, **[f. 135d]** scilicet simpliciter, et sic sonat extorsionem, vel de expensis iudicis, ut reus pristinam recipiat dignitatem: et sic exigere plus quam purus homo possit, sonat misericordiam et bonitatem iudicis erga nos: et hoc est quod dicit Psalmus: *redemptionem misit Dominus populo suo*.¹⁵⁶ Quod enim ultra vires nostras exegit, ad gloriae nostrae cumulum fuit: quia aliter conscientia testis veritatis semper diceret nos rapuisse, et non solvisse Dei honorem.

[4.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod homo in quantacumque gratia Dei¹⁵⁷ sit, dummodo sit purus homo, non potest satisfacere pro peccato quod in omnem mundum redundavit: et hoc sufficienter in praemissis probatum est: nec tamen secundum dicta Sanctorum credo, quod umquam alicui post primum peccatum gratia salutis

¹⁵⁵ Paris: "peccato."

¹⁵⁶ Ps. 110:9.

¹⁵⁷ Paris om. "Dei."

data sit, nisi in dilectione et fide unigeniti, qui omnes reconciliavit. Non dico, quod non dare¹⁵⁸ potuerit quantum est de potentia Dei. Et sic patet, quod nihil est quod objicit.

[5.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod mandata non sunt gravia habenti caritatem: et hoc ideo quia Filius Dei nobis ea levigavit¹⁵⁹ sustinendo pro nobis quod nos sustinere debebamus: quia *Dominus iniquitates nostrum omnium in eo posuit*,¹⁶⁰ et nunc iam facile est nobis. Unde potest dici, ut prius, quod a nobis ad injuriam nostram non exegit impossibile nobis, sed ad gloriam, ut ipse daret Unigenitum per quem factum est possibile, quod ante erat¹⁶¹ impossibile, licet non Deo cui nihil est difficile.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad totum.

[Articulus II]

[Mg] De alio modo redemptionis qui dicitur fuisse possibilis.

Secundo quaeritur, quae sit illa possibilitas de qua dicitur, quod alius modus fuit Deo possibilis?

Videtur autem, quod nulla: quia

[1.] Potentia Dei non potest esse nisi secundum congruentiam decentissimam: ergo Deus nihil potest, quod congruenter non potest.

¹⁵⁸ Paris: "dari."

¹⁵⁹ Paris: "alleviavit."

¹⁶⁰ Isa. 52:6. Paris: "*Dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum.*"

¹⁶¹ Paris add. "nobis."

[2.] Item, potentia Dei non refertur ad opus nisi secundum ordinem sapientiae praeordinantis, quia aliter ageret praecipitanter Deus: sed sapientia Dei praeordinaverat istum modum: ergo non fuit possibilis apud Deum alius modus, ut videtur.

[3.] Item, detur quod potentia Dei sit respectu alterius modi cum igitur fuit respectu¹⁶² istius, ut patuit in effectum, ipse¹⁶³ mutaretur de opere in opus: cum hoc igitur sit aliqua mutatio, et Deus sit immutabilis penitus, videtur quod si potentia Dei fuit de isto modo, quod non potuit esse de alio.

Sed contra:

Deus non agit per necessitatem naturae, sicut facit virtus et potentia naturalis, sed agit per voluntatis libertatem: quidquid autem facit libertas voluntatis potest facere et non facere, et alio modo facere: ergo videtur, quod Deus potuit hoc modo liberare et non liberare et alio modo liberare, quia aliter ipse esset minus liber in agendo quam nos; quod absurdum est.

Solutio: Dicendum quod, una est et simplex potentia Dei: sed tamen potest dupliciter considerari, scilicet ut exsequens sapientiae praevisionem et ordinationem, et sic videtur, quod non fuit alius **[f. 136a]** modus possibilis nostrae liberationis,

¹⁶² Paris om. "alterius modi... fuit respectu."

¹⁶³ Paris: "ipsa."

quam praemissus¹⁶⁴ a sapientia ordinante: sed tamen potuit alius esse praevisus, et tunc potentia operans alium exsequeretur. Aliter consideratur secundum quod antecederet se habet ad sapientiam: potest enim Deus facere per sapientiam omnia ordinantem, non ordinavit se facturum: et de hac potentia loquendo, alius modus fuit Deo¹⁶⁵ possibilis: et de hac potestate loquuntur Sancti plerumque.

[1.] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quidquid Deus faceret, eo ipso esset decentissimum quoad operantem, quod ipse faceret, ut prius dictum est. Et si objicias, quod dicit Aristoteles, quod potest Deus prava agere: dicendum, quod accepit materialiter, id est, potest agere id quod est pravum, quod tamen non esset pravum, sed optimum eo ipso quod Deus ageret illud.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de potentia exsequente ordinem praevidentis sapientiae: et de hac non loquimur, cum dicimus quod alius modus liberationis fuit possibilis Deo.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod potentia Dei immutabilis est: quia si daretur quod fuit de alio modo, sequeretur quod numquam fuit de isto: licet enim utraque istarum possibilis sit divisim, potentia Dei est de isto modo, et potentia Dei est de alio modo:

¹⁶⁴ Paris: "praevisus est."

¹⁶⁵ Paris om. "Deo."

tamen non sunt compossibiles secundum relationem ad potentiam operantem: quia aliter Deus mutaret opus suum, quod esse non potest.

[Articulus III]

[Mg] Utrum alius modus redimendi genus humanum Deo fuisse possibilis.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, "*Sed nostrae miseriae sanandae modum non fuisse.*" Potest enim esse dubium, quamvis alius modus possibilis fuit liberationis nostrae, quod tamen alius modus quo redimeremur non fuit possibilis. Hoc enim probatur sic:

[1.] Redimere est rem suam justo pretio vel bello recuperare: sed justum pretium esse non potuit nisi aequivalens offensae et damno: sed, sicut probatum est super, damnum est tota natura humana perdita, et quidquid fluxit in ipsa in pejorem statum, et hoc est omne quod est inferioris naturae quam homo, sicut dicit Glossa, ad Roman. viii: *Omnis creatura ingemiscit et parturit usque adhuc.*¹⁶⁶ Offensa autem fuit infinita, quia contra Deum. Ergo justum pretium oportuit esse infinitum bonum, non autem potuit esse infinitum bonum¹⁶⁷ nisi Deus et homo, qui deberet ut homo, posset ut Deus: ergo redemptio non potuit esse nisi per Deum et hominem.

¹⁶⁶ Rom. 8:22.

¹⁶⁷ Vice "non autem potuit esse infinitum bonum" Paris hab. "et ad hoc non."

[2.] Item, si de redemptione belli jure loquimur: tunc sicut patet in littera, justum est et¹⁶⁸ idem vincat qui vinctus est, et in eodem, scilicet in ligno. Unde Ambrosius in hymno de passione "Ipse lignum tunc notavit, damna ligna ut solveret."¹⁶⁹ Hoc ergo iterum non poterat fieri juste, nisi per Deum et hominem: et ita alius modus non fuit possibilis nostrae redemptionis.

[3.] Item, detur quod redimamur ab alio quam a Deo, sive sit homo de novo exinde damnata¹⁷⁰ natura factus, sive angelus incarnatus: **[f. 136b]** illi ergo tenemur tamquam redemptori: ergo erimus inferiores illo semper: homo autem creatus est, et in tanta dignitate, ut nulli nisi soli Deo subesset: ergo per redemptionem illius pristinae dignitati non erit restitutus: ergo redemptio non est perfecta per illum.

[4.] Item, Deus praevidit futurum hominem in dignitate aequali angelorum: si autem¹⁷¹ redemisset, non esset in aequali dignitate: ergo Deus frustaretur praeordinatione sua: quae quia omnia impossibilia sunt, videtur quod alius modus non fuit impossibilis redemptionis nostrae.¹⁷²

Sed contra:

¹⁶⁸ Paris: "ut."

¹⁶⁹ Venantius Fortunatus, Hymnum *Pange lingua*, Stroph. 2.

¹⁷⁰ Paris: "depravata."

¹⁷¹ Vice "autem" Paris hab. "ergo angelus."

¹⁷² Vice "impossibilis redemptionis nostrae" Paris hab. "possibilis nostrae redemptionis."

[1.] Ab injuste possidente non oportet redimere pignus, sed vindicare in potestatem: sed diabolus injuste possedebat nos, ut infra dicetur in hac eadem distinctione: ergo ab illo non oportuit tali pretio hominem redimere.

[2.] Item, impium est dicere, quod pretium saeculi, scilicet Christi sanguis, et anima, ablata¹⁷³ sint diabolo ad redemptionem hominis: cum igitur non tenuerit nos nisi diabolus, videtur quod non sumus redempti a diabolo, nec hoc modo, nec alio.

Solutio: Sine praejudicio loquendo, concedo primas rationes, scilicet quia non fuit alius modus possibilis nostrae redemptioni, nisi per pretii talis solutionem, nisi redemptio large pro liberatione accipiatur: quia non est nisi duplex redemptio, scilicet jure belli, et sic redempti sumus a servitute? diaboli per victoriam Christi: et solutione pretii, et sic non sumus redempti a diabolo: quia absit quod Christus sit diabolo oblatus pro nobis, sed Patri: et nos soluti sumus a decreto Patris obligante nos ad non intrandum in paradysum, nisi tanta appareret in uno justitia humilitatis quod omnibus sufficeret, ut supra distinctione xviii dictum est.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum.

Ad praecedens dicendum, quod licet diabolus nos injuste possideret, nec pretium solutum sit diabolo, tamen juste nos

¹⁷³ Paris: "oblata."

possidebamur, tenente nos in obligatione sua justa sententia
justitiae iudicis, cui etiam pretium solvebatur in nostra
redemptione.

[Articulus IV]

[Mg] Utrum Filius Dei fuisset incarnatus si homo non peccasset.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit "*Qui enim mentes nostras
tantum erigit, ad amorem.*"

[1.] Secundum hoc si homo non peccasset, videtur quod non
tantum amorem suum provocasset. Unde in quadam sequentia
cantatur: "O culpa nimium beata, qua redempta est natura. Deus
qui creavit omnia nascitur ex foemina."¹⁷⁴ Quasi diceret: Hoc
ipso quod culpa peracta est, Deus homo est factus. Igitur si
homo non peccasset, Deus non esset incarnatus.

[2.] Item, in quibusdam ecclesiis in benedictione cerei
cantatur: "O felix culpa, quae tantum ac talem meruit habere
redemptorem."¹⁷⁵ Ergo videtur, quod si culpa non esset, Filius Dei
non esset incarnatus.

[3.] Item, Apostolus ad Rom. xiii *Quoniam diligentibus Deum
omnia cooperantur in bonum, his qui secundum propositum vocati
sunt sancti,*¹⁷⁶ dicit Glossa, "Etiam peccata." Ergo peccatum
unitatis¹⁷⁷ in aliquod bonum debuit cooperari universitati: hoc

¹⁷⁴ Notcerus Balbulus "Eia recolamus laudibus."

¹⁷⁵ *Exultet.*

¹⁷⁶ Rom 8:28.

¹⁷⁷ Paris: "universitatis."

autem peccatum [f. 136c] originale est quod omnes trahunt ab Adam: ergo aliquod bonum oportebat¹⁷⁸ elici ex illo: hoc autem non de facili invenitur nisi incarnatione Christi: ergo videtur, quod Christus non fuisset incarnatus, si peccatum non fuisset.

[4.] Item, ad quid fuisset incarnatus si peccatum non fuisset?¹⁷⁹ Non enim tunc indigeremus doctore, vel liberatore, vel redemptore: ergo videtur quod superflua fuisset incarnatio eius,¹⁸⁰ ergo videtur quod si peccatum non fuisset, non excitasset ad caritatem, sicut fecit peracto peccato.

Sed contra:

[1.] Bonum est diffusivum sui et esse: ergo optimi erunt optimo modo quo potest se defendere: non autem potest se melius nobis infundere¹⁸¹ quam incarnando: ergo videtur, quod incarnatus esset etiam si peccatum non esset.

[2.] Item, Anselmus dicit quod quatuor generationes sunt de perfectione naturae, sine quibus generatio est imperfecta, scilicet de terra virgine vir virgo, de viro virgine femina virgo, de viro et muliere corruptis infans virgo. Restat ergo unus modus, scilicet de femina virgine virum virginem producere, vel ordo generationis non fuisset perfectus: ergo cum Dei perfecta sint opera, ipse complevisset hunc ordinem, etiamsi

¹⁷⁸ Paris: "potest."

¹⁷⁹ Paris om. "si peccatum non fuisset."

¹⁸⁰ Paris om. "ergo videtur quod superflua fuisset incarnatio."

¹⁸¹ Vice "erunt optimo modo quo potest se defendere: non autem potest se melius nobis infundere" Paris hab. "erit optimo modo quo potest se diffundere: non autem melius potest esse in nobis diffundere."

homo non peccasset: si de virgine non potest nasci nisi Filius Dei, ut dicit Cassianus:¹⁸² ergo Filius Dei esset incarnatus, etiamsi non peccasset homo.

Item Deus ab aeterno praeviderat filium incarnandum: ergo necesse fuit impleri: ergo si homo non peccasset nihilominus fuisset ipse incarnatus.¹⁸³

[3.] Item, supra per verba Sanctorum probatum est angelum non esse unibilem, sed hominem: cum igitur nulla aptitudo frustra sit creata a Deo, necesse fuit hanc aptitudinem impleri: ergo necesse fuit Deum incarnari.

[4.] Item, peccatum non fecit similiorem et unibiliorem nostram naturam cum Deo, quam esset ante peccatum: ergo cum similior sit Deo ante¹⁸⁴ peccatum, quam post peccatum, videtur etiam unibilior.¹⁸⁵

[5.] Item, perfectio universi consistit in dimensione circulari, ut probat Philosophus: et quia circulo nihil adhibetur, ideo mundus maxima perfectione naturae est perfectus: ergo similiter cum Dei opera sint perfecta, ultimum debet concludi an¹⁸⁶ primum ut circulus fiat: primum autem Deus et homo debent uniri: et hoc contingeret, etiamsi homo non peccasset.

¹⁸² Cf. Cassianus, *De incarnatione*, 6.8.

¹⁸³ Paris om. "Item Deus... ipse incarnatus."

¹⁸⁴ Paris: "sine."

¹⁸⁵ Paris add. "et sic Deo magis conveniebat ei uniri, ut videtur."

¹⁸⁶ Paris: "in."

[6.] Item, Amor maximus se communicat maximo modo: non autem potest magis, quam ut se uniat: ergo cum talis amor sit Dei¹⁸⁷ ad hominem, ipse unit se ei: ut videtur etiam si non peccaret.

Solutio: Dicendum quod in hac quaestione solutio conjuncta¹⁸⁸ est. Sed quantum possum opinari, credo quod Filius Dei factus fuisset homo, etiamsi numquam fuisset:¹⁸⁹ nec tamen fuisset factus angelus, quia angelus non est unibilis naturae sicut homo, ut supra **[f. 136d]** ostendimus: tamen nihil de hoc asserendo dico: sed credo quod hoc quod dixi, magis concordare pietati fidei.

[1.] Dico igitur ad primum, quod tales locutiones valde impropriae sunt, ut dicatur culpa beata et felix: quia non dicitur beata¹⁹⁰ in se, sed ex consequenti. Et licet forte Christi incarnatio non sit sequens ad culpam, tamen magnalia opera redemptionis per laborem et passionem et mortem secuta sunt ad culpam.

[2.] Per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum.

[3.] Ad alium dicendum, quod peccatum non cooperatur bonum nisi per accidens, sed quia ferventior et magis gratus aliquis quandoque resurgit, quando cecidit, et magis efficitur humilis

¹⁸⁷ Paris: "ei."

¹⁸⁸ Paris: "incerta."

¹⁸⁹ Paris add. "peccatum."

¹⁹⁰ Paris add. "et felix."

et cautus: si autem et Christi incarnatio secuta est, nescio:
sed hoc certum est, quod redemptio per mortem est secuta.

[4.] Ad aliud dicendum quod incarnatus fuisset ad
ostensionem eximii amoris sui, et ut multiplices delicias
praepararet homini, cum contemplaretur eum in carnem similem vel
fratrem, quem universitas habet dominum.

[1.] Si autem velimus contrarium sustinere, quod tamen mihi
non videtur: dicemus ad primum contra objectum, quod bonum¹⁹¹
diffundit se secundum ordinem naturae, secundum¹⁹² capacitatem
eorum qui capiunt illud: non autem cadit in capacitatem aliquam
naturae vel meriti unio deitatis ad carnem: et ideo non oportet
quod se illo modo diffunderet.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod non¹⁹³ completa esset sine
ultimo modo in esse naturae, licet non in optimo esse gratiae:
nec oportet hoc quod Deus faciat in optimo esse quod potest
ipsum facere si vellet: sed sufficit illo modo quo vult dummodo
nihil deficiat ei de esse naturae vel¹⁹⁴ de naturalibus.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod aptitudo non est ex natura, sed
ex gratia electionis, ut saepe supra habitum est: quia homo ille
ut in unitatem Filii Dei assumeretur, non meritis vel natura,
sed gratia habuit.

¹⁹¹ Paris add. "non."

¹⁹² Paris: "sed."

¹⁹³ Paris: "natura."

¹⁹⁴ Vice "illo modo... naturae vel" Paris hab. "ut faciat sicut vult, dummodo nihil neget eis."

[4.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod licet peccatum fecerit
necessarium deformem tantum,¹⁹⁵ fecit necessarium redemptorem: et
haec necessitas cogit misericordem Deum incarnari.

[5.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod talis ratio circuli non est
necessaria ad perfectionem, sed potius circulus ordinis, ut
ordinentur ad Deum tamquam ad finem, quae exiverunt ab ipso
tamquam a principio.

[6.] Ad aliud dicendum, quod sufficebat ostensio amoris in
glorificatione: quia non oportuit Deum omni modo amoris
ostendere, sicut nec modo facit.

Ad hoc autem quod objicitur de praedestinatione habet
solutionem specialem, scilicet quod praedestinatio ponit ordinem
sapientiae: et illa praevidit culpam futuram, et non¹⁹⁶ prae-
ordinavit redemptorem. Sed tantum primum mihi probabilius
videtur.

[Articulus V]

[Mg] Utrum homo iuste a potentia diaboli sit liberatus.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi "*Sic justitia
superatur diabolus*" [f 137a] Potest enim hic esse dubium, quae
sit illa justitia¹⁹⁷ redemptorum, aut redimentis.

[1.] Si primo modo est: cum illi justitiam fecerunt etiam
ante incarnationem Christi, videtur quod debuissent fuisse

¹⁹⁵ Vice "fecerit necessarium deformitatem tantum" Paris hab. "non fecerit deiformem naturam, tamen."

¹⁹⁶ Paris: "ideo."

¹⁹⁷ Paris add. "qua superatur diabolus? Aut enim haec est justitia."

redempti: sicut dicit de Abraham, Rom v,¹⁹⁸ quod signaculum
justitiae fidei circumcisionem accepit,¹⁹⁹ et sic de aliis. Si
autem esset justitia redemptoris, ut videtur dici in littera:
tunc videtur, quod non fiat justitia: quia non est justum ut
liberetur per justitiam alterius, qui justitiam non fecerit.

[Mg] Utrum si Deus homo alio modo liberasset, modus ille
iustus fuisset.

[2.] Ulterius quaeritur si alius modus esset vel fuisset,
utrum fuisset injustus? Et videtur quod non: quia Deus nihil
potest facere injustum.

Sed Contra:

[1.] Potentiae modus hic dividitur contra justitiae modum:
igitur si usus fuisset Christus potentiae modo, non fuisset
justus modus.

[2.] Item, ponamus Deus et nostram carnem accepisset, et
tamen nos potestate eripuisset: tunc videtur modus convenientior
fuisse: quia tunc ~~videtur~~ teneremur ad gratiarum actionem de
suscepta natura, et tamen et ipse et nos sine²⁰⁰ labore veniremus
ad regnum: igitur ille fuisset modus magis conveniens, et magis
nos obligans Deo.

[3.] Item, in iudicio hominis fraus nulli patrocinator:
ergo non debet acquirere jus aliquod in iudicio Dei. Constat

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Rom 4:11.

¹⁹⁹ Paris add. "Abraham, Noe vir justus atque perfectus in generatione sua."

²⁰⁰ Paris: "simili."

autem, quod diabolus fraudulenter decepit hominem: ergo nullum jus fuit ei acquisitum in homine: ergo videutr magis fuisse injustus modus, quod hominem quasi adjudicatum dimisit ei, et per justitiam laborare²⁰¹ voluit, quam si condemnando hominem²⁰² daemonem propter fraudem, hominem in potestatem suam retraxisset.

Solutio: Dicendum quod nullus modus esset injustus²⁰³ ex parte Dei: sed ex parte hominis justitia redditio²⁰⁴ pro meritis: et ideo poena satisfactoria pro culpa debet infligi. Unde dico quod primum intelligitur de justitia redemptoris, quam solvit pro redemptis.

[1.] Ad illud quod contra objicitur, dicendum quod justitia redemptoris exigebatur ad hoc ut²⁰⁵ esset obex apud eos: quia gratia capitis non profluit sua membra nisi sit dispositio in membris, quasi receptibilia stringere:²⁰⁶ et ita utraque exigitur: via ut praeparans subjectum, altera ut liberans.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum quod omnis modus fuisset Deo justus, sed non adeo conveniens ex parte hominis redempti.

[1.] Ad aliud dicendum quod poenae modus non dividitur contra justitiae modum, ut oppositus ei, sed ut non adeo

²⁰¹ Paris: "liberare."

²⁰² Paris om. "hominem."

²⁰³ Paris: "justus."

²⁰⁴ Paris: "est redemptio."

²⁰⁵ Paris: "ne."

²⁰⁶ Vice "stringere" Paris hab. "sint gratiae."

conueniens, non ex parte Dei, sed ex parte nostra, ut prius expositum est.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod fraus daemonis non fuit sine culpa hominis decepti: et ideo licet daemonibus patrocinari non debuit, tamen homini debuit nocere: et ideo ex parte illa debuit iustitia liberatoris contra hominis iustitiam²⁰⁷ poni.

[Articulus VI]

[Mg] Utrum solum a peccato originali simus redempti.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit "*in potestate diaboli ita datum est genus humanum,*" etc. Ex hoc enim videtur quod solum originale sit causa [f. 137b] quare indigemus redemptore: et ita videtur, quod quilibet per se potuit satisfacere de actuali.

[Mg] Utrum de actuali peccato quilibet sine redemptore satisfacere potuisset.

Sed hoc non videtur, quia:

[1.] Majus peccatum est commissum per seipsum, quam contractum ab alio: ergo pro Christo²⁰⁸ major debetur satisfactio. Si ergo pro alieno²⁰⁹ peccato oportuit intervenire iustitiam redemptoris, multo magis debuit hoc fieri pro peccato proprio.

²⁰⁷ Paris: "injustitiam."

²⁰⁸ Paris om. "pro Christo."

²⁰⁹ Paris: "reliquo."

Item²¹⁰ gravius peccatum est, quod graviori poena punitur in delinquente: sed actuale punitur et carentia visionis Dei et igne gehennae; originale autem tantum carentia visionis Dei: ergo si originale exigit redemptorem, multo magis actuale.

[2.] Item, hoc videtur ex auctoritate Sanctorum supra posita, quod dicunt quod nulli numquam peccatum remissum est, neque adulto neque parvulo, sine mediatoris fide. Constat autem, quod mediatoris fides conjungit justitiam Christi cum justificatis: ergo sine justitia Christi nulli remittitur peccatum.

[3.] Item, si verum est quod dicunt Sancti et omnes doctores communiter, quod passio Christi operetur in omnibus sacramentis: tamen oportet dicere quod etiam operatur in poenitentia: cum igitur sine sacramento poenitentiae nulli umquam remissum sit peccatum: sine justitia mediatoris in passione umquam nulli remissum est peccatum.

[4.] Item, Isa. liii: *Nos omnes quasi oves eramus*²¹¹... *et Dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum*. Ergo posuit in eo etiam iniquitatem actualement.

[5.] Item, Glossa, ad Roman. vi, dicit quod peccata praecedentium fuerunt in sustentatione Dei, donec²¹² ad ostensionem justitiae redimentis per Christum.

²¹⁰ Paris: "Ergo."

²¹¹ Paris: "erravimus."

[6.] Item, in praecedenti distinctione expresse scribitur sic: "In poenitentia poena minoratur per Christum: non enim sufficeret illa poena qua poenitentes ligat Ecclesia, nisi Christi poena²¹³ cooperaretur, qui pro nobis solvit." Constat autem quod Ecclesia nullum temporali poena obligat pro originali. Ergo in²¹⁴ actuali non possemus satisfacere, nisi esset ibi justitia.

[7.] Item, ratio Anselmi est quod indignimus redemptore: quia offendere Deum facit offensam infinitam, sicut ipse est infinitum bonum: cum ergo in actuali morali offendatur Deus, videtur eadem ratione exigere redemptorem.

Sed contra hoc quidam objiciunt sic:

[1.] Alius modus fuit possibilis: ergo non necessario exigitur justitia redimentis.

[2.] Item, antiqui patres fidem, spem et caritatem habuissent, etiamsi Christus non fuisset incarnatus: cum ergo cum talibus virtutibus non possit stare actuale peccatum, merito fidei, et aliarum virtutum fuisset deletum, etiam praeter justitiam redemptoris.

[3.] Item, potentia gratiae ad vincendum peccatum major est quam peccati potentia: ergo si peccatum sine alterius adiutorio valet inficere animam, potentia gratiae virtutum sine alterius

²¹² Paris add. "venirent."

²¹³ Paris: "meritum."

²¹⁴ Paris: "pro."

adjutorio valebit expellere peccatum: ergo sine gratia et **[f. 137c]** justitia redimentis.

Solutio: Dicendum quod consentiendum est rationibus primis: quia hoc dicunt Sancti innitentes illi verbo Io. i: *dicimus plenitudinem omnes accepimus gratiam pro gratia.*²¹⁵ *Et illi qui praeibant et qui sequebantur omnes pariter clamabant: Hosanna in excelsis!*²¹⁶ non pro originale tantum, sed pro omnibus actualibus.

[1.] Ad primum autem quod objicitur in contrarium, dicendum quod alius modus fuit possibilis: sed tamen impossibilis fuit omnis ille modus qui non conferret gratiam adjuvantem contra peccatum ex justitia aliena: sive illa fuisset Dei justitia, sive fuisset alicujus alterius satisfaciens.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum quod fides antiquorum et spes et alia bona efficaciam traxissent tunc ab illo alio modo quicumque fuisset: sed quia alius non fuit, ideo trahebant efficaciam ab isto. Sicut si sol non esset causa diei, esset aliud luminare quod faceret diem: numquam tamen esset possibile, quod mundus illuminaretur seipsa, quod haberet sufficiens lumen ex quibusdam partibus suis, micantibus ut gemmae sunt, vel quaedam partes ignis: et hoc modo justitia meritorum Christi fulget in

²¹⁵ Jn 1:16.

²¹⁶ Mc 11:9.

virtutibus Sanctorum, sicut sol in gemmis, quae magis rutilant in praesentia solum, in absentia autem obtenebrantur.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod gratia potentior est: sed non habet potentiam illam, quae destruat id quod aliquo modo infinitum est vel conjuncta illi quod aliqua ratione est infinitum, ut merito Christi, quod est meritum Dei et hominis: et quod peccatum dicitur posse inficere sine adjutorio, hoc non est posse, sed potius deficere. Deficere enim quodlibet potest per se corruptione principiorum conservantium, sed non ex se ita proficere.

[Articulus VII]

[Mg] Utrum aliquis cuius natura non fuisset depravata praeter Christum satisfacere potuisset.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi: "*Eramus natura filii irae: natura scilicet, ut est depravata,*" etc.

Ex hoc enim videtur, quod si natura alicujus non fuisset depravata, quod illud potuisset satisfacere pro nobis: et hoc saepe supra improbatum est: quia hoc autem esset pura creatura aut Deus purus et creatura. Si creatura pura aut spiritualis aut corporalis aut conjuncta ex spirituali et corporali.²¹⁷ Si corporalis: ergo esset vilior homine: et si homo redimeretur,

²¹⁷ Vice "autem esset pura... ex spirituali et corporali" Paris hab. "esset creatura pura, aut corporalis, aut spiritualis."

per consequens subiceretur viliori se: ergo per redemptionem non recuperaret dignitatem quam amiserat.

Item, secundum hoc praescientia Dei, quae praeordinaverat hominem coaequandum angelis fore, frustraretur.

Item, secundum hoc justo pretio non essemus redempti, sed viliori quam fuit ablatum: quia totum genus humanum fuit ablatum, et offerretur illud corpus unum quod est impossibile.²¹⁸

Item, infinita offensa Dei non esset recompensata: ergo in opere redemptionis non servaretur justitia.

Si autem fuisset creatura spiritualis vel angelus: Contra:

Maximum operum quoad difficultatem se est offerre in pretium per mortem: angelus autem est immortalis: ergo redimere non posset.

Praeterea, nullus angelus est adeo [f. 137d] altus cui non possit praeferri unus purus homo et aequari plures: quia beata Virgo praelata est omnibus, et alii assumi possunt secundum sortes angelorum: ergo angelus cum tota gratia non valet unum hominem, et aequivalent alteri: ergo ut melius nullus angelus pro omnibus hominibus posset offerri.

Item, cum sit finitae bonitatis, ipse infinitam offensam non posset recompensare, nec honorem debitum pro peccato Deo exhibere.

Aliae etiam rationes sunt ad hoc quod supra posuimus.

²¹⁸ Vice "illud corpus unum quod est impossibile" Paris hab. "Deo corpus unum tantum."

Si autem dicas quod est creatura composita ex homine corporali et angelo, prorsus sequuntur eadem inconvenientia.

Si vero dicas quod potuit esse purus Deus: Contra:

Deus²¹⁹ non potest: quia mereri est apud alium, et est inferioris:²²⁰ ergo Deus merendo non potest satisfacere.

Item, Deus nulli debet, nec pro se, nec pro alio: ergo debitum pro alio non restituit.

Item, Deus non est medius inter Deum et hominem: ergo ut mediator non est reconcilians et satisfaciens.

Item, Deus in causa hominis iudex est: ergo non potest esse reus, vel loco rei exhibere satisfactionem.

Ex his concluditur, quod necesse fuit quod sit Deus et creatura: aut ergo homo, aut alia quam homo. Si homo, habeo propositum. Si alius quam homo: ergo satisfaciet qui non debet satisfacere: sed hoc est injustum: ergo non potest fieri coram summo Deo justo: ergo necesse est, quod sit Deus et homo.

Item, mediatorem necesse est habere naturam utriusque extremorum, licet mediet tantum in altera, ut habitum est in praecedenti distinctione: satisfaciens autem pro nobis mediator est: ergo necesse est quod habeat naturam utriusque, Dei scilicet et hominis: et hoc est quod intendimus.

Sed Contra:

²¹⁹ Paris add. "mereri."

²²⁰ Paris add. "mereri."

[1.] Originale peccatum est per alterum constructum:²²¹ ergo per alterum potest satisfactio fieri. Non autem est per alterum contractum: ergo perquisivit²²² Deus: ergo per alium non Deum potuit satisfieri, ut videtur.

[3.] Praetera, quae justitia est illa ut pro peccato cui numquam communicamus in operando nec in volendo tanta exigitur satisfactio quam non possit exsolvere nisi Deus et homo?

[2.] Item, videtur quod Deus debuit creare Adam alium, qui omnes justitiam satisfactionis²²³ transfunderet, sicut ille injustitiam transfundit: quia aliter non videtur posse omnibus prodesse justitia, sicut omnibus nocuit culpa.

[4.] Item, ubi est probatum originale peccatum esse in homine, ut talem oporteat habere redemptorem?

Solutio: Dicendum quod primis rationibus standum est, quod non remittitur peccatum nisi Deo et homine satisfaciente pro nobis, licet alius modus fuisset possibilis.

[1.] Ad id ergo quod contra objicitur, dicendum quod originale per alterum contrahitur quod principium est omnium: et ideo per alterum non solvitur, nisi et ille principium sit omnium: sed non potest eodem modo esse, quia monstruosa natura est quae unius rationis duo **[f. 138a]** habet principia, sed

²²¹ Paris: "contractum."

²²² Vice "convictum: ergo perquisivit" Paris hab. "contractum qui fuit."

²²³ Paris: "redemptoris."

Christus est principium efficiens secundum divinitatem et²²⁴ influens per modum meriti: sed ab alio non posset fieri, quia ille non haberet virtutem influendi membris, tamen nullo modo esset caput corporis mystici, ut alibi dictum est.

[2.] Ad aliud dicendum quod si fecisset alium Adam, essent duo principia secundum unum modum generationis naturalis:²²⁵ et tamen ille non influeret gratiam: quia gratia a nullo influi potest nisi ab eo qui est Deus et virtutis infinitae, et secundum quod homo habet gratiam ad mensuram, quod non conveniret alicui qui purus homo esset.

Si autem objicias quod secundum hoc Adam si non peccasset, non influxisset gratiam innocentiae ceteris posteris, quod est contra Anselum qui dicit, quod sicut transfudit originale peccatum, ita si stetisset, transfudisset originalem justitiam. Ad hoc dico quod hoc fuisset non ex Adam, sed ex hoc quod conjunctio humanae naturae ad Deum nulla²²⁶ fuisset interrupta peccato: et ideo a Deo semper fuisset influentia utriusque vitae, scilicet naturalis, et gratiae, in animam et ab anima in corpus. Sed postquam facta est interruptio, non potuit fieri influentia gratiae hoc modo; sed oportuit quod esset per meritum satisfactionis: et illud meritum non influeret omnibus per²²⁷

²²⁴ Paris add. "secundum humanitatem."

²²⁵ Paris: "materialis."

²²⁶ Paris: "nullo."

²²⁷ Paris: "qui."

rationem membri tantum, et non ~~in omnem~~ capitis vel principii haberet.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod voluntate actuali et opere proprio non communicavimus,²²⁸ sed ex hoc quod nati sumus ex Christo et materia corrupta corrumpit animam secundum infectionem culpae, ut probatur in secundo libro de originalis peccati transfusione.

[4.] Ad aliud dicendum quod signa expressa probant nos esse in peccato: haec autem signa sunt poenae non decentes dignitatem humanae naturae, ut retarditas²²⁹ et infantia, debilitas, pugna carnis contra spiritum, concupiscentia et ignorantia et error huiusmodi, quibus nulla ratio dicit Deum punivisse hominem nisi pro²³⁰ peccato.

[Articulus VIII]

[Mg] Cum homo propter peccatum transgressionis sit invasus a diabolo, quare diabolus non fuit invasus ab alio cum plus peccaverit.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi: "*potestatem peccati auctor illico invasit,*" etc.

²²⁸ Paris add. "peccato Adae, in materia tamen corrupta communicamus."

²²⁹ Paris: "irrationabilitas."

²³⁰ Paris: "in."

Videtur enim quod ambo debebant invadi a tertio: sicut enim meruit invadi homo per offensum,²³¹ ita diabolus per fraudem et mendacium, et multo magis.

Ad hoc dicendum quod ambos invasit sententia iudicis condemnantis: sed tamen debebat eo jure homo in potestatem diaboli transire: quia se illi sponte tradidit, permittens se decipi ubi de facili temptationem cavere potuit: et hoc est quod intendit.

[Articulus IX]

[Mg] Quare Deus homo potius per humilitatem quam per potentiam voluerit liberare.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ibi: "*Ideo autem potentia vincere noluit,*" etc.

Hic enim innuit magister, quod talis liberationis modus non fuit necessarius, sed utilis homini quod est²³² contra dicta Anselmi, et etiam contra ea quae superius probavimus.²³³

Ad hoc dicendum quod sicut dicit Tullius in libro **[f. 138b]** *de Amicitia*,²³⁴ licet vero amicitia fundetur supra virtutem²³⁵ et non supra utilitatem, habet tamen multas utilitates adjunctas. Ita dico hic ratio quidem necessitatis liberatoris non fundatur supra utilitatem, vel hoc vel alio modo habet tamen multas

²³¹ Paris: "pro consensu."

²³² Paris: "videtur esse."

²³³ Paris: "probata."

²³⁴ Cf. Cicero, *De amicitia*, 51 et 100.

²³⁵ Paris: "amorem."

utilitates adjunctas, quarum Magister partem tangit hic ex verbo Augustini, et quasdam alias non tangit. Impossibile est autem omnes tangere praecipue cum sint utilitates adjunctae contra quatuor:

[Mg] Notatur quatuor causae quare Christus nos per modum humilitatis et non potentiae voluerit liberare.

scilicet, ut amorem habeamus justitiae, non potestatis; ut exemplum humilitatis suae accipiamus; ut doctrinam fidei et prudentiae praedicationum ejus observantia;²³⁶ ut miraculis plusquam demonstrationibus in fide roboremur.

Utilitates autem passionis infra in sequenti parte Magister exsequitur.

[Divisio Textus]

"*Christus ergo sacerdos et hostia,*" etc. Hic incipit pars illa quae est de opere passionis, in quo consistit principale meritum.

Et habet duas partes: in quarum prima determinat Magister oblationem et traditionem Christi, qualiter facta est ab ipso a Patre, a Juda, a Judaeis, a Gentibus. In secunda autem tangit utrum bona fuit vel non, ibi: "*Passio autem Christi et opus Judaeorum,*" etc.

[Articulus X]

²³⁶ Paris: "observemus."

[Mg]Utrum solum praedestinati valeat efficaciter passio Christi.

Incidit autem dubium primo de hoc quod dicit:

"Praedestinati tantum salutem effecit," etc.

[1.] Praedestinati enim habuissent salutem, etiamsi ipse non fuisset passus: ergo videtur quod frustra patiebatur pro illis.²³⁷

[2.] Item, videtur falsum quia multi sunt qui accipiunt²³⁸ praesentem justitiam ad remissionem peccatorum: et hoc non possunt facere sine virtute sacramentorum, in quibus operatur virtus passionis Christi: ergo et non praedestinati valet efficienter passio sua, ut videtur.

Solutio: Dicendum quod non nisi praedestinati valet efficienter passio sed omnibus tamen sufficienter: ita quod efficienter dicat ademptionem gratiae et gloriae, propter quae fuit passio²³⁹: non enim fuit tantum propter gratiam, sed etiam propter gloriam: et ideo non totum effectum suum efficit in quibus valet ad gratiam in praesenti tantum: et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.

[1.] Ad primum autem dicendum quod praedestinatum erat hoc non ut alio modo quam per passionem Christi liberarentur: et ideo necessaria fuit passio. Vel potest dici, quod etiam his

²³⁷ Verbo eraso, hic "illis" scriptum est altera manu.

²³⁸ Haec verba "sunt qui accipiunt" scripta sunt, altera manu, verbis alteris erasis.

²³⁹ Paris: "gratia."

quae fiunt in tempore, ut orationibus fidelium, praedestinatio
juvatur, non ex parte Dei praedestinantis, sed ex parte effectus
praedestinationis, qui est appositio gratiae.

[Articulus XI]

[Mg]²⁴⁰ Utrum Patri conveniebat tradere Filium vel Christo
tradere se ipsum.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit ibi: "*De quo etiam
legitur, quod sit traditus a Patre.*"

[1.] Si enim tradere est in mortem dare, tunc videtur quod
tradere sonat in actionem occisionis Christi: et ita Patri et
Christo non convenit. Si autem tradere est pretium per mortem
Patri solve, **[f. 138c]** tunc videtur quod soli Christo, et non
Patri convenit: et ita videtur falsum quod hic dicit.

[2.] Item, Apostolus.²⁴¹ Ergo Pater tradidit Filium in
mortem: quod videtur sonare crudelitatem Patris in Filium.
Redit ergo quaestio adhuc, ut dicatur, secundum quem modum
differentem traditio illa convenit omnibus illis qui in littera
Christum tradere dicuntur.

Ad quod dicendum quod tradere est dare in mortem prout hic
accipitur. Est autem dare dupliciter, scilicet utrum unus²⁴²
datur: et ut datur exhibitio ad aliquod quod non est munus, quia
non est dantis, sed datur alio modo. Primo modo tradidit Pater

²⁴⁰ Haec verba marginalia scripta sunt, verbis alteris erasis.

²⁴¹ Paris add. "ad Roman viii, 32: *Qui etiam proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.*"

²⁴² Vice "utrum unus" Paris hab. "ut munus."

Filium in mortem, ut donum quo homo reconcilaretur, et Christus tradidit se in mortem. Sed Deus Pater tradidit Filium homini in pretium quod pro se offerat. Filius autem tradidit se Patri per mortem satisfaciendo. Traductio autem quae est exhibitio ad interficiendum, competit Judae ut proditori, Judaeo ut instigatori et creatori, Gentibus autem ut exsecutori ministerio iniquitatis.

[1.] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Pater tradidit Filium in passionem, sed non in actionem interficientium, quia hoc faciunt actus animae, quia separantur ea quae secundum naturam non sunt separabilia. Unde cum tradere sit velle mori Filium, voluit Pater Filii passionem: et numquam voluit actionem: sed permisit volentibus iniquis: et hoc non est crudelitas, sed misericordia, eo quod mors nec auferre Filium sibi, nec ingloriosum coram eo Filium facere poterat, et alios poterat etiam ablatos restituere. Et per hoc patet solutio at totum.

[Articulus XII]

[Mg] De diversa qualitate operationum Dei et Judeorum in passione Christi.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, ibi: "*Respiciens enim ad passionem, unum opus, id est, passionem illorum dicitur.*"

Videtur esse impossibile, quia

[1.] In natura non potest una materia simul habere diversas formas et contrarias: ergo in motionibus non potest unum opus informari diversis et contrariis circumstantiis.

[2.] Item, secundum hoc unum et idem opus esset optimum et pessimum: opus autem Patris et Christi non potest esse nisi optimum, opus autem Judae et Judaeorum non potuit esse nisi pessimum in hoc facto.

Solutio: Distinguendum est, quod est opus operans quod est operatio ipsa, scilicet prout est ab agente, et in ipso ut accidens²⁴³ in subjecto: et est opus operatum, scilicet res constituta et effecta per operationem et actionem: et quod dicit Magister, intelligitur de opere operato, et non de opere operante, quia illud pessimum fuit. Circa idem autem operatum possunt esse et concurrere diversae voluntates et operationes bonae et malae: hoc enim non est inconueniens, quia circumstantiae non referuntur ad opus operatum, sed ad opus operans: et ideo non ponuntur contrariae **[f. 138d]** formae in eodem. Et per hoc patet solutio ad totum.

[Articulus XIII]

[Mg] Utrum passio Christi sit simpliciter dicenda bona vel mala.

Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod dicit circa finem: "*Quaeritur autem concedendum sit eos operatos esse?*"

²⁴³ Paris om. "accidens."

Videtur enim, quod passio sit simpliciter dicenda bona: quia omne opus virtutis est bonum: mors autem Christi fuit opus fortitudinis et caritatis Christi: ergo simpliciter passio illa fuit dicenda bona vel esse quoddam bonum.

Item, quid dicetur simpliciter bonum, si passio Christi [simpliciter]²⁴⁴ bona et secundum quid non bona diceretur, a qua omne bonum nostrum emanavit? Ergo videtur quod non distinguendum sit, ut dicit Magister.

Sed Contra:

[1.] Passio est illata ab alio: esse autem laudabile est a nobis, non ab alio: ergo passio non est ex se laudabilis, ut videtur.

[2.] Item, opus Judaeorum est passio, et opus Gentilium et Judae: ergo est pessima.

[3.] Item, Boetius in *Topicis* "Cujus generatio est bona, ejus corruptio est mala." Sed Christi generatio et²⁴⁵ vita optima erat: ergo ejus mors erat pessima: ergo dicenda est mala absolute et sine distinctione.

Solutio: Dicendum quod mors Christi absolute et sine distinctione optima dicenda est quatuor rationibus.

[Mg] Notatur quatuor rationes commendantes passionem Christi.

²⁴⁴ Hoc ms. vice "[simpliciter]" hab. "si passio Christi quid."

²⁴⁵ Paris: "in."

Quarum una est, quia praecipuae virtutis erat summum, ut fortitudinis, quae secundum Philosophum praecipua virtus est: et maxime in Christo et illius virtutis summum quod attingere potest, est mors: sicut etiam ipse dicit: *Majorem hanc dilectionem nemo habet, quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.*²⁴⁶

Alia ratio est quia si pretiosa est in conspectu Domini mors Sanctorum ejus,²⁴⁷ pretiosissima mors est Christi et pretio plena, sicut dicit Psalmus: *Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem. Notas mihi fecistis vias vitae: adimplebis laetitia cum vultu tuo: delectationes in dextera tua, id est, in aequalitate tua secundum deitatem, et in potioribus bonis secundum humanitatem, usque in finem.*²⁴⁸

Tertia causa est utilitas totius redemptionis in genere humano, sicut dicit Osee, xiii: *O mors ero mors, mors tua, morsus tuus ero inferne super caput!*²⁴⁹

Quarta causa est honestas causae moriendi: posuerunt enim causam eius scriptam super caput eius: *Jesus Nazarenus, rex Judaeorum*, id est, haec est mihi causa moriendi, quod sum salvator florens gratia et virtute redemptionis, rex confitentium et glorificantium Deum.

²⁴⁶ Jn. 15:13.

²⁴⁷ Ps. 116:15.

²⁴⁸ Ps. 16:10-11.

²⁴⁹ Hos. 13:14. Sic citatur in editio Paris. "*Ero mors tua, o mors! Morsus tuus ero, inferne!*"

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Magister non jube distinguere in illa utrum mors Christi fuerit bona vel mala: sed in hac, utrum operati sint Judaei aliquid boni vel mali. Et in hoc distinguendum est secundum praedictum modum de opere operante, et sic nihil sunt boni operati: et de opere²⁵⁰ operato, et sic aliquid praeter intentionem operati sunt boni. **[f. 139a]**

[1.] Ad id quod objicitur contra, dicendum quod passio in eo quod ab aliquo non est opus virtutis, sed in eo quod suscepta cum voluntate sustinendi gratia boni: et sic sustinere est a nobis, et non ab interficiente.

[2.] Ad aliud patet solutio per antedicta de opere operante et operato.

[3.] Ad aliud dicendum quod Boetius non intelligit quod mors in se sit mala, sed quod privat bonum quod acquiritur in generatione ad esse et vitam: et sic refertur ad intentionem Judaeorum qui Christo vitam auferre et extinguere cupiebant: in se tamen bona est quae tantorum bonorum causa fuit.

²⁵⁰ Paris: "bono."

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