Disability insurance

Rutledge, Matthew S. “Disability insurance”. Issue in Brief 11-14, Chestnut Hill, Mass.: Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, November 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104195.
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Abstract

The brief's key findings are: (1) Jobless individuals tend to delay applying for disability insurance (SSDI) until their extended unemployment insurance (UI) runs out. (2) Those who do apply for SSDI while still on unemployment are more likely to be approved, suggesting they are less healthy than those who delay. (3) UI extensions do not appear to reduce SSDI costs, because any given application is more likely to be approved due to worsening health or poor job prospects.

Title
Disability insurance: Does extending unemployment benefits help?
Author
Rutledge, Matthew S.
Center
Center for Retirement Research
Genre
report
Date Issued
November 2011
Publisher
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
Series Title
Issue in Brief
Series Number
11-14
Version Identification
Version of record.
Persistent Link
http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104195
Use Restrictions
These materials are made available for use in research, teaching and private study, pursuant to U.S. Copyright Law. The user must assume full responsibility for any use of the materials, including but not limited to, infringement of copyright and publication rights of reproduced materials. Any materials used for academic research or otherwise should be fully credited with the source. The publisher or original authors may retain copyright to the materials.
Subject
Social Security

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