

The Muslim brotherhood's gamble with the Arab Spring: The re-radicalization of Islamist parties in democratizing governments


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
THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S GAMBLE WITH THE ARAB SPRING: THE RE-RADICALIZATION OF ISLAMIST PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIZING GOVERNMENTS

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Advisor: Professor Kathleen Bailey

Introduction

- In 2011, the Middle East was swept with revolution and unrest. In a span of weeks, the largest Arab state – Egypt – saw millions take to the streets and demand President Hosni Mubarak's ouster. Amid shouts of "Irahal!" or "Get Out!", the shadow organization that supplied and organized these enormous protests began to hope for real change.
- A religious organization dedicated to *da'wa* [preaching], social service provision, education, and mobilization of Muslim civil society, the Muslim Brotherhood had spent decades attempting to maneuver their way into a position of political power, and the Arab Spring presented itself as the perfect platform to realize their dream.




- In a span of a few months, the Muslim Brotherhood went from an illegal group tortured by the regime to a political party who could claim a majority in Egypt's Parliament and the Egyptian Presidency.
- Many policymakers in the West and many secularists in Egypt hoped that the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood into the political system would force them to "moderate" their "radical" ideology. Perhaps with the presence of electoral pressures, systemic limitations, and the need for pragmatic day-to-day governance, they would abandon more Islamist policies aimed at institutionalizing Islam's role in politics and society.
- Unfortunately, this hoped-for moderation never appeared. What happened?

Theory Visualized

Can the oft-cited inclusion-moderation hypothesis be applied to Islamist parties in Middle Eastern and North African countries?

Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis Versus Cyclical Re-Radicalization



The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood experience has varied greatly from that of the Christian Democrats or Democratic Socialists of Europe:

- Party's rapid switch from minority to majority power
- Islam as the party's guiding principle
- History of semi-authoritarian autocracy
- Powerful military
- Forced secularization
- A deficiency of pre-existing liberal democracy
- Weak opposition

So, can the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis even be applied to Egypt?

Investigation and Codification of the Muslim Brotherhood's Platforms and Behaviors

What has this research concluded as concerns the validity of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis? What happened when the Muslim Brotherhood entered government?

Amended Coding Guide:

A) View Towards Democracy

- 0- No mention of democracy.
- 1- Secular democracy. Statement of support for democracy and a secular polity.
- 2- Islamic Democracy. Statement of support for democracy with explicit reference to Islamic principles (e.g. shura) in agreement with democratic state structures.
- 3- Islamic, Illiberal Democracy. Support for democratic procedures, but not liberals, principles.

B) Desired Strength of Shari'a

- 0- No details.
- 1- Weak form. No law which goes against the shari'a, or some other statement which acknowledges the shari'a as a guiding framework for legislation.
- 2- Strong form. Qur'an and Sunnah as the only source of law.
- 3- Strict, institutionalized form. Islamic Religious Establishment has ultimate legislative say rather than elected parliament.

C) Women's Role in Society


- 0- No mention.
- 1- Full legal equality for women.
- 2- A distinct women's role in family and society.
- 3- Categorical, state-tolerated discrimination against women.

D) Treatment of Minorities


- 0- No mention.
- 1- Full legal equality for minorities.
- 2- "Separate but equal" style of inclusion with reference to some Islamic criteria.
- 3- Categorical, state-tolerated discrimination against minorities.

The 21st Century Evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood: Before and After the Arab Spring (2000-2013)

Election Year	A) View Towards Democracy	B) Desired Strength of Shari'a	C) Women's Role in Society	D) Treatment of Minorities	Average Value
2000	2	2	2	2	2
2005	2	2	2	1	1.75
2010	1	1	1	1	1
2011	2	2	2	2	2
2012-2013 MB Governance	3	2	3	3	2.75



De-Radicalization and Re-Radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2000-2013 Time Frame.




NB: The lower the number, the less radical the platform and behavior are.

New Theory Formation and Application: Implications for Future Research


The lack of recognition of local context has rendered the inclusion-moderation hypothesis inapplicable in certain situations.

What is the answer when the inclusion-moderation cannot be applied? How can the Egyptian experience be explained and qualified?

Framework for a New Inclusion-Re-Radicalization Hypothesis: Egypt as a Case Study



Graphical Representation of De-Radicalization and Re-Radicalization: Egypt as a Case Study with Specific Steps Apportioned



Conclusions

Why is this research and framework important?

- While much work has been done to investigate the behavior of the Brotherhood under semi-authoritarian regimes, there has been a deficiency in the theorization of post-authoritarian environments.
- In under 30 months, Egypt experienced:
 - A revolution
 - The first set of free and fair elections
 - The victory of an Islamist president
 - A counter-revolution
 - And the installation of another military junta.
- How and why did this happen?



- Since the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is not wholly applicable to cases such as post-Arab Spring Egypt, this new reworked framework can *hopefully* be used to predict the behaviors of Islamist parties and deep states in the future when regime upheaval and democratization affect other MENA countries that share similar structural and socio-political trends with Egypt.
- By taking into account the intertwined role of politics and the deep state, better behavioral predictions can be made by state and non-state actors.

Major Researchers Utilized

These are a few of the most important authors and researchers to this thesis. Their work forms the backbone for this thesis' question, research, and reformulated hypothesis.

Mustafa Akyol, Omar Ashour, Nathan Brown, Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, Andrew Reynolds, Thanassis Cambanis, Michaëlle Browers, Brecht De Smet, Ibrahim El-Houdaiby, Ashraf el-Sharif, Hafez Ghanem, Hazem Kandil, Quinn Mecham, Mariz Tadros, Eric Trager

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