The Origins of Descartes' Concept of Mind in the Regulae ad directionem ingenii

Abstract

This dissertation attempts to locate the origins of Descartes' concept of mind in his early, unfinished treatise on scientific method, the Regulae ad directionem ingenii. It claims that one can see, in this early work, Descartes' commitment to substance dualism for methodological reasons. In order to begin an analysis of the Regulae, one must first attempt to resolve textual disputes concerning its integrity and one must understand the text as a historical work, dialectically situated in the tradition of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century thought. The dissertation provides this historical backdrop and textual sensitivity throughout, but it focuses on three main themes. First, the concept of mathesis universalis is taken to be the organizing principle of the work. This methodological principle defines a workable technique for solving mathematical problems, a means for applying mathematics to natural philosophical explanations, and a claim concerning the nature of mathematical truth. In each case, the mathesis universalis is designed to fit the innate capacities of the mind and the objects studied by mathesis are set apart from the mind as purely mechanical and geometrically representable objects. Second, Descartes' account of perceptual cognition, the principles of which are found in the Regulae, is examined. In this account, Descartes describes perception as a mechanical process up to the moment of conscious awareness. This point of awareness and the corresponding actions of the mind are, he claims, independent from mechanical principles; they are incorporeal and cannot be explained reductively. Finally, when Descartes outlines the explanatory bases of his natural science, he identifies certain "simple natures." These are the undetermined categories according to which actual things can be known. Descartes makes an explicit distinction between material simples and intellectual simples. It is argued that this distinction suggests a difference in kind between the sciences of the material world and the science or pure knowledge of the intellectual world. Though the Regulae is focused on physical or material explanations, there is a clear commitment to distinguishing this type of explanation from the explanation of mental content and mental acts. Hence, the Regulae demonstrates Descartes' early, methodological commitment to substance dualism.