From Consciousness to Life

Abstract

In my dissertation I aim to reconstruct the basic principles of Heidegger’s fledgling attempt at a phenomenology of religion in his 1920 and 1921 courses on St. Paul and St. Augustine. In order to understand the parameters and the stakes of that project I consider it light of Husserlian phenomenology as well as broader German trends in “scientific” [Wissenschaftliche] philosophy, theology, and history of religions. The measure of Heidegger’s success is his account of “formal indication,” which endeavors to provide a reflective (i.e. philosophical) articulation of life without privileging a particular theoretical standpoint. This attempt leads him to reconceive phenomenology as a hermeneutics of factical life and to shift his emphasis from a phenomenology of religious consciousness to a phenomenology of religious life. What distinguishes this account is its focus on the “motivated” or “enacted” nature of meaning from out of life. After reconstructing and elaborating Heidegger’s account I note a problematic tendency toward over-formalization that focuses exclusively on the enactment sense (Vollzugsinn) at the expense of the content sense (Gehaltsinn). I enlist the aid of Kierkegaard, whom Heidegger is reading carefully at this point in time, to show why a focus on the appropriative nature of meaning does not require one to ignore its content. I conclude by suggesting some ways that a modified version of Heidegger’s formally indicative philosophy of religion still may prove useful to us today.