Montesquieu on the History and Geography of Political Liberty

Abstract

Montesquieu famously presents climate and terrain as enabling servitude in hot, fertile climes and on the exposed steppes of central Asia. He also traces England's exemplary constitution, with its balanced constitution, independent judiciary, and gentle criminal practices, to the unique conditions of early medieval northern Europe. The English "found" their government "in the forests" of Germany. There, the marginal, variegated terrain favored the dispersion of political power, and a pastoral way of life until well into the Middle Ages. In pursuing a primitive honor unrelated to political liberty as such, the barbaric Franks accidentally established the rudiments of the most "well-tempered" government. His turn to these causes accidental to human purposes in Parts 3-6 begins with his analysis of the problem of unintended consequences in the history of political reform in Parts 1-2. While the idea of balancing political powers in order to prevent any one individual or group from dominating the rest has ancient roots, he shows that it has taken many centuries to understand just what needs to be balanced, and to learn to balance against one threat without inviting another. Knowledge of the administration of criminal justice has proven the most important to liberty, as well as the most difficult to acquire and put into practice. Montesquieu's attention to accidental causes sheds light on the contradictions within human nature, and the complex relationship between humans and their physical and conventional environments. He shows how nature provides support for both political liberty and for despotism. The wisdom of organizing government with a view to political liberty, as well as the means for doing so, does not follow from human nature in the abstract, but has required reflection on experiences with the consequences of actual governments. By highlighting the dependence of free politics on conditions outside the legislator's immediate control, he encourages reformers to attend to the non-legal supports of political liberty, the limits of human ingenuity, and the risks of unintended consequences. His attention to forces beyond human control provides the occasion to clarify the character of liberal legislative prudence, the art of leading by "inviting without constraining."