

The Standing of the Soul: The Search for a Middle Being between God and Matter in the *De Statu Animae* of Claudianus Mamertus

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THE STANDING OF THE SOUL: THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE BEING
BETWEEN GOD AND MATTER IN THE *DE STATU ANIMAE* OF CLAUDIANUS
MAMERTUS

a dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

THE STANDING OF THE SOUL: THE SEARCH FOR A MIDDLE BEING BETWEEN GOD AND MATTER IN THE *DE STATU ANIMAE* OF CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS

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This thesis is intended as a complement to Fr. Ernest Fortin's *Christianisme et culture philosophique*. In that work, he examined the *De statu animae* of Claudianus Mamertus and its affinity to the thought of the Neoplatonic philosophers (especially Porphyry) in order to make its doctrine more clear. But he also looked at it to see the greatness of philosophical spirit that its author possessed, a remarkable spirit considering the time in which he wrote. Though Fr. Fortin's work is quite thorough, there are some aspects of the *De statu animae* that are treated only slightly or not at all. This thesis aims at filling out some of them.

The thesis first considers the difficulty of the philosophical question discussed in the work: the incorporeality of the human soul. Among the many difficulties which this question raises is one raised by Faustus of Riez, against whom Claudianus is writing, namely, that of conceiving an incorporeal creature without confounding it with God. It then considers the historical context, both political and philosophical, in which Claudianus lived and wrote. In particular, it brings out the influence of the Emperor Julian in his efforts to replace Christianity with pagan philosophy (especially as influenced by Porphyry and Iamblichus), and his connection with the intellectual life in Gaul. This it does to put into relief the magnanimity of a Christian writer who could look to the philosophy that most influenced the most ardent opponents of Christianity and see in it an ally rather than an enemy.

Faustus regarded the philosophers as enemies because he thought them, in their reasonings, to have raised the soul to the dignity of its Creator. Of the philosophers open to

this charge of impiety, it is, perhaps, most aptly laid upon the Platonists. A tendency in this direction appears in Plato, and reaches something of an apex in the thought of Plotinus. In Plato's writings, it appears especially in the *Phaedo*, which Claudianus quotes at length in the Second Book. The thesis looks at this dialogue to bring into relief this tendency in the work, and then compares it to *Ennead* V.1 to show that Plotinus takes the considerations in that dialogue and follows them out to show the kinship between the soul and the divine.

Against this background, there are a couple of aspects of *De statu animae* that emerge. The first is the importance of seeing the soul as a *middle being* between God and bodily creatures. The second is the importance of seeing the soul as the *imago Dei*. Claudianus, in spite of his rhetoric, saw the seriousness of the difficulty raised by Faustus, and his work can be read, especially in the First Book, as an attempt to raise the mind of the reader from the fleshy world of sensation to the more beautiful, true, and good world of the spirit. The thesis argues that though the work is polemical, and so formed somewhat in the order of Faustus's own arguments, Claudianus has worked that order to his own end; this can be seen in his use of the word *status*. This word is taken from Faustus, who uses it in his letter to name the nature of the soul. Claudianus, without leaving behind that sense, uses it to bring out the importance of understanding the soul's *nature* through understanding its *standing* in the order of beings. His arguments are meant to help the reader to do just that. He first establishes that the world would be more perfect if there were an incorporeal creature, then he argues that there is in fact such a creature, and finally how it is possible for there to be such a creature. In doing so, he relies on ideas of the Neoplatonists, and especially Iamblichus, who looked at the soul as a middle being in order to see it as, on the one hand, less than the beings of the intelligible order, and yet superior to those of the sensible order.

It is in this notion of the soul as a middle being that Claudianus finds an account for the changeableness of the soul without relying on matter. To show this, he invokes a distinction among motions: stable, in time, and in time and place. The first belongs to God, the second to the soul, and the last to bodies. This distinction arises from the fact that God is above all the categories of Aristotle, bodies are subject to them all, but the soul is subject only to some. In this way, the soul can be seen to undergo qualitative change, or changes in its affections, without suffering change in place. Thus, though not a body, it is nevertheless subject to change of some sort. And so, though superior to bodies, it falls short of the perfection of its Creator.

But running throughout this discussion is the notion of image. And at the end of the book, its importance emerges. When Claudianus turns to a consideration of our act of knowing, the nature of the soul becomes more clear. When the soul turns its attention from bodies to look at itself, what it sees is an image of God, Who is incorporeal. And so, it sees, if it can free itself from the seductions of the images of bodies it has drawn in through the senses, that it is incorporeal. Here he reveals to the reader more fully what he has been trying to do. He has been working to turn the eye of the mind from the world of sensation to look at itself in itself, for if it does this, it will see itself as the *imago Dei*, and thus incorporeal.

In this last aspect of the work especially, we can see the influence of Iamblichus, who, as Carlos Steel has shown, came to conceive of the soul as the image of Intellect precisely to establish it as a middle being between Intellect and the material world. It is an image so that it can be both like and unlike its exemplar. It understands (or more precisely, reasons) and so is like Intellect. But it does so by introducing order into its thoughts so that though always thinking (like Intellect), it moves from one thought to the next. Thus, it introduces time into the world. In this way, it departs from Intellect and becomes subject to

change, though not in place. Claudianus recognizes in this a way of conceiving of the soul as incorporeal, therefore like God, and yet subject to change in time, therefore unlike Him, and so a creature. And so he comes to see the soul, in its essence to be the image of its Creator.

Claudianus, in his refutation of Faustus, has raised the minds of his readers to lofty heights. Following the teachings of the Platonists, to whom his friend Sidonius likens him in everything except his garb, he has purged his mind from the entrapments of the corporeal world, has raised it to the pure world of being, and found himself a part of it. But those he has followed had been, either directly or indirectly, ardent foes of the faith which he professed and to which he had given his life. Porphyry had composed a work attacking Christianity; and Iamblichus, through his disciples, had inspired Julian with a devotion to the pagan gods that led him to attack the Church both in his writings and in his political endeavors. But unlike Faustus and others like him, he saw a harmony between his faith and his philosophy that gave him confidence that the natural light of reason and the light of revelation could work together to unite his soul to its Beginning, which is also his End.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

If every being were a mobile being, Aristotle teaches in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, Natural Philosophy would be wisdom, for it would consider being in all its universality.¹ And yet, even as early as Anaxagoras, there was a glimpse of a being that was not a mobile being, a being that stood apart from those encountered in the sensible, mobile world. Mind, he saw, must be unmixed so that it might rule.² This was only a glimpse, however, and he apparently did not see how to focus his gaze upon it. Plato and Aristotle both comment on his inability to follow out the implications of this insight.³ But it is hard to

¹ *Metaphysics*, Bk IV, ch. 3, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 1:1005a33-b2: ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο [i.e., the first principles of our knowledge] δρῶντες· μόνοι γὰρ ὄντο **περί τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος**. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω (ἐν γὰρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἢ φύσις), τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἂν εἰνὴ σκέψις· ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη. (Emphasis added.)

² “Mind is unlimited, autonomous, and unmixed with anything, standing entirely by itself...If Mind were to share in the universal mixture, the things with which it was mixed would prevent it from having command over everything in the way that it now does” (DK 12), *The Presocratics*, ed. and tr. Philip Wheelwright, (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1966), 162.

³ Cf. *Phaedo* 97c-98d and *Metaphysics* I.4, 985a18-22.

understand well a nature not composed of matter.⁴ Aristotle tells us that our first concepts, which are derived from sensible, material things, are inevitably bound up with matter, and it is not easy to free our thoughts from it. Plato, in the allegory of the cave, described the turning from material to spiritual things as a painful process, often even needing coercion to be effected.⁵

If it is difficult to grasp the nature of the first principle of things, especially if it is unlike them, as Anaxagoras saw, it is also difficult to grasp the nature of the thing trying to know that principle. The question of *its* nature followed quickly upon that of the first principle.⁶ Was it like the objects it experienced around it, material and changeable, or did it transcend their condition and have a share in eternity? As like seems to be known by like, the answer to this question generally depended on how one answered the question concerning the nature of the first principle. Those who saw no principle above matter naturally saw the soul as material and mortal. Thus Empedocles posited it to be composed of the four elements, and Democritus and Epicurus as composed of subtle, quick-moving atoms.⁷

⁴ Xenophanes strove in his thought to separate God from the world of mortality, but still he saw God as “spherical in substance.” Diogenes Laertius, quoted in Wheelwright, *Presocratics*, 37.

⁵ “Consider, then, what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would be like...When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he’d be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he’d seen before.” *Republic* Bk. 7, 515c, tr. G. M. A. Grube (rev. C. D. C. Reeves), *Plato: The Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 1133.

⁶ “[Thales] was the first to declare that the soul by its very nature is always in motion, and indeed is self-moving,” Aetius, quoted in Wheelwright, *Presocratics*, 50.

⁷ It is precisely to explain the power of the mind to know all the things it experiences that leads Empedocles to see the soul as composed of the four elements: γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ, etc. (Fr. 109, G.S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 2nd ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 310.) The atomists, however, while positing the soul to be composed of spherical atoms to explain the motion it imparted to the body (see Aristotle, *De anima* I.2, 405a9-13), are left with the difficulty of explaining how the mind knows things. They attempted to solve this problem through the notion of images given off from the surface of the sensible, which enter the soul through the eye, or some other organ: “They [The Atomists] attributed sight to certain images, of the same shape as the object, which were continually streaming off from the objects of sight and impinging on the eye.” (Alexander, quoted in Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 428.) Epicurus gives a more detailed account in his Letter to Herodotus. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, Book X.

Those who, like Anaxagoras, saw in the first principle something transcending matter, also tended to see the soul as participating in that transcendence. This movement away from a material conception of soul was taken up in earnest by Plato, who, in trying to understand the nature of our knowledge, was struck by its eternal, unchanging character. Unlike the things one meets in the sensible world, our knowledge, when it is truly knowledge and not simply opinion, cannot be other than it is. It is immovable.⁸ There must, then be a principle (or principles) of our knowledge, i.e., that which we know, that is itself immovable, and therefore incorruptible and eternal. And since our soul knows incorruptible and eternal things, it too must in some way be incorruptible and eternal.⁹ The soul, then, is something Godlike and so immaterial or unbodily. Aristotle, too, in his *De anima*, argued from the nature of our knowledge to the separability of our soul from matter, and hence to its divinity.¹⁰ This recognition of the immateriality and divinity of the human soul continued to grow, in Platonic thought especially, reaching its apex in the thought of Plotinus.

But the task of raising the mind to a consideration of the immaterial, even when it is thinking itself, is inherently difficult. To consider the immaterial as such, the mind must grope toward that of which it has no direct experience; it must leave behind the aid of the

⁸ See *Meno*, 97d-98a. There Socrates distinguishes knowledge from right opinion. He likens our thoughts to statues of Daedalus that, in their extreme likeness to life, are apt to run away if left untied (like opinion); they must be tied down so that they cannot move (like knowledge). In thus distinguishing knowledge from opinion, he adds an uncharacteristic claim: "I certainly do not think I am guessing that right opinion is a different thing from knowledge. If I claim to know anything else—and I would make that claim about few things—I would put this down as one of the things I know." (98b. G. M. A. Grube, tr., *Plato: The Complete Works*, 896.)

⁹ Plato's path to the eternal will be considered in more detail below, in ch.3.

¹⁰ *De anima*, III.5. See *Ethics*, X.7, 1177a12-18, for a statement of the divinity of our soul: "If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is the element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine, or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect happiness." *Ethica Nicomachea*, tr. W. D. Ross, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1104.

senses and imagination.¹¹ If this is true in coming to know God, it is also true in coming to know other spiritual beings, but these raise difficulties of their own. Since God is not only immaterial, but also uncaused, and wholly without motion,¹² the question of how such a being could come to be cannot be asked. Yet beings that are immaterial but still dependent and in some way contingent make the question about their coming-to-be a real and important one.

It is precisely in order to understand the coming into being of things that the distinction between matter and form was discovered.¹³ Experience of the natural world seems to show that, if form is necessary for being, matter is necessary for becoming. It thus seems that anything contingent and therefore not wholly unchangeable must be composed of matter and form. If the soul has come to be, then it is hard to see how it can be immaterial. This difficulty is somewhat¹⁴ mitigated if one can think of souls as being eternal; but the Christian must hold by faith that all things other than God have come into being, have been created in time; therefore, the Christian is left with the question.¹⁵ If an adequate solution was arrived at in the Middle ages, especially in the teachings of St. Thomas,¹⁶ in earlier times, when the Christian tradition was still in the beginnings of its formation, this

¹¹ Boethius, when making his division of the sciences based upon the degree to which the subject of the science is separable from matter, says that theology, or metaphysics, considers what is *sine motu abstracta et separabilis* (*nam dei substantia et materia et motu caret*), and so in *divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit, neque diduci ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae vere forma neque imago est...* (*De trinitate*, ch. 2, l.17, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973], 8)

¹² See Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, chs. 6 (the first mover is unmoved) and 10 (the first mover is immaterial).

¹³ See Plato, *Timaeus* 48e-51b, and Aristotle, *Physics*, 1.7.

¹⁴ The fact that they are contingent, and so need a cause of their being, suggests that even if they are eternal, they still must ‘come to be’ in some sense, and so still be composed of matter and form. The persistence of this opinion can be seen by the need St. Thomas felt to refute it in Ch. 4 of his *De ente et essentia*.

¹⁵ On the other hand, as we will discuss below, the omnipotence of God would allow the Christian to hold that God could maintain a (material) being in existence that left to its own would perish, thus circumventing the difficulty altogether.

¹⁶ See, again, his *De ente et essentia*, ch. 4, in which he argues to their being composed of *essentia* and *esse*.

difficulty exerted its influence on those who attempted to understand the nature of the soul.¹⁷

The question of the nature of the soul, then, as that of the nature of God, is something of a meeting ground for philosophy and sacred doctrine. They are subjects upon which philosophers have, since the beginning, considered open (to a degree) to the inquiries of the human mind. They searched for God because He is the Cause of all things, and the mind is naturally inclined to search for the causes of things.¹⁸ They inquired into the nature of the soul because, if the mind can know anything, it should be able to know itself.¹⁹ Given the importance of individual salvation in the Christian faith, it, too, considered itself to have a concern in these matters. It is not surprising that there should be differences in the teachings of philosophy and the Christian faith on these subjects. Yet a Christian, who holds that the teachings of his faith are the revealed word of God, ought not to rest easy in these disagreements. Since God is the author of both nature and the revelation, if there is in fact a disagreement, then one cannot escape the conclusion that

¹⁷ St. Augustine, in speaking of the creation of the soul, takes up the question of its matter: *si enim quiddam incommutabile esset anima, nullo modo eius quasi materiem quaerere deberemus; nunc autem mutabilitas eius satis indicat eam interim uitiis atque fallaciis deformem reddi, formari autem uirtutibus ueritatisque doctrina, sed in sua iam natura, qua est anima, sicut etiam caro in sua natura, qua iam caro est, et salute decoratur et morbis uulneribusque foedatur*. He goes on, however, in the next chapters to raise difficulties with the notion of spiritual matter. *De genesi ad litteram XII libri*, ed. Ioseph Zycha, CSEL vol. 28, pars 1 (Vindobonae: Bibliopola Academiae Litterarum Caesareae Vindobonensis, 1894), VII.6, 9.

In his *Confessions*, he speaks of the difficulty he experienced in coming to conceive of an immaterial substance, even in the case of God. See *St. Augustine's Confessions*, tr. William Watts, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912) V.14, 258: *quod si possem spiritualement substantiam cogitare, statim machinamenta illa omnia soluerentur et abicerentur ex animo meo; sed non poteram*. Yet, it was due to the lack of a notion of immortality that he was not able to rest in the Epicurean materialism: *disputabam cum amicis meis Alypio et Nebridio de finibus bonorum et malorum, Epicurum accepturum fuisse palmam in animo meo, nisi ego credidissem post mortem restare animae uitam et tractus meritorum, quod Epicurus credere noluit*. *Ibid.*, VI.16, 326.

¹⁸ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, 980a22.

¹⁹ See *Republic* X, 608d, where Socrates points out to Glaucon that understanding the immortality of the soul is not hard.

God deceives, an unthinkable conclusion.²⁰

The Fifth Century is particularly interesting in regard to this question, because of the unique circumstance brought about by the wide acceptance of Christianity and, through this, the wider spread of ideas that had been for centuries the property of the Jewish nation. This influence lies not simply in the different propositions it contained about the causes and nature of things, but also with the more radical claim that these propositions were revealed by God himself. Thus, the claim that the world had a beginning in time, though certainly held before, now came forth under a new guise, namely as the position of the One who would most know, namely the Creator himself. In other words, the claim that certain truths about the world, and about man in particular, have been revealed to us directly from God, who is Truth itself, and so neither able to deceive nor be deceived, puts those truths on a very different plane in terms of philosophical investigation. In fact, it could easily seem that it removes them from the realm of philosophy all together.

While Christianity was spreading its influence, philosophical culture had continued to develop. For about eight hundred years, philosophers had been inquiring into the causes of things natural and human, and had, through the teachings of the earlier philosophers, and of Plato in particular, reflected again and again upon the different ways of understanding themselves and the world around them. The vigor with which the philosophical life was pursued had waxed and waned, but in the Third Century, it had received an infusion of life from the teachings of Plotinus. Through his influence, the philosophical endeavors of the late Empire was very much concerned with the lofty matters of the nature of God, His

²⁰ See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* 1.7 (Romae: Apud sedem commissionis Leoninae, 1934), 6-7: *Illud idem quod inducitur in animam discipuli a docente, doctoris scientia continet: nisi doceat fide, quod de Deo nefas est dicere. Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est indita: cum ipse Deus sit nostrae auctor naturae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principis huiusmodi contrarium est, divinae sapientiae contrariatur. Non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur quae ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt naturali cognitioni esse contraria.*

relation to the universe, and the nature and place in the universe of the human soul—the very things with which the teachings of the Jews and Christians were concerned. Given the way men are, this was bound to lead to conflicts between these philosophers and those in the Church, even if in many ways the two teachings were fairly close to one another.²¹

Human beings are, after all, jealous of their own, prone to error and misunderstanding, and willful in holding to their (or rather, our) opinions.²² When this natural disposition is coupled with the particular political turmoil in the late Roman world within which these doctrines were circulating, it is no surprise that conflict would arise. Moreover, the growth of religious sentiment, not only on the part of the Christians, made it inevitable. Thus it is not surprising that some, at least, among the Church reacted vehemently against the ‘wisdom of the world.’ Rather, it is more wonderful in some ways that the majority of Christian thinkers, while remaining aware of the seductions that this wisdom presented to the soul, nevertheless saw that there was much in it of value, even to those whose minds had been enlightened by Sacred Doctrine.²³

As is clear from the Letters of St. Paul,²⁴ these tensions were present from the beginning of the spread of Christianity, and although the Church was relieved of political persecution through the Edict of Milan, the tensions between philosophy and Christian thought were still quite strong even in the Fifth Century. This was due in part to Julian’s attempt to eradicate Christianity from his empire and revive pagan thought and religion. Gaul in particular found itself quite involved in this attempt, as will be outlined more fully

²¹ The likeness was not simply an historical accident, as the teachings of Plotinus and his school had exerted an influence on important Christian teachers, especially St. Augustine.

²² See *De statu animae* I.1 for Claudianus’s own recognition of this short-coming.

²³ See, for instance, St. Basil’s “Address to Young Men on Reading Greek Literature.”

²⁴ See 1 Corinthians 2.6-9 for a statement of the opposition he saw between God’s wisdom and man’s. On the other hand, in his preaching to the Athenians (Acts 17), he seems to indicate that their sages had some share of the wisdom he preaches.

below. This secular attempt to revive paganism met with resistance from the Church in Gaul, and one center of that resistance was the monastery of Lerins. The monks of that monastery were well-educated in Christian thought, and, because a number of its monks became bishops for the dioceses of southern Gaul, their influence was strong.

This coming together of the pagan revival and growing Christian learning produced a dispute between two members of the clergy, one a bishop, the other a priest and brother to a bishop. This dispute arose over the question of the incorporeality of the human soul, a question, as we have seen, in which philosophy and faith intersected. But beneath this question was the larger question of the value of philosophy in light of revelation. We are witnesses to this dispute through the two writings in which it was aired. The first is a brief letter of Faustus, Bishop of Riez, and a former monk of Lerins, in which, to a question posed to him concerning the incorporeality of the human soul, he answers forcefully that it is not. In response, Claudianus Mamertus (his *adversarius*) composed three books *De statu animae*, arguing that it is. Though this is the immediate object of their dispute, Fr. Ernest Fortin has shown that Faustus, in his rejection of the soul's immateriality, reveals another argument, one that holds that philosophy, 'worldly wisdom,' is less than helpful for settling this question. Rather, he implies, one must turn to the Sacred Scriptures and the writings of the saints to find the answer to this question.²⁵ In the inquiry into the nature of the soul, then, Faustus insinuates not only that philosophy is not helpful, but that it will lead one necessarily into damnable impiety. Claudianus, sensitive to this insinuation, goes to great pains to rescue philosophy from this charge. Both men were considered by their contemporaries to be among the most learned of their time,²⁶ and so the outcome of this

²⁵ E. L. Fortin, A. A., *Christianisme et culture philosophique au Cinquième Siècle: La querelle de l'âme humaine en Occident* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1959), 64-73.

²⁶ See, for instance, Sidonius, Letters IX, 3 and 9, and IV, 11 and V, 2.

conflict would have important and immediate consequences for the cultural life of their contemporaries. But even more, Claudianus's work, at least, was to be read widely throughout the schools of Europe well into the Middle Ages, and so would exert some influence on the development of philosophical culture in Medieval Europe.²⁷

Because Claudianus was on the winning side of this argument, his work holds particular interest for us. When one looks more closely at the work, that interest only increases. Even a cursory reading reveals a strong influence from the Greek pagan philosophers, especially the "Platonists." This work, then, reveals Claudianus's deep conviction, in face of Faustus's opposition, that Christians can learn much from philosophers, that what we can learn from nature is in harmony with what God has revealed.

Fr. Fortin has studied rather fully the philosophical background of this work, and has drawn out nicely its concern to vindicate philosophy from the charges Faustus implicitly brings against it. But as he is concerned more with the philosophical preconceptions that underlie Claudianus's thought, he does not examine in detail the arguments that Claudianus uses to answer the more immediate challenge of Faustus's letter. Such an examination will help to make more concrete the character of the work, and will underscore the boldness of Claudianus's thought concerning both the nature of the soul and the relationship between philosophy and Christianity. It will also shed light upon Claudianus's understanding of the immateriality of the soul and how he answers the more general question of the very possibility of an immaterial creature.

This last question is what underlies and so forms the basis for Faustus's argument. As we will see in more detail below, his contention is that philosophy, by leading us to consider the soul as immaterial, deceives us and leads us to confuse, or rather confound, the

²⁷ See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 22-27 for an account of this history.

creature with the Creator. The question that he poses is how an immaterial being, which is necessarily eternal, immortal, and outside of place, can be anything but God. In his mind, since philosophy leads us to conclude that the human soul is immaterial, it also leads us to conclude that we are God.

This is a serious charge. Claudianus feels its weight and in spite of his dismissive rhetoric,²⁸ takes it seriously. Nor, he realizes, is it an easy task to refute it. And this is a large part of why he produced three long books in response. His aim was to show that it is possible to have a creature that is *like* God in its immateriality, and yet *unlike* Him in its creatureliness, and thus subject to limitations in its being in some way, though not to those of place and death.

Significantly, this very question of the ontological status of the soul was also occupying the thought of the leading thinkers of the Neoplatonic school, especially Iamblichus and Proclus. Plotinus, as will be discussed below, in his exuberance at the recognition of the soul's divinity, seems at times to lose the distinction between God and the soul. This made his followers, even one as devoted to him as Porphyry, uncomfortable and led them to search for ways of seeing, in spite of the immateriality of the soul, its distinction from God. In this attempt, the notion of the soul as image becomes prominent.

As a Christian, and a student of St. Augustine, Claudianus saw man, and more particularly, his soul as being created "in the image and likeness" of God. Finding this same notion²⁹ in the Neoplatonists, who used it to distinguish the soul from God, he thought that he had found a notion in philosophy that also finds a sanction in the Bible, which was

²⁸ Claudianus goes to great pains to indicate that he considers his adversary to be somewhat of a fool. Yet it is clear from the completeness with which he discusses the question that he recognizes the philosophical import of it.

²⁹ At least verbally the same.

singularly fit to serve as the means for answering Faustus. It is the aim of this thesis, then, to examine Claudianus's use of the notion of the soul as *imago Dei*, influenced by the teaching of later Neoplatonists, in order to understand how he distinguishes the immaterial creature from God.

Chapter 2

Faustus of Riez and His Arguments against the Immateriality of the Soul

Faustus of Riez

Faustus, Claudianus's opponent, was born in Britain in the early part of the Fifth century, but migrated in his youth to Southern Gaul.¹ There he entered the monastery at Lerins, where he eventually became the abbot. He developed a reputation for holiness and excellent preaching, and was an ardent opponent of the Arianism of the Gothic peoples settled in Southern Gaul. Eventually he was called from the cloisters to lead the Church at Riez and was consecrated a bishop about the year 458. Though exiled from his see from 477-85 by the Visigothic (and Arian) king Euric, he returned to Riez and ended his life there about the year 490. Only a handful of his writings have come down to us: five letters, a number of sermons, and two theological works, *De sancto spiritu* and *De gratia Dei*.² The latter of these is his most well-known, and in it he attempts to mediate between Pelagius and Augustine on the nature of grace. This work was condemned and his teachings labeled semi-Pelagian, though the justice of this charge has recently been called into doubt.³

¹ See A. Neuwirth, "Faustus of Riez," *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 5 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), 861.

² His works are contained in *Fausti rizensis et Ruricii opera*, ed. A. Engelbrecht, CSEL XXI (Vindobonae: Bibliopola Academiae Litterarum Caesareae, 1891).

³ Thomas A. Smith, *De Gratia: Faustus of Riez's Treatise on Grace and Its Place in the History of Theology* (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1990).

It is against the doctrine of the soul presented in Faustus's third Letter that Claudianus argues in the *De statu animae*. We are in these two writings confronted with a disputed question of sorts: *utrum incorporea anima humana sit*.⁴ Yet implicit in this debate is the question, from where is one to draw the principles to discuss this question. Is human reason competent to answer it, or, as in articles of faith, are we compelled to rely only upon the word of God? Just as these two men differed in their conclusions, so they differed also in their principles. Claudianus, as we shall see, has tremendous confidence in the ability of human reason to understand the nature of the soul.⁵ Faustus, on the other hand, is convinced that reason unaided by the light of revelation is destined to fall into the greatest impieties: it is only in the writings of Scripture and the Saints that one is able to proceed with any confidence and safety.

Given this difference, it is interesting to note that Faustus and Claudianus seem to have had a common teacher,⁶ namely St. Eucherius, whom Claudianus praises in his work.⁷

⁴ That Claudianus and those of his acquaintance engaged in this form of intellectual inquiry, which was to form such a central part of the life of the Medieval schools, is shown through a description given by Sidonius, in a letter written to a nephew of Claudianus on the occasion of his death:

Angit me nimis damnum saeculi mei nuper erepto avunculo tuo Claudiano oculis nostris, ambigo an quempiam deinceps parem conspicaturis. Vir siquidem fuit providus prudens, doctus eloquens, acer et hominum aevi loci populi sui ingeniosissimus quique indesinenter salva religione philosopharetur; ... deus bone, quid erat illud, quotiens ad eum sola consultationis gratia conveniebamus! quam ille omnibus statim totum non dubitans, non fastidians aperiebat, voluptuosissimum reputans, si forte oborta quampiam quaestionum insolubilitate labyrinthica scientiae suae thesauri eventilarentur. iam si frequentes consederamus, officium audiendi omnibus, uni solum quem forsitan elegissemus deputans ius loquendi, viritum vicissimque, non tumultuatim nec sine schematis cuiuspiam gestu artificioso doctrinae suae opes erogaturus. Dien quaecumque dixisset protinus reluctantium syllogismorum contrarietatibus excipiebamus; sed repellebat omnium nostrum temerarias oppositiones: itaque nihil non perpensum probatumque recipiebatur. (Letters IV, 11.1-3, *Poems and Letters*, trans. W. B. Anderson, vol. 2 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965], 102, 104.)

⁵ In fact, he is perhaps too confident in reason's power and thinks that reason can even come to see God as triune. See *De statu animae* II.7, where he praises Plato for having raised his mind to a vision of the Trinity.

⁶ See R. de la Broise, *Mamerti Claudiani vita ejusque doctrina de anima hominis* (Paris: Retaux-Bray, 1890), 31-32.

⁷ *sed quamquam nonnullis dissertatoribus proferendis necessario supersederim, dum ad oracula diuina, ex quis eorum pendet auctoritas, iure festino, haudquaquam tamen Eucherium praeterierim mihimet uiuente doctrina et praesentaneis coram disputationibus cognitum, non porro nuntiis aut lectione conpertum, qui scilicet uiridis aeni, maturus animi, terrae dispuens, caeli adpetens, humilis spiritu, arduus merito ac perinde ingenii subtilissimus, scientiae plenus, eloquii profluus, magnorum saeculi sui pontificum longe maximus editis in rem fidei multiingis uariorum operum uoluminibus ad populum quoque his super statu*

Perhaps they were even at his school at the same time.⁸ Under the tutelage of Eucherius, they may have pursued studies in both philosophy and theology,⁹ and he obviously had an impact on the thought of Claudianus. But if that was the case, one cannot but wonder what the character of the philosophical part of these studies was like, for Faustus seems to have drawn from them a different lesson, namely a thorough distrust of philosophy,¹⁰ and so turned away from these early studies.¹¹ It is likely that philosophical discussions of the soul had been part of this education, for reflections on the nature of the soul had always been part of the philosophers' task, and one that had occupied them a great deal. Plato gives it a

animae contionatus est. De Statu Animae, II.8, *Claudiani Mamerti Opera*, ed. A. Engelbrecht, CSEL vol. 11 (Vindobonae: C. Geroldi Filium Bibliopolam Academiae, 1885), 135.9-20. Subsequent references to this work will be given by page and line number.

⁸ As supporting evidence for his claim that Claudianus spent his youth in Lugdunum, de la Broise points to the school of Eucherius as the most probable meeting place of Claudianus and Sidonius, but if this is so, perhaps Sidonius's friendship with Faustus dates from the same time. See *Claudiani Mamerti vita*, 4-6.

⁹ de la Broise, *Claudiani Mamerti vita*, 9, in commenting upon the character of the studies in which Claudianus was engaged under the tutelage of St. Eucherius, notes that Claudianus's own words, quoted in the note above, suggest that they included philosophical as well as theological matters: *Porro hoc verbo 'disputationibus', non 'contiones' sacras ad populum intelligit, de quibus meminit postea, sed philosophicas vel theologicas argumentationes.*

¹⁰ These differing reactions are interesting. Claudianus enlists St. Eucherius as an ally of the soul's incorporeality; however, in his *The World Contemned*, Eucherius abuses the philosophers with strong rhetoric:

Casting off then the vain and absurd precepts of philosophy, wherein you busy yourself to no purpose, embrace at last the true and saving knowledge of Christ. You shall find even in that employment enough for your eloquence and wit, and will quickly discern how far these precepts of piety and truth surpass the conceits and delirations of philosophers. For in those rules which they give, what is there but adulterate virtue and false wisdom? and what in ours but perfect righteousness and sincere truth? Whereupon I shall justly conclude, that they indeed usurp the name of philosophy, but the substance and life of it is with us. For what manner of rules to live by could they give, who were ignorant of the first cause, and the fountain of life? For not knowing God, and deviating in their first principles from the author and the wellspring of justice, they necessarily erred in the rest. Hence it happened, that the end of all their studies was vanity and dissension. And if any amongst them chanced to hit some more honest tenets, these presently ministered matter of pride and superstitiousness, so that their very virtue was not free from vice. It is evident then that these are they, whose knowledge is earthy, "the disputers of this world," "the blind guides," who never saw true justice, nor true wisdom. Can any one of that School of Aristippus be a teacher of the truth, who in their doctrine and conversation differ not from swine and unclean beasts, seeing they place true happiness in fleshly lusts? "whose God is their belly, and whose glory is in their shame." Can he be a master of sobriety and virtue, in whose School the riotous, the obscene, and the adulterer are philosophers? But leaving these blind leaders, I shall come again to speak of those things which were the first motives of my writing to you." St Eucherius, *The World Contemned*, tr. Henry Vaughan the Silurist (London, 1654), www.ccel.org/ccel/eucherius/contempt.html, accessed 12/18/2015.

¹¹ See Fortin, *Christianisme et Culture Philosophique*, ch 1, for a detailed consideration of the influences at work in Faustus's rejection of philosophy as a means for attaining truth. Much of the discussion here of Faustus and his thought is indebted to this work.

prominent place in his dialogues,¹² Aristotle refers to it as a subject most worthy of pursuit,¹³ and Plotinus sees the investigation of the soul as the means to fulfill the divine injunction to know oneself.¹⁴ Could it have been in studies on the nature of the soul that Faustus turned from them? It was in their teaching on the soul that he found them committing what he regarded as a tremendous impiety, namely, claiming that the soul is unbodily. In so doing, as Faustus saw it, they made the soul equal to God.¹⁵ If this is where philosophy leads, then one must not follow!

He did not reject learning altogether, however. Rather, he turned from one font of wisdom to another, namely to Sacred Scripture and the writings of the saints, for in them one finds a wisdom that is simple and unadorned with the seductive trappings of the world. These seductions are precisely the subtleties of reasoning that are necessary to untangle the knots of our thoughts. They confuse the mind and lure one irresistibly into impiety. In Sacred Scripture, on the other hand, we find a simplicity that opens up the profoundest truths to a humble mind.¹⁶ His devotion to sacred learning and teaching earned high praise from Sidonius for taking Philosophy, purged of impurities acquired during her sojourn in the world, as his bride:

An artist then endowed with all these intellectual and literary excellences, you have joined to yourself a beautiful woman, but who married you in the ritual prescribed by Deuteronomy, my Lord Bishop. You had seen her, while still in your youth,

¹² Especially, of course, in the *Phaedo*. Faustus may have made an allusion to this dialogue in his letter; see below.

¹³ *De Anima* I.1.

¹⁴ *Ennead* V.1.1.31-35.

¹⁵ Faustus's objections will be discussed in detail below. The unbodiliness of the soul is, of course, only one direction that such reflections took. The Stoics took another, and one that leads to the conclusion that even God is bodily. See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 63, esp. note 2. Some Christians would follow them, most notably Tertullian (see note above), but Faustus does not. While acknowledging the superiority of spiritual being, he sees its excellence as fitting only to God.

¹⁶ See note 24, below.

among the hordes of the enemy, and there in the midst of the hostile ranks you fell in love with her and, defying the attempts of the opposing warriors to drive you back, you carried her off with the conquering arm of desire. Her name was Philosophy; rescued by force from the crowd of blasphemous sciences, she shaved off the locks that betokened false religion, shaved off the disdainful eyebrows of worldly knowledge, cut away the folds of her old former raiment *and by folds I mean the twists and turns of sinister dialectic screening wrong and unlawful behaviour*: and then, when cleansed in every part, she united herself with you in a mystic embrace. (Emphasis added.)¹⁷

As Fr. Fortin points out,¹⁸ sometimes hidden in a compliment is a criticism, even an unintended one. This text is a case in point. The epithets given to those areas of learning that are most associated with philosophy are particularly striking: *blasphemous* sciences, *false* religion, *worldly* knowledge,¹⁹ *sinister* dialectic. Such scorn of secular wisdom, on the one hand, and such praise of Faustus for having purified that wisdom, suggests that unlike the vision of secular and sacred learning being two wings by which the soul rises to God,²⁰ Sidonius²¹ and Faustus saw them as rivals pursuing the same beloved, one seducing her into impiety, the other, truer lover raising her from that impiety to reveal her true beauty and purity. Thus it was necessary for him to wrest her from the hands of the seducer and then purge her of the stains she had acquired while in his company. In particular, she must be

¹⁷ *Igitur his animi litterarumque dotibus praeditus mulierem pulcrum sed illam deus nomio astipulante nubentem, domine papa, tibi ingasti; quam tu adhuc iuvenis inter hostiles conspicatus catervas, atque illic in acie contrariae partis adamatam, nil per obstantes repulsus proelatores, desiderii brachio vincente rapuisti, philosophiam scilicet, quae violenter e numero sacrilegarum artium exempta raso capillo superfluae religionis ac supervilio scientiae saecularis amputatisque pervetustarum vetium rugis, id est tristes dialecticae flexibus falsa morum et illicita velantibus, mystico amplexu iam defaecata tecum membra coniunxit.* (Letters IX, 9.12, 541.)

¹⁸ *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 66.

¹⁹ Worldly here obviously has the perjorative sense that St. John gives it in his writings as something opposed to God, but it also brings to mind the charge against Socrates of searching out the things of the heavens and under the ground, i.e., attempting to discover in nature what God (or the gods) has hidden. Read in either way, such knowledge becomes impious. See Plato, *Apology* and Aristophanes, *Clouds*.

²⁰ See John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1998), 7.

²¹ At least while praising Faustus. Such sentiments do not appear when he turns to praise Claudianus.

disrobed of the “twists and turns of sinister dialectic,” the immodest dress that she had acquired as a woman of the world. In this phrase, Sidonius is singling out for praise the very thing that Claudianus sees to be one of Faustus’s greatest vices, his fear of arguments or his misologia.²²

To avoid the trappings of worldly philosophy, one must put all one’s trust in the words of Sacred Scripture, and turn a deaf ear to the tintinnabulations of sophistical dialectic.²³ Another opponent of philosophy, and one of Faustus’s masters, St. John Cassian, explains to his monks:

This is proper humility towards God, this is the pure faith of the most ancient fathers, perduring unadulterated even until today among their successors. The apostolic virtues, which have been manifested often through them, render indubitable witness to this faith not only among ourselves, but also among the infidels and unbelievers. They, holding fast with simple hearts to the simple faith of fishermen, did not take it up in a worldly spirit, by dialectical syllogisms or Tullian embellishment. Rather, by the living of a good life and most pure activity and also the correction of vices, to speak more truly, they showed by proofs for all to see that the nature of perfection lies in faith, and without faith neither piety towards God nor purgation of vices nor betterment of morals nor the perfection of virtues can be attained.²⁴

²² That the human spirit is apt to fall into a hatred of reason, or of arguments, can be seen in a poignant passage of the *Phaedo* (89d-91c), when Simias and Cebes raise their objections to Socrates’s arguments. Socrates is aware of a cloud that has come over his listeners, and he is more anxious to dispel it than he is to answer the objections, so he first gives them an exhortation to avoid becoming haters of arguments.

²³ See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 66-67.

²⁴ *Haec est propria humilitas erga Deum, haec est antiquissimorum patrum sincera fides, quae penes successores ipsorum mera nunc usque perdurat. Cui fidei virtutes apostolicae, quae saepenumero per eos manifestatae sunt, non solum apud nos, sed etiam apud infideles et incredulos indubitatum testimonium reddunt. Qui simplicem piscatorum fidem corde simplici retinentes non eam syllogismis dialecticis et Tulliana facundia spiritu concepere mundano, sed experimento vitae sinceris actuque purissimo, correctione quoque vitiorum, et ut verius dixerim in ipsa perfectionis inesse naturam oculatis indicibus deprebenderunt, sine qua nec pietas in Deum nec vitiorum purgatio nec emendatio morum nec virtutum consummatio poterit adprehendi. (De institutis coenobiorum, XII, 19, 3ff, ed. Petschenig, CSEL 17.1 [Vindobonae: Bibliopola academiae litterarum Caesare Vindobonensis, 1888], 220.)*

As a model of one who puts their faith entirely in the simple faith of fishermen, he presents to us the following:

For when a certain heretic who followed the perfidy of Eunomius tried to subvert the integrity of the Catholic faith by means of his dialectical art and had already deceived a great multitude of men, Blessed Macarius, when he was asked by Catholic men, who were gravely disturbed by the ruin effected by so great a subversion, came to them so that he might free the simplicity of all Egypt from the shipwreck of infidelity. And when the heretic approached him with his dialectical art and attempted to lead him unawares into Aristotelian thorns, Blessed Macarius, cutting short his multifarious speech with apostolic brevity, said, “the kingdom of God is not in words, but in virtue.”²⁵

Such a reaction to reason by a rational animal might strike one as unnatural and frustrating. If the heretic gives sophistical arguments, then it seems that the one who is wise ought to show them to be such.²⁶ But these men, Faustus, Cassian, and Eucherius were not only theologians, but also pioneers in Western monasticism,²⁷ a way of life that, following St. Anthony,²⁸ entailed a radical rejection of many parts of our natural life. Though learning, and some of it secular, formed a large part of the life at Lerins, nevertheless, judging by the

²⁵ *Nam cum haereticus quidam, qui Eunomii perfidiam sectabatur, sinceritatem catholicae fidei arte dialectica subvertere conaretur magnamque iam hominum multitudinem decepisset, rogatus a catholicis viris, qui ruina tantae subversionis gravissime movebantur, beatus Macarius, ut simplicitatem totius Aegypti ab infidelitatis naufragio liberaret, advenit, quem cum haereticus arte dialectica fuisset adgressus et ad Aristotelicas ignorantem spinas vellet abducere, beatus Macarius apostolica multiloquium eius brevitate concludens, non est, inquit, in verbo regnum Dei, sed in virtute (1 Cor 4.20). (Conlationes, XV, 3, 1-2, ed. Petschenig, CSEL 13 (Vindobonae: apud C. Geroldi filium bibliopolam academiae, 1886), 428-29.)* Blessed Macarius then invited the heretic to come with him and raise a corpse back to life, a challenge which he wisely declined, but which Macarius accomplished, to the edification of the faithful.

²⁶ Cf. 1 Peter 2.15: “Always be prepared to make a defense to any one who calls you to account for the hope that is in you.” (RSV)

²⁷ All three of these men were educated and formed at the monastery at Lerins, which was at this time a prime center of education and culture, and was providing the Church of Gaul with most of her leaders, not least among them the three here mentioned. For the importance of Lerins as a center of learning in fourth and fifth century Gaul, see Haarhoff, *Schools of Gaul: A Study of Pagan and Christian Education in the Last Century of the Western Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1920), 177-180.

²⁸ Monasticism seems to have been introduced to Gaul by St. Athanasius. See Haarhoff, *Schools of Gaul*, p. 177.

words of these three, the contentions and contradictions of the philosophical traditions seem to have left them skeptical of the ability of reason to get very far on its own.

Against this backdrop, Faustus comes before us as one who, while not innocent of philosophy, has found in it much to distrust and to be on guard against. This distrust, not surprisingly, had its effect upon his thought. As we shall see, the arguments he puts forth in his letter are often based on confusions that could have been cleared up with fairly easy distinctions.²⁹ Nevertheless, his arguments do bring up interesting and difficult questions about the nature of the soul.

In this letter, Faustus attempts to establish that the human soul is a bodily thing. This, of course, was not a novel doctrine. Democritus and Empedocles, true to their materialism, thought the soul to be bodily. The Epicureans and Stoics shared in this opinion. The picture of the soul presented in Homer, though approaching the notion of incorporeality, does not quite attain it.³⁰ Plato, Aristotle, and those following them asserted its incorporeality. They considered it a very important question, for upon it hung the possibility that the soul survives death.

Christian theology, on the other hand, needed no such assurance. Christ revealed that the soul is immortal, but this immortality need not be natural to the soul. God, who is able to create all things from nothing, can maintain a thing in existence even if left to its own, it would corrupt. Rather, their difficulty lies in the notion that a thing that is spiritual is

²⁹ Compare the contrary conclusion reached by St. Ambrose on this same subject, though he shares with Faustus the principle that omnipresence is a divine prerogative. He sees in this no obstacle to the possibility of spiritual creatures, for the limits Faustus is anxious to impose on them through matter, Ambrose sees as arising from the very fact that they are creatures: *Cum igitur omnis creatura certis naturae suae sit circumscripta limitibus; si quidem et illa invisibilia opera, quae non queunt locis et finibus comprehendī, substantiae suae tamen proprietate clauduntur.* (*De Spiritu Sancto* 1.7, PL 16, 723A [quoted by Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 60].)

³⁰ Cf. Odyssey XI.95-6, where the shade of Tiresias must drink blood in order to speak to Odysseus. For a discussion of Homer's understanding of ψυχή, see Warner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), ch. 5.

not eternal. Through revelation, Christian writers were certain that the soul was created by God and created in time. Yet the arguments of the philosophers for the spirituality of the soul seemed to conclude that the soul is eternal, for how could that which could never cease to be come to be?³¹ It was this that led Plato to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, a doctrine manifestly repugnant to the Faith. Thus, we find many of the fathers wrestling with this question, and coming to conclusions similar to those of Faustus. And among them are some rather important thinkers.

Justin Martyr thought the soul naturally corruptible,³² Tertullian thought it a body, though this is not surprising in one who thought God to be a body.³³ To these we can add Arnobius, Tatian, Ireneus, Cassian, and Hilary. Thus, though others opposed this position, Faustus was not without support from tradition.³⁴ Moreover, Scripture seems to bear these thinkers out, rarely speaking about anything but God as a spirit.³⁵ Moreover, certain teachings, such as the torment by fire, point to the same conclusion. Fire burns bodies, not spirits. St. Augustine, to be sure, had recently gone a long way in appropriating the notion of

³¹ See *Republic* X, 611a ff.

³² “[W]hatever exists or shall exist after God has a nature subject to corruption, and therefore capable of complete annihilation, for only God is unbegotten and incorruptible... This is also that reason why souls die and are punished.” (*Dialogue with Trypho*, tr. Thomas B. Falls [Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1948], 157.)

³³ “For who will deny that God is a body, although ‘God is a Spirit?’ For Spirit has a bodily substance of its own kind, in its own form.” (*Against Praxeas*, tr. P. Holmes, *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 3 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, repr. 1978], 603.)

³⁴ For a brief discussion of the the fathers who shared this opinion with Faustus, see A.-C. Germain, *De Mamerti Claudiani scriptis et philosophia dissertatio* (Monspeli: Boehm et sociorum, 1840), 18-22. Claudianus will attempt to deny any basis in tradition for this idea. See *De statu animae* I, chs. 1 and 11.

³⁵ See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 49-51, where he gives numerous biblical citations that on the surface seem to imply the soul is a body. Some of these passages will be discussed below, as Faustus brings them in as witnesses to his doctrine. But, on the other hand, one wonders what Faustus would have made of the following text from St. Paul in 1 Cor 2.11: “For what person knows a man’s thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God.” (RSV)

spiritual creatures for Christian theology. Still, it is not surprising that this difficult and not so obvious notion was not universally accepted.

The Letter of Faustus and the Corporeality of the Soul

The Letter of Faustus was written in response to questions put to him by an unnamed priest. It is divided into three parts, each dealing with different questions. The first question is: “how one ought to answer the Arians, who with blasphemous mouths try to assert that it can only (so they say) come about that the begotten be younger than the unbegotten.”³⁶ The second explains how Faustus thinks one can say: “[God] feels nothing with the sense of one suffering, but He feels with the affection of one suffering with.”³⁷ Though this question does not bear immediately on the nature of the soul, Claudianus unleashes all his rhetorical talent in responding to this part of the letter, for as Faustus denies spiritual being to the soul in order to avoid making it God, so Claudianus attacks this opinion for making a body equal to God.³⁸ Finally, the third part takes up the question: “What must be considered bodily in human things, and what must be considered unbodily.”³⁹

To answer this last question, one which had been regarded by all philosophers as within the province of human reason, Faustus has recourse to a number of different and different kinds of arguments. They include appeals to reason, to authority, to Scripture. It is

³⁶ *quo modo Arianis respondendum sit, qui blasphemio ore conantur adserere: non potest, inquit, fieri, nisi ut iunior sit genitus ab ingenito. Epistola Fausti, in Claudiani Mamerti Opera*, ed. A. Engelbrecht, CSEL 11 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium Bibliopolam Academiae, 1885), 3.2-5. Subsequent references will be given by page and line numbers of this edition.

³⁷ *Nilhil sensit patientis sensu, sed sensit conpatientis adfectu.* (6.11-12)

³⁸ *Tu dicis lucem corpoream homini communem simul et pecori eatenus, ut deum non sentire vulnus inflictum et quamlibet pulchrum corpus, corpus tamen summo incorporeo non adsimilas, sed exaequas. De statu animae I, 32.*

³⁹ *transeamus ad tertiam quaestionem, qua ut respondeam praecipis, quae in rebus humanis corporea, quaeve incorporea sentienda sint.* (8.15-17)

to the last that he has most recourse, not only for his principles, but even for his examples.⁴⁰ His reliance on sacred learning is evident from the beginning. He assures his readers that it is not the power of his own reason that will support him, but the teaching of the “older saints, especially since these are not able to harm the soul, and are able to nourish it with regard to the Faith.”⁴¹ When he warns his reader that in questions of this sort, the “sense and spirit must be prepared for a more subtle understanding,”⁴² it is from the Spirit that such an understanding is to come.⁴³

In spite of this basic distrust of natural reason, the arguments of the letter are philosophical in nature and raise good and interesting questions. The main propositions from which Faustus argues to establish his thesis are these: nothing created is unbodily, and nothing unbodily can undergo change. These propositions are, of course, closely related, and rest on the assumption that change of any sort depends upon matter. He begins by bringing forward the testimony of the “older saints” that “whatever is created, they declare to be seen to be matter and comprehensible to their Creator, and to be bodily.”⁴⁴ The proof of this, which is applicable to the angels as well as our souls, lies in their having a beginning in time

⁴⁰ See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 46.

⁴¹ *ad haec aliqua non pro sensus mei praesumptione depromam, sed pro sanctorum opinione seniorum, praesertim cum haec animum laedere non possint et ad fidem nutrire possint.* (8.17-20)

⁴² *ergo quando de tractatu altiori conlatio est, ad subtiliorem intellectum sensus et animus praeparandus est.* (9.2-3)

⁴³ On this note, it is perhaps apropos to point out the condescending tone in which Faustus refers to the philosophers earlier in the letter. When speaking of the way in which God can be said to suffer with His creatures, he introduces a distinction between affections when they are attributed to men and when they are attributed to God:

First, this, *which does not even escape the philosophers, is most easily known*...what is in man an affection and grace, in God is power and nature,

Prima hoc, quod nec philosophos latuit, scire promptissimum...quod in homine adfectus et gratia, in deo uirtus est et natura. (6.14-19; emphasis added.)

Here, then, is the more subtle challenge of the letter, that it is not in philosophy that one should seek for wisdom, but only in Scripture and the saints.

⁴⁴ *Quidquid creatum est, materiam uideri et factori suo comprehensibile et corporeum esse definiunt.* (9.5-6) That their knowability also depends upon their corporeality will be discussed below, and by Claudianus.

and extent.⁴⁵ This claim is then supported by a number of quotations from Jerome and Cassian that Faustus believes supports his position.

He then takes up an objection: the soul seems not to be a body because it is not in place, nor is it subject to qualities or quantities.⁴⁶ This objection effectively comes to a denial that the soul can be changed in any sense, for it cannot change its place, either by locomotion or by changing its quantity by growth or shrinking; nor can it undergo alteration of qualities. Substantial change is not directly excluded, though without these other species, a change of an already existing substance is naturally impossible. Thus, Faustus concludes that whoever asserts these things is asserting the soul to be simply divine: “it is clear that this ought to be believed about the majesty of God alone.”⁴⁷ A quotation from John Cassian is used especially to support this claim. In it he describes God’s omnipresence as following from His not having a body and so not being constrained in place.⁴⁸ Rather, God is in all places. It is interesting to note the dichotomy that seemed to present itself to Faustus’s mind: that a thing is either somewhere or everywhere. There is no chance of it being nowhere.

Having thus answered the objection in a general way, he then turns to a more particular refutation by showing that it is not true that the soul is not subject to quantity or place. Interestingly, he sets aside quality, and in so doing seems to sense implicitly that these first two accidents belong properly to bodies; that qualities, though present in bodies, are not so connected with their materiality in the way that these others are. This is not to say that he

⁴⁵ *Nam et animarum et angelorum naturam adserunt esse corpoream pro eo, quod initio circumscribantur et spatio.* (9.6-8)

⁴⁶ *sed inter haec ideo tu animam negas esse corpoream, quia iuxta aliquorum opinionem nec localis sit nec qualitate aut quantitate subsistat.* (9.13-15)

⁴⁷ *quod de sola dei maiestate credi debere manifestum est.* (9.15-16)

⁴⁸ *Ingredi, inquit, et implere omnia soli est possibile trinitati, quae sic uniuersae intellectualis naturae efficitur penetratrix, ut non solum circumplecti eam atque ambire, sed etiam inlabi ei et uelut incorporea corpori possit infundi.* (9.17-22)
The quotation is from his *Conlationes*, VII.13.

did not believe that bodies are necessary for the acquisition of qualities. Perhaps he assumed that in bodies what is most fundamental, that is, the accident closest to its nature, is quantity.⁴⁹ Be that as it may, Faustus reduces the question to whether the soul is in place and subject to quantity: “if the soul is not in place or subject to quantity, we must without doubt grant it to be unbodily, but if we demonstrate it to be determined by quantity or closed up in a place, consequently you yourself may not doubt that it is shut up in a body.”⁵⁰ Much of the rest of the letter is devoted to manifesting that the soul is in place and subject to quantity.

He thinks it is evident that the soul is in place, since it is in the body.⁵¹ This position betrays a rather univocal understanding of *in*. Examples of resurrection from the dead (Lazarus and Christ) also show the soul to be in a body as in place, for how could something leave the body and then return to it if it were not there as in place: “Do you then see that [the soul of Lazarus] has been driven out as from the dwelling of a guest-house, and then resettled there from where it had gone out, and yet you contend that it is not in place?”⁵² So also, Scripture suggests that the souls of the dead are in places, and these places are themselves separated by a great abyss.⁵³ Angels, too, are presented with bodies, and so it seems necessary to hold that our souls do too.⁵⁴ Finally, Scripture says that God created all

⁴⁹ St. Thomas will often point out that quantity is the proximate subject for qualities in natural things. See, e.g., his division of the categories in his Commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics*, Book III, Lectio 5.

⁵⁰ *si nec localis sit nec quantitati subiaceat, esse eam haud dubie incorpoream concedamus, si vero eam demonstrauerimus quantitate determinari locoue concludi, consequenter eam etiam corpore contineri nec ipse iam dubites.* (10.18-11.2)

⁵¹ *quomodo non localis est, quae inserta membris et inligata uisceribus solis motibus uaga condicione substantiae tenetur inclusa?* (11.2-4)

⁵² *tunc eam* [sc., *animam Lazari*] *tamquam et hospitii habitatione depulsam et rursum intra hospitium, unde absentauerat, restitutam uides et localem non esse contendis?* (13.12-14)

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 14. Cf. the story of Dives and Lazarus in Luke 16.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 14-16.

things in number, weight, and measure.⁵⁵ Since souls are admittedly created, they too must have number, weight, and measure—undeniably properties of bodies.

This is, in substance, his argument. However, there are a few points that he makes while developing it that are worth noting more particularly. The first concerns an objection Faustus raises to his thesis, namely, that in our sensations and thoughts our souls seem to be in places other than our bodies. How can this be if the soul is a body? In answering this question, he shows his notion of our thoughts to be quite material, and shows, furthermore, a confusion between thought and imagination:⁵⁶

But if you think that one must assert that the soul is not in place because it wanders forth by the senses through different things and is scattered by thoughts, first it must be understood the nature [*status*] of the soul is one thing, the affection of thought that is born of the soul another. Wherefore, then, one must rather think that if the soul at times imagines something for itself, it is more occupied with its own motions within itself, and if it seems to see something else, this is rather described for it in the looking glass of the memory.⁵⁷

This he supports with an appeal to common experience. We are not satisfied with an imaginary visit to a friend. If we imagine a place, we do not see what is happening at that place. No one would maintain that when we think of Peter or Paul that our mind is taken up into paradise.⁵⁸ If there is any movement involved, it is the movement of the affections and

⁵⁵ Wis 11:21.

⁵⁶ It is interesting that in this confusion of thought and imagination, Faustus fails to see what in Aristotle's treatment of the soul is the key to discovering its incorporeality, namely the universality of our thought.

⁵⁷ *Quod si localem non esse animam ideo adserendum putes, quod per diuersa sensibus enagetur et cogitationibus differatur, primum intellegendum est, quod aliud sit animae status, aliud is qui de anima nascitur cogitationis adfectus. Quam ob rem aut hoc potius aestimandum est, quod si quando sibi aliquid imaginatur, magis cum suis intra semet ipsam motibus occupetur, et si quid aliud est, quod adspicere uidetur, magis ei in recordationis speculo describatur.* (11.4-12)

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

not the substance of the soul.⁵⁹ In other words, the objection seems to presuppose that if the soul is incorporeal, it will not be limited to a particular place in the way that bodies are, and so will be free to wander whither it wills, regardless of the place of its body. Since experience shows this not to be the case, the soul must be bodily.

His claim that the angels have bodies also bears looking at, mostly because of the way in which he phrases it. In establishing the angelic corporeality, he appeals to the descriptions of angels in Scripture. The angels in Jacob's dream were seen to ascend and descend, but they "certainly would not be able to appear and depart by ascending and descending if they were not in place."⁶⁰ When the Angel Gabriel appeared to the Virgin, he was confined to a place.⁶¹ Even Satan has a body:

Tell me, if he does not have a body, how he fell down in that dejection? How do you deny that he has a bodily nature, whose ruin you dare not deny? And if, as you say, he does not have a body, he will not burn; but where will he feel the fire that has been prepared for that devil and his angels, except in a body?...the body is what is corrupted, what is stained, what is altered by whatever happens to it. Therefore, this one, once the firstborn of the angels, has now been made the prince of the shades and, once beautiful in a bodily way, has now been made ugly with the loathsome horror of hellish sin. The body, I say, is what has place, is banished by an action, is bounded by quantity, changed in quality, subdued with sorrow.⁶²

⁵⁹ *Sed hoc ideo euenit, quia ad uos cordis affectu, non ipsa substantiae meae ueritate peruenio.* (12.15-17)

⁶⁰ *Ego autem ne angelos quidem locales esse dubitauerim, quos certum est nunc in caelestibus continere, nunc per aeris uacua ferri, nunc ad terrena dimitti, quos sermo diuinus ascendentes et descendentes in patriarchae uisione describit, qui utique si locales non essent et ubique essent, adesse atque discedere ascensu descensuque non possent.* (14.13-18)

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *dic mihi si corpus non habet, in illa deiectione quid decedit? Quid illi negas corporalem naturam, cuius negare non audes ruinam? Et si, ut dicis, corpus non habet, non ardebit: ubi autem, nisi in corpore, sentiet ignem illum, qui paratus est diaboli et angelis eius?...corpus est quod inficitur, quod maculatur, quod quacumque ex accedenti adiectione uertitur. Hic ergo dudum primogenitus angelorum, nunc princeps factus est tenebrarum et quasi corporeus pulcher ante. Nunc dedgener, dudum caelesti splendore conspicuus, nunc taetro infernalis peccati horrore foedatus. Corpus, inquam, est quod <locum> habet, actione depellitur, quantitate circumscribitur, qualitate mutatur, dolore conficitur.* (15.9-16.6)

Angels have bodies because they are in place, they suffer bodily pains, have quantity. But it is interesting that he says that they *have* bodies rather than that they *are* bodies. That they have bodies, Claudianus will grant, but in that very statement is implied a distinction between him and his body. If he is not his body, is he bodily?⁶³

Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, he appeals to the Book of Wisdom, which teaches that God made all things in number and weight.⁶⁴ One might expect that from this text, he would simply draw the conclusion that these are properties of bodies, and so, since every creature, including the soul, has them, they must all be bodily. But he adds an interesting premise to this otherwise simple argument, namely, that in making creatures in this way, God not only made them, he made them to be knowable because they are bodies: “Certainly those things that are above us are invisible: but all things are able to be grasped by Him, *and so* they are bodily.”⁶⁵ This points to the fundamental reason for his position. For a thing to be knowable, it must be definable, but to be definable, it must have limits. And the limits it must have, according to the Book of Wisdom, are number, weight, and measure. Thus, since these are limits of bodies, all things are knowable by being bodies. If a creature were not bodily, then, it would be ungraspable; it would be spread out everywhere; it would be infinite. For it to be finite, for its being to have limits and so be distinguishable from its Creator, who alone is infinite, a creature must be circumscribed by place and thus be a body. On the other hand, if one asserts that the soul is unbodily, one is led to a tremendous, and tremendously impious, conclusion: if souls do not have bodies, then they are omnipresent,

⁶³ See *De statu animae* I, ch. 16. Claudianus will harangue him for this ‘slip of the tongue,’ for does it not show that Faustus was really aware, in spite of himself, that the soul is not a body?

⁶⁴ Wis 11.21. The text names number, weight, and measure. He only mentions these two at first, but brings measure into the argument shortly afterward.

⁶⁵ *equidem nobis ea quae supra nos sunt, inuisibilia sunt: sed omnia sicut comprehensibilia, ita et corporea sunt.* (16.16-18; emphasis added)

they are impassible, they are incomprehensible. In short, they are God, or at least sharers in his divine Substance:

See where this unwise and foolhardy conviction tends: when anyone says [the soul] is unbodily, he also confesses it to be ungraspable, and thus ascribes to the work that has been formed what is fitting only to the One Who forms, and grants to created things the privilege of majesty and extends to the thing to be made a power un-owed, even to the injury of the One making. If we ask (as we ought) what the outcomes are to which you are leading our minds, [know that] this rash belief even cast down the devil from the station of a blessed throne, and on account of this he lost the dignity of an angel, when he dared to think that he had the nature of God.⁶⁶

Faustus's argument, then, reduces to the following: the soul changes; what changes is bodily; therefore the soul is a body. This is a fairly simple argument, and though in some ways easily answered, rests upon a difficult problem. Its ordered presentation, with numerous references to Sacred Scripture, is rhetorically appealing and shows why it aroused interest among young, active minds, as Claudianus himself tells us it did; though he, in his rhetorical bid to overcome his opponent, does not concede that it is worthy of such attention.⁶⁷

This, then, is Faustus's opinion of the philosophers and their notion that the soul is immaterial. A look at the teaching of the Platonists shows that his charges and suspicions are not without foundation. Plato repeatedly speaks of the soul as immortal, and this, he sees, leads to its being immaterial. He comes to see this primarily by examining the way that we

⁶⁶ *Vide quo tendat imprudens et inperita persuasio, qui incorporeum cum loquitur, etiam inconprehensibilem confitetur, ac sic condito adscribit operi, quod soli competit conditori, ac rebus creatis communicat privilegia maiestatis et indebitam facturae potentiam usque ad factoris extendit iniuriam, si bene requiramus ad quos rerum exitus animum referas, haec uel maxime diabolum credulitas ex illa beatae sedis statione deuoluit, et propter hoc angeli perdidit dignitatem, dum se dei praesumit habere naturam.* (17.5-13)

⁶⁷ See *De statu animae* I, chapters 1-2, in which Claudianus describes his first meeting with this letter. He attributes the interest it aroused entirely to its novelty: *nuper etenim offendi in quosdam, qui chartulam quondam oppido studiose lectitabant, et quia mortalium generi mos est, noui operis agnitione plecti ad id percipiendum sedulo animo intenderant: hoc idem mihi acsi cognitu? necessarium ultro ingerentibus inspicere plane non abnui.* (24.3-7)

know. Because our knowledge is eternal and unchanging, what we know must be eternal and unchanging, and so immaterial. But since what knows is like what it knows, our soul, too, must be immaterial. To put this another way, since our knowledge is of what *is*, and not of what *becomes*, that by which we know must also be eternal and unchanging. This leads directly to the conclusion that the soul is free from the principle of corruption, non-being.

But this cannot be wholly true. While the soul is in some ways like the beings that it knows, it is not wholly like them. They are not only free from the limitations of matter, they are wholly unchangeable in a way that the soul is not. The soul stands as passive with respect to the forms it receives into itself. It is also subject to the passions, which, since Plato saw the soul as the man, must be attributed to the soul. The soul *becomes* happy and sad, virtuous and vicious. Thus, in his myth in the *Timaeus*, he speaks of the coming to be of the soul in a very material way.⁶⁸ The soul, then, is something more of the realm of being than of becoming,⁶⁹ but it is not entirely free of becoming. How Plato and his followers thought themselves able to reconcile these aspects of the soul lies at the heart of Claudianus's response to Faustus. But, in order to more fully appreciate his use of their thought, we will look briefly at the broader cultural context within which Claudianus approached the thought of the philosophers and brought it to bear upon the discussion of the soul's immateriality.

⁶⁸ 35a ff. Although Plato does not mean this to be understood as the coming to be of a body, because he (or, *Timaeus*) is nevertheless describing a coming-to-be, he has recourse to very matter-like images.

⁶⁹ See *Phaedo* 79a ff.

Chapter 3

The Historical and Philosophical Backdrop to the *De statu animae*

Claudianus was born toward the end of the first quarter of the fifth century in Southeastern Gaul into a Roman Empire in the throes of collapse. The imperial government was increasingly incapable of keeping order.¹ Barbarian races, long settled within the borders of the Empire, had risen to high command in the imperial army and to high position in the imperial palace. Paganism had largely lost its vitality and Christianity had risen to take its place. The vandals were besieging Hippo Regius, and St. Augustine was dying within its walls. Not long after Claudianus's own death, an Arian Goth was to be proclaimed king of Italy. The thousand year old civilization of Rome was sending forth its last gasps, and rendering up its corpse as soil for the seeds that were to grow into the peoples and cultures of Medieval Europe.

Claudianus was to help in the germination of those seeds. A Roman by birth and education, a Christian by baptism, living surrounded by a foreign and menacing race, and endowed with an inquiring and philosophical disposition, he was to provide an example of the indefatigability of the human spirit as darkness was falling upon the Western world. Though not by any means the most important figure, he was to lend his support to the work to which St. Augustine had devoted so much energy, that of transforming the Roman world

¹ “[T]he final paralysis of the government was revealed in a law which authorized all persons *pro quiete communi* ‘to exercise with impunity the right of public vengeance against the common enemy’ by exterminating malefactors, brigands, or deserters, wherever they could be found.” Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), 354. The law quoted was promulgated in 409. Claudianus seems to have been born between 420 and 430; see de la Broise, *Mamerti Claudiani vita*, 3.

into a Christian one. In order to see well just what his role was, it is important to understand the world in which he lived and wrote.

Roman Gaul in the Late Empire

Though the Gauls had been ancient enemies of the Romans until their conquest by Julius Caesar,² Claudianus's homeland had been under Roman rule some 500 years before his birth and had enjoyed Roman citizenship for some part of that time.³ Gaul had given Rome soldiers, senators, orators, and poets, and was, within Claudianus's own lifetime, to give her an emperor.⁴ As Romans who were proud of being Roman and were careful to preserve the culture they had inherited,⁵ it was painful for them to witness her collapse, but it was impossible for them to ignore it.

Throughout the Fourth Century, the Empire had grown weaker and weaker. The growing bureaucracy and need for military support had created an insupportable tax burden especially upon those who held the offices of municipal government and the professions that helped to maintain the Empire. The need for these unpopular services, however, prompted legislation making them obligatory for certain classes, and hereditary. For many, citizenship became more a burden than a privilege. The population of Romans shrank, and this in turn caused a dramatic drop in the availability of recruits for the army.⁶

² Livy recounts the sack of Rome by Gauls in 390 B.C. in Book V of his history.

³ Caracalla had granted citizenship to the Gauls in 212 A.D.

⁴ The Emperor Avitus enjoyed a brief reign from 455-56.

⁵ Claudianus, in his Letter to Sapaudus, views the preservation of this culture as an act of piety: *modo tu fac meminervis docendi munus tibi a proanis et citra hereditarium fore, eoque copiosius te adniti oportere scientiae, quo multiplex in te a maioribus projecta tuis doctrina confluit.* (Claudianus Mamerti Opera, 205.)

⁶ Wars in the East especially drained the Empire of its fighting population: "Speaking of the recent battle of Mursa, in which Constantius had overthrown Magnentius, Eutropius declares that it had consumed a vast amount of military strength which might otherwise have served to protect the security and glory of the empire in any number of foreign wars." (Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 289.) The Emperor Julian's

Thus, no longer able to produce citizens to protect her, Rome turned to the Germanic peoples for allies and mercenaries, who were themselves anxious to move into the lands of the Empire. And so, barbarians began to climb the military ladder to influence and power.⁷

Theodosius, the last of the emperors to rule with some semblance of order, died in 395. He had attempted to establish a dynasty to continue his rule, but the weakness of his sons and the troubles of the Empire laid open the door to intrigue and chaos. At his death, the Empire was left in the hands of his two sons, Arcadius, eighteen years of age, and Honorius, eleven. Too young to rule themselves, the responsibilities of the government rested upon regents, one of whom, Stilicho, was a Vandal whom Theodosius himself had appointed as regent to Honorius. Eventual hostilities between the two *de facto* rulers led to a formal split between the Eastern and Western parts of the Empire.⁸ Stilicho, though a barbarian, worked hard to preserve Roman rule against the inroads of other barbarians. He was an able soldier, and largely successful in preserving the borders in Italy and Gaul. In 408, due to court jealousies and intrigues, he was assassinated, leaving Italy essentially defenseless. This laid open the way for Alaric to sack the city in 410.

These invaders from the North and East, themselves under pressure from the movements of peoples even farther East, began to weigh heavily upon the Empire. From the

defeat in the East decimated an army of 65,000 troops. "This force, together with his own life, he was destined to throw away on the sandy wastes of Mesopotamia. In so doing he contributed to the military paralysis which marked the last decades of the empire." *Ibid.*

⁷ In his efforts to defeat the usurping Magnentius, Constantius, in 351, had authorized a migration of Germanic peoples across the Rhine and into Gaul. Once there, they attempted to continue their intrusion. It was the activity of these peoples that forced Constantius to appoint his cousin Julian to Caesarship in Gaul. The Germanic peoples were thrown back for a while by the energetic campaigning of Julian. After his death, Valentinian expended much energy in maintaining the defenses in Gaul, using barbarian soldiers to do so. At the battle of Adrianopolis in 377, the Roman army was cut down by Goths that had been allowed to settle in the Eastern part of the Empire, further weakening Rome's ability to provide for her own defense. This laid the door open to the rise of men like Stilicho (a Vandal), who though of barbarian blood, became rulers of the Empire.

⁸ See A. Boak, *A History of Rome to 565 A.D.* (New York, 1959), 469.

time of Caesar, the Romans had been largely successful in holding them back. But at the beginning of the Fifth Century, the disorder within was unable to withstand the pressure from without, and the barbarians made further incursions into Roman territories. Tribe after tribe overran its borders, and the place of passage was often Gaul. Some tribes passed through to other areas of the Empire, but others settled there, often displacing previous invaders into Spain and Africa.⁹

Southeastern Gaul and Claudianus's own city of Vienne were not exempt from the ravages of these warlike tribes. After some vying amongst the different peoples, this part of Gaul came to be settled by the Burgundians, who came to be recognized as *Foederati*, a semi-autonomous state within the Empire. In the years around Claudianus's birth, the imperial power, shaken by rebellious rivals and faithless subordinates¹⁰ was showing its weakness, especially in dealing with the Vandals in Africa.¹¹ The Vandal king Gaiseric was gaining control over most of Roman Africa, and was besieging Hippo Regius at the time of St. Augustine's death (430).¹² The Imperial armies were unable to defeat him and by 435 had ceded much of the province to him.

Seeing the difficulties the emperors were facing, many of the tribes in Gaul and Spain, among them the Burgundians, rose up in rebellion. Vienne suffered severe invasions in 423 and 438. The poet Orientius thus described the devastation: "In the towns, the estates, the fields, the thoroughfares, the villages, everywhere, all along the ways, one sees

⁹ For an overview of these invasions and their effect on Rome, see C. W. Previté-Orton, *The Later Roman Empire to the Twelfth Century, Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), especially chapters 3-5.

¹⁰ A Constantine had proclaimed himself *Augustus* in Britain in 406 and then invaded Gaul. In 413, another usurper, Jovinus, attempted to assume the purple. Boniface, who was governor in Africa, refused to acknowledge the authority of Honorius's successor, leading to the disastrous conflict with Gaiseric.

¹¹ For a general overview of the history of the Western part of the Empire about the years of Claudianus's life, see W. B. Anderson's introduction to *Sidonius: Poems and Letters* (Harvard, 1963).

¹² This also coincided, more or less, with the birth of Claudianus.

only death, sorrow, waste, disaster, fire, and mourning; in short, the whole of Gaul is only a smoking pyre.”¹³ Succumbing to its weaknesses, the Empire was forced to give up something to the barbarians and its concessions generally involved Gaul. While Claudianus was still a young boy, the Goths in Gaul were recognized by Rome as a sovereign people, that is, they no longer were required to give even nominal submission to Rome as *Foederati*.¹⁴ Over the years of Claudianus’s life, the barbarians came to be more and more firmly in control of his homeland. The Romans of Gaul were left on their own to coexist as best as they could with their foreign and hostile neighbors.

A brief turnabout of their fortunes came to the Gallo-Romans when in 455 Avitus, one of their own, was proclaimed Emperor. His reign, however, was brief. In the following year, due to the animosity of the Italian senators, and some politically imprudent acts, he was forced to resign. Avitus’s downfall was a shock to the Gallo-Romans.¹⁵ Their dignity as Romans was deeply offended, and it further forced upon them the reality of the weakness of the Empire. A revolt soon arose, centered in Lugdunum (Lyon). The Gallo-Romans ironically invited the Burgundians into the city to help them in their bid for secession. Disaster was averted, however, for before the imperial forces marched on the city, they reconciled themselves with the new Emperor Majorian, and he received them back with leniency. The city had avoided violence, but the Burgundians were allowed to occupy the region around Lugdunum, though not the city itself.

The Gallo-Romans were reconciled, but peace did not come to them. The constant attention to be paid to Africa, a major source of food to the Empire, left the Romans in

¹³ *Commonitorium*, II, 180; quoted by Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 15.

¹⁴ Anderson, *Poems and Letters*, vol. 1, xxi.

¹⁵ Avitus’s ill-treatment by the Italian senators who precipitated his downfall was particularly resented by the Gallo-Romans. See Anderson, *ibid.*

Gaul vulnerable, and war after war ravaged the country. The Burgundians, as a price for their help against rebellious generals, were allowed to occupy Lyon in 462. A final stand of sorts took place at Auverne, where the Roman citizens held out for quite some time against the onslaught of invaders.¹⁶ But finally in 475, just a few years after Claudianus's death, the Empire, weakened and exhausted, surrendered Auverne in an attempt to maintain some power in Gaul. This sacrifice was of little avail, however, and in the following year, not only was any claim to sovereignty in Gaul relinquished, but Italy found a barbarian king holding sway over much of her land.

In the midst of all this social upheaval, it is not surprising that the cultural life of the Empire also suffered. The Fourth and Fifth Centuries produced no Vergils, no Horaces, no Livys. If they did produce such men as Athanasius, the Gregorys, and Augustine, that was due to a foreign leaven, a theme we will discuss below.

The political onslaught of the Barbarians was destined to succeed. Their invasions were bringing in peoples who, when fused to the Gallo-Roman stock, would give rise to the various nations of Europe. Though not as culturally advanced as the Romans¹⁷ and impressed by Roman learning and social organization, the invaders did not discard all that they brought with them. Their own languages and customs were to meld with those of the conquered over the next few hundred years, thus producing new peoples, new languages, new customs. But, as war is the father of all things,¹⁸ these changes did not arise without a struggle. One important ingredient in that struggle would prolong it, and in fact ensure

¹⁶ Claudianus's friend, Sidonius, who was at this time bishop of Auverne, was instrumental in maintaining resistance to the advancing barbarians.

¹⁷ Though they had developed a primitive system of writing, it fell to the Empire (in the person of Ufila) to give them a system that could support literature. See Lucien Musset, *The Germanic Invasions: The Making of Europe AD 400-600*, tr. Edward and Columba James (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1993), 12.

¹⁸ Heraclitus, Fr. 53: πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς. Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 193.

that the Germanic elements were not overwhelmed by the Roman, namely, their religion.

The Germanic peoples, before their contact with Rome, had been pagan peoples. As they poured over the borders in the latter part of the Fourth Century, it was inevitable that they come into contact with the religion of the Empire, especially given that the evangelical nature of Christianity demanded that missionaries try to convert them to the Faith. Of the missionaries who worked among the Gauls, none was more successful than Ufila (or Wufila), who, though born among the Goths, was of Roman stock. His maternal grandparents had been Cappidocians (and Christians), and had been carried off by the Goths in a raid during the third century. Later (341), he came to Constantinople as a hostage.¹⁹ There he was converted to Arianism and ordained a priest and bishop by the Arian Eusebius, who then sent him forth to labor among the peoples with whom he had grown up. He was ideally suited to his task. He came to the Goths with a Gothic name, and knowing their language, which afforded him a ready welcome. Knowing Greek, he was able to develop an alphabet for the Gothic tongue, into which he translated Sacred Scripture. He was not the only preacher of Christianity, of course, but he was the most successful, and planted seeds that, within twenty years of his death (in 381), would lead the Visigoths and other East German tribes, among them Claudianus's close neighbors, the Burgundians, to embrace Arian Christianity. Thus, when the people of Vienne looked out at their neighbors, they saw not only barbarians, but heretics as well. This difference in faith was to be a constant source of tension during the rise of the Goths within the Empire, and would, within fifty years of Claudianus's death, claim the life of his fellow

¹⁹ Previté-Orton, *The Later Roman Empire*, 56. H. Chadwick says that Ufila came to Constantinople "as a member of a Gothic embassy to Constantius." *The Early Church*, The Pelican History of the Church, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1967), 249.

philosopher, Boethius.²⁰

It is thus that, when the proponents of Arianism were defeated within the Empire,²¹ it leaked back in through the holes in the defenses along the frontiers. Though they were rather recent converts, they embraced their faith with the same intensity with which they fought on the battlefield.²² This difference in faith was a major obstacle to the absorption of the Germanic peoples into the empire. And so we find, at the middle of the Fifth Century, the bishop Faustus engaged in an attempt to eradicate it from Gaul, It was against this heresy that he wrote the letter that was to evoke from Claudianus his *De Statu Animae*.

The Rise of Christianity

The various fortunes of Christianity in the first few centuries of the Empire need not be dwelt on here. From the years of persecution, the Church had risen to favor under Constantine. This ascendancy received temporary setbacks first under the Arian Emperor Constantius, and then, more seriously, under his cousin Julian. However, under the emperors that followed Julian, especially Theodosius,²³ orthodox Christianity regained a hold on the Empire that it was not to relinquish. Thus, we find, in fifth century Gaul, a

²⁰ See Chadwick, *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 67-68. He argues here that though politically motivated, Theodoric put Boethius to death because of his orthodoxy.

²¹ The council of Nicea, in 324, had sealed the fate of Arianism, but it was not until the council of Constantinople in 381 that it received the deathblow. "...the doctrinal decisions of the council marked the end of the Arian attempt to capture the church of the empire." Chadwick, *The Early Church*, 151.

²² In fact, the very expression of their faith had a martial tone to it: "From the Gospel ethic something was sifted out which was, in fact, an ethical system based on strength, energy, and heroism—that is to say, on those qualities to which the rough soldiery would be most susceptible. And the liturgy acquired new aspects, all calculated to exalt the souls of the mystically minded warriors." Daniel-Rops, *The Church in the Dark Ages*, tr. A. Butler (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1959), 111.

²³ Who summoned the council of Constantinople.

strong orthodox faith; a faith growing ever more confident and, following the lead of Augustine, beginning to forge for itself its own intellectual culture.

The advent of Christianity into the Roman world began quietly. We can see in the Acts of the Apostles that Rome was not hostile at first to what she regarded as a sect of Judaism. But when the Jews rose up in rebellion, attempting to establish an independent Jewish state, the guilt of the one faith was visited upon the other.²⁴ Begun during the reign of Nero, the persecution of the Church was to continue, on and off, until the reign of Constantine, almost three hundred years later. Though for most of this time Christians lived peacefully enough, it remained a crime simply to profess the name of Christian.²⁵ Thus even in times of peace, the faithful lived under continual threat of denunciation.

Even if the persecutions began under a cloud of confusion, they did not cease when the Romans learned to distinguish Christian and Jew. They were inevitable,²⁶ and the worst persecutions came after the Church had begun to make her apology to the Empire. The continuity of persecution was a result of what the Romans, and not a few Christians, saw as irreconcilable differences in their understandings of the nature of man and his happiness.

The Romans had inherited from the Greeks the principle that man was by nature a political animal, that for one to live apart from the state, one had to be either a god or a

²⁴ J. Danielou and H. Marrou argue that the change in attitude of the Romans to Christianity was, in the First Century, largely a result of the identification of the Christians with the Jews. See Danielou, J. and H. Marrou. *The First Six Hundred Years, The Christian Centuries*, vol. 1, tr. Vincent Crown (New York: Paulist Press, 1964) 84-85.

²⁵ See the famous letter of Pliny the Elder to the Emperor Trajan, in which he asks: "Is it the name, in the absense of any crime, or the crimes inseparable from the name that are to be punished?" *Letters*, Book X, Letter 96, tr. William Melmoth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 401. Trajan replied (*ibid.*, Letter 97, 407) that, though they were not to be sought out, still, any Christian that did not renounce the name was to be condemned. This was written during a time of relative calm for the Church.

²⁶ Cochrane, in *Christianity and Classical Culture*, argues that the political ideas of the Classical world and Christianity are inherently incompatible.

beast.²⁷ It is, then, in political association that man is to find his happiness.²⁸ Since man's welfare depended upon the welfare of the state, and the welfare of the state depended on the gods, religion was of central importance.²⁹ Worship was owed to the gods for their good guidance of the state and to keep their favor. The notion that divine beneficence was manifested through the prosperity of the state led to the notion that a good law-giver was close to a god.³⁰ This notion of the god-like nature of the statesman was to develop to the point that the man who could govern well, and he alone, would receive the eternal reward of living in society with all the just and the gods.³¹ It was only a small step from this to the apotheosis of the Emperor.³²

Christianity, on the other hand, proposed that our fulfillment comes not in this life, in this earthly city, but in the life to come, the heavenly Jerusalem. Christians were *in* the world but not *of* the world, and although they recognized the good that comes of living in an orderly state,³³ their allegiance to it goes only as far as it allows them to work toward the

²⁷ ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν, ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος. Aristotle, *Politica*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957) I.2.1253a2-4.

²⁸ Aristotle argues (*Ethics* X) that final happiness consists in the contemplation of God, and happiness is found in a secondary way in the polis, but such a notion was incomprehensible to the Roman mind. Thus we find Cicero, one of the most philosophical minds that Rome produced, arguing the superiority of the practical over the speculative life. See Cicero, *De officiis*, Book I, par. 153: *Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur*.

²⁹ Livy presents this as a fundamental insight of Numa, who was able, by raising up institutions of civil religion, to civilize the rude outcasts that Romulus had gathered into his walls. See *Ab urbe condita*, Book I, chs. 19-20.

³⁰ μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως [ἀγαθὸν] φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894) I.2.1094b9. So also we find Plato (*Republic*, Bk VI) arguing that only the philosophers are fit to rule because they alone have gazed upon the Good.

³¹ *Omnibus, qui patriam conservaverint, aduerint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aeo sempiterno fruuntur*. Cicero, *De re publica* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928), 264.

³² Indeed, the chaos of the last years of the Republic could have easily given the impression that only a god among men could bring peace. Cf. Vergil, *Eclogue* 4.

³³ “Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.” (Mt 22.21) This was not true of all Christians, however. Tertullian was rather strident in maintaining that he was a citizen of the heavenly Jerusalem only. “‘The fact that Christ rejected an earthly kingdom’, he declares, ‘should be enough to convince you that all secular powers

attainment of the inheritance prepared for them from the beginning.³⁴ Thus, the Christian presented himself to the Empire as one who was by definition a traitor. When there is added to this ideological difference the strangeness, even mysteriousness, of their worship and the constant attempt to lead other citizens away from the traditions of the state, it is not surprising that they would be charged with the crime of *odium humani generis*.³⁵ They could not appear otherwise to the state-worshipping Romans.

This opposition had its effect on the development of Christian thought within the Empire. Because of the un-Roman feel of the new Faith, the Church was slow to make converts among the educated classes, and when these converts came, they found different ways to view their relation to the classical culture. These can be exemplified by two rough contemporaries, Justin and Tertullian.

Justin was born a pagan and educated in the philosophical schools before his conversion. When he came into contact with Christianity, he found in it the fulfillment of the desire which he had been seeking in philosophy. But rather than seeing between philosophy and the Faith an intrinsic opposition, he saw the Faith rather as the perfection of philosophical thought. He witnessed to this belief by, after his conversion, travelling about in the philosophers' pallium as he offered his defense of Christianity to whomever would listen.³⁶ "He is the first ecclesiastical writer who attempts to build a bridge between

and dignities are not merely alien from, but hostile to, God.' Accordingly, 'there can be no reconciliation between the oath of alligiance taken to God and that taken to man, between the standard of Christ and that of the devil, between the camp of light and that of darkness.'" Quoted by Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 213.

³⁴ Cf. Mt 25.34.

³⁵ *igitur primo correpti qui fatebantur, deinde indicio eorum multitudo ingens, haud perinde in crimine incendii, quam odio humani generis convicti sunt.* Tacitus, *Annalium ab excessu divi Augusti libri*, ed. C. D. Fisher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), XV.44.15-18.

³⁶ See J. Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 1 (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1950), 197.

Christianity and pagan philosophy.³⁷

Tertullian, on the other hand, also well-educated and a lawyer, saw the faith he had embraced as utterly other than, and opposed to the learning of the world. *Quid Athenas cum Jerusalem?* was his famous cry. They cannot have anything to do with each other because the one is filled with the Spirit of Truth, while the other is weighed down by utterances inspired by demons.³⁸ The classical learning was empty and vain, for it lacked the foundation of faith in Jesus Christ, and the only path for a Christian was to reject the reasoning of the philosophers, and to embrace the folly of the Apostles.³⁹

These thinkers stand more or less at the beginning of a Christian literature, one in the East and the other in the West, and as Christian thought developed they were both to have their influence. Though Justin's notion was to eventually triumph, and was even the more influential of the two throughout the development of Christian thought, still those who thought like Tertullian were not entirely absent, even in the Fifth Century.

To fuel the fire begun by Tertullian, pagan thinkers rose up in opposition to Christianity, and the most formidable foes came from the school that Justin had found most congenial to the Faith, namely Platonism, or more precisely, Neo-Platonism. The first influential attack came from Celsus⁴⁰ in the second Century, but he was followed by a greater

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ "For by whom has truth ever been discovered without God? By whom has God ever been found without Christ? By whom has Christ ever been explored without the Holy Spirit? By whom has the Holy Spirit ever been attained without the mysterious gift of faith? Socrates, as none can doubt, was actuated by a different spirit." *A Treatise on the Soul*, tr. P. Holmes, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, repr. 1978), 181.

³⁹ "And the Son of Man died; *it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd.* And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible." Tertullian, *On the Flesh of Christ*, tr. P. Holmes, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, repr. 1978), 521. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁰ "[Celsus] had studied his subject, had read the Bible and many Christian books...He is a resourceful opponent, who shows great skill and misses nothing that could be said against the faith...As a Platonic philosopher he asserts that striking superiority of the worship and philosophy of the Greeks." J. Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 2 (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1953), 54. Origen answers Celsus in his *Contra Celsum*.

mind, Porphyry. After Porphyry came the Emperor Julian, about whom we will have more to say below.

The school of Neoplatonism, founded by Plotinus, introduced (or re-introduced) mysticism into philosophy, and a philosophy that was strikingly “monotheistic.” Plotinus taught that God, or “The One,” was the cause of being for all things; that all things emanated forth from this supreme supra-being; and that happiness consists in the contemplation and ecstatic union with it. The appeal of such notions to a thoughtful Christian such as Justin is not surprising. However, the repugnance of the Neoplatonists for Christianity arose because of the closeness of the Christian God to the world of matter, and especially to the idea of the Word becoming flesh.⁴¹ In their doctrine of gradual descent through a hierarchy of beings from the immaterial to the material, nothing could be farther from the being of God than matter, nothing so opposed to it. Add to this the notion of God suffering on the cross, and it is clear that St Paul’s statement that the gospel is folly to the Gentiles would not be more true of anyone than the Neoplatonists. And so it is not surprising that we find the greatest intellectual challenge to the Faith coming from one of the greatest exponents of this school.

While intellectual resistance to the Faith was growing, so also was the confidence of the Christians to meet the classical culture on its own ground. By the beginning of the fourth century, the work laid by the Apologists flowered into the expansive thought of the Fathers of the East, especially Sts. Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, and John Chrysostom and, in the West, Augustine. All of these men were educated in the schools of the Empire (Basil and Gregory were fellow students with Julian, the emperor-to-be.) And

⁴¹ Cf. Porphyry’s statement that his master, Plotinus, “seemed ashamed of being in the body.” *On the Life of Plotinus and the Order of His Books*, in *Plotinus*, vol. 1, tr. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 2.

they were all raised in Christian homes. They had a great respect for the intellectual achievement of the pagan thinkers, but were well aware of their limitations. They likened themselves to the Israelites, who despoiled the Egyptians as they left for the Promised Land.⁴² Basil is careful to point out the inadequacies of the pagan writers even as he is laying out their usefulness to Christian students.⁴³ In Augustine, where perhaps the union of pagan thought to Christian is most complete⁴⁴ there is a clear dividing line between the City of God and the City of Man. Thus as the Fifth Century dawned, the most important Christian thinkers had perceived a gulf lying between pagan and Christian thought, and some regarded that gulf as an abyss.

Still, these thinkers had continued the work begun two centuries before by the Greek apologists, and they had made considerable headway in the appropriation of pagan thought to the service of the Faith. As this was occurring, a reaction against the emerging faith was also growing up, and was to culminate in the person of the Emperor Julian. Though not the greatest mind of his age, and short-lived in his attack on the Church, he did possess something of genius and something of an insight into the structure of the Church. He also had a strong hatred of the faith, and this made him a formidable enemy. Julian's reaction against Christianity is of especial interest for us, for in his attempt to revive paganism, he turned to philosophy to give it order and reasonableness. In particular, he turned to the philosophy of the Neoplatonists. He found in the fusion of Greek mythology

⁴² See Origen, Letter to Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, Book II, ch. 40.

⁴³ Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ συμβουλευσὼν ἦκω, τὸ μὴ δεῖν εἰς ἅπαξ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις, ὥσπερ πλοίου, τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν παραδόντας, ἥπερ ἂν ἄγωσι, ταύτη συνέπεσθαι· ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐστὶ χρήσιμον αὐτῶν δεχομένους, εἰδέναι τί χρή καὶ παριδεῖν. τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ὅπως διακρινοῦμεν, τοῦτο δὴ καὶ διδάξω ἐνθεν ἐλόν. St. Basil, *To Young Men, on How They Might Derive Profit from Pagan Literature*, 1.5, in *St. Basil, the Letters*, vol. IV, tr. R. J. DeFerrari and M. R. P. Maguire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 380.

⁴⁴ See Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 383-85.

and Neoplatonic philosophy, which had appropriated those myths through its interpretations, a system of religious worship and “theology” that he thought capable of satisfying the human heart and uprooting the “Galilean Superstition.” In his promotion of this philosophic paganism, the Emperor helped to confirm suspicions within the Church that philosophy was the mother of all heresies.

Julian’s policies were to affect the entire Empire, but he had particular influence in Gaul. He began his public life as Caesar in Gaul, and he was given the task of saving a threatened Gaul from the invasions of barbarians from across the Rhine. With an energy that surprised (and consternated) his cousin Constantius, he repulsed the invaders and freed Gaul for a time from their threat. What is more, there is evidence that he put considerable effort into reviving learning in Gaul and so had a share in shaping the studies with which the schools were occupied.⁴⁵ Thus, he played no small part in helping to form the intellectual climate into which Claudianus was to enter. And so it will be useful to say a few words about Julian and his paganism.

Julian

The “Edict of Milan” had released the Church from persecution in 313, and proclaimed an official statement of general toleration of religions within the empire.⁴⁶ But as

⁴⁵ Haarhoff, *Schools of Gaul* (Oxford, 1920), 2-3, quotes the Gallic panegyrist Mamertinus praising Julian for his aid to Gaul thus: “‘Shall I,’ he says, ‘tell the tale of Gallic provinces, now rewon by thy valor, of the rout of barbarism, as though it were some new and unheard of thing?... Thou, O mightiest of emperors, thou, I proclaim, hast rekindled the dead fires of literature; thou hast not only freed philosophy from persecution, suspected as she was until recently, but hast clothed her in purple and bound on her head gold and gems, and seated her on a regal throne.’” His edict on teachers, to be mentioned below, shows his concern for the form of education in the schools throughout the Empire. But this quotation is of interest because of its connection to Gaul in particular.

⁴⁶ *Ut daremus et Christianis et omnibus liberam potestatem sequendi religionem quam quisque voluisset...*, Edict of Milan, as reported by Lactantius, *De mortibus persecutorum*, Opera Omnia, Patrologiae Latinae, tom. 7 (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1844) 268.

Constantine became more secure in his rule, this toleration became more and more patronage. Under the accommodating and encouraging policies of this emperor, Christians rose to positions of power and influence in the Empire: the Consulate, the Prefecture of Rome, and of the Praetorium.⁴⁷ Laws were framed to promote Christian morality, and to benefit the clergy.⁴⁸ The Church's change in fortunes allowed her the opportunity to grow and flower in many ways; it also made her subject to the temptations of worldly ambition.

The dangers of these temptations were magnified under the rule of Constantine's son, both by his example and his decrees. In spite of his Christianity, Constantius rose to imperial power through cruelty and treachery. An Arian Christian, he attempted to root out paganism using some of the same means that earlier emperors had used against the Christians, thus making it politically wise to embrace Christianity.⁴⁹ His edicts discouraged Judaism as well. He also made the faith, and especially the offices of the clergy, attractive by exempting clerics from many of the taxes the Empire had imposed upon her citizens.⁵⁰ For those in imperial service (Christians, of course), his court offered worldly magnificence and luxury, thus adding enticements to fear for those outside the fold.⁵¹ As patron of the Church, he saw himself as her ruler as well, and attempted strenuously to impose his heresy on the Church: in his own eyes he was, more than just in title, the *Pontifex maximus*.⁵²

⁴⁷ Danielou, J. and H. Marrou, *The First Six Hundred Years*, 236-37.

⁴⁸ See Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 200ff.

⁴⁹ For particulars of his efforts to suppress paganism, see Cochrane, *ibid.*, 254ff. Also given there are measures taken against Jews.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 256.

⁵¹ "There were a thousand cooks, as many barbers, and even more butlers. There were swarms of waiters, more eunuchs than flies around cattle in springtime and a multitude of drones of every sort and kind." Thus Libanius described the court of Constantius (quoted by G. W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978], 72).

⁵² "Boldly thrusting himself into theological controversy, in his desire to impose upon the ecclesiastical authorities a modification of the Nicene formula, he argued that, as the divine repository of imperial power, his authority was paramount in Church as well as state; and, in the declaration, 'my will must be

Such was the “Christian” house into which the young Julian was dragged. Growing up in the house of Constantius, Julian was raised a Christian,⁵³ and educated by Christian tutors in the faith. The education he received through the actions of his cousin, however, were to make a deeper impression. The first ‘lesson’ was that which brought him under the Emperor’s roof, namely, the murder of his father, a brother, and several kinsmen.⁵⁴ Julian was six at the time.

Upon reaching adolescence, he was exiled to Cappadocia, where he passed his youth under house-arrest, cut off from all association with friends and family. In this isolation he became disaffected with the faith professed by his cousin and forced upon him by the teachers his cousin had appointed.⁵⁵ It is no wonder that he should turn elsewhere for the happiness he saw Christianity failing to deliver.

In the lessons before his exile, he had become devoted to the writings of the Classical literature, and now, in his exile, barred from other enjoyments, he devoted himself

considered binding’ (ὅπερ ἐγὼ βούλομαι, τοῦτο κανὼν νομιζέσθω), he assumed a more than papal infallibility.” Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 187.

⁵³ To what extent he was educated in Christianity in the early years under the care of his cousin is uncertain. After his reception into the house of Constantine, he was put under the tutelage of Eusebius of Nicomedia, who was soon to become the bishop of Constantinople. Ricciotti thinks that Eusebius had higher ambitions on his mind than simply being tutor to the young prince (*Julian the Apostate*, tr. M. J. Costelloe, SJ. [Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1960], 11). He was primarily under the care of Mardonius, a eunuch who had been tutor to his mother as well. It is not known whether Mardonius was a Christian or not. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate*, 24, is inclined to think he is, but Ricciotti, *ibid.*, 12, thinks that he was not. Again, it is not known for certain when he was baptized, though he was certainly baptized no later than his early teens, for he was received into the clergy as a lector during his exile in Cappadocia (Ricciotti, pp. 18-19).

⁵⁴ Constantine had entertained hopes of dividing the rule of the Empire among his sons and a half-brother (Julian’s father) and his two sons. It was to prevent this division that the murders occurred. See Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* 21-22. Although Constantius denied ordering the deaths, Julian nevertheless laid the guilt squarely upon his shoulders: see his *Letter to the Athenians*, 270C and following.

⁵⁵ “For very good reasons... the classical culture ‘took’ with Julian and left him with a passionate and rather romantic love of Hellenic-roman classical culture which lasted the rest of his short life... [it was] given him by someone he loved and respected (Mardonius)...whereas the Christian education was given him and supervised by people he had good reason to hate and despise (agents of Constantine’s immediate family, who [had] murdered his relatives).” A. H. Armstrong, quoted by J. Bergman, “Elements of the Emperor Julian’s Theology,” 340, in *Traditions of Platonism: Essay in Honor of John Dillon*, ed. John Cleary (Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 1999) 337- 350.

to reading whatever he could find. He became increasingly attracted by the splendor of the ancient literature, which presented to him a vision of nobility in stark contrast to the 'barbarism' of the faith of the Galileans, as he scornfully called Christians, a barbarism manifested in his cousin's court. On his release from exile, he continued his studies in the different places to which he found himself sent around the Eastern part of the Empire,⁵⁶ eventually landing in Pergamum.

There he came under the tutelage of the Neoplatonist Aedesius. This proved to be a most important acquaintance for Julian. Disaffected with Christianity and enthralled with the beauty of the ancient letters, he was ripe for a conversion. Yet he had been reared a Christian, and so had been exposed to the yearnings for a life that transcends the present world, a yearning traditional paganism could not satisfy. From Aedesius, he received a philosophy that looked to that transcendent world in a way that Julian thought could satisfy the desires of the human heart.

Aedesius was a pupil of Iamblichus, who was himself a pupil of Porphyry. Beginning from Plotinus, Platonism had taken on an increasingly mystical air. Plotinus taught that the end of the philosophical life was the mystical union between the soul and the Divine.⁵⁷ This union could only be attained through philosophy and asceticism, which rendered it beyond the reach of most men. Plotinus's disciples, Porphyry and Iamblichus, realizing this, thought they saw in the practice of theurgy a means of opening to all a road to the Divine. They differed, however, in their opinions as to its usefulness. Porphyry saw it as a means of opening the soul to the influence of the transcendent world as the beginning of a journey

⁵⁶ He studied in Athens for a time, and was a fellow pupil of Sts. Gregory Nazianzus and Basil.

⁵⁷ Τί ποτε ἅπα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν οὔσας...; *Enneads* V.1.1.1-3. This seems a fairly logical extension of Plato's definition of philosophy as a preparation for death.

that would reach its fulfillment in philosophy. Iamblichus, on the other hand, saw in these rites the only way to complete salvation.⁵⁸ Because of the importance of theurgy as a connection between the human and the Divine, these thinkers turned their attention to explaining the religion of the Greeks through their philosophy. Thus when Julian came upon Aedesius and his school engaged in an attempt to rationalize Greek mythology and join it to their philosophy, he abandoned the Christian faith and embraced the traditional paganism of the Empire. This he hid from the world until his revolt from his cousin after being acclaimed Augustus by his soldiers in Gaul.

Julian was convinced that he had found in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus and his disciples, in its combination of worship for the gods that had made Rome great and the more secure foundation of Platonic philosophy, a religion that could rival and supplant Christianity. He also became gradually convinced that he had been chosen by the gods to be the means whereby the “Galilean Superstition” would be put down and true worship restored, a conviction arising from the influence of his pagan teachers and friends and his spectacular rise to power.

While he was still subject to Constantius, even as Caesar, it was expedient for him to hide his paganism, but once his cousin was dead and he stood alone as Augustus, he threw off his disguise. He openly worshipped the pagan gods and did everything he thought expedient to restore their worship among his subjects. He was resolved, at first, not to impose his faith upon the Empire by force. He did, however, remove imperial patronage from the Church and placed it on the pagan priesthoods and temples. And he overlooked violence directed at Christians, leaving no doubt where his sympathies lay.⁵⁹ But as he

⁵⁸ See Wallis, *Neoplatonism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), 3-4.

⁵⁹ Most notable among these was his gentle rebuke against the Alexandrian pagan mob that murdered bishop George of Cappidocia:

became more aware that his religion was not being universally adopted, he became more insistent in his efforts to spread it.

He never resorted to the violent persecutions of earlier times; he remained convinced that paganism would triumph on its own merits. However, there were measures he could take to help it overcome its adversary. Legislatively, the one act of his that is important for us is his edict concerning teachers:

It is necessary that the masters and doctors of studies excel first in morals, then in eloquence. But because I myself am not able to be present in every city, I order that whoever wishes to teach should not leap at this office impulsively or rashly, but should be approved by the judgment of the municipal senate and merit a curial decree by the unanimous consent of the best men. For this decree will be referred to my care so that they may approach the studies of the cities with somewhat higher honor by *our* judgment.⁶⁰

On the face of it, this decree, in which Julian established an exclusively public system of schools within the Empire, was aimed at restoring and maintaining the moral integrity of the schools. However, in a letter⁶¹ meant to explain the meaning of the decree, Julian made clear that the moral turpitude from which he wishes to free the schools is the

It is fortunate for you, men of Alexandria, that this transgression of yours occurred in my reign, since...I preserve for you the affection of a brother. For power that would be respected and a really strict and unswerving government would never overlook an outrageous action of a people...But, ...I administer to you the very mildest remedy, namely admonition and arguments..." Letter 22, "To the People of Alexandria" (380C), *The Works of the Emperor Julian*, vol. III, tr. W. C. Wright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 67.

Bowersock, in commenting on this says: "Julian's handling of the Alexandrian riots of late 361 showed to anyone of sense that the new emperor was not about to protect the rights of Christians. Worst still, he believed that they merited extirpation, though not by illegal means." (*Julian the Apostate*, 81.)

⁶⁰ *Magistros studiorum doctoresque excellere oportet moribus primum, deinde facundia. Sed quia singulis civitatibus adesse ipse non possum, iubeo, quisque docere vult, non repente nec temere prosiliat ad hoc munus, sed iudicio ordinis probatus decretum curialium meretur optimorum conspirante consensu. hoc meum decretum ad me tractandum referetur, ut altiore quodam honore nostro iudicio studiis civitatum accedant.* From the *Codex Theodosianus*, xiii, 3.5 (362 a.d.). Quoted by Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 286. The translation is my own, but the rendering of *ordinis* by 'municipal senate' is taken from *The Theodosian Code and Novels and Sirmonian Constitutions*, tr. Clyde Pharr (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 388.

⁶¹ See Letter 36, "Rescript on Christian Teachers," *The Works of the Emperor Julian*, vol. III, 116-23.

hypocrisy of those who teach one thing but believe another. Christians, he said, who deny the worship due to the pagan gods cannot, in good conscience, teach the works of the Greek tradition, which are all inspired by these gods.⁶² Thus, the very desire of Christians to teach pagan literature shows them unfit to teach.

In issuing this decree, which was lamented even by influential pagans,⁶³ Julian had at least a two-fold motive: first, to marginalize Christians as a sect foreign and hostile to Roman society; second, to use the schools as a means to proselytize and catechize the young of the Empire. For though Christians could not teach in the schools, their children were by no means to be kept from attending them.⁶⁴ This decree showed unequivocally that in his opinion, the culture of Greece and Rome was irreconcilable with the faith of the Christians.

Julian, in addition to marginalizing Christians through his decrees, attempted to reestablish paganism as a vital force in Roman society. Among the measures he undertook was a reform of the pagan priesthood along the lines of the Christian clergy. He also tried to promote worship of the gods through his writings, composing hymns in honor of Helios, the sun-god, and Cybele, the mother of the gods. It is in these hymns that his blending of philosophy and religion is most pronounced.

Julian's hymns demonstrate the intimate connection between pagan philosophy and pagan religion. As a disciple of Iamblicus, whom he places on a level with Plato,⁶⁵ Julian sees philosophy reaching its perfection in the cults of the gods, especially Helios, who is the link between the intelligible world and the sensible world. It is in this attempt to

⁶² Letter 36, 423A, *ibid.*, 118.

⁶³ His friend and historian, Ammianus, in discussing this decree, says, "we ought to pass over in perpetual silence the harsh decree by which he tried to prevent adherents of the Christian Church from teaching as grammarians and rhetoricians." Quoted by Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 288.

⁶⁴ Letter 36, 424A, *The Works of the Emperor Julian*, vol. III, 120-21.

⁶⁵ ὁ θεῖος ἀληθῶς καὶ μετὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα τρίτος Ἰάμβλιχος (Letter 2, *The Works of the Emperor Julian*, vol. I, 4).

appropriate the philosophy of the Greeks to his religion that Julian presented the greatest threat to the development of Christian culture, for he showed to many Christians as forcefully as he could that Tertullian was right: Socrates and his ilk were inspired by an unholy spirit.

Julian's reign was brief, and immediately after his death, his legal efforts were undone. How influential his literary efforts were is hard to judge. St. Gregory Nazianzus attacked him for attempting to deny the Christians any inheritance from the ancients,⁶⁶ and Cyril of Alexandria composed a lengthy refutation of his tract *Against the Galilean*. Still, this work was never formally condemned as was Porphyry's. It certainly failed in giving rebirth to paganism—that work died with him. But did his philosophical influence have a more lasting impact? Iamblichus, whom Julian praises in the highest degree, was to exert his influence more in the East. The Western schools tended to follow Porphyry. And yet there is a hint that perhaps he had some influence on the thought of Claudianus in Gaul nearly a hundred years after Julian's death.⁶⁷

This, then, is the world into which Claudianus came—a world in tumultuous change, in which the culture in which he was raised was crumbling, in which the heirs of that culture were sharply divided over the rightness of its appropriation. The great philosophical minds of that age, Porphyry and Iamblichus, were both responsible (though Iamblichus indirectly) for sharp attacks on his Faith. Yet it is to these thinkers that he turned in the formulation of his own thoughts on the nature of the soul. That he was able to study their teachings calmly and rationally, taking whatever he found to sound of truth

⁶⁶ Oration 4.

⁶⁷ This is seen most evidently in Claudianus's denying that plants have souls. This is a teaching he has in common with Iamblichus, but which Porphyry opposes. See Wright's note to Julian's *Hymn to King Helios*, 130B, *The Works of the Emperor Julian*, vol. I, 353.

and using their teaching to instruct those who could only see them as enemies of Truth,
shows a greatness of mind and philosophical disposition that can only be admired.

Chapter 4

The Platonic Background

Plato and the *Phaedo*

Although Plotinus seems to see the soul as divine more clearly than Plato, as we will see, the Platonic dialogues manifest a real tendency in that direction. Plato, in his dialogues, insists upon the soul's immortality. This is asserted in the *Meno*,¹ when Socrates attempts to convince Meno that knowledge is worth seeking after. It is argued again in the *Phaedo*, as he considers what death means for man. And it is put forth in the *Republic* as one of the few things that it is easy for us to know.² Given the conviction of the soul's immortality, it is not really a surprise that Plato would see the soul as something more divine than natural, for immortality is one of the first things that one ascribes to a god.³

In considering Plato's thoughts on the soul, I will, for two reasons, focus my attention on the discussion in the *Phaedo*. First, it is the one dialogue that Claudianus quotes in the *De statu animae*, and so it clearly had a direct influence on the work.⁴ Second, the progress of the conversation it records raises the soul closer and closer to divinity. Though

¹ 81b-d.

² Bk. X, 608d.

³ Empedocles, to emphasize the immortality of his elements, gives them the names of gods: τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ριζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε/ Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ' Αἰδωνεύς/ Νῆστις θ' ἡ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον. (Fr. 6, Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 286.)

⁴ One can only wonder if Faustus himself was familiar with the dialogue. He begins his discussion of the 'third question' by distinguishing the 'invisible' and the 'incorporeal.' (Letter of Faustus, 9) It is curious that he begins his discussion in this way. Though not the only place he might have encountered the idea, Plato, as we will see, uses the notions of visible and invisible to characterize the material and immaterial in this dialogue. Could he be subtly attacking that doctrine here? If so, that might explain Claudianus's strong rhetoric and lengthy refutation of this distinction, and perhaps, too, why he quotes at length from the *Phaedo*. See *De statu animae*, Book I, ch. 6.

in Socrates' mind (as presented in the dialogues), the soul is clearly a lesser being than God, the things that he shows about it would make one hard-pressed, if one were to ask what kind of thing it is that he is describing, not to say a god. Thus, this dialogue contains the germs of ideas that will later lead to a close identification of the soul with the realm of the divine.

In the *Phaedo*, Plato presents to us the conversation between Socrates and some of his friends on the final day of his life, ending with his execution.⁵ This setting gives a solemnity and seriousness right from the beginning, which grows into an awareness of the divine when we are told that his day of execution was actually fixed by the boat sacred to Apollo that had been sent to Crete.⁶ Its return to Athens was to signal the day of Socrates' departure from this life.⁷ The conversation then reveals that Socrates had been spending some time during his imprisonment composing verses to fulfill a command from Apollo, leading to a reminder to his friends that we must live our lives in the service of the gods. It is, he tells them, to the realm of these superior beings that he hopes he is about to go, and that, in fact, it is for the sake of going to this realm that he has been working all his life.

This last remark and his evident peacefulness in the face of his impending death made a strong impression on his friends. In response to their surprise, he explained that philosophy is nothing more than a preparation for death, and if this is so, what would be more illogical than for him to turn in fear from his life's aim? The notion that philosophy is a preparation for death occasioned some laughter, in spite of the impending separation, but

⁵ However, he is careful to tell us that he was not there, and presents the conversation through a retelling of it by one who was. This raises questions about how historically we are to take the dialogue.

⁶ This ship was sent annually to Crete as a thanksgiving to Apollo for his help in freeing the Athenians from the gruesome tribute owed to the Minotaur. Could Plato see in this a metaphor for the god's help in raising man from the life of a beast to that of the gods?

⁷ That Socrates sees the ship as in some way signalling his departure to the gods can be seen by the dream he relates in the *Crito* (44b).

also prompted a demand for a defense. It is this defense that raised the problem of the immortality of the soul.

Socrates' defense consists of looking at the perfection of the soul, which is assumed to be wisdom, and seeing how it is attained. He begins by pointing out that death is the separation of the soul from the body. But the concern of the philosopher is not with the pleasures of the body. Rather, his aim is wisdom. To reach for wisdom, the philosopher must, as far as he is able, free himself from attachment to bodily pleasures, for these only hinder him on the way toward his goal. "And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality."⁸ Fundamentally, the reason for this is that what the soul is eager to know is not what is presented by the senses, that is, not something sometimes beautiful and sometimes not, or sometimes just and sometimes not, but Beauty and Justice, and in general, the "reality of all...things, that which each of them is essentially." (65e) This knowledge can only come about for one who, "using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself," (66a) and by 'pure' he means freed from the vicissitudes of matter that keep the mind from grasping anything with certainty. (65b) Since no one in this life can be entirely free from the contaminations of the body, true wisdom is possible only after the soul has been freed from the body, that is, after death. (66e-67a) But if we are to come face to face with such goodness, we must ourselves be purified as much as is possible by continually striving to turn our attention away from the sensible realm: "for it is not permitted to the impure to attain the pure." (67b) Here especially, Socrates points to a

⁸ *Phaedo*, 65c. All quotations have been taken from the translation of G. M. A. Grube, *The Complete Works of Plato*, ed. John Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 50-100.

principle that should show the soul to be immortal: that if the soul, unlike the body, is capable of knowing what is certain, unchanging, and real, it must itself share in these attributes. That is, he has given an argument that the soul is not corrupted by death. But his friends did not see this and so push him to show what they see as necessary for this to be true, namely, that the soul is the kind of thing to survive death.⁹

Socrates' attempt to satisfy their desire, no easy or unimportant¹⁰ task, takes up most of the time leading to his death. It is not our concern to go through this discussion in detail; rather, our aim is to follow the trajectory of the understanding of the human soul that it reveals. The discussion is broken into fairly obvious sections. Socrates presents an argument that the soul is incorruptible. One of the friends then raises inadequacies with it. Socrates then attempts to answer the objection in the following section. This mode of presentation suggests that the arguments will proceed from more superficial to more substantive considerations about the nature of the soul.

Socrates' first attempt to argue for the soul's immortality proceeds from the notion of living and being dead being opposites. It is a fact of change that opposites only come to be from opposites. But living and being dead are opposites. It is evident that the dead come from the living, and so it must be that the living come from the dead. Socrates assumes that, since death is the separation of body and soul, coming to life is the soul being united to a body. Bodies, of course, are pre-existent (at least in elemental forms), and so souls must be

⁹ In fairness to his friends, Socrates has only been discussing the soul of the philosopher (see the last quotation especially), and so that the perfection of the soul as such lies in coming to wisdom is not clear. It is interesting, however, that St. Thomas sees in this argument a demonstration of the soul's immortality (see *Summa contra gentiles*, Book II, ch. 79, *ad hoc*). In fact, in the chapter on the incorruptibility of the human soul, he gives it (in a more formal presentation) as his second argument. Compare this, too, to Aristotle's claim, at the beginning of the *De anima* (Book I, ch. 1, 403a10), that if we can find some operation of the soul that does not depend on the body, then we will have shown it to be able to exist apart from the body.

¹⁰ "I do not think, said Socrates, that anyone who heard me now, not even a comic poet, could say that I am babbling and discussing things that do not concern me." (70c). Cf. Callicles's criticism of philosophy as child's play in the *Gorgias* (484c-485e).

also. Hence souls must “exist in the underworld” (71e). This argument proceeds from a rather general attribute (living), and so it seems that this argument would apply to any souls at all, and not just human souls.¹¹ But what it adds to the understanding of the soul is its eternity. Difficulties will be raised about this later in the conversation,¹² but the argument implies that the soul does not corrupt after death because it is an eternal being.

The eternity of the soul is implied more forcefully in the next section of the dialogue, which argues from knowledge being recollection. This is brought into the discussion by Cebes, who defends the idea that learning is recalling by the experience of those who, questioned wisely,¹³ are able to answer rightly about things of which they had been ignorant. After Cebes has recalled this doctrine, Socrates goes on to give a deeper defense of it based on the nature of the knowable object and our experience of sensation. He begins by pointing out that we can be led to recall one thing by something unlike it—a portrait of Simmias can remind us of Cebes—but this can only happen if one already has knowledge of Cebes. (73c-74a) However, we admit that we have knowledge of equality itself, and that we come to this knowledge through our acquaintance with ‘equal’ sticks or through other things we call equal. But the equal sticks are very different from equality itself, as the very same sticks appear sometimes equal, and sometimes not, something that can never be said of the equal itself.

“But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from the Equal, that you have derived and rasped the knowledge of equality?”

¹¹ Socrates will, of course, exploit this generality in his myth at the end of the work to describe the fates of unphilosophical souls.

¹² Simmias will raise the objection that the arguments have shown that the soul existed before the body, but not that it survives death (77b).

¹³ 73a. In the *Meno* (83a), where he famously questions one of Meno’s slave-boys about the doubling of a square in evidence of this theory, Socrates says he will question the slaveboy *in order*; it is not simply random questioning that will produce this result.

“Very true, Socrates.

“Whether it be like them or unlike them?

“Certainly.

“...Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?

“Necessarily.

“...We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to be like the Equal but are deficient in this.

“That is so.” (74c-75a)

He thus establishes that, in our experience of coming to know, the object of knowledge differs greatly from the objects of sense that give rise to our knowledge. This shows that the soul had knowledge of its object before encountering the objects of sense. The next question to answer is when that knowledge was acquired. It must have been before we have our sense powers, but we have them at birth. Hence, the soul must have acquired its knowledge prior to its life in this body and so must have existed before the body. It must be such that it is capable of acting, and so existing, apart from the body. And because our minds are apparently capable of learning anything knowable in the life apart from the body, the soul knows all things.¹⁴ And so, the soul is omniscient.

Up to this point in the conversation, Socrates has proceeded by considering activities of the soul, namely living and knowing. Simmias, though convinced by the argument that learning is recollection that the soul must exist before birth, still does not see that Socrates

¹⁴ This is going perhaps a bit farther than Socrates actually goes: “...we knew before birth and immediately after not only the Equal, but the Greater and the Smaller and all such things, for our present argument is no more about the Equal than about Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious and as I say, about all those things which we mark with the seal of ‘what it is.’” (75d)

has shown that the soul must also exist after death. His difficulty forces Socrates to move beyond the activities of the soul and look at its substance. To do so, he distinguishes between things that are apt to be destroyed and those that are not. (78b) It is the composed that dissolves into its component parts; what is not composite cannot be broken up. Not only are these two kinds of things distinguished by being indestructible or not, they are distinguished by being unchangeable at all or not.¹⁵ The obvious division of things that this suggests is between the objects of knowledge discussed earlier (Justice itself, Goodness itself, Equality itself) and the particulars encountered through our senses. (78d-e) This distinction suggests a further one: that the incomposite (and so incorruptible) are not objects of sense—or to use the expression of the dialogue “invisible,”¹⁶ while the composite are sensible, and hence, visible.

The next obvious question is to which of these two kinds the soul belongs. Given the above divisions, it has an equally obvious answer: the invisible. Unlike the body, which is clearly visible and subject to dissolution, the soul is invisible. Moreover, the soul, when it is drawn to look upon the things in the visible realm, becomes confused and dizzy, almost drunk (79c). It suffers from such contact and finds it difficult to do what it wants to do. On the other hand, when it turns to investigate the things in the invisible realm, what is “pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging,” (79d) then it finds itself raised out of that confusion and at rest.¹⁷ In this realm, it has found that to which it is akin. This is wisdom, the desire of the soul.

¹⁵ This, of course, brings us to the heart of Faustus’s criticism. It is interesting that right from the beginning of the consideration of the soul’s substance (by my reading), the soul seems to to be something unchangeable.

¹⁶ See note 4, above.

¹⁷ See *Symposium* 174d-175b, which speaks of Socrates’s habit of being lost in abstraction. His experience there seems to point to the truths he is expounding.

The soul, since it is akin to the things of the invisible realm, must also share in their characteristics; it must be “most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself.” (80b) And when death comes, it “makes its way to the invisible, which is like itself, the divine and immortal and wise, and arriving there it can be happy, having rid itself of confusion, ignorance, fear, violent desires, and the other human ills and...spend the rest of time with the gods.” (81a).

In his descriptions of the soul occasioned by these reflections, Socrates paints a portrait of the soul that shows it to be quite godlike. But, probably because of his admission (and our own experience) that, in spite of all that has been said, the soul is also like those things of the visible realm (at least in its affections), Cebes in particular, seems to focus his attention more on the *like* than on the *god* in that expression. He raises an objection to the argument that his companions at first think quite devastating.¹⁸ Granted that the soul is *like* the divine, does that likeness consist simply in its being more long-lived than the body? Perhaps it is more *like* the uncomposed. But it does suffer change, and must be drawn out of its love for the alterable. Perhaps, then, its likeness only extends to its existing for a long time, rather than its being, like the things it is like, eternal and indissoluble.¹⁹

“This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction,” Socrates replies. (96a) Hence this objection forces a still deeper consideration of the substance of the soul. It has been shown earlier that the soul is godlike; now, to the extent he is able, Socrates must show the cause of that likeness, and how deeply rooted it is in the very nature of the soul.

¹⁸ His objection, and that of Simmias (that the soul is a harmony of the body), bring forth from Socrates an exhortation to avoid the sin of misology, for they seem to undo all that has been argued to this point. Simmias’s objection and Socrates’ response do not directly concern us here and so will be passed over.

¹⁹ What is being suggested here is that the likeness is comparable to the likeness of time to eternity that is described in the *Timaeus*. The soul would be, of those in the realm of the corruptible, what is most like the incorruptible. This would make this position very like that of Faustus.

He has recourse again to the theory of the Forms. Having searched in vain for some account of the causes of things,²⁰ he tells his friends, he fell back on the thought that the things that *are* are the unchanging, invisible things themselves. If a thing (of sense-experience) is said to be beautiful, this can only be accounted for by its sharing in the Beautiful Itself, and so with what is called good and just and great: “nothing else makes [a thing] beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship. but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful.” (100d) Socrates admits that this is not the most illuminating of answers,²¹ but it has the advantage of certainty: “if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error.” (100e).

A thing comes to be a certain way, then, by coming to share in some one of the Forms. Because a Form can never admit of its opposite—tallness can never become (or partake in) shortness, nor the even, odd—coming to be is explained by the thing ceasing to share in one of the Forms and coming to share in its opposite. In many instances, the thing is able to partake of opposed Forms, though not at the same time, or at least with respect to the same thing. Thus, Simmias can be shorter than Phaedo, but taller than Socrates. (102c-d) This is because the qualities of the Forms do not belong to the nature of the thing that partakes of it. There are some things, however, to which one of a pair of opposites belongs in such a way that, though it is not the Form, it “has its character whenever it exists.” (103e) Fire, for instance, cannot exist without partaking of Heat, though it is not heat, nor can three exist without partaking of the Odd. (103e-104c) This allows Socrates to go, in some instances, beyond the “safe and ignorant” answer to name the cause of coming to be in a

²⁰ Especially through the teachings of Anaxagoras. (97c-99d)

²¹ After making an important addition to this account, he speaks of the response that a thing becomes hot by heat to be “safe and ignorant” (105c).

more “sophisticated” way: the cause of something becoming hot is not simply by the coming into it of heat, but also of fire. (105c)

The soul always makes the thing to which it comes alive, and thus, just as fire cannot exist without heat, neither can the soul exist without life. But life is the opposite of death, and since life belongs to the very nature of the soul, and so is inseparable from it, it is incapable of admitting death to itself. It is therefore deathless. (105 d-e) But what is deathless is, obviously, indestructible:

All would agree, said Socrates, that *the god, and the Form of life itself, and anything that is deathless*, are never destroyed.—All men would agree, by Zeus, to that, and the gods, I imagine, even more so.

If the deathless is indestructible, then the soul, if it is deathless, would also be indestructible?—Necessarily.²²

It belongs, then to the very nature or substance of the soul to be living and deathless, and this places it in company with “the God.” To this, there are no more objections. At this point Socrates then turns to a ‘myth’ concerning the soul to give some idea what the life of the soul, taking into account its eternity, ought to be like. Though different fates await different souls according to the life they have led in this world, the soul of the philosopher is welcomed into the company of the gods, in which it will rest for all eternity, freed from the imprisonment of the sensible world. Thus Socrates concludes his defense of the claim that philosophy is a preparation for death.

The picture of the soul that this discussion has painted for us reveals the soul to be unbegotten, indestructible, omniscient, invisible, and by its very nature inseparable from life. It is no mere figure or hyperbole to say that it is *godlike*. Yet, Socrates sees the soul to be something different from the God, to be only *like* Him. Though it is “most like the divine,

²² 106e. Emphasis added.

deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself,” nevertheless, it is not wholly free from the vicissitudes of the visible realm. Through its desires, it “is imprisoned in and clinging to the body.” (82e) Its love for the pleasures of the visible world welds the soul to the body and makes it corporeal. (83d-e) This would be impossible for God. Moreover, though the soul is omniscient, it is so only by having come into contact with the Forms and being itself formed by them. The soul, then, is not entirely apart from the world of becoming: though it shares in the form of Life as fire shares in heat, it is not Life. Socrates description of the experiences of the soul after death shows the dependency he sees of its life there upon the life that is lived in the body. If the soul lives so as to free itself from the pleasures and pains of the body, it will enter into the company of the gods and spend its existence among those to whom it is most akin. If it remains ensnared, its desires will lead it back to the bodily realm where it will live with those to which it is not by nature akin, but has made itself so by its loves. Socrates does not see himself as having shown that the soul is a god, but only something very like and akin to one.

And yet, he has shown it to share in many divine attributes. Especially in the last part of the argument, when he introduces the theory of participation, he leaves open the question of exactly what that means. That it has some relationship to the divine is clear, but what exactly that is, is not. Is it possible to maintain that account without falling into a kind of pantheism that accounts for the presence of these attributes by making the soul itself something really divine?

Plotinus and the Divination of the Soul

Plotinus took up the teachings of Plato and attempted to go beyond them by using dialectic to advance to the principles, and then turning around and descending back through

their causes to the things we know first. In so doing, he arrived at the transcendent One, which, though itself eternally perfect and at rest, nevertheless, gives forth being from itself, first to Intellect, and then, through a series of processions, to the multiplicity that we encounter in ourselves and the world around us, terminating in the sterile realm of matter. It is not our present aim to examine Plotinus's doctrine of the soul in depth. Rather, we will look at a particular treatise (*Ennead* V.1) in order to reveal how he develops the teaching of Plato on the soul in such a way as to bring the soul into real kinship with God.

We will look primarily at *Ennead* V.1 because in this treatise, as in the *Phaedo*, there is an attempt to reveal the nature of the soul. But whereas Socrates is content to argue *that* the soul is immortal without going too deeply into *why* it is so, Plotinus approaches the question explicitly with regard to the soul's origin in higher beings.²³ If all knowledge is recollection, then Plotinus's task is to help the soul recall²⁴ itself, and find its origin and its end, that is, its cause. There are, he points out, two ways to help the soul recall itself. The first is to lead the soul to condemn the things that it loves now, the things beneath it.²⁵ The other, which he says is prior, is to remind the soul of its kind²⁶ and dignity.²⁷ By calling it prior, he seems to be saying that it is the more perfect way, rather than prior in the order of learning,²⁸ and its

²³ Plotinus begins with this question: Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκεῖθεν οὐσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἐαυτὰς καὶ ἐκεῖνον; Plotinus, *Ennead* V.1.1.1-4 (emphasis added.) Thus, from the very raising of the question, he has shown that he sees the soul to be something quite divine. The title of the treatise is ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΙΩΝ ΑΡΧΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΝ. Though it is Porphyry's, it does reveal that the soul will only recollect itself by seeing its relation to the more principal hypostases.

²⁴ διδάσκων καὶ ἀναμνήσκων. (*Ennead* V.1.1.28)

²⁵ This is, obviously, the path that Socrates took in the *Phaedo*. Whether intended or not, this text places the treatise in relation to the *Phaedo*.

²⁶ γένος: *family* or *tribe* would not be out of place in this context.

²⁷ *Ennead* V.1.1.23-29.

²⁸ It would seem necessary to draw the soul away from these lower loves before it could recall itself to its higher origins, especially as its attachment to them is a cause of its forgetfulness. Cf. the allegory of the cave in *Republic* VII.

perfection lies precisely in that it will reveal *why* the soul is to be thought immortal, all-knowing, and divine. Thus, this treatise develops more deeply the ideas about the soul that Socrates put forth upon his deathbed and so can be read as something of a complement to the *Phaedo*. It shows one way, at least, that the account of the soul in the *Phaedo* can be tied down²⁹—a way, given the prominence of Plotinus’s teaching in the late Empire, that had great influence. But, as we will see, it is also a way that caused real concern in some of his followers (not just Christians like Faustus) that he had raised the soul to too great a height, a height that should be reserved for God alone.³⁰

In particular, we will look at how he establishes the soul’s eternity, knowledge, and life. Socrates had argued that the soul was eternal because it is uncomposed, but the motions of the soul seem to imply composition. Unlike the things that it knows, it can be happy or sad, can learn or forget. Moreover, if the soul comes to knowledge through recollection, that leaves open the question of how it came to know in the first place. For, if it always had it, and yet, unlike God, it is dependent on another for that knowledge, how did it come to that knowledge? Finally, if the soul has life by participation, what exactly does that mean?

Soul gives life; this is what is most evident about it. “Let every soul, then, first consider this, that it made all living things itself, breathing life into them.”³¹ Although other things may pass and die, the soul does not, for it does not depart from itself. Plotinus is referring to the argument in the *Phaedrus* for the soul’s immortality, or rather, its eternality,

²⁹ Note Simmias’s sense that what he was left with at the end of the *Phaedo* was not quite knowledge: “I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the importance of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some private misgivings about what we have said.” (107a-b)

³⁰ Or perhaps better, did not lower it enough. In speaking of Plotinus’s notion that the whole soul does not descend from the noetic realm, J. M. Rist remarks that “where Plotinus openly breaks with the tradition, very few of the later Neoplatonists followed him.” *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 172.

³¹ V.1.2.1-2.

which begins from the awareness that the soul is a self-mover.³² This text also sheds light on what it means for the soul to participate in life in such a way that, as Socrates says, the one always accompanies the other, and Plotinus's reference to that text shows that he had formed a notion of life that is grounded in that. The soul is the source of life for living things—at least visible living things. This, again is evident to us. As it is the source, it is a principle, and therefore it is in some way unbegotten. Nevertheless, our experience of the universe shows us that this is not so in an unqualified way. Our vision of the more perfect beings, the gods, the sun, etc., show that there are souls that are more perfect in their effect than ours. The universe as a whole, animated, ordered and eternal, points to the existence of a great Soul (the cosmic Soul).

Though its effect is much greater, there is a likeness, evidently, between us lower souls and the Great Soul animating the universe³³ that allows us to see about ourselves that we are eternal, if only we can calm our souls sufficiently to see it. The motions and order of parts that we see in the universe and in the heavenly bodies, arising because of the influx³⁴ of soul, are everlasting, and follow the wise guidance of Soul; but as our souls animate our bodies in the same way that the great Soul does the universe, or the souls of the gods do their bodies, we see that we are of the same nature as they.³⁵ Because their effects are eternal (or perhaps better, perpetual), they must be eternal, and so also must we. It is the lowliness of the body which is formed of what the gods hate and is more to be thrown away than

³² Cf. *Phaedrus*, 245c ff.

³³ σκοπεῖσθω δὲ τὴν μεγάλην ψυχὴν ἄλλη ψυχὴ οὐ σμικρὰ ἀξία τοῦ σκοπεῖν γενομένη ἀπαλλαγεῖσα ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν γεγοητευκότων τὰς ἄλλας ἡσύχῳ τῇ καταστάσει. V.1.2.12-14. (Emphasis added)

³⁴ Plotinus uses this term to help our understanding with an image, one that is very local and concrete, of a liquid being poured into a body. V.1.2.17-19.

³⁵ V.1.2.44: ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡμερτέρα [ψυχὴ].

dung³⁶ that gives rise to the corruption of death that we see about us. Our souls, on the other hand are things honorable and divine.³⁷

In this recognition, we have already begun our assent to God, and, Plotinus assures us, we do not have far to go.³⁸ But there is a step between here and there. Our souls are not only sources of life for the things of this world, but they have an activity that is from within and belongs to it most properly.³⁹ In this activity it shows itself to be an image of a Intellect that is more divine than itself, since it is itself dependent in its knowing.

To understand better this activity, it is necessary to see better the relation that soul has to Intellect. The soul is its image as the word uttered is the image of the word in the soul.⁴⁰ It is, then, the activity (ἐνέργεια) of Intellect, and its outward life. It stands to Intellect as heat to fire. But this last image could be misleading, for we should not think of the procession of soul as an outpouring from Intellect, as he described the relation of the soul to nature. The soul is a lesser thing,⁴¹ as heat is less than fire, but (like heat) is not wholly other. It both remains in Intellect and stands apart as something other.⁴² Hence, it is another hypostasis and has its own proper activity, but it only has it by turning back and gazing upon its father, that is, by remaining in it (as heat, separated from fire loses its ability

³⁶ Plotinus applies to matter a phrase that Homer uses to describe Hades: ὁ στυγέουσιν οἱ θεοί. (V.1.2.8) The verb used here is striking, being stronger than μισεῖν, implying a hatred filled with dread or fear. The root is the same as in the name Styx. (See LSJ) Given the opposition between life given by the soul and the darkness and non-existence of matter, Plotinus's quotation is significant. The second phrase (νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι [V.1.2.43]) comes from Heraclitus (Diels B 96) and is meant to emphasize the instability, and hence the imperfection, of the body as opposed to the rest and perfection that belongs to the soul by its nature.

³⁷ τίμια καὶ θεῖα: see V.1.3.1.

³⁸ V.1.3.1-7.

³⁹ ἔνδοθεν καὶ οἰκεῖα: V.1.3.18.

⁴⁰ V.1.3.8-9.

⁴¹ Mind begets soul and its mind as something ὃν οὐ τέλειον ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν [sc. Νοῦς] ἐγέννησεν. (V.1.3.15-16)

⁴² μένουσαν μὲν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ [sc. Νοῦς], τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ὑφισταμένην. (V.1.3.12-13)

to heat). Because of this closeness in nature,⁴³ it is only its intellectual acts that can be called properly the soul's. All other activities are lower and come to it from outside itself.

In this we find an account of our coming to know, which Socrates had called recollection. We have in ourselves the power to know all things because we came forth from Intellect and remain in it. By turning our gaze upon this father of ours, we see in it all the intelligibles in their eternity and truth. Our admiration for the visible world (the effect of Intellect mediated through the life-giving activity of Soul) should lead us to “ascend to its [sc., the universe's] archetypal and truer reality and there see them all intelligible and eternal in it, in its own understanding and life.”⁴⁴

Learning, then, is recollection because of the soul's paternity, arising as it does from the divine Intellect. The soul is the activity arising from this Intellect, and so does not become wholly distinct from it. Its own intellect joins it to its father, and through it, the soul remains in Intellect; in its highest part at least, it is among the intelligibles, united to them.⁴⁵ This allows it, when rightly disposed, to turn its gaze from the lower things to their archetypes in the divine Intellect. When it has done so, when “it has come near then to him and, in a way, become one with him, it lives forever.”⁴⁶ Its true life and its thinking are one.

But we have not finished our ascent. In the soul's gaze upon the divine Intellect, it sees great perfection, eternity, peace, and wisdom. But it sees also multiplicity. It sees thought and being, the object of thought. It sees “Intellect making Being exist in thinking it,

⁴³ As the activity that comes from Mind also raises the soul up to be something more divine. The divinity of Mind gives rise to things that are intelligible and eternal, and the soul has some share in this higher divinity because Mind is its father and present to it. Its divinity allows it to bestow life, but this is a life that is sunk into the temporality of matter. (V.1.3)

⁴⁴ V.1.4.6-9, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, vol. 5, 23.

⁴⁵ V.1.5.1-2.

⁴⁶ V.1.5.3-4, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, vol. 5, 27.

and Being giving Intellect thinking and existence by being thought.”⁴⁷ Thus, there is a cause of thinking, and a cause of being. And, because thinking and being are always simultaneous, their cause must be one.

This is the first God, the primary and simple One, from which all other things, and first of all Intellect, take their beginning. But if the One is simple, unmoved at all, perfect and entirely within itself, how does anything come forth from it? There is, necessarily, a radiating from the One, which though coming forth from it, leaves it entirely unmoved. All things that exist “necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced.”⁴⁸ This production follows upon their perfection. But the One is forever perfect, and so its radiance is likewise eternal.

And this Radiance is less than the One, but next to it in perfection. As Soul is an expression and a kind of activity of Intellect, so also is Intellect of the One. Hence, though a separate hypostasis, nevertheless, there is not a complete distinction of being: “[B]ecause its substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to the One and comes from the One, it is strengthened by the One and made perfect in substantial existence by and from it.”⁴⁹ Like the soul in relation to Intellect, the Intellect itself remains rooted in the One, from which arise all its perfections. And so we find the source of the soul’s being: the soul is inseparable from life (and so incorruptible) because it has arisen from Intellect in such a way that its being and activity (its true activity) are rooted in Intellect. But Intellect is itself rooted in the One. In the end, it is its connection with the One and *its* perfection that make the soul to be

⁴⁷ V.1.4.27-29, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus*, vol. 5, 25.

⁴⁸ V.1.6.31-33.

⁴⁹ V.1.7.14-17.

what it is: incorruptible, eternal, intellectual, and life-giving. These divine attributes belong to the soul because the soul is divine, because it is the offspring of the God.

And so we see that in giving an account of the attributes of the soul that Socrates shows in the *Phaedo*, Plotinus—who is not held back by Jewish and Christian notions of creation—falls into the ‘impiety’ that so concerns Faustus.

Iamblichus and the Un-Divinization of the Soul

The account of Plotinus’s thought just given is not the whole story. Even though the soul is something divine, even in the treatise we looked at, it must be remembered that he has distinguished the different levels of things as *hypostases*, thus seeing real distinction between them. However, one need not be a Christian to be made uneasy by the lofty conception of the soul Plotinus had attained. Our human, very human, experience of our frailties and wicknesses flies in the face of the supposed purity and impassibility of the higher part of the soul that Plotinus taught.⁵⁰ Iamblichus, focusing on the loftiness he saw in Plotinus’s teaching, uses it as an occasion to develop his own notions of the soul.⁵¹

However, without a clear notion of creation, it is hard to see how Plotinus’s position, or something like it, could be avoided. By seeing the soul as a further emanation from the One, and an immediate production of Intellect, which, though more divided than the One,

⁵⁰ We will look at the teaching of Iamblichus more particularly not because we think it likely that his work was known directly by Claudianus, but rather because he appears to be the source of criticism against Plotinus’s tendency to emphasize the transcendence of the soul, and to have formulated a notion of the soul’s nature that is opposed to that of Plotinus and influential in the work of those who helped to spread his teaching, especially Proclus. See Carlos Steel, *The Changing Self: A Study in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus* (Brussel: Paleis der Academiën, 1978).

⁵¹ He seems to admit that his understanding of Plotinus’s thought is not entirely fair: “Plotinus also thought this way, without, however, being fully in favor of it.” See Steel, *Changing Self*, 30.

nevertheless continues in its purity and stability, and seeing that every son is like his father,⁵² this tension between what our thought leads us to, and what our life in the body leads us to is quite inevitable, it seems. We have the experience of grasping the eternal and the immaterial. In fact this experience is in some way fundamental for the philosophical life.⁵³ And yet we also have the experience of the tumultuous life within the body. An experience that can crowd out the life of the eternal and put itself forward as the perfection of our life, as Plato has Callicles argue in the *Gorgias*.⁵⁴

Plotinus attributed this passible life to a lower part of the soul, one distinct from the higher part that partakes of the life of the intellect and so remains pure. The separation of this part of the soul from the world of sense is such that the soul, at least in its highest part, stands in no need of redemption or purification, and so he asks at one point “what could catharsis of the soul be if it has not been defiled at all?”⁵⁵ But this does not seem to explain the fact that the actions of this lower life are ours, that they proceed from the soul’s own choice and so involve our higher parts.⁵⁶ Looked at from another way, if our complete

⁵² See Enn. V.1.1. Porphyry, following Plotinus in this, describes this likeness quite strongly: *eam* (sc. animam) *consubstantialem paternae illi menti...fieri posse dicatis* (sc. Porphyry and his followers). See Augustine *De civitate Dei* X.29, Fragment 10, J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre le philosophe néo-platonicien* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1913), 37*.

⁵³ The most obvious way we have this experience is in the science of mathematics. Thus, Plato is reported to have placed above the gate to the Academy the words: Let no one enter her who is without geometry.

⁵⁴ In that dialogue, Callicles puts forth the wonderful image of the soul as a sieve, the perfection of which is to pass as many carnal pleasures through it as possible. No image of the soul could be farther from that of Plotinus!

⁵⁵ Enn. III.6.5.13: Ἀλλὰ τίς ἡ κάθαρσις ἂν τῆς ψυχῆς εἴη μηδαμῇ μεμολυσμένης ἢ τί τὸ χωρίζειν αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος;

⁵⁶ Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* III, p. 334.4-8: Τί γὰρ τὸ ἀμαρτάνων ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν τῆς ἀλογίας κινσάσης πρὸς ἀκόλαστον φαντασίαν ἐπιδράμωμεν; ἄρ’ οὐχ ἡ προαίρεσις; καὶ πῶς οὐχ αὕτη; κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην διαφέρομεν τῶν φαντασθέντων προπετῶς. Εἰ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀμαρτάνει, πῶς ἀναμάρτητος ἡ ψυχὴ; Steel, *Changing Self*, 40f, points out that Proclus, in this part of his commentary, is using arguments of Iamblichus to argue against Plotinus’s teaching that the highest part of the soul always remains in pure contemplation, that is, is ‘undescended.’

happiness consists in contemplation of the divine, and the best part of us is continually in this activity, how is it that we are not all happy.⁵⁷ That we are not is quite evident.⁵⁸

Plotinus and his followers were aware of these difficulties, of course. Iamblichus even recognizes that Plotinus does not wholly hold onto this doctrine. Still, he saw in their teachings a tendency to see the soul as an “‘indivisible substance’ and the ‘divisible’ aspect of it...explained away in various ways, e.g. as an accidental result of its relation to the body, as an apparent form which is not constitutive of the essence of the soul.”⁵⁹ In other words, the soul essentially belongs to the divine,⁶⁰ and any instability or changeability is an accident of being in this or that body. This could not be true. The soul itself, says Iamblichus, is able to be ignorant, unhappy, sinful, attributes which are far from the divine being.

On the other hand, the soul is not entirely unlike the divine: “the soul,” Iamblichus says, “is in itself an immaterial substance, incorporeal, entirely unoriginated and indestructible, which has being and life from itself.”⁶¹ This certainly sounds like a divine being, but it is important to understand the being that it has, that is, the life that it has, in order to see how he distinguishes the soul from the divine. It must be a life and being that can be, while indestructible and alive, ignorant, wicked, and unhappy. In order to be such, it

⁵⁷ Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.*, III.335.7-15, cited by Steel, *Changing Self*, 42.

⁵⁸ To these two arguments against the ‘Plotinian position’ given by Iamblichus (through Proclus), Steel adds a third, taken from Plato, regarding the myth of the charioteer in the *Phaedrus*. He also points out that these arguments are given against a “rather distorted presentation of Plotinus’s conception of the soul.” (p. 44) Iamblichus emphasizes certain aspects of the teaching while ignoring others that show a more nuanced, difficult notion of the soul’s nature and relation to higher beings. He was arguing against what he saw as a “‘tendency’ which he believed he ascertains in certain ‘moderns’ (νεώτεροι), namely the overemphasis of the transcendence of the soul.” (Steel, *Changing Self*, 32) If his account of Plotinus’s teaching is exaggerated, still, it served as a springboard to his own conception of the nature of the soul.

⁵⁹ Steel, *Changing Self*, 32.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Enn.* IV.10.16-20: φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθὴς θεῖα ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ἐγγενοίτο φαύλω τινὶ καὶ θνητῷ πραγματι, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη θεῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἅτε θεῶν μετὸν αὐτῷ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιαν.

⁶¹ Stobaeus., *Ecl.* II, 173.5-6: οὐσία ἐστὶν ἄυλος ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἀσώματος, ἀγέννητος πάντη καὶ ἀνώλεθρος, παρ’ ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν. (tr. Steel, *Changing Self*, 23-24)

must be a being that is a *mean* between the indivisible (unoriginated, having life from itself) and the divisible (ignorant, unhappy). It is a life that ‘goes out of itself’ without doing so wholly. Unlike Plotinus and Porphyry, who saw the soul untouched by its descent into the body,⁶² Iamblichus sees the soul related to the body in its very being. Though, being immaterial, it is not wholly mixed with the body, yet in order to bring forth irrational life, it must go forth from itself. In doing so it introduces division into its life. “It no longer perfectly coincides with itself and thus also is no longer united in act to the objects of knowledge which are proper to its essence.”⁶³ By this *προβολή* of the soul, it is separated from the intelligibles, and its happiness is to return to them through a separation from the body, which in this life is never fully effected. Hence, the life of the soul becomes one of movement and change, as it gives itself to the divisibles to which it itself has given rise, on the one hand, or returns its gaze to the principle from which it has come forth, on the other.

Hence the life of the soul is characterized by ‘movement’ or change, though not by a change entirely the same as that in which the divisibles partake. They, being bodily, are always going outside of themselves, never coincide with themselves, and in their change are at least tending toward non-being.⁶⁴ This is not true of the soul, for it remains, in spite of its contact with the bodily realm, a thing ungenerated and having life in itself through itself. Hence the soul, though succumbing to disunity, does not do so to the extent that it loses its original unity entirely. The soul in its essence becomes a ‘*coincidentia oppositorum*’⁶⁵ and in this

⁶² Cf. *Enn.* I.1.7-8, VI.4.15-16 and Porphyry, *Sententiae* IV and XXVIII-XXIX. The soul does not proceed outside itself in its being, but only through an emanation of its power. See Steel, *Changing Self*, 63.

⁶³ Steel, *Changing Self*, 63. By introducing this kind of disunity into the soul, Iamblichus is able to give an account of the Platonic ἀνάμνησις. By the *προβολή* of the soul, it is separated from the intelligibles, and so forgets them; its happiness is to return, through a separation from the body, to the undivided contemplation of them.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Physics* IV.12, 221b1-3, where Aristotle says, in his discussion of time, that time is more a cause of destruction than of coming to be.

⁶⁵ Steel, *Changing Self*, 64.

way becomes un-divinized, a middle being, a being that as a whole (essentially) proceeds (from itself) and yet remains (with itself).⁶⁶

The change belonging to the soul, then, is without corruption. It does not change in place, and its becoming does not involve a ceasing to be. Its movement is in thought or choice and it becomes subject to passions. The soul is eternal in being, yet it is essentially a being in change, a change from itself and back to itself. This is a change characterized particularly by being *in time*. Hence the life of the soul gives rise to change in time, a characteristic it will pass on to the being it produces in the irrational realm.

This brief account of the thought of Iamblichus upon the nature of the soul is sufficient to see how a Christian like Claudianus could look to Neoplatonic philosophy as it put itself forth after Iamblichus and find in it a staunch ally in his fight for the incorporeality of the soul.⁶⁷ It shows how the soul, while still conceived as a complete substance, and as having an existence prior to the body, can be seen to stand apart from the Creator. In particular, it gives an account of the soul as changeable, and so not purely actual, but not bound to place, nor destructible. It does so by seeing attributes of divinity belonging to it because of its incorporeality, and yet other aspects, especially change in time, that separate it *in its very being* from its divine source. It thus presents a way to account for the incorporeality of the soul without asserting that it is changeless and eternal (even if it is immortal). As we shall see, it is in developing these same notions of the soul's changeability and temporality

⁶⁶ Priscianus, *In de an.*, p. 6.14: ὅλη πρόεισι καὶ μένει [sc. ἡ ψυχὴ]. Steel, *Changing Self*, 66, has a nice summary of Priscian's interpretation of Iamblichus's position: "That the soul simultaneously supports these contraries in its essence is only possible because it is not a unity which is static and fixed in itself but rather a continuously self-developing process. The soul only *remains* itself because it ceaselessly *proceeds from itself* and, at the same time, returns into itself. This is... no purely external event that leaves its substance undisturbed; it is a tension within the very being of the soul itself. The *μονή* and *πρόοδος* are 'substantial modes of being' of the human soul." (Emphasis in original.)

⁶⁷ But there is a deeper conception of the soul in Iamblichus that will make him an even stronger ally, and this is his conception of the soul as an *image* of the divine. This will be discussed in detail in ch. 6.

that Claudianus, in his contest with Faustus, will show the way to conceiving of an incorporeal creature.

Chapter 5

Claudianus and the Soul as a Middle Being

The Need for an Incorporeal Creature

Claudianus, like Plato, the Neoplatonists, and especially Iamblichus, conceives of the soul as a *media res*, and in that notion finds the grounds for his understanding of the soul as an incorporeal creature. To see how he unfolds this notion, we will give a fairly full exposition of the first book of *De statu animae*, for his account of the soul's incorporeality is, in the main, given there. In his preface, he points out that the First Book contains the core of his teaching, and the Second and Third Books are supplemental.¹ Moreover, he states at the end of the first book that he has given a sufficient response to Faustus's contention.² Nevertheless, the later books do bring forth ideas that shed light on the argument of the first book, and so we will also look to those books to help illumine the teaching of the first.

Before turning to his arguments, we should say a word or two about the nature of the work as a whole. Claudianus, as can be seen from his letter to Sapaudus,³ is concerned not only with truth, but also with the way in which that truth is expressed. It is a mark of intellectual perfection to be eloquent as well as wise (indeed, one cannot be one without the other). Hence, he closes his dedication of the work to Sidonius by saluting him as *veteris*

¹ He no longer speaks of a contest in the second book, but rather of strengthening the belief of the reader with arguments and testimonies from ancient writers, both pagan and Christian. And of the third, he says that after arguing a bit at the beginning, *saucios ex adversa acie palantes insequitur, demum uero nec aspernatur pacem, nec conflictum metuit aduersantis ignoti*. (*De statu animae* 20.9-10; Citations to the *De statu animae* will be given by page and line numbers to the text in *Claudiani Mamerti Opera*.)

² *Ecce de statu vel visione rationalis animae infinitarum pro quaestionis magnitudine rationum tactis breviter potius causis quam satis usque discussis arbitror me de inlocalitate atque incorporalitate animae sufficiens dedisse responsum*. (97.13-16)

³ See Appendix for a translation of this letter.

reparator eloquentiae. (20.17) The polemical form of the work is well-suited to this two-fold concern, for it provides an opportunity for rhetorical flourish as well as philosophical prowess.⁴ It therefore allows him to treat of the philosophical difficulties Faustus has raised in such a way that the reader finds delight not only in the truth of the arguments but also in the eloquence of their expression.

Claudianus's concern to be pleasing as well as enlightening leads him to alternate between passages that are dense and aim at precision and more diffuse, playful passages. The 'persona' of the athletic contest also has a determining effect on the order of the work. He will be 'trading blows' (*varium luctamen alternat*) with his opponent, and so will determine the order of his work to some extent by that of his opponent. Therefore, the work will not have the precise order that one would find if he were simply laying out the doctrine of the soul's incorporeality.⁵ However, if his intent is not simply to beat down his opponent, but to lead the reader to the truth of his teaching; if his aim is to display a mastery of the art of eloquence, then he should be able to turn his opponent's moves to his own advantage. What we hope to show is that if one follows out the order of the first book, one will see a movement of thought intended to bring the reader to a grasp of the truth of the spirituality of the human soul.

The first thing that he attempts to show is that the existence of a non-bodily creature is something to be desired. He does this in the text quoted above regarding the fullness of creation: *mirum autem videtur subplemento rerum defore aliquid, si rosae flosculus non exsisteret, et non defore si incorporea substantia non esset creata*. (38.5-7) His invocation of the rose blossom,

⁴ That this is to be a work of polemics is announced at the outset: *de animae statu uarium cum aduersario luctamen alternat*. (19.12-13) *Varium luctamen alternat* is a metaphor from wrestling, and so lets the reader know from the start that he is about to see a fight. Though he will also use metaphors from war (see note 1, above), this first, bringing to mind the image of an athletic contest, gives the reader more the expectation of the pleasure associated with the spectacle of the game than the horror of mortal combat.

⁵ See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 76.

especially in his use of the diminutive *flosculus*, clearly points to the ephemeral nature of the goods of creation in the material realm.⁶ The rose is beautiful, but that beauty quickly fades. How could the goodness of God be reflected in creation if it were made up only of such things? There ought, then, to be something that endures, reflecting His eternity, His immobility.

He then brings out the desirability of the incorporeal by a reminder of what we consider more noble and perfect: *Omne autem incorporeum corporeo et inlocale locali et insecabile secabili et uiuens non uiuenti in naturae dignitate praeponitur.* (38.20-22) Our conceptions of God as a spirit and omnipresent is enough to establish the truth of the first two, and also of the fourth.⁷ And our experience of life shows us the truth of the fourth as well.⁸ But the reason for the inclusion of the third is perhaps a little less clear.

For one greatly influenced by the Neoplatonists, the inclusion of the dichotomy between the indivisible and divisible is, perhaps, natural enough. But the term *insecabile* is not exactly synonymous with *indivisible*. The latter is a more abstract term, and can apply even to those things which, though bodies, would be practically indivisible (or uncuttable) such as atoms. Moreover, the Neoplatonists introduce the notion of divisibility into the intellectual realm, where there is nothing to be cut, to distinguish lower intellectual beings from the higher. The term *insecabile*, on the other hand, at least in Claudianus's mind, has a much closer tie to bodies, like the corresponding English verb 'to cut'.⁹ Though it might be true to

⁶ Cf. Cicero, *De officiis*, 2.12.43: *ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt.*

⁷ "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Jn 14.6.

⁸ Claudianus will rank beings in their dignity according to their mode of life in Ch. 21.

⁹ This is evident from the subsequent appearances of this adjective and the related verb *secare*. These words appear always in close conjunction with the related ideas of *inlocale* (as here) or *partile*: *in dei nero ipsa trinitate huius secabilitatis et localitatis partes et spatia esse non dicimus* (60.3-5); *aerem namque, ex quo aut cui similem animam esse pronuntias, diuiduum secabilemque nemo dubitat. nam et cum flamus et refflamus, particulas eius haurimus et reddimus* (63.10-12); *omne porro corpus quamlibet magnum, quamlibet paruum secari profecto potest, quod idcirco illi accidit, quia partibus constat* (63.20-22).

say that God is *insecabilis*, because He is already thought to be far removed from the corporeal realm, there is no point in doing so.

Rather, the term has been included here in contrast to the very ‘cuttable’ flower of the rose, which from its apparent unity unfolds as it blossoms to display its manifold petals, from which in fact it derives much of its beauty, though a beauty that “wITHERS like the grass.”¹⁰ It is hard not to see in this word a reference to something like the diamond, which, in its indestructability and its brilliance would be something like the incorporeal being to which Claudianus is leading his reader.¹¹ And in these aspects it is set ahead of the rose in its dignity.¹²

The pre-eminence of the incorporeal over the corporeal allows Claudianus to rephrase his argument in Chapter 4 in a way that will locate the soul as a middle being. The incorporeal creature ought to have been created because *cum creator incorporeus maximum bonum sit, et creatum incorporeum magnum bonum sit, et creatum corpus...aliquod bonum sit...sicut creatum est corpus aliquod bonum, ita creari debuit incorporeum magnum bonum*. (39.10-15) If God made only what is good, and not what is a great good, then indeed the goodness of his creation would be only *semiplenum*.

The incorporeal creature, then, because of its essential goodness, in which it exceeds bodily creatures and yet falls short of its Creator, ought to have been created. Yet the

¹⁰ Cf. Is 40.6-8.

¹¹ Cf. Pliny, *Natural Histories* XX.1, who refers to the diamond as *infragilem* (though still able to be shattered by the he-goat’s blood).

¹² The *in-* prefix in these terms, though signifying a negation (not-bodily, not-local, not-cuttable) is intended to point the mind to a perfection, and so to something more noble than what is signified by the positive term. Seneca describes how the notion of *insecabile* is arrived at and seen to be something good in one of his letters. See Letter CXVIII, *Ad Lucilium epistolae morales*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), 370: *Eodem modo aliquid difficulter secari cogitavimus; novissime crescente hac difficultate insecabile inventum est. Sic ab eo, quod vix et aegre movebatur, processimus ad immobile. Eadem ratione aliquid secundum naturam fuit; hoc in aliam proprietatem magnitudo sua transtulit et bonum fecit*. (Emphasis added.)

difficulty of its possibility still lurks beneath this desirability.¹³ Claudianus will give reassurance: it is precisely insofar as it is a creature that it will be inferior to its Creator. That would be true, no doubt, if it were truly possible. But how have we seen that it is?

In the following chapter, Claudianus turns to our power of sensation, in which he sees a similarity to the incorporeal, and which, through our experience of its activity, shows that there are beings that exist between contrary realms, middle beings that partake of aspects of each, and join them together. The occasion for this is Faustus's attempt to prevent us from mistaking the invisible for the incorporeal.¹⁴ Claudianus takes this opportunity to engage in a bit of sarcasm at Faustus's expense, twisting his words to show that they conclude to God being corporeal. But beyond the fun, there is a serious question here. The division between the corporeal and incorporeal does not correspond to that between the visible and the invisible, for though no incorporeal thing is visible, there are corporeal things that are invisible.¹⁵ This non-coincidence is in fact a happy thing for us, for it provides us, in our very experience of the activity of our souls, something that will help us move from the purely material to the immaterial.

Even in irrational beasts, which do not transcend the corporeal, there is a power to sense. Indeed it is in virtue of this power that they are said to be ensouled.¹⁶ But this power is not itself sensible (or visible), for by touch, we can touch bodies, but we cannot touch the

¹³ *Sed dices mihi: 'si aliquod incorporeum creatum est, aequiparat ergo creatorem.'* 40.7-8.

¹⁴ *Nonnulli eruditissimi patrum alia adserunt esse innisibilia, alia uero incorporea.* (Letter of Faustus, 9) There is reason enough to fear this 'mistake' for those familiar with Plato. As we have seen, in the *Phaedo*, he distinguishes between the immaterial and material, the temporal and eternal, in exactly these terms: the invisible and visible. With this distinction, he argues that the soul is more akin to the invisible, and so is itself immortal. See *Phaedo*, 79a ff; see also Ch 3, n. 4, above.

¹⁵ This remains true, even if invisible is taken to mean not able to be sensed. Thus, though every body is visible, in this broad sense, there are things of bodies that are not. Among these are the senses.

¹⁶ *Ex quorum (sc. elementorum) metrico pro portione conuentu, compactis rate dimensionibus, uegetante anima uiuens corpus efficitur, quamquam mult sint, quae animata non sunt et uiuere negari non possunt. Sed de eis loquimur, quae non solum uiuunt, sed etiam sentiunt, sicut sunt animata rationis expertia.* Ch 6, 42.20-43.4. Cf. Ch. 21.

sense itself. (43.11-13) And this is as true for the other senses. We see here, then, a being (though not in the sense of substance, of course) that, because it is something belonging in some way to the body is corporeal, and yet is not sensible. This is because, though bodily in a way, they are also something of the soul. This is clear because a thing is only sensitive when a soul is present. And when the soul perishes, as with the beasts, the power of sensation is lost with it.

In looking to the power of sensation, which is common to both men and beasts, Claudianus seems to be approaching closely to the Aristotelian notion of the soul as the form of the body.¹⁷ He will make the distinction between form and matter in just a few chapters (Ch. 10), and will discuss more fully the difference between the beasts and man. He sees that the soul of the beast is not a bodily thing, as it gives life to the body. Yet it is not a distinct being as the human soul is. Hence though incorporeal, it is not incorruptible, for all its activities are bound up with the body. So that when the body ceases to be able to obey the promptings of the soul, i.e., when it perishes, the soul, whose whole being is tied up with the body, perishes, too.¹⁸ This is not so for the human soul, for it partakes of intelligible life and so shows itself to be of another order than the souls of beasts. In addition to sharing with them in the life of sensation, it also shares with the angels in the life of reason.¹⁹

¹⁷ However true this may be about the soul of the beast, he does not see the human soul this way. He holds strongly to the opinion that man is his soul: *de vero homine, hoc est de hominis anima quaerimus*. Fr. Fortin discusses Claudianus's understanding of the union of body and soul in chapter 3 of *Christianisme et culture philosophique*. The union is not one of form and matter, but of two distinct substances, a kind of hypostatic union. See, *ibid.*, 112ff.

¹⁸ *Ita cum animalis cuiuspiam corpus dissonantia sui discederit, recurrentibus ad regiones suas elementorum particulis anima non habens quo intentiones suas explicet pecudis deperit, humana requiescit ab his tamen tantum motibus, quibus corpus movebat per loca ipsa per tempus inlocaliter mota*. Ch. 21, 76.4-9.

¹⁹ He will, later on, speak of man as composed of spirit, soul, and body (following St. Paul). And in the resurrection, the soul is transformed into spirit. Hence he seems to see the spirit as separating the human soul from the beast.

So the souls even of the beasts are incorporeal, and give rise in the beast to the life of sensation. Their sense-power, though not sensible itself, is still dependent on the body for its activity, which, unlike the life of the soul, is confined to the locality of the organ. If we attend to these things, we will see that the power of sense is a middle between the invisible (i.e., things not able to be sensed) and sensible bodies. It takes from its being tied to and bound up in the body that it is corporeal and from the incorporeal soul from which it arises that it is invisible.²⁰ Hence between the invisible and incorporeal and the visible and corporeal there lies the invisible corporeal thing, namely, our sense powers. If it is clear that there can be such a middle, does it seem far-fetched that there would also be between the incorporeal Creator and the corporeal creature a being that has a share in the being of both? Since it has come to be, it cannot share with the Creator that it is a creator, but it can share with it the perfection of being incorporeal. In this it would stand above the corporeal creature; yet since, like the creatures in the sensible order, it has a beginning, it shares its creaturely existence. Hence there ought to be between the incorporeal creator and the corporeal creature an incorporeal creature. Seeing the reasonableness of the soul sharing in an attribute of God, this can be put another way. In between God and the body, which is wholly unlike god (note that it is opposed to God in respect to both being a creature and corporeal) there is a creature that is like God. And so it seems reasonable to expect that in creating, God would not only make what is unlike Him; he would also make that which is like him.

²⁰ ...*inter inuisibile incorporeum et corpus uisibile est illud inuisibile corporeum, quod in nobis uisus, auditus, odoratus, gustus et tactus est: quae quoniam non nisi in animato sunt corpore, ex utriusque diuersi commercio eadem et corporea sunt et inuisibilia trahentia de corpore uisibili ut corporea sint, de incorporeo animo ut sint inuisibilia.* (Emphasis added.) The word *commercium* is interesting. Its first sense is that of trade, or commercial intercourse, which would point to the distinct properties of each meeting in their activities, but there is another sense of the word that gives this passage a more Neoplatonic feel, that of forbidden, or illicit commerce (in fact in the Code of Law of Theodosius it is equivalent to *collusio*; see Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, under *commercium*).

And so, by the time the reader comes to the end of this part of the text, he should be moved to see that it is desirable and reasonable to expect that an incorporeal creature, not the meanest, but rather the *potissima pars* of creation, be created. This *prooemium*, if you will, should have properly disposed us to receive the arguments that Claudianus is about to put before us.

That There Is an Incorporeal Creature

In the chapters that follow, Claudianus begins to argue more directly to the incorporeality of the soul. It is not until chapter 18 that he begins to explain *how* a creature can be unbodily, but *that* the soul is so he attempts to establish in the chapters leading up to it. In these arguments he does not rely directly on the notion that the soul is a middle, but he is laying the groundwork for the later arguments, and so there are some points in these chapters that are still of interest to us. In particular, Claudianus will argue that the soul is unbodily because it is not any particular body, it is not in place, and it is not add-able or cuttable the way that bodies are.

He begins by taking up the question of what kind of body the soul is.²¹ The soul, Faustus claims, is a “subtle air.”²² After all, if the soul is a body, and all bodies are of the elements, then the soul must be one of these. That it is air is suggested by the name *spiritus*, which in its first senses means wind or breath. Therefore Claudianus takes up the argument

²¹ *Ecce habes omnigenum corpus ex omnibus elementis...elige nunc ex quo corporum genere anima sit, si corpus est anima.* (47.4-7) Claudianus commends Faustus for having the prudence to think it made of one of the elements: *callido uidelicet cantus ingenio noluit animae substantiam multorum corporum congregare mixtura, ne ex hisdem contracta principiis quibus corpus extrarium, si perinde diceretur potuisse formari, eatenus uideretur posse dissolui.* (47.15-19)

²² The Letter of Faustus, 10.3.

that it is not possible for our soul, or any other soul,²³ to be composed of air or any other element. If he shows this, he tells Faustus, then “it will be right that you indulge and agree with us.”²⁴

There are two main considerations that Claudianus uses in order to argue that the soul is not air (and by implication, no other body, either). The first is the perceived excellence of the soul over the body, and the other is the soul’s power to understand, and especially to understand God.

He argues first, then, that among the elements there is an order of excellence. Fire, especially, is more excellent than air. This he shows by pointing to the power of fire over air. Air, he points out, suffers from fire, but fire does not suffer from air. The other is that air is able to be shut up in ‘any little jar’, but this in no way happens to fire (the unplaced excels the placed in dignity). But if this is so, and sight is from fire, and the sight of some beasts is more excellent than ours, then the sight of some beasts is more excellent than our souls. But this is manifestly false, therefore, etc.

The second argument is more interesting, and opens the way to other arguments in this part of text. If the soul is air, he argues, then the departure of the visible sun will be its darkness, and its rising will be its light. Though he does not draw this out entirely, he is clearly suggesting that our ignorance (which is called a darkness of the soul) ought to come and go with the rising and setting of the sun. But this is obviously not the case. Moreover, what are we to make of the Evangelist’s words when he speaks of the “Light that illumines

²³ I.e., even the souls of beasts, which though not separable from the body of the beast, are still not bodily.

²⁴ *Sin, ut est et egomet pro ratae ueritatis iure mihi uindico, non humana tantum, sed omnis omnino anima non solum non ex aere, sed ex nullo prorsus constare corpore ratiocinando probabitur, fas erit ut nobis aut consentias aut ignoscas.* (48.8-12)

every man coming into this world”?²⁵ Though couched in biblical terms, terms to which his opponent will have to listen, nevertheless, the analogy of understanding to sight is no new one. Plato uses it famously in the *Republic*²⁶ to help his readers come to an understanding of the relationship of the Good to our minds. And St. Augustine Christianizes that notion in his *De magistro*, in which he reasons to the need for Christ to illumine the mind of the student so that he can come to understand.²⁷

Faustus sees that God is incorporeal. He also see that He is the one that illumines the mind.²⁸ Therefore, to Claudianus “[i]t seems a great wonder if this light [i.e., the sun] has eyes to illumine, yet that true light does not: or if it does, as truly it does, have [such an eye] through which the incorporeal is able to be seen, not only is [that eye] not airy, but I think it is not corporeal.”²⁹ Because the light that comes into the world is not corporeal, and so neither are the things that it illumines, the eye that sees the things *it* illumines must itself not be corporeal. Though he is arguing from a Scriptural authority, nevertheless, as the subsequent chapters make clear, this is for the sake of his opponent only. The reflection of the mind upon its own activities especially shows it by its own natural powers to be

²⁵ Jn 1.9.

²⁶ See Books 6 and 7.

²⁷ In his *De Trinitate*, Augustine invokes the notion of an incorporeal light to ‘correct’ Plato’s theory of how we come to know (recollection): *credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditor, subjuncta sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadjacent, cujus lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. De Trinitate, XII.15.24.* Vernon Bourke, in commenting on this passage, points out the lack of clarity of exactly how this light is to be understood. “Whether this spiritual light is natural as well as supernatural, whether it falls within the framework of the general *concursus* with which God the Creator supports creation, or whether this light is a special help given the individual mind by God—these are questions for which there appears to be no satisfactory answer in the works of St. Augustine.” *Augustine’s Quest of Wisdom: Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo* (Milwaukee, WI: Bruce Publishing Company, 1944), 217.

²⁸ Though how well he understands what this means will be brought out a little later in the text.

²⁹ *ualde autem mirum uidetur, si lux ista babeat oculos quos inluminet, illa autem uera non babeat: aut si habet, sicuti uere habet unde uideri incorporeum potest, non solum non aerium, sed arbitror non esse corporeum.* (Ch. 9.4-7)

incorporeal.³⁰ He is using this text to introduce this aspect of the soul's activities into the discussion.

This turn to a consideration of the nature of our knowing power, though only introduced here, provides a means of moving from a refutation of Faustus's particular position that the soul is a "subtle air" to the more universal refutation of the position that the soul is bodily in any way. The visible sun illumines all bodies. The True Light does not illumine any body: that is not the kind of light that it is.³¹ Therefore, since the light must have some object and some 'eye' to illumine, and these cannot be any body, therefore the mind, the 'eye' of the soul, must be incorporeal.

In giving this attention to the 'eye' of the soul, Claudianus is hinting at a distinction in the soul that raises our thought beyond its being a mere form that, though not itself corporeal, is nevertheless inextricably bound to matter, like the soul of a beast, because it lacks any intention that is not directed toward matter. Our souls, he will say later on, have being like the rock, life, like the plant, and sensation like the beast. There is at each stage a movement up out of matter. The rock has a form,³² though one that allows it only to suffer. The plant has life, whereby it feeds and grows, but cannot move of itself. The beast, in his ability to sense acquires the power to move itself from here to there, and to have some acquaintance with the things around it. All these we share, and in the power of sense especially, as we have seen, we see something of the incorporeal. But in none of them do we see any intention that is not directed towards the body. Our souls give shape to the body,

³⁰ Iamblichus sees in this very ability to reflect a proof of the soul's divine nature (i.e., intellectual life that raises it above the material). It is also in this reflection of the soul upon its act that leads Plato and Aristotle to the same conclusion. See *Phaedo* 79d-e and *De anima* III.4.429a10-28.

³¹ As Augustine's said, it is *sui generis*. See note 27, above.

³² See Ch. 10, where Claudianus chastises Faustus for not seeing the distinction between form and matter. "Whatever is created," says Faustus, "is seen to be matter." (Letter of Faustus, 9.5) But, Claudianus points out, if this is true, since matter is unformed, and the world is formed, creation is not matter. (50.21-22)

make it alive, and endow it with sensation. But if there were not something of our soul that is turned away from matter, then as different as the soul is from the body, it would not actually transcend the world of bodies in its activities, and so would not merit the predicate ‘incorporeal’. But the soul evidently has an ‘eye’, or part, or power, that does in fact have such an intention, and it is because of this intention that it ‘sees’ in the True Light, not in the visible light of this visible sun.

Before turning directly to a consideration of our knowing and the difficulties it poses to Faustus’s position, he takes a couple of chapters to manifest an additional aspect of our souls. He begins by taking exception to Faustus’s claim that “nothing created is incorporeal, because whatever is comprehensible to its Maker is unable to be incorporeal.”³³ After pointing out the consequence of this position, namely that since God is incorporeal, He will be incomprehensible to Himself, Claudianus points to the cause of this mistake: *Et cum discernere nequeas a creato materiam, ab informi formatum, ab aere spiritum, sic imaginem dei pronuntias tamquam potissimum scitus, qui minimorum probari ignarus.* (51.18-21)

In order to help him with this last distinction (*ab aere spiritum*), he then turns to Faustus’s citation of a text from St. Jerome in which he speaks of the opinion that the heavenly bodies are ‘embodied spirits’. After pointing out that what is ‘embodied’³⁴ cannot itself be a body, he takes up a text from St. Paul from the 15th chapter of the First Letter to the Corinthians, in which he speaks of the resurrection of the body: *the animal body will be planted, and a spiritual body will rise.*³⁵ If we are not going to run into grave difficulties in understanding this text, then we will have to attend to the division of man that St. Paul lays

³³ Letter of Faustus, p. 9.6. He seems to hold this position because the incorporeal must be infinite, and so unknowable. See Chapter 2, p. 27.

³⁴ *Corporatum*.

³⁵ 1 Cor 15.44.

down elsewhere: *as your whole spirit and soul and body*.³⁶ In explaining St. Paul, he points out that “after the resurrection one will not live as an animal, namely when one will not eat or drink, when one will not sleep or lay together, the whole animal body will pass over into a spiritual body, because *the whole soul will pass over into spirit*, and the whole spiritual body will be for the sake of the spirit dwelling within it.”³⁷ Not only must one distinguish the spirit from air, one must also separate it from the soul. The soul busies itself about the affairs of the body (eating, drinking, etc.); these are not the affairs of the spirit.³⁸ This distinction can be hard to make in practice because of the tendency of the spirit to lower itself to the concerns of the body, i.e., to lower itself to the level of the soul: “if this spirit in this life certainly has desires contrary to those of the flesh and has not left off turning itself away from the body and its desires, rightly will it experience no difficulty with this in eternity.”³⁹ That the true business of the spirit lies in the world of being rather than becoming, to express the idea in Platonic terms,⁴⁰ or that it lies in desiring to be united to that world of being, is shown most perfectly in the lives of the saints, but also by the philosophers. There is in us, then, something that separates us from the beasts, and has intentions away from the body.⁴¹

³⁶ 1 Thess 5.23.

³⁷ *Post resurrectionem non animaliter uiuendum est, scilicet ubi non edendum uel bibendum, ubi non dormiendum neque coeundum est, transibit totum animale corpus in spiritale corpus, quia et anima tota transibit in spiritum, et erit totum spiritale corpus propter inhabitantem spiritum.* (56.21-57.1, emphasis added.)

³⁸ He does not here explicitly say what the business of the spirit is, but it is implied when he speaks of the soul being changed *ut deum videat, quem flagrantia castae caritatis inbianit*. (56.18-19)

³⁹ Though the discussion begins from the authority of St. Paul, here in this passage it comes back to a place where the philosophers had expressed themselves. Plato will say very similar things in the *Phaedo*, though he does so in the context of a myth. His followers, esp. Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus will all see this as a philosophically attainable doctrine.

⁴⁰ That such things are the true business of the spirit can also be seen from the pleasure that it receives from being engaged in pursuit of the divine.

⁴¹ *Duplex ergo est angelica sicuti est humana substantia: habens corpus totius facilitatis maximaeque pulchritudinis, quod hominibus cum iubetur adpareat, habens incorporeum quo deum semper uideat iuxta illud euangelicum quo dictum est: quia angeli eorum semper uident faciem patris mei.* (57.20-25) This text is the conclusion of an argument that angels, like men, have bodies, and so are composed of a part (the body) that, though more beautiful than ours, is, as ours should be, at its beck and call, and another part (the spirit) that always sees God, like ours should.

His consideration of the higher activities has revealed that the soul is not any body. It also shows us that the soul is not in place. Claudianus shows this by looking particularly at our ability to know God: *Valde autem stupeo quo modo quispiam Christianus doctoris praesertim loco definat cuilibet pulchro, cuilibet sublimi corpori, corpori tamen contemplabilem deum fore et universalem uideri localiter posse, cum deum uidere hoc sit intellegere. Intellectum vero localem non esse uel intellegendo cognoscimus.* (58.3-7)

He emphasizes our knowledge of God, again, because Faustus has granted him God's incorporeality, and so His inlocality. But he intends this argument to extend to anything we know, as his change from *deum* to *universalem* makes clear. The masculine form of the adjective makes clear that he is using it as a name for God, but the use of it in this context shows that it ought to draw our attention to the nature of our knowledge in general. This involves an equivocation on the notion of universal, to be sure (God is not a predicate), but the inability of the universal predicate to be in place, once one has seen that our thought transcends the imagination (something, by the way, Faustus does not seem to have seen), is in fact easier to see: a triangle would have to be scalene or isosceles to be in place, but our notion of triangle is neither.⁴²

If, then, the object of our knowledge is not in place, then neither is our intellect. For "nothing is in place that is not itself a place."⁴³ Moreover, if our intellect is in place, it is itself a place. If it receives God into itself when it knows, then it receives God into place, and so God too will be in place. He will therefore be a body, but this is repugnant.

⁴² Someone like Tertullian, who still thought of God as a body, would have difficulty seeing that God, at least in principle, could not be contained in a place.

⁴³ *Nihil enim locale est, quod non et ipsum locus est.* (ibid., 1.9) This certainly recalls Aristotle's definition of place in *Physics*, Bk 4. Ch. 4: place is the inmost motionless boundary of what contains. And so something can be a place because it is a body, and every body can, at least in principle, be in place.

Therefore, our intellect, which does indeed know God, cannot be a place, or in place. Therefore there is in us something that is unbodily, namely our intellect.

That did not take long. And right on the heels of this argument comes another consideration: that of the additivity and divisibility of the bodies, and how these cannot be attributed to the soul. Many souls that understand perfectly the same thing do not understand it better than one. Nor do many souls desiring the same thing desire it more than one. These souls are all said to be of one will. Nor are souls cuttable. If they were and they are spread throughout the body so that they can give life to the whole, they would be lessened if some part of the body were cut off: presumably the part of the soul that gave life to that part of the body would be lost. Therefore, some part of the powers that belong to the soul, such as the memory, should be lessened. But this does not happen. Thus, the soul must not have part outside of part as bodies do, and so the soul cannot be a body.

That divisibility, or cuttability especially, belongs to bodies as such is shown by Aristotle in Bk 6 of the *Physics*. It is also an idea that forms much of the Neo-Platonic notion of the body, and signals its gross imperfection. Divisibility, in a broader sense, however, does belong even to the soul, as it can be pulled in its loves toward the material world on the one hand, and toward the intelligible on the other. It is in fact the task of philosophy precisely to overcome this divisibility and bring the soul back to its original unity. In his *Confessions*, St. Augustine sees the existence of man as extended in time, and so in this sense divisible.⁴⁴ But a body, extended in space as well as in time has extension in such a way that its existence is not only now but also then, even in the now its existence is not only here, but also there. In virtue of the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth, body has part outside of part. Hence

⁴⁴ Book XI.

no body can coincide with another entirely. But souls, as is clear from such expressions as “they were of one heart and one mind”⁴⁵ show that they can.

The human soul, then, cannot be a body, for it is not made of any of the elements, it is not in place, and this is because it is not extended, having part outside of part. Hence this consideration of the soul’s activities has shown *that* it is not a body. But the question of how such a creature can be conceived, though in places hinted at must now be taken up in earnest.

How There Can Be an Incorporeal Creature

Before turning to Claudianus’s arguments, it is important to point out an assumption about the nature of the soul that informs his discussion of the soul’s incorporeality. This is that the soul is a distinct substance, like the body. I am my soul. This is an assumption that runs through Platonism, beginning from the *Phaedo*. Recall Socrates’ jest with Crito, who after having listened to Socrates’ account of the immortality of the soul asks the unhappy question, “how shall we bury you? In any way you like,” comes the reply, “if you can catch me.”⁴⁶ The notion of death being the separation of the soul and body seems to suggest this. Hence it is that Claudianus is inclined to make this assumption himself. Faustus also makes this same assumption, as is clear by the very position Claudianus is refuting. If the soul is a body, it must be distinct from the fleshly body, and so a distinct substance.

But if it is a distinct substance, it must have its own properties. Faustus sees them to be its subtleness and quickness. But Claudianus, who has fairly mocked these notions, must

⁴⁵ Cf. Acts 4.32.

⁴⁶ *Phaedo* 115b. The objection raised by Simmias that the soul is a harmony (86a ff) goes against the implicit assumption earlier in the discussion that the soul is a complete substance. This forces Socrates to attend, at least briefly, to this problem, which he does with uncharacteristic directness, rattling off a number of quick syllogisms to show that the notion that the soul is an accident of the body is not reasonable.

find other, less bodily properties, and yet ones that distinguish it from its Creator. These properties, however, cannot be something wholly other than those of the body, for if this were so, then it is hard to see how we would become aware of them, given our reliance on the bodily world for our coming to know.⁴⁷ Here his example of sensation is helpful. It distinguishes itself not by having properties entirely its own, but by having them partake of the properties of both the ‘invisible’ and the ‘corporeal’ so that it, and its properties, can hold a middle place between the wholly invisible (and incorporeal) and the corporeal.

The notion of the soul as a middle being, as has been pointed out above, shows that its presence among the beings of the universe, which would be incomplete without it, is a desirable one. It is that same middle place, more perfectly understood, that will reveal its possibility. In order to show this, Claudianus has recourse to the idea of motion.

In a way this recourse to motion is not surprising, for it is motion (or change) that separates creatures from their Creator. God is immutable. In his perfection he lacks no good that change could bring to Him. Creatures, on the other hand, are obviously not immutable, because they necessarily have at least come into being. However excellent their being might be afterwards, this remains true: they are not immutable. However, to focus on God’s immutability in attempting to locate the soul in a *middle place* among beings is not terribly helpful. Even if one could show the nature of the change the soul undergoes to be more excellent than that of bodies, it would not bring the mutable any closer to the immutable. But finding a way of speaking of *motus* with respect to God would make such a location possible.

⁴⁷ Even if this dependency is more a punishment than natural. See Ch. 24.

Claudianus is certainly aware of the doctrine of God as the unmoved mover. In fact, he refers to such a necessity almost at the beginning of his discussion of motion.⁴⁸ And he cautions us to keep this in mind during this discussion, so that we do not misunderstand what he is saying: “Keep this in mind for a little, while we separate the motion of the soul from the motion of the body.”⁴⁹ This separation is just what he needs to explain how an incorporeal thing can be a creature. Like bodies, and unlike God, it will be mutable. And yet, if its nature is to be above that of bodies, and so closer to the divine nature, it will have to have a likeness to God that bodies cannot have.

In order to make this separation, he refers back to the division of motion that he made while discussing the problem of God’s suffering in Chapter 3.⁵⁰ Motion, he reminds us, is of three kinds: stable, not in place, and in place. (64.14-15) The first of these is, of course, the most difficult to understand. It belongs to God, and had been used by earlier thinkers to help explain how it is that God could create in time, and yet be unchangeable.⁵¹ Claudianus recalls this:

There is stable motion because God did not always make creation but nevertheless, He did not wish to create with a new will when He created it because He always willed to create it then when He made it. *Then* is a signification of time, [but] does not always pertain to time. Therefore, this *then* pertains to the beginning of time, not to time, because the stability of the sempiternal Will embraces temporal motion, and through this to always will a *then* is a stable motion.⁵²

⁴⁸ *Hic oportet accipias nihil moveri posse nisi ab inmoto, atque ut id doceamus exemplo, digitum certe nisi stante manu movere non possumus, motus autem brachii ab humeri stabilitate est.* (64.23-65.2)

⁴⁹ *Tene istud cum paulisper animi motum a corporis motu discernimus.* (65.3-4)

⁵⁰ See 30.24-31.6.

⁵¹ See the discussion of this term in Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 105ff.

⁵² *stabilis motus est quod deus creaturam non semper fecit, sed tamen eandem non nova voluntate tunc creare voluit cum creavit, quia semper tunc voluit creare cum fecit. tunc temporis significatio est, semper non ad tempus pertinet. tunc ergo istud ad*

But Claudianus is not now concerned with the problem of God's eternity and a beginning of creation in time. Rather, the description of God's eternity as a stable motion provides a way to understand the soul in relation to God on the one hand and creatures on the other. It is intended to speak of God, although an unmoved mover, as supremely *active*. Unlike a rock, God is not inert. Thus, though the soul does not move as God does nor as bodies, the notion of the soul as falling away from His immutable activity provides a way to see how it is that the soul can be unbodily and yet not be immutable.⁵³

There are, then, three motions: stable, not in place, and that in place.⁵⁴ It is the middle motion that belongs to the soul. That motion not in place cannot belong to bodies is evident, but how is it distinct from stable motion, whose name is meant to signify by its standing that it is not moved according to place? The standing referred to in the notion of stable motion signifies not only a negation of change with respect to place, but also of time, as when we speak of time *standing still*. Thus, though the first introduction of the motion of the soul is to separate it from that of bodies, Claudianus is quick to contrast it with that of God through its temporality.⁵⁵

principium temporis pertinet, non ad tempus, quia temporaneum motum stabilitas sempiternae uoluntatis includit, ac per hoc semper tunc uelle stabilis motus est. (64.16-23)

⁵³ It is interesting to note that Claudianus does not seem to view the difficulty in terms of potency and act, as St. Thomas did (see *De ente et essentia*). In all his uses of *potentia*, Claudianus sees it as an active power, often placed alongside *vis* as a synonym. Nor does he use the term *passio* except when speaking of Christ's Passion, with one exception, when he is going through the Categories in chapter 19. Even *adfectus*, which he speaks of as a synonym for *passio* is only used a few times outside of c. 3, and generally it refers to an accidental form, and so more to an actuality that has befallen a thing than focusing on the *potency* that such an addition to being implies. Hence, Faustus's challenge that an incorporeal being lacks a principle of changeability (matter) is not being met head on. Rather, Claudianus, beginning from God's activity must find a way to limit the activity of the creature. This can be done for bodies quite readily, for they evidently are limited in their activity by place and time.

⁵⁴ *Tres ergo esse motus, stabilem, inlocalem localemque iam notum est.* (64.14-15)

⁵⁵ *Sicut...deus stabiliter mouetur, sic anima temporaliter.* Ibid., p. 65.5-6. *Mouetur* here must have the signification of the middle voice.

Time provides the way to understand the limit of the soul's activity. God's motion, because it stands (i.e., is stable), is outside of time, and because it is not the activity of a body, is also outside of place. These two different reasons for distinguishing God's motion from that of bodies allows Claudianus to make the separation between the motions of the soul and the body in such a way that the soul's motion arises through a falling away from the divine, but not as far as that of the body.⁵⁶ The soul moves in time, and therefore is not eternal. That it does move in time is evident from the changes it undergoes in its affections: *temporale est autem, quod paulo ante superba, nunc humilis, prius laetam nunc tristis...*⁵⁷ But it does not move in place because it is not a body.

Though he will explain the reason for the soul moving in time, and only in time, in the chapters that follow, Claudianus spends the rest of this chapter giving the foundations for this motion, which lie in the soul's divisibility on the one hand, and its uncuttability on the other. The first especially helps to explain the soul's position as a middle mover.⁵⁸ Though Claudianus does not use the term divisible to describe the soul here, he does in fact describe it as such. In order for the soul to move the body to do its bidding, it gazes upon the incorporeal forms in order to be guided in its rule over the members. Because the forms are themselves unbodily, this gaze is itself something that does not involve place (*inloca*). While it is so gazing, its intentions become fixed toward the member that it moves in order to bring about a likeness of the form in matter.⁵⁹ By looking toward that eternal,

⁵⁶ That motion in time is a falling away from the divine perfection, but in such a way as to be like it, in fact to be an image of its eternality, is clear from the *Timaean*.

⁵⁷ 65.6-7.

⁵⁸ At this point in the text Claudianus asks his reader to be more attentive: *adtentioem mihi lectorem opus est*, signaling that he is coming to the crux of the matter. (But one cannot help but wonder if he is not subtly mocking Faustus's similar admonition, which he had earlier castigated him for.)

⁵⁹ *Stabit ergo anima in contemplatione formarum ut moueat corpus in formatione formabilium, quae formarum ueritas nisi rationali conspicabilis non est. stat enim omnis anima in adpetitu rationalis et in consilio.* (66.6-9)

unchangeable form, in its will and mind it participates in its immobility; it too becomes an unmoved mover. Since, moreover, it must have a fit instrument for its work, the soul must also stretch itself out to the body to give it life. Hence, unlike the Divinity, its activity is divided between the gaze upon the eternal and the governance of the material. This division gives rise to the question whether the soul uses one *part* for one activity and another for another; that is, whether this division of activity should be explained by a cuttability⁶⁰ of its substance. As, for instance, if one walks and talks at the same time, this is possible only because there are different members, separated in place, that make this possible: namely, the tongue and the legs. Claudianus answers this question by looking again at the activities of the soul—giving life, sensing—and reminds us that the soul does all these things with the whole of itself. The soul can move in time because it lacks the unity of God, is divisible in its intentions; but because of the unity that it does have, its uncuttability, it is not subject to motion in place, like a body.

But if the soul is uncuttable, and a body must be cuttable to be moved, as it seems,⁶¹ how is the soul to be moved? Aristotle's division of beings into the ten Categories arises from our experience of bodily motion. A thing is here and then there, is white and now black, is five feet tall and then six feet tall, is a son and then a father, etc. In each of these changes something different about the beings we encounter through our senses is revealed. But this is because the objects of sense do not possess all they are at once or in the same way. Thus we distinguish a thing from its quantity, its qualities, relations, etc. This distinction provides the means for finally separating out the motion of the soul from the motion of the body. God, being completely one, undivided, and not subject to change, cannot be placed

⁶⁰ See the discussion of *insecabile* above.

⁶¹ Aristotle, by looking at the potency of motion, argues that a body must be divisible in order to be moved. See *Physics*, Bk. 6, ch. 4, 234b10-20.

into any category.⁶² Bodies, with their dispersed being, are subject to them all. Souls, however, are subject to some, but not all.

This distinction places the soul again in the middle of things. And Claudianus's way of putting it brings this out quite clearly, and in fact shows the soul to be more like God than bodies in this: *ex illis Aristotelicis categoriis nulli prorsus subiacet essentia diuina, rursus anima humana non omnibus subiacet, porro corpus quodlibet subiacet omnibus.* (69.4-6) The adverbs he uses are artfully employed to insinuate his teaching. *Prorsus* has as its first sense *straight on*, and then *utterly* or *entirely*. The sense in which it is used here is clearly in these later senses, but the directional notion will be picked up in what follows. He introduces the clause concerning the soul's subjection to the categories with *rursus*, which signifies a turning back, which is what the soul must do to enjoy its true life, as we will see. This ability to turn back allows it to be like God, and so, instead of stating that the soul is subject to *some*, he states rather that it is subject to *not all* the categories, echoing the *none* that God was said to be subject to. Finally, the clause concerning bodies is introduced by *porro*, which has the first sense of *forward*, which, given the use of *rursus* in the preceding clause, carries the sense of forward away from God, and so is meant to have its later sense of *afar off*.⁶³ Bodies are afar off from God and so *every body whatever* (*quodlibet*) is subject to *all* the categories (note the emphatic final position of *omnibus*). The rest of the chapters that follow are in a way simply an unfolding of what is contained in this brief sentence.

But at this point, one should be mindful of Faustus's position. Given, as was pointed out, the categories are manifested to us by the motion of sensible bodies, a thing ought to be

⁶² The way in which Claudianus excludes God from the categories is interesting. He denies that God is subject to any of the categories of accidents, as is not surprising, but he simply points out that there is a tenth, from which the rest arise: *Nam de deo non dicimus qualis est, quia non potest comparari quasi ad aliud, ut dicatur: talis est. nec dicimus quantus est, quia non mole magnus est...iam decima, immo prima est ipsa substantia, de qua haec praedicamenta texuntur.* (69.7-15)

⁶³ For the senses of these words, see their entries in Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*.

subject to all or to none. *Not all* does not seem to be a possibility. Indeed, quantity, the second category discussed by Aristotle, is at the root of many of the subsequent categories. For some, this dependence is obvious: that a thing can be somewhere clearly follows upon its having quantity. So also with the category of position (*situs*), and because motion follows quantity, that a thing is somewhere and then somewhere else also follows quantity. Even our affections seem to depend upon quantity; I cannot blush without a surface, nor can there be a shape without surface.

If one looks carefully at Aristotle's discussion of the category of quality, one will note that though some kinds of quality clearly follow quantity (again, shape is the most obvious example), the first kinds he discusses do not. Dispositions and habits, though they can be said of bodies (as 'a healthy disposition'), can also be said, and said more obviously, of things that pertain to the soul, such as knowledge and virtue. These are, in fact, the first examples that Aristotle gives us within this category.⁶⁴ And they are things that are said only of ensouled beings.

Claudianus's argument is fairly simple. The soul is able to be incorporeal, like God, because, though not having any quantity, and so not subject to change in quantity or place or any of the categories that follow directly upon place, it is still subject to quality, and therefore to change in quality. Because of this the soul is able to be said to be 'such and such'.⁶⁵ And so, unlike God, it is subject to change, a change which, though again not in place, is in time.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Categories*, ch. 8, 8b27-35: ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολλῷ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ τε ἐπιστήμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἢ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων...ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή...οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι. (*Aristotle*, vol. 1 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938], 62. Emphasis added). Claudianus may have read the *Categories* in Greek. If so, Aristotle's very language separates these qualities from motion quite a bit. It may have suggested ways in which the soul is able to remove itself from the world of (loco)motion.

⁶⁵ ...ita de animabus propter inlocalitatem uel qualitatem taliter esse uel taliter iure pronuntiatur. (82.10-11)

Still, death is defined as the separation of the soul and the body⁶⁶ and the account of Christ raising Lazarus from the dead⁶⁷ shows the soul to both depart from and re-enter the body.⁶⁸ Does not this departure and entrance of the soul, which at least on the side of departing, is evident to us all, show that the soul is in the body as in a place, and therefore, in spite of all the arguments to the contrary, is a thing in place and therefore a body? In fact, the very words that we use to discuss this question, departure and entrance, are terms that signify a relation to place.

That the soul is *in* the body, Claudianus does not want to deny. However, he goes to great lengths to show that this does not imply that the body *contains* the soul the way that a jar contains water. Faustus's great difficulty is that he is stuck in the letter that kills, and is unable to raise his understanding from the fleshy significations of our words to their spirit, which gives life to the mind. And so, Claudinaus devotes the next few chapters to helping the reader move from a corporeal understanding of the soul's dwelling in the body to a more spiritual understanding, one more proper to its own nature.⁶⁹

God is life and the source of life to all that lives in this world. And to the extent that a thing is alive, it has powers that in some way transcend the material, dissected existence of bodies. Thus the plants, which do not have souls⁷⁰ and yet are alive, manifest in the activities proper to them as living that life is in them, though it is not in them as in place. "In the

⁶⁶ See *Phaedo* 64c.

⁶⁷ Jn 11.38ff.

⁶⁸ Letter of Faustus, 13.

⁶⁹ *Quod ut magis pateat, hoc ipsum diligentius uentilemus atque ab extremo uiuentium genere ad rationalem quoque uitam ordinatim gradatimque ueniamus...* (71.3-5)

⁷⁰ *sed animata si essent, motu proprio non carerent, quia sunt quae mouentur motu non proprio. sentirent etiam uulnus inflictum.* (72.6-8) The ability to move in ways other than those of natural bodies (i.e., up, down, or in circles) and the ability to sense are what most of all separate the ensouled from other bodies. See *Phaedo* and *De anima* I.1.

established order of things, the lower are made by the higher.”⁷¹ And so, God, by His power and goodness combines the elements into a harmony that results in the life of the tree. This life is lost, not by the coming into the mix of some other body, but by the loss of the harmony itself. And so when these same elements are allowed to bring discord into the plant, the harmony is weakened or destroyed, and with it the life that was there. It is by the disobedience of the elements, not by a local recession, that the tree loses its life. The body of a tree does not lose (*amitti*) its life (by life departing), rather it itself forsakes (*dimitti*) it. (72.3-4) Moreover, if one looks at the power of the plant to reproduce, which belongs to it precisely as living, one sees clearly that this life cannot be in the plant as in a place. A grain of wheat will give rise to countless offspring, and so these offspring are in⁷² that grain in some way, for they will all *come forth* from that one grain, but clearly not as from a place but rather from *causalibus secretis*. So many seeds cannot be locally present in such a small seed, as a cutting open of the seed will surely reveal, if one needs more sensible evidence. Hence the life even of plants, which does not rise to the dignity of a soul, cannot be said to enter into and depart from the plant as in or from a place.

If we turn now to the beasts, there is in them, in addition to life, which they share with the plants, motion and sense, and so souls. Unlike our souls, though, and like the life of the plants, these souls are mortal, neither coming before or going on after the life of the body. (74.19-20) Yet neither can they be thought to be in the body they serve as in a place. Illness again shows that the failure in maintaining the animal lies on the side of the body. For we have the experience of someone losing the use of a limb:

⁷¹ *inferiora nempe rato rerum ordine a superioribus adficiuntur.* (72.18-19) A principle dear to the Neoplatonists.

⁷² *reposita.* (74.12)

See—that man has a strong left hand, but he has lost the use of his right through the attack of a humor, as happens: this, remaining with the rest of the body, even if it is not in the same health, remains in the same species; nevertheless, it does not serve the inclinations of the soul. What shall we say, that the soul has been beaten back and has departed from it as from a place? And where did it go? For to where did it depart from there? But perhaps it gathered itself to the remaining part of itself: yet the soul already fills the whole body, and is anything able to be added to something full and not overflow?...because this can never happen, observe this: that the soul did not lose the power of commanding, rather, the hand lost the power of serving.⁷³

If the whole soul gives life to the whole body, and we see that the body becomes unable to follow the commands of the soul while the soul is still present, then we can extrapolate from this to death, and understand it as a failure of the body as a whole to be able to serve the soul. Hence, though we speak of death through words with spatial signification, because the actual causes are hidden from us, we cannot *understand* it in spatial terms. Thus the soul ‘departs’ when the body is no longer able to obey it. Because the body is still ‘present’ before us but the lack of vital activity shows that the soul no longer is, we speak of the soul as having departed.

This should make clear that souls are not in the body as in a place. But the truth of this is even more evident when we turn to the human soul. For the life of the plant and the soul of the beast are mortal, and both begin with the living thing and perish with it. But our souls do not. They transcend the material in their existence and their activities, and reveal their character as holding a place above that of the rest of the visible creation. The soul of

⁷³ *ecce ille laevae manus uigore ualet, usum dexteræ ictu ut adsolet humoris amisit: manus reliquo adhaerens corpori, etsi non in eodem uigore, in eadem permanet specie, nec tamen seruit nutibus animae. quid dicemus, pulsa exinde localiter cessit anima? et quo abiit, quo inde discessit? sed forte ad reliquam partem sui se contulit: sed iam totum corpus inplebat anima, et potest adici pleno quippiam quin superfluat?...quod quoniam fieri nequaquam potest, illud potius intueri quod non anima imperandi uim perdidit, sed uires seruiendi manus amisit. (75.5-18)*

the beast gives it the power to move and to sense, to follow its appetites and to have knowledge of the world around it. But God has bestowed these powers so that the animal soul can serve its body, to maintain it in health so the animal can continue its existence.⁷⁴ Hence, as has been pointed out above, the soul of the beast has no intentions that do not pertain to the body. It senses so that it can know its food, and perceive dangers. It has appetite so that it can seek that food, or flee danger when present. But it cannot even know that for the sake of which it exercises these powers, namely, its own substance.⁷⁵

When he comes to examine the activity of the human soul in this context, namely, the departure of the soul from the body, strong Neoplatonic influences appear, and to an extent that is surprising for a Christian. The relation of the soul and its activities to the body raises questions about the nature of the union of soul and body. Fortin devotes a chapter of his work to laying out Claudianus's understanding of this union and its Neo-Platonic influences.⁷⁶ This question does not directly concern us; rather we will look to these passages to see what they reveal about the nature of the soul as a middle being.

The incorporeality of the human soul is manifested most through the act of understanding. And so although the discussion of life and the irrational soul has been helpful to show that even in things that do not transcend the body entirely, they must still be understood to be themselves unbodily. How exactly Claudianus understands the relation of the mortal soul to the body it vivifies is not entirely clear;⁷⁷ that its existence is utterly bound

⁷⁴ *administrat irrationalis anima corpus animale in salutem.* (82.2-3)

⁷⁵ *animae belluarum etsi imagines locorum naturaliter retinent, ipsius tamen substantiae suae scientiam non habent.* (71.15-17)

⁷⁶ See *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, Chapter 4. Fortin shows that the notion of the hypostatic union is very operative in Claudianus's understanding of the unity of soul and body. It is this that allows him to see a distinction of substance between the soul and the body, such that he can maintain that the soul is what is most properly the man, on the one hand, and still see man as composed of soul and body, on the other.

⁷⁷ Though he obviously does not follow Plato and the Pythagoreans in seeing in the beasts human souls; he sees a real difference between the souls of humans and those of beasts.

up with that of the body is clear.⁷⁸ It is also clear that this is not the case for human souls, as attention to its activities manifest.

Understanding, understand thyself!⁷⁹ Our knowledge of the sensible world might make it difficult to see the incorporeality of the soul, tied up as it is with the images of things sensed contained in its memory.⁸⁰ But we are able to know something else; in fact, we cannot avoid knowing it, namely, we know that we know. This reflection on our act of knowing reveals to ourselves that we are things that can think—we can, unlike the beasts, know our own substance. In order for us to do this, because the knower and the known are one,⁸¹ our knowledge of our knowledge must coincide with itself. In other words, the whole of it must ‘touch’ the whole of the other. But, it has been shown that this is not possible with bodies. Even if a page of paper is folded back on itself, so that the whole surface of one coincides with the surface of the other, what is beneath or above remains untouched. Thus our ability to carry out the command given at Delphi shows our souls not to be in place.

He lends emphasis to this by looking to St. Paul (*quem sui iam substantia non latebat*)⁸² who points out that “while we are in the body we wander far from the Lord.”⁸³ Which implies that the soul though in the body is not a body. But it also points to the fact that it can be with God. And this leads to the second ‘proof’ that the soul is not in place. God is

⁷⁸ They neither pre-exist or survive the body. Furthermore, as has been seen, all the activities of such souls are directed toward the body.

⁷⁹ *Intellectum tuum, si potes, intellege.* (76.12-13)

⁸⁰ *Sed istius modi inclusiones in memoriam patitur anima, ex qua nihil phantasiarum reutilitare ac proferre posset, nisi easdem a formis corporum per corporeos sensus hausisset.* (84.24-85.3) *hinc est ille prae oculis eius imaginum corporearum tumultus se semper obiectans, ut si quando uel ad se uel ad deum suum ratiocinando nititur, semper ad corporea phantasiis corporis auocetur.* (85.17-21)

⁸¹ *Intellegisne intellegibile et intellegens nequaquam posse seiungi?* (91.22-23)

⁸² 77.16-17.

⁸³ 2 Cor 5.6.

present to the soul, and this is obviously not by being in the soul as wine is in a jar, for “God is Spirit.”⁸⁴

And because the soul that is holy is taken up into God with a chaste affection, note that neither its wandering nor its fatherland has the nature of place. Is God not with the soul in this life, even if it is not with God? For it is one thing to be with God and another not to be without God, for not according to place does one go to Him, nor does one depart according to place. Hence, that soul is with God which sees, that is understands, God. And that soul is not with God, naturally, which does not understand Him. God, however, is present both to the one understanding and the one not understanding, but not according to place.⁸⁵

Though God is present to all His creatures, only the human soul can really be with Him, as it is only through the understanding that the soul is able to turn toward Him. But if He is with us “not according to place,” how then could we be with Him, that is, understand Him, in a way that is in place?

But the soul must turn itself toward its God in order to be with Him, in order to return to its fatherland, which is God.⁸⁶ And because it is wandering in this fleshy body, it must do this through its acquaintance with the corporeal world. Yet, if one attends closely to this knowledge, knowledge of things that in themselves are bound up by time and place, one sees that even here this knowledge is not “according to place.” Even in our memory, we see signs of this, for it contains likenesses of everything that we have encountered in our lives. Like the seed, which contains in some way the innumerable seeds to which it will give rise,

⁸⁴ Jn 4.24.

⁸⁵ *et quoniam sancta anima adfectu casto in deum rapitur, animaduerte nec peregrinationem illi localem esse nec patriam. numquid in hac uita deus cum anima non est, etiam si ipsa cum deo non sit? aliud enim est esse cum deo, aliud non esse sine deo, quia non localiter ad illum uenitur nec localiter ab illo disceditur. proinde anima illa cum deo est, quae uidet, hoc est intellegit deum, et illa cum deo non est, quae utique non intellegit deum. deus autem et intellegenti et non intellegenti adest inlocaliter.* (80.1-9, emphasis added.)

⁸⁶ *Quae cum ita sint, peregrinatur anima in corpore, cuius corruptione, debilitate atque indigentia a patria, hoc est a deo separatur.* (80.15-17)

so these infinite colors, sounds, smells, are contained in the abyss of memory. And yet they are there in a different, and superior, way. For the seed must fall to the ground and die in order to bring forth what is contained in its power, but the things stored in memory are there, in some way, to be recalled and brought forward for consideration. How could this be if they were there as in a place? But this is common to both human and beast souls. These likenesses, though not in place, still have something of the limitations of those things that they are likenesses of. Hence, Claudianus speaks of every color, every sound, every smell, every flavor he has encountered as being present in his memory. Yet there are there also things of grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, music and arithmetic as well, which rise above the simple impressions of sense and help turn our minds to the higher things: “According to the forms of the parts of the world that I see, I learn about unbodily things, with reason helping with regard to the things I do not see, and I embrace the world with this capacity.”⁸⁷

The encounters with bodies, which give form to the imagination and memory, in the human soul, cause, or at least should cause, the soul to come to a recognition of the forms, of which these bodily things it encounters are images, and so behold them in their causes, which are eternal, unmoving, and unbodily. This is perhaps most evident in the consideration of mathematical things.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ *iuxta formas partium mundi, quas uideo, de his quas non uideo adminiculante ratione cognoscens incorporea mundum capacitate complector.* (81.8-10)

⁸⁸ Cf. the legend that Plato had inscribed above the entrance to the Academy “Let no one enter who is without geometry.” See also the importance of geometry in the education of the guardians: “What we need to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to make it easier to see the form of the good. And we say that anything has that tendency if it compels the soul to turn itself around towards the region in which lies the happiest of the things that are, the one the soul must see at any cost...That’s easy to agree to, for geometry *is* knowledge of what always is. –Then it draws the soul towards truth and produces philosophic thought by directing upwards what we now wrongly direct downwards. –As far as anything can.” *Republic* VII, 526e-527b, *Plato: Complete Works*, 1143.

Though things are long through length, length itself is not long. And so for breadth and width. And so, our knowledge of length is not bodily. Claudianus uses the very things that make bodies such that they occupy place, have quantity, and are, indeed, bodies, to show that the soul does not know even bodies in a bodily way.⁸⁹ If *length* is known without being long, *width* without being wide, and *depth* without being deep, then surely nothing we know will have these attributes, and so not be in place. But even when we think of lines and compose from them a triangle, that a triangle is so composed is a truth *aeterna atque indemutabilis*, (89.14) which can not be said of any body. In fact, it is more likely that the whole world will pass away before this truth ceases to be true.⁹⁰ The eye of flesh sees forms that are *tumidae atque locales*, the eye of the soul sees the eternal and unchanging. These are surely not in place, and so surely neither is the soul.

This look at the objects of our knowledge has shown that the soul is not in place, that it is not a body. In looking toward these objects to understand the nature of the soul, Claudianus is following in the tradition that began with the Presocratics, and informed deeply the thought of Plato and Aristotle on these matters. But he goes farther in his conclusions than they do.⁹¹ Claudianus concludes that the soul not only can think, it cannot not think. Thinking is its substance, and so is its willing.⁹² Thus, “if the whole soul loves,

⁸⁹ See Ch. 25, 88-89.

⁹⁰ *Numquid ergo tribus lineis paribus quae semet mutuo capitibus tangunt fieri umquam nisi trigona poterit? aut istud magis nunc uerum est, quam fuit, aut esse hoc uerum aliquando coepit aut aliquando desinet, aut non est facilius corporeum interire mundum, cuius utique tumidae localesque formae istarum inlocalium incorporaliumque sunt imago formarum, quam ut aliquid ex his uel uariari specie uel transmutari loco uel senio ueterescere uel quoquo pacto mutari queat?* (89.15-23)

⁹¹ Plato, to my knowledge, does not consider the way in which a soul would exist apart from the body, and Aristotle, seeing the soul as the substantial form of the body, would see an actuality for the soul that Claudianus would not. Hence, he could say what Claudianus could not, that the mind (the possible intellect) is nothing in act before it understands (*De anima*, Book III, ch. 4, 429a22-24).

⁹² *uerum tu idcirco uel maxime de animae statu falleris, quia aliud animam, aliud esse animae potentias credis. Quod enim cogitat accidens eius est, substantia uero qua cogitat. Hoc equidem de uoluntate oportet agnoscas. Nam sicut tota anima cogitatio est, sit anima tota uoluntas est et quae perfecte nult tota nult.* (86.5-8)

certainly the whole soul is love” which, when one recalls, as he does, that “God is love,”⁹³ makes the soul look again very much like God. And he is aware of this.⁹⁴

In order to keep these bold claims from falling prey to Faustus’s charges of impiety, Claudianus reveals his adherence to the doctrines of the Neoplatonists. The extent to which he is willing to follow them is perhaps surprising for a Christian. It is the soul’s place in the middle of being that again supplies the means of speaking of the soul as so like God, and yet also very unlike. It is particularly the soul’s subjection to division within itself that provides the distance between the Creator and the creature.

This division is manifested through it being subject to change in its affections, a change, as we have seen, that is according to time, but not place. Because of this division in its being, the soul is able to turn in its affections from its Beginning and attach itself to the world of bodies. When this happens, as its punishment, the soul is subject to the seductions and blandishments of the bodily images that flow through sensation into its memory. These images overwhelm it (or can overwhelm it) to the point that it forgets itself, and believes itself also to be a body. And so the soul becomes, in the language of the *Phaedo*,⁹⁵ riveted to the flesh:

[the soul] is certainly never able to imagine anything within the womb, as it were, of the memory unless it has received it through the body. And these are not natural to it, but are punishments. Since from the highest Good (which for it is God) it has descended, enticed by bodily allurements, into a body, therefore, having been thus seduced, it suffers justly within itself that in which it unjustly took delight outside of itself. Do not, therefore, desire to persuade me that the soul is that by which you see it to be disturbed. For if it had remained in the loftiness of its original state,

⁹³ 86.25-87.2 (quoting I Jn 4.8).

⁹⁴ He is careful to add, after he refers to the First Letter of St. John, that the love that is God *talis est, ut nec ipsa diligere nisi bonum nec per eam diligere possit nisi bene*. (87.2-3) He will deny this of the human soul.

⁹⁵ 83d.

from which it has fallen by its own will, that flesh would never desire against the spirit, nor the spirit against the flesh, and if man truly had understood his dignity as, namely, the image of God, he would never *have been set among the foolish beasts*,⁹⁶ that is, so that he should live as an animal. Hence it is that he is a tumult of the bodily images before his eyes, and always gets in his own way so that if he ever strives in his thinking toward himself or his God, he is always recalled to bodily things by the phantasms of the body!⁹⁷

Claudianus has given a sufficient account of the soul's incorporeality. He has explained *that* the soul is not a body, and *how* it can be so without 'grasping at divinity.'⁹⁸ It stands in the middle of the ontological order, partaking of spirituality in its likeness to God, and change in its likeness to bodies. For though it is not subject to all the categories of Aristotle, as bodies are, it is subject to some, and especially the category of quality. This category, like that of quantity, is an immediate subject of change or motion, even in qualities such as knowledge and virtue that are not bound up with quantity. This implies a finitude to its substance, in spite of its incorporeality, that distinguishes it sharply from God: it assures it of its status as a mere creature, in spite of its great perfection and goodness.

His account of the creatureliness of the soul is strikingly like that of Iamblichus as outlined above. But there is a deeper affinity in their thought. Near the end of the text quoted above, Claudianus gives expression to the goodness of the soul by reminding it that it has been created as the image of God. It is in this notion of the soul, in fact, that he sees the

⁹⁶ Ps 48.13 and 21.

⁹⁷ *certum tamen est imaginari illam intra quendam uentrem memoriae nequaquam posse nisi ea, quae per corpus accepit. et haec illi non naturalia, sed poenalia sunt, ut, quoniam a summo bono quod ei deus est inlecebris plecta corporeis defluxit in corpus, persuasa patiatur illud intra semet ipsam iniste, quod extra se dilexit iniuste. non ergo mihi tu illud esse animam persuadere uelis, quo perturbari potius eandem uides. illa namque si in status pristini sublimitate mansisset, a quo sponte dilapsa est, numquam contra spiritum caro, nec contra carnem spiritus concupisset, et si homo uerus, hoc est anima rationalis honorem suum, imaginem scilicet dei intellexisset, numquam insipientibus fuisset comparata iumentis, uidelicet ut animaliter uiueret. hinc est ille prae oculis eius imaginum corporearum tumultus se semper obiectans, ut si quando uel ad se uel ad deum suum ratiocinando nititur, semper ad corporea phantasiis corporis auocetur.* (85.6-21)

⁹⁸ Cf. Phil. 2.6.

most perfect expression of the soul's nature, both in its likeness to its Creator and in its separation from Him in its creatureliness. In other words, it is the most perfect way to express the soul as a middle being, and this too he shared with Iamblichus. How this is so will be explained in the following chapter.

Chapter 6

The Soul as the *Imago Dei*

The Importance of the Notion of Image in *De statu animae*

It is the soul's standing as the mean between God and the material world that explains its incorporeality. As we have tried to show, Claudianus, through the long series of arguments in Book I, is leading his adversary to an understanding of this momentous truth. His arguments culminate in the final chapters, where he reflects upon the soul's knowledge of itself, and how that knowledge reveals to it its true nature. He lets us know that he is approaching more difficult and more important matters at the end of Chapter 20:

So that this may be more clear, let us stir this up more diligently, and come from the farthest kind of living things to the life that is also rational in an orderly and gradual way, so that we may be able to see these three things, memory, counsel, and will, from which the oneness of the human soul is made, although remembering is common to the rational and irrational. (71.3-8)

The previous chapters have been preparing us for what is to come; these later chapters especially are intended to reveal the soul's nature to itself, and allow it to see itself in itself. If it has sufficiently rid itself of the seductions of the senses, what the soul will see is that it is the image God.

Fr. Fortin has shown how deeply indebted, in what follows, Claudianus's understanding of the nature of soul is to the Neoplatonists, and Porphyry in particular.¹

¹ See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 155ff. He is following here the findings of P. Courcelle in *Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources*, tr. Harry E. Wedeck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

What we hope to show, by looking carefully at a different aspect of the discussion, is that there is evidence of influence from another source, namely Iamblichus, informing his notion of the soul, especially where it concerns the distinction between the soul and its Creator. In this part of the text, Claudianus reveals that not only is the soul incorporeal, it is also (or at least should be) self-evident to the soul that it is so. The soul is what we are, and if we cannot see ourselves, then we are blind indeed. However, there is a very clear cause of this blindness. It is our dependency upon the senses for our knowledge. There is something common to our ability to recognize our true nature and the cause of our blindness: the notion of the image. Our phantasms, though alluring, are only images of things that are themselves but images of what is truly real. A realization of this will allow us to look beyond the images to the things that are. But it will also allow us to see our true selves as *imagines Dei*. Furthermore, our experiences of the images in the world of sense will help us to recognize in ourselves, when we understand clearly what it means to be an image, that though very like our Creator, we are also very different. The recognition of the sensible world as a world of images he owes to Plato and his followers, but his understanding of the soul as an image of God seems to come more particularly from Iamblichus.²

Let us turn again, then, to the later chapters of Book I, this time in order to see in them the importance and content of the notion of *imago Dei* for Claudianus. In Ch. 21 Claudianus begins a discussion that leads him to speak of the soul as if the proper thing for it to know first is itself. He separates it from the soul of the beast by this knowledge: the souls

1969), 241-50, where he argues that Claudianus followed the text of Porphyry's *De regressu animae* (in Greek) very closely when he composed the *De statu animae*.

² Though I have tried to show the likeness between Claudianus and Iamblichus in their conception of the soul as a middle being, this is a notion that they share with Porphyry. The soul as an image of the intelligible, however, is a notion that distinguishes them, as will be seen. I am not claiming that Claudianus had any direct acquaintance with the writings of Iamblichus. But there is, as will be shown, a real likeness, *mutatis mutandis* (for the most part), between Iamblichus's understanding of soul as image and Claudianus's.

of beasts cannot know their own substance “since they do not have the eye of reasoning to see themselves, let alone something above them.”³ The use of the verb *uidere* is suggestive of the ease and clarity with which the soul ought to know itself,⁴ although the gerund, *ratiocinandi*, indicates the need for a discourse. However, in the texts that follow, it is the notion of sight, more than discourse, that predominates.⁵ In this incorporeal sight, the soul is distinguished from the beasts and is brought into community with the angels: “Understand, if you can, your understanding, to which alone with the angel it is granted to see these things.”⁶ But perhaps this self-evidence is stated most clearly as the book is drawing to a close. Claudianus writes in the persona of Truth speaking to the soul: “You yourself, O human soul, look into yourself [inquiring] about yourself, and you will remember yourself.”⁷

If the eye of the mind is able to look into itself and behold itself, how is it that it can be deceived about itself, be so deceived that it thinks itself, though it is ‘little less than a god,’ a bodily creature?⁸ The text just quoted points us to the answer: it recalls to us the theory of recollection in Plato’s dialogues. In reminding us of this, it helps us to understand better the state of the soul that could lead to such confusion. In Chapter 24, after referring to Faustus’s comments on the nature of our thought and its reliance upon the things in our memory, he replies with the text quoted at the end of the last chapter.⁹ He says that the soul, though once existing apart from this earthly body, has fallen into it as a punishment, the punishment

³ *Ratiocinandi non habentes oculum, non dicam supra se aliquid, sed se ipsas uidere non possunt.* (71.19-20)

⁴ It is also suggestive of the ease with which it should know *supra se aliquid*. The notion of image will shed light upon this, too.

⁵ *non se nunc aliqua veluti corpuscula oculis mentis obiectent...* (76.10-11)

⁶ *intellectum tuum, si potes, intellege, cui soli cum angelo haec uidere concessum est.* (76.12-13)

⁷ *introinspice te de te ipsa, o humana anima, et te memineris.* (95.16-17)

⁸ *tu certe qui corpus esse te credis, unde incorporeo uerbo uteris?* (94.20)

⁹ 85.6-21. This text is quoted in note 97 in the last chapter.

for being seduced by the beauty of bodies to turn from its true father. And so, it is condemned to being informed in its attempts to know by the *phantasms* of bodily things that come through its senses and dominate its attention. These phantasms are punishments for turning away from its Beginning and Good, and introduce a division in which the flesh lusts against the spirit, and in which his understanding is darkened and disturbed. It becomes forgetful of its dignity as the image of God, and can even be reduced to thinking itself a body, like the things of which its phantasms are images.

This text, so rich in Platonic notions, reveals much of Claudianus's conception of the soul, and shows, too, how far he followed his Neoplatonic predecessors in the development of that conception. It is clear that he thought of the soul as having some sort of existence before being imprisoned in this body.¹⁰ He does not seem to be aware of the theological problems involved in such a notion,¹¹ but it does allow him a way to assert that by nature the soul sees itself as itself, since there is no hindrance to obscure its sight, and yet hold that, in this earthly life, the sight of the soul is obscured and overwhelmed by the phantasms that come between the eye of the mind and its natural objects, itself and God.

This last point leads us to an important insight. The soul knows itself *and* God. Since it is with itself when it is by itself, that it can then gaze upon itself is not surprising, but what

¹⁰ *utrumnam idcirco nunc anima peregrina dicatur, quia in corpore, an quia in tali sit corpore?* (78.19-20)

¹¹ "When the theory of the soul coeternal with God seems difficult to reconcile with Christianity, Claudianus avoids the difficulty, while Augustine devotes a special chapter to it." (P. Courcelle, *Late Latin Writers*, 245.) See, in contrast, St. Augustine's hesitancy on the question of the soul's existence before coming into this earthly body, in *In Gen. ad litt.* X, chs 3-14, in which he raises different accounts of the soul's origin and looks at the different difficulties they raise; with respect to the soul's prior creation, or more generally the soul not being derived from Adam, he sees a real difficulty in accounting for the doctrine of original sin: *anima [infantis] innocentissima est, si ex adam propagata non est. unde quomodo possit iuste ire in condemnationem, si de corpore sine baptismo exierit, quisquis istam sententiam de anima tenens potuerit demonstrare mirandus est.* (Ch. 11) Augustine, sensitive to the difficulty of this question, never appears to have settled it in his own mind. See *Retractationes*, 1.1.80; in commenting on a passage from *Contra academicos* in which he had discussed the origin of the soul: *nec tunc sciebam, nec adhuc scio.* He did reject the notion that the soul is sent into the body as a punishment (see *Epistola* 166.9.7), which Claudianus shares with Origen. This notion was formally condemned by the Church in the 6th century.

is less obvious in turning its gaze upward, it is also able to see God.¹² How is the soul naturally able to see God? The answer to this question is found in the conception of the soul as the *imago Dei*. The notion of image appears in two contexts in the passage quoted above. The first is to remind the soul of its dignity as the *imago Dei*. The second is to explain the deceptions that the soul is subject to. The first comes from Scripture, and the second from Plato. It is in bringing these two notions of image together, or better, by using the latter to fill out the former, that the soul is able to come to the truest notion of itself.

The soul is both like God and unlike God. This would seem to be true of any creature, and yet Claudianus sees this characteristic as separating the soul from the rest of creation, allowing it to fill out the goodness of the universe called for at the beginning of his treatise. But there are different ways of being like. Material creation, because it has come forth from God, has something of goodness in it, and it must in some way reflect its cause, if only faintly.¹³ There is, then, a likeness in bodies, but only to the extent that one can see something of an outline, or an impression of God. Because of this, bodies are called vestiges.¹⁴ The first sense of this word is that of ‘footprint,’ and this sense is probably good to recall here. The footprint is a kind of likeness, but a likeness that consists in being unlike. Where the foot is convex, the print is concave. In this way, it has a likeness like a photographic negative (the name of which is very fitting for bringing out Claudianus’s thought). The negative has something of the thing photographed, but it is only by

¹² That he thinks the soul capable of seeing God as He is, is clear from his praise of Plato in Book II. There he lauds this prince of philosophers for having raised his mind to the vision of the triune God. See Chapter 7, 122.11-20.

¹³ *Creatum corpus, quod nisi creatum non est, aliquod bonum [est].* (39.12-13)

¹⁴ *permanat ergo a summo, quod deus est, per medium, quod anima, ad imum, quod corpora, unitae specimen trinitatis corporibus signa sui inprimens, animabus etiam notitiam tribuens illa formans uisibiliter, has intellegibiliter. cum ergo nihil substantiam nisi essentia capiat et nihil nisi tribus, sicut supra disseruimus, unum fiat, quando tanta est unitas in corpore, hoc est in uestigio trinitatis, quanta est in anima, hoc est in imagine trinitatis, et item cum tanta sit in imagine, quanta est in ipsa trinitate?* Book II, ch. 6. (119.16-25)

consciously trying to see dark where the negative is light, and light where it is dark, that one can come to a recognition of the thing in the photograph. Bodies are like this in relation to God. He is unmoved, they are moved. He is beyond any category, bodies are subject to all. They suffer, He acts.

The soul, on the other hand, is the *image* of God. This is a likeness of a wholly different order, and there is in the soul a real reflection of the very essence of God. Although the soul is subject to some categories, it is not subject to all; though it is moved, it also moves; though it suffers, it also acts. It understands and loves, and is incorporeal. Thus, it is in some respects convex where God is convex.

Now, most of the aspects of the soul just mentioned are things we know about ourselves from our own experience of ourselves, and so that the soul is incorporeal ought to be self-evident, as we have said above. The arguments of Book I, then, take on the task, not so much of *demonstrating* the incorporeality of the soul, as of manifesting a truth of which the soul itself in some way is already aware. But the images of material things, drawn in through the senses, can deceive us, making us think that we are like them, and draw our love to themselves and away from our true selves and the Beginning and End of our selves.

In spite of this tendency, however, if one leaves behind childish ways¹⁵ and recognizes these images for what they are, they provide us with a way of coming to understand ourselves better. We can come to see ourselves in our very being as *imagines Dei*. The notion that we are images of God comes to us, of course, from Scripture. Thus it is a fitting notion for Claudianus to take up in his contest with Faustus. Faustus cannot possibly object to the term, as God has used it. But Claudianus also sees in the word philosophical implications that make it particularly apt for his task; it is a term that contains in it all that he

¹⁵ Cf. Book I, ch. 1.

wants to show of the soul, and in particular, as we shall see, its standing among beings. The notion of *imago Dei* runs through the whole of the first book, not always at the forefront, but never far from sight. Claudianus introduces the idea right at the beginning of his treatment of the soul, and recurs to it, or to the notion of image, a number of times, ending with an emphatic reiteration of the notion at the end of the book.¹⁶ As we hope to show, he sees in this idea a naturally accessible definition of man, and one that if understood correctly makes manifest that the soul, though incorporeal, is nevertheless not God.

Because of the closeness of the likeness it signifies, it is a striking word to appear in the context of manifesting the relation of man to God, and is clearly meant to distinguish man from all the rest of material creation. It occasioned much comment from the Church Fathers from the very beginning. In their works, these Christian writers tended to stay close to the ideas of the Sacred Text, even when they would rely upon the philosophers to fill out their understanding. Though there was philosophical influence, Fr. Hamman describes this more as a Christianizing of a Hellenistic notion, than a Hellenizing of a Christian one.¹⁷ However, in the case of Claudianus, the opposite seems to be more true.

He introduces the notion of man, or, rather the soul, as the *imago dei* almost from the beginning of his discussion of the soul. As he turns from his discussion of the divine impassibility in Ch. 4 of Book I, he turns the reader's mind with these words: The standing of the human soul, that is, of the *divine image*, is now called into doubt.¹⁸ (Emphasis added.)

¹⁶ The term is used a number of times in chs. 4-5, only occasionally in the following chapters. It is used repeatedly in the last two chapters. (See below.)

¹⁷ "Même ceux qui ont été formés par la philosophie grecque dont ils emportent les dépouilles dans leur exode chrétien n'hellénisent pas le christianisme mais christianisent l'hellénisme, en s'évertuant à trouver aux intuitions des penseurs païens les arêtes fermes pour soutenir leur foi et aiguïser leur réflexion." A.-G. Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu* (Paris: Desclee, 1987), 7.

¹⁸ *Status nunc animae humanae, hoc est imaginis divinae vocatur in dubium.* (37.13-14)

His use of the expression ‘divine image’ rather than the more Scriptural ‘image of God’ is artful and telling. It is close enough to the scriptural words to evoke them and find their justification in them, but points, at the same time, to a more philosophical, or more particularly, Neoplatonic, understanding of that expression. Plotinus applies the epithet of ‘divine’ frequently to the soul, and tries to remind the soul of its true Father.¹⁹

The Scriptural authority that we are in God’s image, as we have said, makes it an apt notion for Claudianus to employ in his struggle with Faustus.²⁰ Supporters of the soul’s corporeality have not been in want of ways of understanding this without seeing the soul as incorporeal,²¹ and yet Claudianus sees in it an affirmation of the soul’s closeness to God and of its incorporeality. In fact, he considers it manifest that no image of the incorporeal can be bodily: “it [the soul] is the image of the incorporeal, therefore it is incorporeal.”²² But he also sees in it, and perhaps even more importantly, considering the argument of the *De statu animae*, an affirmation of its creatureliness.²³ An image is *like* that of which it is an image, but it is also *unlike* it, and this unlikeness is part of the very notion of *image*.²⁴ A thing can be like itself, but it cannot be an image of itself. It was precisely this two-fold implication contained

¹⁹ *Ennead* V.1. See the discussion of Plotinus’s teaching on the soul above.

²⁰ *nam illic ubi de creatione hominis Moyses loquitur, sic ait: et dixit deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. et fecit hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam. ad imaginem dei creavit eum, masculum et feminam. diuinae istud auctoritatis oraculum nec eloquio eludi potest nec argumento falli nec uirtute uinci nec arte uitari.* (40.15-22)

²¹ Tertullian, for instance, understood the soul to be in the image of God because it was His breath (see *De anima*, ch. 3). “Tertullian drew a distinction between the Spirit of God and the breath of God (*spiritus* and *flatus*), which saved his theory from the danger of Stoic pantheism. Man is not, he holds, the spirit of God, but the breath of God, and herein he found the possibility of attributing to man a separate personal existence, and a free will, able to obey his Maker, but also capable of disobeying Him. Thus he held his ground between the idealism of the heretics, whom he combated, and the material pantheism of the Stoics, whose support against his adversaries he welcomed.” (R. E. Roberts, *The Theology of Tertullian* [London: Epsworth Press, 1924], 154.)

²² *Si imago dei est humana anima, incorporei uidelicet imago est, si incorporei imago est, incorporea utique ipsa est.* (40.22-24). We will consider this text in detail below.

²³ *Similis utique quantum incorporea incorporeo, inferior quantum creata creatori.* (40.10-11)

²⁴ See our discussion of the Platonic notion of image below.

in the notion of image that caused the followers of Plotinus, and especially Iamblichus and Proclus, to take it up as a way of understanding the nature of the soul, preserving its dignity as rational or intelligible on the one hand, and yet distinguishing it from God on the other.²⁵ If Claudianus found much in the thought of the pagan thinkers that helped to shed light on the nature of the soul, it is in their notion of image most of all that Claudianus found them allies in his struggle against his Christian adversary.²⁶

As pointed out above, Claudianus introduces the notion of the *imago dei* right at the commencement of his account of the soul. He returns to it only occasionally in the subsequent chapters. But in the final chapters of the book, he returns to it in force. In Chapter 26, bringing the book to a close, he refers again to the biblical text in Genesis and alludes to St. Paul's description of Christ as the "image of the invisible God."²⁷ Shortly after this, he gives a sort of peroration in which he repeats the phrase over and over. Given the pugilistic metaphor that he has used to describe his work, one cannot help but think that he sees himself as having his opponent down and pummeling him into submission.²⁸

²⁵ Iamblichus's understanding of the soul as an image and how that separates it from the Intelligibles will be discussed below.

²⁶ *quosque delegi, qui ueritati in praesentiarum testificarentur, quorum quidem ex abundanti est proferre sententias, non quo propriis deficiamus, sed quo magis mirum sit aduersum nos dimicare nostros et extraneos pugnare pro nobis.* (104.16-19)

²⁷ "From Him you will obtain the unalterable stature of that image from which you have taken your beginning." Bk. I, ch. 26. The allusion is Col 1.15. We see also in this text the influence of the fathers, who see the image being effaced by sin, and being renewed through Christ. See especially St. Athanasius: "So he rightly took a mortal body, that in it death might henceforth be destroyed utterly and human beings be renewed again according to the image. For this purpose, then, there was need of none other than the Image of the Father." (*On the Incarnation of the Word* 14, tr. John Behr [New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011], 63.)

²⁸ The context of this text is his answer to Faustus regarding his objection that one cannot be with a friend just by thinking of him, as the soul is confined to the body. He says: *quod cum ita sit, non arbitror animos sequestratione disici, quos uidemus iunctis corporibus posse separari. ac perinde parum est, quod officiunt corpora mutuis animorum repraesentationibus, si non aut per eadem in se imago dei quaeratur aut ipsa quaerantur. miserum namque est multumque uero contrarium, ut imago dei, id est uerus homo per corpus potius quam per se quaeratur. per se autem quaeritur atque agnoscitur, si per imaginem dei quaeritur, imago autem dei omnis anima rationalis est, proinde qui in se imaginem dei quaerit, tam se quam proximum quaerit, et qui illam in se quaerendo cognouerit, in omni eandem homine recognoscit. tu autem non inmerito carum tuum absentem te habere causaris, in quo corpus diligis, nec aliud quam corpus diligere in illo potes, quem non credis esse nisi corpus. dilige deum tuum, dilige in deo tuo earum tuum, imaginem dei tui.* (98.9-23)

How, then, are we to understand Claudianus's conception of the soul as the *imago Dei*? That his notion is informed by the sacred text is clear, and unsurprising. He introduces the notion by referring to Genesis, and he returns to that source at the end of the book. However, the text does not state very clearly how that idea is to be understood. It could mean simply that man, in his oversight of nature, acts like God. In subsequent texts in the Old Testament, there seems to be an emphasis on man's dominion over the rest of material creation.²⁹ That is, as God rules over the whole of creation, both heaven and earth, so man rules over the animals of the earth, and the plants as well.³⁰ Nevertheless, the text describing Adam's begetting of Seth³¹ points to a closer relation to God, and this raises the question of how the expression relates to man's nature. Is it simply a moral likeness: God orders all of creation, we order the animals and plants. Or are we in His image in our very nature, as the texts seem to suggest.³² Or does it point to a deeper likeness: Formed into His likeness by His grace? Texts in St. Paul certainly point in this direction.³³ These different ways of thinking of man as "in the image of God" are certainly not opposed to one another, and in fact are rather complementary. However, Claudianus, being concerned in the *De statu animae* with the nature of the soul, takes the text to say that in its very essence or nature the soul is

²⁹ For example, Sir. 17.1-3: "The Lord created man out of the earth, and made him into his own image; he turned him back into earth again, but clothed him in strength like his own. He gave to men few days, a limited time, but granted the authority over the things upon the earth."

³⁰ See Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu*, 16-17. Commenting on Gen 1.26-27, Paul LaMarche says, "En effet, être à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu comporte pour l'homme le pouvoir de dominer sur toutes les créatures terrestres, spécialement sur les animaux...Et c'est ordinairement ce thème de la seigneurie de l'homme que développent les textes de l'ancien Testament." "Image et ressemblance: I. Écriture sainte," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique*, vol.7 (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne), 1402.

³¹ Gen. 5.3: "When Adam had lived a hundred and thirty years, he became the father of a son in his own likeness, after his image, and named him Seth."

³² This seems to be implied in the text from Gen 1.27: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them." If it were not in his nature that man were thus created, why add "male and female he created them"? This comes out more clearly in Wis. 2.23, where it is said that man was created "in the image of his own eternity."

³³ See LaMarche, *ibid.*, 1405.

the image of God. In fact, he sees in this text a definition of man, and *one that can be arrived at by the natural light of reason*. That he considers it so appears from his use of the term. It serves as a middle term in his major argument for the soul's incorporeality. He also places it in apposition to soul, as expressing the nature named by it. It is being God's image that sets the soul apart from all other beings.

Though Augustine thinks that the soul is in its nature the *imago Dei*, he does not see this as an expression of its nature (at least naturally speaking). This can be seen in a number of ways. First, he sees it as applying to angels as well as men.³⁴ Second, he sees it, following St. Paul, as something that can be more and more perfected in man.³⁵ And lastly, when confronted with a task similar to Claudianus, namely defending the soul from the position that it is bodily or in place, he gives many arguments, but none of them reduce to the idea that the soul is the image of God. He has, rather, recourse to the fact that the soul *knows*, and knows incorporeally: *atqui si corporea corporeis oculis mira quadam rerum cognatione cernuntur; oportet animum quo uidemus illa incorporalia, corporeum corpusue non esse*.³⁶ St. Augustine, when confronted with the idea that man is in the image of God looks to find in him a foundation for this being said of him, and it is in that with separates him from the beasts and all lower

³⁴ See *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tres*, Q. 51: *iam porro quae sapiunt ita illi similitudini sunt proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. quod enim participat sapientiae et uiuit et est, quod autem uiuit necesse est ut sit, non necesse est ut sapiat. quare cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiae secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit deo coniunctius*. Though the conclusion here is about man, which is fitting given the context of the question, still, the general way he puts the reason for a thing being an image certainly applies to angels as well as men. This can also be seen in *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book III, ch. 20: *dixit enim deus: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et cetera. ac deinde non dicitur: et sic est factum, sed iam subinfertur: et fecit deus hominem ad imaginem dei, quia et ipsa natura scilicet intellectualis est sicut illa lux [that is, the angelic intellect], et propterea hoc est ei fieri, quod est agnoscere uerbum dei, per quod fit*. (Emphasis added.) So also does Claudianus, but it is not clear that he sees them as another kind of being.

³⁵ This is, at least, a consequence of sin: *sicut enim post lapsum peccati homo in agnitione dei renouatur secundum imaginem eius*. (*Ibid.*)

³⁶ *De quantitate animae* 13.22. Compare this with the argument Claudianus uses at the beginning of his discussion of the soul: *si imago dei est humana anima, incorporei uidelicet imago est, si incorporei imago est, incorporea utique ipsa est*. (40.22-24)

creatures.³⁷ Man, in his essence, is rational, intellectual, and as such is an image of its Creator, but this latter is a consequence of the former.

How, then, does Claudianus conceive the soul as in its essence the image of God? The way in which he approaches the question of the soul's corporeality sheds light on this, and points us to his reliance, not on the 'saints,' but rather on the philosophers. As we have seen, he begins his discussion of the nature of the soul with an argument that creation would be *semiplenum* if the incorporeal creature did not exist, and this is because there would be no creature that is like the Creator:

But perhaps some injury might be referred to the Creator if He is said to have fashioned something corporeal and like Himself, because nothing like God is found in a body. But the human soul is called like to God by God Himself, yet in a body there is not able to be any divine likeness: therefore that which is like to God will be incorporeal. But the human spirit was made to the likeness of God. Therefore the human spirit is incorporeal.³⁸

Unlike Augustine, who sees being in God's image a consequence of the soul that God has breathed into him, a soul whereby he can name and rule over the lower creatures, Claudianus, approaching the nature of the soul from the need in creation for a creature that is *like* Him, sees the soul in its essence as intended to be the image and likeness of God, and therefore rational and incorporeal.

In a way, the whole First Book can be seen as aiming at helping us see this truth. Though he speaks of the soul as the image of God at the commencement of his discussion

³⁷ "C'est d'Ambroise qu'Augustin tient le point fondamental de sa doctrine et sur lequel il ne variera jamais. L'homme est fait à l'image de Dieu selon son âme, et même selon ce qu'il y a de plus élevé dans l'âme: *mens* ou *intellectus*...ensuite elle [thèse] situe l'image dans ce qui distingue l'homme des créatures inférieures." A. Solignac, "Image et ressemblance: II. Pères de l'Eglise," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol 7, 1418.

³⁸ *sed ad creatoris forte referatur iniuriam, si incorporeum aliquid ac sibi simile condidisse dicatur, quia simile deo nihil inuenitur in corpore. sed ab ipso deo similitudo dei anima dicitur humana, in corpore autem nulla esse potest similitudo diuina: incorporeum ergo erit, quod deo sit simile, humanus uero animus ad similitudinem dei factus est, incorporeus igitur est animus humanus.* (38.9-12)

of the ‘third question,’ it is not the first time that he has used the term. At the beginning of the first chapter of the first book, he points out that in our attempts to know, if we are not careful, if we have not matured from the state of intellectual infancy, we are often “made sport of in the gaze of [our] mind by the images of bodily things, or rather certain shadows of things, drawn in through the senses of the body...”³⁹ He thus first puts before his reader a negative idea of image, one that emphasizes its difference with the thing of which it is an image. They mock us because, though they put themselves forth as the things of which they are likenesses, they are in reality mere shadows of those things. This will dispose the reader, when he meets the term in a couple of chapters, to have in the fore of his mind the distance that separates the image and the model, and so to see the truth that the image is other than its model, and therefore that the soul, which is the image of God, must be other than, and inferior to, God Himself.

Plato’s Notion of Image

It also, though perhaps less deliberately, points us to the source of his notion of image, namely Plato. The move from image to shadow leads one to think of Plato’s allegory of the cave in the *Republic*. It also, although not so directly, points to the discussion of the Forms in the *Phaedo*. Though Plato does not refer to the soul as an image, nevertheless, his notion of image will lay the foundation for conceiving of it this way in his followers. And so it will be worthwhile to spend some time looking at his understanding of this word. We can begin by looking at the occurrences of the word in the *Phaedo* and in the *Timaeus*, as these are the two dialogues which Claudianus most explicitly brings before the reader. They both

³⁹ *Nam plerique mortalium aut per sensus corporis corporearum rerum haustis imaginibus ueluti quibusdam rerum umbris obtutu mentis inluduntur.* (21.7-10)

contain interesting and important uses of the idea of image, the *Phaedo* in elucidating the theory of the forms, and the *Timaean* in a very important passage in which he explains the creation of time as an attempt by the Demiurge to make the world of motion to imitate to the extent that it can the immobility of the perfect world by making time as an *image* of eternity.⁴⁰ And the treatment of the notion of image in these two works brings to the fore two aspects that make it useful for Claudianus. However, Plato does not use the word many times in these dialogues, and so we will use texts from others to amplify its sense. We cannot be sure to what extent Claudianus knew the works of Plato directly (in addition to the *Phaedo* and the *Timaean*, he mentions only the *Phaedrus* explicitly); yet the Neoplatonists that have influenced him surely knew them, and have been formed in their understanding by these works.

Turning first to the *Phaedo*, the word appears in two places in the dialogue, and at first sight these uses might not seem too informative. Cebes uses it to describe the metaphor he is about to introduce to explain a way of understanding the soul's outliving a body. "Like Simmias," he says, "I too need an image..." He then goes on to describe the relation of a weaver to his cloak. He may outlive any number of cloaks during his lifetime, but there will come at last a cloak that will outlive him. "The image illustrates, I think, the relationship of the soul to the body, and anyone who says the same thing about them would appear to me to be talking sense, that the soul lasts a long time while the body is weaker and more short-lived."⁴¹

⁴⁰ This passage will figure prominently in the development of the ideas of Iamblichus and Proclus on the nature of the soul, as will be discussed below.

⁴¹ *Phaedo*, 87b3, d7(tr. Grube, *Plato: the Complete Works*, 77-78) : εἰκόνας γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι...τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον.

The other occurrence is similar in its sense. This time it is Socrates who is speaking, and he is explaining how he came, after much frustrating investigation, to the theory of the forms:

After this, he said, when I had wearied of investigating things, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection (εἰκόνα) in water or some such material. A similar thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of things by means of words. However, perhaps this analogy is inadequate, for I certainly do not admit that one who investigates things by means of words is dealing with images (εἰκόσι) any more than one who looks at facts (ἔργοις).⁴²

The use of image to speak of the reflection in the pool (itself here an image in words of how Socrates understands his way of investigating the causes of things) contains in some way all the important aspects of an image. And though both he and Cebes use the word to describe their speeches,⁴³ nevertheless, Socrates at the end of this passage reminds us that this epithet can be applied also to the very things that led him to his investigations.

The comparison of his activity to those looking at the eclipse of the sun brings out a couple of important aspects of an image. The first is its usefulness, namely of helping one to see in some way that of which it is an image, for it is like it.⁴⁴ The second arises, on the other hand, from the fact that, though the image is like its model, it is also, in some way, unlike it; it falls away from it in some way. By looking at the reflection, rather than the sun, one is

⁴² *Phaedo* 99d-100a, tr. G. M. A. Grube, *Plato: Complete Works*, 86.

⁴³ In fact, Plato often uses the word 'image' to describe a likeness drawn in words, e.g., *Cratylus* 439a; *Meno*, 80c; *Theaetetus*, 162e; *Symposium*, 215b.

⁴⁴ As we shall see below, this usefulness is a double-edged sword, as the very likeness that the image presents can become a deception.

turning to something more proportioned to the power of the eye. The sun itself is excessively see-able, and so can damage the eye that tries to exercise its power on it directly.⁴⁵ The image in the water, on the other hand, is more proportioned to our eyes, and so we can look upon it to get some sight of the eclipse itself. It is only because the reflection lacks a great deal of the see-ability of the sun that we can look upon it without ill-effect.

Thus there is a two-fold proportionality that belongs to the image. The first is of the image to its model. Cebes is thinking of this when he says that the weaver has the same relationship to the cloak that the soul has to the body. And it is this likeness, this proportionality, that allows him to use the one to see something about the other. As the weaver is to his cloak, so is the soul to its body. Hence, just as the weaver outlives some cloaks, but is outlived by the last, so the soul (the argument goes) outlives many bodies, but will be outlived by the last.

In the *Sophist*, this proportionality of the image to its paradigm is brought out nicely and in fact is part of the very soul, so to speak, of the image. In an attempt to discover the nature of the sophist,⁴⁶ the Visitor helps Theaetetus make a distinction between kinds of likenesses. He divides the kinds of imitations in this way:

VISITOR: One type of imitation I see is the art of image-making.⁴⁷ That's the one we have whenever someone produces an imitation *by keeping to the proportions of*

⁴⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, Book II, ch. 12; also *Metaphysics* II, Ch. 1, where Aristotle uses the 'image' of the eye of the owl to manifest the weakness of our minds with respect to the truth.

⁴⁶ Whom he has just decided is a "kind of cheat, who imitates real things": *πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοήτων ἐστὶ τις, μιμητὴς ὢν τῶν ὄντων* (234e7-235a1). He then goes on to equate the cheat and the imitator: *Γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μιμητὴν ἄρα θετέον αὐτόν τινα* (235a7). This identification leads him to distinguish the kinds of imitations. The translation is that of Nicolas White, in *Plato: The Complete Works*, 255.

⁴⁷ I have here altered the translation of *εἰκαστική* from 'likeness-making' to bring out more clearly the place of *εἰκών* in the discussion.

length, breadth, and depth of his model, and also by keeping to the appropriate colors of its parts.⁴⁸

But imitators do not always keep to the proportions of the model in their likenesses. Sometimes, for the sake of appearances, sculptors and painters (especially in large works) will depart from the thing's proportions, saying "goodbye to truth" to produce in their likenesses "proportions that *seem to be beautiful* instead of the real ones."⁴⁹ Because of the lack of true proportionality, these likenesses do not deserve the name image; rather they are called appearances.⁵⁰ It is, then, due to the very fact that the image preserves the original proportions and other aspects as far as possible that it is rightly called an image.⁵¹

On the other hand, the image has a proportionality to the one seeing it. If this were not so, it could not benefit the one seeing the image. Hence, it is because the reflection does not reproduce the full brightness of the sun in the eclipse, making the brightness more proportioned to our eyes, that makes it fit for us to gaze upon. By its likeness to the model it is joined to *it*, and by its proportionality to the one seeing it, it joins itself to *him*. Thus, the image stands as a kind of mean between the model and the viewer.

Though Socrates does not use the word again in the discussion that follows, he has given a way to understand what he says in light of the image, for the one using words, he has told us, is no more involved with images than the one looking at facts.

⁴⁸ Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ. ἔστι δ' αὕτη μάλιστα ὅταν **κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μήκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει**, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι χρώματα ἀποδιδούς τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις, τὴν τοῦ μιμήματος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζηται. (235d6-e2, tr. White, *Plato: Complete works*, 256; emphasis added.) Socrates speaks of the appropriateness of colors in the formation of an image, and the effect this has on the perfection of the image in *Cratylus* 423b, 424e.

⁴⁹ *Sophist*, 236a, *ibid.*, 256. (Emphasis added.)

⁵⁰ *Sophist*, 236a-b. The word used for appearance is φάντασμα.

⁵¹ *Sophist*, 236a: Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἕτερον (i.e., the one preserving the proportions) οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκὸς γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν; The pun, which brings out the justness of the name, is not reproducible in English with the word 'image,' though it can be, of course, with the more general 'likeness.'

After this passage he then goes on to explain how he has come to understand things in relation to their cause. It is only by participation with the Forms that the thing is the way it is. It is by having some share in the Beautiful itself that a thing is called beautiful, or by sharing in Tallness that a thing is called tall. Though, as we have said, he does not here use the word image to describe the thing seen in relation to its source, its following so closely upon the text above can only incline the reader to think that these things (εἰργον) are also to be regarded as images. And it gives an account of the proportionality it has to its paradigm: by having some share of the thing, that is, by participating in its species, it has the likeness that is proper to the image. It is this sharing in the species that makes it useful in coming to some knowledge of the paradigm.⁵²

With these things in mind, one can look back to an earlier point in the dialogue to see how these images are able to help us come to know. In explaining his theory of recollection, Socrates uses the example of the equal. Two sticks are said to be equal, but if one looks more closely, it becomes clear that they are not, in fact, equal. One or the other of them necessarily falls short of the other, if only by a little. It is due to their corporeality that they are unable to be perfectly equal. And yet they are like it enough that they can work on our memory and lead us to recall the truly equal. The likeness is such that if we are not careful, we can be deceived by it into thinking that what is merely an image is the thing itself. This is the state of those living in the cave, in the ‘image’ of human life that he puts before us in the *Republic*.⁵³

⁵² Though of course it is always better to learn from the thing itself when one can. Cf. 65e-66a; *Cratylus* 439 a7.

⁵³ Glaucon: “It’s a strange image you’re describing, and strange prisoners.” Socrates: “They’re like us.” (515a, tr. Grube, *Plato: The Complete Works*, 1132-3.)

In the *Timaeus*, on the other hand, the difference between the eternal world and the world of motion is manifest. Because there is motion and change in the visible world, the world perceived by the senses, it must be caused. The cause itself, however must be free from change and stable. So, as he begins his account of the coming to be of the world, Timaeus divides things into what always is and what is always coming to be, but is not.⁵⁴ This visible world in itself then, must be “not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion.”⁵⁵ Now, the God took this chaos and gave order to it, desiring to make all things as like to himself as possible,⁵⁶ and so what is visible to us now is beautiful. This beauty in what comes to be (so unlike coming to be in itself) points us to its cause:

...of all the things that have come to be, our universe is the most beautiful, and of causes the craftsman is the most excellent. This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that which is changeless and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.

Since these things are so, it follows by unquestionable necessity that this world is an image of something.⁵⁷

Socrates had looked at the reflection in the pool in order to see, in a way fitting to him, what he could not see in itself. However, that there was an eclipse was clear, and it was this awareness that led to his turning to the image. In this text, Timaeus is showing that we can come to the existence of the model by seeing first the image, and then coming to realize that it is in fact an image. The stuff of the visible world is restless and dissatisfied, always imperfect and passing away. And yet, if one regards the whole of this world, it is unmistakably beautiful. There is, in spite of its shifting foundation, an order and goodness

⁵⁴ 28a.

⁵⁵ 30a, tr. Donald J. Zeyl, *Plato: the Complete Works*, 1236.

⁵⁶ 29e.

⁵⁷ 29a-b, *ibid.*, 1235. ‘Image’ translates εἰκών.

that we can see and thus conclude that in its coming to be in this order and goodness, it is striving to be like and to have some share in the order and goodness that belongs to its cause. Thus, even without first seeing the model, we can know with *all certainty*,⁵⁸ that this world is an image. It is because of the blending of perfection and imperfection in this world, (that is, a recognition that the world, though beautiful, is not Beauty itself, and that what has a quality, but not through itself, only has that quality because of something that does) that this can be seen so clearly.

It is striking that Timaeus asserts with such certainty that this world is an image, for in what follows in his attempt to give an account of the coming into order of this visible world, all he is able to give us is a “likely tale.”⁵⁹ This is because that by which he sees it is an image, and so the account that he is able to give must itself maintain the character of the image. Even if he himself were able to see the cause in itself, because our speech is tied up in the things of the visible realm, that is images, he would not be able to put his understanding into speech for those who have not seen it themselves.⁶⁰ In fact, given the nature of words put forth in the *Cratylus*, it is because words are themselves likenesses that they must in some way preserve the character of that of which they are a likeness, though only as a ‘likely story.’

One thing that Timaeus’s account brings out clearly is that it is the character of this world as an image that renders it so like its cause, and even confers upon it a real dignity.

⁵⁸ *πᾶσα ἀνάγκη*. (29b)

⁵⁹ “The accounts we give of things have the same character as the subjects they set forth, so accounts of what is stable and fixed and transparent to understanding are themselves stable and unshifting. We must do our very best to make these accounts as irrefutable and invincible as any account may be. On the other hand, accounts we give of that which has been formed to be like that reality, since they are accounts of what is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts, i.e., what being is to becoming, truth is to convincingness....So we should accept the likely tale on these matters.”⁵⁹ (29c-d, tr. Zeyl, *Plato: Complete Works*, 1235-36.)

⁶⁰ “To find the maker and father of this universe is hard enough, and even if I succeeded, to declare him to everyone is impossible.” (28c, *ibid.*, 1235.) See also Socrates’ reply to Glaucon when he asks to to be led into dialectic in Bk. VII of the *Republic*: ‘Ουκέτ’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὃ φίλε Γλαυκῶν, οἷός τ’ ἔσῃ ακολουθεῖν—ἐπεὶ τό γ’ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι—οὐδ’ εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὐ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές. (533a13)

This is seen in the answer given to the first question to be asked about the world's maker: why did he make it? "He was good, and one who is good can never become jealous of anything. And so, being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to become as much like⁶¹ himself as was possible."⁶² This is because "he believed that likeness is incalculably more excellent than unlikeness."⁶³ In his fashioning of the universe, in order to render it more excellent, he endowed it with intelligence and soul, and soul was, like him, invisible, hence soul "came to be as the most excellent of all the things begotten by him who is himself most excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal."⁶⁴ Here too we see in the word 'begotten' the origin of the image in its model.

Though in the texts just quoted, image does not appear, it does in the text in which Timaeus describes the coming to be of time. And here we see that this image, by being an image, has all the qualities just discussed:

Now when the Father who had begotten the universe observed it set in motion and alive, a thing that had come to be as a shrine for the everlasting gods, he was well pleased, and in his delight he thought of making it more like its model still. So, as the model was itself an everlasting Living Thing, he set himself to bringing this universe to completion in such a way that it, too, would have that character to the extent that was possible. Now it was the Living Thing's nature to be eternal, but it isn't possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten. And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according

⁶¹ Παραπλήσια: closely resembling.

⁶² 29e, *ibid.*, 1236.

⁶³ νομίσας μῦρ' ἰσ' ἄλλ' ὁμοίον ἀνομοίου. (33b5-6)

⁶⁴ τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων. (37a1-2)

to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we now call “time.”⁶⁵

Time, made in the image of the eternity that remains in unity, renders this universe as like its Father as possible. But this text also reminds us of the other aspect of the image, namely that it belongs to the image to be other than its model. The Father will make an image of eternity, and make it as like to it *as possible*. But this image, a moving image, being an image of what does not move, being begotten from the unbegotten, and having the multiplicity of number in its attempt to come near that which is perfect unity, must finally remain apart from its model. Socrates says elsewhere that “an image cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what it represents.”⁶⁶ And in *The Sophist*, the Visitor, in trying to see how images can be true at all, leads Theaetetus to say of them:

VISITOR: You’re saying it’s another *true* thing like it? Or what do you mean by *like it*?

THEAETETUS: Not that it’s *true* at all, but that it resembles the true things.

VISITOR: Meaning by *true*, really being?

THEAETETUS: Yes.

VISITOR: And meaning by *not true*, contrary of true?

THEAETETUS: Of course.

VISITOR: So you’re saying that that which is like is not really that which is, if you speak of it as not true.

THEAETETUS: But it *is*, in a way.

VISITOR: But not truly, you say.

THEAETETUS: No, except that it really is a likeness (εἰκών).

VISITOR: So, it’s not really what is, but it really is what we call a likeness (εἰκόνα)?

⁶⁵ 37d3, *ibid.*, 1241.

⁶⁶ *Cratylus*, 432b, tr. C. D. C. Reeve, *Plato: Complete Works*, 148.

THEAETETUS: Maybe *that which is not* is woven together with *that which is* in some way like that—it's quite bizarre.”⁶⁷

Theaetetus has captured well the notion of image that arises from these texts. Inasmuch as it captures something of the model it is made of *that which is*, and inasmuch as it falls short of its model, it is made of *that which is not*. The image of the eclipse has the same shape and coloring as the real eclipse, but is on the surface of water and so subject to distortion and destruction even from the blowing of a breeze. This is like the account Timaeus gives. An image, then, in Plato's thought⁶⁸ is composed of likeness and unlikeness and takes rise from a model, which gives it that likeness, and to which it is trying to be like. And though there are hints of his applying it to the soul (at least, the world-soul) in the texts from the *Timaeus*, the application of the idea to the soul has not been explicitly made.

And yet, if we attend carefully to the description of the generation of the world soul, what is said in regard to time clearly applies to the soul. In forming the soul, the Demiurge looks to himself, and forms the soul precisely to make his product (the universe) as much like himself as possible. In order to effect this, he takes the stuff from which soul will come to be, and divides it in several proportions, proportions which compose the harmonic scale, in fact. Thus the order and proportions that are imposed give rise to the perfection and beauty that is derived from its model. Although this description fits well with the notion of an image, can this notion be used to define the soul—to name its very being, as Claudianus uses it? This does not seem to be the case, for the name 'image' does not seem to name a distinct degree or kind of being. Rather, Plato's use of the word points to something added

⁶⁷ 240b-c, tr. White, *Plato: Complete Works*, 261.

⁶⁸ To the extent that these texts reveal his thought, of course. However, the consistency of his use of this word in the different dialogues certainly gives the impression that this is his understanding.

to the being of something, or to the way that one thing is related to another, than what the thing is in itself.

The things of this sensible world are formed by the imposition of the order and proportions of true being upon disordered and chaotic ‘becoming’. The first sense of ‘image’ refers to likenesses in painting or in statues,⁶⁹ and Socrates looks to these kinds of images when, in the *Cratylus*, he is trying to make clear to his listeners what it means for names to be images: “primary names may be compared to paintings.”⁷⁰ Paintings, though they reproduce the colors and shapes of a thing, nevertheless do so in a different way, for these colors and shapes are imposed on a different sort of thing than they are imposed on in the thing itself. Socrates asks Cratylus, if a god were to fashion an image of Cratylus, but unlike a painting, he were to make “all the inner parts like yours, with the same warmth and softness, and put motion, soul, and wisdom like yours into them,”⁷¹ would this still be an image? No, for it would be rather another instance of the same thing: not just an image of Cratylus, but *another* Cratylus. An image “cannot remain an image if it presents all the details of what it represents.”⁷² And so, an image is an image insofar as the colors and shapes of the model *are received* into something different, something that allows not only for the sameness of the image, but also its difference.

This dependence of the image upon another for its being is brought out more clearly in the *Timaeus* in the discussion of the receptacle. Timaeus, when he comes to discuss the four elements (earth, air, fire, water), finds that his earlier division of things into being and

⁶⁹ See entry for εἰκόν in LSJ.

⁷⁰ 431c, tr. Reeve, *Plato: the Complete Works*, 147.

⁷¹ 432b, *ibid.*, 148.

⁷² οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέη πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν ἐστιν ὃ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι. *Ibid.*

becoming⁷³ is not adequate, but that the very changeableness of these things, especially of one into another, leads him to posit something further, something whose existence is difficult to see, and is arrived at only through a “bastard reasoning.”⁷⁴ But the difficulty lies not only on the side of the receptacle; it is also due to the dream-like state of our own understanding. Failing to recognize the things of the visible world as images, we fail to see that

its nature is to be available for anything to make its impression upon, and it is modified, shaped and reshaped by the things that enter it. These are the things that make it appear different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are imitations of the things that always are, imprinted after their likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe.”⁷⁵

At this point Timaeus gives another division of things into things that come to be, that in which they come to be, and that after which the thing coming to be is modeled. These three are compared, the receptacle to a mother, the model or source to a father, and the thing that becomes to their offspring.⁷⁶ Again, this division might lead one to expect him to conceive of the things that become as essentially images, but he does not. As he ends his general account of this nature, he summarizes his thought in this way: “There are being, space, and becoming, three distinct things which existed even before the universe came to be.”⁷⁷ It is through the working together of these three that the things that come to be arise. These things, as we have seen, are intended to be likenesses or images of the things that are, but this is something that results from their coming to be and not what defines them. Just

⁷³ *Timaeus*, 28c.

⁷⁴ 52b, tr. Zeyl, *Plato: Complete Works*, 1255.

⁷⁵ 50c, *ibid.*, 1253.

⁷⁶ 50d.

⁷⁷ 52d, *ibid.*, 1255.

before making this final division, Timaeus has said about an image that “since it belongs to it [the image] that that in which it has come to be is not of itself, and it carries off the appearance of something other still, therefore it belongs to it to come to be in something other, clinging precariously to substance, or to be nothing at all.”⁷⁸ I understand him to be saying that the form that the image has does not belong first and foremost to that in which it comes to be (is not of itself), nor does that in which it comes to be have that form of itself (it carries off the appearance of another), hence the being of an image is something that comes to a thing (that in which it is) from something else (the model). An image clings to substance, or being, because its form does not belong properly to its subject, nor is its subject properly receptive of the form. It is something that it carries off for itself in its striving to attain further perfection. Hence it is that things that become can be called images because they arise from the imprinting of the form of *what is* upon *that which becomes*, when it has been suitably prepared by the space in which it is.⁷⁹

This account of image fits well with other places in which he discusses the notion. In *The Laws*, he discusses the nature of music as an imitation, and it is clear there, too, that music is an image inasmuch as the sounds of which it is composed are capable in some way of taking on the proportions of that of which it is an imitation.⁸⁰ This is a striking instance of

⁷⁸ εἰκόνι μὲν, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ’ ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστίν, ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασμα, διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἑτέρῳ προσήκει τινὶ γίνεσθαι, οὐσίας ἀμωσγέπως ἀντεχομένην, ἣ μὴδὲν τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν εἶναι. 52c (The translation is mine.)

⁷⁹ “As the wetnurse of becoming [i.e., space] turns watery and fiery and receives the character of earth and air, and as it acquires all the properties that come with these characters, it takes on a variety of visible aspects.” (52d-e, tr. Zeyl, *Plato: Complete Works*, 1255).

⁸⁰ “[I]f someone doesn’t know what each of the bodies of the things imitated is[, w]ould he ever know what is correctly executed in them? What I mean is something like this: doesn’t he have to know whether the imitation captures *the number and the arrangement of each of the parts*, how many there are and how they fit next to one another in the appropriate order, and also the colors and shapes?” 668d-e, tr. Thomas Pangel, *The Laws of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), 50. In this text, the Athenian stranger is speaking of visible images, such as paintings, but he is doing so to make more manifest the nature of music as an image. Hence there is a clear implication that the number and order and arrangement of the parts *in the music itself* must, like the paintings, preserve those of the model as best it can, as will become clear in the text quoted below.

what Timaeus has said in his account of image, for the things imitated by music are clearly things that do not exist in sound first, but in some way the melodies and rhythms carry off their appearances:

Isn't it the case, then, that with regard to each image, in painting and in music and in all the rest, the person who is going to be a prudent judge must have three kinds of knowledge? He must first know what the thing is, and then know how correctly, and then—the third thing—how well, any of the images of it in words, tunes, and rhythms are produced.⁸¹

This text, too, points to another sign that Plato sees an image, not as a being in its own right, but what is added to a thing: the many times that he refers to images in speech. We have already noted a couple of them in the texts above, and many more could be brought forth, but it will suffice to make our point for us to look back at the text from the *Phaedo* that was quoted above. In that text Socrates seems to see image to be said univocally of both words and facts. Hence, though it is right and important to see the visible world, and the soul, to be images, it is important not to mistake this for the very thing that they are, rather than something that follows from what they are. By taking on the proportions of what *are*, these images acquire some share in the goodness of their cause, and become useful for the human mind as it attempts to ascend from an awareness of these things as images to an understanding of the realities that these images reflect. It also explains why we can become ensnared in them and, like those still dwelling in the cave, fail to recognize them as images.

Plotinus's Notion of Image

Upon the foundation laid by Plato, and influenced by his description of the generation of nature in the *Timaeus*, the Neoplatonists took up the notion of image, and it

⁸¹ 669a-b, *ibid.*, 51.

became in the hands of Plotinus a useful way of delineating and relating the different levels of being that he distinguished. The bringing together of likeness and unlikeness contained in it provides a fruitful way for him to discuss the relation of the world of sense to that of the intellect, emphasizing in turns each of these aspects. In order to bring out the deficiencies of the things of this world, or to explain them without attributing badness to them simply, he invokes the differences between the model and its image. In order to lead us to turn our minds from the things of this world to the things that are, he will add likeness to their difference, so that seeing what is good in them, and yet recognizing that they are not perfectly good, we will turn our souls from them and be led to the contemplation of what is.

‘Image,’ then can be used to help us see more clearly the nature of the visible things that we see around us. “When we see the beauty in bodies, we must not run after them; we must know that they are images, traces, shadows.”⁸² It is because of the fall from the model that attends an image that evil enters into the world. It is not because there is an evil principle alongside the good, he replies to the Gnostics, that there is evil. Rather, it is a consequence, and one to be expected, of this world being a mere image of the intelligible, where there is no evil:

evil cannot be included in what really exists or in what is beyond existence [the Good]; for these are good. So it remains that if evil exists, it must be among non-existent things, as a sort of form of non-existence,⁸³ and pertain to one of the things that are mingled with non-being⁸⁴ or somehow share in non-being. Non-being here does not mean absolute non-being but only something other than being;

⁸² 1.6.8.7-9, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol.1, 257. Plotinus will emphasize the deficiency of the image (or the falling away from its model) by combining epithets, as here, to bring this out more clearly.

⁸³ Armstrong refers the reader here to 5.8.7.22, where matter is called εἰδὸς τι ἔσχατον. See n. 2, *ibid.*, 282.

⁸⁴ Recall Theaetetus’s description of image in the *Sophist*.

not non-being in the same way as the movement and rest which affect being, but like an image of being or something still more non-existent.⁸⁵

Evil arises in this world as an image of being, ἡ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον μὴ ὄν. This last phrase is illuminating in that it puts into relief the falling away implied in the notion of image, a falling away from the being that its model possesses. In spite of this falling away, however, the image still retains some connection with its cause, and therefore is not absolute non-being. Because of this, Plotinus can say elsewhere that “if they [evils] did not exist the All would be imperfect.”⁸⁶ Still, sensible things, and the evils they sometimes involve, are far removed from the Source of all things, for they flow from the Good to the Intellect to the Soul of the All, to individual souls and then to their lower principle, which then finally form them in the visible realm. At each level, something of being is lost, and what this last principle receives are but traces (ἵχνη) of true being. Hence its product, the visible world⁸⁷ is εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται...εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος.⁸⁸ Given this nature, it can only be expected that evil will arise. It is not surprising, then that Plotinus will often speak of the image pejoratively, as when, speaking of the relation of time to eternity he says, “[Time] is properly called ‘the image of eternity,’⁸⁹ since it intends to bring about the disappearance of⁹⁰ what is permanent in eternity by its own dispersion.”⁹¹ Time *wants* to destroy the unity of eternity, and to do so by means of its own destruction. It is a μὴ ὄν indeed. This is a very different view of time

⁸⁵ 1.8.3.2-9, *ibid.*, 283.

⁸⁶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα ἦν, ἀτελὲς ἂν ἦν τὸ πᾶν. (2.3.18.2-3, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol. 2, 101.)

⁸⁷ ὁ κόσμος.

⁸⁸ 2.3.18.16-17.

⁸⁹ Plato, *Timaeus* 37d5.

⁹⁰ Or, ‘do away with’: ἀφανίζειν.

⁹¹ 1.5.7.16-18, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol.1, 223.

than that of Plato, who portrays the Demiurge producing time precisely to make the universe as perfect a likeness as he can.⁹²

However, these texts, as is often the case with Plotinus, do not tell the whole story. Though it is necessary for the image to be a *μη ὄν* in some respect, and so always be a deficient being at least with respect to its exemplar, nevertheless, it is also an *ὄν* in a way derived from that same exemplar, and this gives that in which the image comes to be a share in a being that is above what it itself is capable of.⁹³ Though it is the falling short of the image that is the material world that accounts for the presence of evil in the cosmos, it is the likeness (or the striving for) in the image that allows it to receive the epithet of beautiful. In answering the Gnostics' objections to the goodness of the world, he says:

For it is not right to disapprove of the management of the All,⁹⁴ first of all because it manifests the greatness of the intelligible nature. For if it⁹⁵ has come to life in such a way that its life is...coherent and clear and great and everywhere life, manifesting infinite wisdom, how should one not call it a clear and noble image⁹⁶ of the intelligible gods? If, being an image,⁹⁷ it is not that intelligible world, this is precisely what is natural to it; if it was the intelligible world, it would not be an image of it. *But it is false to say that the image is unlike the original; for nothing has been left out which it was possible for a fine natural image⁹⁸ to have.*⁹⁹

⁹² However, it does fit somewhat with the tendency that the images in the sensible world have to deceive us. Yet, there the fault lies more with those that are deceived than with the images themselves.

⁹³ In this regard, it is helpful to look back to the text from *Timaeus* 52c, in which Plato speaks of the subject of the image as 'carrying off' the appearance that belongs to another as a kind of spoil.

⁹⁴ Which is the work of the world-soul.

⁹⁵ I.e., the All.

⁹⁶ ἄγαλμα ἐναργὲς καὶ καλόν.

⁹⁷ μιμούμενον: imitating; this is also translated 'image' in the next instance.

⁹⁸ καλήν εἰκόνα φυσικήν.

⁹⁹ 2.9.8.9-19, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol. 2, 253, emphasis added.

As an image, it has something of the perfection, the order, the nobility of that which it images, but only to the degree to which that in which the image is can have it.¹⁰⁰ This two-fold nature of the image, to be like and unlike, to draw its shape from one thing, but be in another,¹⁰¹ is what allows Plotinus to speak of it disparagingly at one time, and to extoll it at another, or at times to do both, as he does when he turns to speak of the nature of time, and its relation to eternity.¹⁰² This passage merits close attention.

Time is not one of the first beings, but is consequent upon soul.¹⁰³ Before soul turned to exercise its power to produce, it was at rest with the Intelligible, and time, which was not yet time, was at rest in eternity. But soul, “being of a meddlesome nature, and wishing itself to rule and choosing to seek after more than it possessed, moved,¹⁰⁴ and time moved with it.”¹⁰⁵ Thus arose ‘before’ and ‘after’, and “we made a long stretch of our journey and constructed time as an image of eternity.”¹⁰⁶

This restlessness of the soul caused it to give rise to a motion other than that of the intelligible realm. In its desire to be on its own, its activity ceased to be one in itself, but spreads out into a length as its activity changed from one thing to other. In this successive

¹⁰⁰ See also, 3.8.11.25-29 (tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol. 3, 401): “Intellect is, certainly, beautiful, and the most beautiful of all; its place is in pure light and pure radiance and it includes the nature of real beings; this beautiful universe of ours is a shadow and image of it.”

¹⁰¹ τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις εἰκόνοσ τοῦ ἐν ἑτέρῳ [εἶναι]. (3.6.14.4)

¹⁰² 3.7.11.

¹⁰³ Though we will see below that it is very intimate to it.

¹⁰⁴ ἐκινήθη. It is interesting that Plotinus uses the aorist passive form of the verb, which can have a middle sense (LSJ), and has been so translated here. But might he be hinting at the lack of self sufficiency in soul when he uses this form?

¹⁰⁵ 3.7.11.14-17. The translation is my own, intended to bring out more strongly the perjorative sense than is obvious in Armstrong’s translation.

Plotinus, just before this text, has playfully invoked time itself, in place of Homer’s Muses, to tell of its beginning: ἀλλ’ ἴσως, εἴπερ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ Μοῦσαι τότε, αὐτὸν δ’ ἂν τις [καλοῖ εἰπεῖν] τάχα τὸν γενόμενον χρόνον, ὅπως ἐστὶν ἐκφανεὶς καὶ γενόμενος. Λέγοι δ’ ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὧδε πως... (3.7.11.8-11)

¹⁰⁶ 3.7.11.18-20, *ibid.*, 338. Armstrong comments on the change to the first person in the verb: “‘We,’ because it is soul which moves and produces time, and we are souls, parts of universal soul and already present in it as it moves out from eternity.” (n. 1)

activity the sensible world was born in imitation of the intelligible. This imitation was necessary, as it had to act in accordance with its knowledge, and what it knew was what it had seen in the intelligible world before its movement.¹⁰⁷ Yet in its desire to not be at rest, it wanted to imitate what it had seen, not all at once, but successively, so that its activity of production could be always. And so, the sensible world came forth in a motion within the soul, but other than the motion that had been before, like it and desiring to be an image of it.¹⁰⁸ Hence the very life of the Soul was changed:

as Soul presents one activity after another, and then again another in ordered succession, it produces the succession along with activity, and goes on with another thought coming after that which it had before, to that which did not previously exist because discursive thought was not in action, and Soul's present life is not like that which came before it.¹⁰⁹

This new life of Soul (at least a part of it)¹¹⁰ is time. Just as the things of sense that proceed from the successive thoughts of the Soul are images of the intelligible, so the motion in which this succession takes place is an image of "the life at rest, unchanging, and identical and already unbounded"¹¹¹ that is eternity. It is life in an analogous sense. Not the same, but not wholly other, and it is in the description of this life that Plotinus gives us a concrete idea of what it means for time to be the image of eternity. In this life there is,

instead of sameness and self-identity and abiding, that which does not abide in the same but does one act after another, and, instead of inseparateness and unity, there is as an image¹¹² of unity, that which is one in continuity; and instead of a complete

¹⁰⁷ Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς ἦν τις δύναμις οὐχ ἡσυχος, τὸ δ' ἐκεῖ ὁρώμενον ἀεὶ μεταφέρειν εἰς ἄλλο βουλομένης, τὸ μὲν ἄθρόον αὐτῇ πᾶν παρεῖναι οὐκ ἠθέλεν. (3.7.11.19-22)

¹⁰⁸ [κίνησιν] ἐθέλουσαν εἰκόνα ἐκείνης εἶναι. (3.7.11.29-30)

¹⁰⁹ 3.7.11.36-40, *ibid.*, 341.

¹¹⁰ 3.7.11.51. A reminder that it is not all of the soul that has turned from the intelligible.

¹¹¹ 3.7.11.46-47, *ibid.*

¹¹² εἶδωλον.

unbounded whole, there is a continuous unbounded succession, and instead of a whole that is all together, there is a whole which is, and always will be, going to come into being part by part.¹¹³

In this text we can see both the difference and the likeness that he sees existing between time and eternity. In time there is activity, as in eternity. But since in time the activity cannot abide, because of the restlessness of Soul, there is one activity after another, so that, though it is not always the same, there is always something. Instead of the whole being all together in unity without separation, there is the unity that things one after another can have, that of continuity. When looked at from the level of the intelligible, what is seen is the falling away (the succession, the separation, the division). But when looked at from the level of what must be lowest in the outflow of being,¹¹⁴ that is, the level of the sensible, one can see the perfections, the beauty, the goodness that it has in its imitation of what is above: the order, and hence the unity, of succession, of continuity, of sempiternity.¹¹⁵ It is clear that in spite of the likeness that it has striven for and possesses, time, and the sensible cosmos, is of a different order of being.

Given the account we have just seen, can one say that Plotinus has come to see this lower order of being as images essentially? That is, can image be said of them as naming their very nature? His way of speaking in his discussion of time would seem to point in that direction. When he speaks of time or the motion that it is as wanting to be an image of its analogue in the intelligible world, this seems to be a way of showing that this is the very ‘what it was to be’ of it. So too with the sensibles, for time stands to eternity as the sensibles

¹¹³ 3.7.11.51-57, *ibid.*, 341-343. I have altered the translation in order to bring out more clearly the opposition between the two lives.

¹¹⁴ It is lowest because, though Soul is able to bring forth being, it has not the perfection or power to bring forth something that is able, like itself, to bring forth other being (hence is matter a sort of last form).

¹¹⁵ Here used to distinguish what is perduring from what is eternal.

to the intelligibles.¹¹⁶ This intention to be an image comes to it from its source, the soul, which is said to have worked time up to be an image of eternity.¹¹⁷ And the text quoted above from the Third Treatise of *Ennead* 2 seems, in its punning on the word to be pointing to the same conclusion: we call it an image because it is an image and its activity is to *be* an image.¹¹⁸ And so it seems that what Plotinus has described for us is a being that is *per se* an image.

This would seem to fit with other texts in the *Enneads*. Unlike Plato, Plotinus does not often use the word ‘image’ to speak of likenesses in speech. However, he often uses it to speak of the sensible world,¹¹⁹ and even makes our happiness depend on realizing that the things of sense are mere images: if we are to attain happiness, “we must know that they are images, traces, shadows, and hurry away to that which they image.”¹²⁰ His conjunction of the word with others denoting deficiency (such as ‘trace’ and ‘shadow’) also seems to indicate that it is only in something at least capable of evil that one finds an image.

However, there are other texts that show this to be a conclusion too hastily drawn. If one considers Plotinus’s order of procession from the One, time and the sensible stand at the end of this order, but not outside it. As Intellect proceeds from the One, and Soul from Intellect, there is at each step a loss of perfection and unity, but still a likeness, as what proceeds must be like its source. This order is spoken of most clearly in the Treatise on the Three Primary Hypostases (5.1). Being is, to use a scholastic expression, *diffusivum sui*, and

¹¹⁶ 3.7.11.47-49.

¹¹⁷ εἰργάσμεθα. For the person of this verb, see n. 105, above.

¹¹⁸ εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται...εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος. 2.3.17-18.

¹¹⁹ Cf., e.g., 3.6.5.5, 3.8.10.29, 6.3.1.21: “New genera must be sought for this Universe—genera distinct from those of the Intellectual, inasmuch as this realm is different from that, analogous indeed but never identical, a mere image of the higher. McKenna, GB p. 281.

¹²⁰ 1.6.8.7, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol.1, 257.

therefore all things that *are* “necessarily produce from their own substances, in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced.”¹²¹ This is a general principle, and so is true of all beings, even that which is beyond being. Hence the One, too, produces something: Intellect. Intellect, because it has come forth *from* the One, is necessarily less than it. Though it stands in need of nothing else, it does stand in need of the One.¹²² Hence “we say that Intellect is an image of the Good.” But in order to clarify his meaning, he adds that Intellect is also like its source:

first of all we must say that what has come into being [from the Good] must be in a way that Good, and retain much of it and be a likeness of it, as light is of the sun. But Intellect is not that Good.¹²³

If the divine Intellect is an image, so too, and perhaps more so, is this true of Soul.¹²⁴ There are a number of passages in which Soul is spoken of as the image of Intellect.¹²⁵ And so, it seems that to be an image is not proper to beings of the sensible realm, but is an attribute that belongs to all beings. But unlike, or more clearly than, Plato, the notion of image is something that belongs first to beings. Although the name might have been taken

¹²¹ 5.1.6.31-34, tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol. 5, 31.

¹²² “Nothing can come from it except that which is next greatest after it. Intellect is next to it in greatness and second to it: for Intellect sees it and needs it alone.” (5.1.6.41-43, *ibid.*, 33) Intellect, because it is intellect, needs an object for its ‘sight’, hence the need for the One. Thus it differs in this need from the One, which is absolutely self-sufficient.

¹²³ 5.1.7.1-5, *ibid.*

¹²⁴ I have found only one other place where Plotinus speaks of Intellect as an image, though he does not use the word ‘image.’ In 3.8.11.19-22, when again distinguishing Intellect from the Good as something which arises from it, he says “A trace of the Good is seen in it, and it is in the likeness of this that one should conceive its true archetype, forming an idea of it in oneself from the trace of it which plays upon Intellect.” (tr. Armstrong, *Plotinus: Enneads*, vol. 3, 399) The word translated trace (ἵχνος) is equivalent to the Latin *vestigium*. Plotinus uses it, as here, as a synonym for image. He will use εἰκών shortly after this (l. 29) to describe the relation of the universe to Intellect.

It is worth noting that this text brings out nicely the importance of seeing the lower beings as images of the higher, so that we can come to see, from the image, the archetype.

¹²⁵ E.g., 5.1.3.7, 5.3.4.24, 5.3.6.29, 5.3.8.47, 5.3.9.8.

from the work of the painter or the sculptor, nevertheless, when one comes to see the order and procession among beings and is led to see the higher in the lower, it becomes manifest that these artists are themselves only images of what truly is.

Iamblichus and the Soul as Image

We now turn to Iamblicus. Since we do not have much that is extant of his writings on these questions, we are indebted to Proclus, who in his commentaries preserves his ideas on the soul as an image.¹²⁶ The notion of image arises, not surprisingly, in his commentary on the *Timaeus* with regard to the passage on time as the image of eternity. In explaining how time is able to be an image of eternity, Proclus turns to the words of Iamblichus, who begins by putting forth the manner in which it imitates eternity, which is always all together in the now: by its circular motion, the continuity of the motion, and its succession. So far, his account is like that of Plotinus given above. But then he adds some things that indicate a different movement of thought: “as [time] is not moveable simply, but is moveable as with reference to eternity, so neither is it simply an image, *but the whole of this* may be justly said to be the image of eternity.”¹²⁷ These words seem to point to the very being of time, that is, what it is is an image. This notion then can be used to distinguish time from other beings, and the text goes on to do just this:

It appears also, that it is the first of images. For all-perfect intellect is not properly said to be the image of the first cause...But time will be the first participant of intellect...And in short, if it is necessary that image should belong to things which participate; for it wishes to preserve the form of another more ancient and

¹²⁶ Could Proclus’s commentaries be, at least in part, a way that Claudianus became acquainted with the doctrine of Iamblichus? Courcelle notes that “this renewal in the life and popularity of the Neoplatonic doctrine in Gaul coincides with the proliferation of the School of Proclus in Athens.” (*Late Latin Writers*, 261)

¹²⁷ Proclus, *In Timaeum*, Bk. 4.248F-249A. (ed. Festugière, vol. 3, 33.14-21; tr. Thomas Taylor, *The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato*, vol. 2, p. 202).

venerable nature, from which it receives the peculiarity of its idea; it is requisite that image should [not] be in the first essences.¹²⁸

Those things that participate are, by that very fact, images, and so as their being is defined by participation, that is, being like and unlike, so they are rightly called images.

In this, he is apparently in agreement with Porphyry, whom Proclus quotes in the same place.¹²⁹ Porphyry makes the same equation between image and what participates: “if as Porphyry, and some other Platonists thought, sensibles alone participate of truly-existing beings, we must investigate images in these alone.”¹³⁰ He limits the notion of participation to the sensible world. In this way, being an image is a way that the sensible beings distinguish themselves from all other beings, a division which corresponds to that between the visible and invisible of Plato. Thus it seems that Porphyry saw image as a metaphysical notion that can be used to divide *per se* being.

Though they agreed in seeing image as a notion belonging properly to what participates, Iamblichus does not follow Porphyry in limiting its application to the sensibles alone. Given what we have seen above of Iamblichus’s teaching regarding the soul and how he separates it sharply from the intelligibles, perhaps this is not too surprising. And so we see him saying that though image is not in the first essences, neither is it “in sensibles alone. For

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ According to Proclus (*ibid.*), this opinion is also that of Numenius and Amelius. However, they saw even Intellect participating in the One (as we saw Plotinus did), and so saw image, like Plotinus, as extending to include even Intellect. Thus, to their teaching, Porphyry and Iamblichus are united in their opposition.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* Carlos Steel attributes the thoughts that what participate are images and that image can be said only of sensibles to Porphyry. (See his article “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” *The Divine Iamblichus*, ed. H. J. Blumenthal [London, 1998], 16.) In what follows regarding Iamblichus’s teaching on the soul as image and model, I am indebted to and follow closely the findings of this article.) This seems to fit with a text from his *Sententiae*, in which he is discussing the way in which the soul, though incorporeal, can be together with a body: “if that which is in place is out of, or has departed from itself, through having proceeded into bulk, that which is intelligible is not in place, and is in itself, because it has not proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the former is an image, the latter is an archetype. And the former, indeed, derives its being through the intelligible; but the latter subsists in (and through) itself. For every [physical] image is the image of intellect.” II.35 (tr. Thomas Taylor, *Select Works of Porphyry* [London: Thomas Rodd, 1823], 223-24). Taylor has inserted the [physical].

those in the middle also participate of first natures, and not sensibles alone, since the sensibles are assimilated to the first, through the representations of middle natures.”¹³¹ Why souls (the middle beings) are to be seen as participating, whereas the intellects do not, and how, though participating they do not fall within the sensibles is not made clear in this text. However, Proclus, in his commentary on *Parmenides*, takes up this question explicitly. Though, unlike the *In Timaeum*, he does not explicitly name the sources for his arguments, it is reasonable, in light of the text we have been looking at, to see in his accounts the arguments of Iamblichus.¹³²

Proclus’s discussion in his *In Parmenidem* of the difficulties involved in understanding the idea of participation is a striking confirmation that the later Neoplatonists had come to see in the notion of image (and, too, the paradigm) a distinct division of being.¹³³ The word εἰκόν does not appear at all in the dialogue. The closest Plato comes is one text in which he uses the verb εἰκάζειν to raise a difficulty with the notion that the form and what participates in it are like one another: “these forms are like patterns set in nature, and other things resemble them and are likenesses; and its partaking of the forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them.”¹³⁴ However, when approaching the question of what kinds of things participate in the forms, Proclus reduces the question to this: ποῖα δεῖ

¹³¹ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αἰσθηταῖς μόναις (μετέχει γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέσα τῶν πρώτων καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν μέσων ἐμφάσεις ἀφομοιοῦνται τοῖς πρώτοις). *In Timaeum*, 4.249A (ed. Fest. 3.33.25-27, tr. Taylor, *On the Timaeus*, 203). I have slightly altered Taylor’s translation. This text is illuminating insofar as it helps to fill out Iamblichus’s understanding of the soul as a middle being. It points to how the soul (τὰ διανοητά) stands toward the things above and below it.

¹³² See Steel, “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 14ff.

¹³³ A division, not levels, for the One as well as the intelligibles are paradigms, and as Proclus, following Iamblichus, is going to argue, both souls and sensibles are images.

¹³⁴ *Parmenides* 132d, tr. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan, *Plato: Complete Works*, 366-67.

τῶν ὄντων παραδείγματα καλεῖν καὶ ποῖα εἰκόνα.¹³⁵ Beings, then, can be divided into models and images.

But can a thing be both a model and an image? That this is not possible for the sensibles is obvious, as there is nothing below them for which they can be models.¹³⁶ Nor is it possible for the intelligibles to be both. If we recall what has been said about image in the tradition, especially that it is something that does not exist in itself, that must have something of becoming, and that must have both likeness and unlikeness in it, the intelligibles, which are characterized by being undivided, eternally at rest, and in themselves, cannot be images.¹³⁷ The image does not retain the being of its principle; its procession is one of likeness according to form. The intelligibles, however, proceed not according to likeness, but according to sameness. Their principles are not models, but causes. But what about the middle beings, or souls?

Because the soul is invisible or incorporeal, it might seem that it must, like the other incorporeal beings not be an image. However, unlike these other beings, soul is not immune from becoming:

As time is to eternity, so the soul is to Intellect; for time is a measure belonging to soul, but eternity a measure belonging to the intellectual; so that the soul also will have the relation of image to Intellect. And *becoming will belong not only to the sensibles, but also to soul*; for soul is at once the best of the things coming to be, and of the things that always are, as Timaeus says, and at once divided and undivided; but Intellect is only undivided. And so becoming has not been attributed to Intellect as it has to soul. Therefore, Intellect is not an image of the Father, but his second

¹³⁵ *In Parmenidem* 744.4, ed. Steel, “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 26.

¹³⁶ Though, of course, they can be models in the more common sense of the word, as what are reflected in pools, or the object of the painter, etc.

¹³⁷ Thus Proclus argues (*In Parmenidem* 744.4-26), presumably following Porphyry and Iamblichus (see Steel, “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 17-18).

procession coming about through sameness. Soul, then, is an image first of all, since it is the first of what comes to be, and then bodies are images after soul. And the undivided nature is only ‘paradigmatic’, but that which is both undivided and divided is, then, both ‘paradigmatic’ and ‘iconic’, so that it can preserve in this way the middle-ness that belongs to it.¹³⁸

Soul always is, like its model, but unlike its model it is not all at once. Soul, like Intellect, knows, but unlike Intellect, whose intuition is simple and whole, the soul’s knowledge consists of dividing and reasoning discursively.¹³⁹ Thus there arises in the soul the movement from one thought to another, from thinking one thing to another, and so the soul’s activity is like and unlike that of its cause. But as we have seen above, this discursive thought of the soul is what gives rise to time, and will then spill over into the being of the sensible world.¹⁴⁰ Soul is then the first of things to suffer division and the first of the things that become.¹⁴¹ Thus, as Iamblichus says, it is the first of images.¹⁴²

Though its falling away from Intellect reduces it to an image, it is clear that Proclus (and Iamblichus) is at pains to separate it out from the sensibles. It is divided (in time, or its thoughts that give rise to time), but also undivided (in place, at least); although becoming belongs to it, nevertheless it is always, and so it retains something of what belongs to those beings that are ‘paradigmatic’ only: it is both an image and a model.

As an image of Intellect, soul knows; but as its being is other, so is its knowledge. It contains within itself not the Forms, which belong to Intellect, but *logoi*, which are images of

¹³⁸ Proclus, *In Parmenidem* 744.37-745.18, ed. Steel “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 26. The translation is my own, as is the emphasis. This paragraph is very likely taken from Iamblichus, for it ends with words that, as Steel describes it (“L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 19), served as a kind of signature of Iamblichus when discussing the middle nature of the soul.

¹³⁹ Cf. Steel, “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 19.

¹⁴⁰ Plato, *Timaeus*; Plotinus, *Ennead* V.3.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Steel, *ibid.*

¹⁴² Proclus, *In Timaeum*. 4.249A.

the Forms.¹⁴³ It is according to these *logoi* that soul will bring forth the sensible world, which are images of the eternal through the mediation of the soul. Hence the soul will image Intellect even in its act of bringing forth. However, the details of this mediation are not important for our task. What is important is to see that in the teaching of Iamblichus, the soul is seen to hold a unique place in the order of being, one in which it partakes imperfectly of the divine, and yet in a way more perfect than the beings of the sensible world. Hence the notion of image has attained the power to name a mode of being that can belong to a thing *per se*, a way of dividing beings.¹⁴⁴ The soul, then, is an image, and so stands apart from the divine; though not the only image, because it is the first and best—still retaining something of its cause—it also stands apart from the visible. It is in this understanding of the soul, *mutatis mutandis*, that Claudianus found the ally he needed in his battle with Faustus.

The Soul as the Image of God

Let now return to Claudianus. What we hope to show is that in the construction of his treatise, he has been influenced by the ideas on the soul as an image of the divine Intellect developed by Iamblicus and his followers. No claim will be made that Claudianus had direct access to the writings of either Iamblichus or Proclus. Nevertheless, however the ideas might have come before him, they form the foundation upon which his account of the soul is based.

At the heart of the treatise is the argument that he puts forth in Chapter Five of the First Book. Having argued that the perfection of creation demands the immaterial creature

¹⁴³ Cf. Steel, “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 19.

¹⁴⁴ Not, of course, in the way material/immaterial divides it, but rather by naming extremes of being, which are nonetheless able to belong in one thing, which then stands as a middle between them.

(in Ch. 4), and that if it were not created, it would be due either to weakness or grudgingness on God's part, neither of which can be piously asserted,¹⁴⁵ he then raises the objection that "if something incorporeal was created, it is equal to the creator."¹⁴⁶ This, as we have argued above, is the heart of Faustus's objection to the incorporeality of the soul. Claudianus gives as a first jab, that "It is not equal to him, rather it is like Him. It is like Him certainly as much as the incorporeal is like the incorporeal, and inferior as much as the creature is to the Creator."¹⁴⁷ Then he gives another jab: that the soul is like God, we have on His own authority: *Let us make man to our image and likeness*. Thus, it is not just any likeness of Him (that would be true of any creature), it is his image. Then comes the knockout blow:

If the human soul is the image of God, surely it is the image of the incorporeal, and if it is the image of the incorporeal, certainly it is itself incorporeal. But if it is not incorporeal, it is in no way the image of the incorporeal. But it is the image of the incorporeal, therefore it is incorporeal: for because it was created, it is not God, and because it is the image of God, it is not a body.¹⁴⁸

The similarity between this text and Proclus's account of the soul is unmistakable. Moreover, what is essential to his thought concerning the nature of the soul is contained in this argument, and so it bears a close examination.

First, its place in the treatise is significant. It comes close to the beginning of his consideration of the soul, and after a prooemium of sorts, in which he bemoans the

¹⁴⁵ Even for a Platonist: see *Timaeus*, 29e.

¹⁴⁶ *si aliquod incorporeum creatum est, aequiperat ergo creatorem*. (40.7-8) It is perhaps interesting to note that this objection is like what Iamblichus levels against Plotinus, as discussed above. Plotinus, recognizing the intellectual nature of the incorporeal, has difficulty in separating soul sufficiently from the divine, in Iamblichus's mind.

¹⁴⁷ *Non est haec aequalis deo, sed similis: similis utique quantum incorporea incorporeo, inferior quantum creata creatori*. (40.9-11)

¹⁴⁸ *si imago dei est humana anima, incorporei uidelicet imago est, si incorporei imago est, incorporea utique ipsa est. at si incorporea non est, incorporei prorsus imago non est. sed incorporei imago est, incorporea igitur est: nam quia creata est, non est deus, quia imago dei est, non est corpus*. (40.22-41.3)

intellectual dishonesty that arises from the mind's tendency to error, and then a rather long harangue, in Ch. 3, against the position of Faustus that God can be said to "suffer with" his creature. Claudianus introduces the idea of 'image' in the prooemium. It comes in the context of pointing to the cause of much of our error, namely, the deceitful character of our sensations: "most mortals are...made sport of in the gaze of their mind by the images of bodily things, or rather certain shadows of things, drawn in through the senses of the body."¹⁴⁹ Thus, they stand far removed from the truths that our reason desires to know. For, indeed, as will appear from what comes later, they are only the imprints in our senses of what are themselves mere images of what really are. He does not elaborate here, beyond exhorting us to attend to the soul of reason rather than the bodies of words.¹⁵⁰ But he has insinuated into the mind of the reader a reminder that to be an image is to fall short of the being to which is it like: they are images, or rather, shadows.

Then he turns to attack Faustus's argument concerning the divine 'compassivity'.¹⁵¹ At first this chapter might appear to have no real connection with the arguments to follow, but simply provide Claudianus the opportunity to expose the weakness of the adversary he is to contend with. Though he certainly takes advantage of the opportunity to do this, nevertheless, he also takes it as an opportunity to bring into the mind of his reader certain things that one might be more inclined to assent to, or see the truth of more clearly, in such a discussion than when he turns to his consideration of the soul. He uses the notion of affectivity to distinguish the soul from God. God cannot be subject to affections, for He is

¹⁴⁹ *Plerique mortalium...per sensus corporis corporearum rerum haustis imaginibus ueluti quibusdam rerum umbris obtutu mentis inluduntur.* (21.8-10)

¹⁵⁰ Cf. 21.11-13. Fortin remarks that Claudianus is here directing his wit against the sophists, among whom he will include his adversary. See *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 36-37.

¹⁵¹ He has, between the first quotation and this chapter taken time to impune his character, accusing him (indirectly) of arrogant pride in persisting in error, and then cowardice in not attaching his name to the letter (in Ch. 2).

perfect. And he has brought into being from non-being a creature (he is speaking, he reminds us of the human soul). But we know from our own experience that the soul can be subject to affections and is, in fact, almost always being affected. This is a result of its having come into existence from non-being, that is, of its being a creature. Hence the soul has within itself something of the being it received from God and the non-being from which it came, and so stands in the middle between God and nothing.¹⁵² In light of what we have seen, however, one cannot but be reminded of what Theaetetus has said about an image, that it is a mixture of being and non-being.¹⁵³ This opposition between being and non-being also underlies the opposition that Iamblichus and Proclus speak of when explaining the nature of the soul as an image, namely that it has something of division and indivision, time and eternity, and more generally, likeness and unlikeness. Though Claudianus probably does not expect the reader to see all this explicitly,¹⁵⁴ he has brought it to mind in order to pave the way for the understanding of what it means to call the soul an image.

Affection or suffering, moreover, belonging to the creature, not to God, has a two-fold effect: “whatever is affected is subject to a two-fold suffering, since it is equally servile to the things that are contrary and things that are fitting.”¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, since God is the cause of all things, though He is unchangeable and unsuffering, He contains in His power what is changeable and able to suffer: this observation leads Claudianus to make the distinction between three kinds of motion: the immutable, that in time, that in time and place. Only God moves in the first way; he alone can move those subject to the second

¹⁵² Cf. Ch. 3, 27.20ff.

¹⁵³ *Sophist*, 240b-c.

¹⁵⁴ Though later in the chapter he does give a reminder of his primary concern.

¹⁵⁵ *quidquid adicitur, contrariis congruentibusque pariter obnoxium ambifariae subditur passioni.* (28.15-6)

(soul); but He and those moved in the second way can move those subject to the third.¹⁵⁶

We have discussed this distinction above, and will turn to it again in light of the understanding of image, but for now it is enough to note that Claudianus has already disposed his reader to see God and the soul as being both different, because He cannot suffer (there is nothing of becoming in Him) but the soul does suffer, and the same, because they are neither of them moved in place: the soul is unlike Him, but not as unlike Him as those that suffer in both time and place.

In fact, in spite of the dissimilarities he has brought before the reader, the soul is also like Him. After abusing Faustus for likening light to God, he gives a reminder that it is not light, but rather the soul that it truly like God: “in such a detestable thought you claim for yourself the privilege not only of innocence, but also of praise; yet you decree that we are outside the Faith because we say that the likeness of God, in order that it be a likeness of Him as He is, is incorporeal.”¹⁵⁷ He has, in bringing before the reader both the unlikeness and the likeness of the soul to God, hinted at the nature of the soul as the *imago Dei*, and paved the way for him to show this when he turns to the question of the soul’s immateriality.

When he does turn to this in Ch. 4, he begins by arguing that the perfection of creation demands an immaterial creature. He concludes this with an argument similar to that he gives in Ch. 5:

Lest, therefore, not the least of things, but rather the most prominent be lacking from the created fullness, the incorporeal substance ought also to have been created. But perhaps some injury would be referred to the Creator if He were said to have fashioned something corporeal and like Himself, because nothing like God is found in a body. But the human soul is called like to God by God Himself, yet in

¹⁵⁶ Cf. 30.19-31.6.

¹⁵⁷ *in tam plectibili sententia non innocentiae tantum privilegium tibi, sed laudis adrogas et nos, quia similitudinem dei, ut eius sicuti est similitudo sit, incorpoream dicamus, extra fidem fore pronuntias.* (32.19-33.2)

a body there is not able to be any likeness to God:¹⁵⁸ therefore that which is like to God will be incorporeal. But the human spirit was made to the likeness of God. Therefore the human spirit is incorporeal.¹⁵⁹

He seems to think it easier to see something to be like another than to see it as an image of another. And this fact is mirrored in our speech. Only when something is very much like another do we say that it is the ‘spitting image’ of that thing.¹⁶⁰ Here he argues through likeness, but he will very quickly make that argument more perfect by reworking it in terms of the soul being the image of God.

This is how Claudianus leads up to the argument in Ch. 5. After it, the notion of man as the *imago Dei* falls beneath the surface, only referred to a couple of times¹⁶¹ before storming back into view in chapters 26 and 27, where, as we have seen above, it is repeated over and over. From that point on, the word is used almost always to name the soul as the *imago Dei*. Image, however, does appear a number of times to describe the phantasms or sensations that we receive from sensible bodies, and a couple of times to refer to the relation of sensible bodies to the forms. This suggests that the intervening chapters aim to help bring out what it means to be an image, and especially, given the negative way they are discussed as

¹⁵⁸ This is a thesis that must be taken in a qualified sense. He does see some likeness to God in bodies. In the next chapter, he will speak of the likeness in terms of goodness. And later on, he will speak of that likeness in terms of being a vestige, as we have mentioned earlier. However, the text from *Genesis*, which he will quote in the next chapter, seems to use the term likeness to distinguish man—and thus for Claudianus, the human soul—from the rest of creation.

¹⁵⁹ *ne ergo non minimum aliquid, sed uel potissimum deforet creaturae plenitudini, debuit incorporea quoque substantia creari. sed ad creatoris forte referatur iniuriam, si incorporeum aliquid ac sibi simile condidisse dicatur, quia simile deo nihil inuenitur in corpore. sed ab ipso deo similitudo dei anima dicitur humana, in corpore autem nulla esse potest similitudo diuina: incorporeum ergo erit, quod deo sit simile, humanus uero animus ad similitudinem dei factus est, incorporeus igitur est animus humanus.* (38.7-16)

¹⁶⁰ The apparent history of this expression seems to be a shortening of: “he is a like him as if he had been spit out of his mouth.” Though this is a bit anachronistic here, the comparison of this expression to that of God breathing into man the breath of life shows an uncanny likeness.

¹⁶¹ In Ch. 11 once, Ch. 15 once, and in Ch. 24 once. In first two instances, it appears only as a synonym for soul and so seems to be used only as a reminder that this is what we are talking about. The last is used in order to remind the soul of its dignity, and so looks to the more significant appearances of the term in the chapters that follow.

deceits and mockeries, that it means to be other and *lesser* than its model. This is the context in which Claudianus puts forth his argument for the incorporeality of the soul.

Turning now to the argument itself, we will analyze it and see how Claudianus expounds each of its parts in the rest of the book. It begins with the premise that if the soul is the image of God, it is the image of the incorporeal. This is not problematic, as Faustus has granted that God is incorporeal: *Deus spiritus est*. And so though what it may mean precisely to be an image might not be clear, this much is clear: since God is incorporeal, if the soul is its image, it must be an image of the incorporeal.¹⁶²

Then comes the difficulty: If it is the image of the incorporeal, it is itself incorporeal. The importance of this premise is such that Claudianus repeats it immediately, in a converted form: if the soul is not incorporeal, it is not the image of the incorporeal. But it is clear that it is the image of the incorporeal, and so he concludes, therefore, that it is incorporeal. Finally, he remind us that with this closeness there is also a distance between God and the soul: because it is a creature, it is not God, but then returns to the important point: *because it is the image of God*, it is not a body. This last statement of the argument suggests that the reason, or cause, of the soul's being immaterial is that it is the image of God. In other words, he seems to consider *imago Dei* as the definition of man. Seen in this light, then, the task of Book I is primarily to reveal the soul to itself, to help it see that it is the *imago Dei*.

Claudianus is content at this point to leave the fact that the soul is the image of God to rest on the authority of Sacred Scripture, and it is reasonable enough for him to do so. He probably sees that the arguments needed to manifest this truth would be repugnant to

¹⁶² His way of putting it shows that Claudianus thinks of God as the first thing to be called incorporeal, as well. Thus it seems more correct to translate the text as 'the incorporeal' than 'something incorporeal.' This too would cause Faustus no difficulty as he sees God as the only thing that the name can be given to.

Faustus at this point.¹⁶³ Moreover, in appealing to Scripture, he is invoking an authority to which Faustus can only assent. Let us look, then, at the premise that he most draws to our attention, that if the soul is the image of the incorporeal, it must itself be incorporeal. This is based upon a prior premise, and one that Claudianus has put forth just before this text, that nothing corporeal can be the image of the incorporeal.¹⁶⁴

There are a couple of objections that come to mind in the consideration of this assertion that are worth considering. The first is that this does not seem to fit with our experience of images. Bodies, which have length, depth, and width, are imitated in images that lack depth, such as reflections in a mirror, and though bodies are visible (or more generally, sensible), our sensations of them, which are images, as Claudianus has reminded us at the opening of his treatise, are invisible. If these things are so, and the image is in something so unlike the exemplar, then it seems that the image of the invisible God ought to be able to be in visible matter. The second is that, as Claudianus himself argues, bodies themselves are images of the Forms, and the Forms are incorporeal. Thus the image of God should also be able to be corporeal.

The first problem Claudianus does not address, perhaps because it is obvious that such things are bodily and in place, like the things of which they are images. The difficulty of dimensions is not a real problem because though the image is only two-dimensional, so in fact is that which it imitates, for it does not image the whole body, the way a statue does, but only its color and shape, which are in the surface of the body only. Thus it is important to

¹⁶³ See the apologetic manner in which he indicates he will rely on the arguments of philosophers in the *praefatio*: *abbinc itidem ad erudiendum in ea quae sunt obscuriora lectorem quippiam ex geometricis et arithmeticiis atque etiam ex dialecticis et nonnullis, prout interfuit usui, philosophomenon regulis modeste ac moderate et quam potuit parciter praelibavit.* (emphasis added) He must have had a wry smile on his face when he wrote this!

¹⁶⁴ *sicut rei corporeae nulla imago esse potest nisi corpus, ita nequaquam imago incorporei inuenitur in corpore.* (40.14-15)

attend to what exactly the image is an image of. However the problem of sensations he does address.

The senses are invisible, and for good reason—if they were sensible in the same way the sensibles are, they would get in their own way as they tried to sense. However, since they are not except in bodies, they are not unbodily. The sense takes from the soul from which it comes forth that it is invisible, but since it is not without the body, it is itself bodily, and so it can receive into itself bodily images, sensations, which, since they are received into the senses as a reflection is received into water, are themselves bodily. Hence the invisibility of the power of sensation does not make it unbodily; and so, like the water, it can receive the likeness of what, of itself, must be bodily.

But what about the forms? When, in Ch. 25, he brings in mathematics to help us see that knowledge differs from sensations, he says: “is not the bodily world, whose forms, swollen and in place, but an image of forms *unbodily and not in place...*?”¹⁶⁵ This seems clearly to contradict his claim, so important to his argument, that nothing bodily can be an image of what is unbodily. And in spite of the evident contradiction, shortly after this he repeats: “do you notice also what difference there is between the forms that we discern with the body and those that we gaze upon with the mind? That these are the eternal world of which this world is an image...”¹⁶⁶ In this, of course, he is being true to Plato, and following the teaching of this most unbodily of souls,¹⁶⁷ but how can he reconcile this to his earlier claim?

¹⁶⁵ *corporeaum...mundum, cuius utique tumidae localesque formae istarum inlocalium incorporealiūque sunt imago formarum.* (89.19-21)

¹⁶⁶ *Animaduertisne etiam quid intersit inter illas formas, quas corpore cernimus, et istas, quas mente conspiciamus? Istas esse sempiternum mundum, cuius hic mundus imago sit...?* (91.23-26)

¹⁶⁷ After crediting Plato with having raised his mind to a vision of the Blessed Trinity, he goes on to say: *persuadere mihi non possum, quod philosophi huius anima corporea fuerit, ac si forsā praecipiti lapsu stultitiae ulla anima corpus esse indicanda est...* (122.20-24)

When he comes to discuss the three kinds of motion, he says some things that point to how one should understand these things: “The soul gazes upon unbodily, unplaced forms,” he says, when it wishes to produce some figure in the sensible world: “therefore, as has been said, always directed toward this and that eternal form, it strives to make a bodily square or hexagon or circle according to the example of these same forms.”¹⁶⁸ In this is implied the answer to the difficulty: the form, of which the bodily instance is an image, is such a thing that, though not bodily in itself, is nevertheless not opposed to body as the incorporeal is. For instance, the form of a square, though not a body (that is, incorporeal insofar as it is a form), when considered as a square, i.e., being composed of four equal lines and four equal angles, contains nothing that cannot be in a body, though it contains them less perfectly (“swollen and in place”), to be sure, when it is in a body than it does as a form that is contemplated. Thus, bodies are only images of the incorporeal accidentally. However, the case of God and the soul is different. God is incorporeal *per se*. When one attempts to understand Him, one sees that to be a body (or in a body) is opposed to His nature, unlike the square. Hence, to be an image of Him, a thing must not be a body. This would be like trying to form an image of a square in curved lines, for curved lines are opposed to what belongs to a square *per se*, namely the straight lines that bound it; or, like trying to make an image of the visible appearance of a thing in sounds. Sounds cannot be seen. To put this more in terms that Plato used, in order for a thing to be an image of a thing, it must preserve the proportions of the thing it is like.¹⁶⁹ Thus the sides of the square in matter are equal just as the sides in the form, making allowances for the falling away of equality that arises

¹⁶⁸ *anima conspicatur incorpores inlocaliter formas...ergo, ut dictum est, aeternis illis hisdemque semper formis intenta ad exempla earundem formarum tetragonum siue hexagonum uel rotundum corporeum per corpus efficere molitur.* (65.17-18, 65.21-66.1)

¹⁶⁹ See the texts from *Cratylus* and *Sophist* quoted above.

because of the swollenness of body. It is for this reason that bodies can be called images of unbodily forms, but not images of God. The side of a body can be proportional to a side in a mathematical form, but to what in God can it be proportional? With respect to Him, they are not images, but only vestiges.¹⁷⁰ Thus, in order to be an image of the incorporeal God, a thing must itself be incorporeal in order that it be able to possess the likeness that is proper to the image.

But did not the teaching of Iamblichus, as we saw earlier, involve just such a contrariety as we have here denied it? That is, is not soul an image of the undivided Mind because it is divided? This is so, but not the whole story. As Proclus pointed out, the image of the Divine Mind is undivided *and* divided, becoming *and* everlasting. This is not in opposition to what we have said. For instance, if we consider time as an image of eternity, it is not any time that is this image, as Steel points out.¹⁷¹ The time that measures any particular motion in mobile things, the time of this or that occurrence, must have a beginning, middle, and end. In other words, it must be finite, bounded. But eternity has none of these things. In fact, they are contrary to what it is, for it is necessarily unbounded and has no beginning, middle, or end. The time, then, that is the image of eternity is the ‘absolute time’ that is the measure of the first of motions, namely the motion of soul, which, like soul itself, is everlasting. So, though it does not have itself all at once, as eternity does, it is not bounded—it has no beginning or end. The image differs from the model not in contrariety, but in falling away from the model as the imperfect from the perfect. Time has something of the unity of eternity, but has it less perfectly, for it is not all at once, but one moment after

¹⁷⁰ Book II, Ch. 6, 119.23.

¹⁷¹ “L’Âme: Modèle et Image,” 18.

another. And soul falls short of Intellect in not seeing what it knows all at once in an intuition, but rather having to run through discursive reasoning.

That Claudianus held similar views is clear especially in his division of beings according to the motion proper to them. As has been seen, he divides motion into three kinds: stable motion, that not in place, that in time and place. God, the unmoved mover, enjoys the first, the soul is subject to the second, and bodies to the third. The soul is moved in time through a change in its affections: “But that is temporal which a little before was proud, but now is humble; that was joyful before and now is sad; that loved before, but now hates; that forgot something before, but now remembers.”¹⁷² Bodies, however, are moved not only in time, but also in place. This is a consequence of their being divisible into parts so that some of a body can be here while some other of it is there.¹⁷³ This is not true, however of the soul: “the whole soul sees through the body and the whole soul reflects upon the things seen and the whole soul hears and recalls what it has heard...the whole soul quickens the whole body...”¹⁷⁴ Thus the being of the soul is divided to the extent that it does not have all its activity at once. It becomes because of its non-being, yet it is all together and so not divided to the extent that bodies are, having some part of them outside some other part; that is, its being is intense enough that it does not have part outside of part.

To understand how it can share in both indivision and division in this way, Claudianus, as we have seen, has recourse to Aristotle’s *Categories*, which can be taken as the ways in which a thing’s being can be divided. He first points out that God, in his perfection,

¹⁷² *temporale est autem, quos paulo ante superba, nunc humilis, prius laeta, nunc tristis, delexit ante, nunc odit, prius aliquid oblita, nunc meminit.* (65.6-8)

¹⁷³ This is a consequence of being contained under quantitative dimensions: *omne corpus quamlibet maximum quamlibet minimum habet longitudinem latitudinem et altitudinem. subiacet autem pro numero partium sex utique motibus.* (67.6-9)

¹⁷⁴ *anima uero et tota per corpus videt et tota uisum recolit et tota audit et tota sonorum reminiscitur et...anima totum corpus tota uegetat.* (67.24-68.2, 68.7) Note in this last clause how he verbally emphasizes his point by the placement of the adjective: **anima totum corpus tota**.

is not subject to any of the categories. The soul, however, is subject to quality. That is, it is able to receive into itself qualities that it did not have before. In this, it is subject to division in its thoughts and affections. However, it is not subject to quantity, and therefore not to division in place (a kind of quantity¹⁷⁵), or any of the categories that depend on quantity. Bodies, on the other hand are subject to them all. Hence, bodies are *wholly* divided in their being. Even the animals, which are the most unified of corporeal beings, are in all their being necessarily directed outward. This is true even of sensation, their highest activity; it is for this reason that they are unable to know their own substance.¹⁷⁶

The soul, then, since it is subject to quality, and the division consequent on that, the division of its thoughts and affections, its being is divided like time, division by succession: it is, as has been pointed out, now happy, now sad; vicious then virtuous. Thus it is divided and undivided, but the division it suffers is not opposed to indivision the way that of bodies is. Because it is all together in unity, it is able to look back at itself and know itself, like the Divine Intellect that is God. Thus the soul, like God, can turn to itself to know itself and to know in itself the One Who has brought it into existence.¹⁷⁷

Thus, the soul, *so that it can be the image of God*, so that it can be the creature that is like Himself and so gives fullness to His creation, is incorporeal. In this, it is able to preserve in

¹⁷⁵ See *Categories*, Ch. 6, 4b25.

¹⁷⁶ Ch. 21, 71.16-17.

¹⁷⁷ In Ch. 18, Claudianus's description of the soul in its activity, seems striking like Iamblichus's notion of the soul as not only image but also model. In Ch. 3 (31.4-6), he has said: "From Him and through Him and in Him is everything that is moved only in time and only by Him, and everything that *is moved by these* through both place and time, and not in time alone." (emphasis added) In Ch. 18 (65.17-21, 66.6-9), he says: "The soul gazes upon unbodily, unplaced forms, and being joined inseparably to them, either as cast over them as subjects or as subject to them cast over, the whole soul both moves the member and gazes upon the truth of the forms and, moreover, gives sensation to the whole body everywhere. ...Therefore the soul will stand in the contemplation of the forms so that it may move the body in the formation of the formables, and the truth of the forms is not visible except to a rational animal. For every soul stands in appetite and in counsel." Though he is most likely not thinking that God *only* exercises His causality through these mediating souls (that would not fit with the creation accounts in *Genesis*), he does see that happening in many instances.

some way the ‘proportions’ of its model. From this one should have seen also that, because it is created, it is not God, and that as the image of God, it is incorporeal.

Because of the unity the soul has as an intellectual creature, it is able to reflect upon itself, and if it does this rightly, it should recognize itself in itself; and because God is also present within it, it should also, in seeing itself, see God. But if we remain as he described us at the beginning of the work, being “made sport of...by the images of bodily things,” we will not be able to see ourselves. The work of the treatise, then, has been to lift our gaze from these mockeries, to turn us from the seductions of our sensations so that we might look upon what we truly are:

Let no little bodily things, as it were, set themselves against the eyes of the mind, causing us to believe that souls, when they have laid aside their bodies, occupy places of the air or some other element. *Understand, if you can, your understanding.*¹⁷⁸

These *corpuscula*, if they are not recognized for what they are, will keep the understanding from understanding itself:

But images of bodily things come upon the soul and by them it is affected and circumscribed not by places but by deceits, and because it only remembers those things whose species it receives through the body, it does not believe that there is anything that is not such, nor is it able to long for its native land, from which it has been rightly cast sown into this wandering life, since it does not even know that it is wandering.¹⁷⁹

And again:

¹⁷⁸ *non se nunc aliqua ueluti corpuscula oculis mentis obiectent, ut animas positis corporibus quaedam loca aeris aut cuiuslibet elementi occupare credamus. Intellectum tuum, si potes, intellege.* (76.10-13)

¹⁷⁹ *sed occurrunt animae phantasiae corporum, quibus per sensus corporis adfecta non locis, sed fallaciis circumscribitur, et quia illorum tantum meminit, quorum species per corpus accepit, nihil esse credit quidquid tale non fuerit, nec suspirare potest illi patriae, de qua in hanc peregrinationem merito praecipitata est, cum peregrinari se nesciat.* (77.9-14)

if the true man, that is, the rational soul had understood his dignity as, namely, the image of God, surely he would never *have been set among the foolish beasts*,¹⁸⁰ so that he should live as an animal. Hence it is that he is a tumult of the bodily images before his eyes, and always gets in his own way so that if he ever strives in his thinking toward himself or his God, he is always recalled to bodily things by the phantasms of the body!¹⁸¹

But if we strive to turn ourselves away from these images, and seek to know ourselves and our Creator, we will hear Truth saying to us: “Do not destroy in yourself my very great gift [to you], this likeness to me, which I have bestowed upon you so generously, so that as you strive toward me, you might not search beyond yourself.”¹⁸² and,

You yourself, O human soul, look inside yourself about yourself, and you will remember yourself. See your mind, see your word, see your will. For the whole of what you think and the whole of what you have remembered is in the mind at once... You will know these things are in you, and even more that these things are you through me radiating to you, if you give to me those eyes by which I deign to be seen.¹⁸³

It was pointed out above that Claudianus, in formulating his argument to show that the soul is incorporeal, was content to let the truth of its being the image of God rest upon the authority of Scripture, as Faustus was sure to assent to it. Now, another reason for this should be apparent. Since the *imago Dei* is what the soul is, when the soul ceases to be captivated by the blandishments of sensations and turns to look upon itself, it will see that

¹⁸⁰ Ps 48.13 and 21.

¹⁸¹ *si homo uerus, hoc est anima rationalis honorem suum, imaginem scilicet dei intellexisset, numquam insipientibus fuisset comparata iumentis, uidelicet ut animaliter uiueret. hinc est ille prae oculis eius imaginum corporearum tumultus se semper obiectans, ut si quando uel ad se uel ad deum suum ratiocinando nititur, semper ad corporea phantasiis corporis auocetur.* (85.15-21)

¹⁸² *noli in te perdere tam magnum munus meum, similitudinem meam, quam tibi benignissime tribui, ut qualiter ad me tenderes, non extra te quaereres.* (95.7-9)

¹⁸³ *introspecte te de te ipsa, o humana anima, et te memineris. uide mentem tuam, uide uerbum tuum, uide uoluntatem tuam. nam totum est in mente quod cogitas, et quod totum simul meministi... haec et in te esse ac potius ista te esse me tibi radiante cognosces, si illos mihi oculos quibus me uideri dignor adtuleris.* (95.16-19, 96.16-17)

that is what it is. It does not need to be proven to the soul,¹⁸⁴ the soul simply needs to be led to see itself, and this has been the work of the first book. In order for him to hold this teaching, it was necessary to move beyond the understanding of image that sees it as something added to its being, but to be the very being of the soul. He found the means of doing so in the doctrines of Plato and the Neoplatonists, especially that of Iamblichus. He truly has ‘Hellenized’ this tenet of the Christian faith.

¹⁸⁴ Although this is certainly Claudianus’s teaching, he does, in Book II, ch. 2, give an argument much like that in the *Timaeus*, to prove that the soul is the image of God.

Conclusion

As Fr. Fortin has pointed out, in the *De statu animae*, we have a work that evinces a remarkable spirit, that shows its author to be animated by a lively mind and sincere confidence in the ability of the human mind to attain to the perfections of truth, goodness and beauty both in its thought and its expression. Though not possessed of the genius of St. Augustine or the other great doctors that preceded him, Claudianus does present to us an instance of the deep longing within the human soul to perceive and be one with the order of the universe of which it is a part—in fact, to his mind, the most beautiful part.¹⁸⁵ In spite of all the turmoil, the apparent destruction and loss of what was humane in his world¹⁸⁶ as the Roman Empire was collapsing under the weight of its own corruption, he was able to maintain his love for and hope in the humane. But what is more, he was also able to see it as at one with the sacred. He saw what Athens had to do with Jerusalem, and it was not hostility. In his investigations into philosophy, it was not as the Israelites taking gold from the Egyptians as they departed for the Holy Land, nor as being united to one that was essentially a foreigner, needing to be stripped of her hair, and other signs of separation.¹⁸⁷ He saw philosophy as so at one with the faith that he could enlist her as an ally in his contest with a bishop of the Church.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ Recall the argument at the beginning of chapter 4: without the immaterial creature, which to him is the soul, God's creation would lack its most beautiful part. God is the greatest good, the soul a great good.

¹⁸⁶ See his letter to Saupadus.

¹⁸⁷ Recall the encomium of Sidonius, in which he praises Faustus for putting philosophy through just such a stripping, as required in *Deuteronomy*.

¹⁸⁸ This is not to say that he failed to recognize that certain teachings of the philosophers, even those he most respected, were incompatible with the Faith. But he recognized these as errors that could be corrected, rather than something belonging to it intrinsically.

Philosophy here means primarily Neoplatonism, as we have seen. Claudianus includes, among his *testes* of the spirituality of the human soul Pythagoreans as well, but the Neoplatonists, and especially Iamblichus, had embraced their teachings and made them their own. This, given the milieu in which he lived, is remarkable. For a Christian to look at the writings of Plato with a placid eye, and see in them much of worth, is perhaps not surprising.¹⁸⁹ Plato lived long before the Incarnation, and could be seen through eyes of faith in the light of being part of the preparation for the Gospel. However, such a benign view of the more proximate writers he looked to is surprising.¹⁹⁰ Porphyry manifested his hostility to the Faith in his book against Christianity, and also in his encouragement of ‘theurgy,’ which St. Augustine points out is nothing other than the grave sin of idolatry.¹⁹¹ His encouragement of this worship of demons, however, is rather ambivalent: “Even Porphyry promises a kind of purification of the soul through theurgy, although he does so hesitantly and with some embarrassment about his argument. At the same time, however, he denies that this art provides anyone with a way of return to God.”¹⁹² He was then a somewhat reluctant advocate of this great impiety, yet he was so “in subjection to invidious powers—he was ashamed of them but too much in fear of them to speak openly against them—[that] he was not willing to recognize that the Lord Christ is the principle by whose incarnation we are cleansed. In fact, he despised him on account of the flesh he assumed in order to

¹⁸⁹ Though it did not always happen. See for instance the hostility towards Plato in the *Divine Institutes* of Lactantius.

¹⁹⁰ “It must be admitted that, in spite of imperial decrees, Porphyry’s great antichristian work was still in vogue in Gaul at the beginning of the fifth century, at least in the form of a manual of objections.” P. Courcelle, *Late latin Writers*, 226.

¹⁹¹ In Bk X of *The City of God*.

¹⁹² *The City of God* X, ch. 9, tr. William Babcock (New York: New City Press, 2012), 314.

become the sacrifice of our cleansing.”¹⁹³ It would have been hard to see such an one as other than a tool of the demons by which they fought against the Church.

But if this is true of Porphyry, whom Claudianus brings forth as a witness of the truth of the immateriality of the soul, even more so is it true of Iamblichus. We do not have evidence that Iamblichus ever openly fought against Christianity, but we do know that he unreservedly espoused the use of theurgy in order to purify the soul and lead it into union with the divine, to overcome the distance that separates the soul from its source, the image from its paradigm. It is unknown whether Claudianus knew Iamblichus directly, but he was surely aware of the connection between the doctrine he put forth and the worship of demons because of the work of Iamblichus’s ‘disciple’¹⁹⁴ Julian. As we pointed out above, Julian was a very ardent and powerful opponent of the faith, and thought that he had seen in the philosophy of Iamblichus means to rationalize paganism in such a way that it could compete with, and overcome, the faith of the “Galileans.” Though he died nearly a century before the writing of the *De statu animae*, it is very likely that his reforms and promotion of the teachings of his masters were the means through which the of the doctrine of the soul as image came down to Claudianus.

For the most distinctive aspects of his thought upon the soul,¹⁹⁵ Claudianus was willing to join forces with those who had been active enemies of the Church during their lives. Yet, he has, apparently, been able to regard their works with an equanimity that allowed him to see in their writings what he thought powerful expositions of the truth that

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, ch. 24, 331.

¹⁹⁴ I have put this in quotation marks because his discipleship to Iamblichus was mediated through Aedesius. See above, Chapter 2.

¹⁹⁵ For the influence of Porphyry, see Fortin, *Christianisme and culture philosophique*, chs. 4-5, esp.

the human soul is incorporeal, something that Faustus and many others before him were unable to do.

This ability to set aside differences in faith and to look for what united them, an earnest desire to see the truth, led Fr. Fortin to say this about Claudianus:

Ce qui donne, cependant, à la sympathie dont Mamertus fait preuve à l'égard de la philosophie un caractère à peu près unique, c'est que nous avons affaire pour la première fois peut-être en Occident à un «philosophe chrétien» au sens plein du mot, c'est-à-dire à un penseur qui n'est ni un païen converti au christianisme et resté plus ou moins fidèle à ses anciennes idées...ni un auteur qui, ayant subi fortement pendant toute une période de sa vie l'emprise de la culture païenne, a conservé une certaine méfiance à son égard. Claudien semble n'avoir connu la philosophie païenne que sous une forme déjà christianisée, ou du moins après l'avoir entendu interpréter chrétiennement par ses devanciers. Il est ainsi «libéré intérieurement» dès le début et de la manière la plus complète, ce qui n'était guère possible à une époque antérieure. Son attitude annonce déjà celle des théologiens de l'époque suivante, qui n'éprouveront plus devant la culture profane, désamorcée et devenue inoffensive, la gêne de leurs prédécesseurs de l'ère patristique.¹⁹⁶

As we have seen, the separation in time from those who had used their philosophy to attack the faith had not yet allowed many of the more learned Christians to look upon Platonism with anything but suspicion.¹⁹⁷ Nor had the quick undoing of many of Julian's measures yet allowed them to lay down their intellectual arms. Still, that inner confidence that the Faith was not only triumphant, but also a brother no longer wholly estranged from philosophy was beginning to awaken. If Eucherius was able to learn from philosophy something of the incorporeality of the soul, he was not yet able to see in it a true ally in the search for the

¹⁹⁶ *Christianisme and culture philosophique*, 173-74.

¹⁹⁷ We are reminded by a remark of Sidonius that Claudianus was a philosopher in everything but his garb that philosophy was still seen by many as a way of life, "embrassant la totalité des opérations humaines et se traduisant souvent d'une manière visible par une «conversion» et un comportement extérieur bien défini. Le philosophe en ce sens était celui qui avait choisi la raison comme norme suprême et qui entendait y conformer sa vie tout entière." (Fortin, *Christianisme and culture philosophique*, 175, emphasis added)

wisdom.¹⁹⁸ Still, there must have been something of the sense of oneness that came across to his pupil. Unlike anyone else of his time that we know of, he had the confidence in both faith and reason that brought him the freedom whereby, in his search for wisdom, he was able to look to those who not long before and, to some of his contemporaries, still seemed to be mortal enemies of the Truth. It is this interior freedom especially that impresses one upon the reading of the *De statu animae*.

In the experience of this freedom, there is an enthusiasm that at times overreaches itself. This enthusiasm, perhaps, leads Claudianus into rhetorical excesses;¹⁹⁹ it certainly led him into intellectual excesses, especially with regard to the power of the human mind to know God. Not only does he think that God's existence is within easy reach of the human mind, so is His triune nature.²⁰⁰ In opposition to thinkers such as Faustus, who do not even think that the soul can know itself (truly), Claudianus is convinced, as we have seen, that the soul can indeed by the light of its own reason know itself, and what it sees itself to be is the image of God. Because it is the *imago Dei*, and God is triune, it stands to reason that when one sees the image of the Trinity, it comes to know the Trinity itself in some way. Hence,

¹⁹⁸ See the text above in which he excoriates the worldliness of philosophy.

¹⁹⁹ For instance, while giving Christian witnesses to the incorporeality of the soul, he unleashes the following tirade against those holding the opposite: "And so it happens that opinions about many things are carried about not according to the quality of their merits, but rather of the entreaties [of their proponents], and on account of the praise given by those pettifoggers gathered round them, authors greater by far are condemned. A man so praised, lest he stand lower in the judgment of those praising him, snatches some tufts, as it were, from various texts of different writers and patches them to his own vile rags (if you will) and cloaked in this mangled vestment, baser than the naked and, apart from his thievish thoughts, lacking all eloquence, he goes forth. You may discern here another in the area of this repulsive cesspool breathing in the stench of the dark sewer of his own belly and the bilge of his mouth, and while he, about to belch forth in his stammering way little mockeries, is praised in a parasitical manner by another who has squandered his stipend in various gormandizings. Among rubbish of this sort could you have safely said anything sober?" (136.18-137.6)

²⁰⁰ In Book II, he says of Plato: "I am not able yet to admire as he deserves the mind of this Plato, who so many centuries before the Virgin Birth, before the Incarnation of God, before the Resurrection of the Man, before the indescribable Unity of the highest Trinity was preached among the Nations, with laudable audacity, wondrous genius, matchless eloquence sought, found, and handed on the three Persons in one Divinity, God the Father and the Mind, art or Counsel of the Father, and the mutual Love of each of These, to be the one, highest, coeternal undivided Divinity not only did he teach it was necessary to be believed, but even demonstrated that it is." (122.11-20)

the soul, by coming to know itself, comes to know God, not just as its cause, but as its exemplar.

Now, in the years following, the *De statu animae* continued to be read, and though its excesses were in need of softening, nevertheless, it is hard not to think that its spirit, enjoying the interior freedom that allowed it to look confidently to reason as well as faith for wisdom, did much to arouse the minds of those that followed in the building up of a Christian culture founded on what of truth, goodness, and beauty the pagans had bequeathed them. Thus we can see, perhaps more clearly than Sidonius himself, the importance of the *triplex bibliotheca* that he ascribes to Claudianus.²⁰¹ It is not, in Claudianus's mind, simply a raising of the books of Christian writers to the level of the pagans in their worthiness of study (or, if one begins from a place like Faustus, a raising of the books of the pagans to that of the Christians), but rather a joining together of the best of each of the three into one, so that they can work together to raise the minds of those who follow to their Father, God, and the divine world of which they are a part.²⁰²

²⁰¹ See *Letters*, IV, 11.6: *Triples bibliotheca quo magistro romana, attica, christiana fulsit.*

²⁰² Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads*, V.1.1.1-3.

Appendix

Translations of the Letter of Faustus, *De statu animae*, and the Letter of Claudianus to the Rhetor Sapaudus

Letter of Faustus

You ask of me, most reverend of priests, how one ought to answer the Arians, who try to assert with blasphemous mouths that it can only (so they say) come about that the begotten be younger than the unbegotten. With regard to this question, I will presume, as I am bidden, to break silence completely not so much for the sake of instruction about reality as for the sake of the confession of faith, attending first of all to this, that I not cover up things obscure in themselves through the desire of polished speech, rather that I draw out some proofs of poor sense, which may be seen to serve for understanding more than adornment. I respond, therefore, to your request as students are accustomed to respond to their masters when they question them. And so I speak at the command of your Blessedness so that you may break down my inexperience; I attest so that you may teach. For if I am silent before the most learned of men, I am scarcely able to know what I do not know.

Since we are about to speak about the unbegotten, we ought to know that the substances of things are different than the names of things. For example, when you say

‘gold’ or ‘silver’, you have produced not the metal itself but words belonging to the metal. For gold in the proper nature of a genus is different than the gold in the naming of speech; it is different when we name it and when we hold it.

The significations ‘Begotten’ and ‘Unbegotten’ belong to the Godhead, they are not the Godhead itself; they are a naming of the Nature and not the Nature itself. The names ‘Unbegotten’ and ‘Begotten’ serve this purpose: that you may understand Who subsists from Whom, and that the Father is not from the Son, but the Son from the Father. A beginning from a beginning is one and lacks a commencement, and so, if you say, “God from God,” not two Gods but one has been spoken of. Therefore the Begotten, the Unbegotten, and the One proceeding from each point to Persons, not natures. For majesty, which is the Father’s indistinguishably with the Son and Holy Spirit, is able to be distinguished by names, but not ordered in grades.

In considering this (be forewarned!), you must apply the intention of your mind. You say, perhaps, because He is from That One, He is after Him. Come, with regard to these things let us nourish our intellects with certain comparisons. Let us see if there is anything that exists from another that nevertheless is not later in age than that from which it exists. For example, this very name ‘Son’ is thought to be derived from the name ‘Father’, yet it is not found after it, because unless this one were born, that one would not be called father. Behold, a name that is of an age completely equal to that from which it is, and since the son is from the father, the son gives the name to the father: the person of the one being born obtains the word of piety for the one begetting. Although this is from that, neither is one proved to be after nor the other more ancient. And since the Son is called by the name ‘arm’ from the power of His works, behold, the arm proceeds from the body, yet the age of the arm does not exceed the age of the body. The word is brought forth from the voice, yet,

although it arises from the mouth, it is not proved to be after the voice. Of fire and heat there is an undivided association, and although heat is understood undoubtedly to be from fire, nevertheless fire is never known to be before its heat. Behold, something that is seen to exist from something else and yet is joined to that from which it exists without any intercession of time.

But when we come to God, that is Begotten which is both just and Justice, wise and Wisdom, merciful and Mercy. Absolutely, we understand that, according to the Apostle, justice and wisdom arise from a just and wise God. And just as there was never a just one without justice, nor a wise one without wisdom, so the Son is from the Father, but the Father was never able to be without the Son.

Without doubt, the Arians do not dare to deny our Savior, but as long as they say that He is less, they are not able to assert that He is God. For God naturally subsists in the fullness of dignity, and their impiety testifies in the first confession that they worship one God. But because their impiety also confesses a younger, through Him that is older, it makes two and rends the solidness of unity. For the very name 'lesser' shows another who is greater. Who is more ancient than Him Who pronounces about Himself: *I am the A and the Ω, the first and the last*;¹ Who, when asked by the Jews who he was, answered thus: *The Beginning, Who also speaks to you*;² Who confirms through the Prophet with a truthful voice: *Before Me God was not, and after Me He will not be*?³ If the Father says this, He confirms that the lesser did not begin after Him, but if the Son says it, He pronounces that He [the Father] was not at all before Him. Concerning this the prophetic speech clearly implies: *This is our*

¹ Is 44.6; Apoc 1.8.

² Jn 8.25.

³ Is 43.10.

*God and no other will be compared to Him,*⁴ and after these: *He was seen among men and conversed with men.*⁵ According to these things, therefore, there is no order between the Begotten and the Unbegotten because He is One, and there is no time between because He is first, and He must not be placed after, because He only is, and must not be called less because He is full. Therefore, He is said to be perfect and of a simple nature, inestimable and unsuffering, even if we confess him to have suffered for us truly and salvifically according to the flesh.

Then, in the next place, you ask me how, with regard to the substance of God, it is written in a certain letter: “He feels nothing with the sense of one suffering, but He feels with the affection of one suffering with.”⁶

First, this, which does not even escape the philosophers, is known most easily: that in man there are different affections, that is, justice, mercy, holiness, kindness, piety: things befalling us, and therefore called affections. But God is not affected by them in the manner of suffering, because they are discerned to be in Him perennially and naturally. Therefore, what is in man an affection and grace, in God is power and nature. For why would anyone not presume to say, in this sense, what has been said: He feels nothing with the sense of one suffering, but He feels with the affection of one suffering with, which even these prophetic utterances commemorate: *rebuke me not in thy indignation, nor chastise me in thy wrath,*⁷ and: *the Lord hath sworn and He will not repent,*⁸ and again: *The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people and He abhorred His inheritance,*⁹ and He is even described with opposite

⁴ Bar 3.36.

⁵ Bar 3.38.

⁶ See The Letter of Faustus to Gratus, PL LVII, 854 C.

⁷ Ps 6.2, 37.2.

⁸ Ps 109.4.

⁹ Ps105.40.

affections: *He loved Jacob and hated Esau.*¹⁰ He is said to be saddened by our sins and to rejoice in His own works; and He Himself says about Himself (subjecting Himself to affections): *I regret having made man,*¹¹ and He proclaimed from His lofty throne in heaven: *Saul, Saul, why do you persecute Me?*¹² and He even seems to show the affection of one suffering with¹³ when He says: *I was hungry and you gave me to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me to drink,*¹⁴ and other things of this sort, which readily come to mind.

And, therefore, in the same way a priest, if he were gifted with the knowledge of many tongues were set up in the middle of different nations and was about to instruct the Hebrew with a Hebrew exhortation, the Greek with a Greek, and the Roman with a Roman, would shape his words according to the understanding of each and adapt the speech of his mouth to the sense of each one, dispensing the various words of one heart and breast into different hearers, so also God, when He was about to speak with man, deigned to assume the tongue of man, and when He was about to take on human form, appealed to the affections to which we are prone¹⁵ through the sounds belonging to our understandings. For when, describing the duties of the five human senses, He speaks in this way: *The eyes of the Lord are upon the just and His ears [incline] to their prayers*¹⁶, and again: *the mouth of the Lord has spoken;*¹⁷ again: *He has smelled the odor of sweetness,*¹⁸ and: *My hand has made all these things. The*

¹⁰ Mal 1.2; Rom 9.13.

¹¹ Gen 6.7.

¹² Act 9.4.

¹³ The Latin is *compatientis*.

¹⁴ Mt 25.35.

¹⁵ The Latin is *ordinationum nostrarum*.

¹⁶ Ps 33.16.

¹⁷ Is 1.20.

¹⁸ Gn 8.21.

heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool,¹⁹ he insinuates to our hearts the powers of things under the signification of members; whence setting aside his ineffable loftiness before the human race, which loftiness does not disdain to name and call servants his friends and sons, he conversed with us as a man with the same human mouth and custom.

Still, the anger of God is justice, the wrath of God is the strength of severity, the swearing of God is defining, the repenting of God is a thought, but one often changed, and when He says He is harmed by someone persecuting Him, He shows the crime of the one harming. The aid of every kind of speech and all reason, by which God may be understood or proclaimed, is cut off from us if this common use of human speech is taken away. Why, then, can one not say, together with these things: “but He feels with the affection of one suffering with”?

If, therefore, a simple and clear response has satisfied a discerning teacher, let us move on to the third question, to which you bid me to respond: “What must be considered bodily in human things, and what must be considered unbodily?” With regard to these things, I will not bring forth anything according to the presumption of my own sense, but according to the opinion of the older saints, especially since their words cannot harm the soul, and are able to nourish it with regard to the Faith, and especially with regard to that by which the Son shows himself be equal to the Father, they avail to arm and to rule against Arian depravities. Therefore, when the consideration is of a higher subject, the sense and the spirit must be prepared for a more subtle understanding. Some most learned of the Fathers assert that some things are invisible, and others are unbodily. Whatever is created they declare to be seen to be matter and comprehensible to their Creator, and to be bodily. They assert the nature of the souls and angels to be bodily because they were circumscribed by a

¹⁹ Is 66.1.

beginning and space. For just as in a certain tract of St. Jerome we read: “They thought that the globes,” he says, “of the stars are embodied spirits,” and again: “if the angels and heavenly bodies are called unclean in comparison to God,” he says, “how do you think man must be judged?”²⁰ But in spite of these things, therefore, you deny that the soul is bodily because, according to the opinions of some, it is not in place, nor does it subsist with quality or quantity, but it is clear that this ought to be believed about the majesty of God alone. For we read in a certain well-respected tract of the fathers:

It is possible only for the Trinity to enter into and fill all things, Who so proves to be the penetrator of every understanding nature, that He is able not only to embrace and surround it but even to flow into it just as the unbodily is able to be poured into a body. For although we will proclaim some natures to be spiritual, as are the angels, archangels and other powers, and even our own soul, or surely that subtle air, nevertheless, in no way must they be judged unbodily. For they have, in themselves, a body through which they subsist, although very, even incomparably, thinner than are our bodies, according to the thought of the Apostle, who says: *there are both heavenly bodies and earthly bodies*.²¹ From which it is manifestly inferred that nothing is unbodily, except God alone, and therefore to Him alone are all spiritual and intellectual natures able to be penetrable.²²

Although these things are so, you object to me that the soul is not bodily because, as was said, it is not in place, nor does it subsist through a quality or quantity. What danger there is in believing this will be shown in what follows, but now, after what has been said, at this point in our treatise the argument will depend upon this: if the soul is not in place or subject to quantity, we must without doubt grant it to be unbodily, but if we demonstrate it

²⁰ St. Jerome, *Comment. In Libr. Iob*, 25.

²¹ I Cor 15.40

²² Cassian, *Collationes*, VII.13

to be determined by quantity or closed up in a place, consequently you yourself ought not doubt that it is shut up in a body. How is that not in place which is thought to be inserted into limbs and entangled and enclosed in entrails that are only moved by the unsettled condition of substance? But if you think that one must assert that the soul is not in place because it wanders forth by the senses through different things and is scattered by its thoughts, first one must understand that the nature²³ of the soul is one thing, the affection of thought that is born of the soul another. Wherefore, then, one must rather think that if the soul at times imagines something for itself, it is more occupied with its own motions within itself, and if it seems to see something else, this is rather described for it in the looking glass of the memory. For when it thinks of someone dear to it who is absent, is it ever satisfied, as when it actually sees the one desired? Or, for example, when it pictures the shapes of Peter and Paul in the secret places of the mind, does it penetrate to the innermost thrones of paradise, where we know them to be? Or when one has placed before oneself in his heart the flames of that Rich Man from the Scriptures, does the soul then descend to the places of his torments and the depths of Hell, which are inaccessible to the living? Without doubt either it fashions all these things by itself within the secret recesses of the breast by means different likenesses, or, certainly, if it is stirred up with an uncertain motion and an unstable thought passes beyond the seat of the soul, it does so in place. And whether it thinks of a city or any other region, it is pictured there only through dallying sense, where it is taken by the intention of the spirit. It is able to imagine some things, but it cannot embrace all things at once. Therefore, when the soul thinks itself at Alexandria or Jerusalem, if its whole presence were there, as you think, it would render to us the layout of the places, the faces of men, the motions and actions of peoples. This very thing that now we are

²³ The Latin is *status*, from which Claudianus takes the title to his response to this letter.

conducting between us, the business of speeches, that I am speaking to you, I sense, but within my mind; that I am approaching you, I do not sense. For if the soul is truly thought to be carried about by its senses, it is itself through itself also present by its thoughts to those things that it remembers. Behold, through these moments of the present time I am thinking of you, and with my spirit recalling you, I see you; but what you are doing and whether you are free to rest or read or pray, I do not know. But this happens for this reason, that I come to you by an affection of the heart, not with the very truth of my substance. For not in those motions which we now think are best, now worst, does the nature of our soul consist. For if it must be believed to consist in its own thoughts, why does it outlast in its vigor and alacrity those, which sometimes disappear and perish? How many, therefore, of the most frequent thoughts and cares in us die, even to our profit, and rather work for the liberty of the interior life! If the soul consists in them, without doubt it could not endure when they have passed away. Whence this argument more says this to our consciences, that each soul either gives birth to many things thought, which have been conceived within itself by the causes of things, or it disperses its senses as certain duties and services to be occupied with different necessities, but itself rests in the apartment of its body, though it will go forth from it once [and for all]. Wherefore, so that we may once again put forth an example [showing] that the soul is in place: Was not the soul of Lazarus, as long as life remained, within his body; but when life departed, was it not banished from the dwelling of the body, and did it not return when it was poured again into the lifeless body and summoned to that [place] whence it had departed? Do you then see that it has been driven out as from the dwelling of a guest-house, and then resettled there from where it had gone out, and yet you contend that it is not in place? But why do I speak of a corruptible man, when He Whose *flesh did not see corruption*²⁴

²⁴ Act 2.31.

certainly had a soul unstained, yet in place, which certainly He held within Himself, when He was fixed to the cross, and which He without a doubt sent out of Himself when He was lying in the sepulcher: how is that which the flesh contains not in place, which life joins [to the body], which death separates [from the body]? But if, as you say, the nature of our souls does not have the necessity of place, are, therefore, the souls shut up in the prison of hell not separated also from the region of paradise? Tell me, I beg of you, if they are not in place, how does that vast abyss, by its unhappy intervention, separate sinners from the gatherings and associations of the just, so that *they are not able to pass from here to there or come over from there to here?*²⁵ Now this is most clear: that those things contained within dimensions are bounded by quantity. If you have acknowledged the soul to be in place, grant that it is bodily. Tell me whether the very soul of our Glorious Redeemer remained on earth when He arose to Heaven?

But I do not even doubt that the angels are in place, who certainly are at one time contained in heavenly bodies, at others are carried through the empty places of the air, at others are sent to earth; whom the divine Word describes as ascending and descending in the vision of the patriarch;²⁶ who certainly would not be able to appear and depart by ascending and descending if they were not in place. The most blessed Gabriel, who bore testimony that *he stood before God*,²⁷ when he announced that the Lord of Heaven was about to be poured into the womb of Mary, and when at the command of the order of the Lord he stood before the eyes of the Mother, without a doubt he was away from Heaven; he was not flying over Mary,²⁸ he was not filling the empty and scattered areas of the broad air, but was

²⁵ Lk 16.26

²⁶ Gn 28.12.

²⁷ Lk 1.19

²⁸ Reading *mariam* for Engel.'s *maria*.

occupying only that place in which he was. Therefore, whatever occupies a place is a body, and I know not how that is not bound by the law of place which is sent from place to place, and, as a body, is carried about by goings and comings, descends by its weight, runs about by its mobility, goes out, comes back, is absent and ascends. Even he, I believe, is in place, who is not in heaven because he was cast out of heaven, and who betrayed not only himself to be in place, who dragged out a third part of the stars from on high when he was cast out. Tell me, if he does not have a body, how he fell down in that ejection? How do you deny that he has a bodily nature, whose ruin you dare not deny? And if, as you say, he does not have a body, He will not burn; but where will he feel the fire *that has been prepared for the devil and his angels*,²⁹ except in a body? Now, I think it superfluous for this to be said: that he, from his association with this air, assumed a certain density from the coming together of the elements. Tell me, if he had no body, where in the world [did] the coming together in the air [come from], where this very density which he was able to collect for himself I know not [how], if he did not drag down with himself something bodily from that celestial summit? He will carry the body of another to torment, I see. Acknowledge that even on your assertion there is a body. The body is what is corrupted, what is stained, what is altered by whatever addition happens to it. Therefore, this one, once the firstborn of the angels, has now been made the prince of the shades and, once beautiful in a bodily way, has now been made base; once conspicuous on heavenly splendor, he has now been made ugly with the loathsome horror of hellish sin. The body, I say, is what has place, is banished by being acted upon, is bounded by quantity, changed in quality, subdued with sorrow. Since these things are so, see into how deep a crime those who say that the soul is unbodily sink themselves. Now first,

²⁹ Mt 25.41.

since God the author of the universe is related to have *made all things in number and weight*,³⁰ therefore, the soul is believed to be excepted from the matter of all creation, since it is not bodily nor in place; if it is not contained in place, therefore it is spread out everywhere, is said to enter all things, to fill all things, and to be present everywhere; and if the creature is united to its Creator, weakness to its Author, one must add that it is no longer a thing of God's, but something that must be judged a part of God. Do you see where that downfall of so great an error leads its assertors? Certainly those things that are above us are invisible: but all things are able to be grasped by Him who made all things out of nothing, and so they are bodily; and just as He established them by His work, so also, He embodied them in matter; and just as He portioned out to all things, among which the soul is numbered, weight, number and measure, so also He laid upon them quantity. Moreover, if perchance one should think it must be asserted that a certain commingling, arising from the admixture of this air with the subtlety of the angelic nature, makes the angel subject to the flames, then in the air alone (if, as he says, what will burn is airy), and not *in* him, but rather *outside* him the punishment will rage. But without doubt, there is no other place than the substance of the body that the force of sorrow is able to hold sway. See where this unwise and foolhardy conviction tends: when anyone says it is unbodily, he also confesses it to be ungraspable, and thus ascribes to the work that has been formed what is fitting only to the One Who forms, and grants to created things the privilege of majesty and extends to the thing to be made a power un-owed, even to the injury of the One making. If we ask (as we ought) what the outcomes are to which you are leading our minds, [know that] this rash belief even cast down the devil from the station of a blessed throne, and on account of this he lost the dignity of an angel, when he dared to think that he had the nature of God.

³⁰ Wis 11.21

Therefore God alone is unbodily, because He is ungraspable and spread out everywhere: for He has not taken a material beginning from the matter of any bodily thing that was about to be made, and therefore the Son is coeternal with the Father, because formed by no work, and bounded by no beginnings, He is over all things that, graspable to their Maker and bodily, He has made within the body of the world; He is spread out in His unbodily majesty, Begotten of the Unbegotten, that is, of the Father, but always with the Father He lords over those things that He raised up from nothingness in the inseparable union of the Holy Spirit.

The Three Books of Claudianus Mamertus

Concerning the Standing of the Soul

Preface

To Sollius Sidonius, Prefect, Patrician, the Most Learned and Best of Men,

Claudianus

You, a judge cautious in his silence and thoughtful in his speech, have demanded of me an edition of the little books I have composed upon the standing of the soul. It was right that I should yield to the experience and trust in the friendship of one so learned and loving. But as you know quite well, many others (themselves, like you, also quite great) have enjoined this task upon me, something that I would not have rashly undertaken, had I not judged it more dangerous to avoid than laborious to undertake—though it would have been my duty as a man, even if I were not requested, to assert the truth as much as I was able. Therefore, I have written these few things as seeds of arguments, as it were, from which anyone who is studious, to my mind, if he does not take them up idly, will be able to draw out many things. And even if they are sprung from slight rivulets, nevertheless after a further running of their course, they will swell into great rivers. But I, deprived of time and with an occupied mind,

have thought it enough, should one look to the preeminence of the matter, to point out as succinctly as possible and as with a pointer what should be avoided and what followed. Of course, whether *that* little work, put forth without an author, yet published everywhere, led out with all its forces in battle array, and met with us in hand-to-hand combat; whether *it* has conquered or retreated, you, most powerful of judges, must render judgment.

But so that anyone who is going to read [these books] may perceive from the preface the course our pen will run, the first book in its beginning, briefly argues that the unsuffering Divinity is subject to no affection at all. Then, it trades manifold blows with its adversary concerning the standing of the soul. Then, just as, for the sake of instructing the reader in things rather obscure, it sets forth certain things from the geometers and arithmeticians, so also it sets forth things from the dialecticians and some, as was necessary for the task, from the rules of the philosophers, doing so modestly and moderately and as sparingly as possible—after grappling with its adversary again and again, and with some things of our own thrown in without any borrowing from others, the book comes to an end.

The second, after some preliminary remarks, treats about measure, number, and weight, not without application and not without, as I think, some fruit, where if the thinker is attentive, under the guiding hand of piety he will, [passing] through the grades of different creatures, arrive, if not yet to some share of the happiness of contemplating the Trinity, the Creator of all things, certainly to the firmness of believing more strongly. Then the whole [rest of] the book makes use of witnesses from here to the end.

The third spends a little time in its beginning drawing things to a conclusion, and then pursues the wounded stragglers from the enemy forces, but indeed neither spurning peace nor fearing conflict with the enemy, though he be unknown.

Behold, you have read, most polished of men, what you are going to read. You have

now received what by your command will be published: recall that it was not without your care that it was produced. Nor would I be hesitant, given the weightiness of the business, if not for the lightness of its execution. Accordingly, lay claim to and defend your council, because if in this I run some small risk in having *written* it down, you will face the responsibility of having *handed* down. Farewell and be strong in life, you restorer of the ancient eloquence.

The First Book of Claudianus Mamertus

Concerning the Standing of the Soul

Chapter I

Of the Opinions of the Inexpert and Their Obstinacies in Defending Their Pride¹

In the human race, the greatest of its many vices, Sollius Sidonius, my most beloved brother, is arrogant ignorance and stubborn perseverance in defending opinions wrongly presumed. For most mortals either are made sport of in the gaze of their mind by the images of bodily things, or rather certain shadows of things, drawn in through the senses of the body, or grow into children again in their old age still with the tender persuasions of their infancy. If they have any ability in speaking, neglecting the causes of things, they spurn the soul of reason and love the bodies of words. And though there is a two-fold way of coming to the truth, so that we may either submit ourselves in trustfulness to authorities judged beforehand [to be worthy of our belief], or strive for knowledge by the exercise of reason, they, saying nothing that authority commands or that reason persuades very powerfully, scorn the learned because of their fewness and play with the ignorant, a very great mob. But they themselves are deceived by the reciprocated mockery of the very ones that they deceive. For they are praised, and falsely praised, and they believe it. In this the health of the mind is especially put at risk. This is how it turns out: the straining of envy, which always grows sour, is both the

¹ It is not certain that these chapter titles are Claudianus's.

crime and the punishment of an envious mind. For if anything of truth be offered to the public good by those whom they have harmed by their unjust hatred, they immediately declare something different, even if they think the same thing, and thus with a hatred fixed and unwearied against those whom they have resolved to hate, they never fear to have sacrificed the truth.

Thus they hate their neighbor, and they hate God. And having, in these two [hatreds], spurned the fullness of all the commandments and the whole law, it is no wonder if those who have separated themselves from both by their divisive hatred do not think rightly about God or about man. Yet I am moved less by this vice of theirs, although it is blameworthy, because even if it sets in motion missiles of malevolence against others, they themselves, transfixed by their own blows, receive the wounds they were trying to inflict. For the authors of hatreds are punished first by the stings of these same hatreds. Here is a crime very much and by far the most dangerous: they foolishly conceive opinions hostile to Catholic health, and then vainly put them forth, proudly declare them, write them boldly, defend them with earnestness, and because they have slipped (as is human) through imprudence, they choose to defend the fault of their audacity with stubborn obstinacy so that they might not seem even to be able to sin. For they so declare their opinions in the open that, by secret murmurings, nevertheless, they might, with pandering flatteries, eagerly supplicate those who are unlearned in [the causes of] things, so that, above all, their opinions should come to rest in agreement with theirs: them: That which they teach [they say] is full of truth, is salvific, and they confirm it by swearing an oath. If you ask for authority, they subjoin that one is never able to approach the secrets of causes of this sort except by Reason, the most subtle investigator of all things. If you then ask for this, they throw in that it is necessary, rather, to yield to authority and not to enter upon the ship-wrecking sea of disputation on account of

the rocks that lie hidden [beneath the surface]. So they elude reason by authority, as they elude authority by the opposition of reason, and they use each of them against the other, so that neither is used. But if the straits of disputation close them in a little more tightly, they say that there are certain of the saints for whom it is quite easy to solve questions of this sort; that they depend more on the authority of others; that they are going to follow most of all what another has sanctioned. Who could bear these things, and who could judge it possible to be borne in any way that someone contradict knowledge yet vindicate doctrine, that he assert his thoughts if there is no objector present, but hide them if he is?

But, you ask, where is this sermon heading? I indeed have gone on with these prefatory remarks a bit longer than I intended, and am causing pain and tedium for my readers. It is because I recently stumbled across some men reading a little paper very studiously, and because it is the custom of the race of mortals to be enticed by the acquaintance with a new work, they were endeavoring with zealous minds to understand it. I, of course, did not refuse to look at this work when they urged it upon me as something that I certainly ought to be acquainted with.

Chapter II

When He Recalls Himself to Have Noticed That This Book Is without an

Author

The first face of the little work, as it wanders out of doors, puts forth an opinion concerning the Begotten and Unbegotten that is not entirely uncatholic, though it puts it forth with a disputation that is quite unequal to it. But, as I see it, the weightiness of the cause compensates for the levity of the reasoning. When, as my reading progressed, I came to the

remaining parts of the reading, I noticed the author of this little work earnestly toiling away, by means of certain circumlocutions, to convince the reader that the Divinity is able to suffer. I searched for the name, but found it neither in response [to my inquiries], nor in writing. I began, I confess, to consider the pen which wrote such a page as entirely suspect, and as is our wont in those places that are breaking apart due to the continual down-pouring of water, or slippery with a gentle slope, or overhanging (as in a cave), or are sharp on account of stakes, I began to advance with cautious steps, rather than run through, this unknown journey until I entered into the part with the third question, as the work itself calls it. At this point there appeared an opinion in words not at all thought out, that one ought to explode rather than explore, that earnestly desired to make it appear, if in any way it was possible, that the soul seems to be a body. Thus, with no power of argument, with no law commanding, with no reason persuading, the third speech came to an end in this fruitless affair.

And it is my first concern to find out what reason there is that one about to enter into such great causes and about to speak about such sublime things should seek to remain unknown. If you knowingly dispute well, why do you hide your name? If you are afraid of being known, why do you put this work forth, or should I say, why do you even write it? Or perhaps you are following the examples of greater men in this? But I see prophets, evangelists, apostles, and after them also most of those who treat of authentic things prefixing their names to their own volumes. Some even begin their works with their own names, for example: *Peter, an Apostle of Christ*² and *Paul*.³ So also do others, even other founders and teachers of the Church. Surely they knew that they would have to guard against

² Cf. 1 Pt 1.1.

³ Cf. Rom 1.1, 1 Cor 1.1, etc.

the vain and noxious writings of those in hiding (or against the vain and noxious effects of secret, non-canonical writings). Only thus could the fictions of the fallacies of impudent men be avoided. Hence it is that the sanity of our Catholic [faith] does not accept many writings although they are prefixed with the names of Paul or many other saints because it weighs the merit of the work not by the blandishment of the name, rather it unites an author to itself because of the truth of his pen. And so by the very fact that that page is sent forth, yet its author is hidden, gives an evident indication that that very page was damned [even] by the one who composed it. For no one desires to be hidden, except him who is afraid to be known. Still, I cannot wonder enough that in this same man there was not a desire to avoid the injuries that fall to one who is guilty of suppressing his name.⁴

Chapter III

That the Unsuffering Divinity is certainly not Subject to Any Affection

But let us return to the task before us, and let us look to the very words of that work: thus he said to the one, namely, to whom he addressed this letter, whom he was as eager to conceal as himself, “you ask me how, with regard to the substance of God, it is written in a certain letter...”⁵ And he did not wish to indicate either what, of whom, to whom, or about what this letter was. And he continues about God: “He felt nothing with the sense of one suffering; rather, He felt with the affection of one suffering with.”⁶ He adds that not even the philosophers were ignorant of this, “that,” he says, “in man there are different affections,

⁴ In spite of this protestation, Claudianus is well aware of the author of the letter; see n. 15, below.

⁵ Letter of Faustus 6.10.

⁶ 6.11.

that is, justice, mercy, holiness, kindness, piety, that happen to us, and are therefore called affections. But God is not affected by them through suffering.”⁷ Oh, not through suffering! Oh, affected! How *is* He affected, if He does not suffer? Why is your memory so quick to forget those very things that you yourself put forth? You said that justice and mercy, because they are accidents in man, are affections. And so, if there are affections in man because there are accidents, in God there are no affections because there are no accidents. Therefore, He in whom there could be no affections, since there are no accidents, did not feel by the affection of one who suffers with. But you add: “Therefore, what is in man an affection and grace, in God is power and nature.”⁸ But is what is power in God not power when it is given to man? For God is undoubtedly Power, who, if He is unchangeable, even when He has given Himself to man, is power in man. Therefore what is power in God is also power in man, with this difference only, that there it is substantially, but here by an addition [to his substance]. Whence Our Lord said to the Apostles: “Remain,” He said, “in the city until you are clothed in power from on high,”⁹ and the Prophet said, “I will love you, Lord, my power.”¹⁰ But you say that God is not power both in Himself and in man. But the reason for such an opinion is clearer than light. It follows, namely, that Him Whom you say is affected, you assert to be changed.

Now, I must certainly first examine the true meaning of this name. An affection, obviously, is named from this, that it affects something; whatever is affected, however, suffers. But suffering pertains only to a substance which is able to suffer and is created. And because it was summoned out of nothingness by the highest nature, which is God, so that it

⁷ 6.15.

⁸ 6.18.

⁹ Lk 24.29.

¹⁰ Ps 17.2.

might exist, this substance is a middle between that from which it was made and Him by Whom it was made. And so it is able to be affected both by those things that are above it, so that it may become better, and by those things that are below it, so that it may become worse. I am speaking, naturally, about the human soul. Therefore nothingness is not able to be affected, because it does not have substance. Nor is God, because He does not feel things that damage or receive things that increase. But things in the middle are affected, as was said above, either by betterment or detriment. For truly whatever is affected suffers, and whatever suffers no sane man will deny is not God. For each of these implies the other: nothing is changeable unless it is able to suffer, nor can anything be able to suffer unless it is changeable. That the testimony of the philosophers says that mercy and justice and good things of this sort are affections of a creature that is capable of suffering and that these same good things are in God essentially and not by an addition, it certainly does not intend to put forth something against itself, since an affection is an addition. But nothing is added to God, therefore He is not subject to affections. For whatever is affected is subject to a two-fold suffering, since it is equally servile to things that are contrary and to things that are fitting. Wherefore, if the highest Divinity felt by the affection of one who suffers with, He is also subject to the goad of wicked passions. “He felt,” you say: certainly feeling is an accident for Him Who did not feel before. But nothing new, which He might come to know (lest I should say, which He might feel), is added to Eternity at the time of the Passion, since He knew sempiternally Christ’s Passion, inasmuch as He Himself decreed it.

But why should I now discourse about affection, and conquer by disputing that He is unsuffering, since the very one against whom we are speaking, without a doubt granted that God had suffered with the Crucified Man. What in the world, I ask, does this mean: “He did

not feel by the sense of one suffering, but He felt by the affection of one suffering with.”¹¹ What is the meaning of “He felt,” or what is the meaning of “He did not feel”? Or how did He suffer if He did not feel? If someone should say *he walks* and *he walks with* or *he speaks* and *he speaks with* does he not also signify that the one talking with talks and the one walking with walks? Or if one should say that this man has died and that that man is has died with, does he not confirm that both are dead? For he who has died with, has certainly died. And so he who suffers with certainly suffers. Therefore, if Divinity has suffered with, then Divinity has suffered, and perhaps He has also died. Or if that is impious even to think, then God has not suffered, nor is He affected. Where now is the affection of one suffering with?

Then he adds something that some of the saints of old had prophesied in a figurative way to those who are wise in the ways of the flesh and of men, and who must be frightened off and held back from such ways, quoting the scripture: *Lord, do not accuse me in your anger*,¹² and: *the Lord has sworn, and he will not repent*.¹³ Before this, through the philosophers, he did not keep accidents away from God. Here, through the prophets, he even lays the necessities of vice upon Him. For things meant to be taken figuratively, if they are not shrewdly examined inwardly, do not advance to the life-giving Spirit, but remain in the letter, which kills. And so it follows that we might believe the undefilable essence of lofty Divinity to be able to suffer if we consider the utterances of the prophets, ensouled with allegorical mysteries, only in the flesh of the letter. Because, when the prophetic oracles relate that He is angered, or that He repents, we must certainly have in mind the effects of these passions, and not their affects. And moreover, this modern writer asserts that his little thoughts ought

¹¹ Claudianus has altered Faustus’s words slightly, in order to bring out more clearly the contradiction they contain, as he does in the next sentence.

¹² Ps 6.2, 37.2.

¹³ Ps 109.4.

to be judged on a par with this example of prophetic speech; he does not declare himself an expositor, but a prophet, in order to unlock the prophetic utterances, although the One born of the Virgin had sealed the mouths of the prophets. Therefore, it is wrong and reason demands [that it be wrong] to weave rhetorical sentences with the mystical pen of the prophets, and so it happens that he who avows himself ready to explain the words of another, is not able himself to be explained. Therefore, do not use words of the prophets, nor prophesy. For indeed, prophetic utterances are of no profit to the present time, nor does prophetic speech profit an expositor. Therefore, whatever you borrow from the prophetic words in defense of yourself fails to help you; rather it turns against you because either the defense you have sought confesses your stupidity, or this unfitting patronage fails to purge your error.

Therefore, you do not say at all rightly that the undefilable Divinity is affected, for what is an effect from the Workman is an affect in the work. When God punishes someone in a temporal way, he who is punished certainly suffers by His eternal counsel. If God came to know in a temporal way the sins of a man, or anger stirred Him to exact justice, He would also suffer something. For truly the unchanging and resting Sempiternity embraces every temporal, movable, and changeable thing, affecting some advantageously, judiciously ceasing to affect others, Himself quite separated from every affection and motion of time and place, gifted with only that motion which is said to be ‘stable.’¹⁴ From Him and through Him and in Him is everything that is moved only in time and only by Him, and everything that is moved by these through both place and time, and not in time alone; and thence arise all the other [motions].

But now let us set aside those things which are, by their merit and force, such that

¹⁴ *stabilis*. See Chapter 18 for a fuller discussion of these notions.

they may justly be rejected, but need not be fought against and come to those testimonies that he has taken from the apostles for his defense. He says,¹⁵ why can one not say he feels with the affection of one who suffers with, when the Apostle thought it must be said that *they would never have crucified the Lord of glory*,¹⁶ although, as the light can never feel the injury of a wound, so the Author of light has never felt the punishment of suffering. Therefore it is possible to say: but He feels with the affection of one who suffers with. It is possible, indeed, for *all things are permitted*,¹⁷ but one ought not, for *not all are expedient*.¹⁸

Nevertheless, I am hardly able to restrain my laughter at this kind of comparisons and utterances of yours. A little before, you had asserted that God ceased to be power, and so that He was changed. Now, with that thought withering, in like manner you declaim that just as light never feels the injury of a wound, so also the Author of light never felt the punishment of His Passion. Therefore [by your argument] only the light feels the injury. Does the earth, or the water, or the air feel the injury of any wound? Or perhaps the light is ensouled? Or any unsouled body is able to feel? Or is there any body which, although it does not feel, is not able to be wounded? And so, the light is able to be wounded, even if it is unable to feel. For just as the night is destroyed by the entrance of the light, so the light is wounded by the darkness. Whence a most noteworthy poet played with quite pleasing Asclepiads, saying:

the envious light leads in the absent day
after night flees, conquered, her robe in tatters¹⁹

¹⁵ Engelbrecht notes that there is nothing corresponding to this in Faustus's letter as we have it. However, it introduces a discussion that shows Claudianus to know who his adversary is. See Fortin, *Christianisme et culture philosophique*, 44ff.

¹⁶ I Cor 2.8.

¹⁷ I Cor 6.12.

¹⁸ I Cor 10.23

¹⁹ Prudentius, *Cathem*. V.27f.

What do you say? As the light does not feel the injury, so the Divinity did not feel the wound in His Passion? If it is so, then He was able to be wounded, even if He was unable to feel, and there was [in Him] something of insensibility and something of corruptibility. For He was not pained on the side of His incorruptibility, if He was able to be wounded, because the light is equally insensible and woundable. Take care, lest that [opinion] which you think we must approve be itself “the downfall of a great error.”²⁰ You say that light, though shared by men and beasts, is bodily in such a way that, it, like God, does not feel the inflicted wound, and you do not [merely] liken this body, however beautiful it may be, to the highest incorporeal thing, rather you make them equal. And in such a detestable thought you claim for yourself the privilege not only of innocence, but also of praise; yet you decree that we are outside the Faith because we say that the likeness of God, in order that it be likeness of Him as He is, is incorporeal. But we will discuss this a little later, now we are discussing *affection*. Therefore, if Christ was so crucified that the incorruptibility of the highest Divinity, which the whole world cannot defile, should be believed to have been crucified, I should wish, except that it is unrighteous, that you would say whom it is right to believe to have been exalted by the highest God, that is, by the very Trinity, after the humiliation of death, to whom was given *the name that is above every name*²¹? To that one, I think, who *was made obedient unto death*²² and, on account of the obedience of unspeakable humility, was indescribably raised up into the glory of God the Father. Dare, if you will, not to confess that same One to be the Lord of glory Whom you confess to be the Son of Man. But you wish to use that which was said: *they would never have crucified the Lord of glory* to show

²⁰ Claudianus is here turning against him a phrase that Faustus has used when he draws the conclusions that denying the soul to be bodily, forces one to consider the soul a “part of God;” see Letter of Faustus 16.16.

²¹ Phil 2.9.

²² Phil 2.8.

this: that without a doubt it may be believed that Divinity itself is able to be affected, if It was able to be crucified. Therefore you have made known your thought with an open profession. For since you think yourself to have said irreproachably that God is affected, since the Apostle said that the Lord of Glory was crucified, and although truth persuades that the “the crucified Lord of glory” be so taken that Divinity should not be believed to have been crucified, yet you conclude more firmly that Divinity is affected, and in your eagerness to defend error, you hardly notice that you say that that punishment which the crime of His persecutors worked upon Christ the man was inflicted upon the very inviolable Divinity. But if this is so, God was able to suffer for men without taking on the man, for if He was able to suffer in man, He was also able to suffer outside of man. But perhaps you contend that he was changed by the touch of the human substance and so became able to suffer after He had assumed the man. God therefore is not incorruptible, because whatever is able to be made worse is certainly able to be corrupted. But Divinity is not able to be corrupted or changed, and therefore It is not able to suffer.

Again, it now remains, that because Christ is true man and true God, one Person from twofold substance, and The God-man, and the man-God, the same Lord of glory both was not crucified, according to His inviolable Divinity, and was crucified in the man, according to the unity of His Person. And so, in a wondrous and unknowable manner, God suffered [as man],²³ yet Divinity did not suffer. See now, therefore, that the testimony of the Apostle vindicates you, not so that your opinion might take strength from it, but rather only this far: that the perversity of such a wretched thought might not remain hidden. You, no doubt, say that Divinity is affected as if truth were making this agreement with you through the Apostle, but the Apostle urges that the Lord of glory be understood to have been

²³ *homo* is bracketed by Engelbrecht

crucified in that part of Him by which He was able to be crucified. And so to you, to you alone does this opinion remain, that the pure and inestimable Divinity was cut with whips, fixed with nails, pierced with a spear, affected with sorrows, consumed by death, because you deny that it [can] be believed that in one and the same Christ there is something other [than Divinity] subject to death, subject to passion.

But when the truth presses down on you, you change your words, saying that the things by which the created substance is affected are in God substantially, not by addition. Go on and speak this way, so that presumptuous ignorance may not scatter a lie upon the sincerity of truth. It is certainly human to err; it is also human to repent of your error. No one sins more dangerously than the one who defends his sin. With the philosophers, you do not deny, as you securely pronounce, that the essence of the highest Divinity is impassible and not subject to any affection. So then, expel the intestine war from your mind. Surely you see that just as essence can in no way be mixed with nothing, so truth cannot be mixed with falsity. Yet you say that He Whom you assert to be unable to suffer can be affected. For the profession of His impassibility is false if He does not lack affection. Exceedingly does one fight against the other. He who says “feels with the affection of one suffering with” does not say that in that suffering he felt nothing. However, you say that God is not affected such that He suffer. Therefore He is affected such that He not suffer. This is akin to one saying that one who is running is standing still, or that one who is awake is sleeping, which the opposition of contraries does not allow. How does it profit you to add “through suffering” when one can say most truly and most assuredly that “God is not affected”? This two-headed declaration does not lack the mark of suspicion. You say that God does not suffer, but you do say that He is affected. Affection and suffering signify one and the same thing: either you have taken both away, or you have preserved each in the other. Thus, one must

say not ‘God is not affected through suffering’, but ‘God is not affected’. If He is not affected, He does not feel with the affection of one suffering with. If He feels with the affection one suffering with, then He is affected.

I myself say that the divine Substance is affected by nothing: you say God is not affected. Let us be reconciled. Let him who disgraces you with infamy, you who have been ignorant perhaps, but certainly incautious, perish from our midst. However, you go on to say and declare the Apostle to have said concerning Christ, after He had already been placed in heaven: *We have such a priest, who is able to suffer with our infirmities,*²⁴ as if there is nothing here to be treated or discussed. You boast yourself satisfied with what has been proposed and ready to go on to the third question. Therefore, so that I may offer as brief a response as I can, that Priest, I believe, the one Who most of all made a sacrifice of the offerings of the human race before the divinity of the most high Trinity, Who expiates our sins, Who commends our prayers, He Himself is the True Priest, because if the Son of God according to what is equal to the Father does not pour forth prayers, but rather hears those who pray, then the Man rather must be understood here, Whom the Apostle calls Priest and declares to suffer with our infirmities, and about Whom he likewise says: *Christ Jesus, Who died, nay also has risen, Who is at the Father's right hand, and Who intercedes for us.*²⁵ Therefore, that priest suffers with²⁶ us, Who also intercedes for us. But the One Who acknowledges the one interceding, the very Trinity, would not have anyone who must intercede to Itself if It were able to suffer or be affected in any way. Now do you understand the opposite, that rather the testimony of truth is taken up into the patronage of falsity [by your understanding]? Because if anything of this sort (as we said above) is found in the divine volumes, it must be referred to the unity of the

²⁴ Heb 4.15. The translation is my own, to render consistently the verb *conpati*.

²⁵ Rom 8.34.

²⁶ *Conpati*.

Person, because just as soul and body, though from different substances, are one man, so God and man, though from different substances, are one Christ. And through this, since He is one from different substances, He Himself in some way petitions Himself, and He Himself in some way hears Himself on our behalf. There are innumerable things which it would be most apt to say concerning this, but because not by expenditure are those things to be achieved which yield of themselves, let the things said about these things suffice for the present.

Chapter III

From Here He Disputes of the Standing of the Soul

The standing of the human soul, that is, of the divine image, is now called into doubt. This, to be sure, is that third question, where this friend of mine, having entered into the discernment of the causes of natures, pronounces the spirit of life to be a body and asserts that he brings forth decrees of the acknowledged²⁷ authority of the fathers, whom indeed he relates not so much to have defined something known to them by the perception of their mind as to have held certain opinions. And because he himself (he as much as says so) yields not so much to demonstrated reason or to authority that is not to be violated, but rather to human opinion, he depends upon this for his too weighty work, that, with divine authority having been spurned and insightful reason put aside, we should give assent to him with eyes closed, so to speak.

²⁷ Or perhaps slandered? A. Souter, *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A.D.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 315, gives *to do harm to* as the meaning of *praeiudico* from Tertullian onward.

Whoever thinks truly and piously about God consequently thinks that nothing that ought to have been created by Him was not created. For the goodness of the Creator is the cause of things being created, Who, being able to create everything He wills, just as He would have exercised none of His goodness if He had created nothing, so He would have used a half-full goodness if He had established something half-full. However, it seems strange that something would be lacking from the fulfillment of things if the flower of the rose did not exist, yet nothing would be lacking if incorporeal substances were not created. Lest, therefore, not the least of things, but rather the most excellent be lacking from the created fullness, the incorporeal substance ought also to have been created. But perhaps some injury might be referred to the Creator if He is said to have fashioned something corporeal and like Himself, because nothing like God is found in a body. But the human soul is called like to God by God Himself, yet in a body there is not able to be any divine likeness: therefore that which is like to God will be incorporeal. But the human spirit²⁸ was made to the likeness of God. Therefore the human spirit is incorporeal.

Chapter V

That the Incorporeal Exceeds the Corporeal and the Not-In-Place Exceeds the In-Place in Dignity

Everything incorporeal, however, exceeds the corporeal and the uncuttable exceeds the cuttable and the living the non-living in dignity. For surely the most all-powerful Creator, and the most kind, if He did not create a substance greater than every body and like Himself,

²⁸ *Animus*.

which it has been agreed ought to have been created, either did not want, or surely was unable, to do so. If He wanted and was not able, He lacked omnipotence. If He was able but did not want to, He was grudging, which is impious even to think. Therefore He was able and He willed, and so He also created. Unless perhaps you should say that that which He was able to will, Who was not able to will except what He ought to do, ought not to have been done. What, tell me, would you contend has not now been created which you do not doubt ought to have been created? *Ought* to have been created, certainly, because since the incorporeal Creator is the greatest good, and the incorporeal creature is a great good, and the created body, which unless it was not created by the most high God Who is the greatest good is something good, just as the created body is something good, so the incorporeal great good ought to have been created, because it would not be fitting to the all-powerful Good, *Who made all goods mightily*,²⁹ to make the perfection of the fullness of things wanting even in the least things, let alone not create the most excellent. But perhaps it will be asserted either that the incorporeal creature is not a good, or that it was not necessary that a good be created, or that what was necessary was not able to be made. But the incorporeal Creator is the highest Good, and the incorporeal creature is a great good: therefore it was necessary that the great good be made by the greatest Good, and that, since He is all-powerful, He was able to do what He, since He is good, ought to have willed. Therefore, He Who was not able not to do what ought to be done, unless it be said that something ought to have been done which He did not do (in which case He will have done something which He ought not to have done), created the incorporeal substance.

But you will say to me: if something incorporeal was created, it is equal to the creator. But we are inquiring about man, that is about the soul of man. It is not equal to

²⁹ Gen 1.31.

God, rather it is like Him. It is like Him certainly as much as the incorporeal is like the incorporeal, and inferior as much as the creature is to the Creator; alike as much as the understanding light is to the understandable light, as much as the changeable creature is to the unchanging Creator, it is unlike. For the Truth is one thing, the image of the truth is another. But just as no image of a corporeal thing is able to be except a body, so the image of an incorporeal thing is never found in a body. For there where Moses speaks of the creation of man, He speaks thus: *And God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness. And He made man to His image and likeness. To the image of God He created him, male and female.*³⁰ That oracle of divine authority is not able to be eluded by sweet speech, nor deceived by argument, nor conquered by power, nor avoided by craftiness. If the human soul is the image of God, surely it is the image of the incorporeal, and if it is the image of the incorporeal, certainly it is itself incorporeal. But if it is not incorporeal, it is in no way the image of the incorporeal. But it is the image of the incorporeal, therefore it is incorporeal: for because it was created, it is not God, and because it is the image of God, it is not a body.

Chapter VI.

That Although Every Incorporeal Thing Is Invisible, Not Every Corporeal Thing Is Visible

But he adds, from I know not whom, and the knowledge of whose names he hides from us, that it is thus taught that they say incorporeal things are different than invisible things. Clearly these are discoursers of awesome skill, who have penetrated even to this

³⁰ Gen 1.26, 27.

secret: if incorporeal things are different than invisible things, then incorporeal things are not invisible things. Therefore the incorporeal must be esteemed less than every corporeal thing, because the Truth says through the Apostle: *the things which are seen are temporal, but those unseen are eternal*;³¹ but you so separate the Creating and the created substance that incorporeal things are different than invisible things. Therefore, every corporeal thing is invisible and every visible thing is incorporeal. At this point, I dare to inquire: is God invisible or visible? If you deny that He is corporeal, you do not deny that He is visible. If you say that He is invisible, you confess Him to be corporeal. According to this opinion (and may it be far from me and thee) the eternal, invisible, incorporeal God either will not be incorporeal or will be visible and will not be eternal.

Nevertheless this learned man, who is ignorant of evident causes, wishes to think something, but is not able to say it well; and I suppose him to say that there seem to be *certain* corporeal things that are not able to be seen, although not to be seen is proper to *all* invisible things, and because of this some corporeal things can be invisible, but incorporeal things cannot be except invisible. For although every incorporeal thing is invisible, not every invisible thing is incorporeal. For the voice is not seen, and it is a body. Although because of the excellence of sight we may say that things pertaining to the other senses are seen, as we often say ‘see what is making that sound’, although sound pertains to hearing, not to sight. And yet we do not say in this way: hear what shines, because sight, since it is more excellent than the rest of the senses, assumes to itself things pertaining the lower powers, although improperly, since it does not mix its own power with theirs. Wherefore, all things that are able to be sensed by any sense of the body are visible if we refer all these things to sight, and they are not all visible if we render to each sense what is special to it. Hence all the principle

³¹ 2 Cor 4.18.

bodies, which are called elements, are without doubt visible, as we know by experience. From the measured and proportionate coming together of which, with dimensions joined together in an orderly way, and with a soul giving it life, the living body is made, although there are many things that are not ensouled and cannot be denied to live. But we are speaking about those things which not only live but also sense, as are things with souls that lack reason. About which we must speak a little as we extend the disputation about ourselves.

Therefore, since we are of soul and body and, as the body is not able to be the soul, so the soul is not able to be the body, the soul which senses in the body, even if it senses through something visible, senses invisibly. For sight is one thing, the eye is another; the ears are one thing, hearing another; and the nostrils are one thing, smelling another; and the mouth is one thing, taste another. Nor are the hand and touch the same thing. Therefore, by touch we discern the hot and the cold, but we do not touch the sense itself by touching. Nor is that sense hot or cold. And by taste we sense the sweet and bitter, but we are not able to taste. For there is nothing bitter or sweet in it. By our nostrils we receive smells, but we do not grasp smelling by smelling, because smelling does not smell, and we draw in voices by hearing, but since hearing makes no sound, we do not hear hearing itself. We look at colored shapes with the eyes, and we perceive them with the eyes because they are colored and shaped, but we do not see sight because it is neither colored nor shaped: for we would see continually if sight shined, and we would always hear if hearing made sound and we would smell perpetually if smell gave off an odor, and we would taste unceasingly if taste had flavor, and we would touch eternally if touch touched itself. And that I may be silent of the rest, if taste were able to be tasted, no one would be able to be hungry, nor would there be things to be provided externally into which the sense would extend itself if it sensed itself.

Therefore, the member through which we sense is one thing, and the sense by which we sense is another, because in between the invisible incorporeal thing and the visible body is the invisible corporeal thing, which in us is sight, hearing, smelling, taste, and touch: which, because they are not except in an ensouled body, from the intercourse of both of these different things, they are both corporeal and invisible, taking from the visible body the fact that they are corporeal, and from the incorporeal soul the fact that they are invisible. Therefore, not by your opinion will that be invisible which will not be incorporeal, as if it were proper to the incorporeal to be visible and to the corporeal to be invisible, since indeed nothing of a body would be invisible unless the invisibility of the incorporeal made it invisible, because in the same man, as we said above, there is an incorporeal invisible thing and an invisible corporeal thing, which the soul leads invisibly from the visible body.

Chapter VII.

That from the Four Elements, the Five Senses of the Body Are Composed

But now whatever we touch of a body with the senses, each of these so especially pertains to each of them that they do not admit the others into a sharing of the things belonging to them. Therefore among all bodies, the light of the sun is without doubt the more excellent. This pertains to that highest element in the corporeal universe, which is called fire. Hence it is that even in the human body sight holds the principle place before all the other senses. From the internal heat of the heart and liver, of course, certain sparks, shining untiringly, fly up into the vault of the head of our body. Poured out through the medium of the eyes and mixed with the external light of the bodies upon which they have fallen, the rays from these sparks fall back as an echo and draw up the colors and forms of

these same bodies. You will note that among the elements, fire is the highest; among the colors, light is the most beautiful; among the senses, sight is the most excellent. Hearing follows this in dignity and power, since it shares in that element which the Greeks call ether. And, although it is by nature of the air, nevertheless because from its heights it separates out certain refuse, as it were, downward towards the lower parts, it surpasses this tempestuous and naturally cloud-born air in place and dignity, being purer and more subtle. Hence it is that the most pure air makes hearing easier and a farther-reaching power. For just as eyes are not able to gaze without the forms of bodies and an external light, so the ears do not sense except with air that has been beaten or blown. So also the sense of the nostrils, for just as the air is tinged with sounds so that it may serve the hearing in the ears, so in a like manner it is also tinged with odors so that it may bring about smell in the nostrils, in which it is not perceived to be present unless air be brought in. And the sense of tasting gives a sign showing that it is never able to act apart from the aid of moisture from this that it senses no flavor if the tongue is dry. But concerning touch, I do not think it is doubted to be of the elements, that is that it is most like earth.

But let us now return to that on account of which we have discussed these things: lo, sight senses and gazes upon light and other bodies through the same light. Does hearing take to itself anything at all from here? On the contrary, the passages of the ears receive sounds and formed voices. Does sight assume to itself anything from here? Through the caves of the nostrils, we take odors of an innumerable kind, but nothing of these helps the hearing to sense. Perhaps in the exploration of flavors taste shares with smell, or is something of touch allowed to taste for sensing things that are rough or smooth? Behold the voice is not seen by the sight, although it is more excellent, light certainly is not heard, the voice is surely not received by the nostrils, or odors by the taste, and flavor is sensed only in the mouth.

Chapter VIII.

That No Soul Is Made from Any Element or Any Body at All

Behold, you have a body born of all the elements, mixed into the fabric of the human body by scarcely knowable modes of that eternal music and the proportion of harmony. Choose now from which kind of body the soul is, if it is a body. Because if the soul is not from one of these or from some or from all bodies, it is not a body. But what shall I do now? Where shall I turn myself, who am outstripped by the talent and skill of a most keen and learned disputer? He, understanding that there cannot be any body that was not created in the beginning from nothing, as are the elements of bodies, or that was not formed from these in a proportionate way, deciding that the soul is a body, he preferred that was formed from one of the principle bodies rather than composed from all. Clearly being cautious and of a prudent character, he did not wish to assemble the substance of the soul by a mixture of many bodies, lest, having been drawn together from the same principles from which the exterior body was, if it were said to be formed likewise, it would seem for the same reason to be able to be dissolved. Wherefore, he chooses air, from which or to which he decides that the soul would be like, and he adds the testimony of that author of his (whoever he is) whose words are: “there are some spiritual natures,” he says, “as angels, archangels, and the other powers, and also our soul itself, or rather certainly that subtle air, nevertheless they must not at all be thought to be incorporeal.”³² Are these words committed to parchment? Is the same business we are considering here considered there? If all else be cast aside the matter will hang on this scale alone, that if the argument, when it has

³² Letter of Faustus 10.1.

been examined, shows that the soul is either made of air or similar to air, I will throw myself, as they say, at the feet of both my adversary and his teacher, to beg forgiveness for my error. But if, as it is and as I claim for myself as the right of fixed truth, it will be proved by reasoning that not only the human soul, but every soul whatever is composed not of air or any other body, it will be right that you indulge and agree with us.

Chapter VIII.

An Argument That the Soul Is Created from No Body Whatever

Already above, the element fire appeared to excel the element air in both place and power. And this earthly fire clearly shows, as it is borne by a mobility scarcely comprehensible into its own region, turned upward by its natural weight. But even if one does not acknowledge its excellence from that, even from this is it clearly able to be understood, that all air shines in the presence of the sun and is dark in its absence. But also this is of the greatest account, that the air suffers the fire so that it grows hot, nevertheless fire does not suffer anything from the air so that it grows cold. Air can be shut up and contained in any little jar, yet this certainly does not happen to fire. Therefore fire, by evident reason, is more excellent than air, but sight is ours from fire, in such a way, nevertheless, that some irrational animals are more vigorous than man with respect to seeing. If, therefore, sight cannot be denied to be from fire, and according to your argument the soul is from air, therefore the eye of the beast is more excellent in the dignity of its substance than the soul of man, since that is from fire and this is from air.

Not without cause does he who judges the soul to be a certain air think the soul to be in place and assert it to be shut up in the confines of the body. Therefore you must now

chose one or the other: either the soul is baser than the sight of the beast, if it is airy, or it is not airy, if it is more excellent. You see how easily the fiction of unlearned presumption has vanished, besides the numberless things that it is very easy to argue against it. Surely if it is air, the darkness of this corporeal soul is the departure of this [visible] sun, and in the same way the coming of this same sun is its light. And so what the Evangelist announced will be false, when he said: *He was the true light that illumines every man coming into the world*,³³ and that which the prophet says in the person of sinners: *therefore the light of justice did not shine on us and the sun has not risen for us*.³⁴ Do those living in this world not see this corporeal sun, and yet incorporeal eyes lack an incorporeal sun? It seems a great wonder if this light has eyes to illumine, yet that true light does not: or if it does, as truly it does, from which the incorporeal is able to be seen, not only is it not airy, but I think it is not corporeal.

Chapter X.

That a Substance Already Formed Is Not Able To Be Called Matter

Now what sort of thing is that of which, in the very beginning of your disputation, you believe the reader must be warned: that he prepare his mind for thinking about rather subtle things? You are trying to lead our reason from the highest to the lowest, from incorporeal things to corporeal things, and as if teaching us to prepare the eye of the mind for subtle things, a little after this you add and say: “whatever is created seems to be matter,”³⁵ which you judge to be corporeal. If the creature is matter, man has not yet been

³³ Jn 1.9.

³⁴ Wis 5.6.

³⁵ Letter of Faustus 9.5.

formed, because it is said to God: *You have created man from unformed matter.*³⁶ But the world is full of forms, both less and more lovely with regard to quality or kind. But matter is unformed and the world is formed; therefore the creature is not matter.

Chapter XI.

That Everything Incorporeal or Corporeal, Whatever It Is, Is Created

After these things you draw your conclusion and say: “therefore nothing created is incorporeal, because whatever is comprehensible to its Maker is unable to be incorporeal.”³⁷ Therefore, by this argument, God is unknown to Himself, Who if He created nothing incorporeal so that nothing created would exceed the knowledge of the Creator, since nothing either corporeal or incorporeal exists unless the knowledge of the one creating precedes it (because manifestly one who does not know makes nothing), therefore He will not know Himself before all things, for He surpasses incorporeally every substance that He has created, and through this is greater than Himself, Who is not able to receive Himself. Because this is not allowed to be said reasonably, it follows that therefore He did not create anything incorporeal lest something created be incomprehensible to Him, although He Himself, the Highest of incorporeal things, is not able to be unknown to Himself. See how the heat of truth, with little effort, melts the frosts of frigid words? And since you are unable to separate matter from the created, the formed from the unformed, the spirit from air, you pronounce the image of God to be thus as one knowing the most excellent things, although you show yourself ignorant of the least. And now, compelled especially by the want of

³⁶ Wis 11.18.

³⁷ Letter of Faustus 9.6.

testimonies, you add, from a certain work of St. Jerome's a certain chapter, which it is agreed you have not understood, where he says: "they believe the globes of the stars to be embodied spirits."³⁸ There is no doubt that everyone who believes doubts. But you say blessed Jerome is passing on the belief of certain men concerning embodied spirits: and if he perhaps follows the opinion of those believing, that is, of those doubting, since you also follow the opinion of this same man, and since the doubt of the one believing proceeds only from ignorance, acknowledge that you offer to us who are seeking truth what is unknown of many instead of the one knowledge that you promised. For since you use, as if it were most trustworthy, the testimony of one who, doubting about those whose testimonies he uses, presents those whom he summons for witnesses as themselves doubting, what are we to think you are able to proclaim, who already is the third to doubt with the doubt from the author of your author who himself doubts.

Chapter XII.

That Not Understanding the Philosophers He Believed the Globes of the Stars to Be Embodied Spirits and Judges the Angels to Be Bodies

Nevertheless, I do find that philosophers say this, who assert in some disputations that even the very globes of the moon and sun are quickened by spirits incorporeal (evidently) under some divine judgment. But you must recognize not only that this same testimony avails for your opinion against us not at all, rather, it avails for us very much

³⁸ Letter of Faustus 9.9, quoting Jerome, *Comm in Librum Job* 25.

against that same opinion. And this happens to you because by your failure to understand that philosophical opinion you have laid it down for your defense; but if it is rightly understood, it is only able to support our position. For, if they had said that spirits were bodily, on the authority of those not [so much] determining, but rather believing, the crux of your argument would totter nonetheless. But since they, not doubtingly, but knowingly called spirits not *bodily*, but *embodied*, is it not known that whatever is embodied is not bodily? Otherwise they would have said that spirits are bodily, not embodied, because that is bodily which the soul ensouls, but that is unbodily by which the body is ensouled. Wherefore, since the body, which is made alive, is distinguished from the incorporeal which makes alive, it seems to me that this advocate of the body either did not understand the philosophical opinion concerning the incorporeal substance or he never should have put it forth in his defense under the name of St. Jerome.

He goes further and adds: “if the angels,” he says, “and even heavenly bodies are said to be unclean in comparison to God, what do you think man must be judged?”³⁹ As far as I can see, this most reckless disputer does not understand this [either]. For he believes that angels are of one substance, so that he thinks better of the stars, which he judges to be embodied spirits. For what else will Jerome, that learned man, be thought to have said, except that the bodies of angels excel by far the bodies of men in their ability and power? Likewise, when he said: “if the angels,” and he added: “even the heavenly bodies,” he wished two things to be understood, angels and heavenly bodies, because although the angels are embodied spirits, there are in the heaven certain things which are only bodies. Therefore, evidently he showed that no body however much the highest in place, however powerful in motion is able to be placed before incorporeal things. Again, making the distinction in a

³⁹ Letter of Faustus 9.11.

comparison, he says: So far is man unable to be compared to things divine, as neither is the angel. He separates further body and flesh, because although every flesh is a body, not every body is flesh. Whence the Apostle says: *some flesh is of birds, some of fish, and some even of man. And there are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies,*⁴⁰ evidently showing that the earthly body would also be flesh, but the heavenly would not also be flesh. Lest perhaps it be fitting that that which he recalls the same Jerome to say (“They think the globes of the stars to be embodied spirits”) be applied here so that the very stars or the bodies of angels are certainly the heavenly bodies, although those spirits which embody them are not bodily, as we say that God was incarnate and as the human soul is certainly incarnate, when it takes up the administering of the flesh. And however much that which Scripture testifies when it says *the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul*⁴¹ happens to it, nevertheless one must not believe that it is turned into a body, however much it is burdened by the weight of the flesh, because neither is the body ever changed into the nature of the soul, however much it is moved by it when it gives life, otherwise it will not be a body. Whence that which the Apostle said: *heavenly bodies and earthly bodies,*⁴² whether he wished it to be understood about the angels, or about the stars, or about certain earthly bodies (about which there is no question), will be clear from the following. For without break and in the next place he adds and says: *the glory of heavenly things is different than the glory of earthly things.*⁴³ And so that he might show clearly what those heavenly bodies are, he says, *the brilliance of the sun is different from the brilliance of the moon and the brilliance of the stars. For star differs from star in glory. So also the resurrection of the dead,*⁴⁴

⁴⁰ 1 Cor 15.39f.

⁴¹ Wis 9.15.

⁴² 1 Cor 15.40.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ 1 Cor 15.41f.

teaching that the same dissimilarity that is in the quality of the stars will be the distance according to the diversity of merits of the resuscitated bodies. Here without doubt, to be sure, the teacher of the gentiles disputing about the resurrection only of human bodies uses comparisons of this sort. For thus he enters into the cause of this topic: *Someone says, how will the dead rise? with what sort of body will they come?*⁴⁵ But from this topic to that comparison of the stars he pursues that same thing without the intervention of any other cause, making no mention of the soul, lest, no doubt, anyone think with perhaps a misguided judgment that what he discussed concerning the differences of the sun and moon and stars, which are surely heavenly bodies, was said about animals.

Chapter XIII.

Of Resurrection

Now therefore if the human body, certainly earthly and mortal, will be changed into that of glory, so that it may become spiritual from [being] carnal, according to the Apostle, who says: *the animal body will be planted, and a spiritual body will rise,*⁴⁶ and the human soul thus is now spiritual, so that nevertheless it is a body, therefore human flesh will be carried over into the dignity of the soul, and the soul which rightly ruled over the body, and which served the Lord piously and rightly, and which faithfully believed God or perhaps even knew Him, when its very own flesh is made equal to it, it will not be advanced in proportion to the quality of its substance. And where [does that leave] this: Not he who has cleansed the eye of flesh, but he who has cleansed the eye of the heart will see God? For *Blessed are the clean of*

⁴⁵ 1 Cor 15.35.

⁴⁶ 1 Cor 15.44.

*heart, for they shall see God.*⁴⁷ Therefore, perhaps the body will be made blessed in its own way, and the soul likewise will be made blessed its own way. The body will be changed so that it may serve readily the spirit (which it often resisted stubbornly) in all things, and the soul will be changed so that it may see God, Whom the ardor of chaste charity has gazed upon. And since the Apostle separated the spirit, soul, and body, when he said: *as your whole spirit and soul and body*,⁴⁸ because after the resurrection one will not live as an animal; that is, when one will not eat or drink, when one will not sleep or lay together, the whole animal body will pass over into a spiritual body because the whole soul will pass over into spirit, and the whole spiritual body will be for the sake of the spirit dwelling within it. And if this spirit in this life certainly has desired against the flesh and has not given itself over to the flesh which desired against it, rightly will it experience no such difficulty in eternity, the difficulties of which it has overcome by the power of heavenly aid. Nor will it be proper that one who submitted unwillingly to its master be made equal to its master, or that one who conquered willingly remain in the state of a slave. Wherefore it is given to be understood that just the substance of the human soul in this life surpasses incorporeally the animal body in its dignity, so after the resurrection and reward it will surpass the spiritual body. However, nothing that is greater than a spiritual body is a body, as it seems to me. Therefore, according to the opinion of my adversary here, who judges the angels to be only bodies, the angelic nature will be inferior to the human substance. For we hold as certain by divine authority that the bodies of the saints, which merit being changed into glory, will be made equal to the angelic bodies, since our Lord says: *and they will be as angels in heaven.*⁴⁹ If therefore the angels are only spiritual bodies and of one substance, and the human body will advance to the dignity of the angelic

⁴⁷ Mt 5.8.

⁴⁸ 1 Thess 5.23.

⁴⁹ Mt 22.30.

body, man will be made equal to the angel in the quality of his body, and will surpass it in the dignity of his spirit. But if, as is certain, this seems absurd, the substance of the angel will be twofold, as is the human substance, having a body of entire promptness and greatest beauty, which can appear to men when it is commanded, and having something unbodily by which it might always see God, according to that gospel where it is said: *because their angels always see the face of my father.*⁵⁰

Chapter XIII.

That in No Way are Spiritual Things Able to Be Seen With Bodily Eyes

But I am especially at a loss as to why any Christian, especially one in the office of teacher, should state that God would be able to be contemplated by any body, however beautiful, however sublime, and He Who is Universal is able to be seen in place, since this seeing God is understanding Him. But we know that the understanding is not in place by the very act of understanding, because if the understanding is in place, that which is understood will also be in place. For nothing is in place that is not itself a place. But if the understanding is in place and God is in it, because God is understood by it, therefore God is in place. And because this is repugnant, we must understand that man consists of something bodily and something unbodily, each to be reformed into something better, and the angel consists of body and spirit formed with the highest dignity among creatures. For it has a spirit more powerful than any [other] created spirit, it has a body of the most powerful of all the elements, and more sublime, according to the text in the prophets where it is put forth without a doubt that the angelic substance is twofold, where it is said: *Who made his angels*

⁵⁰ Mt 18.10.

*spirits and His ministers burning fire.*⁵¹ But that fire is not spirit and that spirit is not fire surely is manifest, because in that place it must not be taken as something allegorical as when the Lord says: *I have come to send fire upon the earth,*⁵² when He was speaking of the Holy Spirit. For it is not right to be believed that human souls are inflamed to divine love through a participation in the angelic spirit, because man is good by the same Gift whereby the angel is good, and by the same Gift each is blessed. Both desire the same thing by the same Will, that is, by the same Spirit; both obtain this same thing by an incorporeal capacity, and man, angel, and God become one spirit, according to the Apostle, who says: *he who adheres to the Lord is one spirit.*⁵³ Yet I do not see how the body is able to be mixed with what is unbodily so that it may rightly be called *one spirit*. For if the soul is a body, therefore something bodily will be changed so that it can be one with something unbodily, and so we necessarily return to that argument in which it is said that something unbodily was able to be created. For if something unbodily is able to come to be from something bodily, it was also able to be created from nothing, unless perchance the unchangeable God is spoken of as if becoming bodily so that He is able to be one with a body. But this the faith of certain lost souls holds, because if it is good for the angel or man to adhere to God, the unchangeable Creator will not be reduced to a creature, rather the changeable creature will advance to the Creator, whence in the Gospel, the Lord says: *Father, may they be one in Us as We also are one.*⁵⁴

⁵¹ Ps 103.4.

⁵² Lk 12.49.

⁵³ 1 Cor 6.17.

⁵⁴ Jn 17.22.

Chapter XV.

That All Bodily Things are Made Greater or Many Rather than Few By Their Addition, But No Unbodily Thing is Increased in Many or Lessened in Singulars

One is not allowed to believe that the joining together of any bodies is able to imitate the unity of the Trinity or to be mixed unconfusedly with it. For it is clear as glass that any one body is doubled by the addition of an equal body, that there is there an above and below, left and right, before and behind, that there is there length, breadth and depth according to the way of magnitude. But we do not say that the parts of this divisibility and locality or extension are in the very Trinity of God, to Whose likeness He Who made [us] says that we are able to be one and to be united with Himself, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles, that *there was one mind of those believing and willing, and one heart.*⁵⁵ I do not reckon that some greater soul came to be from the many souls, because the Trinity, through Whom and with Whom all good souls become one, is not less in any one Person of this same Trinity than in the Three, nor greater in the Three than in any One. So also the substance of the human soul, in imitation of Him Whose image it is, is not greater according to any mass in many, nor is it lesser according to any mass in singulars, because although they are powers, they are not bodies. However, the Creating Power certainly excels the created powers by right for the very reason that It created them. For we also experience and learn that one soul often stands out before another, yet we do not believe that the one that we have learned to stand out with respect to power is greater with respect to mass, of which it has none. I do not even think that you deny that a multitude of souls, no matter how great, understanding

⁵⁵ Acts 4.32.

something perfectly does not understand it more than one soul understanding it perfectly, nor do many souls wanting something earnestly want more what one soul wants earnestly, nor do many souls recall with greater tenacity of memory what each remembers best. But a large body has more weight than a small one, and a multitude of bodies is stronger than a few, and a band of many certainly holds back or holds up or drives on more strongly than one. Now let us inquire about what follows.

Chapter XVI.

That Souls Are Unbodily

You say, “Souls through themselves have bodies whereby they subsist, although they are much, even incomparably, thinner than our bodies.”⁵⁶ Let it be taken so, if it is so. I should like you to answer this: Who is the one who says, “The soul has a body incomparably thinner than our bodies”? If these are the words of the soul, what⁵⁷ body does it say is its own, that which is itself or that one of flesh which it makes to sense and live? For the soul itself says: the body of the soul is thinner than my body. What⁵⁸ is the body that the soul calls its own, except that which it is itself, if the soul is a body? Either, therefore, the soul is a body and that fleshly body is not rightly called its own, because that is more its own which it is, or that body of the soul is a body, but it itself, as is given to be understood, is not a body. Then he speaks thus also to his consuler:

You object to me, therefore, that the soul is not bodily because it is not in place, nor does it subsist through a quality or quantity. What danger there is in believing

⁵⁶ Letter of Faustus, 10.4.

⁵⁷ Reading *quid* for Engelbrecht’s *quod*.

⁵⁸ Reading *quid* for Engelbrecht’s *quod*.

this will be shown in what follows, but now at this point in our treatise, with the discussion we have had, the argument will depend upon this: if the soul is not in place or subject to quantity, we must without doubt grant it to be unbodily, but if we demonstrate it to be determined by quantity or closed up in a place, consequently you yourself may not doubt that it is shut up in a body.⁵⁹

Clearly you have placed the standing of your treatise in the solution of this point, that if the soul can be proved to be subject to place and quantity, it would also be believed to be bodily, which nevertheless a little while later you pronounce to fashion varieties of thoughts and to stir up motions in the workshop of the breast.

Chapter XVII.

Of Life: That the Soul Gives Life to the Body without Being in Place

And first I ask you to respond, in what place in the body is the soul: in the whole or in a part? If it is in a part, how does it move and give sense to the whole body everywhere? If it is in the whole, how does it fashion its thoughts and exercise its motions only in the workshop of the breast? Or perhaps it is not only in the breast, but also in the head, and not only in the head, but also in the soles of the feet and in the bones? And wherever you think the soul is in place, there also you confess it to understand in place and to think in place; and because, if it is bodily, so far is it in a body that as water in a bottle fills the lesser parts with a lesser part of itself and greater parts with a greater part, it necessarily follows that there is for it a greater thought in the breast and a smaller thought in the finger. And so no matter how small a part someone cuts off from the living body, he cuts off a whole part of the living soul as well, and through this, there will not be in a lame soul either so great a power of

⁵⁹ Letter of Faustus 10.12f.

thinking or so great an ability to remember. For no one doubts that air, from which, or similar to which, you pronounce the soul to be, is cuttable. For even when we inhale and exhale, we draw in and send back little parts of it, which those veins, which the Greeks call ἀρτηρίαι take into the feeding ground of the whole body, and through which the air is dispersed by an untiring stirring up of the lungs into the mixture of the other three elements. But if the air drawn in, according to your opinion, pertains to the food of the soul, because surely an airy thing is fittingly fed by air, therefore, as was said above, with the body that it enlivens it undergoes a cutting up. Certainly the power of memory without question pertains to the whole soul. Furthermore, every body no matter how large or small is certainly able to be cut up, which happens to it because it is made up of parts. For whatever has parts clearly is able to be divided because a part can be taken away from a part. Wherefore if the soul is a body, it is certainly able to be cut; if it is able to be cut, it can be lessened; if it can be lessened, when a part of the living body is destroyed one also destroys a part of the soul, but with a part of the soul perishes part of the memory; the soul therefore of which the substance is lessened ought certainly to remember less. And through this, if the soul is in place, it is able to be divided by a multifold cutting and to be wiped out by frequent lessening. But because a sane mind, not to say a learned one, does not accept this, so that it might be more apparent that the soul is not in place, as far as we, with divine aid, are able to show, let us inquire about motion, because there will not be a doubt that, just as that which is moved in place is a body, so that is not a body which is not moved in place.

Chapter XVIII.

That There Are Three Kinds of Motion

That there are three motions, stable, not in place, and in place, has already been noted.⁶⁰ The motion of God is stable; that of the soul, not in place; and that of the body, in place. There is stable motion because God did not always make creation but nevertheless, He did not wish to create with a new will when He created it because He always willed to create it then when He made it. *Then* is a signification of time, [but] does not always pertain to time. Therefore this *then* pertains to the beginning of time, not to time, because the stability of the sempiternal will embraces temporal motion, and through this to always will a *then* is a stable motion. Here one must acknowledge that nothing is able to be moved except by one unmoved, and so that we may teach this by example, certainly we are not able to move the finger unless the hand is at rest, but the motion of the arm is by the stability of the shoulder. And so that we may not tarry too long, in walking certainly one foot must be fixed so that the other can be moved. Keep this in mind while, for a little while, we separate the motion of the soul from the motion of the body. For just as God is moved stably, as was said above, so the soul is moved temporally. But that is temporal which a little before was proud, but now is humble, that was joyful before, and now is sad, that loved before, but now hates, that forgot something before, but now remembers. But the body does not share motions of this sort with the soul, for it is moved by them even when the body is not. Whence one understands that the soul is moved in time, but not in place and by it the body is moved both in time and in place, but it is not moved in place by the body.

And so that I may make this plain in words, if in some way I am able, it is necessary

⁶⁰ See Ch. 3, above.

that the reader be more attentive to me. Behold, in order to write or fashion something, the nod of the soul is directed so that the hand is moved. The soul gazes upon unbodily, unplaced forms, and being joined inseparably to them, either thrown upon them as subjects or subject to them having been thrown upon it, the whole soul moves the member and gazes upon the truth of the forms and, moreover, gives sensation to the whole body everywhere. When, therefore, as has been said, being always directed toward this and that eternal form, it strives to make a bodily square or hexagon or circle according to the example of these same forms, certainly if it turns the mind, that is, its eye in another direction, so that, wishing to make a square it thinks circle or wishing to write the name Paul it thinks the name Simon, is not the motion of the limb immediately moved to expressing or shaping that to the thinking of which the nod of the soul has passed? Therefore the soul will stand in the contemplation of the forms so that it may move the body in the formation of the formables, and the truth of the forms is not visible except to a rational animal. For every soul stands in appetite and in counsel. But it is not believable that the hand of the writer is moved with the nod of the soul and the soul is moved by the stirring of the hand, which unless it saw the forms of letters unmovingly and not in place, it would not be able to form them in place by the motion of the fingers.

But perhaps you will say: There is that part of the soul which is moved by the fingers in writing, and the rest is not moved. Those who thought the soul to have parts held this, notwithstanding that, by inseparable consequence, if it were bodily, it would have parts, because that which is bodily has parts and everything that has parts is bodily. Let us inquire therefore whether the spirit is able to be broken into parts so that we may see whether or not it is able to be moved by a part of itself instead of a part of the body. And of the question that we are about to investigate, this we ought to note first and most of all: that if

the mind has parts, it is able to be cut into parts. Let us note with our minds that no body is able to either touch or be touched entirely at the same time, and the whole soul is together in each of its motions and acts. For as we disputed above, every body, however great, however small, has length, width, and depth. And according to the number of parts, it is subject to six motions. For every body is moved up, down, to the right or left, forward and backward. But in a seventh motion it is also moved, as a wheel or sphere, and this motion, which is perfect, is accomplished as a sign of eternity by itself and through itself and in itself. Therefore every body, as we said, having six parts and subject to six motions certainly has in proportion to its thickness also some middle. For the exterior things in bodies would be altogether nothing if the internal things were also not. Every body, therefore, even if it is clasped by a hand and touched in its whole exterior parts, in its internal parts it is clearly not touched. Hence it is clear that no body is able to be touched entirely, nor is all of it able to be in one place, however small, as for example, the grain of a poppy or however small a part of that grain, because it does not have its lower parts there where its upper parts are, nor does it have its right where its left is, nor, it is certain, does it have its front where its back is. But the whole soul sees through the body and the whole soul recalls the things seen; and the whole soul hears and remembers what it has heard; and smells and remembers the odors and through the tongue and, as other think, through the palate senses flavors and distinguishes them and touches something soft and rough and proves and disproves. Yet it seems wondrous, according to the necessity of the locality of times, as I discussed above, that the whole soul quickens the whole body and with the whole body living nevertheless and sensing, the whole soul at once receives forms through the smallest part of the body, which is sight, and through a part of this same body, which is hearing the whole soul receives at the same time voices and through the narrow member of the nostrils the whole soul senses fragrances and

through the sense of tasting the whole soul judges the differences of tastes and the whole soul discerns hot and cold by the tip of the finger. If therefore the whole soul is present in place in the eye so that it may see, how is it not wholly absent from the other senses at the same time, so that the whole soul senses everywhere and quickens the individual parts of the body, not with parts of its own, but with its whole self, and wholly gives sense to the different parts at the same time? When, therefore, you have convinced me that the soul performs these things in place, then you will persuade me that it also is in place and has parts. And yet all these things are still common to men and beasts.

Chapter XIX.

Of the Soul, That It Is not Subject to Quantity

Therefore if the unplaced-ness of the soul has appeared even a little, although I have not yet discussed the principle soul, that is, our rational mind, in which its unplaced-ness and unbodiliness will certainly shine forth more clearly, let us discuss to what extent the soul is not subject to quantity, since where there is not placed-ness, there is not able to be quantity, because these two things are joined so mutually to each other that either they are both able to be in a thing or neither of them is. The divine essence is not in any way subject to any of those categories of Aristotle; moreover, the human soul is not subject to all of them, but every body is subject to them all. For we do not say of God how He is, because He is not able to be compared, as it were, to another so that it might be said that he is such. Nor do we say how much He is because He is not great in weight, nor what He has, for there is nothing He does not have, nor in what way He is for He is the Way, nor do we inquire about His outfit for He contains all things, nor His place, for only bodies are in place, nor His

time, for He is Sempiternity, nor His act, for he acts at rest, nor His undergoing, for He does not undergo. Now the tenth, or rather the first, is substance, from which these predicaments are woven.

Chapter XX.

That the Soul Receives Quality

Now, although the human soul does not receive quantity, yet it is subject to quality. For if about anything we ask how⁶¹ its body is, of course, a quality of the body is indicated: it is golden, it is colored, it is pale, or it is black. But if we inquire about the soul, in like manner its quality is shown to us: it is proud, humble, angry, at peace; it remembers well or forgets quickly. Again, if the quantity of a body is sought, it will be said to us rightly: the length of this body is five feet, its width is likewise two feet; it weighs so much. If the quantity of the soul is shown with these same signs, is there found something long or wide or thick? But if it is so, then whoever has a roomier body will have a greater soul, yet we would not ever call a man with an exceedingly large body great-souled; in fact, we generally call enormously fat men small-souled. Rather, we call Moses great-souled because being a fearless leader, he entered the path in the Red Sea, and we call that people small-souled who did not believe, although God had promised it, that it would quite easily be done. Behold, the spirit of one man, greater in virtue, not in mass, without doubt, than the spirit of the whole people, because if it were greater in mass, then the mass of even two souls (I need not say many) would be greater than that of one. Therefore, there is quality in the soul, but there is not quantity, because what is subject to the changes of affections receives quality, but what

⁶¹ I.e., *quale*.

does not have mass, does not have quantity. Hence it is that no ensouled body, when it dies, loses its soul, rather it forsakes it, because what is not shut in does not go out, and what is not held is not lost. For if it is held, it is not lost, and if it were not lost, it would not die, whence not as a poet, but as a philosopher, did Papinius say: “I hate the limbs and this fragile use of the body, deserter of the spirit.”⁶²

So that this may be more clear, let us stir this up more diligently, and come from the farthest kind of living things to the life that is also rational in an orderly and gradual way, so that we may be able to see these three things, memory, counsel, and will, from which the oneness of the human soul is made, although remembering is common to the rational and irrational.

Chapter XXI.

That Memory Is Common to the Rational and Irrational Soul and That Man is Every Creature

Whence not without truth is it said that the boundary between man and beast is in memory. For storks and swallows come back to their nests after a year, and horses return to their stables, and dogs know their masters. But because the souls of beasts, even if they retain the images of places, do not have knowledge of their own substance, they necessarily remain in the remembrance of bodily things that they have drawn in through bodily senses, and are not able, since they do not have the eye of reasoning, to see themselves, let alone something above themselves. Therefore, the whole man renders thanks, if not as much as he

⁶² Statius, *Theb.* 8, 738.

ought, at least as much as he is able, to his Creator, Who from the bounty of His inexpressible kindness gave him being, which he shares with stones, and the life of the seed, which he shares with the grasses and trees, and the life of the senses and the animal, which he shares with the beasts, and the life of reason, which he shares with the angels. Therefore, so that it may be clear that the life of the grasses and shrubs is incorporeal, and that it is not lost by the body, but is forsaken, I ask you whether you deny that grasses and trees live? Or perhaps you say that since some of these are living, there are souls in them so that they may live. But if they were ensouled, they would not lack their proper motion; but they are in fact things that are moved by a motion that is not proper to them. They would also feel a wound when it is inflicted. But we know that these are not in such things from the cutting of bones and hair and the trimming of nail, which we cut off without any feeling of pain. Therefore there is life even where there is no soul.

Note now that in order to produce this life of the tree, seeds have formed from parts of all the elements. Certainly, it has earth in its heaviness, water in its moisture, air in its growth, and fire in its bud. If, however, the soul is of air or something like air, as you declare, therefore you will not deny that the tree is ensouled, because it is clear that a nature like air is in it. Obviously, in the established order of things the lower are made by the higher: that is, when the wintry frost has been driven away through the revolution of the heaven by the return of the constellations, heat coming from on high first affects the air nearest it in place and nature. And as it yields to fire by as great a degree as it stands above water, it draws waters from the depths of the earth through the roots of trees, or any other plant, because fire, the element that naturally takes away all things, draws the water, when it has been made warm, to itself, and just as it itself drinks air, so the air drinks water through the marrow of the tree, and the water earth. Whence it is that we also drink water without difficulty through

a reed of straw of this type when the air has been drawn out, and water, rather heavy by nature, is driven upward from the depths of wells by machines artfully made, and with the support of air is poured forth when it is forced into the narrow passages of pipes as far as the edge and pushed out over the top of the well.

Therefore, so that every living body may exist, this dissonance of bodies contrary to each other is driven by the nod of the Creator into a certain harmonious song. But if any one of these four elements, which sing together temperately and musically in the life of the tree, happens to exceed or fall short of its due measure, the tree first grows sick, and then dies, conquered, as it were, by sickness. You see in this case that when the parts of the body break harmony with the song of unity, life is deserted by the body rather than the body being forsaken by life. Therefore it remains that no life departs from a body according to place, nor is it in a body according to place, nor does it come to a body according to place.

If here you scrutinize the secrets of arguments from causes, you would note that although soul is absent from unmoving living things, unbodily life is not. And, to pick but one from all the kinds of seeds, surely we know of how great a size is the grain of wheat, and we reckon fully its bulk by its capacity. And if we wish to see something of its bodily interior and cut it open, we will see nothing except so much of its white grain as the small capacity of its slender skin contains. Behold, do you see? The whole of a grain of wheat in its bodily extent! Now you give to me in this same little grain the swellings of buds, the flowerings of grasses, the reeds of the stalks, the bristles of the pistils, the lightness of the chaff, the richness of the fruit and from these the seeds of seeds to be multiplied untiringly, which are all stored up by secret causes in that grain. Now therefore, either show all these seeds which come forth from seeds to be in these same seeds in a bodily way or confess that the life of grasses is also unbodily; yet proclaim, if you will, that the soul of man and the life of the

bush is bodily. And because no man can bear this with sound judgment, let us pass over to ensouled living things, which not only live, but also sense.

There is, therefore, in the beast, a corruptible body and a mortal soul, which neither comes before nor goes on after the life of the body. Therefore in the body of the beast, you see motion and sense added to the life of the seed, which we found in grasses and trees, through the appetite of the soul, in such a way, nevertheless, if the body be well disposed, with the elements fittingly singing together in due proportion, that it harmonizes with the inclinations of the soul with the fitting obedience of its motion. See: that man has a strong left hand, but he has lost the use of his right through the attack of a disease, as sometimes happens. This hand, remaining with the rest of the body, even if it is not in the same health, remains in the same species; nevertheless, it does not serve the inclinations of the soul. What shall we say, that the soul has been beaten back and has departed from it according to place? And where did it go? For where did it depart from there? But perhaps it gathered itself to the remaining part of itself: yet the soul already fills the whole body, and is anything able to be added to something full and not overflow? And so perhaps something of the soul must be exhaled or belched forth, or in some way scattered because less than the whole body does not contain the whole soul. These things, without doubt, must follow if the soul is a body. And because this can never happen, observe this: that the soul did not lose the power of commanding, rather, the hand lost the power of serving. For when the harmony of the elements as they grow heavy is disturbed, for instance, by an attack of the blood, the possibility of serving is taken from that body and a difficulty in ruling arises for the mind, and what was useful now begins to be a burden. Nevertheless, the soul does not lose the power to move, rather, the member does not offer itself in a manner suited to the required motion, and in anyone who is blind, if one looks to the soul, the power of seeing bodily

things through the body remains, but the members of the organ with which it extends its powers to see bodily things fail. Therefore just as it is certainly clear, by an evident argument, that the soul is not driven from a crippled limb, rather the limb, numbed by illness as by a certain nearness of death, is separated from the vigorous intention of the soul, so when the body of some animal is separated [from the soul] by its own dissonance, and the elements return to their proper regions, the soul of the beast, not having the means to set forth its intentions, perishes, yet the human soul rests only from those motions by which it moves the body through places, itself being moved through time but not through places.

Let no little bodily things, as it were, set themselves against the eyes of the mind, causing us to believe that souls, when they have laid aside their bodies, occupy places of the air or some other element. Understand, if you can, your understanding, to which alone with the angel it is granted to see these things. What do you see in your understanding that is long, wide, or high? Does the splendor of any bodily light shine there? Does the melody of an old song, measured out and flowing through time resound there, or the sweetness of a passing fragrance linger there, or does it taste something fleshy there, or touch something soft or hard? By prudence does its sight grow bright, by foolishness it grows dark. Its hearing is offended by falsehood, caressed by the truth. Justice smells sweet to it without being in place, injustice is fetid, it decays through vanity, grows full through virtue. It is wretched through intimacy with stupidity, is blessed through the embrace of wisdom. Therefore the whole is an eye, for the whole sees and sees the whole thing that is seen, but no body either is wholly seen or sees with its whole self. The whole is hearing, for the whole hears all of that which it hears, but a body hears nothing wholly. And the whole smells, and tastes, and touches, although a unity and ability such as this cannot be in a body. Therefore this is suited to it by nature, that there seeing and hearing are the same, hearing and smelling are the same,

smelling and tasting are the same, tasting and touching are the same. But images of bodily things come upon the soul and by them it is affected and circumscribed not by places but by deceits, and because it only remembers those things whose species it receives through the body, it does not believe that there is anything that is not such, nor is it able to sigh for its native land, from which it has been rightly cast down into this wandering life, although it does not know that it is wandering. It is unable to know that it is a foreigner in the body, indeed, if it believes itself to be a body; whence that man, from whom his own substance surely was not hidden thus said: *While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. But we are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord.*⁶³ What, I ask, can be said more clearly? All bodies, whether thick and heavy, as water and earth, or thin and light, as fire and air, or those which are made from them as from seeds when they come together are no doubt included in the name body. Whatever and of what sort a body it is, whatever is able to be called a body, be it a quite thin body, a quite swift body, a rather lofty body, a rather bright body, still, it is able to be called nothing but a body. Yet when the Apostle says *while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord*, it seems to me he would never have said that the soul wanders in the body if he thought that the soul was a body. For if the soul is a body, and it wanders in the body, then it wanders in its own substance, and it will not ever be able not to wander since it will not ever be able to be without itself. But nothing ever loses itself, for nothing can be after itself. For something is able more easily to utterly destroy itself so that it becomes nothing at all than it is able to lose itself and outlast itself. So, either the soul is a body and the Apostle is deceived, or, if it does wander in the body, the soul is not a body.

⁶³ 2 Cor 5.6, 8.

Chapter XXII.

An Examination Is Had As to How the Soul Wanders in the Body

Perhaps you will object to these things and say: “How is the soul said to wander, because it is in the body, only here? If we believe in the resurrection, and we should, we will not be without bodies in the eternal fatherland, either.” Here I would ask you to tell me, is the soul called a wanderer now because it is in a body, or because it is in such a body? Surely this body, as I recalled above, does not weigh down the soul⁶⁴ at all by that weight which is able to be weighed, for if so, then one would be stronger the more fasting and sickness wasted the body. Whence this also adds much to our arguments because it is as clear as glass, with regard to that life which we have in common with the beasts, that the soul of man is burdened more by a body that is consumed and withered than by one nourished and plump. This happens because a body that is exhausted is not strong enough to serve the bidding of the soul with easy motion: it is not the heaviness of its weight that is burdensome to it, but the difficulty of acting. And just as if we think about the life of the beast, which is manifestly in us in this life, this body does not weigh down the soul, but if we look to the life that will be with the angels, it weighs down the soul by busying it and enticing it with things necessary and things pleasurable, directing it toward beautiful bodies and stealing it away from contemplating the highest Beauty. Therefore it is clear that although eating and drinking are necessary for the health of the body, if they are used more than is necessary, or if the spirit is busied beyond what is fitting with the trifles of pleasures or afflicted through the body by pains and sorrows beyond what is fitting, the soul will be weighed down and burdened through the repetition and difficulty of acting. And it is about this wandering that the

⁶⁴ Cf Wis 9.15.

Apostle says: *When we are in the body we are absent from the Lord.* But when he who merits it will have come to the alteration of the body, about which the Apostle says: *We will all arise, but we will not all be changed,*⁶⁵ the animal body, which will not be, will not then oppose the bidding of the soul, rather the spiritual body, which will be, will serve it in all things. But it will not desire anything at all that is unfitting, nor will it command anything unjust. And because the soul that is holy is taken up into God with a chaste affection, note that neither its wandering nor its fatherland has the nature of place. Is God not with the soul in this life, even if it is not with God? For it is one thing to be with God and another not to be without God, for not according to place does one go to Him, nor does one depart according to place. Hence, that soul is with God which sees, that is understands, God. And that soul is not with God, naturally, which does not understand Him. God, however, is present both to the one understanding and the one not understanding, but not according to place. But the soul wanders here to the degree that it is called from the contemplation of the highest Good through bodily pleasures and sorrows, through time and place, through fantasies and imaginings, a thing that will not happen at all *when this corruptible puts on incorruption and this mortal puts on immortality.*⁶⁶

Wherefore, the soul wanders in the body by whose corruption, weakness, and want it is separated from its fatherland, that is from God. And I think that a substance, whose wandering is in place and in the body and whose fatherland is unbodily and not in place, is not truly said to be either bodily or in place. There is no wandering in that by the desire of which one is not enticed, by the resistance of which one is not busied, by the weight of which one is not fettered. It is clear, I think, that the soul wanders not in any body, but only

⁶⁵ 1 Cor 15.51.

⁶⁶ 1 Cor 15.53f.

in a body of flesh, because a body of flesh obstructs, but a spiritual body approaches unbodily things. Therefore, so that we may discuss only our own substance for a while, as I said I would—who is able to gaze into the abyss or probe the cave even of memory? There I have every color and shape I have ever seen, there every word or sound I have heard with my ears, there every odor I have drawn in with my nostrils, there every flavor I have known in their diversity, there everything I have discerned through the pronouncements of touch; there have been stored for me in some way grammar, when I discuss things dialectical, and rhetoric, when I discuss things geometrical, and astrology, when I discuss things musical, and all these together, when I discuss things arithmetical: according to the forms of the parts of the world that I see, with reason helping with regard to the things I do not see, I learn about unbodily things and embrace the world with this capacity.

Chapter XXIII.

That the Soul Sees Unbodily Things through Itself in an Unbodily Way, but Sees Bodily Things through the Body

But you say to me: you do not comprehend the world with your memory, rather, you comprehend the figure of the world. Even from this understand that the soul is not bodily, because you see that the soul is not able to understand even bodily things in a bodily way. To memory, then, there is added an eye, not in place but with power and ability, which is one and the same as the spirit or mind or understanding, even if it is called by different names. Therefore as a stone is to a living thing without a soul, so a living thing without a soul is to an ensouled living thing, and as a living thing without a soul is to an ensouled living thing, so an ensouled living thing is to one living and understanding. The irrational soul serves the

animal body, surely, for its health, and the understanding, the capacity to reason, serves the rational soul for the health, naturally, of the rational soul, with God working and helping by his foremost power and stable motion and unbegun linchpin of substances, first that they may be, then that they may be in due proportion and as is fitting, such as He Who only disposes things rightly has established that they should be. Just as a body is fittingly said to be here or there on account of the necessity of its being in place, so on account, not of their being in place, but of their possessing qualities is it rightly proclaimed of souls that they are such and such; for just as a bright place and temperate air are pleasant to a living body, so are tranquility of thought and security from fear pleasing to a life-giving soul. Again, as a dark place and violent touch are punishments to the body, so unfirmness of thought and distress of fear are punishments to the soul. Therefore, the soul acts not through places, but delightfully or painfully, according to a diversity of affections. It is clear, then, that the soul is able to be delighted or afflicted properly without the body in an unbodily way through its affections, but the body is not able to sense delights or punishments without the soul. Therefore, the soul joined to a body is able to sense bodily things and the same soul is able to see unbodily things without the body. Therefore, as the body without the soul senses nothing, so the mind without the body does not sense any bodily thing. Hence it is that even as it takes care of and gives sensation to the body, if when it is raised up to the things that are highest and always the same, it so forsakes in some way the bodily senses and recedes from them in a way not involving place that it does not see things placed before it, nor does it hear things making noise right next to it, nor does it understand by reading the page it has looked over. The soul is present so that, through the eye, it gathers the signs of letters and joins them into syllables and distinguishes them into words, yet it is not present so that it does not know what it has done through these actions. I read something clearly, and another

who fixes the eye of his mind upon it understands me as I pronounce [the words], but I myself do not know what I have read because my soul, intent upon something else in a way not involving place, has withdrawn. Then, when I am admonished, and I return to myself, I am myself the one, certainly, who returns and I myself am the one to whom I return. And I was not with myself, because I have returned to myself after an interval, not of place, but of time; yet I was not apart from myself because I was not able to be without myself. The soul is there so that it sees through the eye what is read, and is not there so that it does not understand what is read. Or does it not often happen that we, applying our sight to readings of this sort or directing our hearing to a report of something, although it is easy to understand these things as well as to hear or see them, nevertheless we receive both sounds and signs by each of these senses, yet we do not understand what they signify? And yet when we return the gaze of our minds to that which was not understood, we comprehend this same thing without any difficulty.

Chapter XXIII

That the Soul Is not One Thing and Memory, Thought, and Will Another,

Since the Soul is All these together

But you will add, saying:

the nature⁶⁷ of the soul is one thing, the affection of thought that is born of the soul another. Better, then, on account of this one must think that if when the soul imagines

⁶⁷ *Status*. Faustus does not use this word in the same sense as Claudianus, though his use of it here allows Claudianus to use it himself with regard to the soul's place in the ontological order.

something for itself, it is more occupied with its own motions within itself and if it seems to see something else, this is rather described for it in the looking glass of the memory.⁶⁸

You think that to be its nature⁶⁹ and not its punishment, and your soul is deceived in its recollection because it cherishes for itself things hostile to itself and, affected through the senses of the body by the mockeries of these fallacies, it is enmeshed in so great an error that it seeks for itself as if it were absent from itself, even though it is itself that seeks itself, for the soul is not that which is sought, but that by which it is sought. For whatever it seeks is something apart from itself and there is no need for it to seek something that is with it. Yet it is with itself, for without itself it is nothing, therefore that does not need to seek itself which is not able to be without itself. Wherefore, since it seeks itself not without itself, it necessarily comes upon something other, because it is not able to discover itself without itself. It is this mockery that saddens the one who understands it and he is sad and groans and, with the prophet, strikes his breast and says, *I go forth sorrowful all the day because my soul is filled with mockeries.*⁷⁰ But it is mockeries of this sort that the soul suffers in its memory. But it would not be able to toss about and bring forth from the memory any of these phantasms unless it had drawn them from the forms of bodies through the bodily senses. For it either imagines to itself those same things that it has drawn to it through the body or it throws together and fashions those things it has not seen from those which it has seen; nevertheless it is certainly never able to imagine anything within the womb, as it were, of the memory unless it has received it through the body. And these are not natural to it, but are

⁶⁸ Letter of Faustus 11.7-12.

⁶⁹ *natura*.

⁷⁰ Ps 37.7-8

punishments. Since from the highest Good (which for it is God) it has descended, enticed by bodily allurements, into a body, therefore, having been thus seduced, it suffers justly within itself that in which it unjustly took delight outside of itself. Do not, therefore, desire to persuade⁷¹ me that the soul is that by which you see it to be disturbed. For if it had remained in the loftiness of its original state, from which it has fallen by its own will, that flesh would never desire against the spirit, not the spirit against the flesh, and if the true man, that is, the rational soul had understood his dignity as, namely, the image of God, surely he would never *have been set among the foolish beasts*,⁷² so that he should live as an animal. Hence it is that he is a tumult of the bodily images before his eyes, and always gets in his own way so that if he ever strives in his thinking toward himself or his God, he is always recalled to bodily things by the phantasms of the body!

For when you say that the soul differs from the thought of the soul, perhaps you had better have said that those things about which it thinks, when it does not think about itself, are not the soul, but the thought itself is nothing other than the soul. For that which you said must be added lacks truth: that the soul is accustomed to rest so far that it thinks nothing at all. Surely the soul is able to vary the things thought, but is not able not to think. Yet what do we see from that which we call dreaming except that not even when the body is exhausted and released to sleep is the power of the soul free from thoughts? Yet the whole soul is there where it thinks, because the whole soul thinks. But you especially are deceived about the nature⁷³ of the soul because you believe that the soul and its powers are different things. For what it thinks is its accident, that by which it thinks is its substance. And it is

⁷¹ Claudianus is here playing on the word *persuade*, which he had used above to describe the fallen soul. There it was translated by the word *seduced*.

⁷² Ps 48.13 and 21.

⁷³ *status*.

necessary that you recognize this also about the will. For just as the whole soul is thought, so the whole soul is will, and what wills completely wills with its whole self and, as was said above, to will certain things is an accident for it, but willing itself is its substance. Hence also in the sacred writings there is a definition of a perfect will, namely that which is so thought damnable or praiseworthy even as it wills. Thus in the Gospel, our Lord says: *He who looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.*⁷⁴ And on the side of the good, in another place, it is said through the voices of angels: *Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of good will.*⁷⁵ Behold, love, as you think, is a part of the spirit, but as reason teaches, it is the whole spirit. If, therefore, I love something with all my love, do I not love it with all my soul? And is not that saying without meaning, to wit, *You will love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and your whole soul,*⁷⁶ if love is thought to be a part of the soul? For if the soul loves with part of itself, without a doubt it does not love with its whole self. But if the whole soul loves, certainly the whole soul is love. For it is said, and said truly, that *God is Love.*⁷⁷ But that Love is such that it is able to love only the good and is only able to be loved through itself as it ought. However that love which is the human soul, because its affections are changeable, is able both to be inflamed with heavenly charity in higher things, which God alone is for it, and to be abandoned with a damnable love to inferior things. But whatever it loves, if it loves with its whole love, it loves with its whole self, and, since its whole self loves, the whole is love, and this is a unity that is not found in a body.

⁷⁴ Mt 5.28.

⁷⁵ Lk 2.14.

⁷⁶ Mt 22.37.

⁷⁷ 1 Jn 4.8.

Chapter XXV

An Example from Geometry, Arithmetic, and Dialectic to Enlighten the Reader in Things That Are Obscure: What the Soul Sees through Itself and What It Sees through the Body

But, you say: “when it thinks of a friend who is absent, does it satisfy its longings as when it actually sees him?”⁷⁸ That is a most powerful cause, as I infer and plainly show, that has compelled you, in your ignorance, to assert that the soul is bodily. I ask you to withdraw from the senses of the body a little and, if you can, observe what and how great a power of seeing is in the soul, and if you are at all able, separate the sight of the mind and of the body. Certainly the body sees nothing, for nothing without a soul senses at all, and thus the mind sees bodily things through the body, and unbodily things through itself. Let us now separate these, as much as the present task requires, so that we may clearly see what of things seen are seen by the mind through the body, and what are seen without the body. For he who is educated at all, I believe, knows, in the discipline of geometry, what a point is, and what a line is, but because among those who deign to read these pages there could be one who does not know, let us investigate about this by discussing it a little. A line, as the most learned and excellent men not only have asserted, but also have demonstrated in their reasonings, is length simply, and this is not able to be formed in bodies at all since every body is long *through* length, but is not itself length, nor is it able to be long in such a way that it is not, at the same time, wide and deep. Wherefore, as they say, even if you think about the thread of a cobweb, because it is surely a body, you have not thought of length alone, for it has in its own way a width and depth inseparable from its length. Therefore, if, as the truth compels

⁷⁸ Letter of Faustus 11.12.

one to confess, length and width are different, when width is taken away, we think of length alone. Yet I know that this same thing is not seen clearly by many, and even Marcius, a philosopher, denied to the mathematician Adrastus that he saw it, even when he saw a carpenter's lines: It is no wonder, replied Adrastus, since you have eyes like those of a carpenter's, but you lack the genius of Pythagoras. But slower minds must not despair, now that we must yield to authority when we do not perhaps grasp the argument.

Therefore this length, about which I have begun to speak, since it began from a point and is indeed at a point is called a γραμμή by the Greeks, and a line by us. Even now if you have been able to recognize what length without width is, and you have formed a line with limited length, make two equal lines ἀντιστάστας⁷⁹ each other in the area. And when you have done this, understand that you have not made a figure with two equal lines, for there is only said to be a figure when a place is enclosed by lines, either equal or unequal, that touch each other at their endpoints. Therefore a figure is not enclosed by two equal lines, whether they be placed opposite each other or if they touch at one end point. But with three equal lines a figure called a triangle is made. And this is eternal and unchanging knowledge, crystal clear to every human mind, even the uneducated. Therefore, from three equal lines that touch each other at their endpoints, is anything other than a triangle ever able to be made? Or is this more true now than it was? Or did this truth begin to be at some time, or will it at some time cease to be true? Or is not the bodily world, whose forms, swollen and in place, are but an image of forms unbodily and not in place, able to perish more easily than that some one of these should be able to be altered in its species or moved in place or grow old or be changed in any way? Therefore, lest I drag you through all the details of this discipline and occupy

⁷⁹ Standing opposite to. Claudianus seems to be showing off a bit with the use of Greek, and so I have left it in the text.

your attention upon arguments concerned with plane figures or cubes or pyramids, let us speak briefly, as we have already done, on account of the perfection of the circle, about one figure only.

A circle comes to be from one line, but now you have been rightly advised that a line without width or depth is more perfect, and yet there is something more perfect than it. A point, of course, is principally the origin of a line, for from it a line begins and by it it is ended, although it is clear that a point neither arises from anything nor is ended by anything. For a point retains this in figures, that it is one in number. Therefore, the line that is able to be cut transversely is not able to be divided lengthwise, for certainly if it is divided this way it has width; and when it is cut, it is cut at a point, though a point, of course, is not cut. Therefore, length is more perfect than width because width can be cut both lengthwise and cross-wise. Width is more perfect than depth for depth is not only able to be divided and cut, but also is able to be cut width-wise. Therefore, depth is not able to be without width or length, and where these three are, without a doubt, there is a body. Width without length is not able to be, but length is able to be without any of these, but cannot be without a point. But a point is always without these, nor does it need anything else in order to be because there is no beginning of one. Therefore, a circle is made from one and the same line when it has been bent around, but just as in triangles and squares, there are points because of the angles by which the notion of these figures is established, so the middle of the circle is occupied by a point in order that the circle may be formed with a determined measure. For when you have fixed one rod of a compass and have led the other about outside the center, attend, as much as you are able, to the power of the point of the compass, which, through the fixed rod, rules that rod which is led about and forms a circle by its power there where it is not in place.

At this point, if you attend keenly to the superfluous things of the mind, what the soul is ought now to glimmer forth for you. Also, how is it that if we consult the sense of the body two equal lines are believed to be able to be led through the middle of a circle right next to one another, although reason manifestly convinces us that two lines are never able to be drawn through the same middle unless one is shorter? It seems to me, as was clear about the triangle above, that here also the nature of a circle remains fixed by laws that are indissoluble and eternal. Now, you tell me, please, if the soul gazes upon these things in place, what is the reason that the notion of round or square is not absent from me, as I try to form something round or triangular or square in the west from bodies, without swelling or motion, although at the some point in time, according to the same law of round or square, someone else in the East is able to make things equal to mine in bodies. Do you see even from these things, what the soul gazes upon, what is the sight of the mind? Do you understand that the understandable and the one understanding are never able to be separated? For do you notice also what difference there is between the forms that we discern with the body and those that we gaze upon with the mind? That these are the eternal world of which this world is an image, whence it has been divinely said: *the figure of this world will pass away?*⁸⁰ Do you see also that although to know lengths and widths and depths of bodies is of almost no moment, it is important enough, so that the Apostle says that we must know *what is the breadth, and length, and height, and depth?*⁸¹ For what will it profit me to seek anywhere the height of the bodily heaven, to search out the distances of the clear stars or the paths of their orbits of the intervals of each? To what the extent of the earth is or to penetrate the depths of the abyss? Not about these things, as I suppose, did the Apostle wish me to be reminded, which are not

⁸⁰ I Cor 7.31.

⁸¹ Eph 3.18.

only tedious, but even harmful if, when one should pass over through these to things eternal and enduring forever, one be stuck and remain in these.

Turn back now and consider that everything long becomes long by length, but that length itself is not able to be called long, just as everything pure becomes pure through purity, though purity is not ever called pure. Therefore, when you desire to contemplate unmixed length or you fix the eye of the mind upon a rectangle or hexagon, cast away, as much as you can and flee from not only every bodily thing, but also anything that is able to be like a bodily thing, and when you see that a triangle is formed from three points and three lines or that a circle is formed from a point or that a line is formed in an unbodily way and apart from place, see also the power and supereminence of numbers and understand that every bodily thing becomes numerable through numbers, yet numbers themselves are unable to be numbered. For who is able not only to say, but even to think, rightly that number, although it is from one and through one and in one, is not nevertheless the beginning and the end of it? For if we say one to be the beginning of number, what shall we say is the beginning of the one itself? Behold you have a beginning of number in the beginning, so that from it there may be number. But already if we wish to number, we add one to one to make two and one to two to make three, and one to three to make four, and however many things we multiply one after another, so many times many individuals, so to speak, are lead into the sums, as when they are lead ten times, there are ten, twenty times, there are twenty, a hundred times there are a hundred, and a thousand times, there are a thousand, so that you acknowledge that every number is such through one, as it proceeds from one. And it is clear that it is not possible to come to an end of number, which is not at all, because beyond every number which is from one and through one and in one there is always one. Nevertheless, these three are, when we say from one and through one and in one, wholly eternal and thus not in place

but wholly everywhere, always equal to the same infinite because no one is truly more and no one is less. It is these ones that begin, produce, and complete numbers: but themselves are not begun, nor numbered not bounded, I believe, because *of the wisdom of God there is no number*.⁸² For although number is from one and through one and in one, and it is not able to be numbered except triply so that through the same number we begin, we number, we end, it itself is a ternary whole, through which every number is. See what dwells in the human soul: see what is granted to eye of the heart to see. Whither do we fly away, whither are we separated, why are we outside ourselves within our very selves? Why do we seek our native land in place, from which we depart, surely, not by walking but by sinning? Why do we believe shadows, which it is surely the same to see and not to see, resplendent? Certainly we seek the truth: do not think it is necessary to seek it through the extent of places or that it is found through something bodily. He who will cling to the truth will separate himself sufficiently from not only touching but even thinking about the body. Certainly we seek something not in place: let us not seek it, I beg you, through something in place. Truth itself has made for itself a likeness participating in itself. Let us bring this in us to that which made us, let us not reproach our God, saying to Him: you were not able to make something like yourself, because if I am a body, I am not like you, because He will convict us by our very selves.

Chapter XXVI

'The Secret Speech of God to the Soul, How it Ought to Examine itself

For silently Truth speaks to me and it says to me: Certainly you, who believe yourself to be a body, how do you use a word that is unbodily? I believe that your word, that is your

⁸² Ps 146.5

counsel, is one thing, the voice of the word another, what sounds another, and what understands yet another. For just as there can be not voice, so there can be a word without a voice. Of course, your word uses the garment, as it were, of the voice so that it may sound in our ears, as I use the garment of the flesh so that I might be seen by men, and when you speak, the obedience of the voice goes as far as the ear, but the word passes through to the soul in a way not involving place, because, as it comes to him to whom you speak, so it does not, surely, recede from you, and if someone hears you speaking, your whole word is resting with you, and the whole word is in his possession; and if two hear, they hear the whole word; and if many, the whole is wholly with all of them, and wholly with each of them and wholly with you. Do not destroy in yourself my very great gift [to you], this likeness to me, which I have bestowed upon you so generously, so that as you strive toward me, you might not search beyond yourself. “No one comes to the Father except through me,”⁸³ and “No one comes to me except him whom my Father has drawn”.⁸⁴ And no one comes to either Me or the Father unless charity is poured into his heart by the Holy Spirit Who descends to no one except he who believes well, hopes well and seeks well. Because We are one God, you, man, were made like this Trinity, when it was said: “Let us make man to our image and likeness.”⁸⁵ You yourself, O human soul, look inside yourself about yourself, and you will remember yourself. See your mind, see your word, see your will. For the whole of what you think and the whole of what you have remembered is in the mind at once; at once you think the whole of what you think, and you will to think and remember it, that is, you love to have mind and thought. Therefore, you embrace your thought with your mind, that is, when you remember that you think, surely you grasp your whole thought with your whole mind; and

⁸³ Jn 14.6.

⁸⁴ Jn 6.44.

⁸⁵ Gn 1.26.

you think your love wholly or your whole mind with your whole thought, when you think about loving or remembering yourself, and you love the same mind wholly and your same thought wholly with your whole love when you love remembering or thinking yourself. Yet there is no one who does not love to recall and think about and love this same thing: when however, there is for you something of your thought and you love in your mind of you recall them as great as they are, your thought is as great as they are, and if you love your mind and your thought according to their proportion your love will surely be equal to them, and if each of these individually, wholly, and at the same time loves or thinks or recalls themselves the three taken wholly and together will not be greater than the whole mind recollecting equally or the thought wholly knowing or the love wholly loving. You will know these things are in you, and even more that these things are you through me radiating to you, if you give to me those eyes by which I deign to be seen. Even the unbodily eye does not see me unless it has been purged; by how much less so you think I am able to be seen by you, if you are a body? I and the Father and our Charity are one God: you, your rational mind and word and love are one man made to the likeness of your Creator, not to the equality, since you were created, not begotten, since you were fashioned, and not the Fashioner. Withdraw from those things that are below you, that are certainly less formed, that is, less beautiful than you are; ascend to the Former of the form, where you are able to be more beautiful, join yourself to Him always, because the more you impress yourself to Him though the weight of charity, the more you will receive from that Species: that is , from Him you will obtain the unalterable stature of that image from which you have taken your beginning. These and things like them Truth speaks to the ear of the heart, admonishing inwardly that because we were made to the likeness of the unbodily God, not to the likeness of the bodily world, we

may know that we are unbodily not only because we are like the unbodily God, but also because we are unlike the bodily world.

Chapter XXVII

That the Soul Will Be Able to Be Present Spiritually Even When One's Own Friend Is Absent Bodily

Behold, since the causes, although briefly, have been touched on and discussed more than enough about the condition of vision of the rational soul of the infinite reasons for the greatness of the question, I think I have given a sufficient response concerning the unplacedness and unbodilyness of the soul. You, now understanding the corporeal vision to be so very different and paced so far below, will no longer be shaken by that uncertainty that if you think about you loved one, when he is away, as you said yourself, you believe him to be absent because if your loved one is for you in that part of himself by which you are both men, and by which you love with a vicarious love, he will be as present to you as you are to yourself. For whatever you are substantially, he is also. But the understanding is the sight of the soul: of you see yourself, you see him who is nothing other than yourself, who if he is standing near you in a bodily way, causes you to recognize him though the sighs of the body. Through which, if perhaps you have received that evidence by which you learn that the same man is rather an enemy, your soul, shaken, certainly, by the disparity of affections will recoil in some way from his soul, and though in one place bodily and in the same footprint, so to speak, you would be separated enough, to be sure, by the diversity of wills. And since this is so, I so not think souls to be destroyed by separation, which we see are able to be separated from bodies joined to them. And thence it is not sufficient that bodies hinder the mutual

representations of the minds if the image of God is not in oneself though them or they themselves are sought. For it is wretched and quite contrary that the image of God, that is the true man, be sought through the body rather than through himself. Yet if it is sought through the image of God, it is sought and recognized through itself, but every rational soul is the image of God, thence he who seeks the image of God on himself seeks for both himself and his neighbor, and he who has come to know this image by seeking in himself will recognize this same image in all men. But you, not without reason, pretend to have your beloved when absent, in whom you love the body, and are not able to love anything other than the body, since you do not believe him to be other than a body. Love your God, love in your God your beloved who is the image of your God. Let him therefore love you in God by loving God. If you both seek the one, you will tend to one, you will always be with each other, for you will stand together in one. But I do not see that it can happen that bodies placed in one thing are able to be present to themselves and minds in one thing are not able to be present to themselves. But because this book must end, because although some things have been touched upon only slightly, and I have made many omissions in my desire for brevity, nevertheless I have not passed over all things for the sake of the excellence of the cause which must be disputed afterwards, let us proceed to the beginning of the second volume.

The Second Book of Claudianus Mamertus

Concerning the Standing of the Soul

Chapter One

That All Things Are Distinguished More Easily by a Comparison of Contraries

A very likely account, as I think (after much thought about the question), as to why most excellent Truth has allowed herself to have so many enemies has appeared to me, as I pondered it within myself over and over again: all things, surely, are distinguished better by a comparison of contraries. Thus, indeed, light placed next to darkness, life placed next to death, and truth placed next to falsity delights us more. Therefore, it was necessary that her patrons take up these oppositions, mastering them in proportion to their qualities, so that the defender of the false might not hide and the assertor of the true might not be without employment, and so that the first might not do more harm by remaining hidden nor the other grow numb through inactivity.

Chapter Two

How Philosophers of the World Have Hunted for the Truth and Little by Little Approached Even to God

And because it is natural to the race of mortals that we should seek more keenly after things hidden, court more things forbidden, and love more things acquired more slowly; so that the truth might be loved more ardently, insofar as it has been desired longer or sought more painstakingly or discovered more slowly, hence it is that there

have always been philosophers, from Pythagoras the Italian or Thales the Ionian onward, who have searched for the truth with excellent talents, multifarious doctrines, contrary opinions, through long ages, who thought, even if others thought differently, that at least in part of their work there was something worthy of so great an investigation. Whence even the Teacher of the Gentiles did not so much judge the philosophers to be ignorant of the truth, as he accused them of despising what they knew, saying: *The invisible things of God have been perceived from the foundation of the world through the things that have been made and understood, and also His eternal power and divinity, so that they are without excuse, because although they knew God, they did not magnify Him as God.*¹ Therefore they knew, and the human mind entered into the secret of His hidden Divinity. Having transcended all bodily things, the soul was amazed and saw Him to be the Creator of all things. It saw in Him not only something that exceeds all bodily things, as does the irrational soul, nor only something that excels the irrational soul, as does the rational soul, but something that stands before all these together by far with an incomparable power. For the soul saw that a body was moved through places and times, when it passed from place to place and grew old by the passing of time. And so the soul rested in itself for a little while; but then regarding its own power, not without horror, it doubted whether it must search for something above itself, or rather remain in itself. But it could not doubt that the one doubting itself was not God, for the cause of its doubt was ignorance, and none but one who is ignorant would be in doubt; but God could be ignorant of nothing and could not doubt.

Moreover, it noticed that it was *necessarily* ignorant, and consequently it questioned. And thus it noticed that, even if it were not subject to motion through place,

¹ Rom 1.20ff.

it was moved in time through its affections, and that what is moved either in time or in place could not be the first foundation of things because nothing is able to be moved except through another, upon whom the universe stands: this alone exists in itself. Having thus raised its thought higher, it recognized in its own Author what I have recalled in the earlier book, and it saw that nothing can be moved except by something unmoved and that therefore the soul necessarily stands in order to move the body through time and place, but God stands in Himself and thus moves the soul through time and the body through both place and time. And because nothing is able to be a beginning to a beginning, one must recognize about Him, from both His immensity and eternity, that as He began from nothing, so He exists in nothing. And believing that one must pass from the lowest things, which is every body, to the highest, which is God, through some middle, it discovered itself to be a middle between the extremes. And it saw that this was so because it did not appear to be like any body whatsoever, since it was a likeness of God; nor was it able to be equal to this same God, because even if it began *from* Him, it was not *of* Him.

It noticed also that in the fullness of things, there was, following the truth, one thing that judges and is not judged, another which both judges and is judged, and another that is judged, but does not judge. Truly, God judges and about Him there is no judging; the soul judges and is judged; bodies are judged and do not judge. Moreover, it noticed that the one judging was least deceived when it adheres to Him according to Whom it judged, but was most deceived when it sinks down to that about which it judges. It understood also on account of the immutable power of contraries, that just as darkness is contrary to light and being to nothingness, so body is contrary to what is

unbodily; and it saw that the likeness of something was not able to be in its contrary, because, of course, the fixed order of things does not allow something dead to live, something blind to see, a substance to be at the same time also nothing. Now, therefore, understanding that something in the human soul is like God, because He is the Light illuminating, and it is an illuminable light, without an doubt it determined itself to be unbodily, adding this, that if the soul were a body, and it was this same likeness of God, therefore God would be bodily. And so it rightly preferred, on account of its likeness to the Creator, to elevate the creature rather than, on account of this same likeness, to humiliate the Creator. it recognized that they were bound indissolubly, that two like things are either both unbodily or both bodily. And it knew that among substantive things, some are not only unlike in species, but also contraries in their natural vigor, as water and fire, and nevertheless these are bodily, and hence it would be a wonder if two dissimilar and even contrary things, as fire and water, were able to be bodily together, and two similar, even fitting things, as God and the soul, were not able to be unbodily together.

Chapter III

He uses Greek Philosophers as Witnesses about Things Bodily and Unbodily and Puts forth the Example of the Camel and the Ant

Having gone through the volumes of philosophers who used arguments of this sort, as far as I was able, and having cast aside the crowd of less noble ones, I have chosen some of the greater, who testify to the truth in the subject with which we are concerned, whose opinions one can bring forth in abundance, not because we are lacking our own, but because

it is rather astounding that our own fight against us, and those outside our number fight for us. Nor would it be agreeable to make use of anything borrowed from them except that our friend of the body through the very mention of the name of philosophy showed to us certain terrors of deeper knowledge. Therefore, from those whom he summoned against the truth, let him receive the voices of truth, and let him hear first the twofold trumpet call of Greece, the melodious horn of the Pythagoreans and the clarion of Plato, and let him not swell up at the mere emptiness of the name, but let him be enriched by the melodious truth of their arguments. Therefore, the thought of Pythagoras, since he wrote nothing himself, we must seek from his progeny. Among whom I find Philolaus the Tarentine to have blossomed perhaps most fully, who, discussing quite obscurely in many volumes the understanding of things and what each thing signifies, before he determines about the substance of the soul, disputes marvelously about measures, weights and numbers according to the geometric, musical, and arithmetic arts, confirming that through them the whole universe has been produced. And so he is in accord with that Scripture, where it is said to God: *You have disposed all things in measure, weight, and number,*² indeed, I wonder that our adversary has raised this sentence from the divine Scripture as an objection to us. For he says with these words:

God, Who made all things from nothing, just as He established them by His work, so He incorporated them in matter. And just as he distributed to all things, among which the soul also is counted, weight, number, and measure, so he also laid down quantity.

Note, our noble advocate, this expert and eloquent doctor of the present age: he wishes nothing created to be unbodily, and says that every bodily thing is incorporated. In

² Wis 11.21.

what, I beg, is that which is a body incorporated? If instead you have, perchance, laid down [the *in-*] to mean ‘not’, so that you wish ‘*incorporated*’ to be understood to mean ‘*not* made a body,’ you grant to us more than we wish, because if the Author of things had *not* made everything that He made bodily, there are, therefore, certain things that are without a body. But it is necessary that whatever is apart from a body is unbodily, which the Greeks rather eloquently call ἀσώματον. But if, in your simplicity, you have used the preposition in this way, you have unknowingly run against the truth. Yet, through the same ignorance having fallen in this one moment, you have said that *all* things are incorporated, although everyone agrees, surely, that the substance of a two-fold creature is so composed by a most orderly law that every thing is created unbodily and [then] incorporated, not however that every bodily thing is also ensouled. Moreover, the body was not able to be called incorporated in the sense of ‘having been sent into a body’ for this reason, that incorporation without doubt pertains to that nature which both before it was incorporated *was* not a body and after it has been incorporated *is* not a body. But if you meant, perhaps, that all things are incorporated in that sense in which it plainly was said (even if one ought not to have said it), that all things have been made bodily, you have destroyed equally the fittingness of the word and the reasoning of truth, for if every creature is bodily, nothing is embodied; if however, something created is unbodily, not every creature is bodily.

But one and the same cause has entangled you in so manifold an error: to wit, a great ignorance of things and a marvelous presumption of knowledge. Thus it is, certainly, that you believe embodied spirits to be a body, or again, that you define bodies to be embodied. In these quite dialectical conclusions of yours, be mindful of that infamy of high error with which you are about to brand others. And may this divine word stir you: *it is first necessary to*

*cast out one's own beam, so that one may remove the speck of another.*³ Accordingly, because you do not challenging those who are uncertain of the battle, but rather you are provoking those inclined to peace with the sharp point of abuse, and you have said that measure, weight, and number have been laid upon every part of creation, and you judge the soul to be a body, I ask you, what is its measure, what is its number, what is its weight? If the measure of a living body makes the measure of a life-giving soul, because the outward body, as a vase, contains the soul like a certain smaller body, therefore, the quantity of the soul, as you say, must be assessed according to the quantity of the body.

Oh, if it were advantageous to speak in close quarters and openly with you, I would surely act liberally and concede some things to you of my right, and would not inquire first about men, but first I would demand and entreat that you, who are an expert in these things, confess with a clear response, whether you assess the souls of the camel and the ant by foresight or by mass? If by foresight, it would be clearer than light that the soul of the ant excels the soul of the camel, so that by however much it is greater in body, by nearly so much the soul of the camel would be smaller than the soul of the ant. If mass had pleased you more in a comparison of this sort, I would revert to the same things and nevertheless I would inquire, if the measure of the soul is the measure of the body, why is the camel brutish below the measure of his body, and the ant vigorous above the measure of his body? Perhaps these words, “which, though large, fly from you safe enough,”⁴ would cease. I put these things forth with a two-fold fate: I would take as my means which of each you should prefer. If you were to choose the mass of the body, I should oppose the small body of the ant, but if you should choose the vigor of the soul, I would convince you that this would in

³ Cf. Mt 7.5.

⁴ Vergil, *Aeneid*, XI.381.

no way correspond to the mass, [the vigor] of which I would show to be nothing in that bodily magnitude of the camel. Hence, I would also bring against you that verse of Vergil, which was spoken most truly about the bees: “They stir up great spirits in a narrow breast.”⁵

Now, since I have begun to discourse upon the state of man, I should demand from you, a new geometer, a measuring rod, not judgment, so that I might discern the talents of someone. When, if perhaps you wished to use this escape: that you would say invisible things are not able to be measured by visible things, I would respond that from their vestiges, from the size of the body that contains the soul, the soul, which fills the body, is able to be measured. If you were to say it was not possible, I would straightaway ask why is that which is able to happen to all bodies not able to happen to one kind? If you allowed that it is possible, I would repeat to you this prophetic word: *Go to the ant, O sluggard, and imitate her ways in living*⁶ that is her foresight, unless, perchance, we must believe that we have been reminded of this heavenly oracle so that we should seek the knowledge of walking from the ant. Don’t let your attention be drawn to the ‘walking’ in this speech, but rather to an ingenuity of acting, so that,

As the ants plunder a great heap of corn
And lay it up safely, being mindful of winter,⁷

So, O man, fallen into the sin of the first-formed man to the level of the irrational [beasts], *lest your flight be in winter*,⁸ by the heat of faith and the devotion of works may you attend to and understand that the great spirits of the little ant and bee are not shut up in small bodies. For nothing great in place is grasped by some slight thing in place; [this is

⁵ *Georgics*, IV.83.

⁶ Prov 6.6.

⁷ Vergil, *Aeneid*, IV.402-1.

⁸ Mt 24.20.

true] even of the small body and great soul of the bee. Therefore, the soul of the bee is not grasped by its body, and so is outside itself. But nothing is able to be outside itself, and therefore it is entirely within the body. But some great bodily thing is not grasped by a small bodily thing, since however great something in place is, so great a space does it fill. Therefore, either the soul is not in place, and thus will not be bodily, or it will be not wholly with itself. But nothing is able to be otherwise than with itself; therefore a great thing *is* in a small thing, but not as in place. Therefore, the spirit is not in place, and nothing not in place is bodily. Therefore the soul is not bodily. However, whatever is not bodily, must not be thought to have mass, and therefore the magnitude of the soul is not from the magnitude of the body.

Now let us see how, if possible, you may get around this: the bee, as you see, lacks greatness of body, the camel lacks greatness of spirit. Take care lest that opinion, though pleasing to you, yield to arguments of this sort, and the greatness of the spirit not be subject to numbers, weights, and measures in the way bodily quantities are, and that which is small hold the whole of something great and the great not disappear in something small. But perhaps the soul is not able to be measured in a bodily way, yet it is able to be weighed. He who thinks he knows how many feet the soul is according to length may dare to say that he is able to know how many pounds the soul can be according to weight. Now, the vestiges of numbers are discerned in the body in three ways. First, in place: so that there may be body, be it the greatest or smallest, it is necessary that it be *one*, which belongs to it by number. Secondly, because it consists of parts, which parts certainly, as we have said already, are right and left, above and below, before and behind. Thirdly, because according to the aforesaid diversity of parts, every body is able to be cut into parts, of which parts of the body, again, any part, on account of the primitive power of number, will itself be one body, and it will

consist of just as many parts and thus will be able to be cut into parts. Now you should have seen whether, since there is one soul of each animated thing, this also is able to be divided in such a way that, again, every part of the soul is soul, just as every part of the body is body. And because I think no sane man is able to say this, time must not be wasted in a discussion of these subjects, which are so clear by their own nature that they seem rather to be obscured by disputation.

Chapter IIII

About the Measure, Number and Weight of the Body

Now, turn your attention more to this, if you do not despise it, so that the divine power of measure, weight, and number, so far as it has deigned itself to be seen, be opened to you. For we read that it is said to God: *you have disposed all things with measure, number, and weight.*⁹ And you have used this testimony most powerfully to this end, that from it you wish to be proved that certain bodily quantities cover our souls. Let us see, therefore, where of place this measure, this weight, this number was, and when they began to be so that God might form the universe to the exemplar, as it were, of these. If nothing is uncreated except the Creator, these, therefore, are created. If they are created, therefore, God did not dispose all things by measures, numbers and weights when He formed these, but not according to themselves. It is unthinkable to resist divine authority: therefore, all things were created by numbers, weights and measures. Therefore, measure, weight, and number are not created: for all things were not created according to them if they themselves were created also. Here we must strive with every power of thinking, so that we can know in what way weight is not the principle that is weighed, but *by which* one weighs; nor is number the same as that which

⁹ Wis 11.21.

is numbered, rather, it is that *by which* one numbers. And measure is not that which is measured, but that *by which* one measures, just as, again, magnitude is not that which is great, and the equal is not equality, and beauty is not the beautiful. For nothing created is great *per se*, but something is called great in comparison to something smaller. This is how we call a mountain small and a grain large, and a mouse large and an ox small. But when one comes to the very creating magnitude, because it cannot be compared, it is neither greater nor less. Thus also in those principle forms, which Plato called Ideas, the account is the same. For according to the same law of squaring, we construct a square table and a square forum, and although the forum is a greater square, nevertheless, it is not more a square. Hence you must grasp the evidence of the weight which is not weighed, and of the unmeasurable measure, and the unnumberable number, which three, together equiternal always, individually always and everywhere wholly are one God.

For all bodies, by which we number, weigh, or measure something are number-able and weigh-able and measurable. For in bodies there is a certain mode to numbers, a certain weight to the scale of a weight, and there is a certain measure of the measuring rod, from the magnitude of which one is allowed to return to smaller magnitudes unto the twelfth or twenty-fourth part and even to the least, less than which there is nothing, and one is allowed to go beyond to the greatest and to the extents of the very universe, which are now inaccessible to the senses. For whatever is limited has a certain measure of magnitude. Therefore the whole mass of the universe, because it is composed of finite bodies, certainly, since one body makes an end for another, without a doubt, it is itself limited and on account of this measurable. And if the human mind thinks of some extent beyond this, it does not doubt, in this reasoning, that it is able to be measured through bodily forms, which is clearly able to happen, in truth, if there is any place outside the universe. But because place is not

able to be outside of every place, the measure of place does not go to where there is no place. And even though that which is able to be measured is wanting, that by which one can measure remains, because an immeasurable measure is not in want of some finite measurable thing. In the same way, the nature of weight, although that which is able to be weighed should fail, does not pass away, and number is not limited to a limited number-able thing. Therefore, if the splendor of an immeasurable light glows for us with any brilliance, necessarily in this matter you will have been admonished so that, with the deceptions of fleshy visions taken away a little, you may tell us to what part of us is the form of the measuring rod visible? But because you will not deny that this is the contemplable, unless perhaps you are too angry, consequently I ask, do you say that that immeasurable measure, about which we have spoken above, is visible to the mind or the body? But truth would not so desert anyone that he would contend that divine things are visible to the body, since he does not think that even bodies are seen by a body unless they are animated, or, to speak more truly, he understands that the soul senses through the body rather than that the body senses anything through itself. Therefore, there is a twofold power of seeing: the soul sees measure, weight, and number through itself, but it sees measurable, weigh-able, and number-able things through the body. Therefore, through the body, it sees things that are like the body, that is, bodily things, but it sees unbodily things, to which it is itself similar, through itself.

Now, if you will, because all things are disposed by measures, weights, and numbers, let us seek signs of them in creatures. Certainly earth is the lowest of all the elements. In a sphere, surely, that which is in the middle is agreed to be lowest, because in a sphere, the extremes or boundaries are not lowest. Therefore, whatever part of the earth, be it large or very small, such as a little tiny stone or the slightest little grain of dust, which are not able to

coincide with a visible point [that is, are too small to be seen], also have a measure proportional to their extent, and a number, by reason of their parts, by which the higher are distinct from the lower, the right from the left, the before from the behind, whence also, although it be smallest, it is able to be divided into two because it is a body. And its weight is noted by this, that this least part, taken from its origin and set down in water, already a higher element, does not desist from its untiring motion until it arrives at the lowest part of the earth. Hold on to this mode, or path, of reasoning in the remaining bodies, for even a droplet of water, which you bear on a wetted finger, has measure owing to its magnitude, and number owing to the distinction of its parts: by the law of weight, if you drop it in air, it will not rest until it comes among its own. The nature of air is the same, and nothing of it is able to be contained under water or carried above fire, for if it happens as decreed, by the necessity of weight, either it rises up naturally out of the one or sinks down out of the other of its own accord. Now it is established that air is measurable and number-able according to the number of its parts, and it is clear from this, as I think, that the bodily universe is able to be measured, and air is the third part of it. Thus also the element fire, because it is in place, in accordance with its parts receives numbers and, because it is limited, in accordance with its extent it is subjected to measures. However, the weight of this earthly fire, turned upward, has the seeds, as it were, of the heavenly fires, which, fed by a nourishment so much greater will be possessed of greater powers, a subtle nature, tending as if toward its native land, breaks through the greater parts of the compacted air and, unless that same depth of the other element should conquer it, it arrives to that place where it is carried by nature.

Chapter V

Concerning the Measure, Number, and Weight of the Soul

Behold, it is clear that nothing is a body that does not have measure, weight, and number. Now, because their unity is of parts, and their weight is in place, and their greatness is measurable, let us inquire whether these three things are in the soul in the same way that they are in bodies. Certainly we call a body great in virtue of its length, breadth, and depth, whose extent we certainly consider grand or small in proportion to its capacity. Therefore, however much any body is capacious with regard to its size, so much does it receive whatever it is of a body. Thus, surely, passing over the grade of inferior creatures, see that the more sublime creature measures the greatness of the soul also by its capacity. Behold, the human soul is receptive of wisdom, for it is receptive of that which is its understanding. Therefore, as it is not able to be called receptive of wisdom before wisdom is acquired, so before it becomes a sharer in it, it is not able to be called wise. I come now to this question, do you judge that by which wisdom is contained to be an extent of place or something placeless? Thus, I think that if the soul of one who is wise is receptive of wisdom according to extent, therefore, wisdom will be great according to bulk. Since truth will not allow this to be said, that which receives it is placeless in order that what is received can be placeless. Lo, do you not see, the greatness of the human soul is without bulk? Now look at the notion of number.

You have noticed, I think, that these signs of numbers are in bodies, that, namely, bodies are manifold, and that they accord with themselves with an agreement of parts according to the pre-eminent equality of number, so that, because the highest equality is of one to one, two to two, and three to three, thus in the same way we call that body numerous,

which, formed with fixed dimensions, so that, to consider the body for example, those parts which are doubles thus have been placed opposite each other, so that they might not be at odds either in size, shape, or place, as are the ears and the eyes, and those that are singular, as the nose and mouth, hold a middle place and, so that they can be beautiful, imitate the harmony of the highest equality. Therefore, as far as we find the truth of number in the human soul, first it ought to harmonize to itself the notion of acting often according to the correspondence of virtues, so that justice accord with wisdom, courage with temperance, which correspondence surely is according to number, because each thing is nearer to number as it is more harmonious. But I think that that rather is of number in the soul by which it is master of number, scientifically, so that, not by parts is it of number as a body is, rather it knows number and judges number by itself. For that three and four are seven and these and three are ten, nothing besides a the human soul is able, or will be able to know. Just as, therefore, was clear about measure, so also about number, it appears sufficiently that these are in the body visibly, but in the soul intellectually.

It remains for us now to determine about weight. It was clear that the weight of bodies is that by which they are naturally borne into their own regions, from which they primordially arose, nor do they rest until, having crossed over the domain of another element, they arrive at their own. But the weight of the soul is its will, which more properly is called love, by which namely, the soul loves either itself or some other thing. For should it either love unbodily things, as true wisdom, for itself, or bodily things, such as beautiful bodies, for the body, it is snatched by the weight of a placeless love until it attains the things loved. Therefore, the weight of the body, wherever it bears the body, drags with it its measures and its numbers from which it is inseparable. On the other hand, the weight of the soul, that is its love, drives along with itself its memory and council into that which it loves,

because it is not able to recall or think about anything except that by which it is enflamed. Whence it is said divinely to man: *You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart and your whole soul*,¹⁰ obviously, so that, just as the body is compelled by its weight into its proper place, so the soul is borne back, by its weight, to its native land. Nevertheless, by its very weight, the soul is joined, not only to other things, but is even itself strengthened, because with the love of council and of the mind as a middle, the mind loves council and the council the mind.

Chapter VI

Concerning Measure, Number, and Weight of the Divine Trinity: How the Trinity is These Three Things

Thus also the complete, supereminent unity of the most high Trinity is in an unbodily way the Measure, as they say, without measure, Weight without weight, and Number without number. The Weight, therefore, by which this same Trinity is ineffably one with itself is the Charity of the Father and Son, for the Apostle properly insinuating the Holy Spirit, says: *Charity of God is poured out into our heart through the Holy Spirit, Which has been given us*,¹¹ showing evidently that by that Weight, that is, divine Charity, that ineffable Number and Measure is carried stably to the one to whom such a weight has come. Therefore, these three are inseparable in a body, but much more so in the soul, and, moreover, they are undivided in the soul, but much more in Him, and just as nothing exists without the one Creator, that is, the very Trinity, so nothing is able to be at all which does not subsist as three-fold and is one. Every body, certainly, will be one and measurable and number-able and weigh-able, and

¹⁰ Mt 22.37.

¹¹ Rm 5.5.

every rational soul subsists with three indivisible things: memory, council, and will, by which it is receptive of measure, weight, and number, as it makes judgment according to these about things measurable, weigh-able, and number-able, that is, about bodies. And if the soul were a body, it surely would not grasp unbodily things, just as a body is able to be judged but is not able to make judgments about bodies. So it remains that from the highest, which is God, through the middle, which is the soul, to the lowest, which are bodies, the mark of the unity of the Trinity impressing signs of itself on bodies, and, bestowing knowledge in souls, forms the first visibly and the others intelligibly. Since, therefore, nothing takes substance except by essence, and nothing becomes one except by three, as we have discussed above, when the unity in a body, which is but the vestige of the Trinity, is this great, how great will be the unity in the soul, which is the image of the Trinity, and when the unity in the image is this great, how great is it in the Trinity itself?

Chapter VII

He Brings forth Pagans Who Witness That There Are in the Soul no Bodily Measures or Weights in Place

But because now is not the time for disputing more copiously about the preeminence of the question, I think that I have tarried enough in these matters as to satisfy prudent men, so that they might fully realize that in the soul there are no bodily measures or weights having place or extent of parts, but that is perceived by it which place does not contain, nor weight move, nor division diminish. Now you, learned judge, have proved yourself expert [enough] to hold a just opinion, whether that is placed which receives the placeless, or parted which cannot be cut or measurable which grasps the infinite. Now I

return to Philolaus from whom I have digressed quite a ways now.¹² This man, in the third of his volumes entitled *Concerning Rhythms and Measures* speaks thus about the human soul: “The soul is put into the body through number and an immortal, as well as unbodily, harmony.”

Again, after other things, he says: “The body is loved by the soul, because without it, it is not able to use the senses, and after it has been lead away from it after death, it lives an unbodily life in the world.” I am not now going over the ways of the arguments and the intricate details of the questions by which Philolaus produced these statements, which are commendable, whoever might oppose them. But in them, if someone should be stirred by curiosity or zeal, he will drink from the font itself. For it will suffice for me by reason of the authority in this same man to have put forth the testimony of so great a philosopher, just as hereafter it will be enough if I put forth briefly that of others. For not rightly does one demand from someone argument equally with testimony.

Archytes, next, of Tarentine, another Pythagorean in a magnificent work that he produced about the nature of things, says, after a long and most subtle discussion of numbers: “The soul has been composed after the example of the one, since it holds sway in the body, though apart from place, as does one among the numbers.”

What, I ask, could be said more excellently, what more truly? Composed, to be sure, after the example of the one, because it has been fashioned to the image of the One. And on that account, one is the principle example of forms, because things formable take their forms from it, which does not have a beginning. Hippo of Metapontus from the same school of Pythagoras, having put forth indestructible arguments according to his own opinion about the soul declares thus: “Far different is

¹² See Book II, ch. 3, 105.7.

the soul from the body, which quickens a sluggish body, sees with a blind body, and lives with a dead body.” From where, however, that is, from what beginning, he says he does not know. But I am not now going to so pursue the opinions of all the philosophers of the Pythagorean family that I compose my book from the volumes of others by piling up the same opinions too abundantly; rather I judge it sufficient that I bring forth the beginning of the Pythagorean Gymnasium as sure evidence concerning the question at hand, being certain that no one of their learned men refutes them, nay rather, these also thought the same thing, and put it forth in writing: Archippus, Epaminondas, Aristeus, Gorgisdes, Diodorus, and all the later Pythagoreans. And by the very multitude of these names, let alone the thoughts, if I wished them to be produced, I would fill out a whole volume.

Therefore, let Plato come forward to center stage, from which it will be clear how great a good in him the human race neglects, especially in our age, who so acclaimed religion in the heavenly deeds and words that have come down to us that with the labor of believing nearly taken way, with the warmth of faith, he came close to seizing the fruit of knowledge and laying hold of the reward of his labors, though his work was not yet fulfilled. Thus, I am not able yet to admire as he deserves the mind of this Plato, who so many centuries before the Virgin Birth, before the Incarnation of God, before the Resurrection of the Man, before the indescribable Unity of the highest Trinity was preached among the Nations, with laudable audacity, wondrous genius, matchless eloquence sought, found, and handed on the three Persons in one Divinity, God the Father and the Mind, Art or Counsel of the Father, and the mutual Love of each of These, to be the one, highest, coeternal undivided Divinity. Not only did he teach it was

necessary to be believed, but even demonstrated that it is. I am not able to persuade myself that the soul of this philosopher was bodily, and if perchance by a precipitous slip of stupidity some soul must be judged a body (indeed I will judge those to be bodily that believe themselves to be bodies), but not in this detracting from the race of souls, but rather denoting some of them, not by my will, but by the falsity of their own opinion. And what is to happen to men whom unknowing so holds that they do not know themselves to be unlearned, yet nevertheless claim for themselves the privilege of science, and while they spew forth filth of childish words into the ears of the inexperienced, they deceive themselves with one and the same lie of science. [Thus] the similes of Lysias deceived others as he taught, and this same Plato in his *Phaedrus* so reproves him for pouring out words empty of things that he added that it is worse to be learned of words but ignorant of causes than to not know either the words or the things, and he considered inexpert silence preferable to loquacious inexperience. Whence Tully also says in the first book of *De Oratore*: “Eloquence is a knowledge of many comprehensible things, without which, volubility of words is vain and laughable.”¹³ And a bit later: “Oratory must flower and redound with knowledge of things, and unless the thing perceived and known by the orator be joined to his words, he will produce only an empty speech, and one quite childish.”¹⁴

But let us proceed from here to other things.

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato makes this pronouncement concerning the soul: “The soul,” he says, “is immortal, because it is always moved by itself and is a cause of motion to other

¹³ De Oratore, I.5.17.

¹⁴ De Oratore, I.6.20

things,”¹⁵ but the body is not moved through itself. He does not only say ‘moves others,’ but ‘is a cause of motion to other things,’ noting, indeed, a man of excellent genius, that there are some things to which it is proper to be moved because of the motion of another. For whatever moves of its own will, is itself entirely a cause of motion to itself, but what is moved neither knowing or willing has motion from something knowing or compelling as causes of its motion. Nor is this repugnant to our earlier disputations, that I say the soul is moved by itself, although we say that the principle hinge of motions is God, because that very thing, its moving of its own will, belongs to it entirely from God, surely, so that, just as the cause of the motion of the mind is its will, so the cause of the substance which uses the will is God, because, even if the possibility of willing belongs to us from God, not every motion of our will will be from God. Or think then, when we sin with the will, the cause of our motion is from us, lest we make God the author of sins. Wherefore, if the body is not moved by itself and what is a cause of motion to itself is not a body, the soul, because it has causes of its own motion in itself, is not a body.

This same Plato, in a book which he wrote *About the Soul*, says: “The soul of all ensouled things is not bodily and itself moves itself and also is the mover of other things which are moved naturally.”¹⁶ In the *Phaedo*, by this same Plato, Socrates so speaks with Simias and Cebes and other philosophers that when we see him pronounce things quite in harmony and entirely in agreement with ours and which use not only the judgment of authority, but are also supported by the strength of reason, we might notice that these souls, which were pursuing things so remote, were approaching things so hidden, and saw things so opened, and therefore were so inspired by the light of Truth beyond the native vigor of

¹⁵ *Phaedrus*, 245c.

¹⁶ Cf. Apul., *de Dogm. Plat.* I.9.

the human mind, that the dogma divinely handed down to the whole world for the salvation of the human race might use the testimonies of the gentiles among the minds of the gentiles that were [still] ignorant of the Truth so that gentiles, blinded by the cloud of ignorance and hardened into a glacier, as it were, by the chill of infidelity might yield to the warmth of the truth of the Gospel, if the same truths are sounded forth in support of it from the mouth of its adversaries. Or, why should we not believe those same things that we know to be useful for refuting the inexperience of our faithful, to have been procured through the philosophers for us for the use of the heavenly Truth? Therefore, true reason spoke in the *Phaedo* as it persuaded Socrates:

While we have a body and our mind is utterly mixed up with such an evil, never do we obtain fully enough that which we now desire, and have desired for a long time. But we desire knowledge of the truth. For the body first presents to us innumerable and infinite occupations by which we are worn away on account of the necessity of sustenance and daily nourishment. Then, if anyone grows sick, they make us less able to inquire after and discover the truth. For the body is burdened with innumerable loves, desires, and fears, and visions of various things, and longings, and by a certain infinite madness so that we are not able to delight in anything else before [we delight in] it. And if ever we have, or make for ourselves, any time that is free for pursuing wisdom, even then the body runs in among our thoughts, and brings to the mind a crowd of errors, so that because of that blindness we are not able to see through to the truth. And so, this one thing is proved for us in every inquiry, and this most evidently: if ever we wish to know anything in good faith, we must withdraw from the body and consider things in the soul itself. For then we seem to pursue what we desire, and loving this thing we are profited, when we die, for while we live, we are without hope. For if it is agreed that the soul is not able to see anything pure while it is mixed up with the body, there follows one of two things: either at no time, nor ever, does true knowledge arise in man, or only then does it arise, when we have departed from life. For the mind of those who have died is free and loosed from the body. Yet while we live, we will at least approach

and come near to science if we do not use the body at all, or as little as possible, nor send the mind down into its society, except as far as it is necessary. For then we will be filled as little as possible with the vicious and turbulent nature of the body, but pure of its contagion as much as we can be, we will be, if we so bring it about, incorruptible and pure, progressing to all incorruptible things, and we will come to pure things.¹⁷

I have thought it necessary to quote these words from this dialogue of one who is still the prince of philosophers and put them into my own volume, not thinking there would be anyone who, accustomed to resist the bodily delights of deceptions and sensing in himself these contrarities of the unequal natures of the body and mind, with himself as a witness of this very thing, would not assent to the carefully considered disputations of a man by far the greatest among philosophers. With reason presiding, he would also judge between the body and the soul, and decide why in the world it is that, as they say, the bodily mind is always hindered from every discovery by the obstacle of the exterior body getting in its way, or why it accuses the exterior body of calling it away from the contemplation of the truth, when it is, if it is a body, an impediment to itself. But I will not argue about these things. The truth certainly shines forth through itself, nor does that need any exterior adornment or assistance which is more beautiful and stronger when naked.

Hence, I thought that up to this point I ought to use the testimony of my witnesses without defense, because only among those who are bodies entirely will there be doubts of these sureties of the truth. Whatever truth this same Plato pronounced about the soul in the *Hipparchus*, in the *Laches*, in the *Protagoras*, in the *Symposium*, in the

¹⁷ *Phaedo*, 66b-67a

Alcibiades, in the *Gorgias*, in the *Crito*, and in the *Timeas* (that apex and summit of philosophy) I am passing over for the sake of pleasing brevity. For it is not a help to the recognition of what is true that about some one thing someone say something more often than what he has thought about it, because the knowledge of things is not more fruitful when things are said often, Though there is an onerous multiplication of words. Wherefore, in the instruction of the truth, one must consider more what one thing many have thought, than what one man has said many times. Nevertheless, having been drawn by an admiration of Plato, whom I consider to be by right the prince of all philosophers, I have named him repeatedly as a witness in the business at hand; however much more you may read here of this man, you will consider it to be little when compared to the innumerable things he has discoursed on concerning the soul. But Porphyry, a Platonist many years after Plato, did not disagree at all with his master in this same subject. With the illustrious voice of his dignity, he admonished the human race: "If," he says, "we would be blessed, we must flee from every body."¹⁸ Therefore, there is something unbodily in us, to which the contact of any body is harmful; and what will that be, except the image of God, except the human soul? Which, if it is not able to be blessed in a body, and yet is not unbodily, will never be blessed, which will not be without itself.

Chapter VIII

He Uses Pagan Romans as Witnesses of the Unbodiliness of the Soul

¹⁸ Source? Porphyry, *De regressu animae*.

In the present business, we have used many testimonies of many philosophers, and many from Greece: if one demanded the reason or permitted an account, I could give one. But so that we should not seem to seek truth in place, and give the impression that this same truth was able to be seen only by one race, but was unknown to others, and since the human substance is master of truth not by region but by kind, we will call as witnesses philosophers of the Romans, among whom Sextius the father and Sextius the son, with a zeal disposed to the exercise of wisdom, first of all philosophized and held this opinion about every soul: “every soul,” they say, “is unbodily and unplaced, and an incomprehensible power, which, capacious without extent, draws up and contains the body.” More keenly have they, unless I am mistaken, entered into the secreted natures of things than some of our own, who, by means of disputations about the investigation of sublime causes fit for chamber-servants, yawning forth something soporific as they lie upon their beds, while a dull-witted eulogist pushes forth an abundance of vapid funeral dirges, sleep off the lethargic suspicions of the opinions of old women and judge the soul, joined to the innards, to be shut up and contained by the prison of the body. But it is this fiction of inexperience devoid¹⁹ of truth that we are refuting, as the nature of different places demands, both as we have discussed in the previous book and now with great testimonies of the greatest authors, with the truth of reason with its powers also coming to our aid in this affair. Marcus Varro, the wisest of his age and, as Tully testifies, “without a doubt, the most learned”²⁰ of all, what does he contend with a kind of divine disputation on music, on arithmetic, on geometry, on philosophy except that by the wonderful ways of eternal art, he draws his soul from visible to invisible, from placed to unplaced, from bodily to unbodily things, and he makes himself master of

¹⁹ *Vacuae*, a play on the notion of place.

²⁰ Cf. Aug., *de Civ. Dei*, 6.2.

himself, which mastery falls apart when he enters into bodies, that is, into its adversaries. And if the soul was a body, the body could not be its adversary. Why should I now bring forth, in defense of the truth, the opinions of Zoroaster, of the Brahmins of India, of Anacharsis of Scythia, of the Catos, of M. Cicero, of Crispus,²¹ who from nearly the very beginning of his work attributes right of dominion to the soul, and places the law of servitude upon the body? Why should I endeavor to demonstrate that the judgment of the whole world concerning the standing of the soul resounds forth for us in the opinions of these men, at least, who so rightly shine forth?

Chapter IX

From Here He Uses Ecclesiastical Doctors as Witnesses of the Unbodiliness of the Soul

Certainly it would be easy for me to do this very thing (unless the assembled crowd of witnesses were not at all permitted to be added, and one were not allowed to open the divine oracles) were there time or if reason advised it. And so that, with those as leaders (as it were) who drank more largely from them, we may approach the very fonts of the heavenly volumes, Gregory Nazianzus in his apologetic declared that the difference between the soul and the body was great, and as the body feeds on bodily things, so the soul feasts on unbodily things. Blessed Ambrose said to the people of the Church at Milan with an expression most learned and polished: “Let us remove ourselves from the body against which, if we would be saved, we must certainly struggle.”²² One and the same thought of such excellent men, which is not without the same understanding, must be noted and treated in the same words. I will say now, therefore, what I recall myself to have said often when the

²¹ Cf. Sall., *Catil.*, 1.2.

²² From a sermon that appears to be lost.

discussion was about places. Ambrose persuades us that it is necessary to remove ourselves from the body. I ask, who is it to whom it is fitting to be separated from the body? For we are composed of soul and body, and through this, since the soul is not able to be separated from itself, there is nothing in us that is able to be separated from the body, if the soul is a body. Why, holy Ambrose, do you teach such things? Why do you besmear the Bride of Christ with the filth of falsity? Why do you force her, with a shove of perverse preaching, from the way of truth into dead-end byways? Why do you maintain that it is necessary to remove a body from a body? What, I ask you, does that profit a man? Just because the nature of the interior man is more subtle, though it is still a body, therefore it is right for it to be scattered and separated? Is it because in the structure of this earthy mass some things are more subtle and lighter and others are massier and heavier that, therefore, it is fitting for the sake of the thinner things to sunder the whole make-up of this solid? Or will air be more blessed if it is not with water or earth? To these chattering falsehoods he brings some such response as this:

For a certain doctrine arises among us stripped of words, void of virtue, foreign to reason, empty of truth, hollow with vanity, swollen with pride, a doctrine of this new schism, without an author, lofty with pride, sordid with lying, filled with abuse, stealing power from the Creator, dignity from the image, which it disgraces with a marvelous kind of stupidity by comparisons of bodily substances and asserts that just as there would be no profit for air to be separated from the massier bodies of the earthly mass, so there would be no profit to the soul if it were able to be separated from the body. Moreover, if there is anyone of you anywhere who are of those gentiles to whose genius the arcane causes [of things] have yielded themselves up, come, be quick, acquaint yourselves with ignorance, look with wonder upon this new dogma: in this whole that is the world, a fourth part of this mundane body is laying hold of the dignity of the soul. Therefore, one soul is greater than all other souls and is more wise in proportion to its mass. And so now someone will be

richer in prudence to the degree that, according to his capacity, he draws in more of this air, and not wrongly has the human race accused nature of wronging it, since she made elephants so much greater than men, and as they are more capacious, so they are more blessed.

But Ambrose by himself brings us this far, and he even by himself would certainly be a sufficient witness; still, I will make a place for others to give their testimony.

Aurelius Augustinus, possessed of a keenness of mind, and a manifold knowledge of things, and a mass of works; a man like Chrysippus in the strength of his arguments, like Zeno in the subtleties of his meaning, like our Varro in the sheer size of his volumes; who surely is outstanding in his application to studies and possessed of such a nature that rightly does he, a spiritual sage, stand apart from the bodily Epicureans or Cynics of our age; this Augustine, in a book he wrote to Jerome concerning the origin of the soul, pronounced the following: “even if it is difficult to persuade the slower that the soul is unbodily, nevertheless, I confess myself to be persuaded.”²³ And since he showed this to be so with great reasons and irrefutable argumentations, when he asked Jerome for his opinion on this, he received a letter back from Jerome so great in his praise that Jerome undeniably said that he thought there was nothing more true about the soul and that he was not able to dispute more perfectly. Do you not see that these two most famous men, endowed with a preeminence in both virtue and learning, agree with us about the standing of the soul and lay your defenseless self low both by the weight of their authority and the power of their reason, and though separate in their bodies, have made their two souls one in the unity of wisdom? Thus I am rather amazed that you cited Jerome as a witness, who though the most able of tractators, will not at all be able to dispute both for and against the soul, although the things

²³ *De origine animae.*

you laid down against us (though you hardly understand them) are so much in our favor that you appear quite cunningly to have set yourself up, not as an adversary, but as an apostate [to the cause of the soul's bodiliness], who by a flattering collusion have helped us to conquer with your very witnesses. Surely it is a glorious kind of victory to take the arms from the one with whom you are struggling and to stand the witness sought by one's adversary on your side and call him as your own witness.

Lest you think me at all slow in making a return of the favor, as this is the place [to make such a return], I advise you that Hilary Pictavus is able to be more an accomplice for you in your opinion, who among the very many excellent disputations of his (having nonetheless some less worthy opinions), set forth these two opinions against the truth: one in which he said that nothing unbodily had been created and the other, that Christ felt no sorrow in His Passion, though if it was not a true passion, then our redemption would not be true, either. But because blessed Hilary destroyed the vice of this opinion by the virtue of confession, thus he checked the sentence of blame because he did not suffer a loss of merits. Wherefore, trust is suitably given to those treating of the Divine Scriptures, so long as they join together with it on the pathway of truth. But although I have refrained out of necessity from bringing forth many who have discussed this question, as I hurry, rightly, to the divine oracles upon which the authority of these doctors depends, nevertheless, I could hardly pass over Eucherius, who was known to me while he lived both by his teaching and by disputations at which I was present, not learned of from afar through messengers and reading, who, youthful in age, mature in mind, despising the earth, seeking heaven, humble in spirit, lofty in merit and likewise most subtle in understanding, full of knowledge, greatest by far of the great priests of his day, and who, in manifold volumes of various works

concerning the faith that he handed down to the people, also published these words upon the standing of the soul:

Some are accustomed to inquire how, in Christ, man and God were able to be mixed. They seek an account of this mystery, which was done once, although they are never able to render an account of something that happens always: how the soul is joined to the body so that a man may come to be. Therefore, just as a bodily thing is joined to an unbodily thing, and the soul is mixed with the body so that man is made, so man is joined together with God and Christ was made: and yet that Christ might come to be, those two unbodily things, that is the soul and God, were able to be more easily mixed than the one unbodily thing is mixed with the other, bodily, thing, that is, the soul with the body, so that the person of a man might come forth.²⁴

Mark, now, those who, equally educated by such a man, have fallen away from these doctrines, making ruins of what could give them health and poisoning themselves with alien poisons, having fallen so far because of the unjust hatred toward those who love them that they prefer to choose those outside the fold with their falsity, and to condemn Eucharius with his truth.

You may see here some men considering a thing with foolish judgment and others, either having no knowledge of the thing and praising with stupid praise or, having a smattering of knowledge, laughing with deceptive consent among those [like themselves] to please one whom no one except the ignorant or cunning have praised. And so it happens that opinions concerning many things are spread about not according to the quality of their merits, but rather of the entreaties [of their proponents], and on account of the praise given by those pettifoggers gathered round them, authors greater by far are contemned. A man so praised, lest he stand lower in the judgment of those

²⁴ From a lost homily of Eucharius; cf. PL 50, 866.

praising him, snatches some tufts, as it were, from various texts of different writers and patches them to his own vile rags (if you will) and cloaked in this mangled vestment, baser than the naked and, apart from his thievish thoughts, lacking all eloquence, he goes forth. You may discern here another in the stagnation of this repulsive cesspool breathing in the stench of the dark sewer of his own belly and the bilge of his mouth, and he, as he is about to belch forth in his stammering way little mockeries, is praised in a parasitical manner by another, one who has squandered his money in various gormandizings. Among rubbish of this sort could you have safely said anything sober? Rather, you will place yourself in very great danger from the foolish mob: why? Surely “there is nothing more unjust than an ignorant man.”²⁵ Nevertheless, I am not alarmed at such as these, and, if now is a time for admonition, I advise and commend: whoever these men are, and whoever the others are, who with their drinking companions murmur insults against great men or absurdities about the highest things, let them speak openly, or let them keep silence! Indeed, my wish is that those who have so far been lurking about may be cast out and dragged forth by name from the shadows of their hiding-places. But one could foresee that they are silent so that I might not hold up [to scrutiny] the deeds of those whose names [if I know them] I will not keep silent about. Nevertheless, let them have done as they please, and let them spurn wholesome advice, though not without punishment; still, I would rather be rejected by them together with Eucherius than together with them be damned by truth.

²⁵ Terence, *Adelphoi*, v. 98.

Chapter X

He Uses Divine Wisdom Herself as a Witness with Testimonies of the Scriptures

Therefore, let us hear what Divine Wisdom will pronounce to the enemies of her image: “The impious,” says She, “who do not think rightly, say: slight and tedious is the time of our life, and our body will be spent in ashes and our spirit scattered as the soft air.”²⁶ The *impious*, therefore, will say these things., about whom, a little further on, the same Scripture speaks thus: “Their wickedness has blinded them, because God created man immortal and made him to the image of His likeness.”²⁷ For my part, I believe that you had better move more sharply to the defense of you position, and that, [in doing so] you are about to speak against me for the sake of your cause in some way as follows: ‘Why do you use testimonies taken from this place and that which, nevertheless, do not at all strike the soundness of our consciences with truth? What has this to do with my position? What difference, moreover, does it make that the impious are divinely struck for the sake of the dignity taken from the divine image since I know that I am not held by the snares of that impiety? Thence I warn you, do not bring on me or falsely brand me with the infamy of such an opinion.’ Now, I, unless you refuse, will return with you to your opinion, from which you will judge whether that oracle of prophetic speech, directed against the impious is directed against you; whether, that is, it rather holds you fast—you, who, with the pretended privilege of science, addicted to your own opinion more than to fame, yet anxious for fame more than your opinion, you defend in one place as your own the same things that in another place you deny as another’s.

²⁶ Wis 2.1,3.

²⁷ Wis 2.21, 23.

Nevertheless, so that there may be no place, for me, of interpreting wrongly, or for you, of denying, let us now look at both of those things with which we are concerned. Without doubt, the prophet says that the impious say: “our body will be spent in ashes, and our spirit will be scattered as soft air.” Now indeed, what do you say, to be sure? “There are some,” you say, “spiritual natures, as the angels, archangels, and other powers, and our soul itself, even, certainly, that subtle air, yet they must not at all be thought to be unbodily.”²⁸ Look carefully at this, you whoever sits as judge of our work, is there any difference between these two utterances? The impious have said about the human spirit, that is, the human soul, that it is scattered as soft air. This adversary of ours here adds that the human soul and the subtle air are equally spiritual, but nonetheless are not unbodily. Weigh out now these words and the sense, for what is in one place called the human spirit is in the other called soul, so that there is perfect agreement, and if each had said soul or each had said spirit, that which is in one place said to be scattered into the soft air is in the other, in like manner, compared to subtle air. Because, therefore, the spirit is said to be scattered as the soft air, it may as well have been said: the spirit is the same as the soft air. Again, our soul is spiritual as is also this subtle air, so it is as if it had been said: our soul is the same as that subtle air, and since from these two, what was said before to be a blasphemy of the impious is what was laid down afterwards as your opinion, and these two are so far united that they are indistinguishable in matter, sense, and word, what follows most certainly, except that either because of the likeness to your opinion, if you think it ought to be defended, the opinion the impious is also worthy of praise, or, because the opinion of the impious is blameworthy, yours is equally damnable?

²⁸ Letter of Faustus, 10.1.

But why indeed should we ramble in these arguments any longer since about this the prophet decreed: “The impious thinking wrongly among themselves have said: slight is the time of our life and spent in ashes will our body be and our spirit scattered as soft air,” and a little after, with a disputation interposed, he adds this thought: “These things,” he says, “they thought, and they erred, for their wickedness blinded them.”²⁹ And as if you had said: ‘What is there to be turned to their fault in this? What error?’ he responds: they thought man to be a bodily soul, and they erred, and just as one³⁰ would ask of one repeating himself, why in this, that one think the soul to be a body, does truth stumble, the prophet makes again this response: “They err, certainly they err, for God created men immortal and made him to the image of His likeness,” that is to say: the soul is so far from being a body that it is a divine image. Is there something whereby you, betrayed by your own words, caught by the powers of truth, and convicted by the testimony of the prophet, may make your way out of the region of places? But anyone would see what he should think: accordingly, my opinion is that what we have discussed so far against bodily men on behalf of the spiritual would be enough, except that I think Apostolic [Testimony] is also pertinent, and even the Gospels can be summoned to the point of the present controversy.

Chapter XI

He Uses Paul as a Witness on behalf of the Unplacedness of the Soul

And so, although I have used in many places (whenever it was helpful) testimonies of the Scriptures, still it is right in many ways to strike the neck of a false accuser with the salubrious incision of the sword of truth. Paul, teacher of the Gentiles, vessel of election,

²⁹ Wis 2.21.

³⁰ Or, perhaps, following the variant reading *rogares*: you.

says: “Every sin is outside the body, though he who fornicates sins in his body.”³¹ If, with the sin of fornication set aside, every sin is outside the body, it must be in the soul. Moreover, if it is in the soul, and the soul is a body, it follows that every sin is not outside the body. But the Apostle says, apart from fornication, every sin is outside the body. Therefore, the soul is unbodily, so that there may be something in which sin is able to be outside the body. And again, as he was about to pronounce sentence upon him who, a defiler of one almost his mother, one stained with the sin of incest, took his stepmother as his mistress, he said, “Even if I am absent in body, still I am present in spirit, and have already passed judgment on the one who committed this act.”³² What is this, Apostle Paul, what is this? How are you absent in the body when your spirit is present? If the spirit is a body, why do you, who are composed of two bodies, not rather say that you are absent in one, but present on the other, or if you are entirely one body, why do you not declare yourself absent in part of your body and present in part? For when you say that you are absent from Corinth in body, there surely you can betake yourself, because you are wholly bodily in your whole self; but because you are wholly bodily, and it is on account of this that you are absent, you are wholly absent, I know not by what of you you say that you are present where you are not: either you convict yourself of a lie, or you convince these bodily men of the unbodiliness of the soul! Is there anything here that is uncertain or perhaps obscure, who in as much as he is bodily is absent from Corinth, is present there either in no part of him or through something unbodily? Therefore, the human spirit, through which Paul the Apostle, though absent from Corinth with his whole body, was able to be present

³¹ 1 Cor 6.18.

³² 1 Cor 5.3.

there, is unbodily. These and innumerable other such texts from nearly the whole body of the authentic Volumes we would be able to bring forward.

Chapter XII

Concerning What the Apostle Says: That He Was Taken Up Even to the Third Heaven

Certainly, the healthful doctrine of the Catholic faith, by interposed steps, ascends so far from the lower to the middle things, from the middle to the highest, that with prudent judgment and placing the bodily creature under the unbodily creature and subjecting this same thing together with its inferior to the highest unbodily Creator, raises up Paul's attendants into the third heaven, who with piercing mind passed over the mass of the sensible world and turning their gaze from the lower part of heaven, with renewed powers they penetrated every unbodily substance with an exertion more powerful in proportion to the dignity of the more excellent substance and at this point, with their breath somewhat taken away, they were fixed in the highest supreme knowledge of the unbodily Creator. Wherefore now, if should I want to question these bodily men about places, what might they have to say about this statement of the Apostle? For since he says that he was snatched up to the third heaven, I ask first whether he was taken up in place or not in place? And what are these three heavens? Are there more of them? Are they all bodily? Are some unbodily? So that, since the order of disputation has taken us down to this, that we have spoken of place, we may see, having carefully pondered the truth, where we must go from there.

And first we must turn our attention a little more scrupulously to a question, not at all an easy one, of the number of heavens. Of course, we read: "Praise the Lord, you heavens

of the heavens.”³³ But this is able to be understood about both many and about two, so that it seems possible to take it as ‘many heavens of many heavens’ and ‘two heavens of two heavens’ since the division of the number is left unstated. Behold, from the parts touching the earth as far as the air there is the element of the waters, from there stretches the depth of the air as far as the lowest light of the lunar star, and beyond this is the region of the aetherial fires up to the farthest reaches of the world, where the world is shut up in a spherical globe. Where now, with this totality of bodies set forth, are we to seek the heaven beyond everything of this world? But in this lightless cloud of gloomy things let us seek again the decrees from the sanctuaries of supercelestial doctrines. “In the beginning,” says the beginning of Genesis, “God created the heaven and the earth.”³⁴ If, having set opinions aside, we seek faith of what is true, behold, the very Author of creation is for you a witness of creatures, and since, before all time, He created the heaven and the earth and then in one day made light, and on the second day likewise established the firmament, and called it heaven with an improper name, in which, when limits of the narrow intervals were determined, he went on to weave the ornaments of the stars wandering in place and time, it is easy to see that this visible firmament yields to the invisible heaven by just as great an interval of substance as it likewise surpasses the region of the lower places of the earth. Whence, that firmament is able to be called heaven with an improper and metaphorical name, since to be heaven belongs properly to that heaven created before time. For indeed, that starbearing thing that we call heaven in Genesis is called the firmament of heaven; indeed, when it recounts the creation of the stars, it says: “God made two great lights and

³³ Ps 148.4.

³⁴ Gen 1.1.

placed them in the firmament of heaven.”³⁵ And by this authority, we are bound to believe that that heaven before time is the true one, although that firmament about which we are speaking, we may also call heaven since God calls the firmament heaven.

But perhaps in the original Volumes the heavens are not just two, but are often called by a plural number. But in truth it must be added that the one body of the earth is called in the Scriptures the orb of the earths.³⁶ So, therefore, perhaps the heavens are called many, though they are two, just as the earth is called many although it is one. Therefore, to what third heaven was Paul taken up? Oh, now let me go forth and, setting aside the masses of the elements, and having placed the weights of bodies into the scale of judgment, let me weigh the world: perhaps some heavens will leap out at us. Or if one world does not have many heavens, the minute atoms might bring forth some worlds for you, as Epicurus taught, so that Paul could come to the third heaven. But what does this have to do with beatitude, that one should go up from one body to another, or from this to a third equally bodily, since there is no reason for that which is higher in place to be more blessed? Otherwise, men will yield to little birds and one will pass to eternity not by (spiritual) progress, but by sparrows.

Therefore, since the preeminence of place does not make one blessed, nor does a bodily soul ever come to three heavens, so that at length the deficient may yield to unbodily bodies, let us see according to the foregoing argument, though this point is not part of that discussion, these three heavens and their difference, because since the differences of dignities is a difference of places, if they are distant more than they differ between the first and second heavens, I ask what difference does it make? Certainly there is either substance or nothing: if nothing, there will be no cause of the created heaven, although even in the

³⁵ Gen 1.16f.

³⁶ Claudianus uses the same word, *terra*, in both places; we would more naturally say ‘lands’ in the second instance, but translating it thus would obscure his point.

lower regions of the earth nothing exists unless there are causes preceding them in age. But if there is not there a multitude of living things greater than these of earth, therefore, that heavenly substance is below heaven taking, surely, the flame of its scintillating stars and the more pure atmosphere of air, whose element fills the hollow of the inter-heavenly void, which other populations of living things and other depths of intervening air separate from the third heaven.

Now then, if having been taken through these, the Apostle came into the third heaven, what, most probably, did he find there, if one must seek it in place and it was not able to be found in the first heaven? But he himself says he was taken up into the third heaven and heard I know not what divine thing, “which man may not speak.”³⁷ So then, Apostle, is God sought through places, or Truth found only in place? If this is the case, God also will be in place, and God, whom you found in place, you will lose in place—Him Who, if He is not except in the third heaven, there, where He was found, will He be left by you. But since you are blessed not from a bodily heaven, but from the Lord of heaven, Who is not sought in place nor is found in place, the true cause of your ascension surely will be given if you ascend from the heaven of inferior substance to the heaven of more powerful substance. Because for those seeking God, there is no ascending from bodily things to bodily things, whither now will bodiliness, so hemmed in, turn and disappear? Behold, it is true that Paul was taken up into the third heaven, and again it is not true that there are three bodily heavens. Therefore, you will confess that there is something unbodily or you will deny that there are three heavens. But because both indisputable authority teaches and manifest reason convinces that there are three heavens and they are not all bodily, we are, with the help of one truth, discussing false things so that we may search out true things.

³⁷ 2 Cor 12.4.

We read in the Prophet: “Who made heaven and earth. He gave the heaven of heaven to the Lord, and the earth to the sons of men.”³⁸ Here we must note that heaven is one thing, heaven of heaven another, surely, when heaven of heaven is said, it is as if heaven and earth were said. Surely this lower, starry heaven is earth, but when before those subject to time, God created heaven and earth, and on the second day He made this visible heaven, therefore, the heaven is after the earth in time, though it is so much more excellent in quality. But, because the instantaneous creation of the world does not admit of the successions and spaces of time or the tarrying of days, (because it is now the time for discussing nothing of the number of six days except their extent) understand that the prophet makes so great a difference between the heaven and the heaven of heaven as there is nearly between this heaven and the earth, so that just as this earth is the earth of this heaven, so is this heaven also the earth of that heaven. Whence we must conclude that the whole body of the world is divinely called earth, and that which was given to the Lord is properly called heaven. For thus says the Scriptures: *He gave the heaven of heaven to the Lord, and the earth to the sons of men.*

What shall we say, then? Has this visible heaven not been given to men, or the shining and heat of the sun? Or the changing through increasing and decreasing of the globe of the moon? Or the wandering and determinate circuits of the stars? Or the gathering meeting and the orderly progressions of the stars through their great orbs, either as they vary with the successions of days and nights, or because they temper the world with the alternating caresses of warmth and cold, or because they signal the changes of the seasons with their measured limits, and by the same unending path of lines they are carried back, returning without end into that same place though the same circular ways, or because they

³⁸ Ps 113. 15f.

adorn the aether with numerous, different dances and musical intervals? Are not all these useful aides to the race of mortals, and do not we look upon them with pleasure? And for this reason, the bodily heaven, because it has been given to man, is called earth, just as the bodies of air and water, though not of the same bodily nature as the earth, nevertheless, because they have been given to the sons of men, they are called earth, with this added, that the touch of all things living by sense is from earth. And moreover, just as nothing can be seen without fire, so nothing can be touched without earth: because fire is subject to touch, and all the aether is fire, it is not abhorrent that there be something earthly there. Wherefore, because the name 'earth' includes every bodily thing, and everything placed among bodily things, by confirmed judgment, every bodily thing is called earth because this sensible world with the visible heaven is the earth, which has been given to the sons of men.

What will we say about the heaven that was given to the Lord, and not to the sons of men? Let us once more have recourse to the Divine Eloquence. Surely the same psalm writer says: "Confess to the Lord Who made the heavens in understanding."³⁹ Wherefore if the heavens which God inhabits are in understanding, and there is no heaven except the unbodily one that was given to the Lord, to Whom, of course, every bodily thing is earth, it is as clear as glass that everything that understands is not bodily. Moreover, the human mind understands in its substance; therefore, the human mind is unbodily. Lo, there for you is an unbodily heaven and an intellectual substance. Now, therefore, so that you might be able to be taken up through the two heavens to the third, where Paul went before you, pass over every bodily thing with that in you that is unbodily, and then transcend even the unbodily yet changeable creature with a keener effort and more agile flight, and from here, coming into the third heaven, rest in the most blessed contemplation of that which is unchanging and

³⁹ Ps 135.3, 5.

unbodily, and know thyself, human soul, to be unbodily, for whom in accordance with the excellence of your nature, it is easy and fitting to a substance standing in the middle, as it were, between lower and higher things, to look down upon the body below and to look upward upon the highest God.

Now I enquire whether you can present to us another account of the threefold number and diversity of the heavens, which I would be happy to see; but clearly no one can give one, unless the nature of unbodily substance inserts itself between the body and God, because if nothing apart from God is without a body, there are not three heavens, but only two, so that one heaven may be entirely body and the other the Creator of bodies. But because Paul was not taken beyond the third, but only into the third, every bodily creature and every unbodily creature must be transcended, as two heavens, and one must come to the Creator as into a third heaven, not in order to pass beyond, for this is impossible, not in order to return, which one ought not do, but in order to stop and remain. And this course and station is an advance and perfection, and this of the virtues, not of places, because he who advances runs and he who perfects arrives.

Now, however, because we have traversed very wide fields of a very broad question by means of a path too brief, though some marks, as I think, having been given that separate the footpaths of errors from the straight road of truth, I ask what it means for the Apostle to say that he was taken up either in the body or without the body? Surely he said this: “I know a man taken up, either in the body or without the body, I know not which,”⁴⁰ and the rest, about which we have said what has occupied us. And first by means of discussion let us see what the Apostle says, in that place, is certain to him and what is uncertain. He knows that a man was taken up, he does not know whether this was in the body or without it. Note now

⁴⁰ 2 Cor 2.12.

that, here, man is said to be one thing, the body another. Behold nevertheless, what the Apostle says he knows is separated from what he says he does not know. Therefore, let us investigate whether he is so unknowing of whether he is from something bodily or something unbodily or from both as he is ignorant of him being taken up with the body or without it. "I know," he says, "a man taken up, but whether in the body or without the body I do not know." One can see here now, that the one taken up both knew himself to be taken up, yet sensing himself not to be a body, he there hesitates as to whether he was taken up with it or without it; yet he does not doubt that he was taken up. And since this whole obscurity is becoming clear, certainly he who was uncertain whether he was taken up with or without the body was certain, nevertheless, both that he is unbodily and that he has a body, because if he was not taken up without the body, and the body was taken up with him also, nevertheless, he is not the same as the body with which he was taken up. If he was taken up without the body, much more is he understood not to be a body, because he is able to be without the body: "I know," he says, "a man taken up. But whether in the body or without the body, I do not know," as if he had said: I know I was taken up, but whether with the body or without the body, I do not know. Therefore, even if you were taken up with the body, still you were able to be taken up without the body. Therefore, you are unbodily even in the body, if you were able to be taken up without the body, surely the unbodily is mixed with the body for the sake of its living with its substance preserved.

Chapter XIII

From the Gospel He Calls God as a Witness on Behalf of the Unbodiliness of the Soul

But now, along side my witnesses, heralds of the Truth, Truth herself will testify to an undoubted faith. The Lord says in the gospel: “Do not fear those who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul.” Why, I ask you, is he who is able to kill the body not able to kill the soul, unless, perhaps, because the soul is not a body? But you say: it is a body, but quite thin; it is surely a body, but rather light. But I make you an answer: let it be thinner and lighter, but still, if it is a body, it is able to be killed by one who is able to kill the body. Surely we live by these two things, I mean the soul and the body, from which the visible man is composed. For He Who said: “Do not fear those,” did not say, who kills the thicker body, the heavier body, but, “who kill the body.” And again, He did not say, but are not able to kill the thinner and lighter body, but “the soul.” Clearly, by this name body, He assuredly includes the living body, because nothing except the living is able to be killed, and through this, if the soul is a living body, it is able to be killed by him who is able to kill the body. Truth says: “he who kills the body is not able to kill the soul.” The soul, therefore, which is not able to be killed by those who are able to kill the body, is not a body. But because the attention of the reader must be weakened by the burden of an unending reading, let this now be the end of this volume.

The Third Book of Claudianus Mamertus Concerning the Standing of the Soul

Chapter I

About the Body of Lazarus, How It laid in Place Unsouled When the Soul Departed from the Body but Not according to Place

Having given these suitable sureties for the instruction of truth, sufficient both in merit and in number, as it seems to me, I must now look to what things remain undiscussed in that little work of this patron of the body, who, with heedless persuasion, judges the soul to be contained by the body. Having taken an example from the Gospel to show this, he argues (as he would have it) decisively, saying that when the body of Lazarus was dead, it was without life, and this same body was renewed with life, so that the soul, since it left the body and then entered it again, is believed to be in place.

Chapter II

About the Soul: In What It Manifests Its Likeness to God

And so that he might direct this to the whole race of souls in common, he pronounces every soul to our Redeemer to be in place, using a formidable (as he thinks) and insoluble syllogism: that the soul is where it is and is not where it is not, as if we must say that the same is either everywhere or nowhere, since if it were everywhere it would be God, if it were nowhere, it is nothing. It is not, to be sure, wholly in the whole world, but just as God is wholly everywhere in the whole [universe], so this is found wholly everywhere in the body. And just as God never fills a lesser part of the world with a lesser part of Himself, or a

greater with a greater, but is wholly in the part and wholly in the whole, so also this is not in the part of the body with a proportionate part of itself. Nor does one part of the soul give sensation to the eye and another give life to the finger, but as the whole soul lives in the eye and the whole soul sees through the eye, so also the whole soul lives in the finger and senses through the finger. Or if perhaps the whole soul senses in the finger suchwise that it is not in the finger, therefore the whole soul senses where it is not, and is where it is not. Therefore, the whole soul will be in the smallest part of the body, though, nevertheless, it is wholly in the whole; or when the whole soul senses where the whole soul is not, the whole is therefore where the whole is not. But I have treated of this at length in the first book; and in the beginning of the second, I set forth not a few things in which, if one attends sagaciously to them, he will, with notions no longer rude, come to this place. For it is most difficult to contemplate unbodily things since the deceptive vision of the bodily senses so covers the eye of the mind, which is weak with sin, that, when it wants to contemplate itself or God, it sees only the veil of bodily images that it has woven for itself, since it is not able to see beyond it. Whoever, then, is displeased by the difficulty of this vision, let him employ his zeal and effort not in calumniating me, but in purging himself.

Nonetheless, I am not so forgetful of myself that I am not aware that there is more of feebleness than health in me. Still, I was pleased to escape this opinion by which the soul is believed to be a body as I escaped from my childish years, because then, since I was merely opining, clearly I was not knowing. Yet to opine belongs to the ignorant man, and ignorance is contrary to knowledge: therefore whoever opines does not know. Hence it happened that I, knowing I did not know to the extent that I opined, was longing for knowledge instead of opinion. But you say that when we seek for the substance of the soul, we cannot see what is above us, since we are not above ourselves, and, moreover, what you

deny can be known, you judge to be known and confirm that the soul is the body of the body. But if you *know* what you say, because false things cannot be known, what you say is true, and, if you say this is true, then you lie when you say the substance of the soul cannot be known. Either, therefore, it is false that the soul is a body or it is false to say that the substance of the soul cannot be known. Do you see how that opinion of yours leads to these consequences? For, because no one opines unless he is ignorant, and ignorance is opposed to knowledge, you, who wish to support a thought as certain from the uncertainty of opinion and to pronounce as one who knows about things that you do not know, you are convicted of teaching what you do not know. Therefore, you teach that you do not know, and although you say this is not able to be known, you presume to teach. Grant us, we ask, clemency when we do not desire to learn non-knowledge.

Chapter III

That the Body Does not Contain the Soul as a Place, Rather the Soul Contains the Body in an Unplaced Way and Everything that Is Is Either in Itself or Is a subject or In a Subject

You say, therefore, that the soul is contained by the body. Ought not the Apostolic word have come into your mind which says: *even if our exterior man is corrupted, yet the interior man is renewed?*¹ Everything, that is, to speak briefly, is either in itself or a subject or in a subject. God is in Himself; among bodily things, the body is a subject and the color of the body is in a subject; among unbodily things, the mind and learning, which are so bound together that as the body is not without color, neither is the rational mind without learning. See now, you who believe the soul to be a body and contained by the body as something

¹ 2 Cor 4.16.

sustained in a subject, whether we are able to prove that what is in a subject remains when that subject passes away, because if it is contained by the body, it is itself sustained in its subject, and what is contained will not remain when that which contains passes away. But the Apostle says that as the body grows old, the soul is renewed, and when the body is corrupted, the soul is strengthened.

I am afraid that you, holding this opinion, seem a new academic, who also with the academics know nothing, yet you determine without hesitation about those things you do not know. See if it is not the case that the body does not contain the soul; rather, that the soul contains it. Clearly, the soul is strengthened when the body is corrupted just as the body in like manner is dissolved by the loss of the soul. The soul lives better without the body. The body without the soul is not even worse [since it is not at all], and so that, of these two, from which the human substance is composed, which is in which may not only be rightly thought by argument, but may also be made clear by authority, let us also put forth the testimony of the prophet: *The body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul.*² And first we must see whether that which is in something weighs it down or that in which that something is. If it is that in which something is, then whatever is burdened will be lightened by the weight. But if that weighs down which is in something, and not that in which something is, the body, which weighs down the soul, will rather be in the soul than the soul, which is weighed down by the body, in the body. The burden, surely, is in the carrier, not the carrier in the burden. Since this is so, this is a very strong sign that there is in the soul a great likeness to its Author, that according to this likeness, just as the world is in God in an unplaced way, so the body is in the soul in an unplaced way.

² Wis 9.15.

Now, I ask you to answer this question: if the soul is within the body as in a place, how does the body contain it? Surely it is known that no bodily thing is able to be contained by a body unless what contains is without and what is contained is within. But the soul, being bodily (as you yourself affirm), how is it *within* the body in order to give it life and *outside* the body in order to contain it?³ Or perhaps it contains it from outside in such a way that it is not outside? Thus we return again to this difficulty, that the soul is outside the body in an unplaced way, so that it may contain the body, or if it contains where it is not, it is where it is not. But perhaps this argument disturbs you by its newness. Be alert a little longer and, if you can, see; if you cannot, admire the power of the unbodily, standing that it may move the body, and coming to any place, but not through places, and acting in these same places in an unplaced way. If you have been able to see this, you will not place before us the soul of Lazarus as some body to prove a certain placed-ness for going and coming, rather you will know that his soul quickened his body with an unbodily motion and departed, but not from a place, and returned to it, but again, not as into a place.

Now, if the fullness of this vision has been clarified for you, you will discuss, with no difficulty in the question, to what extent the soul, once the body is laid aside, is able to be in the world as unplaced, because it will be in any part of the world as unplaced, just as it was in the body without place. But you, to the detriment of the race of all souls even pronounce the soul of Christ to be in place and bodily, and you say the soul of the Redeemer is a body, although it is not the soul of a beast.

³ Claudianus seems here to be arguing from the conclusion, established by biblical authority, that the soul contains the body (rather than from Faustus's position, as one would expect from the beginning of the paragraph) to show that it cannot be understood to contain it as one body contains the other, since it is clearly also in the body giving it life.

Chapter IIII

That Just as the Body, though It Is in Place, Is in the Soul without Place, So the World, though It Is in Place, Is in God without Place

But perhaps you may contend, how is the soul in place and yet not placed? And I demand of you with a corresponding inquiry, how is the bodily world both placed and not in place? But if you answer that the world is in place, I seek, with no less readiness, the place in which the world is, is it outside the world or of the world? If it is of the world, the world is not in it, but in something else, since it is itself the world; of it is outside the world, again I ask whether the place in which the world is is in place. Either, therefore, you will profess these places, that is, bodies, to be infinite and so make body equal to God, Who alone is infinite, or you will grant that the world is not in place. Now, therefore, with your mind drawn by this argument, and just as you perceive so great a number of places and so great an expanse of spaces to be not in place, understand that it is possible to be in place without place, because if that which is placed is not in place, how much less is that in place which is not placed.

Chapter V

That Just as the Soul Departs without Place from the Body When the Body Dies, So the Divinity of Christ Departed without Place So That the Son of God, Christ, Might Die on the Cross

Yet I am not sure whether or not you understand this, however clear it is: Because it follows so simply that, though I would not say knowledge of it is manifest, nevertheless, it is not easily avoided, thus I cannot wonder enough that it has escaped you. You say that the body of Christ, when it was raised up on the gibbet was ensouled, but when it was placed in

the tomb, was unsouled, and on account of this one cannot deny, by the argument of your keenness, that the mind will be placed, because it alternated between giving life to the body of Christ [and not]. Therefore, under the necessity of this opinion, we will also, with profane audacity, believe God to be placed, Who also was in Christ when He was crucified, and left Him in His Passion. The Lord Himself even cried from the cross: *My God, why have You forsaken me?*⁴ For if He did not depart, He did not forsake; if He forsook, undoubtedly He departed. Object now to the placed-ness of God! Continuous, surely, is the ladder, so that, from an injury to the likeness, you bear yourself against God, and you who defame the image provoke the Author. Therefore, just as unplaced-ness was not taken from God because He served man by departing from Christ, so the soul does not lose the privilege of unplaced-ness when it departs from the dying body.

Chapter VI

That Mary Did not See the Angel Gabriel in the Substance by Which He Is a Spirit, but from This That for a time He Assumed a Visible Body from the Air

Here, now, proud speaker that you are, you have carried yourself to the nature of the angels, and you choose for yourself Gabriel as an exercise for your tongue, thus declaring:

The most blessed Gabriel, who bore testimony that *he stood before God*,⁵ when he announced that the Lord of Heaven was about to be poured into the womb of Mary, and when at the command of the order of the Lord he stood before the eyes of the Mother [Genitrix], without a doubt he was away from Heaven; he was not flying over Mary, he was not filling the empty and scattered areas of the broad air, but was occupying only that place in which he was.⁶

⁴ Mt 27.46; Mk 15.34.

⁵ Lk 1.19

⁶ Letter of Faustus, 14.18-15-2.

When the discussion of this opinion was expanded a little, I confess that the very great repugnance of contradictory statements struck me dumb. In one place you speak of subtle air, in another you call that same thing a waste. In one place you speak of the great place of the world, which the element of air fills part by part, [then] by a certain poetical license you assert it is a vacuum, and you do not understand that it is certainly not able to be a vacuum, because there is not nothing where something is, and air is not nothing. Therefore where air is, there is not a vacuum. But neither is that which is nothing rightly able to be called a vacuum, for what is nothing is not able to receive anything. Accordingly, what is receptive of nothing is not a vacuum. But by do you prefer to call the Mother of the Lord, in the manner of poet, his Genitrix and weave a poetical oration, though without verses? I do not do the like, but inquire what you are saying and I ask so that you may answer.

When the most blessed Gabriel stood before the eyes of the Mother of the Lord, did Mary see in Gabriel that by which Gabriel sees God? Because if that were visible to Mary, the unplaced is contemplable to the placed; but if it is, it is not unplaced: because if anyone is in place, he sees in place and as he gazes is able to regard only in part. He who sees in place, therefore, sees place because place is a part and the place of places is certainly a part and places are bodies. And he who sees a part sees with a part of himself, and a part is only to be seen by a part, but there is not a part of God, because the unpart-able does not have parts. Thus, either Gabriel does not see God, or he sees a solid. Nor is a whole able to be seen except by a whole. But a body is not able to be seen as a whole or to see a whole. Therefore it is not a body whereby Gabriel sees God, because that by which Gabriel sees Mary in place and Mary sees him in place is not able to be seen except in place. But, so that I may walk with you in word, if the whole of Gabriel is not except a body, in accordance with the distance of the parts, the whole is not the foot, or the mouth, or the eye. Wherefore,

when he appeared to Mary, he did not speak with his foot, nor did he see with his mouth, nor did he stand with his eye: each part of the members carried out the office fitting to its own quality. Therefore, just as he stood in place and made sounds in place, so also he saw in place.

Here now (as an end to my question), I ask whether the angel Gabriel, only a body (as you contend), occupied in bodily things, as he gazed upon Mary, saw the unplaced God in one and the same vision and at one and the same time in which he saw the placed Mary in place. And because this cannot be, because of the diversity of the bodily and unbodily, it remains that either Gabriel never saw Mary or that he ceased to see God. But to this falsity the sentence of truth opposes itself, by which it is said: *that their angels always see the face of my Father.*⁷ If they always see [Him], they are never not seeing [Him]. But if when Gabriel saw Mary, he ceased to see God, the angels, then, do not always see God. Thus, either when Gabriel saw Mary, he did not cease to see God, or what Truth said will not be true. Wherefore, one concludes by an indissoluble argument, as is clear, that because by the same placed vision, fixed in the contemplation of Mary, the angel was not able to see God and nevertheless one cannot deny at that same time God was visible to Gabriel, lest like the fall of the devil into misery, namely, of never seeing the God of unchanging blessedness, the nature of the angel fall, there is in him both a bodily and unbodily substance: one by which he is visible to a body and he sees bodily, the other by which he gazes unceasingly in an unbodily way upon the unbodily.

⁷ Mt 18.10.

Chapter VII

How Far Unformed Matter Stands from Nothing and Already Formed Matter Stands from the Unformed

Come now, in accord with the keenness of [your] excellent genius and for the sake of a knowledge of causes and things, search out, distinguish, and pronounce how unformed matter differs from nothing; what it is when formed and unsouled; what it is when formed and likewise ensouled; what are place and time; how motion in place is subjected to that in time, although temporal motion is not at all subject to motion in place; what is stable motion, or what is eternity; what it is to be nowhere and not to be nowhere what it is to be never and never not to be: and I seek the hidden account of all these, and in whatever things every substance is included, choose something that you judge the angels to be. For surely they are not nothing, for whatever is something is not nothing. They are not unformed matter because unformed matter is between nothing and something; behold we have barely departed from nothing.

And now let us treat of formed, unsouled matter, from which it pleases you [to think] that the angels are. Note now that just as unformed matter, which is formable, stands above nothing, so what is now formed is better than that which, although it is able to be formed, is not formed. Again, just as that which is formed goes before that which is not formed, so whatever is formed but unsouled yields to that which is formed and also ensouled, because just as the formed is with form, so the ensouled is with life. And just as there are these three: unformed matter, the lifeless formed things, and the form of things, so in the same way there are these three: the enlivened, the enlivening, life. The life of bodies is one thing, the life of lives is another. The body is living, the soul is alive, God is life, so that, naturally, as the soul that in itself is alive is life to the body, and just as the soul does not live

without God, so the body does not live without it. Understand now that to assert that the holy angels are bodies is to deny them life. And through this, since it is agreed that any ensouled thing is of a two-fold substance, and you think the angels are only bodies, therefore, a little worm is better than an angel; because even if the angel has the form of a body it does not, at any rate, have life, as the worm does. No body, surely, is life to itself, for the body is one thing, the life of the body another. Therefore, in the angel either there is a life-giving spirit, or the angel is a lesser thing than any living thing; or since it is greater than every created living thing, there is not just any life in it, rather, there is the most blessed.

Chapter VIII

That Angels, Good or Bad, Are Spirits, not Bodies, and the Angel Does not See God through a Body nor Does Bodily Man See an Angel Unless the Angel Assumes a Visible Body

There is, therefore, in Gabriel both something unbodily by which he sees God unchangeably and a body which Mary saw and through which Mary was seen, and which, subject to the spirit, carries out in place what the spirit knows in truth in a way outside of place what it is going to do. It is clear enough, I think, that the blessed angels are of each substance and unbodily in that part of themselves by which God is visible to them, and in like manner in that part by which they are themselves visible to men, they are bodily. It is impossible for God to be seen by the angel through a body or for the angel to be seen by men without a body. Thus, one is not able to deny that the devil also is made from something unbodily and something bodily, inasmuch as, created together with the holy angels, he is of a two-fold substance. And he, after he had swollen with the dropsy of pride and wasted away with the fever of jealousy, having fallen through his own will from holiness,

not from place, and been cast down (but not through his own will), when he ceased to be, not an angel, but good, he lost his innocence, not his nature. Then, just as the multitude of angels that remained were made blessed in both of these aspects of their being, so those that fell away are punished in both. Therefore, hardly rightly do you deny the two substances of the devil, for even if *I* am scorned, it will surely be necessary that you yield, prudently, *to yourself* and stamp out one part of your prosecution with [another] part, and destroy the false. Therefore, the devil has, though he is himself unbodily, his own body because he will not be able to feel bodily torments without a body. And again, he who senses differs from that through which he senses. Indeed, if you attend, you will be taught the truth in your assertion. Of course, you have said: “if from this concrete air the devil draws a body, therefore, he will carry the body of another to torment,”⁸ just as I myself have said often and everywhere. But you ought not deny what is owed to this, that by this argument, though unwittingly, you hand the victory to us. Surely, when you say that the devil will not carry the body of another to torment, you confess, of course, that he will carry his own. It does not matter to my position whether he has his own or another’s body; but whether he has a body, that does matter. But you not only state, but argue, that the devil not only has a body, but that he has his own. This, indeed, is your opinion: if from this concrete air the devil draws a body, he will carry the body of another to torment. Certainly, he who carries and what is carried are both something, And when it is said, “he carries his own,” then it is signified that he who carries and what he carries are different. Thus, the devil is from a two-fold, diverse substance because, since he carries his body, he is not that which he carries. Indeed, the burden is one thing, the bearer another. Wherefore, you will contend with us no further, if you believe yourself, because the body and he who has the body are substantially two, and these two are

⁸ Letter of Faustus, 15.19.

different, and so that they may be different, one will be unbodily and the other bodily. Therefore the devil, being from a two-fold and diverse substance is both bodily and unbodily.

Chapter VIII

That One Must Understand Spiritually, not Bodily, How Lazarus, in the Bosom of Abraham, and Dives, in Hell, Speak to Each Other, Though a Chasm is Placed in Between

But if beyond these things, we have given back the argument in some part, let us look at the abyss, which, placed between the guilty and innocent souls, as you argue, separates them by places under the discussion of this chapter (as is fitting). For thus you assert:⁹

if they are not in place, how does that vast abyss, by its unhappy intervention, separate sinners from the gatherings and associations of the just, *so that they are not able to pass from here to there or come over from there to here?*¹⁰

That example of the Gospel reading you have laid down, with the simplicity of our Lord's speech removed, to assert the placed-ness of souls. But the wholeness of the divine Oracle, put forth in its own truth, will make clear what that word of yours has changed, corrupted, concealed. In the Gospel, the Lord says:

A poor man died and was taken up by angels into the bosom of Abraham; a rich man [Dives] also died and was buried in hell. And when he was in torment, he saw Abraham from afar and Lazarus in his bosom and said, "Father Abraham, send Lazarus so that he might moisten the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue, for I am pained exceedingly in this fire." And Abraham answered, "Recall, Son,

⁹ Letter of Faustus, 14.5-8.

¹⁰ Lk 16.26.

that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus, likewise, received evils, and therefore now he is consoled and you are pained. And, moreover, between us is a great chasm set, so that no one is able to go from here to you, not to pass over from there to here.”¹¹

Explain this to me now according to places, times, or bodies; now bring it about that there are, through some bodily soul (as you assert), words with voices, [yet] without the exchange of receding air and the organ of the breast and the pipe of the throat and the cave of the mouth and the beating of the tongue. Here show me the hand of the soul, the tip of the finger of which Lazarus would have placed in the water as he was about to cool the tongue of the Rich Man who was burnt in the flames. Here teach me something bodily about that bodily bosom of Abraham, so that it may be narrow in the manner of the human body, and yet can receive many; and that chasm, either so slight that those whom it separates are able to exchange words, or so immense that no one can cross it. Yet I seek this most of all, how the Rich Man, who, in hell, is seething in the flames of Gehenna, now was able to address Abraham in speech, if he had not approached the place of blessedness. How, indeed, does Abraham speak with the Rich Man, if he does not go to hell? Surely you say that the souls of the saints dwell in the inmost palaces of Paradise (a not improbable opinion). Accordingly, although Abraham in Paradise and the Rich Man in hell are so separated from each other by something immense and uncross-able, that they might not only gaze upon each other, but also speak to each other just as if there was nothing in between them; if these things are to be judged according to place, either you are compelled to confess that Abraham and the Rich Man neither spoke to nor saw one another, or that either hell is in Paradise or Paradise in hell!

¹¹ Lk 16.22-26.

Chapter X

How This Question Can Be Taken Spiritually

But because one cannot obstinately oppose divine authority, nor mix blessedness with misery, let us look at the problem raised by this prologue, having removed ourselves little by little from places and bodies, since we are not able to see within with the dim-sightedness of bodily imaginations, and when [we have seen that] there is said to be an immense space between those separated by judgment so that there is yet able to be a commerce of speech, let us attend to the separation not of places, but of merit. For the unjust is able to be in place with the just, as far as one looks to the body, but the unjust, to the extent that he is unjust, is not able to be in the innocence of the just. Whence, because after death one is able neither to repent or sin, the unchangeable standing is said to be an uncross-able chasm between the saved and the lost. Thus your own words are brought against you. Clearly, you notice that the testimony that you thought to be different from our position has become one with us in the profit of disputation and, with the door closed against you, has shut you off from its most narrow paths leading into the boundless space of regions without place, because the narrowness of bodily breadth, not grasping the immensities of unbodily subtleties, is not able to embrace distance without place, nor a word without noise, nor a lap without space. But surely whatever are so are not bodies. And the souls of Abraham, Lazarus, and the Rich Man are so; thus they are not bodies. But those things that follow after these and are like them ought to present less work in their refutation for those who are vigorous in judgment. Certainly an intelligent judge rightly considers one as conquered who, in accordance with his weakness, is equal to the conquered. Whence not

without shame am I astonished that you add, for the sake of proving the bodiliness of the soul:

Behold the soul, if it thinks of Alexandria or Jerusalem, and through its thought its whole presence is there, it will bring back to us the lay of the places, faces of men, motions and acts of the people.¹²

Is not the author of this opinion ashamed to take up as evidence of the bodiliness of the soul, what he ought to have seen as an argument of its unbodiliness?

Chapter XI

That the Understanding is the Sight of the Soul, and Just as It Sees Bodily Things through the Body, So It Sees Spiritual Things through Itself, but if It Saw Bodily things through Itself, It Would More Easily See Its Own Innards

Thus far, indeed, I have discussed the unbodily and placeless sight of the mind, and it was clear as glass that it, without any mediating substance, always gazes upon eternal and immutable things. Therefore, since the rational soul, through itself, looks upon things unbodily and placeless, and by a quite unbodily vision distinguishes truth, which is God, from falsity and does not see things placed and bodily except through the body, what reason is there to believe it to be like those things that it uses the body as an interpreter to gaze upon and to judge it unlike those things that it contemplates through itself? The understanding, as is often said, and which I do not hesitate to repeat, is the sight of the soul. Assuredly, bodily things are not able to be understood; they are able to be sensed by the soul through the body. But the soul, just as it senses through the body, so it understands through itself; the substances of things sensed and of things understood stand far apart. Wherefore it happens that the soul, because it is not a body, is not able to sense anything bodily except

¹² Letter of Faustus, 12.4-7.

through a body, yet it is able to see through itself things which must be able to be understood. And do you find this opinion so repugnant that you wish bodily things to be understood and unbodily things to be seen? But lest the human mind, which you believe to be bodily, seem to you to be able to see either nothing or only bodily things, or perhaps only unbodily things through itself, as is proper to its nature, let us consider the obscurity of this question as briefly as we can. Consequently, therefore, let us see whether the human mind sees through itself or not. But because at this point we are concerned with nearly the summit of this business, I ask the reader to be both watchful and on his guard. The sight of the mind that is through the body, and common to beasts and men, reaches itself forth and thrusts itself out through those points of the pupils from the front-ward heated cavity of the brain with invisible flames from the bowels and as far as it goes forth into rays, if it lays hold of something of color or form in its way, it takes it in and, as it ran out, so it runs back and takes it back with rapid motions of the lines [of light], and this is what we call sight, as we have treated in the First Book. Through this, therefore, with the beast, the human mind also separates things familiar from the unfamiliar, white bodies from black. Is this the extent of the sight of the human mind? By what, then, does it discern the just from the unjust, the true from the false? Or perhaps fools who have bodily eyes are believed to excel in judgment those who, though wise, are blind? Yet we have as witnesses concerning this present obscurity, from the Roman Senate, Appius, and from the Greek Gymnasium, Hermophilus, and from the number of prophets, Tobias. Of these, Appius offered the light of counsel to those who, though shining outwardly with their eyes, were inwardly blind; and Hermophilus taught Theopompus geometry without a drawing rod; and Tobias, as he led the way and opened the road to heaven, gave to his son an angel as his companion. Thus the mind sees apart from the body, and it does not see anything bodily, or colored, or filling up places,

rather, it contemplates with an unbodily gaze Truth itself, which, at the summit of unbodily things, is God.

But for the sake of lily-livered little men, there still remains to be discussed whether the human mind, through itself, is able to see bodily things without the body. Now, therefore, be wholly attentive and, to the extent that you can, be present. Certainly, as you assert, the human mind, itself bodily and shut up in the confines of the exterior body, if it is able to see anything bodily through itself, it will see nothing more readily than the interior of the body within which it is enclosed. Come, I beg you, turn that bodily sight, which you assert is of the mind, upon your innards, and upon all the parts of things entirely bodily, and declare for yourself and proclaim to us about yourself in what ways or in what position the triplicity of shape of the brain comes together, how the mass of the liver lies, how the disk or pattern of the spleen holds together, the scales of the stomach hang, how the plectrum of the heart beats, what are the pathways of the veins and what is their texture, what are the origins, what the structure of the nerves, how the bones come together, and what is their arrangement? What are the cavities of the lungs, what the tortuous bendings and windings of the intestines, set out with supple bands? Lo, why do you fail to give an answer (as I perceive) to these questions? Why, again, do you refuse? Because, to be sure, the mind never sees bodily things through itself. But why is that which all agree is not without sight never able to see bodily things? No one sees anything bodily who does not have bodily sight. But the mind, which has sight and sees nothing bodily, sees in an unbodily way, and is seen to be able to see unbodily things in an unbodily way; only what is unbodily has unbodily sight, and the human mind sees in an unbodily way: therefore, the human mind is unbodily. Thus, concern yourself with these frivolities no longer, so that you suppose the mind not to be there where it thinks, that it is unable to contemplate through nature the situation of places,

faces of men, the movements and actions of peoples, seeing that these are bodily. Moreover, the unbodily mind is not able to see what is against its nature, nevertheless it is thus far present where it thinks, that it does not see with a bodily vision the places that it thinks, just as it is present where it gives life, so it does not see the very internal parts of its own body to which it gives life. And if it is so far clear that the mind is not able to see bodily things without a body and that it cannot see unbodily things with a body, let us no longer tarry at Alexandria, but returning from Egypt, having crossed the sea of errors and measured out the desert of ignorance, let us enter the fatherland of truth and, as it were, the land of promise, not idly and sluggishly, nor in truth in fear, so that even if some offspring of the vice of lying vanity cries out beside us, or sets itself up as an obstacle, still with Jesus, as our Guide and Helper, we might find rest.

Chapter XII

Against Those Who Say: the Soul is Unbodily to Itself, but Bodily to God

But lo, even if we kept from the journey of those who destroy souls with their prattling trifles, nevertheless, let us shorten it. Yet to spend a little time is no loss, rather it is a pleasure, provided the very truth drive away or trample down anything opposed, or even different, than it. And when I hear certain men who wish souls to be bodily, and yet cannot deny that they are unbodily, say that souls are the one to themselves, and the other to the Creator; to God, they say, souls are bodily, but to themselves they are unbodily, and this is as if they say souls are bodily and not bodily, I call eternity as a witness that responding to such inanities is a difficult task for me because there is nothing with which I might engage, nothing which I might utterly cast away, nothing that struggling with which would be exercise, noting, surely, that conquering would be nothing of a victory. Therefore, if the soul

is bodily to its Creator and unbodily to itself, how shrewdly reason, looking for truth, demands that these two to be discussed: either it is really true that the soul is unbodily, if it truly knows this about itself, or, again, it is true that the soul is bodily if that is how it appears to the Author of the soul. Those who say this speak the truth, and it is the truth, that the soul is unbodily because it knows this in truth; and again it is true that the soul is a body, because the Creator of the soul knows it; and yet these two are contraries, one to the other, and each contends that it is true, although the true is not contrary except to the false. Wondrous indeed and brilliant is that discourse which, while it scorns the one and only truth, discovers these two truths together. Nevertheless, so that I might hold them in the bonds of their own profession, the human mind is unbodily even to those speaking of it on the side of man.

Because, therefore, upon this part of the question it befits us and it remains that they teach to what extent the unbodily substance is bodily to Him Who created it unbodily. And at first I do not say that it is so or not, but I concede it to be so for the time being, nevertheless, I ask from where he knows it to be so. If the letters of the divine Volumes contain this, let them read, if any argument leads them to think it, let them teach, if it helps to employ dialectic, let them convince. If there is none of these, at least let them grant to their own opinion that those who are unbodily in themselves do not believe that they are bodily outside themselves because he who is able to be nothing outside himself is not able to be something other than himself outside himself. Whence the mind, which is unbodily in itself, is in no way able to be bodily outside itself, because its Author does not know it to be other than He made it. Nor is it able to know itself other than it was made. And through this, if it truly knows when it knows itself to be unbodily, then God is deceived if He knows the soul, which is unbodily, to be bodily. But God cannot be deceived, thus He knows the

mind to be unbodily, lest the truth by which the mind truly knows itself to be unbodily be false. Therefore, the mind is unbodily to itself because it is so also to its Creator. Just as earth is earth to man because it is also earth to God, and as water, air, and fire are these very things to man because they are these to God, and just as all things that became known to man are that in man's knowledge which they are, so, of course, the human mind is in no way able to be in one way and to be known to be in another by God. For the Science of the Creator is not from knowledge of things, rather, the existence of things is from the knowledge of the Creator. Wherefore unless the human mind were unbodily to God, it would not be able to be unbodily, for whatever in any way is unbodily is in no way able to be bodily. But lest we dally upon this longer than is just, I take it as granted and ask about something which we have not discussed at all.

Chapter XIII

That Man Consists of Two Substances, an Immortal and Placeless Soul and a Mortal and Placed Body, and Just as the Soul Suffers in an Immortal Way, So It Is Glorifies Immortally and Placelessly

You also say:

When, for example, the spirit paints for itself, in the hidden parts of the mind, the form of Peter or Paul, does it immediately penetrate the inmost thrones of paradise, where it knows them to be? Or when it proposes to itself the flames of that Rich Man in the Scriptures, does it then descend to the place of his torments and the depths of Hell, though they are inaccessible to the living?¹³

Already I have rendered a suitable response concerning the unbodily places of souls and hell and Paradise, and the unbodily vision of the soul without the body when we spoke about the rich man and the poor man and when we treated of the soul's two-fold vision. But because

¹³ Letter of Faustus, 11.14-19.

now your claim that Hell is inaccessible to the living remains to be discussed, to what extent, I ask, have you said that we are composed of soul and body? And although no one doubts which is immortal in us and which is mortal, nonetheless, I will treat this with you thus, so that I may respond to whichever you prefer. If from the side of neither of our substances we die, no part of us descends to hell, because you have said that hell is inaccessible to the living. If both die, thus the body descends to hell, nor do we need to search long for that bodily hell, since, surely, the very sepulcher of the Lord is a place of hell. But sane opinion spurns both of these absurdities; thus we do not die in both substances, nor do we not die in both, and the soul lives even when the body is laid to rest, although if it has deprived itself of its God, it is rightly said to be dead. Nonetheless, it is certainly not believable that the soul that sins loses its nature as a soul, since even the dead body does not cease to be a body. For when the body dies, it loses the soul with its life, but the soul does not lose the soul. Wherefore, the soul is immortal, but the body is mortal. But if the body does not enter hell, inasmuch as it is committed to the grave and separated into the different parts of the world in accordance with the differences of the elements which harmonize with each other to make it up. And the mind does not go to hell because your opinion debars the living from hell: either there is not hell, or no man descends to it. And so the account of our faith is endangered, if the soul of our Redeemer did not open [the gates] of hell by going there and returning. It is possible, perhaps, to say that there are some parts of hell that would be inaccessible to the living, although it remains that hell is not able to entered excepted by the living.

Recall now that you had placed the foundation of your tractate on this, that if you had been able to prove the soul was subject to quantity or place, the part [of men] differing [with you] would think with you concerning its bodiliness. But if you are mindful of your

writings, once you might notice that you have more proposed about what one must dispute than you have disputed about what you proposed, nor have you known, as is the custom of older academics, your own ignorance, but in the manner of the younger members of that sect, you have been ignorant as to whether you know something. For who, with two things boldly laid down, in which the whole body of the entire work necessarily consists, would not exert himself to make, in the first place, both of them at least credible, if not probable, to anyone at all, if he were able; or if he were not able to make both, at least make one or the other such? Surely these two things come together in victory, that the goodness of the cause is shared with the good author. The power of the action is weakened one of them is missing; if both are wanting, it is dried up completely. Thus a fallacy happening upon you as its defender, as forgetful as you are ignorant, amongst those with vigorous intellect, has brought about not only this effect, that it is clear that one is not compelled to believe you on this point, but also that the truth, which one must always believe, appears more clearly and brilliantly under the necessity of conflict and the comparison to falsehood.

Chapter XIII

That the Soul is not Held Closed Up in the Body, Nor is It Moved from Place to Place, Although It Is Moved Temporally through Affection

Therefore, you professed yourself about to give the quality, quantity, and placed-ness of the soul, and straightaway add: “How is that not in place which is held inserted in limbs and entangled in entrails, wandering with motions only, shut up in the condition of its substance?”¹⁴ In no way, when perhaps you have thought something wrongly and you have contended that it seem like the truth, is [your] error able to make the one pardonable and

¹⁴ Letter of Faustus, 11.2-4.

ignorance of the error able to make the other so. But now I am stupefied at the wondrous manner in which you have said things so diverse and so contrary at nearly the same moment and with nearly the same words: "Therefore, entangled in limbs it is wandering in its motions," and again, "wandering in motions it is held shut up in the condition of its substance." If the soul is moved, as you say, with the force of the body, it is moved although standing, which reason forbids one to say. But if it is carried beyond the body, therefore it is not held shut up in the condition of its substance. Who, however, would say it is wandering with only motions? As if anything were able to wander unmoved, or as if it were easier to be moved and not to wander, which the mind does through affection because it is subject, certainly, to motion, but not in place, than that something wander but not be moved, which is proper to the body, because it is subject to motion even in place, but you say that it stands, though wandering, and that it wanders though closed up, although, as has been established above, it is able to stand still when the body moves and to be moved when the body is unmoved. Lo, how far you have disputed about the placed-ness of the soul, nonetheless I do not accuse you of idleness in this. Indeed, you have been incapable of that of which even the most able of orators would have been incapable in this place especially, for whatever an assertor of the false, though endowed with copious speech, is able to lie against perspicacious truth, he is unable to deceive. But why have you announced yourself about to dispute about its quantity, and yet you have not treated it at all? I am not able to say that it was forgetfulness, since it is readily agreed that its name could not have been put forth except from memory. Therefore, one must rather believe, not that you did not want to say something nor that you forgot to say it, but that you did not find anything to say. So, how was it fitting, on the one hand, to invoke in your disputation things to be kept secret, or, on the other, to keep secret things you have proposed? Now, there will be no controversy about

quality, to which I do not deny to soul is subject, which would certainly be utterly without quality, as without quantity, if it were a god, and again, would yield to quantity, as to quality, if it were a body. But now, having been allotted a certain middlemost nature, unbodily but created, neither is it a god, since it has quality, nor is it a body, since it does not have quantity.

And because, as we have taught, having driven back your disputations, it is abundantly clear that in questions of this sort especially it is in no way possible to examine those things encompassing the origins of the principle causes unless you discern, employing the balance of judgment, a creature of twofold substance, as far as a man is lawfully permitted. Either one must give up completely, or proceed there along these lines so that first you separate the body from what is unbodily, and from there just as in the genus of bodies you set the brilliant entirely before the dark, the lofty before the lowly, the dear before the vile, so also in unbodily things that have been created, you should place the human before the bestial, and again in things which are human, you should set the prudent before the foolish, in these again, moreover, which are by nature flourishing, you should set the souls that are learned before those that are unlearned.

Chapter XV

That the Sun and Moon or Stars are only Bodies, They do not Have Spirits, and
Just as the Better Body Is Placed Before the Inferior Body, So the Better Spirit
Is Placed Before the Inferior Spirit

Just as the sun is a body and any rock whatsoever is unequal to it, though it is equally a body, so every nature of every kind of living thing is unbodily. But just as one body surpasses another, although, nevertheless, both are bodies, so one mind is preferred to another, although, nonetheless, both are minds. And again, the occupation with riches and

causes of wealth entice one to speak, and these obstacles [to true virtue] seek, and even compel, that they be described in ways that seem flattering to them. But those most powerfully would approach these excellences and preeminences and supremacies, if any there are whom “ardent virtue bears up into the aether.”¹⁵ But, as far as I am concerned, I was bound to respond to this question, in the present case, concerning the standing of the soul as he with whom I have fallen in has proposed, and perhaps I have done so a little more than necessary: whether I have done rightly or not an equable and learned judge will decide.

Chapter XVI

A Brief Recapitulation of the Earlier Books

But because an advocate cannot easily retain in memory the many things that we have discussed, in this place and that, during the discussion of this question, which things have been spoken of haphazardly and which have been proved all-together and briefly and only at points, I have brought them back under the mind’s eye and brought them together to be re-seen and re-thought out.

1. About the Unbodily

God is unbodily, but the human spirit, because man was made to the likeness and image of God, is the image of God. Certainly a body is not able to be the image of the unbodily; therefore, because the human spirit is the image of God, the human spirit is unbodily.

2. About Life

Everything unplaced is also unbodily, moreover the soul is the life of the body, and in the living body the smallest part of the body lives as the whole body lives. Therefore, there is

¹⁵ Verg. Aen. VI.130.

as much life in the smallest part as in the whole body, and this life is the soul. And that is not in place which is as great in the whole as in some [part] and as great in the small as in the great. Therefore the soul is not in place, and whatever is placeless is not bodily: therefore the soul is not a body.

3. About Reason

Again, the soul reasons, and to reason is in the soul substantially, and reason is unbodily and unplaced: therefore the soul is unbodily.

4. About the Will

Again, the will of the soul is its substance, and, if the whole soul wills, the whole is the will, and the will is not a body: therefore the soul is not a body.

5. About the Memory

Again, the memory is a certain placeless power, which is not distended by the multitude of things remembered nor constricted by their fewness, and recalls even bodily things in an unbodily way. And when the mind remembers, the whole remembers and the whole is the memory that remembers as a whole and the memory is not a body: therefore the mind is not a body.

6. About Touch

Again, the body touched in a part of itself senses there where it is touched, yet the whole mind senses through not the whole body, that is, through a part of the body; but a sense of this sort is unplaced and everything unplaced is unbodily: therefore the mind is unbodily.

7. About Coming and Going

Again, the body does not come near God, nor does it go away from God, but the mind both approaches and stands apart in a placeless way: therefore the mind is not a body.

8. About Motion

Again, the body is moved through place, but the mind is not: therefore the mind is not a body.

9. About Measure

Again, length, breadth, and depth are in body, and whatever lacks these is not a body; but the mind lacks these: therefore it is not a body.

10. About Right and Left

Right, left, above, below, before, behind are in every body, yet are in no soul: therefore, the soul is not a body.

See to what extent we have gathered from every part of our disputations, how much we have labored in the whole work, because what we have restated here as briefly as possible could not have been rendered credible without the preceding arguments, although if this great task had found a suitable advocate, he surely would not have dishonored the dignity of the cause with speech so unequal to it. Yet surely my work has been equal as far as the adversary was able to resist while engaged in battle or as he happened to turn his back in flight and, taken by the hand, was stripped of his leaden clubs. Moreover, to proceed further and toss weapons in the air and to fight without an enemy is an empty contest and a waste of one's powers, for it will be as inglorious as it is without effort.

Chapter XVII

Against the Scorners and Calumniators of These Books: He Proposes a Comparison from the World [Showing] How Such a One is Vanquished

Why, someone may say, have you expounded against this brief page throughout three volumes, if it is enough to answer a word with a word? But it is not as difficult a task to build up falsehood as it is to destroy it. Let someone deny that the world is a sphere: he will have denied this with one word, but surely Timaeus did not prove this with one word. Whence to the extent that we have spoken about this a little too fully, we have been compelled not only by the mere desire to refute the false, but also to teach the true. Certainly to unteach harmful things is a different task than teaching useful ones, nor is it the same thing to only pull up weeds and to sow grain, thus it is not the same thing to weed out vice and to implant virtue. Thus it is a far greater task to take on both of these than one or the other. And even more, since it was my duty to take in both of these tasks, in so thorny an undertaking, my terseness rather than my prolixity is certainly more to be wondered at. For although things could have appeared and showed themselves and revealed themselves from every direction, and otherwise multiplied over and over again, I set a number to the causes that I would speak about more fully, I established a measure, I fixed a limit, so that I might not bring into the discussion more than was necessary, nor contend longer than was fitting, nor proceed further than was right.

Chapter XVIII

At the End of the Book He Seeks Clemency from His Opponent and Appoints the Contest Itself as Judge between Them

Whoever you are, my adversary, the wrongs of whose writings have compelled us to speak against you, I pray and beseech you, do not be angry with me, for I have not rendered insult nor returned abuse. I have only weighed back truth for falsity, hardly an equal exchange. I am the adversary of those things that, the more they are yours, are more harmful to you, and I will be, and I exhort you, for your own sake, to turn against these same things. I have rendered these responses, few and meager due to the lack of time; you must consider with yourself both sides, assume the persona of judge between yourself and me, employ the balance of justice. If our scale is more downward and weightier, there should be no displeasure or shame in fleeing back from a desertion or moving, under cover of truth, away from falsity. But if, what I do not wish, nor would you do by my persuasion, you remain obstinate, hand down whatever you would have read publicly as your own opinion and do not hide your name: as God is our Master and Life, since we, brought together from either side, have made a an attempt of the ways, test the power of truth to destroy falsehood.

Epilogue

If I were not sending these things that I have written to you, reverend Sir, to be examined and corrected, well might it appear excessive and boastful that I, who know that I do not know, should wish to teach and to give from the dirth of my poverty a penny to one who greatly abounds in the wealth of knowledge. Thus it happens that this edition of little books that I have sent to you, which I have set in order with the most subtle disputation of the philosophical art, has made me wary and solicitous that I not commit their intelligence to my own judgment, but that I submit them to the expertise of a better judge, and not only those things that I have perceived from their recent reading, but also whatever I have entrusted to memory for safe-keeping and I have previously sent to you for your approval. Well does your Worthiness know that what we hold surely and firmly [in our understanding] is hardly anything in comparison with those about which we are doubtful.

Now, every nature that is known to God is called by its own name, and therefore the name of the nature of each thing brings that nature into view. Therefore, those who have gone before us have spoken a name that should make a thing known, which sends into our ears images of the thing as it were through the senses of the body, which our memory sets in order, and just as we understand when someone speaks to us, so we think about things in their absence and their images, which we have retained in our memory, whenever we wish. But there is a two-fold nature of things, namely a corporeal and a spiritual nature. For every creature is either a spirit or a body. We sense the corporeal things through the body and perceive the intellectual through the intellect. Why is it, therefore, that there are said to be three kinds of questions: whether it is, what it is, how it is? Why, I ask, it is asked whether it is if every knowledge, since it brings to light the thing, takes away uncertainty and leaves no room for doubt? But I think this has been set down as doubtful because all things are not of

the number of substances, but there are found some things that show, rather, their perfections. For example, if one asks whether 'good' is a substance or not, we will respond that it is not, rather it is a privation of evil. For rightly one asks in the first question whether it is a body or spirit, and in the next one asks whether a body is animal or spiritual, or whether the spirit is rational or irrational. Rightly, therefore, are these three kinds of questions defined, about which we have now spoken briefly enough, to my mind. And so now let us see how many kinds of bodies there are.

Although there are innumerable species under it, there are but three genera, namely the body that lives and senses, the body that lives but does not sense, and the body that neither lives nor senses. But this genus of body which neither lives nor senses, I think to be of the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, which are the principle and simple bodies, from which all other bodies are compacted, to wit, the living and sensing bodies of the animals, and the living but not sensing bodies of the trees and grasses.

Wherefore, with regard to what things they differ, it is evidently quite clear, but let us enquire more intently into what they have in common, with the help of God. For thus we desire, with God inspiring and helping us, to not only look into His creation, but also by ascending through those things that He has made, to look upon, with our understanding, the creating Substance and, although we cannot reach so far that we are able to understand His substance and know what He is, at least we can reach, evidently, to what He is not.

Therefore, every body is a subject to quantity and quality, but a body cannot be in a body as in a subject, for a body *is* a subject, not *in* a subject, since a body is a substance, not an accident. Accidents, on the other hand, are *in* substance, they are not substances. Therefore quantity and quality are accidents of body, for quantity is in measures, quality in colors. To be a body is not the same as to be 'how much', nor is it the same as to be 'of what

sort,' because even when the color is changed, the body remains, and in a body that has been made smaller, the quantity that was there before is no more. And through this, magnitude is not the same as being large, nor length the same as being long, nor width the same as being wide, nor the colored the same as the color. There is for the body a measure, number, and weight, and so Holy Scripture says *God has disposed all things in measure and number and weight*, but I see that these are attributed to the rational spirit in another way, and we must discuss this in what follows. But now we will explain what we began to say about the body. For, as we have said, magnitude is not the same as being large, so also the measure is not the same as the measurable, nor number the same as the numerable, nor weight the same as the weigh-able. A body can be lessened therefore, because in every part it has an up and down, it has a right and left, it has a before and behind. It is moved through time and place; it does not judge, but is judged; it is cut into parts *ad infinitum*.

Come now, let us see what that gives life to a body yet does not give it sensation. For it is better to regard equally that which receives and that which gives. For life, which is not less in the part than in the whole and is not less in a lesser part and does not bestow a greater part to a greater and a lesser to a lesser, is not a body, but a spirit. The spirit of the beast, which does not subsist after the body, must be set aside for now so that we may come to the rational spirit. Therefore, a spirit does not have quantity, but if it were long or wide, it would certainly be rightly called a 'how much.' But wisely is it distinguished and separated from the body because it is not subject to quantity, although it is subject to quality. For learning is accident of the spirit,¹ as is justice and injustice, chastity and wantonness. There are four principle virtues, namely, prudence and temperance, bravery and justice. And the prudent spirit is not the same thing as prudence, nor the just the same as justice, nor the temperate

¹ *animus*.

the same as temperance, nor the brave the same as bravery. It is one thing to be a spirit,² another to be a just spirit. So, when I say 'just spirit,' I understand two things; and I could have said the same about prudence, temperance, and fortitude, because the spirit is able to be without the virtues, though if it does not have them, it follows that it will be vicious. For it is understood that the spirit is always subject either to vices or virtues, and, as we have said, it is subject to learning, and learning cannot be without it. And the account of number is a learning, for it will never happen that four and two make seven or seven and three, eleven. Likewise, the figure of a circle does not receive contrariety. Never will it be that the figure of a circle should come about from two or three lines or that a square come about from three or a triangle from four. For if you add or subtract something, there will no longer be a triangle or a square, for there remain eternal and unchangeable. The accounts of these disciplines are in the spirit as in a subject, and without it they cannot be. Thus, one infers from this that that in which they are is also eternal, just as that which is in it. Therefore the soul is immortal, and it always knows and sees this, that it lives always, but it is not always aware of this, because when it is untroubled it and knows about itself that it can lose itself in its many meditations, it distends itself and if, moved through time though unmoved through place, nevertheless it moves the body through time and place, and it judges the body, and yet is itself judged [by another].

See, therefore, o human soul, how great a good you are, since you pass judgment on bodies, since you are joined to reason, since you are made a partaker of eternal truth. You must not love things beneath you, and although there is in you a measure, you are not the measure. Though there is a number to your thoughts, and a weight to your pleasures, you are not number or weight. Give back the will of your love to that Number without number,

² *animus*.


about which the Psalmist says: *and of His wisdom there is no number*,³ give your love to that Measure without measure to that Weight without weight, by Which all things are weighed and measured. This is the highest Good, by Whom all good kinds of bodies were made. This it is by Whom the great good of rational beings were made: leave behind the good, the great good things, and love the highest and simple Good, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, this Trinity and One God. And yet the body and spirit must be so loved, insofar as they must be loved, as a certain most noble interpreter of the Holy Scriptures has said: “You will set down four rules of love: that we love what is above us, what is akin to us, ourselves, and what is below us.” Therefore, let us love that highest Good, Which is above us, in the order of nature, not of place, because the creature cannot be coequal with the Creator. For only the Son is coequal to the Father, and likewise the Holy Spirit, because they are not creatures, but with Them there is one nature.

These things, which we have set out in a brief lecture, is shown in the picture placed below:⁴

	Highest Good without quality
Deus:	Moves without time or place
	Judges and is not judged
	Great good with quality
Spirit:	Moves in time without place
	Judges and is judged
	Good with quality and quantity
Body:	Moves in place and in time
	Does not judge, but is judged

³ Ps 146.5.

⁴ The picture, on the following page, has been taken from *Opera Claudiani Mamerti*, 197.



Letter of Claudianus to Sapaudus

To the Most Learned Sapaudus, the Rhetor

Claudianus

Greece, the mistress of all disciplines and arts, has advanced most of all in noble studies and embraced nearly the whole orb with manifold doctrines because there was not one of all those there who bore some good fruit to whom there was not an equal honor, as is right. Hence, not a few mortals nearly surpassed the nature of mortals with the powers of their excellent geniuses extended in every direction, searching out with untiring efforts things hidden, stored-up causes of first beginnings and of substances flowing in time, embracing by investigation and art the prefixed limits of time, they entered into not only the mystery of this world, but also that of the heavens.

And it is useful for me to say this now because the slave of ignorance and unlearnedness, who serves delights and riches, is about to throw away the accomplishments of the good arts wrought by the ages of our forefathers and, despising the cultivation of the mind, by which alone the human race stands above the beast, has surely destroyed virtue along with doctrine. For shall we ascribe to negligence or to nature the fact that apart from you alone no one aspires not only to the renewal, but not even to the not-learning of noble discipline? Suppose we attribute that evil to a fault of nature, can we say the human race differs from the human race? Or their geniuses are not the same as they were? Or Cicero,

the greatest orator of his age, had goods received at birth and had not, considering the goods at home and of his city of little worth, traveled as far as Greece for the sake of taking up a richer knowledge? Or perhaps Plato, the apex and culmination of philosophy, content with his own good of nature, though following the opinions of Socrates and believing that Greece was poorer in doctrines than he was of virtues, this untiring searcher of things did not approach Egypt and even to the Brahmans of India and the inheritors of Pythagorean doctrines. I pass over the rest in silence because neither time nor this letter is capable of holding it all. But without doubt I should say this one thing: it is not talent that is lacking to our age, but studies. With a mournful epitaph would I myself entomb the death, as it were, of these studies, if you had not revived them with venerable profession, praiseworthy care, keen talent, flowing eloquence. And this good work is the more admirable, as far as I am concerned, because the situation is so desperate.

For I see the Roman tongue to be an object not only of neglect, but even of shame to the Romans: Grammar is driven off as a barbarian with the kick and fist of the barbarism and solecism; dialectic is feared as an Amazon threatening to fight with her sword drawn; Rhetoric, like a grand lady in a vulgar place, is not accepted; music and geometry and arithmetic are despised as the three Furies; what is more, Philosophy is accounted as a threatening beast. But these arts have been supported by your praise, because if there were many attached to the studies of which you are a devotee, you would have been, if not the most powerful of all, surely one [standing] apart from the many. Hence, far from an injury to the rest of those belonging to our Gaul, you only and alone are the equal of your profession, and don't think this word is given as flattery or fawning. Never, indeed, am I able to fawn, nor do you stand in need of false praise. But the sweetness of your

declamations has been fixed in my mind and cannot be destroyed or plucked out, a sweetness mixed with the virtue of Attica as with honey, to which by its own nature health, strength, and sweetness have been bestowed. And as the swift and industrious little bee on the slopes of Hybla drinks in the dew falling from heaven and, when it has been digested with fragrance-bearing workmanship, pours forth honey, and this maker of offspring nourishes the brood of her virginity and drenches the walls of the honeycomb, so you, to be sure, from the greatest authors as from the lofty mountains, making an early harvest of each of their more learned teachings like fragrant thyme and quite fruitful flowers confect honeycombs of eloquence which you fill with the honey of your genius, from which likewise is formed the beloved number of disciples, who are like sons to you, which, imbued with the nectar of Greek studies, as if fed on Attic honey, when they begin to raise a noise with the wings of science, will themselves confect honeycombs of eloquence.

Now, you must be mindful that the duty of teaching was given to you by our forefathers almost as an inheritance, and as this manifold doctrine advanced by your forebears has flowed into you, so it is necessary for you to support our science more abundantly.

It is fitting, too, that you also be admonished that [by your studies] you will release the ancient, noble city of Vienna, of which you are a citizen and doctor, and not an inactive one, from a twofold debt, and render a twofold repayment both to our fathers and to our fatherland. To sum up, I beseech you in as friendly a way as possible, that you spurn boyish trifles of novel, petty reasonings and waste no time upon perusing things which flourish leathern whips of resounding gossip and unman oratorical strength with celebrating applause. Naevius and Plautus are helpful for acquiring elegance, Cato for gravity, Varro for

expertise, Gracchus for severity, Chrysippus for discipline, and Cicero is profitable for acquiring eloquence. For whoever has recently written anything worth remembering, has not read novelties. We must return to and commit to memory those from whom the writers we admire were able to derive profit. I have given this as a testimony of friendship, though perhaps a little too familiarly for some, yet the indulgence of your good will will excuse the boldness of love.

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