

NATO and EU Enlargement: Flawed Road to Membership

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NATO and EU Enlargement: Flawed Road to Membership
Political Science Thesis

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List of Acronyms

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
European Community (EC)
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)
European Union (EU)
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Organizations (IOs)
Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Minorities at Risk (MAR)
Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
North Atlantic Council (NAC)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economy (PHARE)
Political Risk Services (PRS)
Political Terror Scale (PTS)
Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD)
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Table of Contents

<i>Chapter 1: Why Enlarge?</i>	5
<i>Chapter 2: Did States Meet the Criteria?</i>	35
<i>Chapter 3: Cold War Enlargement- Spain</i>	75
<i>Chapter 4: Post-Cold War Enlargement- Poland and Hungary</i>	94
<i>Chapter 5: Post-Cold War Enlargement- Romania</i>	117
<i>Chapter 6: Conclusion- What's Next?</i>	135

Chapter 1: Why Enlarge?

Introduction

Although Romania acceded to the European Union (EU) in 2007, serious questions remain regarding the presence of rule of law and democratic governance within the country. As recently as 2012, disputes between top leadership officials in Romania and accusations of corruption have been a cause for concern in the international community. EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso indicated that Romania has to “remove all doubts on its commitment to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the respect for constitutional rulings” or face the EU’s displeasure.¹ Romania’s struggles with implementing a stable political system and promoting democratic governance have been especially acute since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. For many observers, its wavering commitment to democracy, faltering market economy, and tenuous respect for human rights could have seriously undermined its bid for membership in both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In spite of Romania’s apparent failure to fully satisfy NATO and EU membership requirements, it joined both organizations in 2004 and 2007, respectively. How was this possible? Why did NATO and the EU allow Romania to join if there were serious flaws in its membership application? Does this suggest that NATO and the EU are not paying enough attention to states’ imperfections with respect to membership requirements? Or, do NATO and the EU look to other factors when determining membership besides the stated criteria? Romania’s case reveals that NATO and EU decision-making when it comes to admitting new members is much more complex than a cursory glance would indicate. To add to the puzzle, NATO and the EU admitted states prior to the end of the Cold War whose membership applications were in pristine order (i.e. the United Kingdom). They also admitted states whose applications appeared lacking (i.e. Greece and Spain).

¹ “Symbol of Romanian Leadership? Hands on a Throat,” *New York Times* (2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/world/europe/in-romania-rancor-between-top-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed: 21 October 2012.

As evidenced by Romania's admission to both organizations after the Cold War ended, NATO and the EU have also accepted states in recent years whose domestic political and economic situations do not appear to align with the institutions' usual standards. States like Belarus and Moldova are not even courted by NATO and the EU as potential members given the troubling nature of their political structure and economic activity, yet Romania and Bulgaria, arguably similarly flawed, still acceded.² Again, the question is, why did a state like Romania gain admission to both the EU and NATO while states like Belarus and Moldova are not able to even entertain membership aspirations? While the UK's 1973 accession to the EU unsurprisingly presented little difficulty in terms of its democracy and market structure, other applicants like Romania and Bulgaria presented more of a challenge. The EU and NATO often make some surprising choices in terms of new members, which begs the question of why institutions behave the way they do when enlargement decisions are on the table.

The question of institutional enlargement has long been a concern of international organizations and their member states. Institutions' motivations for enlargement have changed over time and institutions, however similar they may seem, have very different perspectives on how to pursue an enlargement agenda. Desire for more military power, an interest in spreading democratization, or other institutional values and norms may spur expansion. Despite the rational objectives that institutions put forth when deciding whether or not to enlarge, there is an occasional tendency to behave irrationally, or what may appear irrationally, when accepting new members. States have been admitted to both institutions even though gaps in fulfilling the membership criteria were present, but perhaps not given enough attention at the time of accession. To attempt to answer the question of why institutions accept members with problematic applications, I will look at the

² Ivan Katchanovski, "Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 12 (3) (2011): 305.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in order to compare and contrast differences in expansion policies and practices.

My research question investigates whether or not prospective EU and NATO member states fulfilled the membership criteria associated with each organization and, if not, as is commonly believed, why they were still admitted. I consider enlargement both during and after the Cold War with case studies focusing on Spain, Poland, and Romania. NATO and the EU both revised their approaches to enlargement after the end of the Cold War; consequently, I will seek to answer what changed while comparing and contrasting different waves of enlargement for each organization. The findings provide a more complete picture and offer explanations for otherwise perplexing institutional behavior. Such insights can answer questions not only about how international institutions react to interest in membership, but also analyze what internal and external pressures motivate NATO and the EU to expand. I will focus on the supply side of enlargement (the institutional side) and not the demand side (whether and why aspiring member states are interested in membership or not). I will examine alternative explanations for institutional behavior rooted in normative, economic, and political influences that may compel international institutions to enlarge.

In this thesis, I find that the EU and NATO each admitted member states that did not completely fulfill the criteria for membership. In addition, I will argue that both organizations proceeded with enlargement (despite the risks) when institutional and member state interests aligned in support of expansion. Enlargement also occurred so that the two institutions could spread liberal norms and values to the new member states. This research puzzle is important because it offers insight into potentially risky institutional behavior brought about by admitting states that did not fulfill the basic criteria. More importantly, the puzzle seeks to answer why some aspiring member states acceded while others were not so fortunate. Finally, the research will explore how prior enlargement decisions might affect future waves of enlargement and will also explore what

factors are the most compelling when determining membership. In order to look into how NATO and the EU approached enlargement, I will now examine the history of enlargement for both institutions.

History of Enlargement

NATO and the European Community (which became the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993)³ both emerged in the aftermath of World War II. NATO was instituted in 1949 in order to create a military alliance between the United States and members of the Western European community. In 1957, the European Community (EC) developed as a unifying economic body intended to bring peace to relations between West European powers. As the Cold War progressed, both NATO and the EU began to expand their borders to include new members. Enlargement can be defined as the process by which states not previously members of NATO or the EU accede to and become official members of either organization. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, enlargement can also be described as a “process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization.”⁴ A system of horizontal institutionalization implies that when states accede to either NATO or the EU, they effectively integrate within the organization, but still maintain their sovereignty and national interests (as do the existing members of the organizations).

During the Cold War, expansion occurred in both institutions, but not on the same scale as when the Cold War ended. Greece and Turkey acceded to NATO in 1952, West Germany acceded in 1955, and Spain acceded in 1982.⁵ Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EU in 1973 while

³ “When did the EC come to be called the EU?” Folketinget. http://www.euo.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/10/. Accessed: 20 January 2013.

⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeir, “Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research, Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 9 (4) (2002): 502.

⁵ “NATO Enlargement,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm. Accessed: 30 September 2012.

Spain, Portugal, and Greece joined in the 1980s.⁶ Once the Cold War ended, multiple waves of EU and NATO enlargement occurred. First, after a brief negotiation period, Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the European Union in 1995.⁷ In the first major enlargement eastward, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland acceded to NATO in 1999,⁸ followed by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004.⁹ Also in 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU.¹⁰ Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU in 2007.¹¹ Finally, Albania and Croatia entered NATO in 2009.¹²

After the end of the Cold War, the process of enlargement became more contested with the question of integrating the former Eastern bloc. The EU and NATO both rushed to clarify the criteria for membership especially since the states clamoring for membership were formerly under Communist rule. According to Ivan Katchanovski, states that were once under Soviet occupation faced resistance when they attempted to join both the EU and NATO since there were inherent cultural and political biases in the West against the former Soviet republics.¹³ Up to that point, NATO and the EU were (mainly) comprised of states that formed Western Europe. Expansion to include Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) was entirely new to both organizations that traditionally looked to include Western states only. However, the end of the Cold War signaled a new chapter in enlargement history. Once confronted with membership appeals from states that

⁶ “European Enlargement,” Civitas (2011), <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Accessed: 30 September 2012.

⁷ Ibid

⁸ “Member Countries,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ “European Enlargement,” Civitas (2011), <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Accessed: 30 September 2012.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² “Member Countries,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.

¹³ Katchanovski, “Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries,” 306.

were culturally distinct from the West, NATO and the EU realized that if they were to successfully instill democratic values in the new states, they must refine their membership criteria to include clear expectations of democratic governance, a market economy, and respect for human rights and minority groups in aspiring member states. NATO and the EU did not follow specific steps for accession before the Cold War's end, but with more calls for membership after the Cold War, both organizations developed and adhered to specific steps so that the enlargement process was streamlined and the membership criteria was clearly represented. I will discuss the specific membership criteria for NATO and the EU and its evolution after the Cold War in Chapter 2.

Membership Processes

Within the accession processes, both NATO and the EU have institutionalized steps that aspiring member states follow in order to integrate into and accede to each organization. The three stages that precede EU accession are as follows: when a country submits a complete membership application, it becomes a candidate for membership as soon as the European Council approves it, the candidate then goes through a negotiation process that involves accepting EU laws and regulations, and finally when the negotiations and reforms have been satisfactorily completed, the country can enter the European Union pending Council approval.¹⁴ Although this appears to be a relatively simple set of steps to gain accession, the actual process is much more complicated and involves lengthy accession discussions. NATO follows a similar accession process with a few differences. In order to start the accession process, countries must be invited to become a member before beginning accession talks with a NATO team and sign accession protocols, NATO at large

¹⁴ "Enlargement," European Commission (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-joining/index_en.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.

either chooses to sign the accession protocols or not, and, if NATO signs the accession protocols, the NATO Secretary General officially invites candidates to accede.¹⁵

Before countries entered NATO, they typically participated in either the Partnership for Peace (in the 1990s) or the Membership Action Plan (present-day). The Partnership for Peace (PFP) allowed aspiring member states to strengthen their military capacity so that they could eventually join NATO.¹⁶ As NATO's accession process evolved, NATO also developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which "provides a framework for enlargement with NATO as aspirants carry out the reforms needed for possible future membership."¹⁷ When states desire to join the European Union, they sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which outlines "common political and economic objectives and encourages regional cooperation" before the EU accession process begins.¹⁸

Explanations for Enlargement

The motivations behind enlargement varied significantly during and after the Cold War. For NATO, countries' strategic location preceded concerns about the presence of democratic values, respect for human rights, or the peaceful resolution of conflicts. With the looming threat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), NATO was more willing to overlook the lack of democratic control of the military, for example. Despite concerns about the democratic stability of states like Turkey, Greece, and Spain, all three countries were still admitted to NATO. NATO's primary concern with regards to enlargement before the end of the Cold War was to further the

¹⁵ "NATO Enlargement," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2012), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.

¹⁶ Jeffrey Simon, "Crossing the Rubicon," *NATO After Fifty Years*, eds. S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001), 125.

¹⁷ "NATO Enlargement," International Delegation: UK and NATO (2012), <http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/new-nato-partners/nato-enlargement>, Accessed: 10 December 2012.

¹⁸ "Stabilisation and Association Agreement," European Commission (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm, Accessed: 10 December 2012.

“collective defense protection of alliance membership.”¹⁹ More importantly, NATO enlarged in order to strengthen its collective military power in the face of a common enemy: the Soviet Union. NATO described its desire for a “return to Europe,”²⁰ a movement towards promoting unity on the European continent. Now that the Soviet threat was nonexistent, NATO believed that it could fully devote itself to enlargement with the goal of bringing a zone of peace to Europe.²¹ NATO enlargement also served the purpose of providing stability for the Central and Eastern European countries that were reeling from the absence of their former Soviet protector.²²

In short, without the threat of the former USSR, NATO could build on its previous unification and expand to involve the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in that unification as well. US President Bill Clinton’s “not if, but when” rhetoric of the 1990s inspired the CEECs to seek NATO membership.²³ Indeed, the United States’ desire to see NATO expand cannot be underestimated in importance. Arguably the most powerful actor in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States exerts a strong influence over enlargement processes. NATO’s interest in expanding had much to do with the United States’ desire to see NATO expand. The US remained the key proponent of NATO enlargement because of the low transaction costs required to maintain “a large degree of autonomy” in European affairs.²⁴ Once NATO began to incorporate enlargement into its foreign policy agenda, it needed to codify the criteria it would use to evaluate potential member states. Although the 1949 Washington Treaty vaguely alluded to the process for enlargement, it was not until 1995 that NATO decided to lay out its criteria for membership in its Study on Enlargement.

¹⁹ Simon, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 121.

²⁰ Ibid, 129.

²¹ Ibid, 127.

²² Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002): 30.

²³ Ibid, 123.

²⁴ Katja Weber, *Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000): 108.

Part of the EU's mandate is to economically revive Western Europe and provide a formalized process for future enlargement. The destruction of World War II caused European states to begin a project of bringing peace and reunification to the continent.²⁵ Originally, though, the European Community was formed to create a sense of economic cooperation among the Western European states. With the addition of each new member state, the European Union sought to deepen the ties that connected the member states to foster more economic cohesion and integration. In a move to acknowledge its economic beginnings, the EU looks at prospective states' economic stability as market economies before deciding to enlarge or not.²⁶ The EU also considers a number of factors when determining whether or not to enlarge: a state's economic situation, respect for human rights, and the presence of democracy, to name a few.²⁷ When potential member states appear strongly positioned to contribute significantly to the European Union, the EU responds favorably to those states' petitions for membership. On the other hand, the EU also admits states that may not display all of the required features of an ideal member state, which is the focus of this thesis.

In the case of the European Union, enlargement was not the major political issue in the 1970s and 1980s that it has become since the end of the Cold War. For example, Greece struggled to present solid economic credentials when pursuing membership in the EU, but the EU looked favorably on the fact that Greece was already a member of NATO and appeared to be "traditionally tied to [the West]."²⁸ Greece acceded to the EU with relative ease, but the newly liberated CEECs in search of EU membership have faced much more of an uphill climb. Despite its initial reluctance, the EU looked to enlargement as "the locomotive for future growth in both the old and new parts of

²⁵ Walker, *Europe in the New Century*, 58.

²⁶ "Enlargement," European Commission (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm, Accessed: 17 January 2013.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Daniel C. Thomas, "The Construction of Europe: Communal Identity and the Politics of EU Enlargement" (paper presented at Cornell University in honor of Peter Katzenstein, October 13-15, 2011), 256.

Europe.”²⁹ To maintain relevance and legitimacy, the EU supported expansion in order to solidify its status as a competent international actor. The EU’s offer of membership is a powerful incentive for states to fulfill the *acquis communautaire*, the body of EU laws required to be considered for membership.³⁰ Several of the CEECs have worked to incorporate the *acquis communautaire* in their domestic laws to prepare for EU accession. The *acquis communautaire* laid out the obligations of EU membership that aspiring member states must put into effect before they can be considered members of the European Union. The EU reacted to the calls for membership after the end of the Cold War and responded by laying out clear requirements. Despite the strict requirements that the EU put forth, all of the states admitted did not necessarily fulfill the basic membership expectations, which contributes to my research question of why they were still admitted.

Argument Overview

In this thesis, I will determine what parts of the membership criteria admitted states did not completely fulfill before accession and then explain why NATO and the EU went ahead with expansion anyway. Certainly the desire to enlarge was strong in both NATO and the EU, but further investigation into why enlargement proceeded despite the risks associated with incomplete membership qualifications is needed. I will argue that NATO and the EU did not place great emphasis on the three trademarks of a liberal democratic system (democratic governance, a functional market economy, and respect for human rights) until the 1990s. However, in the early years of enlargement (1950-1980), both NATO and the EU looked for, but did not require, signs of the three marks of a liberal democracy in prospective member states. As long as aspiring member

²⁹ Martin Walker, *Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower*, ed. Robert J. Guttman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2001), 57.

³⁰ “Acquis communautaire,” Eurofund (2007),

<http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/acquiscommunautaire.htm>, Accessed: 27 November 2012.

states displayed progress and improvement in these three areas, NATO and the EU proceeded with enlargement because both sought to spread liberal norms and values to the aspiring member states. When the Cold War ended, though, both institutions produced documents detailing the requirements for admission. Since both NATO and the EU claimed to value the three aspects of a liberal democracy, they knew that it was time to translate their beliefs into clear expectations and codify them in official criteria. The EU's Copenhagen Criteria and NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement established these clear membership expectations.

Further, NATO was primarily preoccupied with defending its members' borders from any Soviet act of aggression during the Cold War. In a military alliance, coordinating effective defense policy took precedence over building a shared liberal democratic identity. When the Cold War ended, NATO turned to expansion as the solution to revitalize Europe, keep the US engaged in European affairs, and encourage the spread of democracy across Europe.³¹ I will also argue that the EU and NATO both naively believed that if states were admitted, their human rights records, market economies, and democratic governance would continue to progress upwards by virtue of being a member of an organization that professed to uphold liberal democratic values. Once the Cold War ended, though, both NATO and the EU took new measures to ensure that the conditions for membership were more explicitly stated and revolved around fostering a liberal democracy in new states.

Literature Review and Hypotheses

Member State Interests

Realist, neoliberal, and constructivist schools of thought typically dominate contemporary debates about the explanations for EU and NATO enlargement. Realist theories highlight “material

³¹ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, 33.

power and the resilience of the state.”³² On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalists argue that war is likely to be averted and peace maintained as long as states adopt democratic systems because democracies rarely engage in warfare with each other.³³ Liberal intergovernmentalism holds that member states formulate their enlargement decisions based on national preferences and then bring their preferences to the institutional level.³⁴ While realists and liberal intergovernmentalists discuss material power and national preferences respectively, constructivists stress that institutions shape the norms, behavior, and identities of new member states so that they fit the institutional model.³⁵ I will first discuss realism and its connection to institutional enlargement. I will then look at neoliberalism and liberal intergovernmentalism as well as constructivism.

Realism

Unlike the EU, NATO has faced the need to assert powerful reasons for its continued existence since the threat (the USSR) has been eliminated. With the Cold War’s end, NATO expanded its security operations to provide stability in the Balkans region in an effort to maintain relevance.³⁶ Despite NATO’s efforts to remain relevant and active in international security, realists argue that NATO is on the way out. The structural realist perspective espoused by Waltz suggests, “NATO is a disappearing thing.”³⁷ Further, Waltz expects “NATO to dwindle at the Cold War’s end.”³⁸ Waltz’s argument suggests that NATO served member states’ interests when it functioned as a military alliance during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War has ended, Waltz does not

³² Mark A. Pollack, “International Relations Theory and European Integration,” *European University Institute* (2000): 5.

³³ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

³⁶ “NATO in the Balkans,” *NATO Briefing* (2005): 1.

³⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 363.

³⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, “NATO expansion: A realist’s view,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21 (2) (2000): 28.

foresee that member states will require NATO's security protection since the threat has disappeared. In order to answer the question of why NATO persists, Waltz suggests that dominant state actors like the US want to retain their grip on European foreign policy affairs; therefore, NATO persists because the US wants it to survive.³⁹ According to the realists, power-based theories explain why NATO continues to expand even without a clear threat to its current state of security. As Waltz mentions, the US wishes to remain involved in European affairs and continued enlargement serves this purpose because the US has a voice in expressing when and how states are admitted.

Adding to Waltz's argument, Mearsheimer articulates that survival is the most crucial objective for any state.⁴⁰ According to Mearsheimer and other realists, NATO is no longer effective or necessary in the absence of the Soviet threat.⁴¹ Enlargement, therefore, is a puzzling course of action for a dying institution and the member states that sustain it. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer acknowledges that enlargement occurs and attributes this to the fact that member states' national and international interests spur expansion. Mearsheimer argues, "the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it."⁴² Other realists like Genov support Mearsheimer's claim that states are the dominant actors and institutions cannot hope to command the same degree of power that states do.⁴³ If institutions enlarge, it is because the most powerful members have an interest in enlargement and pursue those interests through those institutions; consequently, institutions do not have any agency in the enlargement process. Instead, they are entirely dependent on member states' interests and desires.

³⁹ Ibid, 29.

⁴⁰ John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (1) (1990): 44.

⁴¹ Ibid, 1.

⁴² Ibid, 13.

⁴³ Georgy Genov, "NATO and EU Enlargement and Globalisation Policies: Re-conceptualization of Security Priorities?" *Economic Alternatives* (1) (2010): 30.

In particular, member states also looked to expansion as a way to provide more security and military protection. States focus on increasing their security networks by adding new members to NATO and the EU. Since cooperative security enables “strategic interdependence,” member states are more likely to support accession if they can enhance their security and military power.⁴⁴ It makes more sense to have states locked into a military alliance with each other than to worry about the possibility that a certain state may begin to act aggressively. For example, in the case of NATO enlargement, Hyde-Price argues that Germany, one of Europe’s most economically powerful states, “had no desire to remain the western bulwark of the Alliance and wanted a belt of NATO members to its east.”⁴⁵ If Germany could ensure that NATO’s borders extended into Eastern Europe, then it would have a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and itself, which would reduce its fears about an attack from the Soviet Union. Thus, security concerns motivated Germany to support enlargement eastward.

Hyde-Price also argues that EU enlargement will “stimulate further economic development...[and] it will provide a multilateral context for German economic power and political influence.”⁴⁶ For example, both Germany and the UK have “strong business interests” in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and “have been the most eager to push the enlargement agenda” as a result.⁴⁷ Germany and the UK’s preferences clearly demonstrate that member states often favor accession when their own economic or military interests can be enhanced via expansion. In addition, domestic pressures spurred member states to support enlargement. Multinational corporations (MNCs) wanted to branch out into new member states because of “location-specific

⁴⁴ Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” *International Security* 21 (3) (1996/1997): 23.

⁴⁵ Adrian Hyde-Price, “The Antinomies of European Security: Dual Enlargement and the Reshaping of European Order,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 21 (2) (2000): 142.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁴⁷ Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümper, “The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and the application for EU membership,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 9 (4) (2002): 556.

advantages, including low labor costs, low material costs, and market proximity.”⁴⁸ Enlargement to the East would allow European investors to extend their business ventures in states where EU laws and regulations would apply.⁴⁹ MNCs also pressured states to support enlargement so that they could gain a foothold in a new economy and increase their global competitiveness.⁵⁰

As Hyde-Price points out, when the member states saw clear political, economic, and security benefits associated with enlargement, they were more likely to advocate for it. If the member states did not support expansion, the institution itself could not push enlargement through since it must first serve its member states’ interests. As long as the member states withhold their support for enlargement, the institution could not expand.

Liberalism

Although the European Union began as a peace and integration project in Europe, member states primarily controlled the institution’s activities and tended to emphasize economic enhancement, not collective defense like NATO. As a result, member states did not focus on defense until much later since NATO was already working on securing the North Atlantic region. Instead, the European Union member states hearkened back to the initial reason for the EU’s formation: to bring about a Europe that was economically integrated. EU member states looked for new members that could contribute to the EU’s economic prosperity. Mearsheimer explains that states are looking to increase their economic satisfaction and provide stability to new member states (especially in Eastern Europe) while creating “a liberal economic order that allows free economic exchange between states.”⁵¹ This is the theory of economic liberalism, which encourages enlargement as a way to increase economic opportunities. The member states have an interest in

⁴⁸ Ibid, 555.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 556.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” 42.

enhancing their economic opportunities and will advocate for enlargement if prospective members can contribute significantly to economic advancement in the European Union.

Because member states have compelling interests, they decide whether or not the institutions decide to enlarge. To further the liberal intergovernmentalism approach, Moravcsik argues, “governments first define a set of interests and then bargain among themselves in an effort to realize those interests.”⁵² Since EU member states concentrated on economic interests at first, they worked on the national level to establish their individual preferences and then worked with each other to bargain and compromise. In essence, member states control the enlargement agenda according to their domestic interests and preferences. Domestic pressures and considerations motivated states to support enlargement at the institutional level when it suited their interests.

Constructivism

Although member states often consider security interests when deciding whether or not to support enlargement, they may have other intentions at the same time. Constructivists add another dimension to why member states driving enlargement policies choose to enlarge. They argue that member states are capable of “constructing” potential member states’ identities so that they fit in seamlessly with the rest of the European community.⁵³ Schimmelfennig suggests, “Liberal human rights (i.e. individual freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights) are at the center of the community’s collective identity.”⁵⁴ Because EU and NATO member states value liberal human rights and are concerned with forming a cohesive European community, they look to expansion to foster these values in new member states.

⁵² Andrew Moravcsik, “A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach to the EC,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31 (4) (1993): 481.

⁵³ Mattli and Plümper, “The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and the application for EU membership,” 556.

⁵⁴ Schimmelfennig, “NATO’s Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-making,” 9.

Schimmelfennig also stresses that embracing commonly held European values (i.e. values that focus on human rights, the rule of law, and democracy) would aid member states aspiring to join the EU because the current member states look for signs of liberal norms.⁵⁵ The current members look for other members that share similar values. They are more likely to support expansion if aspiring members have liberal, democratic values in common with the existing members. With regards to NATO enlargement, Schimmelfennig makes a similar argument: NATO's member states are the bearer of a set of values and norms that they seek to implement in the new member states.⁵⁶ NATO's member states have a vision of a European identity that they wish to instill in new members. Once NATO and the EU member states asserted their respective forms of a European identity or, more generally, a community identity, they were able to assess potential member states to see if they fit in the European identity model or not.

The concept of identity is particularly important for expansion. Tyler Curley argues "the development of a national identity in relation to Europe is the most significant contributing factor to a policy to support/oppose expanding the EU to include applicant countries."⁵⁷ Curley's research also indicates that "the stronger a member identifies with the group, the less likely they are to support the inclusion of an outsider."⁵⁸ Consequently, aspiring member states have to align their national identity as closely as possible to the identity displayed by the current member states if they harbor ambitions of eventual accession. Concerns about whether or not a state is sufficiently European or sufficiently attached to the European identity could easily end a state's membership appeal. NATO and EU member states look for states that will share their interests so that way the newly admitted states can integrate into each institution with ease. If member states see potential members beginning to partake in the European identity, then they will be more likely to enlarge so

⁵⁵ Schimmelfennig, "The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement," 11.

⁵⁶ Schimmelfennig, "NATO's Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-making," 12.

⁵⁷ Tyler M. Curley, "Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion," *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009): 649.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 652.

they can continue to spread and implement liberal norms and values. If and when both institutions do enlarge, the hope is that the new member states will fully adopt the European identity and strengthen it as the membership process is solidified.

Continuing the discussion about the importance of enlargement, Risse-Kappen believes that “the security dilemma is almost absent among democracies.”⁵⁹ In other words, democracies rarely engage in warfare with each other so adding new democratic members will increase security on the European continent and in the North Atlantic region more generally. If NATO and the EU’s current member states see commonalities in their democratic political systems with aspiring member states, they will view those states as potential allies and future partners in both organizations. Since NATO (after the end of the Cold War and fueled by its member states) is based on a commitment to democratic principles,⁶⁰ continuous enlargement will make Europe more secure. Once NATO and the EU enlarge, its member states can actively spread democratic values to the new states that are then required to submit to democratic governance. As soon as the member states’ vision of a European identity matches up with the potential member states’ visions, then enlargement will ensue, driven by the current member states in each organization.

These three perspectives on member state interests offer the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The EU and NATO expanded because member state preferences (both material and non-material) spurred both institutions to enlarge.

Hypothesis 1(a): Member states sought to spread a European identity and European norms and values to new members.

⁵⁹ Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” 368.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 378.

Hypothesis 1(b): Member states sought to add new members in order to increase their own material power (economic and military).

Hypothesis 1(c): Member states sought to add new members in response to domestic pressures and interests.

Institutional Interests

Constructivism

Although some scholars focus on member states and their interests, others stress that institutions are viable actors in their own right. From a constructivist perspective, Barnett and Finnemore emphasize, “international organizations (IOs) possess authority”⁶¹ and are “autonomous actors” that can exercise power in world politics.⁶² Therefore, institutions are not relegated to simply following orders from the member states, but instead are able also to express their own interests as international actors. According to this view, NATO and the EU are therefore capable of acting on their own, pursuing enlargement, and convincing their members to adopt their interests. Even though member states may ultimately make enlargement decisions, NATO and the EU can temper their interests and desires. Ultimately, the EU and NATO decide to enlarge in order to spread a communal identity that includes liberal democratic norms and values.⁶³ Member states and institutions alike emphasize a European identity and believe that spreading that identity is critical to the work of each institution. Since NATO and the EU have each established their own political community, they want to expand to invite other like-minded members to join. According to Schimmelfennig, NATO also seeks to spread its liberal democratic values and norms to new members especially once the Cold War ended. Prior to the end of the Cold War, though, the EU and

⁶¹ Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 5.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶³ Thomas, “The Construction of Europe: Communal Identity and the Politics of EU Enlargement,” 252.

NATO did not emphasize respect for human rights, the presence of a market economy, or liberal democratic governance in prospective member states. Once the Cold War ended, though, “the structural precondition for NATO’s decision to admit those CEECs that had made the greatest progress in liberal democratic transformation” became the rule.⁶⁴ Although member states can affect enlargement, the institution has significant power.

This institutional power, according to Finnemore, can originate from member states themselves. As states continue to pour energy and resources into institutions “to ensure that these organizations actually do their job, [they have] expanded the size and scope of most international institutions far beyond the intention of their creators.”⁶⁵ Finnemore also contends that institutions have influence over member states, too.⁶⁶ When the member states give power to institutions, the institutions may use that influence to persuade members to see things their way. Because the states have granted the institution legitimacy, the institution can use its new credibility to convince member states to support it. Finnemore argues that institutions have the power to reach into member states’ domestic constituencies in an effort to build support for their agendas.⁶⁷

When institutionalization deepens and institutions’ power becomes more far-reaching, the institutions themselves evolve into an alternative to the member states as the authoritative bodies in international affairs.⁶⁸ With more institutionalization comes more power to “construct new goals for actors...which become accepted by publics and leaders.”⁶⁹ As institutions construct new goals for their members, they also develop their own agendas and mandates that do not depend exclusively on member state input.

⁶⁴ Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO’s Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-making,” *EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Report 1998-2000* (2000): 1.

⁶⁵ Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be,” *World Politics* 61 (1) (2009): 70-71.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Though the realist arguments maintain that institutions cannot act unless they are specifically guided to do so by the member states, Finnemore's arguments reveal that greater institutionalization allows institutions to consolidate their influence so that they can affect the international community even if decision-making capacity ultimately rests (as it does with EU and NATO enlargement) with member states. In addition, the fact that NATO and the EU have endured for the length of time that they have underscores the notion that there is "extensive institutionalization and an extraordinarily high level of commitment on the part of their members."⁷⁰ When the EU and NATO wish to expand, they move through institutional channels to decide whether or not to enlarge. Member states are allowed a voice, but the institution guides the final decisions. Both NATO and the EU are competent actors on the international stage and make decisions about enlargement while considering institutional interests.

Daniel Thomas also takes on the constructivist perspective when discussing EU enlargement. He argues, "The desire...to join the EU is fuelled by a strong sense of identification with liberal democratic values that are fundamental to the EU, namely rule of law, social and political pluralism, private property, and free speech."⁷¹ Thomas emphasizes that norms of the European political community have not remained stagnant and are instead subject to evolutionary forces.⁷² The institutions themselves are responsible for creating the new European political community and identity. Over time, the member states adopt the identity and new member states are admitted based on whether or not they have successfully adopted the identity. Once again, the end of the Cold War signified a necessary recalculation in what states were ready for membership and what states needed to undergo certain internal readjustments prior to admission. Although the

⁷⁰ Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallender, *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 47.

⁷¹ Mattli and Plümper, "The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and the application for EU membership," 557.

⁷² Thomas, "The Construction of Europe: Communal Identity and the Politics of EU Enlargement," 264.

criteria for membership in the EU has become more pronounced and clearly articulated with the Copenhagen criteria, the EU still looks to expansion as a means to include states that already share its liberal values and norms.⁷³ Risse-Kappen adds to this point by explaining how sharing in the European collective identity of liberal values and norms can boost aspiring member states in the eyes of the institution.⁷⁴ According to Risse-Kappen, institutions help to create these collective and shared identities in the first place.⁷⁵ Institutions focus on building a community identity in new member states before they are admitted. Now that institutions have power that the member states grant them, the institutions have more control over how enlargement decisions are made.

If states already demonstrate progress in the area of liberal democratization, both the EU and NATO would be more likely to accept their applications for membership. If states appeared weak on liberal democratization, NATO and the EU believed that as institutions they could help to spread democratic values so that the potential member states would become “peace-loving democracies.” After demonstrating evidence of some democratic governance and subsequent admission to either or both institutions as a result, the member states would (at least NATO and the EU hoped they would) continue to adopt the liberal democratic values that have become a hallmark of both organizations. As long as states display a commitment to implementing liberal democratic values (a key criteria component for membership), then NATO and the EU tend to favor granting membership. NATO and the EU also favor enlargement to expand the European community. In order to bring together the various explanations for enlargement processes in both NATO and the

⁷³ Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East” (paper presented at the ECSA Sixth Biennial International Conference, Pittsburg, Philadelphia, June 3-5, 1999): 11.

⁷⁴ Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” 397.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 518.

EU, Fierke emphasizes that the two institutions have identities themselves and that those identities continue to take on new social and political meaning.⁷⁶

Neoliberalism

While constructivists focus on institutions' power of persuasion and non-material interests, neoliberal arguments explaining NATO and EU expansion look to aligning material interest-based explanations for enlargement. The neoliberal argument describes the "constellation of interests" that link member states together and help to form a cohesive institution.⁷⁷ Neoliberals further emphasize, "states are able to realize common interests through cooperation and use international institutions to this end."⁷⁸ According to Keohane, NATO and the EU are institutionally strong because their member states "share common social values and have similar political systems."⁷⁹ Therefore, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to expand as long as potential member states display similar interests as the current member states.

Espousing the neoliberal perspective, Keohane makes clear that institutions create stability and balance in global politics and have the appropriate power to do so.⁸⁰ He argues that the safest course in international affairs is to follow institutional guidelines. "Even powerful states have an interest, most of the time, in following the rules of well-established international institutions, since general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more predictable."⁸¹ Neoliberals believe that operating under the same set of rules that the institution puts forth will allow states to live in peace and avoid conflict. States understand that if they expect others to follow the rules, then

⁷⁶ K.M. Fierke, "Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (5) (1999): 5.

⁷⁷ Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 26.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 83.

⁷⁹ Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* (110) (1998): 91.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*.

⁸¹ Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" 86.

they must do so as well. Consequently, institutions help to provide the necessary stability so that states can cooperate and live by the same rules.

Hypothesis 2: The EU and NATO expanded in response to their institutional interests (both material and non-material).

Hypothesis 2(a): Each institution sought to spread a European identity and European norms and values to new members.

Hypothesis 2(b): Each institution sought to add new members in order to affirm its own institutional agenda and mandate.

Methods

Despite the amount of literature that has been generated on the subject, most authors neglect to carefully analyze whether states that were admitted to both the EU and NATO were qualified to be members in the first place. Scholars writing about enlargement typically either did not address whether or not institutional membership criteria was satisfied or assume that states met all of the membership qualifications before their accession without examining the empirical evidence. This thesis will look at the membership criteria for each wave of enlargement for both NATO and the EU to determine if the admitted states were ready for accession based on the criteria. In order to find evidence of gaps in membership criteria, I will look at progress reports from NATO and the European Commission, examine accession treaties and protocols, and enter data for democracy, human rights, respect for minority populations, and economic liberalization for each new member state at the time of accession. For each criteria component, I will examine statistical measures of states' fulfillment of membership criteria, then focus on cases from three different enlargement waves for each organization. After obtaining results from my empirical analysis, I will argue that

NATO and the EU proceeded with enlargement in order to increase the existing member states' security while spreading liberal norms and values. I am pairing each admitted state with another state that was vying for membership at the same time, but was ultimately not admitted. This comparison will allow me to examine why certain states were admitted and others were not.

In order to examine NATO and EU enlargement since both organizations' initiation, I will look at case studies of countries admitted before the Cold War ended in 1991 and after the Cold War ended. Among these cases, I will look at case studies of countries that in hindsight may have submitted flawed membership applications for consideration to NATO and the EU while also considering countries that presented more complete applications based on my analysis in Chapter 2. My three case study chapters include Spain, Poland/Hungary, and Romania. Spain was admitted to both organizations before the Cold War's end while Poland, Hungary, and Romania acceded afterwards. Examining a case of state accession before the Cold War ended and three cases after it ended will allow me to investigate how enlargement evolved over time and what impact, if any, the Cold War had on membership decisions. Since the thesis focuses on why new member states were admitted despite failing to fulfill basic membership criteria, I will compare cases of states that arguably did not fulfill key membership criteria with cases that did fulfill the criteria and were quickly admitted (i.e. the United Kingdom). NATO and the EU seem to behave irrationally since they occasionally admitted states that have weak membership applications. I will ask the question of why the EU and NATO still admit such states and, if incomplete membership qualifications are present, what effect does this have on each institution?

Case Selection

My first case study is Spain. Spain acceded to NATO in 1982 and the EU in 1986.⁸² In more recent years, NATO membership typically precedes EU membership, but EU membership tends to follow shortly after NATO accession. In Spain's case, there is some question as to whether it was even ready to be admitted. For NATO, Spain's strategic location and readiness to contribute to the burgeoning military alliance convinced NATO to accept Spain as a permanent member while the EU was much more wary given Spain's military dictatorship under Franco.⁸³ If Spain was troubled politically and democratically, how did it still manage to become a member of two organizations that claim to value democratic principles and governance? Montero, Gunther, and Torcal argue that democratic consolidation in Spain has encountered numerous problems over the years and Spain does not appear to have evolved into a complete democratic system that is up to NATO and the EU's usual standards.⁸⁴

Given Spain's dictatorial history, it is possible that Spain's transition to a democratic system will take more time and effort than it would for other states that do not share a similar history. Spain's history of a military dictatorship adds a layer of complexity to the accession procedures that will be interesting to investigate. Moreover, Spain's current financial situation provides an opportunity to reflect on whether or not Spain was ever ready to be a member of NATO and the EU since its now-weak economic credentials have undermined the power of the EU's euro. By focusing on Spain as the first study, I can look at Cold War enlargement, broadly speaking. Because Spain developed differently than other European countries during the twentieth century, it presents an interesting and compelling case study.

⁸² "NATO Enlargement," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 30 September 2012 and "European Enlargement," Civitas (2011), <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Accessed: 30 September 2012.

⁸³ Thomas, "The Construction of Europe: Communal Identity and the Politics of EU Enlargement," 259.

⁸⁴ José Ramón Montero, Richard Gunther, and Mariano Torcal, "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, Discontent, and Disaffection," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 32 (3) (1997): 125.

In order to investigate enlargement after the Cold War ended, I will look at Poland and Hungary next. Poland and Hungary both joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004.⁸⁵ Since these two states were previously behind the Iron Curtain, but sought to join institutions that originated in Western Europe, they serve as a link between the Cold War and European integration. Moreover, Poland and Hungary represent compelling cases because they underwent democratization with significant assistance from external agents that were affiliated with the international community at large as well as with NATO and the EU.⁸⁶ Prior to their admission to the NATO and the EU, much uncertainty surrounded their ability to muster the economic credentials required for membership by both organizations.⁸⁷ Questions about Poland's ability to contribute to NATO's military strength intensified as the accession process continued. Hungary faced questions about its respect for minority groups. Given the complex nature of Poland and Hungary's membership applications, further investigation is called for in order to determine why both states were still admitted if they did not meet all of the membership criteria.

My final case study is Romania. Romania acceded to NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007.⁸⁸ Currently, Romania is one of the more troubled members in both NATO and the EU given its tentative adherence to democratic governance and lack of transparency in its judicial system. Both NATO and the EU have criticized Romania for state corruption. Spendzharova and Vachudova stress that Romania continues to struggle with "corruption, judicial quality, and state capacity."⁸⁹

⁸⁵ "NATO Enlargement," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 30 September 2012 and "European Enlargement," Civitas (2011), <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Accessed: 30 September 2012.

⁸⁶ F. Steves, "Poland and the International System: External Influences on Democratic Consolidation," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 34 (2001): 339.

⁸⁷ Thomas M. Magstadt, "Flawed Democracies: The Dubious Credentials of NATO's Proposed New Members," *Cato Institute* (1998): 1.

⁸⁸ "NATO Enlargement," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 30 September 2012 and "European Enlargement," Civitas (2011), <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Accessed: 30 September 2012.

⁸⁹ A.B. Spendzharova and M.A. Vachudova, "Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession," *West European Politics* 35 (1) (2012): 40.

Further, EU and NATO officials have revealed their concern about trafficking in human beings, police violence, and violations of the rights of persons with disabilities in Romania that were not necessarily resolved before Romania entered NATO and the EU.⁹⁰ As with Poland, Romania was once behind the Iron Curtain. Its floundering adherence to respecting minority groups and liberal democratic governance calls into question whether or not it fulfilled the qualifications for membership before it was admitted to each organization. With the case study of Romania, I will again look at why NATO and the EU accepted a member state that appeared to have not fulfilled all of the qualifications for membership.

Overview of Thesis

Although NATO and the EU both focus on enlargement and European security, little has been written on the relationship between the two enlargement processes. I seek to answer the question of why institutions enlarge, especially two institutions that share a common history and continent despite new members' inability to meet membership criteria in practice. In Chapter 2, I will work through the phases of enlargement for each organization and at the membership criteria for each phase. With each wave of enlargement, I will examine whether new members met stated criteria or not. Once I have done so, I will begin to explain motivations for enlargement that concern both organizations by conducting in-depth case studies. Since NATO and the EU have separate objectives and missions, it is necessary to look at both organizations independently and also look into how they play on the same team when it comes to securing the European continent either financially, economically, militarily, or otherwise.

⁹⁰ Amnesty International, "Bulgaria and Romania: Amnesty International's Human Rights Concerns in the EU Accession Countries," (2005): 7.

Before I begin to go through my three case studies, I will examine the membership criteria that NATO and the EU put forth before the end of the Cold War and after the end of the Cold War. I will cover the terms of NATO's Washington Treaty, the EU's Treaty of Rome, the EU's Copenhagen Criteria, and NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement with regard to enlargement policies. Since the first two documents were written during the Cold War and the last two were written in the post-Cold War era, a careful consideration of all four documents will help to formulate my answer to what the membership qualifications were and whether or not member states fulfilled them. I will look at the different waves of enlargement and examine statistical measures of membership criteria in new members to determine if states were sufficiently prepared (according to the membership criteria) to join NATO and the EU. In particular, I will focus on post-Cold War enlargement while analyzing human rights violations, democratic governance, respect for minority populations, and the strength of market economies in all of the countries that entered NATO and the EU. I will argue that enlargement proceeded despite the potential risks and the questions of candidates' readiness to accede because institutional and member state interests aligned in favor of expansion. Further, the desire to spread liberal norms and values to new member states spurred enlargement. The next chapter will look at the membership criteria over time. I will provide measurements for all of the criteria and assess whether states met the criteria or not when they joined NATO and/or the EU.

Chapter 2: Did States Meet the Criteria?

Introduction

Although both NATO and the EU anticipated institutional expansion when they wrote their original founding documents, neither institution established official membership criteria until the 1990s. Instead, during the Cold War, each organization relied on informal criteria and other informal requirements to determine states' readiness for membership. Once the Cold War ended, both organizations acknowledged that if enlargement was to proceed smoothly and effectively, the institutions would need clear expectations so that the expansion process would be transparent. In this chapter, I will look at NATO and EU membership criteria during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. After I determine what criteria (official or unofficial) applied for each organization during the Cold War and after, I will examine statistical measures of states' fulfillment of the membership criteria. For each variable that I use, I will explain how the variable can be measured and interpreted to determine if basic membership qualifications were met at the time of accession. The methodology section of this chapter will detail how I selected the data sources. I will also explain the data that each source provides. Once I assess the data, I will provide an analysis of whether states fulfilled the membership criteria.

The EU and NATO both attempted to restore a sense of unity and stability to the European continent whether it was in the form of collective security or economic integration. Ultimately, though, the two organizations were interested in bringing Europe together. In 1949, NATO emerged as the leading military alliance in Europe and the EU followed shortly thereafter with the ambition of creating economic unity. It is curious that each organization was relatively vague in its initial description of how enlargement would proceed. The Cold War's end gave the two institutions an opportunity to clarify how states could pursue membership and how the institutions would evaluate the membership applications. The EU, followed soon after by NATO, established the Copenhagen Criteria and NATO published its Study on Enlargement. Both organizations were ready to

objectively analyze new states' bids for membership. Even though NATO and the EU now had official membership criteria, the question remains: did some states not fulfill all of the criteria and still acceded? This chapter will seek to answer that question.

Methodology

For the purpose of comparing NATO and EU membership requirements, I will look at the following variables: democracy, respect for human rights, respect for minority rights, and the strength of economic liberalization in each acceding state. Each organization also has several distinct elements of the membership criteria; those differences will be measured and explained as well. For example, the EU also requires that states be prepared to cope with the market forces in the Union, respect human rights, and have the ability to fulfill the obligations of membership (contained in the *acquis*).⁹¹ NATO, on the other hand, requires that new members demonstrate a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, contribute to the military alliance's operations, and commit to democratic civil-military relations.⁹² In this chapter, I will look at measurements for democracy, minority rights, and economic liberalization for both NATO and the EU. I will then look at the separate criteria for each organization.

The EU defines democracy in its 1993 Copenhagen Criteria as including “stable institutions [and] the rule of law.”⁹³ In 1995, NATO indicated that aspiring member states must have a “functioning democratic political system.”⁹⁴ The Polity IV variable, which is used to measure institutionalized democracy, looks at national institutions, the presence or absence of control over

⁹¹ “Conditions for Membership,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

⁹² “NATO Enlargement,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

⁹³ “Conditions for Membership,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

⁹⁴ “NATO Enlargement,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

an executive's power, and whether or not citizens are guaranteed their civil liberties.⁹⁵ Since the Polity IV variable looks at institutionalized democracy, it assesses whether states have incorporated institutions that support democracy in civil society and measures if these institutions contribute to a functioning democratic political system. Munck and Verkuilen further explain that the Polity IV data assesses the “competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on executive.”⁹⁶ Thus, the variable explores whether the state is governed by the rule of law. Rule of law suggests that states have institutionalized democracy and can inspire public confidence in their institutions. Polity IV scores range from 0-10. States that score a 10 have a fully institutionalized democracy, which would be in line with the EU and NATO's expectations.⁹⁷

Although Munck and Verkuilen stress the many factors that the Polity IV variable takes into consideration, they also point out that Polity IV neglects to measure levels of political participation and does not adequately cover how the right to vote was acquired in different countries.⁹⁸ In spite of the absence of a political participation measurement within Polity IV, Polity IV provides a measure of democracy that is most closely related to the EU's and NATO's own definition because it focuses on measuring democratic institutions' efficacy and monitors the development of rule of law in new member states. Polity IV also measures constraints on the executive and the balance of power, which the EU and NATO support in newly acceding states. This measure will be helpful in determining if new members can create the functioning democratic political system that NATO looks for; if states have a functioning democratic political system, then they can more easily contribute to the liberal, democratic identity that the institutions desire.

⁹⁵ Monty Marshall, Keith Jagers, Ted Gurr, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010: Dataset Users' Manual,” *Center for Systematic Peace* (2010): 2.

⁹⁶ Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices,” *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (1) (2002): 10.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

The human rights measurement is taken from data coded by CIRI. I will use CIRI's physical integrity rights index. CIRI looks at torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators in order to assess how states score on protection of physical integrity rights.⁹⁹ For the CIRI variable, scores range from 0 (several instances of the above violations of rights) to 8 (the government respects citizens' rights).¹⁰⁰ The Political Terror Scale (PTS) also measures physical integrity rights on a scale from 1 (rule of law prevails, citizens are secure) to 5 (terror and violations of rights abound, citizens are insecure and lack trust in government).¹⁰¹ Even though PTS codes data on human rights, the concern is that the difference between a score of 4 and a score of 5 might be vast.¹⁰² Because CIRI's scale is bigger, it is more likely to pick up the nuances in human rights abuses that PTS is not able to capture.¹⁰³ Therefore, I will use CIRI to measure human rights.¹⁰⁴

In order to measure states' respect for minority populations, which is a recent requirement for EU and NATO membership, I will use data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, which provides two measures of governmental political and economic discrimination against minority groups.¹⁰⁵ First, political discrimination against minorities is coded on a scale from 0 (no discrimination) to 4 (governmental policies restrict the minority group's political participation).¹⁰⁶ Second, economic discrimination against minorities is coded on a scale from 0 (no discrimination)

⁹⁹ David Cingranelli and David Richards, "Human Rights Dataset," *CIRI Human Rights Data Project* (2010): 3.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ "Political Terror Scale," <http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php>, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

¹⁰² Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron, "Seeing Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes," *World Politics* 61 (2) (2009): 381.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ The EU's 1993 Copenhagen Criteria requires a respect for human rights while NATO does not have a similar requirement in its post-Cold War membership criteria. Therefore, I will only measure human rights for the EU, not for NATO.

¹⁰⁵ "Minorities at Risk (MAR) Codebook," http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf, Accessed: 8 February 2013.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

to 4 (governmental policies restrict the minority group's economic opportunities).¹⁰⁷ Even though MAR provides several measures of minority rights, discrimination, and governmental repression, it is based on a "limited sample" of countries¹⁰⁸ and does not cover all of the European countries that acceded to NATO and the EU. Moreover, its data coverage begins in 1950 and stops in 2006, but it still provides a useful indication of minority status and rights in countries that applied to join both NATO and the EU in the years leading up to 2006. However, because NATO and the EU did not have an explicit requirement for human rights during Cold War enlargement, I will use CIRI's data beginning with the EU's 1995 wave of enlargement.

The next variable is a measure of economic liberalization and the strength of the market economy. For data coverage from 1998-2009, I will use the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD's) measures of price liberalization, competition policy, trade and foreign exchange system, and large-scale privatization in order to assess if each acceding state's economy had evolved into a market economy by the time of accession.¹⁰⁹ Price liberalization is scored on a scale from 1 (government controls pricing) to 4+ (the country has reached the level of an advanced industrial economy).¹¹⁰ Competition policy is also measured on a scale from 1 (little to no economic competition) to 4+ (effective control and enforcement of competition policy).¹¹¹ The trade and foreign exchange system is measured on a scale of 1 (excessive import and export controls) to 4+ (WTO membership, virtually no tariff barriers).¹¹² Finally, large-scale privatization is on a scale from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (75% of assets are in private ownership).¹¹³ These four

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Jonathan Fox, *Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis*, (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 420.

¹⁰⁹ "Transition Report Archive," <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml>, Accessed: 1 February 2013.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

factors are all critical in developing a market economy. By measuring each state's progress in these four areas over the course of the five years leading up to accession, I can best determine if states had sufficiently cultivated economic liberalization to be considered a market economy by EU and NATO standards. Since the EBRD listed four key elements of a market economy (price liberalization, competition policy, trade and foreign exchange system, and large-scale privatization), it provides the most comprehensive coverage of economic development in a new market economy. The EBRD's coverage starts in 1994 with its first transition report and continues through 2011.¹¹⁴ Both the EU and NATO did not start to look at economic credentials until 1993 (for the EU) and 1995 (for NATO). Therefore, the EBRD provides economic data and measures that are relevant for the more recent waves of enlargement (from 1995 onward).

Diverging from the EU, NATO has three other requirements for membership: military contributions, democratic civil-military relationships in society, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. NATO's membership criteria states that new members must have "the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations [as well as] as a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures."¹¹⁵ To measure military contributions, I will use data from the World Bank, which measures military expenditures as a percent of GDP. NATO requires that its members dedicate 2% of GDP towards defense spending so that the alliance can maintain its defense capabilities and strengthen the military relationship between the member states.¹¹⁶ Since the new 1995 criteria, NATO has required the 2% target.¹¹⁷ I will look at military expenditures as a percent of GDP for all states admitted to NATO after 1995. If

¹¹⁴ "Transition Report Archive," *European Bank for Reconstruction and Development* (2010), <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml>, Accessed: 29 April 2013.

¹¹⁵ "NATO Enlargement," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013

¹¹⁶ "NATO emphasizes defense spending despite crisis," *Reuters* (2010), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/us-nato-doctrine-idUSTRE64G48920100517>, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

¹¹⁷ "Alliance-wide Progress on Meeting the Prague Capability Commitments," *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* (2004), <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=489>, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

new members are meeting the 2% of GDP target, then they will have met this institutional requirement for membership. The World Bank provides data on military expenditures as a percent of GDP beginning in 1988. Because NATO's new 1995 criteria requires a contribution to the organization's defense, data stretching back to 1988 will be more than sufficient for the purposes of measuring states' readiness to accede for this particular criteria component.

In order to measure democratic civil-military relationships in society, I will use data from the Political Risk Services (PRS). PRS measures military in politics. Because the military's involvement in politics suggests governmental ineffectiveness and lack of democratic accountability,¹¹⁸ a high military in politics score is concerning. Military in politics is measured on a scale from 0 (military is in control of civil society) to 6 (military is completely divorced from politics).¹¹⁹ PRS data goes back to 1985 and NATO's criteria does not include democratic civil-military relationships until 1995 so PRS has coverage for the years leading up to the first wave of post-Cold War NATO enlargement.

NATO's Study on Enlargement states that new members must resolve conflicts peacefully "in accordance with OSCE principles."¹²⁰ If states applying for membership in NATO are already members of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), then these states are in compliance with OSCE principles and have satisfied the peaceful resolution of conflicts requirement for NATO membership. In the next section, I will look at whether NATO member states were also members of the OSCE before they joined the military alliance.

In summary, I will provide measurements for the following variables for both NATO and the EU: democracy, respect for minority populations, and economic liberalization. For EU

¹¹⁸ "The PRS Group: Guide to Data Variables," <http://www.prsgroup.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/VariableHelp.aspx>, Accessed: 14 December 2012.

¹¹⁹ The PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx, Accessed: 1 May 2013.

¹²⁰ "Study on NATO Enlargement," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (2008), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

membership, I will look at whether states were prepared to take on the obligations of membership according to the institution. I will also look at human rights scores in aspiring EU members. For NATO membership, I will look at measures of military contributions, democratic civil-military relationships, and whether states were committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts as demonstrated by OSCE membership. In the next section, I will look at years of accession and then examine NATO and EU membership criteria during the Cold War. After that, I will look at membership criteria in the post-Cold War era.

Years of Accession for NATO and EU Enlargement

Table 2.1 (NATO and EU Waves of Enlargement) provides the years of accession for states that joined NATO and the EU. Not all of the states are members of each organization. The table can be found on the next page (page 44).

Table 2.1- NATO and EU Waves of Enlargement

Country	Year of NATO Accession	Year of EU Accession
Turkey	1952	Not a member
Greece	1952	1981
Germany	1955	Original Member
United Kingdom	Original Member	1973
Ireland	Original Member	1973
Denmark	Original Member	1973
Portugal	Original Member	1986
Spain	1982	1986
Austria	Not a member	1995
Finland	Not a member	1995
Sweden	Not a member	1995
Czech Republic	1999	2004
Poland	1999	2004
Hungary	1999	2004
Estonia	2004	2004
Cyprus	2004	2004
Latvia	2004	2004
Lithuania	2004	2004
Malta	2004	2004
Slovakia	2004	2004
Slovenia	2004	2004
Bulgaria	2004	2007
Romania	2004	2007
Albania	2009	Not a member
Croatia	2009	2013

NATO Cold War Accession Criteria

NATO (and the EU) did not have specific membership criteria during the Cold War, but did have some informal requirements. However, NATO did not have informal requirements for membership when it admitted Turkey, Greece, and West Germany in the 1950s. On the other hand, before Spain joined the alliance in 1982, NATO did implement an informal criteria component: the need for new members to have a democracy. In the next section, I will look at Spain's democratic development as it prepared for membership.

Although NATO and the EU (then the European Community or the EC) both emerged after the end of World War II, they had separate purposes and developed different expectations for aspiring members. NATO's 1949 Washington Treaty sought to establish basic membership procedures for each organization. As enlargement became more of central institutional focus after the Cold War, NATO designed more specific membership qualifications in order to streamline the accession negotiations. For the Cold War enlargement, though, NATO adhered to very basic criteria.

NATO was established in 1949 as a formal military alliance between the U.S. and its Western allies. In NATO's 1949 Washington Treaty, Article 10 covers the topic of enlargement. Article 10 states the following:

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.”¹²¹

Article 10 makes clear that aspiring members must be European states, must be in a position to support the objectives of the treaty, and must be able to contribute to North Atlantic security.

¹²¹ “The North Atlantic Treaty,” http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/pdf/nato_treaty_en_light.pdf, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

NATO was principally concerned with extending the security umbrella across the European continent, the front line in the Cold War against the Soviet Union as the Cold War was getting underway. Strategic positions and the balance of power, not democracy or human rights, were key for NATO during the Cold War.

Article 10 does require that new members “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area,” which NATO assesses in each of the protocols with the new members; this assessment will be explained in the next section. Article 10 also highlights the United States’ critical role in enlargement since new members must deposit their instruments of accession with the U.S. government. Until the end of the Cold War, Article 10 was the authority on enlargement proceedings. Thus, for the first three waves of NATO enlargement (1952, 1955, and 1982), the organization looked to the Washington Treaty to determine whether aspiring members could join. The current member states looked to their strategic interests and the institution did the same when deciding on enlargement.

NATO Cold War Accession in Practice

Turkey and Greece acceded to NATO in 1952, West Germany acceded in 1955, and Spain acceded in 1982.¹²² Three waves of enlargement all took place before the Cold War ended. The only thing the institution looked for in new members in the 1950s was their ability to contribute to collective security in the North Atlantic region (Spain, on the other hand, had to be a democracy and able to contribute to security before it could join). In the individual protocols that NATO signed with Turkey, Greece, West Germany, and Spain, the institution declared that all four states were poised to contribute to increasing security in the North Atlantic. Before Spain

¹²² “NATO Enlargement,” last modified 1 April 2009, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Date Accessed: 30 September 2012.

acceded, though, NATO incorporated a new, informal requirement: democracy. The democratic requirement was not included in the Washington Treaty, but the North Atlantic Council (NAC) made clear that Spain would not be admitted without a democracy in place.¹²³ Table 2.2 (Democracy in Spain) lists Spain's scores on the Polity IV scale.

Table 2.2- Democracy in Spain

Country	Year	Democracy: Polity IV
Spain	1978	9
Spain	1979	9
Spain	1980	9
Spain	1981	9
Spain	1982	10
NATO Average	1982	9.08

Analysis of 1982 NATO Enlargement

Spain's score of 10 on Polity IV suggests the presence of a fully institutionalized democracy within the country.¹²⁴ Spain even scored higher on the Polity IV scale than the NATO average. Therefore, Spain satisfied NATO's democracy requirement and met the contributing to collective security requirement as well. According to the membership criteria at the time, Turkey, West Germany, Greece, and Spain all fulfilled NATO's expectations before acceding.

EC Cold War Accession Criteria

The European Community, in contrast, was formed in 1957 with the purpose of creating economic integration on the European continent. The EC's 1957 Treaty of Rome laid out the

¹²³ Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, "The Accession of Spain to NATO," *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe* (CVCE) (2012): 2NAT.

¹²⁴ Monty Marshall, Keith Jagers, Ted Gurr, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010: Dataset Users' Manual," *Center for Systematic Peace* (2010): 2.

criteria for membership, which was not very explicit. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome explains the criteria for enlargement:

“Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”¹²⁵

Much like NATO’s initial requirements, the EC emphasized that other European states were welcome to join the Community. NATO required that new states “further the principles of the treaty,” while the EC underscored the importance of member states’ involvement in the decision-making process. According to the EC Treaty of Rome, the membership agreement is between the member states and the applicant state.¹²⁶ This suggests a case-by-case decision-making process that guided enlargement in the European Community until the Cold War ended. Member states would carefully consider each application and render a decision based on that individual case.

Like NATO, the EU produced clear membership criteria after the end of the Cold War. Although the EC’s Treaty of Rome criteria was relatively vague, the institution clarified that democracy was an unofficial criteria component for the Cold War enlargement cases. In 1962, the EC issued the Birkelbach Report, which made clear that states must have democratically legitimated governments before the EC would grant them membership.¹²⁷ Since the EC had never had a non-democratic member nor relations with a non-liberal government, the institution decided to make democracy contingent on a membership offer.¹²⁸ For the EC’s 1973, 1981, and 1986 waves of enlargement, democracy was, therefore, an informal requirement. After the Cold

¹²⁵ “The Treaty of Rome,” http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Mark J. Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2000): 97.

¹²⁸ Nikolay Marinov, “Does Integration Spread Democracy Through Ideas or Conditionality?” *UCLA International Institute* (2004): 17.

War, the EC (now the EU) made democracy an explicit criteria component. I will look at democracy scores for all of the states admitted to the EC after 1962 (the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal). I will now go through the waves of Cold War enlargement for the EC/EU, highlight the data, and determine whether or not states were prepared for membership according to the criteria at the time, which was minimal and very informal.

EC Cold War Accession in Practice

Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC in 1973 while Spain, Portugal, and Greece joined in the 1980s.¹²⁹ The EC did not have codified membership criteria in place for the 1973, 1981, and 1986 waves of enlargement besides what the Treaty of Rome's Article 237 referred to in terms of enlargement. In addition to Article 237, the EC issued a protocol for each wave of enlargement during the Cold War to assess whether states were ready for membership. The 1972 protocol in advance of the 1973 admission of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland stated the following with regards to accession criteria that needed to be met:

“The new Member States undertake to accede to the conventions provided for in Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, and to the protocols on the interpretation of those conventions by the Court of Justice, signed by the original Member States, and to this end they undertake to enter into negotiations with the original Member States in order to make the necessary adjustments thereto.”¹³⁰

The protocols for Greece, Spain, and Portugal's accession used the same language as the 1972 protocol. The EC required the states seeking membership during the Cold War to accede to the Article 220 conventions and agree to all of the protocols and agreements signed by the

¹²⁹ “European Enlargement,” last modified 21 July 2011, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Date Accessed: 30 September 2012.

¹³⁰ “Documents concerning the Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom on Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” *Official Journal of the European Communities* (1972), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1972:073:FULL:EN:PDF>, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

current member states. I will look at the accession treaties for the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain to determine if these states met the requirements that the EC listed in the protocols. The accession treaties and protocols from these three waves of enlargement alluded to the need to implement the “liberalization of capital movements.”¹³¹ I will use International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports from the 1970s and 1980s to assess whether the UK, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece met this requirement when they joined the EC during the Cold War era. In addition, the EC’s 1962 Birkelbach report made democracy an informal requirement for admission. I will use Polity IV to assess democracy in the states that joined the EC in 1973 as well as the states that joined in 1981 and 1986. The next paragraph will address the “liberalization of capital movements” in the Cold War applicant states, the following paragraph will address whether the EC (in the accession treaties) deemed that the applicants were ready for membership, and the last paragraph will look at democracy scores in the acceding states.

According to the IMF, by 1980, Greece had established a secure “exchange control policy”¹³² so it was prepared for EC accession in 1981; the country had liberalized capital flows that satisfied the institution. Spain had also established and was monitoring a foreign exchange policy so that it could eventually accede to the EC in 1986.¹³³ Finally, Portugal developed its own exchange controls in order to meet the EC’s expectation of the liberalization of capital

¹³¹ “Acts Concerning the Conditions of Accession and The Adjustments to the Treaties,” <http://www.eurotreaties.com/ukaccessionact.pdf>, 13 January 2013.

¹³² International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1980* (Washington DC: 1980): 170.

¹³³ International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1985* (Washington DC: 1985): 556.

movements.¹³⁴ The UK, Ireland, and Denmark all worked to pursue the objectives of the EC's economic mission.¹³⁵

Since all of the states that acceded before the EU implemented the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, they had to agree to the terms of the EC's Treaty of Rome, liberalize capital flows, implement democratic systems, and accept any previous agreements that the EC member states had signed. In 1972, the EC concluded that the UK, Denmark, and Ireland had met all of the requirements for membership.¹³⁶ The 1979 accession treaty between Greece and the EC also concluded that Greece had satisfied the requirements for membership.¹³⁷ Finally, the 1985 accession treaty brought about Spain and Portugal's membership in the EC.¹³⁸ Thus, all six states that joined the EC during the Cold War were prepared for membership according to the institution's requirements on liberalization of capital movements and agreeing to the terms of the Treaty of Rome as well as other conventions. The next paragraph will look at democracy (a new, informal requirement) in the states that acceded during the Cold War.

After 1962, the EC began to look at states' level of democratic development before granting membership. Table 2.3 (1973 EC Enlargement), Table 2.4 (1981 EC Enlargement), and Table 2.5 (1986 EC Enlargement) include data about democracy in the aspiring member states. The years of accession and the EC averages for democracy in the year of accession are highlighted. The tables can be found on the next page (page 52).

¹³⁴ Ibid, 326.

¹³⁵ "Treaty between the Member States of the European Communities and the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community," *The European Economic Community* (1972), <http://www.eurotreaties.com/ukaccessiontreaty.pdf>, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ "Treaty on the accession of Greece to the EEC and to the EAEC," *CVCE* (2012), <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/c0f4782f-969a-4b20-8992-c1ede3370164/en>, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

¹³⁸ "Treaty on the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC and the EAEC," *CVCE* (2012), http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/25a76505-fd0e-41af-8e7a-b47a4af4a528/publishable_en.pdf, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

Table 2.3- 1973 EC Enlargement

Country	Year	Democracy: Polity IV
United Kingdom	1969	10
United Kingdom	1970	10
United Kingdom	1971	10
United Kingdom	1972	10
United Kingdom	1973	10
Ireland	1969	10
Ireland	1970	10
Ireland	1971	10
Ireland	1972	10
Ireland	1973	10
Denmark	1969	10
Denmark	1970	10
Denmark	1971	10
Denmark	1972	10
Denmark	1973	10
EC Average	1973	9.5

Table 2.4- 1981 EC Enlargement

Country	Year	Democracy: Polity IV
Greece	1977	8
Greece	1978	8
Greece	1979	8
Greece	1980	8
Greece	1981	8
EC Average	1981	9.67

Table 2.5 - 1986 EC Enlargement

Country	Year	Democracy: Polity IV
Spain	1982	10
Spain	1983	10
Spain	1984	10
Spain	1985	10
Spain	1986	10
Portugal	1982	10
Portugal	1983	10
Portugal	1984	10
Portugal	1985	10
Portugal	1986	10
EC Average	1986	9.89

Analysis of 1973, 1981, and 1986 EC Enlargement

All of the states admitted in the 1973 enlargement wave and the 1986 enlargement wave scored a 10 on the Polity IV scale, indicating that they all have fully institutionalized democracies. Greece scored an 8 on democracy in the year of accession, which suggests that a democracy is still present. As a result, all of the states admitted in 1973, 1981, and 1986 fulfilled the requirements for membership in the European Community.

NATO and EU Membership Criteria after the Cold War

At the Cold War's end, NATO and the EU clarified the expectations for aspiring members so that they were clear, relevant, and compatible with a liberal system of governance. NATO and the EU realized that the prospective member states in the post-Cold War era came from different political and historical backgrounds than the rest of Western Europe. In order to ensure a smooth transition into both organizations, NATO and the EU wanted the new members to commit to the same goals and agenda as the respective institution. Establishing membership criteria that applied to all new members would make this possible. Moreover, the EU and NATO wanted to demonstrate that they were leaders in the democratic, peace-loving world. The EU looked at enlargement as a "political necessity and a historic opportunity" that would give the institution new opportunities for economic growth and provide greater stability on the European continent.¹³⁹ In order to do this, the institutions needed membership criteria that upheld the values of liberal governance. In 1993, the EU agreed to the Copenhagen Criteria, which laid out the conditions that must be in place before granting membership. In addition to agreeing to EU standards and rules, gaining membership approval from EU institutions and member states, and

¹³⁹ "Madrid European Council," *European Union* (1995), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-C.EN5.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

having the support of its national population, an aspiring member state must also fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria in order to gain admission into the EU.¹⁴⁰ The Copenhagen Criteria requires the following:

“Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.”¹⁴¹

Although the EU’s incoming member states typically displayed evidence of all of the above requirements (democracy, a market economy, respect for human rights, respect for minority rights, and an ability to assume the responsibilities of membership), the EU as an institution did not formally require any of these specific components in a membership application. The EU’s Copenhagen Criteria applied for all states that were admitted after 1993 and required all of the above components in a membership application. Committed to integrating and uniting Europe, the EU took the initiative to explain how new states should pursue membership and satisfy the membership requirements. The EU’s 1995 Madrid Council expanded on the role of enlargement in the post-Cold War era. It stressed that enlargement would give the EU a sense of stability, security, freedom, and solidarity.¹⁴² The Madrid Council reinforced the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria and included additional arguments in favor of expansion.

The EU provided a model from which NATO could base its own membership criteria, which it sought to specify at the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain. NATO chose to pursue enlargement in order to expand the security architecture in Europe, increase stability and the common defense, and build a sense of European cooperation based on shared

¹⁴⁰ “Conditions for Membership,” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² “Madrid European Council,” *European Union* (1995), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-C.EN5.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

democratic values.¹⁴³ In 1995, NATO's Study on Enlargement outlined how future waves of enlargement would proceed and established a clear set of criteria for membership. Although Article 10 in the Washington Treaty emphasized that new states ought to contribute to security in the North Atlantic region, NATO realized that in order to maintain its position as a security leader committed to promoting liberal values, it would need to make sure its membership criteria matched up with its objectives (i.e. military, strategic, democratic, liberal). The new membership criteria requires the following:

“A functioning democratic political system based on a market economy, the fair treatment of minority populations, a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations, and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures.”¹⁴⁴

The above criteria did not become a formal requirement for incoming members until 1995. The next section will look at quantitative measures of the membership criteria for both NATO and the EU to determine if states met institutional requirements for accession.

Data for Post-Cold War NATO and EU Enlargement

Post-Cold War enlargement began in earnest in 1995. Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the European Union in 1995 under the terms of the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria.¹⁴⁵ The EU's Copenhagen Criteria helped to solidify the qualities that the EU was looking for in prospective member states. Table 2.6 (1995 EU Enlargement) includes the membership criteria and how each of the three states scored on all of the requirements. The data include the five years

¹⁴³ “Study on NATO Enlargement,” *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (2008), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

¹⁴⁴ “NATO Enlargement,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

¹⁴⁵ “European Enlargement,” last modified 21 July 2011, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Date Accessed: 30 September 2012.

preceding accession as well as the EU average for each measurement in the year of accession. Included in the table are measures of democracy, human rights, and respect for minorities.

Table 2.6- 1995 EU Enlargement

Country	Year	Democracy- Polity IV	Human Rights- CIRI	Political Dis- MAR	Economic Dis- MAR
Austria	1991	10	7	.	.
Austria	1992	10	7	.	.
Austria	1993	10	7	.	.
Austria	1994	10	7	.	.
Austria	1995	10	8	.	.
Finland	1991	10	8	.	.
Finland	1992	10	8	.	.
Finland	1993	10	8	.	.
Finland	1994	10	8	.	.
Finland	1995	10	8	.	.
Sweden	1991	10	8	.	.
Sweden	1992	10	8	.	.
Sweden	1993	10	8	.	.
Sweden	1994	10	8	.	.
Sweden	1995	10	8	.	.
EU Average	1995	9.91	7.17	1.4	1.2

Analysis of 1995 EU Enlargement: Political and Economic Criteria

The data in Table 2.5 reveal that Austria, Finland, and Sweden met or exceeded the EU averages for democracy and human rights. All three states admitted in this wave were prepared to be members and had fulfilled the criteria. There is not a measure for economic liberalization for these three states since the EBRD does not cover Western or Northern European states in its data. However, prior to accession, Austria, Finland, and Sweden all participated in the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).¹⁴⁶ This suggests that the three states already had close trade relations with the EU and were familiar with EU economic affairs so their integration into the

¹⁴⁶ Fritz Breuss, "Austria, Finland, and Sweden in the European Union: Economic Effects," *Austrian Economic Quarterly* (2003): 131.

Union would not be problematic. The EU wanted to deepen economic integration so they looked favorably on admitting new members that were already economically advanced like Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

Table 2.7 provides the data for NATO's first post-Cold War enlargement wave.

Table 2.7- 1999 NATO Enlargement (Political Criteria)

Country	Year	Democracy-Polity IV	Political Dis-MAR	Economic Dis-MAR	Military in Politics- PRS	Military exp. as % of GDP- World Bank	Membership in OSCE?
Czech Republic	1995	10	1	1	6	1.84	Yes
Czech Republic	1996	10	1	1	6	1.73	Yes
Czech Republic	1997	10	1	1	6	1.66	Yes
Czech Republic	1998	10	1	1	6	1.83	Yes
Czech Republic	1999	10	1	1	6	1.94	Yes
Hungary	1995	10	1	3	6	1.56	Yes
Hungary	1996	10	1	3	6	1.47	Yes
Hungary	1997	10	1	3	6	1.69	Yes
Hungary	1998	10	1	3	6	1.47	Yes
Hungary	1999	10	1	3	6	1.67	Yes
Poland	1995	9	.	.	6	1.96	Yes
Poland	1996	9	.	.	6	1.97	Yes
Poland	1997	9	.	.	6	2.03	Yes
Poland	1998	9	.	.	6	2.02	Yes
Poland	1999	9	.	.	6	1.92	Yes
NATO Average	1999	9.79	1.25	1.13	5.5	2.07	Yes (all NATO members are also OSCE members)

Analysis of 1999 NATO Enlargement

Political Criteria

Based on the data in Table 2.7, in terms of institutionalized democracy, Poland scored a 9, which suggests the presence of a strong democracy. Both the Czech Republic and Hungary scored a 10 on democracy in 1999 so they also had fully institutionalized democracies. The Czech Republic fared well on respect for minorities while Hungary's score of 3 on economic

discrimination implies that minority groups in the country are impoverished and their interests are underrepresented.¹⁴⁷ All three states had democratic-civil military relations. Even though the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland fell short on defense expenditures, they were close to NATO's 2% target. The most concerning piece of the data is Hungary's high score (and therefore worse score) on economic discrimination against minorities. However, Hungary still acceded to NATO in 1999 even though NATO's new 1995 criteria placed an emphasis on respecting minority groups. The question of how and why Hungary still acceded will be taken up in Chapter 4. All three states that joined NATO in 1999 did not meet the NATO 2% target. Hungary lagged behind the most with only 1.67% of GDP spent on defense. This will also be explored further in Chapter 4.

Table 2.8 contains the data for the measures of economic liberalization in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. There is not a comparison to the NATO average because the EBRD data does not cover data for Western Europe, only Eastern European states.

Table 2.8- 1999 NATO Enlargement (Economic Criteria)

Country	Year	Price liberalization	Trade/Exchange System	Competition Policy	Large-scale Privatization
Czech Republic	1995	3	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	1996	3	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	1997	3	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	1998	3	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	1999	3	4+	3	4
Hungary	1995	3	4+	3	4
Hungary	1996	3	4+	3	4
Hungary	1997	3+	4+	3	4
Hungary	1998	3+	4+	3	4
Hungary	1999	3+	4+	3	4
Poland	1995	3	4+	3	3
Poland	1996	3	4+	3	3
Poland	1997	3	4+	3	3+
Poland	1998	3+	4+	3	3+
Poland	1999	3+	4+	3	3+

¹⁴⁷ Minorities at Risk, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf, Accessed: 8 February 2013.

Economic Criteria

Scores of three or above suggest that there is some enforcement and implementation of liberal economic reforms, but it is still not a consolidated market economy system.¹⁴⁸ Poland scored a 4+ for its trade and foreign exchange system but did not score a 4 in any of the other categories. As a result, Poland's economic system was not a consolidated market economy by the time it acceded to NATO in 1999. NATO requires that states have a fully functional market economy and Poland's scores were below the requisite levels of economic reform. Studies show that the emergence of democracy is directly related to the "state of economic development" in a given country.¹⁴⁹ As Poland continues to strengthen its democracy, then its economy will be on the rise as well so this is an encouraging sign for the institution. NATO looked favorably on Poland's accession, believing that Poland's economy would continue to improve and would be an asset to the institution. Poland's economic issues will be taken up in Chapter 4.

Table 2.9 and 2.10 contain the data for the 2004 wave of EU enlargement.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ "Transition Report Archive,"

<http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml>, Accessed: 1 February 2013.

¹⁴⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1960): 48.

¹⁵⁰ The data for 2004 EU Enlargement has been broken up into two tables.

**Table 2.9- 2004 EU Enlargement (Political Criteria)
Part 1**

Country	Year	Democracy- Polity IV	Human Rights- CIRI	Political Dis- MAR	Economic Dis- MAR
Cyprus	2000	10	7	0	0
Cyprus	2001	10	7	0	0
Cyprus	2002	10	7	0	0
Cyprus	2003	10	7	0	0
Cyprus	2004	10	7	0	0
Czech Republic	2000	10	7	1	1
Czech Republic	2001	10	8	0	0
Czech Republic	2002	10	8	0	0
Czech Republic	2003	10	7	0	0
Czech Republic	2004	10	6	0	0
Estonia	2000	9	8	0	1
Estonia	2001	9	7	0	1
Estonia	2002	9	7	0	1
Estonia	2003	9	7	0	1
Estonia	2004	9	7	4	4
Hungary	2000	10	8	1	3
Hungary	2001	10	7	1	3
Hungary	2002	10	7	1	3
Hungary	2003	10	7	1	3
Hungary	2004	10	6	1	3
Latvia	2000	8	7	1	3
Latvia	2001	8	6	1	3
Latvia	2002	8	7	1	3
Latvia	2003	8	7	1	3
Latvia	2004	8	6	1	3
EU Average	2004	9.93	7.13	0.83	0.83

**Table 2.10- 2004 EU Enlargement (Political Criteria)
Part 2**

Country	Year	Democracy- Polity IV	Human Rights- CIRI	Political Dis- MAR	Economic Dis- MAR
Lithuania	2000	10	7	0	0
Lithuania	2001	10	6	0	0
Lithuania	2002	10	7	0	0
Lithuania	2003	10	7	0	0
Lithuania	2004	10	7	0	0
Malta	2000	.	.	3	0
Malta	2001	.	8	3	0
Malta	2002	.	.	3	0
Malta	2003	.	8	3	0
Malta	2004	.	8	.	.
Poland	2000	9	6	.	.
Poland	2001	9	7	.	.
Poland	2002	10	8	.	.
Poland	2003	10	7	.	.
Poland	2004	10	6	.	.
Slovakia	2000	9	6	.	.
Slovakia	2001	9	7	.	.
Slovakia	2002	9	7	.	.
Slovakia	2003	9	6	.	.
Slovakia	2004	9	7	1	1
Slovenia	2000	10	7	.	.
Slovenia	2001	10	8	.	.
Slovenia	2002	10	8	.	.
Slovenia	2003	10	7	.	.
Slovenia	2004	10	7	.	.
EU Average	2004	9.93	7.13	0.83	0.83

Analysis of 2004 EU Enlargement

Political Criteria

Looking at the data for the 2004 wave of enlargement highlights that the new members (as of 2004) satisfied the membership criteria based on their democracy scores. Human rights and respect for minority rights proved to be more problematic for some countries. Poland's score of 6 from CIRI indicates that there were isolated instances of torture, extrajudicial killing,

political imprisonment, and disappearance within the country.¹⁵¹ Even after five years of NATO membership, Poland's human rights scores were still a little concerning as it approached EU membership. Its human rights score dropped from a 7 to a 6 from 2003 to 2004. This decline raises some doubts that Poland was ready to join in 2004. In addition, Hungary's economic discrimination scores remained at a 3 from 1999-2004; it was still not fully supportive of minority rights. Estonia and Latvia's scores on political and economic discrimination were also a little alarming, which suggests that problems with respecting minority rights were common in Central and Eastern Europe and were not confined to one state or another.

Table 2.11 and 2.12 include the measures of economic liberalization in the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004. Again, there is not a comparison to the EU average available since the EBRD does not provide data for Western or Northern European states.

¹⁵¹ "CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual," http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf, Accessed: 9 February 2013.

Table 2.11- 2004 EU Enlargement (Economic Criteria)
Part 1

Country	Year	Price liberalization	Trade/Exchange Policy	Competition Policy	Large-scale Privatization
Cyprus	2000
Cyprus	2001
Cyprus	2002
Cyprus	2003
Cyprus	2004
Czech Republic	2000	3	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	2001	3	4+	3	3+
Czech Republic	2002	3	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	2003	4+	4+	3	4
Czech Republic	2004	4+	4+	3	4
Estonia	2000	3	4+	3-	4
Estonia	2001	3	4+	3-	3+
Estonia	2002	3	4+	3-	4
Estonia	2003	4	4+	3-	4
Estonia	2004	4+	4+	3-	4
Hungary	2000	3+	4+	3	4
Hungary	2001	3+	4+	3	3+
Hungary	2002	3+	4+	3	4
Hungary	2003	4+	4+	3	4
Hungary	2004	4+	4+	3	4
Latvia	2000	3	4+	2+	3
Latvia	2001	3	4+	2+	3-
Latvia	2002	3	4+	2+	3+
Latvia	2003	4+	4+	3-	3+
Latvia	2004	4+	4+	3-	4-

**Table 2.12- 2004 EU Enlargement (Economic Criteria)
Part 2**

Country	Year	Price liberalization	Trade/Exchange Policy	Competition Policy	Large-scale Privatization
Lithuania	2000	3	4	3-	3
Lithuania	2001	3	4+	3	3-
Lithuania	2002	3	4+	3	4-
Lithuania	2003	4+	4+	3	4-
Lithuania	2004	4+	4+	3	4-
Malta	2000
Malta	2001
Malta	2002
Malta	2003
Malta	2004
Poland	2000	3+	4+	2+	3+
Poland	2001	3+	4+	3	3+
Poland	2002	3+	4+	3	3+
Poland	2003	4+	4+	3	3+
Poland	2004	4+	4+	3	3+
Slovakia	2000	3	4+	3	4
Slovakia	2001	3	4+	3	3
Slovakia	2002	3	4+	3	4
Slovakia	2003	4+	4+	3	4
Slovakia	2004	4+	4+	3	4
Slovenia	2000	3+	4+	3-	3
Slovenia	2001	3+	4+	3-	3-
Slovenia	2002	3+	4+	3-	3
Slovenia	2003	4	4+	3-	3
Slovenia	2004	4	4+	3-	3

Economic Criteria

As has been the case with the Central and Eastern European states that acceded to NATO around the same time, gaps in competition policy seem to be common problems. While scores for price liberalization, trade and exchange systems, and large-scale privatization tend to be higher, scores for competition policy are comparatively lower. Some of the scores for large-scale privatization are also relatively low. For example, Slovenia scored a 3, which suggests the presence of some privatization, but the process has not been completed yet and there are

unresolved disputes over implementing corporate governance.¹⁵² Poland displayed some signs of improvement from its NATO accession to its EU accession. For example, in 1999, Poland scored a 3+ in trade and exchange policy, but by 2004, its score increased to a 4+ meaning that it had removed the majority of its barriers to trade.¹⁵³ On the other hand, Poland made no progress on its competition policy score. That score did not change from 1999 to 2004. Other states admitted in the 2004 wave were able to bring their scores up over the course of the five years preceding enlargement (i.e. Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), which compelled the EU to take their accession aspirations seriously.

Table 2.13 contains the data for NATO's 2004 wave of enlargement. The table appears on the next page.

¹⁵² "Transition Report Archive,"

<http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml>, Accessed: 1 February 2013.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

Table 2.13- 2004 NATO Enlargement (Political Criteria)

Country	Year	Democracy- Polity IV	Political Dis- MAR	Economic Dis- MAR	Military in Politics- PRS	Military exp. as % of GDP- World Bank	Membership in OSCE?
Bulgaria	2000	8	0	3	5	2.72	Yes
Bulgaria	2001	9	0	3	5	2.93	Yes
Bulgaria	2002	9	0	3	5	2.85	Yes
Bulgaria	2003	9	0	3	5	2.75	Yes
Bulgaria	2004	9	3	1	5	2.57	Yes
Estonia	2000	9	0	1	5	1.38	Yes
Estonia	2001	9	0	1	5	1.51	Yes
Estonia	2002	9	0	1	5	1.67	Yes
Estonia	2003	9	0	1	5	1.74	Yes
Estonia	2004	9	4	4	5	1.70	Yes
Latvia	2000	8	1	3	5	0.89	Yes
Latvia	2001	8	1	3	5	1.05	Yes
Latvia	2002	8	1	3	5	1.58	Yes
Latvia	2003	8	1	3	5	1.69	Yes
Latvia	2004	8	1	3	5	1.67	Yes
Lithuania	2000	10	0	0	5	1.70	Yes
Lithuania	2001	10	0	0	5	1.77	Yes
Lithuania	2002	10	0	0	5	1.70	Yes
Lithuania	2003	10	0	0	5	1.70	Yes
Lithuania	2004	10	0	0	5	1.49	Yes
Romania	2000	8	.	.	5	2.53	Yes
Romania	2001	8	.	.	5	2.45	Yes
Romania	2002	8	.	.	5	2.30	Yes
Romania	2003	8	.	.	5	2.10	Yes
Romania	2004	9	3	3	5	2.03	Yes
Slovakia	2000	9	.	.	6	1.68	Yes
Slovakia	2001	9	.	.	6	1.87	Yes
Slovakia	2002	9	.	.	6	1.80	Yes
Slovakia	2003	9	.	.	6	1.88	Yes
Slovakia	2004	9	1	1	6	1.69	Yes
Slovenia	2000	10	.	.	5	1.11	Yes
Slovenia	2001	10	.	.	5	1.32	Yes
Slovenia	2002	10	.	.	5	1.41	Yes
Slovenia	2003	10	.	.	5	1.43	Yes
Slovenia	2004	10	.	.	5	1.46	Yes
NATO Average	2004	9.82	1	1.09	5.61	1.89	Yes (all NATO members are also OSCE members)

Analysis of 2004 NATO Enlargement

Political Criteria

The states that joined NATO in 2004 had established democracies. The CIRI data also revealed several flaws in the acceding states' applications. For example, both Bulgaria and Romania scored a 5 during the year of accession. A score of 5 on CIRI's scale suggests limited governmental control over and possible participation in torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance.¹⁵⁴ As with the three states that joined NATO in 1999, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia did not meet the NATO 2% target for defense spending. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia still gained admission in 2004 even though they did not meet the 2% target.

Romania scored a 3 based on MAR's economic discrimination index, which implies that minority groups are not always treated with respect and given an equal opportunity to achieve economic opportunity as other dominant groups in society.¹⁵⁵ The fact that NATO still enlarged even where there were indications that Bulgaria and Romania (among others) had not met the expectations for membership suggests that other forces at work compelled it to enlarge despite the risks. These forces and factors will be explored in the case study chapters.

Table 2.14 includes the data for the measures of economic liberalization in the states that joined NATO in 2004.

¹⁵⁴ "CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual,"

http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf, Accessed: 9 February 2013.

¹⁵⁵ Minorities at Risk, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf, Accessed: 8 February 2013.

Table 2.14- 2004 NATO Enlargement (Economic Criteria)

Country	Year	Price liberalization	Trade/Exchange Policy	Competition Policy	Large-scale Privatization
Bulgaria	2000	3	4+	2+	4-
Bulgaria	2001	3	4+	2+	2+
Bulgaria	2002	3	4+	2+	4-
Bulgaria	2003	4+	4+	2+	4-
Bulgaria	2004	4+	4+	2+	4
Estonia	2000	3	4+	3-	4
Estonia	2001	3	4+	3-	3+
Estonia	2002	3	4+	3-	4
Estonia	2003	4	4+	3-	4
Estonia	2004	4+	4+	3-	4
Latvia	2000	3	4+	2+	3
Latvia	2001	3	4+	2+	3-
Latvia	2002	3	4+	2+	3+
Latvia	2003	4+	4+	3-	3+
Latvia	2004	4+	4+	3-	4-
Lithuania	2000	3	4	3-	3
Lithuania	2001	3	4+	3	3-
Lithuania	2002	3	4+	3	4-
Lithuania	2003	4+	4+	3	4-
Lithuania	2004	4+	4+	3	4-
Romania	2000	3	4	2+	3
Romania	2001	3+	4	2+	2
Romania	2002	3+	4	2+	3+
Romania	2003	4+	4	2+	3+
Romania	2004	4+	4+	2+	4-
Slovakia	2000	3	4+	3	4
Slovakia	2001	3	4+	3	3
Slovakia	2002	3	4+	3	4
Slovakia	2003	4+	4+	3	4
Slovakia	2004	4+	4+	3	4
Slovenia	2000	3+	4+	3-	3
Slovenia	2001	3+	4+	3-	3-
Slovenia	2002	3+	4+	3-	3
Slovenia	2003	4	4+	3-	3
Slovenia	2004	4	4+	3-	3

Economic Criteria

Again, there are no NATO averages that can be used to compare to the above scores, but each score can still be interpreted to determine if the qualifications for membership were satisfied. At the time of accession, Bulgaria lagged behind significantly in ensuring that

competition policy was secure. Likewise, issues with implementing competition policy plagued Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Romania also had not finished integrating large-scale privatization into its economic system before it acceded. All of the states that joined NATO in 2004 were formerly part of the Soviet Union and operated under communist systems. Because these states were previously communist and needed to adopt a capitalist system, it was more difficult to bring about significant market reforms in just a little over a decade. NATO understood this and was more likely to admit these states based on strategic and defense reasons instead of focusing on economic issues with the new members.

Table 2.15 contains the data for the states that acceded to the EU in 2007 and the corresponding EU averages for each measurement.

Table 2.15- 2007 EU Enlargement (Political Criteria)

Country	Year	Democracy- Polity IV	Human Rights- CIRI	Political Dis- MAR	Economic Dis- MAR
Bulgaria	2003	9	5	0	3
Bulgaria	2004	9	5	3	1
Bulgaria	2005	9	6	1	1
Bulgaria	2006	9	6	1	1
Bulgaria	2007	9	6	.	.
Romania	2003	8	6	.	.
Romania	2004	9	5	3	3
Romania	2005	9	6	3	3
Romania	2006	9	5	3	3
Romania	2007	9	5	.	.
EU Average	2007	9.74	6.88	.	.

Analysis of 2007 EU Enlargement

Political Criteria

Both Bulgaria and Romania scored a 9 on democracy, which indicated a solid democratic foundation in society. However, both states scored lower on CIRI with Bulgaria scoring a 6 and Romania scoring a 5. In the year before accession, Bulgaria managed to bring its economic and political discrimination scores up to a 1. On the other hand, in 2006, Romania's political and economic discrimination scores still sat at a 3. A score of 3 for political discrimination implies that minority groups are under-represented and the government is not doing enough to help.¹⁵⁶ When Romania acceded to NATO in 2004, it scored a 3 on economic and political discrimination. Even though Romania's discrimination scores did not improve over the next three years, it still joined the EU in 2007. As with other states that joined the EU like Estonia and Hungary, problems with respecting minority groups were very common among the new EU members.

Table 2.16 includes the data for economic liberalization for Bulgaria and Romania.

Table 2.16- 2007 EU Enlargement (Economic Criteria)

Country	Year	Price liberalization	Trade/Exchange Policy	Competition Policy	Large-scale Privatization
Bulgaria	2003	4+	4+	2+	4-
Bulgaria	2004	4+	4+	2+	4
Bulgaria	2005	4+	4+	3-	4
Bulgaria	2006	4+	4+	3-	4
Bulgaria	2007	4+	4+	3-	4
Romania	2003	4+	4	2+	3+
Romania	2004	4+	4+	2+	4-
Romania	2005	4+	4+	2+	4-
Romania	2006	4+	4+	3-	4-
Romania	2007	4+	4+	3-	4-

¹⁵⁶ "CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual," http://www.humanrightsdata.org/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf, Accessed: 9 February 2013.

Economic Criteria

Romania and Bulgaria both received a score of 3- for competition policy in 2007. Over the course of the years leading up to accession, though, both states managed to increase their price liberalization, trade and exchange systems, and large-scale privatization scores so that they are closer to EU standards. However, both countries struggled and ultimately did not manage to meet the minimum standards especially for competition policy before they acceded in 2007.

Table 2.17 includes the data for the states that acceded to NATO in 2009 along with the NATO averages.

Table 2.17- 2009 NATO Enlargement (Political Criteria)

Country	Year	Democracy-Polity IV	Political Dis-MAR	Economic Dis-MAR	Military in Politics-PRS	Military exp. as % of GDP-World Bank	Membership in OSCE?
Albania	2005	9	1	3	5	1.31	Yes
Albania	2006	9	1	3	5	1.54	Yes
Albania	2007	9	.	.	5	1.82	Yes
Albania	2008	9	.	.	5	1.97	Yes
Albania	2009	9	.	.	5	2.05	Yes
Croatia	2005	9	3	3	5	1.62	Yes
Croatia	2006	9	3	3	5	1.70	Yes
Croatia	2007	9	.	.	5	1.65	Yes
Croatia	2008	9	.	.	5	1.86	Yes
Croatia	2009	9	.	.	5	1.82	Yes
NATO Average	2009	9.5	.	.	5.46	1.82	Yes (all NATO members are also OSCE members)

Analysis of 2009 NATO Enlargement

Political Criteria

While Albania exceeded NATO's 2% target, Croatia did not spend as much as was required on defense spending by the time it acceded in 2009. Both Croatia and Albania had difficulties with respecting minority groups. The two states did, however, have functioning democracies and were already members of the OSCE.

Table 2.18 contains the data for the measures of economic liberalization for Albania and Croatia.

Table 2.18- 2009 NATO Enlargement (Economic Criteria)

Country	Year	Price liberalization	Trade/Exchange Policy	Competition Policy	Large-scale Privatization
Albania	2005	4+	4+	2	3
Albania	2006	4+	4+	2	3
Albania	2007	4+	4+	2	3
Albania	2008	4+	4+	2	3+
Albania	2009	4+	4+	2	4-
Croatia	2005	4	4+	2+	3+
Croatia	2006	4	4+	2+	3+
Croatia	2007	4	4+	3-	3+
Croatia	2008	4	4+	3-	3+
Croatia	2009	4	4+	3	3+

Economic Criteria

As with many of the countries that acceded to NATO in 2004, Albania and Croatia both struggled to enact reforms that guaranteed competition policy in the new market economy. When Albania acceded in 2009, it only scored a 2 in terms of competition policy while Croatia scored a 3. These scores suggest that there are “some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive environment.”¹⁵⁷ However, further reform was needed. The two states’ scores in the other areas of economic reform are acceptable, though. Both states made strides in the years leading up to accession to bring their economic standing up to NATO member state levels.

Analysis of the Findings

In looking at the data over time, NATO and the EU admitted some member states that met all of the institutional requirements, but also admitted states that did not. During the Cold

¹⁵⁷ “Transition Report Archive,” <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/flagships/transition/archive.shtml>, Accessed: 1 February 2013.

War, NATO and the EU did not really have formal criteria, but beginning in the 1990s, both organizations had established a list of conditions for accession. NATO and the EU both expected that member states would have stable democracies, a market economy, and a respect for minority rights. Based on the scores for each variable, states that joined NATO and/or the EU in the post-Cold War era did not always satisfy the criteria as the institutions originally envisioned. NATO and the EU looked for a stable market economy and Poland did not deliver when it acceded to both institutions. The EU and NATO hoped that new member states would demonstrate respect for minority groups and Romania fell short. Even for the states that entered NATO and the EU at different times, there was little noticeable improvement in the time between the different states becoming full members in both organizations. The same weaknesses that plagued states when they joined NATO came up again when they prepared for EU membership.

Admitting member states that did not meet some of the institutional membership criteria represents a certain risk for both NATO and the EU. For example, NATO admitted several member states since 1999 that did not meet the 2% target spending on defense. In 2012, only four of NATO's twenty-eight members met the target on defense expenditures.¹⁵⁸ Even though NATO has admitted many new states since the end of the Cold War, not all of these states have been able to contribute substantially to defense spending. Because NATO admitted states that had underdeveloped market economies, these new members did not have the economic foundation to generate military and defense benefits for the alliance. On the other hand, the EC/EU took a risk in admitting states that had not met the institution's criteria. The EU sought to create an identity that was based on respect for minorities and human rights. By admitting states that did had difficulty supporting minority groups and were occasionally in violation of human

¹⁵⁸ "The Future of NATO: Bad Timing," *The Economist* (2012), <http://www.economist.com/node/21551491>, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

rights, the EU undermined its credibility as an institution. Moreover, the EU is heavily dependent on states' economic resources since the institution was founded on the principle of economic integration and prosperity. Consequently, if the EU allows states to join with questionable economic credentials, it runs the risk of putting a strain on its own economy as well as the economies of the other member states. NATO and the EU both wanted to unite the European continent, but both organizations took a risk in admitting new members who did not meet all of the political and economic criteria that each institution adopted.

Now that these states have joined both organizations, it is not likely that they will seek to improve their democratic, human rights, minority rights, and economic standards unless compelled to by the organizations. Both the EU and NATO cannot exercise the same influence over states to bring about democratic and economic reform since the powerful carrot of membership has been used up. Instead, NATO and the EU should have been more cognizant of the gaps in membership criteria fulfillment. More interesting still, if NATO and the EU knew about these gaps and omissions, why did they still expand? Member state interests, institutional interests, and political reasons can all play a role in determining who joins and who does not.

In the next three chapters, I will look at three separate case studies for states that joined both organizations at around the same time. Based on the data that I collected in this chapter, it is evident that these states (Spain, Poland/Hungary, and Romania) did not satisfy all of the criteria or presented weak applications for membership, but were still admitted. I will first look at enlargement during the Cold War and then move to post-communist enlargement in Eastern Europe for the final two case studies.

Chapter 3: Cold War Enlargement- Spain

Introduction

Enlargement was on both the EC's and NATO's minds when they were initially created as evidenced by Article 237 and Article 10, respectively. During the Cold War, the institutions pursued expansion and both admitted Spain. Spain presents a compelling case study since it joined both NATO and the EC in the 1980s during the height of the Cold War. It acceded to NATO in 1982.¹⁵⁹ In 1986, it acceded to the then-European Community (EC, later the EU).¹⁶⁰ Prior to 1975, both organizations would not consider Spain as a potential member because Franco ruled the country as a dictator.¹⁶¹ Once Spain emerged as a fledgling democracy, NATO and the EC were both receptive to its membership petitions. Spain improved democratically and economically during the 1970s and 1980s after the end of the Franco regime, which contributed to its success in acceding.¹⁶² In this first case study, I will look broadly at Cold War enlargement in the context of Spain's accession.

NATO and the EC had general membership criteria in place at the time of Spain's accession. The two institutions required that Spain be a democracy. NATO also required that Spain contribute to the common security while the EC looked for liberal economic trends in the Spanish economy. In this chapter, I will look at Spain's accession to each organization. To begin, I will look at a brief history of Spain in the twentieth century, analyze Spain's pre-accession relationship with both the EC and NATO, assess whether or not Spain was ready for admission, and conclude with a discussion of how the case of Spanish accession encouraged the development of new, explicit membership criteria in the 1990s. I find that Spain met the

¹⁵⁹ "Member Countries," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (26 April 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 28 February 2013.

¹⁶⁰ "European Enlargement," CIVITAS EU Facts (21 July 2011) <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Accessed: 30 September 2012.

¹⁶¹ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, "In Search of Lost Europe: Spain," in *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*, eds. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (New York: Routledge, 2004): 95.

¹⁶² Ibid.

institutional requirements for both NATO and the EC. It was admitted to each organization with little difficulty especially once it adopted democracy after 1975. This reinforces the idea that enlargement during the Cold War was relatively unproblematic and not controversial as it would become later. The Spanish case study will look broadly at how enlargement proceeded during the Cold War era. Spain complied with the institutional criteria for each organization so it did not encounter much resistance to its membership ambitions, but later applicants would experience more difficulty. This chapter sets up the enlargement process as it evolved during the Cold War and provides an analysis of how future enlargement would progress.

Spain under Franco

The Spanish Civil War began with a military rebellion in 1936 with Francisco Franco and his forces emerging as the victors and new leaders of Spain.¹⁶³ By the end of 1936, both Hitler and Mussolini recognized Franco as Spain's legitimate leader.¹⁶⁴ When World War II ended in 1945, though, the European states and other interested parties (i.e. the United States) strengthened economic ties with Spain. Franco's regime, though dictatorial in nature, provided great political stability that inspired confidence in Spain's markets.¹⁶⁵ As long as political stability seemed intact, outside investors and economic agents came to rely on the security of property rights and were more likely to continue investing.¹⁶⁶

A UN Resolution barred Spain from working with the UN, but the United States still sought to expand economic and military relations with Spain.¹⁶⁷ Despite Franco's tight grip on

¹⁶³ "The Spanish Civil War," http://history-world.org/spanish_civil_war.htm, Accessed: 21 February 2013.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, "American Military Interests and Economic Confidence in Spain under the Franco Dictatorship," *The Journal of Economic History* 67 (3) (2007): 741-742.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 741.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 742.

Spanish politics, his regime was authoritarian, not totalitarian because there was some pluralism in society in terms of the freedom of expression.¹⁶⁸ The limited political space for participative politics was not sufficient to satisfy NATO and the EC when they looked at Spain as a potential member. Both organizations required that Spain make a complete democratic transformation before they accepted the state's bid for membership.¹⁶⁹

Even though Spain was not eligible to join NATO or the EC until it established a democracy, NATO and EC member states still maintained an interest in the country as a source of economic and defense potential. For example, the U.S. took an interest in Spain because of its critical geographic location. For strategic reasons, the U.S. established a series of military agreements with Spain in 1953 (known as the Madrid Pacts) that allowed the U.S. to construct bases on Spanish soil.¹⁷⁰ By 1957, Franco recognized the need to increase Spain's economic opportunities and called for the formation of a new government that would work towards the goal of integrating into Europe.¹⁷¹ Spain continually displayed its willingness to become a member of both NATO and the European Community as evidenced by signing a preferential agreement with the EC in 1970 and establishing defense agreements with NATO before accession.¹⁷²

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EC and NATO did not have formal or extensive membership criteria until 1993 and 1995, respectively. For all Cold War enlargement, both organizations proceeded on a case-by-case basis in order to determine states' readiness for

¹⁶⁸ Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. *Spain: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988.

¹⁶⁹ Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, "The Accession of Spain to NATO," *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE)* (2012): 2NAT and Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, "In search of lost Europe: Spain," in *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*, eds. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (New York: Routledge, 2004): 97.

¹⁷⁰ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, "In Search of Lost Europe: Spain," 95.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): 88.

accession, but the organizations relied on their founding treaties to guide enlargement decisions at the same time. For each aspiring member state, NATO and the EC often had specific requirements that were designed with the prospective member in mind. Generally speaking, Cold War enlargement did not present the same set of difficulties as post-Cold War enlargement did. Prior to the 1980s, the majority of states that entered NATO and the EC in the Cold War era had similar political and economic backgrounds as the current member states, but Spain does not have a similar background, which makes it an interesting and useful case study. In Spain's case, both NATO and the EC waited out Franco's rule and required that Spain transition towards democracy before accession. Since both organizations' inception, they have acknowledged that "Spain was clearly a Western European state in geographical and historical terms."¹⁷³ Accordingly, both institutions maintained that when Spain established a democracy, it would be assured of admission.¹⁷⁴ In the meantime, Spain courted favor with both institutions beginning in the 1950s. It was not until the 1980s, though, that it acceded.

In order to finally gain accession, Spain needed democracy. After Franco's death in 1975, Spain moved quickly to establish a democratic system of governance with significant support from the European Parliament and the Assembly of the Council of Europe; these two groups traveled to Spain and met with Spanish political organizations to discuss the transition.¹⁷⁵ Elections were organized and the Spanish Parliament adopted a resolution that included "the re-establishment of trade union rights [and] the legalization of all political parties."¹⁷⁶ By the 1977 elections, Spain appeared to be on the path to democratization. International political organizations continued to remain involved in the Spanish transition to democracy by providing

¹⁷³ Mark J. Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000): 127.

¹⁷⁴ This will be elaborated on in the next sections on Spain's negotiations with NATO and the EC.

¹⁷⁵ Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85*, 127-128.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 130.

political parties with the financial means to remain viable in national politics.¹⁷⁷ After the June 1977 elections, Spain officially became a parliamentary democracy and could now seriously pursue membership in NATO and the EC.¹⁷⁸ Intent on gaining membership in NATO and the EC, the Spanish king, Juan Carlos, visited the United States in 1981 to discuss how to join both organizations.¹⁷⁹ He wanted to divert “the Spanish military from its obsession with domestic politics” and viewed NATO and EC membership as essential in accomplishing this.¹⁸⁰ Now that Spain had a democracy, membership in the two institutions was within reach.

Spain’s Negotiations with NATO

As a key member of NATO, the U.S. established military and economic ties with Spain, which hinted at its interest in seeing Spain join the alliance. Franco’s death in 1975, several NATO member states including the U.S. supported Spain’s accession now that Franco was no longer in power and the state had transitioned to democracy.¹⁸¹ Spain’s accession did not happen that quickly, though. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) rejected Spain’s membership in May 1975 because the country did not have a fully consolidated democratic system.¹⁸² Despite the fact that Article 10 of the Washington Treaty did not require that aspiring members have a democracy, the NAC refused to consider Spain as a potential member until it satisfactorily demonstrated that it was democratic. The reason for this was for Spain to enter the alliance with a democratic foundation that was similar to the other member states. Further complicating Spain’s ambitions to join NATO, it faced domestic pressure from its own left-wing opposition in

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, 133.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 150.

¹⁷⁹ Paul Preston, *Juan Carlos: Steering Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004: 493-494.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, “The Accession of Spain to NATO,” *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe* (CVCE) (2012): 2NAT.

¹⁸² Ibid.

the Spanish Parliament.¹⁸³ Despite earlier resistance, in 1976, Spain renewed its commitment to joining NATO by suggesting the “future participation by Madrid in the plans of the Atlantic Alliance.”¹⁸⁴ The 1977 democratic elections in Spain compelled NATO to remove the political veto on Spain and the institution now took Spain’s membership ambitions seriously.¹⁸⁵ The attempted coup convinced Spain that political and military stability could be found in NATO accession. Spain also thought that NATO membership would cement democracy’s place at the center of the national politic and increase its chances of joining the EC; Spaniards were fearful of a return to a dictatorship and NATO’s insistence on democratic reforms before accession was well received.¹⁸⁶

Spain Accedes to NATO: 1982

Before Spain acceded to NATO in 1982, it needed to comply with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty and also display evidence of having a functioning democracy. Article 10 specifies that each new member state should be able to contribute to the alliance’s security.¹⁸⁷ The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain states that NATO was “satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Spain to that Treaty.”¹⁸⁸ NATO was primarily concerned with European security and (as soon as Spain was democratic) supported the state’s accession since it was

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Preston, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85*, 148.

¹⁸⁶ Francisco José Rodrigo Luelmo, “The Accession of Spain to NATO,” *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe* (CVCE) (2012): 2NAT.

¹⁸⁷ “Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (29 September 2009) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1373C968-97134386/natolive/official_texts_23106.htm, Accessed: 28 February 2013.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

strategically located and could contribute to increasing security against external threats.¹⁸⁹ Based on Spain's 1977 democratic elections, NATO concluded that Spain was a consolidated democracy by the time of accession in 1982.¹⁹⁰ The democratic requirement was not included in the Washington Treaty, but the NAC made clear that Spain would not be admitted without a democracy in place. Establishing democratic governance thus became an informal requirement. NATO's attention to democracy at the time of Spanish accession paved the way for the institution to eventually create a formal set of accession criteria that included democracy. On the other hand, NATO determined that Spain could contribute to collective security with its strategic location, its commitment to defense spending, and its ability to add to the NATO defense network.

The Washington Treaty's Article 10 emphasizes that a new member state must uphold the terms of the treaty and "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."¹⁹¹ Strategically located on the European continent, Spain represented a key asset for the military alliance. The military agreements between the U.S. and Spain that began in the 1950s highlight the "military links" between Spain and NATO as well as NATO's other members.¹⁹² Spain's accession can also be thought of as a move to counteract U.S. influence over NATO by increasing European states' representation in the military alliance; on the other hand, the U.S. was a primary proponent of Spanish accession because of the military and defense benefits it would derive from Spain's membership. As a result, both the U.S. and the European members of NATO viewed

¹⁸⁹ "The Pros and Cons of NATO Expansion," OPS-Alaska and San Francisco State University (2002), http://pweb.jps.net/~gangale/opsa/ir/NATO_Expansion.htm, Accessed: 5 May 2013.

¹⁹⁰ Monty Marshall, Keith Jagers, Ted Gurr, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010: Dataset Users' Manual," *Center for Systematic Peace* (2010): 2.

¹⁹¹ "The North Atlantic Treaty," http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/pdf/nato_treaty_en_light.pdf, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

¹⁹² Javier Tusell. "The Transition to Democracy and Spain's Membership in NATO," in *Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives*, eds. Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).

Spain's membership as an important, strategic move for the alliance albeit for slightly different reasons. Specifically, European states hoped to expand their military strength so that they did not have to depend entirely on the U.S. for defense, protection, and security needs. From a realist perspective, this implies that the U.S. and other member states were hoping to maximize their power by adding Spain. After "NATO faced the structural problems caused by a self-confident and economically prosperous group of states that were in a decidedly unequal military relationship with a superpower."¹⁹³ NATO and its member states believed that Spain could help to fill several gaps in military defense that the alliance was confronting at the time. Spain's inclusion would offset U.S. dominance in the alliance. For example, Spain was situated at "a crossroads of international commerce and communications," which represented a military and geographic advantage for NATO.¹⁹⁴ NATO also envisioned constructing a rear base for operations for its military activities on Spanish soil.¹⁹⁵ Spain could also be used as a base to launch an attack if a war with the Soviet Union were to drive European powers as far west as Spain.¹⁹⁶

In addition to contributing to collective security, NATO members must also be democratic, according to the institution. NATO could not, in its view, admit Spain to its organization while it was still under the Franco dictatorship. According to Mark Smith, "Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such, was wholly unacceptable."¹⁹⁷ Franco's ties to both Stalin and Mussolini gave NATO pause when it considered Spain's membership petition. His death in 1975 prompted Spain to apply for membership, but the North Atlantic Council

¹⁹³ Mark J. Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 137.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 143-144.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 133.

would not grant admission until Spain demonstrated that it could hold free and fair elections, which it did in 1977. The NAC's and by extension NATO's immovability on the issue of democracy revealed the newfound belief that the military alliance had to be built around a group of democratic states. Once Franco died and Spain held democratic elections, NATO could no longer postpone Spanish accession.

With its new democratic requirement, NATO demonstrated that it was willing to pursue a liberalizing agenda in the new member states. As an institution, it recognized that it had the capacity to require a democratic system before integrating new members into the democratic-military alliance. By establishing that democratic states formed the bedrock of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO was able to present itself as a clear contrast to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact since they subscribed to communism. NATO's mandate as an institution evolved into promoting democracy. In this way, it was able to set an agenda that was independent of the member states. The member states individually clamored for NATO to admit democratic states, but NATO acted as an institution to establish that expectation. Through enlargement, the institution gained more normative power.

Once Spain joined NATO in 1982, it began to subscribe to the widely held view that NATO accession could be used as a stepping-stone to eventually join the EC.¹⁹⁸ Spain had always looked on NATO membership as a means to an end: eventually joining the EC. The next section will look at Spain's negotiations with the EC and its path to membership in the Community.

¹⁹⁸ "NATO, EU experience growing pains," *Washington Post* (9 November 2009), <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/09/nato-eu-experience-growing-pains/?page=all>, Accessed: 28 February 2013.

Spain's Negotiations with the EC

In the 1950s, Spain began to entertain hopes of joining the European Community. As early as 1957, Spain prepared itself for eventual EC accession by forming the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Study of the European Economic and Atomic Communities (CICE).¹⁹⁹ Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando María Castiella sent an official application to the President of the EEC Council of Ministers in 1962 to open the discussion about Spain's membership aspirations.²⁰⁰ For Franco, Spain's admission to the EC would reap significant economic benefits, and he hoped to avoid political confrontation while pursuing membership.²⁰¹ When Spain attempted to join the EC in the early 1960s, only then did the Community issue a statement indicating that non-democratic states were ineligible for membership. In spite of Spain's interest in joining the EC, the Parliamentary Assembly rejected Spain's application on the following grounds:

“Those states whose governments are not democratically legitimated and whose peoples do not partake in the political decision-making, whether it be directly or by means of freely elected representatives, cannot expect to be admitted to the society of peoples which form the European Communities.”²⁰²

Despite the EC's position that it would not admit Spain until its government was democratic, Spain did not give up. In February 1964, “the Spanish government formally submitted their second association request.”²⁰³ After that, the EC agreed to look at economic cooperation with Spain; from 1966-1970, the EC and the Spanish negotiated an economic agreement.²⁰⁴ Franco's death in 1975 helped to put Spain on the path to democratization, which would aid its EC

¹⁹⁹ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, “In Search of Lost Europe: Spain,” 96.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid, 97.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 98.

accession aspirations.²⁰⁵ By 1977, Spain held its first free and fair general election and a new democratic constitution was formally implemented in 1978.²⁰⁶ In early 1977, the President of the European Council issued a statement that made clear that “enlargement was an investment in Europe’s democratic future.”²⁰⁷ The 1977 election helped to legitimate democratic governance in Spain and EC accession seemed assured.

Although Spain had satisfied the EC’s requirements for democracy, membership did not follow immediately thereafter. Instead, Spain’s quest for membership was met with some resistance especially from France. In the 1970s, France expressed fears that Spain’s accession would be “unbearable for French agriculture.”²⁰⁸ Once the Spanish economy began to revive itself, though, France saw clear economic benefit with Spain as an EC member rather than as an outside rival.²⁰⁹ As Mark Smith notes, “It was obvious, then, that the powerful neighbor was changing her mind as the Spanish economic threat was gradually taking shape.”²¹⁰ France’s key role in determining the fate of Spanish accession reveals that member states’ material and economic interests could significantly influence enlargement decisions.

Because of France’s initial resistance to Spanish membership, Spain was not admitted right away even though it had established a democracy. Instead, Spain acceded to the EC in 1986, a little more than a decade after it became a democracy. As soon as its economic fortunes began to improve, France and other EC member states supported Spain’s membership ambitions. In addition to the belief that economic prospects would be enhanced with new members, EC members generally acknowledged that Spain had always been a member of Europe.²¹¹ Therefore,

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 99.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, 101.

²⁰⁷ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, “In Search of Lost Europe: Spain,” 103.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 102.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 103.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Mark J. Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War: Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 127.

in order to reunite Europe, Spain's accession must be accepted. Before it could accede to the EC, though, Spain knew that its democratic and economic credentials needed to be in order. It received support from several key member states, though. The member states' opinions could sway the EC to move towards enlargement or not. Loukas Tsoukalis states that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) advocated on behalf of the pro-Spanish lobby at the EC.²¹² Not only did member states verbally offer their support, but, in the case of the FRG, they can also become actively involved in promoting expansion. Even though France was initially wary of Spanish accession, it ultimately supported its neighbor. This will be elaborated on in the next section.

Prior to offering membership to Spain in 1986, the EC recognized that the country had to first clear some important hurdles. The challenges facing Spain included "an underdeveloped rural region, a large migrant workforce working abroad and agricultural productions that was in need of CAP support."²¹³ Instead of prohibiting Spain's accession because of its economic weaknesses, the EC saw an opportunity to implement "a number of reform and policy resolutions [that] were required in order to clear the road for Spanish...entry."²¹⁴ Because the EC was interested in deepening European integration with the ultimate goal of establishing a single market, Spain's accession allowed it to lay the groundwork for this goal.²¹⁵ The EC was beginning to use enlargement as a mechanism to support the "reform, policy development, and the internal dynamics of the Community."²¹⁶ Now, more than ever, enlargement could be used as a political tool to promote the institution's economic agenda.

²¹² Ibid, 77.

²¹³ Johnny Laursen, "The Experience of Enlargements: The Enlargement of the European Community, 1950-1995," in *Experiencing Europe: 50 Years of European Construction 1957-2007*, ed. Wilfried Loth (Germany: Nomos, 2009): 291.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 293.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

Spain Accedes to the EC: 1986

Spain acceded to the EC under the terms of the Treaty of Rome's enlargement article (Article 237), as well as the EC's 1962 declaration that new members must have "democratically legitimated" political systems.²¹⁷ As with NATO, the EC's Treaty of Rome did not include the requirement that states be democratic when they become full EC members. According to the Commission Opinion rendered on 31 May 1985, the report also mentioned the need for "pluralist democracy" to be present in a country that was entertaining membership goals.²¹⁸ The Commission's Opinion helped to reinforce the earlier declaration that insisted that new members display evidence of a democratic system.

Based on Spain's democracy scores for the five years leading up to accession, the country had successfully implemented democratic reforms when it was admitted to NATO in 1982 and it maintained its democratic identity in the years leading up to its EC accession in 1986. Spain's promising progress in the area of democratic development and implementation represented a source of great hope for the EC. When the EC was faced with a Spanish membership application for admission, it recognized Spain's progress in the areas of economic and democratic development and began to support Spain's accession. Because Spain was now a democracy, the EC could begin to move Spain through the membership process since it had satisfied the democracy requirement.

According to the IMF's data from 1986 (the year of Spanish accession to the EC), Spain had some flexible arrangements and restrictions on payments for capital transactions.²¹⁹ Spain

²¹⁷ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, "In Search of Lost Europe: Spain," 97.

²¹⁸ "Commission Opinion of 31 May 1985 on the applications for accession to the European Community by the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic," European Commission (31 May 1985), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1985:302:FULL:EN:PDF>, Accessed: 28 February 2013.

²¹⁹ International Monetary Fund. *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1986* (Washington DC: 1986).

had already established several of the key features of a liberalized economy, but it did not have all of the flexible economic arrangements in place or bilateral payment arrangements with other states and organizations.²²⁰ Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Spain's rate of inflation increased dramatically when compared to other EC member states.²²¹ Countries like France had strong reservations about Spain's accession; France held back its unqualified support because it did not want to make any concessions that "might prejudice the economic interests of France and particularly the French farmers."²²² Germany, on the other hand, favored Spain's accession for political and economic reasons.²²³ Arguably two of the most powerful and influential actors in the EC, Germany and (eventually) France's support for Spanish accession helped to bring about Spain's admission in to the EC.

There were economic gains to be had with Spanish accession, both for the member states and the EC at large. According to one study, "Spanish membership increased EC land under cultivation by 30 per cent and for fresh fruit by 48 per cent."²²⁴ At last, French farmers were appeased and supported Spain's admission. Once France had the backing of its people, it was able to push for Spain's accession at the institutional level. The institution and its member states were well positioned to obtain material benefits from the increased economic coordination between different European member states, which was one of the major forces pushing enlargement forward.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Loukas Tsoukalis, *The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981): 21.

²²² Ibid, 77.

²²³ Ibid, 77.

²²⁴ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, "In Search of Lost Europe: Spain," 105.

Analysis of the Findings

In summary, NATO and the EC were interested in pursuing Spanish membership, but wanted to ensure that the country was a democracy before offering membership. Looking broadly at Cold War enlargement, most of the cases were less problematic than later cases would be because these states were already considered part of Western Europe. Instead, states admitted after the 1960s had to demonstrate achievement in democratic governance before NATO and the EC would accept their membership petitions. NATO required that the new states contribute to security of the North Atlantic region while the EC had economic expectations for its new members. Spain's admission to both NATO and the EC proved to be a pivotal moment in both organizations' histories. Neither organization had specific membership criteria until the 1990s. Instead, they relied on declarations and the brief description of enlargement found in each of their founding treaties to determine if states were eligible for membership. When Spain began to gear up to join both organizations in the late 1970s, NATO and the EC wanted to ensure democratic continuity in their organizations so they each separately resolved that Spain would not be admitted until it proved itself to be a fully functioning and consolidated democracy. After the 1977 elections, both NATO and the EC were satisfied that Spain was on the path to democratization.

Spain was also important because it served as the connection between Cold War and post-Cold War enlargement. Spain joined NATO and the EC in the 1980s; both the EC and NATO did not admit new members again until 1995 and 1999, respectively. Spain's admission to both institutions ended the era of Cold War enlargement. It also signaled that NATO and the EC would begin work on a clear set of membership criteria to avoid the confusion and delays that accompanied Spanish accession. If both organizations were to establish clear membership

expectations, then aspiring members would know what areas they needed to improve on. Streamlining the accession process would also put all aspiring members on a level playing field so that they were all playing by the same set of rules. In addition, clear criteria components would allow NATO and the EC to assess states' progress as they continued on the road to membership. After the end of the Cold War and the new applications from Eastern Europe for membership in NATO and the EC, the two organizations codified official criteria using some of the same criteria that they used to determine if Spain was ready for membership in 1982 and 1986, respectively.

Overall, Spain met the membership expectations that NATO and the EC had developed up to the point of its admission. On the NATO side, Spain was poised to contribute to security in the North Atlantic region and had implemented a stable democratic system by the time it joined. For the EC, though, Spain faced a little more resistance because the thought was that Spain might be an economic drain on EC resources and markets. Spain met the EC's democracy requirement, but its economic system was considered unstable since it was still emerging from the shadow of a dictatorial past. However, Spain gained admission because it was later determined that it could provide extensive economic benefits for the EC members including additional land cultivation and economic coordination.

With its transition to democracy, Spain could more easily prevail on NATO and the EC to grant membership. Spain transitioned to democracy under the second wave of democratization. The general consensus after World War II was "that democracy...was the most powerful and advanced form of political arrangement."²²⁵ Therefore, if NATO and EU member states were committed to democracy, then the institutions would have an "advanced political

²²⁵ Charles Kurzman, "Waves of Democratization," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 33 (1) (1998): 55.

arrangement” and a common political framework that could be used for collective decision-making. The decades following World War II often fall under the second wave of democratization, during which democracy becomes the most beneficial political system.²²⁶ The goal of increasing institutional power thus motivated NATO and the EC to uphold democracy in new members as a way to ensure that the “most beneficial political system” was available to them.

In keeping with member states’ material and non-material interests, the members supported Spain’s accession if they thought they could derive economic benefit in the form of new trade opportunities or greater economic cooperation. Another NATO material interest was the acquisition of land for new military bases that could be built on Spanish soil. Keen on increasing its military capabilities, NATO advocated for Spain’s accession. Non-materially, both the member states and the institutions viewed Spain as a traditional member of the West. In order to expand European unity and spread liberal, democratic values, the member states and the institutions both favored Spain’s eventual admission. During the 1960s and on, both NATO and the EC took it upon themselves to mold their respective institutions into democratically based organizations. The formal criteria that both adopted in the 1990s reflected this initial desire to ensure that new members were democratically stable. Domestic pressures also influenced member states to favor expansion. For example, Germany’s precarious geographical location motivated it to seek the increased security that adding new members would afford.

Spain’s admission to NATO and the EC came a critical moment when both institutions were readjusting their priorities and membership expectations. Though Spain can be considered the last of the Cold War enlargement cases, its admission impact still resonates with new members since it spurred both institutions to adopt explicit membership criteria. In the next

²²⁶ Ibid.

chapter, I will take up the first of two post-Cold War enlargement cases. Using Spain as the contrast case from the Cold War era, I will seek to explain how enlargement progressed differently when former Soviet states began the institutional membership process in the 1990s and 2000s. From there, I will analyze whether these new states met the membership criteria that NATO and the EU adopted after the Cold War's end. I will continue to elaborate on why both institutions proceeded with enlargement despite the risks associated with adding new members (especially if the new members failed to fulfill institutional membership criteria).

Chapter 4: Post-Cold War Enlargement- Poland and Hungary

Introduction

This chapter will compare and contrast two states that entered NATO and the EU at the same time. Both Poland and Hungary joined the two European institutions after the Cold War ended. Their admission to NATO in 1999 was the institution's first post-Cold War enlargement.²²⁷ When Hungary and Poland joined the EU in 2004, numerous EU Commission reports indicated that they did not meet all of the institutional criteria by the time of accession. The data from Chapter 2 also indicates that Poland and Hungary had not met all of the institutional criteria for NATO and the EU (this will be explored further in the chapter). In this second case study, I will look at two similar accession stories to analyze what membership qualifications were not met. Records indicate that Hungary had not met the institutional requirement of respecting minority rights and populations as well as certain military obligations that NATO required of its members. On the other hand, Poland did not satisfy institutional requirements for a stable market economy and did not implement all of the EU's tax regulations and reforms when it finally acceded. Even though Poland and Hungary each had separate problems satisfying the membership criteria, they were both still admitted to NATO and the EU. I will look at gaps in the membership criteria for these two states and then answer the question of why NATO and the EU admitted Poland and Hungary despite their flawed membership applications.

Unlike Spain, Hungary and Poland had to satisfy specific membership criteria as outlined in the EU's 1993 Copenhagen Criteria and NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement. Post-Cold War enlargement encompassed an effort to make membership contingent on satisfying institutional criteria. To begin, I will cover a brief history of Hungary and Poland in the communist and

²²⁷ "Member Countries," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (26 April 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 28 February 2013.

postcommunist eras, analyze their pre-accession relationship with both the EU and NATO, and assess whether both states were ready for membership based on each institution's standards. I will then conclude with a discussion of why the institutions enlarged if the new states did not meet the requirements. At the same time, I will reflect back on the Spanish case study to draw parallels and contrasts between Cold War and post-Cold War enlargement. I find that both Poland and Hungary struggled to satisfy different elements of the membership criteria while adequately meeting others. Poland lacked economic credentials while Hungary did not have military contributions and infrastructure that were in keeping with NATO's expectations. Hungary also struggled to uphold respect for its minority populations. By looking at separate criteria components that states attempted to fulfill, I draw conclusions about each institution's reaction to new members' desire to implement the necessary requirements, but difficulty in doing so. I also look at why NATO and the EU still pursued accession even if the new states did not seem ready for the rigors of membership as evidenced by an inability to fulfill some parts of the membership criteria. I will begin with a brief history of Poland and then look at Poland in the context of NATO and EU expansion.

Case Study: Poland- Democracy Without Economic Credentials

History of Poland: The Communist and Postcommunist Era

During the communist era, sparks of protest politics and resistance began to emerge in Poland. Under Lech Wałęsa, the Solidarity movement positioned itself as a cornerstone of resistance to the Soviet Union.²²⁸ New pockets of resistance to Soviet rule grew steadily within

²²⁸ "Poland in the 20th century," *Britannica Online Encyclopedia* (2011) <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/466681/Poland/28211/Poland-in-the-20th-century>, Date Accessed: 14 March 2013.

the country. Caution held the Solidarity movement back from moving too quickly to topple the regime because the regime could retaliate with its coercive power. The combined efforts of Solidarity and the Catholic Church allowed Polish society to become an actor and introduce the political reforms that ultimately led to democracy.²²⁹ The 1989 elections proved to be a watershed moment in Polish politics. In January 1990, the Polish Communist Party voted to disband itself; Poland could now begin its transition to democracy.²³⁰

Contrasting sharply with the rest of the postcommunist world, Poland had political and religious institutions (i.e. Solidarity and the Catholic Church) that fostered the emergence of civil society and the move towards democracy. This fact alone helped to propel Poland on the path to democratization once it started to seriously consider NATO and the EU membership in the 1990s. Poland also had the “most extensive and elaborate networks of opposition groups...in the Soviet bloc.”²³¹ Poland had a historical base of protest politics in civil society that could push for democratic change. As Polish protests continued to open civil and political society, state actors were more likely to embrace democratization once regime breakdown ended. Because of both institutions’ activism during the regime breakdown, they laid the groundwork for future democratic progress, especially now that the concepts of protest politics and civil society were deeply ingrained in the Polish paradigm. When the next political crisis arose, the Poles could depend on the power of protest politics within civil society to ensure that the state remained undeterred in its quest to implement democracy. Protest politics help to create healthy democratic society that would serve Poland well during its integration into major European institutions like NATO and the EU. By the 1990s, Poland had successfully established a

²²⁹ Jane L. Curry, “Poland: The Politics of “God’s Playground,” in *Central and Eastern European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011): 163.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

consolidated democracy, conducted free and fair elections, opposition candidates had an opportunity to gain power, and the transfer of power from one party to another was peaceful.²³² Poland's postcommunist transition to democracy was very successful, but the country did not fare so well economically when it put forward its membership application.

Poland and NATO

Polish Accession to NATO

According to NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement, new members must have a democracy, a market economy, a respect for minorities, a commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, be able to contribute militarily to NATO's operations, and implement democratic control of the military.²³³ When Poland acceded to NATO in 1999, it had democratic control of the military, seemed positioned to contribute militarily to the organization, had a democracy as well as respect for minority groups, and had indicated its willingness to resolve conflicts peacefully. However, a crucial criteria element that Poland did not quite meet was the economic criteria. While Poland struggled to liberalize its economy, Hungary experienced difficulties with respect for minority populations.

In terms of the economy, Poland's major issue areas were price liberalization, competition policy, and large-scale privatization. Poland had made some progress on price liberalization and state involvement in price setting had been limited.²³⁴ As important as price liberalization is in the Polish transition, price stabilization is also a necessary condition for

²³² Ibid.

²³³ "NATO Enlargement," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

²³⁴ "Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of transition," European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999), <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/TR99.pdf>, Accessed: 26 March 2013.

effective reform.²³⁵ Price stabilization is highly correlated with price liberalization in postcommunist states.²³⁶ In order to achieve the most stable price system possible, Poland needs to match up price stabilization and price liberalization. Based on its price liberalization and price stabilization scores, Poland was poised to be very successful on this economic front. On the other hand, just under 50% of formerly state-owned enterprises and assets in Poland are being shifted over to private ownership, which is a discouraging number.²³⁷

Poland's competition policy included some enforcement mechanisms to ensure a competitive environment and the promotion of a market economy, but its score on competition was the lowest compared to the other measures of economic liberalization.²³⁸ Although Poland adopted a general competition law in 1990, it still has problems with the dominance of larger firms.²³⁹ This was problematic from a liberal economic standpoint. If Poland could not control competition within its own borders, then it would be ill-prepared for membership in an international institution. Quantitatively speaking, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Poland did not display a solid grasp on its economic reforms when it was admitted to NATO, but it still managed to join as scheduled in 1999. Poland's economic progress was interrupted by elections. According to Balcerowicz (a reputable Polish economist and mastermind behind Poland's shock therapy economic program):

“It is clearly better for [elections] to be organized in the fourth year of the implementation of an economic program (as in Hungary) rather than in its first year (as in Poland).”²⁴⁰

²³⁵ Anders Åslund, Peter Boone, and Simon Johnson, “How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-communist Countries,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1 (1996): 218.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 219.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ “OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: Regulatory Reform in Poland from Transition to New Regulatory Challenges and the Role of Competition Policy in Regulatory Reform,” OECD (2002) <http://www.oecd.org/regreform/1940078.pdf>, Accessed: 6 May 2013.

²⁴⁰ Timothy Frye and Edward D. Mansfield, “Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization in the Postcommunist World,” *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (2004): 375.

Poland held elections in the mid-1990s, which disrupted the progress of economic reform as Balcerowicz states. Because of the change in power, Poland's political leadership did not always support the move to economically liberalize. Power changes at the highest levels of government after elections (which prompted governmental inconsistency in reforming the economy) and a weak competition policy were the main reasons for Poland's lack of preparedness to be a NATO member. In addition, tax and expenditure reforms "suffered from delays and a lack of ambition."²⁴¹ Because the tax police wielded power in Polish society, it was difficult for the governments to monitor taxation. Instead, the government implemented limited reform on tax policies in the hopes that NATO would be satisfied. After Poland's shock therapy, it seemed likely that the country would be on track to become a full market economy. However, tax and expenditure reform continued to limit the Polish government's attempts to achieve a full market economy. Poland's inability to implement tax and expenditure reforms from the mid-1990s to the late 1990s contributed to its lower scores on competition policy, price liberalization, and large-scale privatization.

Because Poland was significantly in debt to Western states, NATO worried that it might not be prepared for the rigors of membership especially since it had several unresolved economic issues.²⁴² The fact that NATO admitted a state that was mired in debt was a risky move, but it suggests that the institution saw potential in Poland as a full-fledged member. NATO was primarily interested in expanding security and stability. By admitting Poland, it could build up a defense network that would counteract Russian influence from the East. Moreover, member states strongly favored Polish accession, which will be discussed in the next section. Poland's debt was concerning, but because Poland was indebted to the West, it made sense for NATO to

²⁴¹ Frank Bönker, *The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Central-Eastern Europe* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, 2006): 115.

²⁴² Gerald Easter, *Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012): 51.

admit the state so that it could monitor debt repayment over time. From a strategic, defense, and military angle, Poland was a valuable candidate for membership even though its economic credentials were of questionable credibility.

Despite Poland's lack of readiness to join NATO (according to its economic membership criteria), it still joined in 1999 along with Hungary and the Czech Republic. The question is: why was Poland still admitted? Dominant member states in NATO pushed for Poland, as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic, to join the organization. A U.S. Department of State publication on NATO enlargement argues that expansion is good for American security because it will help to prevent future conflicts in Europe, it will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address future security challenges, it will help consolidate democracy and stability in Central Europe, and it will help erase the Cold War dividing lines.²⁴³

European member states, on the other hand, also supported Poland's accession because of the military muscle the state could provide. As of November 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had 80,000 tanks and other combat vehicles that it could contribute towards European defense.²⁴⁴ This display of military might impressed the European member states of NATO and compelled them to support Polish accession. While the U.S. advocated for institutional expansion, its four reasons imply a concern about material and non-material benefits. The U.S. (and other member states) wanted to spread democracy (non-material) and also increase safety, stability, and security in Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole (material). Because of Poland's military capabilities, though, the NATO member states expanded with the intention of strengthening the alliance (material benefits). Even though Poland did not satisfy the

²⁴³ "The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security," U.S. Department of State, Public Information Series, Bureau of Public Affairs (1998).

²⁴⁴ "Poland and the Future of NATO," Rice University (1999)

<http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/999/chodakiewicz.html>, Accessed: 6 May 2013.

economic membership criteria, it received support from the existing member states that were in favor of its eventual accession. Member states supported Poland's accession on the grounds that the state could further the institution's defense objectives by providing military equipment. Also, the members believed that admitting Poland would help to spread security throughout Eastern Europe now that the Cold War had ended.

Poland and the EU

Polish Accession to the EU

The EU Commission reports from 2001-2003 suggest that Poland adhered to some EU membership expectations, but accession as early as 2004 may have been a bit premature. Since the EU requires that states have democratically legitimated governments, Poland worked to implement democracy and was highly successful since the EU never questioned that Poland was a full democracy. Democracy is listed as the first set of membership criteria in the EU's Copenhagen Criteria, which conveys its importance in the institution's eyes. The Commission's 2001 report makes clear that Poland had satisfactorily achieved "the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law."²⁴⁵ Poland also had successfully demonstrated that it was in compliance with EU standards regarding respect for and protection of human rights and freedoms.²⁴⁶ Democracy, human rights, and civil and political rights all constitute the EU's political criteria. As evidenced by the positive comments associated with Poland's quest to implement the political criteria, the state satisfied the political aspect of the membership requirements with few questions asked.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

Economic criteria proved to be more challenging for Poland. The Commission's 2001 report indicates that trade issues continue to bog down Poland's bid for membership (i.e. implementation of the Custom's Code).²⁴⁷ If Poland does not have a liberalized trade environment, that will complicate trade negotiations and relations at the supranational and institutional level, which is concerning for the EU when it is considering granting Poland membership. EU Commission reports did express optimism that Poland could integrate into the EU's economic system, but held back from asserting its complete confidence in Poland as a viable and economically liberal force. The 2000 EU Commission report also found that Polish economic policies lacked coordination and cohesion, which has contributed to a decline in economic activity, a rise in unemployment, and a weak monetary policy.²⁴⁸ The Commission also implies that significant reform must be undertaken before the EU will approve Poland's accession. By the time Poland joined the EU in 2004, it had made progress in its economic reforms, but questions and concerns lingered. The issue of economic reforms plagued Poland as it pursued EU membership.

The 2003 EU Commission report on Poland's progress stated, "Privatization considerably slowed down in the past two years and the pace of privatization in the first months of this year has been disappointing."²⁴⁹ In most cases, Poland started the necessary economic reforms, but did not go as far as the EU hoped it would. According to the Commission, Poland needed to continue restructuring its heavy industries and accelerate privatization.²⁵⁰ With regards to the *acquis*, the Commission found that while Poland was adopting important provisions in the EU's

²⁴⁷ "2001 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession," Commission of the European Communities (2001), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/pl_en.pdf, Accessed: 25 March 2013.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ "Comprehensive monitoring report on Poland's preparations for membership," Commission of the European Communities (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_pl_final_en.pdf, Accessed: 25 March 2013.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

comprehensive body of laws and regulations, the enforcement mechanism and administrative capacity were not always present, which were areas for improvement.²⁵¹

To summarize Poland's compliance with EU membership criteria, the state had democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Even though Poland had liberalized economically, it did not complete all of the internal reforms it needed to meet the EU's economic requirements. Arguably, the EU was not looking for applicant states that had perfect scores on all of the criteria components, but they were certainly looking for states to not have glaring gaps or omissions in their membership applications. Because Poland lagged in terms of implementing competition policy, privatization, and did not adopt all of the EU's economic regulations, it failed to fully meet the economic requirements for membership. In the next section, I will look into Poland's inability to meet the economic criteria and offer an explanation for why the EU still accepted Poland as a new member.

Poland's price liberalization and trade scores were satisfactory, but its competition and large-scale privatization scores should have given the EU pause. Because Poland was eager to join the European Union and was in compliance with the other membership criteria components, the EU appeared to overlook Poland's economic gaps. The European Union was certainly aware of Poland's difficulty in establishing a solid competition and monetary policy since the Commission's progress reports point out these flaws frequently in several different reports. Based on Poland's accession experience, it is evident that the EU placed greater emphasis on the fulfillment of political criteria and believed that once the new state joined the Union, its economy would eventually inch upward. Because the EU is a liberal, democratic body, it paid special attention to new members' satisfaction of political criteria. If the EU were to admit a state that was less-than-democratic, it would undermine its own institutional identity. However, by

²⁵¹ Ibid.

admitting a state with a struggling economy, the EU could work with that state to bring its economic credentials up to institutional standards over time. Thus, the EU was more favorably inclined towards Poland because it shared its liberal identity; this is an example of the EU acting to construct a certain identity in another state. The EU's competitive, economically stable environment would naturally boost Poland's own economy so the worries about Poland's economy would be temporary.

As mentioned in the NATO section, Poland also failed to meet EU tax requirements and regulations in the years leading up to accession. Although Poland became an official EU member in 2004, the EU acknowledged, "priority still is needed to be given to improving the efficiency of tax collection and fiscal control."²⁵² Even though it was unlikely that Poland's economic credentials would be in line with EU standards by the time of accession, EU officials did not foresee any problems with Poland's eventual accession. One EU official said quite bluntly, "To be sure, Poland is the biggest country amongst the candidates, but not the greatest problem."²⁵³ However, as the notion of a "return to Europe" took shape, the EU, as an institution, looked favorably on Poland's membership and viewed its admission as a necessary part of restoring and reuniting Europe.²⁵⁴ The EU and its member states also looked at enlargement from a material and self-preservation angle. Paul Latavski notes, "Extending European integration eastwards can offer a constructive framework for the nationalism of the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe and lay to rest Western fears of Balkanization."²⁵⁵ If the EU wants to promote a democratic and united Europe, then it must follow through on enlargement offers so that it can maintain its credibility. Also, since the EU is concerned about the possibility of Balkanization, bringing the

²⁵² Gerald Easter, *Capital, Coercion, and Postcommunist States*, 79.

²⁵³ Zdzisław Krasnodębski, "Poland and the European Union: Changing Attitudes," in *Problems and Chances of the East Enlargement of the EU*, ed. Ilja Srubar (Hamburg: Reinhold Krämer Verlag, 2003): 88.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 89.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

CEECs into the fold will allow the institution to monitor the economic, political, and military situation in Eastern Europe.

Interestingly, the EU also identified clear benefits in adding Poland, specifically in terms of balancing out Germany's growing political and economic influence. As the German economy has grown, so too have the Central and Eastern European economies also grown, which contributes to positive economic growth for the EU as a whole.²⁵⁶ This was noticeable even before the CEECs acceded to the EU and was further developed after many of the CEECs were admitted to the EU. At the institutional level, the EU determined that the German economy could aid the Polish economy if Poland joined the Union.

With this in mind, the EU chose to add Poland in 2004 even though it was not prepared economically. The EU saw an opportunity to augment institutional material and non-material benefits through Polish accession. While Poland was mainly concerned with molding its economy to fit NATO and EU standards, Hungary encountered other problems as it inched towards membership. Specifically, Hungary had issues with respecting minority populations and did not meet NATO's expectations on military and defense contributions. As in the case of Poland, Hungary still acceded. The institutions and member states carefully calculated their material and non-material interests. Deciding that enlargement was in both groups' interests, the EU and NATO accepted Hungary despite the country's flaws. Even though there were many forces that brought about Poland's accession to the EU, the most important drive behind Poland's membership was the belief that, as a democracy, Poland was ideologically similar to the rest of the EU member states and would have little trouble integrating into the institution. Eager to promote its democratic identity, the EU and its member states identified with Poland and supported its membership aspirations.

²⁵⁶ Ibid, 92.

Case Study: Hungary- Democracy and Economic Reform without Minority Rights

History of Hungary: The Communist and Postcommunist Era

Much like Poland, Hungary had established a fully consolidated democracy by the 1990s and was the most politically stable of the postcommunist states.²⁵⁷ Also like Poland, Hungary had a history of democratic development and liberalization, which helped to facilitate its transition to democracy after the end of the Cold War. Dissatisfied with the Soviet Union's economic system, Hungary opened itself up to Western business and investment.²⁵⁸ In October 1989, the new Hungarian Republic was announced.²⁵⁹ Hungary's democratic transition differed from Poland's. There were fewer political openings in civil society in Hungary until the Hungarian republic was declared. At that point, there was more space in civil society for reform.

The newly elected Hungarian political leaders supported Hungary's move towards democracy, capitalism, and European integration.²⁶⁰ After a series of political power changes throughout the 1990s, the Socialists and the Alliance of Free Democrats regained control of the Parliament in 2002.²⁶¹ The FiDeSz (a center-right party) won control of the parliament in 2010.²⁶² Their victory constituted the resurgence of the right in Hungarian politics. Rightist parties tended to focus on traditional home values and were more skeptical about European integration. The right's comeback in Hungarian politics is also connected to other political issues such as less certain democratic footing and less respect for minority populations both politically and economically. Even though Hungary had established a consolidated democracy by the time it joined both NATO and the EU, it did not always respect and protect its minority population's

²⁵⁷ Federigo Argentieri, "Hungary: Appraising the Past and Adjusting to the Present," in *Central and Eastern European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011): 213.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, 217.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, 220.

²⁶⁰ Ibid, 222.

²⁶¹ Ibid, 223.

²⁶² Ibid.

civil rights and political liberties, which will be discussed in the next section. Both NATO and the EU require that states look out for their minorities and Hungary has struggled to do that. In addition, NATO still admitted Hungary in 1999 even though Hungary failed to adopt all of the required military protocols and requirements that NATO looked for. Hungary was in partial compliance with EU and NATO requirements, but not in full compliance. This will be discussed in the next section.

Hungary and NATO

As demonstrated by its Polity IV and its economic liberalization scores, Hungary had satisfied NATO's political and economic criteria at the time of accession in 1999. Hungary's years of peace and stability during the post-Cold War era demonstrated its commitment to the NATO value of resolving conflicts peacefully and Hungary was also a member of the OSCE. Hungary failed to meet institutional expectations in the areas of military contributions and was unsteady in terms of civil-military relations. When NATO set Hungary's accession date for March 12, 1999, it hoped that the country would make the necessary military contributions by that time and prove that it was ready to be entrusted with membership.²⁶³ Unfortunately, by 1999, Hungary "could only meet 60 percent of its [military] membership commitments."²⁶⁴ The question is: what might have prompted NATO to accept Hungary even though it was not able to fulfill all of the membership requirements?

Although Hungary and Poland did not meet all of the membership criteria, they each struggled with different aspects (Poland on economics and Hungary on military contributions

²⁶³ Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations* (Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003): 59.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

and respect for minority populations).²⁶⁵ If NATO was not going to reprimand Poland for insufficient privatization or price liberalization, then it should not punish Hungary for not implementing all of the military requirements. Because NATO was more focused on moving countries along the path towards accession, it was less concerned with taking countries to task for not fulfilling certain aspects of the criteria.

Moreover, if NATO had planned an enlargement wave for a certain date and time, it would want to do everything in its power to keep states' progress toward accession on track. NATO needed to ensure that its offer of membership was credible. If at the last minute NATO had to withdraw a membership offer, it would appear indecisive and this act might even discourage states from continuing the application with hope of joining NATO at a later time. In addition, NATO wanted to actively integrate and socialize (politically and economically) states that it has cited as future members. If the member states do not gain admission at the pre-determined time and date, then NATO will appear as though it has not done enough to encourage and motivate aspiring states.

Since NATO (especially the dominant member states) strongly supported a return to Europe, it was more likely to overlook or even forgive states' inability to meet all of the membership criteria. Hungary and Poland were both required to implement the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement membership criteria. Although Hungary had met a majority of NATO's requirements, on January 14, 1999, it announced that it would "not comply with NATO force goal targets."²⁶⁶ Not only was Hungary unable to meet all of NATO's military requirements, but it was also, to some extent, unwilling. In further testament to Hungary's military unpreparedness, Chief of Staff Ferenc Vegh stated that after membership, Hungary would still have to improve in

²⁶⁵ I will discuss Hungary's weak support for minorities in the context of EU accession.

²⁶⁶ Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations*, 61.

the areas of “air defense and air space control modernization, foreign language instruction, improvements in reconnaissance, and increasing the combat capacity of rapid reaction troops.”²⁶⁷

Because of the military benefits that Hungary offered, NATO brought Hungary into its ranks as planned in 1999. Reasons for enlargement in spite of deficiencies in membership criteria fulfillment stemmed from an interest in harnessing Hungary’s military power. The fact that Hungary had met a majority of the membership requirements also played out in its favor and NATO supported its accession.

Hungary and the EU

The EU Commission reports from 2001-2003 chart Hungary’s progress as it pursued membership. Although the 2001 report acknowledged that Hungary had implemented a consolidated democracy, it stressed that Hungary must work to eliminate corruption and develop a consistent jurisprudence.²⁶⁸ In terms of respecting minority groups’ rights, Hungary (and the EU) needed to push forward the Roma action programme to prevent economic, political, and cultural discrimination against the Roma people living in Hungary.²⁶⁹ Minority representation in the parliament remains low and the EU Commission made clear that this can be rectified.²⁷⁰ The EU’s political criteria states that new members must respect minority groups and have a fully consolidated democracy. Because the Commission had already affirmed Hungary as a democracy, the issue with Hungary’s membership lay with its ability to protect minority populations. In the 2001 report, the EU Commission pointed out that “Hungary does not have a

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ “2001 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress Towards Accession,” Commission of the European Communities (2001), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/hu_en.pdf, Accessed: 26 March 2013.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

unified law on anti-discrimination.”²⁷¹ Hungary’s police force also has a poor record in terms of treating minority populations with respect. International human rights organizations have “reported cases of unjustified and harsh police action against Roma people.”²⁷² In addition to the brutal treatment that the Roma people receive at the hands of the Hungarian police, they live in deplorable conditions and face social and employment disadvantages.²⁷³ The Roma people constitute as much as 6% of the Hungarian population²⁷⁴ so the 2001 EU Commission report maintains that protection of Roma rights and opportunities must be enshrined in Hungary’s constitution before the state can join the EU.

By the time Hungary joined the EU in 2004, it presented an incomplete membership application to the Commission, but the institution still decided to accept Hungary. The 2000 report pointed out that Hungary had yet to adopt an anti-discrimination law and the 2002 report indicated that Hungary had still not done so.²⁷⁵ In the last year (2001), respect for the Roma population has also not been upheld. Discrimination against the Roma people instead took on unexpected and undesirable forms. Reports from international organizations have indicated that there continues to be mistreatment, forced interrogation, and even a police raid on a Roma settlement, which is not in keeping with the EU’s expectations that members will respect their minority populations.²⁷⁶ The Minorities at Risk data indicates that Hungary scored a 3 on economic discrimination for the years 2000-2004.²⁷⁷ Hungary has policies on the books that prevent minorities from accessing equal rights and civil liberties, which is very problematic for

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ “2002 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress Towards Accession,” Commission of the European Communities (2002), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/hu_en.pdf, Accessed: 26 March 2013.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

²⁷⁷ “Minorities at Risk (MAR) Codebook,” http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/mar_codebook_Feb09.pdf, Accessed: 8 February 2013.

the EU. As mentioned earlier, the Roma people were overwhelming unemployed, which can also contribute to the concerning economic discrimination score.

To summarize Hungary's compliance with EU membership criteria, the state had adopted democracy and the rule of law. The EU Commission reports also concluded that Hungary had met the economic guidelines and requirements to be considered a stable and functioning market economy. Where Hungary did not fully satisfy the institutional criteria was with regards to respect for minority rights. Repression of and discrimination against the Roma people continued to drive Hungarian policy towards minorities. Hungary did little to combat its anti-minority policies and practices. Instead, it lagged behind other states in meeting the minority rights membership criteria component. I will now offer an explanation for why the EU enlarged to include a state that had insufficient qualifications on some of its institutional membership criteria.

Hungary and the EU: Analysis

Hungary's issues with its Roma minority stretch back to the end of the communist era. After the end of state-mandated employment under communism, the Roma people were increasingly unemployed and lacked access to equal economic opportunities.²⁷⁸ Since the 1990s, Hungary has had difficulties with protecting minority rights, especially at the economic level. Economic discrimination against minorities has been the major cause of concern. Because of the violence and discrimination that the Roma people encounter, they emigrate often.²⁷⁹ "Violence against the Roma in Central Europe has enabled the group to seek asylum as victims of racial

²⁷⁸ Roni Stauber, "Violence Against The Roma Minority In Hungary and The Czech Republic and Its Repercussions," Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University (2009), <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/articles/roma.pdf>, Accessed: 27 March 2013.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

persecution.”²⁸⁰ Because the Roma do not have economic opportunities and are fearful for their general safety and security, they immigrate to Canada in large numbers.²⁸¹ The number of Roma asylum seekers has steadily increased since the year 1995 in various Western European and North American countries.²⁸² Although economic disadvantages have motivated the Roma people to migrate, racial violence against the Roma also occurs in Hungary. The EU requires that all member states respect their minority populations, but Hungary had evidently not accomplished this by 2004 (the year of accession). The Roma people in Hungary had few employment opportunities and racial violence against their people was rampant. This was not acceptable based on the EU accession criteria.

Yet, Hungary still joined the EU in 2004. As with Poland, Hungary managed to meet a majority of the EU’s criteria, but the one blatant problem was the issue of respecting minorities. The Hungarian government repeatedly claimed that extremist groups and individuals were responsible for planning the attacks on the Roma people, not the government or another state actor.²⁸³ Hungary hoped that this proclamation would erase the problem, but it became evident (especially in the EU Commission progress reports) that the EU was still holding Hungary responsible for the actions of some of its deviant non-state actors. Because the 2003 EU Commission progress report does not acknowledge Hungary’s progress on the fulfillment of political criteria, it is logical to conclude that the institution believed Hungary had satisfied all of the political criteria. Based on MAR scores, though, Hungary was still having serious issues with

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Judit Tóth, “The Incomprehensible Flow of Roma Asylum-Seekers from the Czech Republic and Hungary to Canada,” *Center for European Policy Studies* (Working Paper 2010), http://aei.pitt.edu/15124/1/EU-Canada_paperToth_final.pdf, Accessed: 27 March 2013.

²⁸² Ibid, 9.

²⁸³ Roni Stauber, “Violence Against The Roma Minority In Hungary and The Czech Republic and Its Repercussions,” Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv University (2009), <http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/articles/roma.pdf>, Accessed: 27 March 2013.

respecting its minority populations, which the EU overlooked when deciding to admit Hungary in 2004. Because the EU saw Hungary as strong on democracy and economic reform, it was fine with overlooking Hungary's minority respect problems. Because several other EU member states and the institution itself were currently grappling with how to deal with minorities, the EU decided not to make minority rights the hold-up for Hungarian membership.

Analysis of the Findings

Looking at the case of Hungary and Poland, it is clear that both states had established solid democratic standing when they acceded to NATO and the EU. Had the two states not proven that they were consolidated democracies, it seems unlikely that NATO or the EU would have accepted them as members. When Spain initially applied for membership in both organizations, the two institutions were of the same mind that a state must have evidence of democracy and a democratic identity before it could join. Because Spain was still living under a dictatorship when it first applied to join the EC, the EC refused to entertain its membership aspirations. Likewise, NATO stated that Spain could not join until it had a solid democracy. Hungary and Poland were both consolidated democracies so they had already cleared an important hurdle as they worked towards eventual accession. Arguably, both NATO and the EU value democracy above their other criteria because they refused to admit Spain because it was not a democracy, but remained favorable to Polish and Hungarian accession since both states were already democracies. Also, Poland and Hungary each had separate issues with the remaining membership criteria, but since they each had a democracy, NATO and the EU felt that they could excuse the two countries for other criteria issues. Because the post-Cold War enlargement waves contained states that struggled with different aspects of the requirements,

NATO and the EU had to treat each case as unique. Poland and Hungary each faced a different set of issues as they worked through the EU and NATO's membership criteria. Post-Cold War enlargement taught the EU and NATO to examine each prospective member state individually. The 1999 wave of NATO enlargement (which included Hungary and Poland) was significant because it was the first time that the institution applied the membership criteria to the aspiring states. In short, the official criteria revolutionized how NATO and the EU conducted membership negotiations and forced states to confront their shortcomings while they were on the road to membership.

Despite Poland's economic flaws, NATO and the EU both decided to admit it because it had advanced democratically and held similar ideological views as the rest of Europe. On the NATO side, Poland represented was a strategically located barrier against Russia; Germany wanted Poland to join for that reason. Germany assembled its national preferences and then brought them to the international stage (liberal intergovernmentalism) to advocate for Poland's accession. NATO also admitted Hungary because it could contribute to the military alliance. Although the EC recognized Hungary's issues with its minority population, the organization still decided to admit since the EC itself did not know how to resolve the question of the Roma people. The EC also recognized Hungary's new democratic identity and wanted to admit the country to add to its pool of democratic states that were aligned economically in the Union. The final case study chapter will look at the EU's last wave and NATO's second to last wave of enlargement. Although Poland and Hungary seemed like potentially problematic members, they both met more than half of the required criteria for both organizations while Romania lagged behind in more criteria categories than one. I will use Romania as the case study to determine

why the EU and NATO might have enlarged despite the risks with an especially problematic new member like Romania.

Chapter 5: Post-Cold War Enlargement- Romania

Introduction

Romania's accession to the EU induced a headache for the institution.²⁸⁴ The “headache case” will serve as my final case study. Romania joined NATO in 2004.²⁸⁵ Three years later, in 2007, it joined the EU.²⁸⁶ Like Poland and Hungary, Romania was required to adhere to NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement membership criteria and the EU's 1993 Copenhagen Criteria. Romania's admission to NATO and the EU raised several eyebrows as skeptics questioned whether Romania had met the economic and political criteria associated with membership. In this chapter, I find that Romania, like Hungary, struggled to uphold respect for its minority populations. In addition, the state lacked the appropriate market liberalization reforms especially in the areas of competition policy and large-scale privatization. In short, Romania was much less prepared for membership than any previous applicant country.

As with Chapter 4, I will continue to look at the impact of each institution's accession criteria on the new waves of enlargement. To begin, I will cover a brief history of Romania in the communist and postcommunist eras, analyze its pre-accession relationship and negotiations with both NATO and the EU, and assess if it was ready for membership based on its fulfillment of the criteria. I will also analyze why the member states and the institutions themselves chose to enlarge if they knew about their prospective new members' shaky economic and political standing. I will refer back to the Spanish case study to continue drawing contrasts between Cold War and post-Cold War enlargement. To begin, I will discuss a brief history of Romania and then look at Romania in the context of NATO and EU enlargement.

²⁸⁴ “Croatia on track for smooth accession,” EuropeanVoice.com (2013), <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/croatia-on-track-for-smooth-accession/76811.aspx>, Accessed: 2 April 2013.

²⁸⁵ “Member Countries,” *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (26 April 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, Accessed: 28 February 2013.

²⁸⁶ “European Enlargement,” last modified 21 July 2011, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSMS/MS1.htm>, Date Accessed: 30 September 2012.

Case Study- Romania

History of Romania: The Communist and Postcommunist Era

By the time Romania gained its independence from the Soviet Union, it had already broadened its economic sphere of influence beyond the USSR and was able to establish trade relations with non-communist states.²⁸⁷ Emerging from the shadow of the Ceaușescu dictatorship, the Romanian government worked to consolidate democracy and integrate into European institutions like NATO and the EU. Romania demonstrated its interest in NATO and EU membership by undertaking the necessary political, economic, and military reforms required for accession.²⁸⁸ However, the new provisional government put a Ceaușescu loyalist in power; thus, it became clear that the movement towards democracy would be neither fluid nor quick.²⁸⁹

Romania's new leader, Ion Iliescu of the National Salvation Front (NSF), did not fully endorse democratization and elections conducted under his watch were free, but generally unfair.²⁹⁰ Even though the Romanian people expressed a desire to join the democratic community, Romania's underdeveloped civil society and strong isolationist policies under Ceaușescu limited the state's ability to push for sustained democratic reform. The new government slowly inched toward democratization, but Romanians had hoped that democratic implementation would progress at a much faster rate. As Romania's interest in establishing a democracy and market economy grew so did its desire to join NATO and the EU. Concerned with defending its borders and preventing Soviet/Russian influence from infiltrating Romanian society, Romania pursued NATO membership in the hopes of bringing a sense of security to the

²⁸⁷ John Gledhill and Charles King, "Romania since 1989: Living Beyond the Past," in *Central and Eastern European Politics: From Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011): 315.

²⁸⁸ "Romania sets its sights on NATO membership," NATO (1997) <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9706-03.htm>, Accessed: 6 May 2013.

²⁸⁹ Gledhill and King, "Romania since 1989: Living Beyond the Past," 317.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

state while NATO also had security interests in mind. On the other hand, then-Romanian President Emil Constantinescu and then-Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea clearly stated that European and Euro-Atlantic integration

“represented a major political priority for the country, the key to its foreign policy, and the only avenue for development in the national interest that would allow Romania to take its rightful place among continental Europe’s democracies.”²⁹¹

Both NATO and the EU offered new opportunities for Romania and the country was eager to integrate into Europe.

Romania’s Pre-Accession Relationship with NATO

With Romania’s increasingly serious ambition to become a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO laid out the requirements that Romania needs to fulfill before membership. Romania must implement reforms in the following areas: military affairs, corruption, security of information, economic reform, the rights of children, minority rights, and trafficking in human beings.²⁹² Once Romania completes these areas of reform and the reforms meet with NATO’s approval, the country must then satisfy other requirements on the economic, military, and political front. I will discuss these requirements in the following paragraphs.

The general consensus in Romania in the years preceding accession suggests that economic reform was at the top of the list of priorities and that supporting the respect for

²⁹¹ Lavinia Stan, “Romania’s EU Integration: Between Political Will and Political Capacity,” (Paper prepared for the South East Europe and EU Enlargement conference, Center for European Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, 15 September 2006): 8.

²⁹² Larry L. Watts, *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration* (The Center for Romanian Studies: Romania, 2002): 23.

minority groups would take the backseat for a while.²⁹³ Recognizing that NATO's membership criteria requires a well-established market economy in each prospective member state, Romania placed great emphasis on economic liberalization in the first decade after communism ended.²⁹⁴ With the new presence of a market economy, Romania began to open up political space in society to allow for democracy to take root. In the 1990s, Romania sought to implement other free market forces and private ownership.²⁹⁵ By 1993, the government adopted an IMF-approved plan that included "progressive elimination of price subsidies for staple goods and services, removal of controls on interest and exchange rates, trade liberalization, accelerated privatization, and reduction in inflation."²⁹⁶ Despite Romania's progress in the areas of economic improvement, the constant turnover in new governments undermined the state's political stability.²⁹⁷ Various government coalitions with competing visions for Romania's economic and political future disagreed on how to implement liberal economic and political reforms.²⁹⁸

On military affairs, Romania proved itself a willing and capable partner for NATO. In January 1994, Romania joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.²⁹⁹ Joining the PfP is the first step in a serious pursuit of membership in NATO. In terms of defense spending, Romania has performed better than many current NATO member states. "Over the last decade, Romanian defense expenditures have exceeded 2% of the GDP every year but one."³⁰⁰ Because many current NATO members are struggling to meet the defense expenditure requirement, Romania's chances of gaining accession were improved because NATO looked to new members

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, 7.

²⁹⁵ Laure Paquette, *NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000: Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria*, 60.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, 62.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Ibid, 63.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

to contribute militarily when the existing members were falling short. Since Romania displayed an interest in membership very early on, NATO was receptive to its membership appeals. As the country prepared for eventual NATO membership, it realized that it would need to implement laws to protect its Hungarian and Roma minority populations to satisfy NATO's new membership requirements. The next paragraph will examine how Romania fared on respecting minority populations as well as how it met (or did not meet) NATO's specific institutional requirements.

NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement requires that prospective member states have a functioning market economy, a stable democratic system, treat minority populations with respect, resolve conflicts peacefully, implement civil-military relations internally, and make a military contribution to the organization.³⁰¹ Romania's economic development experienced significant growth during the 1990s and early 2000s, but the state lagged behind some NATO members and other prospective members. Price liberalization and trade policy remained two of Romania's greatest accomplishments in the area of economic reform. Romania's progress in the areas of price liberalization, trade policy, and large-scale privatization are encouraging signs of the country's economic recovery and advancement. One aspect of economic reform where Romania's progress has not been so smooth is competition policy. Boosting competition policy in the postcommunist states presented a myriad of problems for the CEECs. Romania's score of 2+ on competition policy in 2004 suggests that there is some competition policy legislation set up, some reduction of entry restrictions, and some enforcement mechanisms that can be used to promote a competitive environment.³⁰² Unfortunately, progress is limited and the country has shown little improvement over the course of the five years leading up to accession in 2004.

³⁰¹ "NATO Enlargement," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, Accessed: 13 January 2013.

³⁰² Ibid.

Because of Romania's weak competition policy, there are barriers to developments in banking, retail, energy, and transport markets, which is increasing the cost doing business.³⁰³ As the barriers to trade continue to affect the Romanian economy, it will also impact the EU economy since the member states' economies are closely connected and dependent on each other for economic prosperity.

Romania had a solid democracy and a strong showing in the area of military contributions. Consequently, NATO believed that the country would be in an excellent position to contribute militarily to the alliance. Romania also satisfied NATO's democratic control of the military requirement based on its military in politics score and demonstrated its commitment to resolving conflicts peacefully by agreeing to a rapprochement with Hungary in the 1990s and by complying with OSCE principles.³⁰⁴ On the other hand, Romania struggled to adequately respect and support rights for minority groups in the country especially the Roma people. In 2004, Romania scored a 3 in economic discrimination and political discrimination against minorities. Despite Romanian political and diplomatic efforts, Europe has "so far been unable to integrate the Roma people."³⁰⁵ Even though Romania did not meet the institutional requirements when it came to minority rights, the institution itself was uncertain about what to do about the Roma.

While Romania satisfied NATO's expectations on military contributions, democratic control of the military, democratic governance, and resolving conflicts peacefully, it ran into trouble with economic reforms and respecting minority rights. Despite Romania's inability to satisfy all of the organization's membership criteria, it still gained membership in 2004. The next

³⁰³ "Competition policies target a more level playing field in Romania," International Finance Corporation (2013) <https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/cross-cutting-issues/competition-policy/competition-policies-target-a-more-level-playing-field-in-romania.cfm>, Accessed: 6 May 2013.

³⁰⁴ Charles King, "The Europe Question in Romania and Moldova," in *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*, eds. Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003): 260.

³⁰⁵ "Romania's Roma: Where is Europe's Roma Policy?" *The Economist* (2012) <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/09/romania-roma>, Accessed: 6 May 2013.

section will explore whether NATO recognized Romania's membership criteria gaps. If NATO recognized, but ignored Romania's flaws, then I will answer the question of why the institution enlarged despite the unfulfilled criteria.

Romania and NATO: Analysis

Even though Romania did not meet NATO's expectations on the economic criteria and respect for minority rights, the organization still enlarged because it viewed Romania as capable in terms of meeting institutional strategic and military interests. As an active participant in the PfP, Romania demonstrated its sustained interest in NATO membership. Almost immediately after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, "Romanian President Ion Iliescu declared his country a de facto NATO ally."³⁰⁶ By joining the war on terror, Romania was able to deepen its ties to NATO, which helped its membership application later on. The 9/11 attacks spurred NATO to broaden its defense efforts to include combating terrorism. With Romania's offers of air bases, territory, and more, NATO could expand its presence into Southeastern Europe and acquire new allies in the fight against terrorism. Consequently, NATO added Romania to the organization because the institution could satisfy its material interests, namely increasing its military power and defense capabilities. Romania's admission contributed to NATO's material benefits. Neoliberal theory indicates that states link together when they have interests in common. After 9/11, NATO and its members were concerned with expanding their defense network and Romania offered them the access they needed.

Romania remained willing to support the NATO mission. It sent troops to fulfill peace support, humanitarian, and peace enforcement missions in Afghanistan.³⁰⁷ Romania's

³⁰⁶ Larry L. Watts, *Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration*, 9.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

willingness to contribute military forces to NATO missions increased its credibility in the institution's eyes. Because of Romania's early involvement in NATO missions, the state already had a fundamental understanding of the institution's agenda, capabilities, resources, and military power. Bringing Romania into the alliance would pose little difficulty because the country knew how to operate within the collective defense organization framework. If Romania were to join NATO, the alliance would gain a partner that could quickly and effectively adopt institutional goals and contribute to the organization's missions.

By the end of the Cold War, Romanian society had developed a strong relationship with its army. When considering new members' applications, NATO places great emphasis on the strength of the civil-military relationship in society.³⁰⁸ Romania had developed this relationship and democratic control of the military was well established by the time of accession. Even though Romania's economic preparedness and support for its minority groups was weak, the country had proven itself militarily capable of meeting the responsibilities of membership. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO was looking for members to fortify its defense infrastructure. Romania offered to fill this security gap and NATO believed that the state could contribute to its international peace and security operations and missions around the world.

Romania's Pre-Accession Relationship with the EU

With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Romania began to pursue an economic relationship with the EU. Beginning in 1990, Romania established diplomatic ties with the EC and by 1991, Romania had signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the Community.³⁰⁹ Although implementing a trade relationship with the EU was crucial in Romania's path towards

³⁰⁸ Ibid, 10.

³⁰⁹ Liana Müller, "Romania's Way into the EU," Universität Wien European Studies Vienna (2002): 9.

European integration, the country actively sought EU membership, not just more trade agreements. In 1993, Romania signed onto the Europe Association Agreement that is an indication of interest in institutional membership.³¹⁰ Around the same time that Romania signed the Association Agreement, the EU published the Copenhagen Criteria, the official requirements of EU membership that would guide future waves of enlargement. Foremost among the new requirements was that states must have a market economy, be a democracy, and be able to fulfill the obligations that accompany EU membership. Eastern European states like Romania that had emerged from under communism were just beginning to experiment with both economic liberalization and democratic governance.

While Romania was on the road to membership, the EU supplied it with significant aid and resources to prepare for its eventual accession. For example, from 2000-2003, the EU gave Romania approximately 660 million euro each year in support of three key programs operating within the country: the Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economy (PHARE), the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), and the Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD).³¹¹ Although PHARE was originally developed with the intention of economically supporting Hungary and Poland when both states were acceding to the EU in 2004, the program remained in existence for the subsequent waves of EU enlargement.

Through funding from PHARE, Romania could focus on institution building and generating investment support.³¹² By seeking investment from other states, institutions, and corporations, Romania could bolster its markets and maximize economic growth. Because

³¹⁰ Ibid, 10.

³¹¹ "Accession Assistance," Permanent Representation of Romania to the European Union (2010), <http://ue.mae.ro/en/node/456>, Accessed: 11 April 2013.

³¹² Ibid.

Romania was still coping with the legacy of its communist past, the institution building component of PHARE allowed the country to consolidate democratic institutions. On the other hand, ISPA funding provided Romania with rehabilitating environmental infrastructure and contributed towards improving the transportation system.³¹³ Finally, SAPARD funding brought agricultural modernization to Romania's rural areas. After the transition to a market economy and the liberalization of producer and food prices, agricultural production in many Central and Eastern European countries (Romania included) has decreased dramatically.³¹⁴

Because the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a crucial component of the EU economy and its expenditure share composes the largest component of the EU budget,³¹⁵ the institution pays attention to how well states are able to adopt the CAP while they are in the process of applying for membership. Questions about Romania's economic readiness to join the EU remained. These concerns are only magnified when the EU looks at Romania's underdeveloped agricultural sector. Moreover, Romania has several different minority groups whose rights it must protect, but this has been an area of reform that has come last or not at all in some cases. By the time of accession, Romania had not fully demonstrated that it was in complete compliance with the EU's human rights and respect for minority rights criteria. Human rights, minority rights, economics, and agricultural reform are four key areas where reform was needed, but not necessarily achieved at the time of accession.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Javier Fernández, "The Common Agricultural Policy and EU Enlargement: Implications for Agricultural Production in the Central and East European Countries," *Eastern European Economics* 40 (3) (2002): 31.

³¹⁵ Ibid, 29.

Romania and the EU: Fulfilling the Membership Criteria

Based on the EU's political criteria, Romania came up short. The EU's 2004 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession stated that Romania had successfully implemented a democratic system, but improvements were needed to root out corruption in the court systems and to offer more protection for individual liberties.³¹⁶ The report commended Romania for integrating the Hungarian minority population, but cautioned that the Roma were still not fully integrated and their rights were not always respected.³¹⁷ As for the court system, the report recognized a significant shortage of judges and questioned the fairness of some judgments rendered. Most startlingly of all, the report indicated that the EU did not recognize any progress made in the area of enforcing judgments in civil cases in Romania.³¹⁸

Although Romania had made great strides in democracy and appeared ready to take on the obligations of membership, the EU Commission noted that discrimination against minority groups is still a problem. "De facto discrimination against the Roma minority continues to be widespread and the social inequalities to which the Roma community is exposed remain considerable. Living conditions are poor and access to social services is limited."³¹⁹ The Roma people in general do not have much of a political voice in society and are often politically and economically discriminated against. This is problematic for the EU because part of its membership criteria involves respecting minorities. If the EU does not withhold membership offers from states that are in violation of the criteria, then the institution loses some of its credibility. The question of why the institution has criteria in the first place also arises.

³¹⁶ "2004 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession," Commission of the European Communities (2004), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf, Accessed: 11 April 2013.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

For the most part, Romania was positioned to fulfill the responsibilities and obligations of membership, but agricultural reform was still an issue. For example, Romania lacks a security system for agricultural products, which the EU looks for in prospective members.³²⁰ Along with agricultural issues, the state of the Romanian economy gave the EU pause. The 2004 report stressed that Romania had achieved limited progress in economic restructuring, but complete market reform still had not been achieved.³²¹ More importantly, the report articulates that Romania must continue to build on its economic growth if it hopes to be able to “cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.”³²² When Romania joined the EU, the organization understood that it would be placed in direct competition with some of the most advanced economies in the world. Therefore, the EU was hesitant to invite Romania to join because it had not yet proven that it could remain competitive with some of the existing member states.

The EU Commission’s 2005 report stressed that Romania still needed to tackle reforms in the areas of “public administration, justice, anti-corruption, and protection of minorities and integration of the Roma minority.”³²³ Although Romania continued to display progress in terms of judicial reform, economic modernization, agricultural policy reform, and support for minority groups, the final EU Commission report issued before Romania’s accession in 2007 indicates that Romania still had not met all of the requirements for membership. The 2006 progress report makes clear that Romania needed to implement anti-corruption measures aimed at limiting abuses in the judicial system, increase respect for its minority groups, and augment its economic

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ “Romania: 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report,” Commission of the European Communities (2005) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/sec1354_cmr_master_ro_college_en.pdf. Accessed: 6 May 2013.

competitiveness.³²⁴ Romania also encountered difficulties when attempting to fulfill the EU's CAP requirements. Even though Romania did fulfill several key components of the Copenhagen membership criteria like the political requirements, it was not able to satisfactorily fulfill all aspects. However, Romania still joined the EU as planned in 2007. The next section will examine what material and non-material interests were at play when the institutions and their member states decided on membership. The next section will also look at why the EU accepted a new member state that was not prepared for membership when it gained admission.

Romania and the EU: Analysis

Enlargement to the East was thought to advance the “completion of political and security integration in the EU.”³²⁵ Once the Cold War ended, the EU looked for a way to consolidate itself as a political and a (new) security institution. Romania's accession indicated that the EU, as in previous waves of accession, was intent on bringing new members in so that it could expand its political, economic, and security umbrella over all of Europe. Coupled with increasing security and stability, the EU also expanded to include states like Bulgaria and Romania in order to minimize the risk of conflict breaking out in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).³²⁶ Because the EU accepted Romania as a member in 2007, the organization could strengthen its position in the Balkans and extend its presence to the Black Sea.³²⁷ The EU wanted to do this so that it would have a more expansive presence on the European continent and would be able to reduce the threat of conflict breaking out in the Balkans.

³²⁴ “May 2006 Monitoring Report,” Commission of the European Communities (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_report_ro_en.pdf, Accessed: 11 April 2013.

³²⁵ Panos Tsakaloyannis, “EU Eastern Enlargement Policy and European Security,” in *EU, NATO, and the Relationship Between Transformation and External Behavior in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe*, ed. Reimund Seidelmann (Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft and Baden-Baden, 2002): 14.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

Even though Romania did not meet all of the membership requirements when it joined the EU, there is an interesting possible explanation for why the EU enlarged anyway: Romania's willingness to adopt EU reforms is a sign of its "maturity to pursue reforms in a serious manner"³²⁸ sometime after accession. EU leaders reference the "historical opportunity" and "moral imperative" that are inherent in enlargement; the EU, as an institution, had a duty to enlarge to reunite Europe.³²⁹ By reuniting Europe, the EU would be able to implement a liberal, democratic identity in new members, which is a non-material benefit of enlargement. Because the EU is an institution that has the power to effect positive democratic and liberal change in postcommunist states, the organization saw great benefits in enlargement activity as a result.

Although there was encouraging news about Romania's economic growth, it still lagged behind other EU member states as it prepared for accession. Romania has managed to catch up with most member states economies' in the realm of structural reform indicators, but progress on corporate governance is still not at current member states' level.³³⁰ Competition policy is also weak in Romania, which is why the EU emphasizes in its progress reports that Romania is not prepared to join the competitive European market with its current economic growth. Again, the EU decided to accept Romania's membership bid after weighing the security and political benefits that would come with this newest member. In addition, the EU also believed that the carrot of membership would encourage Romania to bring its economic standing up to comparable member states' standards. As part of the EU's liberal approach to enlargement

³²⁸ F. Peter Wagner, "EU, NATO and Romania: Beyond "Sultanism," in *EU, NATO, and the Relationship Between Transformation and External Behavior in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe*, ed. Reimund Seidelmann (Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft and Baden-Baden, 2002): 270.

³²⁹ Heather Grabbe, "Challenges of EU Enlargement," in *Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership*, eds. Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003): 68.

³³⁰ Christoph Duenwald, Nikolay Gueorguiev, and Andrea Schaechter, "Too much of a good thing? Credit booms in transition economies: the cases of Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine," in *Financial Development, Integration, and Stability: Evidence from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe*, eds. Klaus Liebscher, Josef Christl, Peter Mooslechner, and Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006): 257.

decision-making, the institution wanted to increase economic liberalization and trade relationships between different European countries.

The question of respecting minority populations, however, was still a very troubling topic for Romania and for the EU by extension. 1.8-2.5 million members of the Roma people live in Romania.³³¹ Romania has the largest population of Roma peoples in all of Europe.³³² The Roma people's plight is difficult and while Romania has demonstrated an interest in protecting this group's rights, not enough improvements had been made at the time of accession. The Roma continue to "lack access to government services and health care...suffer from high rates of unemployment and discrimination on the labor market."³³³ Despite Romania's difficulty with providing sufficient economic, political, and cultural protection for the Roma people, it still joined the EU.

Finally, Romania's agricultural development had come a long way since the end of communism, but it was still untested and Romania, therefore, was not prepared for EU integration. Although agriculture was central to the Romanian economy, "slow macroeconomic reform and persistent recession have resulted in unfavorable conditions for agricultural development."³³⁴ Due to the agricultural sector's slow growth, the EU expressed some concern about admitting Romania. Ultimately, though, the EU determined that its own markets could supplement Romanian agriculture until it emerged as its own economic force. In summary, the EU decided to expand to include Romania for security and political reasons while also carefully analyzing the material and non-material benefits that would come with Romania's accession.

³³¹ Arno Tanner, "The Roma of Eastern Europe: Still Searching for Inclusion," *Migration Information Source* (2005), <http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=308>, Accessed: 11 April 2013.

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Kenneth J. Thomson, "Introduction: The Context for Reform and Accession," in *Romanian Agriculture and Transition toward the EU*, eds. Sophia Davidova and Kenneth J. Thomson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003): 5.

The next section will analyze the findings from Romania's integration into NATO and the EU while drawing contrasts with previous waves of enlargement.

Analysis of the Findings

A common theme emerges from looking at NATO and EU enlargement: both institutions were willing to overlook applicants' difficulty in satisfying certain aspects of the membership criteria if the organizations calculated that they could reap more benefits from admitting them anyway. However, as time went on, both organizations realized that they might need to carefully analyze states' ability to be contributing and effective members of the organization. While Poland and Hungary both had one or two major issues with their membership applications for NATO and the EU, Romania has several issues including corrupt judicial systems, a struggling agricultural sector, economic underdevelopment, and weak support for minority groups' rights. Romania was not alone, though. Bulgaria joined NATO and the EU in the same years as Bulgaria. Like Romania, Bulgaria joined the EU with a shaky standing on public administration, anti-corruption measures, a weak justice system, and protection of minority rights.³³⁵ These weaknesses and deficiencies only became more apparent with time.

Even though NATO and the EU viewed enlargement as a sort of "moral imperative" to bring peace and unity to the European continent, both organizations incorporated the specific membership criteria in the 1990s to provide a more structured format for institutional expansion. This way, states would be able to follow clear expectations and the enlargement process would be smoother. Not only that, but fulfillment of the membership criteria would ensure that states were as prepared as possible for membership. NATO and the EU both undermined the

³³⁵ "Commission Staff Working Document Bulgaria: May 2006 Monitoring Report," Commission of the European Communities (2006) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_report_bg_en.pdf, Accessed: 6 May 2013.

effectiveness of this system by admitting states that did not fulfill some or a lot of the criteria. Both institutions had compelling reasons for admitting the states anyway; material and non-material interests like security or economic gains factored heavily in this endeavor. Over time, however, both institutions' approach towards and feelings about enlargement changed.

Post-Cold War enlargement became a much more contested process with the addition of membership criteria. Enlargement during the Cold War proceeded with relative ease and took place in a more informal context. Member states heavily influenced the enlargement process during the Cold War, but post-Cold War enlargement has seen the emergence of a new set of formidable actors: the institutions themselves. Prospective members often interact with institutions during the enlargement proceedings. The EU, for example, releases progress reports on each aspiring member in the years leading up to admission. The membership criteria has given both the institution and the member states the ability to (as objectively as possible) evaluate states' membership petitions. In the case of Romania, NATO and the EU played critical roles in facilitating Romania's European integration.

Chapter 6: Conclusion- What's Next?

Introduction

The European Union's recent wave of enlargement in 2007 raised eyebrows and questions. Were the newly admitted states ready for membership? Did the institution ignore or fail to see insufficient progress in the areas of corruption and judicial reform for the new members? EU committees have issued stern warnings for future enlargement: "Enlargement fatigue (in the EU) and accession fatigue (in aspirant countries) could seriously threaten the future of the enlargement agenda."³³⁶ What exactly is the future of the enlargement agenda? As of right now, the future seems uncertain. New states continue to send in applications for membership in NATO and the EU, but the institutions and the current member states have expressed a reticence for further enlargement. My thesis outlines how enlargement, at various stages in each institution's history, was premature and accompanied by a series of unsatisfied membership criteria. More recent waves of institutional enlargement have come under fire for expanding too soon, when the new members were not prepared to take on the obligations of membership. Now that the carrot of membership has been used, the institutions have been forced to be creative with how they cajole members to improve on the basic tenets of membership like democracy, respect for minorities, and strengthening the market economy.

In this final chapter, I will first go through an overview of my thesis, highlighting main points and key arguments. I will then look at the policy implications for enlargement for each organization, the member states, and aspiring members. To conclude, I will examine the politics and policy of the institutions today. I will look at how enlargement influenced and continues to influence political, economic, and cultural discussions at the institutional level. I will also explore contemporary issues that allude to broader themes of institutional behavior.

³³⁶ "Peers want more vetting of EU applicant states," *BBC* (2013), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21673549>, Accessed: 18 April 2013.

Overview of Thesis

The first chapter of the thesis laid the theoretical groundwork for the investigation into organizational enlargement. Each institution has specific reasons for pursuing enlargement depending on their needs and interests. Member states also played a critical role in swaying the decision in favor of admission if the members stood to gain economically, politically, or otherwise from adding new states to the organization. When the members decided to exert their influence over enlargement decisions, they often develop a set of national preferences and later bring these preferences to the institutional level for discussion and debate.³³⁷

In the example of Spain's accession in the 1980s, the U.S. had previously made a military agreement with Spain and was eager to enhance defense ties with the strategically located state.³³⁸ Because the U.S. is a powerful actor in NATO, it could establish its national preference (admitting Spain for strategic/defense reasons) and then convince the institution that Spain's accession would reap significant benefits for the organization. This theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (establishing national preferences and then bringing them to the institutional level) factored heavily in arriving at enlargement decisions especially in the case of the U.S. and Spain's accession as well as in the case of Germany and Poland's accession. As the hypotheses suggest, both the institutions and the member states had similar goals and interests regarding enlargement, but the main question is who or what is driving enlargement. My thesis holds that both member states and the institutions have agency in enlargement decisions, but may exert their influence at different points and possibly for different reasons.

³³⁷ Mark A. Pollack, "International Relations Theory and European Integration," *European University Institute* (2000): 8.

³³⁸ Javier Tusell, "The Transition to Democracy and Spain's Membership in NATO," in *Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives*, eds. Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).

Another theory holds that member states endorse enlargement in an effort to maintain influence, especially in a certain geographic region. For example, Waltz emphasizes that the U.S. only supported NATO enlargement in Europe because it was interested in maintaining a foothold in European affairs.³³⁹ From the very first NATO enlargement waves to the most recent, the U.S. has always been instrumental in expansion decision-making. The U.S. often had security, strategic, defense, and military interests at play when enlargement decisions were on the table. Given these many material interests, the U.S., according to realist Kenneth Waltz, was concerned about its own preservation as well as the general security of Europe. Consequently, enlargement became an important endeavor in the Cold War and post-Cold War era. The U.S. pushed for expansion to the East once the Cold War ended. According to a 1998 U.S. Department of State publication, the U.S. wanted to expand NATO's security presence so that it encompassed Eastern Europe.³⁴⁰ However, the U.S. was not alone in its desire to spread liberal democratic reforms to Eastern Europe. Many other NATO member states recognized the necessity of supporting democratic development in the former communist states as crucial to the security and stability of the European continent.

A realist theory specific to the EU involves how states look for economic benefits that they might be able to derive from new members. Krasnodębski notes that the German economy would benefit enormously from adding Eastern European markets to the EU.³⁴¹ Germany's economic power would be increased and it would also gain new, geographically close trading partners. Germany saw the material benefits inherent in adding new members like Poland to the Union. With new members come new bilateral trade relations. Although Germany is often

³³⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "NATO expansion: A realist's view," *Contemporary Security Policy* 21 (2) (2000): 29.

³⁴⁰ "The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security," U.S. Department of State, Public Information Series, Bureau of Public Affairs (1998).

³⁴¹ Zdzisław Krasnodębski, "Poland and the European Union: Changing Attitudes," in *Problems and Chances of the East Enlargement of the EU*, ed. Ilja Srubar (Hamburg: Reinhold Krämer Verlag, 2003): 88.

mentioned as benefitting from Poland's accession, other existing member states were also in favor of enlargement for the same reasons. Domestic pressures fueled by multi-national corporations also spurred the member states to respond by supporting enlargement.³⁴²

Constructivism also shaped the trajectory of enlargement decisions. Commonly held European values, ideals, and liberal tendencies had a powerful effect on current member states and the institutions. The concept of identity also factored in heavily when deciding how to admit new members. States and institutions tend to favor those who are similar to them. If aspiring members were able to demonstrate their European nature, then states and the institutions would be more favorably inclined toward their eventual accession. As Curley suggests, states that identify very strongly with the group will be less likely to include newcomers.³⁴³ Therefore, prospective members that successfully prove their allegiance and adherence to the European identity will be much more likely to be approved for accession. Once aspiring members win over the current members, the road to membership becomes less conflict-ridden and more assured.

If, however, the existing member states express serious doubts about a state's readiness for membership, then that state's accession is less certain. The notion of the European identity rests on the shoulders of democracy. Because both Poland and Hungary had consolidated democracies by the time of accession, there was little question that their identity would be in line with the rest of Europe. Identity is a fundamental component of a nation's and an institution's mission so its importance cannot be underestimated. Poland and Hungary were propelled towards membership in NATO and the EU because they were democracies and had proven themselves to be European, to the satisfaction of the members and the institutions themselves.

³⁴² Walter Mattli and Thomas Plümpert, "The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: democracy and the application for EU membership," *Journal of European Public Policy* 9 (4) (2002): 555.

³⁴³ Tyler M. Curley, "Social Identity Theory and EU Expansion," *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009): 649.

While the member states can exert pressure and influence over enlargement decisions, studies and research show that institutions retain this same capability. Barnett and Finnemore stress that institutions are autonomous actors and have the potential to steer the organization in one direction or another.³⁴⁴ For many of the same reasons as the member states, institutions support expansion. One key difference is that the institutions derive their authority from the members so they must respect and support their interests. When these interests and needs align, the process of enlargement is relatively non-controversial, but when members and the institutions have different interests, then difficulty arises.

For example, in the case of Spain's accession to the EU in 1986, France initially opposed the aspiring member's application for membership. France believed that admitting Spain would deal a blow to the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and weaken the common market since Spain's economic activity lagged behind the existing member states'.³⁴⁵ France's resistance managed to hold up the enlargement proceedings for some time while EU officials contemplated how to appease France while still attempting to admit Spain. The careful, political balancing act between member states and institutions begins. Because the institution appealed to other material and non-material interests, France eventually changed its stance and became more open to the prospect of Spain's membership. The EU was able to leverage its institutional weight to present the economic benefits that Spain's admission would eventually produce while remaining committed to the goal of bringing a new state on board.

The reasons for enlargement are varied, but the explanation for why states that did not fulfill all of the membership criteria were admitted is the question that this thesis has sought to

³⁴⁴ Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 5.

³⁴⁵ Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, "In search of lost Europe: Spain," in *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*, eds. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (New York: Routledge, 2004): 102.

answer. Spain, Poland, Hungary, and Romania all experienced difficulties with implementing a functioning market economy. Hungary and Romania were weak on supporting rights for minority groups. None of the countries discussed in the case studies were admitted with a perfect score on all aspects of the criteria. Unlike many other states that were admitted in the early waves of enlargement during the Cold War, most of these states had rather glaring gaps in the membership criteria fulfillment. Spain's admission was the least problematic of the group since both NATO and the EU had always assumed that Spain would eventually be admitted. Because Poland, Hungary, and Romania were all behind the iron curtain for most of the second half of the 20th century, NATO and the EU did not expect that any of those states would one day be knocking on the door of membership. Both institutions needed time and resources to adjust to the idea of admitting Eastern European states to the two institutions of European integration. Once member states and the institutions adjusted to the idea, enlargement could follow. Still, though, NATO and the EU each admitted states that were not, according to the criteria, ready for membership. Both institutions' lack of experience with cultivating membership ties with states that were not from Western Europe may have clouded the organizations' ability to perceive faults clearly.

Since both member states and the institutions actively participate in enlargement decision-making, it can be a crowded field with many opinions, insights, accord, and sometimes discord. Member states and the institutions have similar interests and needs when it comes to adding new states. If incoming states can demonstrate their willingness and ability to take on the burdens of membership, then the institutions as well as the members will often support their admission. If members and the institutions diverge sharply on opinions pertaining to enlargement, then it becomes a more contested process. One thing is clear: expansion can be

complicated and requires the input of both member states and the institutions. As long as aspiring states can prove that they are in compliance (more or less) with the criteria and can contribute to the non-material and material wellbeing of the existing members and institutions, then the odds of enlargement are quite good.

The Policy Implications for Enlargement

NATO

As mentioned earlier, enlargement fatigue has affected both NATO and the EU. The push for expansion in the years following the end of the Cold War appeared to diminish in intensity by the 2000s. Now, new questions have emerged about whether there is such a thing as too much enlargement and too much inclusion. According to Katharina Remshardt, further enlargement threatens NATO's "homogeneity and manageability" and can negatively impact European security, broadly speaking.³⁴⁶ Therefore, by adding new states that have different historical and cultural legacies, it becomes more difficult to govern a collection of states that are dissimilar. This is a powerful argument against pursuing enlargement, at least for the foreseeable future. For states that are interested in membership, it appears unlikely that new waves of enlargement may come up soon especially for states that come from different historical backgrounds. For example, Georgia's participation in the Membership Action Plan has been well received, but the country must still undergo substantial reform so that it can integrate into NATO. According to a U.S. Congressional Report, the Georgian military does not have standard Western-made or modern

³⁴⁶ Katharina Remshardt, "Undermining Security? The Post Cold War Enlargement of NATO," e-International Relations (2012), <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/29/undermining-security-the-post-cold-war-enlargement-of-nato/>, Accessed: 18 April 2013.

conventional weapons at its disposal.³⁴⁷ If Georgia needs to build up its defense network so that it more closely resembles the rest of the alliance, then that will take time. NATO will most likely only grant membership once it is convinced that Georgia can join the alliance without incident. From this point on, it seems likely that NATO enlargement will slow down.

EU

EU enlargement also appears to be proceeding more cautiously. As with NATO, enthusiasm for moving states down the road to membership is becoming less and less of a reality. As Sinnott points out, there are “modest levels of support for European integration and quite high levels of indifference.”³⁴⁸ Member states and the institutions are beginning to temper their support for expansion so that a careful assessment of states’ readiness to join can be made. This is due in part to the aspiring states that are hoping to join both institutions. States like Moldova and Ukraine have experienced great difficulty in pursuing EU membership because there are inherent cultural and political biases in the West against the former Soviet republics.³⁴⁹ Now that the EU has to monitor Romania and Bulgaria’s judicial reform after both states had already joined the institution, it appears as though the EU will not be eager to add new members when it is concerned about its existing members’ progress. Both NATO and the EU have experienced the phenomenon of “enlargement fatigue” and are more determined than ever to carefully analyze prospective future waves of enlargement. The EU especially has questioned its willingness to allow Romania and Bulgaria into the Union when both states did not fulfill the

³⁴⁷ Jim Nichol, “CRS Report for Congress: Georgia [Republic] and NATO Enlargement: Issues and Implications,” (2008), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103692.pdf>, Accessed: 18 April 2013.

³⁴⁸ Richard Sinnott, “Assessing the Implications of EU Enlargement for the Existing Member States: The Public Opinion Perspective,” *EUI Working Papers* (2004), http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/04_11.pdf, Accessed: 18 April 2013.

³⁴⁹ Ivan Katchanovski, “Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries,” *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 12 (3) (2011): 306.

basic membership criteria and needed to undergo significant reform even after admission. Now, though, both organizations are committed to expanding at a gradual pace that will allow them to determine how and when to add new members.

The Politics and Policy of Today's Member States and Institutions

NATO

Whereas enlargement took up a majority of the conversation during the 1990s, NATO and the EU have now begun to refocus their efforts. The U.S. is an important NATO member and its pivot to Asia has sparked speculation about how NATO might respond or even follow suit. The U.S. strategic pivot to Asia is based on three themes: security, economy, and democracy.³⁵⁰ Those three themes are also encapsulated in NATO's membership criteria and in their general mission. NATO has largely followed the U.S. in the pivot towards Asia in an effort to encourage ties between Europe and the Far East. While the U.S. certainly influenced NATO to pursue an agenda focused on establishing trade relations with Asia, NATO took the important step to broaden its mission to the global, instead of just the regional level.

EU

While NATO has been increasing its global presence, the EU has concentrated more on deepening its institutional structure while contending with the economic crisis that has gripped the organization since 2008. Enlargement has taken a back seat now that the EU is principally concerned with its financial stability. However, disputes at the highest levels of the EU government continue to trouble the Union. As the crisis worsens, member states are pitted

³⁵⁰ Donald K. Emmerson, "Challenging ASEAN: the American pivot in Southeast Asia," *East Asia Forum* (2013), <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/13/challenging-asean-the-american-pivot-in-southeast-asia/>, Accessed: 18 April 2013.

against each other. At a Brussels summit in 2013, “France, Spain, and Portugal [clashed] with Germany, Holland, and Austria over their demand for more time to meet their debt-cutting targets against a growing popular backlash against EU austerity.”³⁵¹ Since austerity set in, the EU has not enlarged, but is scheduled to bring Croatia into the Union in the summer of 2013. The EU expressed confidence that Croatia will join with little difficulty and will not cause the Union the same headaches that Romania and Bulgaria’s accession induced when the two states joined in 2007.³⁵² Even though the EU is carefully monitoring both Romania and Bulgaria as they work on reducing judicial corruption and organized crime, the EU has not postponed future enlargement (as evidenced by Croatia’s imminent accession). For now, neither NATO nor the EU has given any indication that the enlargement agenda has been put on hold. Each institution continues to invite new members to adopt the Membership Action Plan (MAP) or sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Enlargement’s future seems active and bright.

Final Thoughts

NATO and the EU are both European-based organizations, but have different motives and agendas when it comes to enlargement. To some extent, the institutions coordinated efforts to bring about a united Europe after the end of the Cold War, but maintained separate identities. Interestingly, both organizations admitted new states that were not ready for membership. For both NATO and the EU, the road to membership asked as many questions as it sought to answer. Cold War and post-Cold War enlargement took entirely different courses, but both incorporated

³⁵¹ Bruno Waterfield and Denise Roland, “EU leaders to clash over austerity measures at summit as unemployment accelerates,” *The Telegraph* (2013), <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9930196/EU-leaders-to-clash-over-austerity-measures-at-summit-as-unemployment-accelerates.html>, Accessed: 18 April 2013.

³⁵² “Croatia on track for smooth accession,” *EuropeanVoice.com* (2013), <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/croatia-on-track-for-smooth-accession/76811.aspx>, Accessed: 2 April 2013.

the goal of uniting Europe and bringing a sense of stability and security to the European continent.

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http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/hu_en.pdf. Accessed: 26 March 2013.
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